The Making and Unmaking of a Megaproject: Contesting Temporalities along the LAPSSET Corridor in Kenya
肯尼亚 LAPSSET 走廊上的一个大型项目的制造和解体：争夺时间性

Introduction 介绍

This article contributes to the burgeoning literature on infrastructural megaprojects by exploring how communities across Northern Kenya engage in stabilising or unsettling a megaproject and its spatio-temporal imaginaries. The question, “what makes a megaproject?”, has been investigated from a plurality of positions: megaprojects have been discussed in connection to risk (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003; see also World Bank 2019); future-making (Müller-Mahn 2020); capitalist expansionism (Kanai 2016; Zhang 2017); colonial legacies (Aalders 2020; Enns and Bersaglio 2020; Kimari and Ernstson 2020); peace- and state-building (Bachmann and Schouten 2018; Stepputat and Hagmann 2019; Uribe 2019); and reconfiguration of state spaces (Demissie 2017; Mayer and Zhang 2020; Ong 2003), to name but a few. In addition, critical scholarship has pointed to the constellations of capital and state interests that drive the current rush of large infrastructure projects across the global South, and have in addition exposed the severe forms of exclusion and dispossession that they produce (Li 2018; Tsing 2003; Uribe 2017).
本文通过探讨肯尼亚北部社区如何参与稳定或动摇基础设施大型项目及其时空想象，为基础设施大型项目蓬勃发展的文献做出贡献。"什么构成了一个大型项目？"这个问题已经从多个角度进行了调查：大型项目已经被讨论与风险有关。 2003; 另见世界银行 2019); 未来制造 (Müller-Mahn 2020); 资本主义扩张主义 (Kanai 2016; 张 2017); 殖民遗产 (Aalders 2020; Enns 和 Bersaglio 2020; Kimari 和 Ernstson 2020); 和平与国家建设 (Bachmann 和 Schouten 2018; Stepputat 和 Hagmann 2019; Uribe 2019); 以及国家空间重构 (Demissie 2017; Mayer 和 Zhang 2020; Ong 2003), 仅举几例。 此外，批判性学术已经指出，推动全球南方大型基础设施项目当前快速发展的资本和国家利益星座，并且还揭示了它们产生的严重排斥和剥夺形式（Li 2018; Tsing 2003; Uribe 2017）。

While taking inspiration from these important interventions, we aim at complementing these views in two respects. First, critical geography tends to regard megaprojects as top-down ventures; something that is inscribed into landscapes and the biography of people, and centrally planned by assumedly powerful but often unspecified “agents of circulation”, as Stepputat and Hagmann (2019:794) put it. However, as scholarship informed by Science and Technology Studies (STS) has demonstrated, it requires sustained work by a multitude of actors to align different interests, imaginaries and material components and mould them into a megaproject (Latour 1996). Second, we seek to expand the common view that affected social groups have limited capacity to engage with large infrastructure as well as land acquisition ventures. While the participation of rural populations in internationally financed and centrally steered megaprojects may often be limited, we demonstrate that, particularly in contexts where the planners' work of aligning visions and infrastructural components has not yet fully succeeded, there is substantial leeway to mould megaprojects in ways not necessarily intended by the planners. The common focus on “expulsion-resistance” (Borras and Franco 2013) is not only unable to cognise multiple cleavages across society but also fails to identify the wide-ranging registers social groups draw on in their encounters with grand projects (cf. Hall et al. 2015; Lind et al. 2020; Scott 1985). By accentuating the capacity of infrastructure to evoke aspirations and even open up new spaces for political collectivity (Appel et al. 2018; Chome 2020; Collier et al. 2016; Harvey and Knox 2015), we aim to show that the way affected people engage with promises, legacies and manifestations of megaprojects often inadvertently contributes to the latter’s consolidation or destabilisation.
在从这些重要干预中汲取灵感的同时，我们旨在在两个方面补充这些观点。首先，批判性地理学倾向于将大型项目视为自上而下的事业；这是一种被刻在景观和人们生平中的东西，由被假定为强大但往往未指明的“流通代理人”中心规划，正如 Stepputat 和 Hagmann（2019:794）所说。然而，正如科学技术研究（STS）所启示的学术研究所表明的，需要多方参与者的持续工作来协调不同利益、想象和物质组成部分，并将它们塑造成一个大型项目（Latour 1996）。其次，我们试图扩展普遍观点，即受影响的社会群体在参与大型基础设施以及土地收购项目方面的能力有限。 虽然农村人口参与国际融资和中央主导的大型项目的机会通常有限，但我们证明，在规划者尚未完全成功地调整愿景和基础设施组件的情况下，特别是在这种情况下，有很大的余地来塑造大型项目，这并不一定是规划者的初衷。对“驱逐抵抗”（Borras 和 Franco 2013）的普遍关注不仅无法认识社会各阶层之间的多重裂痕，而且也无法识别社会群体在与宏伟项目相遇时所依赖的广泛注册（参见 Hall 等人 2015；Lind 等人 2020；Scott 1985）。通过强调基础设施激发愿景的能力，甚至为政治集体开辟新空间（Appel 等人 2018；Chome 2020；Collier 等人。 2016; Harvey and Knox 2015), 我们的目标是展示受影响的人如何与大型项目的承诺、遗产和表现形式互动，往往无意中促进了后者的巩固或不稳定化。

Taking our theoretical cues from STS, the anthropology of infrastructure as well as critical geography, we introduce the two practices of entangling and fraying in order to carve out the dynamics of this engagement. By entangling, we refer to practices through which actors contribute to mega-project alignment by attaching new features to a supposedly unalterable set of infrastructure components and visions. With fraying, we hope to make visible the unruly centrifugal forces that threaten to unsettle key elements of the corridor by pointing at alternative spatio-temporal imaginaries. In our example of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor in pastoralist Northern Kenya, we demonstrate how some practices along the corridor may augment the “megaproject”, while others may render the trajectory of the megaproject brittle.
从 STS 理论、基础设施人类学以及批判地理学中汲取理论启示，我们引入纠缠和磨损这两种实践，以便剖析这种参与的动态。通过纠缠，我们指的是行动者通过将新特征附加到一组基础设施组件和愿景上，从而促成大型项目的对齐。通过磨损，我们希望揭示那些威胁到走廊关键元素的难以控制的离心力，指出替代的时空想象。在我们以肯尼亚北部牧民地区的拉穆港-南苏丹-埃塞俄比亚运输（LAPSSET）走廊为例，我们展示了走廊沿线的一些实践可能增强“大型项目”，而其他实践可能使大型项目的轨迹变得脆弱。

