2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:1 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

A. Transfer of Privacy Rights

§ 10:1. Transfer of privacy rights

Synopsis:

While the rights of privacy can be “waived” or “consented to,” under the traditional general rule they cannot be “sold” outright to another. This rule is usually shortened to the statement that “privacy rights are personal.” The authors opine that the general rule should be subject to some exceptions in recognition of commercial reality. Only the person whose own privacy has been invaded has standing to sue; others cannot sue under a “relational” right. The general rule of nonsaleability of privacy rights does not fit well with commercial realities and was one historical factor leading to development of the right of publicity.
虽然隐私权可以"放弃"或"同意",但根据传统的一般规则,隐私权不能完全"出售"给他人。这条规则通常被简化为"隐私权属于个人"的说法。作者认为,考虑到商业现实,一般规则应该有一些例外。只有隐私受到侵犯的人才有权起诉;其他人不能根据"关系"权利起诉。隐私权不可出售的一般规则与商业现实并不完全相符,这也是导致公开权发展的一个历史因素。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:2 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

A. Transfer of Privacy Rights

§ 10:2. Transfer of privacy rights—Privacy rights are personal
§ 10:2. 隐私权的转让——隐私权属于个人

The traditional general rule as to the right of privacy is that, while acts which invade privacy may be “consented” to or “licensed,” a person’s privacy rights cannot be “assigned” or sold outright.
关于隐私权的传统通则是,虽然侵犯隐私的行为可能得到"同意"或"许可",但个人的隐私权不能被"转让"或直接出售。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:3 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

A. Transfer of Privacy Rights

§ 10:3. Transfer of privacy rights—Privacy rights are personal—General rule
§ 10:3. 隐私权的转让——隐私权属于个人——一般规则

One’s Personal Privacy Cannot Be Sold to Another. It is relatively clear that the general and traditional rule is that the right to be free from invasion of the “four torts” of privacy are not capable of being sold outright to another person. The traditional way of stating this rule is to say that privacy rights are “personal.” One aspect of this rule is that there is no “relational right” to sue for invasion of privacy. That is, the right to sue for an invasion of privacy is personal and cannot be asserted by a surrogate such as one’s spouse or offspring. As a California court noted, “The authorities appear to be uniform that the right of privacy cannot be asserted by anyone other than him whose privacy is invaded.”
个人隐私不能出售给他人。 相对而言,一般和传统的规则是,免受"四种侵权行为"侵犯的隐私权不能直接出售给他人。 传统上,隐私权被称为"个人"权利。 该规则的一个方面是,不存在因隐私侵犯而提起诉讼的"关系权利"。 也就是说,因隐私侵犯而提起诉讼的权利是个人权利,不能由他人(如配偶或子女)代为主张。 正如加利福尼亚州法院所言,"当局似乎一致认为,隐私权不能由隐私被侵犯者以外的任何人主张。"

One’s Right Not to Have Privacy Invaded Cannot Be “Assigned” to Another. It would be unusual for one to “assign” one’s privacy rights in the right to be free from intrusion, or to be free from public disclosure of private facts or to be free from being placed in a false light. Similarly, the notion of “assigning” or “selling” one’s right not to be assaulted or libeled sounds bizarre. However, “assigning” one’s right to control the use of one’s identity in advertising sounds more reasonable. Yet, the commercial “appropriation” form of invasion of privacy also focuses upon human dignity and the mental distress which results from unpermitted commercial use of identity and persona.
一个人不受到隐私侵犯的权利不能"转让"给他人。一个人"转让"自己的隐私权,即免受侵犯、免于公开披露隐私或免于被错误报道的权利,是很不寻常的。同样,"转让"或"出售"自己不受攻击或诽谤的权利听起来也很奇怪。然而,"转让"自己控制广告中身份使用的权利听起来更合理。然而,商业"侵占"形式的隐私侵犯也关注人的尊严以及因未经许可的商业使用身份和角色而造成的精神困扰。

An “assignment” or “sale” of privacy rights of Jones implies that the assignee then has the right to grant “licenses” or “consents” to others to do things which would invade the privacy of Jones. Third parties would be legally permitted to invade Jones’ rights of privacy without Jones’ actual and knowing consent to these acts. This is the result the law forbids. While Jones is certainly permitted to “consent” to conduct which would otherwise invade Jones’ privacy and cause emotive harm, Jones is not permitted to sell the right to give such consents.
琼斯隐私权的"转让"或"出售"意味着受让人有权向他人授予"许可"或"同意",允许他人从事侵犯琼斯隐私的行为。第三方可以在未经琼斯实际知情同意的情况下侵犯其隐私权,这是法律所不允许的。虽然琼斯当然有权"同意"他人从事侵犯其隐私和造成情感伤害的行为,但琼斯不得出售给予此类同意的权利。

Additionally, if such a sale of privacy rights were permitted, the assignee, not Jones, would have standing to sue those who acted without the consent of the assignee. Jones would not be a party to a lawsuit in which his or her dignity and state of mind were in issue. This result is unpalatable to the law and would be offensive to most persons’ sense of fairness.
此外,如果允许出售隐私权,那么受让人(而非琼斯)有权起诉未经其同意而采取行动的人。琼斯不会参与涉及其尊严和心理状态的诉讼。这样的结果不符合法律,而且有违大多数人的公平感。

New York Law and the Howard Hughes Precedent. Under the New York privacy and publicity statute, it has been held that while one can assign the right of publicity, one cannot “assign” traditional privacy rights. In one case, the late recluse millionaire Howard Hughes had assigned all of his publicity and privacy rights to Rosemont Enterprises, Inc., a corporation organized for the ostensible purpose of preparing the “authorized” biography of Hughes’ life. The court rejected Rosemont’s standing to sue for invasion of Hughes’ privacy rights under the New York statute, saying that “such right is a purely personal one which may be enforced only by the party himself.”
纽约法律和霍华德·休斯先例。根据纽约隐私和公开法规,人们可以转让公开权,但不能"转让"传统的隐私权。在已故隐士百万富翁霍华德·休斯的一个案例中,他将所有的公开权和隐私权转让给了罗斯蒙特企业公司(Rosemont Enterprises, Inc.),该公司表面上的目的是为休斯撰写"授权"传记。法院驳回了罗斯蒙特公司根据纽约法规起诉侵犯休斯隐私权的诉讼资格,称"此类权利纯属个人权利,只能由当事人本人行使"。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:4 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

A. Transfer of Privacy Rights

§ 10:4. Transfer of privacy rights—Privacy rights are personal—Authors’ comment
§ 10:4. 隐私权的转让——隐私权是个人权利——作者评论

The traditional general rule is that all privacy rights, apparently including the right to prevent commercial use of identity which causes indignity, can only be “licensed” or “consented to” by the person. Yet, there will arise commercial transactions which necessitate, to some degree, judicial recognition of an “assignment” of such privacy rights as an exception to the general rule.
传统的一般规则是,所有隐私权,显然包括防止身份被用于商业用途从而造成侮辱的权利,只能由本人"许可"或"同意"。然而,在商业交易中,这种隐私权的"转让"在某种程度上需要得到司法认可,作为一般规则的例外。

A relatively modest “exception” to the general rule is to permit someone like a professional entertainer to appoint an ‘agent’ with the power to grant permission to use the person’s identity in advertising uses. The agent should be allowed to grant “consents” or “licenses” as to conduct which otherwise would be an invasion of the entertainer’s right of “appropriation privacy.” Commercial reality requires that such an agent have the power to license appropriation privacy rights as well as the right of publicity. Otherwise, the agent could not grant complete security to an advertiser. The rationale for the rule against a sale of privacy rights would not seem applicable in a principal-agent relationship. The principal can carefully delineate the scope of agency and end it when the principal wishes. However, the law of agency must be carefully applied in favor of the principal to prevent possible abuses when an agent has the power to grant consents for commercial use.
一般规则中一个相对温和的"例外"是允许像专业艺人这样的人指定一名"代理人",该代理人有权允许在广告中使用该艺人的身份。代理人应有权就行为授予"同意"或"许可",否则将侵犯艺人的"隐私权"。商业现实要求该代理人有权许可隐私权以及公开权。否则,代理人无法向广告商提供完全的安全保障。禁止出售隐私权的规则似乎不适用于委托代理关系。委托人可以仔细划定代理范围,并在需要时终止代理。然而,当代理人有权授予商业用途的同意时,必须谨慎适用代理法,以维护委托人的利益,防止可能的滥用。

Another exception should be recognized when a prominent person assigns to another all rights to commercialize that person’s identity in a defined scope of market or context of use. Since the law recognizes that the right of publicity may be so assigned, it must recognize that to some extent associated privacy rights must also be assigned. That is, an assignment of the right to commercial use, to be marketable, must also include a waiver of the right to object to uses which might otherwise invade privacy rights. In cases where the assignor retains some continuing interest and control over the activities of the assignee, the danger of a “run-away” assignee is diminished, if not eliminated. However, if a person completely assigns any and all commercial rights of identity without restriction to a stranger, the courts must stand open as the equitable last resort to prevent unfair or inequitable uses by such an assignee.
另一个例外情况是,当一位知名人士将自己在特定市场或使用环境中的身份商业化权利全部转让给他人时。既然法律承认公开权可以转让,那么它也必须承认,在一定程度上相关的隐私权也必须转让。也就是说,商业使用权的转让,即用于市场推广,还必须包括放弃对可能侵犯隐私权的用途提出异议的权利。如果转让人保留对受让人的活动的一些持续利益和控制权,那么"失控"受让人的危险就会降低,甚至消除。然而,如果一个人将身份的任何和所有商业权利完全转让给一个陌生人,不受任何限制,那么法院必须作为公平的最后手段,防止这种受让人进行不公平或不公正的使用。

Still another exception must be recognized, and is recognized when a person whose name has become associated with that person’s business as a trade name, trademark or service mark sells the entire business to another. The sale of a whole business, “lock, stock and barrel,” includes by implication good will, all marks and names and the right to commercial use of the personal name in that business. Of necessity this includes the “appropriation” form of privacy. After the sale, the seller cannot then sue the buyer for invasion of “privacy” because the buyer continues to use the seller’s personal name. To permit the seller to sue for invasion of privacy on the theory that privacy rights are not assignable would be a perversion of the law. The seller’s personal name has become an asset of the business which has been sold. The seller cannot keep the right to exclusive use of the name and keep the purchase price too.
还有一个例外必须得到承认,当一个人的名字作为商号、商标或服务商标与他的业务联系在一起时,如果他将整个业务出售给他人,则属于例外。出售整个业务,包括good will、所有商标和名称以及在该业务中使用个人姓名的商业权利。这必然包括"挪用"隐私的形式。出售后,卖方不能以买方继续使用卖方个人姓名为由起诉买方侵犯"隐私"。如果以隐私权不可转让为由允许卖方起诉侵犯隐私,则属于曲解法律。卖方的个人姓名已成为已出售业务的资产。卖方不能既保留对姓名的独占使用权,又保留购买价格。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:5 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

A. Transfer of Privacy Rights

§ 10:5. Transfer of privacy rights—Rule leads to creation of the right of publicity
§ 10:5. 隐私权的转移——规则导致公开权的产生

The nonassignability of traditional privacy rights was one important reason for the creation of the separate concept of the right of publicity. Prior to judicial acceptance of the right of publicity, commercial licenses were viewed only as waivers of the right to sue for invasion of privacy. For example, one court said in 1935 that professional baseball players could neither assign nor exclusively license their names for use on baseball bats: they could only sign a consent or waiver which prevented them from objecting to the manufacturer’s use of their names on baseball bats. The name of a baseball player was said to be “not vendible in gross” because “fame is not merchandise.” Therefore the baseball bat manufacturer who had a license from Babe Ruth had no standing to sue a competing bat maker who sold a “Ruth bat.”
传统隐私权不可转让是产生单独的公开权概念的重要原因之一。在司法部门承认公开权之前,商业许可仅被视为放弃起诉侵犯隐私的权利。例如,一家法院在1935年表示,职业棒球运动员既不能转让也不能独家许可他人使用其名字制作棒球棒:他们只能签署同意书或弃权书,以防止制造商在棒球棒上使用他们的名字。据说棒球运动员的名字"不能整体出售",因为"名声不是商品"。因此,拥有贝比·鲁斯(Babe Ruth)许可的棒球棒制造商没有资格起诉销售"鲁斯棒球棒"的竞争对手。

Such early cases viewed a commercial “exclusive license” as no more than a release or waiver of the right to sue for having one’s feelings hurt by commercial use of identity. Since it was usually “public figures” who were granting these licenses, the courts could not see that there was really any “privacy” right to be invaded in the first place. The licenses appeared to be illusory. Viewing commercial endorsement and advertising licenses as no more than a personal waiver of a tort was a misperception of the commercial realities. The law needed a new mode of thinking and a new set of semantic labels to deal with such commercial realities. Thus was born the concept of a right of publicity.
早期的案例认为商业"独家授权"不过是放弃或放弃因商业使用身份而使感情受到伤害而提起诉讼的权利。 由于通常是"公众人物"授予这些许可,法院无法看到首先确实存在任何"隐私"权利受到侵犯的情况。 许可证似乎是虚幻的。 将商业代言和广告许可视为个人放弃侵权是对商业现实的误解。 法律需要一种新的思维方式以及一系列新的语义标签来应对这种商业现实。 因此,产生了公开权概念。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:6 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:6. Right of publicity is property

Synopsis:

While the term “property” can carry many different connotations, the law defines the right of publicity as a form of “property” right. This categorization is helpful in making decisions about such issues as transferability, standing to sue, choice of law, descent after death and the statute of limitations. In addition, the act of infringing on the right of publicity can properly be viewed as a commercial “tort,” as well as a form of “unfair competition.”
虽然"财产"一词可以有多种不同的含义,但法律将公开权定义为一种"财产"权利。这种分类有助于就可转让性、起诉资格、法律选择、死后继承和诉讼时效等问题做出决定。此外,侵犯公开权的行为可以被恰当地视为商业"侵权行为"和"不正当竞争"的一种形式。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:7 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:7. Right of publicity is property—Right of publicity viewed as a “property” right
§ 10:7. 公开权是财产权——公开权被视为"财产权"

The courts have uniformly held that the right of publicity is a “property” right. The courts have also applied the synonymous label “proprietary” right. Similarly, commentators, the Restatement of Unfair Competition and the Restatement of Torts agree that the right of publicity is a “property” right. Several state statutes explicitly state this.
法院一致认为,公开权是一种"财产"权利。法院还使用了同义词"专有"权利。同样,《不正当竞争法重述》和《侵权法重述》也认为公开权是一种"财产"权利。一些州法规也明确指出了这一点。

Courts view the right of publicity as a form of “intellectual property,” having both similarities to and differences from other forms of intellectual property such as copyrights and trademarks. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that the right of publicity was a form of intellectual property and thus applied the “first sale” doctrine of patent, trademark and copyright law to right of publicity cases. In another example, the California court of appeals held that an insurance policy that excluded coverage for “intellectual property” claims also excluded the expense of defending a right of publicity infringement case.
法院将公开权视为一种"知识产权",它与版权和商标等其他形式的知识产权既有相似之处,也有不同之处。例如,第十一巡回法院认为公开权是一种知识产权,因此将专利、商标和版权法的"首次销售"原则适用于公开权案件。另一个例子是,加州上诉法院认为,排除"知识产权"claims的保险单也排除了公开权侵权案件辩护费用。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:8 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:8. Right of publicity is property—Significance of the “property” label
§ 10:8. 公开权是财产——"财产"标签的意义

The right of publicity is “property.” From that label flows a plethora of legal categorizations and conclusions, but Justice Cardozo warned us to beware of “the tyranny of labels.” The word “property” is merely a convenient label and should not be viewed as a magic substitute for thought. As Judge Jerome Frank cautioned in the seminal Haelan case, “Whether [the right of publicity] be labeled a “property” right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag “property” simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has a pecuniary worth.” While Prosser in 1960 said that “[i]t seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a right is to be classified as ‘property,’ ” Prosser noted that the Haelan case viewed the right as having a “proprietary nature.” Prosser opined that that “would seem clearly to be justified.” Prosser observed that whether or not the right is called “property,” “it is at least, once protected by the law, a right of value upon which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses.” This “right of value” is what most of us would call “property.”
公开权是"财产"。从该标签中可以得出许多法律分类和结论,但Justice卡多佐警告我们,要当心"标签的暴政"。 "财产"一词只是一个方便的标签,不应被视为思想的魔法替代品。正如杰罗姆·弗兰克法官在开创性的Haelan案中告诫的那样,"[公开权]是否被标记为"财产"权利并不重要;因为在这里,就像在其他地方一样,"财产"这个标签只是象征着法院执行claim具有金钱价值的事实。" 虽然普罗瑟在1960年表示,"争论这种权利是否应归类为"财产"似乎毫无意义,"但普罗瑟指出,Haelan案认为该权利具有"专有性质"。普罗瑟认为,"这似乎显然是有道理的。"普罗瑟认为,无论该权利是否被称为"财产","一旦受到法律保护,它至少是一种有价值的权利,原告可以通过出售许可来利用它。"这种"有价值的权利"就是我们大多数人所说的"财产"。

Judge Learned Hand warned us that “words are chameleons, which reflect the color of their environment.” Dubbing a legal right as “property” does not automatically mean that we have thus solved any and all problems of the shape and scope of that legal right. “Property” is a flexible concept which, like Learned Hand’s chameleon, can take on very different colors in different legal settings. What is and is not “property” can change over time in legal development and take on new and different forms, depending upon context. In an income tax case in which federal rice allotments were dubbed taxable “property,” Judge Goldberg observed that:
法官Learned Hand提醒我们,"语言是变色龙,反映所处环境的颜色。"将一项合法权利称为"财产"并不意味着我们因此解决了该合法权利的任何和所有形式和范围问题。"财产"是一个灵活的概念,就像Learned Hand的变色龙一样,在不同的法律环境中可以呈现不同的颜色。随着法律的发展,什么是"财产"和什么不是"财产"可能会随着时间的推移而改变,并呈现出新的和不同的形式,这取决于具体情况。在联邦大米配额被列为应税"财产"的所得税案件中,戈德堡法官指出:

[W]e must remind ourselves that “property” is an expansionistic term. Its mooring is contemporary rather than historical. The attempt to define “property” is an elusive task …. It is not capable of anatomical or lexicographical definition or proof. It devolves upon the court to fill in the definitional vacuum with the substance of the economics of our time …. Some kinds of property known to the English common law never made the trans-atlantic voyage to our shores. Other kinds have died out over the years, and new forms have taken their place …. “Property” evolves over time. It can be defined as the bundle of rights attached to things conferred by law or custom, or as everything of value which a person owns that is or may be the subject of sale or exchange …. Both of these definitions contemplate the possibility that law or custom may create property rights where none were earlier thought to exist.
我们必须提醒自己,"财产"是一个扩张性的术语。它的定义是当代的,而不是历史的。试图定义"财产"是一项难以捉摸的任务……它无法进行解剖学或词典学的定义或证明。法院需要用我们这个时代的经济学实质来填补定义上的空白……英国普通法所熟知的某些财产从未跨过大西洋来到我们的海岸。其他一些财产多年来已经消亡,取而代之的是新的形式……"财产"随着时间的推移而演变。它可以被定义为法律或习俗赋予的与事物相关的权利的集合,也可以被定义为一个人拥有的所有有价值的东西,这些东西是或可能是出售或交换的对象……这两个定义都考虑了法律或习俗可能会在以前被认为不存在的地方创造产权的可能性。

Judge Goldberg then used the right of publicity as an example of a new form of “property” right:
戈德堡法官随后以公开权为例,说明了一种新的"财产权"形式:

An example of this development can be seen in the “right of publicity.” Once thought to be a personal, non-assignable right emanating from the right of privacy, the “right of publicity” evolved into a legally-protected, transferable interest …. In the “right of publicity” context, the courts have realized that the tag “property” expresses a legal conclusion rather than any independent meaning, … but have nevertheless labeled the right “property.” … An interest labeled “property” normally may possess certain characteristics: it can be transferred to others; it can be devised and inherited; it can be levied upon to satisfy a judgment; it comes under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court in a bankruptcy proceeding; it will be protected against invasion by the courts; it cannot be taken away without due process of law.
这种发展的一个例子可以在"公开权"中看到。 曾经被认为是一种源于隐私权的个人、不可转让的权利,"公开权"演变成一种受法律保护的可转让权益……在"公开权"的背景下,法院已经意识到"财产"一词表达的是一个法律结论,而不是任何独立的含义……但仍然将这种权利标记为"财产"……被标记为"财产"的权益通常可能具有某些特征:它可以转让给他人;它可以被设计和继承;它可以被征收以满足判决;在破产程序中,它属于破产法院的管辖范围;它将受到法院的保护,免受侵犯;未经正当法律程序,不得被剥夺。

”Property” is a compendious term. As the California Supreme Court observed in an early case, “[Property] extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money value.” Faced with such an open-ended concept of “property,” there seems to be little point in debating in the abstract whether the right of publicity is or is not “property.” This is undoubtedly what both Judge Frank and Professor Prosser meant when they warned against “pointless” disputes over the label. Philosophically, they were correct. However, for us mere mortals, such a label is certainly helpful to direct and guide our thinking about the shape and contour of the right of publicity. The fact that the law bestows upon the right of publicity the label “property” has obvious implications as to its ability to be transferred and sued upon by the transferee. In addition, the “property” tag is significant in several other contexts, for example: federal tax laws, marital property law, descendibility at death, choice of law, the statute of limitations, and the measure of damages.
"财产"是一个概括性术语。正如加利福尼亚州最高法院在早期案件中所指出的,"[财产]包括所有能够以货币形式体现的权益。"面对"财产"这样一个开放性的概念,抽象地争论公开权是否属于"财产"似乎没有什么意义。毫无疑问,弗兰克法官和普罗瑟教授正是出于这个原因,才告诫人们不要为这个标签进行"无意义的"争论。从哲学上讲,他们是对的。然而,对于我们这些凡人来说,这样的标签无疑有助于引导我们思考公开权的形态和轮廓。法律赋予公开权"财产"的标签,显然意味着公开权可以转让,也可以被受让人起诉。此外,"财产"标签在其他一些方面也很重要,例如:联邦税法、婚姻财产法、死亡继承、法律选择、诉讼时效和损害赔偿。

As Post observed, the right of publicity recognizes a property right in identity that can be legally separated from the person in a way that privacy rights cannot: “[P]ersonality is commodified and becomes ‘something in the outside world, separate from oneself.’ For this reason, commodified personality can endure long beyond the living self of the individual who creates it and can also be owned and used by persons other than its creator.”
正如Post所言,公开权承认身份的财产权,这种财产权可以合法地与个人身份分离,而隐私权则不能:"[P]ersonality被商品化,成为'外部世界中的某种东西,与自我分离'。因此,商品化的个性可以长期存在,远远超出创造它的个人的生命本身,也可以由创造者以外的人拥有和使用。"

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:9 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:9. Right of publicity is property—Infringement of the right of publicity as the “tort” of “unfair competition”
§ 10:9. 公开权是财产——侵犯公开权属于"不正当竞争"的"侵权行为"

There is no reason why infringement of the “property” inherent in the right of publicity cannot be viewed as a commercial “tort.” The U.S. Supreme Court has used this terminology. Other courts have used the term “tort” or “tortious” to refer to infringement of the right of publicity. The right of publicity “implicates elements of both Tort and Property law.” It all depends upon one’s point of view. If one looks at things from the point of view of plaintiff’s right, the right of publicity is clearly “property” capable of being licensed and of being “trespassed” upon. If one looks at things from the point of view of the defendant’s “wrong,” invasion or infringement of the right of publicity is clearly a “tort.” Even Prosser admitted that there is no really satisfactory overall definition of a “tort.” “Trespass” to “property” rights in both land and chattels is clearly viewed by all as a “tort,” notwithstanding the blurring of the categories of property and tort.
没有理由不将侵犯宣传权中固有的"财产"视为商业"侵权行为"。美国最高法院曾使用过这一术语。其他法院则使用"侵权行为"或"侵权行为"来指代侵犯宣传权的行为。宣传权"涉及侵权法和财产法的要素。"这完全取决于个人的观点。如果从原告权利的角度来看,宣传权显然是能够被许可和被"侵犯"的"财产"。如果从被告"错误"的角度来看,侵犯宣传权显然是"侵权行为"。即使普罗瑟也承认,对于"侵权行为"并没有一个真正令人满意的整体定义。尽管财产和侵权行为的类别有blurring,但侵犯土地和动产中的"财产"权利显然被所有人视为"侵权行为"。

Since infringement of the right of publicity is properly called a commercial “tort,” it is not inappropriate to also call it a form of “unfair competition.” Courts and commentators agree. The term “unfair competition” is certainly broad enough to include infringement of the right of publicity.
由于侵犯公开权的行为被恰如其分地称为商业"侵权行为",因此将其称为"不正当竞争"也不为过。法院和评论家们都同意这种说法。毫无疑问,"不正当竞争"一词的含义非常广泛,足以涵盖侵犯公开权的行为。

The notion of a right being intellectual “property” and its infringement a “tort” is not unusual. For example, a trademark can be viewed as “property” and its infringement as a commercial “tort.” In fact, the similarities between trademarks and the right of publicity have led some courts and commentators to make a direct analogy.
知识产权是正当的"财产",侵犯知识产权属于"侵权行为",这种观点并不罕见。例如,商标可以被视为"财产",侵犯商标权属于商业"侵权行为"。事实上,由于商标与公开权之间存在相似之处,一些法院和评论家直接进行了类比。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:10 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:10. Assignment of the right of publicity—Introduction
§ 10:10. 公开权的转让——引言

Synopsis:

An outright assignment of the right of publicity conveys all rights to the assignee. The courts have upheld the assignability of the right of publicity and have permitted it to be “in gross”: apart from any business or service provided by the assignee. That is, the “anti-assignment-in-gross” rule of trademark law is not applicable to assignments of the right of publicity.
公开权转让将所有权利转让给受让人。法院支持公开权的可转让性,并允许其"整体转让":即除受让人提供的任何业务或服务外。也就是说,商标法的"禁止整体转让"规则不适用于公开权的转让。

Unlike a license, an “assignment” of rights implies the sale of all legal and equitable title to the assignee. While a mere license is permission to use, “it is quite a different matter to relinquish all ownership in one’s name ….” All of the assignor’s rights in the property sold pass to the assignee, who then “stands in the shoes” of the assignor. The consideration that passes to the assignor can take many forms, from a continuing royalty to a single, up-front lump sum.
与许可不同,"转让"权利意味着向受让人出售所有合法和公平的所有权。虽然单纯的许可只是允许使用,但"放弃以自己名义拥有的所有权……则是完全不同的事情……"转让人在所售财产中的所有权利都将转移给受让人,后者将"取代"转让人的位置。转让给转让人的对价可以采取多种形式,从持续性的特许权使用费到一次性预付的单一费用。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:11 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:11. Rules of trademark assignments

The Trademark “Assignment in Gross” Rule. Prior to development of the right of publicity, the right to use a person’s identity in advertising could not be sold outright except insofar as that identity had achieved trademark significance and the transfer complied with the special rules of trademark assignment. For a trademark assignment to be valid, the transfer of the mark must be accompanied by the “good will” symbolized by the mark. This is known as the “antiassignment-in-gross” rule. An assignment of a trademark symbol alone, divorced from the good will it symbolizes, is known as an “assignment in gross.” The antiassignment-in-gross rule is founded upon the assumption that if a mark is assigned without associated good will, the assignee may use the mark on goods or services not having any continuity with or similarity to those sold by the assignor under the mark. The situation sought to be prevented by the rule is customer deception resulting from abrupt and radical changes in the nature and quality of the goods or services after assignment of the mark. The principle is that a mark should symbolize an equal quality level of goods on a temporal scale. Customers expect the general nature and quality of goods and services sold under the mark to remain relatively stable, no matter who has bought and sold the mark. That customers might soon perceive a post-assignment change in the nature and quality of the goods “fails to give the consumer the protection it initially deserves.”
"整体转让"商标规则。在公开权发展之前,除非某人的身份已经具有商标意义,且转让符合商标转让的特殊规则,否则在广告中使用该身份的权利不能被完全出售。为了使商标转让有效,商标转让必须附带商标所代表的"good will"符号。这被称为"禁止整体转让"规则。仅转让商标符号,而不转让其所代表的"good will"符号,被称为"整体转让"。禁止整体转让规则基于以下假设:如果转让商标时没有附带相关的"good will"符号,则受让人可以在与转让人所售商品或服务没有任何连续性或相似性的商品或服务上使用该商标。该规则旨在防止因商标转让后商品或服务的性质和质量发生突然而剧烈的变化而欺骗消费者。其原则是,商标应代表一段时间内商品质量的同等水平。无论商标的买卖方是谁,消费者都希望该商标所售商品和服务的总体性质和质量保持相对稳定。如果消费者很快发现转让后商品性质和质量发生了变化,则"无法为消费者提供最初应有的保护"。

Tangible Assets as a Surrogate for “Good Will.” Since “good will” itself is an intangible, evasive concept, some courts will use the assignor’s tangible assets as a surrogate for “good will.” However, the ultimate focus in applying the antiassignment-in-gross rule is upon protecting customers’ legitimate expectations of continuity, not on searching for a “stereo-typed set of formalities.” The assignment is valid where the trademark assignee receives sufficient assets to “go on in real continuity with the past.” And even if the assignee receives no tangible assets, the transaction may still be valid if continuity of the nature and quality of the goods sold is preserved.
有形资产作为"Good Will"的替代物。由于"good will"本身是一个无形、难以捉摸的概念,一些法院将转让人的有形资产作为"good will"的替代物。然而,适用禁止整体转让规则的最终目的是保护客户对连续性的合理期望,而不是寻找"一套刻板的程序"。如果商标受让人获得了足够的资产,能够"与过去保持真正的连续性",则转让有效。即使受让人没有获得任何有形资产,如果所售商品的性质和质量保持连续性,交易仍然有效。

Assignment of a Service Mark. An assignment of a service mark presents a somewhat different situation. Looking to physical assets as a tangible manifestation of “good will” seems misplaced when one is concerned with continuity of services. In such cases emphasis is placed upon the actual marketplace continuity of the nature and quality of services when the mark is in the hands of the assignee. Emphasis is upon the substance of the use, not upon the ceremony of the transaction.
服务商标的转让。服务商标的转让涉及的情况有所不同。当人们关注服务的连续性时,将实物资产视为"good will"的有形表现似乎有些不当。在这种情况下,当商标在受让人手中时,重点在于服务性质和质量在市场上的实际连续性。重点在于使用的实质,而不是交易的仪式。

Assignment of Personal Name Service Mark Symbolizing Personal Skill. While a person can possess valid service mark rights identifying that person’sown personal services, it may be that that person cannot validly assign, as opposed to license, those service mark rights to another. The difficulty is that the “good will” symbolized by the mark may be personal to the services of that one person. Since the personal services cannot be “sold” in perpetuity, the transfer may be an invalid assignment-in-gross. Some cases have found that in such situations, good will is personal where business reputation and skill depend largely upon qualifications and talents personal to an individual or group of individuals. Examples sometimes given include the name of an artist, a musician, a physician or an attorney. In such cases, a mark signifying personal services and the good will symbolized by the mark may be incapable of being validly assigned outright to another. Similarly, the possibility exists that the name and service mark of a performing group is sometimes personal to the performers who make up the group.
个人姓名服务标记的分配象征着个人技能。虽然一个人可以拥有有效的服务标记权利来识别其个人服务,但这个人可能无法有效地将这些服务标记权利转让给他人,而不是许可。困难在于,标记所象征的"good will"可能只属于该个人的服务。由于个人服务不能永久"出售",因此转让可能属于无效的整体转让。在某些情况下,good will属于个人,因为商业声誉和技能在很大程度上取决于个人或团体的资质和才能。有时给出的例子包括艺术家、音乐家、医生或律师的名字。在这种情况下,表示个人服务的标记和标记所象征的good will可能无法有效地直接转让给他人。同样,表演团体的名称和服务标记有时可能属于组成该团体的表演者个人。

While one can assign a personal name as a symbol of a company (trade name) or of a source of goods (trademark), one cannot sell off one’s personal name as a symbol of personal skill to a buyer with which the “seller” is not associated. The buyer would use the name falsely if it represented itself as having an assignor’s personal skill when it did not. Thus, it has been held that unless a contract provides otherwise, a person is not precluded after the sale of personal name trademark or of a trade name from taking advantage of his individual name as indicating personal reputation, vis-a-vis the reputation of the business that bore his name.
虽然人们可以将个人名字作为公司(商号)或商品来源(商标)的象征,但不能将个人名字作为个人技能的象征出售给与"卖方"无关的买方。如果买方谎称自己拥有转让人的个人技能,而实际上并非如此,则属于虚假使用。因此,除非合同另有规定,否则个人在出售个人名字商标或商号后,仍可利用其个人名字来表明个人声誉,而不是以其名字命名的企业的声誉。

Sale of a Business Identified by a Personal Name Mark. When a business and good will are sold to another, the trademarks and trade name of the business pass to the buyer, even though they may consist of the personal name of the assignor. If a person sells a business identified by his or her personal name, the name is an asset which has been sold, and the seller cannot keep use of the name and keep the purchase price too. In such a case, the seller can use his own name to identify himself as a person, but he has sold the right to use the name as a commercial symbol—a trademark. If plaintiff has used his personal name in business as a mark and sold his business, good will and mark to the defendant, then plaintiff can have no privacy or publicity claim against the defendant buyer.
出售以个人名字为标志的企业。当企业和good will出售给他人时,企业的商标和商号也会随之转移给买方,即使它们可能包含转让人的个人名字。如果某人出售以他或她的个人名字为标志的企业,那么名字就是已出售的资产,卖方不能继续使用该名字,也不能保留购买价格。在这种情况下,卖方可以使用自己的名字来表明自己的身份,但他已经出售了将名字用作商业符号——商标——的权利。如果原告将他的个人名字作为商标用于商业,并将他的企业、good will和商标出售给被告,那么原告不能claim针对被告买方享有隐私权或公开权。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:12 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:12. Sale of name prior to acceptance of the right of publicity
§ 10:12. 在接受公开权之前出售姓名

Prior to judicial acceptance of the right of publicity, some courts held that a person could not assign or exclusively license his or her name for commercial use unless the name had been used as a trademark and the transfer included “good will.” For example, the name of a baseball player was said to be “not vendible in gross” because “fame is not merchandise.” The difficulty with this view is that the right of publicity, which is an inherent property right of every person, is not analogous to a trademark or service mark in this respect. A trademark or service mark is merely a symbol of the good will value of an ongoing business. The right of publicity concerns identification of the “persona” of a single human being.
在司法部门承认公开权之前,一些法院认为,除非名字已被用作商标,且转让包括"good will",否则个人不得将其姓名转让或独家授权用于商业用途。例如,据说棒球运动员的名字"不能整体出售",因为"名声不是商品"。这种观点的难点在于,公开权是每个人与生俱来的财产权,在这方面与商标或服务商标并不相似。商标或服务商标只是正在运营的企业good will价值的象征。公开权涉及的是对单个"人"的识别。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:13 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:13. Assignment of the right of publicity

Right of Publicity Can be Assigned “In Gross.” In the seminal Haelan case, Judge Jerome Frank distinguished between the transfer rules or trademark and those of the right of publicity. He specifically linked the right of publicity to the ability of a person to “grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture” and said that “such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross’, i.e. without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.”
公开权可以"整体"转让。在著名的Haelan案中,法官Jerome Frank区分了商标转让规则和公开权转让规则。他特别将公开权与个人"授予他人独家发布其照片的权利"联系起来,并指出"这种授予可以'整体'进行,即无需附带转让业务或其他任何东西。"

Since the right of publicity grants rights in the publicity value inherent in the identity of a human being, it should not be required to be linked to the “good will” of a business, as is required of a trademark.
由于公开权授予的是人类身份固有的宣传价值,因此不应像商标那样要求与企业的"good will"相关联。

In his ground breaking 1954 article, Professor Nimmer argued that the property rights in a right of publicity must be assignable in gross:
尼默教授在1954年发表的一篇开创性文章中认为,公开权中的财产权必须整体转让:

The pecuniary worth of publicity values will be greatly diminished if not totally destroyed if these values cannot be effectively sold. Yet, under the theory of unfair competition, an assignee cannot acquire the right to use a name except as an incident to his purchase of the business and good will in connection with which the name has been used. Therefore, if the potential purchaser of publicity values must rely upon the law of unfair competition to protect his investment, he will be unwilling to purchase publicity values unconnected with a business. This in effect means that the sale of publicity values will usually be effectively blocked, since the potential seller of publicity values generally has established such value not in connection with his own business but rather through the rendering of personal services for another; he will therefore be unable to sell the business in connection with which his name has achieved fame.
如果这些价值不能有效地出售,那么宣传价值的金钱价值将大大降低,甚至完全丧失。然而,根据不正当竞争理论,受让人不能获得使用名称的权利,除非作为其购买业务和good will与该名称相关的附带条件。因此,如果宣传价值的潜在购买者必须依靠不正当竞争法来保护其投资,他将不愿意购买与业务无关的宣传价值。这实际上意味着宣传价值的销售通常会受到有效阻止,因为宣传价值的潜在卖方通常不是通过自己的业务而是通过为他人提供个人服务来建立这种价值;因此,他将无法出售与他的名字取得名声的业务。

The rule of free assignability in gross of the right of publicity has never been seriously questioned by the courts, which have either implicitly or explicitly accepted the rule. The statutes of three states recognize assignability of the right of publicity. The Supreme Court of Georgia stated that: “The right of publicity is assignable during the life of the celebrity, for without this characteristic, full commercial exploitation of one’s name and likeness is practically impossible …. That is, without assignability the right of publicity could hardly be called a ‘right.’ “ The California Court of Appeals held that there is no doubt that both the common law and statutory California right of publicity of a living person may be assigned to another.
法院从未对公开权可自由转让的规则提出过严重质疑,而是以暗示或明示的方式接受了这一规则。三个州的法规承认公开权的可转让性。佐治亚州最高法院指出:"公开权在名人有生之年是可转让的,因为如果没有这一特性,对一个人的名字和肖像进行完全商业化的exploitation利用几乎是不可能的……也就是说,如果没有可转让性,公开权就很难被称为'权利'。"加利福尼亚上诉法院认为,毫无疑问,无论是普通法还是加利福尼亚州的成文法,在世者的公开权都可以转让给他人。

The Restatement agrees that the right of publicity can be assigned in gross without any accompanying business or good will.
《重述》同意,宣传权可以整体转让,无需附带任何业务或good will。

A party asserting rights as an assignee must, of course, allege in the complaint that an assignment was actually made. Courts have found that a simple assertion of the fact of assignment without more is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss based on a claim of lack of standing. However, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff will be obliged to provide more specific evidence, most typically a written agreement or, at the least, affidavits of those who can testify to an agreement, in order to avoid an adverse outcome.
作为受让人的当事人当然必须在complaint中主张实际进行了转让。法院认为,仅主张转让事实而不做进一步说明,足以应对基于claim提出的缺乏诉讼地位的驳回动议。然而,为了应对简易判决动议,原告必须提供更具体的证据,最典型的是书面协议,或者至少是能够证明协议存在的宣誓书,以避免不利结果。

Limited Assignment of the Right of Publicity. The right of publicity need not be assigned for any and all uses. It may be assigned limited to certain defined uses, such as use of identity in a specific photograph. For example, a model consent agreement may not only consent to use, but may also specifically assign the model’s right of publicity inherent in the use of a specific photo or photos. This makes it clear that the assignee has the power to enforce the right of publicity of the model in a commercial use of that image.
有限公开权转让。公开权无需为任何用途进行转让。公开权可仅限于某些特定用途,例如在特定照片中使用身份。例如,模特同意协议可能不仅同意使用,还可能明确转让模特在特定照片使用中固有的公开权。这表明受让人有权在商业使用该图像时执行模特的公开权。

