The MIT Press 麻省理工学院出版社

Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War
进攻、防御和战争原因
Author(s): Stephen van Evera
作者：斯蒂芬-范-埃韦拉
Source: International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring, 1998), pp. 5-43
《资料来源国际安全》，第 22 卷，第 4 期（1998 年春季），第 5-43 页
Published by: The MIT Press
出版商：麻省理工学院出版社麻省理工学院出版社
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Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War
进攻、防御和战争原因

Iswar more likely when conquest is easy? Could peace be strengthened by making conquest more difficult? What are the causes of offense dominance?

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How can these causes be controlled? These are the questions this article addresses.
如果征服容易，战争就更有可能发生吗？是否可以通过增加征服的难度来加强和平？进攻占优势的原因是什么？

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如何控制这些原因？这些都是本文要讨论的问题。

I argue that war is far more likely when conquest is easy, and that shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war. Ten warcausing effects (summarized in Figure 1) arise when the offense dominates. (1) Empires are easier to conquer. This invites opportunistic expansion even by temperate powers (explanation A). (2) Self-defense is more difficult; hence states are less secure. This drives them to pursue defensive expansion (explanation B). (3) Their greater insecurity also drives states to resist others’ expansion more fiercely. Power gains by others raise larger threats to national security; hence expansionism prompts a more violent response (explanation C). (4) First-strike advantages are larger, raising dangers of preemptive war (explanation D). (5) Windows of opportunity and vulnerability are larger, raising dangers of preventive war (explanation E). (6) States more often adopt fait accompli diplomatic tactics, and such tactics more often trigger war (explanation F). (7) States negotiate less readily and cooperatively; hence negotiations fail more often, and disputes fester unresolved (explanation G). (8) States enshroud foreign and defense policy in tighter secrecy, raising the risk of
我认为，当征服容易时，战争的可能性要大得多，攻守平衡的变化对战争风险有很大影响。当进攻占主导地位时，会产生十种引发战争的影响（如图 1 所示）。(1) 帝国更容易被征服。即使是温和的大国也会因此而伺机扩张（解释 A）。(2) 自卫更加困难，因此国家更不安全。这促使它们追求防御性扩张（解释 B）。(3) 国家更不安全也促使它们更激烈地抵制他国的扩张。他国势力的增强对国家安全构成了更大的威胁，因此扩张主义促使各国做出更激烈的反应（解释 C）。(4) 先发制人的优势更大，增加了先发制人战争的危险（解释 D）。(5) 机会之窗和脆弱性更大，增加了预防性战争的危险（解释 E）。(6) 各国更经常地采取既成事实的外交策略，而这种策略更经常地引发战争（解释 F）。(7) 各国谈判的意愿和合作性降低，因此谈判经常失败，争端得不到解决（解释 G）。(8) 国家对外交和国防政策更加保密，增加了发生战争的风险（解释 C）。

Stephen Van Evera teaches international relations in the Political Science Department at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Stephen Van Evera 在麻省理工学院政治学系教授国际关系。

Thanks to Robert Art, Charles Glaser, and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on this article. It is distilled from Causes of War, Volume 1: The Structure of Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 1999).
感谢罗伯特-阿特（Robert Art）、查尔斯-格拉瑟（Charles Glaser）和一位匿名审稿人对本文的评论。本文摘自《战争的原因，第一卷：权力的结构与战争的根源》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，即将于 1999 年出版）。

Abstract 摘要

1. In this article “offense dominant” means that conquest is fairly easy; “defense dominant” means that conquest is very difficult. It is almost never easier to conquer than to defend, so I use “offense dominant” broadly, to denote that offense is easier than usual, although perhaps not actually easier than defense. I use “offense-defense balance” to denote the relative ease of aggression and defense against aggression. As noted below, this balance is shaped by both military and diplomatic/ political factors. Two measures of the overall offense-defense balance work well: (1) the probability that a determined aggressor could conquer and subjugate a target state with comparable resources; or (2) the resource advantage that an aggressor requires to gain a given chance of conquering a target state. I use “offense” to refer to strategic offensive action-the taking and holding of territory-as opposed to tactical offensive action, which involves the attack but not the seizure and holding of territory.
1.在本文中，"进攻占优势 "是指征服相当容易；"防御占优势 "是指征服非常困难。征服几乎永远不会比防守容易，因此我广泛地使用 "进攻主导 "来表示进攻比通常容易，尽管实际上可能并不比防守容易。我用 "进攻防御平衡 "来表示进攻和防御进攻的相对容易程度。如下所述，这种平衡受军事和外交/政治因素的影响。有两种方法可以很好地衡量进攻与防御的总体平衡：(1) 一个坚定的侵略者在拥有可比资源的情况下征服目标国的概率；或 (2) 一个侵略者为获得征服目标国的既定机会所需的资源优势。我用 "进攻 "来指战略进攻行动--夺取和守住领土--而不是战术进攻行动，后者涉及进攻，但不涉及夺取和守住领土。

miscalculation and diplomatic blunder (explanation H). (9) Arms racing is faster and harder to control, raising the risk of preventive wars and wars of false optimism (explanation I). (10) Offense dominance is self-feeding. As conquest grows easier, states adopt policies (e.g., more offensive military doctrines) that make conquest still easier. This magnifies effects 1-9 (explanation J).
(9) 军备竞赛更快、更难控制（解释 I）。(9）军备竞赛更快、更难控制，增加了预防性战争和虚假乐观战争的风险（解释 I）。(10) 进攻主导是自我喂养的。随着征服变得越来越容易，国家采取的政策（如更具进攻性的军事理论）使征服变得更加容易。这放大了 1-9 的效应（解释 J）。
The perception of offense dominance raises these same ten dangers, even without the reality. If states think the offense is strong, they will act as if it were. Thus offense-defense theory has two parallel variants, real and perceptual. These variants are considered together here.
即使没有实际情况，进攻占优势的观念也会带来这十大危险。如果国家认为进攻是强大的，他们就会像进攻一样行动。因此，进攻防御理论有两个平行的变体，即现实变体和感知变体。本文将一并讨论这两种变体。

How does this theory perform in tests? Three single case-study tests are performed below. They corroborate offense-defense theory

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and indicate that it has large theoretical importance: that is, shifts in the offense-defense bal-ance-real or perceived-have a large effect on the risk of war. The actual offense-defense balance has marked effects; the effects of the perceived offensedefense balance are even larger.
这一理论在测试中表现如何？下面进行了三个单一案例研究测试。它们证实了进攻防御理论

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，并表明该理论具有重要的理论意义：也就是说，进攻防御平衡的变化--实际的或感知的--对战争风险有很大的影响。实际的进攻防御平衡会产生明显的影响，而感知到的进攻防御平衡的影响更大。

What causes offense and defense dominance? Military technology and doctrine, geography, national social structure, and diplomatic arrangements (specifically, defensive alliances and balancing behavior by offshore powers) all matter. The net offense-defense balance is an aggregate of these military, geographic, social, and diplomatic factors.
是什么导致了进攻和防御的主导地位？军事技术和理论、地理、国家社会结构和外交安排（特别是防御性联盟和离岸大国的平衡行为）都很重要。净攻防平衡是这些军事、地理、社会和外交因素的总和。

How can offense dominance be controlled? Defensive military doctrines and defensive alliance-making offer good solutions, although there is some tension between them: offensive forces can be needed to defend allies. Offense dominance is more often imagined than real, however. Thus the more urgent question is: How can illusions of offense dominance be controlled? Answers are elusive because the roots of these illusions are obscure.
如何控制进攻优势？防御性军事理论和防御性结盟提供了很好的解决方案，尽管两者之间存在一定的矛盾：可能需要进攻性力量来保卫盟友。然而，进攻优势往往是想象出来的，而不是真实存在的。因此，更紧迫的问题是：如何控制进攻优势的幻想？答案难以捉摸，因为这些幻想的根源模糊不清。

On balance, how does offense-defense theory measure up? It has the attributes of good theory. In addition to having theoretical importance, offensedefense theory has wide explanatory range and prescriptive richness. It explains an array of important war causes (opportunistic expansionism, defensive expansionism, fierce resistance to others’ expansion, first-strike advantage,
总的来说，进攻防御理论的衡量标准是什么？它具备优秀理论的属性。除了理论上的重要性，进攻防御理论还具有广泛的解释性和丰富的规定性。它可以解释一系列重要的战争原因（机会主义扩张、防御性扩张、激烈抵制他国扩张、先发制人的优势、

Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War $∣ 7$
进攻、防御和战争原因 $∣ 7$

windows of opportunity and vulnerability, faits accomplis, negotiation failure, secrecy, arms races, and offense dominance itself) that were once thought to be independent. In so doing, offense-defense theory explains the dangers that these war causes produce and the wars they cause. This simplifies the problem of power and war: a number of disparate dangers are fed by a single taproot. Moreover, both the reality and the perception of easy conquest can be shaped by human action; hence offense-defense theory offers prescriptions for controlling the dangers it frames.
进攻-防御理论认为，战争的起因（机会之窗和脆弱性、既成事实、谈判失败、保密、军备竞赛和进攻优势本身）是独立存在的。这样，进攻防御理论就解释了这些战争原因产生的危险及其引发的战争。这就简化了权力与战争的问题：许多不同的危险由单一的根源滋生。此外，人类的行为可以塑造轻易征服的现实和观念；因此，进攻防御理论为控制其框定的危险提供了处方。

The next section outlines offense-defense theory’s ten explanations for war. The following section identifies causes of offense and defense dominance. The fourth section frames predictions that can be inferred from offense-defense theory, and offers three case studies as tests of the theory: Europe since 1789, ancient China during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, and the United States since 1789. The final section assesses the general quality of offense-defense theory.
下一节概述了攻防理论对战争的十种解释。下一节指出了进攻和防御占优势的原因。第四部分提出了从进攻防御理论中可以推断出的预测，并提供了三个案例研究作为对该理论的检验：1789 年以来的欧洲、春秋战国时期的古代中国以及 1789 年以来的美国。最后一节评估了进攻防御理论的总体质量。

Hypotheses on the Effects of Offense Dominance
关于进攻优势影响的假设

A host of dangers arise when conquest is easy. Some are obvious and some more subtle, some are direct and some indirect. Together they make war very likely when the offense dominates.
征服容易，危险就多。有些是显而易见的，有些则更为隐蔽；有些是直接的，有些则是间接的。当进攻占据主导地位时，这些危险加在一起就很有可能引发战争。

A: OPPORTUNISTIC EXPANSIONISM
A: 机会主义扩张

When conquest is hard, states are dissuaded from aggression by the fear that victory will prove costly or unattainable. When conquest is easy, aggression is more alluring: it costs less to attempt and succeeds more often.

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Aggressors can also move with less fear of reprisal because they win their wars more decisively, leaving their victims less able to retaliate later. Thus even aggressor states are deterred from attacking if the defense is strong, and even quite benign powers are tempted to attack if the offense is strong.
在难以征服的情况下，国家会因为担心胜利代价高昂或遥不可及而放弃侵略。当征服容易时，侵略就更有诱惑力：侵略的代价更低，成功的次数更多。

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侵略者还可以减少对报复的恐惧，因为他们可以更果断地赢得战争，使受害者日后更无力报复。因此，如果防御强大，即使是侵略国也会望而却步；如果进攻强大，即使是相当仁慈的大国也会受到诱惑而发动进攻。

B AND C: DEFENSIVE EXPANSIONISM AND FIERCE RESISTANCE TO EXPANSION
B和C：防御性扩张主义和对扩张的激烈抵抗

When conquest is hard, states are blessed with secure borders; hence they are less aggressive and more willing to accept the status quo. They have less need
在难以征服的情况下，国家拥有安全的边界，因此侵略性较弱，更愿意接受现状。它们不太需要

for wider borders because their current frontiers are already defensible. They have less urge to intervene in other states’ internal affairs because hostile governments can do them less harm.
因为他们目前的疆界已经可以抵御。由于敌对政府对它们造成的伤害较小，因此它们不太想干涉其他国家的内政。

Conversely, when conquest is easy, states are more expansionist because their current borders are less defensible.

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They covet others’ geographic strong points, strategic depth, and sources of critical raw materials. They worry more when hostile regimes arise nearby because such neighbors are harder to defend against. These motives drive states to become aggressors and foreign intervenors.

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States also resist others’ expansion more fiercely when conquest is easy. Adversaries can parlay smaller gains into larger conquests; hence stronger steps to prevent gains by others are more appropriate. This attitude makes disputes more intractable.
相反，当征服变得容易时，国家就会更加扩张，因为其现有边界的防御能力较弱。

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他们觊觎别人的地理优势、战略纵深和关键原材料来源。当附近出现敌对政权时，它们会更加担心，因为这些邻国更难防御。这些动机促使国家成为侵略者和外国干涉者。

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当征服容易时，国家也会更强烈地抵制他国的扩张。对手可以将较小的利益转化为更大的征服；因此，采取更有力的措施来防止他人的利益更合适。这种态度使得争端更加棘手。

The basic problem is that resources are more cumulative when conquest is easy. The ability to conquer others and to defend oneself is more elastic to one’s control over strategic areas and resources. As a result, gains are more addi-tive-states can parlay small conquests into larger ones-and losses are less reversible. Hence small losses can spell one’s demise, and small gains can open the way to hegemonic dominance. States therefore compete harder to control any assets that confer power, seeking wider spheres for themselves while fiercely resisting others’ efforts to expand.
根本问题在于，当征服容易时，资源的累积性更强。征服他人和保卫自己的能力与一个人对战略地区和资源的控制力更有弹性。因此，收益更具有叠加性--国家可以将小规模的征服转化为更大规模的征服，而损失则更不容易逆转。因此，小的损失可能导致灭亡，而小的收益则可能为霸权统治开辟道路。因此，各国会更加努力地竞争，以控制任何能带来权力的资产，为自己寻求更广阔的领域，同时激烈抵制其他国家的扩张努力。

This problem is compounded by its malignant effect on states’ expectations about one another’s conduct. When conquest is hard, states are blessed with neighbors made benign by their own security and by the high cost of attacking others. Hence states have less reason to expect attack. This leaves states even more secure and better able to pursue pacific policies. Conversely, when the offense dominates, states are cursed with neighbors made aggressive by both temptation and fear. These neighbors see easy gains from aggression and danger in standing pat. Plagued with such aggressive neighbors, all states face
这一问题因其对国家间行为预期的恶性影响而变得更加复杂。在难以征服的情况下，由于自身的安全和攻击他国的高昂代价，各国都有幸与邻国友好相处。因此，国家就更没有理由期待受到攻击。这使得国家更加安全，更有能力奉行和平政策。反之，当进攻占主导地位时，国家会受到邻国的诱惑和恐惧而变得好斗。这些邻国认为侵略容易得利，而袖手旁观则危险重重。在这种侵略性邻国的困扰下，所有国家都面临着

Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War|9
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greater risk of attack. This drives them to compete still harder to control resources and create conditions that provide security.
遭受攻击的风险更大。这就促使它们更加努力地竞争，以控制资源，创造条件，提供安全保障。

Thus states become aggressors because their neighbors are aggressors. This can proceed reciprocally until no state accepts the status quo.
因此，国家成为侵略者是因为其邻国是侵略者。这种循环往复的过程一直持续到没有一个国家接受现状为止。

D: MOVING FIRST IS MORE REWARDING
D：先行动更有收获

When conquest is easy, the incentive to strike first is larger because a successful surprise attack provides larger rewards and averts greater dangers. Smaller shifts in ratios of forces between states create greater shifts in their relative capacity to conquer and defend territory. (A reversal in the force ratio between two states from 2 to 1 to 1 to 2 means little if attackers need a 3 to 1 advantage to conquer; it means everything if an attacker needs only a 1.5 to 1 advantage.) Hence a surprise strike that shifts the force ratio in the attacker’s favor pays it a greater reward. This expands the danger of preemptive war and makes crises more explosive. States grow more trigger-happy, launching first strikes to exploit the advantage of the initiative, and to deny it to an opponent.

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当征服容易时，先发制人的动机就会更大，因为成功的奇袭会带来更大的回报，避免更大的危险。国家间兵力比例的微小变化会导致国家征服和保卫领土的相对能力发生较大变化。(如果进攻方需要 3 比 1 的优势来征服，那么两国之间的兵力比例从 2 比 1 到 1 比 2 的逆转就没有什么意义；如果进攻方只需要 1.5 比 1 的优势，那就意味着一切）。因此，出其不意地将兵力比转向对进攻方有利的方向，会给进攻方带来更大的回报。这就扩大了先发制人战争的危险性，使危机更具爆炸性。各国越来越喜欢扣动扳机，发动第一次打击，以利用主动权的优势，并剥夺对手的主动权。

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Conversely, if the defense dominates, the first-move dividend is small because little can be done with any material advantage gained by moving first. Most aggressors can be checked even if they gain the initiative, and defenders can succeed even if they lose the initiative. Hence preemptive war has less attraction.
相反，如果防御占优势，先手红利就会很小，因为先手所获得的任何物质利益都是微不足道的。大多数侵略者即使获得主动权也会被遏制，而防御者即使失去主动权也能取得成功。因此，先发制人的战争吸引力较小。

E: WINDOWS ARE LARGER AND MORE DANGEROUS
e：窗户更大、更危险
When conquest is easy, arguments for preventive war carry more weight.

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Smaller shifts in force ratios have larger effects on relative capacity to conquer or defend territory; hence smaller prospective shifts in force ratios cause greater hope and alarm. Also, stemming decline by using force is more feasible because rising states can be overrun with greater ease. This bolsters arguments for shutting “windows of vulnerability” by war. As a result, all international change is more dangerous. Events that tip the balance of resources in any direction trigger thoughts of war among states that face relative decline.
当征服容易时，预防性战争的论点就更有分量。

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较小的兵力比变化对征服或保卫领土的相对能力有较大的影响；因此，较小的兵力比预期变化会引起更大的希望和恐慌。此外，通过使用武力来阻止衰落也更可行，因为崛起的国家更容易被攻克。这支持了通过战争关闭 "脆弱之窗 "的论点。因此，所有的国际变化都更加危险。使资源天平向任何方向倾斜的事件都会在面临相对衰落的国家之间引发战争的念头。

Conversely, if the defense dominates, arguments for preventive war lose force because declining states can more successfully defend against aggressors even after their decline, making preventive war unnecessary. States are also
相反，如果防御占主导地位，那么预防性战争的论点就失去了力量，因为衰落的国家即使在衰落之后也能更成功地抵御侵略者，从而使预防性战争变得没有必要。国家还

deterred from preventive war by the likelihood that their attack will fail, defeated by their enemy’s strong defenses.
由于他们的攻击很可能会失败，被敌人强大的防御所击败，从而不敢发动预防性战争。

F: FAITS ACCOMPLIS ARE MORE COMMON AND MORE DANGEROUS
F：既遂犯更为常见，也更为危险

When conquest is easy, states adopt more dangerous diplomatic tactics-specifically, fait accompli tactics-and these tactics are more likely to cause war.
当征服容易时，国家会采取更危险的外交策略，特别是既成事实策略，而这些策略更有可能引发战争。

A fait accompli is a halfway step to war. It promises greater chance of political victory than quiet consultation, but it also raises greater risk of violence.

