The Kuomintang-Communist United Front in Malaya during the National Salvation Period, 1937-1941
马来亚抗日民族统一战线（1937-1941）

While it can be accepted that the politics of the hua-ch'iao or overseas Chinese in Malaya during the pre-war period generally reflected the politics of China (overseas Chinese responses to such events as the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, the May Fourth Incident of 1919, the Tsinan Affair of 1928 and the Mukden Incident of 1931 strongly substantiate this), this quality of hua-ch'iao politics can give rise to misleading assumptions regarding other events. The Kuomintang (Nationalist)-Communist united front during the Sino-Japanese War is a case in point.
尽管可以接受的是，战前时期马来亚的华侨或海外华人的政治通常反映了中国政治（海外华人对 1911 年中国革命、1915 年二十一条、1919 年五四运动、1928 年济南事件和 1931 年九一八事变等事件的反应强烈地证实了这一点）， 华侨政治的这种性质可能会导致对其他事件的误解。国共在抗日战争期间的统一战线就是一个典型的例子。

Earlier accounts on the subject strongly imply that the Nationalist-Communist collaboration in China was fully extended to Malaya. Observes G. Z. Hanrahan, for example:
国民党和共产党的合作关系一直延伸到马来亚。例如，G. Z. Hanrahan 观察到:

In another study entitled Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War 1948-1960, E. O'Ballance states: "As the Communists and Nationalists were collaborating in China . . . the two political parties followed suit in Malaya and Singapore ....." L. W. Pye also gives the impression that the Kuomintang-Communist front was fully extended to Malaya when he writes: "Calling for collaboration with the previously hated Kuomintang, the MCP threw its full organisational strength behind the effort to raise funds for the war in China." Even the more recent studies by C. B. MacLane and Y. Akashi which touch on Kuomintang-Communist activities during the Sino-Japanese War do not provide sufficient information on the formation and the operations of the united front.
在另一项题为“马来亚：1948-1960 年的共产党叛乱战争”的研究中，E. 奥巴伦斯指出：“由于共产党和国民党在中国正在合作......这两个政党也在马来亚和新加坡步调一致……”李文培也给人们留下了一种印象，即当他写道：“呼吁与以前憎恨的国民党合作，马来亚共产党全力以赴，筹集资金支援中国战争。” 即使是麦克莱恩和赤石最近的研究 ，他们在触及中日战争期间国共活动时，也没有提供关于统一战线的形成和运作的足够信息。

Since the appearance of these studies, sufficient material on the subject has become available, enabling new light to be shed on it. The aim of this paper is, therefore, to ascertain the extent to which the united front between the Kuomintang of China (KMTC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was reflected by the Kuomintang in Malaya (KMTM) and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP).
自这些研究问世以来，有关该主题的充足资料已经面世，使人们得以对其有新的认识。因此，本文的目的是查明中国国民党 (KMTC) 和中国共产党 (CCP) 之间的统一战线在何种程度上反映在马来亚国民党 (KMTM) 和马来亚共产党 (MCP) 之间。

An examination of available data pertaining mostly to united front activities in Singapore shows that they modify earlier perceptions of the magnitude of the alliance in Malaya. They strongly indicate that the nature and duration of the KMTM-MCP collaboration were quite limited.
可用的数据主要与新加坡的统一战线活动有关，对其进行检验表明，它们修正了人们先前对马来亚联盟规模的看法。这些数据强烈表明，国民党马来亚共产党和马来亚共产党之间的合作性质和持续时间非常有限。

To begin with, we need to establish when the cooperation between the two parties began in Malaya. In order to do so it would first be necessary to be clear on when the united front between the KMTC and the CCP commenced in China. According to L. P. Van Slyke :
首先，我们需要确定这两个党派在马来亚的合作始于何时。为此，首先需要明确中国共产党与马来亚共产党之间的统一战线何时开始。根据 L. P. Van Slyke 的说法：

The final touches were put to the KMT-CCP agreement during August and September [1937]. On August 25, the Red Army became the Eighth Route Army (later also called the Eighteenth Group Army), under the nominal command of the National Government. On September 22, the Nationalist Government released the CCP's 'Manifesto on KMT-CCP Cooperation', which reiterated the CCP's concessions: (a) to strive for the realization of Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles (San-min-chu-i); (b) to abandon its policies of armed revolt, sovietization, and forcible confiscation of landlord's land; (c) to abolish the present soviet government; and to abolish the term 'Red Army' and place Communist troops under government command. Chiang Kai-shek responded the following day, praising the statement as a 'triumph of national sentiment over every other consideration.?
八路军编入国民革命军序列，并于 9 月 22 日改称国民革命军第十八集团军，由国民政府名义统率。9 月 22 日，国民政府发表了中共的《关于国共合作宣言》，重申中共的让步：（a）为实现孙中山的三民主义而努力；（b）放弃武装暴动、苏维埃化和强行没收地主的土地的政策；（c） 废除现有的苏维埃政权； 废除“红军”称号，将共产党军队置于政府指挥之下。蒋介石次日做出回应，赞扬该声明是“民族情感战胜一切其他考虑的胜利”。

of China Relief Fund of the South Seas - which emerged in October 1937 and October 1938 respectively. But they neither served as "the remitting agency for the entire Malayan Chinese community" as Pye suggests nor "came under Leftist domination" as Hanrahan suggests. The fact is that practically all fund-raising activities were centred around the state China Relief Fund Associations which were set up before October 1937. They were the remitting agencies for hua-ch iao funds. See S. Leong, "Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937-1941", Ch. v.
中国南洋救济基金，分别成立于 1937 年 10 月和 1938 年 10 月。但它们既不像皮耶所说的那样“充当整个马来亚华人社区的汇款代理机构”，也不像汉拉汉所说的那样“受到左翼的控制”。事实上，几乎所有的筹款活动都是围绕着 1937 年 10 月之前成立的各州中国救济基金会进行的。它们是华侨募捐的汇款机构。见李盛，“马来亚的海外华人民族主义，1937-1941”，第五章。

Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966) and The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941 (Lawrence, Kansas, Kansas University Press, 1970).
苏维埃在东南亚的战略（新泽西州普林斯顿，普林斯顿大学出版社，1966 年）和南洋华侨救亡运动，1937-1941 年（堪萨斯州劳伦斯，堪萨斯大学出版社，1970 年）。

While the KMTM was a branch of the KMTC, the MCP was not a branch of the CCP but "an affiliate of the Communist International". However, owing to the fact that the origins of the Communist movement in Malaya began from China and that it was almost exclusively a Chinese movement, the MCP shared the aspirations of the Communists in China.
虽然国民党马来亚支部是国民党的一个分支，但马来亚共产党并非中国共产党的支部，而是“共产国际的一个附属”。然而，由于马来亚共产党运动起源于中国，并且几乎完全是由华人组成，因此马来亚共产党与中国共产党有着共同的理想。

For the status of the MCP in the Communist International and its organisational structure, see Ma-lai-ya ch'u-pan she, Ma-lai-ya kung-ch'an-tang chang-ch'eng yü t'ieh-ti chi-lü (Singapore, Ma-lai-ya ch'u-pan-she, 1945). The 1934 Constitution was issued by the Sixth Plenary Session of the MCP's Central Committee in March of that year. An English translation of this document is available in Hanrahan, pp. 151-162.
马共在共产国际中的地位及其组织结构，参见马来亚出版社出版的《马来亚共产党章程与铁纪律》（新加坡，马来亚出版社，1945 年）。1934 年 3 月，马来亚共产党中央委员会第六次全体会议发布了 1934 年宪法。这份文件的英文翻译收录在韩瑞翰的著作中，第 151-162 页。

L.P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 92-93; see also J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 231-232 and Wang Chien-ming, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang shih-kao (Taipei, National Cheng-chih University, 1965), III, 179.
```zh-CN L.P. Van Slyke，《敌人与朋友：中国共产党历史中的统一战线》（斯坦福，加利福尼亚州，斯坦福大学出版社，1967 年），第 92-93 页；另见 J. Ch'en，《毛泽东与中国革命》（纽约，牛津大学出版社，1965 年），第 231-232 页，王健民，《中国共产党史稿》（台北，国立政治大学，1965 年），第三卷，第 179 页。 ```

In view of this statement we can accept that the KMTC-CCP collaboration began in late August 1937 when the Red Army became part of the National Government's army. As for the KMTM-MCP united front, it appears that the KMT Central did not direct the Malayan branches until September, and as we shall presently see, the two parties did not begin to cooperate until October 1937.
鉴于此声明，我们可以接受 KMTC-CCP 合作始于 1937 年 8 月下旬，当时红军成为国民政府军的一部分。至于国民党马来亚支部，似乎国民党中央直到 9 月才发出了指示， 正如我们现在所看到的，这两党直到 1937 年 10 月才开始合作。

One factor for the limited united front was the organisational problems which both parties faced during the months immediately following the outbreak of war. Unlike in China where the KMTC and the CCP had far more favourable conditions to organise and to carry out their activities, the situation in Malaya was unfavourable for the KMTM and the MCP. In the case of the KMTM, party development suffered major setbacks during the Clementi Administration (1930-34) owing to the Governor's strict prohibition of KMT activities in the country. Disregard for the official ban caused Perak leaders Teh Lay Seng (Cheng Lo-sheng) and Loh Chi Kai (Lo Tz'u-ch'i) and Penang activist Png Chi Cheng (Fang Chih-cheng) to be deported to China in August 1930. In January 1932, the Selangor KMT Branch was crippled by the banishment of its Executive Committee. KMTM members readily admit that Clementi's policy had a devastating effect on party development throughout the country. Although a KMT source states that there were 12,000 members in Malaya in 1934, it is doubtful that the party was as active as the number suggests. As former KMTM members explain, even though many names remained on the party roster after the Clementi ban of 1930 , not all were willing to regard themselves as members for fear of government reprisals.
