This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neither the United States government nor Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
本文件是由美国政府机构赞助的工作成果。美国政府、劳伦斯-利弗莫尔国家安全有限责任公司及其任何雇员均不对所披露的任何信息、仪器、产品或流程的准确性、完整性或实用性作出任何明示或暗示的保证，也不承担任何法律责任或义务，或声明使用这些信息、仪器、产品或流程不会侵犯私人拥有的权利。此处以商品名称、商标、制造商或其他方式提及任何特定的商业产品、流程或服务，并不一定构成或暗示美国政府或劳伦斯-利弗莫尔国家安全有限责任公司对其的认可、推荐或青睐。本文作者的观点和意见并不一定代表或反映美国政府或劳伦斯-利弗莫尔国家安全有限责任公司的观点和意见，也不得用于广告或产品代言目的。
本文件是由美国政府机构赞助的工作成果。美国政府、劳伦斯-利弗莫尔国家安全有限责任公司及其任何雇员均不对所披露的任何信息、仪器、产品或流程的准确性、完整性或实用性作出任何明示或暗示的保证，也不承担任何法律责任或义务，或声明使用这些信息、仪器、产品或流程不会侵犯私人拥有的权利。此处以商品名称、商标、制造商或其他方式提及任何特定的商业产品、流程或服务，并不一定构成或暗示美国政府或劳伦斯-利弗莫尔国家安全有限责任公司对其的认可、推荐或青睐。本文作者的观点和意见并不一定代表或反映美国政府或劳伦斯-利弗莫尔国家安全有限责任公司的观点和意见，也不得用于广告或产品代言目的。
This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.
这项工作是在美国能源部的支持下，由劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室根据 DE-AC52-07NA27344 合同完成的。
这项工作是在美国能源部的支持下，由劳伦斯利弗莫尔国家实验室根据 DE-AC52-07NA27344 合同完成的。
Nuclear Decision-Making, Complexity, and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies: A Comprehensive Assessment
核决策、复杂性以及新兴和颠覆性技术：全面评估
FINAL DRAFT: 01/31/2022 最终草案：01/31/2022
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 执行摘要
- The complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could significantly impact nuclear decision-making, particular in an escalating regional conventional conflict. Such conflicts may present governments with a range of nuclear decisions: whether to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis, whether to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use, how to respond to a limited nuclear attack, whether to expand the scope and intensity of initial limited attacks, and whether to escalate to an all-out nuclear war. At each decision point, EDTs create potential risks as well as rewards.
新兴技术和颠覆性技术（EDTs）之间复杂的相互作用会对核决策产生重大影响，尤其是在地区常规冲突不断升级的情况下。此类冲突可能会给政府带来一系列核决策：是否在危机中引入核因素，是否通过有限的核使用跨越核门槛，如何应对有限的核攻击，是否扩大最初有限攻击的范围和强度，以及是否升级为全面核战争。在每个决策点上，EDT 都会带来潜在的风险和回报。 - EDTs are likely to influence the context for nuclear decision-making and the choices between different courses of action. EDTs could impact the context of nuclear decisionmaking by improving or degrading situational assessment, the ability to deliberate, and the ability to manage one's nuclear forces. EDTs could influence the choice between nuclear restraint or escalation by affecting the perceived strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements associated with different courses of action.
EDT 可能会影响核决策的背景以及不同行动方案之间的选择。EDT 可通过改善或降低态势评估、审议能力和管理核力量的能力来影响核决策的背景。EDT 可通过影响与不同行动方案相关的可感知战略利益、升级风险和作战要求，影响核克制或升级之间的选择。 - Even though particular combinations of EDTs could precipitate nuclear use in some scenarios, they could encourage restraint in others. The impact and relevance of the same combinations of EDTs might be different at various nuclear decision points. The availability of specific combinations of EDTs at different stages of a conflict would also vary because of the attrition and one-time-use nature of some capabilities. In later stages of a conflict, the decision maker's confidence in different combinations of EDTs would depend on their previous experience in using them.
即使 EDT 的特定组合在某些情况下会促使使用核武器，但在另一些情况下也会鼓励克制。在不同的核决策点，相同的 EDT 组合的影响和相关性可能不同。由于某些能力具有损耗和一次性使用的性质，因此在冲突的不同阶段可获得的特定 EDT 组合也会不同。在冲突的后期阶段，决策者对不同 EDT 组合的信心取决于他们以往使用这些组合的经验。 - While the interactions of EDTs are likely to bring additional complexity to a nuclear decisionmaking process, EDTs are also not the only source of complexity. Broader strategic, military, operational, legal, moral, and emotional factors are also likely to play an important role. These factors may dominate decision-making in a range of potential cases.
虽然 EDT 的相互作用可能会增加核决策过程的复杂性，但 EDT 也不是复杂性的唯一来源。更广泛的战略、军事、作战、法律、道德和情感因素也可能发挥重要作用。在一系列可能的情况下，这些因素可能会主导决策。
RECOMMENDATIONS 建议
- Decision makers should seek to understand the limitations and potential consequences, intended and unintended, of more widespread adoption of EDTs.
决策者应努力了解更广泛地采用电子贸易工具的局限性和潜在后果，无论是有意的还是无意的。 - Even if a comprehensive risk reduction agenda seems currently elusive, decision makers should focus on laying the foundation for risk reduction measures. Such efforts should cover a number of unilateral and cooperative measures.
即使全面的减少风险议程目前似乎难以实现，决策者也应把重点放在为减少风险措施奠定基础上。这些努力应包括一些单边措施和合作措施。 - Unilateral measures to identify opportunities for risk management could include:
确定风险管理机会的单边措施可包括 - Improved risks assessments that seek to understand not only the 'good' but also 'the bad and the ugly.' This includes seeking better understanding of how EDTs could impact nuclear decision making during all phases of an escalating conflict.
改进风险评估，不仅要了解 "好"，还要了解 "坏和丑"。这包括更好地了解在冲突升级的各个阶段，电子数据传输如何影响核决策。 - Assessing the performance and resilience of EDT-dependent systems during nuclear deterrence posture reviews.
在核威慑态势审查期间评估依赖 EDT 的系统的性能和复原力。 - Incorporating greater reliance on EDT-enabled systems into nuclear exercises.
在核演习中更多地依赖 EDT 系统。 - Building resilience into the elements of nuclear decision making which are likely to rely on EDTs.
在有可能依赖 EDT 的核决策要素中建立复原力。 - These unilateral efforts can highlight opportunities for cooperative measures, including political commitments, legally binding agreements, and cooperative dialogues to jointly identify problems and solutions.
这些单方面的努力可以突出合作措施的机会，包括政治承诺、具有法律约束力的协议以及共同确定问题和解决方案的合作对话。
INTRODUCTION 引言
Military power is increasingly synonymous with leadership in emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs). Motivated by the conviction that the mastery of EDTs will translate into significant strategic and military advantages, major military powers and their allies are racing to capitalise on the strategic and tactical promise of EDTs. One area of acute concern is the intersection of new technologies and nuclear weaponry. The introduction of new technologies into the nuclear decision-making process creates wide-ranging uncertainties about associated rewards and risks. Compounding this analytic challenge is the fact that modern militaries will almost certainly adopt several potential game-changing technologies simultaneously, integrating them in complex ways to accomplish operational tasks.
军事实力日益成为新兴和颠覆性技术（EDTs）领先地位的代名词。主要军事强国及其盟国坚信，掌握新兴和颠覆性技术将转化为重大的战略和军事优势，因此正竞相利用新兴和颠覆性技术的战略和战术前景。新技术与核武器的交叉是一个令人严重关切的领域。在核决策过程中引入新技术会给相关收益和风险带来广泛的不确定性。现代军队几乎肯定会同时采用几种可能改变游戏规则的技术，并以复杂的方式将它们整合在一起，以完成作战任务，这加剧了这一分析挑战。
军事实力日益成为新兴和颠覆性技术（EDTs）领先地位的代名词。主要军事强国及其盟国坚信，掌握新兴和颠覆性技术将转化为重大的战略和军事优势，因此正竞相利用新兴和颠覆性技术的战略和战术前景。新技术与核武器的交叉是一个令人严重关切的领域。在核决策过程中引入新技术会给相关收益和风险带来广泛的不确定性。现代军队几乎肯定会同时采用几种可能改变游戏规则的技术，并以复杂的方式将它们整合在一起，以完成作战任务，这加剧了这一分析挑战。
Scholars and experts from a variety of fields have already begun to think through the challenges that EDTs will pose for modern military competition, coercion, and warfare. This literature is rich and extensive, and it has generated a large body of insights relevant to nuclear decision-making.
来自不同领域的学者和专家已经开始思考 EDT 将对现代军事竞争、胁迫和战争带来的挑战。这些文献内容丰富、涉及面广，产生了大量与核决策相关的见解。
来自不同领域的学者和专家已经开始思考 EDT 将对现代军事竞争、胁迫和战争带来的挑战。这些文献内容丰富、涉及面广，产生了大量与核决策相关的见解。
- How might the complex interactions of EDTs impact nuclear decision-making at key phases of an escalating conflict?
在冲突升级的关键阶段，EDT 复杂的相互作用会如何影响核决策？ - How might EDTs change the context and choices available during nuclear decisionmaking?
电子讨论如何改变核决策的背景和选择？ - Which combinations of EDTs will be the most relevant to nuclear decision-making?
哪些 EDT 组合与核决策最为相关？
The paper focuses on nuclear escalation resulting from a conventional conflict, which is generally seen as the most likely pathway to a nuclear conflict today. Such a conflict is likely to involve several nuclear decisions, not all of which will be limited to the decision to use nuclear weapons. These include the decision to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis through signalling, the decision to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use, the decision on how to respond to a limited nuclear attack, the decision of whether to expand the scope and intensity of nuclear strikes, and the decision to escalate to an all-out nuclear war. In considering these decision points, this paper focuses on the technological landscape as it might look in the
本文的重点是常规冲突导致的核升级，而常规冲突通常被视为当今最有可能导致核冲突的途径。此类冲突可能涉及若干核决定，但并非所有决定都仅限于使用核武器。这些决定包括：通过信号为危机引入核层面的决定、通过有限核使用跨越核门槛的决定、如何应对有限核攻击的决定、是否扩大核打击范围和强度的决定，以及升级为全面核战争的决定。在考虑这些决策点时，本文将重点关注未来可能出现的技术格局。
2025-2030 timeframe. The intent behind this timeframe is to highlight technologies and strategic dynamics that will confront the current generation of nuclear policy makers.
2025-2030 年时间框架。制定这一时间框架的目的是为了突出当代核决策者将面临的技术和战略动态。
本文的重点是常规冲突导致的核升级，而常规冲突通常被视为当今最有可能导致核冲突的途径。此类冲突可能涉及若干核决定，但并非所有决定都仅限于使用核武器。这些决定包括：通过信号为危机引入核层面的决定、通过有限核使用跨越核门槛的决定、如何应对有限核攻击的决定、是否扩大核打击范围和强度的决定，以及升级为全面核战争的决定。在考虑这些决策点时，本文将重点关注未来可能出现的技术格局。
2025-2030 timeframe. The intent behind this timeframe is to highlight technologies and strategic dynamics that will confront the current generation of nuclear policy makers.
2025-2030 年时间框架。制定这一时间框架的目的是为了突出当代核决策者将面临的技术和战略动态。
To illustrate the impact of the combined use of EDTs on the context of nuclear decisionmaking, the paper examines the potential positive and negative effects on a decision maker's situational awareness, ability to deliberate, and ability to manage forces. To visualise the impact of EDTs on a decision maker's choices, the paper examines how EDTs might affect the assessment of strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements, ultimately pushing the decision maker towards nuclear resolve or restraint.