We start by a brief discussion of some of the existing literature on infrastructural megaprojects in order to situate the LAPSSET Corridor, before taking up the argument that the “making” of a megaproject requires hard work, not only in terms of the material construction of concrete infrastructures but also in terms of coherently aligning different “futures”. We then introduce the categories of entangling and fraying, particularly in relation to the power of infrastructure to project specific temporalities, followed by a discussion of four episodes centring on contestations related to land, which all illustrate how the hard work of aligning megaprojects faces challenges through entanglement—building temporary “manyattas” (traditional forms of settlement) at corridor sites in Isiolo and engaging with land reform in Turkana—and fraying—contesting land acquisition in Turkana as well as in Isiolo (see Figure 1 for geographical reference). The paper’s main conclusion is that while pastoralist communities encountering megaprojects such as LAPSSET share an experience of invisibility and exclusion, they also take up active and differentiated roles in navigating as well as shaping a complex landscape of different spatial and temporal visions.
我们首先简要讨论了一些关于基础设施大型项目的现有文献，以便将 LAPSSET 走廊置于其中，然后提出一个论点，即“制造”一个大型项目需要辛勤工作，不仅涉及具体基础设施的材料建设，还涉及将不同的“未来”有条不紊地对齐。然后，我们介绍了纠缠和磨损的类别，特别是与基础设施投射特定时间性的力量有关，接着讨论了四个重点争议的情节，这些情节都说明了如何通过纠缠来面对对齐大型项目的辛勤工作所面临的挑战——在 Isiolo 的走廊地点建造临时的“manyattas”（传统的定居形式）并参与 Turkana 的土地改革，以及磨损——在 Turkana 和 Isiolo 争议土地收购（参见地理参考图 1）。 该论文的主要结论是，尽管牧民社区在遭遇 LAPSSET 等大型项目时分享了一种隐形和排斥的经历，但他们也在导航和塑造不同空间和时间愿景的复杂景观中扮演着积极和多样化的角色。

Aligning Megaprojects 对齐大型项目

While the main body of this article will be concerned with the ways that the aligning of megaprojects is locally consolidated or challenged, we first give a brief overview of different ways to define and understand megaprojects in general and LAPSSET in particular.
本文的主体将关注于大型项目的对齐是如何在当地得到巩固或挑战的，我们首先简要概述了一般和特别是 LAPSSET 的不同定义和理解大型项目的方式。

Governments across the global South often identify uneven and insufficient connectivity as one of the primary impediments to economic development, including a fairer distribution of opportunity and welfare. No wonder then that megaprojects are commonly branded as key vehicles for change; for megaprojects signal prowess, opportunity and transformation. Annual infrastructure spending in “emerging economies” in the last decade has exceeded $2 trillion. In the five years between 2004 and 2008, China spent more on infrastructure than in the entire 20^th century; and most of it went into projects that can safely be considered “big”: dams, highway and railway networks, ports as well as urban development schemes (Flyvbjerg 2014). The number and scope of both envisioned and realised megaprojects on the African continent are extraordinary and outshine earlier modernist aspirations of transcontinental connectivity (AfDB 2019; Herz 2018; Vhumbunu 2016). The Central Corridor connecting Tanzania to Uganda and the Great Lakes region, the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor in Tanzania, the Gibe III dam in Ethiopia as well as the Standard Gauge Railway project in Kenya are but a few that join LAPSSET on the list of ongoing—and contested—megaprojects in East Africa (Chome at al. 2020; Mosley and Watson 2016; Wang and Wissenbach 2019; Wiig and Silver 2019).
政府经常将不平衡和不足的连接性视为经济发展的主要障碍之一，包括机会和福利的更公平分配。难怪大型项目通常被视为变革的关键载体；因为大型项目象征着实力、机会和转变。过去十年，“新兴经济体”每年的基础设施支出超过 2 万亿美元。在 2004 年至 2008 年的五年间，中国在基础设施上的支出超过了整个 20 世纪；其中大部分用于可以安全视为“大型”的项目：大坝、公路和铁路网络、港口以及城市发展计划（Flyvbjerg 2014）。非洲大陆上构想和实现的大型项目数量和范围都是非凡的，超越了早期现代主义对跨大陆连接的愿望（AfDB 2019；Herz 2018；Vhumbunu 2016）。 中央走廊连接坦桑尼亚与乌干达以及大湖地区，坦桑尼亚南部农业增长走廊，埃塞俄比亚的吉贝三号大坝以及肯尼亚的标准轨道铁路项目只是东非正在进行中——以及有争议的——众多大型项目清单上的几个项目（Chome 等人2020; Mosley 和 Watson2016; Wang 和 Wissenbach2019; Wiig 和 Silver2019）。

Despite being analytically elusive, the term megaproject has gained considerable traction, primarily within business management and development studies. In what is probably the most parsimonious definition, Bent Flyvbjerg (2014:6) considers megaprojects to signify “large-scale complex ventures that typically cost $1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational and affect millions of people”. In the global South, we would add, megaprojects are typically tightly steered by governments and hinge upon accessing international capital. Measured against these indicators, the LAPSSET Corridor is a formidable megaproject. Clearly envisioned as a transformational or “Game-Changer” (LCDA 2017:iii) project, LAPSSET investors and planners aim at connecting the land-locked countries of South Sudan and Ethiopia to the Indian Ocean as well as integrating the vast and historically marginalised Northern parts of Kenya into the fold of the Kenyan state. It includes a new 32 berth port at Lamu, approximately 2000 km of highways and roads; crude and product oil pipelines; interregional standard gauge railway lines; international airports as well as resort cities in Lamu, Isiolo and Turkana counties; a multipurpose dam along river Tana; and a number of supporting, associated projects including electric power supply, land survey and acquisition, environmental assessments, and security installations (LCDA 2015; see Figure 1 for a spatial overview of the corridor). Furthermore, an economic area for industrial investments is envisioned to extend up to 50 km on each side of the 500 m wide infrastructural corridor.
尽管在分析上难以捉摸，但“大型项目”这个术语在商业管理和发展研究领域获得了相当大的关注。在可能是最简洁的定义中，本特·弗利布约格（2014 年：6）认为，大型项目意味着“典型成本为 10 亿美元或更多的大规模复杂项目，需要多年才能开发和建设，涉及多个公共和私人利益相关者，具有变革性并影响数百万人”。在全球南方，我们可以补充说，大型项目通常由政府严格控制，并依赖于获取国际资本。根据这些指标来衡量，LAPSSET 走廊是一个强大的大型项目。显然，LAPSSET 投资者和规划者将其设想为一个变革性或“改变游戏规则”（LCDA 2017：iii）的项目，旨在将南苏丹和埃塞俄比亚这两个内陆国家与印度洋连接起来，并将肯尼亚北部广阔且历史上被边缘化的地区整合到肯尼亚国家的体系中。 它包括在拉穆新建的 32 个泊位港口，约 2000 公里的高速公路和道路；原油和成品油管道；跨区域标准轨道铁路线；国际机场以及拉穆、伊西奥洛和图尔卡纳县的度假城市；塔纳河上的多功能水坝；以及一系列支持性、相关项目，包括电力供应、土地测量和收购、环境评估和安全设施（LCDA 2015；请参见图1以了解走廊的空间概况）。此外，预计将建立一个工业投资经济区，延伸至基础设施走廊每侧 50 公里。