由于战事爆发后的几个月里，双方都面临组织问题，因此统一战线规模受到限制。与国民党和共产党在组织和开展活动方面有更优越条件的中国不同，马来亚共产党和马共所处的环境不利。国民党马来亚支部发展在 1930 年至 1934 年期间的克莱门蒂政府期间遭受了重大挫折，因为该州长严格禁止国民党在该国进行活动。无视官方禁令导致霹雳州领导人陈礼生（程乐声）和陆子凯（罗子崎）以及槟城活动家方志成（冯子诚）于 1930 年 8 月被驱逐出境到中国。1932 年 1 月，雪兰莪国民党支部因执行委员会被流放而瘫痪。 国民党马来亚支部成员 readily admit 克莱门蒂的政策对该党在全国范围内的发展产生 了灾难性影响。 尽管国民党消息来源称，1934 年国民党在马来亚有 1.2 万名党员， 但怀疑该党像其人数所暗示的那样活跃。 正如前国民党党员解释的那样，尽管在 1930 年克莱门蒂禁令之后，许多名字仍然保留在党籍名册上，但并非所有人都愿意承认自己是党员，因为害怕政府的报复。

The weak and inactive state of affairs continued even after Clementi's departure from Malaya in 1934 and following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937. Except for the state of Perak where the KMT Branch was reported to have undertaken new registration of members - given as 3,000 - there is no evidence of other state branches having engaged in similar activity. This inactive state of the KMTM no doubt contributed to the lack of response from the branches to the Party Central's request on 23 August 1937 to set up a national salvation society with branches in various towns under the direction and supervision of the party branches and the Consul-General. And when the KMT Central's instructions for united front collaboration with Communists were received in late September, the disarray in the organisational apparatus of the KMTM branches in most of the states made it difficult for them to respond effectively to that call.
克莱门蒂于 1934 年离开马来亚，中日冲突于 1937 年 7 月爆发，此后马来亚国民党事务活动依然萎靡不振。除了霹雳州国民党支部据报进行了新的党员登记（达 3,000 人）外，没有证据表明其他州支部参与了类似活动。 国民党马来亚支部的不活跃状态无疑导致了支部 对 1937 年 8 月 23 日党中央关于在各党支部和总领事的指导和监督下，在各城建立救国会并成立分支机构的要求缺乏响应。 当国民党中央关于与共产党联合抗日的指示于 9 月下旬传来时，大多数州国民党 马来亚支部组织机构的混乱状态使他们难以有效地响应这一号召。

Like the KMTM, the MCP's organisation was also weak at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (7 July 1937). While it is true that the Communist Party had been more courageous than the KMTM during and after the Clementi years (especially in the field of labour from 1935 to early 1937), it nevertheless suffered steep reverses during the first half of 1937. According to the police, 20 party members including "some quite well-trained" ones were arrested and banished following the labour disturbances of January-April 1937. More importantly, 13 members of a "small nucleus which forms the highest directing organ of the MCP" were arrested and banished. Although the authorities noted May through July as the "period of recuperation and reorganisation due to severe handling the Party received at the hands of the Government, we shall presently see that the first signs of Communist activity did not appear until late October 1937.
与国民党军委会同样，在卢沟桥事变发生之时(1937 年 7 月 7 日)，马来亚共产党(下称“马来亚共产党”)的组织也非常薄弱。虽然，共产党在克莱门蒂执政期间(1935 年至 1937 年初)和之后比国民党军委会表现得更加勇敢，(特别是在 1935 年至 1937 年初的劳工问题上)，但在 1937 年上半年，它仍然遭受了惨重的挫折。据警方称，20 名党员，包括一些“训练有素”的党员，在 1937 年 1 月至 4 月的劳工骚乱后被捕并流放。 更重要的是，马来亚共产党最高领导机关的核心成员中有 13 人被捕并流放。 尽管当局将 5 月至 7 月定为“因政府对该党进行严厉打击而进行的休养和改组时期”， 但我们目前会看到，共产党活动的首个迹象直到 1937 年 10 月下旬才出现。

Another reason why the united front was limited in scope was the reluctance on the part of many conservative KMTM members to collaborate with the Communists. According to information obtained from discussions with former KMTM members, many of their comrades did not consider cooperation with the MCP to be vital in carrying out national salvation activities because they regarded the situation in Malaya as different from that in China and because they believed in the efficacy of the relief fund associations which, as community leaders, they had helped to set up to provide financial assistance to the motherland. These conservative KMTM members included Lee Chin Tian (Li Chen-tien) and Tan Chor Lam (Ch'en Ch'u-nan) in Singapore; Leong Sin Nam (Liang Sang-nan), Ong Chin Siong (Wang Chen-hsiang) and Lee Guan Swee (Li Yüan-shui) in Perak; Lau Geok Swee (Liu Yü-shui) in Penang, and Wong Yik Tong (Huang Yi-t'ang) in Negri Sembilan.
共产党人拒绝与国民党合作的原因之一是许多保守的国民党成员不愿与共产党合作。根据与国民党前成员的谈话获得的信息，许多他们的同志并不认为与马共合作对进行民族救亡活动至关重要，因为他们认为马来亚的局势不同于中国，而且他们相信救济基金协会的功效，这些协会是由他们作为社区领袖帮助建立的，为祖国提供经济援助。 这些保守的国民党成员包括新加坡的李鎭田(李振田)和陈柱男(陈初南)；霹雳的梁燊南(梁生南)、王振祥(王振祥)和李源瑞(李源瑞)；槟城的刘玉水(刘玉水)；森美兰的黄奕堂(黄奕堂)。

The positions assumed by many KMTM members as community leaders also contributed to their reticence in collaborating with the Communists. Since the local government regarded them as law-abiding leaders, they were reluctant to have this image tarnished by associating with the anti-British Communists. More importantly, being successful businessmen they were fearful of running afoul of the law and being banished from Malaya as happened to some of their party colleagues during the Clementi Administration. While they were willing to contribute funds to China's cause, help organise fund-raising societies and encourage fellow hua-ch'iao to contribute, and even secretly urge the illegal boycott of Japanese goods, they were unwilling to run the risk of being caught in illicit collusion with the Communists. As the relief fund societies were approved by the local authorities, they preferred to work within the framework of these organisations.
许多国民党党员在社区中担任领导角色，这也导致了他们不愿与共产党合作。由于地方政府将他们视为守法的领导者，他们不愿与反英的共产党交往而玷污自己的形象。更重要的是，作为成功的商人，他们担心触犯法律并被驱逐出马来亚，就像他们在克里门蒂政府时期一些党内同僚的遭遇一样。他们虽然愿意为中国的事业捐款，帮助组织筹款会，鼓励侨胞捐款，甚至秘密敦促抵制日货，但他们不愿冒着被发现与共产党非法勾结的风险。由于救济基金会得到了地方当局的批准，他们更愿意在这些组织的框架内工作。

Who then in the KMTM participated in the united front with the MCP? Available evidence shows that in Singapore KMTM participation in the united front consisted of a small section of the island's party branch. They represented the younger and activist faction which included Lim Keng Lian (Lin Ch'ing-nien), Lim Bo Seng (Lin Mou-sheng), Ong Keat Soo (Wang Chi-shih), Chuang Huich'üan, How Say Hoan (Hou Hsi-fan) and Oh Siow Yam. These members supported the united front with the Communists because they believed that such a strategy would be most effective for uniting all the hua-ch'iao for national salvation work.
谁参加了马来亚共产党和国民党之间的联合阵线？现有证据表明，在新加坡，国民党参与联合阵线的是该岛党支部的一小部分人。他们代表了包括林清年、林谋盛、王吉士、庄辉泉、侯希范和吴少岩在内的年轻激进派。这些党员支持与共产党结成统一战线，因为他们相信，这一策略将最有效地团结所有华侨进行民族救亡工作。

What was the nature of the KMTM-MCP united front? According to KMTM participant Oh Siow Yam and MCP participant Ng Yeh Lu (Huang Yeh-lu) both groups met occasionally to discuss measures for carrying out propaganda, fund raising, boycott activities and "elimination of traitors". Propaganda activity involved the preparation of pamphlets for various causes; fund raising called for organising groups of patriots to canvass for donations. The boycott entailed the formation of clandestine groups to ensure that local merchants did not trade in enemy products, and to impose penalties on those found doing so. "Elimination" of traitors meant inflicting physical injury (e.g., clipping off an ear) on persons believed to be supporters of Japan.
国民党马来亚共产党 (KMTM-MCP) 统一战线的性质是什么？据国民党马来亚共产党 (KMTM) 参与者王晓岩和马来亚共产党 (MCP) 参与者黄业陆 (Ng Yeh Lu) 称，两党会定期会面，讨论开展宣传、筹款、抵制活动和“消灭叛徒”的措施。宣传活动包括为各种事业准备宣传册；筹款活动包括组织爱国者群体进行募捐。抵制活动包括组建秘密团体，确保当地商人不出售敌人的产品，并对发现违反者进行处罚。“消灭叛徒”是指对被认为是日本支持者的个人进行身体伤害（例如，剪掉耳朵）。

As far as can be ascertained, the united front activities were carried out by KMT organisations such as the Chinese National Liberation Vanguard Corps (CNLVC) (Chung-hua chieh-fang hsien-feng-tui), the Chinese Labour Anti-Japanese National Salvation Corps (Chung-hua lao-kung k'ang-Jih chiu-kuo-t'uan) and the Communist Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS) (K'ang-Jih hou-yüan-hui). According to Chua Hui Seng, a member of the CNLVC, the Vanguard Corps was formed by a non-partisan patriot by the name of Si Hong Ping (Shih Fang-p'ing) and How Say Hoan a KMTM man. Other KMTM activists who participated in the CNLVC included Ang Pow Soo (Hung Pao-chih), Wu Chih-hsiu, Lim Keng Lian and Lee Chun Eng (Li Ch'un-jung). According to Chuang Hui-ch'üan, together with the Chinese Labour Anti-Japanese National Salvation Corps, the CNLVC was connected to the Singapore China Relief Fund Association led by Tan Kah Kee, a non-partisan patriot, by assisting in fund-raising activities for the Association.
