PARADIGMATIC CONTROVERSIES, CONTRADICTIONS, AND EMERGING CONFLUENCES
範式爭議、矛盾和新興融合

oriented studies and dissertations. Third, the number of qualitative texts, research papers, workshops, and training materials has exploded. Indeed, it would be difficult to miss the distinct turn of the social sciences toward more interpretive, postmodern, and criticalist practices and theorizing (Bloland, 1989, 1995). This nonpositivist orientation has created a context (surround) in which virtually no study can go unchallenged by proponents of contending paradigms. Further, it is obvious that the number of practitioners of newparadigm inquiry is growing daily. There can be no question that the legitimacy of postmodern paradigms is well established and at least equal to the legitimacy of received and conventional paradigms (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).
導向性研究和論文。第三，定性文本、研究論文、研討會和培訓材料的數量激增。事實上，社會科學明顯轉向更具解釋性、後現代和批判性實踐和理論化（Bloland，1989 年，1995 年），這一轉向使得幾乎沒有研究能夠逃脫對立範式支持者的挑戰。此外，顯而易見的是，新範式探究的實踐者數量每天都在增加。毫無疑問，後現代範式的合法性已得到確立，至少與傳統範式的合法性相當（Denzin＆Lincoln，1994 年）。

On the matter of hegemony, or supremacy, among postmodern paradigms, it is clear that Geertz's prophecy about the "blurring of genres" is rapidly being fulfilled. Inquiry methodology can no longer be treated as a set of universally applicable rules or abstractions. Methodology is inevitably interwoven with and emerges from the nature of particular disciplines
關於後現代範式中的霸權或至高無上的問題，很明顯，吉爾茨對「類型模糊」的預言正在迅速實現。調查方法論不再能被視為一套普遍適用的規則或抽象。方法論不可避免地與特定學科的性質交織在一起並從中產生。
(such as sociology and psychology) and particular perspectives (such as Marxism, feminist theory, and queer theory). So, for instance, we can read feminist critical theorists such as Olesen (2000) or queer theorists such as Gamson (2000), or we can follow arguments about teachers as researchers (Kincheloe, 1991) while we understand the secondary text to be teacher empowerment and democratization of schooling practices. Indeed, the various paradigms are beginning to "interbreed" such that two theorists previously thought to be in irreconcilable conflict may now appear, under a different theoretical rubric, to be informing one another's arguments. A personal example is our own work, which has been heavily influenced by action research practitioners and postmodern critical theorists. Consequently, to argue that it is paradigms that are in contention is probably less useful than to probe where and how paradigms exhibit confluence and where and how they exhibit differences, controversies, and contradictions.
（例如社會學和心理學）和特定觀點（如馬克思主義、女性主義理論和酷兒理論）。因此，例如，我們可以閱讀女性主義批評理論家如奧萊森（2000 年）或酷兒理論家如蓋姆森（2000 年），或者我們可以追隨關於教師作為研究者的論點（金切洛，1991 年），同時我們理解次級文本是教師賦權和學校實踐的民主化。事實上，各種範式開始“雜交”，以至於兩位先前被認為在不可調和衝突中的理論家現在可能在不同的理論框架下，互相影響對方的論點。一個個人例子是我們自己的工作，受到行動研究實踐者和後現代批評理論家的重大影響。因此，爭論的焦點可能不是範式之間的爭論，而更有用的可能是探究範式在哪裡以及如何展現融合，以及在哪裡以及如何展現差異、爭議和矛盾。

In our chapter in the first edition of this Handbook, we presented two tables that summarized our positions, first; on the axiomatic nature of paradigms (the paradigms we considered at that time were positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109, Table 6.1); and second, on the issues we believed were most fundamental to differentiating the four paradigms (p.112, Table 6.2). These tables are reproduced here as a way of reminding our readers of our previous statements. The axioms defined the ontological, epistemological, and methodological bases for both established and emergent paradigms; these are shown here in Table 8.1. The issues most often in contention that we examined were inquiry aim, nature of knowledge, the way knowledge is accumulated, goodness (rigor and validity) or quality criteria, values, ethics, voice, training, accommodation, and hegemony; these are shown in Table 8.2. An examination of these two tables will reacquaint the reader with our original Handbook treatment; more detailed information is, of course, available in our original chapter.
在本手冊第一版的章節中，我們呈現了兩個總結我們立場的表格，首先是關於範式的公理性本質（當時我們考慮的範式包括實證主義、後實證主義、批判理論和建構主義；Guba＆Lincoln，1994 年，第 109 頁，表 6.1）；第二是我們認為最基本的區分四種範式的問題（第 112 頁，表 6.2）。這些表格在這裡重現，以提醒讀者我們先前的陳述。這些公理定義了既定和新興範式的本體論、認識論和方法論基礎；這些在表 8.1 中顯示。我們檢視的最常爭議的問題包括探究目的、知識的性質、知識累積方式、優質（嚴謹和有效性）或品質標準、價值觀、倫理、聲音、培訓、適應和霸權；這些在表 8.2 中顯示。檢視這兩個表格將使讀者重新熟悉我們原始手冊的內容；當然，更詳細的信息可在我們原始章節中找到。

Since publication of that chapter, at least one set of authors, John Heron and Peter Reason, have elaborated on our tables to include the participatory/cooperative paradigm (Heron, 1996; Heron & Reason, 1997, pp. 289-290). Thus, in addition to the paradigms of positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism, we add the participatory paradigm in the present chapter (this is an excellent example, we might add, of the hermeneutic elaboration so embedded in our own view, constructivism).
自從該章節發表以來，至少有一組作者，約翰·赫倫和彼得·理智，已經對我們的表格進行了詳細說明，包括參與/合作範式（赫倫，1996 年；赫倫和理智，1997 年，第 289-290 頁）。因此，除了實證主義、後實證主義、批判理論和建構主義的範式之外，我們在本章中還添加了參與範式（這是一個很好的例子，我們可以補充說，這是我們自己觀點中融入的解釋詳述的一個很好的例子，建構主義）。

Our aim here is to extend the analysis further by building on Heron and Reason's additions and by rearranging the issues to reflect current thought. The issues we have chosen include our original formulations and the additions, revisions, and amplifications made by Heron and Reason (1997), and we have also chosen what we believe to be the issues most important today. We should note that important means several things to us. An important topic may be one that is widely debated (or even hotly contested)-validity is one such issue. An important issue may be one that bespeaks a new awareness (an issue such as recognition of the role of values). An important issue may be one that illustrates the influence of one paradigm on another (such as the influence of feminist, action research, critical theory, and participatory models on researcher conceptions of action within and with the community in which research is carried out). Or issues may be important because new or extended theoretical and/or field-oriented treatments for them are newly available-voice and reflexivity are two such issues.
我們在這裡的目標是通過借鑒 Heron 和 Reason 的補充，並重新安排問題以反映當前的思想，進一步擴展分析。我們選擇的問題包括我們最初的表述以及 Heron 和 Reason（1997 年）所做的補充、修訂和擴充，我們還選擇了我們認為今天最重要的問題。我們應該指出，對我們來說，“重要”意味著幾件事情。一個重要的話題可能是廣泛辯論的（甚至是激烈爭論的）-有效性就是這樣一個問題。一個重要的問題可能是表明一種新意識的問題（例如對價值觀的角色認識）。一個重要的問題可能是展示一個範式對另一個範式的影響（例如女性主義、行動研究、批判理論和參與模型對研究者對研究所在社區內和與社區互動中行動概念的影響）。或者問題之所以重要，是因為對它們進行了新的或擴展的理論和/或領域導向的處理-聲音和反思就是這樣兩個問題。

Table 8.3 reprises the original Table 6.1 but adds the axioms of the participatory paradigm proposed by Heron and Reason (1997). Table 8.4 deals with seven issues and represents an update of selected issues first presented in the old Table 6.2. "Voice" in the 1994 version of, Table 6.2 has been renamed "inquirer posture," and we have inserted a redefined "voice" in the current
表 8.3 重述了原始表 6.1，並增加了由 Heron 和 Reason（1997）提出的參與範式的公理。表 8.4 處理七個問題，並代表了在舊表 6.2 中首次提出的選定問題的更新。在 1994 年版本的表 6.2 中，“Voice”已更名為“inquirer posture”，我們在當前版本中插入了重新定義的“voice”。

Table 8.1. Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms
表 8.1. 替代探詢範式的基本信念（形而上學）

T. Table 8.2. Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical Issues
T. 表 8.2。範式對選定實際問題的立場

Table 8.3. Basic Beliefs of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms-Updated
表 8.3. 替代性探詢範式的基本信念-更新

a. Entries in this column are based on Heron and Reason (1997).
a. 本欄目的條目基於 Heron 和 Reason（1997）的研究。

a. Entries in this column are based on Heron and Reason (1997), except for "ethics" and "values."
本欄目的條目基於 Heron 和 Reason（1997）的著作，但不包括“倫理”和“價值觀”。

Table 8.5. In all cases except "inquirer posture," the entries for the participatory paradigm are those proposed by Heron and Reason; in the one case not covered by them, we have added a notation that we believe captures their intention.
表 8.5。在所有情況下，除了“詢問者姿勢”之外，參與範式的條目是由 Heron 和 Reason 提出的；在他們未涵蓋的一種情況下，我們添加了一個註釋，認為這樣可以捕捉到他們的意圖。

We make no attempt here to reprise the material well discussed in our earlier Handbook chapter. Instead, we focus solely on the issues in Table 8.5: axiology; accommodation and commensurability; action; control; foundations of truth and knowledge; validity; and voice, reflexivity, and postmodern textual representation. We believe these seven issues to be the most important at this time.
我們在這裡並不試圖重述在我們早期手冊章節中已充分討論的材料。相反，我們僅專注於表 8.5 中的問題：價值論；適應和可比性；行動；控制；真理和知識的基礎；有效性；以及聲音、反思和後現代文本表徵。我們認為這七個問題在這個時候是最重要的。