Oral Assignment of the Right of Publicity. As with all legal agreements simple prudence suggests that assignments of the right of publicity should be evidenced by a writing. Nonetheless, there is some sparse authority that an oral assignment of the right of publicity can be valid. In one illustrative case, after the death of artist and television host Bob Ross a dispute arose over ownership of his publicity rights between a corporation he had formed during his lifetime (called BRI) and a competing entity formed by his son, who claimed the rights as his heir and through a trust that the elder Ross had created. Evidence showed that Ross had orally assigned the relevant rights to BRI before the creation of the trust. A written agreement confirming that assignment was prepared but never signed by Ross. The court observed that
口头转让公开权。与所有法律协议一样,出于谨慎考虑,公开权的转让应以书面形式证明。然而,也有少数权威机构认为口头转让公开权是有效的。在一个典型案例中,艺术家兼电视节目主持人鲍勃·罗斯(Bob Ross)去世后,他生前成立的公司(名为BRI)与他的儿子成立的竞争实体之间就公开权的所有权问题产生了争议。罗斯的儿子声称自己是罗斯的继承人,并通过罗斯创建的信托基金获得了公开权。证据表明,罗斯在信托基金创建之前就已经口头将相关权利转让给了BRI。罗斯曾准备了一份书面协议来确认该转让,但从未签字。法院认为

While there is no formal written agreement assigning [the publicity rights] to BRI, there is ample evidence in the record supporting that the unsigned written agreement would have merely formalized Bob Ross’s oral grant of … [his] right of publicity to BRI. Bob Ross formed BRI … to commercially promote his name and likeness. In a memorandum, Bob Ross described his name and likeness as being the best thing “we” – BRI – owned. And throughout his lifetime, Bob Ross acted as though and consented to documents stating that BRI held exclusive rights to his name, image and likeness. … [B]ecause Bob Ross gave BRI his right to publicity during his lifetime, it could not have transferred to his son on his death.
虽然没有正式的书面协议将[宣传权]授予BRI,但有充分的证据表明,未签署的书面协议只是将鲍勃·罗斯口头授予……[他的]宣传权正式化。鲍勃·罗斯成立了BRI……以商业推广他的名字和肖像。鲍勃·罗斯在一份备忘录中称,他的名字和肖像是"我们"——BRI——拥有的最宝贵的财富。在他的一生中,鲍勃·罗斯的行为表明并同意文件中的说法,即BRI拥有他的名字、形象和肖像的独家使用权。……由于鲍勃·罗斯生前将宣传权授予了BRI,因此在他去世后,宣传权不能转移给他的儿子。

In reaching this result the court relied on the language in the Florida publicity statute that provides: “No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such use given by: (a) Such person ….”
法院在得出这一结果时依据的是佛罗里达州宣传法规中的规定:"未经以下人员以书面或口头形式明确同意,任何人不得出于商业目的或任何商业或广告目的发布、印刷、展示或以其他方式公开使用任何自然人的姓名、肖像、照片或其他肖像:(a)该人……"

In your authors’ view this seems to be an overbroad reading of the statutory language. The word “consent” in the quoted statutory excerpt would normally suggest the grant of permission to use without a transfer of underlying ownership. It is certainly the case that orally granting your neighbor consent to use your lawn mower does not transfer ownership of the mower to the neighbor. Perhaps a more apt analogy is to note that the Statute of Frauds requires a transfer of ownership in land to be in writing, but that venerable statute does not preclude one from giving someone oral consent to use their home for a week while they are away in return for a payment of an agreed upon rent.
在作者看来,这似乎是对法定语言的过度解读。在引用的法定摘录中,"同意"一词通常表示在不转让基本所有权的情况下授予使用许可。口头同意邻居使用你的割草机,当然不会将割草机的所有权转让给邻居。也许一个更恰当的类比是,《反欺诈法》要求以书面形式转让土地所有权,但该法并不禁止人们口头同意他人在自己外出期间使用自己的房屋一周,以换取约定的租金。

Whatever the merits of the decision in the Bob Ross case on the facts presented, there seems scant support for the general proposition that an oral transfer of publicity rights is authorized by Florida law. Moreover a different provision of the Florida law strongly suggests that assignments must be in writing. It is our sense that much confusion would be avoided if courts mandated a written agreement in all instances where a party claims to own another person’s publicity rights as an assignee, absent unequivocal statutory language permitting oral assignments.
无论鲍勃·罗斯案中基于所陈述事实的判决有何优点,但佛罗里达州法律授权口头转让宣传权的普遍主张似乎缺乏支持。此外,佛罗里达州法律的另一条规定强烈暗示转让必须以书面形式进行。我们认为,如果法院规定,在当事人作为受让人拥有他人的宣传权的所有情况下,必须签订书面协议,那么confusion 许多问题都可以避免,除非有明确的法律条文允许口头转让。

Consideration. Other general rules of contract formation also apply to assignments of publicity rights. Thus, assignments procured by duress, or which are unconscionable can clearly be set aside by a court, just as is true for any other contract. Similarly, the assignment must be supported by consideration, unless the separate requirements for a gift can be established, including donative intent.
对价。其他合同订立的一般规则也适用于宣传权的转让。因此,法院可以明确撤销通过胁迫或不合理手段获得的转让,就像撤销其他任何合同一样。同样,转让必须得到对价的支撑,除非可以证明存在单独的赠与要求,包括捐赠意图。

Retroactive Assignment of the Right of Publicity. In some cases, a party believing itself to be the owner of another individual’s publicity rights may file suit alleging infringement of those rights, only to discover that no prior assignment agreement exists. It may then seek to have the individual in question execute a retroactive (or “nunc pro tunc”) assignment of the publicity rights. The problem with this strategy is that in order to have standing to litigate in federal courts, the plaintiff must own the rights in question at the time the complaint was filed. Thus, as one district court in Florida explained, “a nunc pro tunc assignment does not confer standing if executed after the complaint’s filing.” Moreover, this problem cannot be cured by filing an amended complaint.
追溯性公开权转让。在某些情况下,一方认为自己拥有另一方的公开权,并起诉对方侵犯其权利,却发现之前并未签订转让协议。此时,该方可能要求对方执行追溯性(或"nunc pro tunc")公开权转让。这种策略的问题在于,为了在联邦法院提起诉讼,原告必须在提起诉讼时拥有相关权利。因此,正如佛罗里达州一家地区法院所解释的那样,"如果追溯性转让是在提起诉讼后执行的,则不能赋予原告诉讼资格。"此外,这一问题无法通过提交修订后的诉讼来解决。

By way of contrast, if the assignment was signed before the suit was commenced, there will be no standing problem regardless of the fact that the assignment contains language backdating its effective date.
相比之下,如果转让协议是在诉讼开始之前签署的,那么无论转让协议中是否包含追溯生效日期的条款,都不会存在时效问题。

A dismissal for lack of standing is without prejudice because it is a matter of jurisdiction and not a ruling on the merits. Consequently a party that relies on a tardy nunc pro tunc assignment can simply dismiss its original complaint and refile the suit, assuming that it is not barred by the statute of limitations at that later point in time.
因缺乏依据而驳回诉讼不会造成损害,因为这是jurisdiction的问题,而不是对案情的裁决。因此,如果一方当事人依赖一项迟延的追溯转让,则可以简单地撤销其最初的complaint,并重新提起诉讼,前提是诉讼在较晚的时间点不受诉讼时效的限制。

Distinguishing Assignments of Trademarks from Assignments of Publicity Rights and the Problem of Contractual Ambiguity. An individual may use his or her own name as either the trade name of a business or as the trademark for a line or brand of goods. If such a person sells the business along with the associated goodwill and trademarks, the purchaser may claim that the seller has also conveyed all of his or her publicity rights, especially if the seller engages in activities that compete with those of the buyer.
区分商标转让和宣传权转让以及合同模糊问题。个人可以将自己的名字用作企业的商标或商品系列或品牌的商标。如果此人将企业连同相关的goodwill和商标一起出售,购买者可以claim,卖方也转让了所有的宣传权,特别是如果卖方从事的活动与购买者的活动存在竞争。

Whether such a claim is viable depends, of course, on the contractual language. Courts tend to disfavor the inference that a party has given up all rights to use their own name. Thus transfer of the entire right of publicity is usually not found unless the contract is unambiguous on that point.
当然,claim是否可行取决于合同条款。法院倾向于不支持一方放弃使用自己名字的所有权利的推断。因此,除非合同对此有明确规定,否则通常不会认定全部公开权已转让。

Two conflicting decisions involving the same transaction illustrate the perils of imprecise drafting. Joe Traeger invented the wood pellet grill in the 1980’s. In 2006 he sold the business, its assets and all its “intellectual property” to a Florida firm that took the name Traeger Grills (TG). In 2019 Mr. Traeger began appearing in advertisements for one of TG’s competitor’s, a firm called Dansons. Those advertisements featured the Traeger name and suggested that Dansons had used Joe Traeger’s expertise to develop its newest grill. TG commenced a suit against Joe Traeger and other Traeger family members in Florida and a parallel suit against Dansons in Arizona. It moved for a preliminary injunction in both cases.
同一笔交易中两个相互矛盾的决定说明了不精确起草的弊端。乔·特雷格(Joe Traeger)在20世纪80年代发明了木屑颗粒烧烤炉。2006年,他将公司、资产和所有"知识产权"出售给了一家佛罗里达公司,该公司取名为特雷格烧烤炉(Traeger Grills,简称TG)。2019年,特雷格先生开始出现在TG竞争对手的广告中,这家竞争对手是一家名为Dansons的公司。这些广告使用了特雷格的名字,暗示Dansons利用了乔·特雷格的专业知识来开发其最新的烧烤炉。TG在佛罗里达对乔·特雷格和其他特雷格家族成员提起了诉讼,并在亚利桑那州对Dansons提起了平行诉讼。它在这两起案件中均申请了初步injunction。

The Florida court found that the contract transferring intellectual property rights was sufficiently ambiguous that TG could not show a likelihood of success on the merits, and refused to preliminarily enjoin Mr. Traeger. However the Arizona court, writing just one month later, and not citing the Florida case, found that the language in the agreement referring to a transfer of “personal goodwill” made it clear that TG owned the publicity rights and that TG thus had shown likely success on the merits. That court thus entered a preliminary injunction against Dansons.
佛罗里达法院认为,转让知识产权的合同存在足够多的模糊之处,TG无法证明胜诉的可能性,因此拒绝初步禁止Traeger先生。然而,一个月后,亚利桑那法院在未引用佛罗里达案例的情况下,认为协议中提及"个人goodwill"转让的措辞表明TG拥有宣传权,因此TG已证明胜诉的可能性。因此,该法院对Dansons下达了初步injunction禁令。

The curious result is that, for the time being, Joe Traeger can use his name to promote pellet grills, either of his own manufacture or for those of any other firm, except for Dansons, who is enjoined from making any reference to Traeger. Obviously, much expense and uncertainty could have been avoided had the agreement made specific reference to the right of publicity and spelled out the scope of any residual rights remaining with Mr. Traeger.
有趣的是,目前乔·特雷格可以用自己的名字来推广颗粒烧烤炉,无论是自己生产的还是其他公司的,但丹森公司除外,因为协议禁止丹森公司提及特雷格。显然,如果协议明确提及宣传权并阐明特雷格先生保留的剩余权利范围,就可以避免很多费用和不确定性。

In addition to a securing an assignment of the right of publicity giving the purchaser the exclusive right to use the seller’s persona, the purchaser may also attempt to limit the seller’s competitive activities via a non-competition clause. Such clauses must be crafted carefully because courts are skeptical about overbroad restrictions, but their inclusion in a contract for the sale of a business may serve to fortify the claim that the intent of the agreement was to transfer all publicity rights.
除了确保授予买方使用卖方形象的专有权的公开权转让之外,买方还可以尝试通过非竞争条款限制卖方的竞争活动。此类条款必须精心设计,因为法院对过于宽泛的限制持怀疑态度,但将其纳入企业出售合同中,可以强化claim,即协议的目的是转让所有公开权。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:14 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

I. Transfer of Publicity and Privacy Rights

B. Transfer of Publicity Rights

§ 10:14. Authors’ comment on assignment of the right of publicity
§ 10:14。作者对公开权分配的评论

Separating the Right of Publicity from the Person. It seems strange to permit a person to sell outright by assignment all rights to the commercial use of one’s identity and persona. In some cases, there may be reasons for such an outright transfer. A celebrity may wish to transfer all publicity rights to a corporation or trust for income tax or estate planning reasons. Or an aging celebrity may wish to grant all such rights to a spouse or offspring to ensure that the rights immediately pass and are not entangled in probate of the estate. Thus, famous animal trainer Clyde Beatty, one month before his death, assigned all rights in his circus, including his right of publicity, to his wife.
将公开权与个人身份分开。允许个人通过转让出售其身份和人格的商业使用权的全部权利似乎有些奇怪。在某些情况下,这种直接转让可能是有原因的。出于所得税或遗产规划的原因,名人可能希望将所有公开权转让给公司或信托机构。或者,年迈的名人可能希望将所有此类权利授予配偶或后代,以确保这些权利立即转移,而不会与遗产遗嘱纠缠在一起。因此,著名的动物训练师克莱德·比蒂(Clyde Beatty)在去世前一个月,将马戏团的所有权利(包括公开权)转让给了他的妻子。

A celebrity may wish to assign to a separate corporation the merchandising part of his or her personal business. During his lifetime, Elvis Presley assigned his right of publicity to Boxcar Enterprises, a corporation controlled by Colonel Tom Parker. Presley owned a 22% share of the corporation. Boxcar then licensed companies to use the Presley identity. The four Beatles formed a British company, Apple Corps Ltd., with the right to exploit all of the performances by the Beatles as a group, with the company equally owned by the four Beatles. All four members of the Beatles assigned to Apple Corps Ltd. their rights of publicity in their names and likenesses, such that Apple Corps Ltd. is the proper party to assert an infringement of those rights.
名人可能希望将个人商业中的商品销售部分分配给单独的公司。猫王埃尔维斯·普雷斯利生前将其宣传权分配给了由汤姆·帕克上校控制的Boxcar Enterprises公司。普雷斯利拥有该公司22%的股份。Boxcar随后授权其他公司使用普雷斯利身份。披头士乐队四人成立了一家英国公司Apple Corps Ltd.,有权利用披头士乐队作为团体的所有表演,该公司由披头士乐队四人平均拥有。披头士乐队所有四名成员将其姓名和肖像的宣传权分配给了Apple Corps Ltd.,因此Apple Corps Ltd.是主张这些权利受到侵犯的适当一方。

Retaining an Interest in the Right of Publicity. It is assumed that in most cases of outright assignments of a right of publicity, the assignor will retain some legal or equitable interest in the activities of the assignee. The assignee may be a company wholly or partially owned by the assignor and the assignor may receive payment in the form of continuing royalties from licenses granted by the assignee. The assignor has an obvious personal and commercial self-interest in some degree of continuing scrutiny over the activities of the assignee. And even if no control is retained, if the assignee is a spouse or trusted associate, the assignor in effect creates a trust relationship which should be honored by the courts. In all these kinds of variations, the person has not lost control over his or her own identity.
保留对公开权的兴趣。在大多数公开权直接转让的情况下,转让人通常会在受让人的活动中保留一些法定或衡平法权益。受让人可能是转让人全资或部分拥有的公司,而转让人则可以从受让人授予的许可中获得持续版税形式的报酬。转让人对受让人的活动进行一定程度的持续审查,这显然符合其个人和商业利益。即使转让人不保留控制权,如果受让人是配偶或值得信赖的合伙人,转让人实际上也建立了信托关系,法院应予以认可。在所有这些变化中,当事人并未失去对自己身份的控制权。

Forced or Inequitable Assignments. If a person under financial pressures assigns outright for an up-front lump sum all his rights of publicity, such traditional legal and equitable doctrines as fraud, mistake, undue influence, duress or changed circumstances exist to guard against an unfair or inequitable transfer. The courts have long experience in preventing, unwinding, or modifying pressured transfers of property.
强制或不公平的转让。如果一个人在财务压力下直接转让其全部公开权利,则欺诈、错误、不当影响、胁迫或情况变化等传统法律和公平原则可以防止不公平或不公平的转让。法院在防止、撤销或修改强制财产转让方面拥有长期经验。

The Rothman Proposal. Professor Jennifer E. Rothman has criticized the view that the right of publicity is and should be freely assignable. She argues that separating the “publicity-holder” from the “identity-holder” is unwise and unacceptable for a number of legal and policy reasons.
罗斯曼提案。詹妮弗·E·罗斯曼教授对"公开权可以且应该自由转让"的观点提出了批评。她认为,出于法律和政策方面的原因,将"公开权持有者"与"身份权持有者"分开是不明智且不可接受的。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:15 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

A. Types of Licenses

§ 10:15. Licenses of the rights of publicity and privacy
§ 10:15. 公开权和隐私权许可

Synopsis:

While an “assignment” is an outright sale of right and title in the right of publicity, a “license” is a limited permission to use. In an “exclusive license,” the licensor promises not to grant further licenses within the scope of exclusivity. The authors opine that the “quality control” requirement of trademark licenses is not applicable to publicity licenses. While a waiver or permission relating to privacy rights is usually dubbed a “consent,” it is helpful to view it as a form of “license.”
"转让"是指公开权中权利和所有权的彻底出售,而"许可"则是有限的使用许可。在"排他性许可"中,许可人承诺不在排他性范围内授予进一步许可。作者认为,商标许可中的"质量控制"要求不适用于公开许可。虽然与隐私权相关的弃权或许可通常被称为"同意",但将其视为"许可"的一种形式是有帮助的。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:16 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

A. Types of Licenses

§ 10:16. Licenses of the rights of publicity and privacy—Assignments, exclusive licenses, and nonexclusive licenses compared
§ 10:16. 公开权和隐私权的许可——转让、排他性许可和非排他性许可的比较

The following sections compare assignments with licenses, exclusive and nonexclusive.
以下部分将任务与许可、排他性和非排他性进行了比较。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:17 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

A. Types of Licenses

§ 10:17. Assignments compared to licenses

While an “assignment” denotes the sale of legal and equitable title, a “license” is only a permission to use within a defined time, context, market line or territory. Whereas an “assignment” conveys title, in a license, title remains with the licensor. Any increase in the publicity value of the licensor’s persona created by the licensed use inures to the legal benefit of the licensor, not the licensee. A useful analogy is to the rental of real estate, where the tenant does not acquire ownership interests, no matter how long the tenancy. However, if the license is exclusive, the licensee has the ability to bring suit to prevent the “trespass” by third parties on the licensee’s area of exclusivity.
"转让"表示合法且公平的所有权转让,而"许可"仅表示在规定的时间、背景、市场或地区内使用。在"转让"中,所有权转移,而在"许可"中,所有权仍归许可方所有。许可方因被许可方使用其商标而获得的任何宣传价值增长,均归许可方而非被许可方所有。一个有用的类比是房地产租赁,无论租期多长,租户都不会获得所有权。然而,如果许可是排他性的,被许可方有权提起诉讼,阻止第三方进入被许可方的排他区域。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:18 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

A. Types of Licenses

§ 10:18. Nonexclusive licenses

A “nonexclusive license” is merely permission to use the licensor’s identity within the area and scope defined by the license. The licensor makes no promise, express or implied, not to license other parties within that same area and scope. For example, person Alpha may nonexclusively license company Gamma to use Alpha’s picture in advertisements for automobiles. Such a license does not preclude Alpha from also licensing company Zeta to use Alpha’s name in a promotional campaign for its Zeta brand automobiles. While the Alpha-Zeta license may be unwise as negatively impacting upon Alpha’s credibility and reputation, there is no legal constraint. The holder of a nonexclusive license has no standing to sue on its own those unlicensed third parties who use Alpha’s persona in the market of the license.
"非排他性许可"仅允许在许可方指定的区域和范围内使用许可方的身份。许可方并未做出任何明示或暗示的承诺,即不会在同一区域和范围内许可其他方使用其身份。例如,Alpha个人可以非排他性许可Gamma公司在汽车广告中使用Alpha的图片。该许可并不妨碍Alpha同时许可Zeta公司在其Zeta品牌汽车的促销活动中使用Alpha的名字。虽然Alpha-Zeta许可可能会对Alpha的信誉和声誉产生负面影响,但并不明智,且不受法律约束。非排他性许可的持有人无权起诉未经许可的第三方在许可的市场中使用Alpha的身份。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:19 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

A. Types of Licenses

§ 10:19. Exclusive licenses

An “exclusive license” is a license with a defined scope which contains an explicit or implicit promise by the licensor that it will not license others within the scope of the license. The licensee’s rights of use are “exclusive” within the time, context of use, product line and territory defined in the license. The licensor’s obligation is not to do anything, such as the granting of other licenses, which will impinge upon the exclusive licensee’s use within the scope of its license. An exclusive licensee has standing to sue for infringements of third parties which impinge upon the rights defined in the scope of its license.
"排他性许可"是指许可方明确或隐含承诺不会向许可范围内其他人发放许可的限定范围的许可。在许可中规定的时间、使用环境、产品线及地域范围内,被许可方拥有"排他性"使用权。许可方的义务是不做任何事情,例如发放其他许可,以免影响排他性被许可方在其许可范围内的使用。排他性被许可方有权起诉侵犯其许可范围内权利的第三方。

Even if a license of only privacy rights is viewed as no more than a release of liability, it can be exclusive, since a person could promise not to give similar “releases” to others.
即使仅涉及隐私权的许可被视为免责条款,它也可以是排他性的,因为一个人可以承诺不对他人做出类似的"免责"。

An “exclusive” license does not necessarily mean that this is the one and only license granted by the licensor. A license of the right of publicity may be “exclusive” as to any defined scope such as product line, context of use, territory or time duration. There would appear to be no limit on how narrowly the scope of exclusivity is defined. This means that when several narrowly defined “exclusive” licenses are granted, at some point the distinction between “exclusive” and “nonexclusive” begins to blur. Many ordinarily “nonexclusive” licenses are capable of being drafted in terms of “exclusivity,” if narrowly enough defined so as not to overlap the rights of other licensees.
"排他性"许可并不一定意味着这是许可方授予的唯一许可。在产品线、使用环境、地域或时间期限等任何限定范围内,公开权许可可能是"排他性的"。排他性范围的界定似乎没有限制。这意味着,当授予多个狭义的"排他性"许可时,"排他性"和"非排他性"之间的区别开始变得模糊。许多通常的"非排他性"许可可以按照"排他性"来起草,前提是定义足够狭义,不会与其他被许可人的权利重叠。

If the licensor Alpha, after having granted an exclusive license to Gamma for use in advertising automobiles, thereafter grants another license to competitor Zeta for use in advertising automobiles, the license to Zeta may be void because Alpha had no rights left to license to Zeta:
如果许可方Alpha在授予Gamma独家许可用于汽车广告后,又向竞争对手Zeta授予了另一项许可用于汽车广告,则向Zeta授予的许可可能无效,因为Alpha已无权再向Zeta授予许可:

It is no defense to such a claim [brought by the first exclusive licensee] that defendant is the assignee of a subsequent [license] contract between [the celebrity] and [a third party], purporting to make a grant to [the third party] and/or its assignees. For the prior grant to plaintiff renders that subsequent grant invalid during the period of the grant (including an exercised option) to plaintiff, but not thereafter.
对于第一个独家被许可人提出的claim诉讼,被告是[名人]与[第三方]之间后续[许可]合同的受让人,该合同旨在向[第三方]和/或其受让人授予许可。由于先前向原告授予的许可使得后续授予在向原告授予许可期间(包括已行使的期权)无效,但此后有效。

Additionally, if Zeta directly induced Alpha to make a license to Zeta (rather than buying the license rights from a third party), knowing of the prior exclusive license to Gamma, Zeta may be liable for the tort of inducing a breach of the exclusive license contract between Alpha and Gamma: “[D]efendant’s argument neglects the fact that, in the contract, the ball-player also promised not to give similar releases to others. If defendant, knowing of the contract, deliberately induced the ball-player to break that promise, defendant behaved tortiously.”
此外,如果Zeta在明知Gamma拥有独家许可权的情况下,直接诱使Alpha向Zeta授予许可(而不是从第三方购买许可权),则Zeta可能因诱使违反Alpha和Gamma之间的独家许可合同而承担侵权责任:"被告的论点忽视了这样一个事实,即合同中,球手还承诺不会向其他人提供类似的许可。如果被告在明知合同的情况下,故意诱使球手违反这一承诺,则被告的行为构成侵权。"

Exclusivity is often of great commercial value to a prospective licensee. It means that no other firm within the area of exclusivity will be licensed to use the licensor’s identity and persona in advertising or sales. Also, exclusivity may also be a reasonable restriction for the licensor to promise. Depending upon the nature of the use and the product line, a public personality may not want conflicting uses of his or her identity. This could dilute his or her reputation for credibility and depress the publicity value of his or her identity.
排他性对于潜在的被许可方而言通常具有巨大的商业价值。这意味着在排他性区域内,其他任何公司都不得被授权在广告或销售中使用许可方的身份和形象。此外,排他性也可以是许可方承诺的合理限制。根据使用性质和产品线的不同,公众人物可能不希望自己的身份被用于相互冲突的用途。这可能会削弱其可信度,并降低其身份的宣传价值。

Some courts view an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing not as an independent source of contractual duties, but merely as a “guide to the construction of the explicit terms of the agreement.” In that case, Judge Moran reviewed a contract clause that gave to the exclusive licensee of the right to use the name “Michael Jordan” on a restaurant in the Chicago area the unlimited contractual right to “review and approve” the licensing of another Michael Jordan restaurant in the area. The court held that this was an absolute contractual right of refusal that was not limited or qualified by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing:
一些法院认为,诚信和公平交易的默示契约并非合同义务的独立来源,而只是"协议明确条款的构建指南"。在这种情况下,莫兰法官审查了合同条款,该条款赋予芝加哥地区一家餐厅的独家许可使用人使用"迈克尔·乔丹"名称的权利,并赋予其无限合同权利,以"审查和批准"在该地区开设另一家迈克尔·乔丹餐厅的许可。法院认为,这是一项绝对的合同拒绝权,不受诚信和公平交易默示契约的限制或约束:

[A]n implied reasonableness restriction must be viewed in light of what the parties explicitly bargained for …. “Good faith” is a compact reference to an implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been contemplated at the time of drafting and which therefore was not resolved by the parties …. [T]his case presents a situation where the parties clearly contemplated the specific contexts in which [the licensee] was to exercise limited discretion to pre-approve [the licensor’s] actions. Where the parties wanted to insert a reasonableness restriction limiting [the licensee’s] right to approve, they included language in the contract to provide for it.
必须根据双方明确协商的内容来审视隐含的合理性限制……"诚信"是指双方明确承诺,不会利用起草合同时无法预见的机会,因此双方并未解决这一问题……本案中,双方明确考虑了[被许可方]行使有限酌情权预先批准[许可方]行动的具体情况。如果双方希望加入合理性限制,限制[被许可方]的批准权,他们会在合同中加入相关条款。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:20 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

A. Types of Licenses

§ 10:20. Publicity licenses compared to trademark licenses
§ 10:20. 宣传许可与商标许可的比较

Trademark-Type Quality Control Is Not Needed in a Right of Publicity License. Judge Jerome Frank’s observation in the seminal Haelan case was that a person had the ability to “grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture” and that “such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’ i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or anything else.” This clearly distinguished right of publicity assignments from the “antiassignment-in-gross” rule of trademark assignments. While less obvious, in the authors’ opinions, it also distinguished right of publicity licenses from the “quality control” requirement of trademark licenses. The Restatement of Unfair Competition agrees.
在公开权许可中不需要商标类型的质量控制。杰罗姆·弗兰克法官在开创性的Haelan案中的观察是,一个人有能力"授予出版其照片的专有权",并且"这种授予可以有效地'整体'进行,即无需附带转让业务或其他任何东西"。这明确区分了公开权转让与商标转让的"禁止整体转让"规则。虽然不太明显,但在作者看来,它也区分了公开权许可与商标许可的"质量控制"要求。《不正当竞争重述》也同意这一点。

The Trademark Law Requirement of Quality Control in a License. Under common law and federal trademark rules, a mark cannot be validly licensed to another unless the licensor exercises control over the quality of goods and services sold by the licensee under the mark. The trademark licensor must exercise control over such goods and services in order to ensure that the quality level of such items sold under the licensed mark remains uniform among all licensees. The rationale of the quality control rule is based upon the assumption that unless the licensor has the duty of enforcing its defined level of quality, there will be a deviation of type and quality of goods and services among the licensees. If that happened, the mark would cease to symbolize good will in the sense of the mark signifying sameness—a uniformity of quality among licensees. Thus, the rationale of the trademark quality control rule is to prevent deception of customers.
商标法对许可中的质量控制要求。根据普通法和联邦商标规则,除非许可人对被许可人使用商标销售的商品和服务质量进行控制,否则商标许可不能有效。商标许可人必须对这类商品和服务进行控制,以确保所有被许可人使用许可商标销售的商品的质量水平保持一致。质量控制规则的基本原理基于以下假设:除非许可人有责任执行其规定的质量水平,否则被许可人之间商品和服务的类型和质量会出现偏差。如果出现这种情况,商标将不再象征good will,即商标所象征的一致性——被许可人之间质量的一致性。因此,商标质量控制规则的基本原理是防止欺骗客户。

Trademark and Right of Publicity Licenses Compared. The trademark law requirement of quality control is unique in the law of licensing. Neither patent, trade secret nor copyright licenses require this element of quality control. The difference is that a trademark is a symbol of good will and of a certain level of quality of goods or services. The licensor is perceived as the “source” of the standards of equal quality. The law of trademarks puts the burden upon the licensor to affirmatively do what it can to require licensees to maintain the licensor’s defined level of quality.
商标和宣传权许可比较。商标法对质量控制的严格要求在许可法中是独一无二的。专利、商业秘密和版权许可都不要求质量控制这一要素。商标是good will和商品或服务特定质量水平的象征。许可人被视为同等质量标准的"来源"。商标法规定,许可人有责任积极要求被许可人保持许可人规定的质量水平。

On the other hand, the right of publicity grants rights in the commercial value of a certain human being. Those things which may identify that human being—name, likeness, associated things, etc.—are symbols of that person as a person. This is distinctly different from a trademark or service mark, the purpose of which is to signify a single, albeit anonymous, commercial source of goods or quality of goods. A trademark, even when licensed to others, need not disclose the name of its owner. However, when a person’s very identity is used by a licensee, the whole commercial purpose and point is to clearly and unequivocally identify that person whose identity is used to attract attention to advertising or to the product. Anonymity of the licensor in the licensee’s use is certainly not the point of right of publicity licensing.
另一方面,公开权赋予特定个人商业价值方面的权利。可识别该个人的事物——姓名、肖像、相关事物等——是个人身份的象征。这与商标或服务商标截然不同,商标或服务商标的目的是表明单一的、匿名的商品或商品质量的商业来源。即使商标被授权给他人,也不必公开其所有人的姓名。然而,当被许可人使用一个人的身份时,整个商业目的和要点是明确无误地识别该人的身份,以吸引人们对广告或产品的关注。被许可人使用许可人的匿名身份肯定不是公开权许可的重点。

Clearly, human identity alone is not a trademark. The law of trademarks has long categorized a personal name as not being an “inherently distinctive” symbol. A personal name does not acquire trademark rights unless and until it acquires associative significance in customer’s minds—“secondary meaning.” It must be proved that the buying public has come to recognize the personal name as a symbol which identifies and distinguishes the goods or services of only one seller or source. Thus, in and of itself, a personal name is not a “trademark.”
显然,仅凭人类身份无法成为商标。商标法早已将个人姓名归类为"非固有显著"符号。除非个人姓名在顾客心中具有关联性(即"次要含义"),否则无法获得商标权。必须证明购买者已经认可个人姓名是仅用于识别和区分某一卖方或来源的商品或服务的符号。因此,个人姓名本身并非"商标"。

Authors’ Comment: Quality Control Should Not Be Required in a Right of Publicity License. Certainly an argument could be made that the similarities between a trademark and a human identity demand that the quality control rule of trademark licensing be exported to right of publicity licensing. Yet, in the authors’ opinion, the differences between the two legal rights outweigh the similarities in this instance. The message to consumers is different. While a trademark conveys a clear message of uniformity and continuity of quality whenever it appears on products or service outlets, a person’s identity, even when a clear message of endorsement is conveyed, does not carry the same message of uniformity of quality among the plethora of items on which that person’s identity may appear. Even direct product endorsement by a prominent person conveys only the message that that person likes the product and recommends it. This is a message distinctly different from that conveyed by a “mark” such as “Kentucky Fried Chicken,” “Ford” or “McDonald’s.”
作者评论:在公开权许可中不应要求质量控制。当然,有人可能会提出,商标与人类身份之间的相似性要求将商标许可的质量控制规则推广到公开权许可中。然而,在作者看来,在这两种法律权利中,差异大于相似性。传达给消费者的信息是不同的。当商标出现在产品或服务网点时,它传达的是质量统一和持续性的明确信息,而一个人的身份,即使传达的是明确的认可信息,也不会在可能出现该人身份的众多物品中传达质量统一的相同信息。即使是由知名人士直接对产品进行认可,也只传达出该人喜欢该产品并推荐它的信息。这与"肯德基"、"福特"或"麦当劳"等"商标"传达的信息截然不同。

To the authors’ knowledge, no court has ever suggested, even by implication, that the quality control requirement of trademark licensing should apply to right of publicity licensing.
据作者所知,没有任何法院暗示过商标许可的质量控制要求应适用于公开权许可。

For these reasons, the authors believe that the quality control requirement of trademark licensing should not be exported to right of publicity licensing. The rationale for the requirement in trademark licensing is not applicable to publicity rights in human identity. The courts agree.
基于这些原因,作者认为商标许可的质量控制要求不应适用于公开权许可。商标许可中要求的理由不适用于人类身份的公开权。法院也同意这一观点。

Personal Name Used as Trademark or Service Mark. This is not to say that if a personal name or picture is used in such a way as to achieve the status of a “trademark” or “service mark” it should be immune from the normal rules of trademark licensing. When a personal name or likeness has been used in such a setting to identify and distinguish the goods and services of one source, then it achieves legal status as a “trademark” or “service mark” and must comply with all the rules of trademark assignment and licensing. A question like “Is Johnny Johnson a trademark?” is unanswerable. One must look carefully at the manner and context of use as to how “Johnny Johnson” has been used in trade. It might have been used as a trade name, a trademark or a service mark, some of them, none of them or all of them. One must not forget that in the United States a “mark” is what customers perceive as a symbol of commercial origin.
个人姓名用作商标或服务标记。这并不是说,如果个人姓名或图片被用作"商标"或"服务标记",就可以免受商标许可的常规规则约束。当个人姓名或肖像被用于识别和区分同一来源的商品和服务时,它就获得了"商标"或"服务标记"的法律地位,必须遵守商标转让和许可的所有规则。像"约翰尼·约翰逊是商标吗?"这样的问题是没有答案的。我们必须仔细研究"约翰尼·约翰逊"在贸易中的使用方式和语境。它可能被用作商号、商标或服务标记,也可能被用作其中一种或全部。我们不要忘记,在美国,"标记"是顾客认为的商业来源的象征。

As a practical matter, many licenses of human identity will in fact involve both right of publicity rights and trademark or service mark rights. In such cases, the special rules of trademark licensing must be followed in order to preserve the trademark significance of the licensed identity or persona. For example, where the widow of famous swing band leader Glenn Miller licensed to a company “the right and license to use the name and likeness of Glenn Miller... in connection with the business activities of [the licensee company],” the court held that this conveyed both a trademark license and a license of Glenn Miller’s right of publicity.
实际上,许多人类身份的许可实际上涉及公开权和商标或服务标记权。在这种情况下,必须遵守商标许可的特殊规则,以维护被许可身份或角色的商标意义。例如,著名摇摆乐队领导人格伦·米勒的遗孀授权一家公司"有权和许可使用格伦·米勒的名字和肖像……与[被许可公司]的业务活动有关",法院认为这既传达了商标许可,也传达了格伦·米勒的公开权许可。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:21 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

A. Types of Licenses

§ 10:21. Consents and licenses of privacy rights

When the statutes and courts speak of permission to use one’s identity in a commercial setting, the word often used is “consent.” That is, the person gives his or her “consent” to conduct which would otherwise be an invasion of the “appropriation” form of privacy. The word “consent” is apparently used because of its origins in the law of torts, the area of law where “privacy” rights reside.
当法规和法庭提到允许在商业环境中使用个人身份时,通常使用的词是"同意"。也就是说,当事人对原本属于侵犯"侵占"隐私的行为表示"同意"。之所以使用"同意"一词,是因为它源于侵权法,而"隐私"权属于侵权法的范畴。

There is no doubt that a person can “consent” to conduct which would otherwise be tortious. The basic principle is the ancient legal maxim, violenti fit injuria, meaning that no wrong is done to one who consents. Thus, a prisoner who makes phone calls from jail after being informed that such calls will be monitored or recorded has given an implied consent to any potential invasion of privacy and cannot succeed in a claim for intrusion. The Restatement of Torts Second provides that:
毫无疑问,一个人可以"同意"原本属于侵权的行为。基本原则是古老的法律格言"暴力即伤害"(violenti fit injuria),意思是说,对同意的人不会造成伤害。因此,一名囚犯在被告知其电话将被监听或录音后仍从监狱里打电话,即默示同意任何可能的隐私侵犯,不能以claim为理由起诉监听。《侵权法重述第二版》规定:

§ 892. A. Effect of Consent

(1) One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.
(1) 一个人如果实际同意他人侵犯其利益的行为,则不能在侵权诉讼中就这一行为或由此造成的损害进行索赔。

(2) To be effective, consent must be

(a) by one who has the capacity to consent or by a person empowered to consent for him, and
(a) 由有行为能力的人同意,或由有权代其同意的人同意,且

(b) to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same conduct.
(b) 特定行为或实质上相同的行为。

(3) Conditional consent or consent restricted as to time, area or in other respects is effective only within the limits of the condition or restriction.
(3) 附条件同意或时间、区域或其他方面的限制性同意仅在条件或限制范围内有效。

(4) If the actor exceeds the consent, it is not effective for the excess.
(4) 如果演员超出同意的范围,超出部分无效。

(5) Upon termination of consent its effectiveness is terminated, except as it may have become irrevocable by contract or otherwise, or except as its terms may include, expressly or by implication, a privilege to continue to act.
(5) 同意终止后,其效力也随之终止,除非该同意因合同或其他原因而不可撤销,或者其条款以明示或暗示方式包含继续行事的特权。

As discussed in the Restatement and as covered later in this treatise, it is crucial to determine the scope of the consent or waiver of the privacy tort. A consent to one act which invades privacy is not necessarily a consent to any and all other forms of invasion of privacy related to that act. For example, in one case, wife Doris consented to her husband Michael taking nude and sexually explicit Polaroid photos of her. Thereafter, the parties were divorced and Michael became spiteful and embittered. He distributed over 60 photocopies of the nude photos to Doris’ neighbors and friends. When sued for invasion of privacy, Michael contended that Doris waived her rights and consented to his distribution of the photos by posing for them and failing to ask for the photos as part of the divorce settlement. The court entered summary judgment for Doris on Michael’s defense of wavier. While Doris consented to the taking and possession of the photos, she did not consent to Michael’s distribution of them to the public. Doris’ claim was “premised not upon [Michael’s] taking or possession of the photographs, but upon distribution of them to the public.”
正如《重述》和本文后面部分所述,确定同意或放弃隐私侵权的范围至关重要。对侵犯隐私的行为表示同意,并不一定意味着同意与该行为相关的任何其他形式的隐私侵犯。例如,在一起案件中,妻子多丽丝同意丈夫迈克尔为她拍摄裸照和露骨的宝丽来照片。此后,双方离婚,迈克尔变得怨恨和痛苦。他将60多张裸照分发给多丽丝的邻居和朋友。当被起诉侵犯隐私时,迈克尔辩称,多丽丝通过摆姿势拍照,并未要求将照片作为离婚协议的一部分,即放弃了权利并同意他分发照片。法院对迈克尔的放弃辩护做出了有利于多丽丝的即决判决。虽然多丽丝同意拍摄和拥有照片,但她不同意迈克尔向公众分发照片。多丽丝的claim"并非基于[迈克尔]拍摄或拥有照片,而是基于向公众分发照片"。

In another example, James on three separate occasions secretly videotaped himself and his girlfriends (three separate girlfriends) engaged in sexual intercourse in James’ bedroom, but did not publicize the tapes. Invasion of privacy by intrusion was found and damages awarded. Defendant argued that the plaintiffs impliedly consented to the videotaping because they consented to the sexual intercourse. The court held that the scope of the consent was a fact issue that the jury decided in plaintiffs’ favor by finding no consent to videotape. The court noted that the scope of consent is a matter of degree: “The question of waiver or consent, however, does not have a zero-sum answer, but, rather, presents an issue of the degree or extent of wavier or consent granted, which depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.”
另一个例子是,詹姆斯三次秘密拍摄自己和女友(三个不同的女友)在詹姆斯卧室性交的录像,但没有公开这些录像。法院认定其侵犯了隐私权,并判其赔偿损失。被告辩称,原告默许了录像,因为他们同意性交。法院认为,同意的范围是一个事实问题,陪审团裁定原告胜诉,认为他们不同意录像。法院指出,同意的范围是一个程度问题:"放弃或同意的问题没有绝对的对错,而是取决于放弃或同意的程度或范围,这取决于案件的事实和情况。"

