Managing culture at British Airways
管理英国航空 （British Airways） 的文化

The British Airways story
英国航空 （British Airways） 的故事

Even by the standards of modern management myths the British Airways transformation was impressive. In the late 70s and early 80s BA was performing disastrously against almost every indicator. An old fleet made for uncomfortable journeys and contributed significantly to the airline’s record for unpunctuality, its productivity was considerably below that of its main overseas competitors, it was beset by industrial disputes—and it was recording substantial financial losses (£140 million or some £200 a minute in 1981). It seemed that staff discontent was more than matched by customer dissatisfaction and in 1980 a survey by the International Airline Passengers’ Association put BA at the top of a list of airlines to be avoided at all costs. By 1996 this picture was reversed. Not only had BA become the world’s most profit- able carrier, it was also voted the company that most graduates would like to work for and, by the year 2000, another survey declared it the second most admired company in Europe.
即使按照现代管理神话的标准，英国航空公司的转型也令人印象深刻。在 70 年代末和 80 年代初，BA 几乎在所有指标上都表现不佳。老旧的机队让旅程不舒适，并在很大程度上导致了该航空公司不守时的记录，其生产力大大低于其主要的海外竞争对手，它受到劳资纠纷的困扰——并且它记录了巨大的财务损失（1981 年为 1.4 亿英镑或每分钟约 200 英镑）。似乎员工的不满与客户的不满相得益彰，1980 年，国际航空公司乘客协会的一项调查将 BA 列为不惜一切代价避免的航空公司名单的首位。到 1996 年，情况发生了逆转。英航不仅成为世界上最赚钱的航空公司，还被评选为大多数毕业生愿意工作的公司，到 2000 年，另一项调查宣布其为欧洲第二大最受尊敬的公司。

Much of the management literature attributes this turnaround to BA’s own cultural change which remodelled staff attitudes and set customer care as the primary focus of activity. As Doyle noted:
许多管理文献将这种转变归因于 BA 自身的文化变革，这种变革重塑了员工的态度，并将客户服务作为活动的主要重点。正如 Doyle 所指出的：

In the 80s BA had been transformed from a disastrous loss-making state enterprise—the British Rail of the sky—into the world’s largest and most profitable international airline. It was a triumph for management, showing that Britain could produce world-class companies that could beat the best of the competition. Its success was the result of the process and strategy that management introduced. The process focused on creating a vision that would inspire the BA staff and gain their enthusiastic commitment.
在 80 年代，BA 已经从一家灾难性的亏损国有企业——英国天空铁路公司——转变为世界上最大、最赚钱的国际航空公司。这是管理层的胜利，表明英国可以培养出能够击败最优秀竞争对手的世界级公司。它的成功是管理层引入的流程和战略的结果。该过程的重点是创建一个愿景，以激励 BA 员工并获得他们的热情承诺。

It is certainly true that a great deal of effort and energy went into shaping BA’s culture. At the heart of this was the ‘Putting People First’ training programme launched by Colin Marshall, the company’s new chief executive, in December 1983. Originally intended for staff who had direct contact with customers, it was, in fact, attended by all 40,000 employees by 1986 and it aimed to revolutionise their attitudes. In a direct challenge to the hierarchical and militaristic culture that existing in BA at the time, staff were instructed not to attend in uniform and, once on the course, put into cross-functional and cross-grade groups. The course itself was consciously designed to modify behaviour. Attendees were encouraged to take a more positive attitude to themselves, taught how to set personal goals and cope with stress and instructed in confidence building and ‘getting what they wanted out of life’. Lapel badges inscribed with the motto “We’re putting people first” provided a visible reminder of the course’s message.
诚然，我们付出了大量的努力和精力来塑造 BA 的文化。其核心是公司新任首席执行官 Colin Marshall 于 1983 年 12 月发起的“以人为本”培训计划。它最初是为那些直接接触客户的员工准备的，事实上，到 1986 年，所有 40,000 名员工都参加了它，它旨在彻底改变他们的态度。为了直接挑战当时 BA 中存在的等级制度和军国主义文化，工作人员被指示不要穿制服参加，一旦进入课程，就被分为跨职能和跨年级的小组。 该课程本身是有意识地设计来改变行为的。鼓励与会者对自己采取更积极的态度，教他们如何设定个人目标和应对压力，并指导建立信心和“从生活中得到他们想要的东西”。刻有“我们以人为本”座右铭的翻领徽章直观地提醒了该课程的信息。