While we believe these issues to be the most contentious, we also believe they create the intellectual, theoretical, and practical space for dialogue, consensus, and confluence to occur. There is great potential for interweaving of viewpoints, for the incorporation of multiple perspectives, and for borrowing, or bricolage, where borrowing seems useful, richness enhancing, or theoretically heuristic. For instance, even though we are ourselves social constructivists/constructionists, our call to action embedded in the authenticity criteria we elaborated in Fourth Generation Evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) reflects strongly the bent to action embodied in critical theorists' perspectives. And although Heron and Reason have elaborated a model they call the cooperative paradigm, careful reading of their proposal reveals a form of inquiry that is post-postpositive, postmodern, and criticalist in orientation. As a result, the reader familiar with several theoretical and paradigmatic strands of research will find that echoes of many streams of thought come together in the extended table. What this means is that the categories, as Laurel Richardson (personal communication, September 12,1998 ) has pointed out, "are fluid, indeed what should be a category keeps altering, enlarging." She notes that "even as [we] write, the boundaries between the paradigms are shifting." This is the paradigmatic equivalent of the Geertzian "blurring of genres" to which we referred earlier.
雖然我們認為這些問題是最具爭議性的，但我們也相信它們為對話、共識和匯聚提供了智識、理論和實踐空間。觀點交織的潛力很大，可以納入多重觀點，並進行借鑒或拼湊，當借鑒看似有用、豐富增強或在理論上具啟發性時。例如，即使我們自己是社會建構主義者，我們在《第四代評估》（Guba＆Lincoln，1989）中詳細闡述的真實性標準中蘊含的行動呼籲，強烈反映了批判理論家觀點中體現的行動傾向。儘管 Heron 和 Reason 詳細闡述了一個他們稱為合作範式的模型，仔細閱讀他們的提議會發現，這種探究形式是後後實證主義、後現代主義和批判主義導向的。因此，熟悉幾種理論和範式研究的讀者會發現，許多思想流派的回聲在擴展表中匯聚在一起。 這意味著，正如 Laurel Richardson（個人溝通，1998 年 9 月 12 日）所指出的，類別是流動的，實際上應該是一個類別不斷變化、擴大。她指出，「即使在[我們]寫作的同時，範式之間的界限也在變化。」這相當於 Geertzian 所說的「模糊的類型」，這是我們之前提到的。

Our own position is that of the constructionist camp, loosely defined. We do not believe that criteria for judging either "reality" or validity are absolutist (Bradley & Schaefer, 1998); rather, they are derived from community consensus regarding what is "real," what is useful, and what has meaning (especially meaning for action and further steps). We believe that a goodly portion of social phenomena consists of the meaning-making activities of groups and individuals around those phenomena. The meaning-making activities themselves are of central interest to social constructionists/constructivists, simply because it is the meaning-making/sense-making/attributional activities that shape action (or inaction). The meaning-making activities themselves can be changed when they are found to be incomplete, faulty (e.g., discriminatory, oppressive, or nonliberatory), or malformed (created from data that can be shown to be false).
我們自己的立場是建構主義陣營，定義寬鬆。我們不認為判斷「現實」或有效性的標準是絕對主義的（Bradley＆Schaefer，1998）；相反，它們源於社區對於「真實」、什麼是有用的，以及什麼具有意義（尤其是對於行動和進一步步驟的意義）的共識。我們相信，社會現象的相當一部分是由群體和個人圍繞這些現象進行的意義創造活動。這些意義創造活動本身對於社會建構主義者/建構主義者來說是中心問題，僅僅因為正是這些意義創造/意義形成/歸因活動塑造了行動（或不行動）。當發現這些意義創造活動是不完整的、有缺陷的（例如歧視性、壓迫性或非解放性）或畸形的（從可以證明是虛假的數據中創建）時，這些意義創造活動本身可以被改變。

We have tried, however, to incorporate perspectives from other major nonpositivist paradigms. This is not a complete summation; space constraints prevent that. What we hope to do in this chapter is to acquaint readers with the larger currents, arguments, dialogues, and provocative writings and theorizing, the better to see perhaps what we ourselves do not even yet see: where and when confluence is possible, where constructive rapprochement might be negotiated, where voices are beginning to achieve some harmony.
我們嘗試過從其他主要的非實證主義範式中納入觀點。這並不是完整的總結；空間限制阻礙了這一點。我們希望在本章中讓讀者熟悉更廣泛的潮流、論點、對話、引人入勝的著作和理論思考，更好地看到也許我們自己甚至還沒有看到的地方：在哪裡和何時可能出現匯合，哪裡可能進行建設性的和解，哪裡的聲音開始達到某種和諧。

Earlier, we placed values on the table as an "issue" on which positivists or phenomenologists might have a "posture" (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Fortunately, we reserved for ourselves the right to either get smarter or just change our minds. We did both. Now, we suspect (although Table 8.5 does not yet reflect it) that "axiology" should be grouped with "basic beliefs." In Naturalistic Inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), we covered some of the ways in which values feed into the inquiry process: choice of the problem, choice of paradigm to guide the problem, choice of theoretical framework, choice of major datagathering and data-analytic methods, choice of context, treatment of values already resident
較早之前，我們將價值放在桌上，作為一個「議題」，實證主義者或現象學家可能會有一種「姿態」（Guba＆Lincoln，1989 年，1994 年；Lincoln＆Guba，1985 年）。幸運的是，我們保留了自己要變聰明或只是改變主意的權利。我們兩者都做到了。現在，我們懷疑（雖然表 8.5 尚未反映出來），「價值論」應該與「基本信念」分組。在《自然主義探究》（Lincoln＆Guba，1985 年）中，我們涵蓋了一些價值如何融入探究過程的方式：問題的選擇，引導問題的範式的選擇，理論框架的選擇，主要數據收集和數據分析方法的選擇，背景的選擇，已經存在的價值的處理。

Table 8.5. Critical Issues of the Time
表 8.5。時代的關鍵問題

within the context, and choice of format(s) for presenting findings. We believed those were strong enough reasons to argue for the inclusion of values as a major point of departure between positivist, conventional modes of inquiry and interpretive forms of inquiry.
在這個背景下，以及選擇呈現研究結果的格式。我們認為這些是足夠強有力的理由，支持將價值觀納入實證主義、傳統調查模式和解釋性調查形式之間的主要分歧點。

A second "reading" of the burgeoning literature and subsequent rethinking of our own rationale have led us to conclude that the issue is much larger than we first conceived. If we had it to do all over again, we would make values or, more correctly, axiology (the branch of philosophy dealing with ethics, aesthetics, and religion) a part of the basic foundational philosophical dimensions of paradigm proposal. Doing so would, in our opinion, begin to help us see the embeddedness of ethics within, not external to, paradigms (see, for instance, Christians, 2000 ) and would contribute to the consideration of and dialogue about the role of spirituality in human inquiry. Arguably, axiology has been "defined out of" scientific inquiry for no larger a reason than that it also concerns "religion." But defining "religion" broadly to encompass spirituality would move constructivists closer to participative inquirers and would move critical theorists closer to both (owing to their concern with liberation from oppression and freeing of the human spirit, both profoundly spiritual concerns). The expansion of basic issues to include axiology, then, is one way of achieving greater confluence among the various interpretivist inquiry models. This is the place, for example, where Peter Reason's profound concerns with "sacred science" and human functioning find legitimacy; it is a place where Laurel Richardson's "sacred spaces" become authoritative sites for human inquiry; it is a place-or the place-where the spiritual meets social inquiry, as Reason (1993), and later Lincoln and Denzin (1994), proposed some years earlier.
我們對不斷增長的文獻進行了第二次“閱讀”，並重新思考我們自己的基礎，得出結論認為這個問題比我們最初所想的要大得多。如果我們再次開始，我們將使價值觀，更正確地說是價值論（處理倫理學、美學和宗教的哲學分支），成為範式提議的基本基礎哲學維度的一部分。我們認為，這樣做將有助於我們看到倫理學在範式內部而非外部的嵌入性（例如，參見 Christians, 2000），並有助於考慮和對話有關精神在人類探究中的角色。可以說，價值論之所以被“定義為”科學探究之外，原因不過是它也涉及“宗教”。但將“宗教”廣泛定義為包括精神層面，將建構主義者更接近參與式探究者，將批判理論家更接近兩者（因為他們關注從壓迫中解放和人類精神的解放，這兩者都是深刻的精神關注）。 將基本問題擴展至包括價值論，是實現各種解釋主義探究模型更大融合的一種方式。這是一個地方，例如，彼得·里森（Peter Reason）對“神聖科學”和人類功能的深刻關注找到合法性；這是一個地方，勞瑞爾·理查森（Laurel Richardson）的“神聖空間”成為人類探究的權威地點；這是一個地方，或者說是唯一的地方，精神與社會探究相遇，正如里森（1993 年）以及後來的林肯和丹辛（1994 年）在幾年前提出的。

Positivists and postpositivists alike still occasionally argue that paradigms are, in some ways, commensurable; that is, they can be retrofitted to each other in ways that make the simultaneous practice of both possible. We have argued that at the paradigmatic, or philosophical, level, commensurability between positivist and postpositivist worldviews is not possible, but that within each paradigm, mixed methodologies (strategies) may make perfectly good sense (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982, 1989, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). So, for instance, in Effective Evaluation we argued:
實證主義者和後實證主義者仍然偶爾爭論範式在某些方面是可比較的；也就是說，它們可以以使同時實踐兩者成為可能的方式互相配合。我們認為，在範式或哲學層面上，實證主義和後實證主義世界觀之間的可比較性是不可能的，但在每個範式內，混合方法論（策略）可能是非常合理的（Guba＆Lincoln，1981 年，1982 年，1989 年，1994 年；Lincoln＆Guba，1985 年）。因此，例如，在有效評估中，我們主張：

The guiding inquiry paradigm most appropriate to responsive evaluation is ... the naturalistic, phenomenological, or ethnographic paradigm. It will be seen that qualitative techniques are typically most appropriate to support this approach. There are times, however, when the issues and concerns voiced by audiences require information that is best generated by more conventional methods, especially quantitative methods.... In such cases, the responsive conventional evaluator will not shrink from the appropriate application. (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 36)
對於反應性評估最適合的引導性探詢範式是...自然主義、現象學或民族誌範式。可以看到，質性技術通常是最適合支持這種方法的。然而，有時觀眾提出的問題和關注需要更傳統方法，尤其是量化方法所產生的資訊...在這種情況下，反應性的傳統評估者不會避免適當的應用。 （古巴＆林肯，1981 年，第 36 頁）

As we tried to make clear, the "argument" arising in the social sciences was not about method, although many critics of the new naturalistic, ethnographic, phenomenological, and/or case study approaches assumed it was. As late as 1998, Weiss could be found to claim that "some evaluation theorists, notably Guba and Lincoln (1989), hold that it is impossible to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches responsibly within an evaluation" (p. 268), even though we stated early on in Fourth Generation Evaluation (1989) that
正如我們試圖澄清的那樣，在社會科學中出現的“爭論”並不是關於方法，儘管許多批評新的自然主義、民族誌、現象學和/或案例研究方法的人認為是如此。直到 1998 年，魏斯（Weiss）仍然聲稱“一些評估理論家，尤其是古巴和林肯（1989 年），認為在評估中負責地結合定性和定量方法是不可能的”（第 268 頁），儘管我們在《第四代評估》（1989 年）中早就指出。

those claims, concerns, and issues that have not been resolved become the advance organizers for information collection by the evaluator. . . The information may be quantitative or qualitative. Responsive evaluation does not rule out quantitative modes, as is mistakenly believed by many, but deals with whatever information is responsive to the unresolved claim, concern, or issue. (p. 43)
那些尚未解決的主張、關切和問題將成為評估者進行信息收集的先導組織者。信息可能是定量的或定性的。反應式評估並不排除定量模式，這是許多人錯誤認為的，而是處理對未解決的主張、關切或問題有反應的任何信息。 (第 43 頁)