为了说明综合使用 EDT 对核决策的影响，本文探讨了 EDT 对决策者的态势感知、审议能力和部队管理能力可能产生的积极和消极影响。为了直观地说明 EDT 对决策者选择的影响，本文探讨了 EDT 如何影响对战略利益、升级风险和作战要求的评估，最终促使决策者下定核决心或保持克制。
为了说明综合使用 EDT 对核决策的影响，本文探讨了 EDT 对决策者的态势感知、审议能力和部队管理能力可能产生的积极和消极影响。为了直观地说明 EDT 对决策者选择的影响，本文探讨了 EDT 如何影响对战略利益、升级风险和作战要求的评估，最终促使决策者下定核决心或保持克制。
This paper consists of two parts. The first part provides a background for the analysis by explaining the key strategic considerations of the nuclear decision-making process, and how EDTs are relevant for the 'context' and 'choices'. It then identifies the key EDTs that, when used in a combined way, are likely to be the most influential in the 2025-2030 timeframe. The second part of the paper presents the analysis on how EDTs could influence the context for nuclear decision-making, and the choices between different courses of action. The conclusion highlights the broader implications of the findings for nuclear decision makers and summarises the answers to the three main questions of the paper.
本文由两部分组成。第一部分提供了分析的背景，解释了核决策过程中的关键战略考虑因素，以及环境、经济和技术因素如何与 "背景 "和 "选择 "相关。然后，它确定了在 2025-2030 年时间框架内以综合方式使用时可能最具影响力的关键 EDT。文件的第二部分分析了环境、经济和技术因素如何影响核决策的背景以及不同行动方案之间的选择。结论部分强调了研究结果对核决策者的广泛影响，并总结了本文三个主要问题的答案。
本文由两部分组成。第一部分提供了分析的背景，解释了核决策过程中的关键战略考虑因素，以及环境、经济和技术因素如何与 "背景 "和 "选择 "相关。然后，它确定了在 2025-2030 年时间框架内以综合方式使用时可能最具影响力的关键 EDT。文件的第二部分分析了环境、经济和技术因素如何影响核决策的背景以及不同行动方案之间的选择。结论部分强调了研究结果对核决策者的广泛影响，并总结了本文三个主要问题的答案。
Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying what a study of this nature can accomplish and what it cannot. First, although this report seeks to be applicable to any nuclear decision maker, we recognise that there are unique cultural, societal, political, and military considerations which influence individual states, decision makers, and/or scenarios. The operating assumption in this paper is that there are enough fundamental similarities and points of convergence at the strategic level to justify a generic discussion. Second, the report does not aim to provide a detailed technical discussion of different EDTs or explain every aspect of the nuclear decisionmaking process. Instead, our aim is to visualise and illustrate the potential rewards and risks associated with growing technological complexity. Finally, it is our hope that the following discussion can provide a foundation and intellectual stimulus for further efforts to better understand how the combined use of EDTs could impact nuclear decision-making.
在继续研究之前，有必要澄清一下这种性质的研究能完成什么，不能完成什么。首先，尽管本报告力图适用于任何核决策者，但我们认识到，有一些独特的文化、社会、政治和军事因素会影响各个国家、决策者和/或方案。本文的工作假设是，在战略层面上存在足够多的基本相似点和趋同点，因此有理由进行一般性讨论。其次，本报告无意对不同的 EDT 进行详细的技术讨论，也无意解释核决策过程的方方面面。相反，我们的目的是直观地展示和说明与日益增长的技术复杂性相关的潜在回报和风险。最后，我们希望以下讨论能够为进一步努力提供基础和智力激励，以便更好地理解综合利用 EDT 如何影响核决策。
在继续研究之前，有必要澄清一下这种性质的研究能完成什么，不能完成什么。首先，尽管本报告力图适用于任何核决策者，但我们认识到，有一些独特的文化、社会、政治和军事因素会影响各个国家、决策者和/或方案。本文的工作假设是，在战略层面上存在足够多的基本相似点和趋同点，因此有理由进行一般性讨论。其次，本报告无意对不同的 EDT 进行详细的技术讨论，也无意解释核决策过程的方方面面。相反，我们的目的是直观地展示和说明与日益增长的技术复杂性相关的潜在回报和风险。最后，我们希望以下讨论能够为进一步努力提供基础和智力激励，以便更好地理解综合利用 EDT 如何影响核决策。
THE APPROACH 方法
The key nuclear decisions
关键的核决定
Analysing the impact of the combined use of EDTs requires an understanding of the evolving nuclear environment. In this regard, there is a growing consensus that the most likely pathway to a nuclear crisis or war is the escalation of a local or regional conventional conflict. Such escalation could occur in different geographic regions, including Europe and Asia.
分析联合使用 EDT 的影响需要了解不断变化的核环境。在这方面，越来越多的共识认为，最有可能导致核危机或核战争的途径是局部或区域常规冲突的升级。这种升级可能发生在不同的地理区域，包括欧洲和亚洲。
分析联合使用 EDT 的影响需要了解不断变化的核环境。在这方面，越来越多的共识认为，最有可能导致核危机或核战争的途径是局部或区域常规冲突的升级。这种升级可能发生在不同的地理区域，包括欧洲和亚洲。
In such scenarios, the nuclear 'temperature' of the crisis or war could rise gradually as both sides steadily climb an escalation ladder.
在这种情况下，危机或战争的核 "温度 "会随着双方不断攀升的升级阶梯而逐渐升高。
在这种情况下，危机或战争的核 "温度 "会随着双方不断攀升的升级阶梯而逐渐升高。
Although each regional conflict would be different, there are at least five key nuclear decisions that a decision maker may have to confront in the scenario of an escalating regional crisis with a nuclear-armed rival. In increasing order of intensity, they include:
尽管每场地区冲突都不尽相同，但在地区危机不断升级、对手拥有核武器的情况下，决策者可能不得不面对至少五项关键的核决策。按照强度递增的顺序，它们包括
尽管每场地区冲突都不尽相同，但在地区危机不断升级、对手拥有核武器的情况下，决策者可能不得不面对至少五项关键的核决策。按照强度递增的顺序，它们包括
- Whether to send (or respond to) nuclear signals;
是否发送（或回应）核信号； - Whether to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use;
是否通过有限的核使用跨过核门槛； - Whether to respond, and if so how, to an adversary's limited use;
是否应对对手的有限使用，如果是，如何应对； - Whether to expand the scope and intensity of initial limited attacks;
是否扩大最初有限攻击的范围和强度； - Whether to escalate to an all-out nuclear war.
是否升级为全面核战争。
Decision makers are likely to confront at least five nuclear decision points, denoted by the circles in Graphic 1:
决策者很可能面临至少五个核决策点，如图 1 中的圆圈所示：
决策者很可能面临至少五个核决策点，如图 1 中的圆圈所示：
CAPTION TEXT: Decision makers are likely to confront at least five nuclear decision points, denoted by circles in the graphic.
说明： 决策者很可能面临至少五个核决策点，图中的圆圈表示这五个点。
说明： 决策者很可能面临至少五个核决策点，图中的圆圈表示这五个点。
The complex interactions of EDTs could impact a decision maker's calculus at each of these decision points. Yet, EDTs alone are unlikely to have a definitive effect on nuclear decision-making because national leaders rarely make decisions based exclusively on technological factors. War remains an inherently political act and there are broader strategic, military, and operational considerations that might affect each of these decisions. Acting under the nuclear shadow, any decision-maker would likely be torn between rational calculations and volatile emotions. Their cost-benefit analysis might be coloured by feelings of indignation, vengeance, humiliation, or fear.
EDT 的复杂相互作用可能会影响决策者在每个决策点上的考虑。然而，单凭 EDT 不太可能对核决策产生决定性影响，因为国家领导人很少会完全根据技术因素做出决策。战争本质上仍然是一种政治行为，而且还有更广泛的战略、军事和作战考虑因素可能会影响这些决策。在核阴影的笼罩下，任何决策者都可能会在理性的计算和多变的情绪之间徘徊。他们的成本效益分析可能会受到愤怒、复仇、羞辱或恐惧等情绪的影响。
EDT 的复杂相互作用可能会影响决策者在每个决策点上的考虑。然而，单凭 EDT 不太可能对核决策产生决定性影响，因为国家领导人很少会完全根据技术因素做出决策。战争本质上仍然是一种政治行为，而且还有更广泛的战略、军事和作战考虑因素可能会影响这些决策。在核阴影的笼罩下，任何决策者都可能会在理性的计算和多变的情绪之间徘徊。他们的成本效益分析可能会受到愤怒、复仇、羞辱或恐惧等情绪的影响。
It is also important to note that the complex interactions of EDTs would impact a decision maker's behaviour against the backdrop of certain enduring features of nuclear strategy and operations.
还必须指出的是，在核战略和核行动某些持久特征的背景下，电子数据传输的复杂互动将影响决策者的行为。
还必须指出的是，在核战略和核行动某些持久特征的背景下，电子数据传输的复杂互动将影响决策者的行为。
First, in every major nuclear power, any decision about the movement, brandishing, or use of nuclear weapons, or the delegation of this authority, is likely to involve an affirmative decision by a national leader.
首先，在每个主要核大国，任何有关移动、挥舞或使用核武器的决定，或这一权力的下放，都可能涉及国家领导人的肯定性决定。
首先，在每个主要核大国，任何有关移动、挥舞或使用核武器的决定，或这一权力的下放，都可能涉及国家领导人的肯定性决定。
Second, nuclear decision-making is likely to be deliberative unless there is no time to convene a high-level discussion, for instance if an attack is already underway and a failure to act quickly is likely to result in significant negative consequences.
其次，核决策很可能是经过深思熟虑的，除非没有时间召集高层讨论，例如，如果攻击已经开始，而不迅速采取行动很可能会导致严重的负面后果。
其次，核决策很可能是经过深思熟虑的，除非没有时间召集高层讨论，例如，如果攻击已经开始，而不迅速采取行动很可能会导致严重的负面后果。
Third, even without EDTs, the decision-making process is likely to involve inputs from a variety of sources, including data from warning systems, intelligence systems, military personnel on the ground, presidential advisers, as well as military commanders and experts. Collecting, presenting, and disseminating these inputs will likely involve significant reliance on information technology. Technology might also be used to support decision-making by helping project the consequences of alternative decisions.
第三，即使没有电子数据传输系统，决策过程也可能会涉及各种来源的投入，包括来自预警系统、情报系统、实地军事人员、总统顾问以及军事指挥官和专家的数据。收集、展示和传播这些信息很可能需要大量依赖信息技术。技术还可用于支持决策，帮助预测备选决策的后果。
第三，即使没有电子数据传输系统，决策过程也可能会涉及各种来源的投入，包括来自预警系统、情报系统、实地军事人员、总统顾问以及军事指挥官和专家的数据。收集、展示和传播这些信息很可能需要大量依赖信息技术。技术还可用于支持决策，帮助预测备选决策的后果。
Fourth, even if technology enables very short-notice operational planning, nuclear decision-making is likely to continue to rely somewhat on pre-planned military operations.
第四，即使技术能够在很短时间内完成作战计划，核决策仍可能在一定程度上依赖于预先计划的军事行动。
第四，即使技术能够在很短时间内完成作战计划，核决策仍可能在一定程度上依赖于预先计划的军事行动。
Lastly, leaders are likely to place significant emphasis on the need for nuclear forces that can survive pre-emptive attacks to carry out retaliatory strikes. Many of the strategic advantages of nuclear possession depend on a nuclear power's ability to retain the option to attack even if attacked first.
最后，领导人很可能会着重强调核力量必须能够在先发制人的攻击中幸存下来，以实施报复性打击。拥有核武器的许多战略优势取决于核大国是否有能力在先发制人的攻击中保留攻击选项。
最后，领导人很可能会着重强调核力量必须能够在先发制人的攻击中幸存下来，以实施报复性打击。拥有核武器的许多战略优势取决于核大国是否有能力在先发制人的攻击中保留攻击选项。
The nuclear decision-making context and choices
核决策的背景和选择
This study focuses on how both technological and substantive factors could affect the inputs and the outputs of a nuclear decision-making process. It does so by considering how the complex interactions of EDTs might impact the circumstances or context surrounding key nuclear decisions and the choices of alternative courses of action.