Scope of consent issues can also come up in less intimate situations. Many website that allow users to post content, including pictures and videos of themselves, have terms of use providing that the user consents to certain subsequent uses of such material by the operator of the website, or that the material becomes available to the public. Such a consent does not necessarily mean, however that the user is consenting to commercial uses of the material by third parties.
在不太亲密的情况下,也会出现同意问题。许多允许用户发布内容(包括自己的图片和视频)的网站,其使用条款规定,用户同意网站运营商对这类材料进行某些后续使用,或同意向公众公开这些材料。然而,这种同意并不一定意味着用户同意第三方对材料进行商业使用。

For instance in one case a woman named Christine uploaded to Instagram photos of herself and a friend dining at a restaurant. The Instagram terms of use granted Instagram the right to use any material posted on their site. They also provided that any uploaded materials would be “available to the public” and could be “re-shared by others” unless the user set their account as “private,” which Christine had not done. Thereafter Groupon, a different web based company that offers discount coupons for dining, used software to locate that photo and used it to promote the restaurant in question. A federal district court denied defendant’s summary judgment motion, finding that there were questions of fact about whether Christine should be deemed to have consented to this sort of third-party use.
例如,一位名叫克里斯汀(Christine)的女性在Instagram上上传了自己和朋友在餐厅用餐的照片。Instagram的使用条款授予Instagram使用其网站上发布的任何材料的权利。条款还规定,任何上传的材料都"可供公众使用",并可以"被他人重新分享",除非用户将其帐户设置为"私人",而克里斯汀没有这样做。此后,另一家提供餐饮优惠券的网络公司Groupon使用软件找到了那张照片,并将其用于推广这家餐厅。联邦地区法院驳回了被告的简易判决动议,认为关于克里斯汀是否应该被视为同意第三方使用存在事实问题。

While these commonsense rules of waiver are couched in terms of tort law as “consent,” there is no reason why they could not also be viewed as rules governing a “license” of the privacy right whose invasion is triggered by the “unconsented” or “unlicensed” commercial use of identity which causes indignity and mental distress. The advantage to using the synonym “license” is that it makes clearer a discussion of permissions as to both privacy and publicity rights. “Permissions” to use the proprietary right of publicity are usually dubbed “licenses,” the term of art for intellectual property rights. Therefore, this discussion will use the term “license” to denote permissions to use both publicity and privacy interests in commercial advertising and sales. However, there are indeed differences between permissions and licenses as to privacy and publicity rights, and they are specifically noted at the appropriate points.
虽然这些放弃的常识性规则在侵权法中被称为"同意",但它们也可以被视为隐私权的"许可"规则,而侵犯隐私权的行为是由"未经同意"或"未经许可"的商业使用身份引起的,从而造成侮辱和精神痛苦。使用同义词"许可"的好处是,它更清楚地讨论了隐私权和公开权的许可问题。使用专有公开权的"许可"通常被称为"许可",这是知识产权的术语。因此,本讨论将使用"许可"一词来表示在商业广告和销售中使用公开和隐私利益的许可。然而,在隐私权和公开权方面,许可和许可之间确实存在差异,并在适当的地方特别指出。

A license or consent by which a person, whether a celebrity or a noncelebrity, permits commercial exploitation of his or her identity implicitly waives, to the extent defined in the license, both publicity and privacy rights. A waiver or license of one without the other is commercially useless.
名人或非名人通过许可或同意,允许对其身份进行商业exploitation使用,即在许可规定的范围内,放弃公开权和隐私权。放弃或许可其中一项,另一项在商业上毫无意义。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:22 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

B. Scope of Activities Permitted in a License

§ 10:22. Scope of licenses

Synopsis:

A license to use the identity or persona of a person can be limited in scope in any way permitted by general law. While the scope of informal and gratuitous licenses is narrowly construed, professionally negotiated licenses are interpreted according to their express language. Common limitations on the scope of licenses are: duration, context of use, and product line.
使用他人身份或角色的许可可以在普通法允许的范围内以任何方式加以限制。非正式和无偿许可的范围应作狭义解释,而专业协商的许可则应根据其明示的语言进行解释。许可范围的常见限制包括:期限、使用环境和产品线。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:23 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

B. Scope of Activities Permitted in a License

§ 10:23. Scope of licenses—Conditions and limitations in licenses
§ 10:23. 许可范围——许可中的条件和限制

There is no doubt that for both publicity and privacy rights, a license can be limited in scope. “The duty of a licensee not to exceed the limits of its grant is no less a part of the consideration flowing to the licensor than [the licensee’s] duty to pay the stipulated royalties.”
毫无疑问,出于宣传权和隐私权考虑,许可的范围可以受到限制。"被许可方有义务不超出许可范围,这与[被许可方]支付规定版税的义务一样,都是对许可方应尽的义务。"

The scope of a consent or license to use a person’s identity is determined by traditional rules of contract interpretation.
使用他人身份的同意或许可范围由传统的合同解释规则决定。

The parties to a publicity or privacy license are free to agree to limit the scope of the license in any way they deem fit or include any legal conditions they choose. As a court noted under the Illinois right of publicity statute, “consent is not a binary matter; one can consent to the use of his or her identity for one purpose but not another.” Limitations on the scope of the license might consist of restrictions upon the time, context of use, product line or territory, or some, none or all of these. Absent external restrictions imposed by other bodies of law, such as antitrust law, the parties are free to agree upon any restrictions or conditions they desire. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed, “an important aspect of the ‘right of publicity’ is being able to control the place as well as time and number of one’s public appearances.”
公开权或隐私权许可的各方可以自由地以任何他们认为合适的方式限制许可范围,或加入任何他们选择的法律条件。正如伊利诺伊州公开权法规中法院指出的,"同意不是二元性的;人们可以同意将其身份用于一个目的,但不同意用于另一个目的。"对许可范围的限制可能包括对时间、使用环境、产品线或地域的限制,或部分、全部或部分限制。在没有其他法律(如反垄断法)施加的外部限制的情况下,各方可以自由地就他们想要的任何限制或条件达成协议。正如第七巡回上诉法院指出的,"'公开权'的一个重要方面是能够控制一个人的公开露面的地点、时间和次数。"

The definition of scope of a license has the following legal ramifications:
许可范围的定义具有以下法律影响:

 • It defines the contractual relationship between the parties for purposes of breach of contract.
• 它规定了双方因违约而产生的合同关系。

• It defines the scope of publicity and privacy rights licensed such that the licensee’s use outside that scope constitutes actionable invasion or infringement of those rights.
它规定了许可的公开权和隐私权的范围,超出该范围的使用构成对这些权利的侵犯或侵害。

• If the license is exclusive, the scope of the license defines the obligation of the licensor not to grant conflicting licenses to others and the duty of third parties not to induce breach by obtaining a second conflicting license.
• 如果许可证是排他性的,则许可证的范围规定了许可方的义务,即不得向他人授予冲突许可证,并规定了第三方的义务,即不得通过获得第二个冲突许可证来诱使违反行为。

• If the license is exclusive, the scope defines the right of the exclusive licensee to sue third parties who impinge upon the exclusive rights in the license.
• 如果许可证是排他性的,则其范围定义了排他性被许可人起诉侵犯许可证排他性权利的第三方的权利。

It is appropriate and not redundant to include in a contract both a waiver of claims as well as a grant of rights. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that under California contract law, it was proper for a movie studio in its contract with a person whose life was to be the basis for a motion picture to include in the contract provisions that, in return for payment, the person (1) waived all claims against the studio and in addition, (2) granted to the studio the right to use the story of the person’s life and experiences in a factual or fictional manner in a motion picture.
在合同中同时包含放弃claims和授予权利的内容是恰当的,并非多余。例如,第九巡回法院认为,根据加州合同法,电影制片厂在与以个人生活为电影题材的人签订的合同中,应包含以下条款:作为报酬,该人(1)放弃对制片厂的所有claims,此外,(2)授予制片厂以事实或虚构的方式在电影中使用其生活经历和故事的权利。

[A] release from claims and a grant of rights together are not redundant. A release extinguishes claims against the released party. … By contrast, a grant is an agreement that creates a right … Parties may include both provisions in a contract without undermining the effect of either the grant or the release. Here, Paramount secured a release from claims relating to [plaintiff] Marder’s involvement with the creation of [the motion picture] Flashdance. By the same document, Marder granted Paramount the right to use her life story in connection with Flashdance. These two clauses do not negate each other and each may be considered without concern for impermissible redundancy.
[A] 解除 claims 和授予权利两者并不重复。解除针对被解除方 claims 无效。……相反,授予是一种协议,产生一种权利……双方可以在合同中同时包含这两项条款,而不会削弱授予或解除的效力。在此,派拉蒙获得了与 [原告] 马尔德参与创作 [电影]《闪舞》有关的 claims 解除。在同一份文件中,马尔德授予派拉蒙使用其与《闪舞》相关的生活故事的权利。这两项条款并不相互否定,而且可以分别考虑,无需担心重复。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:24 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

B. Scope of Activities Permitted in a License

§ 10:24. Scope of licenses—Determining the scope of the license
§ 10:24. 许可范围——确定许可范围

A License or Consent is to Specific Uses. Whether the license or consent is written, oral, informal or tacit, it should be interpreted to cover only that particular conduct licensed to the user. The Restatement of Unfair Competition makes it clear that:
许可或同意是针对特定用途的。无论许可或同意是书面、口头、非正式还是默许的,都应解释为仅涵盖许可给用户的特定行为。《反不正当竞争法》明确规定:

The defense of consent extends only to conduct that is within the scope of the consent. …. If the use is outside the scope of consent, the defendant is subject to liability for any harm resulting from conduct that exceeds the consent.
同意的辩护仅适用于同意范围内的行为。……如果使用超出了同意的范围,被告应对超出同意范围的行为所造成的任何伤害承担责任。

Thus, a consent to having one’s photograph taken for the purpose of illustrating a news story is not a consent to having the same photograph used to illustrate a commercial advertisement. In finding that a consent of plaintiff while he was in the Army to having his photograph used to bolster home front morale was not a consent to defendant’s use of the photograph in advertising, a court observed that “a waiver of the right justifies an invasion of privacy only to the extent warranted by the circumstances which brought about the waiver.”
因此,同意为新闻报道拍摄照片并不意味着同意将同一张照片用于商业广告。法院认为,原告在军队服役期间同意使用其照片来鼓舞国内士气,并不意味着同意被告将照片用于广告宣传。法院指出,"放弃权利只能用于在导致放弃的情况所允许的范围内侵犯隐私。"

Unambiguous License or Consent. If a written license is unambiguous, the courts will refuse to admit parol evidence or evidence of custom and usage to vary the clear terms of a restriction. As the Eighth Circuit observed:
明确的许可或同意。如果书面许可明确无误,法院将拒绝采纳口头证据或习惯和惯例证据来更改限制条款的明确内容。正如第八巡回法院所言:

Plaintiff’s argument is rooted in the concept that the intent of the parties was to restrict the advertising and sale of products. To accept plaintiff’s interpretation of the [license] contract would require a rewriting and the interpolation of words into the contract. This we cannot do when the language of the contract is clear. The contract, being unambiguous as it is, needs no interpretation except to give the plain and simple words their plain meaning …. Contracts are not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties do not agree upon their proper construction …. Our function is to enforce the contract as made.
原告的论点源于双方意图限制产品广告和销售这一概念。如果接受原告对[许可]合同的解释,就需要改写合同并插入文字。当合同语言清晰明了时,我们不能这样做。合同本身毫不含糊,除了赋予简单明了的文字以简单明了的含义外,无需任何解释……合同不会因为双方未就其正确解释达成一致而变得含糊不清……我们的function是执行已签订的合同。

In one case, plaintiff, a professional basketball player, was supplementing his income by professional modeling. Plaintiff posed for a photograph wearing a red shirt and holding a bowling ball. The photograph was to be used for some then-unknown possible advertising use. Plaintiff signed a release and license permitting the photograph to be “distorted in character or form” and to be used “for art, advertising, trade or any other lawful purpose whatsoever,” with the added exception, “unless it can be shown that said reproduction was maliciously caused, produced and published solely for the purpose of subjecting me to conspicuous ridicule, scandal, reproach, scorn and indignity.” The plaintiff’s photograph was later selected for use in an advertisement for Schmidt’s beer, with a beer glass and bottle added to the photograph. Plaintiff’s name was not used in the ad, and the advertising agency selected the picture because of plaintiff’s appearance, not his identity, and not knowing of plaintiff’s athletic fame. Plaintiff objected, saying that use of his picture in connection with an ad for beer subjected him to criticism and injured his standing as a professional basketball player and his possible future career as a college coach. The court found that the release contract signed by plaintiff was clear and was a complete bar to his claims for libel, invasion of privacy and infringement of the right of publicity.
在一起案件中,原告是一名职业篮球运动员,他通过职业模特工作来增加收入。原告穿着红色衬衫、拿着保龄球摆姿势拍照。这张照片可能用于当时未知的广告用途。原告签署了一份免责和许可协议,允许"对照片进行变形处理",并允许"出于艺术、广告、贸易或任何其他合法目的"使用照片,但附加了例外条款:"除非可以证明该复制行为是恶意的,且仅出于让我遭受明显嘲笑、丑闻、指责、蔑视和侮辱的目的而制作和发布。"原告的照片后来被选中用于施密特啤酒的广告,照片上还添加了啤酒杯和啤酒瓶。广告中没有使用原告的名字,广告公司选择这张照片是因为原告的外表,而不是他的身份,而且当时并不知道原告是运动员。原告对此表示反对,称他的照片被用于啤酒广告,使他遭受了批评,损害了他作为职业篮球运动员的地位以及未来担任大学教练的可能性。法院认为,原告签署的免责合同非常明确,完全禁止他claims 提出诽谤、侵犯隐私和侵犯公开权等诉讼。

In another example, Maureen Marder signed a release and license permitting Paramount Pictures to make the 1983 motion picture Flashdance based on Marder’s life. The Ninth Circuit held that under California contract law, the agreement barred Marder from making any claims of copyright or right of publicity infringement based on a 2003 Jennifer Lopez music video made by Sony which was based on scenes in the movie Flashdance. The court held that the release and grant was clear and unambiguous and barred all of Marder’s claims against Paramount, Lopez, and Sony.
另一个例子是,莫琳·马尔德(Maureen Marder)签署了一份授权书和许可协议,允许派拉蒙影业(Paramount Pictures)根据马尔德的生活经历拍摄1983年的电影《Flashdance》。第九巡回法院认为,根据加州合同法,该协议禁止马尔德基于索尼公司2003年制作的珍妮弗·洛佩兹(Jennifer Lopez)音乐视频侵犯版权或公开权,该视频取材自电影《Flashdance》中的场景。法院认为,该授权书和许可协议清晰明确,禁止马尔德对派拉蒙影业、洛佩兹和索尼公司提起任何诉讼。

A contract by which an actor granted the producer “all rights throughout the universe in and/or to all results and proceeds of [the actor’s] services rendered hereunder,” to exploit in any manner the images of the actor in the movie and the right to use the actor’s likeness “for commercial purposes” was found to be unambiguous. This contract was held to convey the right to use images of the actor’s character in the movie on consumer merchandise, thus waiving a right to sue for false endorsement.
一份合同明确规定,演员授予制片人"[演员]在本合同项下提供的服务的所有结果和收益在全世界范围内的全部权利",允许制片人以任何方式使用演员在电影中的形象,并有权"出于商业目的"使用演员的肖像。该合同被认定赋予了在消费品上使用演员在电影中角色的形象的权利,从而放弃了因虚假代言提起诉讼的权利。

In a dispute over the scope of a license or consent, the disputed language must be read in connection with other parts of the overall agreement so as to be consistent with the contract as a whole.
在关于许可或同意范围的争议中,争议语言必须结合整体协议的其他部分来解读,以便与整个合同保持一致。

Model Releases. It is not unusual for models, especially those who are lesser-known and without bargaining power, to sign an unconditional photographer’s release prior to a photo shoot. Sometime later the model may discover that some of the photos taken during that shoot appear in a publication the model finds derogatory, or are being used to advertise a business that the model finds disagreeable or disreputable. If the model brings a suit claiming false light or appropriation privacy torts or asserting claims under the right of publicity the case will often turn on how the court chooses to treat the release.
模特协议。模特,尤其是知名度较低且没有议价能力的模特,在拍摄前签署无条件摄影师协议的情况并不罕见。有时,模特可能会发现,拍摄期间拍摄的一些照片出现在模特认为有损名誉的出版物中,或者被用于模特认为令人不快或声誉不佳的商业广告中。如果模特提起诉讼,声称存在虚假曝光或侵犯隐私的侵权行为,或者根据公开权主张claims,那么案件往往取决于法院如何选择处理协议。

In an older case from the federal court in Ohio, where a young woman signed an unconditional photographic release and her photo appeared two years later on the cover of Hustler magazine, a sexually explicit publication, the court found that the release was a complete bar to a suit for invasion of privacy.
在俄亥俄州联邦法院审理的一起旧案中,一名年轻女子签署了无条件摄影作品授权书,两年后她的照片出现在色情杂志《Hustler》的封面上。法院认为,该授权书完全排除了侵犯隐私的诉讼。

[Y]oung and impressionable people who want to go into modeling are often eager, ambitious and anxious and will sign a release without any thought to the future. At a subsequent period of time, there are often changed circumstances. Thus, when the models’ pictures are used, they may not be happy about how their pictures are used. Twenty-twenty hindsight comes into play. The obvious answer is either do not sign a release or, if you do sign a release, make sure that you add or delete any language you deem appropriate or inappropriate before you sign the release.
想要从事模特行业的年轻人容易受影响,他们往往充满渴望、雄心和焦虑,会草率地签署协议,而不会考虑未来。 随后,情况往往会发生变化。 因此,当模特的照片被使用时,他们可能对照片的使用方式感到不满。 事后诸葛亮总是容易犯这种错误。 显而易见的答案是,要么不签署协议,要么在签署协议之前,根据自己认为适当或不适当的语言进行添加或删除。

Similarly, the federal court in California refused to interpret or modify the clear and absolute language of a consent to use a photo of a child “for any purpose whatsoever” where the child’s mother thought that the consent to use a photo of the child was limited to use in one magazine, not for advertising use.
同样,加利福尼亚州联邦法院拒绝解释或修改"出于任何目的"使用儿童照片的明确且绝对的语言,因为孩子的母亲认为同意使用孩子的照片仅限于在一本杂志上使用,而不是用于广告。

However, a Florida court held that a model who had signed a release permitting use of his photo for advertising insurance policies could sue for invasion of privacy under both common law and the Florida statute. His privacy claim was occasioned by the use of the photo in an advertisement soliciting individuals who were terminally ill with AIDS to sell their life insurance policies for a lump sum, in what is known as a viatical settlement. The model alleged that the use of his photo in this ad in periodicals directed to the LGBTQ community, and the particular placement of the text and photo within the ad, falsely implied that the model was gay and was suffering from a terminal AIDS diagnosis. The court held that the economic loss rule (baring common law tort recovery for purely economic losses) did not bar a claim of unauthorized commercial use of the model’s photo in a manner not within the reasonable scope of the model release.
然而,佛罗里达州的一家法院认为,一名模特在签署许可协议后,允许他人将其照片用于保险广告,根据普通法和佛罗里达州法规,他有权起诉侵犯隐私。他的隐私claim被用于广告中,该广告招募身患绝症且艾滋病晚期的人出售其人寿保险单,以获得一次性付款,即所谓的"临终保险"。该模特声称,他的照片被用于针对LGBTQ群体的期刊广告中,且广告中文字和图片的位置暗示该模特是同性恋且身患艾滋病晚期。法院认为,经济损失规则(不包括普通法侵权赔偿中的纯粹经济损失)并不禁止claim以超出模特许可协议合理范围的方式未经授权将模特照片用于商业用途。

In a Georgia case, a professional model signed two inconsistent agreements: a voucher which provided that most types of commercial use of the photo had to be negotiated with the model’s agent and a release which permitted use of the photo for all advertising uses. The jury found that the conditions in the voucher controlled over the release and awarded the model $25,000 for an advertiser’s use of her photos.
在佐治亚州的一起案件中,一位专业模特儿签署了两份内容不一致的协议:一份凭证规定,大多数类型的商业用途必须与模特儿的经纪人协商,而另一份免责协议则允许将照片用于所有广告用途。陪审团认为,凭证中的条件优先于免责协议,并裁定广告商使用模特儿照片的行为侵犯了其肖像权,因此判给模特儿25000美元赔偿。

Perhaps the most detailed treatment of the issue is found in a Second Circuit decision involving claims under the New York right of publicity statute. In this case, several models sued a “gentleman’s club” (i.e., strip club) for using their photos without authorization to promote the club on social media sites. The photographs in question had been taken at photo shoots conducted by third parties, and the models had all signed broad releases allowing the photographer or modeling agency that took the photos to use the photos “for any commercial or noncommercial purpose whatsoever,” or words to that effect. However the defendant strip club had not obtained a license from the photographers nor had it obtained consent from the models themselves. It nonetheless claimed that the releases operated as a general waiver of any publicity rights insofar as use of the disputed photographs in question was concerned. The district court accepted that argument and granted summary judgment to the clubs.
也许对这个问题最详细的处理方式可以在第二巡回法院根据纽约公开权法规做出的涉及claims的判决中找到。在这个案例中,几位模特起诉了一家"绅士俱乐部"(即脱衣舞俱乐部),原因是该俱乐部未经授权在社交媒体网站上使用他们的照片来宣传俱乐部。这些照片是在第三方摄影棚拍摄的,模特们都签署了广泛的免责协议,允许摄影师或摄影机构"出于任何商业或非商业目的"使用这些照片,或大意如此。然而,被告脱衣舞俱乐部既没有获得摄影师的许可,也没有获得模特本人的同意。尽管如此,它声称就使用有争议的照片而言,这些免责协议相当于对任何公开权的普遍放弃。地区法院接受了这一论点,并授予俱乐部简易判决。

Reversing, the Second Circuit held that the releases operated only in favor of the “releasees” (i.e., the photographers or modeling agencies that took the pictures in the first place). It noted that the club was not a party to the releases, had not obtained licensees from those who had secured the releases, and was “plainly” not a third-party beneficiary of those releases either. It also rejected the defendant’s claim that the releases operated as “written consent” for others to use the photos for commercial purposes observing somewhat cryptically that even though “their releases conveyed their proprietary rights to the photographs [that] does not defeat their claims, because their cause of action under Section 51 is based on their statutory rights, not their proprietary rights in the photographs.”
第二巡回法院在撤销原判时认为,这些免责条款仅有利于"被免责方"(即最初拍摄照片的摄影师或模特经纪公司)。法院指出,俱乐部并非免责条款的签署方,没有从获得免责条款的各方那里获得许可,而且"显然"也不是免责条款的第三方受益人。法院还驳回了被告的claim,即免责条款相当于"书面同意"他人将照片用于商业用途。法院还略带隐晦地指出,即使"他们的免责条款表明他们对照片拥有所有权,但这并不妨碍他们的claims,因为他们在第51条下的诉讼理由是基于他们的法定权利,而不是他们对照片的所有权。"

The lesson that emerges from these cases is that a release is not equivalent to an assignment. A release is merely a covenant not to sue, and runs only in favor of the party who receives it (the “releasee”). Thus when a third-party uses photographs or other materials, its conduct will not be shielded from liability by the release. By contrast, an outright assignment, conveys all rights in one’s persona to the assignee, leaving the assignor with no basis to assert any claims when someone makes unauthorized use of his or her name or likeness.
从这些案例中得出的教训是,免责并不等同于转让。免责只是不提起诉讼的约定,且仅对接受方("被免责方")有利。因此,当第三方使用照片或其他材料时,其行为不会因免责而免于承担责任。相比之下,彻底转让会将个人身份的所有权利转让给受让人,当有人未经授权使用其姓名或肖像时,转让人没有任何依据主张任何claims。

Ambiguous License or Consent. If a writing is ambiguous, parol evidence may be introduced to clarify the intent of the parties. For example, where race car driver Mario Andretti accepted a $6,000 Rolex watch, acknowledged in writing his membership in the “Rolex Club” and sent a signed photograph to the President of Rolex, it was held a question of fact whether by these acts Andretti had licensed Rolex to use his name and picture in advertisements for Rolex watches. The New York Court of Appeals said that, “Parol evidence may be introduced to establish that an equivocal writing signed by the subject of the photograph was intended as the expression of consent contemplated by the [New York publicity and privacy] statute to the use of the name.”
模棱两可的许可或同意。如果书面文件模棱两可,则可以引入口头证据来澄清各方的意图。例如,赛车手马里奥·安德烈蒂(Mario Andretti)接受了一块价值6000美元的劳力士手表,以书面形式承认自己是"劳力士俱乐部"的会员,并向劳力士总裁发送了一张签名照片。问题是,安德烈蒂的这些行为是否意味着他授权劳力士在劳力士手表的广告中使用他的名字和图片。纽约上诉法院表示:"可以引入口头证据来证明照片主体签署的模棱两可的书面文件是为了表达[纽约宣传和隐私]法规所规定的对使用名字的同意。"

Sub-Licenses. The licensee may be permitted in the contract to sublicense or transfer its license rights to others, or it may be restricted from doing so. The contractual language controls. The trademark rule that there is no right to sub-license a trademark without an explicit contractual provision permitting it also applies to a license of the right of publicity.
次级许可。合同中可能会允许被许可人将许可权转授或转让给他人,也可能限制其这样做。合同语言具有约束力。如果没有明确的合同条款允许,则无权转授商标,这一商标规则也适用于公开权许可。

Implied Covenants. In the analogous field of copyright licenses, the courts will imply in every license an implied covenant of good faith that neither the licensor nor the licensee will do anything to destroy the rights of the other party. The use of such an implied covenant may assist in resolving the scope of ambiguous licenses.
默示契约。在类似的版权许可领域,法院会在每份许可中隐含一项诚信契约,即许可人和被许可人不得采取任何行动破坏另一方的权利。使用这种默示契约有助于解决模糊许可的范围问题。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:25 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

B. Scope of Activities Permitted in a License

§ 10:25. Scope of licenses—Examples of limitations in licenses
§ 10:25. 许可范围——许可限制示例

The following types of limitations in publicity or privacy licenses have been upheld.
以下类型的广告或隐私许可限制得到了支持。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:26 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

B. Scope of Activities Permitted in a License

§ 10:26. Scope of licenses—Examples of limitations in licenses—Duration
§ 10:26. 许可范围——许可限制示例——期限

The New York Court of Appeals has observed that, “The right to withhold consent to a use includes the right to limit the period within which the consent remains in effect…. Use after expiration of the effective period of consent is no less an invasion of privacy than is use without consent.”
纽约上诉法院指出:"拒绝同意使用的权利包括限制同意有效期……在同意有效期过后使用,与未经同意使用一样,都是侵犯隐私的行为。"

Where consent is oral, informal and gratuitous, a lapse of years until use is made may impose upon the user an obligation to renew the consent. For example, where a young man of 24 took a course of training at a health studio, he tacitly consented to the taking of “before and after” photographs for the purpose of advertising the studio. Ten years later the health studio used his photographs in an advertisement in the local newspaper. Holding that the informal and gratuitous consent to use did not continue for such a long period, the court found an invasion of privacy, remarking that “people change over a period of ten years and what might have been agreeable to a young man of 24 might not have been agreeable to the same man at the age of 34.”
如果口头同意是非正式且无偿的,那么在使用前经过数年时间,使用者可能需要承担更新同意的义务。例如,一名24岁的年轻人在一家健身工作室参加培训课程,他默认同意为宣传该工作室而拍摄"前后"照片。十年后,该健身工作室在本地报纸的广告中使用了他的照片。法院认为,非正式且无偿的使用同意不会持续如此长的时间,因此认定侵犯了隐私权,并指出"十年间人们会发生变化,24岁的年轻人可能同意的事情,34岁的同一个人可能不同意。"

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:27 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

B. Scope of Activities Permitted in a License

§ 10:27. Scope of licenses—Examples of limitations in licenses—Context of use
§ 10:27. 许可范围——许可限制示例——使用环境

The New York Court of Appeals held that use of a professional model’s photo for a large poster advertisement was outside of a license permitting “magazine ad use only” of advertising photos of the model, giving rise to a claim for invasion of publicity or privacy rights. Similarly, a look-alike model’s consent limited to use in a certain publication and conditioned upon use with a disclaimer was held to give rise to a claim for invasion of publicity rights when both restrictions were exceeded.
纽约上诉法院认为,将专业模特的照片用于大型海报广告超出了"仅允许用于杂志广告"的许可范围,侵犯了模特的公开权或隐私权,因此判定claim。同样,当超出某出版物和附带免责声明的限制时,法院认为,仅限于在特定出版物中使用且附带免责声明的相似模特的同意书侵犯了公开权,因此判定claim。

A license or consent to use of identity for a particular use cannot be stretched to include a consent for other and different uses. For example:
为特定用途而授予的许可或身份使用授权不能扩展为其他不同用途的授权。例如:

 • a soldier’s consent to use of his photograph in military publications to bolster morale is not consent to a commercial firm’s advertising use of that photo
• 士兵同意在军事出版物中使用其照片以鼓舞士气,并不意味着同意商业公司将其照片用于广告宣传。

• a Kodak’s employee’s consent to the use of a color photograph of his family in a Kodak publication is not consent to another company to use the photograph as an insert in the display and promotion of picture frames
柯达员工同意在柯达出版物中使用其家人的彩色照片,并不等于同意另一家公司将该照片作为相框展示和促销的插图。

• the consent of a former college football player to his college to use his picture in college promotional materials is not necessarily consent to use of the picture in a Coca-Cola advertisement in a program for a football game
• 前大学橄榄球运动员同意其大学在宣传材料中使用其照片,并不一定意味着同意在足球比赛节目中可口可乐广告中使用该照片

• a consent by a prosecuting attorney to use his name and picture in his narration of a documentary film on a famous case, on the condition that the film be shown only on television, was not a consent to exhibition in theaters
检察官同意在讲述著名案件的纪录片中使用其姓名和照片,但前提是该片只能在电视上播放,这并不表示同意在影院放映。

• a consent to use of one’s name and picture is not consent to mistaken use of the name in connection with another person’s picture
同意使用自己的名字和照片,并不意味着同意将名字与他人照片混淆使用。

• the consent of a user to LinkedIn sending one “invitation” to persons on her contact list was not necessarily consent to second and third repeated invitations, which could cause professional reputational harm
用户同意LinkedIn向其联系人发送一次"邀请",并不一定同意重复发送第二次和第三次邀请,这可能会损害其职业声誉。

• a license to reprint and distribute an author’s book as a commercial promotion for products is not a license or consent to intersperse the book with commercial advertising creating the false impression that the author endorsed the products
• 出于产品商业推广目的而重印和发行作者书籍的许可,并不意味着允许在书中插入商业广告,造成作者认可产品的假象。

• a publishing contract permitting use of an author’s name is not a license to use the author’s name on a revised edition which the author did not approve
• 允许使用作者姓名的出版合同并不等于允许在未经作者同意的修订版中使用其姓名

• a professional model’s license to Playboy magazine to print nude photos is not an implied license to Hustler magazine to reprint the same photos
• 《花花公子》杂志获得的专业模特拍摄裸照的许可并不意味着《Hustler》杂志可以转载这些照片。

• a professional baseball player’s grant of permission to his team to use still and video pictures of him and to grant the team “all rights in such pictures” for use by the team for “publicity purposes” did not include the right to use the player’s photo as imprinted on merchandise such as a jersey. The player retained that right
• 一名职业棒球运动员授权其球队使用他的照片和视频,并授予球队"使用这些照片的所有权利",用于"宣传目的",但该授权不包括将运动员的照片印在球衣等商品上的权利。运动员保留该权利

• a license from famous baseball player Mickey Mantle to a company to use his identity to make a movie about him and sell merchandise to advertise the movie did not permit the licensee to use on a Web site selling Mantle-related goods unrelated to the motion picture
著名棒球运动员米奇·曼托(Mickey Mantle)授权一家公司使用其身份拍摄一部关于他的电影,并销售电影周边商品。但该授权不允许被授权方在销售曼托相关商品的网站上使用与电影无关的内容。

• a license permitting use of recordings of a person’s sport’s commentary so long as it not used to endorse a product or service does not permit use in an infomercial touting a football video game
• 允许使用个人体育评论录音的许可,前提是不得用于为产品或服务做宣传,也不得用于宣传足球电子游戏的电视购物节目

• a noncelebrity’s consent to the use of a videotape of him installing ceramic tile as an instructional aid to tile buyers is not a license to broadcast the videotape as part of a television commercial for the tile company
• 一名非名人同意使用他安装瓷砖的录像作为瓷砖购买者的教学辅助材料,但这并不意味着瓷砖公司有权将此录像作为电视广告的一部分进行播放。

• a patient’s permission to her plastic surgeon to use her “before and after” photos for educational purposes did not allow use in surgeon’s promotional newsletter
• 患者允许整形外科医生出于教育目的使用其"前后对比"照片,但不允许用于外科医生的推广新闻简报

• a patient’s license to his hair transplant provider to use “before and after” photos only in areas more than 500 miles outside his home state did not allow use within that defined territory
• 患者授权其植发医生仅可在其家乡以外500英里以上的地区使用"前后对比"照片,但不得在指定区域内使用

• an expert in human sexuality who granted a license to TLC company to use the expert’s identity in promoting sex education videos did not also give permission to TLC to grant a sub-license to TEI company to use plaintiff’s identity in distributing the videos along side sexually explicit videos and products
一位人类性学专家授权TLC公司使用其身份推广性教育视频,但并未授权TLC公司再授权TEI公司使用原告的身份,将视频与色情视频和产品一起发行。

However, an employee’s consent to his or her employer’s use of a photo in an inhouse magazine was held to include consent to use the photo in general advertising to the public. And a professional model’s consent to her agent to use her photo in advertising promotions was held to include entering the model in a promotional beauty contest and having a newspaper advertise the fact.
然而,员工同意雇主在内部杂志中使用其照片,即视为同意在一般广告中向公众使用该照片。专业模特同意其经纪人使用其照片进行广告宣传,即视为同意参加美容比赛,并同意在报纸上刊登广告。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:28 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

B. Scope of Activities Permitted in a License

§ 10:28. Scope of licenses—Examples of limitations in licenses—Product line
§ 10:28. 许可范围——许可限制示例——产品线

For obvious commercial reasons, both the personality and the licensee may desire a license that is exclusive to a defined product line. Only occasionally has a licensor disputed its licensee’s use as exceeding the product line scope of the license.
出于显而易见的商业原因,被许可方可能希望获得针对特定产品线的独家许可。只有极少数情况下,许可方会因被许可方超出许可的产品线范围而提出异议。

In one such case, baseball player Orlando Cepeda had licensed the Wilson Sporting Goods Company to use his identity in connection with the sale of baseballs and baseball equipment. Cepeda claimed that Wilson exceeded this product line scope by selling baseballs to the Swift company to use in a promotional campaign under which purchasers of Swift meat products could send in a wrapper and obtain an “Orlando Cepeda baseball” for one dollar. The Swift ad campaign featured Cepeda’s name and picture but did not convey any false message that Cepeda endorsed Swift meat products. While Wilson paid Cepeda royalties based upon the sales through Swift, Cepeda objected to this use as outside the scope of the license to Wilson. Applying normal rules of contract interpretation, the court held that the contract contained no limitation on the manner in which Wilson baseballs could be advertised or sold. The court refused to read any additional restrictions into the otherwise unambiguous terms of the license contract.
在其中一个案例中,棒球运动员奥兰多·塞佩达授权威尔逊体育用品公司使用他的身份来销售棒球和棒球装备。塞佩达声称威尔逊公司超出了产品线的范围,将棒球出售给斯威夫特公司用于促销活动,购买斯威夫特肉类产品的顾客可以寄来包装纸,花一美元购买"奥兰多·塞佩达棒球"。斯威夫特的广告宣传中使用了塞佩达的名字和图片,但没有传达任何虚假信息,即塞佩达认可斯威夫特的肉类产品。虽然威尔逊公司根据斯威夫特的销售情况向塞佩达支付了版税,但塞佩达反对这种使用,认为这超出了威尔逊公司的许可范围。根据正常的合同解释规则,法院认为合同中并未限制威尔逊棒球广告或销售的方式。法院拒绝在许可合同中原本明确的条款中加入任何额外的限制。

In another example, the exclusive licensee of the right to use the name “Michael Jordan” on a restaurant in the Chicago area was held to have standing to sue the licensor’s organization for granting another such license in the same trade area.
另一个例子是,芝加哥地区一家餐厅独家获得了"迈克尔·乔丹"的名称使用权,该餐厅有权起诉许可方组织在同一贸易区域授予另一家餐厅类似许可。

Former Harlem Globetrotter Meadowlark Lemon’s contract with the Globetrotters provided that the team owner could use his name and number forever, provided that the use was the same as that which occurred while he played for the team. Lemon sued the team owner for infringement arising out of the sale through retail outlets clothing bearing his name and number because there had been no such merchandising during his tenure with the team. That is, the accused sales were outside the scope of the license. He recovered an award of almost $784,000 for profits from the sale of the infringing clothing.
前哈林篮球队队员梅多拉克·莱蒙与篮球队签订的合同规定,只要使用方式与他在篮球队效力时相同,球队老板就可以永久使用他的名字和号码。莱蒙起诉球队老板侵犯了他的权益,因为球队老板通过零售店出售印有他名字和号码的服装,而他在球队效力期间从未有过此类商品。也就是说,被告的销售行为超出了许可范围。他因出售侵权服装获利,获得了近784,000美元的赔偿。

Even more recently, a federal court in California confronted a situation where the son of jazz legend Thelonious Monk, acting on behalf of Monk’s estate, granted an oral license to a brewery to use Monk’s name and image in connection with sales of a Trappist Ale sold under the name BROTHER THELONIOUS. The license required the brewery to donate a portion of the proceeds realized from sales to the Thelonious Monk Institute of Jazz. The license allegedly did not cover the sale of additional promotional merchandise and the parties got into a dispute when the brewery began selling such items. Eventually the younger Monk informed the brewery that the license was terminated but the brewery nonetheless continued to use the name and image of the older Monk. Applying New Jersey law the court found that the allegation of termination was sufficient to preclude summary judgment for the defendant.
最近,加利福尼亚州的一家联邦法院审理了一起案件,爵士乐传奇人物塞隆尼斯·蒙克(Thelonious Monk)的儿子代表蒙克遗产,向一家啤酒厂授予了口头许可,允许其在销售以"兄弟塞隆尼斯"(BROTHER THELONIOUS)为名的特拉普啤酒时使用蒙克的名字和形象。该许可要求啤酒厂将销售所得的一部分捐赠给塞隆尼斯·蒙克爵士乐研究所。据称,该许可并不涵盖额外促销商品的出售,当啤酒厂开始销售此类商品时,双方产生了纠纷。最终,小蒙克通知啤酒厂终止许可,但啤酒厂仍继续使用老蒙克的名字和形象。法院适用新泽西州法律,认定终止许可的指控足以排除对被告的即决判决。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:29 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

C. Oral and Written Licenses

§ 10:29. Oral and written licenses and termination
§ 10:29. 口头和书面许可以及终止

Synopsis:

The privacy and publicity statutes of some states require that a consent or license be in writing. In New York, which has a requirement of a writing, the courts hold that an oral or implied consent, while not a complete defense, may be pleaded in mitigation of damages. Other state statutes expressly or by implication permit oral consents and licenses. There is a split of authority as to whether a gratuitous license can be terminated at any time regardless of the licensee’s detrimental reliance.
某些州的隐私和公开法规要求以书面形式表示同意或授权。在纽约州,虽然要求以书面形式表示同意,但法院认为口头或暗示同意虽然不能完全作为辩护理由,但可以作为减轻损害的请求。其他州的法规明确或暗示允许口头同意和授权。对于无偿授权是否可以在任何时候终止,而不考虑被授权人的不利依赖,存在不同的权威意见。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:30 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

C. Oral and Written Licenses

§ 10:30. Oral and written licenses and termination—Is a writing required?
§ 10:30. 口头和书面许可及终止——需要书面形式吗?

