sections 1-8 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
《合同重述（第二版）》第 1-8 节
How those general provisions impact your understanding of what a contract is—and what it is not.
这些一般条款如何影响你对合同是什么以及不是的理解。
Introductory Note
引言说明
Problem of Multiple Meanings
多重含义的问题
Words often have different meanings to the speaker and to the hearer.
词语对说话者和听者往往有不同的含义。
Definitions in the Restatement are used to avoid confusion, even though words can have various connotations.
《重述》中的定义用于避免混淆，即使词语可能有多种含义。
Objective of Definitions
定义的目标
To reduce ambiguity and circumlocution in stating rules.
为了减少在陈述规则时的模糊性和冗长。
To use familiar legal terms where possible, ensuring each term has a single core definition in this Restatement.
在可能的情况下使用熟悉的法律术语，确保每个术语在本重述中具有单一的核心定义。
Limits of Definitions
定义的界限
Complex institutions like “contract” or “promise” cannot be fully captured in a single definition.
像“合同”或“承诺”这样的复杂机构无法通过单一定义完全表达。
Operative facts and legal relations are further explored in subsequent chapters.
后续章节将进一步探讨操作事实和法律关系。
§1. Contract Defined
§1. 合同定义
“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”
“合同是一个承诺或一组承诺，因其违反而法律提供救济，或法律以某种方式承认其为义务的履行。”
Comment
评论
a. Other meanings
a. 其他含义
“Contract” is often used more broadly or differently (synonym for “agreement,” “bargain,” or including executed transactions).
“合同”通常被更广泛或不同地使用（作为“协议”、“交易”的同义词，或包括已执行的交易）。
This Restatement’s definition focuses on promises recognized as enforceable, excluding executed transactions with no continuing promise, and obligations imposed without a promise.
本重述的定义侧重于被认定为可强制执行的承诺，排除没有持续承诺的已执行交易，以及没有承诺的强加义务。
b. Act and resulting legal relations
b. 行为及其产生的法律关系
“Contract” refers to the act(s) of promising which have legal effect.
“合同”是指具有法律效力的承诺行为。
The term also is used for the resulting legal obligation or overall legal relationship.
该术语也用于指代由此产生的法律义务或整体法律关系。
Compare Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) § 1-201(11), which defines “contract” as the “total legal obligation” resulting from the parties’ agreement.
比较《统一商法典》（UCC）§ 1-201(11)，该条款将“合同”定义为当事人协议所产生的“全部法律义务”。
c. Set of promises
c. 承诺集
A contract may include one or multiple promises made by and/or to various persons.
合同可以包括由一个或多个个人作出的一个或多个承诺。
Promises need not be simultaneous if they are treated as a single contract or sufficiently related.
如果将承诺视为单一合同或足够相关，则不必同时进行。
d. Operative acts other than promise
d. 除承诺外的操作行为
Definition does not specify which additional acts (e.g., consideration, delivery) might be needed to form a contract.
定义并未指定形成合同可能需要哪些额外行为（例如，考虑、交付）。
Those are discussed in other sections (e.g., §17 for formation, §71 for consideration).
这些在其他章节中讨论（例如，§17 讨论形成，§71 讨论对价）。
e. Remedies
e. 救济措施
Legal remedies for breach include damages, restitution, and specific performance (see Chapter 16).
违反法律的救济措施包括损害赔偿、返还和特定履行（见第 16 章）。
Indirect recognition (e.g., restitution) can also reflect a legal duty, thus making the agreement a contract (illustration given about Statute of Frauds).
间接承认（例如，返还）也可以反映法律义务，从而使协议成为合同（关于欺诈法的例子）。
f. Varieties of contracts
f. 合同的种类
The term is generic and includes “voidable,” “unenforceable,” “formal,” “informal,” “express,” “implied,” “unilateral,” “bilateral,” etc.
该术语是通用的，包括“可撤销的”、“不可执行的”、“正式的”、“非正式的”、“明示的”、“默示的”、“单方的”、“双边的”等。
g. “Binding promise”
g. “绑定承诺”
A “binding” promise is one that meets contract definition, although the remedy may vary or be limited by other facts.
“具有约束力”的承诺是符合合同定义的，尽管救济可能因其他事实而有所不同或受到限制。
The word “binding” is used to indicate a duty arises unless other defeating facts exist (e.g., lack of capacity, illegality).
“binding”一词用于表示除非存在其他抵消事实（例如，缺乏能力、违法），否则会产生义务。
§2. Promise; Promisor; Promisee; Beneficiary
§2. 承诺；承诺人；受承诺人；受益人
(1) A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain so as to justify a promisee in understanding a commitment has been made.
(1) 承诺是意图采取行动或克制的表现，以使承诺人理解已作出承诺。
(2) Promisor = person manifesting the intention.
(2) 承诺人 = 表示意图的人。
(3) Promisee = person to whom the manifestation is addressed.
(3) 受诺人 = 向其表达的对象。
(4) Beneficiary = person, other than promisee, who will benefit from performance.
(4) 受益人 = 除了承诺人之外，将从履行中受益的人。
Comment
评论
a. Acts and resulting relations
a. 行为及其结果关系
“Promise” denotes the act of the promisor; not limited to legally enforceable acts.
“Promise”指的是承诺人的行为；不限于法律上可强制执行的行为。
A promise can also be used to refer to the resulting complex of human relations and expectations.
承诺也可以用来指代人际关系和期望的复杂结果。
b. Manifestation of intention
b. 意图的表现
Objective standard: “external” expression.
客观标准：“外部”表现。
Promisor’s words or conduct must be such that a reasonable person would interpret them as a commitment.
承诺人的言辞或行为必须使合理的人将其解读为一种承诺。
If more than one inference is possible, other contract interpretation rules apply (see §§19, 20, 201, 219).
如果可能有多个推论，则适用其他合同解释规则（见 §§19, 20, 201, 219）。
c. Promise of action by third person; guaranty
c. 第三方的行动承诺；担保
Language that literally promises a third person’s action usually implies the promisor commits to cause or ensure that action (e.g., guarantor).
字面上承诺第三方行为的语言通常意味着承诺者承诺促成或确保该行为（例如，担保人）。
The promise is valid only if it justifies the promisee’s expectation of promisor’s conduct or responsibility for failure.
只有在承诺能够证明受承诺人对承诺人行为或未能履行责任的期望时，承诺才是有效的。
d. Promise of event beyond human control; warranty
d. 超出人类控制的事件的承诺；保修
A statement about an uncontrollable event may be interpreted as a promise to answer for harm if the event does not occur (e.g., a warranty).
关于不可控事件的声明可以被解读为对损害负责的承诺，如果该事件未发生（例如，保修）。
Warranties can concern present or past facts, not just future occurrences.
保修可以涉及现在或过去的事实，而不仅仅是未来的事件。
Must be interpreted in context to determine if it is really a promise.
必须在上下文中进行解释，以确定这是否真的是一个承诺。
e. Illusory promises; mere statements of intention
e. 虚幻的承诺；仅仅是意图的陈述
If performance is entirely optional to the promisor, there is no real promise.
如果履行对承诺人完全是可选的，那么就没有真正的承诺。
A conditional promise is still a promise if the condition is outside the promisor’s unfettered discretion.
如果条件不在承诺者的自由裁量范围内，条件性承诺仍然是一个承诺。
f. Opinions and predictions
f. 意见和预测
Distinguish a promise from mere opinion/prediction (no commitment is manifested).
区分承诺与仅仅是意见/预测（没有表现出承诺）。
Under UCC § 2-313(2), a mere seller’s opinion is not a warranty.
根据《统一商法典》第 2-313(2)条，仅仅是卖方的意见并不构成保证。
g. Promisee and beneficiary
g. 受益人和受益者
“Promisee” = the addressee of the promisor’s manifestation.
“Promisee” = 承诺人的表现的受领人。
A third person benefiting is a “beneficiary.”
第三方受益人是“受益人”。
A beneficiary may or may not have a legal right to performance.
受益人可能有或可能没有对履行的法律权利。
§3. Agreement Defined; Bargain Defined
§3. 协议定义；交易定义
“An agreement is a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons. A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or a promise for a performance, or to exchange performances.”
“协议是两个或更多人之间相互同意的表现。交易是交换承诺或承诺与履行之间的协议，或交换履行。”
Comment
评论
a. Agreement vs. bargain
a. 协议与交易
“Agreement” is broader than “contract,” “bargain,” or “promise.”
“协议”比“合同”、“交易”或“承诺”更广泛。
Some contracts do not require an agreement (e.g., §§82–90).
某些合同不需要协议（例如，§§82–90）。
Agreement implies no inherent legal consequences.
协议不意味着具有固有的法律后果。
b. Manifestation of assent
b. 同意的表现
Can be by words or conduct (including silence in some cases, see §19, §69).
可以通过言语或行为（在某些情况下包括沉默，见§19，§69）。
Compare UCC § 1-201(3).
比较 UCC § 1-201(3)。
c. Bargain vs. agreement
c. 交易与协议
Bargain is a narrower type of agreement involving exchange.
交易是一种更狭义的协议，涉及交换。
Includes even unenforceable or invalidated transactions if they were intended as an exchange.
包括即使是不可执行或无效的交易，只要它们被视为交换。
Covers fully executed exchanges (barter, sale) if a promise was made.
涵盖完全执行的交换（以物易物、销售），如果有承诺的话。
d. Offer
d. 提供
A bargain typically arises from offer and acceptance, specifying the items of exchange (§§22, 24).
交易通常源于要约和承诺，具体说明交换的项目 (§§22, 24)。
e. Contract vs. bargain
e. 合同与交易
Not all contracts are bargains (e.g., gifts under seal, §§82–94).
并非所有合同都是交易（例如，密封的赠与，§§82–94）。
Bargain requires manifestations of mutual assent in a particular exchange form.
交易需要在特定的交换形式中表现出双方的同意。
§4. How a Promise May Be Made
§4. 如何制定承诺
“A promise may be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.”
“承诺可以用口头或书面语言表述，也可以完全或部分通过行为推断。”
Comment
评论
a. Express and implied contracts
a. 明示和默示合同
Distinction: mode of manifesting assent (words vs. conduct).
区分：表示同意的方式（言辞与行为）。
“Express” = language; “implied” = conduct, usage, circumstances.
“Express” = 语言; “implied” = 行为，使用，情况。
No difference in legal effect; only in how assent is shown.
法律效力没有区别；仅在表示同意的方式上有所不同。
Illustrations
插图
Ordering flour by phone → obligation to pay.
通过电话订购面粉 → 付款义务。
Picking up an apple in a store with a price tag and nodding → promise to pay.
在商店里拿起一个带价格标签的苹果并点头 → 承诺付款。
b. Quasi-contracts
b. 准合同
Different from implied-in-fact contracts.
不同于事实隐含合同。
Quasi-contracts (aka contracts implied in law) are obligations imposed by law to prevent injustice.
准合同（即法律暗示的合同）是法律强加的义务，以防止不公正。
Not based on the parties’ manifested intent (see Restatement of Restitution).
不基于当事方的明确意图（见《不当得利重述》）。
Illustration: Spouse’s necessary supplies purchased without actual authority → duty is quasi-contractual, not contractual.
插图：配偶所需物品在没有实际授权的情况下购买 → 义务是准合同性质的，而不是合同性质的。
§5. Terms of Promise, Agreement, or Contract
§5. 承诺、协议或合同的条款
(1) A term of a promise/agreement = portion of manifested intention relating to a particular matter.
(1) 承诺/协议的条款 = 与特定事项相关的表现意图的部分。
(2) A term of a contract = portion of resulting legal relations relating to that matter, whether or not the parties intended those relations.
(2) 合同条款 = 与该事项相关的法律关系的部分，无论当事方是否意图这些关系。
Comment
评论
a. Agreed terms
a. 同意的条款
Expressed in words/conduct, considering context (usage of trade, course of dealing/performance).
以文字/行为表达，考虑上下文（交易习惯、交易过程/履行）。
If promise is binding, these terms usually become contract terms unless invalidated.
如果承诺具有约束力，这些条款通常会成为合同条款，除非被宣布无效。
b. Contract terms supplied by law
b. 法律规定的合同条款
Many rules fill gaps or override parties’ intentions (public policy).
许多规则填补空白或覆盖当事方的意图（公共政策）。
These can be viewed as “implied terms,” but often reflect policy rather than manifested intent.
这些可以被视为“隐含条款”，但通常反映的是政策而非明确的意图。
c. Statutory contract terms
c. 法定合同条款
Some statutes prescribe mandatory or optional contract terms (e.g., UCC).
某些法规规定了强制性或可选的合同条款（例如，UCC）。
Contract law may treat them as if the party had promised in the statutory terms.
合同法可能将它们视为当事方已按照法定条款作出承诺。
Illustration: UCC disallows certain disclaimers (excludes an implied warranty) → that implied warranty is treated like a contractual promise.
插图：UCC 不允许某些免责声明（排除隐含担保）→ 该隐含担保被视为合同承诺。
§6. Formal Contracts
§6. 正式合同
Certain types of contracts have special rules due to formal characteristics:
某些类型的合同由于形式特征而有特殊规则：
(a) Contracts under seal
(a) 密封合同
(b) Recognizances
(b) 保证金
(c) Negotiable instruments and documents
(c) 可转让票据和文件
(d) Letters of credit
(d) 信用证
Comment
评论
a. “Formal contracts.”
a. “正式合同。”
Traditionally labeled “formal” vs. “informal.”
传统上标记为“正式”与“非正式”。
This Restatement avoids that label since many contracts also have partial formal requirements (e.g., Statute of Frauds).
该重述避免了该标签，因为许多合同也有部分正式要求（例如，欺诈法）。
The special rules for (a)-(d) are mostly not stated in this Restatement; UCC and other statutes govern.
(a)-(d) 的特殊规则大多未在本重述中说明；适用《统一商法典》和其他法规。
b. Contracts under seal
b. 密封合同
Chapter 4 deals with formation under seal.
第四章讨论了密封下的形成。
Many states have modified or abolished seals by statute.
许多州通过法令修改或废除了印章。
UCC often disregards the seal (e.g., §2-203).
UCC 通常忽视印章（例如，§2-203）。
c. Recognizances
c. 保证金
Acknowledgment in court of an obligation (e.g., bail).
在法庭上对义务的承认（例如，保释）。
Historically to secure attendance, prosecution, or payment.
历史上为了确保出席、起诉或付款。
d. Negotiable instruments
可流通票据
Drafts, notes, certificates of deposit, etc., in bearer or order form.
草稿、笔记、存款证等，以持有人或指令形式。
Governed by UCC Articles 3 & 8 (or older uniform acts).
受 UCC 第 3 条和第 8 条（或较早的统一法案）管辖。
e. Negotiable documents
可流通文件
Warehouse receipts, bills of lading, documents of title, recognized by UCC Article 7 or federal statutes.
仓库收据、提单、所有权文件，受到 UCC 第 7 条或联邦法规的认可。
Provide for transfer of rights by endorsement or delivery.
通过背书或交付转让权利。
f. Letters of credit
f. 信用证
Promise to honor drafts or demands for payment within UCC Article 5.
承诺根据《统一商法典》第 5 条尊重汇票或付款要求。
Developed from law merchant; partially codified in the UCC.
源自商法；在《统一商法典》中部分成文。
Some unique formal requirements.
一些独特的正式要求。
§7. Voidable Contracts
§7. 可撤销合同
“A voidable contract is one where one or more parties have the power, by a manifestation of election, to avoid the legal relations or to ratify them.”
“可撤销合同是指一个或多个当事方通过选择的表现，有权避免法律关系或对其进行确认的合同。”
Comment
评论
a. “Void contracts”
a. “无效合同”
If the law gives no remedy or duty to perform, it is not truly a “contract” under §1.
如果法律没有提供救济或履行的义务，那么它在§1 下不是真正的“合同”。
“Void contract” is a contradiction in this Restatement’s terminology.
“无效合同”在本重述的术语中是一个矛盾。
b. Grounds of avoidance
b. 规避的理由
Typical grounds: infancy, fraud, mistake, duress, breach of warranty.
典型理由：幼年、欺诈、错误、胁迫、违约。
Sometimes only one party has power to avoid; sometimes both (e.g., mutual mistake).
有时只有一方有权避免；有时双方都有（例如，互相错误）。
c. Consequences of avoidance
c. 避免的后果
Legal relations may revert to pre-contract status, or the party may recover property or value.
法律关系可能恢复到合同前状态，或者当事方可以恢复财产或价值。
Some cases allow a party to avoid without restoring status quo (e.g., infants in many jurisdictions).
某些情况下，允许一方在不恢复现状的情况下避免（例如，在许多司法管辖区的婴儿）。
d. Promptness of election
d. 选举的及时性
Some situations require timely avoidance or return of benefits; others allow waiting until suit.
某些情况需要及时避免或返还利益；其他情况则允许等到诉讼。
Illustrations:
插图：
Party induced by fraud must tender back goods within a reasonable time.
因欺诈而产生的当事人必须在合理时间内退还货物。
Infant can avoid but must ratify or disaffirm upon reaching majority.
婴儿可以避免，但必须在达到法定年龄时予以确认或否认。
e. Power of ratification
e. 批准权
“Voidable” means the contract is effective until the power to avoid is exercised.
“可撤销”意味着合同在行使撤销权之前是有效的。
Ratification ends the power to avoid, making it fully enforceable.
批准结束了避免的权力，使其完全可执行。
Action may be needed to prevent ordinary legal consequences (e.g., disaffirming upon discovery of fraud).
可能需要采取行动以防止普通法律后果（例如，在发现欺诈后撤销）。
§8. Unenforceable Contracts
§8. 无法执行的合同
“An unenforceable contract is one for which neither damages nor specific performance is available, but which the law recognizes as creating a duty of performance in some other way, absent ratification.”
“不可强制执行的合同是指既无法获得损害赔偿也无法获得特定履行的合同，但法律承认该合同以其他方式产生履行义务，前提是没有批准。”
Comment
评论
a. Distinction between “voidable” and “unenforceable.”
a. “可撤销”和“不可强制执行”之间的区别。
Both lack a judicial remedy, but in “unenforceable,” there is no single party’s election that can make it enforceable.
两者都缺乏司法救济，但在“不可执行”的情况下，没有任何一方的选择可以使其可执行。
Unenforceable contracts still have some legal consequences without further party action.
不可强制执行的合同仍然会在没有进一步当事人行动的情况下产生一些法律后果。
b. Types of unenforceable contracts
b. 无法执行的合同类型
Arise from illegal bargains that are not entirely void or voidable, or from remedial limitations (e.g., Statute of Frauds, statute of limitations).
源于不完全无效或可撤销的非法交易，或源于补救限制（例如，欺诈法、时效法）。
Illustrations:
插图：
Illegal but partially recognized bargains (public policy).
非法但部分被认可的交易（公共政策）。
Contract unenforceable under Statute of Frauds but has other legal effects (e.g., property/ownership recognized).
根据《欺诈法》合同无法强制执行，但具有其他法律效力（例如，财产/所有权被认可）。
c. Government contracts
c. 政府合同
Sometimes unenforceable due to sovereign immunity.
有时由于主权豁免而无法执行。
The duty may be recognized (e.g., can offset in a government suit), but no direct remedy in court.
该义务可能被承认（例如，可以在政府诉讼中抵消），但在法庭上没有直接的救济。
Some statutes waive immunity, making such contracts enforceable in specialized courts.
某些法规放弃了豁免，使得此类合同在专门法院可强制执行。
Illustrations:
插图：
A foreign government’s notes, used only as an offset.
一个外国政府的备忘录，仅用作抵消。
Contracts with U.S. government subject to Court of Claims: if a judgment is rendered, it may still need Congressional appropriation.
与美国政府的合同受索赔法院管辖：如果作出判决，仍可能需要国会拨款。
How those general provisions impact your understanding of what a contract is—and what it is not.
