our science are justified; but of these claims themselves Kant has not made the criticism. I mean that he took for granted the idea of a science that is one, capable of binding with the same force all the parts of what is given, and of co-ordinating them into a system presenting on all sides an equal solidity. He did not consider, in his Critique of Pure Reason, that science became less and less objective, more and more symbolical, to the extent that it went from the physical to the vital, from the vital to the psychical. Experience does not move, to his view, in two different and perhaps opposite ways, the one conformable to the direction of the intellect, the other contrary to it. There is, for him, only one experience, and the intellect covers its whole ground. This is what Kant expresses by saying that all our intuitions are sensuous, or, in other words, infra-intellectual. And this would have to be admitted, indeed, if our science presented in all its parts an equal objectivity. But suppose, on the contrary, that science is less and less objective, more and more symbolical, as it goes from the physical to the psychical, passing through the vital: then, as it is indeed necessary to perceive a thing somehow in order to symbolize it, there would be an intuition of the psychical, and more generally of the vital, which the intellect would transpose and translate, no doubt, but which would none the less transcend the intellect. There would be, in other words, a supra-intellectual intuition. If this intuition exist, a taking possession of the spirit by itself is possible, and no longer only a knowledge that is external and phenomenal. What is more, if we have an intuition of this kind (I mean an ultra-intellectual intuition) then sensuous intuition is likely to be in continuity with it through certain intermediaries, as the infra-red is continuous with the ultraviolet. Sensuous intuition itself, therefore, is promoted. It will no longer attain only the phantom of an unattainable thing-in-itself. It is (provided we bring to it certain indispensable corrections) into the absolute itself that it will introduce us. So long as it was regarded as the only material of our science, it reflected back on all science something of the relativity which strikes a scientific knowledge of spirit; and thus the perception of bodies, which is the beginning of the science of bodies, seemed itself to be relative. Relative, therefore, seemed to be sensuous intuition. But this is not the case if distinctions are made between the different sciences, and if the scientific knowledge of the spiritual (and also, consequently, of the vital) be regarded as the more or less artificial extension of a certain manner of knowing which, applied to bodies, is not at all symbolical. Let us go further: if there are thus two intuitions of different order (the second being obtained by a reversal of the direction of the first), and if it is toward the second that the intellect naturally inclines, there is no essential difference between the intellect and this intuition itself. The barriers between the matter of sensible knowledge and its form are lowered, as also between the ‘pure forms’ of sensibility and the categories of the understanding. The matter and form of intellectual knowledge (restricted to its own object) are seen to be engendering each
但康德并没有对这些主张本身进行批判。我的意思是说，他想当然地认为科学是一体的，能够以同样的力量把所给定的东西的所有部分结合起来，并把它们协调成一个在所有方面都呈现出同等稳固性的体系。他在《纯粹理性批判》中没有考虑到，科学从物理到生命，从生命到心理，变得越来越不客观，越来越符号化。在他看来，经验并不是以两种不同的、也许是相反的方式运动的，一种符合理智的方向，另一种则与之背道而驰。对他来说，只有一种经验，而理智涵盖了它的全部内容。这就是康德所说的我们所有的直观都是感性的，或者换句话说，都是非智力的。如果我们的科学在其所有部分都呈现出同等的客观性，那么这一点确实是必须承认的。但是，相反地，假设科学从物质到精神，通过生命体，越来越不客观，越来越符号化：那么，由于确实有必要以某种方式感知一个事物，以便将其符号化，就会有一种精神的直觉，更广泛地说，是生命体的直觉，毫无疑问，理智会将其转译和翻译，但它同样会超越理智。换句话说，这就是一种超智力的直觉。如果这种直觉存在，那么对精神本身的占有就是可能的，而不再仅仅是外在的和现象的知识。 更重要的是，如果我们有这样一种直觉（我指的是超智性直觉），那么感性直觉很可能通过某些中介与之相通，就像红外线与紫外线相通一样。因此，感性直观本身也会得到提升。感性直观不再仅仅是一种无法实现的幻象。它将把我们引入绝对本身（只要我们对它进行某些不可或缺的修正）。只要它被视为我们科学的唯一素材，它就会在所有科学中反映出某种相对性，而这种相对性会冲击对精神的科学认识；因此，作为身体科学开端的对身体的感知本身似乎就是相对的。因此，相对性似乎就是感性直观。但是，如果把不同的科学区分开来，如果把对精神（进而对生命）的科学认识看作是某种认识方式或多或少的人为延伸，那么情况就不是这样了，这种认识方式应用于身体时，完全不是象征性的。再进一步说：如果存在着两种不同顺序的直观（第二种直观是通过颠倒第一种直观的方向而获得的），如果理智自然而然地倾向于第二种直观，那么理智和这种直观本身并没有本质的区别。感性知识的内容与其形式之间的壁垒降低了，感性的 "纯粹形式 "与理解范畴之间的壁垒也降低了。知识的内容和形式（仅限于其自身的对象）被认为是相互产生的。
other by a reciprocal adaptation, intellect modelling itself on corporeity, and corporeity on intellect.
智力以肉体为模型，肉体以智力为模型。