本研究的重点是技术因素和实质性因素如何影响核决策过程的投入和产出。为此，它考虑了电子数据处理的复杂互动如何影响关键核决策的环境或背景，以及替代行动方案的选择。
本研究的重点是技术因素和实质性因素如何影响核决策过程的投入和产出。为此，它考虑了电子数据处理的复杂互动如何影响关键核决策的环境或背景，以及替代行动方案的选择。
With regards to the decision-making context, experts on decision-making in business, economics, and social psychology all agree that it is an important factor in how people make decisions.
关于决策背景，商业、经济学和社会心理学领域的决策专家都认为，它是影响人们如何做出决策的一个重要因素。
how the pursuit of individual-level goals shift based on the environment. For example, people appear willing to make riskier bets to avoid losing a given amount of money than to win the same amount of money. The value of money to the individual is the same, but the contextwhether one is losing or winning-has an important impact on the overall decision.
个人层面的目标追求如何随环境而变化。例如，与赢同样多的钱相比，人们似乎愿意为避免输掉一定数额的钱而下更大风险的赌注。对个人而言，金钱的价值是相同的，但环境--是输钱还是赢钱--对整体决策有着重要影响。
关于决策背景，商业、经济学和社会心理学领域的决策专家都认为，它是影响人们如何做出决策的一个重要因素。
how the pursuit of individual-level goals shift based on the environment. For example, people appear willing to make riskier bets to avoid losing a given amount of money than to win the same amount of money. The value of money to the individual is the same, but the contextwhether one is losing or winning-has an important impact on the overall decision.
个人层面的目标追求如何随环境而变化。例如，与赢同样多的钱相比，人们似乎愿意为避免输掉一定数额的钱而下更大风险的赌注。对个人而言，金钱的价值是相同的，但环境--是输钱还是赢钱--对整体决策有着重要影响。
The complex interactions of EDTs could make a difference in the decision-making context by improving or degrading a decision maker's ability to assess the situation, deliberate about the optimal course of action, and control one's forces and execute pre-planned operations. They could do this in various ways. The combined use of EDTs could impact a decision maker's situational awareness-both positively or negatively-by affecting the ability to assess the intentions, capabilities, and behaviours of the adversary; by changing the information environment in which the decision maker operates, including domestic political support; or by affecting the ability to detect attacks, distinguish between real and false alarms, or conduct damage assessment.
EDT 的复杂交互作用可提高或降低决策者评估局势、考虑最佳行动方案、控制部队和执行预先计划的行动的能力，从而在决策过程中发挥作用。它们可以通过各种方式做到这一点。综合使用电子战手段可能会对决策者的态势感知能力产生积极或消极的影响，如影响评估对手意图、能力和行为的能力；改变决策者所处的信息环境，包括国内政治支持；或影响侦测攻击、区分真假警报或进行损害评估的能力。
EDT 的复杂交互作用可提高或降低决策者评估局势、考虑最佳行动方案、控制部队和执行预先计划的行动的能力，从而在决策过程中发挥作用。它们可以通过各种方式做到这一点。综合使用电子战手段可能会对决策者的态势感知能力产生积极或消极的影响，如影响评估对手意图、能力和行为的能力；改变决策者所处的信息环境，包括国内政治支持；或影响侦测攻击、区分真假警报或进行损害评估的能力。
Any decision maker that confronts a nuclear scenario must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the choices available, relative to the circumstances. They must explicitly or implicitly answer the question of whether securing vital interests demands showing nuclear resolve or whether the same goals can be achieved by exercising nuclear restraint.
任何决策者在面对核问题时，都必须根据具体情况权衡各种选择的利弊。他们必须明确或含蓄地回答这样一个问题：是确保重大利益需要展现核决心，还是通过核克制可以实现同样的目标。
任何决策者在面对核问题时，都必须根据具体情况权衡各种选择的利弊。他们必须明确或含蓄地回答这样一个问题：是确保重大利益需要展现核决心，还是通过核克制可以实现同样的目标。
The complex interactions of EDTs could affect a decision maker's choice on whether to pursue nuclear resolve versus restraint, by impacting their influence on strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and the operational effectiveness of different options. EDTs could impact a decision maker's assessment of which course of action is likeliest to achieve the desired strategic objectives. The combined use of EDTs could encourage or dissuade a decision maker from a particular course of action by decreasing or increasing the risks of accidents, mishaps, misperception, and miscalculation that could lead to unwanted escalation. Likewise, EDTs could alter the decision maker's choices of the preferred course of action by having an impact on the lethality, flexibility, and reliability of different military operations.
EDT 的复杂相互作用可能会影响决策者对是否采取核决断或核克制的选择，因为它们会影响战略利益、升级风险和不同选择的作战效力。EDT 可影响决策者对哪种行动方案最有可能实现预期战略目标的评估。通过降低或增加可能导致意外升级的事故、失误、误解和误判风险，综合使用电子讨论可以鼓励或劝阻决策者采取特定的行动方案。同样，电子战雷达也会对不同军事行动的杀伤力、灵活性和可靠性产生影响，从而改变决策者对首选行动方案的选择。
EDT 的复杂相互作用可能会影响决策者对是否采取核决断或核克制的选择，因为它们会影响战略利益、升级风险和不同选择的作战效力。EDT 可影响决策者对哪种行动方案最有可能实现预期战略目标的评估。通过降低或增加可能导致意外升级的事故、失误、误解和误判风险，综合使用电子讨论可以鼓励或劝阻决策者采取特定的行动方案。同样，电子战雷达也会对不同军事行动的杀伤力、灵活性和可靠性产生影响，从而改变决策者对首选行动方案的选择。
The analytical framework for this paper is visualised in Table 1:
本文的分析框架如表 1 所示：
本文的分析框架如表 1 所示：
决策要点
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The Impact of the Combined Use of EDTs on: 综合使用 EDT 对以下方面的影响： |
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情况评估
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审议能力
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管理部队的能力
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战略效益
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升级风险
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运行的促进因素和制约因素
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| Signalling 信号 |
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| First Use 首次使用 |
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| Response 回应 |
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规模较大，小于
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生存攻击
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全面核战争
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EDTs and complexity EDT 和复杂性
Many EDTs have the potential to reshape international politics by changing the nature of military and economic power.
许多电子技术都有可能通过改变军事和经济力量的性质来重塑国际政治。
许多电子技术都有可能通过改变军事和经济力量的性质来重塑国际政治。
Although studies vary in their focus, most of them concentrate on the medium term, which includes EDTs that are likely to mature in the 2040s, with early adoptions beginning in the mid-2030s and late adoptions by 2050. This is the perspective taken by the NATO Science & Technology Organization, the U.S. National Intelligence Council's Global Trends Project, and other notable efforts.
虽然研究的重点各有不同，但大多数都集中在中期，包括可能在 2040 年代成熟的 EDT，早期采用始于 2030 年代中期，晚期采用始于 2050 年。北约科技组织、美国国家情报委员会的全球趋势项目以及其他著名机构都采取了这种观点。
虽然研究的重点各有不同，但大多数都集中在中期，包括可能在 2040 年代成熟的 EDT，早期采用始于 2030 年代中期，晚期采用始于 2050 年。北约科技组织、美国国家情报委员会的全球趋势项目以及其他著名机构都采取了这种观点。
There is significant convergence within the literature on which potentially gamechanging technologies will be mature or widely adopted by 2030, and which will still be in the early stages of development because of barriers to widespread adoption. The latter category includes quantum supremacy (the development of quantum computers capable of solving problems that are impossible to solve using current computers); some forms of quantum sensing; and directed energy air and missile defences. In contrast, the focus of this report is on the technologies that are likely to make a difference to nuclear decision-making in the 20252030 timeframe. These include:
关于哪些可能改变游戏规则的技术将在 2030 年成熟或被广泛采用，以及哪些技术由于广泛采用的障碍而仍处于早期开发阶段，文献中的观点有很大的一致性。后一类技术包括量子至上（量子计算机的开发能够解决当前计算机无法解决的问题）、某些形式的量子传感以及定向能防空和导弹防御。相比之下，本报告的重点是 20252030 年期间可能对核决策产生影响的技术。这些技术包括
关于哪些可能改变游戏规则的技术将在 2030 年成熟或被广泛采用，以及哪些技术由于广泛采用的障碍而仍处于早期开发阶段，文献中的观点有很大的一致性。后一类技术包括量子至上（量子计算机的开发能够解决当前计算机无法解决的问题）、某些形式的量子传感以及定向能防空和导弹防御。相比之下，本报告的重点是 20252030 年期间可能对核决策产生影响的技术。这些技术包括
- Artificial intelligence and big data analytics. Machine learning tools, a subset of the broader discipline of artificial intelligence, can help analyse massive amounts of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) data; contribute to actionable intelligence and targeting information; support decision-making; and facilitate command and control (C2). Machine learning is essentially a very powerful data analysis tool used to enhance other technologies. For instance, neural networks, a machine learning technique that mimics the processing structure of the brain, can be used to train existing computer graphics technology to produce hyper-realistic videos ("deepfakes"). They can also be used to analyse sensor data, optimise equipment maintenance schedules, and support decision-making and military planning.
人工智能和大数据分析。机器学习工具是更广泛的人工智能学科的一个子集，可帮助分析海量情报、监视和侦察（ISR）数据；提供可操作的情报和目标信息；支持决策；促进指挥和控制（C2）。机器学习本质上是一种非常强大的数据分析工具，用于增强其他技术。例如，神经网络是一种模仿大脑处理结构的机器学习技术，可用于训练现有的计算机图形技术，以制作超逼真的视频（"深度伪造"）。神经网络还可用于分析传感器数据、优化设备维护计划以及支持决策和军事规划。 - Al-enabled cyber operations. Artificial intelligence can increase the efficacy of offensive and defensive cyber operations. For instance, machine learning can be applied to develop 'self-healing networks' that automatically identify suspicious activity and cue organisations to patch vulnerabilities and respond to attacks.
Conversely, AI can facilitate better phishing campaigns, vulnerability scanning, or malware generation.
人工智能支持的网络行动。人工智能可以提高网络攻防行动的效率。例如，机器学习可用于开发 "自愈网络"，自动识别可疑活动，提示组织修补漏洞和应对攻击。反之，人工智能可以促进更好的网络钓鱼活动、漏洞扫描或恶意软件生成。
Predictive analytics tools could also help identify threats originating from the humanmachine interface by identifying potentially problematic users.
预测分析工具还可以通过识别潜在的问题用户，帮助识别来自人机界面的威胁。
预测分析工具还可以通过识别潜在的问题用户，帮助识别来自人机界面的威胁。
- Cheaper and smarter space assets and space weapons. Several militaries already rely heavily on space-based early warning, intelligence, and navigation (positioning, navigation, and timing or "PNT"), and communications systems. In the coming decade, the economics of space exploitation are likely to shift dramatically. Private and public sector innovation is lowering the cost of deploying sophisticated sensing and communications capabilities in various orbits while the integration with other technologies, such as edge computing or self-healing networks, is expanding the resilience and capability of space systems.
At the same time, militaries are improving their ability to fight in space using both kinetic (weapons that cause damage through physical impact) and non-kinetic space weapons. Some non-kinetic anti-satellite systems have reversible effects while others, such as lasers, can cause permanent damage to satellite components. Militaries are also testing dual-capable systems, such as spacecraft that can grab or dock with satellites.
更廉价、更智能的太空资产和太空武器。一些国家的军队已经在很大程度上依赖天基预警、情报、导航（定位、导航和授时或 "PNT"）和通信系统。未来十年，太空开发的经济学可能会发生巨大变化。私营和公共部门的创新正在降低在各种轨道上部署尖端传感和通信能力的成本，而与边缘计算或自愈网络等其他技术的整合正在扩大空间系统的弹性和能力。与此同时，各国军队正在提高使用动能（通过物理撞击造成破坏的武器）和非动能太空武器进行太空作战的能力。一些非动能反卫星系统具有可逆效应，而激光等其他系统则可对卫星部件造成永久性损坏。各国军队还在测试具有双重能力的系统，例如可以抓住卫星或与卫星对接的航天器。 - Autonomous systems. Autonomous systems are physical or digital systems that can engage in self-directed behaviour in accordance with delegated and bounded authority.