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The acting side moves without warning, facing others with an accomplished fact. It cannot retreat without losing face, a dilemma that it exploits to compel the others to concede. But if the others stand firm, a collision is hard to avoid. Faits accomplis also pose a second danger: because they are planned in secret, the planning circle is small, raising the risk that flawed policies will escape scrutiny because critics cannot quarrel with mistaken premises.
既成事实是通往战争的半途而废。与静悄悄的协商相比，既成事实能带来更大的政治胜利，但也会带来更大的暴力风险。

^{8}

行动的一方毫无征兆地采取行动，以既成事实面对他人。它不能在不丢面子的情况下后退，它利用这种两难局面迫使其他方让步。但如果其他方立场坚定，碰撞就难以避免。既成事实还会带来第二种危险：由于是秘密策划，策划圈子很小，批评者无法对错误的前提提出异议，从而增加了有缺陷的政策逃避审查的风险。

Faits accomplis are more common when the offense dominates because the rewards they promise are more valuable. When security is scarce, winning disputes grows more important than avoiding war. Leaders care more how spoils are divided than about avoiding violence, because failure to gain their share can spell their doom. This leads to gain-maximizing, war-risking diplomatic strategies-above all, to fait accompli tactics.
既成事实在进攻占优势时更常见，因为它们承诺的回报更有价值。当安全稀缺时，赢得争端比避免战争更重要。领导者更关心如何分配战利品，而不是如何避免暴力，因为如果不能获得自己应得的利益，他们就会面临灭顶之灾。这就导致了利益最大化、冒战争风险的外交战略，尤其是既成事实战术。

Faits accomplis are more dangerous when the offense dominates because a successful fait accompli has a greater effect on the distribution of international power. A sudden resource gain now gives an opponent more capacity to threaten its neighbors’ safety. Hence faits accomplis are more alarming and evoke a stronger response from others. States faced with a fait accompli will shoot more quickly because their interests are more badly damaged by it.
当进攻占主导地位时，既成事实会更加危险，因为成功的既成事实会对国际力量的分配产生更大的影响。突然获得的资源使对手更有能力威胁邻国的安全。因此，既成事实更令人震惊，也会引起其他国家更强烈的反应。面对既成事实的国家会更快地开火，因为它们的利益会因此受到更严重的损害。

G: STATES NEGOTIATE LESS AND REACH FEWER AGREEMENTS
G：各州的谈判减少，达成的协议也减少

When conquest is easy, states have less faith in agreements because others break them more often; states bargain harder and concede more grudgingly, causing more deadlocks; compliance with agreements is harder to verify; and
当征服变得容易时，国家对协议的信任度就会降低，因为其他国家会更频繁地破坏协议；国家更难讨价还价，让步更勉强，从而造成更多僵局；协议的遵守情况更难核查；以及

states insist on better verification and compliance. As a result, states negotiate less often and settle fewer disputes; hence more issues remain unsettled and misperceptions survive that dialogue might dispel.
各国坚持要求更好地核查和遵守。因此，各国谈判的次数减少，解决争端的数量减少；更多的问题仍未得到解决，对话本可消除的误解却依然存在。
States break agreements more quickly when the offense dominates because cheating pays larger rewards. Bad faith and betrayal become the norm. The secure can afford the luxury of dealing in good faith, but the insecure must worry more about short-term survival. This drives them toward back-alley behavior, including deceits and sudden betrayals of all kinds-diplomatic faits accomplis, military surprise attacks, and breaking of other solemn agreements. Hence compliance with agreements is less expected.
当进攻占主导地位时，国家会更快地破坏协议，因为欺骗会得到更大的回报。不守信用和背叛成为常态。安全的国家可以奢侈地进行诚信交易，但不安全的国家必须更多地担心短期生存。这就促使他们采取背道而驰的行为，包括各种欺骗和突然背叛--外交上的既成事实、军事上的突然袭击，以及破坏其他庄严的协议。因此，人们对遵守协议的期望较低。

When states do negotiate, they bargain harder and concede less when the offense dominates. Agreements must be more finely balanced to gain both sides’ agreement, because a relative gain by either side poses greater risks to the other’s safety.
当国家进行谈判时，当进攻方占主导地位时，他们会更努力地讨价还价，让步更少。协议必须更加微妙地平衡才能获得双方的同意，因为任何一方的相对利益都会给另一方的安全带来更大的风险。

Verification of compliance with agreements is both more necessary and more difficult when the offense dominates. States insist on better verification of the other’s compliance because smaller violations can have larger security implications; for example, an opponent might convert a small advantage gained by cheating on an arms control agreement into a larger offensive threat. At the same time, verification of compliance is harder because states are more secretive when security is scarce (see explanation G). As a result, the range of issues that can be negotiated is narrowed to the few where near-certain verification is possible despite tight state secrecy.
当进攻占主导地位时，核查协议遵守情况既更有必要，也更困难。各国坚持要求更好地核查对方遵守协定的情况，因为较小的违约行为可能会产生较大的安全影响；例如，对手可能会将通过违反军控协定获得的微小优势转化为更大的进攻威胁。同时，核查遵守情况也更加困难，因为在安全稀缺的情况下，国家会更加神秘（见解释 G）。因此，可以谈判的问题范围缩小到少数几个问题，在这些问题上，尽管国家严格保密，但仍有可能进行近乎确定的核查。

As a net result, states let more disputes fester when the offense dominates.
最终的结果是，当进攻占主导地位时，各州会让更多的争端恶化。

H: STATES ARE MORE SECRETIVE
H：各州更加神秘

Governments cloak their foreign and defense policies in greater secrecy when conquest is easy. An information advantage confers more rewards, and a disadvantage raises more dangers: lost secrets could risk a state’s existence. Thus states compete for information advantage by concealing their foreign policy strategies and military plans and forces.
当征服容易时，政府会将其外交和国防政策隐藏得更加隐秘。信息优势会带来更多回报，而信息劣势则会带来更多危险：失密会危及国家的存亡。因此，各国通过隐藏外交战略、军事计划和军事力量来争夺信息优势。

Secrecy in turn is a hydra-headed cause of war. It can lead opponents to underestimate one another’s capabilities and blunder into a war of false optimism.

^{9}

It can ease surprise attack by concealing preparations from the victim. It opens windows of opportunity and vulnerability by delaying states’ reac-
保密反过来又是战争的九头怪。它可能导致对手低估彼此的能力，陷入虚假乐观的战争。

^{9}

它可以向受害者隐瞒准备工作，从而便于发动突然袭击。通过延迟国家的反应时间，它可以打开机会之窗，使国家变得脆弱。

Figure 1. Offense-Defense Theory
图 1.攻防理论
Prime hypothesis: War is more likely when conquest is easy.
主要假设当征服容易时，战争更有可能发生。

IntP = Intervening phenomenon.
IntP = 干预现象。
tions to others’ military buildups, raising the risk of preventive war. It fosters policy blunders by narrowing the circle of experts consulted on policy, increasing the risk that flawed policies will survive unexamined. It prevents arms control agreements by making compliance harder to verify.
对其他国家的军事集结施加影响，增加了预防性战争的风险。它缩小了政策咨询专家的范围，增加了有缺陷的政策未经审查而继续存在的风险，从而助长了政策失误。它使军备控制协议的遵守情况更难核查，从而阻碍了军备控制协议的达成。

I: STATES ARMS RACE HARDER AND FASTER
一：各国军备竞赛更加激烈，速度更快

Offense dominance intensifies arms racing, whereas defense dominance slows it down.

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Arms racing in turn raises other dangers. It opens windows of opportunity and vulnerability as one side or the other races into the lead. It also fosters false optimism by causing rapid military change that confuses policymakers’ estimates of relative power. Thus offense dominance is a remote cause of the dangers that arms racing produces.
进攻优势会加剧军备竞赛，而防守优势则会减缓军备竞赛。

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军备竞赛反过来又会引发其他危险。当一方或另一方处于领先地位时，军备竞赛就打开了机会之窗，也打开了脆弱之窗。此外，军备竞赛还会导致军事变化迅速，混淆决策者对相对实力的估计，从而助长虚假的乐观情绪。因此，进攻优势是军备竞赛造成危险的一个遥远原因。

States have seven incentives to build larger forces when the offense is strong.
当攻势强劲时，各国有七种动力来组建更大规模的部队。

Resources are more cumulative (see explanations B and C). Wartime gains and losses matter more: gains provide a greater increase in security, and losses are less reversible. Therefore the forces that provide these gains and protect against these losses are also worth more.
资源更具累积性（见解释 B 和 C）。战时的收益和损失更重要：收益能更大程度地提高安全性，而损失的可逆性较低。因此，提供这些收益和防止这些损失的力量也更有价值。
Self-defense is more difficult because others’ forces have more inherent offensive capability. Hence states require more forces to offset others’ deployments.
自卫的难度更大，因为他国军队的固有进攻能力更强。因此，各国需要更多的部队来抵消他国的部署。
States are more expectant of war. Their neighbors are more aggressive (see explanation B), so they must be better prepared for attack or invasion.
国家对战争的预期更高。它们的邻国更具侵略性（见解释 B），因此它们必须为攻击或入侵做好更充分的准备。
The early phase of war is more decisive. Lacking time to mobilize their economies and societies in the event of war, states maintain larger standing forces. $^{11}$ The possibility of quick victory puts a premium on forces-in-being. $^{12}$
战争初期更具决定性。由于没有时间在发生战争时动员经济和社会，国家需要维持更多的常备军。 $^{11}$ 速战速决的可能性使得有生力量显得尤为重要。 $^{12}$
States transfer military resources from defense to offense because offense is more effective (see explanation J). Others then counterbuild because their neighbors’ capabilities are more dangerous and so require a larger response. States also infer aggressive intent from their neighbors’ offensive buildups, leading them to fear attack and to build up in anticipation.
国家将军事资源从防御转向进攻，因为进攻更有效（见解释 J）。其他国家则进行反集结，因为邻国的能力更危险，因此需要更大的反应。各国也会从邻国的进攻性集结中推断出侵略意图，从而担心遭到攻击并进行集结以备不时之需。
States hold military secrets more tightly when the offense dominates (see explanation H). This causes rational overarming, as states gauge their defense efforts to worst-case estimates of enemy strength, on grounds that
当进攻占主导地位时，国家会更严格地保守军事机密（见解释 H）。这就造成了理性的过度武装，因为国家会根据对敌方实力的最坏估计来衡量其防御努力，理由是

underspending is disastrous whereas overspending is merely wasteful. It also allows national militaries to monopolize defense information more tightly. Given that militaries are prone to inflate threats, states will overspend groundlessly when militaries have an information monopoly that lets them alone assess the threat. Thus “action-reaction” becomes “action-over-reaction-overreaction.”
支出不足是灾难性的，而超支只是浪费。它还能让各国军队更严密地垄断国防信息。由于军方容易夸大威胁，当军方垄断信息、独自评估威胁时，国家就会毫无根据地超支。因此，"行动-反应 "变成了 "行动-过度反应-过度反应"。

States reach fewer arms control agreements when the offense dominates, because agreements of all kinds are fewer (see explanation G). Hence states are less able to limit arms competition through agreement.
当进攻占主导地位时，各国达成的军备控制协议较少，因为各类协议都较少（见解释 G）。因此，各国通过协议限制军备竞赛的能力较弱。

If the defense dominates, things are reversed. States build smaller offensive forces because offense is less effective, and because other states have less aggressive aims. States are safe without wider empires; hence offensive forces that could provide empires lose utility. The national military therefore grows defense-heavy. This causes other states to feel safer, which in turn makes them less aggressive, further lowering all states’ insecurity-hence their need for empire and for offense-up to a point.
如果防御占主导地位，情况就会相反。各国建立较小规模的进攻力量，因为进攻的效果较差，而且其他国家的侵略目的也较小。没有更广阔的帝国，国家就安全了；因此，可以提供帝国的进攻力量就失去了作用。因此，国家军队越来越偏重防御。这使其他国家感到更安全，反过来又使他们减少了侵略性，进一步降低了所有国家的不安全感--因此他们对帝国和进攻的需求都会降低到一定程度。

States also reduce defensive forces when the defense dominates because defense is easier and attack seems more remote. Moreover, as their neighbors buy less offense, they need even less defense because their defense faces less challenge.
当防御占主导地位时，国家也会减少防御力量，因为防御更容易，攻击似乎更遥远。此外，当邻国购买的进攻力量减少时，它们需要的防御力量就更少，因为它们的防御面临的挑战更小。

In short, states buy smaller forces in general, and less offense in particular, when the defense dominates. This leads to still smaller forces and still less offense. If information were perfect, arms racing would slow to a crawl if the defense strongly dominated.
简而言之，当防御占主导地位时，国家购买的部队一般较少，尤其是进攻较少。这就导致了更小的兵力和更少的进攻。如果信息是完美的，那么在防御占主导地位的情况下，军备竞赛就会变得缓慢。

J. CONQUEST GROWS STILL EASIER
J.征服更容易

Offense dominance is self-reinforcing

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for three main reasons. First, states buy relatively more offensive forces when the offense dominates. They prefer the more successful type of force, so they buy defensive forces when the defense is strong and offensive forces when the offense is strong.

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This reinforces the initial dominance of the defense or the offense.

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进攻优势会自我强化，主要有三个原因。首先，当进攻占主导地位时，国家购买的进攻部队相对较多。他们更喜欢更成功的部队类型，因此在防守强大时购买防守部队，在进攻强大时购买进攻部队。

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这强化了防御或进攻的初始优势。

Second, alliances assume a more offensive character

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when the offense dominates because aggressors can more easily drag their allies into their wars of aggression.

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Insecure states can less afford to see allies destroyed, so they must support even bellicose allies who bring war on themselves. Knowing this, the allies feel freer to get into wars. As a net result, even de jure defensive alliances operate as defensive-and-offensive alliances. Alliances also assume a more offensive character if the allies adopt purely offensive military doctrines. This hamstrings states that would demand that their allies confine themselves to defensive preparations in a crisis, given that all preparations are offensive.

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其次，当进攻占主导地位时，同盟会具有更强的进攻性，因为侵略者可以更容易地将盟国拖入侵略战争。

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缺乏安全感的国家更不愿意看到盟友被摧毁，因此它们必须支持甚至是好战的盟友，因为它们会给自己带来战争。了解了这一点，盟国就会更自由地卷入战争。结果，即使是法律上的防御性联盟，也变成了防御与进攻并存的联盟。如果盟国采用纯粹进攻性的军事理论，那么联盟也会更具进攻性。这就束缚了那些要求盟国在危机中只做防御准备的国家，因为所有的准备都是进攻性的。

Third, status quo states are less able to protect their allies from conquest when the offense dominates because attackers can overrun defenders before help can arrive.
第三，当进攻占主导地位时，维持现状的国家保护盟国免遭征服的能力较弱，因为进攻者可以在救援到达之前就碾压防御者。

Thus offense dominance raises the danger of greater offense dominance. Once entered, an offense-dominant world is hard to escape.
因此，进攻主导地位会引发更大的进攻主导地位的危险。一旦进入，进攻主导的世界就很难摆脱。

Military offense dominance has one self-limiting effect: it leads status quo powers to cooperate more closely against aggressors.

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They jump to aid an aggressor’s victims because each knows that its neighbor’s demise could lead more directly to its own undoing. Conversely, when states think that the defense dominates, they do less to save others from aggression because each expects it can defend itself alone even if others are overrun. As a result, aggressors can more often attack their victims seriatim, which is far easier than defeating a unified coalition. This countervailing effect, however, is more than offset by the several ways that offense dominance feeds itself.
军事进攻优势有一个自我限制效应：它会导致维持现状的大国更紧密地合作对付侵略者。

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它们会跳出来援助侵略者的受害者，因为每个国家都知道，邻国的灭亡会更直接地导致自己的灭亡。反之，当国家认为防御占主导地位时，它们就会减少拯救其他国家免受侵略的行动，因为每个国家都认为，即使其他国家被占领，自己也能独自保护自己。因此，侵略者可以更频繁地连续攻击受害者，这比击败一个统一的联盟要容易得多。然而，进攻优势的几种自我滋养方式抵消了这种反作用。

These are the dangers raised by offense dominance. As noted above, these same ten dangers arise when the offense is weak but governments think it dominates. They then act as if it dominates, with comparable effects.
这就是进攻主导所带来的危险。如上所述，当进攻力量薄弱但政府认为它占主导地位时，也会出现这十种危险。然后，政府就会像它占主导地位那样行事，并产生类似的后果。

Are offensive capabilities always dangerous? The one-sided possession of offensive capabilities by status quo powers that face aggressors can lower rather than raise the risk of war under some conditions. Most important, status quo powers often need offensive capabilities to defend other states against
进攻能力是否总是危险的？在某些情况下，维持现状的大国在面对侵略者时片面地拥有进攻能力可能会降低而不是增加战争风险。最重要的是，维持现状的大国往往需要进攻能力来抵御其他国家的进攻。

aggressors (e.g., as France required some offensive capability to defend Czechoslovakia and Poland from Germany in 1938-39). Offensive capabilities in the hands of status quo powers also may provide more deterrence than provocation if the aggressor state knows that it provoked the status quo power’s hostility, if the aggressor knows that the status quo power has no bedrock aggressive intentions, and if the aggressor cannot remove the status quo power’s offensive threat by force. These conditions are not unknown but they are rare. Hence offensive capabilities usually create more dangers than they dampen.
侵略者（例如，1938-1939 年法国需要一定的进攻能力来保卫捷克斯洛伐克和波兰免受德国的侵略）。如果侵略国知道是自己挑起了维持现状大国的敌意，如果侵略国知道维持现状大国没有根本的侵略意图，如果侵略国无法用武力消除维持现状大国的进攻威胁，那么维持现状大国手中的进攻能力也可能比挑衅更具威慑力。这些情况并非不存在，但很少见。因此，进攻能力通常会带来更多的危险，而不是减少危险。

Causes of Offense and Defense Dominance
进攻和防守占优的原因

The feasibility of conquest is shaped by military factors, geographic factors, domestic social and political factors, and the nature of diplomacy. Discussions of the offense-defense balance often focus on military technology, but technology is only one part of the picture.

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军事因素、地理因素、国内社会和政治因素以及外交性质决定了征服的可行性。关于攻守平衡的讨论往往集中在军事技术上，但技术只是其中的一部分。

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MILITARY FACTORS 军事因素

Military technology, doctrine, and force posture and deployments all affect the military offense-defense balance.

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Military technology can favor the aggressor or the defender. In past centuries, strong fortification techniques bolstered the defense, and strong methods of siege warfare strengthened the offense. Technologies that favored mass infantry warfare (e.g., cheap iron, allowing mass production of infantry weapons) strengthened the offense because large mass armies could bypass fortifications more easily, and because mass armies fostered more egalitarian polities that could raise loyal popular armies that would not melt away when sent on imperial expeditions. Technologies that favored chariot or cavalry warfare (e.g., the stirrup) strengthened the defense, because cavalry warfare required smaller forces

^{20}

that were more easily stopped by
军事技术、理论、兵力态势和部署都会影响军事攻防平衡。

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军事技术可能有利于进攻方，也可能有利于防守方。在过去的几个世纪中，强大的防御工事技术加强了防御，而强大的攻城战方法则加强了进攻。有利于大规模步兵作战的技术（如廉价铁，可以大规模生产步兵武器）可以加强进攻，因为大规模军队可以更容易地绕过防御工事，还因为大规模军队促进了更加平等的政体，这些政体可以培养忠诚的人民军队，这些军队在帝国出征时不会消亡。有利于战车或骑兵作战的技术（如马镫）加强了防御，因为骑兵作战需要的兵力

^{20}

较小，更容易被防御工事阻挡。

fortifications, and fostered hierarchic societies that could not raise armies that would remain loyal if sent on quests for empire.

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In modern times, technology that gave defenders more lethal firepower (e.g., the machine gun) or greater mobility (e.g., the railroad) strengthened the defense. When these technologies were neutralized by still newer technologies (motorized armor), the offense grew stronger.

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在近代，技术为防御者提供了更强的致命火力（如机枪）或更大的机动性（如铁路），从而加强了防御。

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在现代，技术赋予防御者更致命的火力（如机枪）或更大的机动性（如铁路），从而加强了防御。当这些技术被更新的技术（机动装甲）所抵消时，进攻就会变得更加强大。

Thus when fortresses and cavalry dominated in the late Middle Ages, the defense held the advantage. Cannons then made fortifications vulnerable and restored the strength of the offense. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries new fortification techniques strengthened the defense. The mercenary armies of the age also remained tightly tied to logistical tails that kept them close to home: one historian writes that an eighteenth-century army “was like a diver in the sea, its movements strictly limited and tied by the long, slender communicating tube which gave it life.”

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Then revolutionary France’s mass armies strengthened the offense because they had greater mobility. Their size let them sweep past border forts without leaving the bulk of their manpower behind for siege duty, and their more loyal troops could be trusted to forage without deserting, so they needed less logistical support. After the conservative restoration in France, Europe abandoned the mass army because it required, and fostered, popular government. This restored the power of the defense, which then waned somewhat as Europe democratized and large mass armies reappeared in the mid-nineteenth century.

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因此，在中世纪晚期，当堡垒和骑兵占据主导地位时，防守方占据优势。随后，大炮使防御工事变得脆弱，恢复了进攻的优势。十七和十八世纪，新的防御工事技术加强了防御。这个时代的雇佣军也仍然被后勤尾巴紧紧捆绑着，使他们离家很近：一位历史学家写道，十八世纪的军队 "就像大海中的潜水员，其行动受到严格限制，并被赋予其生命的细长通信管束缚着"。

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随后，法国革命的大规模军队加强了进攻，因为他们拥有更大的机动性。他们的规模让他们可以横扫边境要塞，而无需留下大部分兵力执行围攻任务，而且他们更忠诚的部队可以在不开小差的情况下觅食，因此他们需要的后勤支持更少。法国保守复辟后，欧洲放弃了大规模军队，因为这需要并促进民众政府。这恢复了国防的力量，但随着欧洲的民主化和19世纪中期大规模军队的重新出现，国防的力量有所减弱。

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The combined effects of lethal small arms (accurate fast-firing rifles and machine guns), barbed wire, entrenchments, and railroads gave the defense an enormous advantage during World War I. The first three-lethal small arms, barbed wire, and trenches-gave defenders a large advantage at any point of attack. The fourth-railroads-let defenders reinforce points of attack faster than invaders could, because invaders could not use the defenders’ railroads (given that railroad gauges differed across states, and defenders destroyed rail lines as they retreated) while the defenders had full use of their own lines. During 1919-45 the power of the offense was restored by motorized armor and an offensive doctrine-blitzkrieg-for its employment; this overrode machine
在第一次世界大战期间，致命的小型武器（精确的速射步枪和机枪）、有刺铁丝网、堑壕和铁路的共同作用为防御方带来了巨大的优势。前三者--致命的小型武器、有刺铁丝网和堑壕--使防御方在任何攻击点都拥有巨大优势。第四项--铁路--使防御者能比入侵者更快地增援攻击点，因为入侵者无法使用防御者的铁路（因为各州的铁路轨距不同，防御者在撤退时会破坏铁路线），而防御者则可以充分利用自己的铁路线。1919-45 年间，摩托化装甲和进攻性理论--闪电战--恢复了进攻的力量。

guns, trenches, and barbed wire. Then after 1945 thermonuclear weapons restored the power of the defense-this time giving it an overwhelming advantage.