The approach was self-consciously “in-doc-trina-tive”. As Colin Marshall said:
这种方法是自觉的 “in-doc-trina-tive”。正如 Colin Marshall 所说：

We ... have to ‘design’ our people and their service attitude just as we design an aircraft seat, an in-flight entertainment programme or an airport lounge to meet the needs and pref- erences of our customers. (cited in Barsoux and Manzoni emphasis added).
我们。。。必须“设计”我们的员工及其服务态度，就像我们设计飞机座椅、机上娱乐节目或机场休息室以满足客户的需求和偏好一样。 （引自 Barsoux 和 Manzoni强调）。

Colin Marshall’s own personal commitment is one of the most written-about features of the PPF programme. He attended 95 per cent of the PPF courses, setting out his vision for BA and participating in question and answer sessions with staff (though this figure is reported as 40 per cent in Barsoux and Manzoni.) This involvement extended beyond the PPF programme. Each time he flew the chief executive would introduce himself to front line staff and passengers and discuss their experience of BA. Once, when a queue formed at the launch of a new service he helped to deliver breakfasts to customers. In his presence all of the symbols of the ‘new culture’ were expected to be in place— even down to the PPF lapel badges. Staff not wearing one of these had replacements pinned in place and Colin Marshall wore his own PPF badge for two years.
Colin Marshall 自己的个人承诺是 PPF 计划中被报道最多的特色之一。他参加了 95% 的 PPF 课程，阐述了他对 BA 的愿景，并参加了与工作人员的问答环节（尽管据报道，这个数字在巴苏和曼佐尼为 40%）。这种参与超出了 PPF 计划。每次飞行时，这位首席执行官都会向一线工作人员和乘客介绍自己，并讨论他们在 BA 的体验。有一次，当一项新服务推出时排起了长队时，他帮助为客户提供早餐。在他面前，所有“新文化”的象征都被期望到位——甚至包括 PPF 翻领徽章。没有佩戴其中任何一个的工作人员都固定了替代品，Colin Marshall 佩戴了自己的 PPF 徽章两年。

But the most impressive aspect of BA’s cultural change is not so much the sophistication of the PPF programme itself, nor the commitment of executive time, but the extent to which other employment policies and practices were changed to fit the ‘new’ culture and the continued emphasis on these practices and pro- grammes throughout the 80s and 90s. Three-quarters of the one hundred Customer First teams, formed to propagate the message of PPF, survived into the 90s. Not only were team briefings and team working introduced but these were developed and refined with TQM (total quality management), autonomous team working and multi-skilling introduced in many areas. Direct contact with all staff was considered so important that ‘down route’ briefings were developed to ensure that mobile and isolated staff were not neglected and in March 1996 BA became the first company to make daily TV broadcasts to its staff.
但是，BA 文化变革最令人印象深刻的方面不是 PPF 计划本身的复杂程度，也不是高管时间的投入，而是其他就业政策和做法的改变程度，以适应 “新 ”文化，以及在整个 80 年代和 90 年代对这些做法和计划的持续强调。 为传播 PPF 信息而成立的 100 个客户至上团队中，有四分之三幸存到 90 年代。不仅引入了团队简报和团队合作，而且通过在许多领域引入 TQM（全面质量管理）、自主团队工作和多技能来开发和完善这些内容。与所有员工的直接接触被认为非常重要，因此制定了“下行”简报，以确保不会忽视移动和孤立的员工，1996 年 3 月，BA 成为第一家向员工进行每日电视广播的公司。