这些一般条款如何影响你对合同是什么以及不是的理解。
Answer:
答案：
a nuanced picture of what a contract is (a legally enforceable promise or set of promises) and what it is not (promises or agreements that do not or cannot give rise to legal duties). Below are a few key takeaways showing how these sections shape our understanding:
合同是什么（一个具有法律约束力的承诺或一系列承诺）以及它不是什么（不会或无法产生法律义务的承诺或协议）的细致描述。以下是一些关键要点，展示这些部分如何塑造我们的理解：
1. Defining “Contract” Narrowly and Broadly
1. 狭义和广义地定义“合同”
Narrow, Core Definition
狭义核心定义
Section 1 defines a “contract” as “a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”
第 1 节将“合同”定义为“一个承诺或一组承诺，因其违反而法律提供救济，或法律以某种方式承认其为义务的履行。”
This emphasizes legal enforceability and a recognized obligation to perform or remedy a breach.
这强调了法律的可执行性和履行或补救违约的公认义务。
“Promise” vs. “Agreement” vs. “Contract”
“承诺” vs. “协议” vs. “合同”
A “promise” (Section 2) is simply a manifestation of intent to act or refrain from acting in a certain way that justifies another party’s understanding that a commitment has been made.
“承诺”（第 2 节）仅仅是以某种方式采取行动或不采取行动的意图表现，这使得另一方理解已经作出了承诺。
An “agreement” (Section 3) is a manifestation of mutual assent by two or more persons (they intend to reach a common understanding).
“协议”（第 3 节）是两个或更多人之间相互同意的表现（他们打算达成共识）。
A “contract” (Section 1) arises only when that agreement or set of promises is also recognized by law as enforceable or giving rise to a legal duty.
“合同”（第 1 节）仅在该协议或承诺的集合被法律认可为可强制执行或产生法律义务时才会产生。
Impact on Understanding: This structure clarifies that not every promise or agreement is a contract. Instead, a “promise” becomes a “contract” only if the legal system will step in and provide a remedy for its breach.
对理解的影响：这个结构澄清了并非每个承诺或协议都是合同。相反，只有在法律系统介入并提供对其违约的救济时，“承诺”才会变成“合同”。
2. Excluding Non-Enforceable Transactions
2. 排除不可强制执行的交易
Executed Transactions With No Ongoing Promise
已执行的交易没有持续承诺
The comments (e.g., § 1, Comment a) exclude wholly executed transfers (like a simple conveyance of property or a gift with nothing left to promise) because there is no unperformed promise left to enforce.
评论（例如，§ 1，评论 a）完全排除了已执行的转让（如简单的财产转让或没有任何承诺的赠与），因为没有未履行的承诺可以强制执行。
“Void” vs. “Voidable” vs. “Unenforceable”
“无效”与“可撤销”与“不可强制执行”
Void: No legal effect at all under § 1’s definition of contract (it’s not recognized as a contract if it creates no duty or remedy).
无效：根据第 1 条对合同的定义，根本没有法律效力（如果没有产生义务或救济，则不被视为合同）。
Voidable (§ 7): A contract that one or more parties can later avoid (e.g., due to infancy, fraud, mistake). It exists legally unless and until the party exercises the power of avoidance.
可撤销的 (§ 7)：一个或多个当事方可以在后续避免的合同（例如，由于未成年、欺诈、错误）。它在法律上存在，除非当事方行使撤销权。
Unenforceable (§ 8): A contract that the courts will not enforce with usual remedies (e.g., under the Statute of Frauds or after the statute of limitations has run), but which the law “otherwise recognizes.” It still has some legal effect (like affecting property ownership or providing a defense in some situations).
不可强制执行 (§ 8)：法院不会以通常的救济措施（例如，根据《欺诈法》或在诉讼时效已过后）强制执行的合同，但法律“以其他方式承认”该合同。它仍然具有一定的法律效力（例如影响财产所有权或在某些情况下提供辩护）。
Impact on Understanding: These distinctions highlight that not all agreements with legal consequences are freely enforceable in damages. Some may carry partial or indirect legal effects without providing the full arsenal of contract remedies.
对理解的影响：这些区别强调并非所有具有法律后果的协议都可以自由地以损害赔偿的方式强制执行。有些可能带有部分或间接的法律效力，而未提供完整的合同救济手段。
3. Recognizing “Illusory” and “Mere Opinions” as Non-Contracts
3. 识别“虚幻”和“仅仅是意见”为非合同
Illusory Promises (Section 2, Comment e)
虚幻的承诺（第 2 节，评论 e）
If performance is “entirely optional” to the promisor or left solely to the promisor’s whim, it is not a promise at all—hence, no contract arises.
如果履行对承诺人“完全是可选的”或仅仅取决于承诺人的心血来潮，那么这根本就不是一个承诺——因此，不会产生合同。
Opinions / Predictions vs. Commitments (Section 2, Comment f)
意见/预测与承诺（第 2 节，评论 f）
Mere statements of opinion or future predictions do not constitute enforceable promises.
单纯的意见陈述或未来预测并不构成可强制执行的承诺。
A buyer cannot treat a casual statement (e.g., “I think your house will never burn down”) as a contractual warranty or promise unless it manifests an intent to be bound.
买方不能将随意的陈述（例如，“我认为你的房子永远不会着火”）视为合同保证或承诺，除非它表现出受约束的意图。
Impact on Understanding: The Restatement’s emphasis on the objective requirement of a manifested, non-illusory commitment helps distinguish mere talk or “hype” from actual contractual obligations.
对理解的影响：重述对表现出非虚幻承诺的客观要求的强调，有助于区分单纯的言辞或“炒作”与实际的合同义务。
4. Formal vs. Informal Contracts and Additional Requirements
4. 正式合同与非正式合同及附加要求
Formal Types (§ 6)
正式类型 (§ 6)
Contracts under seal, recognizances, negotiable instruments, letters of credit may carry special rules or forms.
带有印章的合同、担保、可转让票据、信用证可能有特殊的规则或形式。
Most modern “simple contracts” are informal; they can be oral, written, or implied from conduct.
大多数现代“简单合同”是非正式的；它们可以是口头的、书面的或根据行为推断的。
What May Be Required Beyond Promise
超越承诺可能需要什么
Section 1 (Comment d) notes that additional acts (e.g., consideration, delivery) may be essential for enforceability.
第 1 节（评论 d）指出，额外的行为（例如，考虑、交付）可能对可执行性至关重要。
Some statutory or public-policy rules supply or modify terms (see § 5) or impose formalities (e.g., the Statute of Frauds).
某些法定或公共政策规则提供或修改条款（见§ 5）或施加形式要求（例如，欺诈法）。
Impact on Understanding: Even if parties agree on a promise, certain formalities or statutory rules can shape whether that promise counts as a contract or remains unenforceable. Thus, “contract” status depends on both the parties’ manifested intent and the legal framework (formalities, statutes, etc.) under which the promise arises.
对理解的影响：即使当事方对一个承诺达成一致，某些形式要求或法定规则也会影响该承诺是否被视为合同或仍然不可强制执行。因此，“合同”状态取决于当事方的表明意图和承诺产生的法律框架（形式要求、法规等）。
5. The “Binding” Quality of Contracts
5. 合同的“约束”性质
“Binding” in Context (Section 1, Comment g)
上下文中的“Binding”（第 1 节，评论 g）
A promise is “binding” if it is recognized as enforceable—but that does not necessarily guarantee a specific remedy will be available in every situation (because of possible defenses, public policy, discharge, etc.).
如果一个承诺被认为是可强制执行的，那么它就是“有约束力的”——但这并不一定保证在每种情况下都会有特定的救济措施可用（因为可能存在抗辩、公共政策、解除等原因）。
Remedies Are Key
补救措施是关键
If a promise is one “the law in some way recognizes as a duty,” then at least some remedy or legal consequence exists.
如果承诺是“法律在某种程度上承认的义务”，那么至少存在某种救济或法律后果。
This can be direct (damages, specific performance) or indirect (e.g., restitution if one party has conferred a benefit).
这可以是直接的（损害赔偿，特定履行）或间接的（例如，如果一方提供了利益，则进行返还）。
Impact on Understanding: The hallmark of a contract under these sections is not just the existence of a promise, but the possibility that, upon breach, the law will react by granting or acknowledging some enforceable duty or remedy—even if limited.
对理解的影响：这些条款下合同的标志不仅仅是承诺的存在，而是在违约时，法律将通过授予或承认某种可强制执行的义务或救济来作出反应的可能性——即使是有限的。
Conclusion
结论
Overall, Sections 1–8 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts clarify that not every agreement or promise is a contract:
总体而言，《合同重述（第二版）》的第 1 至 8 节澄清并非每个协议或承诺都是合同：
A “contract” must involve a promise (or set of promises) that the law will recognize as creating a duty or providing a remedy for breach.
“合同”必须涉及一个（或一组）法律将承认的承诺，以创建义务或提供违约的救济。
Certain agreements remain outside contractual scope (e.g., void promises, illusory promises, purely gratuitous transactions already carried out).
某些协议仍然超出合同范围（例如，无效的承诺、虚幻的承诺、已经完成的纯赠与交易）。
Others might be recognized only partially (voidable, unenforceable) yet still carry some legal effect.
其他可能仅部分被认可（可撤销、不可执行），但仍然具有一定的法律效力。
These definitions establish a structured lens through which to identify when a promise truly gives rise to legal duties and when it fails—thus showing exactly what a contract is (an enforceable promise or set of promises) and what it is not (a mere statement of future intent, gratuitous act, or a promise lacking legal recognition).
这些定义建立了一个结构化的视角，通过它可以识别何时承诺真正产生法律义务，何时又未能产生——从而准确显示合同是什么（一个可强制执行的承诺或一组承诺）以及它不是什么（仅仅是未来意图的陈述、无偿行为或缺乏法律承认的承诺）。
Week # | Topic | American Contract Law |
1 | Introduction; Mutual Assent | Units 2 & 3 |
Unit 2
单位 2
Key Takeaways from In re Baby M
《Baby M 案》的主要要点
Background
背景
Mr. and Mrs. Stern, unable to have a child on their own (partly due to Mrs. Stern’s health concerns), engaged Mary Beth Whitehead as a “surrogate” through the Infertility Center of New York (ICNY).
斯特恩夫妇由于无法自己生育（部分原因是斯特恩夫人的健康问题），通过纽约不孕不育中心（ICNY）聘请了玛丽·贝丝·怀特黑德作为“代孕者”。
Under their contract, Ms. Whitehead would be artificially inseminated with Mr. Stern’s sperm, bear the child, and then surrender the baby to Mr. and Mrs. Stern upon birth, relinquishing her parental rights so Mrs. Stern could adopt the baby.
根据他们的合同，怀特黑德女士将接受斯特恩先生的精子进行人工授精，怀孕并生下孩子，然后在出生时将婴儿交给斯特恩夫妇，放弃她的父母权利，以便斯特恩夫人能够收养婴儿。
A fee of $10,000 would be paid to Ms. Whitehead upon surrender of the child and completion of other obligations.
在交还孩子并完成其他义务后，将向怀特黑德女士支付 10,000 美元的费用。
Trial Court Holding (Superior Court of New Jersey, 1987)
初审法院裁定（新泽西州高级法院，1987 年）
Judge Sorkow upheld the surrogacy contract, finding it a valid and enforceable agreement.
索科夫法官支持了代孕合同，认为这是一个有效且可执行的协议。
The trial court concluded that Ms. Whitehead had changed her mind post-birth and thus breached the contract.
初审法院得出结论，怀特黑德女士在分娩后改变了主意，因此违反了合同。
Although surrogacy was a novel situation, the judge applied contract principles, ruling that Ms. Whitehead was obligated to surrender the child and renounce her parental rights.
尽管代孕是一种新情况，但法官适用了合同原则，裁定怀特黑德女士有义务交出孩子并放弃她的父母权利。
Importantly, the trial court also considered the best interests of the child. It concluded that custody should remain with the Sterns and that Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights be terminated.
重要的是，初审法院还考虑了孩子的最佳利益。它得出结论，监护权应继续由斯特恩夫妇持有，并终止怀特黑德女士的父母权利。
Supreme Court of New Jersey Holding (1988)
新泽西州最高法院裁决（1988）
The Supreme Court reversed and held the surrogacy contract invalid under New Jersey law.
最高法院推翻了判决，并根据新泽西州法律认定代孕合同无效。
Chief Justice Wilentz explained that the contract conflicted with:
首席法官威伦茨解释说，该合同与以下内容相冲突：
Adoption statutes that strictly prohibit paying money in connection with a private placement.
禁止在私人配售中支付款项的收养法规。
Statutes requiring proof of parental unfitness or a valid surrender through proper channels before terminating parental rights.
要求在终止父母权利之前，证明父母不适合或通过适当渠道有效放弃权利的法规。
Public policy, because it undermines the best interests of the child by predetermining custody without a proper best-interests inquiry and effectively “sells” a child.
公共政策因为在没有适当的最佳利益调查的情况下预先决定监护权，从而损害了儿童的最佳利益，并有效地“出售”了一个孩子。
Public Policy Concerns
公共政策问题
The payment of $10,000 to Ms. Whitehead was viewed as tantamount to paying for a child (even if the contract labeled it “compensation for services”).
向怀特黑德女士支付的 10,000 美元被视为相当于为一个孩子支付（即使合同将其标记为“服务补偿”）。
Irrevocable surrender of parental rights was contrary to New Jersey statutes, which require parental consent to be revocable in private-placement adoptions.
不可撤销的父母权利放弃与新泽西州法规相悖，该法规要求在私人安置收养中父母同意必须是可撤销的。
The Supreme Court found that the best interests of the child were subordinated in a commercial surrogacy arrangement that lacked adequate safeguards, counseling, and a full statutory adoption process.
最高法院发现，在缺乏足够保障、咨询和完整法定收养程序的商业代孕安排中，儿童的最佳利益被置于次要地位。
Outcome
结果
Although the Supreme Court ultimately gave custody of the child to Mr. Stern (the biological father), it voided the termination of Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights and the adoption by Mrs. Stern.
尽管最高法院最终将孩子的监护权判给了斯特恩先生（生物父亲），但它无效了怀特黑德女士的父母权利终止和斯特恩夫人的收养。
Ms. Whitehead’s legal status as the child’s mother was restored, and the Court remanded for further proceedings on visitation.
怀特黑德女士作为孩子母亲的法律地位得到了恢复，法院决定对探视权进行进一步审理。
The Supreme Court clarified that the Legislature could enact new laws governing surrogacy, but under existing law, such a commercial surrogacy agreement was invalid and unenforceable.
最高法院澄清，立法机构可以制定新的法律来规范代孕，但根据现有法律，此类商业代孕协议无效且不可执行。
How the Parties Argued
各方是如何辩论的
The Sterns’ Position
斯特恩一家立场
Enforceable Contract
可执行合同
The Sterns argued that the contract was voluntarily entered into by both sides, with clear obligations. Both Ms. Whitehead and Mr. Whitehead had experience with a similar earlier agreement, indicating they understood the nature of surrogacy.
斯特恩夫妇辩称，合同是双方自愿签订的，具有明确的义务。怀特黑德女士和怀特黑德先生都有类似早期协议的经验，表明他们理解代孕的性质。
They claimed the $10,000 was compensation for Ms. Whitehead’s services (pregnancy and childbirth) rather than a fee for surrendering a child.
他们声称这$10,000 是对怀特黑德女士（怀孕和分娩）服务的补偿，而不是放弃一个孩子的费用。
Best Interests of the Child
儿童最佳利益
They insisted that granting custody to the biological father (Mr. Stern) and allowing Mrs. Stern to adopt was in the best interests of the baby, noting their stable home, education, and ability to provide medically and financially.
他们坚持认为，将监护权授予生物父亲（斯特恩先生）并允许斯特恩夫人收养对婴儿的最佳利益是有利的，指出他们的家庭稳定、教育良好，并能够在医疗和经济上提供支持。
They emphasized Ms. Whitehead’s actions after birth—fleeing to Florida, defying court orders—and argued that these behaviors indicated that Ms. Whitehead could jeopardize the child’s future stability.
他们强调了怀特黑德女士在分娩后的行为——逃往佛罗里达，违抗法庭命令——并辩称这些行为表明怀特黑德女士可能会危及孩子未来的稳定性。
Consent and Capacity
同意与能力
They pointed out that Ms. Whitehead had been examined psychologically and was cleared to act as a surrogate. The Sterns claimed that Ms. Whitehead knowingly consented to give up her parental rights from the outset.
他们指出，怀特黑德女士已经接受了心理评估，并被批准担任代孕者。斯特恩夫妇声称，怀特黑德女士从一开始就明知地同意放弃她的父母权利。
They argued that Ms. Whitehead’s later regret did not negate her informed consent at the time of making the contract.
他们辩称，怀特黑德女士后来的遗憾并不否定她在签订合同时的知情同意。
The Whiteheads’ Position
怀特海德的立场
Invalid or Unconscionable Contract
无效或不合理的合同
The Whiteheads contended that the contract was unconscionable—that is, it was a lopsided agreement effectively paying Ms. Whitehead for her child.
怀特海德夫妇主张该合同是不合理的——也就是说，这是一个不对等的协议，实际上是在为怀特海德女士的孩子支付报酬。
They alleged it was a “contract of adhesion” offered on a “take it or leave it” basis and that Ms. Whitehead lacked equal bargaining power.
他们声称这是一个以“接受或放弃”为基础的“附合合同”，而怀特黑德女士缺乏平等的议价能力。
Public Policy Violations
公共政策违规
They argued that the surrogacy arrangement violated adoption laws and public policy by requiring a pre-birth surrender of parental rights, circumventing the statutory safeguards to protect both the child and the biological mother’s rights.
他们辩称，代孕安排通过要求在出生前放弃父母权利，违反了收养法和公共政策，规避了保护孩子和生物母亲权利的法定保障。
Ms. Whitehead maintained that the statute prohibiting money in exchange for adoption directly barred the arrangement.
怀特黑德女士坚持认为，禁止以金钱交换收养的法规直接阻止了这一安排。
Fraud/Overreaching/Coercion
欺诈/过度行为/胁迫
They insisted Ms. Whitehead was not fully informed of the emotional consequences she would feel after giving birth and that her alleged “consent” was not truly informed or freely given.
他们坚持认为怀特黑德女士并未充分了解她在分娩后会感受到的情感后果，并且她所谓的“同意”并不是经过充分知情或自由给予的。
They claimed she was misled by the Infertility Center’s promises and the repeated insistence by all parties that she would be fine simply walking away.
他们声称她是被不孕症中心的承诺和各方反复坚持她只需走开就会没事的说法所误导的。
Best Interests of the Child
儿童最佳利益
Despite acknowledging Mr. Stern’s paternity, the Whiteheads argued that the best interests analysis should not have so quickly favored the Sterns and that Ms. Whitehead, as the natural mother, deserved a full hearing on custody.
尽管承认斯特恩先生的父亲身份，怀特海德夫妇认为最佳利益分析不应如此迅速地偏向斯特恩一家，怀特海德女士作为生母，应该获得关于监护权的全面听证。
They highlighted the bond Ms. Whitehead had with the baby and insisted that the arrangement effectively sold that bond for money.
他们强调了怀特黑德女士与婴儿之间的纽带，并坚称这种安排实际上是将这种纽带以金钱的形式出售。
In Short
简而言之
Trial Court (1987): Enforced the surrogacy contract, terminated Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights, and awarded custody to the Sterns.
初审法院（1987 年）：执行了代孕合同，终止了怀特黑德女士的监护权，并将监护权授予斯特恩夫妇。
Supreme Court (1988): Declared the surrogacy contract invalid on statutory and public-policy grounds (largely because it circumvented adoption law, required pre-birth surrender, and involved payment in violation of adoption statutes). The Court restored Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights but ultimately awarded custody to Mr. Stern, subject to further consideration of Ms. Whitehead’s visitation rights.
最高法院（1988 年）：基于法定和公共政策的理由宣布代孕合同无效（主要是因为它规避了收养法，要求在出生前放弃权利，并涉及违反收养法规的支付）。法院恢复了怀特黑德女士的父母权利，但最终将监护权授予斯特恩先生，待进一步考虑怀特黑德女士的探视权。
The controversy in In re Baby M thus illustrates the inherent tensions between (1) private contractual freedom and the desire of infertile couples to have children, and (2) the strong legal safeguards around adoption, parental rights, and the best interests of the child.
在 Baby M 案中，争议因此揭示了（1）私人合同自由与不育夫妇渴望拥有孩子之间的固有紧张关系，以及（2）围绕收养、父母权利和儿童最佳利益的强大法律保障。
Review Question 1
复习问题 1
The trial court states that it “was further told by the parties that they all understood their obligations under the contract.” Why can’t we just end the inquiry there? What, based on this opinion, do you now understand to be the elements of an enforceable contract?
