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Chapter 4. Cross-Border Impacts of Fiscal Policy: Still Relevant?
第 4 章财政政策的跨境影响:仍然相关吗?
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International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.
国际货币基金组织。研究部

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Positive cross-country spillovers from collective fiscal action by the world’s largest economies helped speed the recovery from the global financial crisis nearly a decade ago. But do fiscal spillovers still matter today? The answer is yes—but the extent depends on circumstances in both the countries that generate fiscal shocks and in those that are recipients of the shocks. This chapter combines new empirical research and model-based simulations to show that fiscal spillovers tend to be low when a fiscal shock originates from a country without output gaps, but the impact intensifies when a source or recipient country is in recession and/or benefiting from accommodative monetary policy—which suggests that spillovers are large when domestic multipliers are also large. The chapter also finds that spillovers from government spending shocks are larger than those associated with tax shocks, that the transmission of fiscal shocks may be stronger among countries with fixed exchange rates, and that fiscal spillovers impact the external positions of source and recipient countries alike. Model-based simulations suggest that the cross-border effects of budget-neutral fiscal reforms are generally modest, though large reforms can trigger spillovers, especially if they affect cross-border investment decisions. Overall, this evidence draws attention to the cross-border repercussions of corporate tax reform in the United States, for example, or of an increase in public investment in Germany.
全球最大经济体集体财政行动产生的积极跨国溢出效应帮助加速了近十年前全球金融危机的复苏。但如今财政溢出效应还重要吗?答案是肯定的,但程度取决于产生财政冲击的国家和受到冲击的国家的情况。本章结合了新的实证研究和基于模型的模拟,表明当财政冲击源自没有产出缺口的国家时,财政溢出效应往往较低,但当来源国或受援国陷入衰退和/或受益于经济衰退时,影响会加剧。宽松的货币政策——这表明当国内乘数也很大时,溢出效应也很大。本章还发现,政府支出冲击的溢出效应大于税收冲击的溢出效应,固定汇率国家之间财政冲击的传导可能更强,财政溢出效应同样影响来源国和接受国的外部头寸。基于模型的模拟表明,预算中性财政改革的跨境影响通常不大,尽管大规模改革可能引发溢出效应,尤其是影响跨境投资决策的情况下。总体而言,这一证据引起了人们对美国公司税改革或德国公共投资增加的跨境影响的关注。

Introduction 介绍

What is the potential for fiscal policy to affect macroeconomic outcomes in other economies through cross-border spillovers? This question has been at the center of the policy debate, especially in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, when many countries experienced persistent economic slack, and monetary policy interest rates approached the effective lower bound. Fiscal stimulus was then advocated widely, especially in major economies with sufficient fiscal space. This was not least because excess capacity and low interest rates would help limit crowding out of private spending and the expected positive spillovers would make collective efforts to boost activity more effective.
财政政策通过跨境溢出影响其他经济体宏观经济结果的潜力有多大?这个问题一直是政策辩论的核心,特别是在全球金融危机之后,许多国家经历了持续的经济疲软,货币政策利率逼近有效下限。随后,财政刺激被广泛提倡,特别是在财政空间充足的主要经济体。这尤其是因为产能过剩和低利率将有助于限制私人支出的挤出,而预期的积极溢出效应将使促进经济活动的集体努力更加有效。

More recently, the global effects of fiscal policy have been discussed amid possible changes in the macroeconomic policy mix in Japan and the United States. Debate is also ongoing about the role of fiscal policies in addressing excess external imbalances, including whether euro area countries with excess current account surpluses should raise fiscal spending, which could also support growth in the currency union.
最近,人们在日本和美国宏观经济政策组合可能发生变化的情况下讨论了财政政策的全球影响。关于财政政策在解决过度外部失衡方面的作用的争论仍在继续,包括经常账户盈余过多的欧元区国家是否应该增加财政支出,这也可能支持货币联盟的增长。

Recent improvements in economic conditions in many countries and their implications for monetary policy raise questions about the size of potential spillovers from fiscal stimulus today. Cyclical positions have improved across the board over the past few years, although with differences across countries (Figure 4.1). For example, the United States is operating at close to full employment and, as a result, the Federal Reserve has begun to normalize monetary policy conditions. At the same time, although euro area economies and Japan are experiencing an encouraging cyclical recovery, output gaps remain negative in many of these countries and core inflation is stubbornly low, prompting monetary authorities to commit to accommodative policies for an extended period. As the chapter discusses, cyclical conditions and the associated ability or willingness of monetary policy to act, both in countries emitting and receiving the fiscal shock, are key determinants of the magnitude of its impact.1 Considerations regarding fiscal space in source countries are also relevant—if term premiums increase and financial conditions tighten following a fiscal stimulus, spillovers could be smaller.
最近许多国家经济状况的改善及其对货币政策的影响引发了人们对当前财政刺激的潜在溢出效应规模的质疑。过去几年,周期性头寸全面改善,尽管各国之间存在差异(图 4.1)。例如,美国的经济接近充分就业,因此美联储已开始货币政策条件正常化。与此同时,尽管欧元区经济体和日本正在经历令人鼓舞的周期性复苏,但其中许多国家的产出缺口仍然为负,核心通胀率也长期处于低位,促使货币当局承诺在较长时期内实施宽松政策。正如本章所讨论的,周期性条件以及货币政策采取行动的相关能力或意愿,无论是在发出还是受到财政冲击的国家,都是其影响程度的关键决定因素。 1 关于来源国财政空间的考虑也很重要——如果财政刺激措施后期限溢价增加且金融状况收紧,溢出效应可能会更小。

Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1.  图 4.1。

Output Gap in Selected Countries
部分国家的产出缺口

(Percent) (百分)

Source: IMF staff estimates.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的估计。
Note: Data labels in the figure use International Organization for Standardization (ISO) country codes.
注:图中数据标注采用国际标准化组织(ISO)国家代码。

Against this backdrop, the chapter aims to answer the following questions:
在此背景下,本章旨在回答以下问题:

  • Are fiscal spillovers large from a global or regional perspective? How do they depend on the fiscal instruments involved (for example, government spending or taxes)? How do they depend on fiscal space in source countries?
    从全球或区域角度来看,财政溢出效应是否很大?它们如何依赖所涉及的财政工具(例如政府支出或税收)?它们如何依赖来源国的财政空间?

  • To what extent does the size of fiscal spillovers depend on cyclical and monetary policy conditions, in both source and recipient countries?
    财政溢出效应的规模在多大程度上取决于来源国和接受国的周期性和货币政策条件?

  • How do fiscal spillovers depend on exchange rate regimes?
    财政溢出效应如何取决于汇率制度?

  • What is the impact of fiscal shocks on external positions and exchange rates in source and recipient countries?
    财政冲击对来源国和接受国的外部头寸和汇率有何影响?

  • Do fiscal reforms generate spillovers, even if the reforms are budget neutral?
    即使财政改革是预算中性的,财政改革是否会产生溢出效应?

The chapter sheds light on these issues by looking at the implications of fiscal policy changes in some major advanced economies for activity across a large group of advanced and emerging market economies. The empirical analysis is based on a newly constructed data set of government spending and tax revenue shocks for five systemic economies between the first quarter of 2000 and the second quarter of 2016, identified using the structural vector autoregression methodology of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Information from the five source-country shocks is combined using the strength of trade links with a range of advanced and emerging market recipient countries to assess global spillovers.
本章通过研究一些主要发达经济体财政政策变化对大量发达和新兴市场经济体活动的影响,阐明了这些问题。实证分析基于新构建的 2000 年第一季度至 2016 年第二季度五个系统性经济体政府支出和税收冲击的数据集,该数据集是使用 Blanchard 和 Perotti (2002) 的结构向量自回归方法确定的。利用与一系列先进和新兴市场接受国的贸易联系强度,将来自五个来源国冲击的信息结合起来,以评估全球溢出效应。

To analyze the role that economic slack, constraints on monetary policy, and exchange rate regimes play in transmission, the chapter uses an econometric framework that can flexibly test for the presence of nonlinear effects. Model-based simulations then help to illustrate the complex cross-border transmission channels of fiscal shocks. This approach offers insights into potential changes in the external positions of source and recipient countries, as well as the dynamic behavior of key macroeconomic variables, and elucidates spillovers from different types of fiscal reforms.
为了分析经济疲软、货币政策约束和汇率制度在传导中的作用,本章使用了可以灵活测试非线性效应是否存在的计量经济学框架。基于模型的模拟有助于说明财政冲击复杂的跨境传导渠道。这种方法可以深入了解来源国和接受国外部头寸的潜在变化以及关键宏观经济变量的动态行为,并阐明不同类型财政改革的溢出效应。

The chapter’s findings add to the existing empirical literature on fiscal spillovers by expanding the scope of the analysis. Previous empirical studies focus on a relatively small sample of recipient countries—often those of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or euro area (Beetsma and Giuliodori 2004; Beetsma, Klaassen, and Wieland 2006; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2013; Nicar 2015; Blanchard, Erceg, and Lindé 2016; Goujard 2017; Poghosyan 2017), and several studies consider only one fiscal instrument (government spending) and/ or only fiscal consolidation episodes. The chapter also adds to the literature, extending the analysis of economic slack, monetary policy accommodation, and the role of exchange rate regimes in determining spillovers from fiscal shocks.
本章的研究结果通过扩大分析范围,丰富了现有的财政溢出效应实证文献。先前的实证研究集中于相对较小样本的受援国——通常是经济合作与发展组织(OECD)或欧元区的受援国(Beetsma 和 Giuliodori 2004;Beetsma、Klaassen 和 Wieland 2006;Auerbach 和 Gorodnichenko 2013; Nicar 2015;Blanchard、Erceg 和 Lindé 2016;Goujard 2017;Poghosyan 2017),以及一些研究仅考虑一种财政工具(政府支出)和/或仅考虑财政整顿事件。本章还补充了文献,扩展了对经济疲软、货币政策宽松以及汇率制度在确定财政冲击溢出效应中的作用的分析。

The chapter suggests that fiscal spillovers still matter, but their size depends on the type of fiscal action and on economic circumstances in both source and recipient countries:
本章表明,财政溢出效应仍然很重要,但其规模取决于财政行动的类型以及来源国和受援国的经济状况:

  • Fiscal spillovers are larger for spending shocks. On average, a 1 percent of GDP fiscal stimulus in a major advanced economy can raise output in recipient countries by 0.08 percent over the first year. But spillovers are larger for government spending shocks than for tax shocks, consistent with the literature that points to higher domestic multipliers for spending shocks—output in recipients can increase by 0.15 percent following a spending hike, versus 0.05 percent after a tax cut. Model simulations reinforce this message and provide more granular evidence—for example, changes in public investment tend to have larger cross-border effects than changes in public consumption.
    支出冲击的财政溢出效应更大。平均而言,主要发达经济体实施 GDP 1% 的财政刺激措施,可以使受援国的产出在第一年提高 0.08%。但政府支出冲击的溢出效应比税收冲击更大,这与指出支出冲击的国内乘数较高的文献一致——支出增加后受援国的产出可以增加 0.15%,而减税后则为 0.05%。模型模拟强化了这一信息,并提供了更细致的证据——例如,公共投资的变化往往比公共消费的变化产生更大的跨境影响。

  • Relatively weak cyclical positions imply larger spillovers. Although modest in normal times, spillovers are larger when cyclical conditions are weak, likely due to the reduced crowding-out effects of public spending on private sector activity.
    相对较弱的周期性头寸意味着更大的溢出效应。尽管在正常时期规模不大,但当周期性条件较弱时,溢出效应会更大,这可能是由于公共支出对私营部门活动的挤出效应减少。

  • Monetary policy constraints also increase spillovers. When monetary policy in either source or recipient countries does not counteract fiscal shocks—for example, because the effective lower bound is binding—spillovers are much larger than during normal times.
    货币政策的限制也增加了溢出效应。当来源国或接受国的货币政策无法抵消财政冲击时(例如,因为有效下限具有约束力),溢出效应会比正常时期大得多。

  • Currency pegs between source and recipient countries may amplify spillovers. There is some evidence suggesting that fiscal shocks tend to have larger spillovers on recipient countries with currencies pegged to the source country’s currency than on those with flexible exchange rates.
    来源国和接受国之间的货币挂钩可能会放大溢出效应。有证据表明,财政冲击对货币与来源国货币挂钩的受援国的溢出效应往往比对实行灵活汇率的受援国产生的溢出效应更大。

  • Fiscal policy can change external positions in source and recipient countries. Trade balances deteriorate in source countries following a fiscal expansion, with a consequent improvement in recipients’ external positions.
    财政政策可以改变来源国和受援国的对外头寸。财政扩张后,来源国的贸易平衡恶化,接收国的对外头寸随之改善。

  • An increase in term premiums may dampen spillovers. If fiscal stimulus at the source increases the term premium—for instance, because of concerns about debt sustainability—spillovers are somewhat lower compared with a constant term premium scenario.
    期限溢价的增加可能会抑制溢出效应。如果源头上的财政刺激增加了期限溢价(例如,由于对债务可持续性的担忧),那么与固定期限溢价情景相比,溢出效应会稍低一些。

  • Under some circumstances, fiscal reforms come with spillovers as well. Most budget-neutral fiscal reforms have limited cross-border effects, although large reforms can generate significant spillovers. For example, a reform that substantially reduces corporate income tax rates and is offset by higher consumption taxes in major economies can have repercussions in the rest of the world, including through higher global interest rates and cross-border reallocation of investment and profits.
    在某些情况下,财政改革也会带来溢出效应。尽管大规模改革可以产生显着的溢出效应,但大多数预算中性的财政改革的跨境影响有限。例如,大幅降低企业所得税率并通过主要经济体提高消费税来抵消的改革可能会对世界其他地区产生影响,包括通过更高的全球利率以及投资和利润的跨境重新分配。

These results point to several important policy lessons that are relevant now. Although fiscal space is currently more limited, and improved cyclical conditions in many countries mean that spillovers from fiscal policy are likely to be lower than during the global financial crisis, the analysis suggests that fiscal stimulus in major economies can nonetheless be important in lifting economic activity abroad, although not everywhere. For example, given the cyclical position and gradually less accommodative monetary policy conditions in the United States, a US fiscal stimulus would likely have relatively modest cross-border spillovers, especially if stimulus takes the form of tax policy measures. In the euro area—where there is fiscal space in some countries—stimulus could have larger spillovers. This is in the context of prospects for continued monetary policy accommodation and still-significant slack in some recipient countries.
这些结果指出了当前相关的几个重要政策教训。尽管目前财政空间较为有限,而且许多国家的周期性状况改善意味着财政政策的溢出效应可能低于全球金融危机期间,但分析表明,主要经济体的财政刺激对于提振经济活动仍然很重要在国外,虽然不是到处都有。例如,考虑到美国的周期性状况和逐渐宽松的货币政策条件,美国的财政刺激措施可能会产生相对温和的跨境溢出效应,特别是如果刺激措施采取税收政策措施的形式。在欧元区——一些国家有财政空间——刺激措施可能会产生更大的溢出效应。这是在货币政策持续宽松的前景以及一些受援国仍然存在严重疲软的背景下发生的。

The impact on external imbalances would also depend on the source of fiscal stimulus, as stimulus in the United States is likely to increase imbalances, whereas stimulus in some surplus euro area countries could reduce them. Where countries are considering significant reductions in corporate income tax rates, the analysis suggests associated changes in investment-location and profit-reporting decisions by multinational corporations could have significant negative spillovers on activity and the fiscal position of nonreforming countries.
对外部失衡的影响还取决于财政刺激的来源,因为美国的刺激措施可能会加剧失衡,而一些欧元区盈余国家的刺激措施可能会减少失衡。分析表明,当各国正在考虑大幅降低企业所得税率时,跨国公司投资地点和利润报告决策的相关变化可能会对非改革国家的经济活动和财政状况产生重大负面溢出效应。

Spillovers from Fiscal Policy—A Conceptual Framework
财政政策的溢出效应——概念框架

The cross-border impact of fiscal policy changes in a given country depends on their initial domestic effects and the transmission mechanisms of shocks. This means that factors affecting the source’s domestic fiscal multiplier are relevant for determining spillovers on recipient countries. The fiscal shock is propagated through different channels—primarily associated with trade links—with the final impact also depending on the economic and policy conditions in the recipient countries (Figure 4.2). This section provides a brief overview of the domestic impact of fiscal shocks, outlines their possible transmission channels, and discusses the factors affecting transmission.
特定国家财政政策变化的跨境影响取决于其最初的国内影响和冲击的传导机制。这意味着影响来源国内财政乘数的因素与确定对受援国的溢出效应相关。财政冲击通过不同渠道传播——主要与贸易联系有关——最终影响也取决于受援国的经济和政策状况(图4.2)。本节简要概述了财政冲击对国内的影响,概述了其可能的传导渠道,并讨论了影响传导的因素。

Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2. 图 4.2。

The Transmission of a Fiscal Shock
财政冲击的传导

Source: IMF staff compilation.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员汇编。

Domestic Impact of a Fiscal Shock
财政冲击对国内的影响

A large body of literature on domestic fiscal multipliers suggests that cyclical and policy conditions play a role in the response of a domestic economy to fiscal shocks. In general, multiplier estimates vary significantly across countries, sample periods, and methodologies. While a comprehensive summary is beyond the scope of this chapter (see, for example, Batini and others 2014), dynamic stochastic general equilibrium and structural vector autoregression models developed since the early 1990s suggest that the size of multipliers tends to be modest (between zero and one over the first year) in “normal times”—generally understood as circumstances in which the economy does not have a significant output gap—and depends on a number of structural characteristics, including a country’s trade openness, exchange rate regime, labor market rigidities, and size of public debt.2 Outside normal times, multipliers can vary with the state of the business cycle (generally larger in a downturn than in an expansion, although the empirical evidence is not conclusive) or the degree of monetary accommodation (larger when monetary policy is unresponsive, such as at the effective lower bound).3 All else equal, a larger domestic multiplier should be associated with greater cross-border spillovers.
大量有关国内财政乘数的文献表明,周期性和政策条件在国内经济对财政冲击的反应中发挥着作用。一般来说,乘数估计值因国家、样本期和方法而异。虽然全面的总结超出了本章的范围(例如,参见 Batini 等人 2014 年),但自 20 世纪 90 年代初以来开发的动态随机一般均衡和结构向量自回归模型表明乘数的大小往往适中(在零之间)以及第一年的一次)在“正常时期”——通常被理解为经济不存在重大产出缺口的情况——并取决于许多结构特征,包括一个国家的贸易开放程度、汇率制度、劳动力市场刚性和公共债务规模。 2 在正常时期之外,乘数可能会随着商业周期的状态(通常在经济衰退时比扩张时更大,尽管经验证据并不确凿)或货币宽松程度(在货币宽松时更大)而变化。政策没有反应,例如在有效下限)。 3 在其他条件相同的情况下,更大的国内乘数应该与更大的跨境溢出效应相关。