From the beginning, LAPSSET has been a megaproject “in search of a rationale” (Browne 2015:5). While the idea of a second Kenyan deep-water port is some 50 years old, it did not gain traction until 2005, when the post-war southern Sudan was looking for a new outlet for its projected oil exports. Simultaneously, the Ethiopian government showed an interest in an alternative transport corridor to the Indian Ocean. However, soon after the ostentatious launch of the project in Lamu in 2012, South Sudan reached an agreement on oil exportation with Khartoum before sliding into a civil war in 2013. With the potential substitute, Uganda, opting for another oil export route, the scope of LAPSSET shrivelled. However, the conveyance of crude remained pivotal for the political economy of LAPSSET thanks to the discovery of oil in Turkana in North-Western Kenya. The Kenyan government frames the corridor primarily as a regional transportation and trade link, instrumental to the country’s industrialisation policy.¹ Due to the lack of commitment from foreign investors however, the government has been forced to cover the lion’s share of the investment costs of the multi-billion dollar project (Kabukuru 2016).²
从一开始，LAPSSET 一直是一个“寻找合理性”的大型项目（Browne 2015:5）。尽管肯尼亚建设第二个深水港口的想法已有大约 50 年的历史，但直到 2005 年，才开始受到关注，当时战后的南苏丹正在寻找其预计石油出口的新出口。同时，埃塞俄比亚政府对通往印度洋的另一条交通走廊表现出兴趣。然而，就在 2012 年在拉木启动该项目后不久，南苏丹与喀土穆就石油出口达成协议，然后在 2013 年陷入内战。随着潜在替代方案乌干达选择另一条石油出口路线，LAPSSET 的范围缩小了。然而，由于在肯尼亚西北部图尔卡纳发现石油，原油的输送仍然对 LAPSSET 的政治经济至关重要。肯尼亚政府将该走廊主要定位为区域交通和贸易联系，对该国的工业化政策至关重要。¹ 由于外国投资者缺乏承诺，政府被迫承担数十亿美元项目的大部分投资成本（Kabukuru 2016）。²

By weaving spaces hitherto considered peripheral into the centre of capitalist relations, grand infrastructural schemes are therefore prime conduits of land enclosure (Enns and Bersaglio 2020; Lesutis 2020; Scott 1998). What for the state authorities means valorisation of resources and augmenting the gaze of the state, spells exclusion and dispossession for distinct parts of the population (Harvey 2003; Kanai 2016). While zeroing in on the different forms of exclusion that many megaprojects entail is a much-needed intervention, we need to be careful not to regard megaprojects as implemented at the full discretion of their planners. Instead, their “success” is contingent upon solving controversies by stabilising conflicting expertise, actor interests and material frictions as scholars within STS have long argued (Callon 1984; Latour 1999). In practice, new knowledge about economic feasibility, challenges of terrain, glitches in assuring interoperability of different components, contestations expressed in courts or on the streets, to name but a few examples, constitute strong intervening forces that can unravel or alter parts of a megaproject. Hence, in order to retain an uncompromised notion of “coherence”, alignment workers must conjure un-breakability as well as the “illusion of ‘friction-free’” and stable mobility flows (Sheller 2018).
通过将此前被视为边缘的空间编织到资本主义关系的中心，宏伟的基础设施计划因此成为土地封闭的主要渠道（Enns 和 Bersaglio 2020; Lesutis 2020; Scott 1998）。对于国家当局来说，这意味着资源的增值和国家视野的扩大，但对于人口的某些部分来说，则意味着排斥和剥夺（Harvey 2003; Kanai 2016）。虽然集中研究许多大型项目所涉及的不同排斥形式是一种迫切需要的干预，但我们需要谨慎对待大型项目不要将其视为完全由规划者自行决定实施。相反，正如 STS 领域的学者长期以来所主张的那样，它们的“成功”取决于通过稳定冲突的专业知识、行为者利益和物质摩擦来解决争议（Callon 1984; Latour 1999）。 在实践中，关于经济可行性的新知识、地形挑战、确保不同组件互操作性的故障、在法庭或街头表达的争议等等，都构成了强大的干扰力量，可能会解开或改变大型项目的部分。因此，为了保持“连贯性”的概念不受损害，对齐工作者必须召唤出不可破坏性以及“‘无摩擦’幻觉”和稳定的流动性（Sheller 2018）。

So far, LAPSSET’s coherence primarily appears where its promises are formulated: in boardrooms, public forums, on government websites, or at international business meetings. It is here that the rather loosely affiliated components of the megaproject are assembled into a “single unitary package” (Salet et al. 2013:1985). And it is here that legal procedures, government promises, technical standards and stakeholders’ interests are fitted into the narrative of a game-changing corridor that is promised to radically transform both economic and social conditions. In fact, many of the components that the Kenyan government lays out to ensure connectivity and effective flows exists so far only in planning documents, impact assessments and on maps. The LCDA (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority) has published several maps in which the corridor is drawn with almost exaggerated bold and confident lines. Such boldness and confidence do however hide the inherent fickleness and controversial nature of the corridor’s components, which are subject to disruption by a wide range of forces, including the forming of publics and court decisions. The work of alignment therefore tends to be directed towards managing contradictions—not only between bold plans and unstable political alliances, but also between different movements that are expected to be enabled or hindered by the corridor. The project’s “meganess” remains aligned in presentations, maps, and reports by occluding the fact that it will only create frictionless mobility for some, while others, including many pastoral communities, will be excluded from its ability to facilitate physical movement through space, and consequently from its promise of modernity.
到目前为止，LAPSSET 的一致性主要体现在其承诺制定的地方：在董事会会议室、公共论坛、政府网站或国际商务会议上。正是在这里，这个大型项目的相对松散的组成部分被组装成一个“单一的整体包裹”（Salet 等人 2013 年：1985）。在这里，法律程序、政府承诺、技术标准和利益相关者的利益被整合到一个改变游戏规则的走廊叙事中，承诺彻底改变经济和社会条件。事实上，肯尼亚政府提出的许多确保连通性和有效流动的组成部分目前仅存在于规划文件、影响评估和地图上。LAPSSET 走廊发展局（LCDA）发布了几张地图，走廊用几乎夸张的粗线和自信的线条绘制出来。然而，这种大胆和自信隐藏了走廊组成部分固有的反复无常和有争议的性质，这些部分受到各种力量的干扰，包括公众形成和法院裁决。 因此，对齐工作往往是针对管理矛盾的，不仅是在大胆计划和不稳定的政治联盟之间，还包括不同的运动之间，这些运动预计会受到走廊的启用或阻碍。该项目的“巨大性”在演示、地图和报告中保持一致，掩盖了这样一个事实，即它只会为一些人创造无摩擦的流动性，而其他人，包括许多牧民社区，将被排除在其促进空间内的物理移动能力之外，因此也无法享受其现代性的承诺。