初审法院表示，“各方进一步告知法院，他们都理解自己在合同下的义务。”我们为什么不能就此结束调查？根据这个意见，你现在理解的可执行合同的要素是什么？
Why We Can’t Just End the Inquiry
为什么我们不能简单地结束调查
Merely stating that the parties “understood” the contract is not sufficient for a court to enforce it when broader public-policy and statutory considerations are involved. In Baby M, the issue was not only whether the parties had “a meeting of the minds” (i.e., mutual assent), but also whether the contract itself violated adoption statutes, involved illegal consideration, or otherwise went against the best interests of the child. In other words, courts look beyond basic contract formation issues when public policy and statutory compliance are implicated.
仅仅声明当事方“理解”合同并不足以让法院在涉及更广泛的公共政策和法定考虑时强制执行该合同。在 Baby M 案中，问题不仅在于当事方是否“达成共识”（即相互同意），还在于合同本身是否违反了收养法、涉及非法对价或以其他方式违背了儿童的最佳利益。换句话说，当公共政策和法定合规受到影响时，法院会超越基本的合同形成问题进行审查。
Elements of an Enforceable Contract (as illustrated by the opinion)
可强制执行合同的要素（如意见中所示）
Offer, Acceptance, and Mutual Assent: Both parties must voluntarily and knowingly agree on the same terms.
要约、接受和相互同意：双方必须自愿并知情地就相同条款达成一致。
Consideration: There must be something of value exchanged—though in Baby M, the courts scrutinized whether the $10,000 was illegal consideration for adoption.
考虑：必须有某种有价值的东西被交换——尽管在 Baby M 案中，法院审查了 1 万美元是否为非法的收养对价。
Capacity and Voluntariness: Each party must have the legal capacity to contract, and they must enter the agreement free of fraud, duress, or undue influence.
能力和自愿性：每一方必须具备签订合同的法律能力，并且必须在没有欺诈、胁迫或不当影响的情况下自愿达成协议。
Legality / Public Policy: Even if the above elements are present, a contract may be unenforceable if it violates statutory requirements or public policy (e.g., buying and selling children, irreversible surrender of parental rights without legal safeguards).
合法性 / 公共政策：即使上述要素存在，如果合同违反法定要求或公共政策（例如，买卖儿童、在没有法律保障的情况下不可逆转地放弃父母权利），该合同可能是不可执行的。
Hence, a simple acknowledgment that “everyone understands their obligations” does not dispose of the more fundamental legal questions—especially whether the contract itself is legal and consistent with public policy.
因此，简单地承认“每个人都理解他们的义务”并不能解决更根本的法律问题——尤其是合同本身是否合法并符合公共政策。
Review Question 2
复习问题 2
The court notes that “Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead had consulted with an attorney” when they signed the 1984 agreement with a prior couple. Why does that matter? Can’t parties enter into contracts without attorneys being involved? What value—if any—can attorneys add to the process of contracting?
法院注意到“怀特海德夫妇在与之前的一对夫妇签署 1984 年协议时咨询过律师”。这有什么重要性？当事人不能在没有律师参与的情况下签订合同吗？律师在合同过程中能增加什么价值——如果有的话？
Why This Matters
这很重要的原因
Contract law does not mandate that an attorney must be present in order for an agreement to be valid. However, the fact that the Whiteheads had previously consulted an attorney (in their 1984 arrangement) went toward showing:
合同法并不要求律师必须在场才能使协议有效。然而，怀特海德夫妇之前咨询过律师（在他们 1984 年的安排中）这一事实有助于表明：
潜在后果的意识: 他们大概至少在一般情况下理解代孕的法律含义。
Opportunity to Negotiate / Avoid Adhesion: Having an attorney suggests the Whiteheads had some professional input on whether the contract was fair, thus undermining claims of unconscionability or that they “didn’t know what they were signing.”
谈判机会/避免附加条款：聘请律师表明怀特海德一家在合同是否公平方面有一些专业意见，从而削弱了不合理性或他们“不知道自己在签什么”的说法。
Value Attorneys Add
价值律师增加
Clarifying Legal Rights and Obligations: Attorneys can explain complex contractual terms, statutory requirements, and potential consequences.
澄清法律权利和义务：律师可以解释复杂的合同条款、法定要求和潜在后果。
Ensuring Voluntariness: Legal counsel can help confirm that no fraud, duress, or undue influence taints the agreement.
确保自愿性：法律顾问可以帮助确认协议没有受到欺诈、胁迫或不当影响的影响。
Negotiating / Drafting / Spotting Illegality: Competent counsel can identify potential conflicts with statutes (e.g., adoption laws) and public policy, and propose changes or safeguards.
谈判 / 起草 / 识别非法性：合格的律师能够识别与法规（例如，收养法）和公共政策的潜在冲突，并提出修改或保障措施。
Reducing Future Litigation Risk: Well-informed clients who fully understand the contract’s terms tend to lead to fewer disputes later.
降低未来诉讼风险：充分理解合同条款的知情客户往往会导致后续争议减少。
Thus, while it is legal to enter into contracts without attorneys, in Baby M, the presence or absence of legal advice was central to whether the surrogacy agreement was fairly negotiated and enforceable.
因此，虽然在没有律师的情况下签订合同是合法的，但在 Baby M 案中，法律建议的有无对代孕协议是否公平谈判和可执行至关重要。
Review Question 3
审查问题 3
The court observes that the “remedies that exist for breach of a contract are an award of money damages or specific enforcement of the terms of the contract.” Which type of remedy does the trial court enforce and why?
法院观察到，“对于合同违约，现有的救济措施是金钱赔偿或强制执行合同条款。”初审法院执行哪种类型的救济措施，为什么？
Type of Remedy Enforced at Trial Court
在审判法院强制执行的救济类型
The trial court (Judge Sorkow) ordered specific performance of the surrogacy contract. In other words, the court required Ms. Whitehead to surrender the child (and her parental rights) according to the contract’s terms, rather than awarding money damages to Mr. Stern.
初审法院（索科夫法官）命令履行代孕合同。换句话说，法院要求怀特黑德女士根据合同条款交出孩子（及其父母权利），而不是向斯特恩先生赔偿金。
Why Specific Performance
为什么特定性能
Uniqueness of the Subject Matter: The “subject” of this contract was a child, and the court reasoned that monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate Mr. Stern for the loss of having his own biological offspring.
主题的独特性：本合同的“主题”是一个孩子，法院认为金钱赔偿不足以补偿斯特恩先生失去自己亲生后代的损失。
Contractual Intent: Judge Sorkow determined that the parties had entered a binding contract with clear obligations and that “performance” (transfer of the baby) was the central objective—not simply a financial exchange.
合同意图：索科夫法官裁定各方已签订具有约束力的合同，明确了义务，并且“履行”（转让婴儿）是核心目标——而不仅仅是财务交换。
Best Interests of the Child: The trial court believed placing the child with Mr. Stern (and terminating Ms. Whitehead’s parental rights) aligned with the child’s best interests. Because money damages do not address child custody at all, the court found the only meaningful remedy was to carry out the contract’s original purpose.
儿童最佳利益：初审法院认为将孩子交给斯特恩先生（并终止怀特黑德女士的监护权）符合孩子的最佳利益。由于金钱赔偿根本无法解决儿童监护问题，法院认为唯一有意义的补救措施是实现合同的原始目的。
Ultimately, although the trial court ordered specific performance, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed that portion of the judgment—holding the contract invalid—but that is how the lower court reached its remedy decision in the first instance.
最终，尽管初审法院命令具体履行，但新泽西最高法院推翻了判决的这一部分——认为合同无效——但这就是下级法院在首次作出救济决定时的依据。
Review Question 4
复习问题 4
Compare the first paragraph of the Supreme Court’s opinion with the story told in the trial court’s findings of fact. To what extent does the way the story is framed impact the way you think about the case? Do judges have an audience for which they are writing, and if so, who is it?
比较最高法院意见的第一段与审判法院事实认定中讲述的故事。这种故事的框架方式在多大程度上影响了你对案件的看法？法官是否有一个他们所写作的听众，如果有，那是谁？
Differences in Storytelling / Framing
叙事/框架中的差异
Trial Court’s Version (Judge Sorkow)
初审法院的版本（法官索科）
The trial court’s narrative is relatively detailed, focusing on the chronology of events: how the Sterns and Whiteheads met, what they each hoped to achieve, and the detailed “findings of fact.”
初审法院的叙述相对详细，重点关注事件的时间顺序：斯特恩一家和怀特海德一家是如何相遇的，他们各自希望实现什么，以及详细的“事实认定”。
Emphasis is placed on contract principles and best interests of the child. The trial court’s writing style often highlights the parties’ intent and how the agreement was formed.
强调合同原则和儿童的最佳利益。初审法院的写作风格常常突出各方的意图以及协议是如何形成的。
Supreme Court’s Version (Chief Justice Wilentz)
最高法院的版本（首席法官威伦茨）
The first paragraph zeroes in on what the Court sees as the essence of the arrangement: “a contract that purports to provide a new way of bringing children into a family,” under which a woman, for $10,000, is to become pregnant, carry a child, and surrender it irrevocably.
第一段聚焦于法院所认为的协议的本质：“一份声称提供将孩子带入家庭的新方式的合同”，根据该合同，一名女性将以 10,000 美元的价格怀孕、怀胎，并不可撤回地交出孩子。
Impact of Framing on Perception
框架对感知的影响
The Supreme Court’s stark, almost starkly critical framing (“forever separated,” “the wife is to adopt the child,” “perhaps criminal”) places the agreement in a more ethically and legally fraught light.
最高法院的严厉、几乎是直截了当的批评框架（“永远分离”，“妻子要收养孩子”，“或许是犯罪”）使得该协议在伦理和法律上显得更加复杂和棘手。
The trial court’s factual recitation reads more like a straightforward contract case (albeit about surrogacy), whereas the Supreme Court’s opening paragraph signals serious concern about baby-selling, coercion, and public policy.
初审法院的事实叙述更像是一个简单的合同案件（尽管是关于代孕的），而最高法院的开头段落则表明对婴儿买卖、胁迫和公共政策的严重关切。
Readers may find themselves more sympathetic to the “child as commodity” critique when the facts are framed in moral or policy-heavy language, versus the trial court’s emphasis on the parties’ free will and explicit promises.
当事实以道德或政策重的语言框架呈现时，读者可能会对“儿童作为商品”的批评更加同情，而不是试验法院对各方自由意志和明确承诺的强调。
Judges’ Audiences
评委的观众
Multiple Audiences: Judges write for several audiences, including:
多个受众：法官为多个受众撰写，包括：
The Litigants: The parties need to understand the outcome.
诉讼方：各方需要了解结果。
Lower Courts / The Legal Community: The opinion becomes precedent and guides future decisions.
下级法院 / 法律界：该意见成为先例并指导未来的决定。
The Public / Legislature: Especially on matters of first impression or strong public policy, courts speak to broader societal values.
公众/立法机构：特别是在首次印象或强烈公共政策的问题上，法院关注更广泛的社会价值。
In Baby M, the Supreme Court’s tone and style suggest it is addressing not just the litigants but also the public and the legislature, recognizing that surrogacy arrangements may call for future statutory guidance.
在 Baby M 案中，最高法院的语气和风格表明它不仅是在对当事人发言，还在对公众和立法机构发言，认识到代孕安排可能需要未来的法定指导。
Review Question 5
复习问题 5
Under the heading “Public Policy Considerations,” the New Jersey Supreme Court articulates reasons not to enforce the parties’ agreement. How do these policy concerns differ from those stated by the trial court? What explains the fact that two trained and experienced opinion-writing judges reached such different results based on the exact same facts? Is “public policy” just another way of saying “in my opinion”?
在“公共政策考虑”一节中，新泽西州最高法院阐明了不执行双方协议的理由。这些政策关切与初审法院所述的有何不同？是什么解释了两位受过训练且经验丰富的意见撰写法官在完全相同的事实基础上得出如此不同的结果？“公共政策”是否只是另一种说法，意味着“在我看来”？
Differences in Policy Concerns
政策关注的差异
Trial Court
初审法院
Focused on enforcing valid contracts and ensuring that the child’s best interests would be served by living with the Sterns.
专注于执行有效的合同，并确保孩子的最佳利益通过与斯特恩一家生活得到满足。
Treated the $10,000 fee more as compensation for “services” (pregnancy) than an improper baby-selling arrangement.
将 1 万美元的费用视为对“服务”（怀孕）的补偿，而不是不当的婴儿贩卖安排。
Acknowledged some broader criticisms of surrogacy but concluded that no explicit statute in New Jersey banned it; hence, the trial court largely approached the case through contract law plus a “best interests” inquiry.
承认了一些对代孕的更广泛批评，但得出结论认为新泽西州没有明确的法律禁止代孕；因此，初审法院主要通过合同法和“最佳利益”调查来处理此案。
Supreme Court
最高法院
Emphasized that such an arrangement undermined adoption laws, potentially violated criminal statutes prohibiting payment for a child, and violated parental rights/consent laws.
强调这种安排破坏了收养法，可能违反了禁止为儿童支付的刑事法规，并违反了父母权利/同意法。
Expressly stated the arrangement contravened public policy because it involved permanent separation of a child from the birth mother, used money in connection with adoption, and bypassed statutory safeguards.
明确指出该安排违反了公共政策，因为它涉及将孩子永久与生母分离，涉及与收养相关的金钱，并绕过了法定保障。
Explaining the Different Results
解释不同的结果
Statutory vs. “Contractual” Lens
法定视角与“合同”视角
The trial court saw the case primarily as a contract enforced unless explicitly barred. The Supreme Court saw the same facts as implicitly barred by adoption statutes, the prohibition on baby-selling, and the best interests standard.
初审法院主要将此案视为合同，除非明确禁止，否则应予执行。最高法院则认为同样的事实在收养法、禁止婴儿买卖和最佳利益标准的隐含禁止下。
Scope of Inquiry
调查范围
Judges Sorkow and Wilentz each weighed “public policy,” but the Supreme Court’s role is to ensure all relevant statutes and the broader legal framework are vindicated. The highest court took a more sweeping, big-picture view of surrogacy and its social implications.
法官索科和威伦茨各自考虑了“公共政策”，但最高法院的角色是确保所有相关法规和更广泛的法律框架得到维护。最高法院对代孕及其社会影响采取了更全面的宏观视角。
Role of Precedent / Institutional Concerns
先例的作用 / 机构关注
A trial judge might be more cautious in declaring a novel arrangement void if no direct precedent says so. The Supreme Court, with the final word on statewide law, felt empowered to articulate a broad public policy against commercial surrogacy.
如果没有直接的先例，审判法官在宣布一种新安排无效时可能会更加谨慎。最高法院作为州法律的最终裁决者，感到有权阐明反对商业代孕的广泛公共政策。
Is “Public Policy” Just Another Way of Saying “In My Opinion”?
“公共政策”是否只是“在我看来”的另一种说法？
Not Exactly
不完全是
“Public policy” is grounded in statutes, case law, and well-established legal principles—even if it can appear open-ended or somewhat subjective. In Baby M, the Court anchored its policy analysis in existing statutes criminalizing baby-selling, the rules governing private adoption, and the principle that parental rights should not be permanently surrendered without formal procedures.
“公共政策”是基于法规、案例法和成熟的法律原则——即使它看起来可能是开放式或有些主观。在 Baby M 案中，法院将其政策分析建立在现有的禁止婴儿买卖的法规、私立收养的规则以及父母权利不应在没有正式程序的情况下被永久放弃的原则上。
Inevitable Judicial Discretion
不可避免的司法裁量权
Judges do exercise judgment in deciding whether a set of facts violates “public policy.” That does not mean it is purely personal preference; rather, it reflects how judges interpret the underlying fabric of laws and societal values.
法官在决定一组事实是否违反“公共政策”时确实行使判断。这并不意味着这纯粹是个人偏好；相反，它反映了法官如何解读法律和社会价值观的基本结构。
Still, Room for Interpretation
仍然，解读的空间
Reasonable minds may differ, as occurred here: the trial court recognized fewer explicit policy barriers, while the Supreme Court identified broader or stronger policy prohibitions.
合理的观点可能会有所不同，正如这里所发生的：初审法院承认的明确政策障碍较少，而最高法院则识别出更广泛或更强的政策禁令。
In short, “public policy” is not just a placeholder for “I personally don’t like this.” It is a recognized legal doctrine requiring courts to consider whether enforcing a contract would conflict with fundamental legal principles and statutory mandates—even if judges do bring their interpretive lens to bear on those principles.
简而言之，“公共政策”不仅仅是“我个人不喜欢这个”的替代说法。它是一项被认可的法律原则，要求法院考虑执行合同是否会与基本法律原则和法定要求相冲突——即使法官确实会将他们的解释视角应用于这些原则。
Problem 2.1
问题 2.1
Hypo: Patricia (a wealthy executive who needs a kidney) pays Donald (an unemployed factory worker) $100,000 plus medical expenses to donate his kidney.
假设：帕特里夏（一个需要肾脏的富有高管）支付唐纳德（一个失业的工厂工人）100,000 美元加上医疗费用，以捐赠他的肾脏。
Question: Under the Baby M trial court holding as controlling law, would this contract be enforceable? And would the answer change if the Baby M Supreme Court opinion controlled?
问题：根据 Baby M 审判法院的裁决作为控制法，这份合同是否可执行？如果 Baby M 最高法院的意见起主导作用，答案会改变吗？
1. Under the Baby M Trial Court Opinion
1. 在婴儿 M 审判法院意见下
A. The Trial Court’s Rationale in Baby M
A. Baby M 案中初审法院的理由
Core Holding: Judge Sorkow enforced the surrogacy contract, primarily because (1) he found no explicit statutory prohibition against surrogacy at the time; (2) the parties had capacity and voluntarily entered into the agreement; (3) consideration (the $10,000 payment) did not, in his view, violate any express law (the trial court treated it as compensation for “services”); and (4) the child’s best interests were aligned with specific performance of the agreement.
核心持有：索尔科夫法官执行了代孕合同，主要因为（1）他发现当时没有明确的法律禁止代孕；（2）各方具备能力并自愿签订协议；（3）对价（$10,000 的支付）在他看来并不违反任何明确的法律（初审法院将其视为“服务”的补偿）；以及（4）孩子的最佳利益与协议的具体履行是一致的。
No Express Ban: The judge noted that New Jersey law did not directly prohibit surrogacy contracts. Therefore, absent a clear statutory ban, he applied ordinary contract principles plus a best-interests analysis.
无快递禁令：法官指出，新泽西州法律并未直接禁止代孕合同。因此，在没有明确的法定禁令的情况下，他应用了普通合同原则以及最佳利益分析。
B. Comparing to Kidney Donation
B. 与肾脏捐赠相比
If we analogize kidney donation-for-pay to Baby M’s surrogacy-for-pay, the crucial question is whether there is any explicit prohibition on selling kidneys under the trial court’s approach. In actual U.S. law, federal statutes (the National Organ Transplant Act) make the sale or purchase of organs illegal—but let’s assume we are only applying the trial court’s Baby M logic in a vacuum.
如果我们将有偿肾脏捐赠类比于 Baby M 的有偿代孕，关键问题是根据初审法院的做法，是否存在任何明确禁止出售肾脏的规定。在实际的美国法律中，联邦法规（国家器官移植法）使得器官的买卖是非法的——但我们假设我们仅在真空中应用初审法院的 Baby M 逻辑。
If the Baby M trial court were faced with a transaction lacking a direct statutory prohibition (again, ignoring real-world organ-sale bans), it might reason:
如果 Baby M 审判法院面临一项没有直接法定禁止的交易（再次忽略现实世界的器官销售禁令），它可能会推理：
Capacity: Donald and Patricia each have the capacity to contract.
能力：唐纳德和帕特里夏各自有能力签订合同。
Consideration: $100,000 is the payment offered in exchange for a kidney.
考虑：$100,000 是为换取一个肾脏而提供的付款。
Voluntary Agreement: Both parties freely consent.
自愿协议：双方自愿同意。
No Explicit Law: Under the hypothetical that our jurisdiction has no direct law banning organ sales, the trial court might treat it as a personal-services contract with a significant bodily/health component.
没有明确的法律：在假设我们的管辖区没有直接禁止器官销售的法律的情况下，初审法院可能会将其视为一项具有重要身体/健康成分的个人服务合同。
Outcome Under Trial Court Logic:
试验法院逻辑下的结果：
The Baby M trial court might well find it enforceable if it believed no statute prohibited the kidney-for-pay arrangement.
如果婴儿 M 案件的初审法院认为没有法律禁止肾脏交易安排，它很可能会认为该安排是可执行的。
However, in reality, the court might still balk on strong public policy grounds even if a statute were silent. But strictly paralleling the trial court’s Baby M reasoning, and ignoring real organ-sale bans, the contract could be deemed valid and enforceable.
然而，实际上，即使法律条文没有明确规定，法院仍可能基于强烈的公共政策理由而犹豫不决。但严格按照初审法院的 Baby M 推理，并忽略真实的器官销售禁令，该合同可以被视为有效且可执行。
2. Under the Baby M Supreme Court Opinion
2. 根据 Baby M 最高法院意见
A. The Supreme Court’s Rationale in Baby M
A. 最高法院在 Baby M 案中的理由
The Supreme Court voided the surrogacy contract primarily because it contravened multiple statutes (e.g., the adoption laws’ prohibition on payment) and offended public policy.
最高法院宣布代孕合同无效，主要是因为它违反了多项法规（例如，收养法对支付的禁止）并且违反了公共政策。
Chief Justice Wilentz emphasized that the arrangement amounted to “baby-selling,” was potentially criminal, and circumvented the statutory processes designed to protect birth mothers and children.
首席法官威伦茨强调，这种安排等同于“婴儿贩卖”，可能是犯罪行为，并且规避了旨在保护生母和儿童的法定程序。
The Court found public policy reasons—rooted in statutes and deeply held legal principles—that strongly outweighed normal contract-law enforcement.
法院发现公共政策原因——根植于法规和深厚的法律原则——强烈超过了正常的合同法执行。
B. Comparing to Kidney Donation
B. 与肾脏捐赠相比
The Supreme Court’s Baby M opinion recognized that even if parties knowingly consent to a transaction, the arrangement can still be invalidated if it:
最高法院的 Baby M 意见承认，即使各方明知同意交易，如果该安排仍然可以被撤销，条件是：
Violates a statute (in real life, organ sale is indeed a federal crime), or
违反法律（在现实生活中，器官买卖确实是联邦犯罪），或者
Seriously violates public policy by commodifying a fundamental human interest (such as “buying” a person or a bodily organ).
严重违反公共政策，通过商品化基本人类利益（例如“购买”一个人或一个身体器官）。
By analogy, paying $100,000 for a kidney is likely to be viewed by the Supreme Court as similarly repugnant to public policy—and would be invalid.
通过类比，支付 100,000 美元购买一个肾脏可能会被最高法院视为同样违背公共政策——并且将被视为无效。
Even in the hypothetical absence of a specific statute, the Baby M Supreme Court signaled a broad willingness to void a contract that “sells” something fundamentally tied to human dignity and bodily integrity.
即使在假设没有具体法规的情况下，Baby M 最高法院也表明了广泛的意愿去废除一项“出售”与人类尊严和身体完整性根本相关的合同。
Outcome Under Supreme Court Logic:
最高法院逻辑下的结果：
Likely unenforceable for reasons similar to those used in striking down the commercial surrogacy contract: it offends deeply rooted policy values and is akin to a prohibited commodification of the human body.
可能因与废除商业代孕合同时使用的理由相似而无法执行：它触犯了根深蒂固的政策价值观，类似于对人体的禁止商品化。
Answer Summary for Problem 2.1
问题 2.1 的答案总结
Under the Baby M Trial Court Opinion:
在 Baby M 审判法院意见中：
Possibly enforceable if the court finds no explicit statutory prohibition and deems it a valid, voluntary contract—though in practice, it could still be struck down on public policy grounds. But strictly following the trial court’s Baby M logic (which looked for a specific statutory ban and did not find one for surrogacy), the contract might survive.
如果法院没有发现明确的法定禁止并认为这是一个有效的自愿合同，则可能可强制执行——尽管在实践中，它仍可能因公共政策原因被推翻。但严格遵循初审法院的 Baby M 逻辑（该逻辑寻找特定的法定禁令，但没有发现代孕的禁令），该合同可能会存活。
Under the Baby M Supreme Court Opinion:
在《婴儿 M》最高法院意见下：
Almost certainly unenforceable, as it would likely be seen as violating fundamental public policy, much like the commercial surrogacy contract was viewed as baby-selling.
几乎可以肯定是无法执行的，因为它可能被视为违反基本公共政策，就像商业代孕合同被视为婴儿买卖一样。
Problem 2.2
问题 2.2
Hypo: Assume, contrary to real-life law, that Donald and Patricia’s kidney-sale arrangement is enforceable in your jurisdiction. One month after signing, one party breaches. What remedies are available to the non-breaching party, drawing on the remedy discussions in both Baby M opinions?
假设，与现实法律相反，唐纳德和帕特里夏的肾脏销售协议在您的管辖区内是可执行的。在签署一个月后，一方违约。非违约方可以获得哪些救济，参考《婴儿 M》意见中的救济讨论？
1. Typical Remedies for Breach of Contract
1. 违约的典型救济措施
Money Damages:
金钱赔偿：
Expectation Damages: Put the non-breaching party in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed.
期望损害赔偿：使非违约方处于合同履行时本应处于的位置。
Reliance Damages: Reimburse costs incurred in reasonable reliance on the contract.
依赖损害赔偿：补偿因合理依赖合同而产生的费用。
Restitution: Return the breaching party’s unjust gain.
赔偿：返还违约方的不当得利。
Specific Performance:
特定履行：
A court order to perform the contract rather than just pay money.
法院命令履行合同，而不仅仅是支付金钱。
Generally disfavored for personal-services contracts—especially those involving unique human attributes (like donating an organ).
通常不被青睐用于个人服务合同——尤其是涉及独特人类特征的合同（如捐赠器官）。
2. Lessons from Baby M
2. 来自婴儿 M 的教训
Trial Court Ordered Specific Performance of the surrogacy contract, requiring the birth mother to surrender the child. This was justified in part because the father’s interest in having his biological offspring was deemed irreplaceable, and money would not adequately compensate him.
初审法院命令对代孕合同进行特定履行，要求生母交出孩子。这在一定程度上是合理的，因为父亲对拥有自己生物后代的兴趣被认为是不可替代的，金钱无法充分补偿他。
Supreme Court Disapproved that approach; indeed, it held the contract invalid. But if it were valid, one could still question whether specific performance is appropriate where bodily integrity is at stake.
最高法院不赞成这种做法；实际上，它认为合同无效。但是，如果合同有效，仍然可以质疑在涉及身体完整性时，特定履行是否合适。
3. Applying to Donald–Patricia’s Hypothetical
3. 应用到 Donald–Patricia 的假设
Would Specific Performance (Kidney Donation) Be Ordered?
是否会下达特定履行（肾脏捐赠）？
Extremely unlikely. Courts are loath to force the breaching party to undergo surgery or to forcibly remove an organ. There are strong constitutional and ethical prohibitions against compelled bodily intrusion.
极不可能。法院不愿强迫违约方接受手术或强行移除器官。对强制身体侵入有强烈的宪法和伦理禁令。
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Baby M required that best interests and fundamental rights must be weighed—human organs, like children, involve profound personal rights.
此外，最高法院在 Baby M 案中要求必须权衡最佳利益和基本权利——人类器官，如同儿童，涉及深刻的个人权利。
Money Damages?
金钱赔偿？
If Donald is the breaching party (refusing to proceed), Patricia could seek expectation damages—but how does one measure “the value of a life-saving organ”? It is essentially impossible to put a dollar figure on losing the chance to survive. Courts typically will not attempt to award “infinite” or “sky-high” damages; the contract price ($100,000) might be the reference point.
如果唐纳德是违约方（拒绝继续），帕特里夏可以寻求预期损害赔偿——但如何衡量“拯救生命的器官的价值”？将失去生存机会的价值用美元来衡量几乎是不可能的。法院通常不会尝试判决“无限”或“天价”赔偿；合同价格（$100,000）可能是参考点。
If Patricia is the breaching party (reneging on payment), Donald might claim the contract price, or at least rely on restitution for any out-of-pocket medical or travel costs, lost wages, etc.
如果帕特里夏是违约方（未支付款项），唐纳德可能会要求合同价格，或者至少依赖于对任何自付医疗或旅行费用、失去的工资等的补偿。
In a real contract dispute, a court might limit Donald’s recovery to reliance damages or the contract price if it decides to treat the $100,000 as the “benefit of the bargain.”
在真实的合同争议中，如果法院决定将$100,000 视为“交易利益”，可能会将唐纳德的赔偿限制为信赖损失或合同价格。
Conclusion on Remedies:
关于救济的结论：
If somehow the contract is deemed valid, the most likely remedy for a breach would be money damages, not specific performance. Courts avoid compelling forced medical procedures in personal-service contexts. Indeed, in Baby M, the Supreme Court itself was wary of ordering specific performance if it contravened significant personal rights (although that case involved a child rather than an organ, the principle that bodily integrity or fundamental personal rights are at stake is comparable).
如果合同被视为有效，违约的最可能补救措施将是金钱赔偿，而不是强制履行。法院在个人服务的情况下避免强制进行医疗程序。实际上，在 Baby M 案中，最高法院本身对下令强制履行持谨慎态度，如果这违反了重要的个人权利（尽管该案件涉及的是一个孩子而不是器官，但身体完整性或基本个人权利受到威胁的原则是相似的）。
Summary for Problem 2.2
问题 2.2 的总结
Assuming enforceability:
假设可执行性：
Specific Performance (forcing the surgery) would almost certainly not be granted due to fundamental concerns with bodily integrity and the unique nature of organ donation.
特定履行（强制手术）几乎肯定不会被批准，因为对身体完整性和器官捐赠的独特性质存在根本性担忧。
Money Damages would be the probable remedy for the non-breaching party—likely limited to the contract amount ($100,000) or reliance damages, depending on the circumstances of the breach and standard contract law principles.
金钱赔偿将是非违约方可能的救济——可能限于合同金额（$100,000）或依赖损失，具体取决于违约的情况和标准合同法原则。
Unit 3
单元 3
I. Mutual Assent
一. 共同同意
A. The Imperfect Nature of Communication
A. 交流的不完美性质
Language Is Not Always Precise
语言并不总是精确的
Words and conduct may be interpreted differently by different parties.
言辞和行为可能会被不同的当事方以不同的方式解读。
Backgrounds, assumptions, and personal experiences can create misunderstanding.
背景、假设和个人经历可能会导致误解。
“But That’s Not What I Meant!”
“但这不是我的意思！”
Illustrates the problem: People may truly believe they are communicating clearly, yet end up with different understandings.
说明了问题：人们可能真的相信他们在清晰地沟通，但最终却得出了不同的理解。
In contract law, this disagreement can lead to disputes about whether an agreement was formed.
在合同法中，这种分歧可能导致关于协议是否成立的争议。
II. Subjective vs. Objective Understanding of Agreement
II. 主观与客观对协议的理解
A. Subjective Understanding
A. 主观理解
Difficulty in Reading Minds
阅读心灵的困难
Courts (and people in general) cannot reliably know another’s actual, internal thought process.
法院（以及人们一般）无法可靠地了解他人的实际内心思维过程。
Historically Not Considered
历史上未被考虑
Early American courts deemed an individual’s internal thoughts irrelevant to whether a valid contract existed.
早期美国法院认为个人的内心想法与有效合同的存在无关。
B. Objective Understanding
B. 目标理解
Focus on What Is Said and Done
关注所说和所做的事情
Courts look to external manifestations of intent (e.g., words, actions).
法院关注意图的外在表现（例如，言辞、行为）。
Earliest American Example: Murray v. Bethune
最早的美国案例：Murray v. Bethune
Court’s stance: A party’s private, subjective understanding cannot by itself establish a contract.
法院的立场：一方的私人主观理解不能单独建立合同。
A party’s uncommunicated belief or meaning does not create or change the terms of an agreement.
一方未传达的信念或意思不会创建或改变协议的条款。
III. Continental European Influence (The “Will Theory”)
III. 大陆欧洲影响（“意志理论”）
A. Growing Concern Over Voluntary, Knowing Consent
A. 对自愿知情同意的日益关注
French Jurisprudence
法国法学
Shift toward asking whether a party truly understood and willed the obligation.
转向询问一方是否真正理解并愿意承担义务。
Influence of Robert Joseph Pothier
罗伯特·约瑟夫·波提耶的影响
His writings contributed to the “will theory” of contract: Contracts must be knowingly and voluntarily entered into before they become binding.
他的著作对合同的“意志理论”做出了贡献：合同必须在知情和自愿的情况下签订，才能具有约束力。
B. Early American Adaptations
B. 早期美国改编
“Meeting of the Minds”
“思想的碰撞”
Emergence of the concept in American courts (e.g., Mactier’s Administrators v. Frith).
该概念在美国法院的出现（例如，Mactier’s Administrators 诉 Frith 案）。
Emphasizes a mutual, subjective agreement or concurrence of wills.
强调一种相互的、主观的意愿一致或一致性。
IV. The Peerless British Influence
IV. 无与伦比的英国影响
A. Britain’s Commercial Dominance
A. 英国的商业主导地位
19th Century Context
19 世纪背景
London as a global commercial hub.
伦敦作为全球商业中心。
British common-law decisions carried significant weight in American courts.
英国普通法的判决在美国法院中具有重要影响。
B. Raffles v. Wichelhaus (The Peerless Case)
B. Raffles v. Wichelhaus（无与伦比案）
Factual Background
事实背景
Buyer in England contracts with Seller in India for cotton shipment via a ship called “Peerless.”
买方在英国与卖方在印度签订合同，通过一艘名为“Peerless”的船运送棉花。
Unknown to parties: two ships named Peerless, one sailing in October, another in December.
未知各方：两艘名为 Peerless 的船，一艘在十月航行，另一艘在十二月航行。
Dispute
争议
Buyer assumed the October Peerless; Seller delivered via the December Peerless.
买方假定了十月的 Peerless；卖方通过十二月的 Peerless 交付。
Buyer refused the goods because they arrived later than expected.
买方拒绝接受货物，因为货物到达的时间晚于预期。
Court’s Holding
法院的裁决
Because neither party knew the other’s interpretation of which Peerless was meant, there was no “meeting of the minds.”
因为双方都不知道对方对“Peerless”的解释，因此没有“心灵的契合”。
Court declined to enforce the contract; buyer not liable.
法院拒绝执行合同；买方不承担责任。
Significance
重要性
Marked a move away from strict objective rules like Murray v. Bethune toward recognizing that deep misunderstandings can negate a contract.
标志着从像穆雷诉贝瑟恩案那样严格的客观规则转向承认深刻的误解可以使合同无效。
Widely cited by treatise writers, shaped American contract law to consider misunderstandings about key terms.
广泛被论著作者引用，塑造了美国合同法，以考虑对关键术语的误解。
V. Key Takeaway for Modern Contract Formation
现代合同形成的关键要点
A. Balancing Subjective and Objective Elements
A. 平衡主观和客观元素
Courts often look both at what parties said/did (objective) and at whether a true “meeting of the minds” occurred on essential terms (subjective).
法院通常既考虑当事人所说/所做的（客观），也考虑在基本条款上是否真正发生了“心灵的契合”（主观）。
B. Future Cases
B. 未来案例
As you read case law, watch how judges weigh subjective vs. objective proofs of intent.
在阅读案例法时，注意法官如何权衡主观与客观的意图证明。
Raffles v. Wichelhaus illustrates that a genuine, fundamental misunderstanding can mean no contract exists at all.
Raffles v. Wichelhaus 说明了真正的、根本的误解可能意味着根本不存在合同。
STONG v. LANE
STONG 诉 LANE
Supreme Court of Minnesota
明尼苏达州最高法院
66 Minn. 94, 68 N.W. 765 (1896)
Background
背景
Plaintiff (Stong) agreed verbally to purchase a lot from Defendant (Lane), believing it was the one someone had pointed out on the east side of Third Avenue.
原告（Stong）口头同意从被告（Lane）处购买一块土地，认为这是有人指给他的位于第三大道东侧的那块。
Defendant intended to sell a different lot across the street on the west side.
被告打算在街对面的西侧出售一个不同的地块。
Each party honestly believed they were discussing the same lot, but they were mistaken about which specific piece of property was at issue.
每一方都诚实地认为他们在讨论同一块地，但他们对具体涉及的财产有误解。
“Meeting of the Minds” Doctrine
“心灵相会”原则
A valid contract requires that both parties assent to the same terms.
有效的合同要求双方同意相同的条款。
Where mutual assent does not exist, there is no enforceable contract.
在没有相互同意的情况下，无法形成可执行的合同。
The court references Raffles v. Wichelhaus (the “Peerless” case) and other precedents illustrating that if a key term is ambiguous—and each party attaches a different meaning—no true agreement is formed.
法院引用了 Raffles v. Wichelhaus（“Peerless”案）及其他先例，说明如果一个关键术语模糊不清——而且每一方赋予不同的含义——则没有形成真正的协议。
Objective Description vs. Subjective Misunderstanding
客观描述与主观误解
If parties formally and knowingly agree to a clear description (e.g., a precise lot number, legal description), one party’s private mistake usually does not void the contract.
如果各方正式且明知地同意明确的描述（例如，精确的地块编号、法律描述），一方的私人错误通常不会使合同无效。
Stong v. Lane is different. The “description” consisted of an unusual, informal reference to “the lot on Third Avenue, second north from Franklin, on the side of the street with Judge Jones’ house.” Because both parties used those words but understood them differently, there was no true “meeting of the minds.”
Stong v. Lane 是不同的。“描述”包含了一个不寻常的、非正式的提及，“位于第三大道，弗兰克林以北第二个，街道一侧是琼斯法官的房子。”因为双方都使用了这些词但理解不同，所以没有真正的“心灵相通”。
Result: No Binding Contract
结果：无约束合同
The court held that the parties never truly agreed on the same subject matter. The plaintiff could therefore recover his $100.
法院认为各方从未真正就同一标的达成一致。因此，原告可以追回他的 100 美元。
This outcome, in essence, amounts to a rescission: the supposed buyer got his deposit back because there never was a valid agreement.
这一结果本质上相当于解除合同：所谓的买家收回了他的押金，因为从未存在有效的协议。
Contrast with Cases of Unilateral Mistake
与单方错误的案例对比
The court acknowledges that an honest mistake by one side alone (without an actual mismatch in the contract terms) can block specific performance but not necessarily rescind a contract.
法院承认，仅由一方的诚实错误（在合同条款中没有实际不匹配的情况下）可以阻止特定履行，但不一定会撤销合同。
Here, though, the court views it as a mutual misunderstanding regarding the property itself—hence, no contract existed in the first place.
不过，在这里，法院将其视为对财产本身的相互误解——因此，根本不存在合同。
How Both Parties Argued
双方如何辩论
Plaintiff (Stong)
原告（Stong）
Mistaken Subject Matter
错误的主题内容
Stong claimed he thought he was buying the lot on the east side of Third Avenue (the one pointed out to him).
Stong 声称他认为自己是在购买第三大道东侧的那块地（就是指给他的那块）。
After discovering it was actually a different lot, he argued there was no true agreement; he had never intended to purchase the opposite lot.
在发现实际上是一个不同的地块后，他辩称没有真正的协议；他从未打算购买相反的地块。
Wants Deposit Returned
希望退还押金
Since there was no meeting of the minds, Stong asked the court to rescind the deal and grant him a refund of his $100 deposit.
由于双方没有达成一致，Stong 要求法院撤销该交易并退还他 100 美元的押金。
Defendant (Lane)
被告（Lane）
Focus on the Informal Description
关注非正式描述
Lane pointed out that he had indeed described the lot “where Judge Jones’ house is,” which fronted west.
Lane 指出他确实描述了“琼斯法官的房子所在的地块”，该地块朝西。
He believed Stong was referring to this west-facing lot and that their agreement was for that specific property.