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火炮、战壕和铁丝网。1945年后，热核武器恢复了防御力量--这一次，它拥有了压倒性的优势。

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Technology and doctrine combined to define these tides of offense and defense. Sometimes technology overrode doctrine, as in 1914-18 and in 194591 (when the superpowers’ militaries embraced offensive doctrines but could not find offensive counters to the nuclear revolution). Sometimes doctrine shaped technology, as in 1939-45, when blitzkrieg doctrine fashioned armor technology into an offensive instrument.
技术和理论共同决定了进攻和防御的潮流。有时，技术凌驾于理论之上，如1914-18年和1945年91 （当时超级大国的军队奉行进攻理论，但却找不到应对核革命的进攻手段）。有时，理论塑造技术，如 1939-45 年，闪电战理论将装甲技术塑造成一种进攻工具。
States shape the military offense-defense balance by their military posture and force deployments. Thus Stalin eased attack for both himself and Hitler during 1939-41 by moving most of the Red Army out of strong defensive positions on the Stalin Line and forward into newly seized territories in Poland, Bessarabia, Finland, and the Baltic states.

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This left Soviet forces better positioned to attack Germany and far easier for Germany to attack, as the early success of Hitler’s 1941 invasion revealed. The U.S. eased offense for both itself and Japan in 1941 when it deployed its fleet forward to Pearl Harbor and bombers forward to the Philippines.

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Egypt eased Israel’s assault by its chaotic forward deployment of troops into poorly prepared Sinai positions in the crisis before the 1967 war.

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国家通过其军事态势和兵力部署来形成军事攻防平衡。因此，斯大林在1939-41年期间将大部分红军调离斯大林防线上的坚固防御阵地，前移到波兰、比萨拉比亚、芬兰和波罗的海国家新夺取的领土上，从而缓解了自己和希特勒的进攻压力。

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这使苏军处于更有利的位置来攻击德国，也使德国更容易攻击苏军，希特勒1941年入侵的早期成功就揭示了这一点。1941年，美国将其舰队部署到珍珠港，并将轰炸机部署到菲律宾，从而缓和了美国和日本的攻势。

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埃及在1967年战争前的危机中，将部队混乱地部署到准备不足的西奈阵地，从而缓解了以色列的进攻。

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States also can change the offense-defense balance through their wartime military operations. Aggressive operations can corrode key enemy defenses, and reckless operations can expose one’s own defenses. Thus the dangers of offense dominance can be conjured up by unthinking wartime policymakers. For example, General Douglas MacArthur’s reckless rush to the Yalu River in 1950 created an offensive threat to China’s core territory and, by exposing badly deployed U.S. forces to attack, eased a Chinese offensive.

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国家还可以通过战时军事行动改变攻防平衡。咄咄逼人的行动可以削弱敌方的主要防御力量，而鲁莽的行动则会暴露己方的防御力量。因此，不假思索的战时决策者可能会臆想出进攻主导的危险。例如，道格拉斯-麦克阿瑟将军在1950年不顾一切地冲向鸭绿江，给中国的核心领土造成了进攻威胁，并使部署不佳的美军面临攻击，从而缓和了中国的攻势。

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GEOGRAPHY 地理

Conquest is harder when geography insulates states from invasion or strangulation. Hence conquest is hindered when national borders coincide with oceans, lakes, mountains, wide rivers, dense jungles, trackless deserts, or other natural barriers that impede offensive movement or give defenders natural strong points. Human-made obstacles along borders, such as urban sprawl, can also serve as barriers to armored invasion. Conquest is hindered if foes are separated by wide buffer regions (third states or demilitarized zones) that neither side can enter in peacetime. Conquest is hindered when national territories are mountainous or heavily forested, and when populations live mainly in rural settings, easing guerrilla resistance to invaders. Conquest is hindered when states are large and their critical war resources or industries lie far in their interior, where they cannot be quickly overrun. Conquest is hindered when states are invulnerable to economic strangulation. Hence conquest is hindered when states are self-sufficient in supplies of water, energy, food, and critical raw materials, or when their trade routes cannot be severed by land or sea blockade.
当地理环境使国家免受入侵或扼杀时，征服就更加困难。因此，当国家边界与海洋、湖泊、山脉、宽阔的河流、茂密的丛林、无迹的沙漠或其他阻碍进攻或为防御者提供天然据点的天然屏障重合时，征服就会受到阻碍。边境上的人为障碍，如城市扩张，也可以成为装甲入侵的障碍。如果敌我双方被宽阔的缓冲区（第三国或非军事区）隔开，和平时期双方都无法进入，则会阻碍征服。如果国家领土多山或森林茂密，人口主要生活在农村地区，游击队对入侵者的抵抗容易发生，征服就会受到阻碍。如果国家幅员辽阔，关键的战争资源或工业远在内陆，无法迅速攻克，征服就会受到阻碍。当国家无法抵御经济扼杀时，征服就会受到阻碍。因此，当国家在水、能源、粮食和重要原材料供应方面能够自给自足，或其贸易路线无法被陆地或海上封锁切断时，征服就会受到阻碍。

The geography of Western Europe, with its mountain ranges and ocean moats, is less favorable to conquest than the exposed plains of Eastern Europe or the open terrain of the Middle East. Israel’s geography is especially unfortunate: physically small, its frontiers have few obstacles and much of its industry and population lie on exposed frontiers. Israeli territory is not conducive to guerrilla resistance, and its economy is import dependent. Germany’s borders are better but still relatively poor: its eastern frontier is open; its economy is import dependent; and its trade routes are vulnerable. Britain, France, and Italy have formidable frontier barriers that make them relatively defensible. The United States’ vast size, ocean-moat frontiers, and independent economy bless it with very defensible geography.
西欧的地理环境拥有山脉和海洋护城河，与东欧裸露的平原或中东开阔的地形相比，不利于征服。以色列的地理位置尤其不利：国土面积小，边境障碍少，大部分工业和人口都位于暴露的边境。以色列领土不利于游击队抵抗，经济依赖进口。德国的边境较好，但仍然相对较差：其东部边境开放；经济依赖进口；贸易路线脆弱。英国、法国和意大利拥有坚固的边境屏障，这使它们的防御能力相对较强。美国幅员辽阔，拥有远洋疆域和独立的经济，这些都为其提供了非常有利的地理条件。

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORDER
社会和政治秩序
Popular regimes are generally better at both conquest and self-defense than are unpopular regimes, but these effects do not cancel out. On net, conquest is probably harder among popular than unpopular regimes today, but in past centuries the reverse was likely true.
受欢迎的政权通常比不受欢迎的政权更善于征服和自卫，但这些影响并不会相互抵消。从净值上看，今天受欢迎的政权可能比不受欢迎的政权更难征服，但在过去的几个世纪里，情况很可能恰恰相反。

Popular governments can better raise larger, more loyal armies that can bypass others’ border forts and can operate far from home with less logistical support. This gives popular regimes greater offensive power. Popular regimes can better organize their citizens for guerrilla resistance, making them harder to conquer. Citizen-defense guerrilla strategies are viable for Switzerland or China, but not for Guatemala or ancient Sparta, because these unpopular governments cannot arm their people without risking revolution. The citizens of unpopular oligarchies may actively assist advancing invaders. This gives attackers more penetrating power and makes early losses less reversible. Thus Sparta feared an invading army might grow if it entered Spartan territory, because Spartan slaves and dissident tribes would desert to the enemy.

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人民政权可以更好地组建规模更大、更忠诚的军队，这些军队可以绕过其他国家的边境要塞，并能在较少后勤支持的情况下远离本土开展行动。这就赋予了人民政权更大的攻击力。人民政权可以更好地组织公民进行游击抵抗，使其更难被征服。公民自卫游击战略在瑞士或中国是可行的，但在危地马拉或古代斯巴达却行不通，因为这些不受欢迎的政府无法在不冒革命风险的情况下武装人民。不受欢迎的寡头国家的公民可能会积极协助入侵者。这给了入侵者更强的渗透力，使早期的损失更难逆转。因此，斯巴达担心入侵军队进入斯巴达领土后会壮大，因为斯巴达的奴隶和持不同政见的部落会向敌人开小差。

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Unpopular regimes are more vulnerable to subversion or revolution inspired from abroad. Subversion is a form of offense, and it affects international relations in the same way as do offensive military capabilities. Frail regimes are more frightened of unfriendly neighbors, making them more determined to impose congenial regimes on neighboring states. The French revolutionary regime and the oligarchic Austrian regime worried that the other side might subvert them in 1792, causing both sides to become more aggressive.

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After the Russian Revolution similar fears fueled Soviet-Western conflict, as each side feared subversion by the other.
不受欢迎的政权更容易受到来自国外的颠覆或革命的影响。颠覆是一种进攻形式，它与进攻性军事能力一样会影响国际关系。脆弱的政权更害怕不友好的邻国，这使他们更有决心将友好的政权强加给邻国。1792 年，法国革命政权和奥地利寡头政权都担心对方会颠覆自己，因此双方都变得更具侵略性。

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俄国革命后，类似的担忧加剧了苏联与西方的冲突，因为双方都担心对方会颠覆自己。

On balance, is conquest easier in a world of popular or unpopular regimes? Popularity of regimes probably aided offense before roughly 1800 and has aided defense since then. The reversal stems from the appearance of cheap, mass-produced weapons useful for guerrilla war-assault rifles and machine guns, light mortars, and mines. The weapons of early times (sword and shield, pike and harquebus, heavy slow-firing muskets, etc.) were poorly adapted for guerrilla resistance. Guerrilla warfare has burgeoned since 1800 partly because the mass production of cheap small arms has tipped the balance toward guerrillas, allowing the hit-and-run harassment that characterizes guerrilla operations. The defensive power of popular regimes has risen in step with this increase in guerrilla warfare.
总的来说，在一个政权受欢迎或不受欢迎的世界中，征服更容易吗？在大约 1800 年之前，政权的受欢迎程度可能有助于进攻，而在此之后则有助于防御。这种逆转源于廉价的、大规模生产的、可用于游击战的武器--突击步枪和机枪、轻型迫击炮和地雷的出现。早期的武器（剑和盾牌、长矛和鹞式步枪、重型慢射火枪等）不适合游击抵抗。自 1800 年以来，游击战蓬勃发展，部分原因是廉价小型武器的大规模生产使天平向游击队倾斜，游击队可以进行打了就跑的骚扰行动。随着游击战的增加，人民政权的防御力量也随之增强。

DIPLOMATIC FACTORS 外交因素

Three types of diplomatic arrangements strengthen the defense: collective security systems, defensive alliances, and balancing behavior by neutral states. All three impede conquest by adding allies to the defending side.
有三种外交安排可以加强防御：集体安全体系、防御联盟和中立国的平衡行为。这三种方式都通过为防御方增加盟友来阻碍征服。

States in a collective security system (e.g., the League of Nations) promise mutual aid against aggression by any system member. Such aggressors will face large defending coalitions if the system operates.

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集体安全体系（如国际联盟）中的国家承诺相互援助，共同抵御任何体系成员的侵略。如果该体系运行，这些侵略者将面临庞大的防御联盟。

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States in a defensive alliance promise mutual aid against outside aggressors, leaving such aggressors outnumbered by resisting opponents. Thus during 1879-87 Bismarck wove a network of defensive alliances that discouraged aggression and helped preserve peace throughout central and eastern Europe.
参加防御性联盟的国家承诺相互援助，共同抵御外来侵略者，使侵略者在人数上处于劣势。因此，在 1879-87 年间，俾斯麦编织了一个防御性联盟网络，阻止了侵略，帮助维护了整个中欧和东欧的和平。

Collective security systems and defensive alliances differ only in the kind of aggressor they target (system members versus outside aggressors). Both kinds of aggressors could be targeted at once, and a hybrid system that did this would offer defenders the most protection.
集体安全体系和防御性联盟的区别仅在于它们所针对的侵略者类型（体系成员还是外部侵略者）。两种侵略者都可以同时成为攻击目标，这样的混合系统可以为防御者提供最大的保护。

Neutral states act as balancers when they join the weaker of two competing coalitions to restore balance between them. Aggression is self-limiting when neutrals balance because aggressors generate more opposition as they expand. Britain and the United States traditionally played balancers to Europe, providing a counterweight to potential continental hegemons.
当中立国加入两个竞争联盟中的较弱联盟，以恢复它们之间的平衡时，它们就扮演了平衡者的角色。当中立国保持平衡时，侵略就会受到自我限制，因为侵略者在扩张时会产生更多的反对力量。英国和美国传统上是欧洲的平衡者，为潜在的大陆霸权提供制衡。

Balancing behavior is more selective than defensive alliance. Balancers balance to avert regional hegemony; hence pure balancers oppose expansion only by potential regional hegemons. Smaller states are left free to aggress. But balancing does contain hegemons and leaves their potential victims more secure. Conversely, if states bandwagon-join the stronger coalition against the weaker one-conquest is easier because aggressors win more allies as they seize more resources.

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平衡行为比防御性联盟更具选择性。平衡者通过平衡来避免地区霸权；因此，纯粹的平衡者只反对潜在地区霸权的扩张。小国可以自由地进行侵略。但平衡确实能遏制霸权，使其潜在受害者更加安全。反之，如果国家加入强国联盟，对抗弱国联盟，那么征服就会变得更容易，因为侵略者在夺取更多资源的同时，也赢得了更多盟友。

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Diplomatic arrangements have had a large influence on the offense-defense balance in modern Europe, and shifts in diplomatic arrangements have pro-
外交安排对现代欧洲的攻防平衡产生了很大影响，外交安排的变化也促进了欧洲的攻防平衡。

duced large shifts in the overall offense-defense balance. Collective security was never effective, but defensive alliances came and went, erecting barriers to conquest when they appeared. Balancing behavior rose and fell as the power and activism of the two traditional offshore balancers, Britain and the United States, waxed and waned. When the United States and/or Britain were strong and willing to intervene against aspiring continental hegemons, conquest on the continent was difficult. To succeed, a hegemon had to defeat both its continental victims and the offshore power. But when Britain and the United States were weak or isolationist, continental powers could expand against less resistance, leaving all states less secure.
这导致了整体攻防平衡的巨大变化。集体安全从未奏效，但防御联盟来来去去，在出现时为征服设置了障碍。随着英国和美国这两个传统离岸平衡者的力量和积极性的消长，平衡行为也随之起伏。当美国和（或）英国强大并愿意对有抱负的大陆霸权进行干预时，在大陆上的征服是困难的。霸权要想成功，必须同时击败大陆上的受害者和近海势力。但当英国和美国软弱无力或孤立主义盛行时，大陆强国就可以在较少阻力的情况下进行扩张，使所有国家都不那么安全。

Tests of Offense-Defense Theory
攻防理论测试

What predictions can be inferred from offense-defense theory? How much history does offense-defense theory explain?
从进攻防御理论中可以推断出哪些预测？进攻防御理论能解释多少历史？

PREDICTIONS AND TESTS 预测和测试

Offense-defense theory’s predictions can be grouped in two broad types, prime predictions and explanatory predictions. The theory’s prime predictions derive from its prime hypothesis (“War is more likely when conquest is easy”; or, for the theory’s perceptual variant, “War is more likely when states think conquest is easy”). Tests of these predictions shed light on whether offense dominance (or perceptions of offense dominance) causes war.
攻防理论的预测可分为两大类，即主要预测和解释性预测。该理论的主要预测源自其主要假设（"当征服容易时，战争更有可能发生"；或者，对于该理论的感知变体，"当国家认为征服容易时，战争更有可能发生"）。对这些预测的检验揭示了进攻优势（或对进攻优势的认知）是否会导致战争。

Offense-defense theory’s explanatory predictions derive from the hypotheses that comprise its ten explanations. Tests of these predictions shed light on both whether and how offense dominance (or perceptions of offense dominance) causes war.
进攻-防御理论的解释性预测来自于构成其十项解释的假设。对这些预测的检验揭示了进攻优势（或对进攻优势的认知）是否以及如何导致战争。
prime predictions. Three prime predictions of offense-defense theory are tested here.
主要预测。这里对进攻防御理论的三个主要预测进行了检验。

War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy or is believed easy, less common when conquest is difficult or is believed difficult.
在征服容易或被认为容易的时期，战争会更常见；在征服困难或被认为困难的时期，战争会较少见。
States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states.
与其他国家相比，拥有或认为自己拥有大量进攻机会或防御弱点的国家会发动更多的战争。
A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities.
当一个国家拥有或认为拥有更大的进攻机会和防御能力时，它就会发动和进行更多的战争。

These predictions are tested below in three case studies: Europe since 1789 (treated as a single regional case study), ancient China during the Spring and
下文将通过三个案例研究对这些预测进行检验：自 1789 年以来的欧洲（作为单一地区案例研究）、古代中国的春秋战国时期和明清时期。

Autumn and Warring States eras, and the United States since 1789. I selected these cases because the offense-defense balance (or perceptions of it) varies sharply across time in all three, creating a good setting for “multiple withincase comparisons” tests that contrast different periods in the same case; because the United States is very secure relative to other countries, creating a good setting for a “comparison to typical values” tests that contrasts U.S. conduct with the conduct of average states;

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and because two of these cases are well recorded (Europe since 1789 and the United States since 1789).
我之所以选择这些案例，是因为在这三个时代中，攻守平衡（或对攻守平衡的认识）在不同时期有很大差异。我之所以选择这些案例，是因为在这三个案例中，攻守平衡（或对攻守平衡的看法）在不同时期有很大差异，这为在同一案例中对比不同时期的 "多案例比较 "测试创造了良好的条件；因为美国相对于其他国家来说非常安全，这为 "与典型值比较 "测试创造了良好的条件，该测试将美国的行为与一般国家的行为进行对比；

^{33}

还因为其中两个案例（1789 年以来的欧洲和 1789 年以来的美国）有详细的记录。

The case of Europe since 1789 allows tests of prime predictions 1 and

2 .^{34}

We can make crude indices of the offense-defense balances (actual and perceived) for Europe over the past two centuries, and match them with the incidence of war (see Table 1). Offense-defense theory predicts more war when conquest is easy or is believed easy. We can also estimate the offensive opportunities and defensive vulnerabilities of individual powers-for example, since 1789 Prussia/Germany has been more vulnerable and has had more offensive opportunity than Spain, Italy, Britain, or the United States-and can match these estimates with states’ rates of war involvement and war initiation. Offense-defense theory predicts that states with more defensive vulnerability and offensive opportunity will be more warlike.
以 1789 年以来的欧洲为例，我们可以检验首要预测 1 和

2 .^{34}

我们可以对过去两个世纪欧洲的攻防平衡（实际平衡和感知平衡）进行粗略的指数分析，并将其与战争发生率进行匹配（见表 1）。攻防理论预测，当征服容易或被认为容易时，战争就会增多。我们还可以估算出单个大国的进攻机会和防御弱点--例如，自 1789 年以来，普鲁士/德国比西班牙、意大利、英国或美国更加脆弱，拥有更多的进攻机会--并将这些估算结果与各国的战争参与率和战争发起率相匹配。进攻-防御理论预测，防御能力更弱、进攻机会更多的国家会更加好战。