There is a spectrum of self-directed behaviour, from the fully manual to the fully independent. As such, autonomy encompasses partially autonomous systems that ask human users to approve a pre-defined course of action, based on defined circumstances, as well as fully autonomous systems that could independently assess the environment and devise courses of action without direct human input or supervision. Greater levels of autonomy are enabled by sensors, communications, on-board data processing, and software, including AI applications. States are pursuing autonomy for a variety of reasons, but a recurring motive is the desire to reduce the cognitive load and physical demands on humans associated with important but complex missions, such as long-endurance missions, pattern recognition, deconfliction, and coordination, etc.
自主系统。自主系统是一种物理或数字系统，可以根据授权和受限权限进行自主行为。自主行为的范围很广，从完全手动到完全独立。因此，自主包括部分自主系统和完全自主系统，前者要求人类用户根据确定的情况批准预先确定的行动方案，后者则可以独立评估环境并制定行动方案，而无需人类的直接输入或监督。通过传感器、通信、车载数据处理和软件（包括人工智能应用），可实现更高水平的自主性。 各国追求自主的原因多种多样，但一个经常出现的动机是希望减少与重要而复杂的任务（如长航时任务、模式识别、消除冲突和协调等）相关的认知负荷和对人类的体力要求。 - Hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic weapons fly at least five times the speed of sound. By this definition, many ballistic missiles are technically hypersonic weapons. Current hypersonic weapons development is focused on four kinds of systems: hypersonic cruise missiles, manoeuvring hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic aircraft, and hypersonic rail guns, although most of the interest in the policy community is on the first two. Because of their in-flight manoeuvrability and high speeds, both weapon systems can potentially evade detection by early warning and defensive systems while precluding precise predictions of intended targets.
Although hypersonic vehicle technology is not new, current efforts are facilitated by improvements in computational modelling, materials science, and new propulsion technologies.
高超音速武器。高超音速武器的飞行速度至少是音速的五倍。根据这一定义，许多弹道导弹在技术上都属于高超音速武器。目前高超音速武器的研发主要集中在四种系统上：高超音速巡航导弹、高超音速机动滑翔飞行器、高超音速飞机和高超音速轨道炮，但政策界对前两种系统的兴趣最大。由于其飞行中的机动性和高速度，这两种武器系统都有可能躲避预警和防御系统的探测，同时排除对预定目标的精确预测。虽然高超音速飞行器技术并不新鲜，但计算建模、材料科学和新型推进技术的改进促进了当前的工作。 - Quantum technology. Extensive private and governmental research is underway to exploit the properties and phenomena of quantum physics for computing and other tasks. The ultimate goal of quantum computing research is the ability to perform computations that current computers are unable to do on useful timescales. True quantum supremacy could enable the breaking of current unbreakable cryptographic ciphers. Most experts believe that useful quantum computing will not arrive by 2030. However, other applications of quantum technology may be in use in the next decade,
量子技术。目前，私人和政府正在开展广泛的研究，以利用量子物理学的特性和现象来完成计算和其他任务。量子计算研究的最终目标是能够在有用的时间尺度内完成当前计算机无法完成的计算。真正的量子优势可以破解目前无法破解的加密密码。大多数专家认为，有用的量子计算不会在 2030 年前出现。不过，量子技术的其他应用可能会在未来十年内投入使用、
particularly quantum sensing, positioning/navigation/timing, and quantum communications. Quantum sensors could allow for more precise detection of vessels or aircraft at ranges or in conditions that confound existing sensor technology. Quantum PNT systems can enable navigation without recourse to global positioning satellites or in difficult environments. Quantum computing would enable secure communications even if quantum computers become able to defeat current cryptographic methods.
特别是量子传感、定位/导航/定时和量子通信。量子传感器可以在现有传感器技术无法探测的距离或条件下，对船只或飞机进行更精确的探测。量子 PNT 系统可以在不借助全球定位卫星或在困难环境中实现导航。即使量子计算机能够击败当前的加密方法，量子计算也能实现安全通信。
Although each of the EDTs discussed above could bring significant changes, military planners believe that the maximum impact of EDTs will come from the integrated use of multiple EDTs to accomplish discrete operational tasks.
尽管上文讨论的每一种 EDT 都可能带来重大变化，但军事规划人员认为，EDT 的最大影响将来自于综合利用多种 EDT 来完成互不关联的作战任务。
尽管上文讨论的每一种 EDT 都可能带来重大变化，但军事规划人员认为，EDT 的最大影响将来自于综合利用多种 EDT 来完成互不关联的作战任务。
A cautionary note must be made in assessing the implications of combinations of different EDTs. Fully understanding the impact of these technologies is difficult because of the complexity associated with the combined use of EDTs. There are a number of fundamental aspects of this complexity.
在评估不同 EDT 组合的影响时，必须谨慎行事。要充分了解这些技术的影响十分困难，因为结合使用 EDT 具有复杂性。这种复杂性有几个基本方面。
在评估不同 EDT 组合的影响时，必须谨慎行事。要充分了解这些技术的影响十分困难，因为结合使用 EDT 具有复杂性。这种复杂性有几个基本方面。
Each combination of EDTs could produce effects that are different from those of individual EDTs. It is not possible to ascertain all possible consequences of different combinations of EDTs based on assessing the individual impact of each EDT. In other words, for a given combination of EDTs, 'the whole is different than the sum of its parts'.
EDT 的每种组合都可能产生不同于单个 EDT 的影响。在评估每个环境技术的单独影响时，不可能确定不同环境技术组合可能产生的所有后果。换句话说，对于给定的 EDT 组合，"整体不同于部分之和"。
EDT 的每种组合都可能产生不同于单个 EDT 的影响。在评估每个环境技术的单独影响时，不可能确定不同环境技术组合可能产生的所有后果。换句话说，对于给定的 EDT 组合，"整体不同于部分之和"。
The complex interactions of EDTs are likely to have impacts across the spectrum of conflict, from day-to-day 'peacetime' interactions through high-intensity war. The use of EDTs in one phase of the conflict could also have impacts on the other phases of the conflict. For instance, how a technology is used in peacetime could affect how it is used in war, or how other states anticipate its use in war. The combinations of EDTs that have a decisive impact on the context of a nuclear decision, or the choice of alternative course of action in one phase of the conflict, might become unavailable or irrelevant in later phases.
从日常的 "和平时期 "互动到高强度的战争，EDT 的复杂互动可能会对整个冲突产生影响。EDT 在冲突某一阶段的使用也可能对冲突的其他阶段产生影响。例如，在和平时期如何使用某项技术可能会影响到在战争中如何使用该技术，或影响到其他国家如何预期该技术在战争中的使用。在冲突的某一阶段，对核决定的背景或替代行动方案的选择具有决定性影响的 EDT 组合，可能在以后的阶段变得不可用或无关紧要。
从日常的 "和平时期 "互动到高强度的战争，EDT 的复杂互动可能会对整个冲突产生影响。EDT 在冲突某一阶段的使用也可能对冲突的其他阶段产生影响。例如，在和平时期如何使用某项技术可能会影响到在战争中如何使用该技术，或影响到其他国家如何预期该技术在战争中的使用。在冲突的某一阶段，对核决定的背景或替代行动方案的选择具有决定性影响的 EDT 组合，可能在以后的阶段变得不可用或无关紧要。
Last but not least, nuclear powers armed with EDTs will face other nuclear powers armed with their own technologies. How each side acts will depend not only on its own capabilities and objectives but on those of the other side. This interactive process will likely involve various degrees of human-human, human-machine, and machine-machine interaction as decision makers attempt to act strategically while contending with their own technological systems and the interaction of their systems with the adversary's technological systems. All these interactions will take place in an uncertain environment that is obscured by the 'fog of war'.
最后但并非最不重要的一点是，拥有反弹道导弹的核大国将面对拥有自己技术的其他核大国。双方如何行动不仅取决于自身的能力和目标，也取决于对方的能力和目标。这一互动过程可能会涉及不同程度的人-人、人-机和机-机互动，因为决策者在试图采取战略行动的同时，还要与自己的技术系统以及自己的系统与对手的技术系统进行互动。所有这些互动都将在被 "战争迷雾 "遮蔽的不确定环境中进行。
最后但并非最不重要的一点是，拥有反弹道导弹的核大国将面对拥有自己技术的其他核大国。双方如何行动不仅取决于自身的能力和目标，也取决于对方的能力和目标。这一互动过程可能会涉及不同程度的人-人、人-机和机-机互动，因为决策者在试图采取战略行动的同时，还要与自己的技术系统以及自己的系统与对手的技术系统进行互动。所有这些互动都将在被 "战争迷雾 "遮蔽的不确定环境中进行。
THE ANALYSIS 分析
Decision on whether to exercise restraint or signal nuclear resolve
决定是保持克制还是表明核决心
Any crisis that involves nuclear weapon states or nuclear alliances is a nuclear crisis. The mere existence of nuclear weapons, even if they remain in the background, influences the choices and risk calculations of decision makers.
任何涉及核武器国家或核联盟的危机都是核危机。核武器的存在本身就会影响决策者的选择和风险计算，即使它们仍处于幕后。
任何涉及核武器国家或核联盟的危机都是核危机。核武器的存在本身就会影响决策者的选择和风险计算，即使它们仍处于幕后。
Even without considering the effects of EDTs, the choice between demonstrating nuclear resolve or exercising nuclear restraint is complex. The reception of such 'messages' would be contingent on the other side observing them - yet some signals may only be observable to the other side at certain times and with certain capabilities. The interpretation of nuclear signals is also a complex process, involving inferences about the consequences and the underlying intent associated with a signal. For instance, raising the readiness of nuclear forces could signal a willingness to escalate to nuclear use, as well as a general acceptance of the risk that such actions could provoke escalation by the other side. Thus, alerting forces could be seen as a signal of resolve. On the other hand, such signals could reflect bureaucratic preferences rather than a deliberate attempt to send a message. For instance, militaries may have doctrinal preferences for bringing all available military tools to bear early in a crisis, which could result in a perceived signal that was solely intended to make certain forces available. This would send a message, but not the intended message.
即使不考虑弹道导弹的影响，在展示核决心还是实行核克制之间做出选择也是复杂的。能否接收到这些 "信息 "取决于对方是否能观察到它们--但有些信号可能只有在特定时间和特定能力下才能被对方观察到。对核信号的解读也是一个复杂的过程，涉及对与信号相关的后果和潜在意图的推断。例如，提高核力量的战备状态可能意味着愿意升级使用核武器，以及普遍接受这种行动可能引发对方升级的风险。因此，提高部队警戒状态可被视为下定决心的信号。另一方面，这种信号也可能反映出官僚主义的偏好，而非刻意传递信息。例如，军方可能在理论上倾向于在危机早期动用所有可用的军事手段，这可能导致人们认为发出的信号只是为了让某些部队可以出动。这将发出一个信息，但不是预期的信息。
即使不考虑弹道导弹的影响，在展示核决心还是实行核克制之间做出选择也是复杂的。能否接收到这些 "信息 "取决于对方是否能观察到它们--但有些信号可能只有在特定时间和特定能力下才能被对方观察到。对核信号的解读也是一个复杂的过程，涉及对与信号相关的后果和潜在意图的推断。例如，提高核力量的战备状态可能意味着愿意升级使用核武器，以及普遍接受这种行动可能引发对方升级的风险。因此，提高部队警戒状态可被视为下定决心的信号。另一方面，这种信号也可能反映出官僚主义的偏好，而非刻意传递信息。例如，军方可能在理论上倾向于在危机早期动用所有可用的军事手段，这可能导致人们认为发出的信号只是为了让某些部队可以出动。这将发出一个信息，但不是预期的信息。
In making the decision to send or respond to a nuclear signal, a decision maker would therefore have to consider several factors. Would sending nuclear signals strengthen or weaken a state's bargaining position? Would an adversary sense weakness in the failure to respond to a nuclear signal? Is there domestic political pressure to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis? Alliance relations could also influence a national leader's deliberations: demonstrating nuclear resolve could reinforce the credibility of one's security assurances, but it could also unnerve some allies who might favour nuclear restraint.