In addition to this, emotions were increasingly emphasised in the work process. The way cabin crew were rostered was changed, creating ‘families’ of staff to work the same shift patterns. These were intended to provide mutual support, make cabin crew feel happier about their work environments and, as a result, facilitate the production of emotional labour. A new role of ‘Passenger Group Co-ordinator’ was introduced and staff appointed based entirely on personal qualities. The importance of emotional pro- cesses was also reflected in the new appraisal and reward systems such that work was judged on the way in which it was performed as well as against harder targets. Managerial bonuses could be as much as 20 per cent of salary and were calculated on a straight 50:50 split between exhibiting desired
除此之外，情感在工作过程中越来越受到强调。机组人员的排班方式发生了变化，创建了员工“家庭”以相同的轮班模式工作。这些旨在提供相互支持，让机组人员对他们的工作环境感到更快乐，从而促进情感劳动的产生。引入了“乘客团体协调员”的新角色，并完全根据个人素质任命员工。情感过程的重要性也反映在新的评估和奖励制度中，这样，工作是根据其执行方式以及更难的目标来评判的。管理奖金可能高达工资的 20%，并且按照表现出期望的 50：50 的比例直接分配

behaviours and achieving quantitative goals. Awards for Excellence and an Employee Brain- waves programme encouraged staff input. The Personnel Department was renamed ‘Human Resources’ with many decisions devolved to line managers and, in the first few years of the programme at least, a commitment was made to job security.
行为和实现量化目标。 卓越奖和员工脑电波计划鼓励员工投入。人事部更名为“人力资源部”，许多决定权下放给直线经理，至少在该计划的最初几年，对工作保障做出了承诺。

Closely following these developments, a Managing People First programme targeted managerial employees and aimed to bring their behaviours into line with a list developed by two consultancy firms. As on PPF, the emphasis on this five-day course was on quasi-group therapy and experiential exercises. Outward bound courses were also intended to support the re-shaping of personality and the small groups formed on these residential programmes were expected to act as mutual support vehicles once back in the workplace.
紧跟这些发展，“管理人才优先”计划以管理员工为目标，旨在使他们的行为与两家咨询公司制定的清单保持一致。 与 PPF 一样，这个为期五天的课程的重点是准团体治疗和体验式练习。拓展课程也旨在支持人格的重塑，在这些住宿计划中形成的小组被期望在回到工作场所后充当相互支持的工具。

Other courses were developed to maintain the momentum created by Putting People First and Managing People First. These included Winning for Customers, A Day in the Life, To Be the Best, Leading in a Service Business and Leadership 2000 and, while each was different, they all shared a focus on shaping staff emotional attitudes to work. The most dramatic form of this was probably the ‘love bath’ exercise in one of the early courses in which delegates took it in turns to sit in the centre of a circle while their colleagues complimented them (see for an account of participants’ reactions to this process). Nearly twenty years after the launch of PPF, BA managers attending a training course were still being told about understanding themselves and taking responsibility:
开发其他课程是为了保持 Putting People First 和 Managing People First 创造的势头。这些奖项包括 Winning for Customers、A Day in the Life、To Be the Best、Leading in a Service Business 和 Leadership 2000，虽然每个奖项各不相同，但它们都专注于塑造员工对工作的情感态度。其中最引人注目的形式可能是早期课程中的 “爱浴 ”练习，代表们轮流坐在一个圆圈的中心，而他们的同事则称赞他们（参见参与者对这个过程的反应）。 在 PPF 推出近 20 年后，参加培训课程的 BA 经理们仍然被告知如何了解自己和承担责任：

“understanding self is our starting point .... That means that to make a change within the airline we need to start with you—what can you do differently.”
“理解自我是我们的起点......这意味着，要在航空公司内部做出改变，我们需要从您开始 - 您可以做些什么不同的事情。“

In 1995, Bob Ayling, newly taken over from Colin Marshall as chief executive, continued this active management of company culture and said of his staff:
1995 年，新接替科林·马歇尔 （Colin Marshall） 担任首席执行官的鲍勃·艾林 （Bob Ayling） 继续积极管理公司文化，并谈到他的员工：

“I want them to feel inspired, I want them to feel optimistic, I want them to feel that this is a good place to be.”
“我希望他们感到鼓舞，我希望他们感到乐观，我希望他们觉得这是一个好地方。“