But this duality of intuition Kant neither would nor could admit. It would have been necessary, in order to admit it, to regard duration as the very stuff of reality, and consequently to distinguish between the substantial duration of things and time spread out in space. It would have been necessary to regard space itself, and the geometry which is immanent in space, as an ideal limit in the direction of which material things develop, but which they do not actually attain. Nothing could be more contrary to the letter, and perhaps also to the spirit, of the Critique of Pure Reason. No doubt, knowledge is presented to us in it as an ever-open roll, experience as a push of facts that is for ever going on. But, according to Kant, these facts are spread out on one plane as fast as they arise; they are external to each other and external to the mind. Of a knowledge from within, that could grasp them in their springing forth instead of taking them already sprung, that would dig beneath space and spatialised time, there is never any question. Yet it is indeed beneath this plane that our consciousness places us; there flows true duration.
但是，康德既不愿意也不可能承认这种直观的二重性。为了承认这种二重性，就必须把持续时间看作是现实的本质，从而区分事物的实质持续时间和在空间中展开的时间。为了承认这一点，就必须把空间本身和寓于空间之中的几何学看作是一种理想的界限，物质事物朝着这个界限发展，但实际上并没有达到这个界限。没有什么比这更违背《纯粹理性批判》的文字，或许还有精神了。毫无疑问，在《纯粹理性批判》中，知识是作为永远敞开的卷轴呈现在我们面前的，经验是作为事实的推动力不断向前发展的。但是，康德认为，这些事实一出现就在一个平面上散布开来，它们彼此是外在的，也是外在于心灵的。要想从内部获得知识，在它们涌现的时候就抓住它们，而不是把它们当作已经涌现的东西，在空间和空间化的时间之下挖掘它们，这是毫无疑问的。然而，我们的意识确实将我们置于这个平面之下；在那里，流淌着真正的持续时间。

In this respect, also, Kant is very near his predecessors. Between the nontemporal, and the time that is spread out in distinct moments, he admits no mean. And as there is indeed no intuition that carries us into the nontemporal, all intuition is thus found to be sensuous, by definition. But between physical existence, which is spread out in space, and non-temporal existence, which can only be a conceptual and logical existence like that of which metaphysical dogmatism speaks, is there not room for consciousness and for life? There is, unquestionably. We perceive it when we place ourselves in duration in order to go from that duration to moments, instead of starting from moments in order to bind them again and to construct duration.
在这方面，康德也非常接近他的前辈。在非时间性与分散在不同时刻的时间之间，他不承认任何平均。由于确实没有直观能把我们带入非时间性，因此根据定义，所有直观都是感性的。但是，物质存在是在空间中展开的，而非时间存在只能是形而上学教条主义所说的那种概念性和逻辑性的存在，在这两者之间，难道就没有意识和生命的空间吗？毫无疑问，是有的。当我们把自己置身于时空之中，以便从时空走向瞬间，而不是从瞬间出发，以便再次把它们捆绑在一起并构建时空时，我们就会感知到它。