While acknowledging the material dimension of assiduous alignment efforts, we propose that a good deal of conjuring the “meganess” of an infrastructural project is about aligning something else: the temporalities the project creates, encounters, and modifies. One aspect frequently overlooked outside the anthropology of infrastructure that we try to capture by focusing on temporalities is how affected communities mobilise, align or attach their own aspirations, hopes, fears and memories in their encounters with megaprojects. In the context of this paper, the concept of temporalities does not only refer to anticipated futures, but importantly also to memories of the past (Appadurai 2013:288). A megaproject such as the LAPSSET Corridor does not only connect the drill sites in Lokichar with a port in Lamu, but also connects a particular past defined by marginalisation, division and destitution (for a more elaborated account of the historical trajectory of colonial as well as post-independence marginalisation of northern Kenya, see for example, Jabane 2016; Kochore 2016) with a particular future of seamless connectivity, unity, and economic potential of capitalist production (Aalders 2020; Enns and Bersaglio 2020). By nourishing the “fantasy of rationality and new beginnings” (Bach 2011:100), megaproject visions point at a future radically different to the present, be it a future marked by alleviation of hardship, or of increased opportunities. What is more, such promises are tied to the past as a redress to past injustice or as a condition to be preserved in light of the radical changes the future will bring about (RoK 2012). While aligning temporal perspectives is crucial in conjuring a megaproject, those processes are met with wide-ranging aspirations by people who encounter the project on the ground. An emphasis on the aspirational power of infrastructure requires a nuanced description of which hopes, fears and imaginaries communities mobilise in their interaction with megaprojects. Scholars within STS and wider social theory conceive the human capacity to both imagining “good life”—as well as eliciting ways to realise such—as a universal practice (Appadurai 2013; Jasanoff 2014; Müller-Mahn 2020). At the same time, such a “capacity to aspire” is anything but distributed evenly across society. The privileged may be more routinised in packaging their future ambitions in layers of justification, in embedding their wants in norms and, in addition, may be able to identify shortcuts from aspiration to outcome. For the marginalised, instead, the future may “present itself as a luxury, a nightmare, a doubt or a shrinking possibility” (Appadurai 2013:299; see also Appadurai 2013:186–188). What kind of temporality a megaproject produces—that is, what particular past and future it points at—is therefore a highly contested and often unequal struggle.
在承认勤奋对齐努力的物质维度的同时，我们提出，基础设施项目的“巨大性”很大程度上是关于对齐其他事物：项目创造、遭遇和修改的时间性。我们试图通过关注时间性来捕捉基础设施人类学之外经常被忽视的一个方面，即受影响的社区如何在与大型项目的相遇中动员、对齐或附加他们自己的愿望、希望、恐惧和记忆。在本文的背景下，时间性的概念不仅指未来的预期，而且还重要地指过去的记忆（Appadurai 2013:288）。 一个大型项目，如 LAPSSET 走廊，不仅连接了 Lokichar 的钻探地点与 Lamu 港口，还连接了一个特定的过去，这个过去被边缘化、分裂和贫困所定义（有关殖民地以及独立后肯尼亚北部边缘化历史轨迹的更详细描述，请参见 Jabane 2016; Kochore 2016）。它还连接了一个无缝连接、团结和资本主义生产经济潜力的特定未来（Aalders 2020; Enns and Bersaglio 2020）。通过滋养“理性和新开始的幻想”（Bach 2011:100），大型项目愿景指向一个与现在截然不同的未来，无论是减轻困难的未来，还是增加机会的未来。更重要的是，这些承诺与过去联系在一起，作为对过去不公正的补偿，或者作为在未来带来根本变化的条件下要保留的条件（RoK 2012）。 在召唤大型项目时，调整时间视角至关重要，但这些过程会受到在现场遇到项目的人们广泛愿望的影响。强调基础设施的愿景力量需要对社区在与大型项目互动中动员的希望、恐惧和想象力进行细致描述。STS 和更广泛的社会理论学者认为，人类能力既可以想象“美好生活”，也可以引发实现这种生活方式的方式是一种普遍实践（Appadurai 2013; Jasanoff 2014; Müller-Mahn 20202013:299; 另请参见 Appadurai 2013:186–188）。一个大型项目产生的时间性质——即它指向的特定过去和未来——因此是一个高度争议的、常常不平等的斗争。

A telling example of the difficulties involved in the hard work of aligning different temporalities into one megaproject is provided by the ceremony on the occasion of Kenya’s first Oil Shipment Flag-off (Project Oil Kenya 2019). Meant as a performance of the alignment of different state and private actors in a joint celebration of Kenya’s common dream of becoming an oil-producing country, the speeches illustrate how hard it is to align different temporalities of hope and anticipation in this context. Turkana’s deputy governor Peter Lotethiro first stressed the “alignment” of the people of Turkana who now finally (after decades of marginalisation) felt like they were “part of Kenya” (Project Oil Kenya 2019). He then added that his county only demanded a small part of the project’s profits, “only the goat’s leg” (goat is a popular local food). This image was then referenced to in many subsequent speeches during the ceremony: for example, the governor of the neighbouring County of West Pokot added that the people of his County “are waiting for just the ribs [of the goat]” (ibid.); and the chief executive of Tullow Oil, Paul McDade, added that “having spent $2 billion, the joint venture partners will be able to get a bit of that goat” (Akwiri 2019). The image of people coming together in a celebration of commonly shared imaginaries of the future, while at the same time ripping “the goat” apart before it is even cooked, is suggestive: the promise of infrastructure does not necessarily or mainly refer to the general success of the entire project, but rather to the particular interests of the parties involved in the project.
一个说明将不同时间性对齐到一个大型项目中所涉及的困难的生动例子是肯尼亚首次石油装运仪式（Project Oil Kenya 2019）的举办。作为不同国家和私人参与者共同庆祝肯尼亚成为石油生产国的共同梦想的表演，演讲说明了在这种情况下如何难以对齐不同的希望和期待时间性。图尔卡纳副州长彼得·洛特西罗首先强调了图尔卡纳人民的“对齐”，他们现在终于（经过几十年的边缘化）感觉自己“是肯尼亚的一部分”（Project Oil Kenya 20192019）。人们聚集在一起庆祝共同分享的未来想象，同时在山羊被烹饪之前将其撕成碎片的形象具有启示意义：基础设施的承诺并不一定或主要指的是整个项目的成功，而是指涉及项目各方特定利益。