据推测，抗日统一战线活动是由国民党组织，例如中华解放先锋队、中华劳工抗日救国会和共产党敌后后援会进行的。据中华解放先锋队的成员蔡蕙盛称，先锋队是由非党爱国人士史方平和国民党党员何思源创立的。 其他参与中华解放先锋队的国民党党员包括洪保芝、吴志秀、林景联和李春荣。 根据庄惠泉的说法，先锋队与中华劳工抗日救国会一起，通过协助筹款活动与由非党爱国人士陈嘉庚领导的新加坡中华救济总会建立了联系。

The rules and regulations of the CNLVC called for strict discipline, secrecy of organisation, and support of the KMTC-CCP united front. Its main functions were to promote the anti-Japanese boycott, exterminate traitors and spies, promote propaganda on national salvation, and to work towards Chinese unity by getting rid of clannishness.
中立民运联合会的规章制度要求严格遵守纪律、保守组织秘密，并支持民革-中共的统一战线。其主要职能是推动反日抵制运动，消灭叛徒和间谍，宣传救亡运动，通过消除宗派主义来促进中国统一。

The Chinese Labour Anti-Japanese National Salvation Corps was led by KMT activists Lim Bo Seng and Chuang Hui-ch'üan. It aimed primarily at promoting patriotic activities among the Chinese workers. It was this society which was responsible for the success of the celebrated walkout by Chinese labourers in the
中国劳工抗日救国会是由国民党积极分子林谋盛和庄惠泉领导的。它的主要目的是在华工中宣传爱国活动。正是这个社团领导了著名的华工罢工取得了胜利。

Japanese mines in Dungun (Trengganu) in February 1938. Writing much later about the incident, Chuang Hui-ch'üan informs us that Lim Bo Seng had sent him to Dungun to instigate the walkout. The KMT activists also arranged for the Dungun workers to be transported to Singapore where relief was provided by Chinese associations.
1938 年 2 月，日军占领了登嘉楼 (丁加奴) 的矿山。 后来，庄辉泉在写关于这次事件时，告诉我们林谋盛派他到登嘉楼去煽动罢工。国民党活动家还安排登嘉楼工人到新加坡，在那里得到华人社团的救济。

It appears that the first Communist patriotic organisation to emerge in Singapore was the Chinese Anti-Enemy National Salvation Society (Chung-hua k'ang-ti chiu-kuo-hui) with its Anti-Traitor Corps to promote the boycott and fund raising. Appearing in early October 1937, the effectiveness of this organisation in the boycott movement was first manifested in the following month when it was reported that two shopkeepers were pressured into purchasing worth of Chinese Government bonds as penalty for trading in enemy products.
在新加坡出现的第一个共产党爱国组织似乎是中华抗敌救国总会及其反奸队，以推动抵制和筹款。该组织于 1937 年 10 月初出现，其抵制运动的有效性首次体现在次月，据报道，两名店主在被发现与敌产品交易后被迫购买了价值 元的中国政府债券作为惩罚。

The Chinese Anti-Enemy National Salvation Society's activities in Penang were more noteworthy. The leader of the organisation there was known as Wong Kheung (Huang Ch'iang). The influence wielded by Wong Kheung's society can be seen in the case involving beans imported by the East Asiatic Company on behalf of Chinese merchants. It was Wong Kheung's letter warning the Chinese shopkeepers that the beans, valued at , were of Japanese origin that caused the latter not to take delivery of the shipment. When East Asiatic Company rejected their offer of compensation at S 50 cents per bag (the actual price being ), Wong Kheung proposed that the dealers pay a larger sum which would be matched by a sum from East Asiatic and would be donated to the state relief fund association. When one merchant refused to comply with this request his shop signboard was tarred. The matter was eventually settled with the intervention of the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce. East Asiatic Company agreed to forego storage charges and to allow a discount for the beans thus saving the dealers about of the costs, and the latter agreed to contribute to the relief fund.
槟榔屿的抗敌救国会活动更为引人注目。当地组织的领导人被认作是黄强。 黄强的社会影响力可以从东亚公司代表中国商人进口豆子时发生的案件中体现出来。 正是黄强在信中警告中国店主 ，表明这些豆子是日本产的，才导致后者没有接收这批货物。 当东亚公司拒绝他们每袋 50 美分的赔偿报价（实际价格为 ）时，黄强提议经销商支付一笔更大的款项，这笔款项将由东亚公司的一笔款项来匹配，并将捐赠给州救济基金会。 当一名商人拒绝遵守这一要求时，他的店铺招牌被泼了柏油。 此事最终在槟城华人商会的干预下得到解决。 东亚公司同意不收取仓储费，并允许对豆类给予 折扣，从而为经销商节省了约 的成本，后者同意向救济基金捐款 。

There appears to be few reports of the activities of the Chinese Anti-Enemy National Salvation Society after November 1937. News of another organisation, the Singapore-Malayan Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (HsingMa hua-ch'iao k'ang-ti hou-yüan-hui) and its branches, could well mean that the former society was being replaced by the latter as the major Communist patriotic body. Judging from the chronology of events, it seems that the Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS) was set up in December with the emergence of its Singapore branch, the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society. The AEBUS there exhorted all Chinese to unite in national salvation work. In order to facilitate this, the Society urged the local authorities to allow freedom of activity for the hua-ch'iao.
1937 年 11 月后，关于中华救亡会活动的报道似乎不多。另一组织--新加坡马来亚华侨抗敌后援会（HsingMa hua-ch'iao k'ang-ti hou-yüan-hui）及其分支机构的消息，很可能意味着前一组织已被后一组织取代，成为主要的共产党爱国团体。从事件的年代顺序来看，抗敌后援会（AEBUS）似乎是在 12 月成立的，其新加坡分支机构新加坡华侨抗敌后援会也随之成立。当地的 AEBUS 号召所有中国人团结起来，进行救亡工作。为了促进这一点，该协会敦促当地政府允许华侨自由活动。

With the emergence of these Kuomintang and Communist organisations, KMTM activists joined MCP cadres in performing united front patriotic activities. From the very beginning, however, the MCP was set on using the newly established entente with the KMTM to achieve its goal: to extend its influence over the Chinese masses and to create trouble for the Colonial Government. This was evidenced by the role of its front organisation, the AEBUS, during the "China Day" rally which it organised in collaboration with the CNLVC on 9 January 1938. On that morning, anti-Japanese pamphlets were distributed and anti-Japanese slogans were chanted. Because the crowd became unruly, police detained some of them. In the evening, another crowd appeared in front of the Central Police Station and demanded the release of those arrested. A riot ensued leading to the arrest of 138 Chinese. According to the police, the AEBUS was involved in the disturbances:The unlawful procession in response to these developments [i.e., the morning rally
随着国民党和共产党组织的出现，国民党积极分子加入了共产党干部，开展统一战线的爱国活动。然而，从一开始，共产党就决定利用新建立的国民党协约来实现其目标：扩大其对中国人民的影响，为殖民政府制造麻烦。这可以从其外围组织 AEBUS 在 1938 年 1 月 9 日与 CNLVC 合作组织的“中国日”集会上所扮演的角色中得到证明。那天早上，散发了反日传单，高喊反日口号。 由于人群变得混乱，警方拘留了其中一些人。晚上，另一群人出现在中央警察局门前，要求释放被捕的人。骚乱随之发生，导致 138 名中国人被捕。据警方称，AEBUS 参与了骚乱：针对这些事态发展（即上午的集会）的非法游行
and the arrest of some participants] had been organised by patriotic Chinese aided
以及逮捕一些参与者]是由爱国的中国人组织的
and abetted by what has now become the Anti-Enemy (Japanese) Backing-Up
并得到现在已成为反日支持者的协助
Society. The leading elements of this organisation are members of various
社会。该组织的领导成员来自各个
communistic societies who while using the platform of patriotism have never-
共产党社会，尽管利用爱国主义的平台，却从未
theless not forgotten their loyalty to their own creed .... 31
他们并没有忘记对自身信条的忠诚 .... 31

The unlawful procession in response to these developments [i.e., the morning rally and the arrest of some participants] had been organised by patriotic Chinese aided and abetted by what has now become the Anti-Enemy (Japanese) Backing-Up Society. The leading elements of this organisation are members of various communistic societies who while using the platform of patriotism have nevertheless not forgotten their loyalty to their own creed ....
这些事态发展（即早晨的集会和一些参与者的逮捕）引发的非法游行，是由爱国华侨组织的，并得到现在被称为反日后援会的大力支持。该组织的领导成员来自各个共产主义协会，他们虽然利用爱国主义的平台，但并没有忘记对自身信仰的忠诚。....

So adroit was the AEBUS in concealing the identities of its agents during the demonstrations in the evening that staunch KMT activists, such as Chuang Hui-ch'üan, did not realise that it was the Society's cadres and not "Japanese vagabonds" (Jihpen lang-jen) and traitors who took advantage of the demonstrations. If any AEBUS members were among the law-breakers, fear of government reprisals soon vanished, for the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, through the initiatives of KMTM activists Lim Bo Seng and Lim Keng Lian, was able to convince the authorities to release those arrested to its custody.
由于 AEBUS 在当晚示威活动期间巧妙地隐藏了其成员的身份，以至于包括庄辉泉在内的坚定的国民党积极分子都没有意识到，是该社团的干部，而不是“日本流浪汉”(日笨浪人)和叛徒趁机进行示威。 如果有任何 AEBUS 成员在违法者之中，对政府报复的担心很快就消失了，因为新加坡中华总商会通过国民党积极分子林文胜和林庆连的倡议，说服当局将被捕者释放给总商会监管。

The militancy of the Chinese patriots surprised the Colonial Government. Immediately after the morning rally of 9 January, it issued a communique declaring: "In the interest of peace and good order in the Colony, the Government warns all residents that the Police have been instructed to prevent all unauthorised assemblies and unlicensed processions, and if such occur to take all necessary measures to disperse them".