他相信斯通指的是这个朝西的地块，他们的协议是针对那块特定的物业。
No Wrongdoing / Honest Belief
没有不当行为 / 诚实信念
Lane contended he was dealing in good faith, had identified the lot to the best of his knowledge, and did not realize that Stong was talking about a different parcel.
Lane 主张他是出于善意在交易，已尽其所能识别该地块，并未意识到 Stong 说的是一个不同的地块。
He insisted there was a valid deal for the west-side lot, so the plaintiff’s deposit should not be returned.
他坚持认为西侧地块有有效的交易，因此原告的押金不应退还。
Court’s Conclusion
法院的结论
The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Plaintiff that there had been no meeting of the minds, because each side honestly but differently interpreted the subject matter of the sale. Consequently, Plaintiff recovered his $100.
明尼苏达州最高法院最终同意原告的观点，认为双方之间没有达成一致，因为每一方都诚实但不同地解释了销售的主题。因此，原告收回了他的 100 美元。
Review Question 1
复习问题 1
Is the decision in Stong v. Lane based on an objective lack of agreement, a subjective lack of agreement, or both? Are you sure that you understand the difference?
Stong 诉 Lane 的裁决是基于客观缺乏一致性、主观缺乏一致性，还是两者都有？你确定你理解这个区别吗？
Objective Agreement vs. Subjective Agreement
客观一致性与主观一致性
Objective agreement: Looks at the outward expressions of the parties—the words they use, the descriptions they give, their apparent conduct—through the eyes of a reasonable person. If those outward manifestations align, courts often find an “objective” contract.
客观协议：通过合理人的视角观察各方的外在表现——他们使用的词语、他们给出的描述、他们明显的行为。如果这些外在表现一致，法院通常会认定为“客观”合同。
Subjective agreement: Focuses on the actual intent or mental assent of each party. If the parties secretly interpret the same words to mean very different things, there may be no true “meeting of the minds,” even if outwardly they seem to agree.
主观一致性：关注每一方的实际意图或心理同意。如果各方秘密地将相同的词语解释为非常不同的含义，即使表面上看似一致，也可能没有真正的“心灵契合”。
How Stong v. Lane Applies Both
How Stong v. Lane 同时适用
The court effectively concluded that no genuine meeting of the minds took place. Although the parties appeared to agree on “the second lot north from Franklin Avenue, on the side of the street with Judge Jones’s house,” each was subjectively referring to a different piece of property.
法院有效地得出结论，认为没有真正的意见一致。尽管各方似乎在“从富兰克林大道向北的第二块地，位于琼斯法官的房子所在街道的一侧”上达成一致，但每一方主观上指的是不同的财产。
Moreover, the language itself was so vague (referring only indirectly to which side of the street) that even an objective observer might find it ambiguous. Thus, from both a subjective and an objective standpoint, the contract collapsed; there was a fundamental mismatch in how each party understood the description.
此外，语言本身是如此模糊（仅间接提到街道的哪一侧），以至于即使是一个客观的观察者也可能会觉得它模糊不清。因此，从主观和客观的角度来看，合同崩溃了；双方对描述的理解存在根本不匹配。
Answer
答案
The decision reflects both a subjective lack of agreement (each party was honestly thinking of a different lot) and an objective lack of clarity (the parties never formally agreed on a definite, unambiguous description).
这一决定反映了主观上的缺乏一致性（每一方都诚实地考虑了不同的地块）和客观上的缺乏明确性（各方从未正式达成对明确、清晰描述的共识）。
Review Question 2
复习问题 2
The court uses the phrase “latent ambiguity” to describe a situation where two parties have different understandings about a contract term. What exactly is the ambiguity in this case, and why is it “latent”? What kind of ambiguity is not “latent”?
法院使用“潜在模糊性”这个词来描述双方对合同条款有不同理解的情况。在这种情况下，模糊性到底是什么，为什么它是“潜在的”？什么样的模糊性不是“潜在的”？
What Is the Ambiguity in Stong v. Lane?
Stong 诉 Lane 案中的模糊性是什么？
The seller said “the lot on the same side of the street as Judge Jones’s house, the second lot north from Franklin Avenue.”
卖方说：“与琼斯法官的房子在同一侧街道上的地块，距离富兰克林大道第二个地块。”
The buyer believed this referred to a different lot (on the opposite side of the avenue) because someone had previously pointed out a lot to him, and he assumed the seller meant that one.
买方认为这指的是一个不同的地块（在大街的另一侧），因为之前有人向他指出过一个地块，他以为卖方是指那个。
Thus, both lots could superficially match portions of the verbal description (“the second lot north of Franklin on Third Avenue”). The critical detail—“the side of Judge Jones’s house”—was not clear enough (or not emphasized enough) to ensure each party was thinking of the same lot.
因此，这两个地块在表面上都可能与文字描述（“在第三大道上，弗兰克林以北的第二个地块”）相匹配。关键细节——“琼斯法官的房子的侧面”——并不够清晰（或没有强调得足够），以确保每一方都在考虑同一个地块。
Why “Latent” Ambiguity?
为什么是“潜在”歧义？
A “latent ambiguity” is one that does not appear on the face of the words used. At first glance, the description sounds sufficient (“second lot north,” “Judge Jones’s house,” etc.). Only when you dig deeper—learning there are actually two second lots on opposite sides of the street—do you discover that the words can apply to two different properties.
“潜在模糊性”是指在所使用的词语表面上并不明显的模糊性。乍一看，这个描述似乎足够清晰（“第二块地北边”，“琼斯法官的房子”等）。只有当你深入挖掘——了解到实际上街道两侧有两块第二块地——你才会发现这些词可以适用于两个不同的物业。
In other words, the ambiguity is “latent” (hidden) because no one realizes there is more than one plausible meaning until additional context or evidence comes to light.
换句话说，这种模糊性是“潜在的”（隐藏的），因为没有人意识到存在不止一种合理的含义，直到额外的上下文或证据浮出水面。
Non-Latent (“Patent”) Ambiguity
非潜在（“专利”）模糊性
A “patent” ambiguity is one that is immediately apparent from the face of the contract language (e.g., a glaring inconsistency or contradictory terms right in the text). You do not need any outside evidence to see that the language conflicts or is unclear.
“专利”模糊性是指从合同语言的表面上立即显而易见的模糊性（例如，文本中明显的不一致或矛盾的条款）。您不需要任何外部证据来看到语言的冲突或不清晰。
OSWALD v. ALLEN
OSWALD 诉 ALLEN
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
美国第二巡回上诉法院
417 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1969)
1. Factual Background
1. 事实背景
Two Coin Collections
两个硬币收藏
Mrs. Allen owned two separate coin collections:
艾伦夫人拥有两个独立的硬币收藏：
A “Swiss Coin Collection,” consisting primarily of Swiss coins.
一个“瑞士硬币收藏”，主要由瑞士硬币组成。
A “Rarity Coin Collection,” also containing some valuable Swiss coins.
一个“稀有硬币收藏”，还包含一些有价值的瑞士硬币。
Each collection was kept in separate vault boxes with distinct keys and labeled cigar boxes.
每个收藏都保存在带有不同钥匙的独立保险箱中，并标记为雪茄盒。
The Parties’ Interaction
各方的互动
Dr. Oswald, a Swiss coin collector from Switzerland, was shown both collections in a bank vault in Newburgh, New York.
奥斯瓦尔德博士，一位来自瑞士的瑞士硬币收藏家，在纽约纽堡的一家银行金库中看到了这两个收藏。
He examined the “Swiss Coin Collection” and also took notes on some Swiss coins from the “Rarity” box.
他检查了“瑞士硬币收藏”，并且还对“稀有”盒子中的一些瑞士硬币做了笔记。
Dr. Oswald testified that he did not realize those extra coins were part of a different “Rarity” set; he believed they were simply more Swiss coins belonging to Mrs. Allen.
奥斯瓦尔德博士作证说，他没有意识到那些额外的硬币是属于不同的“稀有”系列；他认为它们只是艾伦夫人更多的瑞士硬币。
Language and Communication Hurdles
语言和沟通障碍
Dr. Oswald spoke very little English; his brother (and an agent from Chase’s Money Museum) served as go-betweens.
奥斯瓦尔德博士说得很少英语；他的兄弟（以及来自切斯的钱博物馆的一名代理人）充当了中间人。
En route back to New York City, the parties discussed a price of $50,000, referring loosely to “Swiss coins” but never clarifying whether that included both sets of Swiss coins or only the Swiss Coin Collection.
在返回纽约市的途中，各方讨论了 50,000 美元的价格，模糊地提到了“瑞士硬币”，但从未澄清这是否包括两套瑞士硬币，还是仅包括瑞士硬币收藏。
Subsequent Letters
后续信件
April 8, 1964: Dr. Oswald wrote to Mrs. Allen confirming the purchase of “all your Swiss coins.”
1964 年 4 月 8 日：奥斯瓦尔德博士写信给艾伦夫人，确认购买“您所有的瑞士硬币”。
April 15, 1964: Mrs. Allen simply replied about meeting again in Newburgh on April 24, never explicitly confirming Dr. Oswald’s broader interpretation.
1964 年 4 月 15 日：艾伦夫人简单回复了关于 4 月 24 日在纽堡再次见面的事，从未明确确认奥斯瓦尔德博士的更广泛解释。
April 20, 1964: Mrs. Allen realized she had miscounted the Swiss Coin Collection and offered a reexamination, implying she was talking about that single collection.
1964 年 4 月 20 日：艾伦夫人意识到她错误地计算了瑞士硬币收藏，并提出重新检查，暗示她是在谈论那个单一的收藏。
Ultimately, Mrs. Allen decided not to proceed, influenced by her family’s wishes.
最终，艾伦夫人决定不继续，受到她家人愿望的影响。
2. The Dispute and Confusion
2. 争议与混淆
Dr. Oswald’s Understanding
奥斯瓦尔德博士的理解
Believed the $50,000 offer was for all Swiss coins owned by Mrs. Allen, encompassing both the Swiss Coin Collection and the Swiss coins in the Rarity Collection.
相信 50,000 美元的报价是针对艾伦夫人所拥有的所有瑞士硬币，包括瑞士硬币收藏和稀有收藏中的瑞士硬币。
Mrs. Allen’s Understanding
艾伦夫人的理解
Believed she was selling only the distinct “Swiss Coin Collection.” She never intended to include the Rarity Collection’s Swiss coins.
她相信自己只是在出售独特的“瑞士硬币收藏”。她从未打算包括稀有收藏中的瑞士硬币。
When Dr. Oswald wrote “all your Swiss coins,” she did not realize he was including the Rarity coins.
当奥斯瓦尔德博士写下“你所有的瑞士硬币”时，她并没有意识到他包括了稀有硬币。
Trial Judge’s Finding
审判法官的裁定
Both parties were sincere but fundamentally mistaken about what “Swiss coins” referred to.
双方都很真诚，但在“瑞士硬币”所指的内容上根本上存在误解。
There was no true “meeting of the minds”—the essential term “Swiss coins” was ambiguous as used by each side.
双方之间并没有真正的“思想碰撞”——“瑞士硬币”这一关键术语在双方的使用中都存在模糊性。
3. Legal Issue: Was There a Valid Contract?
3. 法律问题：是否存在有效合同？
Core Question: Does an agreement exist when each party interprets a critical term (here, “Swiss coins”) in a materially different way, and there is no reasonable way to prefer one interpretation over the other?
核心问题：当每一方对一个关键术语（在这里是“瑞士硬币”）的解释存在实质性差异，并且没有合理的方式来偏向其中一个解释时，是否存在协议？
4. Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
4. 法院的推理和法律适用
Restatement and the Raffles Principle
重述与拉弗尔斯原则
The Second Circuit cites Raffles v. Wichelhaus (the “Peerless” case), reaffirming that if a contract term is ambivalent and each party honestly but differently understands it, there is no binding contract if there is “no sensible basis” for choosing one interpretation over the other.
第二巡回法院引用了 Raffles v. Wichelhaus（“Peerless”案），重申如果合同条款含糊不清，且各方诚实但不同地理解它，则如果没有“合理的依据”来选择一种解释而非另一种，则没有具有约束力的合同。
Restatement of Contracts § 71(a) similarly endorses the notion that no contract is formed in such a scenario of irreconcilable ambiguity.
合同重述 § 71(a) 同样支持在不可调和的模糊情况下不形成合同的观点。
“No Sensible Basis” Criterion
“没有合理依据”标准
Professor Young’s explanation: when neither side knows (nor should have known) the other’s different interpretation, and the term is genuinely ambiguous, no contract arises.
杨教授的解释：当双方都不知道（也不应该知道）对方的不同解释，并且该术语确实模糊时，合同不成立。
Objective vs. Subjective
客观与主观
Though contract law generally looks to objective manifestations of intent, if an essential term is ambiguous in a way that no reasonable observer could resolve, the law deems there to be no mutual assent.
尽管合同法通常关注意图的客观表现，但如果一个重要条款模糊到没有合理观察者能够解决的程度，法律认为不存在相互同意。
Dr. Oswald’s letter referencing “all your Swiss coins” and Mrs. Allen’s reference to the “Swiss Coin Collection” highlight that mismatch. Each party was acting under a different assumption.
奥斯瓦尔德博士的信中提到“你所有的瑞士硬币”，而艾伦夫人提到的“瑞士硬币收藏”突显了这种不匹配。每一方的假设都不同。
Holding
持有
Affirmed the district court’s decision: no contract existed because the “Swiss coins” phrase was fatally ambiguous—one party reasonably understood it to mean all Swiss coins, the other to mean only the Swiss Coin Collection.
确认了地区法院的裁决：不存在合同，因为“瑞士硬币”这一短语存在致命的模糊性——一方合理地理解为所有瑞士硬币，另一方则理解为仅指瑞士硬币收藏。
5. Significance
5. 重要性
Mutual Mistake vs. Ambiguity
共同错误与模糊性
This case is a classic example of mutual misunderstanding—not simply one party’s unilateral mistake. Both parties used similar language but assigned different scopes to “Swiss coins.”
这个案例是相互误解的经典例子——不仅仅是某一方的单方面错误。双方使用了类似的语言，但对“瑞士硬币”赋予了不同的范围。
Practical Lesson
实用课程
When negotiating specialized assets (like coins in multiple sets), it is crucial to specify exactly which items are included. Vague references can lead to no enforceable contract if the misunderstanding is fundamental.
在谈判专门资产（如多个套装中的硬币）时，明确具体包含哪些项目至关重要。模糊的表述可能导致没有可执行的合同，如果误解是根本性的。
Broader Contract Law Principle
更广泛的合同法原则
Oswald v. Allen joins Raffles v. Wichelhaus in demonstrating the “no contract” outcome if an essential contract term is subject to different, equally plausible interpretations, and neither party had reason to suspect the other’s meaning.
奥斯瓦尔德诉艾伦案与拉夫尔斯诉维切尔豪斯案一起表明，如果一个重要的合同条款存在不同的、同样合理的解释，并且双方都没有理由怀疑对方的意思，则会导致“没有合同”的结果。
Bottom Line
底线
Outcome: Dr. Oswald cannot force Mrs. Allen to sell all Swiss coins because there was never a meeting of the minds on that specific point.
结果：奥斯瓦尔德博士无法强迫艾伦夫人出售所有瑞士硬币，因为在这一特定问题上从未达成共识。
Legal Doctrine: Even if outward language appears to form an agreement, if a term is genuinely ambiguous and each party understands it differently without fault or notice, the contract fails for lack of mutual assent.
法律原则：即使表面语言似乎形成了协议，如果某个条款确实模糊，并且每一方在没有过错或通知的情况下对其理解不同，则合同因缺乏相互同意而无效。
Review Question 3. Oswald refers to section 71 of the original (sometimes later called “First”) Restatement of Contracts. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts phrases things a little differently in its section 20. Review that provision. Assume that it governs the facts in both Stong and Oswald. How would you analyze these cases under section 20? What results would you get from each case and why? You may also wish to consult sections 18 and 19 while considering these questions.
复习问题 3。奥斯瓦尔德提到原始（有时称为“第一”）合同重述的第 71 节。合同重述（第二版）在其第 20 节中以稍微不同的方式表述。复习该条款。假设它适用于斯通和奥斯瓦尔德的事实。你将如何根据第 20 节分析这些案件？你会从每个案件中得到什么结果，为什么？在考虑这些问题时，你也可能希望参考第 18 节和第 19 节。
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20
合同重述（第二版）§ 20
Section 20 provides, in essence:
第 20 节实质上规定：
No Contract if:
没有合同的情况：
The parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations, and
各方对其表现赋予了实质上不同的含义，且
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the other, or
(a) 双方均不知道或没有理由知道对方所附加的意义，或者
(b) each party knows or each has reason to know the meaning attached by the other is different.
(b) 每一方都知道或有理由知道对方所附加的意义是不同的。
Contract According to One Party’s Meaning if:
合同根据一方的意思如果：
One party does not know (and has no reason to know) that the other party is attaching a different meaning, while the other party knows (or has reason to know) of the first party’s different meaning.
一方不知道（也没有理由知道）另一方赋予了不同的含义，而另一方知道（或有理由知道）第一方的不同含义。
Because §§ 18 and 19 simply explain that assent may be expressed by words or conduct and that there must be a genuine manifestation of mutual assent, the crucial section for “different understandings” is § 20.
因为第 18 条和第 19 条只是解释了同意可以通过言语或行为表示，并且必须有真实的相互同意的表现，因此“不同理解”的关键部分是第 20 条。
1. Stong v. Lane
Facts Recap
事实回顾
Seller (Lane) described a lot as “the second lot north of Franklin Avenue on the side with Judge Jones’ house.”
卖方（莱恩）将该地块描述为“在法兰克林大道北侧，靠近琼斯法官的房子第二个地块。”
Buyer (Stong) thought the description matched a different lot across the street (the one previously pointed out to him).
买家（Stong）认为描述与街对面一个不同的地块相符（就是之前指给他的那个）。
Each honestly believed they were talking about the same property, but in reality, they had two different parcels in mind.
每个人都诚心相信他们在谈论同一处房产，但实际上，他们心中想到的是两个不同的地块。
Applying § 20
适用第 20 条
Materially Different Meanings: They used the same verbal reference (“the second lot north on Third Avenue”), yet each had a different lot in mind.
实质上不同的含义：他们使用了相同的口头参考（“第三大道北边的第二块地”），但每个人心中想到的地块却不同。
Knowledge or Reason to Know:
知识或应知的理由：
The court found that neither party realized—nor had reason to realize—that the other party’s lot description referred to something else. Each side was innocently mistaken.
法院发现，双方都没有意识到——也没有理由意识到——对方的地块描述指的是其他事物。双方都是无辜的错误。
That scenario fits § 20(1)(a): “neither party knows or has reason to know” the other’s different interpretation.
该情形符合§ 20(1)(a)：“任何一方都不知道或没有理由知道”另一方的不同解释。
Conclusion Under § 20
根据第 20 条的结论
Because neither side knew or should have known of the other’s meaning, no manifestation of mutual assent existed.
因为双方都不知道或不应该知道对方的意思，因此不存在相互同意的表现。
Result: No contract. This aligns with the court’s holding that “the minds of the parties never met.”
结果：没有合同。这与法院的裁定一致，即“双方的意图从未达成一致。”
2. Oswald v. Allen
Facts Recap
事实回顾
Mrs. Allen owned two coin collections: the “Swiss Coin Collection” and the “Rarity Collection,” which also contained some Swiss coins.
艾伦夫人拥有两个硬币收藏： “瑞士硬币收藏”和“稀有收藏”，后者也包含一些瑞士硬币。
Dr. Oswald offered $50,000 believing he was purchasing all her Swiss coins (i.e., including both collections’ Swiss coins).
奥斯瓦尔德博士出价 50,000 美元，认为他是在购买她所有的瑞士硬币（即，包括两个收藏的瑞士硬币）。
Mrs. Allen believed she was only selling the “Swiss Coin Collection,” not the extra Swiss coins in the “Rarity Collection.”
艾伦夫人认为她只是在出售“瑞士硬币收藏”，而不是“稀有收藏”中的额外瑞士硬币。
Applying § 20
适用第 20 条
Materially Different Meanings: The phrase “Swiss coins” was understood in two different ways, leading each party to think a different group of coins was being sold.
实质上不同的含义：“瑞士硬币”这个短语被理解为两种不同的方式，导致每一方认为正在出售不同组的硬币。
Knowledge or Reason to Know:
知识或应知的理由：
Neither party appeared to suspect the other’s interpretation (there was a language barrier, plus an agent and limited discussion on specifics).
双方似乎都没有怀疑对方的解释（存在语言障碍，加上代理人和对具体问题的有限讨论）。
Therefore, each party innocently attached a different meaning to “Swiss coins,” again fitting § 20(1)(a) (no reason to suspect a discrepancy).
因此，各方无意中对“瑞士硬币”赋予了不同的含义，再次符合§ 20(1)(a)（没有理由怀疑存在差异）。
Conclusion Under § 20
根据第 20 条的结论
No objective way to reconcile whose meaning should control, and no indication one side “knew or should have known” of the other’s different interpretation.
没有客观的方法来调和谁的意义应该控制，也没有迹象表明一方“知道或应该知道”另一方的不同解释。
Result: No contract, mirroring the Second Circuit’s conclusion.
结果：没有合同，反映了第二巡回法院的结论。
Summary of the Outcomes
结果摘要
Stong v. Lane: No contract under § 20(1)(a) because neither party had reason to know the other’s different meaning about which lot was being sold.
Stong v. Lane：根据§ 20(1)(a)没有合同，因为双方都没有理由知道对方对出售哪个地块的不同含义。
Oswald v. Allen: No contract under § 20(1)(a) because each side believed “Swiss coins” referred to a different set of coins, and neither knew or should have known of the other’s interpretation.
Oswald 诉艾伦：根据§ 20(1)(a)没有合同，因为双方都认为“瑞士硬币”指的是不同的一组硬币，且双方都不知道或不应知道对方的解释。
In both cases, a critical term (the lot location in Stong; the scope of Swiss coins in Oswald) was so ambiguously used that there was no mutually agreed-upon subject matter. Thus, applying § 20 leads to the same result each court reached independently—namely, that no enforceable contract arose.
在这两种情况下，一个关键术语（Stong 中的地块位置；Oswald 中的瑞士硬币范围）使用得如此模糊，以至于没有达成一致的主题。因此，适用§ 20 导致每个法院独立得出的相同结果——即没有产生可强制执行的合同。
LUCY v. ZEHMER
LUCY 诉 ZEHMER
Supreme Court of Virginia
弗吉尼亚州最高法院
196 Va. 493; 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954)
Rule of Law
法治
The objective, outward expression of a party’s intent to be bound in an agreement, as opposed to that party’s subjective mental assent to the agreement, is all that matters when determining the existence of a valid and enforceable contract.
在确定有效且可执行合同的存在时，党派意图受约束的客观外在表现，而不是该党派对协议的主观心理同意，才是最重要的。
Facts
事实
On the evening of December 20, 1952, A.H. Zehmer (defendant) was drinking alcohol in a bar and was approached by his acquaintance, W.O. Lucy (plaintiff). Lucy was also drinking, and bought additional drinks for Zehmer. The two began conversing, and Lucy offered to purchase a farm owned by Zehmer for $50,000. Lucy had offered to purchase the same farm several times on previous occasions, and Zehmer always refused. On this particular occasion, Zehmer and Lucy spoke for forty minutes about Lucy’s purchasing the farm, and Zehmer expressed doubt that Lucy could come up with the $50,000. Lucy stated he could, and invited Zehmer to write out a contract for sale. Zehmer drafted an agreement on the back of a bar receipt stating his intention to sell the farm to Lucy for $50,000. Lucy examined it, and requested that Zehmer rewrite the agreement to include his wife’s agreement to sell the property, and have his wife signed it. Zehmer obliged and asked his wife (who was also in the bar) to sign the agreement. When she initially refused, Zehmer whispered to her that the whole matter was merely a joke. Zehmer’s wife signed the agreement, but neither party communicated to Lucy that they intended it to be a joke. The agreement also contained a provision for examination of title, and a description of what would be included in the sale. Zehmer completed the agreement and gave it to Lucy, who offered Zehmer $5 to close the deal. At this point, Zehmer realized Lucy was serious and stated that he intended the agreement to be a joke. Lucy left the bar, and enlisted his brother to help him raise the $50,000 pursuant to the agreement. They were successful and upon completion of a title check, Lucy again stated his intention to purchase the farm from Zehmer pursuant to their agreement. Zehmer refused, and Lucy sued for specific performance. The trial court held Lucy was not entitled to specific performance, and Lucy appealed.
1952 年 12 月 20 日晚上，A.H. Zehmer（被告）在酒吧喝酒，遇到了他的熟人 W.O. Lucy（原告）。Lucy 也在喝酒，并为 Zehmer 买了额外的饮料。两人开始交谈，Lucy 提出以 50,000 美元购买 Zehmer 拥有的一块农场。Lucy 之前曾多次提出购买同一块农场的请求，但 Zehmer 总是拒绝。在这次特别的场合，Zehmer 和 Lucy 谈了四十分钟关于 Lucy 购买农场的事，Zehmer 对 Lucy 能否凑出 50,000 美元表示怀疑。Lucy 表示他可以，并邀请 Zehmer 写一份销售合同。Zehmer 在酒吧收据的背面起草了一份协议，表明他打算以 50,000 美元将农场出售给 Lucy。Lucy 检查了协议，并要求 Zehmer 重新写一份协议，以包括他妻子同意出售该财产的条款，并让他的妻子签字。Zehmer 同意了，并请他的妻子（她也在酒吧里）签署协议。当她最初拒绝时，Zehmer 对她低声说整个事情只是个玩笑。 泽默的妻子签署了协议，但双方都没有告知露西他们打算把这当作一个玩笑。协议中还包含了对产权的审查条款，以及对销售内容的描述。泽默完成了协议并交给了露西，露西则向泽默提出 5 美元以完成交易。此时，泽默意识到露西是认真的，并表示他打算将该协议视为玩笑。露西离开了酒吧，并请他的兄弟帮助他筹集根据协议所需的 50,000 美元。他们成功了，并在完成产权检查后，露西再次表示他打算根据他们的协议从泽默那里购买农场。泽默拒绝了，露西因此提起了特定履行的诉讼。初审法院裁定露西无权要求特定履行，露西上诉。
Issue
问题
Whether the actual mental assent of the parties to an agreement is necessary to form a valid and enforceable contract.
当事人对协议的实际心理同意是否是形成有效且可执行合同的必要条件。
Holding and Reasoning (Buchanan, J.)
持有与推理（布坎南，J.）
No. Zehmer’s outward actions, when interpreted by a reasonable person, indicate a willingness to be bound in his agreement to sell his farm to Lucy, and Lucy is thus entitled to specific performance of that agreement. The objective, outward expression of a party’s intent to be bound in an agreement, as opposed to that party’s subjective mental assent to the agreement, is all that matters when determining the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. If the words or actions of one of the parties has only one reasonable meaning, any undisclosed intentions have no bearing on the existence of a valid and enforceable contract unless they reflect an unreasonable meaning that is actually disclosed to the other party. The facts surrounding the creation of Zehmer’s agreement to sell his farm to Lucy, when interpreted by a reasonable person, indicate an outwardly-expressed desire by Zehmer to be bound to that agreement. It does not matter that his subjective desire was that the agreement should be a joke, as this was never communicated to Lucy. The agreement itself was discussed between the two parties for over forty minutes before it was signed, was redrafted at the request of Lucy to contain provisions for title examination and what was included in the sale, and was signed by both Zehmer and his wife with no indication that it was not complete and binding. Additionally, although Zehmer and Lucy were drinking alcohol, the elaborate and detailed manner in which they discussed and drafted their agreement suggests they were not so drunk as to be unaware of their actions. Thus, equity does not justify voiding the contract on these grounds, and Lucy is entitled to specific performance of the contract. The decision of the trial court is reversed and remanded.
不，泽默的外在行为在合理人的解读下，表明他愿意受其与露西达成的出售农场协议的约束，因此露西有权要求该协议的具体履行。判断有效且可执行合同存在的关键在于一方对协议的客观外在表达，而非该方对协议的主观心理同意。如果一方的言辞或行为只有一个合理的含义，任何未披露的意图对有效且可执行合同的存在没有影响，除非它们反映出一个实际上已向另一方披露的不合理含义。围绕泽默与露西达成出售农场协议的事实，在合理人的解读下，表明泽默外在表达了希望受该协议约束的愿望。他的主观愿望是该协议应该是个玩笑这一点并不重要，因为这从未传达给露西。 协议本身在双方之间讨论了超过四十分钟后才签署，按照露西的要求进行了重新起草，以包含对产权审查的条款以及销售中包含的内容，并由泽默和他的妻子签署，没有任何迹象表明该协议不完整或不具约束力。此外，尽管泽默和露西在饮酒，但他们讨论和起草协议的详细和复杂的方式表明，他们并没有醉到无法意识到自己的行为。因此，公平并不支持以此为理由使合同无效，露西有权要求合同的具体履行。初审法院的裁决被推翻并发回重审。
Review Question 4. In both Stong and Oswald, the parties did not understand their respective proposed deals in the same way. What, if anything, is different about the situation in Lucy v. Zehmer that leads to a different result?
复习问题 4。在 Stong 和 Oswald 的案例中，各方对各自提议的交易理解并不相同。那么，在 Lucy v. Zehmer 的情况下，有什么不同之处导致了不同的结果？
1. The Nature of the Misunderstanding
1. 误解的本质
Stong v. Lane & Oswald v. Allen
Stong 诉 Lane 和 Oswald 诉 Allen
In Stong and Oswald, both parties were honestly mistaken about a key contractual term but in different ways, and neither party had reason to suspect the other was interpreting it differently.
在 Stong 和 Oswald 案中，双方对一个关键合同条款都诚实地误解了，但方式不同，且双方都没有理由怀疑对方的解释不同。
As the courts found, there was no objective basis for deciding which side’s interpretation should prevail because both interpretations were equally plausible.
正如法院所发现的，没有客观依据来决定哪一方的解释应当占上风，因为两种解释都是同样合理的。
In both cases, the courts concluded there was no contract—a “mutual misunderstanding” meant no genuine meeting of the minds.
在这两种情况下，法院得出结论认为没有合同——“相互误解”意味着没有真正的意见一致。
Lucy v. Zehmer
露西诉泽默
Zehmer claimed he believed the deal was a joke. Lucy clearly believed it was real.
泽默声称他认为这笔交易是个玩笑。露西显然相信这是真的。
Instead of each party having an equally plausible, good-faith misunderstanding of an essential term (as in Stong/Oswald), here only one side (Zehmer) later insisted subjectively it was a joke.
与每一方对一个基本术语有同等可信的善意误解（如在 Stong/Oswald 案中）不同，这里只有一方（Zehmer）后来主观地坚持这只是一个玩笑。
Objectively, however, Zehmer and Lucy had a signed writing, a stated purchase price, and all indicia of a serious agreement—even if Zehmer says he was “kidding.”
然而，从客观上看，泽默和露西有一份签署的书面文件、一个明确的购买价格，以及所有严肃协议的标志——即使泽默说他是在“开玩笑”。
Courts typically apply the “objective test” in contract law: if a reasonable person in Lucy’s position would think Zehmer was serious—because everything outwardly looked like a genuine contract—then Zehmer’s private belief that “it was all in jest” does not negate the agreement.
法院通常在合同法中适用“客观测试”：如果处于露西位置的合理人会认为泽默是认真的——因为一切外表看起来像是真正的合同——那么泽默的私人信念“这都是开玩笑”并不否定协议。
2. Objective vs. Equally Plausible Ambiguities
2. 目标与同样合理的模糊性
Stong / Oswald:
Symmetrical misunderstanding: Each side was sincere and equally unaware that the other side meant something different.
对称的误解：双方都是真诚的，且同样没有意识到对方的意思有所不同。
No way to choose whose interpretation should govern, so the courts said no contract.
没有办法选择谁的解释应该占主导地位，因此法院说没有合同。
Lucy:
露西：
Asymmetrical assertion of “no seriousness”: Lucy was serious and had no reason to think otherwise.
不对称的“没有严肃性”主张：露西是认真的，没理由认为其他。
From an objective standpoint, Zehmer’s written and signed memorandum for sale was consistent with an actual intent to sell, rendering it enforceable.
从客观的角度来看，泽默的书面签署的销售备忘录与实际出售意图一致，因此具有可执行性。
The court reasoned that a “joke” undisclosed to the other party cannot defeat the apparent, outward intent to form a valid contract.
法院认为，未向另一方披露的“玩笑”不能否定形成有效合同的明显、外在意图。
Bottom Line
底线
In Stong and Oswald, the misunderstanding centered on ambiguous terms where each side’s interpretation was equally valid, so there was no meeting of the minds.
在 Stong 和 Oswald 的案例中，误解集中在模糊的术语上，各方的解释同样有效，因此没有达成共识。
In Lucy v. Zehmer, the supposed “misunderstanding” was one-sided—only Zehmer claimed it was a joke. But all objective evidence showed a real contract, so the court enforced it.
在露西诉泽默案中，所谓的“误解”是单方面的——只有泽默声称这是一场玩笑。但所有客观证据显示这是一个真实的合同，因此法院予以执行。
AUGSTEIN v. LESLIE
AUGSTEIN 诉 LESLIE
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
美国纽约南区地方法院
11 Civ. 7512 (HB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149517 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2012)
11 Civ. 7512 (HB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149517 (S.D.N.Y. 2012 年 10 月 17 日)
Rule of Law
法治
An offeror makes a valid offer of a reward if an objective, reasonable person would understand the offeror’s conduct as intending to induce potential offerees to perform a specific action.
如果一个客观、合理的人会理解出价者的行为是为了诱使潜在受邀者执行特定行为，则出价者提出的奖励有效。
Facts
事实
Ryan Leslie (defendant) was a musician whose laptop computer, external hard drive, and other personal property were stolen while he was on tour in Germany. The items contained valuable intellectual property including an unreleased album. Leslie announced in a YouTube video that he would give $20,000 to anyone who returned the items. Leslie later posted another YouTube video increasing the amount of the award to $1 million. A printed message at the end of that video stated, “In the interest of retrieving the invaluable intellectual property contained on his laptop & hard drive, Mr. Leslie has increased the reward offer . . . .” The increase was covered by news organizations, announced on Leslie’s Facebook and Twitter accounts, and discussed by Leslie in a television interview. Armin Augstein (plaintiff) gave Leslie’s laptop and hard drive to the police in Germany and tried to collect the reward from Leslie. However, Leslie refused to pay the reward money to Augstein, claiming that the intellectual property was no longer present on the hard drive when Augstein returned it. Leslie asserted that he and his staff had unsuccessfully tried to access the material on the hard drive. Leslie had then sent the hard drive to the manufacturer, which deleted all the information from the hard drive and sent Leslie a replacement. Augstein sued Leslie in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Augstein asserted that Leslie made an offer of the reward for the return of the laptop and other property, and that Augstein accepted the offer and fully performed by giving the laptop to the German police. Augstein also alleged that after he asked Leslie for the reward money, Leslie caused the hard drive to be erased to avoid paying the reward. Leslie argued that the reward was an advertisement and not an offer. Augstein moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the reward was a valid offer that Augstein accepted and performed by returning the laptop.
瑞安·莱斯利（被告）是一名音乐家，他的笔记本电脑、外部硬盘和其他个人财物在他德国巡演期间被盗。这些物品包含了有价值的知识产权，包括一张未发布的专辑。莱斯利在一段 YouTube 视频中宣布，任何归还这些物品的人将获得 2 万美元的奖励。莱斯利后来又发布了一段 YouTube 视频，将奖励金额提高到 100 万美元。该视频结尾处的打印信息写道：“为了找回他笔记本电脑和硬盘中包含的无价知识产权，莱斯利先生提高了奖励金额……” 这一增加得到了新闻机构的报道，并在莱斯利的 Facebook 和 Twitter 账户上宣布，莱斯利在一次电视采访中也进行了讨论。阿尔敏·奥古斯坦（原告）将莱斯利的笔记本电脑和硬盘交给了德国警方，并试图向莱斯利索取奖励。然而，莱斯利拒绝向奥古斯坦支付奖励金，声称在奥古斯坦归还硬盘时，知识产权已不再存在于硬盘上。莱斯利声称他和他的工作人员曾试图访问硬盘上的材料，但未能成功。 莱斯利随后将硬盘送回制造商，制造商删除了硬盘上的所有信息，并向莱斯利发送了一个替换品。奥格斯坦在纽约南区美国地方法院起诉莱斯利。奥格斯坦声称莱斯利提出了对归还笔记本电脑和其他财物的奖励，并且奥格斯坦接受了该提议，并通过将笔记本电脑交给德国警方来完全履行。奥格斯坦还声称，在他向莱斯利索要奖励金后，莱斯利导致硬盘被擦除，以避免支付奖励。莱斯利辩称奖励是一种广告，而不是一个提议。奥格斯坦就奖励是否为有效提议的问题申请了简易判决，认为他接受并通过归还笔记本电脑履行了该提议。
Issue
问题
Does an offeror make a valid offer of an award if an objective, reasonable person would understand the offeror’s conduct as intending to induce potential offerees to perform a specific action?
如果一个客观、合理的人会理解要约人的行为是意图诱使潜在受要约人采取特定行动，那么要约人是否提出了有效的奖励要约？
Holding and Reasoning (Baer, J.)
持有与推理（Baer, J.）
Yes. An offeror makes a valid offer of a reward if an objective, reasonable person would understand the offeror’s conduct as intending to induce potential offerees to perform a specific action. Once the action is performed, the bargain is concluded, and the reward is paid. A court evaluating the legitimacy of an offer should consider what a reasonable person would have understood the alleged offeror’s conduct to convey. Here, a reasonable person viewing Leslie’s YouTube videos, other postings, and television interview announcing the reward would understand that Leslie was seeking to induce someone to return his laptop and other items. Once the property was returned, the bargain would be concluded, and the reward would be paid. The increase in the award, the valuable nature of the lost property, and the news reports further support the conclusion that a reasonable person would view Leslie’s conduct as making an offer. Accordingly, Augstein’s motion for summary judgment is granted to the extent he seeks a declaration that the reward was an offer.
是的。如果一个客观、合理的人会理解出价者的行为是为了诱使潜在受邀者执行特定行动，那么出价者就做出了有效的奖励提议。一旦该行动被执行，交易就完成，奖励就会支付。法院在评估提议的合法性时，应考虑一个合理的人会如何理解被指控出价者的行为。在这里，一个合理的人观看 Leslie 的 YouTube 视频、其他帖子和宣布奖励的电视采访时，会理解 Leslie 是在试图诱使某人归还他的笔记本电脑和其他物品。一旦财产被归还，交易就会完成，奖励就会支付。奖励的增加、失去财产的宝贵性质以及新闻报道进一步支持了一个合理的人会将 Leslie 的行为视为提出了一个提议。因此，Augstein 的简易判决动议在他寻求声明奖励是一个提议的范围内被批准。
Review Question 5. The Augstein court uses the term “unilateral contract.” What does that mean and how does it differ from a “bilateral contract”? Look up both terms and make sure you would be able to explain their meanings to a classmate or your professor. You will come across one or both of these terms in many contracts cases, so you might as well know what the courts are talking about.
复习问题 5。Augstein 法庭使用“单方合同”这个术语。这是什么意思，它与“双方合同”有什么不同？查找这两个术语，并确保你能够向同学或教授解释它们的含义。在许多合同案例中，你会遇到这一个或两个术语，因此你最好知道法庭在谈论什么。
Review Question 6. The first three cases in this unit (Stong, Oswald, and Lucy) all involve situations in which the parties seem to have reached at least some kind of agreement about something. Is that the issue in Augstein? Did the parties argue that they were mistaken about what they agreed to, or that they never agreed at all?
复习问题 6。本单元的前三个案例（Stong、Oswald 和 Lucy）都涉及当事方似乎在某种程度上达成了某种协议的情况。在 Augstein 中也是这样吗？当事方是否争辩他们对达成的协议存在误解，或者他们根本没有达成协议？
Review Question 5
复习问题 5
A unilateral contract is a promise by one party that can be accepted only by the other party’s performance (an action rather than a return promise). A common example is a reward offer: “I will pay $1,000 to whoever returns my lost dog.” No one is obliged to hunt for the dog, but if someone does find and return it, the original promisor (the offeror) must pay. The contract forms when the offeree actually performs the requested act.
单方合同是由一方作出的承诺，只有另一方的履行（行动而非回报承诺）才能接受。一个常见的例子是奖励提议：“我将支付 1,000 美元给任何找到我丢失的狗的人。”没有人有义务去寻找这只狗，但如果有人确实找到了并归还了它，原始承诺人（出价人）必须支付。当受要约人实际履行请求的行为时，合同就形成了。
A bilateral contract, on the other hand, is created by an exchange of mutual promises. Each side agrees to do something in the future. For example: “I promise to pay you $500 if you promise to paint my garage next week.” The moment you promise to paint, and I promise to pay, we have a bilateral contract—even before the garage is painted.
另一方面，双边合同是通过相互承诺的交换而形成的。每一方同意在未来做某事。例如：“如果你承诺下周给我油漆车库，我承诺支付你 500 美元。”当你承诺油漆时，我承诺支付时，我们就有了一个双边合同——即使车库还没有被油漆。
In short:
简而言之：
Unilateral: Offer is accepted by doing the requested act.
单方面：通过执行请求的行为来接受报价。
Bilateral: Offer is accepted by promising to do something in return.
双边：通过承诺以某种方式回报来接受报价。
Review Question 6
复习问题 6
In the first three cases—Stong, Oswald, and Lucy—the dispute centered on whether the parties truly reached a mutual understanding about the deal. In Stong and Oswald, each side genuinely believed the contract referred to different subject matter, resulting in no contract because there was no “meeting of the minds.” In Lucy, one party claimed the agreement was a “joke,” while the other believed it was genuine—raising the issue of serious intent to be bound.
在前三个案例中——Stong、Oswald 和 Lucy——争议的焦点在于各方是否真正达成了对交易的共同理解。在 Stong 和 Oswald 中，双方都真心相信合同涉及不同的主题，因此没有合同，因为没有“心灵的契合”。在 Lucy 中，一方声称协议是一个“玩笑”，而另一方则认为这是认真的——这引发了关于是否有认真意图受约的争议。
By contrast, in Augstein, the key question was not whether the parties misunderstood each other or lacked a meeting of the minds. Instead, it was whether Ryan Leslie’s reward announcement constituted a valid offer that could be accepted by performance. The dispute focused on whether Leslie’s statements were legally binding promises or mere advertisements—not on any confusion or mistake about the terms. Thus, Augstein turned on unilateral contract principles (offer + performance = binding agreement) rather than on arguments that “we never agreed at all” or “we misunderstood what we agreed to.”
相比之下，在 Augstein 案中，关键问题不是各方是否误解了对方或缺乏共识。而是 Ryan Leslie 的奖励公告是否构成了一个可以通过履行接受的有效要约。争议集中在 Leslie 的陈述是否为具有法律约束力的承诺或仅仅是广告——而不是对条款的任何混淆或错误。因此，Augstein 案的焦点在于单方合同原则（要约 + 履行 = 具有约束力的协议），而不是“我们根本没有达成一致”或“我们误解了我们达成的协议”的论点。
Problem 3.1
问题 3.1
Tyson is a major American producer of fresh frozen chicken. Männliches Huhn GmbH (MHG) is a German supplier of chicken to restaurants and fast-food establishments in Europe. After some telephone discussions between Tyson’s offices in Little Rock and MHG’s offices in Frankfurt, MHG orally agrees to buy 100,000 lbs. of fresh frozen chicken from Tyson, to be packed in cryovac and delivered to MHG in Germany. Tyson sends a memorandum of the offer to MHG as an invoice describing the product as “US Fresh Frozen Chicken, Grade A, Government Inspected, Eviscerated, each chicken individually wrapped in Cryovac, packed suitable for export.” When the chicken arrived at MHG, however, the company rejected it, saying that the chickens delivered were cheap “stewing chickens”—that is, chickens suitable only for things like soup and pot pies—rather than more expensive “frying” chickens which are suitable for cooking and barbecuing in restaurants. The chicken as delivered was useless to MHG. Tyson sued, claiming that it had a contract to deliver “chicken,” and that the birds delivered were, in fact, “chickens.”
泰森是美国一家主要的鲜冻鸡生产商。Männliches Huhn GmbH (MHG) 是一家德国供应商，向欧洲的餐馆和快餐店提供鸡肉。在泰森位于小石城的办公室与 MHG 位于法兰克福的办公室之间进行了一些电话讨论后，MHG 口头同意从泰森购买 100,000 磅鲜冻鸡，包装在真空袋中并运送到德国的 MHG。泰森向 MHG 发送了一份报价备忘录，作为发票，描述产品为“美国鲜冻鸡，A 级，政府检验，去内脏，每只鸡单独用真空袋包装，适合出口。”然而，当鸡肉到达 MHG 时，该公司拒绝接受，称交付的鸡是便宜的“炖鸡”——即仅适合用于汤和锅饼的鸡——而不是更昂贵的“炸鸡”，后者适合在餐馆中烹饪和烧烤。交付的鸡对 MHG 来说毫无用处。泰森提起诉讼，声称它有合同交付“鸡”，而交付的鸟实际上是“鸡”。
Is there a contract between the parties? If so, is it for stewing chickens or frying chickens? Based on what you have learned in this unit, what would you expect the arguments for both sides to be?
双方之间是否有合同？如果有，是用于炖鸡还是炸鸡？根据你在本单元中学到的内容，你期望双方的论点是什么？
Is There a Contract?
有合同吗？
Yes, There Is (Likely) a Valid Contract.
是的，可能存在有效合同。
Offer and Acceptance: Tyson and MHG reached an oral agreement for the sale of 100,000 lbs. of “fresh frozen chicken,” confirmed by Tyson’s written memorandum/invoice. Both parties clearly intended to make a binding deal.
要约与接受：Tyson 和 MHG 达成了口头协议，出售 100,000 磅“新鲜冷冻鸡”，并由 Tyson 的书面备忘录/发票确认。双方显然意图达成具有约束力的交易。
Consideration: Tyson promised to ship 100,000 lbs. of fresh frozen chicken; MHG promised to pay the agreed-upon price.
考虑事项：泰森承诺运送 100,000 磅新鲜冷冻鸡；MHG 承诺支付约定的价格。
The dispute is not whether the parties formed some contract, but rather what type or quality of chicken is required under their agreement.
争议不在于各方是否形成了某种合同，而在于根据他们的协议需要什么类型或质量的鸡。
2. Is the Contract for Stewing Chickens or Frying Chickens?
2. 合同是用于炖鸡还是炸鸡？
Core Dispute: The meaning of “fresh frozen chicken.”
核心争议：“新鲜冷冻鸡”的含义。
MHG’s Position: They believed they were buying chickens suitable for frying or barbecuing in restaurants (i.e., younger broiler/fryers). When MHG received older, tougher hens (“stewing chickens”), they argue the product is useless for their restaurant customers.
MHG 的立场：他们认为自己购买的是适合在餐厅炸或烧烤的鸡（即年轻的肉鸡/炸鸡）。当 MHG 收到较老、较硬的母鸡（“炖鸡”）时，他们认为该产品对他们的餐厅客户毫无用处。
Tyson’s Position: Tyson insists that “fresh frozen chicken” is a broad term encompassing any Grade A, government-inspected chicken, including older hens. Tyson delivered what it calls “chicken”—thus fulfilling the contract’s literal description.
泰森的立场：泰森坚持认为“新鲜冷冻鸡”是一个广泛的术语，包括任何 A 级、经过政府检查的鸡，包括老母鸡。泰森交付了他们所称的“鸡”——因此满足了合同的字面描述。
3. Potential Legal Analyses
3. 潜在法律分析
A. Ambiguity and “Meeting of the Minds”
A. 模糊性与“心灵的相遇”
Latent Ambiguity
潜在模糊性
Stong v. Lane and Oswald v. Allen remind us that if two parties use a term with genuinely different meanings (and neither knows or should know the other’s interpretation), a court could find no meeting of the minds and thus no enforceable agreement on that term.
Stong 诉 Lane 和 Oswald 诉 Allen 提醒我们，如果两个当事方使用一个具有真正不同含义的术语（且双方都不知道或不应知道对方的解释），法院可能会发现没有达成共识，因此在该术语上没有可强制执行的协议。
Here, if “chicken” is genuinely ambiguous within the trade and both sides acted in good faith without realizing the other’s interpretation, a court might say there was no true agreement on “fryer vs. stewing.”
在这里，如果“鸡肉”在交易中确实存在歧义，并且双方在没有意识到对方的解释的情况下本着善意行事，法院可能会认为在“炸鸡与炖鸡”上没有达成真正的协议。
However, courts are often reluctant to declare “no contract” when the term can potentially be clarified by usage of trade or prior dealings.
然而，当条款可以通过行业惯例或先前交易进行澄清时，法院通常不愿意宣告“没有合同”。
Usage of Trade
贸易的使用
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or general contract law, courts often look to industry standards and usage of trade to interpret ambiguous terms.
根据统一商法典（UCC）或一般合同法，法院通常会参考行业标准和贸易惯例来解释模糊条款。
If “fresh frozen chicken” is commonly understood in the export/restaurant-supply trade to mean only younger broiler/fryers, MHG could argue the contract implicitly excluded stewing hens.
如果“新鲜冷冻鸡”在出口/餐厅供应行业普遍被理解为仅指年轻的肉鸡/炸鸡，MHG 可以争辩说合同隐含地排除了炖母鸡。
Tyson would counter that usage of trade includes older hens—if that can be shown to be standard.
泰森会反驳说，贸易使用包括老母鸡——如果可以证明这是标准的话。
B. Subjective vs. Objective Interpretations
B. 主观与客观的解释
Courts typically interpret the contract objectively—what would a reasonable person in the chicken export trade believe “fresh frozen chicken” to mean?
法院通常以客观的方式解释合同——在鸡肉出口贸易中，一个合理的人会认为“新鲜冷冻鸡”意味着什么？
If the objective meaning in that context is “young broiler/fryers,” then MHG’s interpretation wins.
如果在该上下文中的客观含义是“年轻的肉鸡/小鸡”，那么 MHG 的解释胜出。
If the term’s ordinary usage includes older chickens (and MHG never specified “only fryers”), then Tyson’s interpretation prevails.
如果该术语的普通用法包括老母鸡（而 MHG 从未指定“仅限于小鸡”），那么泰森的解释占上风。
C. Mutual Mistake or Unilateral Mistake
C. 共同错误或单方错误
If a court finds that both parties truly misunderstood each other about a vital term and that it is equally ambiguous, the court might void the contract for mutual mistake. However, if either side had reason to clarify or should have known the other side’s meaning, the court might interpret the term against the party who failed to clarify.
如果法院发现双方在一个重要条款上确实误解了对方，并且该条款同样模糊，法院可能会因双方的错误而宣布合同无效。然而，如果任何一方有理由进行澄清或应该知道对方的意思，法院可能会对未能澄清的一方作出不利解释。
4. Likely Arguments for Each Side
4. 每一方可能的论点
MHG (Buyer)
MHG (买方)
Industry Usage / Prior Dealings:
行业使用 / 先前交易：
Argue that in the European restaurant supply context, “fresh frozen chicken” means “young chickens suitable for frying.” MHG might produce evidence from industry catalogs, standard shipping specifications, or prior dealings to show that “stewing hens” are never referred to simply as “fresh frozen chicken” in such transactions.
在欧洲餐饮供应的背景下，“新鲜冷冻鸡”指的是“适合油炸的年轻鸡”。MHG 可能会提供来自行业目录、标准运输规格或以往交易的证据，以表明在此类交易中，“炖母鸡”从未仅被称为“新鲜冷冻鸡”。
Material Breach / Product Useless:
重大违约 / 产品无用：
Emphasize that older hens are inedible for typical restaurant preparation (frying, barbecuing). This is a significant difference in kind, not just quality.
强调老母鸡对于典型的餐厅准备（油炸、烧烤）是不可食用的。这是种类上的显著差异，而不仅仅是质量上的差异。
No True Meeting of the Minds:
没有真正的思想碰撞：
Claim that if “chicken” included old stewing birds under Tyson’s definition, MHG had no idea and would have never agreed to pay a higher price for worthless product. Possibly no mutual assent under a latent ambiguity theory.
声称如果“鸡”在 Tyson 的定义下包括老炖鸟，MHG 对此毫不知情，并且绝不会同意为无价值的产品支付更高的价格。根据潜在模糊理论，可能没有双方同意。
Tyson (Seller)
泰森（卖方）
Literal “Chicken”:
字面意思“鸡”：
Argue that “fresh frozen chicken” can refer to any properly slaughtered, Grade A–inspected bird. They delivered exactly that.
争论“新鲜冷冻鸡”可以指任何经过适当屠宰、A 级检验的鸟。他们正是提供了这一点。
Buyer’s Burden to Specify:
买方的指定责任：
If MHG wanted young fryers, it should have explicitly said “broiler/fryers” or “frying chickens.” Because MHG did not specify, Tyson interprets “chicken” in the broad sense.
如果 MHG 想要年轻的炸鸡，它应该明确说“肉鸡/炸鸡”或“炸鸡”。因为 MHG 没有具体说明，泰森将“鸡”解释为广义。
No Industry Consensus:
没有行业共识：
If the trade usage is not uniform, or if the contract’s language was unqualified, “chicken” must be read broadly.
如果贸易惯例不统一，或者合同的语言没有限制，“chicken”必须被广泛理解。
Binding Contract:
绑定合同：
Since MHG never objected to the broad label and the invoice clearly stated “US Fresh Frozen Chicken,” MHG is bound to accept the product.
由于 MHG 从未对广泛的标签提出异议，并且发票上清楚地写着“美国新鲜冷冻鸡”，MHG 必须接受该产品。
5. Possible Outcomes
5. 可能的结果
Court Finds No Meeting of the Minds
法院发现没有达成共识
If the court determines the term “chicken” is truly ambiguous, and both sides sincerely used it in different ways with no reason to suspect the other’s meaning, it could declare no enforceable agreement regarding the type of chicken.
如果法院认定“鸡”这个词确实模糊不清，并且双方真诚地以不同的方式使用它，且没有理由怀疑对方的意思，法院可以宣布关于鸡的类型没有可执行的协议。
Court Uses Industry Usage to Decide “Chicken” Means Broiler/Fryer
法院利用行业用法决定“鸡”指的是肉鸡/炸鸡
If MHG proves that in the export/restaurant context, “chicken” unambiguously refers to young fryers, the court might enforce the contract as requiring fryers—and hold Tyson delivered the wrong goods, entitling MHG to reject them.
如果 MHG 证明在出口/餐厅的背景下，“鸡肉”明确指的是年轻的炸鸡，法院可能会执行合同，要求提供炸鸡，并认为泰森交付了错误的货物，使 MHG 有权拒绝接受。
Court Enforces Tyson’s Broader Definition
法院执行泰森的更广泛定义
If Tyson shows either (a) it is standard trade practice that “chicken” can include older hens, or (b) MHG’s own lack of clarity was at fault, the court might rule the contract allowed for stewing chickens, so MHG is stuck with the shipment.
如果泰森证明（a）“鸡”可以包括老母鸡是标准贸易惯例，或者（b）MHG 自身的不明确是错误，法院可能裁定合同允许炖鸡，因此 MHG 必须接受这批货物。
Conclusion
结论
Most courts will look to custom, prior dealings, and any trade usage to decide which meaning of “chicken” is correct under the contract. If there is no single accepted usage or if the ambiguity is irreconcilable, the court may conclude that there was no true “meeting of the minds” and thus no binding deal on the type of chicken. Otherwise, the court might decide in favor of the party whose definition aligns with objective evidence of trade usage and the parties’ mutual understanding—or impose the interpretation against the party who “could have clarified” but did not.
大多数法院会参考习惯、先前的交易和任何贸易惯例来决定在合同中“鸡”的正确含义。如果没有单一的公认用法，或者如果歧义无法调和，法院可能会得出没有真正的“意见一致”，因此没有关于鸡的具有约束力的交易的结论。否则，法院可能会支持与贸易惯例的客观证据和双方的共同理解一致的定义的一方，或者对“本可以澄清”但没有澄清的一方施加解释。
Problem 3.2
问题 3.2
Jay the owner of an automobile body shop, has a 1962 Chevrolet Corvette convertible, all original and beautifully restored. His neighbor, Zeke, a very well-to-do investment banker, has long coveted the car and over the years has repeatedly asked Jay if he would sell. Jay has always refused. In early March Jay learns that his wife, Vera, has been having an affair with Zeke. Jay does not want a divorce, but he wants revenge. Jay purchases a rather beat-up 1994 Corvette for $3,500. Pretending that he is ignorant of the affair, Jay has a conversation with Zeke.
汽车修理店老板杰伊拥有一辆 1962 年的雪佛兰科尔维特敞篷车，完全原装且经过精美修复。他的邻居齐克是一位非常富有的投资银行家，长期以来一直渴望这辆车，多年来反复询问杰伊是否愿意出售。杰伊一直拒绝。三月初，杰伊得知他的妻子维拉与齐克有染。杰伊不想离婚，但他想报复。杰伊以 3500 美元购买了一辆相当破旧的 1994 年科尔维特。假装对这段婚外情一无所知，杰伊与齐克进行了一次对话。
“You know, Zeke,” he says, “I’m really torn about the Corvette.”
“你知道，齐克，”他说，“我对科尔维特真的很纠结。”
“What about it?” says Zeke.
“那又怎么样？”泽克说。
“Well,” says Jay, “business has been off at the shop with this recession, and a lot of my investments are down. You know, the economy and everything.”
“嗯，”杰伊说，“由于这次经济衰退，店里的生意不好，我的很多投资也在下滑。你知道的，经济和其他一切。”
“Of course,” says Zeke. “Things are tough.”
“当然，”泽克说。“事情很艰难。”
“They sure are. Fact is, though, much as I don’t want to, I’ve got a Corvette I don’t need, and some ready cash would be very helpful.”
“他们确实是。事实上，尽管我不想这样，但我有一辆不需要的科尔维特，一些现钱会很有帮助。”
“You mean, you want to sell your Corvette?”
“你的意思是，你想卖掉你的科尔维特？”
“I don’t really want to. But you know how it is.”
“我其实不想。但你知道是怎么回事。”
“Sure,” says Zeke, who really doesn’t, since his investment bank paid him a hefty bonus this year. But he says, “How much are you asking?”
“当然，”泽克说，他其实并不想，因为他的投资银行今年给了他一笔丰厚的奖金。但他说：“你要多少钱？”
Jay hesitates. “I hadn’t really decided on it.”
杰犹豫了。“我还没有真正决定。”
“Well, if it will help you out I’ll give you $65,000 for it, right now,” says Zeke.
“好吧，如果这能帮到你，我现在就给你 65,000 美元。”泽克说。
Jay shakes his head. “Thanks. I appreciate that. But I’m not sure I really want to sell. The cash is tempting, but . . . . “ He breaks off.
杰摇了摇头。“谢谢。我很感激。但是我不确定我真的想卖。现金很诱人，但……。”他停住了。
“But what?”
“但是什么？”
“I want to think it over. It’s a tough decision.”
“我想再考虑一下。这是一个艰难的决定。”
“Tell you what,” says Zeke. “I’ll give you $70,000 right now.” He pulls out a checkbook. “Right now,” he repeats. “That’s a very good offer, you know.”
“我告诉你，”泽克说。“我现在就给你 70,000 美元。”他拿出一本支票簿。“现在就给，”他重复道。“你知道，这是一个非常好的报价。”
“I know.” Jay hesitates again. “Actually, I feel like I’m taking advantage of you at that price.”
“我知道。”杰伊再次犹豫。“其实，我觉得以那个价格我在占你的便宜。”
Zeke waves a hand. “Don’t worry about me. I can afford it. The investment banking business is still going strong.” He grins and takes out a pen. “I can write the check right now. It’s good. You can get the cash tomorrow morning.”
齐克挥了挥手。“别担心我。我能负担得起。投资银行业务仍然蒸蒸日上。”他微笑着拿出一支笔。“我现在就可以写支票。这是可以的。你明天早上就能拿到现金。”
Jay agrees. Zeke writes the check. Jay insists on filling out a bill of sale, specifying the price and a Vehicle Identification Number of 299492033218. He tells Zeke that the Corvette (and the title document) is down at Jay’s shop, getting a new wax polishing, and that Zeke can pick it up tomorrow.