Cracks in the Megaproject Alignment: Practices of Entangling and Fraying
超级项目对齐中的裂缝：纠缠和磨损的实践

Based on the acknowledgement of the “hard work” of aligning megaproject temporalities accounted for above, we now shift our attention to the ways people encounter and manage the (often powerful) ambition of large infrastructures to make futures (Flyvbjerg et al. 2003). In this section, we will introduce two principal ways through which local actors engage the LAPSSET Corridor: entangling and fraying, with a particular focus on how these practices refer to temporalities.
基于上述对齐大型项目时间性的“辛勤工作”的认可，我们现在将注意力转向人们如何遇到和管理大型基础设施的（通常强大的）雄心，以实现未来（Flyvbjerg 等人 2003 年）。在本节中，我们将介绍两种主要方式，即当地参与者参与 LAPSSET 走廊的方式：纠缠和磨损，特别关注这些实践如何涉及时间性。

One of the challenges facing the LCDA are alignments that are too successful and not only consolidate all the elements of the corridor that are mentioned in information brochures and official planning documents, but also additional features that break in and get entangled into the megaproject. This is particularly pertinent when extremely comprehensive visions of modernity and the future of Kenya are mobilised to contextualise and justify the LAPSSET Corridor. If the corridor is ultimately about “Infinite possibilities. Endless opportunities”, as its official website proclaims (LCDA 2020), it becomes difficult to argue that a particular thing does not belong to it. We chose to call the dynamic of elements attaching to megaprojects that exceed the original intentions of the planners entangling. While we draw broadly on STS in our inquiry we specifically zero in on how people affected by the corridor through their practical engagement with LAPSSET add alternative lines of memories and anticipation to dominant imaginaries. By doing so, they de facto contribute to an alignment of “external” elements into the cohesive LAPSSET package. The difference to the way we understand the work of alignment described above is the power relations that define their respective positions: while alignment is work done by a political and economic elite, often in the form of a centralised authority, entanglement happens when people with limited official authority seek to impress their own ambitions onto the megaproject. This means that people who feel excluded from the allegedly universal vision of the future produced by the planning authority insert themselves into this vision. Unlike alignment, the aim is not to stabilise the project, but to use it in accordance with their own aspirations for the near or distant future.
LCDA 面临的挑战之一是对齐太成功，不仅巩固了信息手册和官方规划文件中提到的走廊的所有元素，还有一些额外的特征混入并纠缠在大型项目中。当极其全面的现代性愿景和肯尼亚未来的愿景被动员起来，以便将 LAPSSET 走廊置于上下文并为其辩护时，这一点尤为重要。如果走廊最终是关于“无限可能性。无尽机会”，正如其官方网站所宣称（LCDA 2020），那么很难争辩说某个特定的事物不属于它。我们选择将超出规划者最初意图的元素附着在大型项目上的动态称为“纠缠”。虽然我们在调查中广泛借鉴了 STS，但我们特别关注受走廊影响的人们如何通过他们与 LAPSSET 的实际参与为主导的想象力增加了替代性的记忆和期待。 通过这样做，他们实际上有助于将“外部”元素纳入具有凝聚力的 LAPSSET 项目中。与我们理解上述对齐工作的方式不同的是，定义各自位置的权力关系：对齐是由政治和经济精英完成的工作，通常以中央集权的形式进行，而纠缠发生在具有有限官方权威的人试图将自己的抱负强加于大型项目之上时。这意味着那些感到被排除在规划机构所产生的所谓普遍未来愿景之外的人将自己融入这一愿景中。与对齐不同，目的不是稳定项目，而是根据他们对近或远期未来的抱负来利用它。

The cohesiveness of LAPSSET is not only troubled by attempts to attach additional elements to original visions and plans, but also by forces of fragmentation and disruption—a practice we term fraying. Infrastructures are furthermore mired in frictions between movement and fixity as they allow for smooth mobility and flow only as long as they are stable, and create pauses and immobilities (Hannam et al. 2006). This tenuous condition of infrastructure provides an opening for people settling along the corridor to intervene into megaprojects in a way that points at, or even leads to, other trajectories and futures than the ones laid out by planners. In contrast to entangling, which describes how those excluded from LAPSSET’s visions of development and modernity seek to gain from that vision, fraying describes a rejection of and separation from the latter. While having family resemblance with practice of everyday resistance (cf. Scott 1985), our interest is in the diverging temporalities by following how strands of the project disintegrate and articulate different pasts and futures.
LAPSSET 的凝聚力不仅受到试图将额外元素附加到原始愿景和计划中的困扰，还受到分裂和破坏力量的影响——这是我们所称的脱线。基础设施也深陷于运动和固定之间的摩擦之中，只有在稳定时才能实现平稳的移动和流动，并且会产生暂停和不动（Hannam 等人2006）。基础设施的这种脆弱状态为沿走廊定居的人们提供了干预超级项目的机会，这种干预方式指向或甚至导致规划者所设定的其他轨迹和未来。与纠缠相反，描述了那些被排除在 LAPSSET 发展和现代化愿景之外的人如何从这一愿景中获益，脱线描述了对后者的拒绝和分离。虽然与日常抵抗实践有着家族相似之处（参见。 Scott 1985），我们感兴趣的是通过跟踪项目的各个部分如何分解并表达不同的过去和未来。