The ancient China case allows a test of prime prediction 1. The offensedefense balance shifted markedly toward the offense as China’s Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods evolved. Offense-defense theory predicts a parallel rise in the incidence of warfare during these periods.
中国古代案例可以检验首要预测 1。随着中国春秋战国时期的发展，攻守平衡明显转向进攻。攻防理论预测，在这些时期，战争的发生率会同时上升。
The U.S. case allows testing of prime predictions 2 and 3. The United States is less vulnerable to foreign military threats than are other states; hence offensedefense theory predicts that it should start fewer wars and be involved in fewer wars than other states. Americans have also felt more vulnerable to foreign military threats in some eras than in others. The U.S. propensity for war involvement and war initiation should co-vary with this sense of vulnerability.
美国的情况可以检验主要预测 2 和 3。与其他国家相比，美国更不容易受到外国军事威胁的影响；因此，根据国防理论的预测，美国应该比其他国家发动更少的战争，卷入更少的战争。美国人在某些时代也比其他时代更容易受到外国军事威胁的伤害。美国卷入战争和发动战争的倾向应与这种脆弱感共同变化。
explanatory predictions. Offense-defense theory posits that offense dominance leads to war through the war-causing action of its ten intervening phenomena A-J: opportunistic expansionism, defensive expansionism, fierce
解释性预测。进攻-防御理论认为，进攻主导地位通过其十种干预现象 A-J 的致战作用导致战争：机会主义扩张主义、防御性扩张主义、猛烈的进攻-防御理论、进攻-防御理论、进攻-防御理论、进攻-防御理论、进攻-防御理论、进攻-防御理论、进攻-防御理论、进攻-防御理论和进攻-防御理论。

Era 时代	Military realities favored 军事现实受到青睐	Military realities were thought to favor 军事现实被认为有利于	Diplomatic realities favored 外交现实更有利	Diplomatic realities were thought to favor 外交现实被认为有利于	In aggregate military and diplomatic realities favored 总的来说，军事和外交现实有利于	In aggregate military and diplomatic realities were thought to favor 总的来说，军事和外交现实被认为有利于	Amount of warfare among great powers 大国之间的战争数量
Pre-1792 1792 年以前	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Med.	Med.	Med.	Med.	Medium 中型
1792-1815	Aggrs.	Aggrs.	Med.	Aggrs.	Aggrs.	Aggrs.***	High 高
1816-56	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Low 低
1856-71	Med.	Med.	Aggrs.	Aggrs.	Aggrs.	Aggrs.	Medium 中型
1871-90	Defs. 后卫	Med.	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs.* 定义*	Low 低
1890-1918	Defs. 后卫	Aggrs.	Aggrs.	Aggrs.	Defs. 后卫	Aggrs.	High 高
1919-45	Aggrs.	Mixed* 混合*	Aggrs.	Aggrs.**	Aggrs.	Aggrs.****	High 高
1945-1990s	Defs. 后卫	Med.	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs. 后卫	Defs.* 定义*	Low 低

resistance to others’ expansion, first-strike advantages, windows of opportunity and vulnerability, faits accomplis and belligerent reactions to them, reluctance to solve conflicts through negotiation, policies of secrecy, intense arms racing, and policies that ease conquest, such as offensive force postures and offensive alliances. If offense-defense theory is valid, these intervening phenomena should correlate with the real and perceived offense-defense balance. Two explanatory predictions can be inferred.
对他国扩张的抵制、先发制人的优势、机会之窗和脆弱性、既成事实和对既成事实的好战反应、不愿通过谈判解决冲突、保密政策、激烈的军备竞赛，以及便于征服的政策，如进攻性力量态势和进攻性联盟。如果进攻防御理论成立，这些干预现象应与实际和感知的进攻防御平衡相关联。可以推断出两种解释性预测。

Phenomena A-J will be more abundant in eras of real or perceived offense dominance: the ten phenomena should increase as offense strengthens and diminish as offense weakens.
在进攻占主导地位或被认为占主导地位的时代，A-J 现象会更加丰富：这十种现象会随着进攻的加强而增加，随着进攻的减弱而减少。
States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will more strongly embrace policies that embody phenomena A-J. $^{35}$
那些拥有或认为自己拥有大量进攻机会或防御弱点的国家将更强烈地拥护体现 A-J 现象的政策。 $^{35}$

Two of the case studies presented here shed light on these explanatory predictions. The case of Europe allows a partial test of both. We can code only two of offense-defense theory’s ten intervening phenomena (IntPs A and B, opportunistic and defensive expansionism) for the whole period. We have fragmentary data for values on the other eight intervening variables. Hence the case lets us test explanations A and B fairly completely and offers scattered evidence on explanations C-J. To test explanations A and B, we ask if expansionism correlates over time with periods of real or perceived offense dominance, and if states that were (or believed they were) less secure and more able to aggress were more expansionist.
本文介绍的两个案例研究对这些解释性预测有所启发。欧洲的案例可以对两者进行部分检验。在进攻防御理论的十个干预现象中，我们只能对其中的两个（干预变量 A 和 B，机会主义和防御性扩张主义）进行全程编码。我们有其他八个干预变量值的零散数据。因此，该案例使我们能够比较完整地检验 A 和 B 项解释，并为 C-J 项解释提供了零星证据。为了检验解释 A 和 B，我们询问扩张主义是否与实际或感知的进攻优势时期相关，以及那些（或认为自己）不那么安全且更有能力进攻的国家是否更倾向于扩张主义。

The case of the United States since 1789 allows a more complete, if rather weak, test of explanatory prediction 2.
美国自 1789 年以来的情况可以对解释性预测 2 进行更全面的检验，尽管这种检验相当薄弱。

TEST 1: EUROPE 1789-1990S
测试 1：1789-1990 年代的欧洲
A composite measure of the offense-defense balance in Europe since 1789 can be fashioned by blending the histories of Europe’s military and diplomatic
将欧洲的军事史和外交史结合起来，就能综合衡量 1789 年以来欧洲的攻防平衡。

offense-defense balances, as outlined above.

^{36}

In sum, the offense-defense balance went through six phases comprising three up-down oscillations after 1789. Conquest was never easy in an absolute sense during these two centuries. Conquest was, however, markedly easier during 1792-1815, 1856-71, and 1930s-1945 than it was during 1815-56, 1871-1920s, and 1945-1990s.
进攻与防御的平衡，如上所述。

^{36}

总之，1789年后，攻守平衡经历了六个阶段，包括三次上下波动。在这两个世纪中，绝对意义上的征服从来都不容易。不过，1792-1815 年、1856-1871 年和 1930 年代-1945 年期间的征服明显要比 1815-56 年、1871-1920 年代和 1945-1990 年代容易得多。

Elite perceptions of the offense-defense balance track these oscillations quite closely, but not exactly. Elites chronically exaggerated the power of the offense, but did so far more in some periods than in others. Most important, they greatly exaggerated the power of the offense during 1890-1918: elites then wrongly thought conquest was very easy when in fact it was very hard. Thus the pattern of reality and perception run roughly parallel, with the major exception of 1890-1918.
精英们对攻守平衡的看法与这些波动非常接近，但并不完全一致。精英们长期夸大进攻的威力，但在某些时期夸大的程度远远超过其他时期。最重要的是，在 1890-1918 年期间，他们大大夸大了进攻的力量：当时的精英们错误地认为征服非常容易，而实际上却非常困难。因此，除了 1890-1918 年这一重大例外，现实与认知的模式大致是平行的。

Tides of war and peace correlate loosely with the offense-defense balance during this period, and tightly with the perceived offense-defense balance. Expansionism and war were more common when conquest was easy than when it was difficult, and were far more common when conquest was believed easy than when it was believed difficult. Moreover, states that believed they faced large offensive opportunities and defensive vulnerabilities (especially Prussia/Germany) were the largest troublemakers. They were more expansionist, they were involved in more wars, and they started more wars than other states.
战争与和平的潮汐与这一时期的攻守平衡关系松散，而与人们所认为的攻守平衡关系紧密。当征服容易时，扩张主义和战争比征服困难时更常见；当认为征服容易时，扩张主义和战争比认为征服困难时更常见。此外，那些认为自己面临巨大进攻机会和防御弱点的国家（尤其是普鲁士/德国）是最大的麻烦制造者。与其他国家相比，他们的扩张主义色彩更浓，卷入的战争更多，发动的战争也更多。

1792-1815. During 1792-1815 the offense was fairly strong militarily, as a result of France’s adoption of the popular mass army (enabled by the popularity of the French revolutionary government).

^{37}

Moreover, European elites widely exaggerated one another’s vulnerability to conquest: at the outset of the War of 1792 all three belligerents (France, Austria, and Prussia) thought their
1792-1815.在1792-1815年期间，由于法国采用了大众军队（法国革命政府的声望使其成为可能），进攻的军事力量相当强大。

^{37}

此外，欧洲精英们普遍夸大了彼此在征服面前的脆弱性：在1792年战争一开始，所有三个交战国（法国、奥地利和普鲁士）都认为自己的国家在1792-1815年期间的军事实力比1792-1815年期间要强。

opponents were on the verge of collapse and could be quickly crushed.

^{38}

Defense-enhancing diplomacy was sluggish: Britain, Europe’s traditional balancer, stood by indifferently during the crisis that produced the War of 1792, issuing a formal declaration of neutrality

^{39}

Moreover, French leaders underestimated the power of defense-enhancing diplomacy because they widely believed that other states would bandwagon with threats instead of balancing against them.

^{40}

In short, military factors helped the offense, and this help was further exaggerated; political factors did little to help bolster defenders, and this help was underestimated.
对手濒临崩溃，可能很快就会被击垮。

^{38}

加强防御的外交活动进展缓慢：作为欧洲传统的平衡者，英国在导致1792年战争的危机中无动于衷，发表了正式的中立声明

^{39}

此外，法国领导人低估了国防强化外交的威力，因为他们普遍认为其他国家会联合起来对付威胁，而不是与威胁保持平衡。

^{40}

简而言之，军事因素有助于进攻，而这种帮助被进一步夸大了；政治因素对支持防御者没有什么帮助，而这种帮助被低估了。

1815-56. After 1815 both arms and diplomacy favored defenders, as outlined above. Mass armies disappeared,

^{41}

British economic power grew, and Britain remained active on the continent as a balancer. Continental powers expected Britain to balance and believed British strength could not be overridden.
1815-56.1815年后，如上所述，武器和外交都有利于守方。大规模军队消失了，

^{41}

英国的经济实力增长了，英国作为平衡者在欧洲大陆依然活跃。大陆上的列强希望英国能够保持平衡，并相信英国的实力是不可战胜的。

This defense-dominant arrangement lasted until midcentury. It began weakening before the Crimean War (1853-56). When war in Crimea broke out, military factors still favored defenders, but elites underestimated the power of the defense: Britain and France launched their 1854 Crimean offensive in false expectation of quick and easy victory.

^{42}

In general, diplomatic factors favored the defense (Britain still balanced actively), but during the prewar crisis in
这种以防御为主的安排一直持续到本世纪中叶。克里米亚战争（1853-1856 年）爆发前，这种优势开始减弱。当克里米亚战争爆发时，军事因素仍然有利于防御方，但精英们低估了防御的力量：英国和法国在错误地期望迅速、轻松地取得胜利的情况下发动了1854年的克里米亚攻势。

^{42}

总的来说，外交因素有利于防御方（英国仍在积极平衡），但在战前的克里米亚危机中，防御方的力量却受到了削弱。

1853, diplomacy favored the offense because Britain and France blundered by giving Turkey unconditional backing that amounted to an offensive alliance. This encouraged the Turkish aggressions that sparked the war.

^{43}

1853年，外交政策倾向于进攻，因为英国和法国错误地给予土耳其无条件的支持，相当于结成了进攻联盟。这助长了土耳其的侵略，引发了战争。

^{43}

1856-71. After the Crimean War the offense-defense balance shifted further toward the offense. Changes in the military realm cut both ways. Mass armies were appearing (bolstering the offense), but small arms were growing more lethal and railroads were expanding (bolstering the defense). In the diplomatic realm, however, the power of defenders fell dramatically because defenseenhancing diplomacy largely broke down. Most important, Britain entered an isolationist phase that lasted into the 1870s, and Russia lost interest in maintaining the balance among the western powers.

^{44}

As a result, diplomatic obstacles to continental conquest largely disappeared, giving continental aggressors a fairly open field. This diplomatic change gave France and Sardinia, and then Prussia, a yawning offensive opportunity, which they exploited by launching a series of wars of opportunistic expansion-in 1859, 1864, 1866, and 1870. But defense-enhancing diplomacy had not disappeared completely, and it helped keep these wars short and limited.
1856-71.克里米亚战争后，进攻与防御的天平进一步向进攻倾斜。军事领域的变化是双向的。大规模军队的出现（加强了进攻），但小型武器的杀伤力越来越大，铁路也在扩张（加强了防御）。然而，在外交领域，防御者的力量急剧下降，因为加强防御的外交在很大程度上瓦解了。最重要的是，英国进入了持续到19世纪70年代的孤立主义阶段，俄国也对维持西方列强之间的平衡失去了兴趣。

^{44}

因此，征服欧洲大陆的外交障碍在很大程度上消失了，给欧洲大陆的侵略者提供了一个相当开阔的战场。这种外交变化给了法国和撒丁岛，然后是普鲁士一个巨大的进攻机会，他们利用这个机会发动了一系列机会主义扩张战争--1859年、1864年、1866年和1870年。但是，防御性外交并没有完全消失，它有助于使这些战争保持短暂和有限。
In 1859 British and Russian neutrality gave France and Sardinia a free hand, which they used to seize Lombardy from Austria.

^{45}

In 1864 British, Russian, and French neutrality gave Prussia and Austria a free hand, which they used to seize Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark.

^{46}

In 1866 British, French, and Russian neutrality gave Prussia carte blanche against Austria, which Prussia used to smash Austria and consolidate its control of North Germany.

^{47}

Even after war broke out, major fighting proceeded for weeks before any outside
1859年，英国和俄国的中立使法国和撒丁岛获得了自由，他们利用这一点从奥地利手中夺取了伦巴第。

^{45}

1864年，英国、俄国和法国的中立使普鲁士和奥地利获得了自由，他们利用这一点从丹麦手中夺取了石勒苏益格-荷尔斯泰因。

^{46}

1866年，英国、法国和俄国的中立态度给了普鲁士对抗奥地利的全权，普鲁士利用这种中立态度打垮了奥地利，巩固了对北德的控制。

^{47}

即使在战争爆发后，主要的战斗也持续了数周之久，然后才有任何外部势力介入。

state even threatened intervention.

^{48}

As A.J.P. Taylor notes, Bismarck’s 1866 diplomatic opportunity-a wide-open field for unopposed expansion-was “unique in recent history.”

^{49}

俾斯麦甚至威胁要进行干涉。

^{48}

正如泰勒（A.J.P. Taylor）所指出的，俾斯麦 1866 年的外交机遇--一个不受反对的广阔扩张空间--"在近代史上是绝无仅有的"。

^{49}

In 1870 Bismarck ensured the neutrality of the other European powers by shifting responsibility for the war to France and convincing Europe that the war stemmed from French expansionism.

^{50}

As a result, Prussia again had a free hand to pursue its expansionist aims. It used this to smash France, seize Alsace-Lorraine, and consolidate control over South Germany.

^{51}

1870年，俾斯麦将战争责任推给法国，并让欧洲相信战争源于法国的扩张主义，从而确保了其他欧洲大国的中立。

^{50}

结果，普鲁士又可以自由地追求其扩张主义目标了。普鲁士借此打垮了法国，夺取了阿尔萨斯-洛林，巩固了对南德意志的控制。

^{51}

1871-90. For some twenty years after the Franco-Prussian War, the defense dominated because of Bismarck’s new diplomacy and Britain’s renewed activism. In the military area the cult of the offensive had not yet taken hold. In diplomacy Bismarck wove a web of defensive alliances that deterred aggressors and calmed status quo powers after

1879 .^{52}

British power waned slightly, but this was offset by the recovery of Britain’s will to play the balancer. The “war-in-sight” crisis of 1875 illustrates the change: Britain and Russia together deterred a renewed German attack on France by warning that they would not allow a repeat of

1870 - 71 .^{53}

1871-90.普法战争后的二十多年里，由于俾斯麦的新外交政策和英国的新行动主义，防御占据了主导地位。在军事领域，对进攻的崇拜尚未深入人心。在外交方面，俾斯麦编织了一张防御性同盟网，在

1879 .^{52}

英国力量略微减弱之后，这张防御性同盟网震慑了侵略者，安抚了维持现状的列强，但这被英国恢复平衡的意愿所抵消。1875年的 "视线之战 "危机说明了这一变化：英国和俄国共同警告说，它们不会允许

1870 - 71 .^{53}

事件重演，从而阻止了德国对法国的再次进攻。

1890-1919. After 1890 military realities increasingly favored the defense, but elites mistakenly believed the opposite. Diplomatic realities swung toward the offense, and elites believed they favored the offense even more than they did.
1890-1919.1890 年后，军事现实越来越倾向于防御，但精英们却错误地认为情况恰恰相反。外交现实转向进攻，精英们认为他们比实际情况更倾向于进攻。

European militaries were seized by a “cult of the offensive.” All the European powers adopted offensive military doctrines, culminating with France’s adoption of the highly offensive Plan XVII in 1913 and with Russia’s adoption of the highly offensive Plan 20 in 1914. More important, militaries persuaded civilian leaders and publics that the offense dominated and conquest was easy. As a result, elites and publics widely believed the next war would be quickly won by a decisive offensive.
欧洲军队被 "进攻崇拜 "所俘虏。所有欧洲列强都采用了进攻性军事理论，法国在 1913 年通过了进攻性极强的 "十七计划"，俄国在 1914 年通过了进攻性极强的 "二十计划"，这些都使进攻性军事理论达到了顶峰。更重要的是，军方说服文职领导人和公众，进攻才是主导，征服才是易事。因此，精英和公众普遍认为下一场战争将通过决定性的进攻迅速取胜。

Bismarck’s defensive alliances withered or evolved into defensive-and-offensive alliances after he left office in 1890, largely because the cult of the offensive made defensive alliances hard to maintain. Pacts conditioned on defensive conduct became hard to frame because states defended by attacking, and status quo powers shrank from enforcing defensive conduct on allies they felt less able to lose. For example, Britain and France felt unable to enforce defensive conduct on a Russian ally that defended by attacking and that they could not afford to see defeated. Elites also thought that aggressors could overrun their victims before allies could intervene to save them, making defensive alliances less effective. Thus Britain seemed less able to save France before Germany overran it, leading Germany to discount British power. Lastly, German leaders subscribed to a bandwagon theory of diplomacy, which led them to underestimate others’ resistance to German expansion. Overall, the years before 1914 were the all-time high point of perceived offense dominance.
俾斯麦的防御性同盟在他1890年卸任后逐渐消亡或演变为防御-进攻同盟，这主要是因为对进攻的崇拜使得防御性同盟难以维持。以防御行为为条件的盟约变得难以制定，因为国家通过进攻来防御，而维持现状的大国又不敢对盟国实施防御行为，因为它们觉得自己输不起。例如，英国和法国认为无法对俄罗斯盟友实施防御性行为，因为俄罗斯盟友以进攻为防御手段，而英国和法国又不能眼睁睁地看着俄罗斯战败。精英们还认为，侵略者可能会在盟国进行干预以拯救受害者之前就将其赶尽杀绝，这使得防御性联盟的效果大打折扣。因此，英国似乎不太有能力在德国攻占法国之前拯救法国，这导致德国对英国的力量大打折扣。最后，德国领导人信奉带队外交理论，这导致他们低估了其他国家对德国扩张的抵制。总体而言，1914 年之前的几年是进攻优势的历史最高点。

Nine of the ten intervening phenomena predicted by offense-defense theory (all except phenomenon G, nonnegotiation) flourished in this world of assumed offense dominance. Opportunistic and defensive expansionist ideas multiplied and spread, especially in Germany. Russia and France mobilized their armies preemptively in the 1914 July crisis. That crisis arose from a fait accompli that Germany and Austria instigated in part to shut a looming window of vulnerability. This window in turn had emerged from a land arms race that erupted during 1912-14. The powers enshrouded their military and political plans in secrecy-a secrecy that fostered crisis-management blunders during July 1914. These blunders in turn evoked rapid, violent reactions that helped drive the crisis out of control. Belief in the offense fueled offensive military doctrines throughout the continent and impeded efforts to restrain allies. Together these dangers formed a prime cause of the war: they bore the 1914 July crisis and helped make it uncontrollable.
在这个假定进攻占主导地位的世界里，进攻防御理论所预测的十种干预现象中的九种（除了现象 G--不谈判）都得到了蓬勃发展。机会主义和防御性扩张思想大量出现并传播，尤其是在德国。俄国和法国在 1914 年七月危机中先发制人地调动了军队。这场危机源于德奥两国挑起的既成事实，部分原因是为了关闭一扇迫在眉睫的脆弱之窗。而这一漏洞又源于1912-14年间爆发的陆上军备竞赛。1914年7月，列强对其军事和政治计划进行了保密--这种保密性助长了危机管理上的失误。这些失误反过来又引起了迅速而激烈的反应，导致危机失控。对进攻的信仰助长了整个欧洲大陆的进攻性军事理论，阻碍了约束盟国的努力。这些危险共同构成了战争的主要原因：它们引发了 1914 年 7 月的危机，并使其变得无法控制。

1919-45. The interwar years were a mixed bag, but overall the offense gained the upper hand by 1939, and the German elite believed the offense even stronger than in fact it was.
1919-45.战时的情况喜忧参半，但总体而言，到 1939 年，进攻占了上风，德国精英们认为进攻比实际上更强大。

Military doctrine and technology gave the defense the advantage until the late 1930s, when German blitzkrieg doctrine combined armor and infantry in an effective offensive combination. This offensive innovation was unrecognized outside Germany and doubted by many in Germany, but the man who counted most, Adolf Hitler, firmly believed in it. This reflected his faith in the offense as a general principle, imbibed from international social Darwinist propaganda in his youth.