We had also strongly asserted earlier, in Naturalistic Inquiry (1985), that
我們在《自然主義探究》（1985 年）中也曾堅決主張

qualitative methods are stressed within the naturalistic paradigm not because the paradigm is antiquantitative but because qualitative methods
質性方法在自然主義範式中受到強調，並不是因為這個範式是反定量的，而是因為質性方法
come more easily to the human-as-instrument. The reader should particularly note the absence of an antiquantitative stance, precisely because the naturalistic and conventional paradigms are so oftenmistakenly-equated with the qualitative and quantitative paradigms, respectively. Indeed, there are many opportunities for the naturalistic investigator to utilize quantitative data -probably more than are appreciated. (pp. 198-199; emphasis added)
人類作為樂器更容易。讀者應特別注意缺乏反對量化的立場，正是因為自然主義和傳統範式經常被錯誤地等同於質性和量化範式。事實上，自然主義研究者有許多機會利用量化數據-可能比人們所認識的還要多。(第 198-199 頁；強調添加)

Having demonstrated that we were not then (and are not now) talking about an antiquantitative posture or the exclusivity of methods, but rather about the philosophies of which paradigms are constructed, we can ask the question again regarding commensurability:Are paradigms commensurable? Is it possible to blend elements of one paradigm into another, so that one is engaging in research that represents the best of both worldviews? The answer, from our perspective, has to be a cautious yes. This is especially so if the models (paradigms) share axiomatic elements that are similar, or that resonate strongly between them. So, for instance, positivism and postpositivism are clearly commensurable. In the same vein, elements of interpretivist/postmodern critical theory, constructivist and participative inquiry, fit comfortably together. Commensurability is an issue only when researchers want to "pick and choose" among the axioms of positivist and interpretivist models, because the axioms are contradictory and mutually exclusive.
證明我們當時（以及現在）並非在談論一種古老的姿態或方法的排他性，而是在談論範式構建的哲學，我們可以再次提出關於可比性的問題：範式是否可比性？是否可能將一個範式的元素融入另一個範式，以便進行代表兩種世界觀最佳的研究？從我們的角度來看，答案必須是謹慎的肯定。特別是如果這些模型（範式）共享相似的公理元素，或者在它們之間有強烈的共鳴。因此，例如，實證主義和後實證主義顯然是可比的。同樣地，解釋主義/後現代批判理論的元素、建構主義和參與式探究可以很好地結合在一起。只有當研究人員想要在實證主義和解釋主義模型的公理之間“挑選”時，可比性才是一個問題，因為這些公理是矛盾的並且互相排斥。

One of the clearest ways in which the paradigmatic controversies can be demonstrated is to compare the positivist and postpositivist adherents, who view action as a form of contamination of research results and processes, and the interpretivists, who see action on research results as a meaningful and important outcome of inquiry processes. Positivist adherents believe action to be either a form of advocacy or a form of subjectivity, either or both of which undermine the aim of objectivity. Critical theorists, on the other hand, have always advocated varying degrees of social action, from the overturning of specific unjust practices to radical transformation of entire societies. The call for action-whether in terms of internal transformation, such as ridding oneself of false consciousness, or of external social transformation-differentiates between positivist and postmodern criticalist theorists (including feminist and queer theorists). The sharpest shift, however, has been in the constructivist and participatory phenomenological models, where a step beyond interpretation and Verstehen, or understanding, toward social action is probably one of the most conceptually interesting of the shifts (Lincoln, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). For some theorists, the shift toward action came in response to widespread nonutilization of evaluation findings and the desire to create forms of evaluation that would attract champions who might follow through on recommendations with meaningful action plans (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1989). For others, embracing action came as both a political and an ethical commitment (see, for instance, Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Christians, 2000; Greenwood & Levin, 2000; Schratz & Walker, 1995; Tierney, 2000).
範式爭議最清晰的展示方式之一是比較實證主義和後實證主義者，他們認為行動是研究結果和過程的一種污染形式，而解釋主義者則認為行動對研究結果是探詢過程中有意義和重要的結果。實證主義者認為行動要麼是一種倡導形式，要麼是一種主觀形式，兩者都會破壞客觀性的目標。另一方面，批判理論家一直主張從推翻特定不公正實踐到徹底轉變整個社會的各種程度的社會行動。行動的呼籲-無論是內部轉變，比如擺脫虛假意識，還是外部社會轉變-區分了實證主義者和後現代批判理論家（包括女性主義者和酷兒理論家）。 然而，最明顯的轉變出現在建構主義和參與式現象學模型中，這裡跨越了解釋和理解，朝向社會行動可能是轉變中最具概念上有趣的之一（林肯，1997 年，1998a，1998b）。對於一些理論家來說，轉向行動是對評估結果普遍未被利用以及希望創建能吸引支持者並將建議付諸有意義行動計劃的評估形式的回應（古巴和林肯，1981 年，1989 年）。對於其他人來說，接受行動既是政治上的也是道德上的承諾（例如，卡爾和肯米斯，1986 年；基督徒，2000 年；格林伍德和萊文，2000 年；施拉茨和沃克，1995 年；提爾尼，2000 年）。

Whatever the source of the problem to which inquirers were responding, the shift toward connecting research, policy analysis, evaluation, and/or social deconstruction (e.g, deconstruction of thespatriarchal forms of oppression in social structures, which is the project informing much feminist theorizing, or deconstruction of the homophobia embedded in public policies) with action hàs come to characterize much new-paradigm inguiry work, both at the theoretical and at the practice and praxis-oriented levels. Action has become a major controversy that limns the ongoing debates among practitioners of the various paradigms. The mandate for social action, especially action designed and created by and for research participants with the aid and cooperation of researchers, can be most sharply delineated between positivist/postpositivist and new-paradigm inquirers. Many positivist and postpositivist inquirers still consider "action" the domain of communities other than researchers and research participants: those of policy
無論問題的來源是什麼，對於研究、政策分析、評估和/或社會解構（例如，解構社會結構中的父權壓迫形式，這是許多女性主義理論的基礎，或解構嵌入公共政策中的恐同情節）與行動之間的轉變已經成為許多新範式探究工作的特徵，無論是在理論上還是在實踐和實踐導向的層面。行動已經成為一個主要的爭議議題，勾勒出各種範式的實踐者之間持續辯論的輪廓。社會行動的要求，特別是由研究參與者設計和創建的行動，並在研究者的幫助和合作下進行，可以在實證主義/後實證主義者和新範式探究者之間最清晰地劃分。許多實證主義和後實證主義者仍然認為“行動”是社區而非研究者和研究參與者的領域：那些政策的領域。
personnel, legislators, and civic and political officials. Hard-line foundationalists presume that the taint of action will interfere with, or even negate, the objectivity that is a (presumed) characteristic of rigorous scientific method inquiry.
人員、立法者、公民和政治官員。強硬的基礎主義者認為行動的污染將干擾甚至否定嚴謹科學方法探究的客觀性（被假定的特徵）。

Another controversy that has tended to become problematic centers on control of the study: Who initiates? Who determines salient questions? Who determines what constitutes findings? Who determines how data will be collected? Who determines in what forms the findings will be made public, if at all? Who determines what representations will be made of participants in the research? Let us be very clear: The issue of control is deeply embedded in the questions of voice, reflexivity, and issues of postmodern textual representation, which we shall take up later, but only for new-paradigm inquirers. For more conventional inquirers, the issue of control is effectively walled off from voice, reflexivity, and issues of textual representation, because each of those issues in some way threatens claims to rigor (particularly objectivity and validity). For new-paradigm inquirers who have seen the preeminent paradigm issues of ontology and epistemology effectively folded into one another, and who have watched as methodology and axiology logically folded into one another (Lincoln, 1995, 1997), control of an inquiry seems far less problematic, except insofar as inquirers seek to obtain participants' genuine participation (see, for instance, Guba &Lincoln, 1981, on contracting and attempts to get some stakeholding groups to do more than stand by while an evaluation is in progress).
另一個傾向變得問題重重的爭議是關於研究的控制：誰發起？誰確定重要問題？誰確定什麼構成發現？誰確定如何收集數據？誰確定發現以何種形式公開，如果有的話？誰確定研究中參與者的代表將如何呈現？讓我們非常清楚：控制問題深深植根於聲音、反思和後現代文本表達的問題中，我們將稍後討論，但僅適用於新範式的探究者。對於更傳統的探究者來說，控制問題與聲音、反思和文本表達的問題有效地隔離開來，因為這些問題中的每一個都在某種程度上威脅到嚴謹性（特別是客觀性和有效性）的主張。 對於已經看到本體論和認識論的卓越範式問題有效地融入一起的新範式探究者，以及看到方法論和價值論在邏輯上融入一起的人（Lincoln，1995 年，1997 年），控制一個探究似乎不再是問題，除非探究者試圖獲得參與者的真正參與（例如，參見 Guba＆Lincoln，1981 年，關於合同和試圖讓一些持份群體不僅僅是旁觀而已，而是在評估進行中做更多事情）。

Critical theorists, especially those who work in community organizing programs, are painfully aware of the necessity for members of the community, or research participants, to take control of their futures. Constructivists desire participants to take an increasingly active role in nominating questions of interest for any inquiry and in designing outlets for findings to be shared more widely within and outside the community. Participatory inquirers understand action controlled by the local context members to be the aim of inquiry within a community. For none of these paradigmatic adherents is control an issue of advocacy, a somewhat deceptive term usually used as a code within a larger metanarrative to attack an inquiry's rigor, objectivity, or fairness. Rather, for new-paradigm researchers control is a means of fostering emancipation, democracy, and community empowerment, and of redressing power imbalances such that those who were previously marginalized now achieve voice (Mertens, 1998) or "human flourishing" (Heron & Reason, 1997). Control as a controversy is an excellent place to observe the phenomenon that we have always termed "Catholic questions directed to a Methodist audience." We use this description-given to us by a workshop participant in the early 1980s-to refer to the ongoing problem of illegitimate questions: questions that have no meaning because the frames of reference are those for which they were never intended. (We could as well call these "Hindu questions to a Muslim,", to give another sense of how paradigms, or overarching philosophies-or theologies-are incommensurable, and how questions in one framework make little, if any, sense in another.) Paradigmatic formulations interact such that control becomes inextricably intertwined with mandates for objectivity. Objectivity derives from the Enlightenment prescription for knowledge of the physical world, which is postulated to be separate and distinct from those who would know (Polkinghorne, 1989). But if knowledge of the social (as opposed to the physical) world resides in meaning-making mechanisms of the social, mental, and linguistic worlds that individuals inhabit, then knowledge cannot be separate from the knower, but rather is rooted in his or her mental or linguistic designations of that world (Polkinghorne, 1989; Salner, 1989).
批判理論家，尤其是從事社區組織計劃的人，痛苦地意識到社區成員或研究參與者需要掌控自己的未來的必要性。建構主義者希望參與者在任何調查中對感興趣的問題提出越來越積極的角色，並設計出讓研究結果更廣泛地在社區內外分享的途徑。參與式調查者了解由當地背景成員控制行動是社區內調查的目的。對於這些範式的信奉者來說，控制並不是倡導的問題，這是一個有點欺騙性的術語，通常被用作更大範圍的元敘事中的代碼，用來攻擊調查的嚴謹性、客觀性或公平性。相反，對於新範式的研究者來說，控制是促進解放、民主和社區賦權的手段，並且是糾正權力不平衡的手段，使那些以前被邊緣化的人現在獲得發聲（Mertens，1998 年）或“人類繁榮”（Heron＆Reason，1997 年）。 控制作為一個爭議點是一個觀察我們一直稱之為“針對衛理會聽眾的天主教問題”的現象的絕佳地點。我們使用這個描述-在 1980 年代初由一位研討會參與者給予我們-來指稱非法問題的持續問題：這些問題沒有意義，因為參照框架是從未打算的。 （我們也可以稱這些為“穆斯林的印度教問題”，以另一種方式來理解範式，或者全面的哲學-或神學-是不可比較的，以及一個框架中的問題在另一個框架中幾乎沒有意義。）範式的制定互動，使得控制與客觀性的要求緊密交織在一起。客觀性源自啟蒙運動對物質世界知識的規定，這被假定為與那些想要知道的人分開並有所不同（Polkinghorne，1989）。 但如果社會（與物理世界相對）的知識存在於個人所居住的社會、心理和語言世界的意義生成機制中，那麼知識就不能與知識者分開，而是根植於他或她對該世界的心理或語言指定（Polkinghorne, 1989; Salner, 1989）。