因此，在决定发送或回应核信号时，决策者必须考虑几个因素。发送核信号会加强还是削弱一国的谈判地位？如果不对核信号做出回应，对手是否会感到软弱？国内是否存在将核问题引入危机的政治压力？联盟关系也会影响国家领导人的考虑：展示核决心可以加强一国安全保证的可信度，但也可能使一些可能赞成核克制的盟国感到不安。
因此，在决定发送或回应核信号时，决策者必须考虑几个因素。发送核信号会加强还是削弱一国的谈判地位？如果不对核信号做出回应，对手是否会感到软弱？国内是否存在将核问题引入危机的政治压力？联盟关系也会影响国家领导人的考虑：展示核决心可以加强一国安全保证的可信度，但也可能使一些可能赞成核克制的盟国感到不安。
How decision makers work through these considerations depends on the decisionmaking context, namely their ability to make sense of the environment, and their understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the available choices.
决策者如何处理这些考虑因素取决于决策环境，即他们对环境的理解能力，以及他们对现有选择的利弊的理解。
决策者如何处理这些考虑因素取决于决策环境，即他们对环境的理解能力，以及他们对现有选择的利弊的理解。
EDTs and the decision-making context
电子讨论组和决策背景
EDTs will likely have a major impact on the context of decision-making through their effect on situational assessment. The standard approach to situational awareness is to rely on human experts to synthesise assessments of adversary intentions and behaviours with military intelligence on the movement of adversary forces. The latter is typically gathered from a mix of technical and human sources, including satellite imagery, reconnaissance aircraft, and
通过对态势评估的影响，EDT 可能会对决策环境产生重大影响。态势感知的标准方法是依靠人类专家将对敌方意图和行为的评估与敌方部队动向的军事情报综合起来。后者通常由技术和人力来源共同收集，包括卫星图像、侦察机、军事情报等。
personnel on the ground. Many of these collection platforms may be difficult to move or 'retask' quickly, limiting the scope of data collection. Finite numbers of collection platforms may also be in demand by multiple bureaucratic actors. The synthesis of the data collected from these platforms happens at the speed of human cognition and action, with analysts relying on mental models and their own expertise to filter signal from noise. Analysts must present their assessments in a format amenable to decision makers' preferred style for information consumption, such as a written or oral briefing.
在实地工作的人员。其中许多收集平台可能难以快速移动或 "重新分配任务"，从而限制了数据收集的范围。多个官僚机构也可能需要数量有限的收集平台。对从这些平台收集到的数据进行综合的速度取决于人类的认知和行动，分析人员需要依靠心智模型和自身的专业知识来过滤噪音中的信号。分析师必须以决策者偏好的信息消费方式（如书面或口头简报）呈现其评估结果。
通过对态势评估的影响，EDT 可能会对决策环境产生重大影响。态势感知的标准方法是依靠人类专家将对敌方意图和行为的评估与敌方部队动向的军事情报综合起来。后者通常由技术和人力来源共同收集，包括卫星图像、侦察机、军事情报等。
personnel on the ground. Many of these collection platforms may be difficult to move or 'retask' quickly, limiting the scope of data collection. Finite numbers of collection platforms may also be in demand by multiple bureaucratic actors. The synthesis of the data collected from these platforms happens at the speed of human cognition and action, with analysts relying on mental models and their own expertise to filter signal from noise. Analysts must present their assessments in a format amenable to decision makers' preferred style for information consumption, such as a written or oral briefing.
在实地工作的人员。其中许多收集平台可能难以快速移动或 "重新分配任务"，从而限制了数据收集的范围。多个官僚机构也可能需要数量有限的收集平台。对从这些平台收集到的数据进行综合的速度取决于人类的认知和行动，分析人员需要依靠心智模型和自身的专业知识来过滤噪音中的信号。分析师必须以决策者偏好的信息消费方式（如书面或口头简报）呈现其评估结果。
EDTs could dramatically change this approach in several ways. The complex interactions of various EDTs could significantly improve situational assessment during a crisis by providing decision makers with more precise or accurate insights into whether nuclear signals might have an impact on adversary behaviour and how adversaries might react. For example, autonomous intelligence and data collection platforms could provide decision makers with up-to-date information on adversary capabilities and actions. These platforms could be re-tasked quickly to move to other areas. Al-enabled big data analytics could then analyse these different streams of intelligence at high speed. This could contribute to estimates of an adversary's intentions and the military balance.
EDT 可以从几个方面极大地改变这种方法。各种 EDT 的复杂互动可为决策者提供更精确或准确的洞察力，使其了解核信号是否会对对手的行为产生影响以及对手可能做出何种反应，从而大大改善危机期间的态势评估。例如，自主情报和数据收集平台可为决策者提供有关对手能力和行动的最新信息。这些平台可以迅速重新分配任务，转移到其他领域。然后，由 Al 支持的大数据分析可以高速分析这些不同的情报流。这有助于估计对手的意图和军事平衡。
EDT 可以从几个方面极大地改变这种方法。各种 EDT 的复杂互动可为决策者提供更精确或准确的洞察力，使其了解核信号是否会对对手的行为产生影响以及对手可能做出何种反应，从而大大改善危机期间的态势评估。例如，自主情报和数据收集平台可为决策者提供有关对手能力和行动的最新信息。这些平台可以迅速重新分配任务，转移到其他领域。然后，由 Al 支持的大数据分析可以高速分析这些不同的情报流。这有助于估计对手的意图和军事平衡。
EDTs could also support decision making by helping generate alternative courses of action. Typical operations research involves days, weeks, or months of study, design, and refinement.
EDT 还可以通过帮助生成备选行动方案来支持决策。典型的运筹学需要数天、数周或数月的研究、设计和完善。
EDT 还可以通过帮助生成备选行动方案来支持决策。典型的运筹学需要数天、数周或数月的研究、设计和完善。
EDTs can also be applied to help defeat adversary attacks through direct defence reducing incentives for hasty decisions. For instance, an AI-enabled battle network can be used to track adversary satellites and surveillance aircrafts, correlate their locations with the locations of one's own forces, and use the data to cue one's air defence forces.
EDT 还可以通过直接防御帮助击败对手的攻击，减少仓促决策的诱因。例如，人工智能战斗网络可用于跟踪对手的卫星和侦察机，将它们的位置与己方部队的位置关联起来，并利用这些数据提示己方的防空部队。
EDT 还可以通过直接防御帮助击败对手的攻击，减少仓促决策的诱因。例如，人工智能战斗网络可用于跟踪对手的卫星和侦察机，将它们的位置与己方部队的位置关联起来，并利用这些数据提示己方的防空部队。
Yet the EDTs could also negatively affect the decision-making context. Improved situational awareness and decision support tools could affect decision making by facilitating overconfidence. The seeming sophistication of digital technologies can create an aura of authoritativeness and objectivity that could lead decision makers to put significant trust in technological judgments. Yet decision makers may have a poor understanding of the inner workings of the algorithms enabling improved situational awareness or decision support tools. Even the experts who devised the algorithms may have difficulty explaining how an algorithm produced a particular result.
然而，电子讨论也可能对决策环境产生负面影响。态势感知和决策支持工具的改进可能会助长过度自信，从而影响决策。数字技术看似复杂，却能营造出一种权威性和客观性的光环，使决策者对技术判断产生极大的信任。然而，决策者可能对能够提高态势感知能力或决策支持工具的算法的内部运作知之甚少。即使是设计算法的专家也可能难以解释算法是如何产生特定结果的。
然而，电子讨论也可能对决策环境产生负面影响。态势感知和决策支持工具的改进可能会助长过度自信，从而影响决策。数字技术看似复杂，却能营造出一种权威性和客观性的光环，使决策者对技术判断产生极大的信任。然而，决策者可能对能够提高态势感知能力或决策支持工具的算法的内部运作知之甚少。即使是设计算法的专家也可能难以解释算法是如何产生特定结果的。
Alternatively, if they produce a flood of information or generate contradictory insights, the use of EDTs for situational awareness and decision support could contribute to confusion and decision paralysis. Several different approaches to integrating EDTs for situational awareness may be in use simultaneously, for instance by intelligence agencies, military organisations, and the national leader's own staff.
反之，如果 EDT 产生大量信息或产生相互矛盾的见解，那么使用 EDT 进行态势感知和决策支持可能会造成混乱和决策瘫痪。例如，情报机构、军事组织和国家领导人自己的参谋部可能会同时使用几种不同的方法来整合 EDT 以实现态势感知。
反之，如果 EDT 产生大量信息或产生相互矛盾的见解，那么使用 EDT 进行态势感知和决策支持可能会造成混乱和决策瘫痪。例如，情报机构、军事组织和国家领导人自己的参谋部可能会同时使用几种不同的方法来整合 EDT 以实现态势感知。
In addition, the use by adversaries of the combinations of technologies that compress decision times (such as hypersonic missiles, swarm robotics, autonomous systems, or kinetic counter-space capabilities) make it very challenging for national leaders to assess, deliberate, and take action in a timely manner. Adversaries could use Al-enabled cyber operations in tandem with kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space systems to degrade and manipulate the information that is available to the decision maker. A volatile information environment, replete with fake news and deep fakes, would likely shape public perception of the crisis and therefore a decision maker's own calculations. The very same EDT capabilities could also degrade communication with allies and undermine the ability to develop new military options.
此外，对手使用压缩决策时间的技术组合（如高超音速导弹、蜂群机器人技术、自主系统或动能反太空能力），使国家领导人及时评估、审议和采取行动变得非常具有挑战性。敌人可以利用 "艾尔 "支持的网络行动，配合动能和非动能反太空系统，削弱和操纵决策者可获得的信息。一个充斥着假新闻和深度伪造的动荡信息环境很可能会影响公众对危机的看法，从而影响决策者自己的计算。同样的 EDT 能力也会削弱与盟友的沟通，削弱开发新军事方案的能力。
此外，对手使用压缩决策时间的技术组合（如高超音速导弹、蜂群机器人技术、自主系统或动能反太空能力），使国家领导人及时评估、审议和采取行动变得非常具有挑战性。敌人可以利用 "艾尔 "支持的网络行动，配合动能和非动能反太空系统，削弱和操纵决策者可获得的信息。一个充斥着假新闻和深度伪造的动荡信息环境很可能会影响公众对危机的看法，从而影响决策者自己的计算。同样的 EDT 能力也会削弱与盟友的沟通，削弱开发新军事方案的能力。
Additionally, EDTs could impact the decision maker's ability to control one's forces and execute pre-planned signalling operations during the crisis, which would affect decision makers' estimates of the potential success of different courses of action. In this regard, resilient spacebased assets could provide more reliable communication channels and increase the resilience of NC3 systems that are crucial to provide a decision maker with the ability to communicate with forces. Similarly, self-healing networks and advanced communications could provide greater confidence to decision makers that they could exert enduring command and control over their forces, even after an attack. In contrast, the combined use by an adversary of Alenabled cyber operations, non-nuclear precision strike, and kinetic and non-kinetic counterspace weapons could destroy or interfere with the operation of C2 systems, significantly undermining a decision maker's abilities to communicate with their own forces and signal resolve or restraint in a crisis.