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直到 20 世纪 30 年代末，德国闪击战理论将装甲部队和步兵结合在一起，形成了有效的进攻组合，军事理论和技术使防御占据了优势。这一进攻性创新在德国以外未得到认可，在德国也受到许多人的怀疑，但最重要的人阿道夫-希特勒却坚信这一点。这反映了他年轻时从国际社会达尔文主义宣传中熏陶出来的对进攻这一普遍原则的信仰。

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More important, the workings of interwar diplomacy opened a yawning political opportunity for Nazi expansion. Britain fell into a deep isolationism that left it less willing to commit this declining power to curb continental aggressors.

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The United States also withdrew into isolation, removing the counterweight that checked Germany in

1918 .^{56}

The breakup of AustriaHungary in that year created a new diplomatic constellation that further eased German expansion. Austria-Hungary would have balanced against German
更重要的是，战时外交的运作为纳粹的扩张提供了一个巨大的政治机会。英国陷入了深深的孤立主义，这使得它不太愿意让这个衰落的大国去遏制欧洲大陆的侵略者。

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美国也陷入孤立，失去了在

1918 .^{56}

年遏制德国的制衡力量。奥匈帝国本来可以与德国保持平衡

expansion, but its smaller successor states tended to bandwagon.

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This let Hitler extend German influence into southeast Europe by intimidation and subversion.

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希特勒的 "扩张主义"，但其较小的继承国却倾向于拉帮结派。

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这让希特勒通过恐吓和颠覆将德国的影响力扩展到了东南欧。

The Soviet Union and the Western powers failed to cooperate against Hitler.

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Ideological hostility divided them. Britain also feared that a defensive alliance against Hitler would arouse German fears of allied encirclement, spurring German aggressiveness. This chilled British enthusiasm for an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance.

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苏联和西方列强未能合作对抗希特勒。

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意识形态上的敌对使他们产生分歧。英国还担心，针对希特勒的防御性联盟会引起德国对盟国包围的恐惧，从而刺激德国的侵略性。这使英国人对英法苏结盟的热情大打折扣。

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Hitler exaggerated the already-large advantage that diplomacy gave the offense because he thought bandwagoning prevailed over balancing in international affairs. This false faith colored all his political forecasts and led him to vastly underestimate others states’ resistance to his aggressions. Before the war he failed to foresee that Britain and France would balance German power by coming to Poland’s rescue.

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Once the war began he believed Germany could intimidate Britain into seeking alliance with Germany after Germany crushed France-or, he later held, after Germany smashed the Soviet Union.

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He thought the United States could be cowed into staying neutral by the 1940 German-Japanese alliance (the alliance had the opposite effect, spurring U.S. intervention).

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In short, Hitler’s false theories of diplomacy made three of his most dangerous opponents shrink to insignificance in his mind.
希特勒夸大了外交给进攻方带来的巨大优势，因为他认为在国际事务中，拉帮结派比平衡更重要。这种错误的信念影响了他所有的政治预测，导致他大大低估了其他国家对其侵略的抵制。战前，他没有预见到英国和法国会通过救援波兰来平衡德国的力量。

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战争开始后，他认为德国可以恐吓英国，让英国在德国击溃法国后寻求与德国结盟，或者，他后来认为，在德国击溃苏联后寻求与英国结盟。

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他认为美国可能会被1940年的德日同盟吓倒，从而保持中立（德日同盟产生了相反的效果，刺激了美国的干预）。

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总之，希特勒错误的外交理论使他心目中三个最危险的对手变得微不足道。

These realities and beliefs left Hitler to face temptations like those facing Bismarck in 1866 and 1870. Hitler thought he could conquer his victims seriatim. He also thought his conquests would arouse little countervailing opposition from distant neutral powers.

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As a result, he believed he faced a yawning opportunity for aggression.
这些现实和信念让希特勒面临着 1866 年和 1870 年俾斯麦所面临的诱惑。希特勒认为他可以连续征服他的受害者。他还认为，他的征服不会引起遥远的中立国的反对。

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因此，他认为自己面临着一个千载难逢的侵略机会。
57. Explaining why weaker states are more prone to bandwagon than are stronger states is Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 29-30.
57.Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp.
58. Bell, Origins of the Second World War in Europe, pp. 172, 224, 260; and Adamthwaite, Making of the Second World War, pp. 60, 69. This failure greatly eased Hitler’s aggressions, because geography made Britain’s 1939 guarantees to Poland and Romania unenforceable without a Soviet alliance. Ibid., pp. 86, 91.
58.贝尔：《第二次世界大战在欧洲的起源》，第 172、224、260 页；亚当斯怀特：《第二次世界大战的形成》，第 60、69 页。这一失败大大缓和了希特勒的侵略，因为地理原因使得英国 1939 年对波兰和罗马尼亚的保证在没有苏联联盟的情况下无法执行。同上，第 86、91 页。
59. Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 361.
59.Raymond J. Sontag, A Broken World, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 361.
60. On August 22, 1939, Hitler assured his generals that “the West will not intervene” to defend Poland. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, 2 vols. (New York: Schocken Books, 1988), vol. 2, p. 741.
60.1939 年 8 月 22 日，希特勒向他的将军们保证，"西方不会介入 "保卫波兰。Jeremy Noakes 和 Geoffrey Pridham 编辑，《纳粹主义，1919-1945 年》：文件和目击者描述中的历史》，2 卷（纽约：Schocken Books，1988 年），第 2 卷，第 741 页。
61. See Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 94.
61.见 Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire：Domestic Politics and International Ambition》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1991 年），第 94 页。
62. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 2, p. 797. Some German leaders also hoped that Germany could win decisively in Europe before the United States could bring its power to bear. Thus in September 1940 Hitler’s naval commander in chief voiced the hope that Britain could be beaten “before the United States is able to intervene effectively.” Ibid., p. 794.
62.Noakes 和 Pridham，《纳粹主义》，第 2 卷，第 797 页。一些德国领导人还希望德国能在美国发挥威力之前在欧洲取得决定性的胜利。因此，希特勒的海军总司令在 1940 年 9 月表示，希望 "在美国能够进行有效干预之前 "击败英国。同上，第 794 页。
63. The fine-grained pattern of events during 1938-40-who attacked whom and when-also fits the predictions of offense-defense theory (specifically, prime prediction 3). The Western allies stood
63.1938-40 年间事件的细微模式--谁攻击谁、何时攻击谁--也符合进攻防御理论的预测（特别是主要预测 3）。西方盟国

Unlike 1914, the late 1930s were not a pure case of perceived offense dominance. Instead, the 1930s saw status quo powers’ perceptions of defense dominance create real offensive opportunities for an aggressor state. Hitler thought the offense strong and even exaggerated its strength, but other powers (the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) underestimated its strength. Their perceptions of defense dominance relaxed their urge to jump the gun at early signs of threat (as Russia did in 1914); this made things safer. But this perception also relaxed their will to balance Germany, because they found German expansion less frightening. This weakened the coalition against Hitler, leaving him wider running room.

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与 1914 年不同的是，20 世纪 30 年代末并不是一个纯粹的进攻优势认知案例。相反，20 世纪 30 年代，维持现状的列强对防御优势的认识为侵略国创造了真正的进攻机会。希特勒认为进攻强大，甚至夸大了其实力，但其他大国（苏联、英国和法国）低估了其实力。他们对防御优势的认识放松了他们在早期威胁迹象出现时（如 1914 年俄国所做的）跃跃欲试的冲动；这使得事情变得更加安全。但这种看法也放松了他们制衡德国的意愿，因为他们认为德国的扩张并不那么可怕。这削弱了反对希特勒的联盟，给他留下了更广阔的活动空间。

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1945-1990s. After 1945 two changes swung the offense-defense balance back toward the defense. First, the end of American isolationism transformed European political affairs. The United States replaced Britain as continental balancer, bringing far more power to bear in Europe than Britain ever had. As a result, Europe in the years after 1945 was unusually defense dominant from a diplomatic standpoint.
1945-1990s.1945 年后，两个变化使攻防平衡重新转向防御。首先，美国孤立主义的结束改变了欧洲政治事务。美国取代英国成为欧洲大陆的平衡者，在欧洲的影响力远远超过英国。因此，从外交角度看，1945 年后的欧洲异常地以防御为主。

Second, the nuclear revolution gave defenders a large military advantageso large that conquest among great powers became virtually impossible. Conquest now required a nuclear first-strike capability (the capacity to launch a nuclear strike that leaves the defender unable to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation). Defenders could secure themselves merely by maintaining a second-strike capability (the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker’s society after absorbing an all-out strike). The characteristics of nuclear weapons-their vast power, small size, light weight, and low costensured that a first-strike capability would be very hard to attain, while a second-strike capability could be sustained at little cost. As a result, the great powers became essentially unconquerable, and even lesser powers could now stand against far stronger enemies. Overall, the nuclear revolution gave defenders an even more lopsided advantage than the machine gun-barbed wire-entrenchments-railroad complex that emerged before 1914.
其次，核革命为防御方带来了巨大的军事优势，以至于大国之间的征服几乎变得不可能。现在，征服需要核一击能力（发动核打击，使防御方无法在报复中造成不可接受的损害的能力）。防御方只需保持二次打击能力（在承受全面打击后对攻击方社会造成不可接受的破坏的能力），就能确保自身安全。核武器的特点--威力大、体积小、重量轻、成本低--确保了第一轮打击能力很难实现，而第二轮打击能力则可以以很小的成本维持。因此，大国基本上变得不可征服，即使是较小的国家现在也能对抗强大得多的敌人。总体而言，与 1914 年前出现的机枪-铁丝网-堑壕-铁路复合体相比，核革命为防御者带来了更加一边倒的优势。

American and Soviet policymakers grasped this cosmic military revolution only slowly, however. At first many feared nuclear weapons would be a boon to aggressors. When this fear proved false, the vast advantage they gave defenders was only dimly recognized, partly because scholars strangely failed to explain it. Thus the nuclear revolution changed realities far more than they did perceptions. As a result, state behavior changed only slowly, and both superpowers competed far harder-in both Central Europe and the third world-than objective conditions warranted. The Cold War was far more peaceful than the preceding forty years, but could have been still more peaceful had Soviet and U.S. elites understood that their security problems had vastly diminished and were now quite small.
然而，美国和苏联的政策制定者们对这场宇宙军事革命的理解却十分缓慢。起初，许多人担心核武器会给侵略者带来好处。当这种担心被证明是错误的时候，人们才朦胧地认识到核武器给防御者带来的巨大优势，部分原因是学者们奇怪地未能对此做出解释。因此，核革命对现实的改变远远大于对观念的改变。因此，国家行为的变化非常缓慢，两个超级大国在中欧和第三世界的竞争也比客观条件所要求的要激烈得多。冷战比之前的四十年要和平得多，但如果苏联和美国的精英们认识到他们的安全问题已经大大减少，现在已经相当小了，那么冷战本可以更加和平。

In sum, the events of 1789-1990s clearly corroborate offense-defense theory predictions-specifically, prime predictions 1 and 2 , as well as both explanatory predictions. These conclusions rest on rather sketchy data-especially regarding the explanatory predictions-but that data confirm offense-defense theory so clearly that other data would have to be very different to reverse the result.
总之，1789-1990 年代发生的事件明显证实了进攻防御理论的预测，特别是主要预测 1 和 2，以及两个解释性预测。这些结论建立在相当粗略的数据之上--尤其是关于解释性预测的数据--但这些数据如此清晰地证实了进攻防御理论，以至于其他数据必须非常不同才能扭转结果。

The incidence of war correlates loosely with the offense-defense balance and very tightly with perceptions of the offense-defense balance (for a summary see Table 1).
战争发生率与攻防平衡的相关性较弱，而与对攻防平衡的看法密切相关（摘要见表 1）。
Europe’s less-secure and more offensively capable continental powers were perennial troublemakers, while more secure and less offensively capable offshore powers were perennial defenders of the status quo. Prussia/Germany was cursed with the least defensible borders and faced the most offensive temptations. It started the largest number of major wars (1864, 1866, 1914, 1939, and shared responsibility for 1870 with France). France and Russia, with more defensible borders and fewer temptations, started fewer major wars. $^{65}$ Britain and the United States, blessed with even more insulating borders, joined a number of European wars but started none. $^{66}$ Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, also insulated from other powers by mountains or oceans, fought very little.
欧洲不那么安全且进攻能力较强的大陆强国是常年的麻烦制造者，而更安全且进攻能力较弱的近海强国则是现状的维护者。普鲁士/德国的边界最不设防，面临的进攻诱惑也最多。它发动的主要战争次数最多（1864 年、1866 年、1914 年、1939 年，并与法国共同承担了 1870 年的责任）。法国和俄国的边界防御能力更强，面临的诱惑更少，发动的大规模战争也更少。 $^{65}$ 英国和美国拥有更加坚固的边界，参加了多次欧洲战争，但没有发动过战争。 $^{66}$ 西班牙、瑞典和瑞士也因山脉或海洋而与其他强国隔绝，但它们很少发动战争。
Thus the timing of war and the identities of the belligerents tightly fit prime predictions 1 and 2.
因此，战争发生的时间和交战方的身份与主要预测 1 和 2 非常吻合。

Sketchy evidence suggests that opportunistic and defensive expansionism were more prominent during the periods of perceived offense dominance (1792-1815, 1859-71, 1890-1914, 1930s-1945) than at other times. The years 1792-1815 saw a strong surge of French expansionism, nearly matched at the outset by parallel Prussian expansionism. $^{67}$ The mid-nineteenth century saw large opportunistic expansionism in Prussia and some French expansionism. The years 1890-1914 saw vast expansionist ambitions develop in Wilhelmine Germany, $^{68}$ matched by fierce resistance to this German expansionism in Russia and France, and by lesser French and Russian expansionism. Large German expansionism then reappeared under the Nazis in the 1930s. During other periods European expansionism was more muted: European powers had smaller ambitions and acted on them less often. This supports explanatory prediction 1.
粗略的证据表明，机会主义和防御性扩张主义在进攻占优势的时期（1792-1815 年、1859-71 年、1890-1914 年、20 世纪 30 年代-1945 年）比其他时期更为突出。1792-1815 年间，法国扩张主义风起云涌，而普鲁士的扩张主义几乎在一开始就与之并驾齐驱。 $^{67}$ 19世纪中期，普鲁士出现了大规模的机会主义扩张主义，法国也出现了一些扩张主义。 $^{68}$ 1890-1914年间，威廉明治时期的德国出现了大规模的扩张主义野心，与之相对应的是俄国和法国对德国扩张主义的激烈抵抗，以及法国和俄国较小规模的扩张主义。20 世纪 30 年代，德国的大规模扩张主义在纳粹统治下再次出现。在其他时期，欧洲的扩张主义较为低调：欧洲列强的野心较小，采取行动的次数也较少。这支持了解释性预测 1。
Opportunistic and defensive expansionism were prominent among those states that saw the clearest defensive vulnerability and offensive opportunity (especially Prussia/Germany, also revolutionary France), while being more muted among states with more secure borders and fewer offensive opportunities (Britain, the United States, the Scandinavian states, and Spain). This corroborates explanatory prediction 2.
机会主义和防御性扩张主义在那些防御弱点最明显、进攻机会最多的国家（尤其是普鲁士/德国，也包括革命的法国）中表现突出，而在那些边界较安全、进攻机会较少的国家（英国、美国、斯堪的纳维亚国家和西班牙）中则表现较弱。这证实了解释性预测 2。

How strong is this test? The strength of a passed test depends on the uniqueness of the predictions tested. Do other theories predict the outcome observed, or is the prediction unique to the tested theory? The predictions tested here seem quite unique. There is no obvious competing explanation for the periodic upsurges and downsurges in European expansionism and warfare outlined above. Offense-defense theory has the field to itself. Particular domestic explanations have been offered to explain the aggressiveness of specific states-for example, some argue that Wilhelmine Germany was aggressive because it was a late industrializer, that revolutionary France was aggressive because its regime came to power through mass revolution, and so forth

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-but no competing theory claims to explain the general cross-time and cross-state pattern of war involvement that we observe. Hence this test seems strong.
测试的强度如何？通过检验的强度取决于被检验预测的独特性。是其他理论预测了所观察到的结果，还是所测试理论的预测是独一无二的？这里测试的预测似乎非常独特。对于上述欧洲扩张主义和战争的周期性起伏，没有明显的竞争性解释。进攻-防御理论独占鳌头。有人提出了一些特定的国内解释来解释特定国家的侵略性--例如，有人认为威廉明德之所以具有侵略性是因为它是一个工业化较晚的国家，革命的法国之所以具有侵略性是因为它的政权是通过群众革命上台的，等等

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--但没有任何竞争性理论能够解释我们所观察到的跨时间、跨国家的战争参与模式。因此，这一检验似乎是强有力的。

What importance does this evidence assign to offense-defense theory? That is, how potent is offense dominance as a cause of war? In Europe since 1789, the nature of international relations has gyrated sharply with shifts in the
这些证据赋予进攻防御理论怎样的重要性？也就是说，进攻优势作为战争原因的效力有多大？自 1789 年以来，在欧洲，国际关系的性质一直随着以下方面的转变而急剧变化

perceived offense-defense balance. War is far more common when elites believe that the offense dominates, and states are far more belligerent when they perceive large defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities for themselves. This indicates that perceptions of the offense-defense balance have a large impact on international relations. Offense-defense theory is important as well as valid.
攻守平衡。当精英们认为进攻占主导地位时，战争的发生率要高得多，而当国家认为自己在防御上有很大的弱点和进攻的机会时，交战性要高得多。这表明，对攻守平衡的看法对国际关系有很大影响。攻防理论既重要又有效。

How much history does this evidence suggest that offense-defense theory can explain? Explanatory power is partly a function of the prevalence of the theory’s cause: abundant causes explain more history than scarce causes. In Europe since 1789 the offense has seldom been really strong, but it was believed strong quite often-often enough to cause considerable trouble.
这些证据表明进攻防御理论能够解释多少历史？解释力部分取决于理论原因的普遍性：丰富的原因比稀缺的原因能解释更多的历史。在 1789 年以来的欧洲，进攻很少真正强大，但却经常被认为是强大的--往往足以造成相当大的麻烦。

TEST 2: ANCIENT CHINA 测试 2：古代中国

The ancient Chinese multistate system witnessed a long-term shift from defense dominance to offense dominance across the years

722 - 221

все.

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Offense-defense theory predicts that warfare should have increased as this transformation unfolded (see prime prediction 1). This prediction is fulfilled: diplomacy grew markedly more savage and international relations grew markedly more violent as the power of the offense increased.

722 - 221

все 年间，中国古代的多国体制经历了从防御主导到进攻主导的长期转变。

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进攻防御理论预测，随着这一转变的展开，战争应该会增加（见主要预测 1）。这一预测应验了：随着进攻力量的增强，外交明显变得更加野蛮，国际关系明显变得更加暴力。

Before roughly 550 все the defense held the upper hand among China’s many feudal states. Four related changes then strengthened the offense: feudalism declined,

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mass infantry replaced chariots as the critical military force, conscription was introduced, and armies grew tremendously in size.

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The two largest Chinese states deployed enormous armies of more than a million men, and some smaller states had armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

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As armies grew, border forts had less stopping power against infantry because invaders could sweep past, leaving a smaller portion of their force behind to besiege the forts. Forts also lost stopping power as improved siege-engines appeared-battering rams, catapults, and rolling towers-that further eased the conquest of fortified positions.

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The decline of feudalism eased offensive operations by reducing social stratification, which increased troop loyalty to
大约在 550 в се 以前，防御在中国的众多封建国家中占据上风。随后，四个相关的变化加强了进攻：封建主义衰落，

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大规模步兵取代战车成为关键的军事力量，征兵制度开始实行，军队规模大幅扩大。

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中国两个最大的国家部署了超过百万人的庞大军队，一些小国的军队人数也达到数十万。

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随着军队的壮大，边境要塞对步兵的阻击力减弱了，因为入侵者可以一掠而过，留下一小部分兵力围攻要塞。随着攻城引擎的改进--撞锤、弹射器和滚动塔的出现，堡垒的阻击力也在减弱，这进一步方便了对坚固阵地的攻克。

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封建主义的衰落减少了社会阶层的分化，从而减轻了进攻行动的难度，这也提高了部队对以下方面的忠诚度

regimes; this meant troops could be trusted to conduct long-distance offensive operations without deserting.
这意味着部队可以在不开小差的情况下开展长距离进攻行动。
The outcomes of battles and wars reveal the shift toward the offense that these technical and social changes produced. The number of independent Chinese states declined from two hundred in the eighth century всE to seven in the late fifth century, to one in the late third century-a clear measure of the growing power of the offense.