Whether or not the world has a "real" existence outside of human experience of that world is an open question. For modernist (i.e., Enlightenment,
世界是否在人類對其世界的經驗之外具有“真實”存在，這是一個開放的問題。對於現代主義者（即啟蒙主義者），
scientific method, conventional, positivist) researchers, most assuredly there is a "real" reality "out there," apart from the flawed human apprehension of it. Further, that reality can be approached (approximated) only through the utilization of methods that prevent human contamination of its apprehension or comprehension. For foundationalists in the empiricist tradition, the foundations of scientific truth and knowledge about reality reside in rigorous application of testing phenomena against a template as much devoid of human bias, misperception, and other "idols" (Francis Bacon, cited in Polkinghorne, 1989) as instrumentally possible. As Polkinghorne (1989) makes clear:
科學方法，傳統，實證主義）研究者，可以肯定地說，除了人類對其的認識存在缺陷之外，"真實"的現實確實存在於"外面"。此外，這種現實只能通過利用方法來接近（逼近），以防止人類對其認識或理解的污染。對於經驗主義傳統中的基礎主義者來說，科學真理和對現實的知識的基礎在於對現象進行嚴格的測試，以盡可能排除人類偏見、誤解和其他"偶像"（弗朗西斯·培根，引自波爾金霍恩，1989 年）的影響。正如波爾金霍恩（1989 年）所指出的那樣：

The idea that the objective realm is independent of the knower's subjective experiences of it can be found in Descartes's dual substance theory, with its distinction between the objective and subjective realms. . . In the splitting of reality into subject and object realms, what can be known "objectively" is only the objective realm. True knowledge is limited to the objects and the relationships between them that exist in the realm of time and space. Human consciousness, which is subjective, is not Uaccessible to 'science, and thus not truly knowable. 0. (p.23)
客觀領域獨立於認識者對其主觀經驗的想法可以在笛卡爾的雙重物質理論中找到，其中區分了客觀和主觀領域。在將現實分裂為主體和客體領域時，只有客觀領域才能被「客觀地」認識。真知識僅限於存在於時間和空間領域中的物體及其之間的關係。主觀的人類意識無法被科學所接觸，因此無法真正被了解。

Now, témplates of trith and knowledge can be defined in a variety of ways-as the end product of rational processes, as the result of expefiential sensing, as the result of empirical observation, and others. In all cases, however, the referent is the physical or empirical world: rational engagement with it, experience of it, empirical observation of it. Realists, who work on the assumption that there is a "real" world "out there," may in individual cases also be foundationalists, taking the view that all of these ways of defining are rooted in phenomena existing outside the human mind. Although we can think about them, experience them, or observe them, they are nevertheless transcendent, referred to but beyondrdirect apprehension. Realism is an ontological question, whereas foundationalism is̀ a criterial question. Some foundationalists argue that real phenomena necessarily imply certain final, ultimate criteria for testing them as truthful (although we may have great difficulty in determining what those criteria are); nonfoundationalists tend to argue that there are no such ultimate criteria, only those that we can agree upon at a certain time and under certain conditions. Foundational criteria are discovered; nonfoundational criteria are negotiated. It is the case, however, that most realists are also foundationalists, and many nonfoundationalists or antifoundationalists are relativists.
現在，真理和知識的模板可以以多種方式來定義-作為理性過程的最終產物，作為經驗感知的結果，作為經驗觀察的結果，等等。然而，在所有情況下，參照物都是物理或經驗世界：與之的理性互動，對其的經驗，對其的經驗觀察。現實主義者工作的假設是存在一個“真實”的世界，“在那裡”，在個別情況下也可能是基礎主義者，認為所有這些定義方式都根植於存在於人類思想之外的現象。儘管我們可以思考它們，體驗它們或觀察它們，但它們仍然是超越的，被提及但超越直接理解。現實主義是一個本體論問題，而基礎主義是一個標準問題。一些基礎主義者主張，真實現象必然意味著某些最終的、最終的標準來測試它們是否真實（儘管我們可能很難確定這些標準是什麼）；非基礎主義者傾向於主張，沒有這樣的最終標準，只有我們可以在某個時間和某些條件下達成共識的標準。 基礎標準是被發現的；非基礎標準是被協商的。然而，大多數現實主義者也是基礎主義者，而許多非基礎主義者或反基礎主義者是相對主義者。

An ontological formulation that connects realism and foundationalism within the same "collapse" of categories that characterizes the ontological-epistemological collapse is one that exhibits good fit with the other assumptions of constructivism. That state of affairs suits newparadigm inquirers well. Critical theorists, constructivists, and participatory/cooperative inquirers take their primary field of interest to be precisely that subjective and intersubjective social knowledge and the active construction and cocreation of such knowledge by human agents that is produced by human consciousness. Further, newparadigm inquirers take to the social knowledge field with zest, informed by a variety of social, intellectual, and theoretical explorations. These theoretical excursions include Saussurian linguistic theory; which views all relationships between words and what those words signify as the function of an initernal relationship within some linguistic system; literary theory's deconstructive contributions, which seek tó disconnect texts from any essentialist or transcendental meaning and resituate them within both author and reader historical and social contexts (Hutcheon, 1989; Leitch, 1996); feminist (Addelson, 1993; Alpern, Antler, Perry, & Scobie, 1992; Babbitt, 1993; Harding, 1993), race and ethnic (Kondo, 1990, 1997; Trinh, 1991), and queer theorizing (Gamson, 2000), which seeks to uncover and explore varieties of oppression and historical colonizing between dominant and subaltern genders, identities, races, and social worlds; the postmodern historical moment (Michael, 1996), which problematizes truth as partial, identity as fluid, language as an unclear referent system, and method and criteria as potentially coercive (Ellis & Bochner, 1996); and
一個將現實主義和基礎主義連接在一起的本體論形式，同時也符合本體論-認識論崩潰的特點，這種形式與建構主義的其他假設非常契合。這種情況非常適合新範式的探究者。批判理論家、建構主義者和參與性/合作性探究者將他們的主要興趣領域確切定位為主觀和互主觀社會知識，以及這種知識的積極建構和人類意識所產生的人類代理人共同創造。此外，新範式的探究者充滿熱情地投入社會知識領域，並受到各種社會、智力和理論探索的啟發。這些理論探討包括索緒爾語言學理論；該理論將詞語之間的所有關係以及這些詞語所指的意義視為某種語言系統內部關係的功能；文學理論的解構性貢獻，旨在將文本與任何基本主義或超越性意義分開，並將其重新定位於作者和讀者的歷史和社會背景之中（Hutcheon, 1989; Leitch, 1996）；女性主義（Addelson, 1993; Alpern, Antler, Perry, & Scobie, 1992; Babbitt, 1993; Harding, 1993）、種族和民族（Kondo, 1990, 1997; Trinh, 1991）以及酷兒理論（Gamson, 2000），旨在揭示和探索主導和被壓迫性別、身份、種族和社會世界之間的各種壓迫和歷史殖民；後現代歷史時刻（Michael, 1996），質疑真理的局部性，身份的流動性，語言的不明確指涉系統，以及方法和標準可能具有強制性（Ellis & Bochner, 1996）；和
criticalist theories of social change (Carspecken, 1996; Schratz & Walker, 1995). The realization of the richness of the mental, social, psychological, and linguistic worlds that individuals and social groups create and constantly re-create and cocreate gives rise, in the minds of new-paradigm postmodern and poststructural inquirers, to endlessly fertile fields of inquiry rigidly walled off from conventional inquirers. Unfettered from the pursuit of transcendental scientific truth, inquirers are now free to resituate themselves within texts, to reconstruct their relationships with research participants in less constricted fashions, and to create re-presentations (Tierney & Lincoln, 1997) that grapple openly with problems of inscription, reinscription, metanarratives, and other rhetorical devices that obscure the extent to which human action is locally and temporally shaped. The processes of uncovering forms of inscription and the rhetoric of metanarratives are genealogical-"expos[ing] the origins of the view that have become sedimented and accepted as truths" (Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 42; emphasis added)-or archaeological (Foucault, 1971; Scheurich, 1997).
社會變革的批判理論（Carspecken，1996 年；Schratz＆Walker，1995 年）。個人和社會群體創造並不斷重塑和共同創造的心智、社會、心理和語言世界的豐富性的實現，使得新範式後現代和後結構主義探究者的思想中產生了無盡豐富的探究領域，這些領域與傳統探究者嚴格隔絕。探究者不再受制於追求超越性科學真理，現在可以自由地重新定位自己在文本中，以不那麼受限制的方式重建與研究參與者的關係，並創造重新呈現（Tierney＆Lincoln，1997 年），公開處理與刻印、重刻、大敘事和其他遮蔽人類行動在當地和時間上受到塑造程度的問題。揭示刻印形式和大敘事修辭的過程是系譜學的-"揭示已經沉澱並被接受為真理的觀點的起源"（Polkinghorne，1989 年，第 42 頁；強調添加）-或考古學的（Foucault，1971 年；Scheurich，1997 年）。

New-paradigm inquirers engage the foundational controversy in quite different ways. Critical theorists, particularly critical theorists more positivist in orientation, who lean toward Marxian interpretations, tend toward foundational perspectives, with an important difference. Rather than locating foundational truth and knowledge in some external reality "out there," such critical theorists tend to locate the foundations of truth in specific historical, economic, racial, and social infrastructures of oppression, injustice, and marginalization. Knowers are not portrayed as separate from some objective reality, but may be cast as unaware actors in such historical realities ("false consciousness") or as aware of historical forms of oppression, but unable or unwilling, because of conflicts, to act on those historical forms to alter specific conditions in this historical moment ("divided consciousness"). Thus the "foundation" for critical theorists is a duality: social critique tied in turn to raised consciousness of the possibility of positive and liberating social change. Social critique may exist apart from social change, but both are necessary for criticalist perspectives.
新範式的探究者以截然不同的方式參與基礎爭議。特別是傾向於馬克思主義解釋的批判理論家，更偏向於實證主義，傾向於基礎觀點，但有一個重要的區別。這些批判理論家不是將基礎真理和知識定位於某種外在現實“外部”，而是傾向於將真理的基礎定位於特定的歷史、經濟、種族和社會壓迫、不公正和邊緣化的基礎設施中。知識者並非被描繪為與客觀現實分離，而可能被塑造為對這樣的歷史現實不知情的行動者（“虛假意識”），或者被塑造為對歷史形式的壓迫有所認識，但由於衝突而無法或不願意在這個歷史時刻改變特定條件（“分裂意識”）。因此，對於批判理論家來說，“基礎”是一種雙重性：社會批評與對積極和解放性社會變革可能性的提高意識相關聯。社會批評可能存在於社會變革之外，但對於批判主義觀點來說，兩者都是必要的。

Constructivists, on the other hand, tend toward the antifoundational (Lincoln, 1995, 1998b; Schwandt, 1996). Antifoundational is the term used to denote a refusal to adopt any permanent, unvarying (or "foundational") standards by which truth can be universally known. As one of us has argued, truth-and any agreement regarding what is valid knowledge-arises from the relationship between members of some stakeholding community (Lincoln, 1995). Agreements about truth may be the subject of community negotiations regarding what will be accepted as truth (although there are difficulties with that formulation as well; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Or agreements may eventuate as the result of a dialogue that moves arguments about truth claims or validity past the warring camps of objectivity and relativity toward "a communal test of validity through the argumentation of the participants in a discourse" (Bernstein, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1989; Schwandt, 1996). This "communicative and pragmatic concept" of validity (Rorty, 1979) is never fixed or unvarying. Rather, it is created by means of a community narrative, itself subject to the temporal and historical conditions that gave rise to the community. Schwandt (1989) has also argued that these discourses, or community narratives, can and should be bounded by moral considerations, a premise grounded in the emancipatory narratives of the critical theorists, the philosophical pragmatism of Rorty, the democratic focus of constructivist inquiry, and the "human flourishing" goals of participatory and cooperative inquiry.
建構主義者則傾向於反基礎主義（Lincoln, 1995, 1998b; Schwandt, 1996）。反基礎主義是一個術語，用於表示拒絕採納任何永久、不變（或“基礎性”）標準，以便普遍知曉真理。正如我們其中一位所主張的，真理和關於有效知識的任何協議都源於某些利益相關社區成員之間的關係（Lincoln, 1995）。有關真理的協議可能成為社區協商的主題，關於什麼將被接受為真理（儘管這種形式也存在困難；Guba & Lincoln, 1989）。或者協議可能作為一種對話的結果，將有關真理主張或有效性的爭論推向客觀性和相對性之爭的戰爭陣營，走向“通過參與者在一個對話中的辯論進行有效性的共同測試”（Bernstein, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1989; Schwandt, 1996）。這種“溝通和實用概念”（Rorty, 1979）的有效性從不是固定或不變的。相反，它是通過社區敘事創造的，本身受到引發社區的時間和歷史條件的影響。 Schwandt（1989）也主張這些論述或社區敘事應該受道德考量的限制，這一前提根據批判理論家的解放性敘事、Rorty 的哲學實用主義、建構主義探究的民主焦點以及參與性和合作探究的「人類繁榮」目標。

The controversies around foundationalism (and, to a lesser extent, essentialism) are not likely to be resolved through dialogue between paradigm adherents. The likelier event is that the "postmodern turn" (Best & Kellner, 1997), with its emphasis on the social construction of social reality, fluid as opposed to fixed identities of the self, and the partiality of all truths, will simply overtake modernist assumptions of an objective reality, as indeed, to some extent, it has already
關於基礎主義（以及在較小程度上的本質主義）的爭議不太可能通過範式信徒之間的對話解決。更有可能的情況是，“後現代轉向”（Best＆Kellner，1997 年）強調社會現實的社會建構，自我的身份是流動的而不是固定的，以及所有真理的局部性，將簡單地超越現代主義對客觀現實的假設，實際上，在某種程度上，它已經進行。
done in the physical sciences. We might predict that, if not in our lifetimes, at some later time the dualist idea of an objective reality suborned by limited human subjective realities will seem as quaint as flat-earth theories do to us today.
在自然科學中完成。我們可能預測，如果不是在我們的一生中，那麼在以後的某個時候，客觀現實被有限的人類主觀現實所支配的二元論觀念將會變得像平地理論對我們今天那樣古怪。

Nowhere can the conversation about paradigm differences be more fertile than in the extended controversy about validity (Howe & Eisenhart, 1990; Kvale, 1989, 1994; Ryan, Greene, Lincoln, Mathison, & Mertens, 1998; Scheurich, 1994, 1996). Validity is not like objectivity. There are fairly strong theoretical, philosophical, and pragmatic rationales for examining the concept of objectivity and finding it wanting. Even within positivist frameworks it is viewed as conceptually flawed. But validity is a more irritating construct, one neither easily dismissed nor readily configured by new-paradigm practitioners (Enerstvedt, 1989; Tschudi, 1989). Validity cannot be dismissed simply because it points to a question that has to be answered in one way or another: Are these findings sufficiently authentic (isomorphic to some reality others construct their social worlds) that I may trust myself in acting on their impligations? More to the point, would I feel sufficiëntly secure about these findings to construct social policy or legislation based on them? At the same time, radical reconfigurations of validity leave researchers with multiple, sometimes conflicting, mandates for what constitutes rigorous research.
對範式差異的討論在關於效度的廣泛爭議中可能是最豐富的（Howe＆Eisenhart，1990 年；Kvale，1989 年，1994 年；Ryan，Greene，Lincoln，Mathison 和 Mertens，1998 年；Scheurich，1994 年，1996 年）。效度並不像客觀性。對於檢視客觀性概念並發現其不足之處，有相當強的理論、哲學和實用理由。即使在實證主義框架內，它也被視為概念上有缺陷。但效度是一個更為惱人的構想，既不容易被忽視，也不容易被新範式實踐者輕易配置（Enerstvedt，1989 年；Tschudi，1989 年）。效度不能被簡單地忽視，因為它指向一個必須以某種方式回答的問題：這些發現是否足夠真實（與某些現實同構造他人的社會世界），以至於我可以信任自己來行動其影響？更重要的是，我是否對這些發現感到足夠安全，以便基於它們來制定社會政策或立法？ 與此同時，對於有效性的激進重組使研究人員面臨著多個，有時是相互衝突的，對於何為嚴謹研究的要求。

One of the issues around validity is the conflation between method and interpretation. The postmodern turn suggests that no method can deliver on ultimate truth, and in fact "suspects all methods," the more so the larger their claims to delivering on truth (Richardson, 1994). Thus, although one might argue that some methods are more suited than others for conducting research on human construction of social realities (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), no one would argue that a single method -or collection of methods-is the royal road to ultimate knowledge. In new-paradigm inquiry, however, it is not merely method that promises to deliver on some set of local or contextgrounded truths, it is also the processes of interpretation. Thus we have two arguments proceeding simultaneously. The first, borrowed from positivism, argues for a kind of rigor in the application of method, whereas the second argues for both a community consent and a form of rigordefensible reasoning, plausible alongside some other reality that is known to author and readerin ascribing salience to one interpretation over another and for framing and bounding an interpretive study itself. Prior to our understanding that there were, indeed, two forms of rigor, we assembled a set of methodological criteria, largely borrowed from an earlier generation of thoughtful anthropological and sociological methodological theorists. Those methodological criteria are still useful for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that they ensure that such issues as prolonged engagement and persistent observation are attended to with some seriousness.
有效性周圍的問題之一是方法和解釋之間的混淆。後現代轉向暗示沒有任何方法能夠達到終極真理，事實上“懷疑所有方法”，尤其是當它們聲稱能夠達到真理時（Richardson，1994）。因此，儘管可以爭論有些方法比其他方法更適合進行有關人類社會現實建構的研究（Lincoln＆Guba，1985），但沒有人會主張單一方法或一組方法是通往終極知識的王道。然而，在新範式的探究中，不僅僅是方法承諾提供一套當地或上下文基礎真理，還有解釋過程。因此，我們有兩個論點同時進行。第一個論點源自實證主義，主張在方法應用中具有某種嚴謹性，而第二個論點則主張社區共識和一種可辯護的推理形式，與作者和讀者所知的其他現實並存，以賦予一種解釋比另一種解釋更具重要性並為解釋研究本身設定框架和界限。 在我們了解到確實存在兩種嚴謹形式之前，我們匯集了一套方法論標準，這些標準主要借鑒自早期一代富有思想的人類學和社會學方法論理論家。這些方法論標準仍然有各種原因的用處，其中最重要的是確保長期參與和持續觀察等問題得到認真對待。

It is the second kind of rigor, however, that has received the most attention in recent writings: Are we interpretively rigorous? Can our cocreated constructions be trusted to provide some purchase on some important human phenomenon?
然而，最近的著作中受到最多關注的是第二種嚴謹性：我們是否具有解釋上的嚴謹性？我們共同創建的建構是否可信，能夠對某些重要的人類現象提供一些洞察？

Human phenomena are themselves the subject of controversy. Classical social scientists would like to see "human phenomena" limited to those social experiences from which (scientific) generalizations may be drawn, New-paradigm inquirers, however, are increasingly concerned with the single experience, the individual crisis, the epiphany or moment of discovery; with that most powerful of all threats to conventional objectivity, feeling and emotion. Social scientists concerned with the expansion of what count as social data rely increasingly on the experiential, the embodied, the emotive qualities of human experience that contribute the narrative quality to a life. Sociologists such as Ellis and Bochner (2000) and Richardson (2000) and psychologists such as Michelle Fine (see Fine, Weis, Weseen, Wong, 2000) concern themselves with various forms of autoethnography and personal experience methods, both to overcome the abstractions of a social
人類現象本身就是爭議的主題。古典社會科學家希望將“人類現象”限制在那些可以獲得（科學）概括的社會經驗中，而新範式的探究者則越來越關注單一經驗、個人危機、頓悟或發現的時刻；對於對傳統客觀性最具威脅的感覺和情感。關心社會數據擴展的社會科學家越來越依賴人類經驗中的體驗、具體化和情感品質，這些品質為生活增添了敘事品質。像艾利斯和博克納（2000 年）以及理查森（2000 年）這樣的社會學家，以及像米歇爾·芬（見芬，韋斯，韋森，黃，2000 年）這樣的心理學家，關注各種形式的自我民族志和個人經驗方法，旨在克服社會抽象。
science far gone with quantitative descriptions of human life and to capture those elements that make life conflictual, moving, problematic.
科學已經深入探討人類生活的定量描述，並捕捉那些使生活充滿衝突、變動和問題的元素。