中国爱国者的激进主义令殖民政府感到惊讶。在 1 月 9 日上午集会之后，政府立即发表声明，宣布:“为了殖民地的和平和秩序，政府警告所有居民，警察已奉命阻止一切未经授权的集会和未经许可的游行，并如果发生此类事件，将采取一切必要措施将其驱散。”

Two days after the events of 9 January, the Singapore AEBUS circulated a letter blaming the disturbance on Chinese traitors and Japanese agents for damaging overseas Chinese relations with the local government so that the latter would impose more restrictions on hua-ch'iao patriotic activities. On the same day, the Perak Branch of the Malayan Chinese Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association, also a MCP organisation, attributed the cause of "misunderstanding by the Government" to the same culprits. The Perak body went a step further by accusing the Government of indirectly allowing Japan to create problems in Malaya. Declared the organisation:
9 月 11 日事件发生两天后，新加坡 AEBUS 发出了一封信，指责骚乱是由通敌的中国人以及日本特务破坏了海外华侨与当地政府的关系，以便后者对华侨的爱国活动实施更多限制。同一天，马来亚华人抗日救国会霹雳分会（也是马来亚共产党的一个组织）将“政府的误解”归因于同样的罪魁祸首。霹雳分会更进一步指责政府间接允许日本在马来亚制造问题。该组织表示：“

We sincerely advise the British Government that in order to safeguard Malaya, the various races should be allowed to oppose Fascism at liberty .... If the Government still adheres to its past attitude of hesitation, is timid towards Japanese Fascism, and is doubtful and suspicious of the people, then it is unconsciously assisting in the nourishment of Japanese power and its perverse activities in Malaya and is [therefore] exterminating itself.
我们真诚地建议英国政府，为了保卫马来亚，应该允许各民族自由反对法西斯主义。如果政府仍然坚持过去的犹豫态度，对日本法西斯主义采取懦弱态度，对人民心存怀疑，那么它就是在无意识地帮助日本势力在马来亚滋长，并在那里进行其邪恶活动，并且在[因此]消灭自己。

The MCP's Perak body also attempted to instigate the various races to demand freedom of action for confronting Japanese imperialism. Appealed the society:
马来亚共产党霹雳州分部也试图煽动各族人民要求采取行动来对抗日本帝国主义。向社会呼吁：

We earnestly expect Malays, Indians and other races in Perak to rise . . . and carry on the brave and fighting spirit of the various races in Singapore to join with the Chinese against Fascism and to advance bravely and demand the release of those arrested and to struggle for liberty to oppose invasion.
我们恳切地期望霹雳州的马来人，印度人和其他的种族奋起……，并将新加坡各民族的勇敢战斗精神发扬光大，与中国人并肩反对法西斯主义，勇敢前进，要求释放被捕者，为反对入侵和争取自由而斗争。

Rise up to make known righteousness. Demand freedom of demonstration and the repeal of the law prohibiting processions.
奋起宣扬正义。 要求示威自由和废除禁止游行示威的法律。

Although the local authorities maintained that the possibility of Japanese agents instigating the disturbances "may not perhaps be entirely ignored", they believed that the machinations of the Communists to be the cause of trouble. In the view of the Government the quickness of the latter's patriotic organisations in denying responsibility for the disturbances and in blaming it on Japanese agents indicated that the Communists "realised that their activities would alienate sober opinion, both European and Chinese, as indeed they did , 37
尽管地方当局声称日本特工煽动骚乱的可能性“也许不能完全忽视”，但他们认为共产党人的阴谋是造成骚乱的原因。在政府看来，共产党人的爱国组织迅速否认对此次骚乱负有责任，并将其归咎于日本特务，这表明共产党人“意识到他们的活动会使中外清醒的舆论疏远，正如他们确实做的那样”。

Events after January, however, began to strain KMTM-MCP collaboration. Spurred by success in instigating Chinese demonstrators on 9 January against the local authorities, the AEBUS increased its nationalist activities. According to the police, anti-Japanese activities during the first three months of the year, "occupied [a] very considerable amount of time and personnel". On May Day 1938, a Communist-organised demonstration among labourers had to be dispersed by the police. On 13 May police in Malacca recovered 8,000 copies of a pamphlet issued by the Selangor and Negri Sembilan Branches of the Malayan Chinese Labourers' AEBUS. Like the appeals of other patriotic bodies; that of the AEBUS to the Chinese labourers were based on patriotism and concern for their welfare. The Society inveighed against capitalist oppression of the workers whom it regarded as the "backbone of the National Salvation Movement" (NSM). It urged the relief fund organisations to provide either work for the unemployed or passage for them to return to China. The Government was again entreated to join in a Far Eastern peace front against Japanese Fascism. In Singapore a demonstration by the AEBUS on 26 June 1938 led to the arrest of 30 Chinese. The disturbances spread up north to Penang where riots occurred between 4-6 July. The disorders which began with the destruction of soya beans alleged to be of Japanese origin led to a shutdown by shopkeepers. After being summoned by the Penang authorities to discuss the situation, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Town Hall issued an appeal on 8 July to shop owners to resume business.
一月以后的事件，然而，开始给国共合作造成压力。受 1 月 9 日煽动华侨示威反对地方当局成功的影响，反侵略运动在抗日活动方面更加积极，据警方统计，今年头三个月的反日活动，“占据[了]大量的时间和人力”。 1938 年五一劳动节，共产党组织的工人示威游行被警察驱散。 5 月 13 日，马六甲警方查获 8000 份马来亚华人劳工反侵略运动雪兰莪和森美兰分会发放的传单， 反侵略运动和其他爱国团体的号召一样，都是以爱国主义和对工人福利的关切为基础。 该社团谴责了资本家对工人的压迫，认为工人是“国民救亡运动的骨干”。 敦促救济金组织为失业者提供工作，或为他们返回中国提供路费。 政府再次被要求加入远东反法西斯和平阵线。 1938 年 6 月 26 日，新加坡的 AEBUS 进行了一次示威，导致 30 名华裔被逮捕。骚乱蔓延到北部槟城，于 7 月 4 日至 6 日发生了骚乱。骚乱始于据称日产大豆的破坏，导致店主关门。应槟城当局的传唤，马来亚华商总会和槟城中华会馆于 7 月 8 日向店主发出呼吁，要求他们恢复营业。

Alarmed by such events and determined to curb Communist influence in the NSM, the Government issued a warning a week later (13 July 1938):
对此类事件感到震惊，并决心遏制共产党对国家社会主义运动的影响，政府一周后（1938 年 7 月 13 日）发布了一项警告：

The Government wishes to make it plain to the Chinese community that it will deal vigorously with any further such action and especially with those who in the name of patriotism instigate rioting, acts of violence and other illegalities but who are careful themselves to stay behind the scenes.
政府希望向华人社区表明，将严厉打击任何此类进一步行动，尤其是那些以爱国主义的名义煽动骚乱、暴力行为和其他违法行为，但他们自己却小心地躲在幕后的人。

On the following day, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs summoned the managers and editors of five Chinese newspapers in Singapore and requested them to exert their influence through the press to restrain nationalist activities.
第二天，华侨事务秘书召见了新加坡五所华文报馆的经理和编辑，并要求他们通过新闻媒体控制民族主义活动。

The disturbances arising from Chinese nationalist activities also caused concern among the KMTC over united fromt activities with the MCP. The Penang disturbances led Chinese Consul Huang Yen-kai to issue an appeal urging the hua-ch iao to obey local laws and for the shopkeepers to resume business as usual.
由于中国民族主义活动引发的骚乱，也引起了国民党对与马共联合抗日的担忧。槟榔屿的骚乱事件，中国领事黄炎楷发表呼吁，敦促华侨遵守当地法律，并督促商店照常营业。

Events in late June and July also distressed the KMTM faction in Singapore which advocated united front cooperation with the Communists. It became increasingly clear to the KMTM activists that the MCP through its AEBUS organisations was exploiting anti-Japanese nationalism to create trouble for the local authorities. They were particularly concerned that if the patriotic activities continued to get out of hand, it would cause the Government to impose more stringent measures on the NSM. While they unctuously believed that their own unlawful activities could be carried out without causing undue alarm to the Government, they no longer were confident that the actions taken by the Communists could do the same.
6 月下旬和 7 月发生的事件也让新加坡支持与共产党合作的联合阵线的国民党马来亚支部感到不安。马来亚国民党积极分子越来越清楚地认识到，马来亚共产党通过其所属的机构正在利用反日民族主义为当地政府制造麻烦。他们特别担心，如果爱国活动继续失控，政府将对马来亚国民党实施更严厉的措施。虽然他们油嘴滑舌地认为，他们自己的违法活动可以进行，而不会引起政府的过度警觉，但他们不再相信共产党采取的行动也能做到这一点。

The opportunity for KMTM activists to express concern over the unruliness of national salvation activities presented itself towards the end of July when the Nanyang Siang Pau, a leading Chinese daily - apparently responding to the request of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs for the press to exert its influence for proper conduct of the Chinese in the NSM - sought to provide some guidelines for nationalist activities. The invitation, which came in the form of a request for proposals for Chinese unity, elicited immediate response from the two political factions involved in the united front. It provided both groups the opportunity to present their case to each other, to the Chinese community as a whole, and, as it appears, to the Colonial Government also. Although for obvious reasons no party affiliations were mentioned, and the NYSP editor presented the articles received as the views of "leaders of overseas Chinese groups and pioneers of cultural circles", there was little doubt in the minds of the KMTM, the Communists and some Chinese as to their political inclinations.
7 月底，南洋商报，一份主要的华文日报，在国民党马来亚分会要求新闻界对国民党在国家救亡运动中的不检行为施加影响后，试图为民族主义活动提供一些指导方针。这一机会使国民党马来亚分会成员能够表达他们对救亡运动混乱状态的担忧。这份邀请以征求华人团结建议书的形式发出，立即引起了参与统一战线的两大政治派系的响应。它为这两派团体提供了一个向对方、整个华人社区以及似乎还有殖民政府陈述自己观点的机会。虽然出于明显的原因没有提及任何党派，而南洋商报的编辑将收到的文章视为“海外华人团体领导人和文化圈先驱的观点”，但国民党马来亚分会、共产党和一些华人对其政治倾向几乎毫不怀疑。

First to appear in the Nanyang Siang Pao forum entitled "Special Edition on the problem of Overseas Chinese Unification in National Salvation" (Hua-ch'iao t'uan-chieh chiu-wang wen-t'i chuan-hao) was the MCP view. In a revealing article "Our Attitude" (Wo-men-ti t'ai-tu), MCP's spokesmen Yeh Lu, Wu T'ien, Hung T'ao, Ying Lang and Yen Chih reaffirmed their belief in the united front. To reassure the overseas Chinese, the KMTM in particular, that they supported the Nationalist Government's "Program for War of Resistance and National Reconstruction", the Communists declared:
"我们的观点"（《南洋商报》〈救亡问题特刊〉）首先出现的是马来亚共产党观点。在题为"态度"的揭示性文章中，马来亚共产党发言人叶路、吴天、洪涛、英朗和严智重申他们对统一战线的信仰。 为了向海外华人，尤其是国民党人保证他们支持国民政府的"抗战建国纲领"，共产党宣称：

According to Chairman Chiang [Kai-shek's] enlightened direction and according to the objective circumstances in Malaya, we recognise that henceforth all groups of Chinese in Malaya, regardless of class or dialect group, should have as their highest program for national salvation the Twenty-two Principles on War of Resistance and National Reconstruction proclaimed by the National Provisional General Assembly.
根据蒋委员长 [凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯] 的英明指示，以及马来亚的客观环境，我们认识到，今后马来亚所有华人群体，无论阶级或方言群体，都应该以国民参政会颁布的《抗战建国纲领》二十二条为其救国最高纲领。< br/> zh-CN: 根据蒋委员长 [凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯-凯] 的英明指示，以及马来亚的客观环境，我们认识到，今后马来亚所有华人群体，无论阶级或方言群体，都应该以国民参政会颁布的《抗战建国纲领》二十二条为其救国最高纲领。

MRCA, July 1938, p. 28.
民国二十七年（1938 年）7 月的《中华民国外汇管理暂行条例》第 28 条。

KWYP, 5 July 1938; NYSP, 6 July 1938.
KWYP，1938 年 7 月 5 日；NYSP，1938 年 7 月 6 日。

As the names would indicate, the real identities of the MCP spokesmen were not revealed.
如同名字所暗示的那样，MCP 发言人并未透露他们的真实身份。

47 See NYSP, 30 July 1938. The MCP article is also available in (June 1968), p. 14.
47 见纽约州立公园，1938 年 7 月 30 日。MCP 文章也发表在 （1968 年 6 月），第 14 页。

Calculated at winning the support of the overseas Chinese masses, Yeh Lu and company then explained their goals for the NSM. In an obvious reference to the activities of the AEBUS, they observed:
为了赢得海外华人华侨的支持，叶露及其团队随后解释了他们对国家民族主义运动的目标。在明显指的是美国东部华人华侨学生会的活动时，他们观察到：

In the past many overseas Chinese thought that we were acting blindly without any clear aim and merely for the sake of pleasure. Some even believed that we were clandestine organisation adopting a closed-door attitude and not allowing enthusiastic overseas Chinese to participate with us. We now emphatically declare that this is a misunderstanding. This is because they did not understand us.
在过去，许多海外华人认为我们行动盲目，目标不明确，仅仅是为了享乐。有些人甚至认为我们是秘密组织，采取闭门态度，不允许热情的海外华人参与进来。我们现在郑重声明，这是一个误解。这是因为他们不了解我们。

The fact is that we have only one aim, and our attitude is the same as that aim: to consolidate and expand the Malayan Chinese national salvation united front and also to utilise all kinds of methods so that every bit of overseas Chinese strength can be used for remitting funds back to China for anti-enemy backing-up work, so that our nation will be able to attain early independence and liberation, and so that we will not become slaves in a vanquished nation. Our goal is sacred, our attitude pure and upright. We are orderly and disciplined. We are non-partisan.
事实是，我们只有一个目标，我们的态度与目标一致：巩固和扩大马来亚华侨民族解放救亡统一战线，并采取各种方法, 使海外华侨的每一份力量都能用于汇款回国支持抗敌工作, 使我们的民族能够早日独立解放, 使我们不成为亡国奴。我们的目标是神圣的，我们的态度是纯洁和正直的。我们是井然有序和纪律严明的。我们是超党派的。 0

Yeh Lu and his colleagues therefore attempted to project the image of their patriotic organisations as well-disciplined and earnestly dedicated to the cause of national salvation. As national salvation was the most noble end for all hua-ch'iao, the use of "all kinds of means" (ko-chung ko-yang-ti fang-shih) was regarded as justified. Their claim to non-partisanship was, of course, aimed at the overseas Chinese masses who were unaware of their political colouration.
叶鲁及其同事因此试图将他们的爱国组织描绘成纪律严明、全心全意为民族救亡事业奋斗的组织。由于民族救亡是所有华侨最崇高的目标，因此使用“各种手段”（ko-chung ko-yang-ti fang-shih）被认为是正当的。 他们声称不偏不倚，当然是为了掩盖他们的政治倾向，不让海外华人大众知晓。

On the vital issue of Sino-British friendship the MCP representatives expressed the following view:
关于中英友好这一重大问题，中共和平解放谈判代表团表达了以下观点：

We see from the above that while professing support for British neutrality in the war, there was thinly veiled hint that such support was conditional: if the overseas Chinese could understand and sympathise with the Colonial Government's position of neutrality, Britain in turn should demonstrate more understanding and sympathy with China's problems as hers were far more pressing and grave. Seeking overt opportunities for its patriotic organisations, the MCP spokesmen therefore appealed to the local authorities on the grounds of humanity and with the assurance that their only enemy was Japan, thus hoping to secure more freedom for the NSM.
从以上内容可以看出，虽然表面上支持英国在战争中保持中立，但实际上却含蓄地暗示了这种支持是有条件的：如果海外华人能够理解和同情殖民政府的中立立场，那么英国也应该对中国的困境表现出更多的理解和同情，因为中国的困境更为紧迫和严重。因此，马共的代言人为了给其爱国组织寻找公开的机会，以人道主义为由，向当地政府发出呼吁，并保证他们的唯一敌人是日本，从而希望为民社争取更大的自由。

The MCP spokesmen then offered their proposal on how the hua-ch'iao could best unite in the NSM:
民族救亡运动中，美华总会发言人进一步提出了华侨如何团结的关键建议:

We recognise that only when there is unity in the belief of national salvation, only when there is a common objective for everyone and when all believe in War of Resistance, can we then have National Reconstruction. National Reconstruction should [therefore] be co-ordinated with War of Resistance. To believe in War of Resistance and National Reconstruction means to pursue the only path for China's national independence, freedom and happiness. Undivided into classes, dialect groups or regions, the 1.8 million overseas Chinese can then unite together to become the rear-guard of the motherland's highest authority. That is why we especially want to emphasise this point.
我们认识到，只有在民族救亡的信念统一起来的时候，只有当所有的人都为了一个共同的目标而努力的时候，当所有人相信抗战的时候，我们才能实现国家重建。因此，国家重建应该与抗战相协调。相信抗战和国家重建意味着追求中国民族独立、自由和幸福的唯一道路。180 万海外华人，不分阶级、方言和地区，都可以团结起来，成为祖国最高权威的后盾。这就是我们特别要强调的。

At present we believe that all the China relief fund societies should unite with the patriotic organisations and overseas Chinese groups in the local places ... in order to jointly set up a body where opinions can be regularly exchanged so as to attain close relations and at the same time to henceforth become the base for the Malayan overseas Chinese truly great unity .... In this regard we hope that all the relief fund societies will coordinate in important events to lead the hua-ch'iao masses throughout Malayan to expand fund-raising work, increase propaganda, and also to thoroughly check traitors and their henchmen so as to strengthen the national salvation front. The masses everywhere should regard the relief fund societies as the nucleus organisations and should sincerely cooperate with them so as to avoid all the friction experienced in the past, and so that all efforts can be channelled into fund raising and remitting them back to China for anti-enemy backing-up work.
目前，我们认为，所有的中国救济基金会都应该与当地爱国组织和海外华人团体联合起来……，以便共同建立一个定期交换意见的机构，以便取得密切的关系，同时，也成为马来亚海外华侨真正大团结的基地…… 在这方面，我们希望所有的救济基金会会在重要事件上进行协调，领导马来亚各地的华侨群众开展募捐工作，加大宣传力度，并彻底检查叛徒及其爪牙，以加强救亡运动。各地的群众都应该把救济基金会看作是核心组织，应该真诚地与他们合作，以避免过去经历的所有摩擦，并将所有努力都用于筹款并将它们汇回中国，支持抗敌工作。

The MCP therefore aimed at galvanising the overseas Chinese masses into a united whole by attaching ideological qualities to the mission of War of Resistance: War of Resistance was the basis for the solution of China's exigent problems, and only when the hua-ch'iao sincerely and consciously accepted this principle could they truly unite in the NSM.
因此，马来亚共产党旨在通过赋予抗日战争的使命以意识形态品质，将海外华人群众团结成一个整体：抗日战争是解决中国紧急问题的基础，只有华侨真诚自觉地接受这一原则，才能真正团结在国家社会主义运动中。

As regards the need for a coordinating body, while Yeh Lu and his colleagues advocated that relief fund societies should be epicentres for national salvation, they made it clear that the central organisation - to be formed by uniting the relief fund societies, patriotic organisations and overseas Chinese societies - should be of the nature whereby "opinions can regularly be exchanged", thus ensuring the MCP, through its patriotic bodies, a voice in matters relating to national salvation. The Communists no doubt felt that with the acceptance of their patriotic organisations as a component in the central body, the task of extending party influence among the masses would be facilitated.
关于协调机构的必要性，叶鲁及其同僚主张救济基金会应成为救国的中心，但他们明确表示，由救济基金会、爱国组织和海外华人社会联合组成的中央组织应具有“定期交换意见”的性质，从而确保中共通过其爱国组织在救亡问题上有发言权。共产党人无疑认为，随着其爱国组织被接纳为中央机构的组成部分，在群众中扩展党的影响力的任务将会得到促进。

For the KMTM activists, too, the Nanyang Siang Pau's forum was the most opportune occasion to attempt to convince the MCP of the need to undertake national salvation work "within" the limits of the law. In their article entitled "Several Basic Principles and Concrete Proposals for Uniting the Overseas Chinese in National Salvation" (Hua-ch'iao t'uan-chieh chiu-wang-ti chi-ko chi-pen yüantse ho chü-t' i chien-i) KMTM activists Lim Bo Seng, Ong Keat Soo, Oh Siow Yam and Chuang Hui-ch'üan reaffirmed their belief in the united front:
对于国民革命同盟会活动人士来说，南洋商报论坛也是一个绝佳的机会，试图说服马共在法律范围内进行民族救亡工作。在题为“华侨团结救亡的若干基本原则和具体建议”（华侨团结救亡的若干基本原则和具体建议）的文章中，国民革命同盟会活动人士林谋盛、王吉顺、吴修岩和庄辉全重申了他们对统一战线的信仰：

Our basic principle is 'Resist Japan as the foremost duty; together let us dedicate to resisting Japan' (K'ang-Jih kao-yü i-ch'ieh, i-ch'ieh fu-ts'ung k'ang-Jih). This is the basic principle for the national united front. Only when everyone has understood the significance of victory over the Japanese bandits, and when all strive in this direction can the unity of mutual trust and mutual understanding of all parties, classes and organisations against the common enemy gradually increase. Then all intrigues by enemy spies, traitors and their henchmen to split our unity will not be able to succeed.
我们的基本原则是'以抗日为首要任务，共同致力于抗日'(抗日高于一切，一切服从抗日)。这是全国统一战线的基本原则。只有当每个人都理解了战胜日本强盗的重要性，并且所有人都朝着这个方向努力，各个党派、阶级和组织之间的相互信任和相互理解才能逐渐增加，才能战胜敌人的阴谋和分裂。

As a reminder that the Communists should adhere to the principles of united front, the KMTM members drew their attention to the CCP's support of the KMT Government's "Programme for War of Resistance and National Reconstruction" by invoking the words of CCP spokesman, Chang Wen-t'ien:
为提醒共产党人应坚持统一战线原则，国民党中央执行委员会成员通过引用中共发言人张闻天的话，提请他们注意中共对国民政府“抗战建国纲领”的支持：

Although these basic principles [for the War of Resistance and National Reconstruction] and the CCP's basic principles on Anti-Japanese National Salvation announced in the past are somewhat different on certain issues, e.g., the nation [min-tsu] and people's livelihood, etc., nevertheless the parties' insistence on War of Resistance and final victory are basically the same. Consequently the CCP resolutely supports this Assembly's [i.e., the KMT Government's Provisional Delegates Assembly's] decision and will readily strive for its implementation.
## 尽管这些基本原则（对于抗日救亡和国家重建）与我党过去所宣布的关于抗日救亡的基本原则在某些问题上，例如民族和人民生活等，有所不同，然而各党派坚持抗日和最后胜利的宗旨是基本一致的。因此，我党坚决拥护本大会（即国民政府临时代表大会）的决定，并将积极努力为其贯彻而奋斗。

Although there does not appear to be any differences in either KMTM and MCP views thus far, there was sharp disagreement on the vital issue of Sino-British friendship. Lim Bo Seng and his comrades underscored the need to maintain good relations with the Colonial Government while performing national salvation duties Explained the KMTM members:
尽管迄今为止，国共两党在观点上似乎没有任何分歧，但在中英友好问题上却存在严重分歧。林谋盛和他的同志们强调，在履行民族救亡职责的同时，必须与殖民政府保持良好关系。 国民党成员解释说：

On the basis of the principles of Sino-British friendship, national salvation work should also avoid friction with the local government .... Since the Double Seventh War of Resistance began, Britain has been a sympathetic and friendly country and has given us assistance ... . Although the present policy of Chamberlain provides some concessions to the aggressors, on the whole, according to the path pursued by this foreign policy, Britain still stands as a member of the peace camp, and we still consider her a 'friendly nation' . . . .
在中英友谊的原则基础上，救亡工作也应避免与地方政府发生摩擦…… 自“七七事变”爆发以来，英国一直是一个同情和友好的国家，并给予了我们帮助…… 尽管张伯伦现在的政策对侵略者做出了一些让步，但总的来说，根据这一外交政策所走的道路，英国仍然是和平阵营的一员，我们仍然认为她是一个“友好国家”。

In the eyes of the British, Malaya is like a powder keg very close to the enemy. A small spark could cause an explosion. In order to protect Malaya's interests she has adopted a neutral attitude, thus avoiding a direct clash with Japan which could cause trouble. We should sympathise with her plight and excuse her because the interests of our overseas Chinese in Malaya are equally important. In order to strengthen and expand the assistance for our motherland's efforts in the War of Resistance, we absolutely do not want Japan to invade Malaya and directly cause Britain to lose her benefits and indirectly for the overseas Chinese to lose theirs. So we must emphasise Sino-British friendship and support Britain in her neutrality. In our activities we must pay attention and consider the circumstances - and we should not be too conspicuous. We must do all we can to avoid friction and misunderstanding so that the enemy will not seize the opportunity to sow discord among us and succeed in their conspiracy to use a borrowed sword to destroy overseas Chinese unity in national salvation.
在英国人的眼中，马来亚就像一个非常靠近敌人的火药桶。一个小小的火花都可能引起爆炸。为了保护马来亚的利益，她采取了中立的态度，从而避免了与日本发生直接冲突，这可能会造成麻烦。我们应该同情她的困境，并原谅她，因为我们在马来亚的海外华人的利益同样重要。为了加强和扩大对我们祖国抗日战争的援助，我们绝对不希望日本入侵马来亚，并直接导致英国失去她的利益，间接导致海外华人失去他们的利益。所以我们必须强调中英友谊，支持英国的中立。在我们的活动中，我们必须注意和考虑实际情况--我们不应该太引人注目。我们必须尽一切努力避免摩擦和误解，这样敌人就不会抓住机会在我们之间制造不和，并成功地利用借刀杀人的阴谋来破坏海外华人救国的团结。(code0)

The KMTM position on Sino-British friendship was clear. International real politik dictated that while struggling with Japan for her survival, China needer sympathy, understanding and assistance from other nations. Although Britain did not provide as much aid as China would have liked, she nevertheless was a sympathetic power. Compared to other countries such as Thailand and the Dutch Indies, Britain was more lenient in allowing the hua-ch'iao to carry out national salvation activities in her colony. Under these circumstances the KMTM maintained that it would not be in China's interest to antagonise the Colonial Government. While the overseas Chinese were concerned with China's needs, they should also understand that Britain had her own interests to safeguard in Malaya. By advising the hua-ch'iao "not to be 'too conspicuous"" (pu kuo-yü piao-hsien-hua) in performing their patriotic activities, the KMTM aimed at protecting Britain from Japanese charges that her claim to neutrality was hollow. Moreover, Britain's involvement in the Sino-Japanese conflict on the side of China would invite Japanese invasion of the country, and cause not only Britain to lose her economic interests in Malaya but also the overseas Chinese to lose theirs. Such as eventuality would render the hua-ch'iao useless to China's war cause for they would no longer be able to provide financial assistance to their motherland.
国民政府海外党部对中英友谊的立场是明确的。国际现实政治要求，中国在与日本为生存而斗争时，需要其他国家的同情、理解和援助。虽然英国没有提供中国所希望的那么多援助，但她仍然是一个友好的力量。与泰国和荷属东印度群岛等其他国家相比，英国在允许华侨在其殖民地开展救亡活动方面更加宽松。 在这种情况下，国民政府海外党部认为，与殖民政府对抗不符合中国的利益。虽然海外华人关心中国，但他们也应该理解，英国在马来亚有自己的利益需要维护。国民政府海外党部建议华侨在进行爱国活动时“不要太显眼” (不要太显眼)，目的是为了保护英国免受日本指责，即英国的中立声称是空洞的说法。 此外，如果英国在中日战争中站在中国一边，将招致日本入侵英国，不仅会使英国失去在马来亚的经济利益，还会使海外华人失去他们的利益。这样的情况将使华侨对中国的战争事业无济于事，因为他们将无法再向祖国提供资金援助。

Turning to the important issue of unification of the overseas Chinese, the KMTM activists advocated:
关于海外华侨的重要统一问题，国民党积极分子主张：

A, Overseas Chinese organisations should get rid of dialect group prejudices and should mutually understand and trust each other; B, overseas Chinese organisations should not make use of this body [to be set up by community leaders] as an instrument of certain dialect groups or individuals for attacking outsiders; C, overseas Chinese organisations should fill in the old model (feudal type) with new contents (national salvation type); D, overseas Chinese organisations should recognise that they are all basic units in uniting for national salvation, and that they should not fight each other for leadership; E , according to the basic principle of national united front, overseas Chinese organisations should unite together and set up a 'Malayan Chinese All-Societies Joint Conference' (Ma-hua ko ch'iao-t'uan lienhsi-hui-i) under the leadership of the topmost overseas Chinese leaders and regard it as the leading body for all organisations participating in national salvation.
A、海外华侨团体应摒弃地域族群偏见，相互了解信任； B、海外华侨团体不应利用此机构（由社区领袖设立）作为某些地域族群或个人攻击外人的工具； C、海外华侨团体应以新的内容（救国型）充实旧模式（封建型）； D、海外华侨团体应认识到它们都是团结救国的基本单位，不应互相争夺领导权； E、根据民族统一战线的基本原则，海外华侨团体应团结起来，在最顶尖的海外华侨领导人的领导下成立“马来亚华侨各社团联合会议”（马华公会联席会议），并将其视为所有参与救国组织的领导机构。

The KMTM activists also provided specific guidelines for the national salvation organisations (chiu-wang t'uan-t'i)-equivalent to the patriotic organisations (ai-kuo t'uan-t'i) referred to by the Communists. In order to thoroughly understand the significance of united front policy, the national salvation bodies were urged to "assiduously study the theory of National United Front" and to apply it to every aspect of national salvation activity. In this regard the KMT activists shared the MCP belief for the need to attach ideological attributes to the concept of united front so as to motivate and sustain overseas Chinese faith in that war strategy.
国民党海外活动者还为国民救亡团体（相当于共产党人所说的爱国团体）制定了具体方针。为了透彻理解统一战线政策的意义，国民救亡团体被敦促“刻苦学习国民统一战线理论”，并将其运用到国民救亡活动的各个方面。在这方面，国民党活动家与马来亚共产党人一样认为，需要为统一战线概念赋予意识形态属性，以激发和维护海外华侨对该战争策略的信心。

While advising the patriotic organisations on their role in national salvation, the KMTM activists proposed measures aimed at influencing MCP organisations. By urging that "persons of different beliefs" should be allowed to "undertake leadership responsibilities" in the national salvation organisations, the KMTM hoped to persuade the Communist bodies to allow Nationalist Party members to assume leadership roles in those organisations.
国民党中央通讯局在告诫爱国组织在这次救亡运动中的作用时，提出了旨在影响中共组织的措施。国民党中央通讯局敦促在救亡组织中让"信仰不同的人"承担"领导责任"，国民党中央通讯局希望说服共产党组织允许国民党员在其组织中担任领导职务。

The KMTM concern over leadership of the NSM and the need to curtail Communist activities directed at the local government was clearly reflected in its proposals for the establishment of the Malayan Chinese All-Societies Joint Conference and for it to be led by "topmost overseas Chinese leaders" (hua-ch'iao tsui-kao ling-hsiu). With the All-Societies Joint Conference as the coordinating body for the united front, all national salvation activities, including those of the MCP, would be regulated, thus ensuring that they would not get out of hand. Thanks to the second proposition, control of the united front would be safely kept out of the hands of the Communists for none of its leaders were acknowledged as community chiefs. Lacking the support of established overseas Chinese institutions such as the regional associations (hui-kuan), clan organisations and chambers of commerce, the outlawed Communists were never regarded as community leaders. On the other hand, many KMTM leaders had such support and were accepted as community heads. Control of the NSM would therefore be monopolised by them. Consequently, although the KMTM activists encouraged the national salvation organisations to engage in "well-intended mutual criticism"-equivalent to the MCP proposal for "regular exchange of opinions"- the KMTM members could nevertheless feel assured that ultimate leadership of the patriotic movement would not be in Communist hands but in theirs.
国民党关于马来亚全国华侨总会领导权和管控针对地方政府的共产党活动的担忧，在其关于建立马来亚华侨各社团联合会议的提议中得到明确体现，并要求由“最高海外华人领袖”（华侨最高领导）领导该会议。 作为统一战线的协调机构，全国华侨总会将协调所有民族救亡活动，包括马来亚共产党（MCP）的活动，从而确保这些活动不会失控。由于第二个提议，统一战线的控制将安全地掌握在国民党手中，因为没有哪位共产党领导人被承认是社区首领。 由于缺乏海外华人既有机构（如区域协会、宗亲组织和商会）的支持，被取缔的共产党人从未被视为社区领导人。另一方面，许多国民党领导人得到了这样的支持，并被接受为社区首领。因此，马来亚全国华侨总会将由他们垄断。 因此，尽管国社党积极分子鼓励救亡团体进行“善意的互相批评”——相当于共产党提出的“经常交换意见”，国社党党员仍然可以确信，爱国运动的最终领导权不会落入共产党手中，而会落入他们手中。

Divergent views on the united front therefore prevented the emergence of any concrete form of a new collaboration between the two parties. Sino-British friendship which the KMTM insisted as a minimum programme for a new cooperation remained the singular obstacle. When the MCP through the AEBUS increased rather than reduced its anti-British activities during August 1938, it became patently apparent to the KMTM activists that they could no longer collaborate with the MCP. As one of them put it: "It became difficult for the two parties to work together because they were having different dreams on the same bed."58 That being the case the KMTM activists began to refrain from participating in activities with the Communists.
由于双方对统一战线的意见分歧，阻碍了双方之间任何具体形式的新合作的出现。国民党人坚持的中英友谊作为新合作的最低限度方案，仍然是唯一的障碍。当 1938 年 8 月，中共通过全国总工会加剧而不是减少其反英活动时， 国民党人意识到他们无法再与中共合作。正如其中一人所说：“由于双方在同一张床上做着不同的梦，所以很难在一起工作。”58 因此，国民党人开始回避与共产党人一起参加活动。

Besides the change of heart on the part of the KMTM participants in the united front, another reason for the failure of a new cooperation to emerge may well have been the lack of support from other KMTM members in Singapore. Besides Lim Bo Seng and company only two other KMTM members submitted their own views on Chinese unity to the Nanyang Siang Pau. The opinions of Lim Keng Lian and Chou Hean Swee generally reflected those of Lim Bo Seng and others. It was not surprising that few KMTM members were willing to advocate united front with the Communists. Many had shown reluctance to collaborate with them in the earlier period, and the problems created for the local government during June and July vindicated their view that cooperation with the MCP would endanger their own position.
除了国民党马华公会参与者在统一战线问题上的态度转变，导致未能形成新合作的另一个原因可能是新加坡其他国民党马华公会成员缺乏支持。除了林谋盛等人，只有另外两名国民党马华公会成员向《南洋商报》表达了他们对中国统一的看法。林庆连和周怀信的意见总体上反映了林谋盛等人的意见。 国民党马华公会成员很少愿意主张与共产党建立统一战线，这不足为奇。许多人之前就曾不愿与他们合作，而且六月和七月间给当地政府造成的问题证明了他们的观点，即与马来亚共产党合作将危及他们自己的地位。

Another indication that no new united front emerged between the KMTM and the MCP after July 1938 was the lack of endorsement from the Party Central in Nanking for the KMTM proposal. This, I believe, was mainly because attention of the KMT in China was drawn to the more attractive proposition of setting up a central body to coordinate hua-ch'iao patriotic activities for the whole of Southeast Asia. The proposal did not originate from KMT members in Malaya but from overseas Chinese leaders in the Dutch Indies and the Philippines.
国民党和共产党之间在 1938 年 7 月之后没有出现新的统一战线的另一个迹象是南京的党中央没有批准国民党马六甲分部的提案。我认为，这主要是因为国民党在中国将注意力集中在建立一个协调整个东南亚华侨爱国活动的中央机构这一更具吸引力的提议上。该提案并非来自马来亚的国民党成员，而是来自荷属东印度和菲律宾的海外华人领导人。

The Federation of China Relief Fund for the South Seas which emerged in October 1938 cannot be regarded as a united front in the sense of the KMTC-CCP collaboration in China, for unlike the Chinese united front where NationalistCommunist cooperation was the most essential determinant, in the case of the Nanyang Federation it was not. It was rather the need to coordinate the patriotic activities of all overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Moreover, unlike the united front in China where Chiang Kai-shek was acknowledged as leader, in the case of the Federation, the leader was Tan Kah Kee (Ch'en Chia-keng), a non-partisan patriot. It was Tan Kah Kee and not the KMTM members whom the Nationalist Government relied upon to organise and lead the Federation. And although KMTM members as a political group were the majority in the Standing Committee, they were aware that their own prestige and influence could not match those of the Hokkien patriarch.
1938 年 10 月成立的南洋华侨救灾总会，不能被视为中国国民党与共产党合作意义上的统一战线，因为与中国国民党与共产党合作是决定性因素的中国统一战线不同，南洋华侨总会的情况并非如此。相反，这是协调东南亚所有海外华人爱国活动的需要。此外，与中国统一战线由蒋介石担任领导人不同，该总会由非党派爱国人士陈嘉庚领导。是陈嘉庚而不是国民党成员被国民政府委托组织和领导该总会。尽管国民党成员作为政治团体在常务委员会中占多数，但他们意识到自己的声望和影响力无法与这位福建族长相提并论。

In a sense it can be said that the Federation approximated the Malayan Chinese All-Societies Joint Conference proposed by the KMTM activists for it was led by the "topmost overseas Chinese leaders" and it supported the essential principle of Sino-British friendship. Moreover, like the All-Societies Joint Conference which excluded MCP leadership, the Federation did not have any Communists in the Standing Committee. On the other hand, Kuomintang representation in that body was conspicuous. Therefore, even though the chairman of the Federation was not a Nationalist Party man, nevertheless with as many as ten KMT members from Malaya and five from other Southeast Asian countries holding official positions, the KMTM could rest assured that leadership of that organisation was safely out of the hands of the Communists.
在某种意义上可以说，马来亚华侨各社团联合会议的提议是由 KMTM 激进分子提出的，因为它由“最顶尖的海外华人领袖”领导，并支持中英友好的基本原则。此外，与排除了马来亚共产党领导层的联合会议一样，联合总会中常委中没有任何共产党人。另一方面，国民党在该组织中的代表人数十分引人注目。因此，尽管联合会主席不是国民党人士，但由于有 10 名来自马来亚、5 名来自其他东南亚国家的国民党员担任官方职位，KMTM 可以放心，该组织的领导权不会落入共产党手中。

We have thus far focused on the KMTM-MCP united front in Singapore. Unfortunately, information on collaboration between the two parties in the peninsular states has yet to surface. As in Singapore, there most probably were some KMTM members in Penang, Perak and Johore who undertook joint activities with the Communists. However, I am inclined to believe that like the Singapore alliance those elsewhere did not last long. Just as the Singapore KMTM activists became disillusioned with united front collaboration with the MCP over the principle of Sino-British friendship, KMTM members in other states very likely experienced the same problem in their efforts to work with the Communists. One basis for this speculation is that the Nanyang Siang Pau forum on Chinese unity for the NSM appeared not to have evoked any overt response among the KMTM members in the peninsula. While this may have been due to the fact that the NYSP was only widely circulated in Singapore and not in the peninsular states, and also because the newspaper only sought Singapore views and not those from across the causeway, nevertheless one would think that the peninsular gazettes, which normally reported national salvation activities in Singapore, would also comment on an important issue as that raised by the NYSP. They however did not do so. An examination of the KMTM organ in Penang, the Kwong Wah Yit Poh, for the period of late July through August 1938, for example, revealed no observations on the Singapore discussion. It is highly improbable that the was not aware of the discourse on Chinese unity. Why then the lack of response? It is my feeling that the silence was due to the fact that unlike the Singapore KMT activists, whose proposals on Chinese unity reaffirmed their belief in the united front and who were willing to continue to collaborate with the Communists in the MCP, they preferred to quietly refrain from engaging in joint ventures with the Communists.