Oral and Written Consents and Licenses. The privacy and publicity statutes of several states require that a consent or license of the statutory right must be in writing. The statutes of some states simply state that a “consent” is necessary, indicating that it may be either written, oral or implied. The statutes of Florida and Washington expressly permit “written or oral” consent.
口头和书面同意与许可。 多个州的隐私和公开法规要求法定权利的同意或许可必须以书面形式提出。 一些州的法规仅规定"同意"是必要的,并指出同意可以是书面、口头或暗示的形式。 佛罗里达州和华盛顿州的法规明确允许"书面或口头"同意。

New York. In New York, the statute specifies a written consent and there are no common law rights of privacy or publicity—the statutory rights are the exclusive source of such legal protection. However, it was early held in New York that if an oral consent from a public figure was proven, there was at most a technical violation of the statutory rights and only nominal damages of six cents would be awarded.
纽约。在纽约,法律规定必须获得书面同意,且不存在普通法中的隐私权或公开权——法定权利是此类法律保护的唯一来源。然而,纽约早期曾裁定,如果能够证明公众人物曾口头同意,则最多只能算是技术性侵犯法定权利,且只能获得象征性的六美分赔偿。

In 1963, the New York Appellate Division, First Department, was squarely presented with the effect of an oral consent. The majority adhered to the rule that oral consent is not a complete defense: it is only a partial defense in mitigation of damages. This prompted a strong dissent by Justice Steuer, who argued that the traditional New York rule indulged in “the easy process of skimming the words of the law without looking for any deeper meaning.” Justice Steuer argued that the purpose of the statutory requirement of a “writing” was only to clearly evidence a consent to invasion of privacy or publicity rights such that if an oral consent was clear on the facts, that should control:
1963年,纽约上诉法院第一庭正式提出了口头同意的效力。多数法官坚持认为,口头同意不能作为完全抗辩:它只是减轻损害的部分抗辩。Justice Steuer对此表示强烈反对,他认为,传统的纽约规则放任"草草浏览法律条文,不求深意"的简单做法。Justice Steuer认为,法律要求"书面形式"的目的只是为了明确证明同意侵犯隐私权或公开权,因此,如果口头同意的事实明确,则应以此为准:

[I]f a question of consent is raised the issue must be resolved against the user unless he can prove it by a writing. The substantive question, however, still remains—was the use authorized. To change this question to whether there was a writing perverts the purpose of the statute, allows the written word to negate the statutory intent, and, in the classic phrase, makes a sword out of a shield. The purpose of the writing is to prevent a fraud. To stress the writing and ignore the consent is to effectuate a fraud.
如果出现是否同意的问题,除非用户能够提供书面证明,否则必须以用户为准。然而,实质性问题仍然存在——使用是否得到授权。将这个问题改为是否有书面文件,会扭曲法规的目的,允许书面文件否定法规的意图,用一句经典的话来说,就是"以盾为剑"。书面文件的目的是防止欺诈。强调书面文件而忽视同意,就是实施欺诈。

Notwithstanding Justice Steuer’s argument, later New York decisions have adhered to the traditional rule that an oral consent is only a partial defense in mitigation of damages. A written consent or license cannot be orally modified to avoid liability.
尽管Justice Steuer提出了上述观点,但纽约州后来的判决仍坚持了传统规则,即口头同意只是减轻损害的部分抗辩。书面同意或许可不能通过口头修改来规避责任。

New York courts have similarly applied the same rule as to a consent implied by conduct and estoppel.
纽约法院同样对行为暗示的同意和不容反悔适用了相同的规则。

Under New York law, it is not necessary that the written consent satisfy the requisites of an enforceable contract.
根据纽约法律,书面同意无需满足可执行合同的要求。

Ohio. Because Ohio § 2741.02(B) requires that a consent be written, an employer cannot rely upon an implied consent to use an employee’s identity in advertising.
俄亥俄州。根据俄亥俄州第2741.02(B)条的规定,雇主不得以默许为由在广告中使用员工的身份信息。

Consent by Electronic Methods. The federal court in Illinois held that the Illinois Right of Publicity Act’s requirement of a “written consent” was satisfied when a smartphone user agreed to use of his or her personal name by clicking the appropriate response. The smartphone app “Ever” allowed storing, editing and sharing of photos. The app asked the user for permission to access the user’s contacts so the app could send invitations to those persons to also use the app. The text message to persons on the contact list said: “[user name] just recommended you check out your photos on Ever.” Plaintiff brought a class action claiming this was a use of his name in a commercial promotion in violation of the Illinois statute. The federal court dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that the app user was fully informed and consented to this use of his name.
电子方式同意。伊利诺伊州联邦法院认为,当智能手机用户点击相应的回复,同意使用其个人姓名时,即满足了《伊利诺伊州公开权法案》中"书面同意"的要求。智能手机应用程序"Ever"允许存储、编辑和分享照片。该应用程序要求用户允许其访问用户的联系人,以便向这些人发送邀请,邀请他们使用该应用程序。发送给联系人列表中人员的短信内容如下:"[用户名]刚刚推荐您查看您在Ever上的照片。"原告提起集体诉讼,声称这是在商业推广中使用其姓名,违反了伊利诺伊州的法规。联邦法院根据第12(b)(6)条动议驳回了诉讼,认为应用程序用户完全知情并同意使用其姓名。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:31 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

D. Informal and Implied Licenses

§ 10:31. Gratuitous licenses, termination and estoppel
§ 10:31. 免费许可、终止和禁止反言

Having given an informal free license to use one’s identity in advertising, can the licensor unilaterally terminate the license after the licensee has relied to its detriment? The answer turns upon whether a court will apply the concept of estoppel.
在广告中使用个人身份的非正式免费许可,许可方是否可以在被许可方依赖该许可而遭受损失后单方面终止许可?答案取决于法院是否适用不容反悔的概念。

The Restatement of Torts equivocates on this issue, reciting simply that: “Upon termination of consent its effectiveness is terminated, except as it may have become irrevocable by contract or otherwise, or except as its terms may include, expressly or by implication, a privilege to continue to act.” The Restatement of Unfair Competition states that “[u]nless irrevocable, consent is terminated when the user knows or has reason to know that the other is no longer willing to permit the particular use.” It explains that a person may be precluded from terminating a consent to use if the termination would be “inequitable because of the user’s reliance” in light of the specific terms, if any, of the license.
《侵权法重述》在这个问题上模棱两可,只是简单地陈述道:"在同意终止时,其效力也随之终止,除非该同意因合同或其他原因而不可撤销,或者其条款明示或暗示地包含继续行事的特权。"《不正当竞争法重述》指出:"除非不可撤销,否则当用户知道或有

In some cases where the issue of termination of an informal or implied consent for no payment is not expressly argued, the courts appear to assume that the consent is perpetual and cannot be revoked.
在某些情况下,如果未明确争论终止非正式或暗示同意不付款的问题,法院似乎会认为同意是永久性的,不能撤销。

Cases directly addressing the issue of termination are split. In an early New York case, the court held that even a written gratuitous license could be revoked at any time. In 1909, performer Mary Garden expressly and in writing permitted defendant to use her name as the trademark for a formulation of perfume. Defendant continued to sell “Parfum Mary Garden” for 20 years, investing considerable amounts in its advertising and promotion. For undisclosed reasons, 24 years later, in 1933, Mary Garden revoked her license and sued the perfume company for using her name without her permission. The court held that her permission was no more than a “gratuitous license” revocable at any time regardless of detrimental reliance by the licensee. The New York court found for plaintiff and enjoined defendant from further use of the name. The court said that by not negotiating detailed terms, the perfume company had assumed the risk that the license could unilaterally be ended at any time Mary Garden desired.
直接涉及终止问题的案例被分成了几类。在纽约早期的一起案例中,法院认为,即使是书面无偿许可也可以随时撤销。1909年,表演者玛丽·加登以书面形式明确允许被告将其名字用作香水配方的商标。被告继续销售"玛丽·加登香水"长达20年,并投入了大量资金用于广告和推广。24年后,即1933年,玛丽·加登撤销了许可,并起诉香水公司未经许可使用其名字。法院认为,她的许可只是一份"无偿许可",可以随时撤销,无论被许可方是否因此遭受损失。纽约法院支持原告,并禁止被告继续使用该名字。法院表示,由于没有详细协商条款,香水公司承担了风险,即玛丽·加登可以随时单方面终止许可。

The Mary Garden decision was followed many years later in a case where Richard Butkus, a famous former football player, consented for an Athletic Club to federally register BUTKUS AWARD as a mark for an annual football award. Butkus later revoked the consent. The court rejected the Club’s argument that its ownership of the mark was a defense to Butkus’ right of publicity infringement claim. The court granted summary judgment of right of publicity infringement to Butkus.
多年后,在著名前足球运动员理查德·布特库斯(Richard Butkus)同意某体育俱乐部将"布特库斯奖"(BUTKUS AWARD)作为年度足球奖项的标志进行联邦注册后,法院做出了与玛丽花园案类似的判决。但布特库斯后来撤销了同意。法院驳回了俱乐部关于其对该商标的所有权是对布特库斯侵犯公开权行为的抗辩claim。法院对布特库斯侵犯公开权的行为做出了即决判决。

A different result was reached by the Supreme Court of Georgia in similar circumstances. W.W. Sims granted defendant an oral and gratuitous license to use his name as the trade name of a chain of retail stores. This was part of an arrangement with defendant under which Sims was to operate some of the stores as a manager. After the parties had a falling out and Sims ceased to manage the stores, Sims sued to prevent the continuing use of the trade name “Sims Service Stores.” Sims’ invasion of privacy claim was rejected, the court finding that he had expressly consented to the use of his surname in defendant’s trade name. The Georgia court rejected the argument that the consent and license were revocable, holding that once the licensee has incurred expense in reliance upon the license, the license becomes irrevocable.
佐治亚州最高法院在类似情况下得出了不同的结果。W.W. Sims口头免费授权被告使用其名字作为连锁零售店的商标。这是与被告达成的协议的一部分,根据协议,Sims将作为经理经营其中一些商店。在双方发生争执且Sims不再管理这些商店后,Sims起诉阻止被告继续使用"Sims Service Stores"商标。法院驳回了Sims侵犯隐私权的指控,认定他已明确同意被告在其商标中使用其姓氏。佐治亚州法院驳回了被告关于同意和授权可撤销的论点,认为一旦被授权人根据授权承担了费用,授权即不可撤销。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:32 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

D. Informal and Implied Licenses

§ 10:32. Implied licenses and estoppel

Synopsis:

A license or consent may be implied from a course of conduct or the total context of facts which gives rise to a clear message of permission to use one’s identity in a certain form and context of commercial use. Actions may speak louder than words, and action, or even inaction, may convey a message of license and consent, albeit a limited one. However, the mere fact that plaintiff has voluntarily publicized him- or herself as a “public figure” is no “waiver” of the right to assert infringement of privacy or publicity rights as against one who makes an unpermitted use of identity in a commercial or advertising use.
从一系列行为或事实的整体背景中可以推断出许可或同意,从而明确传达出允许在特定形式和商业用途中使用个人身份的信息。行动胜于雄辩,行动或甚至是不作为都可以传达出许可和同意的信息,尽管这种信息是有限的。然而,原告自愿公开其"公众人物"身份,并不能"放弃"对未经许可在商业或广告中使用其身份的人主张侵犯隐私权或公开权。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:33 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

D. Informal and Implied Licenses

§ 10:33. Implied licenses and estoppel—Consent and license implied from conduct
§ 10:33. 默示许可和禁止反言——从行为中推断出的同意和许可

Implied Consent and License. Consent to the use of personal identity can be implied from conduct or inaction that is reasonably interpreted as evidencing consent. In some circumstances, the line between an “oral consent” and a consent implied from conduct will be subtle indeed. It may depend largely upon the credibility of witnesses to the event and their temptation consciously or subconsciously to shade their memory of the critical events and words.
默示同意和许可。个人身份的使用可以通过行为或不作为来暗示,这些行为或不作为可以被合理地解释为同意的证据。在某些情况下,"口头同意"和通过行为暗示的同意之间的界限确实很微妙。这主要取决于事件证人的可信度,以及他们有意或无意地歪曲对关键事件和话语的记忆。

For example, where a noncelebrity casually and gratuitously “consents” to use of his or her identity in advertising, the consent may rest on a mixture of words, consent and conduct seasoned by elements of “estoppel.” In such cases, while a court may find that a person casually consented, it may also narrowly construe the scope of the consent. Imagine, for instance, that a person who is involved in an event of public interest is asked by a newspaper photographer, “Will you step over here so I can take your picture?” If this is a consent to anything, it is only a consent to the newspaper to voluntarily pose to illustrate a newsworthy item. It is certainly not a consent to others to use the photo in an advertisement. On the other hand, where a party gives another an ambiguous permission to use his or her image broadly, a court may require that plaintiff to show that a challenged use was specifically outside the scope of consent. The grantor, in other words has to show that the limitation on use was communicated in a way that “would cause a reasonable person to believe that there was no consent.”
例如,当一位非名人随意且无偿地"同意"在广告中使用其身份时,这种同意可能基于"禁止反言"因素的混合,包括言语、同意和行为。在这种情况下,虽然法院可能会认定某人随意地表示了同意,但法院也可能对同意的范围进行狭义解释。例如,假设一位参与公共活动的人被一位报社摄影师问到:"你能过来一下吗,我想给你拍张照?"如果这算是一种同意,那也仅仅是同意自愿摆姿势以说明新闻价值。这当然不是同意他人将照片用于广告。另一方面,如果一方含糊地允许另一方广泛使用其形象,法院可能会要求原告证明被质疑的使用行为明确超出了同意的范围。换言之,授予者必须证明,对使用的限制是以"会使一个理性的人认为没有同意"的方式传达的。

Implied License to Use Name of Creative Person in Connection with Their Work. A creative person, such as an artist or author, who sells their work impliedly consents to the use of their name to market the work. The general rule is that it is permissible to use the name of an author or artist to correctly and truthfully identify works created by that person. For example, the federal court in Missouri held that a retail dealer in jewelry had an implied license to sell the goods on the Internet using the name of the jewelry designer.
与作品相关的创作者姓名使用许可。艺术家或作家等创作者在出售其作品时,即默示同意使用其姓名进行作品营销。一般规则是,允许使用作者或艺术家的姓名来正确、真实地识别其创作的作品。例如,密苏里州联邦法院认为,珠宝零售商拥有使用珠宝设计师姓名在互联网上销售商品的默示许可。

Employer’s Use of Employee’s Identity. Another example of a casual implied consent often arises in an employer’s use of an employee’s name in advertising for the company. For example, a sheet metal worker in a Boeing Airplane factory was asked by his foreman if he would step over and have his photograph taken working on a B-47 airplane. The worker agreed and the photos were taken. The employee’s coworkers all thought that the photos might be used in Boeing’s weekly employee magazine. The worker did not inquire further and forgot about the matter. The photos were posted on bulletin boards in the factory and the worker made no objection. However, when the photo appeared as part of a Boeing advertisement in nationally distributed publications, the worker sued Boeing, claiming he should be paid. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the worker had impliedly consented to having his photo taken and used for advertising for his employer.
雇主使用员工身份。另一个常见的随意默示同意的例子是雇主在公司的广告中使用员工的名字。例如,波音飞机工厂的一名钣金工被他的工头要求走到B-47飞机旁拍照。该员工同意了,照片也照了。该员工的同事都认为这些照片可能会出现在波音公司的每周员工杂志上。该员工没有进一步询问,也就忘了这件事。这些照片被张贴在工厂的公告板上,该员工也没有提出异议。然而,当这些照片作为波音广告的一部分出现在全国发行的出版物上时,该员工起诉波音公司,声称他应该得到报酬。堪萨斯州最高法院认为,该员工已经默示同意了他的照片被拍摄并用于雇主广告。

In such cases of implied consent, the critical issue is not consent to some kind of use, which may be readily implied, but to the scope of the implied consent.
在默示同意的情况下,关键问题不是对某种可能很容易默示的使用的同意,而是对默示同意的范围的同意。

In such employer-employee situations, other courts have taken varying positions on the existence and scope of implied consent.
在其他涉及雇主和雇员关系的案件中,其他法院对默示同意的存在和范围持不同立场。

The New York Rule. Feeling constricted by the New York statute requiring a written consent, the New York courts have taken the position that while consent from estoppel by conduct is not an absolute defense, it is relevant to mitigate damages. The New York courts apparently take the same position as to an alleged general custom and usage in an industry which implies consent.
纽约规则。纽约法规要求书面同意,这令纽约法院感到束手束脚,因此法院认为,虽然行为不容反悔原则下的同意并非绝对抗辩,但有助于减轻损害。对于暗示同意的行业惯例,纽约法院显然持相同立场。

Estoppel and Acquiescence. While estoppel is relatively undeveloped in the case law of privacy and publicity rights, there appears to be no reason why the familiar legal concept of “estoppel” would not provide a defense if the elements of estoppel are proven. Dobbs has listed the elements:
不容反悔和默认。尽管在隐私权和公开权的判例法中,不容反悔原则相对不成熟,但似乎没有理由认为,如果不容反悔的要素得到证实,那么人们所熟知的"不容反悔"法律概念不能提供辩护。多布斯列出了这些要素:

An estoppel case … has three important elements. The actor, who usually must have knowledge of the true facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or silence. The other relies upon that communication. And the other would be harmed materially if the actor is later permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct.
不容反悔的情况……有三个重要因素。行为人通常必须了解真实情况,却通过言语、行为或沉默以误导的方式传达某些信息。他人依赖该信息行事。如果行为人后来被允许做出与其先前行为不一致的任何claim行为,则他人将受到实质性损害。

”Acquiescence” is sometimes used as a label for cases where the plaintiff, by affirmative word or action, conveys a message of consent to another. One who is aware that another is making commercial use of one’s identity, and stands silently by or even assists in some way while another expends effort and money, may well be estopped by “acquiescence” from later coming to life and suing. The law is not so ossified as not to recognize that “A knowing wink can mean more than words.” Acquiescence is subtly different from estoppel by “laches,” which denotes a merely passive consent implied from a long failure to object coupled with prejudicial reliance by the defendant. Many decisions blend together the concepts of laches, estoppel and acquiescence to reach an equitable result. As one court observed in a trademark case:
"默许"有时被用来描述原告通过肯定的话语或行为向他人传达同意的信息。如果某人知道他人正在利用自己的身份进行商业活动,却默不作声,甚至以某种方式协助他人,而后者却花费了精力和金钱,那么此人很可能因"默许"而丧失日后提起诉讼的权利。法律并非一成不变,它承认"一个善意的暗示比言语更有意义"。默许与因"怠于行使权利"而产生的禁止反悔有细微差别,后者仅指被告长期不反对并产生偏见,从而暗示被动同意。许多判决将怠于行使权利、禁止反悔和默许的概念混为一谈,以达成公平的结果。正如一家法院在商标案件中指出的:

In order to find that a claimant’s … interminable inactivity or negligence has swollen to the level of disabling laches or estoppel, his delay must be an inexcusable one that has consequently prejudiced an innocent user …. By the mechanics of this precept, equity comes to the aid of an innocent user and grants him refuge from a claimant who has calmly folded his hands and remained silent while the innocent user has exploited and strengthened his mark… One who is estopped may be merely the hapless victim of his own lethargy. Estoppel, then, is synonymous with apparent or implied acquiescence.
为了证明原告……无休止的不作为或疏忽已经发展到不可抗辩或不容反悔的程度,其延迟必须是无可原谅的,并因此损害了无辜用户的利益……根据这一规则,公平原则会帮助无辜用户,使其免受原告的侵害。原告在无辜用户利用并巩固其商标时,却袖手旁观,保持沉默……被禁止反悔的人可能只是自己无精打采的倒霉受害者。因此,禁止反悔等同于明示或暗示的默认。

Posing for Publicity Photos. When an entertainer voluntarily poses for publicity photographs the copyright in which is owned by the photographer, does this constitute an implied license of the right of publicity to use the photos for commercial purposes, such as in posters? While each situation will present different facts, the First Circuit court of appeals agreed that “by authorizing photographs, a performer does not, without more, license their commercial use.” A Florida decision found that selling a photograph of oneself, knowing that the buyer will use it in an advertisement, is an implied consent to such use.
为宣传照片摆姿势。当一名艺人自愿为宣传照片摆姿势时,照片的版权归摄影师所有,这是否意味着默许了将照片用于商业目的(如海报)的权利?虽然每种情况都有不同的事实,但第一巡回上诉法院认为,"通过授权照片,表演者并没有授权将其用于商业用途。"佛罗里达州的一项判决认为,在明知买家将照片用于广告的情况下出售自己的照片,即默许了这种用途。

Non-Celebrity Consents to a Videotape but Not a Photograph. The Georgia Supreme Court held that by consenting to being videotaped in a public place by a stranger, that person does not thereby also consent to a still photo being used to advertise a compilation of similar videos. “[S]uch consent would not be the equivalent of consenting to have one’s image placed on the cover of the packaging of a commercially distributed video tape ….”
非名人同意录像但不许拍照。佐治亚州最高法院认为,同意陌生人公开录像,并不意味着也同意将照片用于类似录像的汇编广告。"这种同意并不等同于同意将自己的形象印在商业发行的录像带的包装盒上……"

The Shirley Jones Precedent: Implied Consent from Posing for Photos. Actress Shirley Jones sued the Corbis photo archive for using her name and picture in online sample images used by Corbis to sell copyright licenses for “red carpet” photos of her along with the millions of other images in the Corbis library. The federal court in Los Angles, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, held that by consenting to photos at various red carpet events, Jones consented to the sale and distribution of the photos. This consent included the use of her name and image by a third party such as Corbis in marketing the photographs: “It is undisputed that Plaintiff voluntarily posed for photographers, who she knew would display her images to prospective buyers, for over 40 years without objection. It was well understood in the entertainment industry that potential customers would not purchase images they could not see before the purchase.”
雪莉·琼斯先例:摆拍照片的默示同意。女演员雪莉·琼斯起诉Corbis图片库,理由是Corbis在出售版权许可时,将她的名字和照片用于在线示例图片,与Corbis图库中数百万张其他图片一起出售她走红地毯的照片。洛杉矶联邦法院经第九巡回法院确认,认定琼斯同意在各种走红地毯活动中拍照,即表示同意出售和分发这些照片。这种同意包括第三方(如Corbis)在营销照片时使用她的名字和形象:"毫无疑问,原告自愿为摄影师摆拍,她知道摄影师会将她的照片展示给潜在买家,而且40多年来从未提出异议。在娱乐行业,人们深知潜在客户不会购买他们无法在购买前看到的图片。"

Invoking the Shirley Jones precedent, the federal court in New Jersey held that by voluntarily appearing as a teacher in a Tai Chi training video, plaintiff impliedly consented to the use of her identity in commercializing the video.
新泽西州联邦法院援引雪莉·琼斯案的先例,认为原告自愿在太极拳培训视频中担任教师,即默示同意在视频商业化过程中使用其身份。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:34 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

D. Informal and Implied Licenses

§ 10:34. Implied licenses and estoppel—Fame is not an implied license to infringe the right of publicity
§ 10:34。默示许可和禁止反言——名气不是侵犯公开权的默示许可

That the plaintiff has the status of “celebrity” or “public figure” is not an implied “waiver” of the right to sue for infringement of the right to publicity. To argue that the right of publicity is “waived” by the plaintiff’s celebrity status is a non sequitur resulting from confusion between some types of “privacy” and the right of publicity. As Nimmer observed in his seminal article: “There must be no waiver of the right [of publicity] by reason of the plaintiff being a well known personality. Indeed, the right usually becomes important only when the plaintiff (or potential plaintiff) has achieved in some degree a celebrated status.”
原告具有"名人"或"公众人物"的身份,并不意味着其"放弃"对侵犯公开权的行为提起诉讼的权利。认为原告的名人身份"放弃"了公开权,这是将某些类型的"隐私"与公开权混为一谈,是不恰当的。正如Nimmer在其开创性文章中所指出的:"不能因为原告是知名人士而放弃[公开]权。事实上,只有在原告(或潜在原告)在某种程度上获得了知名人士的身份时,这项权利才会变得重要。"

When a plaintiff asserts invasion of privacy by public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, the fame of the plaintiff is sometimes used in balancing the public’s right “to know” against the plaintiff’s right to privacy. Some courts mistakenly refer to this balancing as a “waiver” of plaintiff’s right of privacy. However, even celebrity status does not remove any and all such protection against public divulgence of private facts. Further, celebrity status is not a “waiver” of the right to prevent either unwarranted physical intrusion or placing plaintiff in a false light.
当原告声称因公开披露令人尴尬的隐私而侵犯其隐私权时,有时会利用原告的名声来平衡公众的"知情权"与原告的隐私权。一些法院错误地将这种平衡称为原告隐私权的"放弃"。然而,即使名人身份也不能免除任何和所有针对公开披露隐私的保护。此外,名人身份也不是对防止无理的身体侵犯或使原告陷入虚假境地的权利的"放弃"。

Some early cases implied that when a “celebrity” asserted invasion of “privacy” by the unpermitted commercial use of identity, there could be no indignity caused by such a use, characterizing the situation as plaintiff’s “waiver” of such a type of privacy. As Denicola has observed:
一些早期的案例表明,当"名人"声称未经许可的商业使用身份侵犯了"隐私"时,这种使用不会造成任何侮辱,这种情况可视为原告"放弃"了此类隐私。正如德尼科拉所言:

To some it seemed incongruous for celebrities whose livelihood depended upon not being left alone to invoke a right to privacy when their name or likeness was appropriated and many decisions held that such personalities had “waived” their rights under the doctrine …. Remedies linked to mental distress clearly were inadequate when the real complaint was uncompensated, rather than unwelcome, publicity.
对于某些人来说,当他们的名字或肖像被滥用时,他们无法单独行使隐私权,这似乎与名人的生活格格不入,许多判决认为这些名人已经根据学说"放弃了"他们的权利……当真正的complaint是未获补偿的,而不是不受欢迎的宣传时,与精神困扰相关的补救措施显然是不够的。

Modern decisions recognize that while the normal unpermitted advertising use of identity will probably not cause indignity and mental distress to a celebrity, offensive or degrading use can cause an invasion of traditional “privacy” rights.
现代决策者认识到,虽然未经许可的正常广告使用身份信息可能不会给名人带来侮辱和精神困扰,但冒犯性或有辱人格的使用可能会侵犯传统的"隐私"权。

Modern decisions have often rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s “celebrity” status constitutes some kind of “implied waiver” of the right to sue for the commercial value of identity—for infringement of the right of publicity. As Judge Neville observed in a case involving the unpermitted commercial use of the identities of baseball players:
现代的判决通常会拒绝原告"名人"身份构成某种"默示放弃"起诉身份商业价值侵权的权利的论点。正如内维尔法官在涉及未经许可的商业使用棒球运动员身份的案件中所指出的:

Defendants’ contention has no merit that by publication in the news media and because of the ready availability to anyone of the names and statistical information concerning the players, such information is in the public domain and the players have waived their rights to relief in this case. Such argument may or may not have some weight against a right of privacy claim, but in an appropriation action such as in the case at bar the names and statistics are valuable only because of their past public disclosure, publicity and circulation. A name is commercially valuable as an endorsement of a product or for use for financial gain only because the public recognizes it and attributes good will and feats of skill or accomplishments of one sort or another to that personality. To hold that such publicity destroys a right to sue for appropriation of a name or likeness would negate any and all causes of action, for only by disclosure and public acceptance does the name of a celebrity have any value at all to make its unauthorized use enjoinable.
被告的论点没有法律依据,因为这些信息在新闻媒体上公开发布,任何人都可以轻松获取球员姓名和统计信息,这些信息属于公共领域,且球员已放弃在本案中寻求救济的权利。这种论点可能对隐私权claim有一定影响,也可能没有影响,但在本案这种侵占行为中,姓名和统计信息之所以有价值,只是因为它们过去曾被公开披露、宣传和传播。一个名字作为产品代言或用于获取经济利益,之所以具有商业价值,只是因为公众认可它,并将good will以及各种技能或成就归因于该名人。如果认为这种公开宣传会破坏对侵占姓名或肖像提起诉讼的权利,那么任何诉讼理由都将无效,因为只有通过披露和公众认可,名人的名字才具有任何价值,才能禁止未经授权的使用。

Similarly, Judge Stewart rejected the argument that because the comedians Laurel and Hardy were public figures they should have no right to prevent unauthorized commercial use of their identities:
同样,斯图尔特法官驳回了喜剧演员劳雷尔和哈代是公众人物,因此无权阻止未经授权的商业使用其身份的说法:

[D]efendant … appears to argue obliquely that Laurel and Hardy by becoming “public figures” waived any rights they might have had. The argument, which fails because of defendants’ confusion between the right of publicity and the right of privacy, is that a public figure has no right of privacy …. These cases, which conclude that public figures essentially have no right of privacy in the context of First Amendment freedoms of speech and press, are inapposite here.
被告……似乎在间接地辩称,劳莱与哈台成为"公众人物"后,就放弃了他们可能拥有的一切权利。这种说法是站不住脚的,因为被告混淆了公开权和隐私权,认为公众人物没有隐私权……这些案例的结论是,在言论自由和新闻自由的第一修正案背景下,公众人物基本上没有隐私权,但在这里并不适用。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:35 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

E. Use by Licensee Outside the Scope of the License
E. 许可使用人在许可范围外使用

§ 10:35. Use outside scope of license

Synopsis:

Use by a licensee outside the scope of a license or consent can constitute invasion of privacy or infringement of the right of publicity as well as breach of the license contract. Substantial alteration or modification of the format of the licensed use may constitute invasion of publicity and privacy rights notwithstanding a relatively unrestricted license or consent.
被许可人在许可或同意范围外使用,可能构成侵犯隐私权或公开权,以及违反许可合同。即使许可或同意相对宽松,实质性改变或修改许可使用的形式也可能构成侵犯公开权和隐私权。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:36 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

E. Use by Licensee Outside the Scope of the License
E. 许可使用人在许可范围外使用

§ 10:36. Use outside scope of license—Use by licensee outside the scope of the license constitutes infringement
§ 10:36. 许可范围外使用——被许可人在许可范围外使用构成侵权

It is clear that use by a licensee which is outside the defined scope of the license not only constitutes breach of the license contract, it also gives rise to an action by the licensor for invasion of privacy or infringement of the right of publicity. The Restatement agrees.
显然,被许可方在许可范围之外使用许可不仅构成违反许可合同,还会导致许可方以侵犯隐私或侵害公开权为由提起诉讼。《重述》对此表示赞同。

A continued use of identity beyond the scope permitted in a consent or license is both a breach of contract and a violation of the New York privacy and publicity rights.
在同意或许可范围之外继续使用身份既违反合同,也侵犯了纽约州的隐私权和公开权。

This rule that use outside of the scope of a license constitutes infringement is similarly followed in the law governing both trademark and copyright licenses.
在商标和版权许可的法律中,同样遵循了超出许可范围使用即构成侵权的规定。

It has been suggested in dictum that a licensee who grants a sublicense outside the scope of the licensee’s contractual rights may be a contributory infringer, liable to an exclusive licensee whose exclusive publicity rights are invaded.
有意见认为,被许可人在其合同权利范围之外授予次级许可,可能构成共同侵权,侵犯独家被许可人的独家宣传权,应承担赔偿责任。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:37 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

E. Use by Licensee Outside the Scope of the License
E. 许可使用人在许可范围外使用

§ 10:37. Use outside scope of license—Licensee changes in content or format of identity
§ 10:37. 许可范围外使用——被许可方变更身份信息或格式

A licensee’s use outside of a context of use restriction in a license will constitute both breach of contract and infringement of publicity or privacy rights. However, even if the licensee stays within the restrictions in the license, the license is exceeded if the licensee makes a significant change in the substance of the particular use which is licensed.
被许可方在许可限制范围之外使用许可将构成违约以及侵犯公开权或隐私权。然而,即使被许可方遵守许可限制,但如果被许可方对许可的特定用途进行重大实质性变更,则仍构成违约。

For example, if a person writes an essay for a promotional contest, wins a prize and signs a license permitting the essay and name and picture to be used in advertising, the license is exceeded if the advertiser substantially changes the content of the essay used in advertising. In such a case, defendant, a company selling electrolysis equipment, sponsored a contest with prizes to be awarded to the writers of the best letters on the subject of “Why I Am Glad I Chose Electrolysis as a Career.” Plaintiff, a professional electrologist, wrote a letter entry and won first prize. Plaintiff executed a written license or consent to the company permitting publication in the company’s magazine of plaintiff’s letter and her photograph. However, when plaintiff’s letter was published in defendant’s magazine, it had been altered in several ways to convey the false impression that plaintiff endorsed defendant’s brand of electrolysis equipment, which plaintiff in fact had never used in her practice. Affirming a jury verdict of $2,250 under the New York statute, Judge Jerome Frank said that, “there can be no doubt as to the following: … The change in the plaintiff’s letter was so substantial as to vitiate her written consent.”
例如,如果某人参加促销竞赛并获奖,随后签署许可协议,允许广告商使用其文章、姓名和图片,那么如果广告商大幅修改广告中使用的文章内容,则属于超出许可范围。在本案中,被告是一家销售电解设备的公司,它赞助了一场竞赛,向以"为什么我选择电解作为职业"为主题的最佳书信作者颁发奖品。原告是一名专业电疗师,她写了一封信并获得了第一名。原告向该公司出具了书面许可或同意书,允许该公司在杂志上刊登原告的信函和照片。然而,当原告的信函在被告的杂志上发表时,被告对其进行了多处修改,以传达原告认可被告电解设备品牌的错误印象,而事实上原告从未在其执业中使用过被告的设备。根据纽约州法规,陪审团裁定被告赔偿原告2250美元,法官杰罗姆·弗兰克(Jerome Frank)表示:"毫无疑问,……原告信函的修改幅度之大,足以推翻她的书面同意。"

Similarly, a modification of plaintiff’s photograph can be so substantial as to exceed the implied scope of plaintiff’s consent to advertising use. For example, the doctoring or alteration of a photograph to add advertising matter may be in excess of a license to use the photograph as originally taken: “A ‘composite’ picture, brought about by double printing or new matter added to a true photograph creates a new picture different from the one for which the subject posed.”
同样,对原告照片的修改可能非常重大,以至于超出了原告同意广告使用的暗示范围。例如,对照片进行修改或篡改以添加广告内容,可能超出了使用原始照片的许可范围:"通过双重打印或添加新内容到真实照片而产生的'合成'照片,会形成与拍摄对象摆拍的照片不同的新照片。"

In cases where the subject has signed a license or release which contains no restriction on the context of advertising use, the license might still be exceeded by substantial alteration of the subject’s photograph. In the Russell case, plaintiff was a female professional model who posed for photographer Richard Avedon for a series of pictures to be used by Marboro bookstores to promote the reading of educational books. The photo that was used by Marboro showed plaintiff in a bed, a male model in an adjoining bed, each reading an educational book, with the caption “For People Who Take Their Reading Seriously.” Defendant Springs Mills, Inc., a seller of bedsheets, obtained the photo and allegedly retouched and altered it so as to place the plaintiff in the “company of an elderly male” reading a “vulgar” book, with a sexually suggestive advertising caption. Plaintiff alleged that the altered photo conveyed the implication that she “had posed for a bed sheet advertisement portraying a willing call girl waiting to be used by a stranger whetting his sexual appetite.” While plaintiff had signed a model’s release not limited to any particular advertising context, the New York court held that plaintiff had stated a cause of action:
如果当事人签署的许可或授权书中没有对广告使用背景做出限制,那么大幅修改当事人的照片仍可能超出许可范围。在Russell一案中,原告是一名职业女模特,她为摄影师Richard Avedon拍摄了一系列照片,供万宝路书店用于推广教育类书籍。万宝路使用的照片显示原告躺在床上,旁边有一名男模特,两人都在阅读教育类书籍,照片标题为"致认真阅读的人们"。被告Springs Mills, Inc.是一家床单销售商,获得了这张照片,并据称对照片进行了修饰和修改,将原告置于"一名年长的男性"身边,阅读一本"粗俗"的书,并带有性暗示的广告标题。原告声称,修改后的照片暗示她"曾为一张床单广告摆姿势,描绘一名自愿应召女郎等待陌生人满足其性欲"。虽然原告签署的模特授权书没有对任何特定广告背景做出限制,但纽约法院认为原告陈述了诉讼理由:

The issue remains whether there has not been consent—by virtue of the signed “model release” …. The problem, as I see it, is one of construction. Without question, the consent would clearly entitle an assignee to use the same picture that was used by the original advertiser. The waiver of the right to inspect or to approve means, at least, that the plaintiff could not object to publication by the assignee of an unflattering portrait of the plaintiff, if that were the one taken by Avedon. But if the picture were altered sufficiently in situation, emphasis, background or context, I should think that it would no longer be the same portrait, but a different one. And as to that changed picture, I would hold that the original written consent would not apply and that liability would accrue where the content of the picture has been so changed that it is substantially unlike the original. In this aspect of the case, I speak of content of the picture as used, not the purpose or extent of its use. If, for instance, Springs had used the original picture for its advertising of bed sheets, without the attendant objectionable writing or references, the fact that the purpose of the advertisement was not to interest readers in books would not negate the effect of the release.
问题在于,是否已经通过签署"模特授权书"获得了同意……我认为,问题在于结构。毫无疑问,获得同意后,受让人显然有权使用原始广告商使用的同一张照片。放弃检查或批准的权利至少意味着,如果原告的照片是由阿维顿拍摄的,原告不能反对受让人发布这张不讨人喜欢的照片。但如果照片在场景、重点、背景或上下文方面被做了足够多的修改,我认为它不再是同一张照片,而是一张不同的照片。至于那张修改过的照片,我认为原始书面同意书不再适用,如果照片内容被修改得与原始照片大相径庭,则应承担责任。就本案而言,我指的是所使用照片的内容,而不是其使用目的或范围。例如,如果斯普林斯将原始照片用于床单广告,而没有附上令人反感的文字或参考资料,那么广告的目的不是引起读者对书籍的兴趣,这一事实并不能否定授权书的效果。

The Second Circuit distinguished the Russell case where the consent was broad enough to cover the challenged advertising use of an altered “before weight loss” photo of plaintiff.
第二巡回法院对罗素案进行了区分,该案中,原告同意使用修改后的"减肥前"照片,但该照片被用于广告宣传,这引起了争议。

The principle in Russell was later applied to reach a different result to find that a model’s photograph was not substantially altered in content where the advertiser added a beer glass and bottle to a photograph and used it to illustrate an advertisement for beer. The difference was that some such addition of advertising matter was necessary to use the picture for any kind of advertising, a general use which the model clearly knew of, the objection being to an ad for beer in particular. However, the model release in that case was totally unrestricted as to the type of product to be advertised.
后来,罗素案中的原则被用于得出不同的结果,即发现模特照片的内容并未被实质性修改,广告商在照片中添加了一个啤酒杯和一瓶啤酒,并将其用于啤酒广告。区别在于,将广告内容添加到照片中是出于任何广告用途的必要,模特显然知道这种一般用途,而反对的是特定的啤酒广告。然而,在这种情况下,模特授权对广告宣传的产品类型没有任何限制。

The principle of “substantial modification” of the format of use covered by a license finds some analogy in the law of copyright licenses. Where a substantial change in the format of the copyrighted work is made by the licensee, such use is outside the scope of the license and therefore constitutes copyright infringement.
许可协议中规定的使用格式"实质性修改"原则与版权许可法中的规定有相似之处。如果被许可方对版权作品格式进行了实质性修改,则这种使用超出了许可范围,因此构成版权侵权。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:38 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

F. Lack of Capacity to Consent by Minors and Others
F. 未成年人及其他人群缺乏同意的能力

§ 10:38. Capacity to license or consent

Synopsis:

Generally, a license or consent from a minor must be obtained from a parent or legal guardian. The New York courts have held that a minor may not disaffirm such a license. A license or consent may not be obtained from a mentally disabled person without complying with local laws on the subject. If neither party to a transaction has a valid license or consent, the courts may refuse to enforce that transaction.
一般来说,未成年人必须获得父母或法定监护人的许可或同意。纽约法院认为未成年人不得否认此类许可。如果未遵守当地法律,则不得从精神障碍者处获得许可或同意。如果交易双方均未获得有效许可或同意,法院可拒绝执行该交易。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:39 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