Yet it was to a non-temporal intuition that the immediate successors of Kant turned, in order to escape from the Kantian relativism. Certainly, the ideas of becoming, of progress, of evolution, seem to occupy a large place in their philosophy. But does duration really play a part in it? Real duration is that in which each form flows out of previous forms, while adding to them something new, and is explained by them as much as it explains them; but to deduce this form directly from one complete Being which it is supposed to manifest, is to return to Spinozism. It is, like Leibniz and Spinoza, to deny to duration all efficient action. The post-Kantian philosophy, severe as it may have been on the mechanistic theories, accepts from mechanism the idea of a science that is one and the same for all kinds of reality. And it is nearer to mechanism than it imagines; for though, in the consideration of matter, of life and of thought, it replaces the successive degrees of complexity that mechanism supposed, by degrees of the realization of an Idea or by degrees of the objectification of a Will, it still speaks of degrees, and these degrees are those of a scale which Being traverses in a single direction. In short, it makes out the same articulations in nature that mechanism does.
然而，康德的直接继承者们为了摆脱康德的相对主义，转向了非时间直观。当然，"成为"、"进步 "和 "进化 "的思想似乎在他们的哲学中占据了重要位置。但是，持续时间真的在其中起作用吗？真正的持续时间是指每一种形式都从先前的形式中流出，同时又为先前的形式增添了新的东西，并且在解释先前的形式的同时也被先前的形式所解释；但是，如果直接从一个完整的存在中推导出这种形式，而这种形式又被认为是完整的存在的体现，那就回到了斯宾诺莎主义。这就像莱布尼茨和斯宾诺莎一样，否定了一切有效作用的持续时间。后康德哲学，尽管可能对机械论的理论很严厉，但它从机制中接受了一种科学的思想，这种科学对各种现实都是一视同仁的。后康德哲学比它想象的更接近于机械论；因为，虽然在对物质、生命和思想的思考中，后康德哲学用理念的实现程度或意志的对象化程度取代了机械论所假定的复杂性的连续程度，但它仍然在谈论程度，而且这些程度是存在者在单一方向上所穿越的尺度的程度。简而言之，它在自然界中提出了与机制相同的衔接。

Of mechanism it retains the whole design; it merely gives it a different colouring. But it is the design itself, or at least one half of the design, that needs to be re-made.
在机制上，它保留了整个设计，只是给它换了一种颜色。但需要重新制作的是设计本身，或至少是设计的一半。

If we are to do that, we must give up the method of construction, which was that of Kant’s successors. We must appeal to experience - an experience purified, or, in other words, released, where necessary, from the moulds that our intellect has formed in the degree and proportion of the progress of our action on things. An experience of this kind is not a non-temporal experience. It only seeks, beyond the spatialised time in which we believe we see continual rearrangements between the parts, that concrete duration in which a radical recasting of the whole is always going on. It follows the real in all its sinuosities. It does not lead us, like the method of construction, to higher and higher generalities - piled-up stories of a magnificent building. But then it leaves no play between the explanations it suggests and the objects it has to explain. It is the detail of the real, and no longer only the whole in a lump, that it claims to illumine.
如果要做到这一点，我们就必须放弃康德的继承者们所采用的建构方法。我们必须诉诸经验--一种经过净化的经验，或者说，在必要时，从我们的理智按照我们对事物的作用的程度和比例所形成的模子中解放出来的经验。这种体验并不是非时间性的体验。它只是在空间化的时间之外寻找一种具体的持续时间，在这个时间里，整体的彻底重塑一直在进行。它追随的是现实中的所有曲折。它不会像建筑方法那样，把我们引向越来越高的概括--一座宏伟建筑的层层堆砌。但是，它所建议的解释与它所要解释的对象之间没有任何联系。它声称要照亮的是现实的细节，而不再只是囫囵吞枣的整体。