For purposes of this discussion, we believe the adoption of the most radical definitions of social science is appropriate, because the paradigmatic controversies are often taking place at the edges of those conversations. Those edges are where the border work is occurring, and, accordingly, they are the places that show the most promise for projecting where qualitative methods will be in the near and far future.
為了本次討論的目的，我們認為採用社會科學最激進的定義是合適的，因為範式爭議通常發生在這些對話的邊緣。這些邊緣是邊界工作正在進行的地方，因此，它們是最有潛力展望定性方法在不久的將來和遠方將會發展的地方。

At those edges, several conversations are occurring around validity. The first-and most radical-is a conversation opened by Schwandt (1996), who suggests that we say "farewell to criteriology," or the "regulative norms for removing doubt and settling disputes about what is correct or incorrect, true or false" (p.59), which have created a virtual cult around criteria. Schwandt does not, however, himself say farewell to criteria forever; rather, he resituates social inquiry, with other contemporary philosophical pragmatists, within a framework that transforms professional social inquiry into a form of practical philosophy, characterized by "aesthetic, prudential and moral considerations as well as more conventionally scientific ones" (p.68). When social inquiry becomes the practice of a form of practical philosophy-a deep questioning about how we shall get on in the world and what we conceive to be the potentials and limits of human knowledge and functioning-then we have some preliminary understanding of what entirely different criteria might be for judging social inquiry.
在這些邊緣，有幾個關於有效性的對話正在進行。第一個，也是最激進的，是由 Schwandt（1996）開啟的對話，他建議我們對“標準學”說再見，或者對“消除疑慮和解決關於什麼是正確或錯誤、真實或虛假的爭議的規範性規範”（第 59 頁）說再見，這些規範已經在標準周圍創造了一個虛擬的崇拜。然而，Schwandt 並沒有永遠地對標準說再見；相反，他將社會探究重新定位，與其他當代哲學實用主義者一起，轉變為一種實踐哲學形式，以“美學、實用和道德考慮以及更傳統的科學考慮”（第 68 頁）為特徵。當社會探究成為一種實踐哲學形式的實踐時，即對我們如何在這個世界上生存以及我們對人類知識和功能的潛力和限制的概念進行深入探討時，我們對於用於評判社會探究的完全不同標準可能有了一些初步的理解。

Schwandt (1996) proposes three such criteria. First, he argues, we should search for a social inquiry that "generate[s] knowledge that complements or supplements rather than displac[ing] lay probing of social problems," a form of knowledge for which we do not yet have the content, but from which we might seek to understand the aims of practice from a variety of perspectives, or with different lenses. Second, he proposes a "social inquiry as practical philosophy" that has as its aim "enhancing or cultivating critical intelligence in parties to the research encounter," critical intelligence being defined as "the capacity to engage in moral critique." And finally, he proposes a third way in which we might judge social inquiry as practical philosophy:We might make judgments about the social inquirer-as-practical-philosopher. He or she might be "evaluated on the success to which his or her reports of the inquiry enable the training or calibration of human judgment" (p.69) or "the capacity for practical wisdom" (p. 70).
Schwandt（1996）提出了三個標準。首先，他認為，我們應該尋找一種社會探究，這種探究應該「產生知識，而不是取代對社會問題的探究」，這種知識形式我們尚未擁有，但我們可以從中尋求從不同角度或透過不同的鏡頭來理解實踐的目標。其次，他提出了一種「作為實踐哲學的社會探究」，其目的是「增強或培養研究過程中各方的批判智慧」，批判智慧被定義為「從事道德批判的能力」。最後，他提出了第三種判斷社會探究作為實踐哲學的方式：我們可以對作為實踐哲學家的社會探究者進行評估。他或她可能會根據「其對探究的報告能否促進人類判斷的培訓或校準」（第 69 頁）或「實踐智慧的能力」（第 70 頁）來進行評估。

Schwandt is not alone, however, in wishing to say "farewell to criteriology," at least as it has been previously conceived. Scheurich (1997) makes a similar plea, and in the same vein, Smith (1993) also argues that validity, if it is to survive at all, must be radically reformulated if it is ever to serve phenomenological research well (see also Smith & Deemer, 2000).
Schwandt 並不是唯一一個希望說“告別評準學”的人，至少不是以前所理解的方式。 Scheurich（1997）提出了類似的請求，同樣，Smith（1993）也主張，如果有效性要繼續存在，就必須徹底重塑，以便能夠很好地服務現象學研究（另見 Smith＆Deemer，2000）。

At issue here is not whether we shall have criteria, or whose criteria we as a scientific community might adopt, but rather what the nature of social inquiry ought to be, whether it ought to undergo a transformation, and what might be the basis for criteria within a projected transformation. Schwandt (1989; also personal communication, August 21, 1998) is quite clear that both the transformation and the criteria are rooted in dialogic efforts. These dialogiclefforts are quite clearly themselves forms of "moral discourse." Through the specific connections of the dialogic, the idea of practical wisdom, and moral discourses, much of Schwandt's work can be seen to be related to, and reflective of, critical theorist and participatory paradigms, as well as constructivism, although Schwandt specifically denies the relativity of truth. (For a more sophisticated explication and critique of forms of constructivism, hermeneutics, and interpretivism, see Schwandt, 2000. In that chapter, Schwandt spells out distinctions between realists and nonrealists, and between foundationalists and nonfoundationalists, far more clearly than it is possible for us to do in this chapter.)
這裡討論的問題不在於我們是否應該有標準，或者我們作為一個科學社區可能採納的標準是誰，而是社會研究的本質應該是什麼，它是否應該經歷轉變，以及在預期的轉變中標準的基礎可能是什麼。 Schwandt（1989 年；也是個人溝通，1998 年 8 月 21 日）非常清楚地指出，轉變和標準都根植於對話努力之中。這些對話努力顯然本身就是“道德話語”的形式。通過對話的具體聯繫，實踐智慧的概念和道德話語，可以看出 Schwandt 的許多工作與批判理論家和參與式範式，以及建構主義有關，儘管 Schwandt 明確否認了真理的相對性。（有關建構主義、解釋學和解釋主義形式的更深入闡釋和評論，請參見 Schwandt，2000 年。在該章中，Schwandt 清楚地闡述了現實主義者和非現實主義者之間、以及基礎主義者和非基礎主義者之間的區別，比我們在本章中可能做到的要清楚得多。）

To return to the central question embedded in validity: How do we know when we have specific
回到嵌入在有效性中的中心問題：當我們擁有特定時，我們如何知道
social inquiries that are faithful enough to some human construction that we may feel safe in acting on them, or, more important, that members of the community in which the research is conducted may act on them? To that question, there is no final answer. There are, however, several discussions of what we might use to make both professional and lay judgments regarding any piece of work. It is to those versions of validity that we now turn.
社會調查是否足夠忠實於某些人類建構，以至於我們可以放心地採取行動，或者更重要的是，在進行研究的社區成員可以採取行動？對於這個問題，沒有最終答案。然而，有幾個討論，我們可以用來對任何一項工作進行專業和非專業判斷。現在我們轉向這些有效性版本。

Perhaps the first nonfoundational criteria were those we developed in response to a challenge by John K. Smith (see Smith & Deemer, 2000). In those criteria, we attempted to locate criteria for judging the processes and outcomes of naturalistic or constructivist inquiries (rather than the application of methods; see Guba & Lincoln, 1989). We described five potential outcomes of a social constructionist inquiry (evaluation is one form of disciplined inquiry; see Guba & Lincoln, 1981), each grounded in concerns specific to the paradigm we had tried to describe and construct, and apart from any concerns carried over from the positivist legacy. The criteria were instead rooted in the axioms and assumptions of the constructivist paradigm, insofar as we could extrapolate and infer them.
也許第一個非基礎性標準是我們對約翰·K·史密斯（見史密斯和迪默，2000 年）的挑戰所發展的。在這些標準中，我們試圖找到用於判斷自然主義或建構主義探究過程和結果的標準（而不是方法的應用；見古巴和林肯，1989 年）。我們描述了社會建構主義探究的五個潛在結果（評估是一種紀律性探究的形式；見古巴和林肯，1981 年），每一個都根據我們試圖描述和構建的範式特定關注，並與從性實主義遺產中延續的任何關注無關。這些標準反而根據建構主義範式的公理和假設，盡我們所能推斷和推斷。

G Those authenticity criteria-so called because we believed them to be hallmarks of authentic, trustworthy, rigorous, or "valid" constructivist or Phenomenological inquiry - were fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity, and tactical authenticity (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 245-25.1). Fairness was thought to be a quality of balance; that is, all stakeholder views, perspectives, claims, concerns, and voices should be apparent in the text. Omission of stakeholder or participant voices reflects, we believe, a form of bias. This bias, however, was and is not related directly to the concerns of objectivity that flow from positivist inquiry and that are reflective of inquirer blindness or subjectivity. Rather, this fairness was defined by deliberate attempts to prevent marginalization, to act affirmatively with respect to inclusion, and to act with energy to ensure that all voices in the inquiry effort had a chance to be represented in any texts and to have their stories treated fairly and with balance.
那些真實性標準-所謂的因為我們認為它們是真實、可信、嚴謹或“有效”的建構主義或現象學探究的標誌-包括公平性、本體真實性、教育真實性、催化真實性和戰術真實性（Guba＆Lincoln，1989 年，第 245-251 頁）。公平性被認為是一種平衡的品質；也就是說，所有利益相關者的觀點、觀點、主張、關注和聲音應該在文本中明顯。我們認為，省略利益相關者或參與者的聲音反映了一種偏見。然而，這種偏見並不直接與源自實證探究的客觀性問題有關，這些問題反映了探究者的盲目性或主觀性。相反，這種公平性是通過刻意努力防止邊緣化，積極行動以促進包容性，並積極確保所有探究努力中的聲音都有機會在任何文本中得到代表，並且他們的故事得到公平和平衡對待。

Ontological and educative authenticity were designated as criteria for determining a raised level of awareness, in the first instance, by individual research participants and, in the second, by individuals about those who surround them or with whom they come into contact for some social or organizational purpose. Although we failed to see it at that particular historical moment (1989), there is no reason these criteria cannot be-at this point in time, with many miles under our theoretic and practice feet-reflective also of Schwandt's (1996) "critical intelligence," or capacity to engage in moral critique. In fact, the authenticity criteria we originally proposed had strong moral and ethical overtones, a point to which we later returned (see, for instance, Lincoln, 1995, 1998a, 1998b). It was a point to which our critics strongly objected before we were sufficiently selfaware to realize the implications of what we had proposed (see, for instance, Sechrest, 1993).
本體論和教育上的真實性被指定為確定提高意識水平的標準，首先是由個別研究參與者，其次是由個人關於周圍人或與其接觸以達到某種社會或組織目的的人來確定。儘管我們在那個特定的歷史時刻（1989 年）未能看到這一點，但在這個時刻，有許多理論和實踐基礎的情況下，沒有理由認為這些標準不能反映施萬特（1996 年）的“批判智慧”或參與道德批判的能力。事實上，我們最初提出的真實性標準具有濃厚的道德和倫理色彩，這一點我們後來回到了（例如，參見林肯，1995 年，1998a，1998b）。這是一個我們的批評者在我們足夠自覺以意識到我們所提出的建議的含義之前強烈反對的觀點（例如，參見 Sechrest，1993 年）。

Catalytic and tactical authenticities refer to the ability of a given inquiry to prompt, first, action on the part of research participants and, second, the involvement of gthe researcher/evaluator in training participants in specific forms of social and political action if participants desire such training. If is here that constructivist inquiry practice begins to resemble forms of critical theorist action, action research, or participative or cooperative inquiry, each of which is predicated on creating the capacity in research participants for positive social change and forms of emancipatory community action. It is also at this specific point that practitioners of positivist and postpositivist social inquiry are the most critical, because any action on the part of the inquirer is thought to destabilize objectivity and introduce subjectivity, resulting in bias. The problem of subjectivity and bias has a long theoretical history, and this chapter is simply too brief for us to enter into the various formulations that either take account of subjectivity or posit it as a positive learning experience,
催化和戰術性的真實性指的是某個詢問的能力，首先是促使研究參與者採取行動，其次是研究者/評估者參與培訓參與者在特定形式的社會和政治行動中，如果參與者希望接受這樣的培訓。在這裡，建構主義詢問實踐開始類似於批判理論行動、行動研究或參與式或合作式詢問，每一種都建立在為研究參與者創造積極社會變革和解放性社區行動的能力上。也正是在這一特定點上，實證主義和後實證主義社會詢問的實踐者最為批判，因為詢問者的任何行動都被認為會破壞客觀性並引入主觀性，導致偏見。主觀性和偏見的問題有著悠久的理論歷史，而本章節對於我們進入考慮主觀性或將其視為正面學習經驗的各種表述來說，簡直太過簡短。

practical, embodied, gendered, and emotive. For purposes of this discussion, it is enough to say that we are persuaded that objectivity is a chimera: a mythological creature that never existed, save in the imaginations of those who believe that knowing can be separated from the knower.
實用、具體、性別化和情感化。 對於本討論的目的，可以說我們被說服客觀性是一種幻想：一種從未存在的神話生物，只存在於那些相信知識可以與知識者分離的人的想像中。

Laurel Richardson (1994, 1997) has proposed another form of validity, a deliberately "transgressive" form, the crystalline. In writing experimental (i.e., nonauthoritative, nonpositivist) texts, particularly poems and plays, Richardson (1997) has sought to "problematize reliability, validity and truth" (p. 165) in an effort to create new relationships: to her research participants, to her work, to other women, to herself. She says that transgressive forms permit a social scientist to "conjure a different kind of social science... [which] means changing one's relationship to one's work, how one knows and tells about the sociological" (p.166). In order to see "how transgression looks and how it feels," it is necessary to "find and deploy methods that allow us to uncover the hidden assumptions and life-denying repressions of sociology; resee/refeel sociology. Reseeing and retelling are inseparable" (p.167).
Laurel Richardson（1994 年，1997 年）提出了另一種有效性形式，一種故意“越軌”的形式，即晶體。在寫實驗性（即非權威、非實證主義）文本，特別是詩歌和劇本時，Richardson（1997 年）試圖“質疑可靠性、有效性和真實性”（第 165 頁），以創建新的關係：與她的研究參與者、她的工作、其他女性和自己。她說，越軌形式允許社會科學家“召喚一種不同類型的社會科學... [這] 意味著改變對工作的關係，以及如何了解和講述社會學”（第 166 頁）。為了看到“越軌的樣子和感覺”，有必要“找到並應用方法，讓我們揭示社會學的隱含假設和否定生活的壓抑；重新看待/重新感受社會學。重新看和重新講是不可分割的”（第 167 頁）。

The way to achieve such validity is by examining the properties of a crystal in a metaphoric sense. Here we present an extended quotation to give some flavor of how such validity might be described and deployed:
通過以隱喻的方式檢視晶體的特性，來達到這種有效性的方法。在這裡，我們提供了一段延伸引文，以展示這種有效性可能如何被描述和應用：

I propose that the central imaginary for "validity" for postmodernist texts is not the triangle-a rigid, fixed, two-dimensional object. Rather the central imaginary is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. Crystals grow, change, alter, but are not amorphous. Crystals are prisms that reflect externalities and refract within themselves, creating different colors, pattern, arrays, casting off in different directions. What we see depends upon our angle of repose. Not triangulation, crystallization. In postmodernist mixed-genre texts, we have moved from plane geometry to light theory, where light can be both waves and particles. Crystallization, without losing structure, deconstructs the traditional idea of "validity" (we feel how there is no single truth, we see how texts validate themselves); and crystallization provides us with a deepened, complex, thoroughly partial understanding of the topic. Paradoxically, we know more and doubt what we know. (Richardson, 1997, p. 92)
我提議後現代主義文本的「有效性」的中心想像不是三角形-一個僵硬、固定、二維的物體。相反，中心想像是水晶，它結合了對稱性和實質性，具有無限多種形狀、物質、變形、多維性和角度的變化。水晶生長、變化、改變，但並非無定形。水晶是反射外部和在自身內部折射的棱鏡，創造出不同的顏色、圖案、陣列，朝不同方向投射。我們看到的取決於我們的觀察角度。不是三角測量，而是結晶化。在後現代主義混合體裁文本中，我們已從平面幾何學轉向光學理論，其中光既可以是波也可以是粒子。結晶化，不失結構，解構了「有效性」的傳統觀念（我們感受到沒有單一真理，我們看到文本如何自我驗證）；結晶化為我們提供了對主題的深入、複雜、全面的理解。矛盾地，我們知道得更多，卻對我們所知的懷疑。 （理查森，1997 年，第 92 頁）

The metaphoric "solid object" (crystal/text), which can be turned many ways, which reflects and refracts light (light/multiple layers of meaning), through which we can see both "wave" (light wave/human currents) and "particle" (light as "chunks" of energy/elements of truth, feeling, connection, processes of the research that "flow" together) is an attractive metaphor for validity. The properties of the crystal-as-metaphor help writers and readers alike see the interweaving of processes in the research: discovery, seeing, telling, storying, re-presentation.
隱喻性的「固體物體」（水晶/文字），可以轉動多種方式，反射和折射光線（光線/多層意義），透過它我們可以看到「波」（光波/人類潮流）和「粒子」（光作為能量的「塊」/真理、感受、連結的元素，研究過程的「流動」）是一個吸引人的有效隱喻。水晶作為隱喻的特性幫助作家和讀者看到研究過程中的交織：發現、看見、講述、故事化、再呈現。

Laurel Richardson is not alone in calling for forms of validity that are "transgressive" and disruptive of the status quo. Patti Lather (1993) seeks "an incitement to discourse," the purpose of which is "to rupture validity as a regime of truth, to displace its historical inscription . . . via a dispersion, circulation and proliferation of counterpractices of authority that take the crisis of representation into account" (p. 674). In addition to catalytic validity (Lather, 1986), Lather (1993) poses validity as simulacralironic validity; Lyotardian paralogy/neopragmatic validity, a form of validity that "foster[s] heterogeneity, refusing disclosure" (p. 679); Derridean rigor/rhizomatic validity, a form of behaving " via relay, circuit, multiple openings" (p. 680); and voluptuous/situated validity, which "embodies a situated, partial tentativeness" and "brings ethics and epistemology together . . . via practices of engagement and selfreflexivity" (p.686). Together, these form a way of interrupting, disrupting, and transforming "pure" presence into a disturbing; fluid, partial, and
Laurel Richardson 在呼籲形式的有效性時並不孤單，她要求的有效性是"越軌"且破壞現狀的。Patti Lather（1993）尋求"引發對話"，其目的是"破壞有效性作為真理制度，取代其歷史銘記...通過對權威反實踐的散佈、流通和擴散，以考慮代表危機"（第 674 頁）。除了催化有效性（Lather，1986）外，Lather（1993）提出了模擬諷刺有效性；李奧塔的詭辯/新實用主義有效性，一種"促進異質性，拒絕揭示"的有效性形式（第 679 頁）；德里達的嚴謹/根莖有效性，一種"通過中繼、電路、多重開放行為"的有效性形式（第 680 頁）；以及豐滿/情境有效性，它"體現了一種情境化、部分的暫時性"，並"通過參與和自我反思的實踐將倫理學和認識論結合在一起"（第 686 頁）。總的來說，這些形式打斷、破壞和轉變了"純粹"存在為一種令人不安的；流動的、部分的、和
problematic presence-a poststructural and decidedly postmodern form of discourse theory, hence textual revelation.
問題存在-後結構主義和明顯後現代形式的話語理論，因此是文本揭示。

As Lather (1993) points out, poststructural forms for validities "bring ethics and epistemology together" (p. 686); indeed, as Parker Palmer (1987) also notes, "every way of knowing contains its own moral trajectory" (p. 24). Peshkin reflects on Noddings's (1984) observation that "the search for justification often carries us farther and farther from the heart of morality" (p. 105; quoted in Peshkin, 1993, p. 24). The way in which we know is most assuredly tied up with both what we know and our relationships with our research participants. Accordingly, one of us worked on trying to understand the ways in which the ethical intersects both the interpersonal and the epistemological (as a form of authentic or valid knowing; Lincoln, 1995). The result was the first set of understandings about emerging criteria for quality that were also rooted in the epistemology/ethics nexus. Seven new standards were derived from that search: positionality, or standpoint, judgments; specific discourse communities and research sites as arbiters of quality; voice, or the extent to which a text has the quality of polyvocality; critical subjectivity (or what might be termed intense self-reflexivity); reciprocity, or the extent to which the research relationship becomes reciprocal rather than hierarchical; sacredness, or the profound regard for how science can (and does) contribute to human flourishing; and sharing the perquisites of privilege that accrue to our positions as academics with university positions. Each of these standards was extracted from a body of research, often from disciplines as disparate as management, philosophy, and women's studies (Lincoln, 1995).
正如 Lather（1993）所指出的，對於有效性而言，後結構形式「將倫理學和認識論結合在一起」（第 686 頁）；事實上，正如 Parker Palmer（1987）所指出的，「每一種認識方式都包含其自身的道德軌跡」（第 24 頁）。Peshkin 反思了 Noddings（1984）的觀察，即「尋求理由往往使我們越來越遠離道德的核心」（第 105 頁；引自 Peshkin，1993，第 24 頁）。我們知道的方式與我們知道的內容以及與研究參與者的關係密切相關。因此，我們中的一位致力於試圖理解倫理如何交織於人際關係和認識論（作為一種真實或有效的認識形式；Lincoln，1995）。結果是對於品質新標準的第一組理解，這些標準也根植於認識論/倫理學的交匯處。 從該搜索中衍生出七個新標準：位置性或立場判斷；特定的話語社群和研究場所作為品質的仲裁者；聲音，或文本具有多重聲音質量的程度；批判性主觀性（或可稱為強烈的自我反思）；互惠性，或研究關係變得互惠而非階層化的程度；神聖性，或對科學如何（以及確實如何）促進人類繁榮的深切尊重；以及與我們作為大學教職員工所擁有的特權分享。這些標準中的每一個都是從一系列研究中提取出來的，通常來自管理、哲學和婦女研究等截然不同的學科（Lincoln，1995）。

Texts have to do a lot more work these days than they used to. Even as they are charged by poststructuralists and postmodernists to reflect upon their representational practices, representational practices themselves become more problematic. Three of the most engaging, but painful, issues are the problem of voice, the status of reflexivity, and the problematics of postmodern/poststructural textual representation, especially as those problematics are displayed in the shift toward narrative and literary forms that directly and openly deal with human emotion.
這些天，文本必須做比以前更多的工作。即使在後結構主義者和後現代主義者的要求下反思其代表性實踐，代表性實踐本身也變得更加棘手。其中最引人入勝但痛苦的三個問題是聲音的問題、反身性的地位以及後現代/後結構主義文本代表性的問題，特別是這些問題體現在向敘事和文學形式轉變的過程中，這些形式直接且公開地處理人類情感。

Voice is a multilayered problem, simply because it has come to mean many things to different researchers. In former eras, the only appropriate "voice" was the "voice from nowhere"-the "pure presence" of representation, as Lather terms it. As researchers became more conscious of the abstracted realities their texts created, they became simultaneously more conscious of having readers "hear" their informants-permitting readers to hear the exact words (and, occasionally, the paralinguistic cues, the lapses, pauses, stops, starts, reformulations) of the informants. Today voice can mean, especially in more participatory forms of research, not only having a real researcher-and a researcher's voice-in the text, but also letting research participants speak for themselves, either in text form or through plays, forums, "town meetings," or other oral and performance-oriented media or communication forms designed by research participants themselves. Performance texts, in particular, give an emotional immediacy to the voices of researchers and research participants far beyond their own sites and locales (see McCall, 2000). Rosanna Hertz (1997) describes voice as
聲音是一個多層次的問題，簡單來說，這對不同的研究者意味著許多不同的事情。在過去的時代，唯一適當的“聲音”是“無處之聲”-代表性的“純粹存在”，正如拉瑟所稱。隨著研究者對其文本所創造的抽象現實越來越有意識，他們同時也更加意識到讓讀者“聽到”他們的資訊來源-允許讀者聽到資訊來源的確切言辭（有時還包括語言外的提示、失誤、停頓、開始、重組）。今天的聲音可以意味著，在更具參與性的研究形式中，不僅在文本中有一位真正的研究者和研究者的聲音，還讓研究參與者自己講話，無論是以文本形式還是通過戲劇、論壇、“鎮上會議”或其他由研究參與者自己設計的口頭和表演導向的媒體或溝通形式。特別是表演文本，為研究者和研究參與者的聲音賦予了一種情感上的即時性，遠遠超出了他們自己的場所和地點（參見麥考爾，2000 年）。羅莎娜·赫茨（1997 年）將聲音描述為

a struggle to figure out how to present the author's self while simultaneously writing the respondents accounts and representing their selves. Voice has multiple dimensions: First, there is the voice of the author. Second, there is the presentation of the voices of one's respondents within the text. A third dimension appears when the self is the subject of the inquiry. . . . Voice is how authors express themselves within an ethnography. (pp. xi-xii)
一個掙扎，試圖找出如何同時呈現作者自己，寫作受訪者的敘述並代表他們自己。聲音具有多個維度：首先是作者的聲音。其次，是在文本中呈現受訪者的聲音。第三個維度出現在自我成為調查主題時。聲音是作者在民族志中表達自己的方式。 (頁 xi-xii)

But knowing how to express ourselves goes far beyond the commonsense understanding of "expressing ourselves." Generations of ethnographers trained in the "cooled-out, stripped-down rhetoric" of positivist inquiry (Firestone, 1987) find it difficult, if not nearly impossible, to "locate" themselves deliberately and squarely within their texts (even though, as Geertz [1988] has demonstrated finally and without doubt, the authorial voice is rarely genuinely absent, or even hidden). Specific textual experimentation can help; that is, composing ethnographic work into various literary forms-the poetry and plays of Laurel Richardson are good examples-can help a researcher to overcome the tendency to write in the distanced and abstracted voice of the disembodied "I." But such writing exercises are hard work. This is also work that is embedded in the practices of reflexivity and narrativity, without which achieving a voice of (partial) truth is impossible.
但知道如何表達自己遠不止於對「表達自己」的常識理解。訓練於實證探究的「冷靜、簡化的修辭」的世代民族志學者（Firestone，1987）發現很難，甚至幾乎不可能，有意識地並堅定地將自己置於他們的文本之中（即使，正如 Geertz [1988]最終且毫無疑問地證明的那樣，作者的聲音很少真正缺席，甚至隱藏）。 具體的文本實驗可以幫助；也就是說，將民族志工作構思成各種文學形式——Laurel Richardson 的詩歌和劇本是很好的例子——可以幫助研究人員克服寫作時遠離和抽象化的脫體「我」的傾向。但這樣的寫作練習是辛苦的。這也是嵌入在反思和敘事實踐中的工作，沒有這些，實現（部分）真實聲音是不可能的。

Reflexivity is the process of reflecting critically on the self as researcher, the "human as instrument" (Guba & Lincoln, 1981). It is, we would assert, the critical subjectivity discussed early on in Reason' and Rowan's edited volume Human Inquiry (1981). It is a conscious experiencing of the self as both inquirer and respondent, as teacher and learner, as the one coming to know the self within the processes of research itself.
反身性是對自己作為研究者的批判性反思過程，即“人作為工具”（Guba＆Lincoln，1981）。我們會斷言，這是在 Reason 和 Rowan 編輯的《人類探究》（1981）中早期討論的批判性主觀性。這是對自己作為探究者和回應者，作為教師和學習者，作為在研究過程中認識自己的人的自覺體驗。

Reflexivity forces us to come to terms not only with our choice of research problem and with those with whom we engage in the research process, but with our selves and with the multiple identities that represent the fluid self in the research setting (Alcoff & Potter, 1993). Shulamit Reinharz (1997), for example, argues that we not only"bring the self to the field, . . [we also] create the self in the field" (p. 3). She suggests that although we all have many selves we bring with us, those selves fall into three categories: researchbased selves, brought selves (the selves that historically, socially, and personally create our standpoints), and situationally created selves (p.5). Each of those selves comes into play in the research setting and consequently has a distinctive voice. Reflexivity-as well as the poststructural and postmodern sensibilities concerning quality in qualitative research-demands that we interrogate each of our selves regarding the ways in which research efforts are shaped and staged around the binaries, contradictions, and paradoxes that form our own lives. We must question our selves, too, regarding how those binaries and paradoxes shape not only the identities called forth in the field and later in the discovery processes of writing, but also our interactions with respondents, in who we become to them in the process of becoming to ourselves. Someone once characterized qualitative research as the twin processes of "writing up" (field notes) and "writing down" (the narrative). But Clandinin and Connelly (1994) have made clear that this bitextual reading of the processes of qualitative research is far too simplistic. In fact, many texts are created in the process of engaging in fieldwork. As Richardson (1994, 1997, 2000; see also Richardson & St. Pierre, Chapter 38, this volume) makes clear, writing is not merely the transcribing of some reality. Rather, writing-of all the texts, notes, presentations, and possibilities-is also a process of discovery: discovery of the subject (and sometimes of the problem itself) and discovery of the self.
反身性迫使我們不僅要面對我們選擇的研究問題，以及我們在研究過程中與之互動的人，還要面對我們自己以及代表研究環境中流動自我的多重身份（Alcoff＆Potter，1993 年）。例如，Shulamit Reinharz（1997 年）認為我們不僅“將自我帶到領域中，[我們還]在領域中創造自我”（第 3 頁）。她建議，儘管我們都有許多自我與我們一起帶來，但這些自我可以分為三類：基於研究的自我，帶來的自我（在歷史上、社會上和個人上創造我們立場的自我），以及情境中創造的自我（第 5 頁）。這些自我中的每一個在研究環境中都發揮作用，因此具有獨特的聲音。反身性以及關於質性研究中質量的後結構主義和後現代感性要求我們盤問我們的每個自我，關於研究努力如何圍繞形成我們自己生活的二元、矛盾和悖論而形成。 我們也必須質疑自己，關於這些二元對立和悖論如何塑造不僅是在領域中召喚的身份，以及後來在寫作的發現過程中，也塑造了我們與受訪者的互動，以及在成為自己的過程中我們對他們的變化。有人曾將質性研究描述為“寫作上”（現場筆記）和“寫作下”（敘事）的雙重過程。但 Clandinin 和 Connelly（1994）已經明確指出，對質性研究過程的這種雙重閱讀過於簡單化。事實上，在從事實地工作的過程中創建了許多文本。正如 Richardson（1994 年，1997 年，2000 年；另見 Richardson＆St. Pierre，第 38 章，本卷）所指出的那樣，寫作不僅僅是將某種現實轉錄下來。寫作-所有文本、筆記、演示文稿和可能性-也是一個發現的過程：發現主題（有時也是問題本身）和發現自我。

There is good news and bad news with the most contemporary of formulations. The good news is that the multiple selves-ourselves and our respondents-of postmodern inquiries may give rise to more dynamic, problematic, open-ended, and complex forms of writing and representation. The bad news is that the multiple selves we create and encounter give rise to more dynamic, problematic, open-ended, and complex forms of writing and representation.
最當代的表述中有好消息和壞消息。好消息是後現代探詢中的多重自我-我們自己和我們的回應者-可能會產生更具動態、問題性、開放性和複雜性的寫作和表現形式。壞消息是我們創造和遭遇的多重自我可能會產生更具動態、問題性、開放性和複雜性的寫作和表現形式。

There are two dangers inherent in the conventional texts of scientific method: that they may lead us to believe the world is rather simpler than it is, and that they may reinscribe enduring forms
傳統科學方法的文本中存在兩個危險：一是可能讓我們相信世界比實際情況簡單，二是可能重新確立持久的形式