F. Lack of Capacity to Consent by Minors and Others
F. 未成年人及其他人群缺乏同意的能力

§ 10:39. Capacity to license or consent—Minors

Minors’ Incapacity to Contract. The statutes of several states require that a consent or license of the statutory privacy or publicity rights of a minor be obtained from a parent or guardian. Some statutes make no mention of any special method of obtaining a consent or license from a minor and are presumably governed by the general state law on the ability of minors to make contracts.
未成年人无缔约能力。多个州的法规要求,在征得未成年人法定隐私权或公开权同意或许可之前,必须先征得其父母或监护人的同意或许可。一些法规并未提及征得未成年人同意或许可的特别方法,因此可能受关于未成年人缔约能力的一般州法律管辖。

In most states, a minor lacks the capacity to make a contract and can later void a contract the person entered into while under age. For example, this is the law in Texas, where a 17-year-old college student, while on spring break on South Padre Island, Texas, participated in a “game show” on a public stage, in which she exposed her breasts for each incorrect answer. Unknown to her, the event was filmed and became part of a video game. Prior to the event, the student filled out a questionnaire and signed a model release. She showed fake identification, which stated that she was 21 years old. In Texas, a minor who fraudulently misrepresents her age to induce another to enter into a contract cannot later void that contract so long as the other person justifiably relied on the misrepresentation. The court held that there was an issue of fact whether, because of suspicious inconsistencies in the young student’s questionnaire and release, the video game producer was justified in relying on her representation that she was an adult. The court issued a preliminary injunction against release of the video game.
在大多数州,未成年人没有签订合同的能力,并且可以在日后撤销其在未成年时签订的合同。例如,德克萨斯州的法律就是这样规定的。一名17岁的女大学生在德克萨斯州南帕德里岛春假期间参加了一场在公共舞台上进行的"游戏节目",每答错一题就要露出胸部。她不知道的是,这场活动被拍了下来,并成为电子游戏的一部分。活动开始前,这名学生填写了一份问卷并签署了模特协议。她出示了伪造的身份证,上面写着她21岁。在德克萨斯州,未成年人通过欺诈手段谎报年龄诱使他人签订合同,只要对方有正当理由相信其虚假陈述,那么该未成年人就不能在日后撤销合同。法院认为,由于这名年轻学生的问卷和协议中存在可疑的不一致之处,电子游戏制作人是否有正当理由相信她是一名成年人的陈述,这是一个事实问题。法院初步裁定injunction禁止发布该电子游戏。

New York Law: The Brook Shields Case. The 1983 Brooke Shields case in New York concerned nude photos taken in 1975 of the 10-year-old Brooke Shields in her bath. Taken by a professional photographer, the photos were widely published and displayed. Shields’ mother signed a release or license on behalf of her minor daughter. In later years, Brooke Shields became a widely known model and actress. A nude photo of her later appeared in a book and she appeared nude in the role of a child prostitute in the motion picture “Pretty Baby.” Reaching the age of 17, Brooke Shields attempted to disaffirm the 1975 contract signed by her mother and sued the photographer for invasion of privacy by use of the 1975 photographs.
纽约法律:布鲁克·希尔兹案。1983年,纽约布鲁克林地方法院审理了布鲁克·希尔兹案,该案涉及1975年拍摄的10岁布鲁克·希尔兹洗澡时的裸照。这些照片由专业摄影师拍摄,被广泛发布和展示。希尔兹的母亲代表未成年女儿签署了发布或许可协议。后来,布鲁克·希尔兹成为家喻户晓的模特和演员。她的一张裸照出现在一本书中,并在电影《漂亮宝贝》中饰演一名儿童妓女。年满17岁的布鲁克·希尔兹试图推翻其母亲在1975年签署的合同,并起诉摄影师使用1975年的照片侵犯其隐私。

The New York Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision refused to permit Shields to disaffirm the license contract. The court stated that while at common law a minor could disaffirm his or her written agreement or one executed by a parent, the legislature could modify that common law rule. The majority viewed the New York publicity and privacy statute, which permits a parent to consent on behalf of a minor, as a signal from the legislature that such a consent or license was binding and could not be disaffirmed:
纽约上诉法院以4比3的投票结果拒绝允许希尔兹撤销许可合同。法院指出,虽然根据普通法,未成年人可以撤销他或她的书面协议或由父母签署的协议,但立法机构可以修改普通法的这一规定。大多数人认为,纽约的公开和隐私法规允许父母代表未成年人表示同意,这是立法机构发出的信号,表明这种同意或许可具有约束力,不能被撤销:

Where a statute expressly permits a certain class of agreements to be made by infants, that settles the question and makes the agreement valid and enforceable. That is precisely what happened here. The Legislature, by adopting section 51, created a new cause of action and it provided in the statute itself the method for obtaining the infant’s consent to avoid liability. Construing the statute strictly, as we must since it is in derogation of the common law…, the parent’s consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the legislative intent. Inasmuch as the consents in this case complied with the statutory requirements, they were valid and may not be disaffirmed.
如果法规明确允许未成年人签订某类协议,那么问题就解决了,协议也有效且可执行。本案的情况正是如此。立法机构通过第51条,创建了一个新的诉讼理由,并在法规中规定了获得未成年人同意以避免责任的方法。我们必须严格解释该法规,因为它是普通法的例外……,父母的同意对未成年人具有约束力,无需任何禁止否认的措辞来达到立法意图。由于本案中的同意符合法定要求,因此是有效的,不得否认。

The court noted that there was no claim that the photographs were pornographic and thus there was no need to discuss the possibility that the contract was unenforceable because of public policy. The court observed that if a parent wishes to place limits on the duration or context of use of a child’s photos, the parent should so limit the agreement which grants a consent or license.
法庭指出,没有claim证据表明这些照片属于色情内容,因此没有必要讨论因公共政策而无法执行合同的可能性。法庭认为,如果父母希望对使用儿童照片的期限或背景进行限制,则应在同意或许可协议中对此进行限制。

The dissent in Shields said that the rule of law should be that “those who contract with minors do so at their own peril,” and would hold that a minor has an absolute right to disaffirm a publicity or privacy license signed by a parent or guardian. The dissent did not read the New York statute as overriding the protection normally given children who may be under the influence of an adult or may not understand the significance of such contracts. The dissent stated that a child should not be forever bound by a license given by an adult “where the continued invasion of the child’s privacy may cause the child enormous embarrassment, distress and humiliation.”
希尔兹的反对意见认为,法律规则应当是"与未成年人签订合同的人应自担风险",并认为未成年人拥有绝对的权利,可以拒绝父母或监护人签署的公开或隐私许可。反对意见认为,纽约法规并未凌驾于通常给予儿童的保护之上,因为儿童可能受到成年人的影响,或者可能不理解此类合同的意义。反对意见指出,儿童不应永远受制于成年人给予的许可,"因为持续侵犯儿童的隐私可能会给儿童带来巨大的尴尬、痛苦和羞辱"。

California Law. In the Faloona case, the court refused to set aside an unrestricted photographic release given by a mother to a photographer who took nude, but not pornographic, photos of her six-year-old girl and four-year-old boy. The photos originally appeared in a publication called “The Sex Atlas” and the mother objected to reprints appearing in Hustler magazine’s book review of “The Sex Atlas.” Finding that the California publicity and privacy statute authorized releases and licenses by a parent or guardian of a minor’s rights, the court upheld the validity of the mother’s consent.
加州法律。在Faloona案中,法院拒绝撤销一位母亲向摄影师授予的无限制摄影许可,该摄影师为她的六岁女孩和四岁男孩拍摄了裸体照片,但并非色情照片。这些照片最初出现在名为《性地图集》的出版物中,而这位母亲反对《性地图集》在《Hustler》杂志的书评中重印。法院认为,加州的公开和隐私法规授权未成年人父母或监护人授予许可,因此支持这位母亲同意的有效性。

The federal court in California refused to interpret or modify the clear and absolute language of a consent to use a photo of a child “for any purpose whatsoever” where the child’s mother thought that the consent to use a photo of the child was limited to use in one magazine and not for advertising use.
加利福尼亚州联邦法院拒绝解释或修改"出于任何目的"使用儿童照片的明确且绝对的语言,而孩子的母亲认为同意使用孩子的照片仅限于在一本杂志上使用,而不是用于广告。

Mental Distress of Children. In connection with the invasion of privacy of children, it has been held that even a five-year-old child is capable of suffering compensable mental distress resulting from the unauthorized use of identity in advertising:
儿童的精神伤害。关于侵犯儿童隐私的问题,法院认为,即使五岁的孩子也可能因未经授权在广告中使用其身份而遭受可赔偿的精神伤害:

In our opinion, notwithstanding he was but five years old, he was liable to the ridicule of his fellows. His susceptibility to vexation and humiliation was at hand, and his appreciation of the outrage committed by defendants would grow in greater proportion than would the failure of memory in his associates.
在我们看来,尽管他只有五岁,但他很容易受到同伴的嘲笑。他很容易受到烦恼和羞辱,而且他对被告所犯的暴行的感激之情将比同伴的记忆力衰退更为严重。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:40 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

F. Lack of Capacity to Consent by Minors and Others
F. 未成年人及其他人群缺乏同意的能力

§ 10:40. Capacity to license or consent—Mentally disabled persons
§ 10:40. 许可或同意的能力——精神障碍者

The ability of mentally deficient persons to consent to an invasion of their privacy has arisen in the context of documentaries filmed at mental institutions. In the best known case, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found an invasion of privacy of inmates at an institution for the criminally insane and enjoined the showing of the film to the general public. The film showed identifiable inmates naked, in degrading conditions, and exhibiting obviously deranged behavior. The superintendent of the institution, upon the advice of the Attorney General, had conditioned permission to film upon the filmmaker’s obtaining consents from inmates legally competent to sign releases. The filmmaker failed to obtain such releases from inmates who were identifiable in the film. The court found a “collective, indecent intrusion into the most private aspects of the lives of these unfortunate persons in the Commonwealth’s custody.”
在拍摄精神病院的纪录片时,出现了智力缺陷者同意侵犯其隐私的情况。在最有名的案例中,马萨诸塞州最高法院裁定,一所刑事精神病院侵犯了住院者的隐私,并禁止向公众放映该影片。影片中可辨认的住院者赤身裸体,处于有辱人格的环境中,并表现出明显的失常行为。根据总检察长的建议,该机构的主管将拍摄许可的条件设定为,制片人必须获得有法律行为能力签署免责协议的住院者的同意。但制片人未能获得影片中可辨认的住院者的同意。法院裁定,"集体、不雅地侵犯了联邦政府监护下这些不幸者最隐私的生活。"

In another documentary film set at a mental institution, a New York court held that a patient’s signed consent form was insufficient because not executed in accordance with New York law concerning rights which may be waived by the mentally disabled. However, the court found that consent was not required because the documentary was a matter of public interest, immune from liability under the First Amendment.
在另一部以精神病院为背景的纪录片中,纽约法院认为,患者签署的同意书并不充分,因为该同意书并非根据纽约法律中有关精神残疾者可以放弃的权利的规定签署。然而,法院认为,由于该纪录片涉及公共利益,根据《第一修正案》无需承担任何责任,因此无需征得患者同意。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:41 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

F. Lack of Capacity to Consent by Minors and Others
F. 未成年人及其他人群缺乏同意的能力

§ 10:41. Capacity to license or consent—Lack of authority to license or consent
§ 10:41. 许可或同意的能力——无权许可或同意

A license or consent to invade privacy or infringe the right of publicity is of course invalid if the person granting the license or consent has no authority to do so. For example, a license or consent is ineffectual if obtained from an agent who acts outside the scope of his or her authority from a principal. However, a person is bound by the acts of his or her agent as against innocent third parties who have no way of knowing of any possible limitations on the authority of the agent. Where a consent signed by the model was limited to use of his photo for only one year and a consent agreement signed by his agent had no time limit, the model was bound by the unlimited duration consent.
如果授权或同意者无权这样做,那么侵犯隐私或公开权的授权或同意当然无效。例如,如果授权或同意是从代理人处获得的,而代理人又超出了委托人的授权范围,那么授权或同意无效。然而,代理人针对不知情的第三方做出的行为对代理人本人具有约束力,因为第三方无法知晓代理人授权的任何可能限制。如果模特签署的同意书仅限于一年内使用其照片,而其代理人签署的同意书没有时间限制,那么模特受无期限同意书的约束。

In a business relationship between a buyer and seller of items which constitute an invasion of privacy or publicity of a third person, neither party has a license and the transaction may be invalid and unenforceable. Where Anabas sold and delivered Michael Jackson stickers to Alper for resale, Anabas sued Alper for not paying the agreed price for the items. Neither had a license from Michael Jackson and the items were clearly an infringement of Jackson’s right of publicity. The court, holding that the contract was illegal and unenforceable, dismissed pursuant to the rule that, “Generally, a court will not enforce a contract to commit an unlawful act.”
在构成侵犯第三方隐私或名誉的物品买卖业务关系中,任何一方均无许可,且交易可能无效且不可执行。在Anabas向Alper出售并交付迈克尔·杰克逊贴纸以供转售时,Anabas起诉Alper未支付约定的物品价格。双方均未获得迈克尔·杰克逊的许可,且这些物品显然侵犯了杰克逊的名誉权。法院认为合同非法且不可执行,并依据"通常情况下,法院不会执行实施非法行为的合同"这一规则驳回了诉讼。

In the analogous area of buyer-seller contracts illegal under federal antitrust law, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that generally the “antitrust defense” is not available where the goods have been delivered and the buyer refuses to pay.
在买卖合同违反联邦反垄断法的类似领域,美国最高法院认为,在货物已交付而买方拒绝付款的情况下,一般不提供"反垄断辩护"。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:42 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

G. Conflicting Licenses and Parole Evidence

§ 10:42. Conflicting licenses and parole evidence

Under New York law, when there are two conflicting licenses granted by a model, one in a form contract specifying no duration to the license (“forever hereafter”), the other handwritten and specifying a one-year duration, a court found that the more specific provision controlled to create a one-year duration. Also under New York law, the parole evidence dictates that an unambiguous model release cannot be modified by an alleged oral agreement as to an important term of the contract. But the Illinois court of appeals held that parole evidence can be admitted to vary or explain the terms of a written license.
根据纽约州法律,当同一车型有两份相互冲突的授权许可时,一份是形式合同,未规定许可期限("此后永久有效"),另一份是手写合同,规定了1年期限,法院认为,应采用更具体的条款,即1年期限。此外,根据纽约州法律,假释证据规定,对于合同的重要条款,不能通过所谓的口头协议修改明确的车型授权。但伊利诺伊州上诉法院认为,假释证据可以被接受,以更改或解释书面许可的条款。

Where there are two ambiguous licenses or consent agreements with conflicting terms, a summary judgment is not appropriate and the dispute can only be determined at trial.
如果存在两个条款相互冲突的模糊许可或同意协议,则不宜进行简易判决,只能通过审判来裁决争议。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:43 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

H. License Invalid Because of Fraud, Mistake or Forgery
H. 由于欺诈、错误或伪造,许可证无效

§ 10:43. License induced by fraud or mistake

Fraudulent Inducement. A license of publicity or privacy rights may be challenged on the ground that it was given in reliance on a mistake or misrepresentation. Restatement Second, Torts § 892B (2) (1979) provides:
欺诈性诱导。基于错误或虚假陈述而授予的宣传或隐私权许可可能会受到质疑。重述 第二,侵权法第892B(2)条(1979年)规定:

If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.
如果同意他人行为的人是因为对自身利益受到侵犯的性质或预期伤害的程度存在重大误解而同意的,且该误解为他人所知或因他人的虚假陈述而产生,则该同意对意外侵犯或伤害无效。

In addition to this effect of entitling plaintiff to an action for infringement that would have been available if the consent or license had not been given, plaintiff may have the remedy of rescission of the license.
除了赋予原告在未获得同意或许可的情况下提起侵权诉讼的权利外,原告还可以要求撤销许可。

Scope of the Fraud. Applying the rule of the Restatement of Torts, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a fraudulent misrepresentation by a licensee of privacy or publicity rights will void the license only if the fraud goes to the manner in which identity will be used or how broad the publication would be. Plaintiff admitted that he consented to defendant’s publication and sale of plaintiff’s photograph on condition that plaintiff would be paid. The consent apparently contained no restrictions whatsoever on the form or context of use and plaintiff made no claim that the scope of his consent was exceeded. After defendant distributed posters with plaintiff’s photograph and did not pay, plaintiff sued, not for breach of contract, but for invasion of privacy. Plaintiff argued that his consent was void because induced by defendant’s alleged fraud in not intending to pay plaintiff. While it was held that plaintiff had no claim for invasion of privacy, plaintiff could sue for breach of contract or for the tort of fraud.
欺诈的范围。根据侵权重述规则,俄勒冈州上诉法院认为,只有在欺诈涉及身份使用方式或出版物范围时,被许可人关于隐私权或公开权的欺诈性虚假陈述才会导致许可无效。原告承认,他同意被告出版和销售原告的照片,条件是原告会得到报酬。该同意书显然未对使用形式或背景做出任何限制,原告也没有claim指出其同意的范围被超出。被告分发带有原告照片的海报后未支付报酬,原告起诉,但不是以违反合同为由,而是以侵犯隐私为由。原告辩称,他的同意是无效的,因为被告涉嫌欺诈,不打算支付原告报酬。虽然法院认为原告没有claim侵犯隐私,但原告可以以违反合同或欺诈罪起诉。

Fraud Negates Consent. In a case where the misrepresentation went to the heart of the licensee’s proposed type of use, a court held that under Texas law a “fraudulently induced consent” is the “legal equivalent of no consent.” There, plaintiff, a performer at an amusement park, sued publisher Larry Flynt for publishing her photograph in Chic, a sexually explicit magazine. Plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy by being put in a false light by having her photo appear in such a magazine. While defendant had obtained consent from the public relations director of the amusement park, the court held that the consent had been obtained by misrepresentation and hence was void and no bar to the invasion of privacy claim. The editor of defendant’s “Chic Thrills” section testified that he told the public relations director of the amusement park that Chic was a men’s magazine featuring men’s fashion, travel and humor. The PR director, who was not familiar with Chic, testified that the editor told her that Chic was a “fashion magazine” that had “the same clientele that would read a Redbook or McCalls.” Upon this understanding, the PR director gave consent to use plaintiff’s photograph. At trial the jury answered a specific interrogatory, finding that Chic had not received a valid consent. After sorting out the legal theories of libel and invasion of privacy, the court of appeals permitted plaintiff to elect to retain a verdict of $15,000 actual and $50,000 punitive damages.
欺诈否认同意。在虚假陈述涉及被许可人拟议使用类型的核心内容时,法院认为,根据德克萨斯州法律,"欺诈性诱导同意"在法律上等同于"不同意"。在该案中,原告(游乐园的一名表演者)起诉出版商拉里·弗林特(Larry Flynt)在《Chic》这本色情杂志上刊登她的照片。原告起诉称,她的照片出现在这样的杂志上,被置于虚假的光环之下,侵犯了她的隐私。虽然被告获得了游乐园公关总监的同意,但法院认为,被告是通过虚假陈述获得同意的,因此无效,不能作为侵犯隐私的挡箭牌。被告"Chic Thrills"栏目的编辑作证称,他告诉游乐园的公关总监,《Chic》是一本男性杂志,主要介绍男性时尚、旅行和幽默。该总监对《Chic》并不熟悉,她作证称,编辑告诉她,《Chic》是一本"时尚杂志","读者群与《红皮书》或《麦考尔斯》的读者群相同"。基于这一理解,该总监同意使用原告的照片。在庭审中,陪审团回答了一个具体的问题,认定《Chic》并未获得有效的同意。在梳理了诽谤和侵犯隐私的法律理论后,上诉法院允许原告选择保留15,000美元的实际损害赔偿和50,000美元的惩罚性损害赔偿的判决。

Consent Agreement Itself Waives Any Inducement. Under New York law, a person who has signed a consent cannot later argue that her consent was induced by fraud if in the contract itself, that person disclaimed reliance on statements allegedly made to induce her to enter into the agreement. Applying that rule, the federal court in New York held that non-actor persons who signed a consent to appear in the mockumentary film “Borat” could not argue that they signed the consents only after being misled as to the true nature of the film. The consents signed by the plaintiffs in that case contained this clause:
同意书本身即放弃任何诱导。根据纽约州法律,如果合同本身声明当事人不依赖据称诱使其签订合同的陈述,则签署同意书的人不得事后声称其同意书是受欺诈而签订的。根据这一规定,纽约联邦法院认为,非演员签署同意书出演纪录片《波拉特》的,不得声称其是在被误导后才签署同意书的。该案原告签署的同意书包含以下条款:

… the Participant acknowledges that in entering into [the Agreement], the Participant is not relying upon any promises or statements made by anyone about the nature of the Film or the identity of any other Participants or persons involved in the Film.
……参与者承认,在签订[协议]时,参与者并未依赖任何人对影片性质或任何其他参与者或参与影片人员的身份做出的任何承诺或声明。

Consent to Enter Premises. Some courts will recognize as a defense a consent to enter premises obtained under a misapprehension, as when reporters fail to identify themselves as engaged in writing a story: “The fact is that consent to an entry is often given legal effect even though the entrant has intentions that if known to the owner of the property would cause him … to revoke his consent.” In that case, a television program had persons with concealed cameras identify themselves only as potential patients in order to gain entrance to an eye surgery clinic to obtain footage for a TV “expose” of allegedly improper practices at the clinic. This consent to entry was held to be a valid defense to claims of trespass and invasion of privacy because “no embarrassingly intimate details of anybody’s life were publicized.”
同意进入场所。 一些法院将因误解而同意进入场所视为一种辩护,例如当记者未能表明自己正在撰写报道时:"事实上,即使进入者有某些意图,而如果物业所有者知道这些意图,可能会导致他……撤销同意,但同意进入通常具有法律效力。" 在这种情况下,一个电视节目让携带隐藏式摄像机的人只表明自己是潜在患者,以便进入一家眼科手术诊所,为电视"曝光"该诊所涉嫌不当行为拍摄素材。 这种同意进入被视为对claims非法侵入和侵犯隐私的有效辩护,因为"没有公开任何人的尴尬生活细节。"

Some courts have held that an entry into one’s home by an invitation obtained under false pretenses is not an actionable intrusion. Other courts hold that a consent to enter upon premises can be negated by a subsequent wrongful act in excess or in abuse of the authority to enter.
一些法院认为,以虚假借口获得邀请进入他人住宅的行为不构成可诉的非法侵入。其他法院则认为,如果事后出现越权或滥用进入权限的不当行为,则先前同意进入住宅的行为可被推翻。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:44 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

H. License Invalid Because of Fraud, Mistake or Forgery
H. 由于欺诈、错误或伪造,许可证无效

§ 10:44. Forged licenses

If a license can be proved to be forged, it is of course void and invalid. In the Wood case, a neighbor broke into plaintiff’s house and stole some nude photos of plaintiff which were privately photographed by plaintiff’s husband for their private use. Having a twisted sense of humor, the neighbor forged plaintiff’s name to a consent form and sent the photos to Hustler magazine. The photos were published in its amateur photo section. A jury verdict of $150,000 against Hustler was affirmed on the basis of a false light invasion of privacy. Hustler was found to have negligently and carelessly administered a “slipshod procedure” to verify amateur nude photo submissions and to have failed to adequately guard against forgery of the kind that occurred here.
如果可以证明驾照是伪造的,那么它当然无效。在伍德案中,原告的邻居闯入原告家中,偷走了原告的一些裸照,这些照片是原告的丈夫私下拍摄的,供他们私人使用。邻居的幽默感扭曲,在同意书上伪造了原告的名字,并将照片发送给了《Hustler》杂志。这些照片被刊登在杂志的业余摄影板块。陪审团裁定《Hustler》赔偿15万美元,理由是虚假的光线侵犯了隐私。《Hustler》被认定在核实业余裸照投稿时存在疏忽和粗心,未能充分防范此类伪造行为。

In the Douglass case, a professional model-actress sued Hustler magazine for invasion of false light privacy and infringement of the right of publicity for publishing nude photos of her. At trial, Hustler produced photocopies of two releases allegedly signed by plaintiff at the photographic session. The parties stipulated that if called as a witness, a handwriting expert would testify that plaintiff’s signature was forged on one of the releases and that the photocopy of the other release was too poor to verify the authenticity of plaintiff’s signature. The court proceeded to analyze the facts on the basis of plaintiff’s testimony that all she signed was a release authorizing only Playboy magazine to publish or dispose of the photographs.
在道格拉斯案中,一位专业模特兼演员起诉《Hustler》杂志侵犯虚假名誉隐私权并侵犯其公开权,原因是该杂志刊登了她的裸照。在庭审中,《Hustler》出示了两份据称由原告在摄影现场签署的声明复印件。双方规定,如果原告被传唤为证人,手写专家将证明其中一份声明上的原告签名是伪造的,而另一份声明的复印件质量太差,无法验证原告签名的真实性。法庭根据原告的证词分析了事实,即她签署的所有声明都仅授权《花花公子》杂志发布或处理照片。

If a signed consent is produced and the signer plaintiff says it’s not a forged signature but says she does not remember signing it, that is no defense. A summary dismissal will be entered.
如果出示了签字同意书,而签字原告却声称这不是伪造签名,但记不清自己是否签过字,这不能作为辩护理由。法庭将立即驳回起诉。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:45 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

I. Employer’s Commercial use of Employee’s Identity
一、雇主将员工身份用于商业用途

§ 10:45. Employer’s use of employee’s identity

Synopsis:

In some types of employment, the very nature of the job will imply the employee’s license or consent to the employer to use the employee’s identity in advertising within the scope of employment. Where advertising use is clearly outside the scope of employment, the employer’s right to use must turn upon an express or implied license and its scope. For such employees, the courts have reached differing conclusions as to the implied scope of licenses.
在某些类型的就业中,工作的性质本身就要求员工许可或同意雇主在就业范围内使用员工身份进行广告宣传。如果广告使用明显超出就业范围,雇主的使用权必须取决于明示或默示许可及其范围。对于此类员工,法院对默示许可的范围得出了不同的结论。

To what extent can an employer make use of an employee’s identity to advertise the employer’s business in the absence of an express consent or license? The answer turns upon the type of job the employee has and whether use of name or likeness in advertising is within the scope of that employment.
在没有明确同意或许可的情况下,雇主可以在多大程度上利用雇员的身份来宣传雇主的业务?答案取决于雇员的工作类型以及广告中使用姓名或肖像是否属于该工作的范围。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:46 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

I. Employer’s Commercial use of Employee’s Identity
一、雇主将员工身份用于商业用途

§ 10:46. Employer’s use of employee’s identity—Use of employee’s identity in advertising outside the scope of employment
§ 10:46。雇主使用员工身份——在雇佣范围之外的广告中使用员工身份

In cases where use of identity in advertising is not within the scope of the employee’s job, the employer has the right to use the employee’s identity in advertising only if there is some form of consent or permission, express or implied, and the employer’s use is within the scope of that consent. The courts have reached varying conclusions depending upon the facts of each case.
如果广告中使用身份不属于员工的工作范围,则只有在获得某种形式的明示或暗示同意或许可的情况下,且雇主的使用属于该同意的范围之内,雇主才有权在广告中使用员工身份。法院根据每个案件的事实得出了不同的结论。

A casual implied consent might be created simply by the employee’s willingness to be photographed, knowing that the employer intends to use the photograph in some form of advertising. For example, Johnson, a sheet metal worker in a Boeing Airplane factory, was asked by his foreman if he would step over and have his photograph taken working on a B-47 airplane. Johnson agreed and the photos were taken. Co-workers all thought that the photos might be used in Boeing’s weekly employee magazine. Johnson did not inquire further and forgot about the matter. The photos were posted on bulletin boards in the factory and Johnson made no objection. However, when the photo appeared as part of a Boeing advertisement in nationally distributed publications, Johnson sued Boeing, claiming he should be paid. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the worker had impliedly consented to having his photo used for advertising for his employer. Focusing solely upon the invasion of privacy aspects of the advertising, the court concluded that:
如果员工知道雇主打算将照片用于某种形式的广告宣传,那么仅仅因为员工愿意拍照,就可能构成一种默认的默许。例如,波音飞机工厂的钣金工人约翰逊被工头要求走到B-47飞机旁拍照。约翰逊同意了,照片也照了。同事们都认为这些照片可能会出现在波音公司的员工周刊上。约翰逊没有进一步询问,也就忘了这件事。照片被张贴在工厂的公告板上,约翰逊也没有提出异议。然而,当照片作为波音广告的一部分出现在全国发行的出版物上时,约翰逊起诉了波音公司,声称自己应该得到报酬。堪萨斯州最高法院认为,这名工人默认了雇主将他的照片用于广告宣传。法院仅关注广告对隐私的侵犯,并得出结论:

Plaintiff’s evidence clearly discloses that he was not hurt, embarrassed, humiliated, aggravated, or in any way “put out,” due to the publication of the advertisement. His subsequent “feeling” in the matter arose when, after being “kidded” by a few of his friends and relatives, he concluded that he should have been compensated. It is clear that his subsequent irritation was the result of his not being compensated, rather than because of the publication of the advertisement, and that the entire matter was an “afterthought” on his part. To permit recovery under these facts would expand the doctrine of privacy beyond all logical reasoning and stretch it almost to the point of absurdity.
原告的证据清楚地表明,他并未因广告的发布而受到伤害、尴尬、羞辱、愤怒或任何形式的"打击"。他随后对此事的"感觉"是在被一些朋友和亲戚"开玩笑"后产生的,他认为自己应该得到赔偿。显然,他后来的恼怒是因为没有得到赔偿,而不是因为广告的发布,而且整个事情都是他"事后"才想到的。如果根据这些事实允许赔偿,就会将隐私原则扩大到超出所有逻辑推理的范围,几乎达到荒谬的程度。

The court did not discuss the obvious question of whether Johnson did indeed have a legal right to be separately compensated for the advertising use of the photograph and whether he had knowingly licensed his employer for no charge.
法庭没有讨论一个显而易见的问题,即约翰逊是否确实有权因广告使用照片而获得单独补偿,以及他是否在知情的情况下免费许可其雇主使用照片。

In some cases of use of an employee’s identity it is clear that the employee consented to some form of advertising use, but the question is whether the employer’s use was within the scope of that consent. Some examples follow:
在某些情况下,员工身份的使用显然表明员工同意以某种形式用于广告宣传,但问题是雇主的使用是否在同意的范围内。以下是一些例子:

 • A “hat check girl” in a private club in Knoxville, Tennessee, consented to having her photo taken and used in a bulletin distributed only to members. However, when the club used the photograph in an advertisement in the local newspaper, plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy. The court rejected her claim, reasoning that consent to publication of the photo in a bulletin distributed to members of a club whose membership was open to all for a small fee was also consent to use in an advertisement in a newspaper. The court viewed her consent to use in the bulletin as “a waiver of her right of privacy with respect to these photographs.”
• 田纳西州诺克斯维尔一家私人俱乐部的一名"寄存帽子的女孩"同意拍摄照片,并同意将其用于仅向会员发放的简报中。然而,当俱乐部在当地报纸的广告中使用该照片时,原告以侵犯隐私为由提起诉讼。法院驳回了她的诉讼,理由是:同意在向俱乐部会员发放的简报中发布照片,即意味着同意在报纸广告中使用该照片。该俱乐部向所有人开放,只需缴纳少量费用即可成为会员。法院认为,她同意在简报中使用照片,即意味着"放弃了她对这些照片的隐私权"。

• A clothes model employed in a department store agreed to pose for the purpose of having a display mannequin made and used solely by her employer. When the company that made the mannequins proceeded to sell them to stores other than her employer, she sued. A New York court upheld her complaint, saying that: “The mere fact that she may have given her consent to her employer solely to use the mannequin for such purposes does not deprive her of the power to invoke that right [under the New York statute] against any other person who uses the same without her written consent.”
• 某百货公司聘请的一位服装模特同意摆出姿势,以便制作一个展示模特,仅供她的雇主使用。当制作模特的公司开始向她的雇主以外的商店出售模特时,她起诉了这家公司。纽约法院支持她的诉讼请求complaint,称:"她可能仅出于上述目的同意雇主使用模特,但这并不剥夺她援引[纽约法规]赋予的权利,对未经她书面同意而使用模特的任何其他人提起诉讼。"

• Plaintiff Betty Lomax was employed by the defendant radio station as an announcer and interviewer. After initially objecting to the radio station’s use of her name and photograph to promote the products of companies that advertised on the station, she agreed to do so. She then cooperated by autographing her photos, appearing at sales promotions of sponsors’ products and handing out her autographed photographs at these promotions. After her employment with the radio station was ended she sued the station for damages for the “unauthorized” use of her name and picture which occurred during her employment. A New York court upheld her claim for invasion of privacy, following the New York “writing” rule that while neither oral consent nor estoppel is a complete defense, both can be used to mitigate damages. This prompted a vigorous dissent, which argued that for an employee to freely consent to use of identity in advertising and then sue because there was no written consent is a “species of double dealing.”
原告贝蒂·洛马克斯受雇于被告广播电台,担任播音员和采访员。起初,她反对广播电台使用她的名字和照片来宣传在电台投放广告的公司的产品,但后来同意了。她随后配合广播电台的工作,在照片上签名,出席赞助商产品的促销活动,并在促销活动中分发她签名的照片。在广播电台终止她的雇佣关系后,她起诉广播电台,要求赔偿她在受雇期间"未经授权"使用她的名字和照片所造成的损失。纽约法院支持她claim侵犯隐私的指控,遵循纽约"书面"规则,即口头同意和禁止反言都不是完全有效的抗辩,但两者都可以用来减轻损害。这引起了激烈的反对,反对者认为,员工自由同意在广告中使用其身份,然后因为没有书面同意而起诉,这是一种"双重交易"。

• A group of 38 employees of the Chemical Bank in New York City sued as a class for invasion of their privacy by their employer. The bank took photographs of 38 employees in the Electronic Customer Services Department and exhibited the photos in a promotional exhibit at a trade show at a New York hotel. The employees alleged that they were never informed of the purpose for which the photographs were to be used and never consented in writing. Following the New York “writing” rule, the court granted summary judgment on liability to the employees, saying that the alleged oral consent is only a partial defense in mitigation of damages.
纽约化学银行38名员工以集体名义起诉,指控雇主侵犯其隐私。该银行为电子客户服务部的38名员工拍摄了照片,并在纽约一家酒店的贸易展上以宣传为目的展出这些照片。员工们声称,他们从未被告知照片的用途,也从未以书面形式表示同意。根据纽约的"书面"规定,法院对员工的责任进行了简易判决,称所谓的口头同意只是减轻损害的部分辩护理由。

• In a variation on the theme, plaintiff Pennie Dabbs registered as a professional model with defendant’s modeling agency in Chicago. Under the agreement, the agency was to endeavor to obtain modeling and public appearance jobs for plaintiff and plaintiff was to keep the agency supplied with recent photographs and make herself available for publicity stunts and promotional programs. The agency entered Pennie Dabbs in a “Miss Jet Credit” beauty contest run in connection with the opening of the Jet Credit Store. The beauty contest was to be part of a promotional “grand opening” gala featuring appearances by Ernie Banks and Mahalia Jackson. The news of plaintiff’s entry in the beauty contest and her photograph appeared in the Chicago Defender newspaper. Plaintiff’s suit for invasion of privacy against the modeling agency, Jet Credit and the newspaper was dismissed, the court finding that this use was within the scope of the consent plaintiff had given the modeling agency.
原告Pennie Dabbs以专业模特的身份在芝加哥被告的模特经纪公司注册,这是本案的一个变体。根据协议,经纪公司应努力为原告争取模特和公众露面工作,而原告应向经纪公司提供近照,并随时准备参加宣传特技和推广活动。经纪公司为Pennie Dabbs报名参加了Jet Credit商店开业时举办的"Jet Credit小姐"选美比赛。这场选美比赛是"盛大开业"庆典的一部分,届时Ernie Banks和Mahalia Jackson将出席活动。原告参加选美比赛的消息和她的照片刊登在《芝加哥捍卫者报》上。原告起诉模特经纪公司、Jet Credit和报社侵犯隐私权,但被驳回,法院认为这种使用方式在原告同意模特经纪公司的范围内。

• Plaintiff Cynthia Staruski was employed as a sales and service representative for the Continental Telephone Co. Over plaintiff’s objection, her employer used her name in an advertisement, attributing words to her in quotation marks, which she did not write, praising her employer’s telephone services. The company’s argument that it had plaintiff’s implied consent was rejected. The Vermont high court held that on the evidence presented, “a reasonable juror could not but conclude that defendant had invaded plaintiff’s privacy by appropriating her identity to promote a business advantage.” The court said that on remand, plaintiff was entitled to prove “all damages reasonably flowing from the publication of the advertisement.”
原告辛西娅·斯塔鲁斯基(Cynthia Staruski)受雇于大陆电话公司(Continental Telephone Co.)担任销售和服务代表。在原告的反对下,她的雇主在广告中使用她的名字,用引号引用了她并未写过的文字,称赞雇主的电话服务。公司辩称已获得原告的默许,但被驳回。佛蒙特州高等法院认为,根据所提交的证据,"一个理性的陪审员只能得出被告通过盗用原告身份来提升商业利益从而侵犯其隐私的结论。"法院表示,在发回重审时,原告有权证明"因发布广告而合理产生的所有损失"。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:47 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

I. Employer’s Commercial use of Employee’s Identity
一、雇主将员工身份用于商业用途

§ 10:47. Employer’s use of employee’s identity—Use of employee’s identity in advertising within scope of employment: in term and post term
§ 10:47。雇主使用员工身份——在雇佣范围内使用员工身份进行广告宣传:在职期间和离职后

Continued Use of an Ex-Employee’s Identity after Termination. In some cases, an unhappy ex-employee has sued his or her former employer for continuing to use identity in advertising after the employee left. For example, Francis Tullos was employed by defendant Colgate-Palmolive Company as a department store demonstrator of defendant’s hair care products. After Colgate discharged Tullos from employment, it blundered by only partially changing an advertisement for an in-store demonstration in Atlanta, Georgia, by Tullos’ replacement. The advertisement said that a “Miss Elsie Sprague” would appear in Rich’s store in Atlanta to demonstrate Colgate products, but continued to use plaintiff Francis Tullos’ photograph. Suing Colgate, Tullos obtained a jury verdict for $1,200, which was affirmed on appeal. Apparently, Colgate, after discharging plaintiff, negligently changed only the name and not the photo on a standard format for an advertisement promoting plaintiff’s upcoming appearance in Atlanta. Assuming that during the term of Tullos’ employment as a demonstrator Colgate had the right to use her name and photo in advertising promoting her appearances, the court held that after plaintiff was discharged, Colgate’s rights immediately ceased: “Having dispensed with [plaintiff’s] services, [Colgate] had no more right to exhibit her picture for commercial purposes than it did to require her to appear in person.”
离职后继续使用前雇员的身份。在某些情况下,不满的前雇员会起诉其前雇主,因为雇主在员工离职后继续在广告中使用其身份。例如,Francis Tullos受雇于被告高露洁-棕榄公司,担任被告护发产品的百货店演示员。高露洁解雇Tullos后,在佐治亚州亚特兰大市店内演示的广告中,只对Tullos的替代者进行了部分修改,这犯了错误。广告称"Elsie Sprague小姐"将在亚特兰大的Rich商店展示高露洁产品,但继续使用原告Francis Tullos的照片。Tullos起诉高露洁,获得了陪审团1200美元的判决,该判决在appeal得到确认。显然,高露洁解雇原告后,在宣传原告即将在亚特兰大市露面的广告的标准格式中,只疏忽地修改了名字,而没有修改照片。假设在Tullos担任演示员的期间,高露洁有权在宣传其露面的广告中使用她的名字和照片,法院认为,在原告被解雇后,高露洁的权利立即终止:"在解雇了[原告的]服务后,[高露洁]没有权利出于商业目的展示她的照片,就像要求她亲自露面一样。"

In a case similar to Tullos, two weeks after insurance salesman and branch manager E.B. Hamilton left his employment with the U.S. Life Insurance Company, the company inadvertently sent out a promotional form letter over Hamilton’s signature to prospective clients. During the year Hamilton had been employed, similar promotional letters had been mailed out over the name and facsimile signature of Hamilton. It was part of his job as branch manager. Finding that Hamilton’s rights had, technically, been violated, a Texas court awarded him nominal damages of one dollar.
在类似Tullos的案件中,保险销售员兼分公司经理E.B. Hamilton从美国人寿保险公司离职两周后,公司无意中向潜在客户发送了一封带有Hamilton签名的促销信函。在Hamilton受雇期间,类似的促销信函也曾以Hamilton的名义和传真签名寄出。这是作为分公司经理的工作内容之一。德克萨斯州法院认定Hamilton的权利在技术上受到了侵犯,因此判给他一美元的象征性赔偿。