此外，EDT 还可能影响决策者在危机期间控制部队和执行预先计划的信 号行动的能力，这将影响决策者对不同行动方案可能成功的估计。在这方面，具有复原力的天基资产可提供更可靠的通信渠道，并提高对决策者与部队通信能力至关重要的第三代国家通信系统的复原力。同样，自愈网络和先进的通信可使决策者更有信心，相信即使在遭到攻击后，他们也能对部队实施持久的指挥和控制。与此相反，如果对手联合使用 "阿里 "网络行动、非核精确打击以及动能和非动能反空间武器，就可能摧毁或干扰指挥与控制系统的运行，从而极大地削弱决策者与自己的部队进行沟通的能力，以及在危机中发出决心或克制信号的能力。
此外，EDT 还可能影响决策者在危机期间控制部队和执行预先计划的信 号行动的能力，这将影响决策者对不同行动方案可能成功的估计。在这方面，具有复原力的天基资产可提供更可靠的通信渠道，并提高对决策者与部队通信能力至关重要的第三代国家通信系统的复原力。同样，自愈网络和先进的通信可使决策者更有信心，相信即使在遭到攻击后，他们也能对部队实施持久的指挥和控制。与此相反，如果对手联合使用 "阿里 "网络行动、非核精确打击以及动能和非动能反空间武器，就可能摧毁或干扰指挥与控制系统的运行，从而极大地削弱决策者与自己的部队进行沟通的能力，以及在危机中发出决心或克制信号的能力。
In summary, EDTs can contribute to the nuclear decision-making context by facilitating deliberate decision making or hindering it. There are three pathways through which they could do so: by improving decision makers' situational awareness (and confidence in situational assessment), by facilitating consultation and the consideration of alternative courses of action, and by improving decision makers' assessments of the performance of their own forces.
总之，电子讨论可通过促进或阻碍深思熟虑的决策，为核决策做出贡献。它们可以通过三种途径实现这一目标：提高决策者对态势的认识（以及对态势评估的信心），促进磋商和对备选行动方案的考虑，以及改善决策者对自身部队表现的评估。
总之，电子讨论可通过促进或阻碍深思熟虑的决策，为核决策做出贡献。它们可以通过三种途径实现这一目标：提高决策者对态势的认识（以及对态势评估的信心），促进磋商和对备选行动方案的考虑，以及改善决策者对自身部队表现的评估。
电子讨论促进决策制定，提高对态势的认识
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电子讨论妨碍决策，增加混乱
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通过提供有关对手意图、行为和能力的更好的实时信息（或增加信心），EDT 提高了对态势的认识。
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EDT 带来信息超载、信息冲突，或削弱决策者对态势感知和评估的信心，从而阻碍决策制定。
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电子讨论支持制定和审议备选行动方案
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电子讨论妨碍方案的制定、审议和磋商
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| EDTs improve confidence in one's own forces 电子讨论组提高了对自身力量的信心 |
EDTs degrade confidence in one's forces EDT 降低了对自己部队的信心 |
These basic considerations about EDT's effects on situational awareness, the ability to deliberate and develop alternative courses of action, and the ability to use one's forces are relevant for all five decision points. Thus, the above table is applicable to all subsequent discussions about the context.
这些关于 EDT 对态势感知、斟酌和制定备选行动方案的能力以及使用部队的能力的影响的基本考虑因素与所有五个决策点都相关。因此，上表适用于随后有关背景的所有讨论。
这些关于 EDT 对态势感知、斟酌和制定备选行动方案的能力以及使用部队的能力的影响的基本考虑因素与所有五个决策点都相关。因此，上表适用于随后有关背景的所有讨论。
EDTs and decision-making choices
EDT 和决策选择
EDT 和决策选择
EDTs will also likely impact decision makers' judgment about the strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements associated with different courses of action. If greater use of EDTs helps convince decision makers that nuclear signalling can produce strategic advantages with minimal operational constraints and escalatory risks, they might tilt the balance in favour of nuclear signalling. Conversely, if EDTs contribute to an assessment that there are no advantages - and many downsides - to nuclear signalling, they may contribute to nuclear restraint. The following table summarises this reasoning.
EDT 还可能影响决策者对不同行动方案的战略利益、升级风险和作战要求的判断。如果 EDT 的更多使用有助于使决策者相信核信号可以产生战略优势，同时将作战限制和升级风险降到最低，那么它们可能会使天平向有利于核信号的方向倾斜。反之，如果电子讨论有助于评估核信号没有任何优势，反而有许多不利之处，则可能有助于核克制。下表总结了这一推理。
EDT 还可能影响决策者对不同行动方案的战略利益、升级风险和作战要求的判断。如果 EDT 的更多使用有助于使决策者相信核信号可以产生战略优势，同时将作战限制和升级风险降到最低，那么它们可能会使天平向有利于核信号的方向倾斜。反之，如果电子讨论有助于评估核信号没有任何优势，反而有许多不利之处，则可能有助于核克制。下表总结了这一推理。
| EDTs and incentives for nuclear signalling 核信号的 EDT 和激励措施 |
EDTs and incentives for nuclear restraint EDT 和核克制的激励措施 |
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EDT 有助于提高核信号的预期战略优势
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EDT 在提供替代品的同时，并未增强核信号的战略吸引力
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EDT 有助于管理或尽量减少与核信号有关的升级可能性
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EDTs can exacerbate the potential for escalation EDT 可加剧升级的可能性 |
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EDT 为核行动制定操作要求，增强信号操作成功的信心
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EDT 最大限度地减少了限制带来的运行弊端，降低了对信号成功的信心
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On the strategic advantages of nuclear signalling
核信号的战略优势
EDTs can facilitate the use of exercises and demonstrations to send nuclear messages. They could also increase the success of such operations by increasing the prominence and clarifying the meaning of a nuclear signals. For example, hacking adversary's space reconnaissance assets and pointing them at ongoing nuclear exercises could drive home the point that these exercises are important. Improved information operations, supported by deepfakes, powerful botnets, and other tools, can also reinforce the sense that nuclear escalation is very likely if the adversary crosses some red line.
电子数据传输可促进利用演习和展示来传递核信息。它们还可以通过提高核信号的显著性和澄清其含义来提高此类行动的成功率。例如，入侵对手的太空侦察资产并将其指向正在进行的核演习，就能让人明白这些演习的重要性。在深度伪造、强大的僵尸网络和其他工具的支持下，改进后的信息行动也能强化这样一种意识，即如果对手越过某些红线，核升级就很有可能发生。
电子数据传输可促进利用演习和展示来传递核信息。它们还可以通过提高核信号的显著性和澄清其含义来提高此类行动的成功率。例如，入侵对手的太空侦察资产并将其指向正在进行的核演习，就能让人明白这些演习的重要性。在深度伪造、强大的僵尸网络和其他工具的支持下，改进后的信息行动也能强化这样一种意识，即如果对手越过某些红线，核升级就很有可能发生。
EDTs can also enhance decision makers' confidence in the ability of nuclear threats to decisively influence an adversary's decision making. Space assets, autonomous and uncrewed surveillance systems, and data analytics can help reveal targets that are highly valued by the adversary and contribute to its ability to sustain military operations. These targets could then be held at risk with nuclear weapons, and signalling campaigns could be devised to communicate a willingness and ability to attack these targets.
EDT 还能增强决策者对核威胁果断影响对手决策能力的信心。太空资产、自主和非乘员监视系统以及数据分析可帮助揭示对手高度重视并有助于其维持军事行动能力的目标。然后，可以用核武器对这些目标进行威胁，并设计信号活动来传达攻击这些目标的意愿和能力。
EDT 还能增强决策者对核威胁果断影响对手决策能力的信心。太空资产、自主和非乘员监视系统以及数据分析可帮助揭示对手高度重视并有助于其维持军事行动能力的目标。然后，可以用核武器对这些目标进行威胁，并设计信号活动来传达攻击这些目标的意愿和能力。
There are certain limitations to the role of EDTs as an alternative to nuclear signals. While nuclear signals are designed to be visible and clearly communicate intent, the signals sent through the combined use of EDTs might not be read by an adversary. Because the destructive effects of EDTs are sometimes reversible and less catastrophic than nuclear weapons, the recipient of such signals may be unimpressed by them. In addition, employing certain EDTs, might not be available on a short notice or on the scale necessary to send the desired message. Employing offensive cyber tools for messaging may also make these tools unavailable if a crisis escalates into a conflict as the maximum battlefield effect of these systems can only be achieved if the capability is not revealed in advance. A related problem with multi-domain signals is linkage. For instance, war games suggest that cyber signalling is difficult because observers tend to have trouble linking action in cyber space to real-world stakes or behaviour.
EDT 在替代核信号方面的作用有一定的局限性。核信号的设计目的是让人看到并清楚地传达意图，而通过联合使用 EDT 发出的信号可能无法被对手读取。由于 EDT 的破坏效果有时是可逆的，而且其灾难性小于核武器，因此此类信号的接收者可能不会对其留下深刻印象。此外，某些 EDT 可能无法在短时间内使用，也无法达到发送所需信息所需的规模。如果危机升级为冲突，使用进攻性网络工具传递信息也可能使这些工具无法使用，因为只有在不事先暴露能力的情况下，这些系统才能发挥最大的战场效果。多域信号的一个相关问题是联动。例如，战争游戏表明，网络信号很难发出，因为观察者往往难以将网络空间的行动与现实世界的利害关系或行为联系起来。
EDT 在替代核信号方面的作用有一定的局限性。核信号的设计目的是让人看到并清楚地传达意图，而通过联合使用 EDT 发出的信号可能无法被对手读取。由于 EDT 的破坏效果有时是可逆的，而且其灾难性小于核武器，因此此类信号的接收者可能不会对其留下深刻印象。此外，某些 EDT 可能无法在短时间内使用，也无法达到发送所需信息所需的规模。如果危机升级为冲突，使用进攻性网络工具传递信息也可能使这些工具无法使用，因为只有在不事先暴露能力的情况下，这些系统才能发挥最大的战场效果。多域信号的一个相关问题是联动。例如，战争游戏表明，网络信号很难发出，因为观察者往往难以将网络空间的行动与现实世界的利害关系或行为联系起来。
Despite these limitations, EDTs might be preferrable to some decision makers because they may see similar uncertainties in nuclear signalling. Nuclear signals have a mixed track record. For instance, although Soviet leaders noticed the large-scale U.S. nuclear alert undertaken by the Strategic Air Command during the Cuban Missile crisis, they seem to have been more impressed by the general U.S. military mobilisation around the Caribbean.
尽管存在这些局限性，但对某些决策者来说，电子数据传输可能更可取，因为他们可能认为核信号也存在类似的不确定性。核信号的记录好坏参半。例如，尽管苏联领导人注意到了美国战略空军司令部在古巴导弹危机期间进行的大规模核警戒，但他们似乎对美国在加勒比海地区的总体军事动员印象更为深刻。
尽管存在这些局限性，但对某些决策者来说，电子数据传输可能更可取，因为他们可能认为核信号也存在类似的不确定性。核信号的记录好坏参半。例如，尽管苏联领导人注意到了美国战略空军司令部在古巴导弹危机期间进行的大规模核警戒，但他们似乎对美国在加勒比海地区的总体军事动员印象更为深刻。
EDTs and escalatory risks
EDT 和升级风险
There are many ways EDTs can facilitate nuclear messaging by decreasing potential escalation risks. For example, technology can create more reliable channels of communication between decision makers, which can allow rival governments to more clearly communicate intent and ensure that a demonstration of resolve is not misunderstood by the opponent. Yet, EDTs could also heighten the risk of unwanted escalation, potentially weakening the appeal of nuclear signals. Nuclear messages in conjunction with the employment of different combinations of EDTs could be misinterpreted by an adversary. For example, cyber operations against NC3, in tandem with attempts to temporarily blind adversary satellites during ongoing nuclear exercises, may be misinterpreted as preparation for a nuclear attack. Whether such signals are misinterpreted, however, is likely to depend on the broader context and the prior relationship between the belligerents. If national leaders are generally suspicious about each other's intent, and there are parallel (but possibly erroneous) signals that an attack is likely, an unwanted escalation is more likely.