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Before 550 вСЕ defenders were often victorious. Thus the states of Tsin and Ch’i fought three great battles, in 632, 598, and 567 BCE, each won by the defender. Dun J. Li concludes, "If the three battles indicate anything, they meant that neither side was able to challenge successfully the other’s leadership in its own sphere of influence.

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In contrast, the state of Ch’in conquered all of China in a rapid campaign lasting only nine years at the end of the Warring States period (230-221 все).

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战斗和战争的结果揭示了这些技术和社会变革所带来的进攻性转变。中国独立国家的数量从公元 8 世纪的 200 个减少到公元 5 世纪末的 7 个，再到公元 3 世纪末的 1 个。

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在550 вСЕ之前，守方经常取得胜利。因此，秦国和楚国在公元前 632 年、598 年和 567 年进行了三次大战，每次都是守方获胜。李敦杰总结道："如果说这三次战役说明了什么，那就是双方都无法在自己的势力范围内成功挑战对方的领导地位。

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相反，战国末期（230-221 все ），楚国仅用九年时间就迅速征服了整个中国。

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This increase in the power of the offense coincides with a stark deterioration in international relations. During the Spring and Autumn period (722-453 все) interstate relations were fairly peaceful, and wars were limited by a code of conduct. The code confined warfare to certain seasons of the year and forbade killing enemy wounded. It was considered wrong to stoop to deceit, to take unfair advantage of adversaries, to “ambush armies,” or to "massacre cities."78 The subsequent Warring States period (453-221 BCE) was perhaps the bloodiest era in Chinese history. Warfare raged almost constantly,

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becoming a “fundamental occupation” of states.

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Restraints on warfare were abandoned. Casualties ran into hundreds of thousands, and prisoners of war were massacred en masse.

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Diplomatic conduct deteriorated; one historian writes that “diplomacy was based on bribery, fraud, and deceit.”

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在进攻力量增强的同时，国际关系也急剧恶化。在春秋时期（722-453 все ），国家间的关系相当和平，战争受到行为准则的限制。该法典将战争限制在一年中的某些季节，并禁止杀死敌方伤员。78随后的战国时期（公元前 453-221 年）可能是中国历史上最血腥的时代。战争几乎无休无止，

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成为国家的 "基本职业"。

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放弃了对战争的限制。伤亡人数高达数十万，战俘遭到大规模屠杀。

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外交行为每况愈下；一位历史学家写道："外交建立在贿赂、欺诈和欺骗的基础上"。

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In short, the shift toward offense dominance in China during 722-221 всE correlates tightly with a dramatic breakdown of China’s international order.
简而言之，722-221 всE 期间中国进攻主导地位的转变与中国国际秩序的急剧崩溃密切相关。

TEST 3: UNITED STATES 1789-1990s
测试 3：美国 1789-1990 年代

Since 1815 the United States has been by far the most secure of the world’s great powers, blessed with two vast ocean moats, no nearby great powers, and
自 1815 年以来，美国一直是迄今为止世界上最安全的大国，它拥有两道巨大的海洋护城河，附近没有大国，而且

(after 1890) the world’s largest economy. In the nineteenth century the United States also had substantial offensive opportunities, embodied in chances for continental and then Pacific expansion against weak defenders. However, America’s security endowments were quite extraordinary, while its offensive opportunities were more ordinary. Offense-defense theory predicts that such a state will exhibit perhaps average offensive opportunism but markedly less defensive belligerence than other states. Hence, on net, it will start fewer wars and be involved in fewer wars than others (see prime prediction 2).
(1890年以后）成为世界最大的经济体。19 世纪，美国还拥有大量进攻机会，这体现在针对弱小的防御者进行大陆扩张和太平洋扩张的机会上。然而，美国的安全禀赋相当非凡，而进攻机会则较为普通。根据进攻防御理论的预测，这样的国家或许会表现出一般的进攻机会主义，但其防御交战性却明显低于其他国家。因此，从净值上看，美国发动的战争和卷入的战争都将少于其他国家（见主要预测 2）。
This forecast is confirmed, although not dramatically, by the pattern of past U.S. foreign policy. The United States has fought other great powers only three times in its two hundred-year history-in 1812, 1917, and 1941-a low count for a great power.

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The 1812 war stemmed mainly from U.S. belligerence, but the wars of 1917 and 1941 resulted mainly from others’ belligerence. The United States did start some of its lesser wars (1846 and 1898), but it joined other wars more reactively (Korea and Vietnam).
美国过去的外交政策模式证实了这一预测，尽管并不显著。美国在其两百年的历史中只与其他大国交战过三次，分别是1812年、1917年和1941年，这对于一个大国来说是一个很低的数字。

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1812年的战争主要源于美国的好战，但1917年和1941年的战争主要源于其他国家的好战。美国确实发动了一些规模较小的战争（1846年和1898年），但它更多地是被动地加入了其他战争（朝鲜战争和越南战争）。

Offense-defense theory also predicts that while the United States will pursue some opportunistic expansionism (intervening phenomenon A), it will embrace few policies that embody offense-defense theory’s other intervening phenomena (B-J) (explanatory prediction 2). Where the record allows judgments, this forecast is borne out. Regarding expansionism, the United States has confined itself largely to opportunistic imperialism against frail opponents. Defensive expansionism has been muted, and overall, expansionist ideas have held less sway in the United States than in other powers. This is reflected in the relatively small size of the U.S. empire. The modern American empire has been limited to a few formal colonies seized from Spain in the 1890s and an informal empire in the Caribbean/Central American area, with only intermittent control exerted more widely-a zone far smaller than the vast empires of the European powers.
进攻-防御理论还预测，虽然美国将奉行一些机会主义扩张主义（干预现象 A），但它将很少采取体现进攻-防御理论其他干预现象（B-J）的政策（解释性预测 2）。在记录允许判断的情况下，这一预测得到了证实。在扩张主义方面，美国在很大程度上局限于针对虚弱对手的机会主义帝国主义。防御性扩张主义一直不温不火，总体而言，扩张主义思想在美国的影响力小于其他大国。这反映在美利坚帝国相对较小的规模上。现代美利坚帝国仅限于 19 世纪 90 年代从西班牙手中夺取的几个正式殖民地，以及加勒比海/中美洲地区的一个非正式帝国，只是间歇性地在更大范围内实施控制--这一区域远远小于欧洲列强的庞大帝国。
The U.S. impulse to engage in preemptive and preventive war has been small. In sharp contrast to Germany and Japan, the United States has launched a stealthy first strike on another major power just once (in 1812) and has jumped through only one window of opportunity (in 1812). Surprise first strikes and window-jumping were considered on other occasions (e.g., preventive war was discussed during 1949-54, and surprise attack on Cuba was considered during the Cuban missile crisis), but seldom seriously.
美国发动先发制人和预防性战争的冲动一直很小。与德国和日本形成鲜明对比的是，美国只对另一个大国发动过一次隐蔽的首次打击（1812 年），只跳过一次机会窗口（1812 年）。在其他场合，美国也曾考虑过出其不意的首次打击和 "跳窗 "行动（例如，在 1949-54 年期间讨论过预防性战争，在古巴导弹危机期间考虑过对古巴发动突然袭击），但很少认真对待。

American diplomacy has been strikingly free of fait accompli tactics. American foreign and security policy has generally been less secretive than those of the European continental powers, especially during the late Cold War, when the United States published military data that most powers would highly classify as state secrets. The U.S. arms raced with the Soviet Union energetically during the Cold War, but earlier maintained very small standing military forces-far smaller than those of other great powers. Overall, intervening phenomena B-J of offense-defense theory are strikingly absent in the U.S. case.
美国的外交一直没有既成事实的策略。与欧洲大陆大国相比，美国外交和安全政策的保密性通常较低，尤其是在冷战后期，美国公布的军事数据被大多数大国视为国家机密。冷战期间，美国与苏联展开了激烈的军备竞赛，但早先维持的常备军规模很小，远远小于其他大国。总体而言，进攻防御理论的 B-J 干预现象在美国的案例中明显缺乏。

In sum, the United States has not been a shrinking violet, but it has been less bellicose than the average great power. Compare, for example, U.S. conduct with the far greater imperial aggressions of Athens, Rome, Carthage, Spain, Prussia/Germany, Japan, Russia, and France.
总之，美国并非缩头乌龟，但它的好战程度低于一般大国。举例来说，将美国的行为与雅典、罗马、迦太基、西班牙、普鲁士/德国、日本、俄罗斯和法国的帝国侵略行为进行比较，美国的侵略行为要大得多。

Offense-defense theory further predicts that levels of American bellicosity should vary inversely with shifts over time in America’s sense of security and directly with the scope of perceived external threats (see prime prediction 3)as in fact they have.
攻防理论进一步预测，美国的好战程度应与美国安全感的长期变化成反比，并直接与所感知的外部威胁的范围成反比（见主要预测 3），事实上也是如此。

During 1789-1815 the United States saw large foreign threats on its borders and large opportunities to dispel them with force. It responded with a bellicose foreign policy that produced the 1812 war with Britain.
1789年至1815年期间，美国看到其边界上存在着巨大的外国威胁，也看到了用武力消除这些威胁的巨大机会。美国采取了好战的外交政策，导致了1812年与英国的战争。

During 1815-1914 the United States was protected from the threat of a Eurasian continental hegemon by Britain’s active continental balancing, and protected from extracontinental European expansion into the Western hemisphere by the British fleet, which was the de facto enforcer of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States responded by withdrawing from European affairs and maintaining very small standing military forces, although it did pursue continental expansion before 1898 and limited overseas imperial expansion after 1898.
1815-1914年期间，英国积极进行大陆平衡，保护美国免受欧亚大陆霸权的威胁，英国舰队则是门罗主义的实际执行者，保护美国免受欧洲向西半球进行大陆外扩张的威胁。美国的应对措施是退出欧洲事务，并保持非常小规模的常备军，尽管它在1898年之前确实进行了大陆扩张，1898年之后进行了有限的海外帝国扩张。

During 1914-91 Britain could no longer maintain the European balance. This deprived the United States of its shield against continental European aggressors. Then followed the great era of American activism-fitful at first (1917-47), then steady and persistent (1947-91). This era ended when the Soviet threat suddenly vanished during 1989-91. After 1991 the United States maintained its security alliances, but reduced its troops stationed overseas and sharply reduced its defense effort.
1914-91 年间，英国无法再维持欧洲的平衡。这使美国失去了抵御欧洲大陆侵略者的屏障。随后，美国进入了积极行动的伟大时代--起初（1917-47 年）是适宜的，随后（1947-91 年）是稳定而持久的。1989-91 年间，苏联的威胁突然消失，这一时代随之结束。1991 年后，美国维持了其安全联盟，但减少了海外驻军，并大幅削减了国防投入。

WHAT THESE TESTS INDICATE
这些测试表明

Offense-defense theory passed the tests these three cases pose. Are these tests positive proof for the theory or mere straws in the wind?
攻防理论通过了这三个案例的检验。这些检验是对该理论的积极证明，还是仅仅是风中残烛？

We learn more from strong tests than from weak ones. The strength of a passed test is a function of the uniqueness of the predictions that the test corroborated. The more numerous and plausible are contending explanations for the patterns that the test theory predicted and the test revealed, the weaker the test.
与弱测试相比，我们从强测试中学到的东西更多。通过的检验的强度取决于检验所证实的预测的独特性。对测试理论所预测和测试所揭示的模式的解释越多、越可信，测试的强度就越弱。

The three case study tests reported here range from fairly weak to quite strong. They each lack Herculean power but in combination they pose a strong test. The test posed by the ancient China case is weak because our knowledge of ancient Chinese society and politics is fairly thin. This leaves us unable to rule out competing explanations for the rise of warfare in the Warring States period that point to causes other than the rise of offense. The test posed by the U.S. case is a little stronger but still rather weak overall. Alternative explanations for the rise and fall of American global activism are hard to come up with, leaving the offense-defense theory’s explanation without strong competitors, so this element of the test posed by the U.S. case is fairly strong. Plausible contending explanations for other aspects of the U.S. case can be found, however. For example, some would argue that America’s more pacific conduct is better explained by its democratic domestic structure than by its surfeit of security. Others would contend that the United States has fewer-than-average conflicts of interest with other powers because it shares no borders with them, and it fights fewer wars for this reason. Hence this element of the test posed by the U.S. case is weak: U.S. lower-than-average bellicosity is only a straw in the wind.
这里报告的三个案例研究测试从相当弱到相当强不等。它们各自都缺乏强大的力量，但综合起来却构成了强大的考验。中国古代案例提出的检验是薄弱的，因为我们对中国古代社会和政治的了解相当匮乏。这使我们无法排除对战国时期战争兴起的其他解释，这些解释指出了进攻兴起以外的原因。美国案例所提出的检验标准稍强，但总体上仍然相当薄弱。对于美国全球行动主义的兴衰，很难找到其他解释，这使得进攻防御理论的解释没有强有力的竞争者，因此美国案例所提出的这一检验要素相当有力。然而，我们也可以为美国案例的其他方面找到合理的解释。例如，有些人会认为，美国的民主国内结构比其过度追求安全更能解释其较为和平的行为。另一些人则认为，美国与其他大国之间的利益冲突少于平均水平，因为它与这些国家没有边界，也正因如此，美国的战争也较少。因此，美国案例提出的这一检验要素是薄弱的：美国低于平均水平的好战性只是一根稻草。

As noted above, the case of Europe since 1789 offers a fairly strong test. Some competing explanations for Germany’s greater bellicosity are offered-as noted above, the lateness of German industrialization is sometimes suggested as an alternative cause, as is German culture. However, there is no obvious plausible competing explanation for the main pattern we observe in the case-the rise of warfare during 1792-1815, 1856-71, and 1914-45, and the greater periods of peace in between. The fit of this pattern with prime prediction 1 of offense-defense theory lends it strong corroboration.
如上所述，1789 年以来欧洲的情况提供了一个相当有力的检验标准。有人对德国的好战性更强提出了一些相互竞争的解释--如上所述，德国工业化的滞后有时被认为是另一个原因，德国文化也是如此。然而，对于我们在案例中观察到的主要模式--1792-1815 年、1856-1871 年和 1914-45 年期间战争的兴起，以及其间较长的和平时期，并没有明显可信的竞争性解释。这种模式与进攻防御理论的主要预测 1 相吻合，为其提供了有力的佐证。

WHAT PRESCRIPTIONS FOLLOW?
有哪些处方？

If offense dominance is dangerous, policies that control it should be pursued. Governments should adopt defensive military force postures and seek arms control agreements to limit offensive forces. Governments should also maintain defensive alliances. American security guarantees in Europe and Asia have made conquest much harder since 1949 and have played a major role in
如果进攻主导是危险的，就应推行控制进攻主导的政策。各国政府应采取防御性军事力量态势，并寻求军备控制协议来限制进攻性力量。各国政府还应保持防御性联盟。自 1949 年以来，美国在欧洲和亚洲的安全保障使征服变得更加困难，并在以下方面发挥了重要作用
preserving peace. A U.S. withdrawal from either region would raise the risk of conflict.
维护和平。美国撤出任何一个地区都会增加冲突的风险。

Conclusion: Offense-Defense Theory in Perspective
结论：进攻防御理论透视

Offense-defense theory has the attributes of a good theory. First, it has three elements that give a theory claim to large explanatory power. (1) Large importance, that is, its posited cause has large effects. Variance in the perceived offense-defense balance causes large variance in the incidence of warfare. Variance in the actual offense-defense balance has less impact because policymakers often misperceive it, but it has a potent effect when policymakers perceive it accurately. (2) Wide explanatory range. The theory explains results across many domains of behavior-in military policy, foreign policy, and crisis diplomacy.

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It governs many intervening phenomena (e.g., expansionism, first-move advantage, windows, secrecy, negotiation failures, crisis management blunders, arms races, tight alliances) that have been seen as important war causes in their own right. Thus offense-defense theory achieves simplicity, binding a number of war causes under a single rubric. Many causes are reduced to one cause with many effects. (3) Wide real-world applicability. Real offense dominance is rare in modern times, but the perception of offense dominance is fairly widespread. Therefore, if perceived offense dominance causes war it causes lots of war, and offense-defense theory explains much of international history.
攻防理论具有良好理论的属性。首先，它具备三个要素，这三个要素赋予了理论巨大的解释力。(1) 重要性大，即假定的原因具有大的影响。感知到的攻防平衡的差异会导致战争发生率的巨大差异。实际进攻-防御平衡的差异影响较小，因为决策者经常误解它，但当决策者准确认知它时，它就会产生强大的影响。(2) 解释范围广。该理论可以解释军事政策、外交政策和危机外交等多个行为领域的结果。

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它可以解释许多干预现象（如扩张主义、先发制人的优势、窗口、保密、谈判失败、危机管理失误、军备竞赛、紧密结盟），这些现象本身就被视为重要的战争原因。因此，进攻防御理论实现了简单化，将许多战争原因归结为一个单一的原因。许多原因被简化为一因多果。(3) 广泛的现实适用性。在现代社会，真正的进攻优势并不多见，但对进攻优势的认知却相当普遍。因此，如果认为进攻占优势会引发战争，那么它就会引发大量战争，而进攻防御理论可以解释大部分国际历史。

Second, offense-defense theory has large prescriptive utility, because the offense-defense balance is affected by national foreign and military policy; hence it is subject to political will. Perceptions of the offense-defense balance are even more malleable, being subject to correction through argument. Both are far more manipulable than the polarity of the international system, the strength of international institutions, the state of human nature, or other war causes that have drawn close attention.
其次，进攻-防御理论具有很大的规定性，因为进攻-防御平衡受到国家外交和军事政策的影响，因此它受制于政治意愿。对攻防平衡的认识甚至更具可塑性，可以通过争论加以纠正。与国际体系的极性、国际机构的力量、人性的状态或其他引起密切关注的战争原因相比，这两者的可操纵性要大得多。
Third, offense-defense theory is quite satisfying, although it leaves important questions unanswered. In uncovering the roots of its ten intervening phenom-
第三，进攻防御理论虽然留下了一些重要的问题，但却令人十分满意。在揭示其十个干预现象的根源时

ena, offense-defense theory offers a more satisfying (and simpler) explanation than do interpretations pointing directly to these phenomena. However, it also raises another mystery: Why is the strength of the offense so often exaggerated?
与直接指向这些现象的解释相比，进攻防御理论提供了更令人满意（也更简单）的解释。然而，它也提出了另一个谜团：为什么进攻的力量常常被夸大？

History suggests that offense dominance is at the same time dangerous, quite rare, and widely overstated. It further suggests that this exaggeration of insecurity, and the bellicose conduct it fosters, are prime causes of national insecurity and war. States are seldom as insecure as they think they are. Moreover, if they are insecure, this insecurity often grows from their own efforts to escape imagined insecurity.
历史表明，进攻优势同时也是危险的、相当罕见的和被广泛夸大的。它进一步表明，这种对不安全的夸大及其助长的好战行为是国家不安全和战争的主要原因。国家很少像它们认为的那样不安全。此外，如果国家不安全，这种不安全往往是由于国家自身努力摆脱想象中的不安全而产生的。

The rarity of real insecurity is suggested by the low death rate of modern great powers. In ancient times great powers often disappeared, but in modern times (since 1789) no great powers have permanently lost sovereignty, and only twice (France in 1870-71 and in 1940) has any been even temporarily overrun by an unprovoked aggressor.