In an internet version of those cases, a violation of the Pennsylvania right of publicity statute was found when, after key employee Dr. Linda Eagle was terminated, the employer changed Eagle’s web page so that a person who searched for Dr. Linda Eagle on Google or “LinkedIn” would be directed to a URL for a web page showing the name, photo and information of another person: the CEO of the company that Eagle had worked for.
在网上的案例中,宾夕法尼亚州公开权法规被违反,因为当关键员工琳达·伊格尔博士被解雇后,雇主更改了伊格尔的网页,这样,在谷歌或"领英"上搜索琳达·伊格尔博士的人,将被引导到一个显示另一人姓名、照片和信息的网页的URL:伊格尔曾供职的公司的首席执行官。

A Missouri case litigated in federal court involved a former employee of a hospital whose email account was kept active after she was discharged from the employment. She alleged that her email was being monitored during her employment, in violation of her right to privacy (presumably a claim of the “intrusion” variety) and also that the use of her name on the account after she was no longer employed constituted a violation of her publicity rights. The court granted summary judgment against her noting “Plaintiff impliedly, if not explicitly, consented to Defendant’s monitoring and accessing of her work email account. And she waived any right to privacy in messages sent from or received by her work email account. Due to Plaintiff’s consent and waiver, her claim for appropriation of privacy and publicity based solely upon Defendant’s receipt of email from third parties by way of an email account owned by Defendant fails.”
密苏里州联邦法院审理的一起案件涉及一家医院的一名前员工,她在离职后仍保留着电子邮件账户。她声称,她在工作期间电子邮件受到监控,侵犯了她的隐私权(可能是"入侵"类型的claim),而且在她离职后账户上使用她的名字也侵犯了她的公开权。法院对她做出了即决判决,指出"原告暗示(即使没有明确)同意被告监控和访问她的工作电子邮件账户。她放弃了工作电子邮件账户发送或接收的邮件的任何隐私权。由于原告的同意和放弃,她claim的隐私权和公开权完全基于被告通过其拥有的电子邮件账户接收来自第三方的电子邮件,因此无效。"

Finding an Implied License to Use an Employee’s Identity While Employed, but Not After. In many cases, the courts assume that the nature of the job gives an employer an implied license to use the employee’s identity in advertising which is directly related to the scope of the employee’s job. In such cases it would seem that during the term of employment the employee is being paid not only for services but also for advertising use of identity which is incidental to the job. That is, such employees cannot claim that use is made without their express license or consent, because their consent is implied by the nature of the employment. The Tullos and Hamilton cases show how the courts differ in their attitudes towards an employer who negligently continues to use the employee’s identity after employment has ended.
在雇佣期间而非雇佣结束后使用员工身份的默示许可。在许多情况下,法院认为,根据工作的性质,雇主有权在广告中使用员工身份,前提是广告与员工的工作范围直接相关。在这种情况下,似乎在雇佣期间,员工不仅因提供服务而获得报酬,还因工作附带的身份广告使用而获得报酬。也就是说,此类员工不能claim,未经其明确许可或同意而使用其身份,因为雇佣性质暗示了他们的同意。Tullos和Hamilton案表明,对于雇主在雇佣结束后疏忽地继续使用员工身份,法院的态度各不相同。

In the Alonso case, after Dr. Kenneth Alonso was terminated as laboratory director for defendant, defendant continued to use his name on a number of forms and documents used in business. The Georgia Supreme Court held that while the employer has an implied and irrevocable license to use the employee’s name in connection with employment, that license normally terminates with the employment, although the employer has a reasonable time to halt the use of the name.
在Alonso案中,被告终止了Kenneth Alonso博士作为实验室主任的职务,但被告继续在商业活动中使用他的名字。佐治亚州最高法院认为,虽然雇主拥有在雇佣关系中使用员工姓名的默示且不可撤销的许可,但该许可通常随雇佣关系的终止而终止,尽管雇主有合理的时间来停止使用该姓名。

Even a relatively minor use of an ex-employee’s name in advertising or promotion cannot usually be dismissed as minor or incidental if it is intended to benefit the employer’s business.
即使是在广告或促销活动中使用前雇员的姓名,如果是为了促进雇主业务,通常也不能被视为无关紧要或偶然。

The Need for an Express Agreement. While an implied consent to use of identity in an employer’s advertising may flow from the very nature of the employee’s job, the careful attorney for employers in such situations should draft a document expressly reciting the license, its scope and duration. Otherwise, the courts will make their own determination as to what advertising uses are within or outside of the scope of employment.
需要明确协议。虽然员工的工作性质可能默示同意在雇主广告中使用其身份,但雇主在这种情况下应谨慎行事,起草一份文件,明确说明许可、许可范围和期限。否则,法院将自行决定哪些广告用途属于雇佣范围,哪些不属于。

Some states require that a consent to use of identity must be in writing. For example, because Ohio § 2741.02(B) requires that a consent be written, an employer cannot rely upon an implied consent to use an employee’s identity in advertising.
有些州规定,使用身份信息必须获得书面同意。例如,俄亥俄州第2741.02(B)条规定,雇主在广告中使用员工身份信息时,必须获得书面同意,而不能以暗示的方式获得同意。

Use of the Identity of a Consultant in Advertising. The principles set out above generally apply to the hiring party’s use of the identity of a consultant. Unless prohibited or defined by express contractual conditions, a hiring party should be free to make some commercially reasonable use of the identity of the consultant in an effort to improve sales or prestige of the hiring company. For example, where a handbag manufacturer hired a fashion designer as a design consultant for three months, it was held not to be an invasion of the consultant-designer’s right of publicity to mention in an interview to the trade newspaper Women’s Wear Daily the fact that the designer had been hired. The New York Appellate Division noted that the consultant-designer admitted that she knew her services were desired by the defendant handbag manufacturer in order to help bring it some national standing in the industry. This, said the court, made the good faith of the consultant-designer’s publicity and privacy claim “highly suspect.” In a similar case a California court held that a letter sent to a customer lauding the qualifications of a newly hired employee is not a violation of the employee’s privacy or publicity rights.
在广告中使用顾问的身份。上述原则通常适用于聘用方使用顾问身份的情况。除非合同条款明确禁止或规定,否则聘用方有权出于商业目的合理使用顾问的身份,以提高聘用公司的销售额或声誉。例如,某手袋制造商聘请了一位时装设计师担任为期三个月的设计顾问,在接受《女装日报》采访时提及设计师被聘用这一事实,并不构成对顾问设计师的公开权侵犯。纽约上诉法庭指出,顾问设计师承认她知道自己提供的服务是被告手袋制造商所希望的,以帮助其在行业中获得一定的全国知名度。法庭表示,这使顾问设计师的公开和隐私诚信claim"非常可疑"。在类似案件中,加利福尼亚州法院认为,向客户发送一封称赞新员工资格的信函并不构成侵犯员工的隐私或公开权。

False Endorsement. There was no false endorsement as to plaintiff’s appearance as an endorser in a television infomercial which continued after plaintiff severed his relationship with the advertiser. The court remarked that: “‘Confusion’ as to whether [plaintiff] is getting paid does not count.”
虚假代言。原告在电视广告中作为代言人的形象并非虚假代言,即使原告与广告商断绝关系后,该广告仍在继续播放。法院指出:"至于[原告]是否获得报酬,这并不重要。"

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:48 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

J. Contracts by Actors and Performers

§ 10:48. Actors’ and performers’ contracts

Synopsis:

When an actor or performer contracts with a producer to perform in a motion picture or record a phonorecord, the actor or performer commonly signs a contract which includes a “grant of rights” clause. A “grant of rights” clause typically assigns copyright in the work to the producer and exclusively licenses the producer to use the actor or performer’s identity in advertising and promotion of the work. Whether the license goes further to exclusively license all merchandising rights depends upon the wording of the clause. Various contracts and their scope have been interpreted by the courts, with the result turning upon the scope of the rights granted to the producer.
当演员或表演者与制片人签订合同,在电影中演出或录制唱片时,通常会签署一份包含"权利授予"条款的合同。 "权利授予"条款通常会将作品的版权授予制片人,并独家授权制片人使用演员或表演者的身份进行广告宣传。 该授权是否进一步授予独家商品化权,取决于条款的措辞。 法院对各种合同及其范围进行了解释,结果取决于授予制片人的权利范围。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:49 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

J. Contracts by Actors and Performers

§ 10:49. Actors’ and performers’ contracts—Grant of rights clause
§ 10:49. 演员和表演者的合同——权利授予条款

The contractual relationship between an actor, singer or performer and a producer of a movie film, video tape or phonorecord controls as to the extent to which the producer is licensed to make commercial use of the actor, singer or performer’s identity in advertising. A license of such rights is usually contained in what is known as the “grant of rights” clause. The most common form of “grant of rights” clause consists of some variation on a basic theme of a license to the producer to the perpetual use of the person’s identity in advertising the “work”—the movie, video tape or phonorecord. The scope of this license can vary considerably, depending largely upon the status and negotiating leverage of the performer. The parties are free to negotiate a larger scope of license which may or may not include the producer’s right to further types of commercial use of the performer’s identity.
演员、歌手或表演者与电影、录像带或录音带制作人之间的合同关系,规定了制作人有权在广告中商业使用演员、歌手或表演者身份的程度。此类权利的许可通常包含在所谓的"权利授予"条款中。最常见的"权利授予"条款形式包括一些基本主题的变体,即许可制作人永久使用该人在广告中宣传"作品"(电影、录像带或录音带)的身份。许可的范围可能有很大差异,主要取决于表演者的地位和谈判筹码。双方可以自由协商更大的许可范围,其中可能包括也可能不包括制作人进一步使用表演者身份进行商业活动的权利。

When a person commercially uses the identity of an actor and complies with the procedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement of a union to which the actor belongs, that constitutes a license of the actor’s publicity rights. Where a film producer put together a program of “Television’s Greatest Commercials” and complied with Screen Actors Guild procedures for attempting to locate and pay an actor who appeared in an old commercial, the court held that this was the equivalent of a license directly from the actor:
当一个人在商业上使用演员的身份,并遵守该演员所属工会集体谈判协议规定的程序时,即构成对该演员宣传权的许可。当电影制片人制作"电视史上最伟大的广告"节目,并遵守美国电影演员协会的程序,试图找到并酬谢一位在旧广告中露面的演员时,法院认为这相当于直接获得了该演员的许可:

[Plaintiff], having freely joined SAG, now is bound by the collective bargaining agreements which SAG negotiated on behalf of its members …. [Plaintiff] must be viewed as having consented to the reuse of the commercials. As a member of SAG, [plaintiff] necessarily agreed to waive his statutory protection under section 51 [of the New York statute] in cases of reuse photography in exchange for the protection of section 36 of the [SAG collective bargaining agreement].
[原告]自愿加入了SAG,现在受SAG代表其成员谈判达成的集体谈判协议的约束……[原告]必须被视为同意重新使用这些广告。作为SAG的成员,[原告]必然同意放弃[纽约法规]第51条规定的法定保护,以换取[SAG集体谈判协议]第36条的保护。

However, if the SAG agreement requires that a person seeking to make advertising use of film footage of an actor negotiate with and pay the actor and the defendant does not comply, the actor can then sue under the state privacy and publicity statute.
然而,如果SAG协议要求寻求使用演员电影片段进行广告宣传的人与演员进行协商并支付报酬,而被告不遵守规定,则演员可以根据州隐私和宣传法规提起诉讼。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:50 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

J. Contracts by Actors and Performers

§ 10:50. Actors’ and performers’ contracts—Grant to producer of merchandising rights
§ 10:50. 演员和表演者的合同——授予制片人商品销售权

Scope of Grant of Rights. Disputes have arisen as to the scope of rights granted a producer by an actor in a grant of rights clause. Producers have argued that the licensed rights include the general right to commercialize the actor’s identity, while the actor argues that the licensed rights cover only the right to advertise that specific film. In general, the courts have interpreted the contracts before them in favor of the actor, so that the actor retains the general right to commercial and merchandising use of his or her own identity.
权利授予范围。在权利授予条款中,演员授予制片人的权利范围存在争议。制片人认为,授权权利包括将演员身份用于商业用途的一般权利,而演员则认为,授权权利仅涵盖为特定电影做广告的权利。一般来说,法院对所审理的合同做出有利于演员的解释,因此演员保留将自身身份用于商业和商品销售的一般权利。

The Laurel and Hardy Case. In the Price case, Hal Roach Studios claimed that its employment contracts with the famous comedians Laurel and Hardy granted Roach the right to general merchandising use of Laurel and Hardy’s identities. Between 1923 and 1939, Laurel and Hardy separately entered into a number of motion picture employment contracts with Hal Roach Studios. While the language of the contracts varied, the court found as a common denominator among them that the actors granted the studio (1) the exclusive right to photograph and record the “acts, poses, plays and appearances” of the actors and to own copyright in those films; and (2) certain rights to use an actor’s “name, voice and likeness for advertising, commercial and/or publicity purposes.” The second grant in some of the contracts was expressly limited to use for advertising publicity only in connection with the motion pictures. In other contracts, this second grant was not limited to advertising and promotion of the movie but was limited to the “term” of the employment contract. Under either interpretation, upon the end of all the contracts in 1939, the studio retained no general right to merchandising use of Laurel and Hardy’s identity. The studio had only the right to use their identity to advertise and promote the films they made while under contract to Hal Roach Studios. Thus, the court held that the studio had in the 1970s no right to license others, anywhere in the world, to merchandising use of Laurel and Hardy’s identity.
劳雷尔和哈代的案例。在普莱斯案中,哈尔·罗奇工作室声称,其与著名喜剧演员劳雷尔和哈代的雇佣合同授予罗奇使用劳雷尔和哈代身份进行一般商品销售的权力。1923年至1939年间,劳雷尔和哈代分别与哈尔·罗奇工作室签订了多份电影雇佣合同。虽然合同语言各不相同,但法院发现,这些合同有一个共同点,即演员授予工作室(1)拍摄和记录演员"行为、姿势、表演和出场"的专有权,以及这些电影的版权;以及(2)出于广告、商业和/或宣传目的使用演员"姓名、声音和肖像"的特定权利。某些合同中的第二项授权明确限制为仅用于与电影相关的广告宣传。在其他合同中,第二项授权不仅限于电影的广告和宣传,还限于雇佣合同的"期限"。根据这两种解释,在1939年所有合同终止时,工作室没有保留使用劳雷尔和哈代身份进行商品销售的一般权利。工作室仅有权在哈尔·罗奇工作室的合同期内使用他们的身份为其制作的电影做广告和宣传。因此,法院认为,在20世纪70年代,工作室无权授权世界任何地方的其他公司使用劳雷尔和哈代的身份进行商品销售。

The Spanky Case. The 1936 contract that child actor George “Spanky” McFarland, star of the “Our Gang” comedies, signed with Hal Roach Studios was similar to the Laurel and Hardy contract. The McFarland contract was held not to convey to the Studio and its successors all of the actor’s right of publicity. The court held that a key provision of the 1936 contract conveyed only a license of the right to use the actor’s name for the duration of the contact plus one year. While other parts of the contract transferred to the Studio certain rights to the nickname and image of the movie character “Spanky,” where a restaurant used without permission the full name “Spanky McFarland,” the court remarked that the restaurant was commercially exploiting not only the identity of the character, but also of the actor known as “Spanky McFarland,” a right never transferred by the actor to the Studio.
斯潘基案。1936年,儿童演员乔治·"斯潘基"·麦克法兰(《我们的帮派》喜剧片中的明星)与哈尔·罗奇制片厂签订的合同与劳雷尔和哈代的合同类似。麦克法兰的合同并未将演员的所有宣传权转让给制片厂及其继承者。法院认为,1936年合同的关键条款仅转让了合同期内及合同期满后一年的演员姓名使用权许可。虽然合同的其他部分将电影角色"斯潘基"的昵称和形象的使用权转让给了制片厂,但一家餐厅未经许可使用了"斯潘基·麦克法兰"的全名,法院指出,该餐厅不仅利用了角色的身份,还利用了演员"斯潘基·麦克法兰"的身份,而演员从未将这一权利转让给制片厂。

Roy Rogers and Television. The court in the Laurel and Hardy case cited as authority the 1954 Roy Rogers case. There, Roy Rogers claimed that Republic studio’s licensing of 81 Roy Rogers movies for showing on commercially sponsored television programs was an advertising use of his identity beyond the scope of his grant of rights clause. That is, Rogers argued that exhibition of his films on television was an advertising use of his name, likeness and voice for advertising purposes other than for the motion pictures, because commercial advertising for other products was interspersed in the television showings. The court found that television showing of Rogers’ movies was within the scope of his grant to the studio, but said in dictum that only Roy Rogers had the right to use his identity in advertisements other than advertisements for the motion pictures. Roy Rogers’ 1937 and 1948 contracts with Republic had the same two-part grant of rights clauses as in the Laurel and Hardy contracts. That is, in the first part they conveyed a perpetual right to copyright in the movies and in the second part they conveyed limited rights to use of Rogers’ identity. The court held that the different terms of art used in these two parts meant different things and conveyed different rights with different limitations. That is, “acts, poses, plays and appearances” referred to activities of the actor in connection with the motion pictures, while “name, voice and likeness” referred to non-motion-picture uses of the actor’s identity. Restrictions on one set of rights “cannot by subsequent implication be read into separate and distinct rights as a restriction upon them.”
罗伊·罗杰斯与电视。劳雷尔和哈代案中的法庭援引了1954年罗伊·罗杰斯案作为权威案例。在该案中,罗伊·罗杰斯声称,共和国制片厂授权在商业赞助的电视节目中播放81部罗伊·罗杰斯电影,属于超出其授权条款范围的对其身份的广告使用。也就是说,罗杰斯认为,在电视上播放他的电影属于出于广告目的对其姓名、肖像和声音的广告使用,而非出于电影目的,因为电视节目中穿插了其他产品的商业广告。法庭认为,在电视上播放罗杰斯电影属于其授权给制片厂的范围内,但法庭在判决书中指出,只有罗伊·罗杰斯有权在电影广告以外的广告中使用其身份。罗伊·罗杰斯与共和国制片厂在1937年和1948年签订的合同与劳雷尔和哈代案中的合同一样,包含两部分授权条款。也就是说,第一部分授予电影版权的永久性权利,第二部分授予使用罗杰斯身份的有限权利。法庭认为,这两部分中使用的不同术语意味着不同的含义,并授予了具有不同限制的不同权利。也就是说,"行为、姿势、表演和出场"指的是演员与电影相关的活动,而"姓名、声音和肖像"指的是演员身份的非电影用途。对一组权利的限制"不能通过后续暗示被解读为对单独和不同权利的限制"。

In his 1937 contract Rogers apparently granted to the studio not only the right to use his identity in advertising the movies but also the exclusive right to use his identity for general merchandising purposes. However, in the 1948 contract he retained the right to enter into general commercial and merchandising use of his identity apart from promotion and advertising of the movies. The court found that the studio had the right to authorize the showing of Roy Rogers films on sponsored television programs because this was merely a use of the films and their associated advertising. Television exhibition of the films was not subject to the reservation of rights in Rogers as to general commercial licensing apart from motion pictures.
在1937年的合同中,罗杰斯显然不仅授权制片厂在电影广告中使用他的身份,还授权制片厂在一般商品销售中使用他的身份。然而,在1948年的合同中,他保留了除电影宣传和广告外,在一般商业和商品销售中使用其身份的权利。法院认为,制片厂有权授权在赞助的电视节目中播放罗伊·罗杰斯电影,因为这只是对电影及其相关广告的使用。电视播放电影不受罗杰斯在一般商业许可方面对电影以外内容的权利保留的限制。

New Media. Roy Rogers primarily objected to the showing of his films on the then-new medium of television. Generally, when a grant of rights includes the right to exhibit a work (and use the actor’s name in related advertising) “by any means or methods now or hereafter known,” it includes any and all media, even if the grantor did not anticipate at the time of contract a particular development in the manner of exhibiting motion pictures. Thus, such a grant includes distribution of a film on videodiscs and videocassettes, even though the grantor did not have such rights in mind at the time of the grant. However, a license to use a work by exhibition on television does not cover the sale of videocassettes according to a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which distinguished cases interpreting licenses with a broader definition of media. The right of actors to share in proceeds from films shown on television, cable and cassettes has been the subject of SAG bargaining agreements.
新媒体。罗伊·罗杰斯主要反对在当时的新媒体电视上播放他的电影。一般来说,当授予的权利包括"以任何现在或以后已知的方式或方法"展示作品(以及在相关广告中使用演员的名字)的权利时,它包括任何和所有媒体,即使授予者在合同签订时没有预料到电影展示方式的特定发展。因此,这种授权包括在视频光盘和录像带中发行电影,即使授予者在授予时没有考虑过这些权利。然而,根据第九巡回上诉法院的一项裁决,通过电视展示作品的使用许可不包括录像带的销售,该裁决区分了以更广泛的媒体定义解释许可的案件。演员分享电视、有线电视和录像带播放的电影收益的权利一直是SAG谈判协议的主题。

Bela Lugosi as Count Dracula. Three dissenting members of the California Supreme Court, addressing an issue not discussed by the majority, held that Bela Lugosi’s 1930 contract with Universal Studios granted the studio only the right to use Lugosi’s identity in advertising and promoting the motion picture “Dracula.” While the trial court was presented with conflicting expert testimony as to whether an actor usually retained or granted general merchandising rights, it was said that the fact that the studio in 1936 sought and received Lugosi’s permission to use a wax likeness of Lugosi as Count Dracula in another movie indicated that Universal viewed the 1930 grant of rights clause as not giving it a generalized right to Lugosi’s identity.
贝拉·卢戈西饰演德古拉伯爵。加州最高法院的三名持不同意见的法官对多数法官未讨论的问题进行了裁决,他们认为贝拉·卢戈西在1930年与环球影业的合同仅授予后者在广告和宣传电影《德古拉》中使用卢戈西身份的权利。虽然初审法院收到了关于演员通常保留还是授予一般商品化权利的相互矛盾的专家证词,但据说,1936年,环球影业寻求并获得了卢戈西的许可,在另一部电影中使用卢戈西的蜡像饰演德古拉伯爵,这表明环球影业认为1930年的授权条款并未授予其使用卢戈西身份的一般权利。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:51 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

J. Contracts by Actors and Performers

§ 10:51. Actors’ and performers’ contracts—Scope of the grant of rights
§ 10:51. 演员和表演者的合同——权利授予范围

It seems clear from the cases discussed above that if the performer has signed a contract with the traditional grant of rights clause, the producer is entitled to use the performer’s name in advertising and promoting the performer’s works covered by the contract. The performer’s right to object to the quality of the final work distributed with the performer’s name seems to rest entirely upon the terms of the performer’s contract with the producer. For example, what if there is no contractual clause directly permitting or prohibiting a producer or subsequent licensee to edit a film in a way objectionable to a performer? The performer may have a false representation claim under Lanham Act § 43(a) for distribution of a mutilated work which falsely represents to the public that this is the performer’s work, when it is in fact a mere caricature of the performer’s talents. However, it has been argued that a contractual clause defining the scope of permitted editing would control over the performer’s § 43(a) rights.
从上述案例中可以清楚地看出,如果表演者签署了包含传统权利授予条款的合同,那么制作人有权在广告和宣传中使用表演者的名字,宣传合同中涵盖的表演者的作品。表演者对以自己的名字发行的最终作品的质量提出异议的权利似乎完全取决于表演者与制作人签订的合同条款。例如,如果没有合同条款直接允许或禁止制作人或后续被许可人以令表演者反感的方式编辑电影,该怎么办?根据《兰哈姆法》第43(a)条,表演者可能会因发行残缺作品而受到虚假陈述claim指控,因为残缺作品向公众虚假地表示这是表演者的作品,而实际上这只是对表演者才华的讽刺。然而,有人认为,合同条款中定义了允许编辑的范围,可以控制表演者的第43(a)条权利。

The extent to which a performer may object to allegedly low quality works, such as poor quality recordings, depends upon who the defendant is. If the performer is not under contract to the defendant, the claim may be based upon an implied misrepresentation that the work, such as a record, is a current product truly representative of a typical performance of the performer. However, when the performer is under contract to the defendant, it has been held that a grant of rights license bars the performer from suing for invasion of privacy or publicity rights by the mere use of the performer’s name on the recordings.
表演者对所谓低质量作品(如劣质录音)的反对程度取决于被告的身份。如果表演者与被告没有合同关系,claim可能基于暗示的虚假陈述,即作品(如唱片)是真正代表表演者典型表演的当前产品。然而,当表演者与被告有合同关系时,法院认为,仅凭在录音中使用表演者的名字,授予权利许可就禁止表演者起诉侵犯隐私权或公开权。

When a grant of rights clause permits a producer to use the actor’s “name, likeness and/or voice” in advertising a motion picture, a New York court held, the producer is allowed to use drawings of the actor which emphasize the character of the role played by the actor. Actress Arlene Dahl sued Columbia Pictures for libel and invasion of privacy for using an advertising drawing of her playing a role in a film called “Wicked as They Come.” She claimed that the drawings were done so as to give the impression that Kathy, the role she played in the movie, “is wild and sexually promiscuous.” Saying that plaintiff had a “hypersensitive reaction” to the sketches of her, the court dismissed the invasion of privacy claim by pointing to plaintiff’s grant of rights to Columbia:
当授权条款允许制片人在电影广告中使用演员的"姓名、肖像和/或声音"时,纽约法院认为,允许制片人在广告中使用强调演员所扮演角色特征的演员画像。女演员阿琳·达尔(Arlene Dahl)起诉哥伦比亚影业公司(Columbia Pictures)诽谤和侵犯隐私,原因是该公司使用了一张她扮演电影《Wicked as They Come》中角色的广告画。她声称,这些画给人的印象是她扮演的电影角色凯西"放荡且滥交"。法院指出原告对她的画像有"过度敏感的反应",驳回了侵犯隐私的指控,并指出原告已授权哥伦比亚影业公司使用其肖像:

She consented to the use of her name, photograph and likeness in connection with the advertising of the motion picture. That consent is to be construed in accordance with the advertising standards then prevailing in the industry and known to her. So long as the advertising is in keeping with the theme of the picture or has some relation to actual scenes depicted and is acceptable when judged by these standards, it falls within the terms of plaintiff’s consent and leaves her with no basis for complaint.
她同意在电影广告中使用她的名字、照片和肖像。该同意应按照当时业界普遍且她所熟知的广告标准进行解释。只要广告符合电影主题或与实际场景有一定关联,且根据这些标准可以接受,就属于原告同意的范围,她也就没有complaint的依据。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:52 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

J. Contracts by Actors and Performers

§ 10:52. Actors’ and performers’ contracts—Recovery under quantum meruit
§ 10:52. 演员和表演者的合同——根据合理报酬原则进行追偿

In the Ventura case, the Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota law, held that even where there is an express service contract with a performer, the performer can in some circumstances recover a reasonable royalty under the rule of quantum meruit for the sale of videos of the performances. Those circumstances are when the express contract is silent on the subject of video royalties or when the express contract, while explicitly waiving video royalties, was induced by the “fraudulent” representation of the hiring party that it only paid video royalties to certain “featured” performers.
在Ventura案中,第八巡回法院适用明尼苏达州法律,认为即使与表演者签订了明确的服务合同,在某些情况下,表演者仍可根据合理报酬原则,就表演视频的销售获得合理的版税。这些情况包括:明确合同未提及视频版税问题,或者明确合同虽然明确放弃视频版税,但受雇方"欺诈性"表示只向某些"主要"表演者支付视频版税。

In the Ventura case, plaintiff was hired to do commentary for televised wrestling matches. For the 1985–1987 period, he worked under an oral contract with the producer that did not say anything about video royalties. The court permitted recovery under the quantum meruit theory for reasonable royalties for the sale of these videos because the plaintiff’s right of publicity was a benefit conferred on the producer, resulting in an unjust enrichment for which the performer was entitled to compensation. For the 1987–1990 period, the plaintiff performer worked under a written contract negotiated by his agent, in which plaintiff waived royalties on video sales because the producer falsely represented to the agent that its policy was to pay royalties only to “featured” performers and the plaintiff was not in that category. The court permitted recovery for reasonable royalties from the sale of videos from this period of the written contract because the false representations justified rescission of the contract, permitting recovery of a reasonable royalty under the rule of quantum meruit.
在Ventura案中,原告受雇为电视转播的摔跤比赛做解说。在1985年至1987年期间,他与制片人签订了口头合同,合同中没有提及视频版税。法院根据合理报酬理论允许原告就这些视频的销售获得合理的版税,因为原告的公开权是赋予制片人的利益,因此表演者有权获得unjust enrichment补偿。在1987年至1990年期间,原告表演者根据其代理人协商的书面合同工作,原告在合同中放弃了视频销售的版税,因为制片人向代理人谎称其政策是只向"主要"表演者支付版税,而原告不属于这一类别。法院允许原告就书面合同期间的视频销售获得合理的版税,因为虚假陈述证明合同应予撤销,允许根据合理报酬规则获得合理的版税。

Courts in other states will not allow a performer to pursue a quantum meruit claim where there is an enforceable express contract between the parties.
在其他州,如果双方之间存在可强制执行的明确合同,法院将不允许表演者索取按劳取酬的报酬。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:53 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

K. Licensee’s Standing to Sue Third Parties

§ 10:53. Licensee’s standing to sue third parties

Synopsis:

A licensee of exclusive rights of publicity has standing to sue for infringements which impinge upon its area of exclusive rights as defined in the license. The standing rule of copyright law provides a useful analogy to follow in right of publicity cases.
独家宣传权被许可人有权起诉侵犯其许可中规定的独家权利的行为。版权法的常规规则为处理宣传权案件提供了有益的类比。

The 1953 Haelan Case Establishes the Rule. Early cases viewed a commercial “exclusive license” as no more than a release or waiver of the right to sue for having one’s feelings hurt by commercial use of identity. Viewing commercial endorsement and advertising licenses as no more than a personal waiver of a tort meant that the “licensee” was merely the holder of a personal covenant by a celebrity not to sue. Such a licensee had no standing to sue third party infringers.
1953年的Haelan案确立了规则。早期的案例认为,商业"独家许可"只是放弃或放弃因商业使用身份而使个人感情受到伤害而提起诉讼的权利。将商业代言和广告许可视为个人放弃侵权,意味着"被许可人"只是名人不提起诉讼的个人契约的持有人。这样的被许可人没有资格起诉第三方侵权者。

In the seminal 1953 Haelan case, plaintiff had obtained exclusive agreements with professional baseball players to use their names and pictures on baseball trading cards used as promotions in selling chewing gum. Defendant was a competitor who had used some baseball players’ pictures and names on similar cards without authorization from the players. Defendant challenged plaintiff’s standing to sue, claiming that plaintiff had no enforceable rights to assert in the identity of the players. Defendant argued that “privacy” was only a personal and nonassignable right by a baseball player not to have his feelings hurt by commercial use on baseball cards. Under the traditional view of pure “privacy” rights this was accurate, for, under the old view, all the players had done was sign for plaintiff a release or waiver of the right to sue for an invasion of “privacy”—no more. As the mere holder of a waiver or “settlement” with each ball player, plaintiff owned no right upon which to sue defendant. It was in rejecting this argument that Judge Jerome Frank coined the label “right of publicity” to denote both the right to prevent commercial use of identity and the corresponding right to grant an exclusive privilege to one firm in a defined market. Rejecting the older view of such transactions as merely involving a waiver of the right to sue for invasion of privacy, Judge Frank held that plaintiff, as the holder of an exclusive license of the “right of publicity,” had standing to sue:
在1953年具有开创性的Haelan案中,原告与职业棒球运动员达成了独家协议,允许在棒球交易卡上使用他们的名字和图片,作为销售口香糖的促销手段。被告是竞争对手,未经球员授权就在类似的卡片上使用了一些棒球运动员的照片和名字。被告质疑原告的起诉资格,声称原告没有可执行的权利来主张球员的身份。被告辩称,"隐私"只是棒球运动员的个人权利,不可转让,即棒球运动员有权不因棒球卡上的商业用途而受到伤害。根据纯粹"隐私"权利的传统观点,这是正确的,因为根据旧的观点,所有球员所做的只是为原告签署一份放弃或放弃起诉侵犯"隐私"的权利——仅此而已。作为每个棒球运动员的放弃或"和解"的单纯持有人,原告没有起诉被告的权利。正是为了反驳这一论点,杰罗姆·弗兰克法官创造了"公开权"这一概念,以表示阻止商业使用身份的权利以及相应地授予一家公司在特定市场中的独家特权。弗兰克法官驳回了旧的观点,即此类交易仅涉及放弃起诉侵犯隐私的权利,他认为原告作为"公开权"的独家许可持有人,有权起诉:

This right of publicity would usually yield them [the baseball players] no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures ….[P]laintiff, in its capacity as exclusive grantee of a player’s “right of publicity,” has a valid claim against defendant.
这种公开权通常不会为棒球运动员带来任何收入,除非将其作为独家授权的主题,禁止其他广告商使用他们的照片……[P]原告作为球员"公开权"的独家授权人,对被告拥有有效的claim。

The Haelan Rule is Followed. The holding in Haelan that an exclusive licensee has standing to sue has never been seriously questioned. The cases have either explicitly or implicitly permitted an exclusive licensee of the right of publicity to sue as plaintiff for infringement of rights within the scope of its license. The Restatement of Unfair Competition agrees.
遵循《Haelan规则》。独家被许可人有权起诉的Haelan案件从未受到过严重质疑。这些案件或明确或隐晦地允许独家被许可人作为原告起诉其许可范围内的侵权行为。《不正当竞争法重述》也持相同观点。

Regarding non-exclusive licenses, one case from the lower federal court in California took the view that a non-exclusive licensee of the right of publicity would lack standing to sue, while a more recent decision from the same court, came to the opposite conclusion.
关于非排他性许可,加利福尼亚州下级联邦法院的一个案例认为,非排他性公开权被许可人没有起诉资格,而同一法院最近的一个判决却得出了相反的结论。

Trademark Law is Not Analogous. Trademark law does not provide a useful analogy because generally a licensee’s use of a mark inures to the benefit of the owner-licensor and the licensee acquires no ownership rights in the mark itself. Under this view, a trademark licensee has no ownership rights to assert. Lanham Act § 32(1) provides that an infringer of a federally registered mark is liable in an action brought by “the registrant.” However, Lanham Act § 43(a) says that a person who violates § 43(a)’s prohibitions is liable in an action brought “by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.” Some courts have held that under this broader standing rule of § 43(a), one need not be the “owner” or “registrant” in order to assert an infringement claim. Both an exclusive and nonexclusive United States distributor of a foreign made branded product have been granted standing to sue under § 43(a) for infringement.
商标法不适用类推。商标法不提供有用的类推,因为一般来说,被许可人使用商标是为了维护许可人的利益,被许可人并不获得商标本身的所有权。根据这一观点,商标被许可人没有所有权可以主张。兰哈姆法案第32(1)条规定,侵犯联邦注册商标的侵权人应承担"注册人"提起的诉讼责任。然而,兰哈姆法案第43(a)条规定,违反第43(a)条禁令的人应承担"任何认为因使用任何虚假描述或陈述而受到或可能受到损害的人"提起的诉讼责任。一些法院认为,根据第43(a)条这一更广泛的现行规则,无需是"所有人"或"注册人"即可主张侵权claim。外国品牌产品的美国独家和非独家经销商均有权根据第43(a)条起诉侵权行为。

Using Copyright Law as an Analogy. In a right of publicity case, Judge Sofaer, in upholding the right of a right of publicity exclusive licensee to sue, made an analogy to the rule in copyright law and extensively relied upon copyright as a guide:
以版权法为例。在宣传权案件中,索法法官在维护宣传权独家许可权被许可人起诉的权利时,以版权法中的规则为例,并广泛参考版权法作为指导:

Plaintiff Bi-Rite, as the exclusive licensee of various rock groups, may also assert this claim. Unlike privacy rights, which protect personality and feelings and are therefore not assignable, the right of publicity gives rise to a “proprietary” interest in the commercial value of one’s persona which is assignable and may be freely licensed …. This proprietary interest is much like a copyright ….; it embodies a bundle of exclusive marketing rights which its holder may transfer in its entirety by an assignment or in part by exclusive licenses. Holders of exclusive licenses gain standing to protect their interests against all who would encroach on the exclusive rights embodied in the licenses.
原告Bi-Rite作为多个摇滚乐队的独家授权商,也可以主张这一claim。与保护人格和感情的隐私权不同,公开权产生于个人商业价值的"专有"利益,这种利益可以转让,也可以自由授权……这种专有利益与版权非常相似……它包含一系列专有营销权,持有人可以通过转让或独家授权的方式全部或部分转让这些权利。独家授权持有人有权保护自己的利益,防止他人侵犯授权中包含的专有权利。

Applying copyright law on standing, Judge Sofaer then upheld on summary judgment the standing of plaintiff as to the exclusive licenses it held and denied standing as to the nonexclusive licenses it held from certain performers. The court also noted that restrictions in the license agreements upon the licensee’s right to sue for trademark infringement did “not impede its right to sue to protect the publicity rights it acquires through the exclusive agreements.”
索法法官适用了关于诉讼资格的版权法,然后通过简易判决维持了原告对其持有的独家许可的诉讼资格,并驳回了其对某些表演者持有的非独家许可的诉讼资格。法院还指出,许可协议中关于被许可人起诉商标侵权的限制并不"妨碍其起诉以保护其通过独家协议获得的宣传权。"

What is an “Exclusive” License? It should be noted that an “exclusive” license does not necessarily mean the one and only license. A license of the right of publicity may be “exclusive” as to any defined scope such as product line, context of use or territory. The point is that the exclusive licensee has standing to sue for infringements which impinge upon the exclusive rights that it holds, however defined. Of course, it has no right to sue generally for infringements which invade commercial areas not within the scope of its license. The exclusive licenses held by the plaintiff “define and impose the limits on its publicity rights.” Also, the right of the exclusive licensee to sue should not preempt the licensor’s own independent right to sue, if it wishes. This is the situation which exists if the license contract is silent on the subject of right to sue. There would appear to be no reason why these rules of standing could not be modified or varied in the license agreement if the parties so choose. For example, the person licensing the rights might choose to retain the exclusive right to sue for infringements and to undertake the corresponding duty to monitor the market and assertively sue infringers when necessary.
什么是"排他性"许可? 需要注意的是,"排他性"许可并不一定意味着唯一许可。在产品线、使用环境或地域等任何特定范围内,宣传权许可可能是"排他性的"。关键是,排他性被许可人有权起诉侵犯其拥有的排他性权利的行为,无论该权利如何定义。当然,对于侵犯其许可范围以外的商业领域的侵权行为,排他性被许可人无权起诉。原告拥有的排他性许可"定义并限制了其宣传权"。此外,如果许可人愿意,排他性被许可人的起诉权不应优先于许可人自身的独立起诉权。如果许可合同未提及起诉权,就会出现这种情况。如果双方愿意,似乎没有理由不在许可协议中修改或变更这些诉讼资格规则。例如,许可人可以保留对侵权行为的排他性起诉权,并承担相应的责任,监控市场并在必要时积极起诉侵权人。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:54 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

L. Criminals’ Publishing Contracts and “Son of Sam” Laws
L. 罪犯出版合同和"山姆之子"法

§ 10:54. Criminal defendants’ publication agreements
§ 10:54。刑事被告的出版协议

Synopsis:

So-called “Son of Sam” Statutes, in effect in many states, require the impoundment in escrow of money received by a person charged or convicted of a crime in return for publication or media rights for the story of the crime. The funds held in escrow are available for payment of damages to victims of the crime. Sometimes, criminal defense attorneys have received an assignment of publication and media rights from their clients in return for legal representation. Such attorney-client arrangements present grave problems of conflict of interest.
许多州都实行所谓的"山姆之子"法规,要求对被指控或定罪的人收取的款项进行托管,以换取犯罪报道的出版或媒体版权。托管的资金可用于支付犯罪受害者的损失。有时,刑事辩护律师会从委托人那里获得出版和媒体版权,以换取法律代理。这种律师与委托人的安排存在严重的利益冲突问题。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:55 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

L. Criminals’ Publishing Contracts and “Son of Sam” Laws
L. 罪犯出版合同和"山姆之子"法

§ 10:55. Criminal defendants’ publication agreements—”Son of Sam” statutes: publication proceeds paid to criminals
§ 10:55。刑事被告的出版协议——"山姆之子"法规:出版收益支付给罪犯