EDT 可以通过多种方式降低潜在的升级风险，从而促进核信息传递。例如，技术可以在决策者之间建立更可靠的沟通渠道，使敌对政府能够更清晰地传达意图，确保所展示的决心不会被对手误解。然而，EDT 也会增加不必要的升级风险，从而可能削弱核信号的吸引力。核信息与 EDT 的不同组合可能会被对手误解。例如，针对 NC3 的网络行动，以及在正在进行的核演习中试图使对手卫星暂时失明的行动，可能会被误解为准备进行核攻击。不过，这种信号是否会被误解，很可能取决于更广泛的背景和交战双方之前的关系。如果国家领导人普遍怀疑对方的意图，而同时又有可能发动攻击的信号（但可能是错误的），那么意外升级的可能性就更大了。
EDT 可以通过多种方式降低潜在的升级风险，从而促进核信息传递。例如，技术可以在决策者之间建立更可靠的沟通渠道，使敌对政府能够更清晰地传达意图，确保所展示的决心不会被对手误解。然而，EDT 也会增加不必要的升级风险，从而可能削弱核信号的吸引力。核信息与 EDT 的不同组合可能会被对手误解。例如，针对 NC3 的网络行动，以及在正在进行的核演习中试图使对手卫星暂时失明的行动，可能会被误解为准备进行核攻击。不过，这种信号是否会被误解，很可能取决于更广泛的背景和交战双方之前的关系。如果国家领导人普遍怀疑对方的意图，而同时又有可能发动攻击的信号（但可能是错误的），那么意外升级的可能性就更大了。
EDTs as operational enablers and constraints for nuclear messaging
EDT 作为核信息传递的运行促进因素和制约因素
EDTs could also create or ameliorate the perceived need to engage in nuclear alerts, force movements, and other actions. Depending on states' particular nuclear postures and capabilities, decision makers concerned about fast-moving attacks could have strong incentives to put their nuclear forces on high alert and disperse them. This could send strong nuclear messages even if this was not the original intention of the decision maker.
EDTs 还可能造成或减轻对核警戒、部队调动和其他行动的认知需求。根据各国特定的核态势和核能力，担心受到快速攻击的决策者可能会有强烈的动机将其核力量置于高度戒备状态并加以分散。这可能会发出强烈的核信息，即使这并非决策者的初衷。
EDTs 还可能造成或减轻对核警戒、部队调动和其他行动的认知需求。根据各国特定的核态势和核能力，担心受到快速攻击的决策者可能会有强烈的动机将其核力量置于高度戒备状态并加以分散。这可能会发出强烈的核信息，即使这并非决策者的初衷。
In certain circumstances, however, EDTs may lessen operational requirements for nuclear signalling. For example, the integration of improved computing, quantum encryption, and machine learning could allow decision makers to monitor weapons and communication links in real time, increasing their confidence in the ability of their forces to perform when used, and remain secure otherwise. EDTs could also help mitigate the risks created by compressed decision times and improved first-strike capabilities. Quantum sensing and a network of autonomous anti-submarine aircraft could be used to stress-test one's sea-based deterrent
不过，在某些情况下，电子数据终端可能会降低核信号的作战要求。例如，改进型计算、量子加密和机器学习的整合可让决策者实时监控武器和通信链路，增强他们对部队能力的信心，使其能够在使用时发挥作用，在其他情况下保持安全。EDT 还能帮助减轻因决策时间压缩和先发制人能力提高而带来的风险。量子传感和自主反潜机网络可用于对海基威慑力量进行压力测试
forces, for example. Advancements in integrated air and missile defence systems (IAMDS) and early warning can significantly augment defences and make it more difficult for adversary strikes to reach their targets.
举例来说。综合防空与导弹防御系统（IAMDS）和预警系统的进步可以极大地增强防御能力，使对手的打击更加难以到达目标。
不过，在某些情况下，电子数据终端可能会降低核信号的作战要求。例如，改进型计算、量子加密和机器学习的整合可让决策者实时监控武器和通信链路，增强他们对部队能力的信心，使其能够在使用时发挥作用，在其他情况下保持安全。EDT 还能帮助减轻因决策时间压缩和先发制人能力提高而带来的风险。量子传感和自主反潜机网络可用于对海基威慑力量进行压力测试
forces, for example. Advancements in integrated air and missile defence systems (IAMDS) and early warning can significantly augment defences and make it more difficult for adversary strikes to reach their targets.
举例来说。综合防空与导弹防御系统（IAMDS）和预警系统的进步可以极大地增强防御能力，使对手的打击更加难以到达目标。
Decisions about nuclear first use
关于首次使用核武器的决定
The decision to use nuclear weapons first in a war is one of the most consequential decisions that any nuclear decision maker can ever make. Doing so would cross the nuclear threshold for the first time since 1945, undermine the nuclear taboo and heighten the risks of an all-out nuclear war.
在战争中首先使用核武器的决定是任何核决策者都可能做出的最具后果性的决定之一。这样做将自 1945 年以来首次跨越核门槛，破坏核禁忌，并增加全面核战争的风险。
在战争中首先使用核武器的决定是任何核决策者都可能做出的最具后果性的决定之一。这样做将自 1945 年以来首次跨越核门槛，破坏核禁忌，并增加全面核战争的风险。
Nuclear first use can take different forms, ranging from a nuclear demonstration that would not cause any significant physical destruction or loss of life to a more consequential (but still limited) attack that would destroy critical civilian or political infrastructure while minimizing casualties and widespread environmental contamination. The threshold for what would be considered limited is subjective. What could be considered limited nuclear use to one person or state could be seen as highly destructive to another.
核首次使用可以采取不同的形式，从不会造成任何重大物质破坏或生命损失的核展示，到会摧毁关键民用或政治基础设施，同时最大限度减少人员伤亡和大范围环境污染的更具后果性（但仍然有限）的攻击，不一而足。被视为有限的门槛是主观的。对一个人或一个国家而言可能被视为有限的核使用，但对另一个人或另一个国家而言可能被视为极具破坏性。
核首次使用可以采取不同的形式，从不会造成任何重大物质破坏或生命损失的核展示，到会摧毁关键民用或政治基础设施，同时最大限度减少人员伤亡和大范围环境污染的更具后果性（但仍然有限）的攻击，不一而足。被视为有限的门槛是主观的。对一个人或一个国家而言可能被视为有限的核使用，但对另一个人或另一个国家而言可能被视为极具破坏性。
A variety of motives might back up a decision to engage in a discriminate use of nuclear weapons. For instance, nuclear first use could be a last resort if a country is conventionally defeated or on the verge of defeat. Nuclear use could serve to shock an adversary into deescalation by 'sobering but not enraging' adversary leaders.
决定有区别地使用核武器的动机可能多种多样。例如，如果一个国家在常规战争中战败或濒临战败，首先使用核武器可能是最后的手段。使用核武器可以 "使 "对手领导人 "清醒但不愤怒"，从而起到震慑对手、缓和局势的作用。
决定有区别地使用核武器的动机可能多种多样。例如，如果一个国家在常规战争中战败或濒临战败，首先使用核武器可能是最后的手段。使用核武器可以 "使 "对手领导人 "清醒但不愤怒"，从而起到震慑对手、缓和局势的作用。
Any decision maker is likely to be under enormous political, military, public, and moral pressure to contemplate a limited nuclear use in an escalating, and potentially very costly, conventional war. While some advisers and public voices will call for restraint, others will call for using any available tool to spare lives and secure victory. As with the decision on whether to demonstrate nuclear resolve or restraint in a crisis, the combined effects of EDTs could impact a decision maker's assessment both in favour and against nuclear first use.
任何决策者都可能面临巨大的政治、军事、公众和道德压力，不得不考虑在一场不断升级且可能代价高昂的常规战争中有限地使用核武器。一些顾问和公众会呼吁克制，而另一些顾问和公众则会呼吁使用任何可用的工具来挽救生命和确保胜利。就像决定在危机中展示核决心还是保持克制一样，紧急状态技术的综合影响可能会影响决策者对首先使用核武器的支持和反对。
任何决策者都可能面临巨大的政治、军事、公众和道德压力，不得不考虑在一场不断升级且可能代价高昂的常规战争中有限地使用核武器。一些顾问和公众会呼吁克制，而另一些顾问和公众则会呼吁使用任何可用的工具来挽救生命和确保胜利。就像决定在危机中展示核决心还是保持克制一样，紧急状态技术的综合影响可能会影响决策者对首先使用核武器的支持和反对。
EDTs and the decision-making context
电子讨论组和决策背景
As in the scenario of nuclear signalling, EDTs could impact the context surrounding a first use decision by affecting decision makers' confidence in the assessment of adversary intent, capabilities, and actions, by facilitating deliberate decision-making, and by influencing decision makers' confidence in the ability to control one's forces.
与核信号情景中的情况一样，电子数据终端可影响决策者对对手意图、能力和行动评估的信心，促进深思熟虑的决策，并影响决策者对控制自身部队能力的信心，从而影响首次使用决策的背景。
电子讨论组和决策背景
As in the scenario of nuclear signalling, EDTs could impact the context surrounding a first use decision by affecting decision makers' confidence in the assessment of adversary intent, capabilities, and actions, by facilitating deliberate decision-making, and by influencing decision makers' confidence in the ability to control one's forces.
与核信号情景中的情况一样，电子数据终端可影响决策者对对手意图、能力和行动评估的信心，促进深思熟虑的决策，并影响决策者对控制自身部队能力的信心，从而影响首次使用决策的背景。
First, EDTs could support assessments of whether limited use would decisively induce an adversary to de-escalate. Such assessments could draw on situational awareness and data fusion technologies to examine the impact of limited use on adversary decision makers,
首先，EDT 可支持评估有限使用是否会决定性地促使对手降级。此类评估可利用态势感知和数据融合技术，研究有限使用对敌方决策者的影响、
domestic politics, and the military balance. In some circumstances the combination of EDTs that support better situational assessment could disincentivise a decision maker from nuclear use by providing more accurate data on the situation on the battlefield than in a situation in which the decision maker did not have such technologies at its disposal.
在某些情况下，支持更好态势评估的电子数据传输系统可提供更准确的战场态势数据，从而抑制决策者使用核武器。在某些情况下，支持更好态势评估的电子数据传输设备的组合，可提供比决策者在没有此类技术的情况下更准确的战场态势数据，从而抑制决策者使用核武器。
首先，EDT 可支持评估有限使用是否会决定性地促使对手降级。此类评估可利用态势感知和数据融合技术，研究有限使用对敌方决策者的影响、
domestic politics, and the military balance. In some circumstances the combination of EDTs that support better situational assessment could disincentivise a decision maker from nuclear use by providing more accurate data on the situation on the battlefield than in a situation in which the decision maker did not have such technologies at its disposal.
在某些情况下，支持更好态势评估的电子数据传输系统可提供更准确的战场态势数据，从而抑制决策者使用核武器。在某些情况下，支持更好态势评估的电子数据传输设备的组合，可提供比决策者在没有此类技术的情况下更准确的战场态势数据，从而抑制决策者使用核武器。
Second, EDTs could facilitate deliberate decision-making about limited use under time compressed conditions. In addition to supporting consultation with allies and internal stakeholders, EDTs could be used to assess the strategic and military impact of a range of nuclear and non-nuclear courses of action. Such decision support tools could lower the nuclear threshold by highlighting the potential advantages of nuclear escalation. For instance, decision makers could use real time data on adversary military activities to assess the impact of limited nuclear use on the prospects for defeating adversary conventional forces. Similar assessments could be done to minimise the risks of collateral damage and damage to one's own forces or allied forces. While it is uncertain how a decision maker's own predilections and 'gut feeling' will interact with advice provided by machines, a decision maker may be heavily influenced by systems that provide a compelling pathway to avoiding defeat, prologuing a conflict.
其次，电子讨论可促进在时间紧迫的条件下就有限的使用做出深思熟虑的决策。除了支持与盟国和内部利益攸关方的磋商外，电子讨论还可用于评估一系列核与非核行动方案的战略和军事影响。此类决策支持工具可通过强调核升级的潜在优势来降低核门槛。例如，决策者可利用对手军事活动的实时数据，评估有限核使用对击败对手常规部队前景的影响。还可以进行类似的评估，以最大限度地降低附带损害和对己方部队或盟军造成损害的风险。虽然决策者自身的偏好和 "直觉 "如何与机器提供的建议相互作用尚不确定，但决策者可能会受到系统的严重影响，因为系统提供了令人信服的避免失败的途径，从而延长了冲突的时间。
其次，电子讨论可促进在时间紧迫的条件下就有限的使用做出深思熟虑的决策。除了支持与盟国和内部利益攸关方的磋商外，电子讨论还可用于评估一系列核与非核行动方案的战略和军事影响。此类决策支持工具可通过强调核升级的潜在优势来降低核门槛。例如，决策者可利用对手军事活动的实时数据，评估有限核使用对击败对手常规部队前景的影响。还可以进行类似的评估，以最大限度地降低附带损害和对己方部队或盟军造成损害的风险。虽然决策者自身的偏好和 "直觉 "如何与机器提供的建议相互作用尚不确定，但决策者可能会受到系统的严重影响，因为系统提供了令人信服的避免失败的途径，从而延长了冲突的时间。
Third, the decision to use nuclear weapon first could also be shaped by a decision maker's calculation on their ability to control nuclear forces and execute a first nuclear strike. This calculus might be impacted by the use of technologies that accelerate the conflict and compress decision times (such as hypersonic missiles, swarm robotics, autonomous systems, or kinetic counter-space capabilities) and also by those technologies that incentivise early and decisive steps to achieve dominance in the initial phase of war. The concerns that an adversary's non-nuclear actions might undermine the ability to execute nuclear strikes later in a conflict could push the decision maker to use nuclear weapons earlier than anticipated. Alternatively, if the adversary succeeded in using EDTs to significantly undermine the decisionmaker's ability to communicate with its own nuclear forces, the decision maker might lose confidence in the ability to execute limited nuclear strike. This might convince a decision maker to refrain from nuclear strikes.
第三，决策者对其控制核力量和实施首次核打击能力的计算也可能影响首先使用核武器的决定。加速冲突和压缩决策时间的技术（如高超音速导弹、蜂群机器人技术、自主系统或动能反太空能力）的使用，以及鼓励尽早采取决定性步骤以在战争初始阶段取得主导地位的技术的使用，都可能对这种计算产生影响。对手的非核行动可能会削弱冲突后期实施核打击的能力，这种担忧可能会促使决策者比预期更早使用核武器。另一种情况是，如果对手成功利用 EDT 大大削弱了决策者与本国核力量的通信能力，决策者可能会对实施有限核打击的能力失去信心。这可能会说服决策者避免核打击。
第三，决策者对其控制核力量和实施首次核打击能力的计算也可能影响首先使用核武器的决定。加速冲突和压缩决策时间的技术（如高超音速导弹、蜂群机器人技术、自主系统或动能反太空能力）的使用，以及鼓励尽早采取决定性步骤以在战争初始阶段取得主导地位的技术的使用，都可能对这种计算产生影响。对手的非核行动可能会削弱冲突后期实施核打击的能力，这种担忧可能会促使决策者比预期更早使用核武器。另一种情况是，如果对手成功利用 EDT 大大削弱了决策者与本国核力量的通信能力，决策者可能会对实施有限核打击的能力失去信心。这可能会说服决策者避免核打击。
EDTs and decision-making choices
EDT 和决策选择
EDTs could impact the prospects for limited first use by affecting how decision makers assess the advantages, disadvantages, and requirements of first use relative to other courses of action.
通过影响决策者如何评估首次使用相对于其他行动方案的利弊和要求，EDT 可能会影响有限首次使用的前景。
通过影响决策者如何评估首次使用相对于其他行动方案的利弊和要求，EDT 可能会影响有限首次使用的前景。
| EDTs and incentives for a nuclear first use 核首次使用的替代技术和激励措施 |
EDTs and incentives for nuclear restraint EDT 和核克制的激励措施 |
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EDT 有助于提高人们对有限使用战略优势的认识
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EDT 为实现政治和军事目标提供了替代途径
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EDT 为管理进一步升级的风险提供了更大的信心
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EDTs 加剧了人们对首次使用核武器后局势更有可能升级的担忧
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EDT 增强了对有限使用成功的信心，有助于减轻操作后果
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EDT 降低了成功实施首次打击的信心，并带来了作战挑战
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EDTs and the strategic appeal of limited use
EDT 和有限使用的战略吸引力
EDT 和有限使用的战略吸引力
In theory, leveraging the combined effects of EDTs may provide an alternative to a limited nuclear strike to avoid military defeat or inflict one's own will on an adversary to finish the conflict on favourable terms. Temporary disruption of an adversary's C2, including NC3, ISR capabilities, and communication lines through AI-enabled cyber operations or non-kinetic counter-space attacks could send a message to an adversary about the risks of continued fighting, while also forestalling a conventional defeat. EDTs may also augment non-nuclear operations to generate effects similar to a limited nuclear strike. Different combinations of AIenabled cyber strikes, kinetic and non-kinetic counter-space attacks, and non-nuclear precision strikes, including hypersonic missiles, could destroy or disrupt an adversary's C2 nodes, military infrastructure and forces. The destructive effects of this would be comparable to a nuclear attack, in terms of the military effect.
从理论上讲，利用 EDTs 的综合效应可提供一种替代有限核打击的方法，以避免军事失败，或将自己的意志强加给对手，从而以有利条件结束冲突。通过人工智能支持的网络行动或非动能反太空攻击，暂时破坏对手的 C2（包括 NC3）、ISR 能力和通信线路，可以向对手发出继续战斗的风险信息，同时也可防止常规战败。EDT 还可增强非核行动，产生类似于有限核打击的效果。人工智能支持的网络攻击、动能和非动能反太空攻击以及包括高超音速导弹在内的非核精确打击的不同组合，可以摧毁或破坏对手的 C2 节点、军事基础设施和部队。就军事效果而言，其破坏性可与核攻击相媲美。
从理论上讲，利用 EDTs 的综合效应可提供一种替代有限核打击的方法，以避免军事失败，或将自己的意志强加给对手，从而以有利条件结束冲突。通过人工智能支持的网络行动或非动能反太空攻击，暂时破坏对手的 C2（包括 NC3）、ISR 能力和通信线路，可以向对手发出继续战斗的风险信息，同时也可防止常规战败。EDT 还可增强非核行动，产生类似于有限核打击的效果。人工智能支持的网络攻击、动能和非动能反太空攻击以及包括高超音速导弹在内的非核精确打击的不同组合，可以摧毁或破坏对手的 C2 节点、军事基础设施和部队。就军事效果而言，其破坏性可与核攻击相媲美。
Under certain circumstances, the combined interactions of EDTs by an adversary could deter states from attempting a limited nuclear attack. For instance, by fielding a high-density integrated air and missile defence network that takes advantage of AI-enabled ISR data and swarms of interceptors, an adversary could convince an attacker that a very limited nuclear attack would fail. The attacker would then have to consider whether to back down or conduct a larger nuclear strike, risking further escalation. Both scenarios present difficult choices and could convince an attacker to favour restraint.
在某些情况下，敌方的电子数据终端的联合互动可阻止各国尝试进行有限的核攻击。例如，利用人工智能支持的 ISR 数据和成群的拦截器，通过部署高密度的综合防空和导弹防御网络，对手可以让攻击者相信，非常有限的核攻击将失败。这样，攻击者就不得不考虑是退缩还是进行更大规模的核打击，从而冒着事态进一步升级的风险。这两种情况都会带来困难的选择，并可能说服攻击者选择克制。
在某些情况下，敌方的电子数据终端的联合互动可阻止各国尝试进行有限的核攻击。例如，利用人工智能支持的 ISR 数据和成群的拦截器，通过部署高密度的综合防空和导弹防御网络，对手可以让攻击者相信，非常有限的核攻击将失败。这样，攻击者就不得不考虑是退缩还是进行更大规模的核打击，从而冒着事态进一步升级的风险。这两种情况都会带来困难的选择，并可能说服攻击者选择克制。
Although non-nuclear capabilities supported by EDTs could generate comparable military effects to a nuclear attack, they may have less psychological impact than nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have a unique political and symbolic cachet that is not yet matched by any conventional weapon. Decision makers may thus find that a nuclear option stands alone among the alternatives.
虽然 EDT 支持的非核能力可产生与核攻击相当的军事效果，但其心理影响可能不如核武器。核武器具有独特的政治和象征意义，这是任何常规武器都无法比拟的。因此，决策者可能会发现，在各种选择中，核选择是独一无二的。
虽然 EDT 支持的非核能力可产生与核攻击相当的军事效果，但其心理影响可能不如核武器。核武器具有独特的政治和象征意义，这是任何常规武器都无法比拟的。因此，决策者可能会发现，在各种选择中，核选择是独一无二的。
EDTs might also enhance the appeal of nuclear escalation. Pairing a nuclear attack with operations in other domains could amplify the psychological and military impact while limiting the ability of the adversary to respond quickly. EDTs could also be used to fine-tune the targeting of a nuclear attack for maximum effect.
EDT 还可能增强核升级的吸引力。将核攻击与其他领域的行动结合起来，可以扩大心理和军事影响，同时限制对手的快速反应能力。EDT 还可用于微调核攻击目标，以取得最大效果。
EDT 还可能增强核升级的吸引力。将核攻击与其他领域的行动结合起来，可以扩大心理和军事影响，同时限制对手的快速反应能力。EDT 还可用于微调核攻击目标，以取得最大效果。
EDTs and the escalation risks of limited first use
EDT 和有限首次使用的升级风险
EDTs could help manage the escalation risks of a limited nuclear attack in several ways, including those discussed above. In addition, EDTs could help manage escalation risks by reducing the collateral damage of a nuclear attack. For instance, a limited nuclear attack could be made more limited by pairing the strike with non-nuclear attacks and attacks in space and cyber space. Such an attack might generate a larger military impact while still leveraging the psychological impact of crossing the nuclear threshold. EDTs could also reduce escalation risks by facilitating the ability of the targets of attacks to respond with restraint. Hypersonic strike systems that avoid missile defences could allow limited attacks to proceed without a preceding campaign to physically destroy an adversary's air defences. EDTs could also facilitate postattack assessments by providing real-time information on effects and adversary responses.
EDT 可通过多种方式帮助管理有限核攻击的升级风险，包括上文讨论的那些方式。此外，EDT 还可以通过减少核攻击的附带损害来帮助管理升级风险。例如，在有限核打击的同时，还可发动非核打击以及太空和网络空间攻击，从而使核打击更加有限。这样的攻击可能会产生更大的军事影响，同时仍可利用跨越核门槛的心理影响。EDT 还可通过提高攻击目标克制应对的能力来降低升级风险。可避开导弹防御系统的高超音速打击系统可使有限的攻击得以进行，而无需先行摧毁对手的防空系统。EDT 还可通过提供有关效果和对手反应的实时信息，促进攻击后评估。
EDT 可通过多种方式帮助管理有限核攻击的升级风险，包括上文讨论的那些方式。此外，EDT 还可以通过减少核攻击的附带损害来帮助管理升级风险。例如，在有限核打击的同时，还可发动非核打击以及太空和网络空间攻击，从而使核打击更加有限。这样的攻击可能会产生更大的军事影响，同时仍可利用跨越核门槛的心理影响。EDT 还可通过提高攻击目标克制应对的能力来降低升级风险。可避开导弹防御系统的高超音速打击系统可使有限的攻击得以进行，而无需先行摧毁对手的防空系统。EDT 还可通过提供有关效果和对手反应的实时信息，促进攻击后评估。
Conversely, heavy reliance on EDTs could also increase the escalation risks of limited use. Even with direct communication channels, an adversary may perceive a limited nuclear strike as a prelude to a disarming counter-force strike, provoking an array of responses that limit the ability to further control the pace of fighting. Finally, EDTs might create unanticipated
相反，严重依赖 EDT 也会增加有限使用的升级风险。即使有直接的沟通渠道，对手也可能将有限的核打击视为解除武装的反武力打击的前奏，从而引发一系列反应，限制进一步控制战斗节奏的能力。最后，EDT 可能会造成意想不到的后果。
相反，严重依赖 EDT 也会增加有限使用的升级风险。即使有直接的沟通渠道，对手也可能将有限的核打击视为解除武装的反武力打击的前奏，从而引发一系列反应，限制进一步控制战斗节奏的能力。最后，EDT 可能会造成意想不到的后果。