至今为止，我们一直关注新加坡的国民党马来亚共产党在联合阵线上。遗憾的是，关于这两党在半岛各州合作的信息尚未浮出水面。在新加坡，槟城、霹雳和柔佛等地很可能有一些国民党马来亚共产党成员与共产党人进行联合活动。然而，我倾向于认为，就像新加坡的联盟一样，其他地方的联盟也没有持续多久。正如新加坡国民党马来亚共产党活动家对与马来亚共产党在中英友好原则上的联合阵线合作感到失望一樣，其他州的国民党马来亚共产党成员在与共产党人合作的努力中很可能也遇到了同样的问题。这种推测的一个依据是，南洋商报关于为全国马来亚共产党争取华团结的论坛似乎没有引起半岛国民党马来亚共产党成员的任何公开回应。 虽然这可能是由于《南洋商报》只在新加坡广泛发行，而没有在马来半岛发行，也是因为该报只寻求新加坡的观点，而不是来自堤坝彼岸的观点，然而，人们会认为，通常报道新加坡救国活动的半岛公报也会对《南洋商报》提出的重要问题发表评论。然而，他们并没有这样做。例如，对 1938 年 7 月下旬至 8 月期间槟城国民党机关报《光华日報》的考察显示，该报没有对新加坡的讨论发表任何意见。国民党中央通讯社不太可能不知道新加坡关于中国统一的论述。那么，为什么没有反应呢？我的感觉是，这种沉默是由于新加坡国民党活动家不同，他们关于中国统一的建议重申了他们对统一战线的信念，并愿意继续与马来亚共产党中的共产党人合作，他们宁愿静静地避免与共产党人进行合资企业。

The foregoing discussion, therefore, modifies previous views regarding the magnitude of the KMTM-MCP united front in Malaya. Contrary to impressions given by earlier studies that the united front in China between the KMTC and the CCP was fully extended to Malaya, the collaboration between the two local parties was in reality substantially limited. Available evidence suggests that in Singapore united front activists between the two groups involved only a small activist section of the Singapore KMT Branch. This minority believed in uniting all overseas Chinese efforts including those of the Communists for national salvation. Conservative KMTM members, however, were reluctant to cooperate with the Communists for fear of the local government. Compared to the Communists, who had far less economic stakes in the country and who saw in the united front an excellent avenue for influencing the Chinese masses, many of the conservative KMTM members were established businessmen and community leaders; as such they were unwilling to risk getting into trouble with the authorities.
由于上述讨论修正了以前关于马共与民革在马来亚统一战线规模的观点。与先前研究给出的中国国民党与共产党之间的统一战线完全延伸到马来亚的印象相反，这两个地方政党之间的合作实际上受到了实质性的限制。现有证据表明，在新加坡，两党之间的统一阵线活动者只涉及新加坡国民党的一个小型积极分子部分。这部分少数派相信，应该团结所有海外华人的力量，包括共产党的，以实现民族救亡。然而，国民党马来亚分支机构的保守派成员却不愿与共产党合作，因为他们担心当地政府。与共产党相比，共产党在该国的经济利益要少得多，而且他们认为统一战线是影响中国民众的一个极好的途径，许多国民党马来亚分支机构的保守派成员都是当地知名的商人 和社区领袖；因此，他们不愿冒险与当局发生冲突。

Besides reluctance on the part of many party members, organisational problems which resulted from several years of passivity for the KMTM also made it difficult for the KMTM branches to respond effectively to the KMTC's call for united front collaboration with the Communists. As for the MCP, although it had been more active than the KMTM during the few years before the Sino-Japanese War, the major setback suffered at the hands of the local government during the first half of 1937 also causes disarray in party organisation. It was not until October 1937 that the KMTM and the MCP began to cooperate with each other.
除了許多黨員的猶豫不決之外，國民黨馬來西亞分部組織問題也導致該組織難以有效響應馬來西亞共產黨的統一戰線合作呼籲。這些組織問題是國民黨馬來西亞分部多年被動的結果。至於馬來亞共產黨，雖然在中日戰爭爆發前的幾年中比國民黨馬來西亞分部更活躍，但 1937 年上半年地方政府的重大挫折也導致了該黨組織的混亂。直到 1937 年 10 月，國民黨馬來西亞分部和馬來亞共產黨才開始合作。

No sooner had the alliance between the two parties begun in late 1937, than problems began to arise. It was not so much the actions adopted by the KMTM and the MCP against each other as it was those taken by the MCP against the local authorities which caused the KMTM activists to review their relations with the MCP. From the beginning the Colonial Government was a major obstacle intruding into the alliance. This in many respects rendered the relations between the KMTM and the MCP more like a triangular constellation; and with wide powers at its disposal, the Colonial Government proved to be a more formidable rival than the KMTM to the MCP.
1937 年底，两党联盟刚一成立，问题就开始出现了。造成这种局面的，并不是国共两党相互采取的行动，而是共产党对地方当局采取的行动，这导致国民党积极分子重新审视他们与共产党的關係。从一开始，殖民政府就是侵入联盟的一个主要障碍。这在许多方面使国共两党之间的关系变得更像一个三角星座；而殖民政府拥有广泛的权力，证明它比国民党更令共产党感到棘手。

Activities of the AEBUS branches in various parts of the country during the months of June and July 1938 convinced the KMTM that collaboration with the MCP would be difficult unless the latter accepted the principle of Sino-British friendship. The KMTM proposal for a united front on a new basis was unequivocal on this point as a precondition for cooperation. To ensure that all national salvation activities, including those of the MCP's, abided by that principle, the KMTM proposed that a central coordinating body be established and that it be under the leadership of the "topmost overseas Chinese leaders".
1938 年 6 月至 7 月期间，民盟各分支机构在全国各地开展的活动使国民党认识到，除非共产党接受中英友好的原则，否则与共产党合作将很困难。国民党关于建立一个新基础的统一战线的提议明确将此作为合作的先决条件。为确保包括共产党在内的所有救亡活动遵循这一原则，国民党提议成立一个中央协调机构，并由“最杰出的海外华人领导人”领导。

The Communists had their own image of how any future united front with the KMTM should operate, and it differed markedly with the Nationalists on the stand on Sino-British friendship and on the role of its patriotic organisations in relation to other groups in the united front. They strongly hinted that their support for British neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict was dependent upon the Colonial Government's understanding and sympathy with China's war cause, to the point that it should grant the hua-ch'iao more freedom to pursue national salvation
共产党对自己未来与国民党合作的联合阵线抱有自己的愿景，这一愿景与国民党在中英友谊问题以及其爱国组织在联合阵线中与其他团体的关系问题上的立场明显不同。他们强烈暗示，他们对英国在中日冲突中保持中立的支持取决于殖民政府对中国战争事业的理解和同情，以至于它应该给予华侨更多的自由来追求民族救亡。
activities. While agreeing on the need to set up a central body to coordinate national salvation work, the MCP's own proposal advocated an organisation that would provide all participating groups with voices commensurate with their potentials in the NSM.
活动。马来共产党同意成立一个中央机构来协调民族救亡工作，但其自身的提案主张成立一个组织，使所有参与团体都能在民族救亡运动中发出与各自潜力相称的声音。

Although information on the KMT-MCP united front in the peninsular states is scarce, it is most probable that as in Singapore there were some KMT activists who participated in joint activities with the Communists. In all probability, like their Singapore colleagues, KMTM activists in other states must have viewed the recent setbacks in community relations with the Colonial Government as damaging to the NSM. They were therefore not keen to retain links with the MCP and were contented to carry out nationalist activities among themselves and through government-approved state relief fund associations.
KMT-MCP 在半岛各州的联合阵线信息虽然稀少，但最有可能的是，像新加坡一样，有一些国民党积极分子参与了与共产党人的联合活动。与新加坡的同志一样，其他州的国民党活动分子很有可能认为最近与殖民政府的关系恶化损害了民族社会主义运动。因此，他们并不热衷于与马来亚共产党保持联系，而是满足于在内部和通过政府批准的国家救济基金会开展民族主义活动。

Nor was there any endorsement or encouragement for the KMTM proposal for a new united front by the KMT Central in Nanking. From August to October 1938, the KMT Government was more interested in a larger project - the setting up of the Federation of China Relief Fund for the South Seas for the coordination of national salvation movements throughout Southeast Asia.
南京国民党中央也没有对国民党马来亚总会的新统一战线提议给予任何认可或鼓励。1938 年 8 月至 10 月，国民党政府更感兴趣的一个更大项目是成立中国南洋救济总会，以协调整个东南亚的救亡运动。

Consequently, while it is likely that individual KMTM members may have occasionally engaged in patriotic activities with the Communists after July 1938, the evidence to date strongly indicates that collaboration on a group level between KMTM and the MCP effectively terminated by the end of that month. Therefore, contrary to earlier suggestions, the united front between the two parties was only a brief episode in the NSM --from October 1937 to July 1938, a duration of about ten months.
因此，虽然 KMTM 的个别成员很可能在 1938 年 7 月之后偶尔与共产党人一起从事爱国活动，但迄今为止的证据强烈表明，到该月底，KMTM 与 MCP 之间的团体合作实际上已经停止。因此，与早期的说法相反，两党之间的统一战线仅仅是 NSM 中的一个短暂插曲——从 1937 年 10 月到 1938 年 7 月，持续时间约为十个月。