Criminals Profiting from their Life Story. Both those charged and those convicted of a crime have been able to leverage media attention into profits from telling their story. They have charged publishers and moviemakers for their cooperation in telling the story of their crimes. Occasionally, convicted criminals have made large amounts of money from selling their stories. In 1977, a New York postal worker, David Berkowitz, admitted to committing a series of thirteen murders or shootings. Berkowitz was dubbed “Son of Sam” by the press as a result of a note signed with that name and left after a killing by Berkowitz. Berkowitz was deluged with offers from publishers and filmmakers eager to capitalize on his story. The murderer accepted several offers, which produced at least $100,000 for Berkowitz. The victims, or their families, were outraged that Berkowitz profited while they received none of these ill-gotten gains. The author of a bill in the New York legislature argued:
罪犯利用自己的生活故事获利。被指控和被定罪的罪犯都通过讲述自己的故事来利用媒体的关注获利。他们向出版商和电影制片人收取合作费用,以讲述自己的犯罪故事。有时,被定罪的罪犯通过出售自己的故事赚了大钱。1977年,纽约一名邮政工人大卫·伯科维茨承认犯下13起谋杀或枪击案。由于伯科维茨在杀人后留下了一张署名"山姆之子"的纸条,媒体称他为"山姆之子"。出版商和电影制片人纷纷向他抛出橄榄枝,希望利用他的故事获利。凶手接受了其中几份提议,为伯科维茨带来了至少10万美元的收入。受害者或其家属对此感到愤怒,因为伯科维茨从中获利,而他们却分文未得。纽约立法机构的一位法案作者认为:

It is abhorrent to one’s sense of justice and decency that an individual such as the forty-four caliber killer can expect to receive large sums of money for his story once he is captured—while five people are dead, other people were injured as a result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal situations, the victim must be more important than the criminal.
像44口径杀手这样的人被捕后,人们会期望他讲述自己的故事,并因此获得巨额报酬,这实在有悖于人们的justice和道德观念——他的行为导致五人死亡,其他人受伤。这项法案将明确指出,在所有犯罪案件中,受害者必须比罪犯更重要。

The New York Statute and Similar Laws Nationwide. In 1977, the New York legislature remedied the injustice of a criminal profiting at the expense of his victims by enacting what is popularly known as the “Son of Sam Law.” Eventually, some forty states and the federal government were to pass similar statutes. While these laws differ in several respects, many require that funds from publication rights agreements by those accused or convicted of a crime be placed in an escrow account. If the defendant is convicted, the victim of the crime and his or her family may collect from the account. If the accused is acquitted, the defendant receives the funds. Also, defense attorneys may draw attorney’s fees from the account.
纽约州法规和全国类似法律。1977年,纽约州立法机构颁布了俗称"山姆之子法"的法律,以纠正犯罪分子以牺牲受害者利益为代价牟取暴利的非正义行为。最终,大约40个州和联邦政府通过了类似的法规。虽然这些法律在几个方面有所不同,但许多法律都要求将那些被指控或定罪的罪犯的出版权协议资金存入托管账户。如果被告被定罪,犯罪受害者及其家人可以从账户中取款。如果被告被无罪释放,被告将获得资金。此外,辩护律师可以从账户中提取律师费。

The New York “Son of Sam” law was enacted in 1977 but was held unconstitutionally overbroad in 1991 by the United States Supreme Court. A considerably narrower version of the statute was enacted in 1992. The 1992 version of the statute permits the victim of a crime to bring a civil action for money damages against a person convicted of a felony within three years of the discovery of any profits of the crime. The new version of the statute requires any company or person that agrees to pay any “profit from a crime” (such as the publisher of a book about the crime authored by the criminal) to notify the Crime Victims Board, which will then notify all known victims of the crime of the existence of the profits. The Crime Victims Board has the power to apply in some instances for pretrial provisional remedies such as attachment of the profits of the crime. “Profits from a crime” includes not only profits from books or motion pictures about the crime, but any money or property the criminal gained as a result of the crime. Conrad has opined that the 1992 New York statute will probably pass constitutional muster. It has been held that the 1992 New York law applies only to those charged or convicted of state law and is not triggered by federal crimes. Remarking that the 1992 version of the law “is modest in comparison to its predecessor,” the New York Appellate Division said that: “It is clear the amended Son of Sam law does not provide any new remedies, but consigns the victim, and the Crime Victim Board acting on behalf of the crime victim and other victims, to the remedies already available to the plaintiff under the Civil Practice Law and Rules.”
纽约"山姆之子"法案于1977年颁布,但美国最高法院于1991年裁定其过于宽泛,不符合宪法。1992年颁布的法案版本大大缩小了适用范围。1992年版本的法案允许犯罪受害者在发现犯罪所得的三年内,对被判重罪的人提起民事诉讼,要求其赔偿经济损失。新版本的法案要求任何同意支付"犯罪所得"的公司或个人(例如出版犯罪分子所著犯罪相关书籍的出版商)通知犯罪受害者Board,后者将通知所有已知的犯罪受害者犯罪所得的存在。犯罪受害者Board有权在某些情况下申请审前临时救济,例如扣押犯罪所得。犯罪所得"不仅包括犯罪相关书籍或电影所得,还包括犯罪分子因犯罪而获得的任何金钱或财产。康拉德认为,1992年纽约法案可能会通过宪法审查。人们认为,1992年纽约法律仅适用于被指控或判定违反州法律的人,不适用于联邦犯罪。纽约上诉法庭指出,1992年版本的法律"与其前身相比有所改进",并指出:"显然,修订后的"山姆之子"法案并未提供任何新的救济,而是将受害者以及代表受害者和其他受害者的犯罪受害者Board置于原告根据《民事诉讼法》和《民事诉讼规则》已经可以获得的救济之下。"

The California Statute. The California act as amended in 1994 provides that all proceeds from the sale of rights of a story of a felony for which a person was convicted are subject to an involuntary trust for the benefit of victims and survivors of victims. The Attorney General may bring an action to require the proceeds to be held in trust. A victim or survivor of a victim must bring an action in court against the convicted felon to recover his or her interest in the trust fund.
《加州法令》。1994年修订的《加州法令》规定,因重罪被判刑者的故事版权出售所得全部用于为受害者及其遗属设立非自愿信托基金。总检察长可提起诉讼,要求将所得款项存入信托基金。受害者或其遗属必须向法院起诉被判刑的重罪犯,以收回其在信托基金中的权益。

In 2000, the California act was amended to include as profits anything sold by the felon or the felon’s representative, the value of which is increased by the felon’s notoriety. This was aimed at discouraging the sale of memorabilia of notorious felons. The California legislature declared that:
2000年,加州法案进行了修订,将重罪犯或其代表出售的任何物品都视为利润,其价值因重罪犯的notoriety而增加。此举旨在阻止notorious重罪犯出售纪念品。加州立法机构宣布:

The state’s compelling interest in ensuring that convicted felons do not profit from their crimes while their victims are not compensated, in protecting crime victims and their families from renewed grief and suffering, and in limiting the risk of crimes that may result from the renewed notoriety of the convicted felon and his or her crime, outweigh the interest of the felon, the felon’s representatives, or others to profit from the sale of the felon’s personal belongings or memorabilia.
国家出于以下考虑,其利益高于重罪犯、重罪犯代表或其他人员通过出售重罪犯个人物品或纪念品获利:确保重罪犯不会从犯罪中获利,而受害者却得不到赔偿;保护犯罪受害者及其家人免受再次伤害和痛苦;限制重罪犯及其犯罪行为可能带来的犯罪风险。

In 2002, in a case concerning publications by the convicted kidnapper of Frank Sinatra, Jr., the California Supreme Court held that the California Son of Sam law was unconstitutional. In the wake of that decision, the California Senate was of the view that it might be impossible to draft a constitutional bill that targeted the profits made by a felon from selling the story of his crime. The California legislature enacted a lengthened statute of limitations to give crime victims more time to file a tort lawsuit against the defendant based on the commission of the crime.
2002年,在涉及小弗兰克·辛纳屈(Frank Sinatra, Jr.)绑架案罪犯出版物的案件中,加州最高法院裁定《加州山姆之子法》违宪。在做出这一裁决后,加州参议院认为,针对重罪犯通过出售犯罪故事牟利的行为起草宪法法案可能是不可能的。加州立法机构延长了诉讼时效,以便犯罪受害者有更多时间根据犯罪事实对被告提起侵权诉讼。

The Federal Statute. The 1984 federal statute permits a court, upon motion of the U.S. Attorney, to order the forfeiture of publication proceeds, after the conviction of a defendant for a federal crime “resulting in physical harm to an individual.” The forfeited publication proceeds are retained in escrow in the Crime Victims Fund and may be used to satisfy a money judgment obtained by a victim. The federal law puts a cap of 20% on funds paid for legal representation of the defendant.
联邦法规。1984年联邦法规允许法院根据美国检察官的动议,在被告因"导致他人身体伤害"的联邦罪行被定罪后,下令没收出版收益。被没收的出版收益将代管在犯罪受害者基金中,可用于满足受害者获得的金钱判决。联邦法律对被告的法律代理费用设置了20%的上限。

The federal statute apparently does not cover persons acquitted by reason of insanity. This means that someone like John Hinckley, acquitted of shooting President Reagan because of insanity, does not have to forfeit the moneys he will receive from cooperating in the writing of a book about his assassination attempt.
联邦法规显然不适用于因精神失常而被宣告无罪的人。这意味着像约翰·欣克利(John Hinckley)这样因精神失常而被宣告无罪的人,不必放弃因合作撰写有关其刺杀总统企图的书而获得的收入。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:56 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

L. Criminals’ Publishing Contracts and “Son of Sam” Laws
L. 罪犯出版合同和"山姆之子"法

§ 10:56. Criminal defendants’ publication agreements—Simon & Schuster case and constitutional challenges
§ 10:56。刑事被告的出版协议——西蒙与舒斯特案和宪法挑战

Some have argued that such statutes unreasonably cut into a criminal defendant’s First Amendment rights to free speech because they diminish the financial incentive to tell his story. Others have argued that such statutes amount to a governmental expropriation of copyright in violation of the Copyright Act.
一些人认为,此类法规不合理地削减了刑事被告根据《第一修正案》享有的言论自由权,因为它们削弱了被告讲述自己故事的经济动力。另一些人则认为,此类法规相当于政府侵犯版权,违反了《版权法》。

In 1991, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the original New York “Son of Sam” statute as against a First Amendment challenge. The court concluded that the statute does single out a certain category of speech based on subject matter and imposes special obligations on that category, but that the law is constitutional because it serves a compelling purpose and is narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose. The New York high court said that the statute serves two important state policies: (1) having criminals, rather than taxpayers, bear the burden of compensating their victims whenever possible; and (2) to preserve the victim’s equitable right to assets earned by a criminal as a result of the victimization.
1991年,纽约上诉法院针对《第一修正案》的质疑,维持了纽约州最初的"山姆之子"法规的合宪性。法院认为,该法规确实根据主题将某些类型的言论单独列出,并对此类言论施加特殊义务,但该法律是合宪的,因为它服务于一个令人信服的目的,并且是为实现这一目的而量身定制的。纽约高等法院表示,该法规服务于两项重要的州政策:(1)尽可能让罪犯而不是纳税人承担赔偿受害者的责任;(2)维护受害者对罪犯因受害而获得的财产的公平权利。

However, in 1991, the United States Supreme Court held that the New York “Son of Sam” statute was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored to serve to advance the state interest in depriving criminals of the profits of their crimes and in using these funds to compensate victims. The Supreme Court characterized the statute as one that does impose a special financial burden on certain books, films, and the like because of their content. Thus, to survive the First Amendment, the state must show that such a law is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that state interest.
然而,1991年,美国最高法院裁定纽约"山姆之子"法规违宪,因为该法规并非严格用于维护国家利益,即剥夺罪犯的犯罪所得,并用这些资金赔偿受害者。最高法院认为该法规确实因某些书籍、电影等的内容而对其施加了特殊的财务负担。因此,为了符合《第一修正案》,该州必须证明此类法律对于维护国家利益是必要的,并且是为了实现这一国家利益而严格制定的。

The Supreme Court emphasized that, unlike many other statutes modeled after it, the New York statute broadly defined a “person convicted of a crime” to include a person who has never been accused or convicted of a crime but who admits in a book or other work to having committed a crime. Thus, had the statute been in effect, it would have impacted on works from the Confessions of Saint Augustine (who admitted to theft) to an autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr., jailed for participating in civil rights protests. Because of this wide sweep, the Supreme Court concluded that “the Son of Sam law clearly reaches a wide range of literature that does not enable a criminal to profit from his crime while a victim remains uncompensated.” To illustrate this overinclusiveness, the Court posited a hypothetical:
最高法院强调,与许多其他以它为蓝本的法规不同,纽约州的法规对"被定罪的人"进行了宽泛的定义,包括从未被指控或定罪,但在书籍或其他作品中承认犯罪的人。因此,如果该法规生效,它将对《圣奥古斯丁的自白》(承认盗窃)和因参加民权抗议而被监禁的马丁·路德·金的自传等作品产生影响。由于这种广泛的涵盖范围,最高法院得出结论:"山姆之子法显然涵盖了广泛的文学作品,这些作品不允许罪犯从犯罪中获利,而受害者却得不到赔偿。"为了说明这种过度包容性,法院提出一个假设:

Should a prominent figure write his autobiography at the end of his career, and include in an early chapter a brief recollection of having stolen (in New York) a nearly worthless item as a youthful prank, the Board would control his entire income from the book for five years, and would make that income available to all of the author’s creditors, despite the fact that the statute of limitations for the minor incident had long since run. That the Son of Sam law can produce such an outcome indicates that the statute is, to say the least, not narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s objective of compensating crime victims from the profits of crime.
如果一位知名人士在职业生涯结束时撰写自传,并在早期章节中简要回顾了年轻时在纽约因恶作剧而偷窃了一件几乎不值钱的东西,那么Board将控制他五年内从书中获得的全部收入,并将这些收入提供给作者的所有债权人,尽管事实上,这一小事件的诉讼时效早已过期。萨姆之子法》能够产生这样的结果,这表明该法规至少不能狭隘地实现国家从犯罪收益中补偿犯罪受害者的目标。

Thus, the New York statutes were too broad in three important respects: (1) the definition of a “criminal” was too extensive; (2) the statute was not restricted to those convicted of a serious crime; and (3) the law applied even if the discussion of the crime took up only a small portion of the work. The Supreme Court specifically noted that the federal government and many states have enacted statutes to serve a similar purpose but by different means, and that “we have no occasion to determine the constitutionality of these other laws.” Thus, it is assumed that a statute that did not suffer from the over-inclusive sweep of the New York statute would survive constitutional scrutiny.
因此,纽约州法规在三个重要方面过于宽泛:(1)"犯罪"的定义过于宽泛;(2)该法规不仅限于被判定犯有严重罪行的人;(3)即使讨论犯罪只占工作的一小部分,该法律也适用。最高法院特别指出,联邦政府和许多州已经颁布了类似目的但手段不同的法规,"我们没有机会确定这些其他法律是否符合宪法"。因此,可以认为,没有像纽约州法规那样过于宽泛的法规,在宪法审查中是可以成立的。

After the 1977 New York statute was held unconstitutionally broad, New York enacted a considerably narrower statutory version in 1992.
1977年纽约州法规被裁定为过于宽泛,不符合宪法规定,此后纽约州于1992年颁布了适用范围大大缩小的法规版本。

In 2002, the Massachusetts Supreme Court advised the state Senate that a substantial portion of a proposed Massachusetts Son of Sam law was unconstitutionally overbroad under the principles in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1991 Simon & Schuster decision. Also in 2002, in a case concerning publications by the convicted kidnapper of Frank Sinatra, Jr., the California Supreme Court held that the California Son of Sam law was unconstitutional under the principles of Simon & Schuster. For the same reasons, other states have also held their statutes to be unconstitutional.
2002年,马萨诸塞州最高法院告知州参议院,根据美国最高法院1991年对西蒙与舒斯特案(Simon & Schuster)的判决原则,马萨诸塞州拟议的《山姆之子法》有很大一部分内容过于宽泛,不符合宪法规定。同样在2002年,在涉及小弗兰克·辛纳屈(Frank Sinatra, Jr.)绑架案罪犯出版物的案件中,加州最高法院认为,根据西蒙与舒斯特案的原则,加州的《山姆之子法》不符合宪法规定。出于同样的原因,其他州也认为其法规不符合宪法规定。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:57 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

II. Licenses

L. Criminals’ Publishing Contracts and “Son of Sam” Laws
L. 罪犯出版合同和"山姆之子"法

§ 10:57. Criminal defendants’ publication agreements—Criminal defense attorneys’ publishing arrangements with their clients
§ 10:57。刑事被告的出版协议——刑事辩护律师与其客户的出版安排

One method by which criminal defendants have ensured that they would have counsel of their choice has been by granting their publication rights directly to their defense attorneys. This method of payment to an attorney raises obvious problems of a potential conflict of interest. For example, would the defense attorney be reluctant to enter a plea of legal insanity to the criminal charge for fear that this would also imply that the defendant was not legally competent to enter into the publishing contract? Would the attorney be tempted to engage in meaningless legal pyrotechnics in the courtroom in order to create a better story? Or, as Art Buchwald suggested, would the public cynically view such an attorney-client contract as tempting the defense attorney, consciously or unconsciously, to “make a better story” by subtly shading the defense so that the defendant received the death penalty? As the California Court of Appeals observed, a literary rights contract resulted in “trial counsel who was devoted to two masters with conflicting interests—[the attorney] was forced to choose between his own pocketbook and the best interests of his client, the accused.”
刑事被告确保自己能够选择律师的一种方法是直接授予辩护律师出版权。这种向律师付款的方式显然存在潜在的利益冲突问题。例如,辩护律师是否会因为担心被告在法律上没有资格签订出版合同而不愿对刑事指控提出法律上精神错乱的抗辩?律师是否会为了编造一个更好的故事而在法庭上进行毫无意义的法律表演?或者,正如Art Buchwald所言,公众是否会愤世嫉俗地认为这种律师-委托人合同有意无意地诱使辩护律师通过巧妙地淡化辩护来"编造一个更好的故事",从而使被告被判处死刑?正如加利福尼亚上诉法院所言,文学版权合同导致"出庭律师不得不同时效忠于两个利益冲突的委托人——[律师]不得不在自己的钱包和被告委托人的最佳利益之间做出选择。"

For these reasons, several courts have disapproved of attorney-client publication agreements. However, some courts have upheld such a publication rights agreement. In 1982, the California Supreme Court upheld such an arrangement between Bobby Joe Maxwell and his attorney. The rationale was that all potential conflicts of interest were disclosed to the defendant, he waived the conflict, and he should therefore have the counsel he desired. Perhaps the ultimately unresolvable question in such cases is whether the short-run monetary gain to the attorney is outweighed by the possible long-run damage to professional reputation.
基于这些原因,一些法院不赞成律师与客户之间的出版协议。然而,一些法院支持这种出版权协议。1982年,加利福尼亚州最高法院支持鲍比·乔·麦克斯韦尔(Bobby Joe Maxwell)与其律师之间的这种安排。理由是,所有潜在的利益冲突都向被告披露,被告放弃了冲突,因此他应该得到他想要的律师。也许在这种情况下,最终无法解决的问题是,律师短期内的金钱收益是否超过了专业声誉可能受到的长期损害。

As to legal ethics, the American Bar Association has taken an explicit stand against an attorney acquiring literary or media rights to a story concerning the lawyer’s representation until the legal matter is entirely concluded.
关于法律道德,美国律师协会明确反对律师在法律事务完全结束前,获取与其代理案件相关的文学或媒体版权。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:58 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:58. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses
§ 10:58. 起草和协商人格许可的清单

The following items should be considered when one drafts or negotiates the terms of a license of name, voice or likeness for use on commercial items or in advertising.
在起草或协商用于商业项目或广告中的姓名、声音或肖像许可条款时,应考虑以下事项。

This checklist assumes that the subject person is the licensor. If some other entity, such as an assignee or a licensee with the power to sublicense, is the licensor, then the license must be modified to reflect this fact. All other things being equal, a licensee would prefer a license direct from the person identified rather than through an intermediary.
本清单假定主体为许可人。如果许可人为其他实体,例如受让人或有权转授权的被许可人,则必须修改许可以反映这一事实。在其他条件相同的情况下,被许可人更希望直接从指定的人那里获得许可,而不是通过中间人。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:59 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:59. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist
§ 10:59. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单

The following sections list matters that should be considered, and if relevant, included in a personality license.
以下部分列出了应在人格许可中考虑并纳入的事项。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:60 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:60. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—What legal rights are being licensed?
§ 10:60. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可了哪些法律权利?

The parties may or may not desire to precisely define in detail in the license the particular legal rights which this licensor is granting. The licensor’s rights can be simply defined in the license as the “Property Rights” or the “Proprietary Rights.” It may be sufficient for the parties to simply recognize that the licensor has the legal right to prevent the licensee from doing the commercial activity which is permitted in the license. If the licensor did not at least arguably have this right, then there would be no point in talking about a license. However, it is crucial for those who draft and negotiate the license to have clearly in their own minds the legal categories of rights which this licensor may have.
双方可能希望也可能不希望详细准确地定义许可方授予的特定法律权利。许可方的权利可以在许可中简单地定义为"产权"或"专有权"。双方只需承认许可方拥有阻止被许可方从事许可中允许的商业活动的合法权利即可。如果许可方至少可以说没有这项权利,那么谈论许可就没有意义了。然而,对于起草和协商许可的人来说,明确许可方可能拥有的权利的法律类别至关重要。

The parties should also make clear whether the license includes within its terms future related rights created by the licensor, such as new characterizations, or new pictures protected by copyright.
双方还应明确许可条款是否包含许可方未来创建的相关权利,例如新特征或受版权保护的新图片。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:61 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:61. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—What legal rights are being licensed?—Rights of publicity and privacy
§ 10:61. 起草和协商人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可的法律权利有哪些?——公开权和隐私权

When a firm uses, in advertising or on products, any indicia by which a particular human is identifiable, then that use, without a license, is an infringement of the right of publicity, absent First Amendment immunity. Neither the implication of an endorsement, nor use as a trademark or service mark, nor “celebrity” status of the person, is required to trigger this potential liability. All that is needed is that the person is identifiable in the use in a way that draws attention to the product or its advertising or in some way enhances the salability of the product.
当公司在广告或产品上使用任何可识别特定个人的标识时,这种未经许可的使用就侵犯了公开权,不受《第一修正案》豁免权的保护。无论是暗示代言、作为商标或服务标记使用,还是个人的"名人"身份,都不足以引发这种潜在的责任。只要该人在使用中可以被识别,从而引起人们对产品或其广告的关注,或以某种方式提高产品的销售能力,就足以引发这种潜在的责任。

Thus, the licensor is granting the licensee limited immunity from suit for infringement of the right of publicity within the defined scope of the license. If the license is “exclusive” in some defined market, the licensee also receives, unless the license otherwise provides, the right to sue third parties who intrude on the licensee’s exclusive rights.
因此,许可方在许可的限定范围内授予被许可方有限的免于侵犯公开权诉讼的权利。如果许可在某些限定市场是"排他性的",除非许可另有规定,被许可方还有权起诉侵犯其排他性权利的第三方。

A license which permits a defined usage of the licensor’s identity also constitutes a “consent,” “release,” “waiver,” or “license” of “appropriation privacy”: the right to sue for unpermitted commercial use of identity in a way that triggers an affront to dignity and resulting mental distress.
允许对许可方身份进行特定使用的许可也构成对"盗用隐私"的"同意"、"免责"、"放弃"或"许可":即对未经许可的商业使用身份的行为提起诉讼的权利,这种行为会损害尊严并导致精神痛苦。

Such a license would also seem to be a “consent” to the three other forms of invasion of privacy. If the person willingly licenses the defined use, then it cannot form the basis for objection on the grounds of the intrusion, false light or public disclosure of private facts types of privacy.
这种许可似乎也等同于对其他三种侵犯隐私行为的"同意"。如果当事人自愿许可规定的用途,那么就不能以隐私侵犯、虚假陈述或公开披露隐私为由提出异议。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:62 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:62. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—What legal rights are being licensed?—Waiver of other tort claims
§ 10:62. 起草和协商人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可了哪些法律权利——放弃其他侵权行为 claims

If the licensee keeps within the form, scope and context of use as defined in the license, the licensor has probably also consented to conduct which might otherwise trigger liability for libel, false advertising, and intentional or negligent infliction of mental distress.
如果被许可方遵守许可协议中规定的使用形式、范围和背景,许可方可能也同意了某些行为,否则这些行为可能会引发诽谤、虚假广告以及故意或过失造成精神困扰的责任。

It is appropriate and not redundant to include in a contract both a waiver of claims as well as a grant of rights. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that under California contract law, it was proper for a movie studio in its contract with a person whose life was to be the basis for a motion picture to include in the contract provisions that, in return for payment, the person (1) waived all claims against the studio and in addition, (2) granted to the studio the right to use the story of the person’s life and experiences in a factual or fictional manner in a motion picture.
在合同中同时包含放弃claims和授予权利的内容是恰当的,并非多余。例如,第九巡回法院认为,根据加州合同法,电影制片厂在与以个人生活为电影题材的人签订的合同中,应包含以下条款:作为报酬,该人(1)放弃对制片厂的所有claims,此外,(2)授予制片厂以事实或虚构的方式在电影中使用其生活经历和故事的权利。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:63 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:63. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—What legal rights are being licensed?—Trademarks and service marks
§ 10:63. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可的法律权利有哪些?——商标和服务商标

Under the earlier view of trademark licensing, it was felt that if the licensor had never used his or her personal name or picture in a trademark or service mark manner, then there were no rights in a mark to license to another. Some cases went further to say that even if the person had used personal identity as a mark on product line A, there could be no license of trademark or service mark rights in product line B, because there were no rights to license in a mark in product line B.
根据早期的商标许可观点,如果许可人从未以商标或服务商标的方式使用过其个人姓名或图片,则无权将商标许可给他人。有些案例更进一步指出,即使许可人将个人身份作为A产品线的商标,也不得将商标或服务商标权许可给B产品线,因为B产品线不存在商标许可权。

However, under the modern view of trademark licensing, rights in a mark can be acquired and maintained through first and subsequent use of the name or picture as a mark by a controlled licensee even when the only use of the mark has been made by the licensee. The reasoning is that since the licensee’s use inures to the benefit of the licensor, the licensee’s first use of the symbol as a trademark or service mark automatically vests ownership rights in the licensor. Otherwise, the licensee would be the first to use the symbol as a “mark,” the licensee would be the owner, and the “license” would be void and irrelevant.
然而,根据现代商标许可的观点,受控被许可人首次及后续使用作为商标的名称或图片,即使被许可人仅使用过该商标,也可以获得并保留商标权。其理由是,既然被许可人的使用符合许可人的利益,那么被许可人首次将符号用作商标或服务商标,所有权就自动归属于许可人。否则,被许可人将成为第一个将符号用作"商标"的人,成为所有者,而"许可"将无效且不相关。

The view that first use by a controlled licensee insures to the benefit of the applicant or registrant was codified in Lanham Act § 5 by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Thus, it is quite clear that rights to a mark can be acquired and maintained through use of a mark by a controlled licensee even when the only use of the mark has been made by the licensee.
1988年《商标法修订法案》将"受控被许可人首次使用可确保申请人或注册人的利益"的观点编入了《兰哈姆法案》第5条。因此,很明显,即使商标仅由被许可人使用,受控被许可人通过使用商标也可以获得并维持商标权。

If the mark is not being used by the applicant for federal registration, but is being used by one or more controlled licensees whose use inures to the applicant’s benefit, applicant must disclose those facts to the Patent and Trademark Office.
如果申请人没有使用该商标进行联邦注册,而是由一个或多个受控被许可人使用,且该使用符合申请人的利益,则申请人必须向专利和商标局披露这些事实。

The better practice is to provide in the license that the licensor is the owner of all trademark and service mark rights in the licensed identity and that the licensor, not the licensee, will seek appropriate registration of those rights. Under the modern view of trademark licensing, the licensee’s use inures to the benefit of the licensor-owner of mark rights and the licensee acquires no ownership rights in the mark itself. To make this clear, the license agreement itself should recite that the licensee acquires no trademark or service mark ownership rights and that all uses by the licensee inure to the benefit of the licensor as owner of the trademark rights. It is also common to have a clause providing that the licensee agrees not to challenge or attack the title of the licensor in the licensed marks.
更好的做法是在许可协议中规定,许可方是许可身份中所有商标和服务商标权利的所有者,并且由许可方而非被许可方对这些权利进行适当的注册。根据现代商标许可的观点,被许可方的使用应符合商标权利所有者许可方的利益,被许可方不获得商标本身的所有权。为了明确这一点,许可协议本身应规定被许可方不获得商标或服务商标的所有权,被许可方的所有使用应符合商标权利所有者许可方的利益。通常还会有一项条款规定,被许可方同意不质疑或攻击许可方在许可商标中的所有权。

In some nations (not the United States), only registered marks are permitted to be licensed and the law requires that the parties file certain disclosure documents so that the licensee can be formally recorded as a “registered user.” In a license covering such nations, some provision could be made to require the licensor to cooperate in executing such documents.
在某些国家(美国除外),只有注册商标才允许授权,法律要求双方提交某些披露文件,以便被许可人可以被正式记录为"注册用户"。在涵盖这些国家的许可中,可以规定一些条款,要求许可人在执行此类文件时予以配合。

This discussion assumes that the licensee will in fact use the licensed identity as a “trademark” or “service mark.” That is, that it will use the licensed identity to identify and distinguish a single commercial source or quality of goods or services. There will be licenses in which the licensee will not be making such a use of the licensed identity, such as use only to draw attention to advertising copy. In those types of licenses, the existence of trademark or service mark rights will be irrelevant.
本讨论假定被许可人实际上会将许可标识用作"商标"或"服务商标"。也就是说,被许可人将使用许可标识来识别和区分单一商品或服务的来源或质量。在某些许可中,被许可人不会将许可标识用于上述用途,例如仅用于吸引对广告文案的关注。在这些类型的许可中,商标或服务商标权利的存在将无关紧要。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:64 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:64. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—What legal rights are being licensed?—Copyrights
§ 10:64. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可了哪些法律权利——版权

The subject person can license the right to commercial use of his or her picture or likeness whether or not he or she owns copyright in the particular likeness to be used by the licensee. If the licensor does own copyright in the particular picture or photograph to be used by the licensee, then that copyright will form part of the general license. If the licensee desires to have special photographs taken of the person for this licensed use, the agreement should provide that copyright in those photographs are assigned to the licensor and licensed back to the licensee.
被摄者可以许可他人对其照片或肖像进行商业使用,无论其是否拥有被许可人使用的特定肖像的版权。如果许可人拥有被许可人使用的特定照片或肖像的版权,则该版权将构成一般许可的一部分。如果被许可人希望为许可用途拍摄特定照片,则协议应规定这些照片的版权转让给许可人,再许可给被许可人。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:65 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:65. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Aspects of identity being licensed
§ 10:65. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——被许可的识别特征

There should be a definition of the specific aspects of the licensor’s identity which are being licensed. This can be defined in the license as the “Licensed Identity” or the “Licensed Rights.” For example, a given license may grant a right to use only the name, or a nickname, or a stage name, or any likeness, or a specific likeness, or a specific picture or photograph, or any aspect of voice, or a specific recording of voice, or any combination of these. The point is that while the licensor may have ownership of all aspects of identity, the license can be limited to the use of only certain defined aspects of identity.
对于被许可人身份的具体方面,应该有一个定义。在许可中,可以将其定义为"被许可人身份"或"被许可人权利"。例如,某项许可可能仅授予使用姓名、昵称、艺名、肖像、特定肖像、特定图片或照片、声音的任何方面、特定录音或这些内容的任意组合的权利。关键的一点是,虽然许可人可能拥有身份的所有方面,但许可可能仅限于使用身份的某些特定方面。

One advantage to the licensor reserving the right to specify a particular picture or photograph is to have some control to prevent the advertising use of pictures that are unflattering or that, at least in the person’s own mind, distort the image the person wants to project.
许可方保留指定特定图片或照片的权利,这样做的好处之一是可以控制广告中图片的使用,避免出现不讨喜的图片,或者至少在当事人看来,图片扭曲了当事人想要塑造的形象。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:66 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:66. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Format and context of use
§ 10:66. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——格式和使用环境

The license should define the “Licensed Product” or the “Licensed Use.” For example, the license must define the type of product on which the licensee is permitted to use the licensed identity. The merchandise should be defined with some specificity and some licenses attach an Exhibit or Schedule listing the items. Merely defining vague categories such as “consumer goods” or “personal care products” is dangerous because it will lead to uncertainty as to the ability of the licensor to grant further licenses which might be interpreted to overlap with previously granted licenses. A licensor may grant an exclusive license to Alpha Cosmetic Co. for use on “personal care products” and later grant a license to the Beta Toy Co. for use on “toys.” If Beta uses the identity on play cosmetic kits for little girls, Alpha may have a valid objection. It has been held that the prior grant renders void a conflicting subsequent grant, and that the subsequent licensee may even be liable for the tort of inducing a breach of the prior exclusive license.
许可协议应定义"许可产品"或"许可用途"。例如,许可协议必须定义被许可人获准使用许可标识的产品类型。商品应定义得具体一些,有些许可协议会附上列有商品的附件或附表。仅定义模糊的类别,如"消费品"或"个人护理产品",是很危险的,因为这会导致许可人授予进一步许可的能力不确定,可能会被解释为与先前授予的许可重叠。许可人可能会授予Alpha Cosmetic Co.独家许可,用于"个人护理产品",后来又授予Beta Toy Co.许可,用于"玩具"。如果Beta将标识用于小女孩的玩具化妆品套装,Alpha可能会提出有效异议。人们认为,先前的授予会使冲突的后续授予无效,后续被许可人甚至可能因诱使违反先前的独家许可而承担侵权责任。

If there are limitations on the channels of trade licensed, they should be defined. For example, the license could limit the licensee to distribution only through the licensee’s wholly owned retail outlets, or only through the licensee’s franchised retail outlets. The licensor might also desire to prohibit sale to other companies for use as give-away items to promote the sale of another line of products.
如果对授权贸易渠道有限制,则应予以明确说明。例如,许可方可以规定被许可方只能通过其全资零售店或特许零售店进行销售。许可方还可能希望禁止被许可方将产品作为赠品出售,以促进另一系列产品的销售。

If there are limitations on the use of the licensed identity as to the type and place of advertising media, they should be defined. For example, advertising might be restricted to newspapers and magazines, prohibiting use on television or prohibiting use on billboards.
如果对授权身份在广告媒体类型和位置方面的使用有限制,则应予以明确说明。例如,广告可能仅限于报纸和杂志,禁止在电视上投放或禁止在广告牌上投放。

Obviously, the license agreement must define whether the license is to be exclusive or nonexclusive as to the defined scope of use. Licensees will usually demand some degree of exclusivity, although artful drafting can usually define some scope of “exclusivity,” no matter how narrow.
显然,许可协议必须明确许可是排他性的还是非排他性的,取决于所定义的使用范围。被许可人通常会要求一定程度的排他性,尽管巧妙的措辞通常可以定义一些"排他性"的范围,无论多么狭窄。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:67 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:67. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Territorial scope
§ 10:67. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——地域范围

The territorial scope should be defined. It could be anything from “world-wide” to defined parts of a nation.
应明确地域范围。范围可以是"全球"或一个国家中的特定区域。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:68 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:68. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Duration of license
§ 10:68. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可期限

The license should define the starting date of the license term and the duration of the basic term. If the parties negotiate an automatic extension of the basic term on the same conditions, the license should provide a mechanism for the extension. For example, a one-year contract may provide that the licensee may elect (within a defined time frame and by a specified notice) to extend the license on the same terms and conditions (except for the sentence providing for the one extension), provided that the licensee has paid the licensor all moneys due during the first term and is not otherwise in default.
许可协议应规定许可期限的起始日期和基本期限的持续时间。如果双方商定在相同条件下自动延长基本期限,则许可协议应提供延期机制。例如,一年期合同可规定被许可方(在规定的时间内,通过指定的通知)可选择以相同的条款和条件(规定一次延期的句子除外)延长许可期限,前提是被许可方已向许可方支付了第一个期限内所有应付款项,且未出现其他违约行为。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:69 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:69. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Up-front payments
§ 10:69. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——预付款

There might be an up-front, lump sum payment due to the licensor upon signing. If so, specify whether it is an “advance” to be applied against royalties, or payment in consideration of the licensor entering into the agreement and not to be deducted from future royalties.
在签署协议时,可能需要一次性支付一笔预付款给许可方。如果是这样,请说明这是否是用于支付版税的"预付款",还是作为许可方签订协议的对价,且不会从未来的版税中扣除。

In an exclusive license, one purpose of an up-front payment could be to give the licensee an incentive to actively develop and promote the licensed product. It sometimes happens that an exclusive licensee may decide to “sit” on an exclusive property which might undercut sales of other products in its line. An up-front payment, coupled with minimum royalties, if high enough, will create an economic incentive for the licensee to develop the licensed property in order to recoup these costs.
在独家许可中,预付款的一个目的可能是激励被许可方积极开发和推广许可产品。有时,独家被许可方可能会决定"坐享"独家财产,从而削弱其产品线中其他产品的销售。预付款加上最低特许权使用费(如果足够高),将为被许可方开发许可财产提供经济激励,以收回这些成本。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:70 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:70. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Running royalties
§ 10:70. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——持续性使用费

A percentage running royalty computed upon a royalty base is the most common form of payment. Money flowing to the licensor depends on both the defined percentage and how the royalty base is defined. A 5% royalty based upon “net profits” will certainly produce much less income than a 5% royalty based upon “gross sales.” There are several ways to calculate “net profits.” Creative cost accounting being what it is, some cynics argue that any percentage of “net profits” is always equal to zero.
根据特许权使用费基数计算的特许权使用费百分比是最常见的付款方式。流向许可方的资金取决于既定的百分比和特许权使用费基数的定义。以"净利润"为基础的5%特许权使用费产生的收入肯定比以"总销售额"为基础的5%特许权使用费少得多。计算"净利润"的方法有多种。由于创造性成本会计的存在,一些愤世嫉俗的人认为,任何"净利润"百分比都等于零。

Each merchandising market has its own “window” of “customary” royalty percentages within which negotiation is realistically possible. For example, if in the widget industry, 10% is “tops” for a personality royalty deal, then the person who makes a “nonnegotiable demand” for 12% will bring negotiations to a halt, probably permanently. Merchandising people in each market know, with a reasonable degree of certainty, where lies the line between profit and loss. If high royalties will predictably raise total costs to the point where there is a net loss on each item sold, there is no point in selling anything. As the old joke goes, if you suffer a loss on each item, you can’t make up for it in volume.
每个商品市场都有其"惯例"版税比例的"窗口",在此范围内进行谈判是切实可行的。例如,在配件行业,个性版税交易的"上限"是10%,那么提出12%"不可协商要求"的人将导致谈判破裂,甚至可能永久破裂。每个市场的商品销售人员都能合理地确定利润和亏损之间的界限。如果高版税将不可避免地提高总成本,导致每件售出商品出现净亏损,那么就没有必要销售任何商品。正如一句老话所说,如果每件商品都出现亏损,那么就无法通过增加销量来弥补。

The definition of royalty base is crucial. It could be anything from “net, net profits” to “gross, gross sales,” with dozens of variations in between. Each market has its own “customary” royalty base within which negotiation is realistically possible. For example, many poster and merchandise licenses define the royalty base as “net sales” or “net wholesale price,” defined to mean revenue computed on prices charged by the manufacturer to its customers, less quantity, trade and cash discounts, returns and allowances. The cautious licensor may want to define all such deductions as well as insert a phrase prohibiting the deduction of any costs other than those defined in computing the royalty base.
版税基数的定义至关重要。它可以是"净利润"或"销售总额",中间还有数十种变体。每个市场都有其自己的"习惯"版税基数,在此范围内进行谈判是切实可行的。例如,许多海报和商品许可证将版税基数定义为"净销售额"或"净批发价",即制造商向客户收取的价格减去数量折扣、贸易折扣和现金折扣、退货和补贴后的收入。谨慎的许可方可能希望定义所有此类扣除,并插入一个短语,禁止扣除计算版税基数时定义的费用以外的任何费用。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:71 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:71. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Minimum royalties
§ 10:71. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——最低版税