As the remainder of the paper will demonstrate, the roads to the future that the Kenyan government is attempting to pave are appropriated and challenged by practices of entangling and fraying as politicians, local elites and groups that live along the corridors engage the megaproject in variegated ways. As much as the work of entangling and fraying looks marginal and ordinary, often pointing to the limited agency to translate aspiration into tangible improvement, such work is nonetheless an expression of collective visions of desirable futures that diverge from and challenge the master narrative put forward by the LCDA and the government. Thought in this way, large technical interventions become part of how people embellish the canvas of personal and collective futures (Jasanoff 2014:5–10). By bringing forward four empirical episodes of what may seem as marginal practices of entangling and fraying along one of the most expansive infrastructure corridors in Africa south of Sahara, we demonstrate how different pastoralist groups, in their engagement with the megaproject seek to gradually “change the terms of recognition” within wider society (Appadurai 2013:293).
正如本文的其余部分将展示的那样，肯尼亚政府试图铺设的通往未来的道路被纠缠和拉扯的实践所占用和挑战，政治家、当地精英和沿着走廊居住的群体以多种方式参与这一大型项目。尽管纠缠和拉扯的工作看起来边缘化和普通，通常指向将愿望转化为切实改善的有限机构的工作，但这样的工作仍然是对令人向往的未来的集体愿景的表达，这些愿景与 LCDA 和政府提出的主导叙事相背离并挑战。从这个角度来看，大规模的技术干预成为人们如何装饰个人和集体未来画布的一部分（Jasanoff 2014:5–10）。 通过提出四个看似边缘实践的实证案例，这些实践发生在撒哈拉以南非洲最广阔的基础设施走廊之一，我们展示了不同的牧民群体如何在与大型项目互动中逐渐“改变更广泛社会中的认可条件”（Appadurai 2013:293）。

We base our account of entangling and fraying practices on mixed-method, qualitative research conducted in person by the authors along the planned LAPSSET Corridor between 2016 and 2019, including several separate but thematically related empirical studies: a “walking ethnography” (Ingold and Vergunst 2008) during a total of three months from Isiolo (one of LAPSSET’s nodes) to Lokichar (the geographical focal point for Kenya’s oil exploitation) carried out by Aalders; almost 30 semi-structured and in-depth interviews with representatives of a broad range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), and community-based organisations (CBOs) in both Isiolo and Turkana counties conducted by Knutsson and Kilaka; approximately 30 individual and focus group interviews performed by Kilaka, targeting different sections of communities based in and around Lokichar in Turkana; and a content analysis by Knutsson of LAPSSET-relevant judicial documents, government and civil society reports, and local as well as national media reports (see Figure 1 for geographical reference). The majority of the interviews were conducted in the native language of the respondents (Turkana, Borana or Samburu, depending on the site of research) through the assistance of local research assistants, while a smaller number of interviews (notably with representatives of county governments, CSOs and NGOs) were conducted in Kiswahili and English.
我们基于作者在 2016 年至 2019 年期间沿着计划的 LAPSSET 走廊进行的混合方法、定性研究来描述纠缠和磨损实践，包括几项独立但主题相关的实证研究：Aalders 进行的“步行民族志学”（Ingold 和 Vergunst 2008）在 Isiolo（LAPSSET 的一个节点）到 Lokichar（肯尼亚石油开发的地理焦点）共计三个月的实地调查；Knutsson 和 Kilaka 在 Isiolo 和 Turkana 两个县对广泛范围的非政府组织（NGOs）、民间社会组织（CSOs）和社区组织（CBOs）代表进行了近 30 次半结构化和深度访谈；Kilaka 进行了约 30 次个人和焦点小组访谈，针对居住在 Turkana 的 Lokichar 及周边社区的不同部分；Knutsson 对 LAPSSET 相关的司法文件、政府和民间社会报告以及当地和国家媒体报道进行了内容分析（有关地理参考，请参见图 1）。 大多数采访是通过当地研究助手的协助，用受访者的母语（取决于研究地点，如土尔卡纳、博拉纳或桑布鲁）进行的，而少数采访（特别是与县政府代表、民间社会组织和非政府组织的代表）是用斯瓦希里语和英语进行的。

Fraying Practices: The Isiolo Resort City
磨损实践：依索洛度假城

Just as the Turkana contestation over the spatial alignment of an airport and a resort city can be read in terms of the intimate connection between the temporal and spatial alignment of the corridor, the following example of negotiations over the location of the Isiolo resort city stresses the mobilisation of different pasts, presents and futures and their inscription into the landscape.
正如图尔卡纳人对机场和度假城的空间对齐进行争论可以从走廊的时间和空间对齐之间的密切联系中解读一样，对伊索洛度假城位置的谈判示范强调了不同过去、现在和未来的动员以及它们在景观中的铭刻。

The main rationale behind locating one of the resort cities projected by LAPSSET in Isiolo is that the region offers “one of the most unique tourist menus in the country that can be exploited and harnessed to create positive economic impact” (LCDA 2017:7). In 2011, a feasibility study identified Kipsing Gap (located approximately 20 km north of the town of Isiolo) as the ideal site for the resort city (The Standard 2011). Shortly after, the Kenyan government issued a formal request to the County Council of Isiolo to set aside 6500 acres of land at Kipsing Gap (Daily Nation 2012). Kipsing Gap was considered ideal due to its proximity to Isiolo town and its newly built airport, as well as its strategic location in relation to both the region’s national parks and many private nature and wildlife conservancies. Furthermore, supply of water to the resort city would be solved through a parallel infrastructure project: the construction of the Isiolo mega dam (nicknamed “the Crocodile Jaw Dam”) on the Ewaso Ng’iro river (see Figure 2 for geographical reference). The choice of location for the resort city in Isiolo therefore forms part of the strategic spatial alignment of two key LAPSSET components.
主要原因是 LAPSSET 计划中的一个度假城市选择在伊西奥洛，是因为该地区提供了“全国最独特的旅游菜单之一，可以利用和利用以创造积极的经济影响”（LCDA 2017：7）。2011 年，一项可行性研究确定了 Kipsing Gap（位于伊西奥洛镇以北约 20 公里处）作为度假城市的理想地点（The Standard 2011）。不久之后，肯尼亚政府向伊西奥洛县议会正式提出请求，要求在 Kipsing Gap 保留 6500 英亩的土地（Daily Nation 2012）。由于 Kipsing Gap 靠近伊西奥洛镇及其新建的机场，以及其相对于该地区国家公园和许多私人自然和野生动物保护区的战略位置，因此被认为是理想的地点。此外，度假城市的供水问题将通过平行基础设施项目得到解决：在 Ewaso Ng’iro 河上修建伊西奥洛大坝（昵称“鳄鱼下颚大坝”）（有关地理参考，请参见图2）。 依索洛度假城的选址选择因此成为两个关键 LAPSSET 组成部分的战略空间对齐的一部分。