The composition of the fiscal intervention—whether it is based on government spending or revenue measures—also influences the size of the domestic multiplier. Many studies have found that, for advanced economies, short-term spending multipliers tend to be larger than revenue multipliers (for example, see a survey in Mineshima, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber 2014). This has been explained using traditional Keynesian theory—for example, while an additional dollar of government spending contributes directly to higher aggregate demand, a dollar of tax cuts can be either spent or saved by firms and/ or households (that is, the marginal propensity to consume can be less than one). Recent empirical evidence using the narrative approach has found somewhat larger tax multipliers than spending multipliers, although narrative-based evidence on the latter is primarily limited to defense-related spending.4 Yet other studies suggest that the relative magnitude of the spending and revenue multipliers may differ between consolidation and expansion episodes and among different degrees of monetary accommodation.5
财政干预的构成——无论是基于政府支出还是收入措施——也会影响国内乘数的规模。许多研究发现,对于发达经济体,短期支出乘数往往大于收入乘数(例如,参见 Mineshima、Poplawski-Ribeiro 和 Weber 2014 年的一项调查)。这可以用传统的凯恩斯主义理论来解释——例如,虽然额外的一美元政府支出会直接导致更高的总需求,但一美元的减税可以由企业和/或家庭花费或储蓄(即边际倾向)消费可能少于一)。最近使用叙述方法的经验证据发现,税收乘数比支出乘数稍大,尽管后者的基于叙述的证据主要限于国防相关支出。 4 然而其他研究表明,在整合和扩张时期以及不同程度的货币宽松之间,支出和收入乘数的相对大小可能有所不同。 5

Channels of Cross-Border Transmission
跨境传输渠道

In standard open-economy macroeconomic models, a fiscal shock is transmitted abroad primarily through the trade channel, which consists of two effects:6
在标准的开放经济宏观经济模型中,财政冲击主要通过贸易渠道传导到国外,这包括两种效应: 6

  • Expenditure shifting (sometimes referred to as “leakages”) refers to the direct impact of a fiscal policy change on the source country’s import demand through changes in domestic consumption and investment, which affects trading partners. Here, the marginal propensity to import by both the public and private sectors plays a key role—if most spending changes are in nontradable sectors and do not translate into a higher or lower level of imports, spillovers from expenditure shifting may be smaller. Larger and more open economies tend to import more, suggesting that fiscal policy changes in these countries will have larger spillovers on others through the expenditure shifting channel.
    支出转移(有时称为“泄漏”)是指财政政策变化通过国内消费和投资的变化对来源国的进口需求产生直接影响,从而影响到贸易伙伴。在这里,公共和私营部门的边际进口倾向发挥着关键作用——如果大多数支出变化发生在非贸易部门,并且不会转化为更高或更低的进口水平,那么支出转移的溢出效应可能会更小。规模更大、开放程度更高的经济体往往会进口更多商品,这表明这些国家的财政政策变化将通过支出转移渠道对其他国家产生更大的溢出效应。

  • Expenditure switching refers to the impact of a fiscal shock operating through changes in the real exchange rate, which can trigger substitution between domestic and foreign goods consumption. For example, in a Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework, fiscal expansion puts upward pressure on interest rates, the nominal exchange rate appreciates in the source country, and domestic prices increase.7 The resulting real appreciation boosts import demand as foreign goods become cheaper. This effect will be more significant, especially in the short term, when the nominal exchange rate is fully flexible; where nominal exchange rates are fixed, relative price—and hence real exchange rate—adjustments can take longer. Either way, expenditure switching effects imply that a fiscal shock can have nontrivial cross-border spillovers, even if its domestic impact is muted, because the boost to import demand can occur without an increase in domestic income.
    支出转换是指财政冲击通过实际汇率变化产生的影响,引发国内外商品消费的替代。例如,在蒙代尔-弗莱明-多恩布什框架中,财政扩张对利率造成上行压力,来源国名义汇率升值,国内价格上涨。 7 随着外国商品变得更便宜,由此产生的实际升值刺激了进口需求。特别是在名义汇率完全弹性的短期内,这种影响会更加显着;在名义汇率固定的情况下,相对价格(以及实际汇率)的调整可能需要更长的时间。不管怎样,支出转换效应意味着财政冲击可能会产生重大的跨境溢出效应,即使其国内影响不大,因为进口需求的增长可能会在国内收入不增加的情况下发生。

In addition to the trade channel, the response of financial variables to a fiscal shock can trigger spillovers through changes in global financial conditions. A fiscal policy change in a large economy can impact global interest rates, exchange rates, and the slope of the yield curve—the latter stemming from any perceived or actual impact of the policy change on long-term fiscal sustainability in the source country. The financial channel can work in the opposite direction to the trade channel. For example, the higher interest rates and exchange rate appreciation associated with an expansionary fiscal shock in the source country can increase the cost of foreign currency borrowing and worsen the balance sheets of corporations and households in recipient countries if there are currency mismatches, generating negative spillovers. Equity prices may also adjust, with cross-border repercussions.
除贸易渠道外,金融变量对财政冲击的反应也可能通过全球金融状况的变化引发溢出效应。大型经济体的财政政策变化可能会影响全球利率、汇率和收益率曲线的斜率——后者源于政策变化对来源国长期财政可持续性的任何感知或实际影响。金融渠道可以与贸易渠道发挥相反的作用。例如,如果存在货币错配,来源国扩张性财政冲击带来的利率上升和汇率升值可能会增加外币借贷成本,并使受援国企业和家庭的资产负债表恶化,从而产生负面溢出效应。股票价格也可能发生调整,并产生跨境影响。

Overall, the relative strength of each transmission channel will depend on the extent of trade and financial linkages between the source and recipient countries. Thus, the net spillover impact of a fiscal shock is an empirical question.
总体而言,每个传输渠道的相对强度将取决于来源国和接受国之间的贸易和金融联系的程度。因此,财政冲击的净溢出影响是一个经验问题。

Factors Affecting the Transmission
影响传输的因素

Like the domestic fiscal multiplier, cross-border spillovers from fiscal actions tend to vary with economic circumstances. Two factors play particularly important roles:
与国内财政乘数一样,财政行动的跨境溢出效应往往会随着经济环境的变化而变化。有两个因素起着特别重要的作用:

  • Cyclical position: The domestic multiplier—and hence spillovers through expenditure shifting—may be larger when the source country has more economic slack. For example, a fiscal stimulus that boosts public employment would be more likely to crowd out private employment when labor markets are tight (Michaillat 2014), resulting in smaller domestic and spillover impacts; the same logic applies to the case of fiscal tightening. Another possibility is that a fiscal stimulus relaxes borrowing constraints (which tend to be tighter during a downturn), for example, by raising the value of collateralizable assets along with demand, helping to increase credit and investment (Canzoneri and others 2016). Somewhat similarly, if the recipient country is operating close to full capacity when an external fiscal shock hits, greater demand in tradable sectors may crowd out activity in the rest of the economy, resulting in a more muted impact on overall economic activity.
    周期性状况:当来源国经济闲置较多时,国内乘数以及由此产生的支出转移的溢出效应可能会更大。例如,当劳动力市场紧张时,促进公共就业的财政刺激更有可能挤出私人就业(Michaillat 2014),从而导致国内和溢出影响较小;同样的逻辑也适用于财政紧缩的情况。另一种可能性是,财政刺激措施放松了借贷限制(在经济低迷时期往往会更加严格),例如,通过提高可抵押资产的价值以及需求,帮助增加信贷和投资(Canzoneri 等,2016)。与此类似,如果受援国在外部财政冲击来袭时接近满负荷运转,那么可贸易部门的更大需求可能会挤出其他经济部门的活动,从而对整体经济活动产生较小的影响。

  • Monetary policy constraints: Whether monetary policy accommodates the fiscal shock matters, and it is relevant for both source and recipient countries. Under normal circumstances, monetary policy reacts to counter the demand and price effects of a fiscal shock. However, when monetary policy is stuck at the effective lower bound, the domestic and spillover effects can be greater. For example, if nominal interest rates in the source country do not rise in response to higher expected inflation following an expansionary fiscal shock, real interest rates decline, crowding in domestic demand and increasing the multiplier (Blanchard, Erceg, and Lindé 2016).8 In this case, the reduction in the real interest rate in the source country may lead its real exchange rate to depreciate, changing the direction of the expenditure switching effect. In a recipient country, when at the effective lower bound, monetary policy will do little to dampen the effect of the external shock.
    货币政策约束:货币政策是否能够适应财政冲击很重要,并且与来源国和接受国都相关。在正常情况下,货币政策的反应是抵消财政冲击的需求和价格影响。然而,当货币政策停留在有效下限时,国内和溢出效应可能会更大。例如,如果来源国的名义利率没有因扩张性财政冲击后预期通胀上升而上升,实际利率就会下降,导致内需拥挤并增加乘数(Blanchard、Erceg 和 Lindé,2016 年)。 8 在这种情况下,来源国实际利率的下降可能会导致其实际汇率贬值,从而改变支出转换效应的方向。在受援国,当处于有效下限时,货币政策对抑制外部冲击的影响作用不大。

Aside from conjunctural factors, institutional or structural features such as the exchange rate regime can also affect the transmission of fiscal shocks and hence the size of spillovers. On one hand, most theoretical frameworks predict that lack of nominal exchange rate flexibility delays real exchange rate adjustments to a fiscal shock, dampening the expenditure switching effect and hence the size of spillovers. On the other hand, currency pegs can strengthen expenditure shifting between the source and recipient—for example, by reducing expected exchange rate volatility and cross-border transaction costs, which is helpful in forming trade relationships (Klein and Shambaugh 2006; Qureshi and Tsangarides 2010; Aglietta and Brand 2013)—and potentially increase spillovers. This may be particularly relevant in currency unions, as long-standing economic and institutional integration and the use of a common currency can strengthen trade (Rose and van Wincoop 2001; Berger and Nitsch 2008). The exchange rate regime also matters for the transmission of fiscal shocks through the financial channel. For example, under flexible regimes, spillovers from an expansionary fiscal shock can be dampened if currency mismatches in balance sheets of households and corporations in the recipient country make depreciations contractionary. Ultimately, which of these considerations dominates is an empirical question.
除了环境因素外,汇率制度等制度或结构特征也会影响财政冲击的传导,从而影响溢出效应的规模。一方面,大多数理论框架预测,名义汇率灵活性的缺乏会延迟针对财政冲击的实际汇率调整,从而抑制支出转换效应,从而抑制溢出规模。另一方面,货币挂钩可以加强来源国和接受国之间的支出转移——例如,通过减少预期汇率波动和跨境交易成本,这有助于形成贸易关系(Klein 和 Shambaugh 2006;Qureshi 和 Tsangarides 2010) ;Aglietta 和 Brand 2013)——并可能增加溢出效应。这对于货币联盟尤其重要,因为长期的经济和制度一体化以及共同货币的使用可以加强贸易(Rose 和 van Wincoop 2001;Berger 和 Nitsch 2008)。汇率制度对于通过金融渠道传导财政冲击也很重要。例如,在灵活的制度下,如果受援国家庭和企业资产负债表中的货币错配导致贬值紧缩,扩张性财政冲击的溢出效应就会受到抑制。最终,这些考虑因素中哪一个占主导地位是一个经验问题。

Spillovers on Economic Activity: Empirical Evidence
经济活动的溢出效应:经验证据

This section examines the relevance of fiscal spillovers in practice and how they vary with economic circumstances. It does so by looking at a very broad sample of source and recipient countries and analyzing different types of shocks under both fiscal consolidations and expansions. It first describes the empirical strategy used to estimate spillovers and then presents the estimated impact on economic activity in recipient countries.
本节探讨财政溢出效应在实践中的相关性以及它们如何随经济环境而变化。它通过考察来源国和受援国的广泛样本并分析财政整顿和扩张下的不同类型的冲击来实现这一目标。它首先描述了用于估计溢出效应的实证策略,然后介绍了对受援国经济活动的估计影响。

Empirical Strategy 实证策略

The baseline approach jointly identifies government spending and revenue shocks in five major advanced economies—France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—using the structural vector autoregression methodology of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).9 A key assumption is that discretionary fiscal policy does not respond contemporaneously to unexpected changes in output, as it takes time for policymakers to assess the output shock and make spending and/or tax decisions, including passing and implementing new legislation. The assumption is more likely to hold in the short term, and therefore the identification uses quarterly data.10
基线方法使用 Blanchard 和 Perotti (2002) 的结构向量自回归方法,共同确定五个主要发达经济体(法国、德国、日本、英国和美国)的政府支出和收入冲击。 9 一个关键假设是,酌情财政政策不会同时对产出的意外变化做出反应,因为政策制定者需要时间来评估产出冲击并做出支出和/或税收决策,包括通过和实施新的政策。立法。该假设在短期内更有可能成立,因此识别使用季度数据。 10

The shocks identified by this approach offer a sensible narrative of the fiscal policies adopted over the past several decades. Comparison of structural shocks with historical policy records (quantified using the narrative approach in the literature) shows that structural shocks can broadly reflect major policy changes in timing and order of magnitude. For example, for the United States, the structural tax shocks capture tax cuts enacted under the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations as well as their subsequent expiration. The same is true of tax hikes during the 1980s, which were put in place following the Greenspan Commission’s recommendations to shore up financing of the social security system (Figure 4.3).11
这种方法确定的冲击为过去几十年采取的财政政策提供了合理的叙述。将结构性冲击与历史政策记录(使用文献中的叙述方法进行量化)进行比较表明,结构性冲击可以广泛反映重大政策变化的时间和幅度。例如,对于美国来说,结构性税收冲击包括罗纳德·里根和乔治·W·布什政府实施的减税政策及其随后的到期。 20 世纪 80 年代的增税也是如此,这是根据格林斯潘委员会关于支持社会保障体系融资的建议而实施的(图 4.3)。 11

Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3.  图 4.3。

Tracking Tax Shocks in the United States
追踪美国的税收冲击

(Percent of GDP) (占国内生产总值的百分比)

Sources: Romer and Romer (2010); and IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:Romer 和 Romer (2010);以及国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。

The structural shocks also have a statistically and economically significant domestic impact. Consistent with traditional Keynesian theory and previous empirical work that uses a similar methodology, estimates of domestic multipliers using the structural shocks tend to be larger for spending instruments (slightly above one) than for tax instruments (slightly below one). Some differences are seen in the size of domestic tax multipliers across the five source countries, with the multiplier of the United States being larger than that of European peers or Japan, possibly reflecting different tax structures and the specific tax instruments used (Blagrave and others, forthcoming).
结构性冲击还对国内统计和经济产生重大影响。与传统凯恩斯主义理论和之前使用类似方法的实证研究一致,使用结构性冲击对支出工具(略高于 1)的国内乘数的估计往往大于税收工具(略低于 1)。五个来源国的国内税收乘数的大小存在一些差异,其中美国的乘数大于欧洲国家或日本,可能反映了不同的税收结构和所使用的具体税收工具(Blagrave 等人,即将推出)。

The spillover effects from the fiscal shocks are estimated using the local projections method.12 The econometric specification relates an economic outcome in a recipient country, such as the level of output, to a fiscal shock from the five source countries—constructed by pooling together shocks from source countries and weighting them by the strength of trade links between the source and the recipient.13 The baseline specification controls for factors that affect the normal short-term dynamics of output in the recipient country, such as past growth rates and external demand developments. The specification is estimated using quarterly data from the first quarter of 2000 through the second quarter of 2016, and the sample of 55 advanced and emerging market economies represents almost 85 percent of world output. Thus, the panel estimation gives spillover estimates for an “average” country in the sample.14 For the panel estimation, the shocks are expressed as a share of recipient countries’ output to facilitate aggregation across sources. For ease of interpretation of the economic magnitude, results are presented with shocks normalized to an average 1 percent of GDP change in the fiscal position across source countries (see details in Annex 4.2, which shows how panel results are rescaled using relative GDP levels and trade links).
财政冲击的溢出效应是使用当地预测方法来估计的。 12 计量经济规范将受援国的经济成果(例如产出水平)与五个来源国的财政冲击联系起来——通过汇集来源国的冲击并按强度对其进行加权来构建来源国和接受国之间的贸易联系。 13 基准规格控制影响受援国正常短期产出动态的因素,例如过去的增长率和外部需求的发展。该指标是使用 2000 年第一季度至 2016 年第二季度的季度数据估算的,55 个发达和新兴市场经济体的样本几乎占世界产出的 85%。因此,面板估计给出了样本中“平均”国家的溢出估计。 14 对于面板估计,冲击表示为受援国产出的份额,以促进跨来源的汇总。为了便于解释经济规模,结果以来源国财政状况平均 1% GDP 变化标准化的冲击呈现(详见附件 4.2,其中显示了如何使用相对 GDP 水平和贸易重新调整面板结果)链接)。

Spillovers on Economic Activity
对经济活动的溢出效应

The results point to significant spillover effects from fiscal policy, especially from government spending shocks. Figure 4.4 shows the estimated response to a foreign fiscal shock of an average recipient country’s output over eight quarters. A shock to the fiscal balance—henceforth referred to as the overall fiscal shock—is constructed as a shock to government spending minus a shock to tax revenues, such that a positive shock implies a reduction in the source country’s fiscal balance (or an increase in the deficit). An overall fiscal shock would increase recipient output on impact, reaching a peak around the third quarter after the shock before starting to dissipate (Figure 4.4, panel 1). Estimations for specific fiscal instruments show that spillovers from a government spending shock are larger, more persistent, and more precisely estimated than those from a tax shock of equal size (Figure 4.4, panels 2 and 3).15 This is consistent with the evidence pointing to larger domestic spending multipliers than domestic tax multipliers—as discussed earlier. Data constraints prevent a more detailed empirical examination of spillovers from specific spending or tax instruments, such as government consumption or investment—an issue assessed later in the chapter through model-based simulations.
结果表明财政政策,特别是政府支出冲击产生了显着的溢出效应。图 4.4 显示了受援国八个季度平均产出对外国财政冲击的估计反应。对财政平衡的冲击(以下称为总体财政冲击)是指对政府支出的冲击减去对税收收入的冲击,因此正冲击意味着来源国财政平衡的减少(或财政支出的增加)。赤字)。总体财政冲击将增加受灾国的产出,冲击后在第三季度左右达到峰值,然后开始消散(图 4.4,第 1 部分)。对特定财政工具的估计表明,与同等规模的税收冲击相比,政府支出冲击的溢出效应更大、更持久、估计更准确(图 4.4,第 2 和第 3 部分)。 15 这与前面讨论的国内支出乘数大于国内税收乘数的证据是一致的。数据限制阻碍了对特定支出或税收工具(例如政府消费或投资)的溢出效应进行更详细的实证研究——本章稍后将通过基于模型的模拟评估这一问题。

Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4.  图 4.4。

Dynamic Responses of Recipient Countries’ Output to Fiscal Shocks
受援国产出对财政冲击的动态反应

(Impact on output level, percent; quarters on x-axis)
(对产出水平的影响,百分比;x 轴上的季度)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: t = 0 is the quarter of the respective shocks. Solid lines denote point estimates and dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands. Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries.
注:t = 0 是相应冲击的四分之一。实线表示点估计值,虚线表示 90% 的置信带。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%。