杰同意了。齐克写下支票。杰坚持填写一份销售单，注明价格和车辆识别号码 299492033218。他告诉齐克，科尔维特（以及所有权文件）在杰的商店，正在进行新的打蜡，齐克可以明天去取。
第二天，齐克来到杰伊的商店，接过钥匙和签署的标题，手里是刚打磨过但仍然相当破旧的 1994 年科尔维特。他非常愤怒。他冲进杰伊的办公室，但杰伊只是对他笑。杰伊一大早就把支票兑现了，已经把钱揣进了口袋。齐克威胁要做各种可怕的事情。
“You bought a Corvette,” says Jay. He picks up the bill of sale. “You got a Corvette. It’s VIN 299492033218, exactly what it says on the bill of sale and on the car title you’re holding there. It’s not my problem if you don’t look at what you sign.” Jay grins happily. “I think maybe you paid a little too much for it,” he says, “But as you said, you can afford it. I’m sure Vera is worth it. Have a really nice day, Zeke.”
“你买了一辆科尔维特，”杰说。他拿起销售单。“你得到了科尔维特。它的 VIN 是 299492033218，正如销售单和你手中的汽车标题上所写的那样。如果你不看你签的东西，那就不是我的问题。”杰高兴地笑了。“我觉得你可能为它支付了有点多，”他说，“但正如你所说，你买得起。我相信维拉值得这个价格。祝你有个愉快的一天，齐克。”
Zeke subsequently sues Jay, demanding the 1962 Corvette or a refund of his money. Is there a contract between the parties? If so, is it for the 1962 Corvette or the 1994 Corvette? Be prepared to make arguments on behalf of both Zeke and Jay when considering this problem.
Zeke 随后起诉 Jay，要求归还 1962 年的科尔维特或退款。双方之间是否存在合同？如果存在，是针对 1962 年的科尔维特还是 1994 年的科尔维特？在考虑这个问题时，请准备为 Zeke 和 Jay 提出论点。
Key Facts
关键事实
Jay’s 1962 Corvette: Beautifully restored, not for sale (in Jay’s mind), but highly desired by Zeke.
杰伊的 1962 年科尔维特：经过精美修复，不出售（在杰伊的心中），但被齐克高度渴望。
Jay’s 1994 Corvette: A beat-up car that Jay purchased cheaply and then “prepped” to fool Zeke.
杰伊的 1994 年科尔维特：一辆破旧的车，杰伊以低价购买，然后“准备”好以欺骗齐克。
Conversation: Jay suggests he might sell “his Corvette” to raise cash; Zeke understands (subjectively) that this is the 1962 Corvette.
对话：杰伊建议他可能会卖掉“他的科尔维特”来筹集现金；齐克主观上理解这是 1962 年的科尔维特。
Price & Sale: Zeke pays $70,000 via check on the spot; Jay provides a bill of sale referring only to a VIN (which Zeke fails to inspect).
价格与销售：Zeke 现场通过支票支付 $70,000；Jay 提供了一份仅提及 VIN 的销售单（Zeke 未进行检查）。
Delivery: Next day, Zeke is given the keys and title to the 1994 Corvette (with the VIN specified in the bill of sale). Jay taunts Zeke: “You bought a Corvette, and you got one. Read what you signed.”
交付：第二天，Zeke 收到了 1994 年款 Corvette 的钥匙和所有权证（发票中指定了 VIN）。Jay 嘲讽 Zeke：“你买了一辆 Corvette，而你得到了一个。看看你签的是什么。”
Zeke sues, demanding either the 1962 Corvette or a refund of his $70,000.
齐克提起诉讼，要求要么获得 1962 年款科尔维特，要么退还他的 70,000 美元。
2. Is There a Contract?
2. 是否有合同？
A. Formation of Some Agreement
A. 达成某些协议
Offer and Acceptance
要约与承诺
Objectively, they appear to have exchanged promises: Zeke promises $70,000, Jay agrees to transfer “the Corvette.”
客观上，他们似乎交换了承诺：Zeke 承诺$70,000，Jay 同意转让“科尔维特”。
Jay and Zeke both signed (or at least completed) a bill of sale referencing a VIN. Payment was made.
Jay 和 Zeke 都签署了（或至少完成了）一份提到 VIN 的销售合同。付款已完成。
So at first glance, it looks like an enforceable contract was formed.
所以乍一看，似乎形成了一个可执行的合同。
What Is the Subject Matter?
主题是什么？
The crux is which Corvette did Jay truly promise to sell? The 1962 or the 1994?
关键是杰伊到底承诺出售哪一辆科尔维特？是 1962 年款还是 1994 年款？
3. Zeke 的论点
Objective Understanding
目标理解
Zeke would insist any reasonable person would interpret “my Corvette” as referring to the prized 1962 model—especially when the conversation is colored by Zeke’s known desire for that car.
齐克坚信，任何理智的人都会将“我的科尔维特”解读为指代那辆珍贵的 1962 年款——尤其是在谈话中夹杂着齐克对那辆车的已知渴望时。
The references to it being “beautifully restored,” or “the car you’ve always wanted,” might be implied if Jay alluded to the 1962 during negotiations.
提到“美丽修复”或“你一直想要的车”的说法，如果杰伊在谈判中提到 1962 年，可能是暗示。
Zeke can argue that Jay’s talk of “I don’t really want to sell” and “I’m taking advantage of you at that price” strongly suggests the valuable 1962 car, not a junk 1994. No rational buyer would pay $70,000 for a beat-up 1994 Corvette.
泽克可以争辩说，杰伊所说的“我真的不想卖”和“我在那个价格上占了你的便宜”强烈暗示了那辆有价值的 1962 年汽车，而不是一辆破旧的 1994 年车。没有理性的买家会为一辆破旧的 1994 年科尔维特支付 70,000 美元。
Hence, from an objective perspective, the real deal is for the 1962.
因此，从客观的角度来看，真正的交易是 1962 年。
Misrepresentation / Fraud
虚假陈述 / 欺诈
Zeke can claim Jay deliberately deceived him:
Zeke 可以声称 Jay 故意欺骗了他：
By not mentioning a second Corvette.
不提及第二辆科尔维特。
By encouraging Zeke to sign a bill of sale with a VIN that Zeke assumed matched the 1962.
通过鼓励 Zeke 签署一份包含 Zeke 认为与 1962 年匹配的 VIN 的销售协议。
If a court finds fraud in the inducement—that Jay intentionally tricked Zeke—the contract might be voidable by Zeke.
如果法院发现诱导欺诈——即杰伊故意欺骗了齐克——则合同可能会被齐克撤销。
Alternatively, if the court sees Jay’s actions as a deliberate concealment, it could award rescission (return the $70,000) or find liability for fraud.
另外，如果法院认为杰伊的行为是故意隐瞒，可能会判决撤销合同（退还 70,000 美元）或认定其对欺诈负责。
No True “Meeting of the Minds”
没有真正的“心灵相会”
Zeke might invoke the “mutual misunderstanding” line of cases (Stong, Oswald)—he believed the contract was for the 1962, Jay “pretends” it was for the 1994. So if each party truly had a different object in mind, no valid contract for either car.
Zeke 可能会引用“相互误解”的案例（Stong, Oswald）——他认为合同是针对 1962 年的，而 Jay “假装”是针对 1994 年的。因此，如果每一方确实有不同的目标，那么对于任何一辆车都没有有效的合同。
But Zeke more likely wants the 1962 car or a refund, not a finding of “no contract at all.”
但泽克更可能想要 1962 年的车或退款，而不是“根本没有合同”的裁定。
4. Jay’s Arguments
4. Jay 的论点
Strict Reading of the Bill of Sale
严格解读销售合同
Jay points to the VIN in the bill of sale, which matches the 1994 Corvette. On its face, that is the unambiguous subject matter.
杰指着销售合同中的车辆识别号码（VIN），与 1994 年款科尔维特相符。从表面上看，这就是明确的主题。
“You get what you sign for.” Courts do look to the four corners of a written agreement. If the writing is clear (the VIN for the 1994), that’s presumably the “Corvette” in the bargain.
“你签的就是你得到的。” 法院确实会关注书面协议的四个角落。如果书面内容清晰（1994 年的 VIN），那么这大概就是交易中的“科尔维特”。
Zeke had every opportunity to inspect the VIN, the car title, the shape of the car, etc. He failed to do so.
齐克有充分的机会检查车辆识别号码、汽车标题、汽车的形状等。他没有这样做。
Lack of Clear Misrepresentation
缺乏明确的误导性表述
Jay might claim he never once explicitly said “I am selling my 1962 Corvette.” He spoke only of “my Corvette,” and “a Corvette I have,” letting Zeke assume incorrectly.
杰可能会声称他从未明确说过“我在卖我的 1962 年科尔维特。”他只提到“我的科尔维特”和“我拥有的一辆科尔维特”，让齐克错误地假设。
Argues that if Zeke was so sure it was the 1962, Zeke should have verified the VIN or at least asked for clarity.
认为如果 Zeke 如此确定是 1962 年，Zeke 应该核实 VIN，或者至少要求澄清。
If the court applies a purely objective standard and looks at the actual signed writing specifying the 1994 VIN, Jay says “This is the entire contract, unambiguous.”
如果法院采用纯粹的客观标准，并查看实际签署的指定 1994 年 VIN 的书面文件，杰伊说：“这就是整个合同，毫不含糊。”
No Meeting of the Minds or the Buyer’s Own Fault
没有思想的碰撞或买方自己的过错
If the court finds a mismatch in understanding, Jay might push that it’s Zeke’s unilateral mistake—Zeke just jumped to the wrong conclusion.
如果法庭发现理解上存在不匹配，杰可能会强调这是齐克的单方面错误——齐克只是跳到了错误的结论。
Under that theory, either the contract is what the writing says (the 1994 Corvette) or it is not enforceable if you need to “add terms” about the 1962.
根据该理论，合同要么是书面所述的内容（1994 年科尔维特），要么如果需要“添加条款”关于 1962 年，则不可执行。
Because Jay is not the one who made any statements about “1962,” he can disclaim responsibility for Zeke’s assumption.
因为杰伊不是关于“1962”发表任何声明的人，他可以否认对齐克假设的责任。
5. Potential Legal Outcomes
5. 潜在法律结果
Contract for the 1994 Corvette
1994 年科尔维特合同
If the court applies a strict textual approach—the VIN is clear, the buyer’s signature is binding—then the contract is for the 1994 Corvette. Zeke is stuck with a junker for $70,000.
如果法院采取严格的文本解释——车辆识别号码是明确的，买方的签名是有约束力的——那么合同就是 1994 年的科尔维特。泽克只能花 70,000 美元买一辆废车。
Zeke’s only relief might be to argue fraud or unconscionability. But in some courts, mere “failing to read the contract” is not enough to avoid the deal absent strong evidence of misrepresentation.
泽克唯一的解脱可能是主张欺诈或不公平。但在某些法院，仅仅“未阅读合同”不足以在没有强有力的虚假陈述证据的情况下避免交易。
Rescission for Fraud or No True Assent
因欺诈或未真实同意而撤销合同
If Zeke proves Jay intentionally and deceitfully lured him into believing he was buying the 1962, the court may void or rescind the contract, returning $70,000 to Zeke and the 1994 car back to Jay.
如果泽克证明杰伊故意和欺骗性地引诱他相信自己在购买 1962 年车型，法院可能会宣布合同无效或撤销合同，将 70,000 美元退还给泽克，并将 1994 年车型归还给杰伊。
The court might also see this as a classic case of “dirty hands” by Jay. Even if the writing is unambiguous, fraud in the inducement can nullify that writing.
法庭也可能将此视为杰伊的“肮脏双手”经典案例。即使书面内容没有歧义，诱导欺诈也可以使该书面内容无效。
Contract for the 1962 Corvette
1962 年科尔维特合同
Less likely unless a court holds that all evidence points to the 1962 Corvette being the real subject matter. The bill of sale VIN might be considered a “mistake,” corrected to reflect the 1962 if the court sees the objective, contextual evidence as overriding. This is possible but an uphill battle if the written contract is explicit about the VIN.
除非法院认定所有证据都指向 1962 年科尔维特是实际标的，否则可能性较小。如果法院认为客观的、上下文的证据具有优先性，销售单上的 VIN 可能被视为“错误”，并更正为 1962 年。这是可能的，但如果书面合同对 VIN 有明确规定，这将是一场艰难的斗争。
6. Conclusion
6. 结论
There is (likely) a contract in the sense that the parties intended a sale/purchase, a bill of sale was signed, and payment was made.
在某种意义上，可能存在一份合同，因为各方意图进行买卖，签署了销售单，并且已付款。
The big question is: Which Corvette?
大问题是：哪款科尔维特？
Jay says the written contract unambiguously covers the 1994, and Zeke simply failed to read.
杰说书面合同明确涵盖了 1994 年，而泽克只是没有阅读。
Zeke says he was tricked into believing it was the prized 1962, and he never intended to buy a junker.
泽克说他被欺骗，以为这是珍贵的 1962 年车型，他从未打算购买一辆废车。
A court’s resolution will hinge on whether the judge/jury finds fraud or misrepresentation by Jay, or concludes that the parties truly had such a mismatch in understanding that no valid contract existed for the 1962.
法院的裁决将取决于法官/陪审团是否发现 Jay 存在欺诈或虚假陈述，或者是否得出结论认为各方之间确实存在如此大的理解不匹配，以至于 1962 年没有有效合同。
If no fraud is found, courts often hold people to the written, signed contract (i.e., the 1994 VIN). But if the judge sees a deliberate scheme by Jay to exploit Zeke’s assumption, a rescission or damage award for fraud is very possible.
如果没有发现欺诈，法院通常会要求人们遵守书面签署的合同（即 1994 年 VIN）。但如果法官发现杰伊故意利用齐克的假设，撤销合同或因欺诈而赔偿的可能性非常大。
Problem 3.3
问题 3.3
Walker is the owner of Rose, a registered purebred polled Angus descended from a long line of highly regarded stock. He buys her for breeding purposes, for which purpose she is worth about $10,000. After a few years and various veterinary examinations, Walker determines that Rose is infertile. Accordingly, he sells Rose, whom he believes is barren, to Sherwood for $500—essentially her value as meat. They sign a contract that Walker will deliver Rose this coming Thursday. On the morning set for delivery, Walker discovers that Rose is, in fact, with calf. He refuses to deliver her, claiming that neither party intended this to be a transaction for a breeding cow. Sherwood demands Rose.
沃克是罗斯的主人，罗斯是一头注册的纯种无角安格斯，来自一条备受推崇的血统。他购买她是为了繁殖目的，因此她的价值约为 10,000 美元。经过几年的各种兽医检查，沃克确定罗斯是不育的。因此，他以 500 美元的价格将罗斯出售给舍伍德，他认为罗斯是 barren——基本上是她作为肉类的价值。他们签署了一份合同，沃克将在即将到来的星期四交付罗斯。在交付的早晨，沃克发现罗斯实际上是怀孕的。他拒绝交付她，声称双方都没有意图将此交易视为繁殖母牛。舍伍德要求交付罗斯。
When Walker continues to refuse, Sherwood sues. Did the parties have a contract or not? What would you expect the two sides to argue regarding that issue?
当沃克继续拒绝时，舍伍德提起诉讼。双方是否有合同？你期望双方在这个问题上争论什么？
Was There a Contract at All?
是否根本存在合同？
Offer, Acceptance, and Consideration
要约、接受和对价
Walker agreed to sell the cow to Sherwood for $500; Sherwood accepted and presumably tendered payment (or promised it), forming a prima facie contract.
沃克同意以 500 美元将牛卖给舍伍德；舍伍德接受了，并且可能已经支付（或承诺支付），形成了初步合同。
Thus, in a formal sense, they did make an agreement.
因此，从正式的意义上说，他们确实达成了协议。
The main question is whether that contract is voidable (or unenforceable) due to mutual mistake about the cow’s fertility.
主要问题是该合同是否因双方对牛的生育能力存在共同错误而可撤销（或不可执行）。
2. Walker’s Likely Argument (Seller)
2. 沃克的可能论点（卖方）
Mutual Mistake of a Material Fact
重大事实的相互错误
Both parties believed Rose was barren—an assumption that drastically affected her value and the nature of the transaction.
双方都认为罗斯是无子女的——这一假设极大地影响了她的价值和交易的性质。
If both sides were fundamentally mistaken about an essential fact going to the very substance of the deal (breeding cow vs. beef cow), the contract could be rescinded.
如果双方在涉及交易实质的一个基本事实（繁殖母牛与肉牛）上根本上存在误解，则合同可以被撤销。
No Meeting of the Minds
没有思想的碰撞
The bargain was supposed to be for a cow worth $500 for meat, not for a $10,000 breeding cow.
这笔交易本应是为了价值 500 美元的肉用牛，而不是一头价值 10,000 美元的繁殖牛。
Since the real situation (a fertile cow) is entirely different from what both parties believed, Walker can argue there was no true “meeting of the minds.”
由于实际情况（一个肥沃的奶牛）与双方所相信的完全不同，沃克可以辩称没有真正的“心灵相会”。
Fairness / Equity
公平 / 公正
Walker might claim it is unjust for Sherwood to get a windfall of a valuable breeding cow at a token price.
沃克可能会声称，舍伍德以象征性的价格获得一头有价值的繁殖母牛是不公正的。
Had they known Rose was pregnant, they never would have agreed to $500.
如果他们知道罗斯怀孕了，他们绝对不会同意 500 美元。
3. Sherwood’s Likely Argument (Buyer)
3. Sherwood 的可能论点（买方）
Enforceable Agreement
可执行协议
Sherwood will insist the written contract for the cow at $500 stands. They signed and agreed on a price, species, and delivery date.
舍伍德将坚持以 500 美元的书面合同购买这头牛有效。他们签署并同意了价格、品种和交货日期。
Walker cannot simply cancel a completed deal because he discovered Rose’s fertility.
沃克不能仅仅因为发现罗斯的生育能力而取消已完成的交易。
“Bare Mistake” Not Fatal
“Bare Mistake”并非致命
Sherwood may argue that the mistake was either unilateral (mainly Walker’s) or not so fundamental as to defeat the contract.
舍伍德可能会辩称这个错误要么是单方面的（主要是沃克的），要么并不那么根本，以至于无法使合同失效。
If the contract did not explicitly condition the sale on Rose’s barrenness, then Walker bears the risk that his own examination was incorrect.
如果合同没有明确将销售条件与罗斯的不育挂钩，那么沃克就承担了自己检查不正确的风险。
Assumption of Risk
风险承担
Since Walker owned Rose and had every chance to confirm her fertility status, he should bear the risk of misdiagnosis.
由于沃克拥有罗斯并有充分的机会确认她的生育状况，他应该承担误诊的风险。
Sherwood was not responsible for verifying whether Rose was barren; thus, no basis exists to invalidate the sale once Walker discovers she is pregnant.
舍伍德不负责验证罗斯是否不育；因此，一旦沃克发现她怀孕，就没有理由使销售无效。
4. Conclusion
4. 结论
Yes, there was a contract—the parties exchanged promises and agreed on a price for “Rose.”
是的，确实有一份合同——各方交换了承诺，并就“Rose”达成了价格协议。
The deeper legal question is whether that contract is voidable by Walker because both parties mistakenly believed Rose was barren (a potential “mutual mistake” of fact).
更深层的法律问题是，沃克是否可以撤销该合同，因为双方错误地认为罗斯是无子女的（这可能是一个“共同事实错误”）。
Walker will argue no meeting of the minds on a breeding cow, while Sherwood will argue that the sale is binding and Walker assumed the risk of the cow’s true condition.
沃克将争辩说在育种母牛上没有达成共识，而舍伍德将争辩说销售是有约束力的，沃克承担了母牛真实状况的风险。
In many jurisdictions (following the reasoning of Sherwood v. Walker), courts hold that such a fundamental mutual mistake about the very nature of the goods may allow the seller to rescind. However, if a modern court deems the risk should have been on the seller, it might enforce the contract as is.
在许多司法管辖区（遵循 Sherwood v. Walker 的推理），法院认为对商品本质的这种根本性共同错误可能允许卖方撤销合同。然而，如果现代法院认为风险应由卖方承担，则可能按原样执行合同。