However, the decision about the resort city’s location was immediately met with contestations among a diversity of national, regional and local stakeholders, citing the risk of land rights conflicts, negative impacts on nature and wildlife conservation, the location’s importance as a grazing land, as well as its close connection with the dam project and subsequent fears of a decrease in access to scarce water resources in downstream areas of Isiolo county (Guyo 2018; Kanyinke 2015; Mulehi 2018). A local chief of a community close to Isiolo town expressed such a critique in the following way:
然而，度假胜地城市位置的决定立即引起了各种国家、地区和当地利益相关者之间的争议，他们指出土地权利冲突的风险、对自然和野生动物保护的负面影响、该位置作为牧场的重要性，以及与水坝项目的密切联系以及随后对伊西奥洛县下游地区稀缺水资源减少的担忧（Guyo 2018; Kanyinke 2015; Mulehi 2018

The people behind LAPSSET are trying to change us. The resort city will finish us! Before we will see a resort city there will be a dam on Ewaso river, and for us the Ewaso river is the main thing for us! You know, our name for our homeland is Waso. The dam will destroy us, not helping us. (Interview with a Borana⁶ chief, 10 January 2019)
LAPSSET 背后的人试图改变我们。度假城市将毁掉我们！在我们看到度假城市之前，Ewaso 河上将修建一座水坝，而对我们来说，Ewaso 河是最重要的！你知道，我们对我们的家园的称呼是 Waso。这座水坝将毁掉我们，而不是帮助我们。（与 Borana 酋长的采访，2019 年 1 月 10 日）

In parallel with increasing voices of public concern, a recent Strategic Impact Assessment of the whole LAPSSET project acknowledged the claimed social importance and ecological fragility of Kipsing Gap and suggests that the area of Kula Mawe, located approximately 80 km east of Isiolo town may be a more feasible location (LCDA 2017). Also, similar to the political mobilisation in Turkana, Isiolo members of the Kenyan parliament have joined the emerging alliance by protesting against attempts by the national government to acquire land for LAPSSET infrastructure in Isiolo County. While most representatives of Borana civil society- and community-based organisations expressed a preference for Kula Mawe as location for the resort city, two representatives of more rurally based organisations stressed that it is primarily in the interest of the urban elite in Isiolo to push for this alternative as they regard eastern Isiolo County as “unused land” (Interviews with CSO representative in Isiolo, 9 and 10 January 2019). However, while acknowledging a friction within the Borana community about the location of the resort city, we also want to highlight a clear thread of consensus in more or less all of our interviews, namely that for many the resort city in particular, and LAPSSET in general, point towards a future of reinforced expansion of the interests of the Kenyan economic and political elite resulting in an increasing marginalisation of the Borana. It is an alternative temporal alignment that draws a straight line between the persecutions of the “Shiftawar” during the 1960s and the persistent post-independence marginalisation of pastoralist Borana by the Kenyan government, to the perceived exclusion and disregard of pastoralist ways of life and identities in LAPSSET plans and visions (Whittaker 2015). According to this narrative, the resort city and the Crocodile Jaw dam projects are poorly aligned with Borana aspirations, and are instead designed to open the drylands for other groups and interests:
与公众关注声音日益增加并行的是，最近对整个 LAPSSET 项目的战略影响评估承认了 Kipsing Gap 的社会重要性和生态脆弱性，并建议位于 Isiolo 镇东约 80 公里处的 Kula Mawe 地区可能是一个更为可行的位置（LCDA 2017）。此外，类似于 Turkana 的政治动员，肯尼亚议会的 Isiolo 成员已加入新兴联盟，抗议国家政府试图在 Isiolo 县获取土地用于 LAPSSET 基础设施。尽管大多数 Borana 公民社会和社区组织的代表表示偏好 Kula Mawe 作为度假城市的位置，但两位来自更农村组织的代表强调，推动这一替代方案主要符合 Isiolo 的城市精英的利益，因为他们认为 Isiolo 县东部是“未利用的土地”（2019 年 1 月 9 日和 10 日在 Isiolo 与 CSO 代表的访谈）。 然而，尽管承认博拉纳社区对度假胜地城市位置存在摩擦，我们也想强调在我们的几乎所有采访中都存在一种明确的共识，即对许多人来说，特别是度假胜地城市，以及 LAPSSET 总体上，都指向了肯尼亚经济和政治精英利益强化扩张的未来，导致博拉纳人日益边缘化。这是一种替代的时间对齐，将 20 世纪 60 年代“Shiftawar”受迫害与肯尼亚政府对独立后牧民博拉纳人的持续边缘化，以及在 LAPSSET 计划和愿景中对牧民生活方式和身份的排斥和忽视之间划定了一条直线（Whittaker 2015）。根据这个叙述，度假城市和鳄鱼嘴大坝项目与博拉纳的愿望并不相符，而是设计用来为其他群体和利益开放干旱地区

We have been told about the resort city and LAPSSET. That it is a government plan. It will come with things that are not Islamic. Lot of people will come. We will get lost. People of Meru⁷ are already claiming 50 km of land. If asked about the resort city, then we don’t want it. We are not ready. It’s the same with Crocodile Jaw. It will cause a big water problem, we will not have water for seven months. You have to go back to the Shifta war, to independence. That experience makes us fear the Kenyan government. You know, the settlement of Meru along the Isiolo border towards Kula Mawe, that is the government, not the Meru. The government don’t want to solve the border dispute. They want a bigger Meru for political reasons. Meru have two million votes. (Interview with a leader of a Muslim faith-based organisation in Isiolo, 11 January 2019)
我们已经听说过度假胜地城市和 LAPSSET。这是一个政府计划。它将带来一些非伊斯兰的东西。很多人会来。我们会迷失方向。梅鲁人已经声称 50 公里的土地。如果被问及度假胜地城市，那我们不想要。我们还没有准备好。鳄鱼咬合也是一样。它会引起严重的水问题，我们将有七个月没有水。你必须回到 Shifta 战争，回到独立。那种经历让我们害怕肯尼亚政府。你知道，梅鲁沿着通往库拉马韦的伊索洛边界的定居点，那是政府，不是梅鲁人。政府不想解决边界争端。他们出于政治原因想要一个更大的梅鲁。梅鲁有两百万选票。（2019 年 1 月 11 日在伊索洛的一位穆斯林信仰组织领导人的采访）