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Both times France soon regained its sovereignty through the intervention of outside powers-illustrating the powerful defensive influence of great-power balancing behavior.
现代大国的死亡率很低，这说明真正不安全的情况并不多见。在古代，大国经常消失，但在近代（自1789年以来），没有一个大国永久丧失主权，只有两次（1870-71年和1940年的法国）被无缘无故的侵略者暂时占领。

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这两次法国都在外部势力的干预下很快恢复了主权--这说明大国平衡行为具有强大的防御影响力。

The prevalence of exaggerations of insecurity is revealed by the great wartime endurance of many states that enter wars for security reasons, and by the aftermath of the world’s great security wars, which often reveal that the belligerents’ security fears were illusory. Athens fought Sparta largely for security reasons, but held out for a full nine years (413-404 BCE) after suffering the crushing loss of its Sicilian expedition-an achievement that shows the falsehood of its original fears. Austria-Hungary held out for a full four years under allied battering during 1914-18, a display of toughness at odds with its own prewar self-image of imminent collapse. With twenty-twenty hindsight we can now see that modern Germany would have been secure had it only behaved itself. Wilhelmine Germany was Europe’s dominant state, with Europe’s largest and fastest-growing economy. It faced no plausible threats to its sovereignty except those it created by its own belligerence. Later, interwar Germany and Japan could have secured themselves simply by moderating their conduct. This would have assured them of allies, hence of the raw materials supplies they sought to seize by force. America’s aggressive and often costly Cold War interventions in the third world now seem hypervigilant in light of the defensive benefits of the nuclear revolution, America’s geographic
许多出于安全原因参战的国家在战时表现出了强大的忍耐力，世界上重大安全战争的后果也揭示了不安全因素被夸大的普遍性，这些战争的后果往往表明交战双方对安全的担忧是虚幻的。雅典与斯巴达的战争主要是出于安全考虑，但在遭受西西里远征的惨败后，雅典坚持了整整九年（公元前 413 年至公元前 404 年）。1914-18 年期间，奥匈帝国在盟军的打击下坚持了整整四年，这与其战前濒临崩溃的自我形象不符。二十年后的今天，我们可以看到，如果现代德国表现良好，它本可以安然无恙。威廉明德国是欧洲的霸主，拥有欧洲最大、增长最快的经济。除了它自己的好战行为造成的威胁之外，它的主权没有面临任何可信的威胁。后来，战时的德国和日本本可以通过缓和自己的行为来确保自己的安全。这本来可以确保它们的盟友，从而确保它们试图用武力夺取的原材料供应。美国在冷战时期对第三世界咄咄逼人且往往代价高昂的干预行动，如今在核革命带来的防御性利益、美国的地理位置、美国的军事力量以及美国的经济实力面前显得过于警惕。

Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War $∣ 43$
进攻、防御和战争原因 $∣ 43$

invulnerability, and the strength of third world nationalism, which precluded the Soviet third world imperialism that U.S. interventions sought to prevent.
第三世界的民族主义是不可战胜的，而且力量强大，这就排除了美国干预所要防止的苏联第三世界帝国主义。

Paradoxically, a chief source of insecurity in Europe since medieval times has been this false belief that security was scarce. This belief was a self-fulfilling prophecy, fostering bellicose policies that left all states less secure. Modern great powers have been overrun by unprovoked aggressors only twice, but they have been overrun by provoked aggressors six times-usually by aggressors provoked by the victim’s fantasy-driven defensive bellicosity. Wilhelmine and Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Napoleonic France, and Austria-Hungary were all destroyed by dangers that they created by their efforts to escape from exaggerated or imaginary threats to their safety.

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自相矛盾的是，自中世纪以来，欧洲不安全的一个主要根源就是这种认为安全稀缺的错误信念。这种信念一语成谶，助长了好战政策，使所有国家都变得不那么安全。现代大国被无缘无故的侵略者碾压的次数只有两次，但被挑衅者碾压的次数却有六次--通常是被侵略者挑衅，而侵略者的挑衅是由受害者的幻想驱动的防御性好战情绪造成的。威廉和纳粹德国、日本帝国、拿破仑时期的法国和奥匈帝国都是被他们为逃避夸大或想象的安全威胁而制造的危险所摧毁的。

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If so, the prime threat to the security of modern great powers is . . . themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence. The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations.
如果是这样，现代大国安全的首要威胁就是......它们自己。它们最大的威胁在于自身倾向于夸大所面临的危险，并以适得其反的好战方式来应对。这种综合症的成因给国际关系专业的学生们提出了一个大问题。

1. I use “offense-defense theory” to label the hypothesis that war is more likely when conquest is easy, plus explanatory hypotheses that define how this causation operates. The classic work on the topic is Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214 at 169. An overview is Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691. The theory I frame here subsumes and elaborates on Jervis’s theory.
  我用 "进攻-防御理论 "来标注 "当征服容易时战争更有可能发生 "的假设，以及界定这一因果关系如何运作的解释性假设。有关这一主题的经典著作是罗伯特-杰维斯（Robert Jervis）的《安全困境下的合作》（"Cooperation under the Security Dilemma"），《世界政治》（World Politics），第 30 卷，第 2 期（1978 年 1 月），第 167-214 页，第 169 页。Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp.我在此提出的理论包含并阐述了杰维斯的理论。
1. Suggesting this hypothesis are Ivan S. Bloch, The Future of War, trans. R.C. Long, pref. W.T. Stead (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899), pp. xxx-xxxi, lxxix; also George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 9. A corroborating test is John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
  提出这一假设的有伊万-布洛赫（Ivan S. Bloch），《战争的未来》（The Future of War），R.R.C. Long, pref.W.T. Stead (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1899), pp.John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.：Cornell University Press, 1983)一书提供了佐证。
1. As Robert Jervis notes, “when the offense has the advantage over the defense, attacking is the best route to protecting what you have…and it will be hard for any state to maintain its size and influence without trying to increase them.” Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” p. 211; see also pp. 168-169, 173, 187-199.
  正如罗伯特-杰维斯所指出的，"当进攻比防御更有优势时，进攻是保护你所拥有的东西的最佳途径......任何国家都很难保持其规模和影响力而不试图扩大它们。杰维斯：《安全困境下的合作》，第 211 页；另见第 168-169 页、第 173 页、第 187-199 页。
2. It also seems possible that states should be more careful to avoid war when conquest is easy, because war then brings greater risk of total defeat. If so, offense dominance should cause more caution than belligerence among states, and should lower the risk of war. Advancing this argument is James Fearon, “The Offense-Defense Balance and War since 1648,” paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, February 1995, pp. 18-24. Fearon’s argument seems deductively sound, but history offers very few examples of policymakers who argued that offense dominance was a reason for caution. This is one of many cases where deduction and the historical record point in opposite directions.
  还有一种可能是，当征服容易时，国家应更谨慎地避免战争，因为战争会带来更大的全面失败的风险。如果是这样的话，进攻优势应该比交战优势更能引起国家间的谨慎，从而降低战争的风险。推进这一论点的是詹姆斯-费伦（James Fearon），《1648 年以来的攻防平衡与战争》，为国际研究协会年会准备的论文，芝加哥，1995 年 2 月，第 18-24 页。Fearon 的论点在演绎上似乎是合理的，但历史上很少有决策者认为进攻占优势是谨慎行事的理由。这是演绎和历史记录指向相反方向的众多案例之一。
1. The classic discussion of these dangers is Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 221-259.
  关于这些危险的经典论述是 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966)，第 221-259 页。
2. For a discussion of the dangers of preventive war, see Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.
  关于预防性战争危险的讨论，见 Jack S. Levy，"Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War"，《世界政治》，第 40 卷，第 1 期（1987 年 10 月），第 82-107 页。
1. On fait accompli strategies, see Alexander L. George, “Strategies for Crisis Management,” in Alexander L. George, Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 377-394 at 382-383, also pp. 549-550, 553-554. Other discussions of faits accomplis include R.B. Mowat, Diplomacy and Peace (London: Williams and Norgate, 1935), chap. 10 (on “sudden diplomacy”); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 57-97 (on “brinkmanship”); and Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 22-28 (on games of “chicken”).
  关于既成事实战略，见 Alexander L. George，《危机管理战略》，载于 Alexander L. George，《避免战争：危机管理问题》（Boulder, Colo.：Westview, 1991 年），第 377-394 页，第 382-383 页，以及第 549-550 页，第 553-554 页。其他关于既成事实的讨论包括 R.B. Mowat，《外交与和平》（伦敦：Williams and Norgate，1935 年），第 10 章（关于 "突然外交"）。10 (on "sudden diplomacy"); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp.57-97 (on "brinkmanship"); and Thomas C. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp.22-28 (on games of "chicken").
1. On wars of false optimism, see Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp. 35-56.
  关于虚假乐观主义战争，见 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3d ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp.
1. See Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 172, 188-190.
  见 Jervis，"安全困境下的合作"，第 172、188-190 页。
2. See ibid., pp. 172, 189.
  见同上，第 172 和 189 页。
3. General Joseph Joffre argued for a larger French standing force in 1913, because “the affair will already have been settled” by the time reservists were mobilized in three to four weeks. David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 193.
  约瑟夫-茹夫尔将军在 1913 年主张扩大法国常备军的规模，因为在三到四周内动员预备役人员时，"事情已经解决了"。David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1996 年），第 193 页。
1. Making this argument is Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 188, 199, 201.
  提出这一论点的是杰维斯，《安全困境下的合作》，第 188、199 和 201 页。
2. Thus Clausewitz explained: “If attack were the stronger form [of war], there would be no case for using the defensive, since its purpose is only passive. No one would want to do anything but attack. Defense would be pointless.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, intro. by Paret, Howard, and Bernard Brodie, commentary by Brodie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 359.
  因此，克劳塞维茨解释说"如果进攻是[战争的]更强大的形式，那么就没有理由使用防御，因为防御的目的只是被动的。除了进攻，没有人会想做任何事情。防御将毫无意义"。卡尔-冯-克劳塞维茨，《论战争》，迈克尔-霍华德和彼得-帕雷特编辑和翻译，导言。Michael Howard and Peter Paret, intro. by Paret, Howard, and Bernard Brodie, commentary by Brodie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 359.
1. A defensive alliance is conditioned on defensive behavior by the ally; the alliance operates if the ally is attacked but not if it attacks. A defensive-and-offensive alliance operates in the event of war regardless of which side started it. The distinction began with Thucydides, who used “empimachy” to denote defensive alliance, “symmachy” for defensive-and-offensive alliances. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 60, 72-73, 106-108, 184, 298-302, 328.
  防御联盟以盟国的防御行为为条件；如果盟国受到攻击，联盟就会运作，但如果盟国发起攻击，联盟就不会运作。如果发生战争，无论哪一方挑起战争，攻守同盟都会发挥作用。这种区分始于修昔底德，他用 "empimachy "表示防御联盟，用 "symmachy "表示防御与进攻联盟。G.E.M. de Ste. Croix，《伯罗奔尼撒战争的起源》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1972 年），第 60、72-73、106-108、184、298-302、328 页。
2. Developing this point are Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.
  Thomas J. Christensen 和 Jack Snyder，"Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks：Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp.
3. Making this argument is ibid.
  提出这一论点的是同上。
1. For a discussion of the causes of offense and defense dominance, see Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 176, 194-199.
  关于进攻和防御占优势的原因，见 Jervis，"安全困境下的合作"，第 176、194-199 页。
2. Several measures of the military offense-defense balance could be adopted, such as: (1) the probability that an offensive force can overcome a defensive force of equal cost; (2) the relative cost that attackers and defenders must pay for forces that offset incremental improvements by the other; or (3) the loss ratio when an offensive force attacks a defensive force of equal cost. All three measures (and more are possible) capture the concept of relative military difficulty of conquest and defense. For a list of possible measures, see Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, “What Is Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82.
  可以采用几种军事进攻防御平衡的衡量标准，例如(1) 进攻部队战胜同等代价的防御部队的概率；(2) 进攻方和防御方为抵消对方的增量改进而必须付出的相对代价；或 (3) 进攻部队攻击同等代价的防御部队时的损失率。所有这三种衡量标准（还可能有更多衡量标准）都体现了征服和防御的相对军事难度概念。有关可能的衡量标准清单，请参阅 Charles L. Glaser 和 Chaim Kaufmann，"什么是攻防平衡以及我们如何衡量它"，《国际安全》，第 22 卷，第 4 期（1998 年春季），第 44-82 页。
3. Cavalry warfare was capital intensive; hence it was usually waged by small forces of taxsupported specialists-knights in shining (and expensive) armor on expensive horses. Infantry warfare is more manpower intensive, and is usually waged by larger, less capitalized armies.
  骑兵作战是资本密集型的，因此通常由小规模的纳税专家部队--身着闪亮（昂贵）盔甲、骑着昂贵战马的骑士--发动。步兵战争则需要更多的人力，通常由规模更大、资本更少的军队发动。
1. On the effects of the stirrup on warfare and society in the Middle Ages, see Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 1-38. On the general effect of military technology on social stratification, see Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 20-74.
  关于马镫对中世纪战争和社会的影响，见 Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1964 年），第 1-38 页。关于军事技术对社会分层的一般影响，见 Stanislav Andreski, Military Organization and Society（伯克利：加利福尼亚大学出版社，1971 年），第 20-74 页。
2. Harold Temperley, quoted in Blainey, Causes of War, p. 188.
  Harold Temperley，引自 Blainey，《战争原因》，第 188 页。
3. Large armies aid the offense only up to a point, however. Once armies grow so big that they can cover an entire frontier (as on the western front in World War I), their size aids the defense because offensive outflanking maneuvers against them become impossible.
  然而，庞大的军队只能在一定程度上帮助进攻。一旦军队壮大到可以覆盖整个边境（如第一次世界大战中的西线），它们的规模就会有助于防御，因为针对它们的进攻性包抄演习变得不可能。
1. Jack Levy provides synoptic history of the military offense-defense balance in “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (June 1984), pp. 219-238 at 230-234. Other discussions include Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System; and Andreski, Military Organization and Society, pp. 75-78. A detailed history is needed.
  Jack Levy 在 "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology：国际研究季刊》，第 28 卷，第 2 期（1984 年 6 月），第 219-238 页，第 230-234 页。其他讨论包括 Quester，《国际体系中的进攻与防御》；Andreski，《军事组织与社会》，第 75-78 页。需要详细的历史资料。
2. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: The Story of World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 168.
  Peter Calvocoressi 和 Guy Wint，《全面战争：第二次世界大战的故事》（纽约：Pantheon Books，1972 年），第 168 页。
3. Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937-1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), pp. 84, 163.
  Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937-1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), pp.
4. Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days That Changed the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 141, 168.
  Donald Neff, Warriors for Jerusalem：改变中东的六天》（纽约：Simon and Schuster 出版社，1984 年），第 141 和 168 页。
5. Likewise, during the Cold War some worried that NATO might inadvertently threaten the Soviet Union’s strategic nuclear deterrent in its effort to defend NATO’s Atlantic sea-lanes during
  同样，在冷战期间，一些人担心北约在保卫北约的大西洋航道时可能会无意中威胁到苏联的战略核威慑力量。
an East-West conventional war. Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 129-158. On a related danger, see ibid., pp. 28-67.
东西方常规战争。巴里-波森（Barry R. Posen），《无心插柳柳成荫》（Inadvertent Escalation：常规战争与核风险》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社，1991 年），第 129-158 页。关于相关危险，见同上，第 28-67 页。
1. De Ste. Croix, Origins of the Peloponnesian War, pp. 89-94. Likewise, Hannibal hoped to defeat Rome by recruiting dissident tribes as he penetrated the Italian peninsula. See R.M. Errington, Dawn of Empire: Rome’s Rise to World Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), pp. 62-64. 30. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 123-124; and T.C.W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (London: Longman, 1986), pp. 76, 85-86, 99-101, 111.
  De Ste. Croix，《伯罗奔尼撒战争的起源》，第 89-94 页。同样，汉尼拔也希望通过在意大利半岛招募持不同政见的部落来击败罗马。见 R.M. Errington, Dawn of Empire：罗马崛起为世界强国》（纽约州伊萨卡：康奈尔大学出版社），第 62-64 页。30.Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.
1. An introduction to collective security is Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 411-433. A recent advocacy of collective security is Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-163.
  关于集体安全的介绍见小 Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares：Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organizations, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1971), pp.Charles A. Kupchan 和 Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security, Vol. 16, No.
2. On balancing, bandwagoning, and other theories of alliances, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). Historians have often suggested that a “breakdown in the balance of power” caused war. They usually mean (and should recast their claim to say) that states failed to engage in balancing behavior, which made aggression easier, causing war. War occurs not when the balance of power breaks down, but when balancers fail to balance, leaving aggressors unchecked, as in the late 1930s.
  关于平衡、拉帮结派和其他联盟理论，见 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)。历史学家经常认为 "均势的打破 "导致了战争。他们的意思通常是（应该重新表述为），国家未能采取平衡行为，这使得侵略变得更加容易，从而引发了战争。战争不是在力量平衡被打破时发生的，而是在平衡者未能实现平衡，使侵略者肆无忌惮时发生的，就像 20 世纪 30 年代末那样。
1. I say more about the logic of within-case comparisons and comparison to typical values tests in Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 58-63. On case selection criteria, see pp. 77-88.
  我在 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp.关于案例选择标准，见第 77-88 页。
2. In principle, prime prediction 3 could also be tested with this case. This, however, would require tracing and describing trends in each state’s sense of vulnerability over time-a large task that would fill many pages.
  原则上，主要预测 3 也可以在这种情况下得到验证。然而，这需要追踪和描述每个州的脆弱性感随时间变化的趋势--这项艰巨的任务将耗费很多篇幅。
Aggrs.: The factor favors aggressors. Defs.: The factor favors defenders.
Aggrs：该因素有利于侵略者。Defs：该因子有利于防守方。
Med.: A medium value: things are somewhere in between, cut both ways.
中间值中间值：介于两者之间，两边都有。
Mixed: Some national elites saw defense dominance, some saw offense dom
喜忧参半：一些国家的精英看到了防守的优势，一些则看到了进攻的优势

The perceptions entries are an average of the perceptions of the great power elites. In some cases, the perceptions of these * Things varied across states. The German elite recognized the military power of the offensive in the late 1930s; the elites of
条目中的看法是大国精英看法的平均值。在某些情况下，不同国家对这些*事物的认识是不同的。20 世纪 30 年代末，德国精英认识到了进攻的军事力量；美国精英则认识到了进攻的军事力量。
other great powers thought the defense was dominant.
其他大国都认为防守占优势。
$* *$ Things varied across states. The German elite (above all Hitler) exaggerated the considerable actual diplomatic weakness of
$* *$ 各国的情况各不相同。德国精英（尤其是希特勒）夸大了德国在外交上的实际弱点。
the defense; the elites of other great powers recognized this weakness but did not overstate it. These beliefs average to a perception of substantial diplomatic offense dominance.
其他大国的精英们也认识到了这一弱点，但并未过分夸大。这些信念平均地形成了外交进攻占主导地位的观念。
*** Elites exaggerated the strength of the offense during 1792-1815, 1871-90, and 1945-1990s, but not by enough to give the realities and perceptions of the offense-defense balance different scores.
***精英们夸大了1792-1815年、1871-1990年和1945-1990年代的进攻实力，但夸大的程度还不足以让人们对攻守平衡的现实和看法打出不同的分数。
When we aggregate perceptions of the offense-defense balance, the errors of Germany and the other powers cancel each
当我们把对攻守平衡的看法综合起来时，德国和其他大国的错误就会相互抵消。
1. Explanatory predictions 1 and 2 are inferred from the “left side” of offense-defense theory, that is, from hypotheses $A_{1} - J_{1}$ , which frame the claim that offense dominance causes intervening phenomena A-J (see Figure 1). Predictions could also be inferred from hypotheses $A_{2} - J_{2}$ , which comprise the “right side” of the theory, and frame the claim that intervening phenomena A-J cause war. For example, we could infer that (6) warfare will be more common in eras and regions where phenomena A-J are more prevalent, and (7) states that embrace policies that embody phenomena A-J will be involved in more wars and will initiate more wars than other states. I leave “right side” hypotheses untested here because the effects of phenomena A-J are less debated than their causes. Most agree that they cause trouble.
  解释性预测 1 和 2 可从进攻防御理论的 "左侧"，即假说 $A_{1} - J_{1}$ 中推导出来，这些假说提出了进攻优势导致 A-J 干预现象的主张（见图 1）。我们还可以从假说 $A_{2} - J_{2}$ 中推断出预测，这些假说构成了理论的 "右侧"，并框定了干预现象 A-J 引发战争的主张。例如，我们可以推断出：(6) 在 A-J 现象更为普遍的时代和地区，战争将更为常见；(7) 奉行体现 A-J 现象的政策的国家将比其他国家卷入更多的战争，发起更多的战争。我在此不对 "右侧 "假设进行验证，因为对 A-J 现象的影响的争论比对其原因的争论要少。大多数人都认为它们会带来麻烦。
1. My composite index represents my own “author’s estimates” based on sources provided throughout this article. I measured the actual and perceived Europe-wide offense-defense balances by asking: (1) Did military technology, force posture, and doctrine favor the offense or the defense? Did elites and publics believe these factors favored the offense or the defense? (2) Did geography and the domestic social and political order of states favor the offense or the defense? Did elites and publics believe they favored the offense or defense? (3) How numerous and powerful were balancer states, and how strongly did they balance? Did elites believe that other states would balance or bandwagon? (4) Did defensive alliances form, and did they operate effectively? Did elites believe that they operated effectively? I gave these factors the same rough relative weight they receive in standard historical accounts.
  我的综合指数是我根据本文提供的资料来源做出的 "作者估计"。我通过以下问题来衡量整个欧洲的实际和感知的攻防平衡：(1) 军事技术、兵力态势和理论是否有利于进攻或防御？精英和公众是否认为这些因素有利于进攻或防御？(2) 各国的地理位置、国内社会和政治秩序有利于进攻还是防御？精英和公众是否认为这些因素有利于进攻或防御？(3) 平衡国的数量和实力如何？精英们是否相信其他国家会保持平衡或拉帮结派？(4) 防御联盟是否形成，是否有效运作？精英们是否相信它们能有效运作？我给予这些因素的权重与它们在标准历史叙述中所占的权重大致相同。
2. A discussion of the military offense-defense balance in this era is Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 66-72.
  Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System [《国际体系中的进攻与防御》]，第 66-72 页。
1. Blanning, Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, p. 116. Austrian and Prussian leaders were assured that revolutionary France could be quickly smashed. Ibid., p. 114. One Prussian leader advised his officers: “Do not buy too many horses, the comedy will not last long. The army of lawyers will be annihilated in Belgium and we shall be home by autumn.” Ibid., p. 116. Meanwhile, French revolutionaries wrongly expected a pro-French revolutionary uprising of the oppressed peoples of feudal Europe. Ibid., p. 136; R.R. Palmer, World of the French Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 95; and George Rudé, Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815 (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1964), p. 209.
  布兰宁，《法国革命战争的起源》，第 116 页。奥地利和普鲁士领导人确信，革命的法国可以很快被摧毁。同上，第 114 页。一位普鲁士领导人建议他的军官"不要买太多的马，喜剧不会持续太久。律师团将在比利时被歼灭，到秋天我们就可以回家了"。同上，第 116 页。与此同时，法国革命者错误地预期欧洲封建社会的被压迫人民会举行亲法的革命起义。同上，第 136 页；R.R. Palmer，World of the French Revolution（纽约：Harper and Row，1971 年），第 95 页；George Rudé，Revolutionary Europe, 1783-1815 （格拉斯哥：Fontana/Collins，1964 年），第 209 页。
2. Blanning, Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, pp. 131-135.
  布兰宁，《法国大革命战争的起源》，第 131-135 页。
3. As Steven Ross notes, French expansionists thought they could intimidate Europe into coexisting with an expanded French empire in the 1790s: “By inflicting rapid and decisive defeats upon one or more members of the coalition, the [French] directors hoped to rupture allied unity and force individual members to seek a separate peace.” Steven T. Ross, European Diplomatic History, 1789-1815 (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Doubleday, 1969), p. 186.
  正如史蒂文-罗斯（Steven Ross）所指出的，法国扩张主义者认为他们可以在 17 世纪 90 年代恐吓欧洲，使其与扩张后的法兰西帝国共存："法国]领导人希望通过对联盟中的一个或多个成员造成迅速而决定性的失败，来破坏盟国的团结，并迫使个别成员寻求单独的和平"。Steven T. Ross, European Diplomatic History, 1789-1815 (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Doubleday, 1969), p. 186.
  Later Napoleon thought he could compel Britain to make peace by establishing French continental dominion, proclaiming after the Peace of Amiens, “With Europe in its present state, England cannot reasonably make war on us unaided.” Geoffrey Bruun, Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814 (New York: Harper and Row, 1938), p. 118. See also Blanning, Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, p. 109.
  后来，拿破仑认为他可以通过建立法国的大陆统治来迫使英国媾和，他在《亚眠和约》后宣称："以欧洲目前的状况，英国不可能在没有帮助的情况下对我们发动战争。Geoffrey Bruun, Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814 (New York: Harper and Row, 1938), p. 118.另见布兰宁：《法国革命战争的起源》，第 109 页。
4. On the post-1815 restoration of pre-Napoleonic warfare, see Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System, pp. 73-74; and Michael Howard, War in European History (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 94-95.
  关于 1815 年后恢复拿破仑时代以前的战争，见 Quester，《国际体系中的进攻与防御》，第 73-74 页；以及 Michael Howard，《欧洲历史上的战争》（伦敦：牛津大学出版社，1976 年），第 94-95 页。
5. Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 191.
  理查德-斯莫克，《战争：控制升级》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1977 年），第 191 页。
1. Ibid., pp. 167, 179-181, 185; Richard Smoke, “The Crimean War,” in George, Avoiding War, pp. 36-61 at 48-49, 52. The motives of the powers also illustrate offense-defense dynamics. The main belligerents (Britain, France, Russia, and Turkey) were impelled in part by security concerns that would have been allayed had they believed the defense more dominant. Smoke, War, pp. 149, 155, 158-159, 162, 190.
  同上，第 167、179-181、185 页；理查德-斯莫克，《克里米亚战争》，载于乔治，《避免战争》，第 36-61 页，第 48-49 页，第 52 页。列强的动机也说明了攻防动态。主要交战国（英国、法国、俄国和土耳其）部分是出于安全考虑，而如果他们认为防御更占优势，这些顾虑就会消除。斯莫克，《战争》，第 149、155、158-159、162、190 页。
2. The harsh Crimean War settlement Britain imposed on Russia turned it into a non-status quo power. Overthrowing that settlement became Russia’s chief aim in European diplomacy, superseding its interest in preserving order to the west. M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 144-146.
  英国在克里米亚战争中强加给俄国的苛刻解决办法将其变成了一个不维持现状的大国。推翻这一解决方案成为俄国在欧洲外交中的主要目标，取代了其维护西方秩序的利益。M.S. Anderson，《东方问题，1774-1923》（伦敦：麦克米伦，1966 年），第 144-146 页。
3. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 108, 110.
  A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.
4. Ibid., pp. 146-154. Britain would have backed Denmark had it found a continental ally but none was available. Ibid., pp. 146-148.
  同上，第 146-154 页。如果丹麦能找到一个大陆盟友，英国本可以支持它，但没有。同上，第 146-148 页。
5. Smoke, War, pp. 85-92. Britain remained in a semi-isolationist mood in 1866, and Napoleon III thought France would profit from the long, mutually debilitating Austro-Prussian war he expected. Like the Soviets in 1939, Napoleon underestimated the danger of a quick, lopsided victory by either side. Ibid., pp. 87-90.
  斯莫克，《战争》，第 85-92 页。1866 年，英国仍处于半孤立主义情绪中，拿破仑三世认为法国将从他预期的长期、相互削弱的普奥战争中获利。与 1939 年的苏联一样，拿破仑低估了任何一方迅速取得一面倒胜利的危险。同上，第 87-90 页。
1. Ibid., p. 86. 同上，第 86 页。
2. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, p. 156. Moreover, Bismarck stopped the 1866 war partly because he feared French or Russian intervention if Prussia fought on too long or conquered too much. Smoke, War, pp. 101-102. Thus lack of defense-enhancing diplomacy helped cause the war while Prussian fear of such diplomacy shortened and limited the war.
  泰勒，《争霸》，第 156 页。此外，俾斯麦之所以停止 1866 年的战争，部分原因是他担心如果普鲁士作战时间过长或征服过多，法国或俄国会进行干预。Smoke，War，pp.101-102。因此，缺乏加强防御的外交活动助长了战争，而普鲁士对这种外交活动的恐惧则缩短和限制了战争。
3. William Carr, The Origins of the Wars of German Unification (London: Longman, 1991), p. 202; and Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (New York: Granada, 1961), p. 57. Austria also stayed neutral because Hungarian Magyar influence was growing inside the Dual Monarchy, and the Magyars felt that the more Austria was pushed out of Germany, the stronger the position of the Magyars within it would be. R.R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 574.
  William Carr, The Origins of the Wars of German Unification (London: Longman, 1991), p. 202; and Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (New York: Granada, 1961), p. 57。奥地利之所以保持中立，也是因为匈牙利马扎尔人在二元君主制内部的影响力日益增长，马扎尔人认为奥地利越是被挤出德国，马扎尔人在德国的地位就越稳固。R.R. Palmer 和 Joel Colton，《现代世界史》，第 4 版（纽约：Alfred A. Knopf，1971 年），第 574 页。
4. On Prussia’s free hand, see Smoke, War, pp. 133-136; Norman Rich, The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 1850-1890, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), p. 140; and W.E. Mosse, European Powers and the German Question (New York: Octagon, 1969), pp. 291, 295.
  关于普鲁士的放手，见 Smoke, War, 第 133-136 页；Norman Rich, The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 1850-1890, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 第 140 页；以及 W.E. Mosse, European Powers and the German Question (New York: Octagon, 1969), 第 291 和 295 页。
5. Bismarck formed defensive alliances with Austria, Italy, and Romania, and a more limited defensive accord with Russia-specifically, a reciprocal agreement not to join a war against the other unless the other attacked France (in the German case) or Austria (in the Russian case). Synopses include Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 249-250; and Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order, and Justice (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 80-81. For a longer account, see Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 258-280, 316-319. 53. Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 28.
  俾斯麦与奥地利、意大利和罗马尼亚结成了防御性联盟，与俄国则达成了更有限的防御性协议--具体而言，双方互不参战，除非对方进攻法国（德国）或奥地利（俄国）。简介包括 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers（《大国的兴衰》）：The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), pp.详见 Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, 第 258-280 页、第 316-319 页。53.Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 28.
1. Hitler often echoed international social Darwinist slogans on the short, precarious lives of states, for example, “Politics is in truth the execution of a nation’s struggle for existence,” and “Germany will either be a world power or there will be no Germany.” Quoted in P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Longman, 1986), p. 81; and in Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second World War (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 119.
  希特勒经常呼应国际社会达尔文主义关于国家生命短暂、岌岌可危的口号，例如，"政治实际上是一个国家为生存而进行的斗争"，以及 "德国要么成为世界强国，要么就没有德国"。引自 P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Longman, 1986), p. 81；以及 Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second World War (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 119。
  Hitler’s faith in the offensive differed from that of the pre-1914 cultists of the offensive in three ways. First, he saw offensive capabilities arising from a long search for offensive methods, not from permanent properties of war. In his mind offense could be created, but also had to be; Germany would discover offensive answers only after a long effort. In contrast, the pre-1914 cultists thought offense inherently easier than defense; deep thought need not be given to how to make it superior, because it already was. Second, Hitler’s offensive optimism was based on racism and social prejudice, as well as on assessment of military factors. Specifically, his contempt for Slavs and Jews led him to expect that the Soviets would quickly collapse under German attack. Third, Hitler’s concerns for German security focused on fear of conquest by economic strangulation, not conquest by French or Soviet blitzkrieg. He thought German security was precarious, but for reasons rooted more in the political economy of war than in the nature of doctrine or weaponry. These differences aside, the logical implications of Hitler’s offensive cult were the same as those of the pre-1914 cult. He exaggerated both German insecurity and the feasibility of imperial solutions to redress it.
  希特勒对进攻的信仰与 1914 年前的进攻崇拜者有三点不同。首先，他认为进攻能力产生于对进攻方法的长期探索，而非战争的永久属性。在他看来，进攻可以被创造出来，但也必须被创造出来；德国只有经过长期努力才能发现进攻的答案。与此相反，1914 年前的崇拜者认为进攻本来就比防御容易；不需要深入思考如何使进攻更胜一筹，因为它本来就是。其次，希特勒的进攻乐观主义基于种族主义和社会偏见，以及对军事因素的评估。具体而言，他对斯拉夫人和犹太人的蔑视使他预计苏联会在德国的进攻下迅速崩溃。第三，希特勒对德国安全的担忧主要集中在害怕被经济扼杀征服，而不是被法国或苏联的闪电战征服。他认为德国的安全岌岌可危，但其原因更多地是源于战争的政治经济学，而非理论或武器装备的性质。撇开这些差异不谈，希特勒进攻崇拜的逻辑含义与 1914 年前的崇拜如出一辙。他既夸大了德国的不安全感，也夸大了帝国解决问题的可行性。
2. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of Great Britain said in 1937 that he “did not believe we could, or ought . . . to enter a Continental war with the intention of fighting on the same lines as in the last,” meaning that Britain would deploy no large ground force on the continent. Bell, Origins of the Second World War in Europe, p. 177. Britain had only two divisions available to send to the continent during the 1938 Munich crisis, and the four-division force it actually sent in 1939 was smaller and less well trained than its small expeditionary force of 1914. These four divisions were a drop in the bucket relative to the 84 French and 103 German divisions then deployed. Ibid., p. 175.
  英国首相内维尔-张伯伦在 1937 年说，他 "不相信我们能够或应该......参加一场大陆战争，并打算按照与上次战争相同的路线作战"，这意味着英国不会在欧洲大陆部署大规模地面部队。贝尔：《第二次世界大战在欧洲的起源》，第 177 页。1938 年慕尼黑危机期间，英国只有两个师可以派往欧洲大陆，1939 年实际派出的四个师的兵力比 1914 年的小规模远征军更少，训练也更差。与当时部署的 84 个法国师和 103 个德国师相比，这四个师简直是杯水车薪。同上，第 175 页。
3. The United States also proclaimed this isolationism in four neutrality laws passed during 1935-39, giving Hitler a clear if misleading signal of American indifference to his aggression. On these laws a synopsis is Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 701-702, 715.
  美国还在 1935 年至 1939 年期间通过的四部中立法中宣布了这种孤立主义，向希特勒发出了美国对其侵略漠不关心的明确信号，尽管这种信号具有误导性。Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp.
without attacking Germany in 1938 and again in 1939-40 because they doubted they could win a decisive victory. Germany stood without attacking westward in the fall of 1939 for the same reason, and finally attacked in May 1940 after German military leaders developed a plausible plan for decisive attack. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 67-133.
德国在 1938 年和 1939-40 年都没有进攻德国，因为他们怀疑自己能否取得决定性的胜利。出于同样的原因，德国在 1939 年秋季没有向西进攻，最终在 1940 年 5 月，在德国军事领导人制定了一个可信的决定性进攻计划后，德国发动了进攻。米尔斯海默，《常规威慑》，第 67-133 页。
64. Would the risk of war have fallen had all powers believed the offense was dominant in the late 1930s? This seems unlikely. The status quo powers would have balanced harder against Hitler, offering him more discouragement, but they also would have been jumpier, making early crises more dangerous. One of these crises-Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Spanish civil war, or the German seizure of Austria or Czechoslovakia-probably would have served as the “Sarajevo” for World War II, with the Allies moving first as Russia did in 1914.
64.如果 20 世纪 30 年代末所有列强都认为进攻占优势，战争的风险会下降吗？这似乎不太可能。维持现状的列强会更加努力地平衡与希特勒的关系，给他更多的挫败感，但他们也会更加谨慎，使早期危机变得更加危险。这些危机中的一个--希特勒对莱茵地区的重新军事化、西班牙内战或德国夺取奥地利或捷克斯洛伐克--很可能会成为第二次世界大战的 "萨拉热窝"，盟国会像1914年的俄国那样先发制人。
1. France can be assigned prime responsibility for 1792 and 1859, and shared responsibility for Crimea and 1870. Russia deserves prime responsibility for the Cold War and shared responsibility for Crimea and the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War.
  法国可以对 1792 年和 1859 年承担主要责任，对克里米亚和 1870 年承担共同责任。俄罗斯应该对冷战负主要责任，对克里米亚和 1904-05 年日俄战争负共同责任。
2. Britain does share responsibility for the Crimean War with Russia, France, and Turkey.
  英国确实与俄罗斯、法国和土耳其共同承担了克里米亚战争的责任。
1. On Prussia’s expansionism, see Blanning, Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, pp. 72-82; on French expansionism, see ibid., passim.
  关于普鲁士的扩张主义，见 Blanning, Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars, pp.
2. A summary of Wilhelmine German aims and policies is Geiss, German Foreign Policy.
  盖斯（Geiss）的《德国外交政策》概述了威廉明时期德国的目标和政策。
3. On Germany as late industrializer, see Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 66-111; and on France as a revolutionary state, see Walt, Revolution and War, pp. 46-128.
  关于作为工业化晚期国家的德国，见 Snyder, Myths of Empire, 第 66-111 页；关于作为革命国家的法国，见 Walt, Revolution and War, 第 46-128 页。
1. Concurring is Andreski, Military Organization and Society, p. 76.
  同意这一观点的是 Andreski，《军事组织与社会》，第 76 页。
2. Noting the decline of feudalism are Samuel B. Griffiths, “Introduction,” in Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 33; and Dun J. Li, The Ageless Chinese: A History, 3d ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978), p. 64.
  Samuel B. Griffiths，"Introduction"，in Sun Tzu, The Art of War（伦敦：牛津大学出版社，1971 年），第 33 页；Dun J. Li，The Ageless Chinese：纽约：查尔斯-斯克里布纳之子出版社，1978 年），第 64 页。
3. On the growth of armies, the introduction of conscription, and the rise of infantry, see Li, Ageless Chinese, p. 56; Griffiths, “Introduction,” pp. 28, 33; and Wolfram Eberhard, A History of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 49.
  关于军队的发展、征兵制度的引入以及步兵的兴起，请参阅 Li，《不老的中国人》，第 56 页；Griffiths，《导言》，第 28、33 页；以及 Wolfram Eberhard，《中国历史》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1977 年），第 49 页。
4. Li, Ageless Chinese, p. 56.
  Li，《不老的中国人》，第 56 页。
5. Andreski, Military Organization and Society, p. 76.
  Andreski, Military Organization and Society, p. 76。
1. Li, Ageless Chinese, pp. 50, 59.
  Li, Ageless Chinese, pp.
2. Ibid., p. 52. 同上，第 52 页。
3. Ibid., p. 59. 同上，第 59 页。
4. Griffiths, “Introduction,” p. 30
  格里菲斯，"导言"，第 30 页
5. Ibid., p. 21. 同上，第 21 页。
6. Ibid., p. 24, quoting Shang Yang, Prime Minister of Ch’in, who conceived war and agriculture to be the two fundamental occupations.
  同上，第 24 页，引自楚国丞相商鞅，他认为战争和农业是两大基本职业。
7. Li, Ageless Chinese, pp. 56, 58-59.
  Li，《不老的中国人》，第 56、58-59 页。
8. Griffiths, “Introduction,” p. 24.
  格里菲斯，"导言"，第 24 页。
1. Britain, France, Russia, and Prussia/Germany fought other great powers an average of five times over the same two hundred years, by my count. None fought as few as three times.
  根据我的统计，英国、法国、俄国和普鲁士/德国在同样的两百年间平均与其他大国交战五次。没有一个国家只打了三次。
1. Moreover, offense-defense theory might be usefully adapted for application beyond the domain of war, for example, to explain international economic competition (or cooperation), or even intra-academic competition. Suggesting its application to economics is Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, who writes of the “prosperity dilemma”-a cousin of the security dilemma in which measures taken by one state to increase its economic well-being decrease another’s economic well-being. See Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance after the Cold War: End of the Alliance?” unpublished manuscript, Olin Institute, Harvard University, 1994, p. 27.
  此外，进攻防御理论还可用于战争以外的领域，例如解释国际经济竞争（或合作），甚至是学术界内部的竞争。土山治雄（Jitsuo Tsuchiyama）建议将其应用于经济学，他写道，"繁荣困境 "是安全困境的表兄弟，在这种困境中，一国为增加其经济福祉而采取的措施会减少另一国的经济福祉。见 Jitsuo Tsuchiyama，"冷战后的美日同盟：同盟的终结？"未发表手稿，哈佛大学奥林研究所，1994 年，第 27 页。
1. France helped trigger the 1870 war; hence one could argue for removing France in 1870 from the list of unprovoking victims of conquest, leaving only France in 1940.
  法国帮助触发了 1870 年的战争；因此，我们可以主张将 1870 年的法国从无端被征服的受害者名单中删除，只留下 1940 年的法国。
1. Mussolini also provoked his own destruction, but his belligerence was not security driven.
  墨索里尼也曾自取灭亡，但他的好战并非出于安全考虑。

The MIT Press 麻省理工学院出版社

Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War 进攻、防御和战争原因

Abstract 摘要

Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War ∣ 7 ∣ 7 ∣7\mid 7进攻、防御和战争原因 ∣ 7 ∣ 7 ∣7\mid 7

Hypotheses on the Effects of Offense Dominance关于进攻优势影响的假设

A: OPPORTUNISTIC EXPANSIONISMA: 机会主义扩张

B AND C: DEFENSIVE EXPANSIONISM AND FIERCE RESISTANCE TO EXPANSIONB和C：防御性扩张主义和对扩张的激烈抵抗

Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War|9进攻、防御和战争原因|9

D: MOVING FIRST IS MORE REWARDINGD：先行动更有收获

F: FAITS ACCOMPLIS ARE MORE COMMON AND MORE DANGEROUSF：既遂犯更为常见，也更为危险

G: STATES NEGOTIATE LESS AND REACH FEWER AGREEMENTSG：各州的谈判减少，达成的协议也减少

H: STATES ARE MORE SECRETIVEH：各州更加神秘

I: STATES ARMS RACE HARDER AND FASTER一：各国军备竞赛更加激烈，速度更快

J. CONQUEST GROWS STILL EASIERJ.征服更容易

Causes of Offense and Defense Dominance进攻和防守占优的原因