Such substantive change certainly seems to justify the plaudits heaped on it. But this kind of fairy tale suffers from a number of flaws. Most significantly, as Anthony notes, together with other prescriptive presentations of culture change, it neglects structure. Yet the existence of cultural factors does not negate the effects of more material ones and there were certainly structural reasons for BA’s success. Colin Marshall’s emphasis on putting people first and caring for one another had been preceded by a rule of fear. BA’s first response to its problems had been a massive series of redundancies, the largest in British history at the time, with staff numbers reduced by 40 per cent between 1981 and 1983 (albeit with generous severance). Senior staff were not exempt from this process, with 161 being ‘removed’ overnight on one memorable occasion in 1983.
这种实质性的变化似乎无疑证明了对其所施加的赞誉是合理的。但这种童话故事存在许多缺陷。最重要的是，正如 Anthony 所指出的，它与其他关于文化变革的规范性陈述一起，忽视了结构。 然而，文化因素的存在并不能否定更多物质因素的影响，BA 的成功肯定有结构性的原因。科林·马歇尔 （Colin Marshall） 强调以人为本并相互关心，在此之前有一条恐惧规则。英航对其问题的第一反应是一系列大规模的裁员，这是当时英国历史上最大的一次裁员，在 1981 年至 1983 年期间，员工人数减少了 40%（尽管有慷慨的遣散费）。高级职员也不能免于这一过程，在 1983 年的一个值得纪念的时刻，有 161 人在一夜之间被“撤职”。

More fundamentally, the company was well provided with slots in Britain’s prestigious Heathrow airport and faced little competition on many of the routes that it served. European markets were still tightly regulated and market share often depended on negotiation skills rather than competitive success. In 1987 just before privatisation, BA controlled some 60 per cent of the UK domestic market and only experienced competition on 9 per cent of its routes into and out of the UK. Post privatisation its position was actually strengthened when it gained a 75 per cent share of domestic routes. Such was BA’s dominance during this period that it could almost charge what it liked. Moreover, BA built up a series of alliances and mergers to consolidate this position.
更根本的是，该公司在英国著名的希思罗机场拥有充足的航班时刻，并且在其服务的许多航线上几乎没有面临竞争。欧洲市场仍然受到严格监管，市场份额通常取决于谈判技巧，而不是竞争成功。1987 年，就在私有化之前，英航控制了大约 60% 的英国国内市场，而进出英国的航线上只有 9% 的竞争。私有化后，当它在国内航线中获得 75% 的份额时，它的地位实际上得到了加强。这就是 BA 在此期间的主导地位，它几乎可以为它喜欢的东西充电。此外，BA 建立了一系列联盟和合并来巩固这一地位。

While staff numbers were being drastically cut the infrastructure was dramatically improved. The fact that new uniforms were provided is well covered in the human resource and marketing literature. Less commonly noted is that BA invested in control systems, terminal facilities and aircraft: between 1980 and 1985 BA replaced over half its fleet. Computer reservations were introduced, a series of hub and spoke routes through first Heathrow and then Gatwick networked flights, and selectively focused competitive pricing served to limit what little competition the airline faced. Nor was this the only strategy deployed against competitors. In 1993 BA used shared booking information to persuade Virgin customers to transfer to BA, informing them (incorrectly) that Virgin flights were no longer available. The subsequent court case cost BA £610,000 in dam- ages and £3 million in costs, and raised questions about the extent of knowledge and involvement of the chairman (Lord King), the chief executive (Sir Colin Marshall) and Bob Ayling, the head of marketing, as well as criticising the impact of the BA culture itself.
虽然员工人数大幅减少，但基础设施得到了显著改善。提供新制服的事实在人力资源和营销文献中得到了很好的介绍。但不太常见的是，英航在控制系统、航站楼设施和飞机方面进行了投资：1980 年至 1985 年期间，英航更换了一半以上的机队。引入了计算机预订，首先通过希思罗机场和盖特威克机场联网航班的一系列轴辐式航线，以及选择性地集中竞争性定价，以限制航空公司面临的微弱竞争。这也不是针对竞争对手的唯一策略。1993 年，英航使用共享的预订信息说服维珍客户转乘英航，并（错误地）通知他们维珍航班不再可用。随后的法庭案件使 BA 损失了 610,000 英镑和 300 万英镑的费用，并引发了对董事长 （Lord King）、首席执行官 （Sir Colin Marshall） 和营销主管 Bob Ayling 的知情和参与程度的质疑，并批评了 BA 文化本身的影响。

Not only can much of the BA turnaround be attributed to structural factors, but also the extent of the company’s cultural transformation itself is open to question. There is little doubt that, in theory, cultural change interventions are both manipulative and totalitarian, seeking as they do influence and control over the thoughts, values, attitudes and norms of others. Yet such hegemony is easier to describe than it is to secure. Employees are not cultural dupes. Co-operation may reflect ambition or pride in work as much as (or instead of) a belief in the organis- ation itself. And Hopfl’s account of British Airways managers in the ‘new’ culture reveals hostility and uncertainty as well as enthusiasm. Further, despite the claims of the prescriptive literature, the existence of ‘culture management’ does not ensure either that employees trust management, or that management trusts employees. So, in BA, ‘new’ management practices varied in the extent to which they were introduced in departments, and conflict between employees and management did not cease. Even at the point at which the company’s unified culture was being heralded as a success at least one bargaining group a year ended up in dispute with it.
不仅 BA 的扭亏为盈在很大程度上可以归因于结构性因素，而且公司文化转型本身的程度也值得怀疑。毫无疑问，从理论上讲，文化变革干预既是操纵性的，也是极权主义的，它们试图影响和控制他人的思想、价值观、态度和规范。然而，这种霸权描述起来容易，而不是确保。员工不是文化骗子。合作可能反映出对工作的雄心或自豪感，以及（或代替）对组织本身的信念。Hopfl 对“新”文化中英国航空公司经理的描述揭示了敌意和不确定性以及热情。此外，尽管规范性文献声称，“文化管理”的存在并不能确保员工信任管理层，也不能确保管理层信任员工。因此，在 BA 中，“新”管理实践在部门中引入的程度各不相同，员工和管理层之间的冲突并没有停止。即使在公司的统一文化被誉为成功的时候，每年至少有一个谈判小组与之发生争议。

Nor was the much vaunted job security quite as robust as it seemed. Alliances, mergers and franchising agreements with other airlines already supported what was, in effect a ‘tiered’ system of terms and conditions with employees based at Heathrow privileged over those in the regional airports. This emphasis on part-time, seasonal and sub-contracted work was extended to most aspects of BA’s operations. Its engine overhaul plant was sold off to GEC, data processing work was moved to Bombay, and job security for existing staff questioned. And all this at a time when BA was making record profits.
大肆吹嘘的工作保障也并不像看起来那么强大。与其他航空公司的联盟、合并和特许经营协议已经支持了实际上的“分层”条款和条件系统，希思罗机场的员工比区域机场的员工享有特权。这种对兼职、季节性和分包工作的重视扩展到 BA 运营的大部分方面。其发动机大修厂被卖给了 GEC，数据处理工作转移到孟买，现有员工的工作保障受到质疑。而这一切都是在 BA 赚取创纪录利润的时候。

In short, BA, while putting a great deal of effort into encouraging certain behaviours from staff, did not base its employment policies and practices around the new culture in the way that many accounts suggest. Their array of human resource management techniques was certainly impressive but not everyone benefited from them and those employed in partner associate, merged or taken-over firms often experienced very different terms and connections to the core BA staff. Staff reactions to “culture change” included enthusiasm and acceptance but also doubt, concern, opposition and open cynicism. Such individual reactions were mirrored by the collective representation and the persistence of disputes even at the height of the “cultural success”.
简而言之，BA 虽然投入了大量精力来鼓励员工的某些行为，但并没有像许多报道所暗示的那样，将其就业政策和实践建立在新文化的基础上。他们的一系列人力资源管理技术无疑令人印象深刻，但并不是每个人都从中受益，而且那些受雇于合伙人、助理、合并或被接管公司的人通常经历了与核心 BA 员工的非常不同的条款和联系。员工对“文化变革”的反应包括热情和接受，但也包括怀疑、担忧、反对和公开的愤世嫉俗。这种个人反应反映在集体代表和持续存在的争论上，即使在“文化成功”的高峰期也是如此。

The 1997 dispute: change or continuity?
1997 年的争论：变化还是连续性？

By the end of the 1990s many of the structural factors that had provided the basis for the company’s success were under threat. The newly-emerged low cost carriers such as Easyjet and Ryanair were undercutting BA’s prices and, elsewhere, alliances between rivals Lufthansa and United Airlines ensured that cross national traffic would be less likely to transfer to BA. The company’s hold on Heathrow was also loosening under double pressure from Europe and the USA. In response, Ayling claimed BA needed a second revolution. BA sought its own alliance with American Airlines, which came under the (unhurried) scrutiny of regulators in both Brussels and the USA, as well as proposing £1 billion of cost savings from within the organisation, with the aim of doubling profits by the year 2000. Much of this was to come from staff savings including 5,000 voluntary redundancies with staff to be replaced by newly hired employees on lower pay. In addition, BA established links with a charter airline called Flying Colours intending to continue its policy of outsourcing to other operators.
到 1990 年代末，为公司成功提供基础的许多结构性因素都受到了威胁。Easyjet 和 Ryanair 等新兴的低成本航空公司正在降低 BA 的价格，而在其他地方，竞争对手汉莎航空和美国联合航空之间的联盟确保了跨国客运不太可能转移到 BA。在来自欧洲和美国的双重压力下，该公司对希思罗机场的控制也在松动。作为回应，Ayling 声称 BA 需要第二次革命。英航寻求与美国航空公司结盟，该联盟受到了布鲁塞尔和美国监管机构的（不紧不慢的）审查，并提议从组织内部节省 10 亿英镑的成本，目标是到 2000 年将利润翻一番。其中大部分来自员工储蓄，包括 5,000 名自愿裁员，员工将由新雇用的较低工资员工取代。此外，BA 还与一家名为 Flying Colours 的包机航空公司建立了联系，打算继续将其外包给其他运营商的政策。

This policy of reducing labour costs was also extended to ‘core’ BA staff. In early 1997, BA attempted to change the structure of payments to cabin crew. It was proposed that the existing employees would be ‘bought out’ of their series of allowances (petrol, overnight stay etc.) by receiving a higher basic wage. BA offered a three-year guarantee that no crew member would earn less under the new system but nothing beyond that and it was clear to cabin crew staff that the measure was launched with the explicit aim of saving money. When these negotiations failed, one union, the TGWU, threatened strike action (Cabin Crew 89, a small breakaway union, had already accepted management’s offer). Despite fourteen years of ‘indoctrination’ into caring for one another and putting people first, the tactics deployed by BA’s management were described by two such different sources as the TUC and The Economist as bullying. Members of the cabin crew were warned not to strike and BA managers were instructed to tell discontented staff that anyone taking industrial action would be summarily sacked, then sued for damages. Any who simply stayed away would face disciplinary action, be denied pro- motion, and lose both pension rights and staff discounts on flights for three years. BA was also reported to be filming pickets.
这种降低劳动力成本的政策也扩展到了“核心”BA 员工。1997 年初，英航试图改变向机组人员支付费用的结构。有人提议通过获得更高的基本工资来“买断”现有员工的一系列津贴（汽油、过夜等）。英航提供了三年保证，在新系统下，没有机组人员的收入会减少，但除此之外就没有了，而且机组人员很清楚，这项措施的推出目的很明确，目的是省钱。当这些谈判失败时，一个工会 TGWU 威胁要采取罢工行动（Cabin Crew 89 是一个小型分离工会，已经接受了管理层的提议）。尽管 14 年来一直被“灌输”互相关心和以人为本，但 BA 管理层部署的策略被 TUC 和《经济学人》等两个不同的来源描述为欺凌。机组人员被警告不要罢工，并指示英航经理告诉不满的员工，任何采取工业行动的人都将被立即解雇，然后被起诉要求赔偿。任何 不参加的人都将面临纪律处分，被拒绝动议，并在 3 年内失去养老金权利和员工航班折扣。据报道，BA 还在拍摄纠察队。

The subsequent strike ballot had an 80 per cent turnout with 73 per cent of employees voting in favour of strike action. The TGWU called a series of 72-hour strikes with the first action scheduled for 9 July 1997. In response, temporary staff and an alternative workforce of ‘volunteer managers’ were given a (probably inadequate) training to perform the key tasks of the ground handling staff and BA threatened to take legal action over claimed discrepancies in the ballot. On the eve of the first day of action airline cabin crew were telephoned at home and warned that ‘they had a duty to co-operate with their employer’.
随后的罢工投票率为 80%，其中 73% 的员工投票赞成罢工行动。TGWU 发起了一系列 72 小时的罢工，第一次行动定于 1997 年 7 月 9 日进行。作为回应，临时员工和“志愿经理”的替代劳动力接受了（可能不充分的）培训，以执行地勤人员的关键任务，英航威胁要对选票中声称的差异采取法律行动。在行动的第一天前夕，航空公司的机组人员在家中接到电话，警告说“他们有责任与雇主合作”。

These managerial actions certainly influenced the impact of the strike. On the first scheduled day of action less than three hundred workers declared themselves officially on strike but more than 2,000 called in sick. The company’s threats and ‘replacement workers’ notwithstanding more than 70 per cent of flights from Heathrow were cancelled. It seemed that BA’s macho approach had ensured only that collective action took the form of collective illness.
这些管理行动无疑影响了罢工的影响。在预定的行动第一天，只有不到 300 名工人正式宣布罢工，但有 2,000 多人请病假。尽管该公司威胁和“替代工人”，但超过 70% 的希思罗机场航班被取消。BA 的男子气概似乎只确保了集体行动以集体疾病的形式出现。

Ironically this ‘mass sickie’ served to make things worse for BA. Not only did the pre-strike ballots (conducted to comply with legislation designed to discourage union activities) com- pound the effects of the strike by providing customers with advance notice of it; but also those employees who had called in sick tended to stay away longer than the official 72-hour strike. BA insisted that sick employees provide a doctor’s note within 48 hours instead of the normal seven days but many employees still stayed off for the full two weeks that their sick notes allowed and, throughout this period, services were cancelled and passengers turned away. The strike was costly. Airline seats are a particularly perishable form of consumer good and aircraft scheduling is easily disrupted. When Bill Morris, the General Secretary of the TGWU announced that he had written to Bob Ayling, suggesting that they resume negotiations, Ayling agreed before even receiving the letter.
具有讽刺意味的是，这种“大规模病态”使 BA 的情况变得更糟。罢工前的投票（为遵守旨在阻止工会活动的立法而进行）不仅通过提前通知客户来削弱罢工的影响;但那些请病假的员工也往往比正式的 72 小时罢工时间更长。英航坚持要求生病的员工在 48 小时内提供医生证明，而不是通常的 7 天，但许多员工仍然在病假证明允许的整整两周内休假，在此期间，服务被取消，乘客被拒之门外。罢工代价高昂。航空公司的座位是一种特别容易腐烂的消费品，飞机时刻表很容易被打乱。当 TGWU 秘书长比尔·莫里斯 （Bill Morris） 宣布他已写信给鲍勃·艾林 （Bob Ayling） 建议他们恢复谈判时，艾林甚至在收到这封信之前就同意了。

The TGWU promised to save £42 million over three years. Catering was sold off but existing staff kept earnings and BA staff discounts, while sanctions against strikers were withdrawn and the TGWU increased its membership by 50 per cent to over 10,000. BA’s management fared less well, despite Bob Ayling’s claim that this agreement marked a ‘new beginning and spirit of a co-operation’. The gulf between the managerial rhetoric on culture and official actions during the strike had a predictable effect on employee morale. One undercover employee publication, aptly named Chaos advised on ways of maximising payments by delaying aircraft. These included throwing duvet feathers into the engine, superglueing down the toilet seat and poisoning the pilot: “a particularly obnoxious captain can be made to suffer all the symptoms of violent food poisoning by emptying eye drops from the aircraft medical kit into his salad or drink”.
TGWU 承诺在三年内节省 4200 万英镑。餐饮被出售，但现有员工保留了收入和 BA 员工折扣，同时撤销了对罢工者的制裁，TGWU 将其会员人数增加了 50%，达到 10,000 多人。英航的管理层表现不佳，尽管鲍勃·艾林 （Bob Ayling） 声称该协议标志着“合作的新开始和精神”。 罢工期间管理层关于文化的言论与官方行动之间的鸿沟对员工士气产生了可预见的影响。一家名为 Chaos 的卧底员工出版物 就通过延迟飞机来最大化付款的方法提出了建议。这些行为包括将羽绒被羽毛扔进发动机、用强力胶粘住马桶座圈和毒害飞行员：“一个特别令人讨厌的机长可以通过将飞机医疗箱中的眼药水倒入他的沙拉或饮料中，从而遭受剧烈食物中毒的所有症状”。

Moreover, the agreement itself fostered further dissent. 4,000 staff left by the end of 1997 but 4,500 more were recruited including 2,000 in 1998. By the terms of the agreement, these new staff were employed on different contracts to existing employees. As a result, cabin crew working the same shifts on the same aircraft were (increasingly) on different pay scales. The impact of this on both labour relations and BA’s much prized team-working was problematic and problems were fuelled by suggestions that BA favoured employees on new contracts for promotion to purser (first line manager). Bob Ayling attempted to salvage the situation by placing more emphasis on managing the company’s culture. Following Colin Marshall he addressed staff training sessions and held question and answer forums with groups of employees. This time there were few positive reactions. The strike cost BA £125 million; morale never entirely recovered and profits suffered. Between 1998 and 1999 they fell by 61 per cent and in 2000 British Air- ways announced losses of £244 million on its main business. While gains from disposals succeeded in keeping the company out of the red this was its worst performance (and first loss) since privatisation. The new logo Bob Ayling had launched (at great expense) during the 1997 dispute was unpopular and had to be withdrawn. These failures so coloured the public perception of the chief executive that even his attempts to refocus BA onto profitable routes and introduce a new seat for business class long haul passengers were not entirely welcomed. On 10 March 2000, Bob Ayling resigned as chief executive.
此外，该协议本身也引发了进一步的异议。到 1997 年底，有 4,000 名员工离开，但又招聘了 4,500 人，其中包括 1998 年的 2,000 人。根据协议条款，这些新员工的合同与现有员工不同。因此，在同一架飞机上轮班工作的机组人员（越来越多地）处于不同的工资等级。这对劳资关系和 BA 备受推崇的团队合作的影响是有问题的，并且有建议称 BA 偏爱签订新合同的员工晋升为乘务长（一线经理），从而加剧了问题。鲍勃·艾林 （Bob Ayling） 试图通过更加重视管理公司文化来挽救局面。继 Colin Marshall 之后，他在员工培训课程上发表了演讲，并与员工团体举行了问答论坛。这一次几乎没有积极的反应。罢工使英航损失了 1.25 亿英镑;士气从未完全恢复，利润受到影响。1998 年至 1999 年期间，它们下降了 61%，2000 年，英国航空公司宣布其主要业务亏损 2.44 亿英镑。虽然出售收益成功地使公司免于亏损，但这是自私有化以来最糟糕的表现（也是第一次亏损）。鲍勃·艾林 （Bob Ayling） 在 1997 年争端期间（花费巨资）推出的新标志不受欢迎，不得不撤回。这些失败使公众对首席执行官的看法蒙上了一层阴影，以至于即使他试图将 BA 的重点重新集中在盈利航线上，并为商务舱长途乘客引入新座位，也并不完全受到欢迎。2000 年 3 月 10 日，鲍勃·艾林 （Bob Ayling） 辞去首席执行官一职。

Questions
问题

From a managerial perspective, what are the main obstacles to improving organizational effectiveness [case study of your choice]?
从管理的角度来看，提高组织效率的主要障碍是什么 [您选择的案例研究]？

What can we learn from the approaches taken by management to improve organizational effectiveness in the case?
我们可以从管理层采取的方法中学到什么来提高案例中的组织效率？

How might we explain the employee reactions to managerial decisions in this case?
在这种情况下，我们如何解释员工对管理决策的反应？

What might have been a better course of action for both managers and employees at [in the case explored]?
对于 [在所探讨的案例中] 的经理和员工来说，什么可能是更好的行动方案？

Please draw upon between three to five of the sessions covered:
请借鉴其中的 3 到 5 节课：

Power and resistance
功率和电阻

Leadership and Followership
领导与追随

Change management
变更管理

Managerial Control
管理控制

Decision making
决策

Managing ethically
合乎道德地管理

Strategy
策略

Operations
操作

Critically reflect on these areas to answer the questions and explore the case study explored.
批判性地反思这些领域以回答问题并探索所探索的案例研究。