Local media reports suggest that the dispute around the resort city has provoked the LCDA to instruct the Isiolo County Council to also set aside 10,000 acres of land in Kula Mawe for the resort city, but an official decision on the location is still pending (Nkirote 2017). Nevertheless, the story of the resort city is not simply one of a seemingly successful resistance against a specific and limited infrastructure project. The dispute around the location of the Isiolo resort city also highlights how attempts to break out a core component from the spatial alignment of a megaproject, the resort city, makes the rationale of another component, the mega dam, almost obsolete. In addition, and echoing the Turkana case of fraying accounted for above, the practices of fraying on behalf of new political alliances in Isiolo work to expose cracks in LAPSSET alignments by questioning that the connectivity generated by LAPSSET will benefit everyone and significantly contribute to the realisation of Kenya as a unified modern nation. And through such cracks, alternative pasts, presents and futures—alternative temporalities—become visible.
当地媒体报道表明，围绕度假胜地城市的争端已经激起了 LCDA 指示伊索洛县议会也在库拉马韦设置 10,000 英亩土地用于度假城市，但关于位置的官方决定仍在等待中（Nkirote 2017）。然而，度假城市的故事并不仅仅是对特定和有限基础设施项目的看似成功的抵抗。围绕伊索洛度假城市位置的争端还突显了如何试图从大型项目的空间对齐中分离出一个核心组成部分，即度假城市，使得另一个组成部分，即大坝，几乎变得过时。此外，回应上述土尔卡纳案例中的磨损，伊索洛新政治联盟的磨损实践揭示了 LAPSSET 对齐中的裂缝，质疑 LAPSSET 所产生的连接将使每个人受益，并显著促进肯尼亚作为一个统一现代国家的实现。通过这些裂缝，替代的过去、现在和未来——替代的时间性——变得可见。

Conclusion 结论

In this article, we have traced some of the complex and often ambiguous ways in which people directly affected by the LAPSSET Corridor interact with the attempts of central authorities to align the corridor’s components and imaginaries in a way that conjures a coherent megaproject. In order to grasp the ways in which people gauge their relation to the corridor—e.g. as refusing, appropriating or adapting to the pathways sketched out by large infrastructure projects—we have suggested the figures of entangling and fraying. What is more, we have demonstrated that such engagement with megaprojects has ideational and material dimensions. The contestations around LAPSSETT are directed towards the specific spatial and temporal relations that the LAPSSET authorities project into the future. They are at the same time, as for example the cases of the “temporary manyattas” or the Isiolo resort city have shown, inscribed into the landscapes traversed by the corridor.
在本文中，我们追踪了一些直接受到 LAPSSET 走廊影响的人们与中央当局试图使走廊的组成部分和想象力相一致的复杂且常常模糊的互动方式。为了理解人们如何评估他们与走廊的关系——例如拒绝、占用或适应大型基础设施项目勾勒出的路径，我们提出了纠缠和磨损的概念。此外，我们已经证明了与大型项目的这种互动具有观念和物质维度。围绕 LAPSSETT 的争议是针对 LAPSSET 当局投射到未来的具体空间和时间关系。与此同时，正如“临时马尼亚塔”或依索洛度假城的案例所显示的那样，它们被铭刻在走廊穿越的景观中。

In the empirical examples discussed in this paper, the contestations express a fundamental gap between an underlying imagination of how the LAPSSET planners open up space they consider “un-used”, and the values and rights that communities attach to particular places within that space. The contestations also highlight the gap between the imagination that LAPSSET brings a future of connectivity and new economic opportunities to an area historically framed as “underdeveloped”, and the fear among communities that the benefits of LAPSSET are not for them but for the elites. In so doing, communities that reside along the corridor point to the very continuity of political and economic marginalisation that the LAPSSET project officially set out to end. The frictions between different ways to remembering the past and anticipating the future can be interpreted as attempts to add to—or break out of—the temporal alignment intended by the planners.
在本文讨论的实证例子中，争议表达了一个根本差距，即 LAPSSET 规划者如何开辟他们认为“未被使用”的空间的基本想象与社区赋予该空间特定地点的价值和权利之间的差距。争议还突显了 LAPSSET 带来未来互联互通和新经济机会的想象与历史上被定义为“欠发达”的地区之间的差距，以及社区担心 LAPSSET 的好处不是为他们而是为精英阶层。在这样做的过程中，沿走廊居住的社区指出了 LAPSSET 项目正式设定的政治和经济边缘化的持续性。对过去的不同记忆方式和对未来的期望之间的摩擦可以被解释为试图增加或打破规划者所期望的时间对齐。

This paper thus makes a case for recognising the aspirations and engagements of the ones affected by a megaproject. Geographers and anthropologists have demonstrated how infrastructure tends to devise specific futures regularly attached to frictionless mobility and an inclusive modernity (Appel et al 2018; Harvey and Knox 2012; Jasanoff 2014; Müller-Mahn 2020). Resonating with recent critical inquiries into contested temporalities of large infrastructure projects in the East African region (Chome 2020; Hönke and Cuesta-Fernandez 2018; Kochore 2016) we show that the way local populations encounter megaprojects—as a plan in which they have no say, as a force displacing people from their home, as a reminder of entrenched injustice, as a disconcerting future—potentially subverts its careful spatial and temporal alignment. However, as this and similar studies on the “infrastructure scramble” in East Africa also reveal, local practices of engagement with infrastructure projects and their subversive agency are highly diverse as they are situated within particular contexts of political as well as economic relations. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, the multiple ways affected populations engage with megaprojects point to how infrastructural expansion affords new alliances and sites where hegemonic futures are disputed. Considering these sometimes subtle contestations reveals their radical implications in challenging the promise of a linear path towards “progress” that motivates and justifies megaprojects.
这篇论文因此提出了一个观点，即要认识到受到大型项目影响的人们的愿望和参与。地理学家和人类学家已经证明了基础设施往往倾向于制定与无摩擦移动和包容性现代性相关的特定未来（Appel 等人 2018 年；Harvey 和 Knox 2012 年；Jasanoff 2014 年；Müller-Mahn 2020 年）。与最近对东非地区大型基础设施项目争议性时间性的批判性调查相 resonating（Chome 2020 年；Hönke 和 Cuesta-Fernandez 2018 年；Kochore 2016 年），我们展示了当地人口如何遭遇大型项目——作为一个他们无法发表意见的计划，作为一种迫使人们离开家园的力量，作为根深蒂固不公正的提醒，作为令人不安的未来——潜在地颠覆了其谨慎的空间和时间对齐。 然而，正如这项以及东非“基础设施争夺战”类似的研究所揭示的那样，与基础设施项目的当地参与实践及其颠覆性机构一样多样化，因为它们处于特定的政治和经济关系背景之中。尽管承认这一点，受影响人口与大型项目互动的多种方式表明，基础设施扩张提供了新的联盟和地点，这些地点是争议主导未来的地方。考虑到这些有时微妙的争论揭示了它们在挑战“进步”线性道路的承诺方面的激进影响，这种道路激励和证明了大型项目。