Spillovers are economically significant and in line with earlier estimates. For example, a 1 percent of GDP overall fiscal shock in an average major advanced economy would raise output in the average recipient country by about 0.08 percent over the first year. For a government spending increase of the same magnitude, the average spillover impact in recipient countries increases to 0.15 percent over the first year; for a tax hike of similar size, output falls by about 0.05 percent (Figure 4.5). As expected, spillovers from fiscal shocks are substantially lower than domestic fiscal multipliers in source countries, but still relevant.16 These are of the same order of magnitude as those found in previous work—for example, Beetsma, Klaassen, and Wieland (2006)—although differences in country and time samples as well as shock identification make a direct comparison challenging.17 While the spillover estimates in this section are averages across different economic and policy conditions, subsequent analysis also shows that there is a large difference between estimates in normal times and those in times of economic slack, for example.
溢出效应具有重大的经济意义,并且与之前的估计一致。例如,对一个主要发达经济体来说,如果总体财政冲击占 GDP 的 1%,那么受援国的产出在第一年平均会提高约 0.08%。对于相同幅度的政府支出增长,受援国的平均溢出影响在第一年增加到 0.15%;对于类似规模的增税,产出会下降约 0.05%(图 4.5)。正如预期的那样,财政冲击的溢出效应远低于来源国的国内财政乘数,但仍然具有相关性。 16 这些与之前的工作(例如 Beetsma、Klaassen 和 Wieland(2006))中发现的结果具有相同的数量级,尽管国家和时间样本以及冲击识别的差异使得直接比较具有挑战性。 17 虽然本节中的溢出估计是不同经济和政策条件下的平均值,但随后的分析也表明,例如,正常时期和经济疲软时期的估计之间存在很大差异。

Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5.  图 4.5。

Spillovers of Fiscal Shocks on Recipient Countries’ Output
财政冲击对受援国产出的溢出效应

(One-year average impact on output; percent)
(对产出的一年平均影响;百分比)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries.
注:冲击标准化为各来源国平均 GDP 的 1%。

Further analysis of components of recipient-country output corroborates the importance of trade for the transmission of fiscal shocks (Figure 4.6), consistent with the conceptual framework outlined above. In particular, a positive fiscal shock from abroad is estimated to raise recipient-country bilateral exports to the source countries. With higher export demand, firms expand investment to build production capacity, generating a second-round effect on recipient-country investment, whereas the impact on consumption appears negligible. The boost to exports and investment increases imports, some of which come from source countries. With bilateral imports rising by much less than bilateral exports, however, the recipient’s trade balance with the source countries improves following the fiscal shock.
对受援国产出组成部分的进一步分析证实了贸易对于传导财政冲击的重要性(图 4.6),与上述概念框架一致。特别是,来自国外的积极财政冲击预计将增加受援国对来源国的双边出口。随着出口需求的增加,企业扩大投资以建设产能,对受援国投资产生第二轮影响,而对消费的影响似乎可以忽略不计。出口和投资的增长增加了进口,其中一些来自来源国。然而,由于双边进口增幅远低于双边出口增幅,接收国与来源国的贸易平衡在财政冲击后有所改善。

Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6.  图 4.6。

Dynamic Responses of Components of Recipient Countries’ Output to a Fiscal Shock
受援国产出组成部分对财政冲击的动态反应

(Percent of output; quarters on x-axis)
(产出百分比;x 轴上的四分之一)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: t = 0 is the quarter of the shock. Solid lines denote point estimates, and dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands. Responses to an overall fiscal shock are presented. Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries.
注:t = 0 是冲击的四分之一。实线表示点估计,虚线表示 90% 的置信带。提出了对总体财政冲击的应对措施。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%。

The empirical spillover estimates are robust to alternative specifications and shock-identification strategies. For example, the baseline results do not change much with the inclusion of additional control variables (for example, the recipient-country short-term interest rate, output gap, unemployment rate, and fiscal stance).18 Estimates are also similar—though slightly larger—using a panel vector autoregression estimation methodology that allows for potential feedback effects of exchange rates and interest rates on output. In addition, estimates using comparable fiscal shocks obtained from alternative identification strategies—namely forecast errors and narrative approach—also yield spillover estimates that are similar in size and dynamics. This provides reassurance that the baseline results are not driven by the structural vector autoregression methodology for identifying fiscal shocks.19 Annex 4.3 gives more details about robustness tests.
经验溢出估计对于替代规范和冲击识别策略是稳健的。例如,纳入额外控制变量(例如受援国短期利率、产出缺口、失业率和财政立场)后,基线结果不会发生太大变化。 18 使用面板向量自回归估计方法进行的估计也类似(尽管稍大),该方法允许汇率和利率对产出的潜在反馈影响。此外,使用从替代识别策略(即预测误差和叙述方法)获得的可比财政冲击的估计也会产生规模和动态相似的溢出估计。这保证了基线结果不是由用于识别财政冲击的结构向量自回归方法驱动的。 19 附件 4.3 提供了有关稳健性测试的更多详细信息。

Spillovers under Different Economic and Policy Conditions
不同经济和政策条件下的溢出效应

Business cycle and monetary policy conditions in both source and recipient countries, along with the bilateral exchange rate regime, can affect the magnitude of spillovers from fiscal policy. As outlined earlier in the conceptual framework, these factors are expected to affect the domestic impact of fiscal shocks—if they pertain to the source country—as well as their cross-border transmission. In general, a larger impact in the source country is expected to give rise to more significant spillovers.
来源国和接受国的商业周期和货币政策状况以及双边汇率制度都可能影响财政政策溢出效应的程度。正如概念框架前面概述的那样,这些因素预计将影响财政冲击的国内影响(如果它们涉及来源国)及其跨境传播。一般来说,对来源国的影响越大,预计会产生更显着的溢出效应。

Cyclical Position and Monetary Policy Constraints
周期性状况和货币政策约束

To test how cyclical positions and monetary policy affect the impact of fiscal shocks, the baseline econometric framework is augmented to allow for potential regime dependence (see Annex 4.2 for details). The definitions of regimes are based on the prevailing output gap or the level of the short-term interest rate in either source or recipient countries. Specifically, a negative output gap is assumed to represent economic slack, and a short-term interest rate below the 25th percentile of the relevant cross-country distribution is a proxy for monetary policy constrained by the effective lower bound.20 Results are robust to using alternative definitions of slack, including the unemployment gap or smooth-transition probability as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013). For the effective lower bound, results are also robust to using an absolute interest rate threshold that is common to all countries.
为了测试周期性头寸和货币政策如何影响财政冲击的影响,我们对基线计量经济框架进行了扩充,以考虑潜在的制度依赖性(详情请参阅附件 4.2)。制度的定义基于来源国或接受国当前的产出缺口或短期利率水平。具体而言,假设负产出缺口代表经济疲软,低于相关跨国分布第25个百分位数的短期利率是受有效下限约束的货币政策的代表。 20 使用松弛的替代定义,包括奥尔巴赫和戈罗德尼琴科(2013)中的失业差距或平滑过渡概率,结果是稳健的。对于有效下限,使用所有国家通用的绝对利率阈值的结果也很稳健。

Consistent with theory and empirical findings in the domestic multiplier literature, spillovers are estimated to be larger during episodes of economic slack than in normal times. For example, if the recipient country has slack when the external fiscal shock hits, its output would rise by 0.11 percent over the first year in response to a 1 percent of GDP overall fiscal shock in an average major advanced economy. By contrast, the response to the same shock would be almost halved—to 0.06 percent—when there is no economic slack (Figure 4.7, panel 1). Differential effects are also observed when the source economy has slack, compared with when it does not—with estimates varying between 0.09 percent and 0.03 percent, respectively (Figure 4.7, panel 2).
与国内乘数文献中的理论和实证结果一致,经济疲软时期的溢出效应估计比正常时期更大。例如,如果受援国在外部财政冲击来袭时出现松弛,那么其产出将在第一年增长 0.11%,以应对主要发达经济体平均 GDP 1% 的总体财政冲击。相比之下,当没有经济疲软时,对相同冲击的反应几乎减半——降至 0.06%(图 4.7,第 1 部分)。当来源经济有闲置时与没有闲置时相比,也可以观察到不同的影响——估计值分别在 0.09% 和 0.03% 之间变化(图 4.7,第 2 幅)。

Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7.  图 4.7。

Spillovers under Various Economic and Policy Conditions
各种经济和政策条件下的溢出效应

(One-year average impact on output; percent)
(对产出的一年平均影响;百分比)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: ELB = effective lower bound. Slack is defined as output gap below zero; and ELB corresponds to short-term interest rates in the bottom 25 percent of cross-country historical distribution. Responses to an overall fiscal shock are presented. Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries.
注:ELB = 有效下限。松弛定义为产出缺口低于零; ELB 对应于跨国历史分布中底部 25% 的短期利率。提出了对总体财政冲击的应对措施。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%。
1Normal times refer to average of no slack and no ELB in both source and recipient countries.
1 正常时间是指来源国和接收国均无松弛且无 ELB 的平均时间。
2Average estimates for conditions in source countries and conditions in recipient countries.
2 对来源国情况和接收国情况的平均估计。

Spillovers can be even larger when monetary policy is constrained by the effective lower bound, either in the source or the recipient country (Figure 4.7, panels 1 and 2). For example, subject to a 1 percent of GDP overall fiscal shock in an average major advanced economy, the response of recipient-country output can be more than four times greater when its interest rate is exceptionally lower than in normal times.21 Monetary policy constraints in source countries have a similar effect on spillovers, as they can amplify the domestic impact of fiscal shocks. Although slack and the effective lower bound have distinct mechanisms to amplify spillovers, it is often difficult to clearly distinguish the two states in empirical estimation because they can coincide in practice, as has occurred in recent years.22 This caveat should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
当货币政策受到有效下限(无论是在货币来源国还是在接受国)时,溢出效应可能会更大(图 4.7,第 1 和 2 部分)。例如,在主要发达经济体平均受到占GDP 1%的总体财政冲击的情况下,当受援国的利率异常低于正常时期时,其产出的反应可能会高出四倍多。 21 来源国的货币政策约束对溢出效应具有类似的影响,因为它们可以放大财政冲击的国内影响。尽管松弛和有效下限具有不同的放大溢出机制,但在经验估计中通常很难清楚地区分这两种状态,因为它们在实践中可能会重合,就像近年来发生的那样。 22 在解释结果时应牢记这一警告。

The response of GDP components under monetary policy constraints offers further insights into how a fiscal shock is transmitted to recipient countries (Figure 4.8). Faced with a positive fiscal shock from abroad, consumption—and particularly investment—in a recipient country responds much more strongly when the domestic nominal interest rate is close to the effective lower bound, likely reflecting declining real interest rates associated with higher expected inflation. This is consistent with results from theoretical models (see section on factors affecting transmission) and is confirmed by the results of the model-based simulations presented in the next section. The responses of exports to and imports from the source countries are also stronger when monetary policy accommodates the fiscal shock, in line with the domestic response of investment.
货币政策约束下 GDP 组成部分的反应进一步揭示了财政冲击如何传导至受援国(图 4.8)。面对来自国外的积极财政冲击,当国内名义利率接近有效下限时,受援国的消费(尤其是投资)反应更为强烈,这可能反映出与预期通胀上升相关的实际利率下降。这与理论模型的结果一致(参见影响传输的因素部分),并由下一节中基于模型的模拟结果证实。当货币政策适应财政冲击时,来源国的出口和进口反应也更强,与国内投资反应一致。

Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8.  图 4.8。

Dynamic Reponses of Components of Recipient Countries’ Output under Normal Times and Effective Lower Bound in Recipient Countries
正常时期受援国产出组成部分的动态响应及受援国有效下限

(Percent of output; quarters on x-axis)
(产出百分比;x 轴上的四分之一)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: Normal times = no effective lower bound. t = 0 is the quarter of the shock. Solid red lines denote point estimates under different conditions; dashed red lines denote 90 percent confidence bands; and solid blue lines represent the unconditional response. Effective lower bound corresponds to short-term interest rates in the bottom 25 percent of cross-country historical distribution. Responses to an overall fiscal shock are presented. Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries.
注意:正常时间 = 无有效下限。 t = 0 是冲击的四分之一。红实线表示不同条件下的点估计;红色虚线表示 90% 的置信区间;蓝色实线代表无条件响应。有效下限对应于跨国历史分布中底部 25% 的短期利率。提出了对总体财政冲击的应对措施。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%。

Exchange Rate Regime 汇率制度

As discussed in the section on factors affecting transmission, the exchange rate regime can also impact the size of fiscal spillovers. To investigate this question, this section analyzes whether the impact of a fiscal shock in the United States varies for recipient countries with fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes vis-à-vis the US dollar. The United States—with its global currency and systemic trade importance—is a suitable source country for this exercise. Countries do not typically peg to the British pound or the Japanese yen. In the case of the euro, Germany’s and France’s trade importance is mostly within Europe, where most sample countries are either euro area members or peg to the euro, not allowing for enough variation in the data to identify the effect for those with flexible regimes.
正如影响传导因素部分所讨论的,汇率制度也会影响财政溢出效应的规模。为了研究这个问题,本节分析了美国财政冲击的影响对于采用固定美元汇率制度和灵活汇率制度的受援国来说是否有所不同。美国因其全球货币和系统性贸易重要性而成为这项活动的合适来源国。各国通常不与英镑或日元挂钩。就欧元而言,德国和法国的贸易重要性主要集中在欧洲内部,其中大多数样本国家要么是欧元区成员国,要么与欧元挂钩,不允许数据有足够的变化来确定对那些拥有灵活制度的国家的影响。

Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9.  图 4.9。

Dynamic Reponses of Recipient Countries’ Output to US Spending Shock under Various Exchange Rate Regimes
不同汇率制度下受援国产出对美国支出冲击的动态反应

(Impact on output, percent; quarters on x-axis)
(对产出的影响,百分比;x 轴上的四分之一)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: t = 0 is the quarter of the shock. Solid red lines denote point estimates conditional on exchange rate regime; dashed red lines denote 90 percent confidence bands; and solid blue lines represent the unconditional estimates. Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries (note that this represents a less than 1 percent of US GDP shock).
注:t = 0 是冲击的四分之一。红实线表示以汇率制度为条件的点估计;红色虚线表示 90% 的置信区间;蓝色实线代表无条件估计。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%(请注意,这代表着美国 GDP 冲击的不到 1%)。

The empirical framework is again modified to allow for regime dependence of the fiscal shock—now originating only in the United States—where the regime definition is based on the prevailing bilateral exchange rate arrangement between the United States and the recipient country in a particular period. Specifically, a “fixed” exchange rate regime is defined as encompassing de facto pegs or crawling pegs, classified using two alternative methods: (1) Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) updated by Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017a, 2017b)—henceforth called “Reinhart-Rogoff” classification; and (2) the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (“IMF” classification).23 More details are provided in Annex 4.1.
经验框架再次被修改,以允许财政冲击的制度依赖性(现在仅起源于美国),其中制度的定义基于特定时期美国与受援国之间现行的双边汇率安排。具体而言,“固定”汇率制度被定义为涵盖事实上的钉住汇率制或爬行钉住汇率制,并使用两种替代方法进行分类:(1) Reinhart 和 Rogoff (2004),由 Ilzetzki、Reinhart 和 Rogoff (2017a、2017b) 更新——此后称为“Reinhart-Rogoff”分类; (2) 国际货币基金组织关于外汇安排和外汇限制的年度报告(“国际货币基金组织”分类)。 23 附件 4.1 提供了更多详细信息。

The evidence suggests that a government spending shock in the United States generates stronger and more persistent impacts on countries whose exchange rates are pegged to the US dollar than on those whose exchange rates are more flexible (Figure 4.9). This is the case regardless of which exchange regime classification is used. The difference in the output responses between fixed and flexible regimes is statistically significant on impact under both classifications and also during the second year under the Reinhart-Rogoff classification. At the same time, no difference in spillovers is observed between fixed and flexible regimes from an overall fiscal shock or a tax shock (not shown). Taken at face value, this result seems to point to relatively weak expenditure switching effects in the transmission of spending shocks. This weakness could reflect that, for a significant portion of the sample, US monetary policy was constrained by the effective lower bound, limiting interest rate and hence exchange rate movements. Another possibility is that, as discussed earlier, trade integration may be stronger under pegs—beyond what can be captured by the simple import ratios used in weighting the shocks.
有证据表明,与汇率更加灵活的国家相比,美国政府支出冲击对汇率与美元挂钩的国家产生的影响更大、更持久(图4.9)。无论使用哪种交换制度分类,情况都是如此。固定制度和灵活制度之间的产出响应差异在两种分类下以及莱因哈特-罗格夫分类下的第二年的影响上具有统计显着性。与此同时,在整体财政冲击或税收冲击(未显示)中,固定制度和灵活制度之间的溢出效应没有差异。从表面上看,这一结果似乎表明支出冲击传导中的支出转换效应相对较弱。这种弱点可能反映出,对于很大一部分样本来说,美国货币政策受到有效下限的限制,从而限制了利率,从而限制了汇率变动。另一种可能性是,正如前面所讨论的,在钉住汇率制的情况下,贸易一体化可能会更强——超出了用于衡量冲击的简单进口比率所能捕捉到的程度。

Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10.  图 4.10。

Impact of Fiscal Shocks on Global GDP Based on Various Instruments
基于各种工具的财政冲击对全球 GDP 的影响

(Two-year average impact, percent)
(两年平均影响,百分比)

Source: IMF, G20 Model (G20MOD) simulations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织、G20 模型 (G20MOD) 模拟。
Note: All shocks are 1 percent of source-country GDP, lasting two years.
注:所有冲击均为来源国 GDP 的 1%,持续两年。

The Transmission of Fiscal Shocks—Model-Based Analysis
财政冲击的传导——基于模型的分析

To complement the empirical analysis, the chapter presents model-based simulations using a multiregion general equilibrium model—the IMF’s G20 Model. The model simulations are intended to be illustrative and offer further insights into the macroeconomic adjustment to fiscal shocks—including the response of exchange and interest rates—and more granularity on the impacts of various fiscal instruments. Overall, simulations serve as theory-based cross-checks on the empirical results and provide insights into how fiscal shocks are propagated.24
为了补充实证分析,本章使用多区域一般均衡模型(国际货币基金组织的 G20 模型)进行了基于模型的模拟。模型模拟旨在说明性,并提供对财政冲击的宏观经济调整(包括汇率和利率的反应)的进一步见解,以及对各种财政工具影响的更详细的了解。总体而言,模拟可以作为对实证结果的基于理论的交叉检验,并提供对财政冲击如何传播的见解。 24

The results are generally consistent with the empirical findings in this chapter: simulations show that spillovers from temporary fiscal shocks can differ substantially depending on the monetary policy response and the fiscal instruments used. In addition, the responses of GDP components under different assumptions on monetary accommodation closely resemble those identified empirically.25 In all cases, fiscal shocks are expressed as a share (generally 1 percent) of a particular source country’s GDP—this differs from how results were presented in the empirical section and implies that, all else equal, shocks emanating from larger countries will have larger spillover effects.
结果与本章的实证结果基本一致:模拟表明,临时财政冲击的溢出效应可能因货币政策反应和所使用的财政工具而有很大差异。此外,在不同的货币宽松假设下,GDP 各组成部分的响应与经验确定的响应非常相似。 25 在所有情况下,财政冲击都表示为特定来源国 GDP 的份额(通常为 1%),这与实证部分中结果的呈现方式不同,并且意味着,在其他条件相同的情况下,冲击来自大国的举措将产生更大的溢出效应。

Spillovers on Output: Fiscal Instruments and Policy Accommodation
产出溢出:财政工具和政策调整

The model simulations confirm substantial spillovers from government spending shocks. Specifically, they show that spending shocks have larger spillover effects than do tax shocks.26 This coincides with results from the empirical analysis described in this chapter. However, structural models offer insights into the impact of specific fiscal instruments as well, as shown in Figure 4.10:
模型模拟证实了政府支出冲击的巨大溢出效应。具体来说,他们表明支出冲击比税收冲击具有更大的溢出效应。 26 这与本章描述的实证分析的结果一致。然而,结构模型也可以洞察特定财政工具的影响,如图 4.10 所示:

  • Spending instruments: Government investment shocks in the G20 Model have larger domestic and spillover effects than shocks to government consumption. This is because government investment increases the public capital stock, which is assumed to increase private sector productivity, stimulating private investment and labor demand and in turn raising wages and labor income. By contrast, government consumption does not affect private sector productivity.
    支出工具:G20 模式中的政府投资冲击比政府消费冲击具有更大的国内效应和溢出效应。这是因为政府投资增加了公共资本存量,这被认为可以提高私营部门的生产力,刺激私人投资和劳动力需求,进而提高工资和劳动收入。相比之下,政府消费并不影响私营部门的生产率。

  • Tax instruments: Model simulations suggest that temporary changes in consumption taxes have the largest domestic and spillover effects among tax instruments. Unlike cuts in labor income or corporate taxes, where benefits can be saved, households must increase their current-period spending to take advantage of temporarily lower consumption taxes.27 In addition, because investment decisions have a long planning horizon and investment can be costly to adjust (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005), the impact of temporary corporate income tax changes is smaller than that of temporary labor income tax changes—the latter affect liquidity-constrained households, which fully adjust consumption in response.
    税收工具:模型模拟表明,消费税的临时变化在税收工具中具有最大的国内效应和溢出效应。与可以节省福利的削减劳动收入或企业税不同,家庭必须增加当期支出才能利用暂时较低的消费税。 27 此外,由于投资决策的规划周期很长,而且调整投资的成本可能很高(Christiano、Eichenbaum 和 Evans 2005),临时企业所得税变化的影响小于临时劳动力的影响所得税的变化——后者会影响流动性受限的家庭,从而充分调整消费。

Consistent with the empirical analysis, model simulations show that spillovers on output can vary widely, depending on the response of monetary policy, in both source and recipient countries. Figure 4.11 depicts the impact of the same temporary two-year US government spending and tax shocks considered in Figure 4.10—using the average across spending and tax instruments—on recipient-country GDP under different monetary policy assumptions: (1) a rule-based response in both source and recipient countries, (2) accommodation in the United States during the first two years following the fiscal shock, (3) accommodation in recipient countries during the first two years, and (4) accommodation in both the United States and recipient countries during the same period. Spillovers vary markedly depending on the response of monetary policy—for example, they can be about four times larger if monetary policy in recipient countries fully accommodates the shock, as compared with when monetary policy follows the inflation-forecast targeting rule in each country.28,29 These results are closely aligned with the empirical analysis presented in Figure 4.7—when interest rates in the recipient country are at or near the effective lower bound, spillover effects are estimated to be about four times larger than they are during normal times.
与实证分析一致,模型模拟表明,产出溢出效应可能存在很大差异,具体取决于来源国和接受国货币政策的反应。图 4.11 描绘了图 4.10 中考虑的相同临时两年期美国政府支出和税收冲击(使用支出和税收工具的平均值)在不同货币政策假设下对受援国 GDP 的影响:(1) 基于规则的来源国和受援国的应对措施;(2) 财政冲击后头两年在美国的住宿安排;(3) 受援国头两年的住宿安排;(4) 美国和受援国的住宿安排同一时期的受援国。溢出效应根据货币政策的反应而显着变化,例如,如果受援国的货币政策完全适应冲击,与货币政策遵循各国的通胀预测目标规则时相比,溢出效应可能会大四倍左右。 28,29 这些结果与图 4.7 中的实证分析密切相关——当接受国的利率处于或接近有效下限时,溢出效应估计约为实际水平的四倍平时。

Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11. 图 4.11。

Spillovers from US Fiscal Shocks with and without Monetary Accommodation
有或没有货币宽松的美国财政冲击的溢出效应

(Two-year average impact on rest of the world GDP, percent)
(对世界其他地区 GDP 的两年平均影响,百分比)

Source: IMF, G20 Model (G20MOD) simulations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织、G20 模型 (G20MOD) 模拟。
Note: Normal response of monetary policy is a rule-based response, in countries without fixed exchange rate regimes, where monetary policy responds to an increase in expected future inflation by increasing nominal interest rates to reduce demand and return inflation to target.
注:在没有固定汇率制度的国家,货币政策的正常反应是基于规则的反应,货币政策通过提高名义利率来减少需求并使通胀回到目标水平,以应对预期未来通胀的上升。

Model-based simulations can also offer insights in terms of regional patterns of the impact of fiscal shocks. Spillovers from stimulus in the United States have the broadest global reach—due to the large size of the US economy and its moderately strong trade links with most regions (Figure 4.12).30 Spillovers from the United States are largest on countries in Latin America and Canada—all of which account for significant shares of US import demand. For shocks from France and Germany, spillovers are largest on Europe, given deep trade integration, but relatively small on other regions. Finally, fiscal measures in China have meaningful spillovers on each region due to the size and openness of the Chinese economy. By region, spillovers are slightly larger on countries in Asia—given strong trade links—though spillovers on Europe, Canada, and Latin America are not trivial. China’s economy, given its growing global clout, is playing an important role in driving spillovers onto neighboring countries through the trade channel and the impact of fluctuations in demand on commodity prices (IMF 2016).
基于模型的模拟还可以提供有关财政冲击影响的区域模式的见解。由于美国经济规模庞大且与大多数地区的贸易联系较强,美国刺激措施的溢出效应具有最广泛的全球影响力(图 4.12)。 30 来自美国的溢出效应对拉丁美洲和加拿大国家的影响最大,这些国家在美国进口需求中都占很大份额。对于来自法国和德国的冲击,鉴于贸易一体化的深入,对欧洲的溢出效应最大,但对其他地区的溢出效应相对较小。最后,由于中国经济的规模和开放程度,中国的财政措施对每个地区都有显着的溢出效应。从地区来看,由于贸易联系紧密,亚洲国家的溢出效应略大,但欧洲、加拿大和拉丁美洲的溢出效应也不容忽视。鉴于其日益增长的全球影响力,中国经济在通过贸易渠道推动对邻国的溢出效应以及需求波动对大宗商品价格的影响方面发挥着重要作用(国际货币基金组织,2016)。

Figure 4.12.
Figure 4.12.  图 4.12。

Regional GDP Impact of Government Spending Shocks from the United States, Europe, and China
美国、欧洲和中国政府支出冲击对地区 GDP 的影响

(Two-year average impact, percent)
(两年平均影响,百分比)

Source: IMF, G20 Model (G20MOD) simulations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织、G20 模型 (G20MOD) 模拟。
Note: EU = European Union; Lat. Am. = Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico). Europe shock refers to France and Germany shocks. Shock to government spending is equivalent to 1 percent of GDP, lasting two years. Average level impact over two years with no monetary accommodation in any country is presented.
注:EU = 欧盟;纬度。是。 = 拉丁美洲(阿根廷、巴西、墨西哥)。欧洲冲击指的是法国和德国的冲击。对政府支出的冲击相当于GDP的1%,持续两年。列出了任何国家在没有货币宽松的情况下两年内的平均水平影响。

Macroeconomic Adjustment and the Role of Financial Variables
宏观经济调整与金融变量的作用

Model simulations can give a richer description of the macroeconomic dynamics behind fiscal spillovers. In particular, simulations allow for an examination of the dynamics of interest rates and exchange rates—because these variables are forward-looking in nature, they respond to changes in the expected future state of the economy, so when a change in fiscal policy is announced or expected, these variables react immediately. This makes it difficult to capture their behavior in empirical exercises using structural shocks, which typically assess the impact of the implementation of fiscal changes.31 The chapter uses both model-based analysis and an alternative empirical approach that isolates anticipation effects to assess the impact of fiscal shocks on exchange rates and external positions in recipient countries.
模型模拟可以更丰富地描述财政溢出效应背后的宏观经济动态。特别是,模拟可以检查利率和汇率的动态——因为这些变量本质上是前瞻性的,它们对预期的未来经济状况的变化做出反应,因此当宣布财政政策变化时或预期,这些变量会立即做出反应。这使得很难在使用结​​构性冲击的实证研究中捕捉他们的行为,而结构性冲击通常评估实施财政改革的影响。 31 本章使用基于模型的分析和隔离预期效应的替代实证方法来评估财政冲击对受援国汇率和外部头寸的影响。

To shed light on the dynamics of adjustment following fiscal shocks, Figure 4.13 presents the response of several variables in the United States and the global economy to a temporary government spending increase in the United States. Given the importance of the monetary policy reaction, it presents a two-year stimulus scenario under both a normal monetary policy response (blue line) and monetary policy accommodation in all countries (red line).
为了阐明财政冲击后的调整动态,图 4.13 展示了美国和全球经济的几个变量对美国政府支出临时增加的反应。鉴于货币政策反应的重要性,它提出了所有国家正常货币政策反应(蓝线)和货币政策宽松(红线)下的两年刺激情景。

Figure 4.13.
Figure 4.13. 图 4.13。

Dynamic Reponses to a US Government Spending Shock
对美国政府支出冲击的动态反应

(Percent deviation from baseline)
(与基线的偏差百分比)

Source: IMF, G20 Model (G20MOD) simulations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织、G20 模型 (G20MOD) 模拟。
Note: Red lines denote the response to a 1 percent of GDP US government spending shock lasting two years with monetary accommodation in both source and recipient countries lasting two years, and blue lines represent the response to the same shock without monetary accommodation in any country.
注:红线表示美国政府对持续两年的 GDP 的 1% 支出冲击的反应,来源国和受援国均实施货币宽松政策,持续两年;蓝线表示任何国家在没有货币宽松的情况下对相同冲击的反应。
1Increase represents appreciation.
1 增加代表升值。
  • Monetary policy response: Following the fiscal shock, policy rates increase to curb inflationary pressures from the demand shock both in the United States and in recipient countries. The uncovered interest parity condition implies that bilateral nominal exchange rates in relation to the US dollar depreciate in the short term given that the response of US monetary policy is more pronounced than elsewhere—being the source of the shock, inflationary pressures are greater there. The increase in US external demand and the nominal exchange rate depreciation in recipient countries induce a modest increase in exports from the rest of the world, and thus a slight improvement in the corresponding trade balances. However, the increase in world interest rates reduces consumption and investment in the rest of the world. The net effect on GDP is small but positive.
    货币政策反应:财政冲击之后,政策利率上升,以抑制美国和受援国需求冲击带来的通胀压力。未覆盖利率平价条件意味着,鉴于美国货币政策的反应比其他地方更为明显,即美国作为冲击的根源,那里的通胀压力更大,短期内双边名义汇率相对于美元会贬值。美国外需增加和受援国名义汇率贬值导致世界其他国家出口小幅增长,​​相应贸易差额略有改善。然而,世界利率的上升减少了世界其他地区的消费和投资。对 GDP 的净影响虽小,但却是积极的。

  • Monetary accommodation: In this scenario, the positive impact on inflation goes unchecked, causing real interest rates to decline. This triggers a strong positive response in both consumption and investment in the rest of the world as the cost of capital and current-period consumption declines. The contrast between the dynamics of consumption and investment under monetary accommodation, as opposed to normal times, is consistent with the empirical findings shown in Figure 4.8. Monetary accommodation also implies a much larger impact on both exports—due to stronger external demand conditions—and imports, due to stronger domestic activity in recipients. The expenditure switching channel operates in the opposite direction under monetary accommodation, with recipient countries’ real exchange rates appreciating against the US dollar. This occurs because the negative impact on US real interest rates is more pronounced than elsewhere. Recipients’ trade balances still improve because of the strong increase in demand from the United States. Overall, as shown in Figure 4.11, the cumulative effect on global GDP is amplified under monetary accommodation.
    货币宽松:在这种情况下,对通胀的积极影响不受控制,导致实际利率下降。随着资本成本和当期消费的下降,这引发了世界其他地区消费和投资的强烈积极反应。货币宽松条件下消费和投资动态与正常时期的对比与图 4.8 所示的实证结果一致。货币宽松还意味着对出口(由于外部需求条件增强)和进口(由于接收国国内活动增强)产生更大的影响。支出转换渠道在货币宽松的情况下向相反的方向运作,受援国的实际汇率兑美元升值。出现这种情况是因为对美国实际利率的负面影响比其他地方更为明显。由于美国需求强劲增长,受援国的贸易平衡仍在改善。总体而言,如图4.11所示,货币宽松对全球GDP的累积效应被放大。

If the term premium increases following a fiscal impulse—capturing potential concerns about debt sustainability or higher future inflation—and monetary policy responds normally, the impact of stimulus in the United States is reduced and spillovers are marginally smaller (Figure 4.14). In this case, higher interest rates than in the baseline scenario discourage investment and consumption in the United States. Therefore, the net effect on GDP in the rest of the world is slightly smaller, illustrating the potential for an adverse reaction of financial markets to an increase in spending to reduce spillovers.32 This possibility underscores the importance of having a credible medium-term macroeconomic framework, which gives market participants confidence that inflation will be held in check because debt dynamics are sustainable.
如果期限溢价随着财政刺激而增加——考虑到对债务可持续性或未来通胀上升的潜在担忧——并且货币政策反应正常,那么美国刺激措施的影响就会减弱,溢出效应也会小一些(图4.14)。在这种情况下,高于基准情景的利率会抑制美国的投资和消费。因此,对世界其他地区GDP的净影响略小,这说明金融市场可能会对增加支出以减少溢出效应产生不利反应。 32 这种可能性强调了建立可靠的中期宏观经济框架的重要性,该框架使市场参与者相信,由于债务动态是可持续的,通货膨胀将受到控制。

Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14.  图 4.14。

Spillovers from US Spending Shock with and without a US Term-Premium Increase
无论美国定期保费增加与否,美国支出冲击的溢出效应

(Percent deviation from baseline)
(与基线的偏差百分比)

Source: IMF, G20 Model (G20MOD) simulations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织、G20 模型 (G20MOD) 模拟。
Note: Red lines denote the response to a 1 percent of GDP US government spending shock lasting two years, with a 25 basis point increase in the US term premium and subsequent spillovers to term premiums in other countries. Blue lines represent the response to the same spending shock with no term-premium increase. No monetary accommodation is assumed for any country.
注:红线表示美国政府对持续两年的占 GDP 1% 的支出冲击的反应,美国期限溢价增加 25 个基点,随后对其他国家的期限溢价产生溢出效应。蓝线代表对相同支出冲击的反应,但期限保费没有增加。任何国家都没有货币宽松的假设。

An empirical examination of how exchange rates and external positions respond to fiscal shocks is presented in Box 4.1. To capture anticipation effects, the analysis constructs fiscal shocks based on the methodology of Forni and Gambetti (2016), which identifies these shocks at announcement dates, as captured by changes in professional forecasts. It shows that an increase in government spending in the United States leads to a real appreciation of the dollar and a worsening of the US trade balance, as predicted by standard macroeconomic models.
专栏 4.1 对汇率和外部头寸如何应对财政冲击进行了实证检验。为了捕捉预期效应,该分析根据 Forni 和 Gambetti(2016)的方法构建了财政冲击,该方法通过专业预测的变化来识别公告日期的这些冲击。它表明,正如标准宏观经济模型所预测的那样,美国政府支出的增加导致美元实际升值和美国贸易平衡恶化。

Fiscal Reforms 财政改革

The model-based analysis also facilitates the examination of spillovers from so-called fiscal reforms—defined as permanent budget-neutral shifts in the composition of the public sector budget. The scenarios considered so far in the chapter deal with temporary fiscal impulses associated with a change in the fiscal stance in the source country. However, budget-neutral fiscal reforms may also have spillover effects. To demonstrate these differences, the following two scenarios are considered: (1) a budget-neutral corporate income tax reform and (2) a budget-neutral infrastructure spending increase. These illustrative scenarios suggest that fiscal reforms have limited cross-border effects, though significant changes can still generate large spillovers.
基于模型的分析还有助于检查所谓财政改革的溢出效应,即公共部门预算构成的永久性预算中性变化。本章到目前为止所考虑的情景涉及与来源国财政立场变化相关的临时财政冲动。然而,预算中性的财政改革也可能产生溢出效应。为了证明这些差异,需要考虑以下两种情况:(1)预算中性的企业所得税改革和(2)预算中性的基础设施支出增加。这些说明性的情景表明,财政改革的跨境影响有限,尽管重大变化仍会产生巨大的溢出效应。

Budget-Neutral Corporate Income Tax Reform
预算中性的企业所得税改革

The direct spillovers of a (simultaneous) budget-neutral reduction in corporate income tax rates in France, Germany, and the United States—the “source” countries in this scenario—would be slightly negative.33 The scenario’s main assumptions are that corporate tax rates are reduced by 15 percentage points, consumption-tax rates rise to offset the revenue loss, and monetary policy responds normally.34 The direct impact of the reform is captured by the blue lines in Figure 4.15. As shown in the figure,
法国、德国和美国(这种情况下的“来源”国)企业所得税税率(同时)预算中性降低的直接溢出效应将略有负面。 33 该情景的主要假设是企业税率降低15个百分点,消费税率上升以抵消收入损失,货币政策反应正常。 34 改革的直接影响如图 4.15 中的蓝线所示。如图所示,

  • Real GDP increases gradually as lower corporate income tax rates raise the return to capital in the source countries, stimulating investment. This positive effect on reform-country GDP is only partly counteracted by the increase in the consumption tax rate, which depresses consumption. Although these reforms are initially budget neutral, the expansion of investment increases tax revenues over time, which reduces the deficit and the debt stock in source countries.35 Their trade balances deteriorate slightly due to investment-driven import demand.
    随着企业所得税率的降低提高了来源国的资本回报率,刺激了投资,实际GDP逐渐增长。这种对改革国家GDP的积极影响仅部分被消费税率的提高所抵消,消费税率的提高抑制了消费。尽管这些改革最初是预算中性的,但随着时间的推移,投资的扩大会增加税收收入,从而减少来源国的赤字和债务存量。 35 由于投资驱动的进口需求,它们的贸易平衡略有恶化。

  • Given the lack of fiscal stimulus in the short term, the direct spillovers on recipient countries are limited. Over the medium term, GDP in recipient countries is slightly reduced, as recipient countries are now at a competitive disadvantage with respect to their return to capital, and real interest rates are slightly higher—implying lower investment. This negative impact more than offsets the small impetus to exports associated with increased demand from source countries.
    由于短期内缺乏财政刺激,对受援国的直接溢出效应有限。从中期来看,受援国的国内生产总值略有下降,因为受援国目前在资本回报方面处于竞争劣势,而且实际利率略高,这意味着投资减少。这种负面影响远远抵消了来源国需求增加对出口的小幅推动。

Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15.  图 4.15。

Spillovers from Corporate Income Tax Reduction Financed by an Offsetting Increase in Value-Added Tax
企业所得税减免的溢出效应由增值税的抵消性增长提供资金

(Percentage-point deviation from baseline, unless noted otherwise)
(与基线的百分比偏差,除非另有说明)

Sources: IMF, G20 Model (G20MOD) simulations; and IMF staff estimates.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织、G20 模型 (G20MOD) 模拟;和国际货币基金组织工作人员的估计。
Note: Blue lines denote the response to CIT/VAT reforms only, red lines denote the response to CIT/VAT reforms plus assumptions on investment shift, and yellow lines denote the response to CIT/VAT reforms plus assumptions on profit and investment shift. No monetary accommodation is assumed for any country. For rest of the world, no reforms are assumed. CIT = corporate income tax; VAT = value-added tax.
注:蓝线表示仅对企业所得税/增值税改革的响应,红线表示对企业所得税/增值税改革的响应加上投资转移的假设,黄线表示对企业所得税/增值税改革的响应加上利润和投资转移的假设。任何国家都没有货币宽松的假设。对于世界其他地区来说,没有任何改革的假设。 CIT=企业所得税; VAT=增值税。

However, beyond this direct effect, fiscal reforms may also affect investment and profit-reporting decisions. As discussed in Devereux (2008) and De Mooij and Ederveen (2008), corporate tax rates influence both intensive and extensive (discrete or location) decisions of firms, suggesting that multinational companies may relocate operations when faced with significant changes in relative tax rates in different jurisdictions. In addition, both studies note that it is feasible for multinational companies to shift profits between countries. In the scenario, the lower corporate income tax rates prompt these firms to shift operations—both investment and the jurisdiction in which profits are reported—to source countries, to the detriment of recipients.
然而,除了这种直接影响之外,财政改革还可能影响投资和利润报告决策。正如 Devereux (2008) 以及 De Mooij 和 Ederveen (2008) 所讨论的,公司税率影响公司的密集型和广泛型(离散或地点)决策,这表明跨国公司在面临相对税率的重大变化时可能会重新定位业务。不同的司法管辖区。此外,两项研究都指出,跨国公司在国家之间转移利润是可行的。在这种情况下,较低的企业所得税率促使这些公司将业务(包括投资和报告利润的管辖区)转移到来源国,这对接收国造成损害。

The effect of investment and profit shifting are illustrated by the red (investment shifting only) and yellow (investment and profit shifting together) lines of Figure 4.15. Based on estimates in the literature on profit and investment shifting, the scenario assumes that foreign direct investment in countries not pursuing reforms could decline by about $400 billion—this loss is assumed to be distributed equally across all countries as a share of GDP.36 By contrast, the countries pursuing reforms are assumed to benefit by a similar amount, above and beyond the immediate impact on investment from the corporate income tax reduction discussed above.37 Profit shifting is assumed to be a pure fiscal revenue gain for source countries and a corresponding loss for other countries.38
投资和利润转移的影响如图 4.15 中的红线(仅投资转移)和黄线(投资和利润转移一起转移)所示。根据有关利润和投资转移的文献中的估计,该情景假设不进行改革的国家的外国直接投资可能会减少约 4000 亿美元——假设这一损失作为 GDP 的一部分平均分配给所有国家。 36 相比之下,追求改革的国家被认为将获得类似的收益,超出了上述企业所得税减免对投资的直接影响。 37 利润转移被假定为来源国的纯粹财政收入收益和其他国家的相应损失。 38

The results suggest that investment shifting and profit shifting could trigger more significant spillovers on activity and affect fiscal positions. Activity in source countries would be considerably higher—with GDP increasing by almost 4 percent after 10 years—although significantly reduced elsewhere, by about 1 percent. Corresponding changes in trade balances would imply a material deterioration for corporate-tax-reforming countries—as import demand rises significantly—and an improvement for the rest of the world, due to import compression and export growth. Both investment shifting and profit shifting can also have an impact on fiscal positions, improving the primary balance of source countries and undermining the balance of others, above and beyond the direct effects of the corporate income tax reform itself. The marginal impact of profit shifting on public debt stocks can be seen by comparing the red and yellow lines in panels 3 and 4 of Figure 4.15—it is clear that the impact of investment shifting (measured by comparing the blue and the red lines) is much larger than that of profit shifting.39
结果表明,投资转移和利润转移可能引发更显着的经济活动溢出效应,并影响财政状况。来源国的活动将大幅增加——10年后GDP增长近4%——尽管其他地方的活动大幅减少,约1%。贸易平衡的相应变化将意味着企业税改革国家的情况将出现实质性恶化(因为进口需求大幅上升),而世界其他国家则将因进口压缩和出口增长而有所改善。投资转移和利润转移也会对财政状况产生影响,改善来源国的基本平衡并破坏其他国家的平衡,这超出了企业所得税改革本身的直接影响。利润转移对公共债务存量的边际影响可以通过比较图 4.15 的图 3 和图 4 中的红线和黄线看出——很明显,投资转移的影响(通过比较蓝线和红线来衡量)是远大于利润转移。 39

Budget-Neutral Permanent Increase in Public Investment
预算中性的公共投资永久增加

Compared with corporate income tax reforms that trigger investment and profit shifting, a budget-neutral permanent increase in public investment would have very modest spillovers.40 The scenario assumes a ½ percent of GDP increase in public investment in the five large economies considered in the empirical exercise—France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States—which is financed by an increase in consumption taxes. Such a reform would boost the capital stock in source countries, thereby increasing output permanently—the increase in investment resulting from the higher productivity associated with an expansion of the public capital stock outweighs the negative impact on domestic consumption of higher consumption taxes. However, as shown in Figure 4.16, although there would be some modest cross-border impact due to expenditure shifting, the impact would be muted by an exchange rate depreciation in source countries, implying that the expenditure switching channel will eventually offset the positive effect.41 The impact on recipient countries’ trade balances is small, but negative.
与引发投资和利润转移的企业所得税改革相比,预算中性的公共投资永久性增长只会产生非常有限的溢出效应。 40 该情景假设实证研究中考虑的五个大型经济体(法国、德国、日本、英国和美国)的公共投资占 GDP 增幅的 0.5%,其资金来源是消费税增加。这样的改革将提高来源国的资本存量,从而永久性地增加产出——公共资本存量扩张带来的生产率提高所带来的投资增加,超过了更高消费税对国内消费的负面影响。然而,如图4.16所示,虽然支出转移会产生一些适度的跨境影响,但来源国汇率贬值会减弱这种影响,这意味着支出转移渠道最终将抵消积极影响。 41 对受援国贸易平衡的影响虽小,但却是负面的。

Figure 4.16.
Figure 4.16.  图 4.16。

Spillovers from Increase in Government Investment in Five Major Economies
五主要经济体政府投资增加的溢出效应

(Percent deviation from baseline)
(与基线的偏差百分比)

Source: IMF, G20 Model (G20MOD) simulations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织、G20 模型 (G20MOD) 模拟。
Note: Spillovers from a permanent 0.5 percent of GDP increase in government investment in five major economies (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) financed via value-added tax. No monetary accommodation is assumed for any country.
注:五个主要经济体(法国、德国、日本、英国、美国)通过增值税融资的政府投资永久增加 GDP 0.5% 所产生的溢出效应。任何国家都没有货币宽松的假设。

Conclusions 结论

Positive cross-country spillovers from collective fiscal policy actions helped the global economy recover from the global financial crisis, but do fiscal spillovers still matter under much-improved economic conditions today? The chapter finds that spillovers continue to be relevant, but to what extent depends on circumstances in both source and recipient countries. It shows that fiscal spillovers tend to be lower when a fiscal shock originates from a country where GDP is at its potential, but that the impact intensifies when either the source or recipient country is in recession and/or benefiting from accommodative monetary policy. This suggests that spillovers are generally large when domestic multipliers are also large. The chapter also finds that spillovers from government spending shocks are larger than those associated with tax shocks, that the transmission of fiscal shocks may be greater among countries with fixed exchange rates, and that transmission may be dampened if the fiscal impulse at the source tightens global financial conditions.
集体财政政策行动产生的积极的跨国溢出效应帮助全球经济从全球金融危机中复苏,但在当今经济状况大幅改善的情况下,财政溢出效应仍然重要吗?本章发现,溢出效应仍然具有相关性,但其程度取决于来源国和接收国的具体情况。它表明,当财政冲击源自国内生产总值发挥潜力的国家时,财政溢出效应往往较低,但当来源国或受援国陷入衰退和/或受益于宽松货币政策时,影响会加剧。这表明,当国内乘数也很大时,溢出效应通常也很大。本章还发现,政府支出冲击的溢出效应比税收冲击的溢出效应更大,财政冲击在固定汇率国家之间的传导可能更大,如果源头的财政冲动收紧全球,那么传导可能会受到抑制。财务状况。

While the chapter does not offer conclusions about how individual countries should conduct fiscal policy from a domestic perspective, it provides information about potential cross-country effects from such action. The current juncture suggests that positive cross-border effects from stimulus in countries with broadly closed output gaps will generally be smaller than during the crisis, but there could still be benefits. For example, in the euro area, spillovers from a more expansionary fiscal stance in countries with fiscal space—such as higher public investment to raise potential output in Germany—on some trading partners experiencing weak cyclical positions might still be important due to continued accommodative monetary policy and evidence suggesting that spillovers tend to be amplified by currency pegs. More generally, the fiscal instrument also matters: spending on public investment is likely to produce greater cross-border dividends than tax cuts.
虽然本章没有提供有关各国应如何从国内角度实施财政政策的结论,但它提供了有关此类行动的潜在跨国影响的信息。当前形势表明,产出缺口基本缩小的国家的刺激措施所产生的积极跨境影响通常会小于危机期间,但仍可能带来好处。例如,在欧元区,由于持续宽松的货币政策,拥有财政空间的国家采取更加扩张性的财政立场(例如德国增加公共投资以提高潜在产出)对一些周期性状况较弱的贸易伙伴的溢出效应可能仍然很重要。政策和证据表明,货币挂钩往往会放大溢出效应。更一般地说,财政工具也很重要:公共投资支出可能比减税产生更大的跨境红利。

The chapter also presents illustrative scenarios of fiscal reforms in which a change in the makeup of the government budget that does not generate a short-term change in the fiscal stance come with small spillovers. However, substantial fiscal reforms, such as large budget-neutral corporate income tax rate reductions—compensated with increases in consumption taxes—that affect the investment-location and profit-reporting decisions of multinational firms, could have large spillovers.
本章还介绍了财政改革的说明性情景,其中政府预算构成的变化不会导致财政立场的短期变化,但会产生较小的溢出效应。然而,影响跨国公司投资地点和利润报告决策的重大财政改革,例如大幅降低预算中性的企业所得税税率(以增加消费税作为补偿),可能会产生巨大的溢出效应。

Finally, and not surprisingly, fiscal actions with economically meaningful cross-border effects can also impact trade balances. For example, the chapter suggests that fiscal stimulus tends to lead to a deterioration in the trade balance of the country where it occurs, with corresponding improvements in the positions of trading partners. This implies that a fiscal expansion in the United States could exacerbate global current account imbalances, while stimulus in Germany would tend to reduce them.
最后,毫不奇怪的是,具有经济意义的跨境影响的财政行动也会影响贸易平衡。例如,本章认为,财政刺激往往会导致所在国贸易平衡恶化,贸易伙伴的地位也会相应改善。这意味着美国的财政扩张可能会加剧全球经常账户失衡,而德国的刺激措施往往会减少这种失衡。

The Spillover Impact of US Government Spending Shocks on External Positions
美国政府支出冲击对对外头寸的溢出影响

Consensus on the effect of government spending shocks on a country’s exchange rate and external balance remains elusive in the empirical literature.1 This may stem partly from the difficulty of isolating agents’ anticipation of fiscal policies, given both legislative and implementation lags, as highlighted by Ramey (2011), among others. This box and a related spillover note (Popescu and Shibata, forthcoming) examine the impact of fiscal spending shocks from the United States on the US trade balance and real exchange rate, from both a multilateral and a bilateral perspective, while carefully taking into consideration the issue of fiscal foresight.
在实证文献中,关于政府支出冲击对一国汇率和外部平衡的影响仍难以达成共识。 1 这可能部分源于隔离主体对财政政策的预期的困难,因为立法和实施都存在滞后性,正如 Ramey (2011) 等人所强调的那样。本专栏和相关溢出说明(Popescu 和 Shibata,即将出版)从多边和双边角度审视了美国财政支出冲击对美国贸易平衡和实际汇率的影响,同时仔细考虑了财政远见问题。

To capture anticipation effects, the approach follows Forni and Gambetti (2016) and relies on professional forecasters’ surveys to identify fiscal shocks at the announcement rather than implementation date.2 Methodologically, the fiscal foresight (“news”) shock is identified in a vector autoregression using US data from the first quarter of 1981 through the fourth quarter of 2016.3 The analysis further extends Forni and Gambetti (2016) to a cross-country perspective to account for recipients’ macroeconomic conditions, which is the main unique contribution of this exercise.
为了捕捉预期效应,该方法遵循 Forni 和 Gambetti (2016),并依靠专业预测者的调查来识别公告时而不是实施时的财政冲击。 2 从方法上讲,财政预见(“新闻”)冲击是使用 1981 年第一季度至 2016 年第四季度的美国数据通过向量自回归来识别的。 3 分析进一步将 Forni 和 Gambetti(2016)扩展到跨国视角,以考虑受援者的宏观经济状况,这是本次研究的主要独特贡献。

The results suggest that news of future government spending leads to a real appreciation of the US dollar and deterioration of the US trade balance—in line with theory and solving the “depreciation puzzle” found in most previous studies. As discussed in Forni and Gambetti (2016), the key intuition is that the inclusion of additional information on fiscal expectations and forecasts improves the estimation of the effects of fiscal spending shocks by capturing more precisely the timing of the impact. The timing is likely significant in assessing the response of fast-moving variables, such as the exchange rate, which react quickly to perceived changes in future conditions.
结果表明,未来政府支出的消息会导致美元实际升值和美国贸易平衡恶化——这与理论一致,并解决了大多数先前研究中发现的“贬值难题”。正如 Forni 和 Gambetti(2016)所讨论的,关键的直觉是,纳入有关财政预期和预测的额外信息可以通过更准确地捕捉影响的时间来改善对财政支出冲击影响的估计。在评估快速变化的变量(例如汇率)的反应时,时机可能很重要,因为汇率会对未来状况的感知变化做出快速反应。

Moving on to the analysis of spillovers, a panel vector autoregression analysis makes it possible to take into account the recipient country’s macro and policy variables (such as cyclical positions, monetary policy, and domestic fiscal policy). The estimation uses an unbalanced panel of 30 US trading partners (23 advanced economies and 7 emerging market economies representing about 80 percent of US imports) from the fourth quarter of 1982 through the third quarter of 2016. Results suggest that an anticipated increase in US government spending triggers real exchange rate depreciations in other countries and improvements in their trade balances with the United States. More specifically, an announcement of a 1 percent of US GDP increase in government spending will depreciate a trading partner’s exchange rate by about 5 percent after one and a half years while improving the partner’s net exports vis-à-vis the United States by 0.3 percentage point of its own GDP after two years (Figure 4.1.1, blue lines).
接下来进行溢出效应分析,面板向量自回归分析可以考虑受援国的宏观和政策变量(例如周期性头寸、货币政策和国内财政政策)。该估算使用了 30 个美国贸易伙伴(23 个发达经济体和 7 个新兴市场经济体,约占美国进口的 80%)组成的不平衡小组,从 1982 年第四季度到 2016 年第三季度。结果表明,美国政府的预期增长支出会引发其他国家的实际汇率贬值以及与美国的贸易平衡的改善。更具体地说,宣布美国GDP增加1%的政府支出将使贸易伙伴的汇率在一年半后贬值约5%,同时使贸易伙伴对美国的净出口提高0.3%两年后其自身 GDP 的点(图 4.1.1,蓝线)。

Estimation over subsamples reveals that the impact on exchange rates and trade balances may have diminished following the global financial crisis. The red lines in Figure 4.1.1 plot the response of the trade balance and real exchange rates vis-à-vis the United States before the global financial crisis (before 2007), suggesting that responses were significantly larger before the onset of the crisis. These results may reflect constrained monetary policy in recent years, which could have dampened US exchange rate appreciation (in response to expansionary fiscal shocks), thus also potentially contributing to a smaller trade balance response.
对子样本的估计表明,全球金融危机之后,对汇率和贸易平衡的影响可能已经减弱。图 4.1.1 中的红线描绘了全球金融危机之前(2007 年之前)贸易平衡和实际汇率相对于美国的反应,表明危机爆发之前的反应要大得多。这些结果可能反映出近年来货币政策受到限制,这可能抑制了美国汇率升值(以应对扩张性财政冲击),因此也可能导致贸易平衡反应较小。

Figure 4.1.1.
Figure 4.1.1.  图 4.1.1。

Response of Recipient Countries’ Trade Balance and Real Exchange Rate vis-à-vis US Dollar
受援国贸易差额和实际汇率对美元的反应

(Quarters on x-axis) (x 轴上的四分之一)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: t = 0 is the quarter of the shock. Dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands.
注:t = 0 是冲击的四分之一。虚线表示 90% 的置信区间。

Performing the same analysis for different groups of countries—only advanced economies or only Group of Twenty economies—suggests that the results are quantitatively robust. The results are also robust to variations in the methodology, including different variable ordering and the inclusion of additional variables, as well as to different weighting schemes (including time-varying weights).
对不同国家组(仅发达经济体或仅二十国集团经济体)进行相同的分析表明,结果在数量上是稳健的。结果对于方法的变化也很稳健,包括不同的变量排序和附加变量的包含,以及不同的加权方案(包括时变权重)。

The authors of this box are Adina Popescu and Ippei Shibata.
本专栏的作者是 Adina Popescu 和 Ippei Shibata。
1For example, while the theoretical literature tends to predict that increases in government spending would trigger exchange rate appreciations, the empirical literature often finds the opposite in the case of the United States; this is usually referred to as the “depreciation puzzle.”
1 例如,虽然理论文献倾向于预测政府支出的增加会引发汇率升值,但实证文献往往发现美国的情况恰恰相反;这通常被称为“折旧之谜”。
2More specifically, the Survey of Professional Forecasters forecasts of government spending are used to capture preannounced or anticipated (also called “news” or “foresight”) fiscal spending by exploiting the change in forecast expectations.
2 更具体地说,专业预测者调查对政府支出的预测用于通过利用预测预期的变化来捕获预先宣布或预期(也称为“新闻”或“远见”)的财政支出。
3The vector autoregression includes, in this order: real federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment, the fiscal news variable based on Survey of Professional Forecasters forecasts, real GDP, private consumption, the federal surplus divided by GDP, net exports of goods and services divided by GDP, the 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate, and the real effective exchange rate.
3 向量自回归按顺序包括:实际联邦政府消费支出和总投资、基于专业预测员调查预测的财政新闻变量、实际GDP、私人消费、联邦盈余除以GDP、商品和服务净出口除以 GDP、10 年期国债固定到期利率和实际有效汇率。

Annex Table 4.1.1.  附表 4.1.1。

Data Sources for Quarterly Fiscal Data by Source Country
按来源国家划分的季度财政数据的数据来源

Country Fiscal Data Data Source Seasonal Adjustment 季节性调整 Note
France Government spending 政府开支 Eurostat1 SWDA by source SWDA(按来源) Sum of government final consumption and GFCF
政府最终消费与GFCF之和
Tax revenue Eurostat1 SWDA by source SWDA(按来源) Current taxes on income and wealth, excluding social contributions
当前的收入和财富税,不包括社会缴款
Germany Government spending 政府开支 Deutsche Bundesbank 德意志联邦银行 SWDA by source SWDA(按来源) Sum of government final consumption and GFCF
政府最终消费与GFCF之和
Tax revenue Eurostat1 X-12-ARIMA by IMF staff
基金组织工作人员的 X-12-ARIMA
Japan Government spending 政府开支 Cabinet Office of Japan
日本内阁府
SAAR by source SAAR(按来源) Sum of government final consumption and GFCF
政府最终消费与GFCF之和
Government total revenue
政府总收入
Ministry of Finance and Cabinet Office
财政部和内阁府
X-12-ARIMA by IMF staff
基金组织工作人员的 X-12-ARIMA
Extrapolated using Denton method
使用 Denton 方法外推
United Kingdom 英国 Government spending 政府开支 Office for National Statistics
国家统计局
Seasonally adjusted by source
按来源季节调整
Sum of government final consumption and GFCF
政府最终消费与GFCF之和
Tax revenue Eurostat1 X-12-ARIMA by IMF staff
基金组织工作人员的 X-12-ARIMA
United States 美国 Government spending 政府开支 US Bureau of Economic Analysis
美国经济分析局
Seasonally adjusted by source
按来源季节调整
Sum of government final consumption and GFCF
政府最终消费与GFCF之和
Tax revenue US Bureau of Economic Analysis
美国经济分析局
Seasonally adjusted by source
按来源季节调整
Source: IMF staff compilation.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员汇编。
Note: For government spending, nominal levels are deflated using the GDP deflator when real levels are not directly available from the source. For tax revenue (total revenue for Japan), real levels are calculated by deflating nominal levels using each country’s GDP deflator. GFCF = gross fixed capital formation; SAAR = seasonally adjusted and annualized data; SWDA = seasonally and working-day adjusted data; X-12-ARIMA = US Census Bureau software package for seasonal adjustment.
注:对于政府支出,当无法直接从来源获得实际水平时,名义水平会使用 GDP 平减指数进行缩减。对于税收收入(日本的总收入),实际水平是通过使用每个国家的 GDP 平减指数缩小名义水平来计算的。 GFCF = 固定资本形成总额; SAAR = 季节性调整和年化数据; SWDA = 季节性和工作日调整数据; X-12-ARIMA = 美国人口普查局季节性调整软件包。

Quarterly nonfinancial accounts for general government database from Eurostat.
欧盟统计局广义政府数据库的季度非金融账户。

Annex 4.1. Data 附件 4.1。数据

Data for Shock Identification
冲击识别数据

Quarterly fiscal data used in shock identification for five shock-emitting (source) countries stem from national statistical bureaus, either directly or via Haver Analytics.42 Quarterly real government spending and tax revenue data used in constructing fiscal shocks are expressed in local currency units, seasonally adjusted, and annualized for the sample period of 2000:Q1–2016:Q2. Government spending is calculated as the sum of quarterly general government consumption and general government gross fixed capital formation from national accounts. For tax revenue, quarterly general government total tax income is used, except for Japan. Data sources for each country are listed in Annex Table 4.1.1. See Blagrave and others, forthcoming, for more details on the data, as well as a discussion of data limitations and construction of fiscal shocks.
五个冲击排放(源)国家用于冲击识别的季度财政数据直接或通过哈弗分析来自国家统计局。 42 用于构建财政冲击的季度实际政府支出和税收收入数据以当地货币单位表示,经过季节调整,并针对 2000 年第一季度至 2016 年第二季度的样本期进行了年化。政府支出计算为季度一般政府消费与国民账户中一般政府固定资本形成总额之和。对于税收收入,使用季度一般政府总税收收入(日本除外)。各个国家的数据来源列于附表 4.1.1。有关数据的更多详细信息以及对数据限制和财政冲击构建的讨论,请参阅 Blagrave 等人即将出版的文章。

Data for Spillover Analysis

Quarterly data from 55 recipient countries for 2000:Q1–2016:Q2 include series on real output, consumption, investment, exports/imports, bilateral good exports/imports, external demand, short-term interest rates, output gaps, and exchange rate regimes, collected from multiple data sources. Data sources for each series are listed in detail in Annex Table 4.1.2, followed by a list of all the countries in the sample in Annex Table 4.1.3.

Data Description
  • Real GDP, consumption, investment: Quarterly real levels are rebased to 2010 prices, expressed in local currency units, seasonally adjusted and annualized. Investment data refer to gross fixed capital formation.

  • Exports/imports: Quarterly real levels are rebased to 2010 prices, expressed in local currency units, seasonally adjusted and annualized. Data from national accounts stem from Haver Analytics and refer to total exports/imports of goods and services.

Annex Table 4.1.2.

Data Sources for Recipient Countries

Series Data Sources Estimation Countries Missing Data Note
Real Output WEO; Haver Analytics Rebased to 2010; deflated using GDP deflator None in the sample Seasonally adjusted, annualized, in national currency
Real Consumption, Investment, Exports, Imports Haver Analytics Rebased to 2010; deflated using respective deflators for each country and variable Vietnam Seasonally adjusted, annualized, in national currency; data from national accounts
Bilateral Goods Exports/Imports DOTS Average of values reported by the reporter and partner countries None in the sample Original data at monthly frequency, aggregated by sum
External Demand WEO; DOTS; Haver Analytics Export-weighted sum of partner countries’ real GDP growth None in the sample Seasonally adjusted, quarter over quarter growth, log difference, percent
Short-Term Monetary Policy Rate
短期货币政策利率
Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Haver Analytics
彭博财经有限责任公司;哈弗分析
Three-month LIBOR, three-month Treasury bill rate, where available
三个月伦敦银行同业拆借利率 (LIBOR)、三个月国库券利率(如有)
Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Uruguay
塞浦路斯、爱沙尼亚、卢森堡、斯洛伐克共和国、乌拉圭
Policy rate, deposit rate, target rate used where LIBOR and treasury bill rates were not available
政策利率、存款利率、LIBOR 和国库券利率不可用时使用的目标利率
Output Gap WEO; Haver Analytics 世界经济展望;哈弗分析 Gap between real output and potential output estimated by HP filter
HP 滤波器估计的实际产出与潜在产出之间的差距
None in the sample
样本中没有
Denton method used to match annual output gap numbers in WEO
Denton 法用于匹配《WEO》中的年产出缺口数
Source: IMF staff compilation.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员汇编。
Note: DOTS = IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics; HP = Hodrick-Prescott; LIBOR = London interbank offered rate; WEO = World Economic Outlook.
注:DOTS = IMF,贸易统计方向; HP=霍德里克-普雷斯科特; LIBOR = 伦敦银行同业拆借利率; WEO = 世界经济展望。
  • Bilateral goods exports/imports: Bilateral weights are calculated using bilateral exports/imports of goods between 55 countries in the sample and five source countries (5 x 55 = 275 pairs). For each country pair, the average is that of reported values of both countries.
    双边货物出口/进口:双边权重是根据样本中的 55 个国家和 5 个来源国之间的双边货物出口/进口计算的(5 x 55 = 275 对)。对于每个国家对,平均值是两个国家报告值的平均值。

  • External demand: This is calculated as a weighted sum of partner countries’ real growth based on bilateral export weights.
    外部需求:根据双边出口权重计算伙伴国实际增长的加权总和。

  • Short-term interest rate: The three-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) and three-month Treasury bill rate are used. For more comprehensive country and historical coverage, policy, deposit, and target rates are used where three-month LIBOR and Treasury bill data are not available.
    短期利率:采用三个月期伦敦银行同业拆借利率(LIBOR)和三个月期国库券利率。为了获得更全面的国家和历史覆盖范围,在无法获得三个月伦敦银行间同业拆借利率 (LIBOR) 和国库券数据的情况下,使用政策利率、存款利率和目标利率。

  • Output gap: The quarterly output gap is first calculated as the gap between real output and potential output, estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Then, to reconcile any potential difference between the estimated output gap and the annual output gap numbers published in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), the Denton proportional benchmarking method is used. This method both preserves the seasonality observed from quarterly estimated output gap series and matches the data published in the WEO when converted to annual basis.
    产出缺口:季度产出缺口首先计算为实际产出与潜在产出之间的差距,由霍德里克-普雷斯科特滤波器估计。然后,为了协调估计的产出缺口与国际货币基金组织《世界经济展望》(WEO)中公布的年度产出缺口数字之间的任何潜在差异,使用了丹顿比例基准法。这种方法既保留了从季度估计产出缺口系列中观察到的季节性,又在转换为年度基础时与《世界经济展望》中公布的数据相匹配。

Variables with notable trends over the sample period are detrended using country-specific linear trends. In addition, outliers—observations with quarter-over-quarter GDP growth rates higher than 10 percent or lower than −10 percent in any given quarter (very few observations)—are excluded.
使用特定国家的线性趋势对样本期内具有显着趋势的变量进行去趋势处理。此外,异常值——任何给定季度内 GDP 环比增长率高于 10% 或低于 -10% 的观测值(极少数观测值)——也被排除在外。

Annex Table 4.1.3. 附表 4.1.3。

Recipient Countries in Sample
样本中的受援国

Region Countries (55 total) 国家(共 55 个)
Africa South Africa
Americas Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, United States,* Uruguay
阿根廷、巴西、加拿大、智利、哥伦比亚、哥斯达黎加、墨西哥、秘鲁、美国、 * 乌拉圭
Asia Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan,* Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam
澳大利亚、中国、印度、印度尼西亚、日本、 * 韩国、马来西亚、新西兰、菲律宾、泰国、越南
Europe Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,* Germany,* Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom*
奥地利、比利时、保加利亚、克罗地亚、塞浦路斯、捷克共和国、丹麦、爱沙尼亚、芬兰、法国、 * 德国、 * 希腊、匈牙利、爱尔兰、以色列、意大利、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、卢森堡、马耳他、荷兰、挪威、波兰、葡萄牙、罗马尼亚、俄罗斯、斯洛伐克共和国、斯洛文尼亚、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、土耳其、英国 *
Source: IMF staff compilation.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员汇编。

Shock-emitting (source) country. Source country is excluded from the set of recipient countries when analyzing fiscal shocks from the same source.
引发冲击的(来源)国家。在分析来自同一来源的财政冲击时,来源国被排除在受援国集合之外。

Exchange Rate Regime Classification
汇率制度分类

A measure of bilateral exchange rate arrangement vis-à-vis the US dollar is constructed to estimate spillovers for different exchange rate regimes.
构建对美元双边汇率安排的衡量标准是为了估计不同汇率制度的溢出效应。

For the Reinhart-Rogoff classification, the exchange rate regime is expressed as a time-varying index based on the annual coarse de facto classification from Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2017a, 2017b), ranging from 1 (most rigid) to 6 (most flexible). For each period, if a country is assigned a value of 1 (de facto peg) or 2 (de facto crawling peg), it is deemed a “fixed regime.” The quarterly index is interpolated from annual data, assigning the same value for all four quarters within a year. For example, in 2015, this classification yields seven “fixed” rate countries (Argentina, China, Costa Rica, India, Peru, Philippines, Vietnam) out of the sample of 55 countries.43
对于 Reinhart-Rogoff 分类,汇率制度表示为基于 Ilzetzki、Reinhart 和 Rogoff(2017a、2017b)年度粗略事实分类的时变指数,范围从 1(最严格)到 6(最灵活)。对于每个时期,如果一个国家的值为 1(事实上的钉住汇率)或 2(事实上的爬行钉住汇率),则该国家被视为“固定汇率制度”。季度指数是根据年度数据插值得出的,为一年内的所有四个季度分配相同的值。例如,2015 年,这种分类从 55 个国家/地区的样本中得出了 7 个“固定”利率国家(阿根廷、中国、哥斯达黎加、印度、秘鲁、菲律宾、越南)。 43

The IMF pre-2008 classification (coarse) consists of six categories, with 1 being the most rigid and 6 the most flexible.44 The classification changed in 2008, and post-2008 data are obtained from the IMF’s website. As under the Reinhart-Rogoff classification, a country is generally classified as having a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar if it is assigned a value of 1 (de facto peg) or 2 (de facto crawling peg or crawling band narrower than or equal to ±2 percent). Again, the quarterly index is interpolated from annual data. For example, for 2015, this classification yields two fixed-rate countries (China, Vietnam) out of the sample of 55 countries, although there are more fixed-rate countries in earlier periods.
IMF 2008 年之前的分类(粗略)由六类组成,其中 1 类最严格,6 类最灵活。 44 2008年分类发生变化,2008年以后的数据来自IMF网站。根据莱因哈特-罗格夫分类,如果一个国家的价值为 1(事实上的钉住汇率)或 2(事实上的爬行钉住汇率或爬行区间),则该国家通常被归类为对美元实行固定汇率。窄于或等于±2%)。同样,季度指数是根据年度数据插值得出的。例如,对于 2015 年,这种分类从 55 个国家的样本中得出了两个固定利率国家(中国、越南),尽管早期有更多的固定利率国家。

Annex 4.2. Empirical Strategy
附件 4.2。实证策略

Baseline Specification 基线规格

As in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), the response of output in the recipient country to a fiscal shock abroad is estimated using the local projections method. This approach is particularly well suited to accommodate nonlinearity; that is, it allows estimation of spillovers under different states of the economy. Moreover, the method is more robust to misspecification of the data-generating process than a vector autoregression, for which the misspecification error is compounded at each horizon of the impulse response.
正如 Auerbach 和 Gorodnichenko (2013) 所指出的那样,受援国的产出对国外财政冲击的反应是使用当地预测方法来估计的。这种方法特别适合适应非线性;也就是说,它可以估计不同经济状态下的溢出效应。此外,该方法对数据生成过程的错误指定比矢量自回归更稳健,矢量自回归的错误指定误差在脉冲响应的每个水平上复合。

The following baseline linear model at time horizon h (for h = 0, . . . , H) is estimated using a panel ordinary least squares estimator:
使用面板普通最小二乘估计器估计时间范围 h(对于 h = 0,...,H)的以下基线线性模型:

Zi,t+hZi,t1Yi,t1=αhShockitYi,t1+ΣLl=1βhlXi,tl+θhi+μht+εiht,(4.1)

in which Zit is the variable of interest (real GDP, consumption, investment, and the like) in recipient country i at quarter t, Yit is real GDP in recipient country i at quarter t, Shockit is the foreign fiscal shock facing country i at time t (see below), and Xit is a vector of control variables including lags of the fiscal shock, lags of GDP growth, and lags of external demand, measured as a weighted average of trading partner growth rates (the number of lags L = 4 was chosen). Variables θhi and μht capture the country and time fixed effects. Given that the foreign fiscal shock is expressed in units of recipient-country GDP (Shockit is scaled by lagged GDP Yit − 1), the coefficient αh is analogous to a domestic multiplier of an external shock (Hall 2009; Barro and Redlick 2011). The impulse response for H periods is constructed from a sequence of estimates {αh}Hh=0.
其中,Z it 为受援国第 t 季度的利益变量(实际 GDP、消费、投资等),Y it 为受援国第 t 季度的实际 GDP t,Shock it 是国家在 t 时刻面临的外国财政冲击(见下文),X it 是控制变量向量,包括财政冲击的滞后、GDP 的滞后增长和外部需求的滞后,以贸易伙伴增长率的加权平均值来衡量(选择滞后数 L = 4)。变量 θ hi 和 μ ht 捕捉国家和时间固定效应。鉴于外国财政冲击以受援国 GDP 为单位表示(冲击 it 按滞后 GDP Y it − 1 缩放),系数 α h 为类似于外部冲击的国内乘数(Hall 2009;Barro 和 Redlick 2011)。 H 周期的脉冲响应是根据一系列估计 {αh}Hh=0 构建的。

The baseline fiscal shock combines country-specific shocks from the five source countries (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States) and weights them using trade links with recipient countries. The assumption behind the weighting system is that fiscal policy is transmitted mainly through trade—countries with tighter trade links to the source would be expected to receive larger shocks in the form of larger changes in export demand, and therefore larger spillovers. However, the estimated spillovers capture those from all transmission channels, including the financial channel. The external fiscal shock facing recipient country i in time t is given by
基线财政冲击结合了来自五个来源国(法国、德国、日本、英国、美国)的特定国家冲击,并使用与接收国的贸易联系对其进行加权。加权体系背后的假设是,财政政策主要通过贸易传导——与来源国贸易联系更紧密的国家预计会受到更大的冲击,其形式是出口需求发生更大的变化,从而产生更大的溢出效应。然而,估计的溢出效应涵盖了所有传输渠道的溢出效应,包括金融渠道。受援国在 t 时间内面临的外部财政冲击由下式给出

Shockkit=Σ5j=1Mij,t1Mj,t1sjtEj,t1Ei,t1,(4.2)

in which j denotes source country, M ijt is country j’s goods imports from country i at time t, M jt is total goods imports by country j, sjt is the identified fiscal shock in country j expressed in real terms in country j’s currency, and Ejt is country j’s US dollar real exchange rate. Therefore, the second term on the right side (sjtEj,t − 1/Ei,t − 1) equals the real monetary value of the fiscal shock coming from country j converted into units of recipient country i’s currency. This term is then scaled by the import share (Mij,t − 1/Mj,t − 1), which captures the relative importance of recipient country i as a supplier of the source country’s imports.45 Finally, the weighted shocks are added up across the five source countries.46 The combined shocks are relatively small: for example, spending (tax) shocks average about 0.06 (0.1) percent of recipient-country GDP over the sample period.
其中 表示来源国,M ijt 是国家在时间 t 从国家进口的货物,M jt 是国家的货物进口总额,s jt 是国家所确定的财政冲击以国家货币的实际值表示,E jt 是国家的美元实际汇率。因此,右侧第二项 (s jt E j,t − 1 /E i,t − 1 ) 等于来自国家的财政冲击的实际货币价值转换为接受国货币单位。然后,该术语按进口份额 (M ij,t − 1 /M j,t − 1 ) 进行缩放,它反映了接收国作为来源国进口产品供应商的相对重要性。 45 最后,将五个来源国的加权冲击相加。 46 综合冲击相对较小:例如,在样本期内,支出(税收)冲击平均约为受援国 GDP 的 0.06 (0.1)%。

Nonlinear Specifications
非线性规格
Role of Cyclical Conditions and Monetary Policy Constraints
周期性条件和货币政策约束的作用

To study the state-dependent effects for recipient countries, a nonlinear version of the baseline specification is estimated. Regression coefficients on the shock and the control variables are allowed to vary with different states. The state is defined with respect to the economic cycle (“slack/no slack”) or with respect to monetary policy stance (“effective lower bound/ no effective lower bound”). Slack corresponds to a negative output gap. Effective lower bound corresponds to short-term interest rate below the 25th percentile value of the cross-country distribution, which is about 0.57 percent for advanced economies and 3.0 percent for emerging market economies.
为了研究受援国的国家相关影响,估计了基线规范的非线性版本。冲击和控制变量的回归系数允许随不同状态而变化。国家是根据经济周期(“松弛/无松弛”)或货币政策立场(“有效下限/无有效下限”)来定义的。松弛对应于负产出缺口。有效下限对应于低于跨国分布第 25 个百分位数的短期利率,发达经济体约为 0.57%,新兴市场经济体约为 3.0%。

Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), the baseline specification is modified in the following way:
继 Auerbach 和 Gorodnichenko(2013)之后,基线规范按以下方式修改:

Zi,t+hZi,t1Yi,t1=α1hIi,t1ShockitYi,t1+α2h(1Ii,t1)ShockitYi,t1+4l=1β1hlIi,t1(1Ii,t1)Xi,tl+4l=1β1hl(1Ii,t1)Xi,tl+θhi+μht+εiht.

in which Ii,t takes the values of either 1 or 0, indicating the state in recipient country i in period t. Spillovers in the two different states can then be analyzed by comparing the estimated parameters α 1h and α 2h.
其中 i,t 取值1或0,表示接收国在t时段的状态。然后可以通过比较估计参数 α 1h 和 α 2h 来分析两种不同状态下的溢出。

For the source country, only the shock is partitioned according to the state of the economy, which can be again either the cyclical position or monetary policy near the effective lower bound. The states are defined in the same way as in the specification for recipient countries. The source-country shock therefore becomes
对于来源国,仅根据经济状况划分冲击,经济状况也可以是周期性状况或有效下限附近的货币政策。州的定义方式与受援国规范中的定义方式相同。因此,来源国冲击变为

Shockjit:Ijt1Shockjit+(1Ijt1)Shockjit,(4.4)

in which Ijt is a {0;1} dummy variable indicating the state in the shock-emitting country. The assumption behind interacting only the shock with the state dummy is that although shocks in the source country and its domestic response might be regime dependent, their propagation to recipient countries is not.
其中 Ijt 是一个 {0;1} 虚拟变量,表示冲击发生国的状态。仅将冲击与国家虚拟变量进行交互背后的假设是,尽管来源国的冲击及其国内反应可能依赖于政权,但它们向接受国的传播却并非如此。

Spillovers to Recipients with Different Exchange Rate Regimes
对不同汇率制度接受国的溢出效应

Similar to the nonlinear specification in which the shock is partitioned based on the source country’s state, the shock is decomposed into two components according to the bilateral exchange rate arrangement between recipient i and the United States:
与根据来源国的状态划分冲击的非线性规范类似,根据接收国与美国之间的双边汇率安排,冲击被分解为两个组成部分:

ShockUSit:FixUSi,t1ShockUSit+(1FixUSi,t1)ShockUSit,(4.5)

in which FixjUSit=1 if country i and the United States share a fixed regime in period t.
其中 FixjUSit=1 如果国家和美国在 t 时期共享固定政权。

Spillover Estimates Expressed in Terms of Source-Country GDP
以来源国 GDP 表示的溢出估算

While the baseline specification expresses fiscal shocks in terms of recipient-country GDP—given the decision to combine shocks from different sources and following standard practice in the literature—this transformation might complicate the interpretation of the magnitude of spillovers. To facilitate the interpretation, the estimates presented in the chapter are rescaled as spillovers in response to a 1 percent of source country GDP fiscal shock. This is done by normalizing the estimated spillover coefficient α in the following way:
虽然基线规范以受援国 GDP 来表达财政冲击(考虑到将不同来源的冲击结合起来并遵循文献中的标准做法的决定),但这种转变可能会使溢出效应幅度的解释复杂化。为了便于解释,本章中提出的估计值被重新调整为溢出效应,以应对来源国 GDP 的 1% 的财政冲击。这是通过按以下方式标准化估计的溢出系数 α 来完成的:

Spilli,t=SjMi,jMjYjYiα,(4.6)

in which Sj is the source-country shock as a percent of its own GDP (assumed to be 1); (Mij/Mj) is the recipient country’s share in the source country’s total imports (the weighting factor in the baseline model); and (Yj/Yi) is the ratio of source to recipient-country GDP—both measured in US dollars.47
其中 S 是来源国冲击占其国内生产总值的百分比(假设为 1); (M ij /M) 是受援国在来源国进口总额中所占的份额(基线模型中的权重因子); (Y/Y) 是来源国 GDP 与受援国 GDP 的比率——均以美元计算。 47

Annex 4.3. Robustness Tests
附件 4.3。稳健性测试

To ensure that the baseline results are not driven by the selected shock identification scheme or econometric approach, this section performs several robustness checks. The results are robust to (1) estimation of spillovers using a panel vector autoregression, which accounts for the endogenous response of exchange rates and monetary policy in recipient countries; and (2) the use of alternative fiscal shocks based on forecast error and narrative approaches.
为了确保基线结果不是由所选冲击识别方案或计量经济学方法驱动的,本节执行多项稳健性检查。结果对于(1)使用面板向量自回归估计溢出效应是稳健的,它解释了受援国汇率和货币政策的内生反应; (2) 基于预测误差和叙述方法使用替代性财政冲击。

Estimation with a Panel Vector Autoregression
使用面板向量自回归进行估计

Analysis in a panel vector autoregression is conducted to ensure that the results are not driven by the choice of the local projections method. A panel vector autoregression explicitly takes into account the endogenous response of key macro variables when estimating spillovers from a fiscal shock. The following six-variable panel vector autoregression model is estimated:
进行面板向量自回归分析,以确保结果不是由局部投影方法的选择驱动的。在估计财政冲击的溢出效应时,面板向量自回归明确考虑了关键宏观变量的内生响应。估计以下六变量面板向量自回归模型:

Yi,t=ci+ΣIp=0ApYi,tp+μi,t,(4.7)

in which ci is a vector of country-specific fixed effects, Ap is a reduced-form coefficient matrix, μi,t is a vector of shock terms, and Yi,t is a vector of six endogenous variables:
其中 c 是特定国家固定效应的向量,A p 是简化形式的系数矩阵,μ i,t 是冲击项的向量,Y i,t

Y={Gshoch;Tshock;effectiveext.demandGDPgrowth;interestrate;REER}.

With the exceptions of Gshock and Tshock, which are identical to the weighted shocks used in the baseline analysis presented in equation 4.1, each variable is in (detrended) quarter-over-quarter growth rates and relates to the recipient country i’s domestic economy.48 The sample period is the same as in the baseline local projections analysis.
除了 Gshock 和 Tshock 之外(与方程 4.1 中基线分析中使用的加权冲击相同),每个变量均采用(去趋势化)季度环比增长率,并与受援国的国内经济相关。 48 样本周期与基线局部预测分析中的样本周期相同。

Panel vector autoregression analysis confirms the findings from the baseline regression model estimated with the local projections method. The results, expressed in terms of the cumulative impulse response following a 1 percent of source-country GDP shock to government spending (tax revenue), are presented in Annex Figure 4.3.1 (red line). Spillovers from an increase in government spending at the source are larger than spillovers from a tax cut. The results are statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, based on simulations conducted using standard (Monte Carlo) resampling methods.
面板向量自回归分析证实了使用局部预测方法估计的基线回归模型的结果。结果以来源国 GDP 对政府支出(税收)冲击 1% 后的累积脉冲响应表示,如附件图 4.3.1(红线)所示。政府支出增加的源头溢出效应比减税的溢出效应更大。根据使用标准(蒙特卡罗)重采样方法进行的模拟,结果在统计上与零存在 5% 的差异。

Annex Figure 4.3.1.
Annex Figure 4.3.1.  附件图 4.3.1。

Effects of Spending and Tax Shock on Recipient Countries’ Output: Comparison with Panel Vector Autoregression
支出和税收冲击对受援国产出的影响:与面板向量自回归的比较

(Percent; quarters on x-axis)
(百分比;x 轴上的四分之一)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: t = 0 is the quarter of respective shocks. Solid blue lines denote the baseline response to respective shocks using local projection method; dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands; and solid red lines represent the response to respective shocks using panel vector autoregressions. Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries.
注:t = 0 是相应冲击的四分之一。蓝色实线表示使用局部投影方法对各个冲击的基线响应;虚线表示 90% 的置信区间;红色实线表示使用面板向量自回归对相应冲击的响应。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%。
Identification Using Forecast Errors
使用预测误差进行识别

The second robustness check focuses on the identification of fiscal shocks. The alternative methodology identifies shocks as forecast errors (the difference between actual variable and its forecast from the previous period) in the growth rates of government spending or tax revenues, this way capturing only unanticipated fiscal changes. This differs from the structural shocks used in the baseline analysis, which are based on actual changes in fiscal variables and can be anticipated by agents if they were announced earlier. The presence of such anticipated shocks could bias the estimates because the information set of the econometrician is different from the information set of the agents. Because forecast errors capture unexpected changes, the problem with fiscal foresight is reduced under this approach, as the information set of the econometrician and private agents is more aligned.
第二项稳健性检查的重点是识别财政冲击。另一种方法将冲击识别为政府支出或税收收入增长率的预测误差(实际变量与其上一时期的预测之间的差异),这样只能捕获意外的财政变化。这与基线分析中使用的结构性冲击不同,基线分析基于财政变量的实际变化,如果提前宣布,则可以由代理人预测。这种预期冲击的存在可能会使估计产生偏差,因为计量经济学家的信息集与代理人的信息集不同。由于预测误差捕捉到了意料之外的变化,因此在这种方法下,财政预见的问题就减少了,因为计量经济学家和私人代理人的信息集更加一致。

Annex Figure 4.3.2.
Annex Figure 4.3.2.  附件图 4.3.2。

Effects of Spending and Tax Shock on Recipient Countries’ Output: Forecast Errors
支出和税收冲击对受援国产出的影响:预测误差

(Percent; years on x-axis)
(百分比;x 轴上的年份)

Source: IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: t = 0 is the year of respective shocks. Solid lines denote the response to respective shocks, and dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands. Effects are estimated based on shocks derived from forecast errors. Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries.
注:t = 0 是相应冲击的年份。实线表示对各自冲击的响应,虚线表示 90% 的置信区间。影响是根据预测误差产生的冲击来估计的。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%。

The approach uses real-time fiscal projections by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and real-time actual data to construct the forecast error shocks at annual frequency on the sample from 2000 to 2012.49 The forecast error for each variable X = {G, T, Y} is constructed as
该方法使用经济合作与发展组织的实时财政预测和实时实际数据,以 2000 年至 2012 年的样本为年度频率构建预测误差冲击。 49 预测每个变量 X = {G, T, Y} 的误差构造为

FEXt=XtXft|t1,(4.8)

in which Xt is the growth rate of the variable from the contemporaneous data release and Xft|t1 is the forecast one period earlier. A positive forecast error means an expansionary spending shock and a contractionary tax shock. Following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), the forecast errors of spending and taxes are regressed on the forecast errors of output to take into account any changes as a result of surprises in the business cycle. They are also regressed on lagged macroeconomic variables’ growth rates (GDP, deflator, investment, government spending or tax revenues) to account for the portion of the innovation that can be predicted from past observations. The forecast error shocks for each source country are then constructed as residuals from this regression, converted to levels using base year (2010) expenditures or revenue, and replaced in equations (4.1) and (4.2).
其中X是同期数据发布的变量增长率, Xft|t1 是前一时期的预测。正的预测误差意味着扩张性支出冲击和紧缩性税收冲击。继 Auerbach 和 Gorodnichenko(2013)之后,支出和税收的预测误差在产出的预测误差上进行回归,以考虑商业周期中意外事件导致的任何变化。它们还对滞后宏观经济变量的增长率(GDP、平减指数、投资、政府支出或税收收入)进行回归,以说明可以从过去的观察中预测的创新部分。然后将每个来源国的预测误差冲击构建为该回归的残差,使用基准年(2010 年)支出或收入转换为水平,并替换为方程(4.1)和(4.2)。

Spillover analysis using forecast error shocks confirms the baseline results—that spending shocks have larger spillovers than tax shocks (Annex Figure 4.3.2)—and provides a strong robustness check. These shocks are constructed using an entirely different methodology, a different database and estimated at a different frequency than the shocks used in the baseline specification. The size of spillovers is somewhat larger compared with the baseline, which can be explained, in part, by a stronger response of source-country spending and revenues to forecast error shocks compared with structural shocks (although these impulse responses are imprecisely estimated because of the small sample).
使用预测误差冲击的溢出分析证实了基线结果——支出冲击比税收冲击具有更大的溢出效应(附件图 4.3.2)——并提供了强有力的稳健性检查。这些冲击是使用完全不同的方法、不同的数据库构建的,并且以与基线规范中使用的冲击不同的频率进行估计。与基线相比,溢出效应的规模稍大,部分原因在于,与结构性冲击相比,来源国支出和收入对预测误差冲击的反应更强(尽管这些脉冲反应的估计不准确,因为小样本)。

Identification Using Narrative Approach
使用叙事方法进行识别

To further confirm that the baseline results are not driven by the shock identification scheme, a robustness check using the narrative tax shocks of Romer and Romer (2010) is conducted. Several studies in the literature present narrative fiscal shocks (for example, DeVries and others 2011), but the data set of Romer and Romer (2010) is the most suitable for comparison with the baseline analysis of the chapter given that it covers both expansion and consolidation episodes.50 The shock is simply replaced in equations (4.1) and (4.2), with analysis conducted only for the United States over the period 1995:Q1–2007:Q4 (2007:Q4 is last period for which the narrative shock is available). A comparable set of time-sample-modified baseline results is obtained by estimating spillovers from the United States on the same sample.
为了进一步确认基线结果不是由冲击识别方案驱动的,使用 Romer 和 Romer (2010) 的叙述税收冲击进行了稳健性检查。文献中的一些研究提出了叙述性财政冲击(例如,DeVries等人,2011年),但Romer和Romer(2010年)的数据集最适合与本章的基线分析进行比较,因为它涵盖了扩张和扩张。巩固事件。 50 冲击被简单地替换为方程(4.1)和(4.2),仅对美国 1995 年第一季度至 2007 年第四季度进行分析(2007 年第四季度是叙事震撼是可用的)。通过估计美国对同一样本的溢出效应,获得了一组可比的时间样本修改基线结果。

Results presented in Annex Figure 4.3.3 show similar spillovers from US tax shocks for shocks identified using a structural vector autoregression and those coming from the narrative approach. Although the spillovers identified using the narrative approach are somewhat smaller compared with the (time-sample-modified) baseline, they fall comfortably within the confidence bands of the baseline estimates. Given that the narrative shocks are based on a completely different identification scheme, these results provide another strong robustness check.
附件图 4.3.3 中的结果显示,使用结构向量自回归和叙述方法确定的美国税收冲击具有类似的溢出效应。尽管使用叙述方法确定的溢出效应与(时间样本修改的)基线相比要小一些,但它们完全落在基线估计的置信区间内。鉴于叙事冲击是基于完全不同的识别方案,这些结果提供了另一个强有力的稳健性检验。

Annex Figure 4.3.3.
Annex Figure 4.3.3.  附件图 4.3.3。

Effects of US Tax Shock on Recipient Countries’ Output: Comparison with US Narrative Tax Shock, 1995–2007
美国税收冲击对受援国产出的影响:与 1995-2007 年美国叙述性税收冲击的比较

(Percent; quarters on x-axis)
(百分比;x 轴上的四分之一)

Sources: Romer and Romer (2010); and IMF staff calculations.
资料来源:Romer 和 Romer (2010);以及国际货币基金组织工作人员的计算。
Note: t = 0 is the quarter of the US tax shock. Solid blue line denotes the response to US tax shock using structural vector autoregression; dashed lines denote 90 percent confidence bands; and solid red line represents the response to US narrative tax shock based on Romer and Romer (2010). Shocks are normalized to an average of 1 percent of GDP across source countries (note that this will represent a less than 1 percent of US GDP shock).
注:t = 0 是美国税收冲击的季度。蓝实线表示使用结构向量自回归对美国税收冲击的响应;虚线表示 90% 的置信区间;红实线代表基于 Romer 和 Romer (2010) 对美国叙述性税收冲击的反应。各个来源国的冲击被标准化为平均 GDP 的 1%(请注意,这将代表不到美国 GDP 冲击的 1%)。

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The authors of this chapter are Patrick Blagrave, Giang Ho, Ksenia Koloskova, and Esteban Vesperoni (lead author), with support from Sung Eun Jung and contributions from Jared Bebee, Ben Hunt, Adina Popescu, and Ippei Shibata.
本章的作者是 Patrick Blagrave、Giang Ho、Ksenia Koloskova 和 Esteban Vesperoni(主要作者),并得到 Sung Eun Jung 的支持以及 Jared Bebee、Ben Hunt、Adina Popescu 和 Ippei Shibata 的贡献。

1

Throughout the chapter, countries from which fiscal shocks originate are referred to as “source” or “shock-emitting”; countries affected by these shocks are referred to as “recipient” or “shock-receiving.”
在本章中,财政冲击的起源国家被称为“来源国”或“冲击源国”;受这些冲击影响的国家被称为“受灾国”或“受冲击国”。

2

For example, see Cole and Ohanian (2004); Kirchner, Cimadomo, and Hauptmeier (2010); Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012); Gorodnichenko, Mendoza, and Tesar (2012); Born, Juessen, and Müller (2013); and Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2013). A multiplier of one would suggest that a change in the fiscal balance translates—dollar for dollar—into a similar change in GDP.
例如,参见 Cole 和 Ohanian (2004);基什内尔、西马莫莫和豪普特迈尔 (2010); Corsetti、Meier 和 Müller (2012);戈罗德尼琴科、门多萨和泰萨尔 (2012);玻恩、约森和穆勒 (2013);以及 Ilzetzki、Mendoza 和 Vegh (2013)。乘数为 1 意味着财政平衡的变化(以美元计算)会转化为 GDP 的类似变化。

3

For example, see Erceg and Lindé (2010); Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011); Eggertsson (2011); Woodford (2011); Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a, 2012b); Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013); Nakamura and Steinsson (2014); Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin (2015); Blanchard, Erceg, and Lindé (2016); and Canzoneri and others (2016). However, Ramey and Zubairy (forthcoming) found little evidence of state dependence of the government spending multiplier based on historical data from the United States.
例如,参见 Erceg 和 Lindé (2010);克里斯蒂安诺、艾肯鲍姆和雷贝洛 (2011);埃格特森(2011);伍德福德(2011);奥尔巴赫和戈罗德尼琴科(2012a,2012b);欧阳、雷米和祖拜里 (2013);中村和斯坦森(2014); Riera-Crichton、Vegh 和 Vuletin (2015);布兰查德、埃尔塞格和林德 (2016);以及 Canzoneri 等人 (2016)。然而,Ramey 和 Zubairy(即将发表)根据美国的历史数据,几乎没有发现政府支出乘数的国家依赖性的证据。

4

The narrative method, pioneered by Romer and Romer (2010), makes use of narrative records, such as budget documents and speeches, to identify the size, timing, and principal motivation for fiscal actions. The Romer and Romer (2010) data set also divides fiscal policy changes into those made for reasons related to prospective economic conditions and discretionary actions (for example, actions aimed at reducing public debt), thereby allowing for a causal analysis of the impact of fiscal policy on output. See also Ramey (2011); Cloyne (2013); Mertens and Ravn (2013); and Guajardo, Leigh, and Pescatori (2014).
叙述法由 Romer 和 Romer (2010) 首创,利用预算文件和演讲等叙述记录来确定财政行动的规模、时间和主要动机。 Romer 和 Romer(2010)数据集还将财政政策变化分为与预期经济状况和酌情行动(例如旨在减少公共债务的行动)相关的原因而做出的财政政策变化,从而可以对财政政策的影响进行因果分析。产出政策。另见 Ramey (2011);克洛因(2013);默滕斯和拉文 (2013);以及 Guajardo、Leigh 和 Pescatori (2014)。

5

For example, see Eggertsson (2011); and Erceg and Lindé (2013).
例如,参见 Eggertsson (2011);以及 Erceg 和 Lindé (2013)。

6

For example, see Fleming (1962); Mundell (1963); Dornbusch (1976); and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
例如,参见弗莱明(1962);蒙代尔(1963);多恩布什(1976);以及奥布斯特菲尔德和罗格夫(1995)。

7

Notice that other frameworks can deliver different exchange rate predictions (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995).
请注意,其他框架可以提供不同的汇率预测(参见 Obstfeld 和 Rogoff 1995)。

8

This insight works for both contractionary and expansionary shocks. Low interest rates prevent the central bank from counteracting a contractionary shock by reducing rates further, while in the case of an expansionary shock, it may be fully accommodated if the central bank aims for a more accommodative stance than feasible; in either case, spillovers are amplified.
这种见解适用于收缩性冲击和扩张性冲击。低利率使央行无法通过进一步降息来应对紧缩性冲击,而在扩张性冲击的情况下,如果央行的目标是采取比可行的更为宽松的立场,则可能会完全适应;无论哪种情况,溢出效应都会被放大。

9

Although spillovers from fiscal policy in China are potentially important, data limitations prevent the inclusion of China as a source country in the empirical analysis. Later in the chapter, model-based simulations help shed light on the potential spillover effects from China’s fiscal policy.
尽管中国财政政策的溢出效应可能很重要,但数据限制阻碍了将中国作为来源国纳入实证分析。在本章后面,基于模型的模拟有助于揭示中国财政政策的潜在溢出效应。

10

Although the use of quarterly fiscal data comes with challenges, it is instrumental to implementing the identification method used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). These data (in real terms and seasonally adjusted) are used for shock identification only and for major advanced economies with high-quality statistics. As discussed later in the chapter, it is also reassuring that alternative identification methods that do not rely on quarterly fiscal data yield similar results for spillovers.
尽管季度财政数据的使用面临挑战,但它对于实施 Blanchard 和 Perotti(2002)使用的识别方法很有帮助。这些数据(实际数据和季节性调整数据)仅用于冲击识别,并用于提供高质量统计数据的主要发达经济体。正如本章后面所讨论的,令人欣慰的是,不依赖季度财政数据的替代识别方法也能产生类似的溢出结果。

11

See Blagrave and others (forthcoming) for more examples.
有关更多示例,请参阅 Blagrave 等人(即将发布)。

12

See Jordà (2005). 参见乔达 (2005)。

13

The use of trade links to weight the shock is instrumental to obtaining country-specific external fiscal shocks, but it does not preclude spillovers through channels other than trade given that the estimates capture the overall response of recipient-country GDP regardless of the channel of transmission. Combining shocks from several source countries is important to use the variability emanating from different sources, given that trade patterns differ. In particular, while some source countries—such as the United States—can have a global impact, the impact of others is more regional; for example, Germany’s and France’s trading partners are more concentrated in Europe.
使用贸易联系来衡量冲击有助于获得特定国家的外部财政冲击,但它并不排除通过贸易以外的渠道产生溢出效应,因为无论传播渠道如何,这些估计都反映了受援国GDP的总体反应。鉴于贸易模式不同,将多个来源国的冲击结合起来对于利用不同来源的变异性非常重要。特别是,虽然一些来源国(例如美国)可以产生全球影响,但其他国家的影响则更具区域性;例如,德国和法国的贸易伙伴更多集中在欧洲。

14

More details about the data and empirical methodology are provided in Annexes 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, as well as in Blagrave and others, forthcoming.
有关数据和实证方法的更多详细信息分别在附件 4.1 和 4.2 以及 Blagrave 等人即将发表的文章中提供。

15

These effects are assumed to be symmetric during fiscal expansions and consolidations—the panel analysis cannot disentangle a potential asymmetry from different policy actions.
这些效应被假定在财政扩张和整顿期间是对称的——面板分析无法消除不同政策行动中潜在的不对称性。

16

As discussed earlier, fiscal shocks in the chapter yield domestic spending multipliers slightly above one and tax multipliers slightly below one, on average, across the source countries.
正如前面所讨论的,本章中的财政冲击导致各来源国的国内支出乘数平均略高于 1,税收乘数略低于 1。

17

Beetsma and others (2006) find that a 1 percent of German (French) GDP shock to government spending results in a European GDP response of about 0.14 (0.08) percent after two years. For a tax shock, spillovers are about −0.05 (−0.03) percent. Compared with studies that express shocks in units of recipient-country GDP (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2013; Goujard 2017), estimates are also broadly similar. A detailed comparison to the literature is provided in Blagrave and others, forthcoming.
Beetsma 等人(2006 年)发现,德国(法国)GDP 的 1% 对政府支出的冲击会导致两年后欧洲 GDP 的响应约为 0.14%(0.08%)。对于税收冲击,溢出效应约为 -0.05 (-0.03)%。与以受援国 GDP 为单位表达冲击的研究相比(Auerbach 和 Gorodnichenko 2013;Goujard 2017),估计值也大致相似。 Blagrave 等人即将发表的文章中提供了与文献的详细比较。

18

These robustness checks can be found in Blagrave and others (forthcoming).
这些稳健性检查可以在 Blagrave 等人(即将出版)中找到。

19

Forecast errors are constructed as the difference between actual and projected values of the relevant fiscal variable (spending or tax revenues). The shocks based on forecast errors are identified as residuals from a regression of the spending- or tax-based forecast errors on GDP forecast errors and lagged macroeconomic variables.
预测误差被构造为相关财政变量(支出或税收)的实际值和预测值之间的差异。基于预测误差的冲击被确定为基于支出或税收的预测误差对 GDP 预测误差和滞后宏观经济变量的回归的残差。

20

Separate distributions are applied for advanced and emerging market economies.
发达市场经济体和新兴市场经济体采用单独的分配方式。

21

These results—for both slack and effective lower bound cases, in both recipient and source countries—also extend to disaggregated spending and tax shocks (see Blagrave and others, forthcoming, for more details).
这些结果——对于受援国和来源国的宽松和有效下限情况——也延伸到分类支出和税收冲击(更多细节请参见 Blagrave 等人,即将出版)。

22

In the post-2000 sample considered in this empirical exercise, about 26 percent of country-quarter observations fall under the definition of “effective lower bound,” three-quarters of which coincide with economic slack. Similarly, about 55 percent of observations fall under the definition of “slack,” 35 percent of which coincide with the effective lower bound. For example, many advanced economies experienced both severe slack and very low interest rates in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Japan, in particular, experienced both slack and effective lower bound for 84 percent of the observations during the sample period.
在本次实证研究中考虑的 2000 年后样本中,大约 26% 的国家季度观察结果属于“有效下限”的定义,其中四分之三与经济疲软相符。同样,大约 55% 的观察结果属于“松弛”的定义,其中 35% 与有效下限一致。例如,全球金融危机后,许多发达经济体经历了严重的经济萧条和极低的利率。特别是日本,在样本期间 84% 的观测值都经历了松弛和有效下限。

23

In 2015, for example, the Reinhart-Rogoff classification has more recipient countries classified as having “fixed” exchange rates compared with the IMF classification. The number of fixed-rate countries varies over time. In general, there tend to be more fixed exchange rate regimes in earlier years of the sample.
例如,2015 年,与国际货币基金组织的分类相比,莱因哈特-罗格夫分类将更多的受援国列为具有“固定”汇率的国家。固定利率国家的数量随着时间的推移而变化。一般来说,样本的前几年往往有更多的固定汇率制度。

24

Additional details on the G20 Model are available in Andrle and others (2015).
有关 G20 模型的更多详细信息,请参阅 Andrle 等人 (2015)。

25

The domestic and spillover effects of permanent fiscal shocks may differ from those of temporary shocks, partly because of their effects on interest rates. For example, permanent fiscal consolidations in large countries may lower global interest rates, thereby crowding in investment and boosting GDP over the long term. Some permanent fiscal reform scenarios are considered in the next section.
永久性财政冲击的国内影响和溢出效应可能与暂时冲击不同,部分原因在于它们对利率的影响。例如,大国的永久性财政整顿可能会降低全球利率,从而吸引投资并长期提振国内生产总值。下一节将考虑一些永久性的财政改革方案。

26

For simplicity, the analysis presented here is conducted for France, Germany, and the United States; the intention is to draw broad lessons about the heterogeneity of spillovers across different fiscal instruments. The findings presented here apply equally to other countries’ fiscal shocks.
为了简单起见,这里的分析是针对法国、德国和美国进行的;其目的是从不同财政工具溢出效应的异质性中吸取广泛的教训。这里提出的研究结果同样适用于其他国家的财政冲击。

27

Conversely, when consumption taxes increase temporarily, households can avoid some of the burden by postponing consumption.
相反,当消费税暂时增加时,家庭可以通过推迟消费来避免部分负担。

28

In the G20 Model, monetary policy in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes responds to an increase in expected future inflation by increasing nominal interest rates to reduce demand and return inflation to target.
在G20模型中,实行灵活汇率制度的国家的货币政策通过提高名义利率来减少需求并使通胀回归目标来应对预期未来通胀的上升。

29

Spillovers are even larger under the full accommodation scenario—they should be viewed as an upper bound, as such a scenario would require an exceptional coordinated accommodation by monetary policy in all countries.
在全面宽松的情况下,溢出效应甚至更大——它们应该被视为上限,因为这种情况需要所有国家的货币政策进行特殊的协调宽松。

30

The regional distribution of spillovers predicted by model simulations closely resembles those implied by the empirical analysis presented earlier. See Blagrave and others (forthcoming) for more details.
模型模拟预测的溢出的区域分布与前面提出的实证分析所暗示的非常相似。有关更多详细信息,请参阅 Blagrave 等人(即将出版)。

31

Several studies estimating fiscal shocks in structural vector autoregression models find that increases in government spending trigger exchange rate depreciations—see, for example, Corsetti and Müller (2006); Kim and Roubini (2008); Monacelli and Perotti (2010); Enders, Müller, and Scholl (2011); and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012). This empirical result runs counter to the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework, although it is consistent with some new open-economy macroeconomic models (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995).
一些在结构向量自回归模型中估计财政冲击的研究发现,政府支出的增加会引发汇率贬值——例如,参见 Corsetti 和 Müller (2006);金和鲁比尼 (2008);莫纳切利和佩罗蒂(2010);恩德斯、穆勒和绍尔 (2011);以及 Ravn、Schmitt-Grohé 和 Uribe (2012)。这一实证结果与蒙代尔-弗莱明-多恩布什框架的预测背道而驰,尽管它与一些新的开放经济宏观经济模型是一致的(Obstfeld和Rogoff 1995)。

32

In this scenario, the increase in the US term premium is assumed to drive up term premiums in other countries as well, according to historical correlations between these variables across countries.
在这种情况下,根据各国这些变量之间的历史相关性,假设美国期限溢价的增加也会推高其他国家的期限溢价。

33

France, Germany, and the United States are considered in this scenario given that they currently have corporate income tax rates above the OECD average, giving them scope for a substantial reduction. Reforms are budget neutral, contingent on the baseline path of output.
法国、德国和美国属于这种情况,因为它们目前的企业所得税税率高于经合组织的平均水平,因此有大幅降低的空间。改革是预算中立的,取决于产出的基线路径。

34

In the case of the United States, which has no federal consumption tax, this would imply enacting such a tax.
就美国而言,没有联邦消费税,这意味着要征收此类税。

35

Absent the offsetting increase in consumption taxes, the corporate income tax reduction would result in a net loss of tax revenues, even after accounting for the increase in the tax base due to stronger investment.
如果没有消费税的增加来抵消,企业所得税的减少将导致税收收入的净损失,即使考虑到投资强劲导致的税基增加也是如此。

36

This is a simplifying assumption. Countries that currently benefit from a significant corporate income tax gap relative to the source countries, or those with a significant presence of multinational corporations based in countries pursuing corporate income tax reforms, may be more adversely affected by investment shifting.
这是一个简化的假设。目前受益于相对于来源国的巨大企业所得税差距的国家,或那些在推行企业所得税改革的国家拥有大量跨国公司的国家,可能会受到投资转移的更不利影响。

37

The assumed impact of investment shifting is derived by applying an estimated semielasticity of the corporate tax base to tax rate changes from De Mooij and Ederveen (2008)—taken to be −3.2—to foreign direct investment inflows and outflow data for France, Germany, and the United States, which proxy the foreign portion of the corporate tax base subject to relocation. Under a large corporate income tax rate reduction, foreign direct investment inflows would increase as foreign multinationals choose to locate more production in the countries pursuing reforms, and outflows would decline as domestic multinationals choose to develop more production capacity domestically. It is important to note that semielasticities in the literature vary widely and that the estimated investment-shifting impact of corporate income tax reform is sensitive to these assumptions.
投资转移的假设影响是通过将 De Mooij 和 Ederveen (2008) 的企业税基半弹性估计值应用于税率变化(取 -3.2)以及法国、德国、德国等国的外国直接投资流入和流出数据得出的。和美国,代表公司税基中可能发生迁移的外国部分。在大幅降低企业所得税率的情况下,随着外国跨国公司选择将更多生产设在进行改革的国家,外国直接投资流入将会增加,而随着国内跨国公司选择在国内发展更多产能,外国直接投资流出将会减少。值得注意的是,文献中的半弹性差异很大,而且企业所得税改革的投资转移影响的估计对这些假设很敏感。

38

The assumed impact of profit shifting is derived by applying an estimated semielasticity of profits with respect to the tax rate—a value of 2, taken from De Mooij and Ederveen (2008)—to estimates of the share of multinational firms in each country, which is assumed to be approximately 0.6 in Germany and France and 0.3 in the United States, and to the corporate income tax rate reduction being considered (15 percentage points). The same caveats mentioned for investment shifting regarding elasticities apply.
利润转移的假设影响是通过应用相对于税率的估计利润半弹性(取自 De Mooij 和 Ederveen(2008)的值为 2)来估计跨国公司在每个国家的份额而得出的,其中假设德国和法国约为 0.6,美国约为 0.3,并考虑降低企业所得税税率(15 个百分点)。对于弹性投资转移所提到的同样的警告也适用。

39

The impact on public debt in this scenario is only transitory, with all debt-to-GDP ratios returning to baseline in the long term. The speed of adjustment back to baseline depends on assumptions regarding the aggressiveness of the model’s fiscal rule—other assumptions would lead to different adjustment dynamics.
在这种情况下,对公共债务的影响只是暂时的,从长远来看,所有债务与 GDP 的比率都会恢复到基线。调整回到基线的速度取决于有关模型财政规则激进程度的假设——其他假设将导致不同的调整动态。

40

This result is broadly consistent with results reported in Bussière and others (2017), who find that most budget-neutral fiscal reforms do not have large cross-border trade spillovers, except in the case of coordinated reforms in periods of accommodative monetary policy.
这一结果与 Bussière 等人(2017 年)报告的结果大致一致,他们发现大多数预算中性的财政改革不会产生巨大的跨境贸易溢出效应,除非在宽松货币政策时期进行协调改革。

41

A permanent productivity shock in source countries increases supply by more than demand, implying that the relative price of source-country goods must fall in equilibrium.
来源国生产力的永久性冲击导致供给增加超过需求,这意味着来源国商品的相对价格必须下降至均衡状态。

42

France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, United States.
法国、德国、日本、英国、美国。

43

The number of countries classified as “fixed” can generally vary over time given that the exchange rate regime classification is time varying.
鉴于汇率制度分类随时间变化,被分类为“固定”的国家数量通常会随时间变化。

44

Data for regime classification before 2008 is from Carmen Reinhart’s website, http://www.carmenreinhart.com.
2008年之前的政权分类数据来自Carmen Reinhart的网站,http://www.carmenreinhart.com。

45

See Blagrave and others, forthcoming, for a discussion of alternative weighting systems.
有关替代加权系统的讨论,请参阅 Blagrave 等人即将出版的文章。

46

Estimated fiscal shocks are not correlated across countries.
各国之间估计的财政冲击并不相关。

47

Plausible alternative weighting systems of the source-country shock would deliver the same results in terms of source-country GDP. Alternative weighting systems would also require recalculating the spillover coefficient estimated in the baseline (α), resulting in an equal and offsetting adjustment of this coefficient, given that any transformation applied to the source shock would be constant across all recipient countries.
来源国冲击的合理替代加权系统将在来源国国内生产总值方面产生相同的结果。替代加权系统还需要重新计算基线(α)中估计的溢出系数,从而对该系数进行平等和抵消的调整,因为适用于源冲击的任何变换在所有受援国都是恒定的。

48

Results from the panel vector autoregression are robust to several alternative specifications, including not detrending the data.
面板向量自回归的结果对于多种替代规范是稳健的,包括不去除数据趋势。

49

After 2012 the forecast data are not continuous.
2012年以后预测数据不再连续。

50

Narrative shock databases for government spending are much less common in the literature, which precludes a robustness check of spillovers from spending shocks based on narrative shocks.
政府支出的叙事冲击数据库在文献中并不常见,这妨碍了基于叙事冲击对支出冲击的溢出效应进行稳健性检查。

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