Some licenses provide, depending upon whether there was an up-front payment (and the amount of it), on a minimum yearly royalty in the event actual sales and royalties are low. One theory is that a minimum annual royalty gives the licensee an incentive to actively promote the item.
有些许可协议根据是否预付了费用(以及金额)的不同,规定了在实际销售额和特许权使用费较低的情况下,最低年度特许权使用费。有一种理论认为,最低年度特许权使用费可以激励被许可方积极推广产品。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:72 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:72. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Method and time of paying royalties
§ 10:72. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——支付版税的方法和时间

The time frame for computing royalties and the time within which payment is due should be clearly defined. In personality merchandise licenses, quarterly royalty periods are common. The license should define number of days after the close of a royalty period within which the licensee must pay. Thirty days is not uncommon. The licensor should also require that with each payment the licensee must furnish a report showing the number and kind of licensed products sold, together with the relevant dollar sales volume and the itemized costs deducted.
应明确计算版税的时间范围和付款期限。在个人商品许可中,通常采用季度版税期。许可协议应规定被许可方必须在版税期结束后多少天内付款。30天并不罕见。许可方还应要求被许可方在每次付款时提供一份报告,说明已售许可产品的数量和种类,以及相关的销售额和扣除的逐项成本。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:73 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:73. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Licensor control over quality of licensed products
§ 10:73. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可人对被许可产品质量的控制

If the licensee is making a trademark or service mark usage of the licensed identity, a quality control clause is essential to the validity of the agreement as a license of a mark. From the licensor’s point of view, it is better to err on the side of treating it as a trademark license and assume that quality control is needed. Even if it is clear that the licensee will make no trademark or service mark use of the licensed identity, the licensor will probably still want to have a right to prevent uses which are inconsistent with the professional image the licensor wishes to project. How “little” quality control is “sufficient” to make for a valid trademark license is always a troubling question that the licensee asks an attorney. The most that can be said is that the more quality control the licensor has and actually exercises, the stronger is the validity of the agreement as a trademark license.
如果被许可方使用许可身份作为商标或服务商标,那么质量控制条款对于协议作为商标许可的有效性至关重要。从许可方的角度来看,最好将其视为商标许可,并假定需要进行质量控制。即使被许可方显然不会将许可身份作为商标或服务商标使用,许可方可能仍然希望有权阻止与许可方希望塑造的专业形象不符的使用。如何"少量"质量控制足以使商标许可有效,始终是困扰被许可方的问题,他们经常向律师咨询。最多只能说,许可方拥有并实际执行的质量控制越多,协议作为商标许可的有效性就越强。

As a practical matter, many licenses of human identity will in fact involve both right of publicity rights and trademark or service mark rights. In such cases, the special rules of trademark licensing must be followed in order to preserve the trademark significance of the licensed identity or persona. For example, where the widow of famous swing band leader Glenn Miller licensed to a company “the right and license to use the name and likeness of Glenn Miller... in connection with the business activities of [the licensee company],” the court held that this conveyed both a trademark license and a license of Glenn Miller’s right of publicity. The court found that the failure of the surviving children to challenge allegedly improper sub-licensing of the licensee or to exercise any quality control, resulted in both larches and estoppel of their claims against the licensee.
实际上,许多人类身份的许可实际上涉及公开权和商标或服务商标权。在这种情况下,必须遵守商标许可的特殊规则,以维护许可身份或角色的商标意义。例如,著名摇摆乐队领导人格伦·米勒的遗孀授权一家公司"有权和许可使用格伦·米勒的名字和肖像……与[被许可公司]的业务活动有关",法院认为这既传达了商标许可,也传达了格伦·米勒的公开权许可。法院认为,未亡子女未能对被许可人的不当转授权提出异议,也没有进行任何质量控制,导致他们claims对被许可人的权利和禁止反言。

In personality licenses, it is not uncommon to provide for quality control by having the licensee furnish samples in advance to the licensor for approval. It is common to provide that if the licensor fails to object within a defined time period, the licensor is deemed to have approved the items represented by the samples. If the licensor disapproves of the samples, the licensor should be required to clearly explain why they are not approved and exactly how they fail to meet the licensor’s standards of quality. Some licenses go further to require that the licensor’s approval shall not be “unreasonably” withheld, or language to that effect. The licensor should also provide for the further shipping of random samples on a periodic basis to verify that the items made over a period of time do in fact conform to the initial samples approved.
在个人许可中,通常会要求被许可人提前向许可人提供样品以供审批,以此来实施质量控制。通常会规定,如果许可人在规定的时间内没有提出异议,则视为许可人已批准样品所代表的物品。如果许可人不同意样品,则应要求许可人明确解释为何不同意,以及样品为何不符合许可人的质量标准。有些许可更进一步要求许可人不得"不合理地"拒绝批准,或使用类似措辞。许可人还应定期提供随机样品的进一步运输,以验证一段时间内生产的物品确实符合最初批准的样品。

While not strictly required by trademark licensing law, the licensor may also wish to provide for a similar right of approval over all advertising or promotional materials to be used to sell the licensed items. However, rather than have disapproval of advertising material be a material term of the license, the parties may wish simply to provide that in the event of a reasonable disapproval, those advertising materials shall not be used.
虽然商标许可法没有严格要求,但许可人可能也希望就用于销售许可产品的所有广告或宣传材料规定类似的批准权。然而,与其将广告材料的不批准作为许可的重要条款,各方可能更希望规定,在合理的不批准的情况下,不得使用这些广告材料。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:74 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:74. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Warranty of right to license
§ 10:74. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——许可权的保证

The licensee will desire that the licensor formally warrant that it is the sole owner of the licensed rights, that the licensor has full legal capacity, power and authority to grant the license and that the licensor has not previously granted conflicting exclusive licenses. Some such recital is critical to the licensee. If the licensor has no power or authority to grant the license or has previously granted a conflicting license, then the licensee receives nothing and may be liable to third parties who own superior rights.
被许可人希望许可人正式保证其为许可权利的唯一所有者,且许可人拥有授予许可的完全法律能力、权力和权限,且许可人此前未授予过冲突的排他性许可。此类陈述对被许可人至关重要。如果许可人没有权力或权限授予许可,或者此前已授予过冲突的许可,那么被许可人将一无所获,且可能对拥有更高权利的第三方负有责任。

In return for a warranty, the licensor will desire that the licensee recite that it recognizes the validity of the proprietary rights the licensor warrants that it owns and is licensing, and that the licensee formally promises that it will not, either during or after the term of the license, challenge the validity of those proprietary rights.
作为获得担保的回报,许可方希望被许可方确认其认可许可方所拥有并许可的专有权利的有效性,并正式承诺在许可期内或期满后不会质疑这些专有权利的有效性。

The licensor must be extremely cautious in wording the scope of the warranty it makes. For example, a license may cover the whole world, yet few licensors are able to say with certainty that they have completely exclusive rights in every single nation in the world. If the warranty of sole and exclusive rights extends to the whole world, all it would take to constitute an arguable breach of the warranty would be a single conflict of rights in one nation. There seems to be no reason why the licensor’s warranty could not be limited to one or more nations in which it feels secure in making a warranty of exclusive rights, even though the territory covered by the license is broader than the scope of the warranty of exclusive rights.
许可方在制定其担保范围时必须格外谨慎。例如,许可可能涵盖全球,但很少有许可方能够肯定地说他们在世界每个国家都拥有完全排他性的权利。如果排他性权利的担保范围涵盖全球,那么只要在一个国家发生一次权利冲突,就足以构成可争辩的担保违约。尽管许可所涵盖的领土范围比排他性权利的担保范围更广,但似乎没有理由不允许许可方将其担保范围限制在一个或多个其认为能够安全地做出排他性权利担保的国家。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:75 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:75. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Licensee’s use of trademark and copyright notices
§ 10:75. 起草和协商人格许可的清单——许可清单——被许可人使用商标和版权声明

If the licensor is licensing copyrights, it will require that the licensee use the copyright notice permitted by United States law and by the Universal Copyright Convention. The format of the required notice can be specified in the contract. For example: “© [year of first publication] [Licensor].”
如果许可方授权版权,则要求被许可方使用美国法律和《世界版权公约》允许的版权声明。所需声明的格式可在合同中指定。例如:"© [首次出版年份] [许可方]"。

If the licensor is licensing trademarks or service marks, it may want to require the licensee to use an informal trademark notice and, if the mark is federally registered, the legal form of trademark registration notice permitted by the Lanham Act. An informal type notice for unregistered marks usually is “TM” for trademarks or “SM” for service marks. The legal form of notice for federally registered marks is the R in a circle (®). While trademark law does not require that the licensor-trademark owner’s name be used on licensed merchandise, the licensor might, for promotional reasons, desire to have some sort of legend appear, such as “Made under license from [licensor].”
如果许可方授权使用商标或服务商标,则可能要求被许可方使用非正式的商标通知,如果该商标已在联邦政府注册,则应使用《兰哈姆法》允许的商标注册通知的法定形式。非正式的通知形式通常为:未注册商标为"TM",服务商标为"SM"。联邦政府注册的商标的法定通知形式为圆圈中的R(®)。虽然商标法不要求在授权商品上使用许可方-商标所有人的名称,但出于宣传目的,许可方可能希望出现某种形式的说明,例如"经[许可方]授权制造"。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:76 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:76. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Termination and rights upon termination
§ 10:76. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——终止和终止时的权利

The contract should provide for a procedure of notification in the event the licensee breaches the terms of the license contract. Often, the license provides for written notice of breach by the licensor, with a period of time for the licensee to cure the breach. The licensee may be given a grace period in which to dispose of existing items.
合同应规定在许可方违反许可合同条款时通知的程序。通常,许可方会书面通知许可方违约,并给许可方一段时间来纠正违约行为。许可方可能会给予许可方宽限期,以便其处理现有物品。

Most personality merchandise license agreements provide that upon termination for any reason, including expiration of the term of the license, any and all rights conveyed to the licensee automatically revert back to the licensor.
大多数个性商品许可协议规定,一旦因任何原因终止协议,包括许可期限到期,则许可方所享有的任何及全部权利将自动恢复。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:77 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:77. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Licensee’s right to assign or sublicense
§ 10:77. 起草和协商人格许可的清单——许可清单——被许可人的转让或转授权权利

The license should clearly state whether the license is personal to the licensee and license rights are not assignable to another or, on the other hand, whether the license also runs to the licensee’s assigns. Similarly, the license should clearly specify whether the licensee is permitted to sublicense others, and if so, spell out in detail the scope of sublicensing permitted.
许可协议应明确说明许可是否仅适用于被许可人,许可权利是否不可转让给他人,或者许可是否也适用于被许可人的受让人。同样,许可协议应明确说明被许可人是否有权再许可他人,如果可以,应详细说明再许可的范围。

The trademark rule that there is no right to sub-license a trademark without an explicit contractual provision permitting it also applies to a license of the right of publicity.
商标规则规定,如果没有明确的合同条款允许,则无权再授权商标,这一规则也适用于公开权的授权。

The licensee might want the licensor to agree that the license rights and obligations of the licensor cannot be assigned to another and are binding upon the licensor’s heirs and personal representatives in the event of the licensor’s death.
被许可人可能希望许可人同意,许可人的许可权利和义务不得转让给他人,且在许可人死亡的情况下,许可人的继承人和个人代表应受其约束。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:78 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:78. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Indemnification and insurance
§ 10:78. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——赔偿和保险

The licensor may well have tort liability exposure for personal or property damages caused by the licensee’s merchandise. The licensor who endorses a product may have personal exposure for claims of deception. It is common for the licensee to agree to indemnify and hold harmless the licensor as to such claims and the cost of defending them. It is also common for the licensee to take out and pay for a policy of insurance (of a defined amount) in the licensor’s name covering liability for any claimed injury to person or property arising out of alleged defects in the licensed items or alleged deception in endorsements.
许可方可能因被许可方商品造成的人身或财产损害而承担侵权责任。为产品背书的许可方可能因claims欺骗行为而承担个人责任。被许可方通常会同意赔偿许可方并使其免受此类claims行为以及辩护费用的影响。被许可方通常还会以许可方的名义购买并支付保险(规定金额),以承担因许可商品被指存在缺陷或背书被指存在欺骗行为而造成的人身或财产损害索赔。

The licensee will want to be indemnified against attorney’s fees, damages and loss of revenues caused by third party claims which challenge the licensee’s use of the licensed property. Common in many licenses is a provision by which the licensor promises to indemnify the licensee from intellectual property claims against the licensee arising out of its use of the licensed property. The license should also recite what happens if the licensee is enjoined at the behest of a third party, temporarily or permanently, from using the licensed property.
被许可方希望被补偿因第三方claims质疑被许可方使用许可财产而导致的律师费、损害赔偿和收入损失。许多许可中常见的一项条款是许可方承诺补偿被许可方因使用许可财产而产生的知识产权claims。许可还应说明如果被许可方应第三方要求被暂时或永久禁止使用许可财产,应如何处理。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:79 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:79. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Arbitration, forum selection, and choice of law
§ 10:79. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——仲裁、法庭选择和法律选择

If the parties agree on an arbitration clause, the method and scope of arbitration must be defined. Many parties prefer to incorporate by reference the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The parties should be aware that an open-ended arbitration clause may empower the arbitrators to adjudicate claims of validity and infringement of intellectual property rights. If the parties do not want arbitration to extend this far, they should so limit its scope to disputes over the formation, validity, construction and performance of the license contract itself.
如果双方同意仲裁条款,则必须确定仲裁的方法和范围。许多当事人倾向于以提及方式纳入美国仲裁协会的规则。双方应了解,开放式仲裁条款可能会授权仲裁员裁定知识产权的有效性和侵权问题。如果双方不希望仲裁的范围如此广泛,则应将其限制在许可合同本身的形成、有效性、解释和履行方面的争议。

Whether or not there is an arbitration clause, the parties can provide that they agree to submit themselves to the personal jurisdiction of a particular state with regard to any disputes of claims arising out of the license. They can also provide that the laws of a selected state shall govern disputes over the construction and performance of the license contract, and perhaps over the validity and infringement of the licensed rights themselves. Most of the court decisions are receptive to choice of law clauses, absent some overriding forum policy or overreaching by one party. Given the sometimes significant differences in the publicity and privacy laws of the various states, choice of law might be crucial.
无论是否存在仲裁条款,双方当事人均可约定,他们同意将因许可产生的任何争议提交给特定州的个人jurisdiction。他们还可以约定,许可合同条款的解释和履行产生的争议,以及许可权利本身的有效性和侵权争议,应受选定州的法律管辖。在不存在某些凌驾于法庭政策或一方当事人凌驾于另一方当事人之上的情况下,大多数法院判决都接受法律选择条款。鉴于各州的公开和隐私法律有时存在重大差异,法律选择可能至关重要。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:80 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:80. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Enforcement of rights against infringers
§ 10:80. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——对侵权者行使权利

A basic decision to make in drafting the license is whether the licensor or the licensee shall have the primary power and responsibility to decide to sue third party infringers and who shall pay for such legal actions. Many licenses provide that the licensor shall have the right, but not the duty, to pursue infringers of the licensed rights. One reason the licensor desires to have this power is that it may decide that a given infringement is so minimal that it is not worth risking the validity of the licensor’s rights in litigation with a marginal infringer. If the licensor recovers damages in litigation which it paid for, licenses usually provide that the licensor shall retain all such damages.
在起草许可协议时,需要做出一个基本决定,即许可方或被许可方是否拥有起诉第三方侵权者的主要权力和责任,以及谁应承担此类法律诉讼的费用。许多许可协议规定,许可方有权(但无义务)起诉侵犯许可权的行为。许可方希望拥有这一权力的原因之一是,它可能认为某项侵权行为微不足道,不值得冒着许可方权利在诉讼中无效的风险与边缘侵权者进行诉讼。如果许可方在诉讼中追回了其支付的损害赔偿,许可协议通常规定许可方应保留所有此类损害赔偿。

Licensees often demand that the license agreement provide that if the licensor does not act within a reasonable time to prevent third party infringements, then the licensee may, at its own expense, take such steps as it deems necessary, including the filing of suit—in the name of the licensor if necessary. If the licensee sues and recovers damages in litigation which it paid for, the licensee will want to retain all of those damages.
被许可方通常要求许可协议规定,如果许可方未能在合理的时间内采取行动阻止第三方侵权行为,则被许可方可以自行承担费用采取其认为必要的措施,包括提起诉讼——必要时以许可方的名义提起诉讼。如果被许可方提起诉讼并获得了赔偿,那么被许可方希望保留所有这些赔偿。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:81 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

III. Contract Checklist

§ 10:81. Checklist for drafting and negotiating personality licenses—Licensing checklist—Boilerplate language
§ 10:81. 起草和谈判人格许可的清单——许可清单——通用条款

Standard Clauses. The license agreement should contain standard boilerplate language covering a variety of issues, e.g., a provision that the license does not create a joint venture or partnership among the parties; the method of giving notices to each party; a clause providing that the failure of one party to enforce any contract rights is not a waiver of those rights; an integration clause providing that the agreement embodies the complete understanding of the parties and cannot be modified except in a writing signed by both parties; a severability clause providing that if one provision is found ineffective or invalid under the law, it shall not invalidate any other parts of the agreement.
标准条款。许可协议应包含涵盖各种问题的标准通用条款,例如,许可协议不会在各方之间建立合资企业或合伙关系的条款;向各方发出通知的方法;一方未能行使任何合同权利并不构成放弃这些权利的条款;规定协议体现了各方完全理解且除非双方书面签字否则不得修改的整合条款;规定如果某项条款被认定为无效或不符合法律规定的,不得影响协议其他部分效力的可分割条款。

No Inducements Clause. Under the law of some states, such as New York, a person who has signed a consent cannot later argue that her consent was induced by fraud if in the contract itself that person disclaimed reliance on statements allegedly made to induce her to enter into the agreement.
无诱导条款。根据纽约等一些州的法律,如果合同中当事人声明不依赖据称诱使其签订协议的陈述,则其不得在事后声称其同意是受欺诈所致。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:82 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

IV. Marital and Estate Property

§ 10:82. Right of publicity as marital property

Synopsis:

The right of publicity can and has been viewed as a form of marital property analogous to professional goodwill. To the extent that right of publicity values in celebrity identity are the result of efforts during the marriage, such values must be accounted for in a distribution of marital property after divorce or dissolution of a marriage. Difficulties will arise in the valuation and apportionment of the right of publicity as marital property.
宣传权可以被视为一种类似于职业goodwill的婚姻财产。在某种程度上,名人身份的宣传权是婚姻期间努力的结果,因此在离婚或婚姻关系解除后,必须考虑这种价值在婚姻财产分配中的比重。在宣传权作为婚姻财产进行估值和分配时,会出现困难。

The Right of Publicity is Property in a Marriage. The right of publicity is a form of property. In the case of a “celebrity,” this property right is usually created through the time, energy, and skill of the person. This is an income-producing property right which can be exploited through the granting of licenses for commercial use of persona. For these reasons, to the extent that the property right inherent in the right of publicity is the result of efforts expended during marriage, it can be viewed as a form of marital property, the value of which must be accounted for in the case of divorce or marital dissolution.
在婚姻中,公开权是一种财产。公开权是一种财产形式。对于"名人"而言,这种财产权通常是通过个人的时间、精力和技能创造的。这是一种创收的财产权,可以通过授予个人肖像的商业使用许可来利用。基于这些原因,由于公开权中固有的财产权是婚姻期间付出的努力的结果,因此可以将其视为一种婚姻财产,在离婚或婚姻解体时必须考虑其价值。

The Right of Publicity in Community Property States. In community property states, the value of a celebrity spouse’s right of publicity can be argued to be an asset of the community, to be divided up upon dissolution. However, it has been argued that requiring a celebrity to pay support based upon a presumed earning level and to buy that same earning capacity from the community as an asset is improper as “double dipping.”
在夫妻共同财产制国家,公众人物配偶的公开权价值可被视为夫妻共同财产,在婚姻解体时进行分割。然而,有人认为,要求名人根据假定的收入水平支付赡养费,并将这种收入能力作为资产从夫妻共同财产中购买是不恰当的,因为这是"双重获益"。

In the Bing Crosby estate case in 2014, the California Court of Appeals did not have to reach the question of whether the California post mortem right of publicity became community property as part of Bing Crosby’s estate. However, the court went on in dictum to speculate that the California post-mortem right of publicity statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1, appears to treat the right of publicity as separate property. If so, it would create an exception to the provision in Cal Probate Code § 760 that all property acquired during marriage is community property except as otherwise provided by statute.
在2014年Bing Crosby遗产案中,加州上诉法院无需裁定加州死后公开权是否成为Bing Crosby遗产的一部分,成为共同财产。然而,法院在判词中推测,加州死后公开权法规(《加州民法典》第3344.1条)似乎将公开权视为单独的财产。如果是这样,那么《加州遗嘱认证法》第760条的规定将出现例外,即除非另有规定,否则婚姻期间获得的所有财产均为共同财产。

The Analogy to Professional Goodwill. The most useful analogy here is the recognition that many states have given to the marital property status of the value of professional goodwill: the value of a physician’s or attorney’s reputation and earning power. For example, the value of the commercial exploitation potential in a performer’s identity and persona can be analogized to the real but intangible value inherent in the “goodwill” of a medical or legal practice. In the context of a professional practice, “goodwill” can be defined as the reputation that will generate future business. A performer’s public recognition similarly has a “reputation” or value that can generate income through future commercial exploitation.
与职业的类比 Goodwill。这里最有用的类比是许多州对职业 goodwill 价值的婚姻财产地位的认可:医生或律师的声誉和赚钱能力的价值。例如,表演者的身份和个性的商业 exploitation 潜力可以类比为医疗或法律实践的"goodwill"中固有的真实但无形的价值。在职业实践的背景下,"goodwill"可以被定义为将带来未来业务的声誉。表演者的公众认可同样具有"声誉"或价值,可以通过未来的商业 exploitation 创造收入。

The Right of Publicity as Marital Property in New York. In the 1988 Golub case, a New York court found that the right of publicity of model-actress Marisa Berenson was an income-producing asset which became marital property to be subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. Noting that New York law held that professional licenses and academic degrees can be marital property, the court said that the same logic supporting that rule also supports the view that marital property includes “a spouse’s unique ability to commercially exploit his or her fame.” Speaking generally, the court remarked that: “If one spouse has sacrificed and assisted the other in an effort to increase that other spouse’s earning capacity, it should make no difference what shape or form that asset takes so long as it in fact results in an increased earning capacity.” The court emphasized that the value of the right of publicity as marital property must be traced to efforts made during the time of the marriage. The court concluded with its holding:
在纽约,公开权属于婚姻财产。在1988年的Golub案中,纽约法院认定,模特兼演员玛丽莎·贝伦森(Marisa Berenson)的公开权是一种创收资产,属于婚姻财产,离婚时须进行公平分配。法院指出,纽约法律认为职业执照和学位可以作为婚姻财产,并认为支持该规则的逻辑同样支持婚姻财产包括"配偶利用其名望进行商业开发的独特能力"的观点。法院在一般性评论中指出:"如果配偶一方为增加另一方的收入能力而做出牺牲和协助,那么该资产采取何种形式或形态并不重要,只要它确实提高了收入能力即可。"法院强调,公开权作为婚姻财产的价值必须追溯到婚姻存续期间的努力。法院最后裁定:

This court … holds that the skills of an artisan, actor, professional athlete or any person whose expertise in his or her career has enabled him or her to become an exceptional wage earner should be valued as marital property subject to equitable distribution.
本法庭……认为,工匠、演员、职业运动员或任何在其职业生涯中凭借专长成为高薪人士的人,其技能应作为婚姻财产进行公平分配。

Golub was distinguished by a New York court that held that the celebrity status of jazz saxophone player Stan Getz was not a marital asset subject to distribution because, in view of Getz’s deteriorating health and terminal illness, he no longer possessed the capacity for generating exceptional earnings.
纽约法院认定爵士萨克斯演奏家斯坦·盖兹(Stan Getz)的名人身份不属于婚姻财产,无需进行分配,因为鉴于盖兹健康状况恶化且身患绝症,他已不再具备创造高额收入的能力。

Building upon the decision in Golub, the New York Appellate Division in the Elkus case held that the right of publicity of famed operatic singer Frederica von Stade Elkus constituted marital property subject to equitable distribution on divorce. During the parties’s seventeen-year marriage, Frederica von Stade’s operatic career blossomed and her income increased from $2,250 to $621,878. Her husband, who during much of the marriage acted as her voice coach and teacher, contended that he sacrificed his own career as a singer and teacher to devote himself to his wife’s operatic career and the upbringing of their two children. Since the value of her career increased during the marriage, in part due to the contributions of the husband, he was held entitled to an equitable distribution of that increase in marital property. Referring to previous cases finding that such things as a professional degree or license was marital property, the New York Appellate Division said that: “There is no rational basis upon which to distinguish between a degree, a license, or any other special skill that generates substantial income.”
根据在Golub案中的判决,纽约上诉法庭在Elkus案中裁定,著名歌剧演员Frederica von Stade Elkus的公开权构成婚姻财产,离婚时须进行公平分配。在双方长达17年的婚姻中,Frederica von Stade的歌剧事业蒸蒸日上,收入从2250美元增长到621878美元。她的丈夫在婚姻的大部分时间里担任她的声乐教练和老师,他声称自己牺牲了自己的歌手和教师事业,全身心投入妻子的歌剧事业和两个孩子的抚养。由于她的事业价值在婚姻期间有所增长,部分归功于丈夫的贡献,因此丈夫有权获得婚姻财产中这部分增长的公平分配。纽约上诉法庭在参考了此前认定专业学位或执照属于婚姻财产的案件后表示:"学位、执照或任何其他能够带来可观收入的特殊技能之间没有合理的区分依据。"

The New York court in the Elkus case rejected the wife’s argument that she would never have an opportunity to utilize her right of publicity through any form of commercialization of her identity. The court responded that this was mere “speculation,” inferring that the issue was the potential value of the property, not whether the celebrity had exploited it in the past or presently intended to actually exploit that value in the future through direct commercialization. The Elkus court concluded that:
纽约法院在Elkus案中驳回了妻子的论点,即她永远没有机会通过任何形式的商业化来利用其公开权。法院回应说,这仅仅是"猜测",并推断问题在于财产的潜在价值,而不是名人过去是否利用过该价值,或者是否打算在未来通过直接商业化来实际利用该价值。Elkus案的法院得出结论:

We agree with the courts that have considered the issue, that the enhanced skills of an artist such as the plaintiff [Frederica von Stade], albeit growing from an innate talent, which have enabled her to become an exception earner, may be valued as marital property subject to equitable distribution …. Accordingly, to the extent the appreciation in the plaintiff’s career was due to the [husband’s] efforts and contributions, this appreciation constitutes marital property.
我们同意审理此案的法院的观点,即原告(弗雷德里卡·冯·斯塔德)等艺术家的技能提升,尽管源于与生俱来的天赋,但使她成为收入超群的人,可以作为婚姻财产进行公平分配……因此,如果原告职业生涯中的升值归因于[丈夫]的努力和贡献,则该升值构成婚姻财产。

The Right of Publicity as Marital Property in New Jersey. In the 1988 Piscopo case, the New Jersey courts found that the right of publicity of comedian Joe Piscopo was a marital asset to be distributed upon divorce. The Piscopo case fell into the classic model of the divorce in which the noncelebrity spouse sacrificed and assisted the celebrity spouse in attaining the star status that creates a valuable right of publicity. The court reached its conclusion by analogizing the value of a celebrity’s identity to an attorney’s goodwill value in a law practice. The court concluded that:
新泽西州将公开权视为婚姻财产。在1988年的皮斯科波案中,新泽西州法院认定喜剧演员乔·皮斯科波的公开权属于婚姻财产,应在离婚时进行分配。皮斯科波案属于典型的离婚模式,即非名人配偶牺牲自己并协助名人配偶获得明星地位,从而创造宝贵的公开权。法院通过将名人的身份价值比作律师在法律实践中的goodwill价值得出结论。法院认为:

The foregoing analysis compels the court to conclude that celebrity goodwill is a distinct asset susceptible of evaluation which is distributable if acquired during the marriage in accordance with the factors outlined in [New Jersey statutes.]
根据上述分析,法院得出结论,goodwill名人是一项可评估的独特资产,如果是在婚姻存续期间获得的,则可根据[新泽西州法规]中列出的因素进行分配。

Putting a Value on the Right of Publicity as Marital Property. The courts have noted the obvious difficulties in putting a dollar value on the right of publicity in distribution of marital property upon divorce or dissolution. In the New Jersey Piscopo case, the trial court appointed an expert C.P.A. to calculate the value of the right of publicity or “celebrity goodwill.” The court-appointed expert stated that the custom of the trade was to take a percentage of the celebrity’s average gross earnings and to apply an appropriate discount. In the Piscopo case, the expert calculated this by taking 25% of average gross earnings over a three year period. He applied no further discount, saying that the 25% figure already contained a discount. The expert C.P.A. valued Piscopo’s “celebrity goodwill” at $158,863 and the parties later stipulated $98,708 as the value.
将宣传权视为婚姻财产。法院指出,在离婚或婚姻关系解除时,宣传权在婚姻财产分配中的价值难以用美元来衡量。在新泽西州皮斯科波案中,审判法院指定专家C.P.A.计算宣传权或"名人goodwill"的价值。法院指定的专家称,行业惯例是按照名人平均总收入的百分比,并适当打折。在皮斯科波案中,专家计算出三年平均总收入的25%。他未进一步打折,称25%的数值已经包含了折扣。专家C.P.A.将皮斯科波的"名人goodwill"价值定为158863美元,双方后来将价值定为98708美元。

Problems with Valuing the Right of Publicity as Marital Property. Several obvious problems of valuation of the right of publicity in martial property settlement cases will arise. Among them are:
将公开权作为婚姻财产评估的问题。在婚姻财产分割案件中,公开权的评估会出现几个明显的问题。其中包括:

 (1) the need to trace the source of the current value of the right of publicity, trying to isolate it as arising prior to, or during the marriage and making a proper apportionment;
(1) 需要追溯公开权当前价值的来源,尝试将其与婚前或婚姻期间产生的价值区分开来,并做出适当的分配;

(2) the need to separate performance income from right of publicity exploitation income in valuing the right of publicity;
(2) 在评估公开权时,需要将表演收入与公开权exploitation收入分开;

(3) the need to determine whether to value the right of publicity as fully exploited or as actually exploited in the past by the celebrity spouse. Under one point of view, the celebrity’s decision in the past not to exploit fame through licensing to the full extent commercially reasonable should have no bearing on the value of that fame because the unilateral decision of one spouse should not be allowed to diminish the other’s share in the potential fully exploited value of a marital asset. The opposite view is that the celebrity spouse should not be compelled to exploit his or her persona to the full extent theoretically possible. For the celebrity spouse who has never or only rarely exploited persona though commercial tie-ins, valuing the right of publicity at its full exploitation value would in effect force the celebrity spouse to exercise the right in future and lose, to some degree, the associated right of privacy.
(3) 需要确定是否将名人配偶过去对公开权的利用视为完全利用或实际利用。一种观点认为,名人过去决定不通过许可在商业上合理地充分利用其名气,不应影响该名气的价值,因为不应允许一方配偶的单方面决定减少另一方配偶在婚姻财产的潜在完全利用价值中的份额。相反的观点认为,不应强迫名人配偶在理论上可能的最大限度内利用其名人身份。对于从未或很少通过商业关系利用名人身份的名人配偶,将公开权完全exploitation估值实际上会迫使名人配偶在未来行使该权利,并在一定程度上失去相关的隐私权。

Probably the most common way to apportion right of publicity in celebrity divorces will be for the noncelebrity spouse to sell his or her interest in the right of publicity to the celebrity spouse. This avoids continuing business dealings between the ex-spouses in connection with licensing and other exploitation of the identity of the celebrity. By the purchase of all interests in his or her right of publicity, the celebrity spouse centralizes ownership rights in himself or herself and potential problems of split or common ownership are avoided.
在名人离婚案中,最常见的是由非名人配偶将其在名人配偶的公开权中的权益出售给名人配偶。这避免了前配偶之间在许可和其他exploitation名人身份相关事务上的持续商业往来。通过购买名人配偶在公开权中的全部权益,名人配偶将所有权集中于自己,避免了分割或共同所有权的潜在问题。

Celebrities and Non-Celebrities. While noncelebrities own a right of publicity, only where one of the spouses is a “celebrity” will the right of publicity have a value sufficient to be considered in divorce and marital dissolution. That is, only for a celebrity will identity and persona be a potential income-producing asset of a value sufficient to list on the balance sheet in apportionment of marital property.
名人或非名人。虽然非名人拥有公开权,但只有当夫妻一方是"名人"时,公开权才有足够的价值在离婚和婚姻解体时予以考虑。也就是说,只有名人身份和人格才有可能成为创收资产,其价值足以在资产负债表中列出,作为婚姻财产分配的一部分。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:83 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

IV. Marital and Estate Property

§ 10:83. Right of publicity as an asset in decedent’s estate
§ 10:83. 作为死者遗产一部分的公开权

As noted in numerous places in this treatise, the overwhelming judicial consensus is that the right of publicity is a species of intangible property. Consequently, when a celebrity dies, the value of their post-mortem publicity rights becomes an asset of their estate. While theoretically, this would also be true for non-celebrities as well, the value of the post-mortem publicity rights of a random John or Jane Doe would be essentially zero in most cases.
正如本论文多处所述,司法界普遍认为,公开权是一种无形财产。因此,当名人去世时,其死后公开权的价值将成为其遗产的一部分。虽然从理论上讲,非名人死后公开权的价值也是如此,但在大多数情况下,普通人死后公开权的价值基本上为零。

As is true for all other forms of property, the post-mortem rights will pass to legatees in accordance with the terms of the decedent’s will. The rights can be left in their entirety to a single person or entity, such a corporation that has been established for the express purpose of exploiting those rights after the person’s death. The rights can also be divided and left to different heirs according to the wishes of the testator. Thus the right to exploit the persona on “toys, dolls, and other three-dimensional objects” could be left to one party while the right to exploit it on “posters, note cards, and other two-dimensional objects” might be left to another. Of course, the wording of any such division needs to be extremely precise and even with the best drafting there are likely to be disputes along the margins.
与其他所有形式的财产一样,死后权利将根据死者遗嘱的条款转移给继承人。这些权利可以全部留给一个人或一个实体,例如,在死者去世后,专门为了利用这些权利而成立的公司。根据遗嘱人的意愿,这些权利也可以分割并留给不同的继承人。因此,利用"玩具、玩偶和其他三维物体"的权利可以留给一方,而利用"海报、便签卡和其他二维物体"的权利可以留给另一方。当然,任何此类分割的措辞都必须非常精确,即使起草得再好,也可能在边缘地带出现争议。

If the testator has made no specific provision in the will regarding post-mortem publicity rights they will pass according to the residuary clause of the will. If there is no will, they will pass according to the intestacy laws of the person’s state of residence at the time of his death.
如果立遗嘱人在遗嘱中没有就死后宣传权做出具体规定,则根据遗嘱的剩余条款处理。如果没有遗嘱,则根据立遗嘱人死亡时所在州的无遗嘱继承法处理。

A further issue that can arise at the time of death is the valuation of the publicity rights for the purposes of federal and state estate taxes. Determining that valuation is an exercise in predicting the future, which is to say it is almost entirely speculative. Public tastes are fickle and there is no precise way to know if a given celebrity’s name and image will be capable of exploitation for decades or if they will promptly fade into obscurity. Bruce Springsteen, now past 70, is revered by many as a living legend in the music world. It is far from clear, however, whether 20 years after his death he will retain the popularity of an Elvis, be remembered with dim nostalgia like the late Perry Como, or fade entirely into obscurity.
死亡时可能出现的另一个问题是,为联邦和州遗产税目的对宣传权的估值。确定估值是一项预测未来的工作,也就是说,它几乎完全是投机性的。公众的品味是善变的,没有确切的方法可以知道某个名人的名字和形象是否能在几十年内保持exploitation,或者是否会迅速淡出人们的视线。布鲁斯·斯普林斯汀(Bruce Springsteen)现在已经70多岁了,被许多人尊为音乐界的一个活着的传奇。然而,在他去世20年后,他是否会像猫王一样保持人气,像已故的佩里·科莫(Perry Como)一样被淡淡的怀旧所铭记,还是完全消失在人们的视线中,这还远远不清楚。

The valuation problem was vividly illustrated after the death of pop icon Michael Jackson. The Internal Revenue Service claimed that, for estate tax purposes, Jackson’s publicity rights should be valued at in excess of $160 million. The representatives of his estate argued, by way of contrast, that by the end of his life his publicity rights were essentially worthless because he had been credibly accused of sexual exploitation of children and drug use and had a generally eccentric and off-putting lifestyle. After lengthy proceedings, the U.S. Tax Court, in a 271-page opinion, valued Jackson’s name and likeness at $4.15 million.
流行偶像迈克尔·杰克逊去世后,估价问题得到了生动诠释。美国国税局声称,出于遗产税目的,杰克逊的公开权价值应超过1.6亿美元。而他的遗产代理人则认为,到其去世时,他的公开权基本不值钱,因为他被确凿地指控对儿童进行性exploitation侵犯和吸毒,而且生活方式古怪而令人反感。经过漫长的诉讼程序,美国税务法庭在一份长达271页的意见书中将杰克逊的名字和肖像价值定为415万美元。

For performers, it is important to note that the value of the publicity rights is distinct from the value of any copyright interests that the individual owned at the time of his death. The recordings and compositions of Michael Jackson (and Springsteen and Como) will likely continue to generate significant revenues for a long time to come. The value of that income stream is not, however, part of the right of publicity.
对于表演者而言,重要的是要注意,宣传权的价值与个人去世时拥有的任何版权利益的价值是不同的。迈克尔·杰克逊(以及斯普林斯汀和科莫)的录音和作品在未来很长一段时间内可能会继续产生可观的收入。然而,这种收入流的价值并不属于宣传权的一部分。

2 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 10:84 (2d ed)

The Rights of Publicity and Privacy | April 2024 Update
公开权和隐私权 | 2024年4月更新

J. Thomas McCarthy and Roger E. Schechter

Chapter 10. Assignments and Licenses

V. ASSETS FOR PAYMENT OF DEBTS

§ 10:84. Foreclosing on the right of publicity

In an article published in 2002, Professors Melissa B. Jacoby and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman placed the right of publicity in the context of the debtor-creditor system. They raised the possibility that the right of publicity could be viewed as an asset subject to seizure by an unsatisfied creditor.
梅丽莎·B·雅各比(Melissa B. Jacoby)和黛安·林赫尔·齐默尔曼(Diane Leenheer Zimmerman)教授在2002年发表的一篇文章中,将公开权置于债务人-债权人体系下。他们提出了一种可能性,即公开权可以被视为一种资产,可由未得到满足的债权人予以扣押。

Jacoby & Zimmerman argued that, like other Intellectual Property rights such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, the right of publicity is an asset that should be included in a debtor’s assets. This would mean that a celebrity debtor may own a valuable asset in his or her exploitable identity which is subject to inclusion in the estate of a bankrupt and subject to seizure and sale.
雅各比和齐默尔曼认为,与专利、商标和版权等其他知识产权一样,公开权也是一种资产,应纳入债务人的资产。这意味着,名人债务人可能拥有可利用身份这一宝贵资产,该资产应纳入破产人的财产,并可能被扣押和出售。

Inclusion of the right of publicity as this kind of asset subjects the concept to the criticism that it violates the principle that the debtor should retain control over his or her future labor. The authors admit that implementing this concept will require disentangling the personal interests from the property interests inherent in the right of publicity. This is because there is a “sharp legal divide” between money generated after the start of bankruptcy by property and money generated by an individual’s services. Profits or proceeds from services performed by the debtor after the start of bankruptcy proceedings do not qualify as property of the bankruptcy estate, but Jacoby & Zimmerman argue that because the right of publicity is a property right that can be valuable without the celebrity’s active cooperation, the celebrity’s future services are not a part of his or her publicity rights. They give this example:
纳入公开权,因为这种资产会受到批评,认为它违反了债务人应保留对其未来劳动的控制权的原则。作者承认,实施这一概念需要将个人利益与公开权固有的财产利益区分开来。这是因为,破产开始后财产产生的金钱与个人服务产生的金钱之间存在"明显的法律鸿沟"。债务人在破产程序开始后提供服务的利润或收益不能算作破产财产,但雅各比和齐默尔曼认为,由于公开权是一种财产权,即使没有名人的积极合作,它也可能有价值,因此名人的未来服务不属于其公开权的一部分。他们举了这样一个例子: