CHINESE BUDDHIST THOUGHT AND ITS ANTECEDENTS 中国佛教思想及其渊源
理
同
brook ziporyn 布鲁克·齐波伦
BEYOND ONENESS
AND DIFFERENCE 超越合一
与差异
SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture 纽约州立大学中国哲学与文化系列
Roger T. Ames, editor 罗杰·T·艾姆斯,编辑
BEYOND ONENESS
AND DIFFERENCE 超越合一
与差异
Li 理 and Coherence in 理与连贯
Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents 中国佛教思想及其渊源
BROOK ZIPORYN 布鲁克·兹波林
Published by 发布者:State University of New York Press, Albany 纽约州立大学出版社,奥尔巴尼
c 2013 State University of New York c 2013年纽约州立大学All rights reserved 版权所有Printed in the United States of America 美国印刷
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Ziporyn, Brook, 1964- 布鲁克·兹波林,1964 年-
Beyond oneness and difference : LiL i and coherence in Chinese Buddhist thought and its antecedents / Brook Ziporyn. 超越同一性和差异性: LiL i 中国佛教思想及其前身的连贯性/Brook Ziporyn。
pages cm . - (SUNY series in Chinese philosophy and culture) 页码 厘米 . - (纽约州立大学中国哲学文化系列)
Includes bibliographical references and index. 包括参考书目和索引。
ISBN 978-1-4384-4817-6978-1-4384-4817-6 (alk. paper) 国际标准书号 978-1-4384-4817-6978-1-4384-4817-6 (普通纸)
This book is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, one I. Ziporyn, immigrant, autodidact, Spinozist, and author of Cosmo-Retardation: A Brief Introduction To A Theory Which Shows The Possibility Of Cosmic Function In A Continuum Devoid Of Energy, a work that received, as far as I know, a total of one printed review, in the journal Philosophy of Science, published by the University of Chicago, July 1940. 本书谨献给我的祖父,一位移民、自学者、斯宾诺莎主义者 I. 齐波林 (I. Ziporyn),也是《宇宙迟滞:显示宇宙功能在缺乏能量的连续体中的可能性的理论简介》一书的作者,据我所知,这项工作在芝加哥大学 1940 年 7 月出版的《科学哲学》杂志上总共收到了一篇印刷评论。
Here is the entire review, consisting of a single sentence: “The mystic use of scientific terms prevents making head or tail of anything in this book. W. M. M.” 这是整个评论,由一句话组成:“科学术语的神秘使用使本书中的任何内容都无法得到头或尾。西玛”
On second thought: this book is dedicated collectively to I. Ziporyn and this reviewer, “W.M.M.,” in the Borgesian hope that they have by now turned out, in the afterlife, to be two aspects of a single soul. 再想一想:这本书集体献给 I. Ziporyn 和这位评论家“WMM”,博尔赫斯式的希望,他们在来世,现在已经成为一个灵魂的两个方面。
CONTENTS 内容
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS … xi 致谢……xi
INTRODUCTION 介绍
Li 理 and Coherence: Recap of Ironies of Oneness and 理与连贯:统一性和连贯性的讽刺回顾
Difference and Terminological Clarifications … 1 差异和术语说明……1
CHAPTER ONE 第一章
Li 理 as a Fundamental Category in Chinese Thought … 21 理作为中国思想的基本范畴……21
Needham and Organic Pattern … 30 李约瑟和有机模式…… 30
Hansen and the Mass Noun Hypothesis … 31 汉森和大众名词假说…… 31
Graham and the Absent Copula and Correlative Thinking … 33 格雷厄姆和缺席的 Copula 以及关联思维…… 33
Peterson and Coherence … 38 彼得森和连贯性...... 38
Hall and Ames and the Focus/Field … 40 霍尔和艾姆斯以及焦点/领域…… 40
CHAPTER TWO 第二章
The Advent of Li, Ironic and Non-Ironic … 49 李的出现,讽刺和非讽刺…… 49
Li as “Greatest Coherence” in the Xunzi … 49 《荀子》中“理”为“大同”…… 49
“Heavenly Principle” (天理 tianli) Ironic and Non-Ironic “天理”(天理 tianli) 讽刺与非讽刺
in the “Inner Chapters” of the Zhuangzi and 在《庄子》的《内篇》中
“The Record of Music” … 59 “音乐唱片”……59
Li in the “Wings” to the Zhouyi … 64 《周易》《翅膀》中的李……64
Li and Centrality in Dong Zhongshu (179-104 BCE) … 68 董仲舒(公元前 179-104 年)中的李和中心地位 … 68
CHAPTER THREE 第三章
The Development of Li in Ironic Texts … 71 反讽文本中“李”的发展……71
Li and Non-Ironic Coherence in the Later Parts of the 李与后面部分的非讽刺连贯性
Zhuangzi: Integrating the Non-Ironic … 71 庄子:整合非讽刺……71
First Type: Li and Dao Both Non-Ironic … 72 第一种:理、道皆非反语……72
Second Type: Dao Ironic, Li Non-Ironic … 73 第二种:道反讽、理非反讽……73
Third Type: Dao and Li Both Ironic … 79 第三种:道理皆反……79
Integrating Types Two and Three … 82 集成类型二和类型三…… 82
CHAPTER FOUR 第四章
The Advent of Li as a Technical Philosophical Term … 107 作为技术哲学术语“理”的出现…… 107
Toward the Ironic: Li in the Pre-Ironic Daoism of the 走向反讽:前反讽道教中的李
Guanzi … 108 管子 … 108
Li Defined: The Later Two-and-a-half Chapters of the Guanzi … 118 李定义:《管子》后两章半……118
The Hanfeizi Commentary on the Laozi: Li as Division and the 韩非子老子评:理为师
Yielding Dao … 125 屈服刀……125
Cosmological Dao and Its Li in the Huainanzi … 131 《淮南子》宇宙道及其理……131
CHAPTER FIVE 第五章
Li as the Convergence of Coherence and Incoherence in 理作为连贯与非连贯的汇合
Wang Bi and Guo Xiang … 137 王弼、郭象……137
Subjective Perspectivism in Wang Bi: The Advent of Ti and 王弼的主观视角主义:钛与物的出现
Yong 體用 as Ironic Structure … 149 勇体用作为讽刺结构… 149
Applications of the Multiplicity of Li in Wang’s 黎的多重性在王氏作品中的应用
Laozi Commentary … 155 老子注释……155
Convergence of Coherence and Incoherence in Guo Xiang: 《郭象》中连贯与非连贯的融合:
Li as “Just the Way It Is,” as Limit, and as 李作为“本来就是这样”,作为极限,作为
Vanishing Convergence … 157 消失的收敛……157
Unintelligible Coherence: Vanishing and Merging into Things … 168 难以理解的连贯性:消失和融入事物...... 168
Ironic Li as Non-Ironic Li in Guo Xiang … 170 讽刺李作为非讽刺李在郭象...... 170
CHAPTER SIX 第六章
Beyond One and Many: Li in Tiantai and Huayan Buddhism … 185 超越一与多:天台礼与华严宗……185
How Emptiness Became Li … 185 空如何变成理……185
Tiantai on Truth, Threefold … 194 天台论真理,三重……194
Li in Early Tiantai: Center as Convertibility of Determinate 天台早期的李:中心为确定的可转换性
and Indeterminate … 210 和不确定……210
Appearance and Reality in Huayan and Tiantai … 220 华严天台的表象与实相……220
Existence and Nonexistence in Tiantai and Huayan … 230 天台华严的存在与不存在……230
Wave and Water in Huayan: “Beyond” Li … 235 华严中的波与水:“超越”李……235
Wave, Water, and Mud in Tiantai: Inherent Entailment 天台浪、水、泥:内在蕴涵
as Omniavailability … 241 作为全方位可用性…… 241
Summary of Differences between Tiantai and Huayan, and the 天台与华严的区别总结及
Irony of Coherence in the Tiantai and Huayan 天台华严连贯的讽刺
Classifications of Teachings … 256 教义分类……256
CHAPTER SEVEN 第七章
Mind, Omnipresence, and Coherence in Tiantai and Huayan … 261 天台华严的心、无所不在、连贯……261
The Pure Mind and the Deluded Mind in Huayan Thought … 261 华严思想中的清净心与迷心……261
Mind and the Nature in Tiantai Thought … 268 天台思想中的心性……268
The Three Thousand Lis and the Three Thousand Events … 293 三千里三千事……293
CONCLUSION 结论
The Vertex of the Vortex … 307 漩涡的顶点……307
EPILOGUE 结语
Toward Li in Neo-Confucianism … 321 新儒学中的礼……321
NOTES … 345 注释……345
BIBLIOGRAPHY … 379 参考书目……379
INDEX … 389 索引 … 389
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 致谢
The acknowledgments section is the customary place in books such as this where the reader, perhaps out of some benevolent combination of default ritual indulgence and behind-the-music curiosity, is prepared to let the author rattle off an invocation of all his or her debts to those persons, places, and things that made the book possible. This is an author’s opportunity to reflect a little on how humblingly enormous a portion of what has come about in his or her work has depended on unpredictable external factors, the seemingly almost infinite chain of encounters and supports necessary to bring any finished thing into the world. Though wary of the cringe-making awkwardness that seems likely if not inevitable in such public displays of the private, I will gladly comply with this custom. In addition to those specific persons and institutions I thanked at the beginning of the previous volume, Ironies of Oneness and Difference-and whom I thank anew, with renewed fervor, here and now, adding to the list also Jonathan Sim and Hiromi Okaue for their help preparing the manuscript-I feel these days an ever more insistent impulse to honor this noble tradition of acknowledgment in a more expansive or even global way; for there are so many more acknowledgeable facts and circumstances and things and fortuities left out of such specificities, and though these abstract inanimates and accidents don’t care, I still want to acknowledge them, to thank them, to extend some kind of gratitude, or whatever is the equivalent of gratitude when applied to unintentional and inanimate abstract quasi-entities, to the whole mysterious and random concatenation of forces that has made it on the one hand possible and on the other hand permissible for me to write books such as this at all. 致谢部分是此类书籍中的常见位置,读者可能出于默认仪式放纵和音乐背后的好奇心的某种善意结合,准备让作者滔滔不绝地援引他或她的所有债务那些使这本书成为可能的人、地点和事物。这是一个作者的机会,让他反思一下他或她的作品中所发生的事情有多么令人谦卑地依赖于不可预测的外部因素,以及将任何成品带入世界所必需的看似几乎无限的遭遇和支持链。 。尽管我担心在这种私人的公开展示中可能会出现令人尴尬的尴尬,但我还是很乐意遵守这一习惯。除了我在上一卷《统一与差异的讽刺》一开始所感谢的那些特定的个人和机构之外,我在这里和现在以新的热情再次感谢他们,在名单中还添加了乔纳森·西姆(Jonathan Sim)和博美·奥考伊(Hiromi Okaue),感谢他们的贡献。帮助准备手稿——这些天我感到一种更加强烈的冲动,以更广泛甚至全球的方式尊重这一崇高的致谢传统;因为在这些特殊性之外还有很多值得承认的事实和情况以及事物和偶然性,尽管这些抽象的无生命和意外事件并不关心,但我仍然想承认它们,感谢它们,表达某种感激之情,或者任何相当于感激之情的东西,当应用于无意识和无生命的抽象准实体时,应用于整个神秘而随机的力量串联时,这些力量一方面使我能够写出这样的书,另一方面也使我能够写出这样的书根本不。
Gratitude, however misplaced, is also a fact to be acknowledged. I can only gape in wonder at this seeming stroke of dumb luck, the fact that, having somehow against all odds stumbled upon something I feel both inclined and able to do, I’ve so far also been permitted to continue to do it, even to get paid for it, rather than being arrested or lynched or tarred and feathered for it. How many lifeforms ever get so fortunate, to find themselves seemingly unchangeably and unjustifiably constituted in a certain way, and yet also to live in a time and place in which that way of being is viewed as an acceptable way to be, rather than as an atrocity that warrants community wrath, destruction, quarantine, or ridicule? Imagine a person 感恩,无论用在什么地方,也是一个必须承认的事实。我只能惊讶地看着这看似愚蠢的运气,事实是,尽管困难重重,我偶然发现了一些我觉得既愿意又能够做的事情,到目前为止,我也被允许继续这样做,甚至并为此获得报酬,而不是因此而被捕、私刑、涂柏油和羽毛。有多少生命形式如此幸运,发现自己以某种方式构成,看似不可改变且不合理,但又生活在这样一个时间和地点,这种存在方式被视为一种可以接受的存在方式,而不是一种存在方式。是否有暴行导致社区愤怒、破坏、隔离或嘲笑?想象一个人
who, for reasons as yet unanalyzed but quite possibly mildly pathological, seems to have always had some kind of ironclad mental block in every situation against doing “the assigned reading,” as it were-who was too autistic or distracted or arrogant or cowardly or shy or contrarian to listen to anything any living person was trying to teach him, especially persons such as teachers in classrooms. Some kind of nonnegotiable resistance to the very idea of receiving instruction-rooted in an obscure but unshakeable doubt that human minds are alike enough for any single mind’s desires and truths to be likely to be applicable to those of another-drives him to the written word, where the sample size is larger and the distance is greater. 出于尚未分析的原因,但很可能是轻微病态的,他似乎在任何情况下都总是有某种铁定的心理障碍,反对做“指定的阅读”,可以说——谁太自闭,要么心烦意乱,要么傲慢,要么胆怯,要么害羞或逆反地聆听任何活着的人试图教他的任何东西,尤其是像教室里的老师这样的人。对接受指导这一想法的某种不可协商的抵制——植根于一种模糊但不可动摇的怀疑,即人类的思想足够相似,任何一个思想的愿望和真理都可能适用于另一个人的愿望和真理——驱使他去书写文字,其中样本量越大,距离也越大。
But the ban falls quickly also even on books written in the past hundred years or so, in any language he has heard spoken in the flesh; the familiarity of the methods and assumptions of the authors make them too easily imaginable as living presences, and therefore repellent. Here is this person who can only listen to and learn from people who have long been safely dead for a long time, who don’t remind him of anyone he knows (i.e., of anyone who, as he sees it in his paranoia, assumes it’s perfectly fine to try to impose their ideas of what is true and what is good, their facts and values, on him), a person who can only dialogue with people who are far enough away from him in every sense. In the self-imposed intellectual isolation that comes with this condition, after many dismal experiments, it turns out there is only one thing that brings intellectual enlargement and some mental companionship: walking around in solitude, preferably in a city or country where no one knows who he is, reading classical Chinese texts, looking up characters in dictionaries, trying out various possible hypotheses to resolve the seemingly endless thrilling ambiguities, pondering them, trying to make sense of them, then making alternate sense of them, then growing the eyes to look at the world through the blossoming of each of these sets of new ideas that erupt as a result of these phantom encounters. 但即使是在过去一百年左右写成的书籍,无论是用他亲耳听到的任何语言写成的书籍,禁令也很快就会失效。作者对方法和假设的熟悉使他们太容易被想象为活生生的存在,因此令人厌恶。这个人只能倾听那些早已安全死去很长一段时间的人的声音并向他学习,这些人不会让他想起任何他认识的人(即,任何人,正如他在偏执狂中看到的那样,假设试图将他们关于什么是真、什么是善的想法、他们的事实和价值观强加给他是完全可以的),一个只能与在任何意义上都离他足够远的人对话的人。在这种情况所带来的自我强加的智力孤立中,经过多次惨淡的实验,事实证明,只有一件事可以带来智力的扩展和一些精神上的陪伴:孤独地走来走去,最好是在一个无人知晓的城市或国家。他是谁,阅读古典文本,查字典,尝试各种可能的假设来解决看似无穷无尽的令人兴奋的歧义,思考它们,试图理解它们,然后做出替代的意义,然后培养眼睛通过这些幻觉相遇所爆发的每组新想法的绽放来观察世界。
That was me. At some point in those years I got lucky enough to have the opportunity to read closely through some of the texts I loved most with some great old-school footnote-free classical-type scholars; it was the deep rootedness in the careful procession through these texts, which were already a part of my private universe, and the new vistas the greater expertise of these mentors opened up in this already beloved territory, that made this a newly viable way to learn to think new thoughts. The slow and methodical burrowing into the texts was an end in itself, with a very large noncoercive space for working through implications and connections that spontaneously emerged from this kind of extended simmering. I internalized the example of those teachers: one went about one’s work, one’s encounter with the text, looking neither right nor left, neither criticizing nor praising anyone else’s encounter with the text, which would be noticed, reluctantly, only when 那是我。在那些年的某个时刻,我很幸运有机会与一些伟大的老派无脚注古典学者一起仔细阅读一些我最喜欢的文本;正是这些文本的仔细阅读中根深蒂固的,它们已经成为我私人宇宙的一部分,以及这些导师在这个已经心爱的领域中开辟的新视野和更丰富的专业知识,使这成为一种新的可行的学习方式思考新的想法。缓慢而有条不紊地深入文本本身就是目的,有一个非常大的非强制性空间来研究从这种长期酝酿中自发出现的含义和联系。我内化了那些老师的例子:一个人做自己的工作,一个人与课文的接触,不左顾右盼,不批评也不赞扬别人与课文的接触,只有在不情愿的时候才会被注意到。
one’s own already internalized resources, the backlog of associations already crystallized from reading hundreds of other such texts, came to a snag, which happened only rarely. For the first and only time, I got knowledge and pleasure from being a student of another human being, and could imagine exchanging ideas with another person in a way that didn’t drive me to despair over the abyss of incommensurability concealed in aggressive assumptions about some form or other of “common sense” or “good will” or “shared goals” or “universal truths.” 一个人自己已经内化的资源,以及通过阅读数百本其他此类文本而结晶的积压的联想,遇到了障碍,这种情况很少发生。第一次也是唯一一次,我从成为另一个人的学生中获得了知识和乐趣,并且可以想象与另一个人交换想法,而不会让我对隐藏在侵略性假设中的不可通约性深渊感到绝望。某种形式的“常识”或“善意”或“共同目标”或“普遍真理”。
What I thought I was doing, and what I loved to do, didn’t feel as if it had anything to do with finding out the truth, becoming more rigorous, joining the ongoing conversation of an existing field of research or inquiry, getting anything right, clarifying history, improving the quality of anything, coming to a consensus, or, god forbid, learning any facts or values from anyone else or making them learn them from me. I liked having new ideas, being able to think new thoughts; tarrying long and intensely with these old Chinese texts seemed to be what facilitated that effect better than anything else I could find. Slowly, as part of this same walk-around-foreign-city-reading policy, a handful of old and long-backburnered European philosophical works also entered my orbit, and, since no one was telling me to read them and it was not my responsibility to do so, and the authors were all good and dead by then, they started to have analogous effects on me, became objects of obsessive study, and I fell in love with them in exactly the same way. My motivation was still very naive and simpleminded: to forge new lenses for looking, to find ways to think about everything I encountered in the world, alternatives to the ways I had previously been thinking about them. This did not at all mean I wanted to replace that first set of ways-of-thinking and lenses-for-looking, as one would replace an error with a truth. It was not an endeavor to fix my vision with a new prescription for my mental spectacles, or a kind of laser surgery to fix my organ of intellectual vision for good, but a greed to acquire as many cool new pairs of elaborate bifocals, trifocals, quadrifocals as I could find. . . . 我认为我正在做的事情,以及我喜欢做的事情,并不觉得与发现真相、变得更加严谨、加入现有研究或探究领域的持续对话、获得任何东西有任何关系。是的,澄清历史,提高任何事物的质量,达成共识,或者,上帝禁止,从其他人那里学习任何事实或价值观,或者让他们向我学习。我喜欢有新的想法,能够思考新的想法;长时间而深入地阅读这些古老的中国文本似乎比我能找到的其他任何东西都更能促进这种效果。慢慢地,作为这种在外国城市散步阅读政策的一部分,一些古老的、长期被搁置的欧洲哲学著作也进入了我的轨道,而且,因为没有人告诉我去读它们,而且这也不是我的。这样做的责任,而且那时作者们都已经死了,他们开始对我产生类似的影响,成为痴迷研究的对象,我以完全相同的方式爱上了他们。我的动机仍然非常天真和简单:打造新的观察视角,找到思考我在世界上遇到的一切的方法,以及我以前思考它们的方式的替代方案。这根本不意味着我想取代第一套思维方式和观察视角,就像用真理取代错误一样。这并不是为了用新的精神眼镜处方来修复我的视力,也不是为了永久修复我的智力视觉器官而进行的激光手术,而是一种贪婪地想要获得尽可能多的酷炫的新型精致双焦点、三焦点眼镜,我能找到的四焦点。 。 。 。
Then someone told me I could do something like this all the time and not have to get a real job if I went to graduate school. So I did that. My goal was then as now simply to have available more, not fewer, ways of thinking. Why? Because otherwise I would die of boredom. All these years later, it’s still the same, and I still love doing this. And I am insanely grateful that I am allowed to do this for a living, and that it has somehow or other turned out that some other people also like to get jostled around in this kind of process. It is true that the institution of formal education, with its notion of rewards and punishments meted out for one way of thinking over another, still seems to me intrinsically obscene, and the idea of one mind standing in judgment over another mind still instinctively revolts me, as much in a 然后有人告诉我,如果我读研究生,我可以一直做这样的事情,而不必找到一份真正的工作。所以我就这么做了。我当时的目标和现在一样,只是为了拥有更多而不是更少的思维方式。为什么?因为否则我会无聊死的。这么多年过去了,情况还是一样,我仍然喜欢这样做。我非常感激我能以这种方式谋生,而且不知何故,其他一些人也喜欢在这种过程中被推来推去。诚然,正规教育机构,其对一种思维方式对另一种思维方式给予奖励和惩罚的概念,在我看来本质上仍然是淫秽的,而一种思想对另一种思想进行评判的想法仍然让我本能地感到反感。 ,就像在一个
classroom as in the idea of a theistic cosmos. But to my surprise, I find that being in this environment-schools-which I detested so much as a student is now sometimes a place to meet really smart, interesting people, both students and colleagues, with strange and intricate minds that in certain places intersect and resonate and ricochet with mine, and that to watch and interact with these people sometimes, if I keep the right distance and the right closeness, can have something of that old new-thought-evoking effect. There’s a tension and a contradiction there, and in the formal setting I’ve still felt it necessary to avoid too much involvement in precisely those fields of inquiry in which I personally have the most mental investment, but nonetheless, I cannot but be grateful for this mysterious circumstance. So that’s gratitude number one. 课堂就像有神论宇宙的观念一样。但令我惊讶的是,我发现在这种我作为学生时非常厌恶的环境——学校——现在有时会成为一个结识真正聪明、有趣的人的地方,包括学生和同事,他们的思想在某些地方是奇怪而复杂的。与我的交叉、共鸣和反弹,有时观察这些人并与之互动,如果我保持适当的距离和适当的亲密程度,可以产生某种旧的唤起新思想的效果。那里存在着紧张和矛盾,在正式场合,我仍然觉得有必要避免过多地参与那些我个人投入最多精力的探究领域,但尽管如此,我还是不得不感激这种神秘的情况。所以这是第一位的感激之情。
On the other hand, this puts me in a funny situation sometimes, and I suspect, or at least hope, that I am not the only one in this funny situation. I still don’t want the truth about things to turn out to be only a single way, or for any philosophical position to be so right that it puts all other positions out of business. I fear any monopolizing convergence of truth that would eliminate errors and mistakes and alternatives. I still think of thinking as Spinoza did, as a kind of activity, a skill, a power to do more and more stuff, correlative to a way of moving one’s body in more ways, rather than as a means of arriving somewhere or getting something (“truth”? “the right answer”? “the best theory”?). I still don’t like this assumption that thinking is a means by which some ideas are found to be truths and entirely other ideas are found to be errors, the former to be honored and preserved and the latter to be reviled and dispelled, such that the possibilities of moving around, mentally and physically, are reduced rather than expanded. I still have no sympathy with the academic goal of consilience of knowledge, or what strikes me as the totalitarian yearning for everyone to share the same view of what is so and of what is good, of what is true and of what they should be doing, to construct arguments and marshal evidence with the purpose of compelling everyone to agree about as much as possible. And I still can’t read or learn anything someone else tells me to read or learn. Though it’s now my job, a lot of the time the professionalization of philosophy (or of sinology, or of Buddhology) leaves me feeling the way I imagine a nymphomaniac who has chosen to make her living as a prostitute must feel-someone who had foolishly thought, Hey, what better way to beat the system, my job will be the exact thing I love doing anyway! It turns out, duh, that making a rent-paying job of something you had originally loved, so that now it must be done on demand, under coercion, in a style dictated by the desires of strangers with their own alien libidinal agendas, can, um, kind of ruin it. One of my main concerns in reading, in writing, in teaching is to find a way to steer clear of this fate. 另一方面,这有时会让我陷入一种有趣的境地,我怀疑,或者至少希望,我不是唯一处于这种有趣境地的人。我仍然不希望事情的真相只有一种方式,或者任何哲学立场都如此正确以至于使所有其他立场都出局。我担心任何垄断性的真理趋同都会消除错误和替代方案。我仍然认为像斯宾诺莎那样的思考是一种活动、一种技能、一种做越来越多事情的能力,与以更多方式移动身体的方式相关,而不是作为到达某个地方或得到某物的一种手段(“真理”?“正确答案”?“最好的理论”?)。我仍然不喜欢这样的假设,即思考是一种手段,通过这种手段,一些想法被认为是真理,而另一些想法则被认为是错误,前者受到尊重和保留,后者受到辱骂和消除,这样精神上和身体上移动的可能性减少而不是增加。我仍然不认同知识一致性的学术目标,或者让我印象深刻的极权主义渴望,即每个人都对事实、善行、真理以及他们应该做的事情持有相同的看法,构建论点并整理证据,目的是迫使每个人尽可能达成一致。我仍然无法阅读或学习别人告诉我要阅读或学习的任何内容。 虽然现在这是我的工作,但很多时候哲学(或汉学或佛教)的专业化让我感觉就像我想象的一个选择以妓女为生的花痴的感觉一样——一个愚蠢地拥有过性行为的人。我想,嘿,还有什么更好的方法来击败这个系统呢,无论如何,我的工作将是我喜欢做的事情!事实证明,呃,把你原来喜欢的东西做一份付租金的工作,所以现在它必须按需完成,在胁迫下,以一种由陌生人的欲望决定的风格,他们有自己的异类力比多议程,可以,嗯,有点毁了它。我在阅读、写作和教学中主要关心的问题之一就是找到一种方法来避免这种命运。
Which brings us to this book. At the beginning of the previous volume, I made some general methodological clarifications that were not unrelated to these concerns-addressing matters of polyessentialism, presentism, truth-as-interest, hermeneutics as a kind of shelf-handy rhyming dictionary, maximal neglect of fallacy as excavation of ever-present but never-complete coherence, and so on-and these same considerations apply to this volume, which continues the work begun there. But I would here like to reinstate some further remarks that I deleted from that discussion, at the time due to a perhaps misguided desire to avoid causing embarrassment to various people, including but by no means limited to myself. These remarks have to do with the always touchy topic of a writer’s relation to other writers. Quite often, people who find themselves engaged in this kind of workprofessional scholars, I mean, who labor long and intensely with certain texts and ideas-have a vague but understandable hope to see their own works universally accepted, or, failing that, at least acknowledged with approval. Or failing that, at least cited. It is thus very human, and very forgivable, for an academic, when faced with a work that purports to discuss a text or topic he or she has spent years researching and writing about, to turn immediately to the index or bibliography in search of his or her own name. I do it too. It is frustrating not to find that name there, after laboring so long, and it would be churlish to censure anyone too harshly for venting a bit of this frustration, either as global hostility or as an ad hoc self-advertisement offered in refutation, when evaluating those works that seem to snub them. 这让我们想到了这本书。在上卷的开头,我做了一些与这些关注点不无关系的一般方法论澄清——解决了多本质主义、当下主义、真理即兴趣、解释学作为一种现成的押韵词典、最大限度地忽视谬误等问题。例如挖掘始终存在但从未完全的连贯性,等等——这些同样的考虑也适用于本书,它继续了从那里开始的工作。但我想在这里恢复我当时从讨论中删除的一些进一步的言论,当时可能是出于避免给各种人(包括但不限于我自己)造成尴尬的错误愿望。这些言论与作家与其他作家的关系这一始终敏感的话题有关。很多时候,那些发现自己从事这种工作的人,我的意思是,那些长期、紧张地研究某些文本和思想的专业学者,都有一个模糊但可以理解的希望,希望看到自己的作品被普遍接受,或者,如果做不到这一点,至少承认并批准。或者如果做不到这一点,至少被引用。因此,对于一名学者来说,当面对一本旨在讨论他或她花了数年时间研究和写作的文本或主题的著作时,立即转向索引或参考书目来寻找他或她的观点是非常人性化的,也是非常可以原谅的。或者她自己的名字。我也这样做。经过这么长时间的努力,在那里找不到这个名字是令人沮丧的,而且如果有人因为发泄了一点这种挫败感而过于严厉地谴责任何人,无论是作为全球敌意还是作为反驳中提供的临时自我广告,那将是无礼的,当评估那些似乎冷落他们的作品。
And no one would deny that the “literature survey,” where a student is supposed to demonstrate mastery of what is quaintly referred to as “the field” by reading all available secondary literature on a given topic, summarizing and perhaps evaluating all the positions previous scholars have put forth on a given text, is a valuable exercise in postgraduate training. It is perhaps for these reasons that it remains an academic custom, richly punished in the breach, to go through the motions of citing all one’s contemporary colleagues when taking up any much-researched topic, respectfully acknowledging the positions put forth there, but then giving a reason why one rejects them in favor of the one currently being advanced. I’ve made some ritual deference to this custom in this book and the prequel, but have tried to keep it to a minimum. For there is good reason to think this practice is—in addition to being enormously onerous, insincere, and self-serving-a wasteful allocation of time and energy. The pretense is that, being a member of one and the same “field,” one has objectively considered the alternate arguments about all the topics that comprise it, and decided on some mutually agreed-upon grounds that a certain argument-one’s own, naturally-is better than the others. This may, indeed, be possible for some cases in some fields. But it is not likely to be possible for all cases in all fields. 没有人会否认“文献调查”,学生应该通过阅读有关特定主题的所有可用的二手文献,总结并可能评估之前的所有立场来展示对所谓“领域”的掌握。学者们所提出的论据,是研究生培养中的宝贵练习。也许正是由于这些原因,在讨论任何经过深入研究的主题时,都会引用所有当代同事的动议,恭敬地承认那里提出的立场,但随后给出一个人拒绝他们而支持目前正在推进的人的原因。我在本书和前传中对这一习俗做出了一些仪式性的尊重,但试图将其保持在最低限度。因为我们有充分的理由认为这种做法除了极其繁重、不真诚和自私之外,也是对时间和精力的浪费。假装是,作为一个同一个“领域”的成员,一个人客观地考虑了构成该领域的所有主题的替代论点,并根据一些共同商定的理由做出了决定,即某个论点——一个人自己的,自然地-比其他人都好。对于某些领域的某些情况来说,这确实是可能的。但这不太可能适用于所有领域的所有情况。
More to the point, and putting aside all my personal reasons for disliking this sort of practice as rehearsed above, I am not at all convinced that adopting these procedures of compulsive citation and review of all prior interpretative expositions would serve, in disciplines other than the hard sciences, as a mechanism to ensure the cumulative advance of knowledge, even if that were something we all agreed we wanted. When it does, as in the narrowing of range of possibilities through the exclusion of failed and discarded approaches, or through the handy clarification of philological and historical confusions, it is mainly as a device for the saving of unnecessary labor, whose value is therefore mainly economical in the broadest sense of helping to allocate wisely our limited resources of energy and attention, rather than a positive building block in the constructing of a system of knowledge that either can or should progress in a single direction and toward an ideal completeness and unanimity. So I have tried to cite and discuss only those works that I have found genuinely pertinent to the task of clarifying, rather than justifying, my readings of the texts at hand; I have tried to avoid citing for citing’s sake, or even pointing out the obvious radical divergences of my interpretative framework from some others that have been advanced. 更重要的是,抛开我个人不喜欢上面所演练的这种做法的所有原因,我根本不相信采用这些强制引用和审查所有先前解释性说明的程序会在非学科领域发挥作用。硬科学,作为确保知识累积进步的机制,即使这是我们都同意我们想要的东西。当它这样做时,就像通过排除失败和废弃的方法来缩小可能性的范围,或者通过方便地澄清语言学和历史的混乱一样,它主要是作为节省不必要劳动的一种手段,因此其价值主要是从最广泛的意义上讲,经济是帮助明智地分配我们有限的精力和注意力资源,而不是构建知识体系的积极组成部分,知识体系可以或应该朝着单一方向并朝着理想的完整性和一致的方向发展。因此,我试图只引用和讨论那些我发现真正与澄清而不是证明我对手头文本的阅读有关的作品;我试图避免为了引用而引用,甚至指出我的解释框架与其他一些已经提出的框架存在明显的根本分歧。
I find it necessary to declare in all sincerity that this is not meant as a sign of disrespect or criticism of the interpretations developed by my esteemed peers. Rather, it is my hope that it will be apparent to readers just how pointless it would be, in the context of the present project, to express an opinion about every one of these interpretations. These works may well be very useful, successful, intelligent, persuasive, and in all ways good for the human race. They may connect in interesting ways with the approach I am taking here, or conversely, raise points that conflict irreconcilably with the conclusions I draw here. But in either case, it is very likely too soon for such conclusions to be drawn, and it is doubtful that any of the participants in a debate of this type have the necessary critical distance to give a useful overview of the issues involved. These are things to be decided by readers of both this work and those works not now, but maybe fifty years from now, by a future generation of scholars who are competent in reading the original texts for themselves with the benefit of all the conflicting hypotheses in their arsenal of interpretative tools-if they are still interested, which of course no one can force them to be. I hope I will be forgiven for expressing the heretical suspicion that, in reality, contemporaneous scholars don’t really write for each other: we write for the future, for the fresh readers who will take up these problems with their own enthusiasms and their own fresh encounters with the original texts. 我发现有必要真诚地声明,这并不是对我尊敬的同行所提出的解释的不尊重或批评。相反,我希望读者能够清楚地看出,在当前项目的背景下,对这些解释中的每一种表达意见是多么毫无意义。这些作品很可能非常有用、成功、聪明、有说服力,而且在各方面对人类都有好处。他们可能会以有趣的方式与我在这里采取的方法联系起来,或者相反,提出与我在这里得出的结论不可调和的冲突的观点。但无论哪种情况,得出这样的结论都很可能为时过早,并且此类辩论的任何参与者是否具有必要的批判距离来对所涉及的问题提供有用的概述是值得怀疑的。这些事情应该由本书和那些作品的读者来决定,不是现在,而是也许五十年后,由未来一代的学者决定,他们有能力自己阅读原文,并受益于书中所有相互冲突的假设。他们的解释工具库——如果他们仍然感兴趣的话,当然没有人可以强迫他们这样做。我希望大家能够原谅我表达了异端怀疑,即事实上,同时代的学者并不是真正为彼此写作:我们为未来而写作,为那些将以自己的热情和自己的热情来解决这些问题的新读者而写。与原文的新鲜邂逅。
What proves useful to future readers survives; what does not, does not. It is for these future students to read and study and consider the possible interactions between parallel interpretations of a given era, if they so desire. 对未来读者有用的内容会被保留下来;什么不,不。如果这些未来的学生愿意的话,他们可以阅读和研究并考虑特定时代的平行解释之间可能的相互作用。
We, and our own first-generation students, are probably too close to the matter to say anything meaningful about it. It requires a “big picture” perspective. A point-by-point comparison of two alternate present-day interpretations, for example, of a particular line in the Analects would be not altogether meaningless, but likely an expenditure of time and energy more fruitfully applied elsewhere; both interpretations belong to a total orientation, with its own set of assumptions, goals, methods, which alone conveys its coherence, its persuasiveness, its value-and which is at present still a work in progress, the final contours of which are not yet discernible. 我们,以及我们自己的第一代学生,可能对此事太过了解,无法对此发表任何有意义的言论。它需要“大局观”。例如,对《论语》中某一行的两种不同的当今解释进行逐点比较并非完全没有意义,但可能花费时间和精力在其他地方更有效;两种解释都属于一个总体方向,有其自己的一套假设、目标、方法,仅靠这些就可以传达其连贯性、说服力和价值——而且目前仍在进行中,其最终轮廓尚未确定。可辨别的。
I propose what to my mind is a more “Confucian” alternative, with all due respect, to my colleagues: let us no longer feel honor-bound to read each others’ work merely out of a concern for base covering, professional obligation, or obsessive scorekeeping. It is not an insult, it is not a disgrace, it need no longer be a shameful secret for us to need to close our ears to each other at times. The type of work we are involved in here is different in kind from the sorts for which it is important to pool knowledge and adjudicate between error and accuracy. If we were training engineers to do mathematics, there would be both a clear standard and a strong motive for stern policing: it would be determinable and would matter whether we did it right or wrong, whether our conclusions were accurate or not, because someone might build a bridge or a helicopter on the basis of our calculations. Lives would be at stake. 带着应有的尊重,我向我的同事们提出了一个在我看来更“儒家”的替代方案:让我们不再仅仅出于对基础覆盖、职业义务或其他方面的考虑而感到荣幸地阅读彼此的作品。痴迷的记分。这不是一种侮辱,这不是一种耻辱,对于我们来说,有时需要互相捂住耳朵,这不再是一个可耻的秘密。我们在这里参与的工作类型与那些重要的是汇集知识并在错误与准确性之间进行裁决的工作类型不同。如果我们训练工程师做数学,就会有一个明确的标准和严格监管的强烈动机:它是可以确定的,并且无论我们做得对还是错,无论我们的结论准确与否,都至关重要,因为有人可能根据我们的计算建造一座桥梁或一架直升机。生命将受到威胁。
No such condition applies to work in the humanities-or at least, if in some loosely analogous sense there are reasons why it might matter which interpretation prevails, it would involve an exponentially slower and subtler set of parameters. Indeed, it could be argued that the thriving of a multiplicity of interpretations is actually a healthier outcome, from an analogously pragmatic point of view. I propose that we drop this whole charade of having a duty to be each others’ watchdogs, and regard ourselves instead as an eccentric guild of obsessives who happen to be smitten with the same compulsion. We can agree to disagree, or even to simply neglect each other while observing all the signs of mutual ritual respect-and do so in all sincerity, as fellow enthusiasts, fellow lovers, and adventurers of the same seas-and leave the hashing out of the better or worse to coming generations. 这样的条件不适用于人文学科的工作——或者至少,如果在某种松散的类似意义上,有理由说明哪种解释占主导地位可能很重要,那么它将涉及一组指数级缓慢且微妙的参数。事实上,可以说,从类似的实用主义角度来看,多种解释的蓬勃发展实际上是一个更健康的结果。我建议我们放弃这种有义务成为彼此监督者的伪装,而将自己视为一个由恰好被同样的强迫所困扰的古怪强迫症患者组成的行会。我们可以同意不同意见,甚至干脆互相忽视,同时遵守相互尊重仪式的所有迹象——而且是真诚地这样做,就像同一个海洋的热衷者、恋人和冒险家一样——并且不去争论。对子孙后代来说是好是坏。
It goes without saying that there is a danger of abuse in granting this exemption to oneself and one’s peers, an opening for laziness, shoddy workmanship and self-righteous ignorance on the one hand or fruitlessly frenetic wheel-reinvention on the other. But these dangers are perhaps outweighed by the worry that our premature compromises and mutual translations into one another’s idioms will snuff out the buddings of innovations that will prove to have unsuspected ramifications when allowed 不言而喻,给予自己和同事这种豁免存在滥用的危险,一方面为懒惰、粗制滥造和自以为是的无知提供了机会,另一方面也为毫无结果的疯狂的轮子重新发明提供了机会。但这些危险或许被人们的担忧所抵消,即我们过早的妥协和相互翻译将扼杀创新的萌芽,而一旦允许,创新将被证明会产生意想不到的后果。
to grow unhindered into their full bloom, and indeed that a wheel reinvented from its first foundations may end up rolling somewhat differently from its unnoticed prototype. To assume otherwise, I think, presupposes precisely the kind of uniform “sameness” among wheels that I would like to bring into question in this very work. In any case, I have tried to steer a middle course between obsessive engagement and hubristic disregard, and I hope the results will be found neither irrelevant nor obstructive to the works of my fellow-enjoyers, both now and in the future. To them, for that hope, for letting me do this kind of thing, for their distant company, for their very cacophony of incompatible views and their strident resistance to each other, for their will to victory and the effulgence of multiplicities that are its unintended side effects, I offer my gratitude. The spaces between us, but also that between which the spaces are, have made this book possible. 事实上,从最初的基础上重新发明的轮子最终可能会与它未被注意到的原型有所不同。我认为,否则的假设恰恰以轮子之间的统一“相同性”为先决条件,我想在这项工作中对此提出质疑。无论如何,我试图在痴迷的参与和傲慢的漠视之间找到一条中间路线,我希望结果既不会与我的同行们的作品无关,也不会妨碍他们现在和将来的工作。为了他们,为了那种希望,为了让我做这样的事情,为了他们遥远的陪伴,为了他们不相容的观点的刺耳声音和他们对彼此的强烈抵制,为了他们的胜利意志和意想不到的多样性的光辉副作用,我表示感谢。我们之间的空间,以及空间之间的空间,使得这本书成为可能。
INTRODUCTION 介绍
LI 理 AND COHERENCE 理与连贯
Recap of Ironies of Oneness and Difference and Terminological Clarifications 统一与差异的讽刺回顾以及术语澄清
In a previous work, called Ironies of Oneness and Difference, I tried to unravel the development of notions of coherence in early Chinese thought as an alternative to models of thinking, mainly Greek and European in origin, that build upon the assumption that words such as “same” and “different” describe facts about the world and refer to real attributes of things, that the distinction between “sameness” and “difference” is in some way absolute-in other words, that things, or certain aspects of things, or facts, or qualities, simply are the same as certain other things or facts or aspects, and different from certain other things or facts or aspects. It was necessary to trace the various alternatives to this way of viewing things in Chinese thought in such a seemingly abstract and thoroughgoing manner, I believe, in order to comprehend the later development of various understandings and usages of the term Li 理 ^(1){ }^{1} in Chinese thought. Most students of the Chinese philosophical tradition have probably noticed that again and again they come up against a repeated tendency toward two kinds of counterintuitive claims that present persistent interpretive problems: first, assertions concerning the relation between oneness and manyness, which do not seem to be applied consistently or intelligibly, or to separate from one another neatly, and second, the surprising importance everywhere-in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and axiology-of negations and negative formulations, which are given a positive value, serving often as groundings of affirmations. ^(2){ }^{2} These are the two main problems I am hoping to clarify with the concepts of “ironic coherence” and “non-ironic coherence” and their relation to Li; for I hope 在之前的一部名为《统一与差异的反讽》的著作中,我试图揭示早期中国思想中连贯性概念的发展,作为思维模式的替代品,这些思维模式主要起源于希腊和欧洲,其基础是这样的假设: “相同”和“不同”描述了关于世界的事实,指的是事物的真实属性,“相同”和“不同”之间的区别在某种程度上是绝对的——换句话说,事物或事物的某些方面,或事实或品质,只是与某些其他事物或事实或方面相同,并且与某些其他事物或事实或方面不同。我认为,有必要以如此看似抽象而彻底的方式追溯中国思想中这种看待事物的方式的各种替代,才能理解后来对“理”一词的各种理解和用法的发展。 ^(1){ }^{1} 在中国人的思想中。大多数研究中国哲学传统的学生可能已经注意到,他们一次又一次地遇到两种反直觉主张的反复倾向,这两种主张提出了持续存在的解释问题:第一,关于单一性和多性之间关系的主张,这些主张似乎并不符合逻辑。一致或可理解地应用,或者巧妙地彼此分开,其次,否定和否定表述在形而上学、认识论、伦理学和价值论中无处不在,具有令人惊讶的重要性,它们被赋予积极的价值,常常作为肯定的基础。 ^(2){ }^{2} 这是我希望通过“反讽连贯”和“非反讽连贯”的概念及其与李的关系来澄清的两个主要问题;因为我希望
to show that the one-many problem and the negation problem, and also the related problem of omnipresence, are all closely intertwined, and that this intertwining is most evident in the interplay of ironic and non-ironic coherence that comes to be embodied in the term Li . That is what I’ll be trying to do in this book. So before launching into the discussion of Li , I would like to repeat the summary of my conclusions about “coherence” from that earlier work. 表明一对多问题和否定问题,以及相关的无所不在的问题,都是紧密交织在一起的,这种交织在反讽和非反讽连贯性的相互作用中最为明显,而反讽和非反讽的连贯性体现在术语李。这就是我在本书中将尝试做的事情。因此,在开始对李的讨论之前,我想重复一下我对早期作品中关于“连贯性”的结论的总结。
In that work I attempted to draw attention to several emergent conceptions of coherence in early Chinese thought, conceived of as a fundamental category accounting for the presence, value, sustainability, and intelligibility of things. This involved delineating two intertwining variants of this conception, the non-ironic and the ironic. In both, we identified coherence as a founding, fundamental category, from which sameness and difference are negotiable, non-ultimate derivatives. Why are things what they are, as they are, able to continue being what they are, and having the values they have? Because of the way they cohere. If they cohere differently, they are different things, have different identities. Harmonizing in a certain way allows things to manifest in a particular way, and this is the ultimate category beyond which no further specification of their ontic status can be made. Their “value,” on the other hand, is itself merely another kind of coherence: a function solely of the relation between these manifested identities and certain human desires and endeavors, a second-order coherence between two first-order coherences. In sum, to be seen, known, shown as having a certain identity and value derives from a relation to a particular context, most centrally a context of human desires and the discerning, exemplary eye of a sagely person steeped in coherence with a tradition of other such persons. These reflections will put us in a position to see how “centrality” and “coherence” converge into the meaning of Li, and how this sort of notion developed through various partial prefigurements in Confucian and Daoist thought. 在那部作品中,我试图引起人们对中国早期思想中几个新兴的连贯性概念的关注,这些概念被认为是解释事物的存在、价值、可持续性和可理解性的基本范畴。这涉及到描述这一概念的两个相互交织的变体,即非讽刺性和讽刺性。在这两者中,我们都将连贯性视为一个创始的、基本的范畴,其中相同性和差异性是可以协商的、非最终的衍生品。为什么事物现在如此,能够继续如此,并具有它们所拥有的价值?因为他们的凝聚力。如果它们的结合方式不同,那么它们就是不同的事物,具有不同的身份。以某种方式协调允许事物以特定的方式显现,这是最终的类别,超出这个类别就无法对其本体状态进行进一步的说明。另一方面,它们的“价值”本身只是另一种连贯性:仅是这些表现出来的身份与某些人类欲望和努力之间关系的函数,是两个一阶连贯性之间的二阶连贯性。总而言之,被看到、知道、显示为具有一定的身份和价值,源自与特定背景的关系,最核心的是人类欲望的背景以及圣人的洞察力、典范性的眼睛,与传统的一致。其他此类人士。这些反思将使我们看到“中心性”和“连贯性”如何汇聚到“理”的含义中,以及这种概念是如何通过儒家和道家思想中的各种局部预兆而发展起来的。
In the Analects, we saw Confucius described as “not having any constant teacher” 何常師之有, and yet finding his teacher everywhere. Here we see already the structure of centrality and coherence. Confucius himself is the “center,” the determinant of the coherence, the “pattern,” the “principle,” the value. But he neither subjectively creates this value ex nihilo nor acts as a mere passive mirror of an objectively existing truth. The value he creates is a coherence, a readable converging, of aspects available everywhere, combined by the selective filter of Confucius’s own responses and evaluations. His discernment is a selective frame that creates/finds coherence, the value-endowed style of culture, which is omniavailable, present in more than one place, not strictly reiterable except in the special sense of being continuable. We have here already the sprout of a model of a 在《论语》中,我们看到孔子“无常师之有,而处处有师”。在这里我们已经看到了中心性和连贯性的结构。孔子本人就是“中心”,是连贯性、“模式”、“原则”、价值的决定者。但他既不主观地无中生有地创造这种价值,也不充当客观存在真理的被动镜子。他创造的价值是一种连贯性,一种可读的融合,无处不在的各个方面,并通过孔子自己的反应和评价的选择性过滤结合起来。他的洞察力是一种选择性框架,它创造/发现连贯性,即赋予价值的文化风格,它是无所不在的,存在于多个地方,除了可延续的特殊含义外,严格来说不可重复。我们这里已经有了一个模型的萌芽
multilocality that is neither nominalist (i.e., denying the existence of any causally relevant multiply instantiated entities in our final ontology) nor realist (i.e., asserting the existence of causally relevant and repeatably instantiatable selfsame entities in our final ontology), manifesting in a cognition that is neither a correspondence with univocally preexisting objective facts nor a baseless projection of subjective fancies. These teachers are really there, and really making available a multiply instantiated something called the Dao of Kings Wen and Wu with its own independent causal relevance, providing models, standards, justifications and even psychological rewards, and constituting a whole that has a constitutive role to play in the essential characteristics inhering in each of the parts that comprise it. But that causal relevance overrides alternative available relevances only when Confucius sees it there, links up to it, names it, desires it, coheres with it, continues it. 多局性既不是唯名论的(即否认我们最终本体中存在任何因果相关的多重实例化实体),也不是实在论的(即断言我们的最终本体中存在因果相关且可重复实例化的同一个实体),表现在这样的认知中:既不是与明确预先存在的客观事实的对应,也不是对主观幻想的毫无根据的投射。这些老师是真实存在的,真正提供了一个多重实例化的东西,即文武王之道,它有自己独立的因果关系,提供了模型、标准、理由甚至心理奖励,并构成了一个具有构成作用的整体。发挥组成它的每个部分所固有的基本特征。但只有当孔子看到它、联系它、命名它、渴望它、与之一致、延续它时,这种因果相关性才会凌驾于其他可用的相关性之上。
The Mencius, we saw, continues this trend in the key passage at 7B24, awarding the honorary normative title “the Nature [of human beings]” (性 xing) to only a subset of the existing inborn capabilities of the human animal, which is thus neither a preexisting objective fact about humans (one could equally have selected out a different subset of these existing tendencies to be named “human nature,” i.e., our defining inborn essence) nor a subjective projection (since this subset too is indeed really there). The criteria for making this selection were made more explicit here: precisely those spontaneous human tendencies that allow for coherence, that is, those that are appealing to (valued by) and discernible to other humans, and that create interpersonal cohesion among humans, are to be called the Nature. Examining the usage of the term xing in the rest of the text, we found that these are, more specifically, the desires that can be satisfied independently of external material conditions, that allow for the other (for example, material) desires to be equally nurtured and developed, the enjoyment of which is increased rather than decreased when shared, and so on. The desires for sensory gratification, on the other hand, are to be called “the Decree” (ming 命) only because they are not conducive to coherence in this sense: they isolate, they create strife because their satisfaction depends on external material resources, which may be in short supply, their enjoyment is decreased when shared, and so on. Thus, the class name “Human nature” is for Mencius neither objective nor subjective, neither nominalist nor realist; and here again we have a “center” embodied by a living human agent, the sage, whose manifestation of these virtues makes him the hub, the center, around which this style of being, humanity, converges. The presence of this center literally actualizes the normative coherence “humanity,” the quality of humanness and equally the really existing community of human beings, just as Confucius’s presence actualized the presence of his “teachers” in all people in his environment. 我们看到,《孟子》在 7B24 的关键段落中延续了这一趋势,仅将“性”这一荣誉规范称号授予人类动物现有先天能力的一个子集,即因此,既不是关于人类的预先存在的客观事实(人们同样可以从这些现有倾向中选出一个不同的子集,命名为“人性”,即我们定义的先天本质),也不是主观的投射(因为这个子集也确实存在) )。做出这种选择的标准在此更加明确:正是那些允许一致性的自发人类倾向,即那些吸引其他人(重视)并为其他人所辨别的倾向,以及在人类之间创造人际凝聚力的倾向,是被称为自然。考察本文其余部分中“性”一词的用法,我们发现,更具体地说,这些欲望是可以独立于外部物质条件而得到满足的欲望,允许其他欲望(例如物质)平等地得到满足。培育和发展,分享时的乐趣会增加而不是减少,等等。另一方面,对感官满足的欲望之所以被称为“命”,只是因为它们不利于这种意义上的连贯性:它们孤立,它们制造冲突,因为它们的满足依赖于外部物质资源,这些东西可能供不应求,分享时他们的乐趣就会减少,等等。 因此,“性”这个类名对于孟子来说,既不是客观的,也不是主观的,既不是唯名论的,也不是实在论的;在这里,我们再次看到了一个由活生生的人类代理人——圣人——所体现的“中心”,他对这些美德的表现使他成为枢纽、中心,而这种存在风格——人性——则围绕着这个中心而汇聚。这个中心的存在确实实现了“人性”的规范一致性、人性的品质以及人类真实存在的共同体,正如孔子的存在实现了他的“老师”在他的环境中的所有人中的存在一样。
In the Xunzi, we find a seeming conflict between a nominalistic and a realist theory of naming, which is resolved once again by recourse to a human center, in this case the tradition of the sages and exemplary persons who literally give order to the cosmos through mandated ritual. But this too is neither creation nor passive reflection of coherence, neither purely objective nor purely subjective: in Xunzi’s view, there are an overabundance of real distinctions, groupings, coherences in the world, for which the sages serve as a selective filter, propagating some while ignoring others, enforcing their standardized names in the same way that weights and measures are to be enforced in the marketplace. Omnipresence is here no longer mere “omniavailability” as it had been for Confucius and Mencius, but the “great coherence” (dali 大理), the value present in all parts of the organized whole that results from the exemplary man’s selective ritual regulations determining which of the really occurring groupings of nature may be grouped into a valued whole, that is, a whole that creates the maximal compossible satisfaction of the entire range of human desires. Although this Great Coherence is not present without human cultural intervention, it is, once created, a causatively non-inert entity which really exists, instantiated in noncontiguous particular events and things, not merely normatively but descriptively, for it includes in its order not only the human but also the natural world. When seen and named so as to become coherent with the maximally coherent set of human desires, the natural cosmos becomes not merely seen and named in a coherent way, but actually endowed with a kind of order that is fully present in more than one instance and also has causal efficacy, such as contributing to keeping the world going in the way that suits human need, inspiring exultations of awe and aesthetic joy, guiding action, and serving as a standard, support, ground, encouragement and guarantor of human virtue. 在《荀子》中,我们发现唯名论和实在论的命名理论之间存在表面上的冲突,这一冲突再次通过诉诸人类中心来解决,在这种情况下,圣贤和模范人物的传统通过字面上的方式给宇宙带来秩序。强制仪式。但这也既不是创造,也不是连贯性的被动反映,既不是纯粹客观的,也不是纯粹主观的:在荀子看来,世界上存在着过多的真正的区别、分组和连贯性,圣人为此充当了选择性过滤器,传播了一些东西。在忽略其他名称的同时,以与市场上执行度量衡相同的方式执行它们的标准化名称。这里的无所不在不再是孔子和孟子所说的“无所不在”,而是“大理”,即存在于组织整体的各个部分中的价值,这种价值是由模范之人选择性的礼制决定的。自然界中真实存在的群体可以被归为一个有价值的整体,即一个创造人类全部欲望的最大可能满足的整体。虽然这种伟大的一致性在没有人类文化干预的情况下不会出现,但它一旦被创造出来,就是一个真正存在的因果非惰性实体,在不连续的特定事件和事物中实例化,不仅是规范性的,而且是描述性的,因为它不仅包括在其秩序中人类,也包括自然世界。 当人们对自然宇宙的观察和命名与人类欲望的最大程度的连贯一致时,自然宇宙不仅以连贯的方式被观察和命名,而且实际上被赋予了一种在多个实例中完全存在的秩序。也具有因果功效,例如有助于保持世界以适合人类需要的方式运转,激发敬畏和审美愉悦的狂喜,指导行动,以及作为人类美德的标准、支持、基础、鼓励和保证。
In the Laozi tradition, we have the advent of ironic coherence: the idea of a form of togetherness (coherent) which is necessarily also unintelligible, unreadable (incoherent). The unhewn is the source, the stuff, the course/ orienter and the end of all intelligible, determinate “hewn” entities, from which they emerge and toward which they all converge, negating them all and supporting them all, and through this negation and the course of arising from and return to this negation of themselves, it is also what unifies them all. This unity of all possible names, forms, values, entities brings them all together but only by being itself unhewn, unnamed, that is indiscernible. This is the ultimate cohering, also the ultimate value, from which lesser values/ coherences emerge. The motif of the center is here transformed from the exemplary center of Confucianism, the model that inspires those around it to modify themselves because it is seen and valued, to the invisible center, which creates togetherness and value precisely by not being seen, not being valued. To be valued is to inspire imitation, which is to inspire competi- 在老子传统中,我们出现了讽刺性的连贯性:一种团结(连贯)形式的观念,但它也必然是难以理解、无法阅读(不连贯)的。未凿成的东西是所有可理解的、确定的“凿成”实体的源头、材料、路线/导向器和终点,它们从中出现,并向其汇聚,否定它们并支持它们,并通过这种否定和支持它们。从这种对自身的否定中产生并返回的过程,也是将它们统一起来的原因。所有可能的名称、形式、价值、实体的这种统一将它们全部聚集在一起,但只有其本身是未凿成的、未命名的,这是不可辨别的。这是最终的凝聚力,也是最终的价值,从中出现了较小的价值/凝聚力。中心的主题在这里从儒家的模范中心(由于它被看到和重视而激励周围的人改变自己的模式)转变为无形的中心,它通过不被看到、不被重视而精确地创造团结和价值。有价值的。受到重视就激发模仿,进而激发竞争
tion, which is to create strife, which is to undermine ultimate coherence. To be seen is to be cut out from a background that is unseen, which means again a loss of the greatest coherence. Coherence is “ironic” in that the true coherence (value, togetherness, the unhewn or devalued from which the valued grows, which is inseparable from the valued, which accounts for the cycle of reversal from value to anti-value, and which is omnipresent in both the valued and the devalued) is by definition incoherent (indiscernible, invisible, indeterminate). 化,这就是制造冲突,这就是破坏最终的一致性。被看见就是从看不见的背景中被剔除出来,这又意味着失去最大的连贯性。连贯性是“讽刺的”,因为真正的连贯性(价值、团结性、未经雕琢的或贬值的东西,有价值的东西从中成长,它与有价值的东西密不可分,它解释了从价值到反价值的逆转循环,它是无所不在的从定义上看,无论是有价值的还是贬值的,都是不连贯的(难以辨别的、不可见的、不确定的)。
The writings of Zhuang Zhou present to us an overabundance of differing perspectives, each positing its own standard of rightness (是 shi), which is intrinsic to being anything at all, to being a particular something, to being a “this” (also 是 shi) at all. Being a “this,” it is intelligible (coherent) only by virtue of its contrast to some “that,” which is itself also a “this,” and hence its own new perspective. This positing of the other perspective is intrinsic to being a perspective at all: to be a this is to also contradict being this. This and not-this thus necessarily “cohere,” and it is only by doing so that they are intelligible (coherent). But this is again a specifically ironic coherence: any determinate entity (this) is coherent as what it is (this) by cohering with its own intrinsic positing of not-this. The coherence of any entity is thus always an ironic coherence. Zhuang Zhou’s “wild card” perspective “responds but does not store”: it reflects and affirms the “rightness” presented by each new situation, but does not consider this rightness, which is always both a shi and a fei (非), to be mutually exclusive with the opposite perspective, the opposed shi/fei, since the latter, the negation of itself, is intrinsic to its very intelligibility. Shi is “this,” which is coherence, value, intelligibility; but in positing its own negation, which in turn negates “this,” every coherence is also necessarily an incoherence, which again affirms Laozi’s ironic coherence: value which is togetherness which is unintelligibility: what Zhuangzi calls “the torch of slippage and doubt” (滑疑之耀 guyizhiyao). The “togetherness” here comes in not as an overriding convergence of all things in a single vision (as in Xunzi’s “Great Coherence” or even the ironic version in Laozi’s “unhewn”) but resides in a new application of the motif of the center, already prefigured in Mencius’s critique of “clinging to the center but without altering by circumstance.” (執中無權 zhizhong wuquan) (7A26). Zhuang Zhou introduces the idea of the pivot of Dao (道樞 daoshu), which is also the pivot of daos: the point where opposed shi/feis are not opposed, not mutually exclusive, precisely because of their mutual positing, and hence, in not “storing,” they flow freely into one another. The center allows one to “travel two roads at once” (兩行 liangxing): this special kind of value bilocality is Zhuang Zhou’s distinctive contribution to the problematic of coherence, universality, and omnipresence (as omniavailability of value) in Chinese thought. In the ironic conception of coherence, in both the Laozian 庄周的著作向我们展示了过多的不同观点,每种观点都提出了自己的正确标准(是是),这是任何事物、特定事物、“此”所固有的标准。 shi)完全没有。作为一个“这个”,它只有通过与某个“那个”的对比才能被理解(连贯),而“那个”本身也是一个“这个”,因此它有自己的新视角。这种对另一种观点的定位是作为一种观点所固有的:成为一个这个也与成为这个相矛盾。因此,这个和非这个必然是“连贯的”,只有这样做,它们才是可理解的(连贯的)。但这又是一种特别具有讽刺意味的连贯性:任何确定的实体(这个)通过与其自身的非此的内在定位相一致,就其本身(这个)而言是连贯的。因此,任何实体的连贯性始终是一种讽刺性的连贯性。庄周的“通配符”视角“反应而不储存”:它反映并肯定了每一个新情况所呈现的“正确性”,但没有考虑到这种正确性,这种正确性永远是“是”和“非”。与相反的观点是相互排斥的,对立的是/非,因为后者,对自身的否定,是其可理解性所固有的。势是“此”,即连贯性、价值性、可理解性;但在提出自己的否定,进而否定“此”时,每一种连贯性也必然是一种不连贯性,这再次肯定了老子讽刺的连贯性:价值即是一体性,又是难以理解的:庄子所说的“滑动和怀疑的火炬”(滑疑之耀(guyizhiyao)。 这里的“一体”并不是所有事物在一个单一视野中的压倒性的融合(如荀子的“大同”,甚至是老子的“未凿”中的讽刺版本),而是存在于中心主题的新应用中,早在孟子批判“居中而不移”中就已预示。 (执中无权 zhizhong wuquan)(7A26)。庄周提出了“道枢”的概念,这也是道的枢轴:对立的势/非不对立,不相互排斥,正是因为它们的相互定位,因此,它们不是“存储”,而是自由地相互流动。该中心允许人们“两行良行”:这种特殊的价值二方性是庄周对中国思想中的连贯性、普遍性和无所不在(作为价值的无所不在)问题的独特贡献。在具有讽刺意味的连贯性概念中,在老子的著作中,
and the Zhuangzian versions, the value, sustainability, and identity of things is seen as coming from their connection with other things (i.e., their own negation, in Laozi), or with particular human perspectives (in Zhuangzi). But here the aspect of intelligibility is denied: the true value and cohesion of things precludes their intelligibility as definitive particular identities. When identified definitively, they are falsified, and indeed lose the cohesion with all things, the value, the sustainability they originally enjoyed. The true X , then, is a non-X. 在庄子的版本中,事物的价值、可持续性和同一性被视为来自于它们与其他事物的联系(即,在《老子》中,它们自身的否定),或者来自特定的人类视角(在《庄子》中)。但这里可理解性的方面被否认了:事物的真正价值和凝聚力排除了它们作为明确的特定身份的可理解性。当被明确识别时,它们就被伪造了,并且确实失去了与万物的凝聚力、价值和它们最初享有的可持续性。那么,真正的 X 是一个非 X。
A notion is thus here developed of a kind of invisible center and its derivative totality that unifies (makes coherent) and brings entities to identifiable being (makes coherent) and gives value (makes coherent with human desire), but is itself coherent only in an ironic sense, that is, unifies and yet is itself unseen, unmanifest, unintelligible. In Liji texts such as the “Daxue” and “Zhongyong,” as also in the Yin-Yang systems of the commentaries to the Zhouyi and Yang Xiong’s Taixuanjing, we find a domestication of this notion of an unseen centering that functions for each emergent coherence as a creator and preserver, thereby accounting for and legitimizing all observable order and consistency (coherence). Overall coherence works through local pockets of invisibility or ironic coherence: the as-yet-unseen sprouts, the unmanifest but constant Inner Coherence (誠 cheng) which reveals itself in all individual affects and actions but never shows itself simpliciter, or as the least manifest aspect of a hexagram-situation, or as the Yin side of a Yin-Yang dyad which, however, works toward and is subordinated to the manifestation and purposes of the Yang. Yin-Yang represents a cohesion between ironic coherence-as-unintelligibility, value as necessarily nonexplicit (Yin), and non-ironic coherence-as-intelligibility, value as explicit (Yang). In all these systems (even, contrary to appearances, Yang Xiong’s Taixuanjing, which gives definite values to things in spite of emphasizing the unintelligibility, xuan 玄, of the ultimate whole), the role of the unintelligible, the background, the unreadable togetherness in which value is rooted is here acknowledged and integrated into the system of Great Coherence, Xunzi’s univocal view of a maximally coherent whole. These are non-ironic integrations of the ironic: the final word, the ultimate value, lies with the non-ironic, the definite and normative values and identities of nonnegotiable individual and collective coherences. We have thus begun to see the development of one form of compromise between these two positions, finding a place for this built-in mysteriousness pertaining to all possible identities without thereby conceding the possible nihilistic consequences of the ironic tradition, which would seem to undermine the value of tradition, moral instruction, and human endeavor, or at least make it troublingly negotiable. 因此,这里发展出一种概念,它是一种无形中心及其派生整体,它统一(使之连贯)并将实体带入可识别的存在(使连贯)并赋予价值(使与人类欲望连贯),但其本身仅在以下方面连贯:讽刺意义,即统一性,但其本身是看不见的、不明显的、不可理解的。在《大学》和《中庸》等《礼记》文本中,以及《周易》和扬雄的《太玄经》注释的阴阳系统中,我们发现了这种看不见的中心概念的驯化,它为每个新兴的连贯性发挥着作用。作为创造者和保护者,从而解释并合法化所有可观察到的秩序和一致性(连贯性)。整体连贯性是通过局部的隐形或讽刺连贯性发挥作用的:尚未见的萌芽,不明显但持续的内在连贯性(诚诚),它在所有个人的情感和行为中展现自己,但从未表现得更简单,或作为最不明显的表现。卦象的一个方面,或者阴阳二元组的阴面,然而,它朝着阳的表现和目的努力并从属于阳的表现和目的。阴阳代表了作为不可理解性的反讽连贯性、作为必然不明确的价值(阴)和作为可理解性的非反讽连贯性、作为明确的价值(阳)之间的凝聚力。在所有这些体系中(甚至与表面相反,杨雄的《太玄经》尽管强调最终整体的不可理解性,但仍赋予事物明确的价值),不可理解性、背景、不可理解的整体性在其中所扮演的角色。其价值的根源在这里得到承认并融入到大连贯体系中,即荀子关于最大连贯整体的明确观点。 这些是讽刺性的非讽刺性整合:最终的词、最终的价值在于非讽刺性的、明确的、规范的价值观以及不可协商的个人和集体一致性的身份。因此,我们开始看到这两种立场之间的一种妥协形式的发展,为这种与所有可能的身份有关的内在神秘性找到了一个位置,同时又不承认反讽传统可能产生的虚无主义后果,这似乎会破坏反讽传统的虚无主义后果。传统、道德指导和人类努力的价值,或者至少使其具有令人不安的可协商性。
These conclusions rested on certain theoretical considerations about coherence as such, and the peculiarities of classical Chinese conceptions of it. One trope that was particularly useful for illuminating this issue was based on a passage in the writings of Qian Mu, my translation of which I will reproduce here: 这些结论基于对连贯性本身的某些理论考虑,以及中国古典概念的特殊性。对于阐明这个问题特别有用的一个比喻是基于钱穆著作中的一段话,我将在这里转载我的翻译:
Wherever there is a circle or a pendulum range, there will be what can be called a center. This center is not on the two sides, nor anywhere outside, but rather lies within [the range of the swing of the pendulum]. A pendulum swing or a cyclic progress never actually comes to rest at that center, but the center is always there, and is always still and solid as a center. It is as if the center were controlling the motion. The ceaseless and infinite motion seems eternally to be under the command of the center, completely controlled by the center, and thus we can say that it is perfectly moving and perfectly still, perfectly changing and perfectly constant. . . . Confucians want to point out a fixed center in this infinite cyclical back and forth, and they call this center “human nature.” This is also what the Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties liked to call “the Center which has not yet become manifest,” “knowing the resting place,” “stillness,” “the master,” “the constant.” The Song Neo-Confucians said that this human Nature is precisely Li [coherence], but were unwilling to say that the Nature is qi [vital energyl, because qi is just the motion, whereas Li is the Center of that motion. If there were truly pure qi with no Li , it would be like an unbridled horse-no one knows where it will run to. Heaven and earth would not be able to become heaven and earth, humans and things would not be able to become humans and things. There would be absolutely no way of handling or explaining the myriad different types and forms of things. The reason we now have this “Heaven and Earth,” and these “humans” and these “things,” is because within the qi there is this Li . Because there is Li in qi, there is constancy and predictability, which is called “the Nature” when viewed as active and emerging from within, and as “the Decree” when viewed as passive and coming from without. But in reality this one motion is at once active and passive, internal and external, indivisibly, which is why the Nature and the Decree are seen to have a common source. Both are ways of describing this motion itself, but emphasizing different aspects of it. 凡是有圆或摆范围的地方,就有所谓的中心。这个中心不在两侧,也不在外面,而是在[钟摆摆动范围]之内。钟摆的摆动或循环的进程实际上永远不会停在该中心,但该中心始终在那里,并且始终是静止且坚固的中心。就好像中心在控制运动一样。永不停息、无限的运动似乎永远都在中心的指挥之下,完全受中心的控制,因此我们可以说它是完美的运动和完美的静止,完美的变化和完美的恒定。 。 。 。儒家想在这种无限循环中指出一个固定的中心,他们把这个中心称为“人性”。这也就是宋明理学家所喜欢的“未显中”、“知其处”、“寂”、“主”、“常”。宋理学家说,人性就是理,而不愿意说性就是气,因为气只是运动,而理是运动的中心。如果真有纯气而无理,就如一匹不受缰绳的马,谁也不知道它会跑到哪里去。天地不能成为天地,人与物不能成为人与物。绝对没有办法处理或解释无数不同类型和形式的事物。我们现在之所以有这个“天地”、这些“人”、这些“物”,就是因为气里有这个理。 因为气中有理,所以有恒常性和可预测性,从主动的、从内而出的,称为“自然”;从被动、从外来的,称为“法令”。但实际上,这一运动既是主动的,也是被动的,是内在的,也是外在的,不可分割的,这就是为什么自然和法令被视为有共同的根源。两者都是描述该动议本身的方式,但强调其不同方面。
“The Good” is what we call the constancy in this eternal change, the center in this unceasing motion, this relatively easily “善”就是我们所说的这种永恒变化中的恒定性,这种不断运动的中心,这种相对容易的
grasped and known nature. Good is just the constant tendency of this motion. . . . Whatever is separated from it by a great distance is called bad. Good is just the center of this motion, evil is nothing but going beyond it or not coming up to it. . . . Although human affairs also go through endless transformations and never stay the same, there is a constancy or a center to them. If you try to separate yourself from this constancy or center and just move straight forward, you will find that it is impossible. For example, peace and struggle are phenomena that arise alternately in human life; they usually form a cycle, a back and forth, moving from peace to struggle and then from struggle back to peace. Within this process too there is a center or a constancy. Struggle must search for peace, and peace must resist struggle (that is, must not be afraid of struggle). So peace which is close to struggle and struggle that is close to peace are both capable of continuing, and both can be called good. But struggle that is far removed from peace and peace that is far removed from struggle are both far removed from the center, so that neither can form a constancy or attain any continuity. Going too far and not coming up to it are equally bad, and both of these can be called evil. Evil is just whatever cannot be constant (sustainable). The same is true of sickness and health. Usually people think a healthy person is free of sickness, but in reality if there were no sickness, how could there be the work of metabolism, assimilating and excreting? The function of excretion is a type of sickness that is not far removed from health (and hence is good). The same is true of work and rest; to rest so much you can no longer work is evil and not good, and to work so much you can no longer rest is equally evil and not good. But people usually think of life as positive, death as negative, peace as positive and struggle as negative, health and work as positive and sickness and rest as negative, and then they start thinking that the positive side is good and the negative side is evil. But according to the theory we are developing here, as long as evil stays close to good, it is no longer evil, and indeed, if good is too far removed from evil it is no longer good. ^(3){ }^{3} 掌握并认识自然。好的只是这个运动的持续趋势。 。 。 。凡是与它相距很远的东西都称为恶。善只是这个运动的中心,恶不过是超越它或达不到它。 。 。 。人间的事物虽然也有无穷无尽的变化,永远不会一成不变,但都有一个恒定性或一个中心。如果你试图将自己从这种坚定性或中心中分离出来,直接向前迈进,你会发现这是不可能的。例如,和平与斗争是人类生活中交替出现的现象;它们通常形成一个循环,一个来回,从和平走向斗争,然后从斗争回到和平。在这个过程中也有一个中心或一个恒常性。斗争必须寻求和平,和平必须抵制斗争(即不能害怕斗争)。所以接近于斗争的和平和接近于和平的斗争都是能够持续的,都可以称为善。但远离和平的斗争,与远离斗争的和平,都远离中心,所以都不能形成恒久,也不能取得连续性。走得太远和达不到同样不好,这两者都可以称为恶。邪恶就是一切不能恒定(可持续)的事物。疾病和健康也是如此。通常人们认为健康的人就没有疾病,但实际上如果没有疾病,怎么会有新陈代谢、吸收和排泄的工作呢?排泄功能是一种与健康相去不远的疾病(因此是好的)。 作息也是如此;休息太多而不能再工作是恶而不是善,工作太多而不能再休息同样是恶而不是善。但人们通常认为生是积极的,死亡是消极的,和平是积极的,斗争是消极的,健康和工作是积极的,疾病和休息是消极的,然后他们开始认为积极的一面是好的,消极的一面是邪恶的。但根据我们在这里发展的理论,只要恶与善接近,它就不再是恶,事实上,如果善与恶相距太远,它就不再是善。 ^(3){ }^{3}
I will repeat what I said there about this trope, which I will refer to henceforth as “Qian Mu’s Pendulum.” I quote this passage at length because we will have many occasions to refer back to it in the pages that follow. I do not claim that this model applies perfectly for all Chinese thinkers. ^(4){ }^{4} Rather, I would like to suggest that in considering each Chinese thinker we are better off searching for something like this model and the ways in which he diverges from it than assuming something along the lines of the 我将重复我在那里所说的关于这个比喻的内容,我将在下文中将其称为“钱穆的钟摆”。我详细地引用了这段话,因为我们将在接下来的几页中多次引用它。我并不是说这个模式完全适用于所有中国思想家。 ^(4){ }^{4} 相反,我想建议,在考虑每一位中国思想家时,我们最好寻找类似这个模型的东西以及他与这个模型的分歧方式,而不是沿着这个模型假设一些东西。
universal/particular model, or a whole/part model, or a substance/accident model, and the particular handlings of sameness into difference that they tend to imply. For this brilliant metaphor gives us a key by which to unlock many of the problems that we will find confronting us there, to be contrasted with the basic metaphors of mimesis, or imposing a shape onto a material that informs the Greek speculations. It is crucial to note, first of all, that the sort of “coherence” indicated here necessarily includes both sustainability and value, which are here seen as one and the same, as synonyms, and inseparably connected to the idea of intelligibility (the graspability of the still, virtual center as opposed to the motion of the pendulum itself) and to “centrality,” a neutral point connecting to two extremes conceived as a dyadic opposition. It also provides us with a strong sense of why it is preferable to speak of “coherence” for such ideas, rather than simply some form of “harmony.” For what is at stake here is literally the holding together of the parts, their grouping with one another as a condition of their being present at all, their identifiability as what they are. If any part flies off to too great a distance from the center, and from the opposite extreme, it ceases to be sustainable as itself, ceases to be itself (e.g., health too far from sickness ceases to be health). It is the coherence between the parts that not only sustains the whole, but sustains each of the parts as what it is, or as anything at all (whatever it may become after “flying off” would, on this model, be determined by its relation to some other center and the corresponding opposite to which it would thus be connected). And this coherence with the whole, and with the center, is really just a shorthand way of designating the relation to the other parts, or better, the opposite part. The “center” is picked out and privileged because it alone provides “coherence” in the other sense: intelligibility, identity, definite characteristics. The whole can be identified, grasped, predicted, only through the center. The center is what “shows up” to observing awareness of the circulation between the extremes. 普遍/特殊模型,或整体/部分模型,或物质/事故模型,以及它们往往暗示的将相同性转化为差异的特殊处理。因为这个绝妙的隐喻为我们提供了一把钥匙,可以用来解开我们将在那里遇到的许多问题,与模仿的基本隐喻形成鲜明对比,或者将形状强加给希腊推测的材料。首先,需要注意的是,这里所指的“连贯性”必然包括可持续性和价值,它们在这里被视为同一个同义词,并且与可理解性(可理解性)的概念密不可分。静止的、虚拟的中心,而不是钟摆本身的运动)和“中心性”,一个连接两个极端的中性点,被视为二元对立。它还让我们强烈地意识到为什么最好将这些想法称为“连贯性”,而不是简单地某种形式的“和谐”。因为这里真正关键的是各个部分的结合,它们彼此的组合作为它们存在的条件,以及它们作为它们本身的可识别性。如果任何部分飞离中心和相反的极端太远,它就不再是其自身的可持续性,不再是它自己(例如,健康距离疾病太远就不再是健康)。部分之间的连贯性不仅维持了整体,而且维持了每个部分的本来面目或任何事物(在这个模型中,无论“飞走”后它可能变成什么,都将由其本身决定)与某个其他中心的关系以及因此与其连接的相应对立面的关系)。 这种与整体和中心的一致性实际上只是指定与其他部分(或者更好的是,相反部分)关系的一种简写方式。 “中心”被挑选出来并享有特权,因为它本身就提供了另一种意义上的“连贯性”:可理解性、同一性、明确的特征。整体只有通过中心才能被识别、把握、预测。中心是观察极端之间循环的意识“显现”的地方。
We might note also the rather approximate nature of this center as a summing up of the motion involved: it is determinative, in that “too great” a distance from it will lead to a part’s demise. But this does not necessarily specify the exact range of each motion, which might be more or less distant in any case, swinging a little erratically from time to time, as long as it doesn’t exceed a certain range. In other words, the “control” of the center, on this model, allows for a certain randomness. It is not conceived here as control in the sense of the issuing of a command that must be exactly obeyed, or laying down a track guiding every detail of the activity. Note also the manner in which this centrality is both immanent and transcendent: it is a function of the two poles, does not really preexist them, and has only a virtual existence, but at the same time it is their “controller” in the sense that their behavior and determinate identities are derivable 我们还可能注意到该中心作为所涉及运动的总结的相当近似的性质:它是决定性的,因为距它“太大”的距离将导致零件的灭亡。但这并不一定指定每个运动的确切范围,在任何情况下,运动的范围可能或多或少,不时地有点不稳定地摆动,只要不超过一定的范围即可。换句话说,在这个模型上,中心的“控制”允许一定的随机性。这里,它并不被认为是发出必须严格遵守的命令或制定指导活动的每个细节的轨道意义上的控制。还要注意这种中心性既是内在的又是超越的:它是两个极点的函数,并不真正先于它们而存在,只有虚拟的存在,但同时它是它们的“控制器”他们的行为和确定的身份是可以推导的
from their relation to this virtual center. In this sense it plays a role similar to that of a “transcendent” fundamental reality, the independent variable that determines the behavior of everything related to it. But the pendulum model also allows us to intuit the manner in which it is simultaneously not transcendent at all. The center does not belong to a separate ontological realm, being itself merely a certain fact about the two poles, namely, a way of describing their relation to one another. 从他们与这个虚拟中心的关系来看。从这个意义上说,它扮演着类似于“超越的”基本现实的角色,即决定与其相关的一切行为的自变量。但钟摆模型也让我们能够凭直觉了解它同时又不是超越的。中心并不属于一个单独的本体论领域,它本身只是关于两个极点的某个事实,即描述它们彼此关系的一种方式。
In Ironies of Oneness and Difference some effort was also made to address some of the founding metaphors underlying the classical Greek methods of conceiving the relations among things in terms of their sameness and difference. These typically had to do with notions of a strictly and precisely repeatable Form being imprinted into a formless Matter, or of a selfsame Substance underlying a multitude of diverse Accidents or Attributes-some notion of a particular self-standing entity with a variety of aspects “belonging” to it as “properties,” or, grammatically and logically, a single identical subject with various genuinely distinct predicates. All such notions offer us certain presuppositions about the relation between sameness and difference. In the case of Form and Matter and the various derivatives of this notion, such as the concepts of “essence” and “instantiation,” we noted that while Form as such irreducibly involves in itself both a sameness and a difference, it is at the same time a device for keeping this sameness and this difference perfectly separate: a shared self-same essence remains mathematically one and the same in every instantiation, while maintaining absolute difference from every other essence. This attempted perfect continence among essences, however, cannot be maintained absolutely, for the commonality between diverse essences continues to leak into any thinking process that attempts to relate them, to wit, in any instance of thinking qua thinking. Hence, we have the stopgap of subsuming species into genus, of nested essences arranged in a single unchanging hierarchical taxonomy, imagined as a downward-branching tree. By means of this expedient, the aspect of sameness and the aspect of difference among any entities can be made to appear to remain perfectly distinct facts. Hence “Dog” and “Horse” are “the same” in that they share the selfsame essence of “Animal, Vertebrate, Mammal,” etc., but differ in that each has a specific essence modified by its distinguishing feature. By introducing the notion of various “respects” as if it were an ontological fact, by distinguishing “the respect in which” they are the same and “the respect in which” they are different, the ontological ultimacy of sameness and difference as final facts can be maintained. The essence is the same, simpliciter, in every instantiation, but this essence is different, simpliciter, from every other essence, and from its instantiations qua instantiations. 在《统一与差异的反讽》中,还努力解决了古典希腊方法中的一些基本隐喻,这些隐喻是根据事物的相同性和差异来构思事物之间的关系。这些通常与严格且精确地可重复的形式被印入无形物质的概念有关,或者与多种不同的事故或属性背后的同一个物质的概念有关——具有多种方面的特定独立实体的一些概念“属于”它作为“属性”,或者,从语法上和逻辑上来说,一个相同的主语具有各种真正不同的谓词。所有这些概念都为我们提供了关于相同性和差异性之间关系的某些预设。就形式和物质以及该概念的各种派生词而言,例如“本质”和“实例化”的概念,我们注意到,虽然形式本身不可简化地涉及同一性和差异性,但它处于同时,一种保持这种相同性和这种差异完全分离的装置:共享的同一本质在数学上在每个实例中都保持一致,同时保持与其他本质的绝对差异。然而,这种本质之间完美克制的尝试并不能绝对维持,因为不同本质之间的共性继续渗透到任何试图将它们联系起来的思维过程中,也就是说,在任何作为思维的思维实例中。因此,我们有权宜之计,将物种归入属,将嵌套的本质排列在单一不变的分层分类法中,想象为一棵向下分支的树。 通过这种权宜之计,可以使任何实体之间的相同方面和不同方面看起来仍然是完全不同的事实。因此,“狗”和“马”是“相同的”,因为它们具有“动物、脊椎动物、哺乳动物”等相同的本质,但不同之处在于,它们各自具有由其区别特征修饰的特定本质。通过引入各种“方面”的概念,就好像它是一个本体论事实一样,通过区分它们相同的“方面”和不同的“方面”,相同和不同的本体论终极性作为最终事实可以维持。在每一个实例中,本质都是相同的、更简单的,但这个本质与所有其他本质以及它作为实例的实例都是不同的、更简单的。
Indeed, we may go so far as to suggest that the entire idea of the so-called “law” of non-contradiction is a further expression of this tendency. 事实上,我们甚至可以认为,所谓的不矛盾“法则”的整个思想就是这种倾向的进一步表达。
The Law of Non-Contradiction is given by Aristotle in three forms, according to the accepted doxa: the ontological form, the logical form, and the psychological form. The “ontological version” (Metaphysics IV 3 1005b1923) concerns what predicates can belong to the same subject. “The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.” The logical version (Metaphysics IV 3 1011b13-14) concerns two contradictory propositions: they cannot both be true at once. The psychological version (Metaphysics IV 3 1005b23-25) concerns two beliefs: one cannot believe both two contradictory claims at once. The latter two versions are dependent on the first version; if the first version were false, the other two would also be false. But in the context of our present discussion, we might notice an enormous red flag in Aristotle’s: it is the words translated “at once,” “at the same time,” and “in the same respect.” With these words, the entire principle puts itself under the suspicion of being a world-historical instance of gerrymandering hand waving. ^(5){ }^{5} What is a “respect”? A “respect in which something is asserted” is, perhaps, the part or side or aspect of some matter that is to be considered of relevance in a particular instance, as determined by a set of relations, or a context, abstracting one aspect or part of the item in question and addressing that alone, in isolation from the other aspects or parts of that very same thing or fact or topic. How do we determinate which among all the characteristics and relations of the thing, and how many of them, get to count as a single “respect”? Answer: only those relations and characteristics that produce a non-contradictory set of predicates count as a single respect. Therefore, “in the same respect” is a circular condition. I allow only as much into a “respect” as can turn out to be non-contradictory. Whatever leads to a contradiction I simply relegate to another “respect.” The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, for what it means to say something is true “in one sense” and untrue “in another sense.” Indeed, less intuitively but nonetheless just as damagingly, the same can be said about the qualifications concerning time, that is, that something might be true “at one time” and untrue “at another time.” How long is one “time”? Unless moments are dimensionless simples, which would present insuperable metaphysical difficulties, the duration of a “time” in this sense must be variable, and the same problems about their definition applies: however much time can include a set of events or predicates or actions that are non-contradictory in whatever sense is under examination will be what counts as a single time in that case. The Law of Non-Contradiction is true only in the same way that the “law” that there are twelve inches to a foot is true. Whatever exceeds twelve inches is considered part of the next foot. This gives us no ontological information at all. We should be no more amazed to find it always true than we are amazed to find that, no matter where we might search throughout the 根据公认的doxa,亚里士多德以三种形式给出了不矛盾律:本体论形式、逻辑形式和心理学形式。 “本体论版本”(形而上学 IV 3 1005b1923)关注哪些谓词可以属于同一主题。 “同一属性不能同时属于和不属于同一主体、同一方面。”逻辑版本(形而上学 IV 3 1011b13-14)涉及两个矛盾的命题:它们不可能同时为真。心理学版本(形而上学 IV 3 1005b23-25)涉及两种信念:一个人不能同时相信两种相互矛盾的主张。后两个版本依赖于第一个版本;如果第一个版本是错误的,那么其他两个版本也将是错误的。但在我们当前讨论的背景下,我们可能会注意到亚里士多德的一个巨大的危险信号:它是翻译为“立即”、“同时”和“在同一方面”的词。有了这些话,整个原则就被怀疑是世界历史上不公正划分选区的挥手例子。 ^(5){ }^{5} 什么是“尊重”? “断言某事的方面”也许是某些事物的部分或侧面或方面,在特定情况下被认为是相关的,由一组关系或上下文确定,抽象出一个方面或问题的一部分,并单独解决该问题,与同一事物、事实或主题的其他方面或部分隔离。我们如何确定事物的所有特征和关系中的哪一个以及其中多少个可以算作一个“尊重”?答案:只有那些产生一组不矛盾的谓词的关系和特征才算作单一方面。 因此,“在同一方面”是一个循环条件。我只允许在不矛盾的情况下给予“尊重”。无论什么导致矛盾,我都简单地将其归结为另一种“尊重”。同样的道理,经过必要的修改,可以说“在某种意义上”是真实的,而“在另一种意义上”是不真实的。事实上,虽然不那么直观,但同样具有破坏性,关于时间的限定也可以这样说,即某件事可能“在某一时刻”为真,而“在另一时刻”则不真实。一个“时间”有多长?除非时刻是无量纲的简单,这会带来无法克服的形而上学的困难,否则这个意义上的“时间”的持续时间必须是可变的,并且关于它们的定义也存在同样的问题:无论多少时间可以包括一组事件或谓词或动作,这些事件或谓词或动作在任何意义上都是不矛盾的,在这种情况下,被检查的将被视为一次。不矛盾定律的正确性与“英尺等于十二英寸”的“定律”的正确性是一样的。任何超过十二英寸的东西都被视为下一英尺的一部分。这根本没有给我们任何本体论信息。我们不应该惊讶地发现它总是正确的,就像我们惊讶地发现,无论我们在整个世界的哪个地方寻找一样。
cosmos, however many billions of light-years away, we always find that every foot of space has exactly twelve inches in it, no more and no less. It tells me nothing about the world, other than the finitude and conditionality of anything determinate (i.e., that there are always more inches than twelve available for counting). The Law of Non-Contradiction does not tell me that the world, or any actual entity in the world, or any truth about the world, is non-contradictory, nor that there are really samenesses and differences, simpliciter, in the world. It just tells me that wherever I can describe two contrary characteristics as coexistent in some composite, I will describe that coexistence as a non-contradictory complexity of a single entity, and whenever the elements in a composite entity fail to be capable of coexisting, due to a conflict between them, I will simply define the elements as no longer belonging to a single entity. As a matter of policy, we separate out whatever can be subsumed into a single concept as a sameness and name that the essence, and call whatever is leftover the difference. Every thing is thus both the same and different from every other thing, but “in different respects.” 宇宙,无论距离有多少亿光年,我们总是发现每一英尺的空间正好有十二英寸,不多也不少。除了任何确定的事物的有限性和条件性(即总是有比十二英寸更多的英寸可供计数)之外,它没有告诉我任何关于世界的信息。不矛盾定律并没有告诉我,世界,或者世界上的任何实际实体,或者关于世界的任何真理,都是不矛盾的,更简单地说,世界上也没有真正存在相同和差异。它只是告诉我,只要我可以将两个相反的特征描述为在某个组合中共存,我就会将该共存描述为单个实体的非矛盾复杂性,并且每当组合实体中的元素无法共存时,由于对于它们之间的冲突,我将简单地将元素定义为不再属于单个实体。作为一项政策,我们将所有可以归入单一概念的东西作为相同点分离出来,并将其称为本质,并将剩下的称为差异。因此,每件事物都与其他事物既相同又不同,但“在不同方面”。
Thus, we see an entire logical system built up on this circular law, which requires us to separate the shared essence from the differing instantiations. The “Realist” interpretation of this arrangement will emphasize the reality of the sameness of the shared essence, which will have to be considered some kind of genuinely selfsame entity that can be instantiated unchanged in more than one time and place, and which continues to be exactly what it is whether or not it is so instantiated. This would mean that its existence has a kind of availability that is independent of whether one or more human beings ever makes mentions or experiences it. Moreover, the Realist essence must be causally relevant, that is, it must be real at least in the sense of playing some actual causal role in making at least some actual entities be what they are and do what they do, while the “Nominalist” will emphasize the difference between individual species or individual members of a species as what is ultimately real, denying that there are any nonparticular or nonconcrete entities that are as ultimately real or that are as causally relevant, in our final ontology of both the natural and human worlds, as particular and concrete entities. But in either case, what is the same and what is different really pertains to these existing things, a definitive, nonnegotiable something that has an unchanging identity in all contexts. 因此,我们看到一个完整的逻辑系统建立在这个循环定律之上,这要求我们将共同的本质与不同的实例分开。对这一安排的“现实主义”解释将强调共享本质的同一性的现实,这必须被视为某种真正相同的实体,可以在多个时间和地点不变地实例化,并且继续存在无论它是否被实例化,它到底是什么。这意味着它的存在具有一种可用性,独立于一个或多个人是否曾经提及或经历过它。此外,现实主义的本质必须是因果相关的,也就是说,至少在使至少某些实际实体成为其所是并做其所做的事情中发挥某种实际因果作用的意义上,它必须是真实的,而“唯名论”则必须是真实的。将强调个体物种或物种个体成员之间的差异作为最终真实的东西,否认在我们自然和人类的最终本体论中存在任何最终真实或因果相关的非特定或非具体实体世界,作为特殊而具体的实体。但无论哪种情况,相同和不同实际上都属于这些现有的事物,是一种确定的、不可协商的事物,在所有情况下都具有不变的身份。
It is useful to consider, in contrast, how same and different are to be conceived on the pendulum model. Again, although of course it would be possible to describe this situation in terms of a sameness (what the two extremes “have in common” is the characteristic of “not being too far from the center”), this description is clearly less useful here than one that stresses a certain sui generis manner of interfusion of same and different. We have 相反,考虑在摆模型上如何设想相同和不同是有用的。再说一遍,虽然当然可以用同一性来描述这种情况(两个极端的“共同点”是“离中心不太远”的特征),但这种描述在这里显然没有什么用处。而不是强调相同与不同的某种独特的融合方式。我们有
an alternate way of organizing sameness and difference here, which is reducible neither to the dividing off of sameness and difference in the manner of Form and Matter, nor of Substance and Accident, nor again of Whole and Part or of a Totality and its Aspects. Nor do we have a total transcendence of all pairs of opposites typical of negative theologies or philosophies of the Absolute (i.e., where all finite determinations, including same and different, are deemed inadequate to describe the truly real, the Absolute, which as infinite can be neither “this” nor “that”). For built into the idea of the extremes and the center in Qian Mu’s pendulum model is the sense that what constitutes the difference between these two extremes is precisely continuity with its opposite, the fact that they share a neutral connecting center. Conversely, what constitutes their own specifiable identities and sustainability as what they are, as well as their continuity with one another, is precisely their concrete non-exclusion of their opposites, their continual tendency to veer back toward their opposites, their connection to and contact with the difference that excludes them, their interaction, interface, and overlap with difference. What joins them as members of this coherence is not so much sharing a certain characteristic, but rather precisely the harmonic coherence of their differences from one another. What makes health health? Its non-exclusion of sickness. What makes sickness sickness (rather than death, which would be the end of sickness)? Its non-exclusion of health. What makes health and sickness belong to the same coherence? Not their sharing of a single essence, but rather their complementarity. On this model, are health and sickness absolutely different from one another, “different” as the total exclusion of sameness? They cannot be, because a health from which all sickness is expunged here ceases to exist as health, and vice versa. The same? But if the two sides are the same, there is no swing, and thus no center, and thus no two sides. Are they different from the center? But the intelligibility of each is merely an aspect of the intelligibility of this center: what we see is only this one thing, identified by the character of the intelligible center; the rest is an unknowable blank. The same? But the center is a merely virtual, approximate point defined by the swing between the extremes, such that a pendulum resting at the center point would cease to function as the center. If it were “all center,” it would be “no center.” What this single concrete image perhaps most clearly shows us is how profoundly inappropriate these questions about same and different are to the case at hand. 这里有一种组织相同性和差异性的另一种方式,它既不能还原为形式与物质、实质与偶然、整体与部分、整体性及其方面的相同性与差异性的划分。我们也没有完全超越典型的消极神学或绝对哲学的所有对立面(即,所有有限的决定,包括相同的和不同的,都被认为不足以描述真正的真实,绝对,作为无限可以既不是“这个”也不是“那个”)。因为钱穆钟摆模型中的极端和中心的概念中蕴藏着这样一种感觉,即构成这两个极端之间的差异的恰恰是与其相反的连续性,即它们共享一个中立的连接中心。相反,构成他们自身特定身份和可持续性的东西,以及他们彼此之间的连续性,恰恰是他们对对立面的具体不排斥、他们不断转向对立面的倾向、他们与他人的联系和接触。与排除它们的差异、它们的相互作用、界面以及与差异的重叠。作为这种连贯性的成员,将他们结合在一起的并不是共享某种特征,而是他们彼此之间的差异的和谐连贯性。是什么让健康变得健康?其不排除疾病。是什么让疾病成为疾病(而不是死亡,死亡才是疾病的终结)?它不排除健康。是什么让健康和疾病属于同一个连贯性?它们不是共享单一本质,而是它们的互补性。 在这个模型中,健康和疾病是否完全不同,“不同”是完全排除相同性?它们不可能是这样,因为在这里消除了所有疾病的健康不再作为健康而存在,反之亦然。相同?但如果两侧相同,则没有摆动,因此没有中心,因此没有两侧。他们和中心有什么不同吗?但每一个的可理解性都只是这个中心的可理解性的一个方面:我们所看到的只是这一件事,由可理知中心的特征所识别;其余的都是不可知的空白。相同?但中心只是一个虚拟的、由极端之间的摆动定义的近似点,因此位于中心点的钟摆将不再发挥中心的作用。如果是“全中心”,那就是“无中心”。这个单一的具体形象也许最清楚地向我们展示的是,这些关于相同和不同的问题对于当前的情况是多么不恰当。
Perhaps more to the point, if we consider closely the point about intelligibility, we can see how this notion inevitably tends toward an idea of nested identities that connects to what we will be calling the ironic model of coherence. For whatever is identifiable, on Qian’s model, is always a center. Activity that does not yet turn around, that does not revert into a finite range, that is continually moving forward and hence is constitutively unfinished, 也许更重要的是,如果我们仔细考虑关于可理解性的观点,我们可以看到这个概念如何不可避免地倾向于一种嵌套身份的想法,这种想法与我们所说的连贯性的讽刺模型相关。因为在钱的模型中,任何可识别的东西总是一个中心。尚未扭转的活动,未恢复到有限范围的活动,不断向前推进的活动,因此本质上是未完成的活动,
cannot be identified and known. Knowing per se depends on the presence of cycles, oscillations, which are intelligible only as their approximate centers. But this means that when we speak of “health” and “sickness,” say, as the two extremes within one cycle, identified perhaps as the center intelligible as “physical life,” each of these two extremes must be a kind of center in its own right (for they have been identified, and identification is only of centers). Hence, within the larger vortex of “physical life,” we have the two smaller vortices of “health” and “sickness.” This sort of nesting would have to go on indefinitely, as long as there are identifiable elements. As an aid to visualizing this, we might expand the pendulum model into three dimensions, somewhat along the line of the Rutherford model of atomic structure (it should go without saying that this is merely a heuristic device; I do not mean to suggest that the early Chinese had in any way anticipated the knowledge of atomic structure-quite the contrary). The cloud of vibrating electrons is knowable only as a unit, which is located at and as the nucleus. But if we focus on trying to identify any further component, say an electron, on this model we will find another swarm of vibrations grouped around a virtual center, as which this swarm is identified. Expanding outward, we will find that the entire “atom” is an electron-in this case, one of two extremes of a pendulum swing-in a larger “atom.” Each element is a vortex. Its center is the vertex by which it is grasped and known. This sense of mutual inclusion might play out, as in the non-ironic conception of coherence later found in, for example, the schematic charts of the sixty-four hexagrams of the Zhouyi broken down into their Yin-Yang line components, as a one-way subsumption model, superficially similar to the taxonomy of species and genus we find on the universal/particular model, or set and set-membership model. But the composition of each level by means of the vortex of mutually entailing opposites, each of which is also composed of some pair of opposites, skews this comparison decisively, particularly with respect to the highest level, but also in terms of the interconnections between the lower levels. In the full-blown ironic version, this will be pushed to the point of undermining any fixed or nonnegotiable knowability concerning the ultimate identity of any of the components. But even in the non-ironic version, there will be many interesting complications to the conception of sameness and difference among the component parts, which we will be examining in detail on a case by case basis in the pages that follow. 无法被识别和知晓。认识本身取决于周期、振荡的存在,而这些只有作为它们的近似中心才能被理解。但这意味着,当我们谈到“健康”和“疾病”时,比如说,作为一个周期内的两个极端,可能被认为是可理解为“物质生命”的中心,这两个极端中的每一个都必须是一种中心。它自己的权利(因为它们已被识别,并且仅识别中心)。因此,在“物质生活”这个更大的漩涡中,我们有“健康”和“疾病”两个较小的漩涡。只要存在可识别的元素,这种嵌套就必须无限期地持续下去。为了帮助可视化这一点,我们可以将摆模型扩展到三个维度,有点类似于原子结构的卢瑟福模型(不言而喻,这只是一个启发式装置;我并不是说建议无论如何,早期中国人都预见到了原子结构的知识——恰恰相反)。振动电子云只能作为一个单位来认识,它位于原子核处并且作为原子核。但是,如果我们专注于尝试识别任何进一步的组件,例如电子,在这个模型上,我们会发现另一个围绕虚拟中心分组的振动群,该振动群就是通过该虚拟中心来识别的。向外扩展,我们会发现整个“原子”都是一个电子——在这种情况下,钟摆的两个极端之一摆动着一个更大的“原子”。每个元素都是一个漩涡。它的中心是它被把握和认识的顶点。 这种相互包容的感觉可能会发挥出来,就像后来在《周易》六十四卦分解成阴阳线组成部分的示意图中发现的非讽刺的连贯概念一样,作为一个整体-方式包含模型,表面上类似于我们在普遍/特殊模型或集合和集合成员模型上发现的物种和属的分类。但是,每个层次的构成都是由相互关联的对立面的漩涡组成的,每个对立面也由一对对立面组成,这决定性地扭曲了这种比较,特别是相对于最高层次而言,而且还就各层次之间的相互联系而言较低的水平。在全面的讽刺版本中,这将被推到破坏有关任何组件的最终身份的任何固定或不可协商的可知性的地步。但即使在非讽刺的版本中,各组成部分之间的相同性和差异性概念也会存在许多有趣的复杂性,我们将在接下来的几页中根据具体情况详细研究这些问题。
Centrality in this sense is itself value, is itself the connection of diverse and opposed particulars, is itself intelligibility: the three meanings of coherence with which we have been grappling. Only a center is what unifies, is discernible, and bestows value (sustainability), as Qian’s analysis suggests. As we shall see in the pages that follow, whenever we talk about Li, we will have to think first and foremost about this idea of a center. 从这个意义上说,中心性本身就是价值,本身就是不同和对立的细节的联系,本身就是可理解性:我们一直在努力解决连贯性的三个含义。正如钱的分析所表明的,只有一个中心才是统一的、可辨别的、并赋予价值(可持续性)的。正如我们将在接下来的几页中看到的,每当我们谈论李时,我们都必须首先考虑这个中心的概念。
We should thus highlight two points about coherence as so conceived. Coherence means both “balance” or equilibrium and “productivity” or the ability to continue in new forms into the future. As balance, a quantitative relation is implied here, a proper proportion, as between the two extremes in the swing of Qian’s pendulum. When either goes too far quantitatively, it disrupts the balance, loses its connection to the center and to the other extreme. Maintaining this proportion, and the ability to revert to the opposite, is precisely what allows both sides to continue forward in time, and it is this that constitutes value. The resulting vaguely quantitative but never strictly quantified sense of balancing of contrasted elements has been justly described as an “aesthetic order,” ^(6){ }^{6} in contrast to “logical order.” For it involves an aesthetic sense of altering quantitative proportions “by feel” in order to produce a qualitative change, as in the cutting of jade to make it a marketable product, or the adjustment of mixtures of ingredients in a recipe, or the adjustment of tones into an experienced harmony. It is especially noteworthy that this balance is generally conceived, as in the pendulum model, in terms of the proportioning of two opposite qualities, a dyad of terms. This sense of coherence as the production of quality by changes in quantity is of great significance, and it is in this sense that we will understand harmony and equilibrium here. 因此,我们应该强调关于如此设想的一致性的两点。连贯性既意味着“平衡”或平衡,也意味着“生产力”或以新形式延续到未来的能力。作为平衡,这里暗示着一种数量关系,一种适当的比例,就像钱钟摆摆动的两个极端之间一样。当任何一个在数量上走得太远时,它就会破坏平衡,失去与中心和另一个极端的联系。保持这个比例,并且能够回复到相反的状态,正是让双方能够在时间上继续前进,也正是这个构成了价值。由此产生的模糊定量但从未严格量化的对比元素平衡感被公正地描述为“美学秩序”。 ^(6){ }^{6} 与“逻辑顺序”相反。因为它涉及一种“凭感觉”改变数量比例以产生质变的审美意识,如切割玉石使其成为适销对路的产品,或调整配方中的成分混合物,或调整音调变成经验丰富的和谐。特别值得注意的是,这种平衡通常是根据两个相反性质的比例(即一对项)来构思的,就像在钟摆模型中一样。这种量变产生质的连贯感具有重要意义,正是在这个意义上我们才会理解这里的和谐与均衡。
Second, the quantitatively produced qualities are said to be productive of further coherences-of more equilibrium, or more life, in a state of intelligible continuity with the past-the production of progeny, culturally and biologically. Equilibrium implies here both life (preservation of the currently intelligible coherence) and continuity (furtherance of related coherences in the future, forming among them another intelligible coherence). It also means the production of larger, more inclusive coherences, as between members of larger and more complex social groups, as we tried to show in the discussion of the Mencius and the Xunzi in the previous volume. 其次,据说数量上产生的品质能够产生进一步的一致性——更多的平衡,或者更多的生命,处于与过去可理解的连续性状态——文化上和生物学上的后代的产生。平衡在这里意味着生命(当前可理解的连贯性的保存)和连续性(未来相关连贯性的进一步发展,在它们之间形成另一种可理解的连贯性)。它还意味着在更大、更复杂的社会群体的成员之间产生更大、更具包容性的一致性,正如我们在上卷中对孟子和荀子的讨论中试图展示的那样。
Coherence in the sense used here is thus not merely consistency among elements of a whole, in the sense that they can coexist without interfering in one another’s continued existence, or are mutually compatible and not contradictory. It is also not merely the relation of coherence in the logical sense of mutual support or mutual entailment of a number of elements. Among available conceptual constructs, our notion of coherence perhaps comes closest to the notion of a Gestalt, which is a combination of elements which form a relation that emerges as a single readable figure, an intelligible whole, which also has some sense of value attached to it, which attracts the eye and the mind through the release of tension and reduction of dissonance, and through its relatively easy assimilation into the current project of the viewer (“a strong Gestalt”). There is also an important element of ambiguity to a Gestalt, as illustrated by the well-known images of 因此,此处所用意义上的连贯性不仅仅是整体各要素之间的一致性,即它们可以共存而不干扰彼此的持续存在,或者相互兼容而不矛盾。它也不仅仅是多个要素相互支持或相互蕴含的逻辑意义上的连贯关系。在可用的概念构造中,我们的连贯性概念可能最接近格式塔的概念,格式塔是形成一种关系的元素的组合,该关系以单个可读的图形、可理解的整体的形式出现,并且还具有某种附加的价值感。它通过释放紧张和减少不和谐以及相对容易地融入观众当前的项目(“强大的格式塔”)来吸引眼睛和思想。格式塔还有一个重要的模糊性因素,正如众所周知的图像所说明的那样
the vase faces, or Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit, which can point us toward the development of the ironic sense of coherence. It is possible but not so inevitable to include a sense of continuance to the value implication of the strong Gestalt. But the quantitative balance between dyadic opposites (the opposite poles of the pendulum swing), and with it the sense of temporal periodicity, does not seem to be as clearly a part of the basic notion of a Gestalt as it will be in the Chinese notions of coherence to be dealt with here. Nor indeed does the idea of a Gestalt lend itself quite so easily to the notion of inclusion of the observer, and thus the multiplication of further inclusive Gestalts growing around the original one. A Gestalt is more usually conceived as something viewed from outside, as an objective presence. The Chinese ideas of coherence would be more like a Gestalt that includes not only, say, the lines on the page that can form the emergent figure of a triangle, but also the eyes, nervous system, and prevailing desires of the living being experiencing that triangle. A coherence would then be a sort of 3-D Gestalt, but with the dyadic periodicity, the ability to create further Gestalts which form a larger Gestalt with the original one, the inclusion of the observer, and the value element stressed and developed to a much greater degree. With these adjustments, we can perhaps view coherence as a modified version of the notion of Gestalt. 花瓶的面孔,或者维特根斯坦的鸭兔,它们可以为我们指明反讽连贯感的发展。强格式塔的价值含义有可能包含延续感,但并非不可避免。但是,二元对立(钟摆摆动的相对两极)之间的数量平衡,以及随之而来的时间周期性的感觉,似乎并不像中国概念中那样明显地成为格式塔基本概念的一部分。这里要处理的是一致性问题。事实上,格式塔的概念也不太容易适用于包含观察者的概念,因此围绕原始格式塔生长的进一步包容性格式塔的倍增。格式塔通常被认为是从外部观察的事物,作为客观的存在。中国人的连贯性观念更像是格式塔,它不仅包括页面上可以形成三角形图形的线条,还包括眼睛、神经系统和生物体经历的普遍欲望。三角形。连贯性将是一种 3-D 格式塔,但具有二元周期性,能够创建进一步的格式塔,与原始格式塔形成更大的格式塔,包括观察者,以及强调和发展为价值元素的价值元素。程度更大。通过这些调整,我们或许可以将连贯性视为格式塔概念的修改版本。
One of the key themes of the discussion of coherence in the aforementioned work was the distinction between ironic and non-ironic coherence, and the various sorts of compromises between them that emerged in the early Chinese tradition. This has been briefly alluded to already, but given its prominence in the analysis to follow, it seems worthwhile to repeat the more thorough exploration of these terms and their implications. 上述著作中讨论连贯性的关键主题之一是反讽连贯性和非反讽连贯性之间的区别,以及中国早期传统中出现的它们之间的各种妥协。这已经被简单地提到过,但考虑到它在接下来的分析中的重要性,似乎值得重复对这些术语及其含义进行更彻底的探索。
We can note in the above reflections an implicit tension in the idea of coherence, which will serve as an engine of many further developments. For what after all is the criterion for coherence? It is not just any set of items that stick together. In early Chinese thinking, it must always be a set of things that form a coherent grouping also with some human desire. This will give us two criteria for coherence: 我们可以在上述反思中注意到一致性理念中隐含的张力,这将成为许多进一步发展的引擎。连贯性的标准到底是什么?它不仅仅是粘在一起的任何一组物品。在早期的中国思想中,它必然是一组事物,它们形成一个连贯的组合,也带有某种人类的欲望。这将为我们提供两个一致性标准:
A grouping counts as a coherence when it creates pleasure, like the harmonious enjoyment of a flavor or a musical harmony. This pleasure may be described as a further coherence, a meta-coherence, for it is the cohering of this togetherness with some human desire. Usually, it is associated also with (a) stability, balance, or equilibrium (since to join with what destabilizes the health and stability of the organism would be experienced as displeasure), generally conceived as a balance of two opposite qualities in a roughly quantitative but not strictly quantified 当一个组合创造出快乐时,就被视为一种连贯性,就像对某种味道或音乐和声的和谐享受。这种快乐可以被描述为一种进一步的连贯性,一种元连贯性,因为它是这种团结与某种人类欲望的连贯性。通常,它还与(a)稳定性、平衡或均衡相关(因为加入破坏有机体健康和稳定的事物会被体验为不愉快),通常被认为是粗略定量的两种相反品质的平衡。但没有严格量化
sense, and (b) progeny, growth, continuance. Indeed, this sense of coherence as implying life, continuation, and growth runs through the tradition in various forms, from Mencian reflections on xing or Human Nature, on the one hand, into the NeoConfucian glosses of Li as ceaseless production and reproduction (生生不息 sheng sheng bu xi),as derived from the “Great Commentary” to the Zhouyi. It is a balancing of contraries that must keep within a certain “distance” of one another, “neither too far nor too near,” in order to maintain their existence, which is to say, less metaphorically, which must be able to change into one another, with neither too much nor too little resistance to this transformation. This is what makes it intelligible as possessing some particular identity, and this is also the source of its value, its ability to sustain itself and create beyond itself. 意义,以及 (b) 后代、成长、延续。事实上,这种意味着生命、延续和成长的连贯感以各种形式贯穿于传统,一方面从孟子对“性”或人性的反思,到新儒家对“理”的诠释,即不断的生产和再生产。息生生不息),出自《周易》《大注释》。这是一种对立的平衡,彼此之间必须保持一定的“距离”,“既不太远,也不太近”,以维持它们的存在,也就是说,不那么隐喻,它必须能够转变为彼此之间,对这一转变的阻力既不太大也不太小。这就是它被理解为拥有某种特定身份的原因,这也是它的价值的源泉,它能够维持自身并超越自身进行创造。
But there is, as it were, a flip side of the notion of continuance and ceaseless progression-seen instead as an infinite regress. In terms of coherence as readability, we notice immediately that when a discernible characteristic becomes fully intelligible, one passes smoothly over it, it is no longer noticed. Since its presencing as coherence depends on desire, interest, human concern, once it is entirely unproblematic, it ceases to be noticed. Phenomenologically, perfectly intelligible presence erases itself; perfect presence passes into non-presence. Removed from its instability, its flow back toward its opposite, the problem of maintaining its delicate balance, it ceases to be present at all. What is stably present is no longer present. In terms of coherence as grouping, the irony can be discerned in a related but slightly different way: when parts cohere perfectly, they become a whole forming a part in a larger whole, demanding a larger context, until the largest whole is reached. But the largest whole is necessarily incoherent, unintelligible, for it has no further outside context from which it can be distinguished and to which it can be contrasted-and distinguishing and contrasting are alone what make a thing intelligible and coherent as some particular essence rather than another, as having any characteristics at all. Perfect togetherness and harmony of parts presses forward to a greater whole, and points already toward the all-inclusive largest whole, which must itself be indeterminate, since determination derives from contextualization within a whole. In terms of coherence as pleasure: when a specific desire is consummated, it is no longer desired, but enjoyed, 但可以说,连续性和不断进步的概念也有其反面——相反,它被视为无限的倒退。就作为可读性的连贯性而言,我们立即注意到,当一个可辨别的特征变得完全可理解时,人们可以顺利地跳过它,它就不再被注意到。由于它作为连贯性的存在取决于欲望、兴趣、人类的关心,一旦它完全没有问题,它就不再被注意到。从现象学的角度来看,完全可理解的存在会抹去自身;完美的存在转变为不存在。摆脱了它的不稳定性、它的流向它的对立面、以及维持其微妙平衡的问题,它就不再存在了。稳定存在的东西不再存在。就作为分组的连贯性而言,讽刺可以通过一种相关但略有不同的方式来辨别:当各部分完美地连贯时,它们就成为一个整体,形成一个更大整体的一部分,需要更大的背景,直到达到最大的整体。但是,最大的整体必然是不连贯的、不可理解的,因为它没有进一步的外部背景可以将其区分开来,也可以与之进行对比——只有区分和对比才能使事物作为某种特定的本质而变得可理解和连贯,而不是另一个,因为根本没有任何特征。各部分的完美结合与和谐推动形成一个更大的整体,并已指向包罗万象的最大整体,而这个整体本身必定是不确定的,因为决定性源于整体内的情境化。就作为快乐的连贯性而言:当一个特定的愿望得以实现时,它不再是渴望的,而是享受的,
incorporated into experience rather than held out as an object of pursuit and attention; the desire as such thereby dies. Perfect harmonic coherence between a human desire and some object eliminates the relationship between them altogether. ^(7){ }^{7} Once all the parts cohere into a single something, readable as a “one,” this means that it has been absorbed as a single unit into something else, a part of another, larger whole. The search for ever more coherence is, in other words, inherent in coherence, and thus ceaseless. Each coherence cries out for further context. The parts can only cohere if the whole coheres with a greater context, and then this context becomes a new whole in search of a yet larger context. We judge something to be coherent only when it coheres with an outside (in the first example, with some of our desires) —but this proposition alone ensures an infinite regress, for once the new coherence is found it becomes the inside seeking a new outside. Since the most all-inclusive totality is necessarily incoherent (i.e., unintelligible, unnameable, devoid of determinate identity or characteristics, all of which necessarily derive from contextualization within a larger whole), and the identity of all lesser coherences depends on their relation to this larger context, the ultimate intelligibility of any definitive identity must be questioned. I call this “ironic” because it means that any attribution of identity can only be meant ironically, since all of them depend on relation to a context that is itself necessarily incoherent (the whole), such that every coherence is itself ultimately incoherent, and this incoherence is not added on to the original coherence, but is the actual principle of its being coherent in the first place, its relation to its context: each identity, fully realized, reveals itself to be an effacement of its original putative identity. It is this “ironic” treatment of coherence that we will find in the Daoist works, where suddenly we find a spate of claims about how any positively valued (i.e., coherent) term (e.g., accomplishment, influence, long-lastingness, knowledge, virtue) is accomplished only in its apparent negation, for example, most famously in slogans such as the Daodejing’s “doing nothing and yet thereby leaving nothing undone” (無為而無不為 wuwei er wubuwei), “Guiding courses can be taken as guides, but if so they fail to reliably guide” (道可道非常道 daokedaofeichangdao), “noticeable values can be valued, but if so they fail to have reliable values” (名可名非常名 mingkemingfeichangming), and “the highest virtue attains no virtue” (上德不德 shangde bude) and 融入经验而不是作为追求和关注的对象;欲望本身就这样消失了。人类欲望与某些物体之间完美的和谐一致性完全消除了它们之间的关系。 ^(7){ }^{7} 一旦所有部分凝聚成一个单一的东西,可读为“一个”,这意味着它已经作为一个整体被吸收到其他东西中,成为另一个更大整体的一部分。换句话说,对一致性的追求是一致性所固有的,因此是永无休止的。每一个连贯性都需要进一步的背景。只有当整体与更大的背景相一致时,各个部分才能一致,然后这个背景就成为一个新的整体,以寻找更大的背景。只有当某物与外部相一致时(在第一个例子中,与我们的一些愿望),我们才判断它是连贯的——但这个命题本身就确保了无限的回归,因为一旦发现新的连贯性,它就变成了寻求新外部的内部。由于最包罗万象的总体性必然是不连贯的(即难以理解、无法命名、缺乏确定的身份或特征,所有这些都必然源自更大整体的情境化),并且所有较小连贯性的身份取决于它们与此的关系在更大的背景下,任何确定身份的最终可理解性都必须受到质疑。 我称其为“讽刺”,因为这意味着任何身份归属都只能具有讽刺意味,因为所有这些都依赖于与本身必然不连贯的背景(整体)的关系,因此每一个连贯性本身最终都是不连贯的,并且这种不连贯性并不是添加到原来的连贯性上,而是它首先是连贯的实际原则,它与其背景的关系:每个身份,在充分实现后,都揭示了自己是对其原始假定身份的抹杀。我们会在道家著作中发现这种对连贯性的“讽刺”处理,突然我们发现大量关于任何积极评价(即连贯)术语(例如,(成就、影响、长久、知识、美德)只有在其明显的否定中才能实现,例如,最著名的口号是《道德经》中的“无为而无不为无为二”。 “无不为”,“道可道非常道,可以作为指导,但如果这样的话,就没有可靠的指导”。名非常名 mingkemingfeichangming),以及“上德不德 shangde bude”
the hundreds of similar claims found in these works. ^(8){ }^{8} What all these claims have in common is a doubled structure which at once affirms and denies the same term, denying XX in its literal sense and affirming thereby the ironic sense of X as it emerges from this very lack of literal X. I suggested in the prequel that the double irony of these claims can best be understood on the model of a prospective picnic goer on rainy day sayings, “Oh, this is great weather for a picnic!” “Great weather” is meant ironically: the pouring rain is precisely not great weather for a picnic. But even this irony is itself ironic: for ultimately rain is in fact great weather for a picnic, “in another sense”: without such weather, there could be no picnics, for there could be no food, for there could be no growth of plants, on which all our picnics depend directly or indirectly. So because this weather is not literally great weather, it is great weather. It fulfills the original demand set up by the term “great,” but does so precisely by failing to satisfy it in the original, non-ironic sense. The same is true of Dao, the ironic Dao which is the failure of all literal small-d daos: it does what small-d daos are suppose to do (bring order, sustainability, harmony, satisfaction) but does so precisely by not providing them literally in the expected way. Real values are attained by failing to attain value as originally conceived: this is ironic value. Real virtue, the virtuosity implicitly promised by the ideal of virtue, is attained by failing to attain that ideal virtue literally. This is ironic virtue. Real coherence (sticking together, harmony, value, continuance, sustainability) is attained, ironically, by failing to attain literal coherence (intelligibility, definite togethernesses of particular groupings, literal harmony, literal virtues, literal continuance as some particular thing). Ironic coherence will continue to be the central theme of interest in Neo-Daoism and Chinese Buddhism works as well, finally made into an explicit principle of all experience in Tiantai Buddhism, under the name of the Three Truths, where (local) coherence and (global) incoherence are literally identified as synonyms, alternate ways of stating the same fact. But Confucian texts such as the “Great Learning” and “Doctrine of the Mean,” and indeed the entire Yin-Yang system of the Zhouyi commentaries, sketch out some non-ironic solutions to the same kind of difficulty, non-ironic incorporations of ironic motifs. Ironies of Oneness and Difference can be consulted for a fuller and more detailed exposition of these categories and their range of application. In the pages 在这些作品中发现了数百个类似的主张。 ^(8){ }^{8} 所有这些主张的共同点是双重结构,既肯定又否定同一个术语,否定 XX 我在前传中建议,这些主张的双重讽刺可以通过一个未来的下雨天野餐者的模型来最好地理解说:“哦,这是野餐的好天气!” “好天气”具有讽刺意味:倾盆大雨恰恰不适合野餐。但即使是这种讽刺本身就是讽刺:因为归根结底,下雨实际上是野餐的好天气,“在另一种意义上”:没有这样的天气,就不可能有野餐,因为不可能有食物,因为不可能有植物生长。我们所有的野餐都直接或间接依赖于植物。因为这种天气并不是字面上的好天气,但它确实是好天气。它满足了“伟大”一词所提出的原始要求,但恰恰是因为未能在原始的、非讽刺的意义上满足它。 Dao 也是如此,具有讽刺意味的 Dao 是所有字面上的小 d 道的失败:它做了小 d 道应该做的事情(带来秩序、可持续性、和谐、满足),但恰恰是通过不提供他们确实以预期的方式。真正的价值是通过未能获得最初设想的价值而获得的:这是讽刺性的价值。真正的美德,即美德理想隐含承诺的精湛技艺,是通过未能从字面上获得理想美德而获得的。这是具有讽刺意味的美德。 具有讽刺意味的是,真正的连贯性(粘在一起、和谐、价值、连续性、可持续性)是通过未能实现字面连贯性(可理解性、特定群体的明确团结、字面和谐、字面美德、字面连续性作为某种特定事物)而获得的。讽刺性的连贯性将继续成为新道教和中国佛教作品感兴趣的中心主题,最终成为天台佛教所有经验的明确原则,以三谛的名义,其中(局部)连贯性和(全球)不连贯从字面上被视为同义词,是陈述同一事实的替代方式。但是,诸如《大学》和《中庸》之类的儒家文本,乃至《周易》注释的整个阴阳体系,都为同样的困难勾勒出一些非讽刺性的解决方案,非讽刺性地将具有讽刺意味的图案。有关这些类别及其应用范围的更全面、更详细的阐述,请参阅《统一性与差异性的讽刺》。在页面中
that follow we will trace out the various convergences of ironic and non-ironic coherence, which take many forms, including the opposite compromise, namely, the ironic incorporation of non-ironic motifs. 接下来,我们将追溯反讽和非反讽连贯性的各种融合,它们有多种形式,包括相反的妥协,即非反讽主题的反讽结合。
Now that we have reviewed the stage-setting, we may turn to the problem of Li in Chinese thought. 回顾了舞台背景,我们可以转向中国思想中的礼问题。
ONE 一
LI 理 AS A FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORY
IN CHINESE THOUGHT 理作为一个基本范畴
中国人的思想
The term Li has a strange history. It came into prominence as the central metaphysical category rather gradually, seemingly through the intervention of Buddhist uses, taking on its decisive role only in the thought of the Cheng Brothers (Cheng Hao 程顥, 1032-1085, and Cheng Yi 程頣, 1033-1107), and further developed by Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200), read back into the pre-Buddhist tradition, although its actual appearance in the early texts is sparse and problematic. Thereafter, the term Li becomes the focus of several explicit controversies in the history of Chinese philosophy. These are well known. Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucians (i.e., those following the line developed by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi ) critique Buddhists for understanding Li as only Emptiness. On the other hand, they critique Lu-Wang Confucians (i.e., those following the approach of Lu Xiangshan 陸象山, 1139-1192, and Wang Yangming 王陽明, 1472-1529) for understanding Li directly as Mind. Cheng-Zhu Confucians themselves, according to the standard interpretation, understand Li as the “principle” of all things, manifested more or less clearly and completely in each instance according to the balance and purity of the constituent qi of that thing. It is present in its entirety in each thing as that thing’s true nature, accounting for the vitality and integrity of that thing as such. In man, it is the good human nature, the nature of heaven and earth, which is not the mind per se but discoverable as an aspect of mind, its pure unmanifest and balanced underpinning, from which the empirical human mind may deviate. As we shall see presently, it is this Cheng-Zhu usage, and its various aftermaths, that has been the primary target for modern writers trying to make sense of the term in the context of the encounter with Western philosophy that began in the twentieth century. Finally, the Qing Confucians, such as Dai Zhen 戴震and Duan Yucai 段玉裁,critique both the Cheng-Zhu and the Lu-Wang Neo-Confucians for understanding “李”一词有着一段奇怪的历史。它作为形而上学的核心类别逐渐受到重视,似乎是通过佛教用途的介入,仅在程氏兄弟的思想中发挥了决定性作用(程浩,程纲,1032-1085,程頣,1033) -1107),并由朱熹(朱熹,1130-1200)进一步发展,重新回顾了前佛教传统,尽管它在早期文本中的实际出现很少且存在问题。此后,“理”一词成为中国哲学史上几个明显争议的焦点。这些都是众所周知的。程朱新儒家(即那些遵循程颐和朱熹发展路线的人)批评佛教徒将理理解为空。另一方面,他们批评陆王儒家(即那些追随陆象山(1139-1192)和王阳明(1472-1529)方法的人)将理直接理解为心。根据标准解释,成朱儒家本身将理理解为万物的“原理”,根据该事物构成之气的平衡和纯净,在每个实例中或多或少地清晰和完整地表现出来。它作为事物的真实本性完整地存在于每件事物中,说明了该事物本身的活力和完整性。在人身上,它是善良的人性,天地的本质,它不是心灵本身,而是作为心灵的一个方面而被发现的,它是纯粹的未显化和平衡的基础,经验性的人类心灵可能会偏离它。 正如我们稍后将看到的,正是这种程朱的用法及其各种后果,一直是现代作家在与二十世纪开始的西方哲学相遇的背景下试图理解该术语的主要目标。 。最后,清代儒家,如戴震、段玉裁,对成朱理学和陆王理学的理解进行了批判
Li as an omnipresent universal principle of all things (whether Mind or the Nature), whereas its real, original meaning, they claimed, on the basis of classical etymological studies, was of the differentiating, particular forms of individual things, the “cuts” between them, not the bridges over these gaps. It is less known that a controversy about the unity and multiplicity of Li also emerges within Tiantai Buddhism, with the so-called Shanjia 山家 or “Home Mountain” school, represented most vocally by Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960-1024), asserting that Li is both a unity and as multiplicity (known respectively as 理總 lizong and 理別 libie), and each phenomenon similarly serves both as a unifier and as one of many items unified in any other phenomenon (known as 事總 shizong and 事別 shibie, respectively), while his opponents, the so-called Shanwai 山外 or “Off-Mountain” school, take Li purely as unity, with diversity accounted for solely by 事 shi, as in Huayen thought (that is, allowing only 理總 lizong and 事別 shibie, though as we shall see later in this book, what is really lacking here is only 理別 libie; both Huayan and the Off-Mountain Tiantai writers do actually acknowledge 事總 shizong). The term Li clearly has not only exceptional importance, but also exceptional ambiguity. What has allowed it to play these multiple roles? 理是万物(无论是心灵还是自然)无所不在的普遍原理,而他们在古典词源学研究的基础上声称,其真正的、本源的意义是个别事物的区分的、特殊的形式,即“切”。他们之间,而不是跨越这些差距的桥梁。鲜为人知的是,天台宗内部也出现了关于礼的统一性和多样性的争论,所谓的山家或“家山”学派,以思明直隶四明知礼(960-1024)为代表。主张理既是一个统一体又是多重性(分别称为“理总 lizong”和“理别 libie”),并且每种现象同样既是一个统一体,又是统一在任何其他现象中的许多项目之一(称为“事总 shizong”和“理别 libie”)。 ”只有“理总 lizong”和“事别 shibie”,尽管我们将在本书后面看到,这里真正缺少的只是“理别 libie”;华严和山外天台的作者实际上都承认“事总 shizong”。 “李”一词显然不仅具有非凡的重要性,而且也具有非凡的模糊性。是什么让它能够扮演这些多重角色?
Before making our own attempt to answer this question, we need to examine a few of the previous attempts at understanding this problem, on some of which we will be building, and the history of the term Li in classical Chinese texts prior to the advent of the brand-name philosophers. In particular, we must make clear what we mean when offering “coherence” as a way of explaining the meaning of Li , and the related problems, or absence thereof, of universals and particulars, form and matter, classes and class membership, nominalism and realism, relativism and natural-kinds, and so on. 在我们自己尝试回答这个问题之前,我们需要回顾一下之前为理解这个问题所做的一些尝试(我们将在其中一些尝试的基础上进行构建),以及在“礼”出现之前中国古典文本中“礼”一词的历史。名牌哲学家。特别是,当我们提供“连贯性”作为解释理的含义时,我们必须明确我们的意思,以及相关的问题或缺乏,普遍性和特殊性,形式和质料,阶级和阶级成员,唯名论和实在论、相对论、自然类等等。
Fung Yulan 馮友蘭 famously and rather rashly declared that the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian notion of “Li” 理 was the traditional Chinese equivalent of the Platonic Forms, based on their putative transcendence to their instantiations, and their essence-like role as a criterion by which to define the identity of these instances. ^(1){ }^{1} This suggestion quickly aroused refutations, as the many points of disharmony between the two doctrines became apparent. Most obvious among these is the fact that, while the Platonic forms are many, although perhaps somehow grounded in a greater unity, the Neo-Confucian Li seem to be simultaneously both one and many. Zhu Xi, for example, states at times both that there is only one Li , and that each thing has its own specific defining LiL i, and that somehow all these particularized Li are one and the same Li (which is also called the Great Ultimate, 太極 taiji). The entire supreme Li is contained in each differentiated entity, Zhu Xi tells us in other contexts, as the reflection of the moon 冯友兰著名且相当鲁莽地宣称,成朱新儒家的“理”概念是柏拉图形式的传统中国等同物,基于它们对实例化的假定超越,以及它们作为标准的本质类角色通过它来定义这些实例的身份。 ^(1){ }^{1} 这一建议很快引起了反驳,因为两种学说之间的许多不和谐之处变得显而易见。其中最明显的事实是,尽管柏拉图式的形式有很多,尽管也许以某种方式建立在更大的统一之上,但新儒家的理似乎同时既是一又是多。例如,朱熹有时会说“只有一个理”,而且每个事物都有自己特定的定义。 LiL i ,并且不知何故所有这些特殊的理都是同一个理(也称为太极太极)。朱熹在其他语境中告诉我们,整个至高之理包含在每个不同的实体中,就像月亮的倒影一样
is reflected completely in a multitude of bodies of water. It is not just that Li per se is both one and many; the multiplicity of it is not limited only to the multiple universals, but also to each and every particular thing. It is not just that Li is at once equivalent to the all-inclusive “Form of the Good” and to the particular universals “Blue,” “Red,” “Justice,” “Love,” but that it is also the specific Li of this blue chair and that red hat, including also man-made objects as much as natural objects. Li includes as much every individual existence as it does universals—Du Fu’s collected works, for example, or the existence of a particular individual person: all these things have their Li^(2)^(2)\mathrm{Li}^{2}{ }^{2} The Li of this boat is what makes this boat this boat, while the Li of boats is what makes boats boats. Li are not in any straightforward sense universals. Indeed, as we shall see, the one-many distinction is precisely what the concept of Li has the least use for, in keeping with the lack of a grammatical distinction between singular and plural in the language in which the idea was developed. If these statements are taken as assertions of definitive doctrine, we have an obvious mismatch with the concept of Platonic ideas. The handling of the one-many problem in Plotinus may be less of a problem here than it is in Plato himself; for in Plotinus, the oneness of The One seems to also be instantiated precisely as the Form-ness, so to say, of the many Forms that collectively comprise its first emanation. Even here, however, the forms remain self-identical across their many instantiations in particular things, unaffected by how or where they are instantiated, and thus do not seem to be able to include indifferently both classes and individuals on equal footing as Forms. That is, the unity or oneness formed by an individual entity instantiating many Forms, which are themselves many diversified instantiations of oneness, cannot be a oneness in the same sense, as would appear to be the case for the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucians. 完全反映在众多水体中。不仅“理”本身既是一又是多;而且“理”本身既是一又是多。它的多样性不仅限于多重共相,还包括每一个特定的事物。理不仅等同于包罗万象的“善的形式”和特定的共相“蓝”、“红”、“正义”、“爱”,而且它也是特定的理。这把蓝色的椅子和那顶红色的帽子,包括人造物体和自然物体。理既包含了每个个体的存在,也包含了普遍的事物——例如杜甫的文集,或者某个特定个体的存在:所有这些事物都有其自身的存在。 Li^(2)^(2)\mathrm{Li}^{2}{ }^{2} 此船之理,使此船成为此船,而船之理,则使船成为船。从任何直接意义上来说,“理”都不是普遍现象。事实上,正如我们将看到的,一对多的区别恰恰是“理”概念最没有用处的地方,因为在发展这个概念的语言中,单数和复数之间缺乏语法上的区别。如果这些陈述被视为明确学说的断言,那么我们与柏拉图思想的概念明显不匹配。普罗提诺对一对多问题的处理在这里可能不像柏拉图本人那样成为问题。因为在普罗提诺那里,“一”的统一性似乎也被精确地实例化为“形式性”,可以说,是共同构成其最初流散的许多形式的形式性。然而,即使在这里,形式在特定事物的许多实例化中仍然是自我同一的,不受它们实例化的方式或地点的影响,因此似乎无法将类和个人与形式平等地包括在内。 也就是说,由个体实体实例化许多形式而形成的统一或统一性,而这些形式本身就是统一性的许多多样化的实例化,不可能是同一意义上的统一性,就像程朱新儒家的情况那样。
Another discrepancy lies in the fact that the Platonic forms may or may not have an evaluative force to them. They do when they define, for example, a virtue, but a universal quality such as “redness” seems to be purely descriptive. There is, of course, a derivative though perhaps pervasive axiological sense in that a putative instantiation of a given form will be judged to be deficient if it fails to meet the definition embodied by the form; a chair is not a “good” chair, which is to say, a real chair, unless it accords with the Form of the chair. This axiological dimension is perhaps reflected in the role given to the sun-like Form of the Good in the Republic, and the implied equation between Being and Goodness that is easily derived from the Platonic position. Still, the axiological dimension of the Neo-Confucian Li is clearly front and center, to such an extent that they have been cited as a classic example of the traditional Chinese “fusion of fact and value.” ^(3){ }^{3} The Li of a thing is both “what makes it so” (所以然之理 另一个差异在于,柏拉图形式可能有也可能没有评价力。例如,当他们定义一种美德时,他们确实这样做了,但诸如“红色”之类的普遍品质似乎纯粹是描述性的。当然,存在一种派生的虽然可能普遍存在的价值论意义,即给定形式的推定实例如果不符合该形式所体现的定义,将被判断为有缺陷;椅子不是一把“好”椅子,也就是说,不是一把真正的椅子,除非它符合椅子的形式。这种价值论的维度也许反映在《理想国》中赋予太阳般的善形式的角色,以及从柏拉图立场很容易导出的存在与善之间隐含的等式。尽管如此,理学家的价值论维度显然仍然处于前沿和中心位置,以至于它们被引用为中国传统“事实与价值融合”的经典范例。 ^(3){ }^{3} 事物的理既是“所以然之理”
suoyiran zhi li) and “how it should be” (當然之理 dangran zhi li), and ethical norms are derived directly from this fusion of “is” and “ought.” As Graham astutely notes of Li as used by the Cheng brothers, it accounts “not for the properties of a thing but for the task it must perform to occupy its place in the natural order.” ^(4){ }^{4} Not its passive qualities, but an activity to be done; not the properties it has in isolation, but its ways of relating to what is around it; not solely what it is, but a task, what it must do to continue to occupy the role it plays in the context of the whole. Here, we have the properties of thing only to the extent that properties are considered to be relations, the essence of a thing only to the extent that it is considered a conatus to continue to perform the task of maintaining a certain set of relationships. It is this in which the “chairness” of a chair is seen to reside: the “ness” is not a Platonic essence or a universal of “chair” that iterates identically in all chairs, but the possibility of doing the work required to continue to coexist in a certain set of relations. This could apply either to an individual entity performing the task of maintaining the individual relations that allow it to continue to perform the role of being what it is, or to a class of thing maintaining its relation with other classes, or with individual instances of that class, or with the whole of all objects and purposes. “当然之理当然之力”和“当然之理当然之力”,而道德规范则直接源于“是”与“应该”的融合。正如格雷厄姆敏锐地注意到程氏兄弟所使用的“理”,“它解释的不是事物的属性,而是它必须执行的任务以在自然秩序中占据其位置”。 ^(4){ }^{4} 不是它的被动性质,而是一项需要完成的活动;不是它孤立的属性,而是它与周围事物的联系方式;不仅仅是它是什么,而是一项任务,它必须做什么才能继续在整体中发挥其作用。在这里,我们只有在属性被认为是关系的情况下才拥有事物的属性,只有在它被认为是继续执行维持一组特定关系的任务的conatus的情况下,我们才拥有事物的本质。正是在这一点上,椅子的“椅子性”被视为存在:“椅子性”不是柏拉图式的本质,也不是在所有椅子上都相同的“椅子”的普遍性,而是完成继续下去所需的工作的可能性在一定的关系中共存。这可以适用于执行维持个体关系任务的个体实体,使其能够继续发挥其本来的作用,也可以适用于维持与其他类或该类的个体实例的关系的一类事物。类,或所有对象和目的的整体。
For these and many other reasons, it has been notoriously difficult for Western interpreters to find a fitting interpretation for Li. Leibniz was the first Western thinker to try to do so, and with results as problematic as Fung’s later attempt from the other side. Leibniz records that the Jesuits had learned that Li is described by “the Chinese” (actually, the canonical Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian sources) as equivalent to the following philosophical categories: the first principle, Reason, the foundation of all nature, the most universal reason and substance, the supreme being than which nothing is greater nor better. Li, Leibniz tells us, is pure, motionless, rarefied, without body or shape, and can be comprehended only through the understanding. It is the law that directs all things and is the intelligence that guides them. It is the Law and universal Order, according to which Heaven and Earth were formed, the origin, source, and principle of all things. It is the sole cause which moves Heaven in a uniform motion, sufficient unto itself, giving all species of being the ability to reproduce their kind, “this virtue not being in the nature of the things themselves and not depending at all upon them but consisting and residing in this Li.” It has dominion over all, is present in all things, governs and produces the world as its absolute master. It is Being, Substance, Entity, infinite, eternal, uncreated, incorruptible. It is the principle of both physical and moral existence. It is indivisible and yet contains the most perfect multiplicity; it is the Grand Void but also the sovereign plenitude. It is compared to a circle, it is the Nature of things, it 由于这些以及其他许多原因,西方翻译家很难为李找到合适的解释。莱布尼茨是第一个尝试这样做的西方思想家,其结果与冯后来从另一方的尝试一样存在问题。莱布尼茨记录说,耶稣会士了解到,“中国人”(实际上是经典的程朱新儒家来源)将理描述为相当于以下哲学范畴:第一原理、理性、一切自然的基础、最普遍的理性和本质,是至高无上的存在,没有什么比它更伟大或更好。莱布尼茨告诉我们,“理”是纯粹的、静止的、稀薄的、没有身体或形状的,只有通过理解才能被理解。指导万物的是法则,引导万物的是智慧。它是法则和宇宙秩序,天地根据它而形成,是万物的起源、根源和原则。它是使天堂以均匀运动的方式移动的唯一原因,它本身就足够了,赋予所有物种繁殖其同类的能力,“这种美德不存在于事物本身的本质中,也不依赖于它们,而是由事物组成。”且住于此黎。”它主宰一切,存在于万物之中,作为世界的绝对主宰统治和创造世界。它是存在、物质、实体、无限、永恒、非创造、不朽坏。这是物质和道德存在的原则。它是不可分割的,但却包含着最完美的多样性;它是伟大的虚空,也是至高无上的充实。它比作一个圆,它是事物的本质,它
is truth and goodness. In short, it is the supreme being, endowed with "all manner of perfections, so that there can be nothing more perfect."5 是真理和善良。简而言之,它是至高无上的存在,被赋予“一切完美的方式,因此没有比这更完美的了。”5
Some of the Jesuits had argued that, in spite of these attributes, Li in the Chinese conception does not mean what the Christian tradition means by God, because it also is said to lack will, activity, life, design, and consciousness. Rather, it is Primal Matter, or at best the Primal Form, the Soul of the World in the sense employed by classical pagan thinkers. 一些耶稣会士认为,尽管有这些属性,中国概念中的“理”并不意味着基督教传统中上帝的意思,因为据说它也缺乏意志、活动、生命、设计和意识。相反,它是原始物质,或者充其量是原始形式,是古典异教思想家所采用的意义上的世界灵魂。
Leibniz, however, argues that this cannot be so, that Li is indeed precisely what Christian philosophers mean by divinity. Leibniz asserts that, given the supreme attributes ascribed to Li , the denial that it has life, consciousness, will, and activity “must” mean merely that it lacks these things in their ordinary sense. It means that Li actually has these attributes in a much greater degree, in what theologians call the “eminent” sense, just as some negative theologians had denied “Being” to God, calling him instead beyond Being, or super-ens, hyperousia. The unquestioned assumption on both sides of this debate is that there is an excluded middle between activity and passivity, spirit and matter, dependence and transcendence. If something is active, it cannot be passive; if it is spiritual, it cannot be matter; if it is transcendent, it cannot be dependent on the world. In all his arguments, Leibniz relies on the assumption of the excluded middle, and presumes that the philosophical categories into which Li is being translated are the only ones possible. “I do not at all see how it could be possible for the Chinese to elicit from prime matter-as our philosophers teach it in their schools, as purely passive, without order or form-the origin of activity, of order and of all forms. I do not believe them to be so stupid or absurd.” ^('6){ }^{\prime 6} Given the qualification offered in the phrase between the dashes (“purely passive, without order or form”), this is quite true. But it also begs the question. For the real issue here, of course, is whether there could be any other sets of assumptions with which to consider these questions, not premised on a prior separation of form from matter, active from passive, order from chaos, for instance, a separation that requires an absolute ontological difference with no overlap. (Ironically, as we shall see in the “Conclusion” to this book, Leibniz himself introduced a concept into philosophy that, in my view, comes much closer than any other in the European philosophical lexicon to actually describing the character of Li specifically in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism: not hyperousia, much less divinity, nor anything like consciousness, design, or will, but rather the concept of compossibility. Important qualifications are of course necessary concerning the nature of the com- here, and the absence of a God who stands above and beyond compossibility and, for Leibniz, must then go on to make a choice to make the preexisting compossibles actually exist, which will be addressed at the end of this book.) 然而,莱布尼茨认为事实并非如此,“理”确实正是基督教哲学家所说的神性。莱布尼茨断言,鉴于“理”具有至高无上的属性,否认它有生命、意识、意志和活动“必然”仅仅意味着它缺乏通常意义上的这些东西。这意味着李实际上在更大程度上具有这些属性,在神学家所谓的“杰出”意义上,正如一些消极神学家否认上帝的“存在”,而是称他超越存在,或super-ens,hyperousia。这场辩论双方毫无疑问的假设是,在主动与被动、精神与物质、依赖与超越之间存在着一个被排除的中间地带。如果某件事是主动的,那么它就不可能是被动的;如果某件事是主动的,那么它就不可能是被动的。如果它是精神的,它就不可能是物质;如果它是超然的,它就不能依赖于世界。在莱布尼茨的所有论证中,他都依赖于排中论的假设,并假设李所翻译的哲学范畴是唯一可能的。 “我完全不明白中国人如何可能从原始物质中引出——正如我们的哲学家在他们的学校中所教导的那样,纯粹是被动的,没有秩序或形式——活动、秩序和所有形式的起源。我不相信他们如此愚蠢或荒谬。” ^('6){ }^{\prime 6} 考虑到破折号之间的短语所提供的限定(“纯粹被动,没有顺序或形式”),这是完全正确的。但这也引出了一个问题。 当然,这里真正的问题是是否可以有任何其他假设来考虑这些问题,而不是以形式与物质、主动与被动、秩序与混乱的事先分离为前提,例如,形式与物质、主动与被动、秩序与混乱的分离。这需要绝对的本体差异,没有重叠。 (具有讽刺意味的是,正如我们将在本书的“结论”中看到的那样,莱布尼茨本人在哲学中引入了一个概念,在我看来,这个概念比欧洲哲学词典中的任何其他概念都更接近于实际描述李的性格,特别是在《程》中。 ——朱理学:不是超性,更不是神性,也不是意识、设计或意志之类的东西,而是共存性的概念,这对于共同性的本质和不存在性来说当然是必要的。对于莱布尼茨来说,超越共存性的上帝必须继续做出选择,使预先存在的共存物真正存在,这将在本书的结尾处讨论。)
The word LiL i is indeed an odd one, with an odd history. Without attaching undue importance to it, readers not proficient in Chinese might get some sense of the semantic range of this term by looking at the compounds in which it appears in the modern Chinese language, remembering that this cannot be used as reliable evidence for its meaning in the classical language of any particular period. ^(7){ }^{7} Pondering these usages, we may notice the range of senses spanning over our notions of “knowing,” “noticing,” “reason,” “thinking,” “rightness,” “reasonability,” “ordering,” “pattern,” “managing,” and “standard of value.” The connection between “noticing,” “responding to,” and “ordering” should particularly pique our interest here. We should note also that the standard modern translation of Plato does indeed use the term lixing 理型 (Li-form) to translate “Idea” in the Platonic sense. We should note also the easy transference of the nominal and verbal usage of the term in modern language. 这个词 LiL i 这确实是一个奇怪的现象,有着一段奇怪的历史。不需过分重视,不精通中文的读者可能会通过查看该术语在现代汉语中出现的复合词来了解该术语的语义范围,记住这不能作为其含义的可靠证据任何特定时期的古典语言。 ^(7){ }^{7} 思考这些用法,我们可能会注意到涵盖“知道”、“注意”、“理性”、“思考”、“正确”、“合理性”、“秩序”、“模式”、“管理”等概念的各种含义。 ”和“价值标准”。 “注意到”、“响应”和“命令”之间的联系应该特别引起我们的兴趣。我们还应该注意到,柏拉图的标准现代翻译确实使用了“理型”一词来翻译柏拉图意义上的“Idea”。我们还应该注意到现代语言中该术语的名义和口头用法的容易迁移。
The most useful starting point for probing more deeply the philosophical implications of the term Li is perhaps still Tang Junyi’s seminal essay “Yuan Li” (原理 Tracing the Origin of Li ), originally published in 1955 but later used as the opening chapter of the first volume of Tang’s massive history of Chinese Philosophy. ^(8){ }^{8} In this work, Tang attempts a comprehensive overview of the usages of Li throughout the history of classical Chinese philosophy, separating out six distinct meanings of the term while also tracing its etymological bases. Tang’s six senses of the term are: wenli (文理 Li in the context of cultural activities), mingli(名理 Li in logical reasoning about abstract philosophical attributes, considered by Tang to be synonymous in its usage with 玄理 xuanli, abstruse or metaphysical Li), kongli (空理 Li as Emptiness), xingli (性理 Li as Human Nature), shili (事理 Li pertaining to events or affairs), and wuli (物理 Li pertaining to concrete empirical things). Tang’s discussion is illuminating, in particular his discussion of the role of human activity in the definition of Li even in its apparently most concrete and objective usages; the distinction between “pattern” as a simple fact found in an object and Li as a kind of interface between human subjectivity and the structure of the surrounding world will be crucial to our discussion below. Tang also brings into focus the problem of unity versus multiplicity that formed one of the essential points of contention between Song-Ming Neo-Confucians on the one hand (Li as the unifying principle of all things) and their later critics among Qing Confucians on the other ( Li as the separating, distinguishing forms of individual things). Tang’s analysis is rooted, quite reasonably, in one of the earliest extant usages of the term LiL i, a passage from the “Minor Odes” 小雅 section of the Shiijing,詩經(“The Book of Songs”), Ode 210, “Xin nanshan” 信南山,where we find the following verse: 要更深入地探讨“理”一词的哲学含义,最有用的起点也许仍然是唐君毅的开创性文章“原理追究理的起源”,该论文最初发表于 1955 年,后来用作第一章的开篇章节。唐氏巨著《中国哲学史》。 ^(8){ }^{8} 在这部著作中,唐试图全面概述“理”在中国古典哲学史上的用法,区分出该词的六种不同含义,同时追溯其词源基础。唐的六种含义是:文理(文化活动中的文理)、名理(关于抽象哲学属性的逻辑推理中的名理),唐认为其用法与玄理玄理、深奥或形而上的理同义。 )、空理(空理)、性理(性理)、事理(事理)、物理(物理理)。唐的讨论很有启发性,特别是他对人类活动在礼的定义中的作用的讨论,甚至在其显然最具体和客观的用法中;作为在物体中发现的简单事实的“模式”与作为人类主体性和周围世界结构之间的一种界面的“理”之间的区别对于我们下面的讨论至关重要。唐还关注了统一与多元的问题,这一问题构成了宋明新儒家(礼为万物统一原则)与后来清代儒家批评者之间争论的焦点之一。其他(“理”是个体事物的分离、区分形式)。唐的分析相当合理地植根于该术语现存最早的用法之一 LiL i 摘自《诗经》小雅篇第210篇《信南山》,有如下诗句:
信彼南山、維禹甸之。畇畇原暃、曾孫田之。我疆我理、南東其畝。 信彼南山、维禹甸之。畇畇原暃、曾孙田之。我疆我理、南东其田。
Truly, the region of that southen hill 确实,那座南山一带
Was governed so as to bring forth crops by Yu. 受禹统治,以生产农作物。
The lands of those marshes and plains 那些沼泽和平原的土地
Are now made into fields by his distant descendants. 现在已被他的远方后裔开垦成田。
We separate them, we divide them 我们把他们分开,我们把他们分开
Into acres stretching to the south and to the east. 绵延数英亩,向南和东延伸。
Li is here used as a verb, not a noun. It is parallel with the term 疆 jiang, “to divide or make a border.” Li here seems to be a verb meaning “to separate into groups, to divide into sections,” but with an implication of doing so for a particular purpose: in this case, the division of a field in order to cultivate crops, and the creation of pathways of access to these fields. The implication is that here Li means “to cut and divide in a way which is consistent with a particular human value,” or a coherence that also necessarily coheres with some human desires or inclinations. Hall and Ames also make much of this passage, but seem to blur this crucial aspect when they characterize this usage as meaning, “dividing up land into cultivated fields in a way consistent with the natural topography.”" But the point here is surely not that the field is simply being cut “in a way consistent with the natural topography.” Rather, what is most evident is the human action and desire and valuation involved. We would perhaps be closer to the implication if we said, “cutting in a way that is consistent with both the topography and, even more decisively, with human need, desire, valuation, and response.” Indeed, this is closer to the “Nominalist” implication Hall and Ames wish to see in the tradition, as we shall discuss in more detail presently. Li在这里用作动词,而不是名词。它与“疆疆”一词平行,意为“划分或建立边界”。这里的“理”似乎是一个动词,意思是“分成几组,分成几部分”,但也暗示这样做是为了特定的目的:在这种情况下,为了种植庄稼而划分田地,并进行创造进入这些领域的途径。其含义是,这里“理”的意思是“以符合特定人类价值的方式进行切割和划分”,或者说是一种也必然与某些人类欲望或倾向相一致的连贯性。霍尔和艾姆斯也对这段话给予了很大的重视,但当他们将这种用法描述为“以符合自然地形的方式将土地划分为耕地”时,似乎模糊了这一关键方面。”但这里的要点肯定不是这片土地只是“以符合自然地形的方式”被切割。相反,最明显的是人类的行为、欲望和价值,如果我们说,“以符合地形、甚至更决定性地符合人类需求的方式进行切割,欲望、评价和反应。”事实上,这更接近霍尔和艾姆斯希望在传统中看到的“唯名论”含义,正如我们现在将更详细讨论的那样。
Tang notes this point as well in his discussion of this ancient usage, stressing above all the subjective and active/temporal sense of Li as primary, with its objective and static/spatial aspects as derivative: Li as a verb rather than as a noun. He also notes, importantly, the role of human will, a human project, in all these early usages of Li ; that is, the essential connection with value and valuation. Tang sees Li in its earliest meaning above all as the purposive, humanly motivated act of cutting, tailoring, which connects its various aspects and phases as means toward this end. It is primarily a human activity, and only derivatively the patterns that emerge from this activity. ^(10){ }^{10} However, Tang’s discussion is excessively beholden to the mutually exclusive categories of subjective and objective, concerned in an almost Bergsonian way with establishing Li as subjective rather than objective (in certain primary usages) and temporal/active rather than spatial/passive. But in fact it is obvious that both sides of what we would call the subject/object split are necessarily involved. Li is here “cutting in a way which is consistent 唐在对这种古代用法的讨论中也注意到了这一点,首先强调“礼”的主观和主动/时间意义是主要的,其客观和静态/空间方面是衍生的:礼作为动词而不是名词。重要的是,他还指出了人类意志、人类计划在“礼”的所有这些早期用法中的作用;即与价值和估价的本质联系。唐认为“理”的最早含义首先是有目的的、人为动机的裁剪、剪裁行为,它将其各个方面和阶段连接起来,作为实现这一目标的手段。它主要是人类活动,并且只是从该活动中衍生出的模式。 ^(10){ }^{10} 然而,唐的讨论过度依赖于主观和客观相互排斥的范畴,以一种近乎柏格森式的方式关注将理确立为主观而非客观(在某些主要用法中)以及时间/主动而非空间/被动。但事实上,很明显,我们所说的主体/客体分裂的双方都必然涉及。李在这里“以一致的方式进行切割”
with both the topography and human value,” or the overlap of the two. We have here again the inclusion of human response in the overall pattern of coherence. And this is how we will be understanding Li in almost every case throughout the tradition, including Buddhist and Neo-Confucian uses. Li always means, “coherence between a set of disparate items, which necessarily includes both nonhuman reality and human responses to that reality (desires and cognitions).” 兼具地形和人文价值”,或者两者的重叠。我们在这里再次将人类的反应纳入整体的连贯性模式中。这就是我们在整个传统中几乎所有情况下理解礼的方式,包括佛教和新儒家的用法。李总是意味着“一组不同的事物之间的一致性,这必然包括非人类现实和人类对该现实的反应(欲望和认知)。”
This implication is very much in evidence in the definition of Li in the earliest Chinese dictionary, Xu Shen’s 許慎 Shuowen jiezi 說文解字. Li is there defined simply as “the treating of jade” (治玉也 zhi yu ye). But jade is not “treated”-i.e., cut, polished, and shaped-merely in accordance with its “natural topography” or its own “inherent lines of pattern,” as we would understand “its own” under the force of the ontological split between the subjective and the objective. Rather, as the great Qing commentator Duan Yucai 段玉裁 says of this entry, "When jade has not yet been treated (理 LiL i ), it is called pup u 朴, the unhewn raw stuff. Li here [is a verb and] means to cut it open and break it apart. Although jade is supremely hard, it is not difficult for it to be made into a vessel (器 qi) if one can find its lines of division along its edges and corners (腮理 saili), ^(11){ }^{11} and this is what is meant by Li. ^(12){ }^{12} Duan is writing with a very specific polemical intent here: he wants to distinguish the original meaning of Li , and its proper sense in true Confucian thought, from the Buddhist and Daoist uses of the term, and the corruption of the term in the perverted Buddhified Confucianism of Zhu Xi and others. The crux of this polemic, however, lies in his imputation of “separation”-cutting, dividing, differentiating-as the primary sense of the term Li in its verbal sense, which brings with it the stress on the sense of differentiation and division of proper roles when it is used in its nominal sense. This is contrasted to the Buddhist, Daoist, and latter-day Confucian interpretation of the term as pointing above all to “unity,” to what is shared, to what is in fact omnipresent. Whatever we may think of Duan’s polemic purposes, it must be admitted that he has identified an unmistakable shift in the meaning of the term. And here we have the crux of our present problem: How is it that a term meaning cutting and differentiating comes to mean the undifferentiated omnipresent? And with this comes a related problem: how does a term meaning originally deliberate human shaping of raw material come to mean the state of the thing prior to human intervention? For Li develops not only from meaning “divided” to “all-inclusive,” but also from “to order” to “the interface between human intentions and the material to be ordered,” and finally to “the true state of the thing prior to deliberate human interference, free of one-sided, private bias.” It is in this last sense that Li tempts the translation “objective Truth” as opposed to subjective emotion. In this it seems to run from the subjective to the subjective-objective and finally to the objective. 这种含义在最早的汉语词典《许慎说文解字》中对“礼”的定义非常明显。礼在这里被简单地定义为“治玉也zhi yu ye”。但玉并没有被“处理”——即切割、抛光和成型——仅仅按照它的“自然地形”或它自己的“固有的图案线条”,就像我们在本体论的力量下理解的“它自己的”一样。主观和客观之间的分裂。相反,正如清代伟大的评论家段玉裁在谈到此条目时所说的那样:“当玉尚未经过处理时(理 LiL i ),它被称为 pup u 朴,未开凿的原料。这里的“离”是动词,意思是把它切开,把它拆开。玉虽然坚硬无比,但若能找到其棱角的分界线,则制成器气并不难。 ^(11){ }^{11} 这就是李的意思。 ^(12){ }^{12} 段在这里的写作带有非常具体的争论意图:他想区分“礼”的本义及其在真正儒家思想中的正确含义,与佛教和道教对该术语的使用,以及该术语在歪曲的佛教中的腐败。朱熹等人的儒家思想。然而,这场论战的症结在于,他把“离”——割断、分裂、区分——归为“理”一词的动词本义,从而强调了“离”的区分和区分意义。当它按其名义意义使用时,应发挥适当的作用。这与佛教、道教和近代儒家对该术语的解释形成鲜明对比,后者首先指向“统一”,指向共享的东西,指向实际上无所不在的东西。 无论我们如何看待段的争论目的,必须承认他已经确定了该术语含义的明显转变。现在问题的症结就在这里:一个意味着切割和差异化的术语怎么会变成意味着无差异的无所不在呢?随之而来的一个相关问题是:一个最初意味着人类对原材料的塑造的术语如何意味着人类干预之前事物的状态?因为“理”的含义不仅从“分”发展到“包罗万象”,而且从“秩序”发展到“人的意图与被秩序的物质之间的界面”,最后发展到“事物先前的真实状态”。故意进行人为干预,避免片面的、私人的偏见。”正是在这最后一个意义上,李尝试将其翻译为“客观真理”,而不是主观情感。这似乎是从主观到主客观,最后到客观。
Of course there is no reason why a term cannot in the course of time, or even in different contexts, change its meaning, and indeed take on an opposite meaning, although “meaning” is such that it must do so by pivoting off continuity with its preexisting denotations and connotations in some way or other. But the fact is that the term Li points to a notion of separation and differentiation that runs smoothly into a concept of undifferentiated omnipresence, and from subjectivity to objectivity. It points to a set of concepts of “coherence” which structures these apparently opposed ideas of differentiated finiteness and undifferentiated omnipresence in a distinctive intertwining, a notion of separation that also points to a joining and vice versa, a notion of subjectivity that also points to objectivity and vice versa. The point I will be trying to make here is that these terms one, many, subjective, objective-are of very limited value when walking about Li , and need to be superseded if we want to understand its history. 当然,一个术语没有理由不能随着时间的推移,甚至在不同的上下文中,改变它的含义,甚至呈现相反的含义,尽管“含义”必须通过与以下内容的连续性来实现这一点:它以某种方式预先存在的外延和内涵。但事实是,“理”一词所指的是一种分离和区分的概念,它顺利地转化为一种无差别的无所不在的概念,从主观性到客观性。它指向一组“连贯性”概念,这些概念以独特的交织方式构建了这些明显对立的有区别的有限性和无区别的无所不在的观念,一种分离的概念也指向一种结合,反之亦然,一种主观性的概念也指向客观性,反之亦然。我在这里要指出的一点是,这些术语“一”、“多”、“主观”、“客观”——在谈论“礼”时价值非常有限,如果我们想了解它的历史,就需要被取代。
Tang Junyi’s analysis is particularly astute on this point. For if the primary sense of Li in pre-Qin texts is what Tang calls 文理 wenli, taken to mean initially the action of making cultural patterns, as expressed especially in social interactions but also in pragmatic skill-activities such as field division and jade treating, then we have in hand a powerful model for understanding the intertwining of unity and differentiation in this concept, as Tang notes in his critique of the Dai Zhen/Duan Yucai “division-only” position. The unification here refers to the end, the goal of the activity, as present in each differentiated and even contrasting particular operation in the procedure. The diversity refers to the various individual means used to achieve this end. Tang stresses, importantly, that the unity here is temporal, not the joining of an array of differentiations but the unity of a single orienting intention governing a complex process. So in treating jade I may sometimes cut and sometimes polish, sometimes sharpen a corner and sometimes dull an edge. “Sharpening” and “dulling” are diverse opposite operations, but they are unified, not as objects in space as in an enveloping container, or instantiations of a universal to which they bear some morphological mimetic similarity, but as immediate phases of the total process of shaping the jade. The presence of the unifying “universal” orientation, the willed, value-informed human activity of creating a coherent pattern, is wholly present in each of these aspects of the process, not partially present, but it is not for that reason replicated as distinct instances of this orientation. Li implies both unity and differentiation in this distinct sense: it is temporal, purposive human activity, orienting means around a definite intended end. 唐君毅在这一点上的分析尤为精辟。因为如果先秦文献中“礼”的主要含义就是唐所说的“文理文礼”,那么最初的意思是创造文化模式的行为,尤其是在社会交往中表达,但也表现在诸如田野划分和玉器处理等实用技能活动中。 ,那么我们就掌握了一个强有力的模型来理解这一概念中统一性与分化性的交织,正如唐在批评戴震/段玉才“唯分”立场时所指出的那样。这里的统一是指活动的结束、目标,存在于程序中每个有区别的甚至是对比的特定操作中。多样性是指为达到这一目的而采用的各种个体手段。唐强调,重要的是,这里的统一是暂时的,不是一系列差异的结合,而是控制复杂过程的单一定向意图的统一。所以在处理玉石时,我有时会切割,有时会抛光,有时会尖角,有时会磨钝边缘。 “锐化”和“钝化”是不同的对立操作,但它们是统一的,不是作为空间中的物体,而是作为包围容器中的物体,也不是它们具有某种形态模仿相似性的普遍性的实例,而是作为整个过程的直接阶段来塑造玉石的形状。统一的“普遍”方向的存在,即创造连贯模式的有意愿的、基于价值的人类活动,完全存在于该过程的每个方面,而不是部分存在,但它并不是因此而被复制为独特的这种取向的实例。 “礼”在这个独特的意义上既意味着统一,又意味着差异:它是暂时的、有目的的人类活动,围绕明确的预期目的制定手段。
Tang’s comments here are a crucial starting point. But again, I believe he has overstressed the sense of subject/object dichotomy, and with it the means/end dichotomy, which I think is alien to the case. We make more progress by following his further implication that what we are talking about here is not really the subjective so much as the intersubjective, the social 唐的评论是一个重要的起点。但我再次认为,他过分强调了主体/客体二分法,以及随之而来的手段/目的二分法,我认为这与本案无关。通过遵循他的进一步暗示,我们取得了更多进展,即我们在这里谈论的并不是真正的主观,而是主体间性、社会性。
interactions of humans within a given community. But this changes the contours of the situation decisively, and allows us to conceive the relation of subject and object, and of unity and differentiation, somewhat differently. We can begin to pick up the thread of the problem from Duan’s comment above. Pu, the unhewn, and qi, vessel, are key terms in the Laozi, as explored in Ironies, and part of Duan’s intent here is to contrast his reading of Li with a “Daoist”- or “Buddhist”-leaning reading that identifies it with the one undivided universal universal, the unhewn, the whole, the encompassing background, the unifying, the omnipresent, as contrasted to individualized vessels. For a “vessel” is a culturally valued object which has been cut out of the unhewn raw material for a particular reason-i.e., because it has an intersubjectively recognized “market value” (whether ritual or economic), to put it crudely. 特定社区内人类的互动。但这决定性地改变了形势的轮廓,使我们能够以不同的方式来理解主体与客体、统一与分化的关系。我们可以从段先生上面的评论中开始了解问题的脉络。正如《讽刺》中所探讨的那样,“未开凿的浦”和“器皿”是《老子》中的关键术语,段在这里的部分意图是将他对“理”的解读与“道家”或“佛教”倾向的解读进行对比,后者认为它具有不可分割的普遍性、未开凿的、整体的、包容的背景、统一的、无所不在的,与个体化的容器形成鲜明对比。因为“器皿”是一种具有文化价值的物体,它出于某种特定原因而从未凿成的原材料中被切割出来——粗略地说,因为它具有主体间认可的“市场价值”(无论是仪式还是经济)。
In many early Daoist works, this cutting of culturally valued “vessels” out of the natural unhewn raw material is seen as a kind of violence to that raw material, damaging it and destroying its true value. Duan’s point here is that certain of the patterns-not necessarily all of the patterns-found “naturally” in the raw material can be used as guidelines to facilitate the creation of a vessel with human cultural value. Both the “objective” and “subjective” sides of coherence are relevant here, but it is the points at which these two types of coherence themselves “cohere” or overlap which makes Li. Li would then mean “second-order coherence between found coherences in the world and coherent clusters of human evaluation.” The question of to what degree these “found coherences” are really in the world, or are themselves effects of the organizing teleology of human evaluations, is left open here, and, as we shall see, to a large extent rendered irrelevant. 在许多早期的道教作品中,这种从天然未开凿的原材料中切割出具有文化价值的“器皿”的做法被视为对原材料的一种暴力,破坏了它并破坏了它的真正价值。段在这里的观点是,原材料中“自然”发现的某些图案(不一定是所有图案)可以用作指导,以促进创造具有人类文化价值的器皿。连贯性的“客观”和“主观”方面在这里都是相关的,但正是这两种连贯性本身“连贯”或重叠的点才构成了Li。那么,李的意思是“世界上发现的一致性与人类评价的连贯性集群之间的二阶一致性”。这些“发现的一致性”在多大程度上确实存在于世界中,或者它们本身是人类评价的组织目的论的结果,这个问题在这里仍然悬而未决,而且,正如我们将看到的,在很大程度上变得无关紧要。
Before pursuing these points through a textual analysis of the early philosophical usages of the term, however, it is worthwhile to clarify our approach to some of these points by taking a quick tour of some of the most suggestive of the attempts to reinterpret and translate the term by recent Western sinologists, which are of especial relevance here since our primary concern is with the mismatch of the Chinese and the Western categories, Of particular interest will be the works of Joseph Needham, Chad Hansen, A. C. Graham, Willard Peterson, and Roger Hall and David Ames, all of whom have contributed crucial insights to the present approach to be taken in the pages to that follow. 然而,在通过对该术语的早期哲学用法进行文本分析来探讨这些观点之前,有必要通过快速浏览一些最具启发性的重新解释和翻译该术语的尝试来澄清我们对其中一些观点的方法。最近西方汉学家提出的术语,在这里特别重要,因为我们主要关注的是中国和西方类别的不匹配,特别感兴趣的是约瑟夫·李约瑟、查德·汉森、AC·格雷厄姆、威拉德·彼得森和罗杰的著作霍尔和大卫·艾姆斯,他们都对当前的方法提出了重要的见解,这些见解将在接下来的几页中采用。
NEEDHAM AND ORGANIC PATTERN 李约瑟和有机模式
As noted, Fung Yulan had suggested that Li be translated as “Platonic Form,” and Form in the Aristotelian sense has also been proposed as a translation, along with Reason, and Law of Nature. Joseph Needham, in his classic work 如前所述,冯玉兰建议将“Li”译为“柏拉图形式”,亚里士多德意义上的“形式”也被提议与“理性”和“自然法则”一起翻译。李约瑟在他的经典著作中
Science and Civilization in China, rejects these suggestions, again with mainly the Neo-Confucian usage in mind, in developing his own overall account of the distinctive nature of traditional Chinese thinking. For Needham, all of these terms are misleading in that they suggest a heteronomous source of order, either form as imposed upon passive matter, or natural law as enforced by God as legislator, in both cases implying a transcendent source of order standing outside the things that are ordered, bearing a different ontological status. He suggested instead the terms organization, or better, organism, as modeled on the interrelation of parts in an animal organism, viewed as spontaneously interacting and organizing themselves around each other. In the West, Needham said, even organism always had to have an extrinsic “guiding principle,” due to the basic belief in a personal god or gods who directed things. In the Chinese context, Needham thought, “cooperation of the component parts was spontaneous, even involuntary, and this alone was sufficient.” ^(13){ }^{13} As Hall and Ames point out, this is a rather unusual understanding of the English word organism. In Western thought, even in Whiteheadian thought, which informs Needham’s understanding, organic order is understood as profoundly teleological: "[T]his term is most generally associated with living things conceived as complex arrangements of parts function with respect to some end or aim. ^(14){ }^{14} This characterization leads, they note, to "a classification of ends or aims which would then undergird a [single, unambiguous, synordinate] taxonomic organization of ‘natural kinds.’ ^(15){ }^{15} —precisely what is lacking in the Chinese case. Still, Needham’s intention is clear; he wants to understand Li as spontaneous pattern brought to bear not by extrinsic coercion, even by a “guiding principle,” but by the spontaneous, involuntary cooperation and reciprocal adjustment of the members in any group. The antitranscendentalist perspective is stressed here. It is not clear, however, that this model can do all the work Needham wants it to do. In particular, the normativity, definiteness, simultaneous oneness and manyness of Li , and its application to human ethics, remain for the most part mysterious on this reading. 《中国科学与文明》在发展他自己对中国传统思想独特性的总体描述时,拒绝了这些建议,同样主要考虑到新儒家的用法。对于李约瑟来说,所有这些术语都具有误导性,因为它们暗示了秩序的异律来源,要么是强加于被动物质的形式,要么是上帝作为立法者强制执行的自然法,在这两种情况下都意味着存在于事物之外的超验秩序来源它们是有序的,具有不同的本体论地位。相反,他建议使用术语“组织”,或者更好的“有机体”,以动物有机体各部分的相互关系为模型,被视为自发地相互作用并围绕彼此组织起来。李约瑟说,在西方,即使是有机体也总是必须有一个外在的“指导原则”,因为人们基本相信有一个或多个指导事物的神。李约瑟认为,在中国的背景下,“各个组成部分的合作是自发的,甚至是非自愿的,仅此一点就足够了”。 ^(13){ }^{13} 正如霍尔和艾姆斯指出的那样,这是对英语单词“organism”的一种相当不寻常的理解。在西方思想中,甚至在为李约瑟的理解提供信息的怀特海思想中,有机秩序也被理解为具有深刻的目的论:“这个术语最普遍地与生物联系在一起,生物被认为是为了实现某种目的而发挥功能的复杂安排。 ^(14){ }^{14} 他们指出,这种特征导致了“对目的或目标的分类,从而巩固‘自然种类’的[单一、明确、同步]分类组织。 ^(15){ }^{15} ——这正是中国案例所缺乏的。 尽管如此,李约瑟的意图还是很明确的。他想把“理”理解为自发的模式,不是通过外在强制,甚至不是通过“指导原则”,而是通过任何群体成员自发的、非自愿的合作和相互调整。这里强调反先验主义的观点。然而,目前尚不清楚该模型是否可以完成李约瑟希望它完成的所有工作。特别是,“理”的规范性、确定性、同时性和多重性,以及它在人类伦理中的应用,在这种解读中大部分仍然是神秘的。
HANSEN AND THE MASS NOUN HYPOTHESIS 汉森和大众名词假说
Chad Hansen, in a controversial study of ancient Chinese logical paradoxes, suggests one reason why the question of universals might not have developed in China in a way that is at all comparable to its development in the West. It should be noted that Hansen was not directly addressing the question of how to interpret or translate Li, whether in Neo-Confucianism or elsewhere, but the more general issue of classes and their members in Chinese thought. Hansen suggests that classical Chinese nouns function more like mass nouns than like count nouns. Mass nouns (e.g., “water”) refer to one pervasive 查德·汉森(Chad Hansen)在对中国古代逻辑悖论进行的一项有争议的研究中提出了一个原因,即为什么普遍性问题在中国的发展方式可能无法与西方的发展相媲美。应该指出的是,汉森并没有直接解决如何解释或翻译“礼”的问题,无论是在新儒学还是其他地方,而是在中国思想中更普遍的阶级及其成员问题。汉森认为,古典汉语名词的功能更像是质量名词,而不是可数名词。质量名词(例如“水”)指的是一种普遍存在的物质。
amorphous entity that is spread out in various places, and can be divided up in various ways, while count nouns (e.g., dog) come with predetermined units for counting. I can have “one dog, two dogs, three dogs” and so on, but “one cup, one quart, two pools” of water. This suggestion has caused some consternation in that it fits better the grammar of modern Chinese (where indeed nouns are generally preceded by a special measure word to indicate the amount of that noun which is being indicated) than classical Chinese, where countable entities can be indicated without recourse to measure words. The lack of special forms indicating singular and plural in both ancient and modern Chinese, however, remains significant in this context. The point is that if a noun indicates primarily the entire mass of that substance, everywhere in the world, the problem of relating individual members to the general class disappears. There is no need to unify individual dogs with a universal canine essence if each dog is really just one dog-shaped scoop of the dog-substance spread out throughout the world. The implication is that rather than an additive class derived cumulatively by assembling individuals and collating their similarities, we are “dividing down” from the whole and provisionally selecting out subdivisions for closer consideration. There is no need for a two-level ontology here, where abstract essences or universals or forms, accessible to the intellect but not to the senses, “participate in” and unify concrete particulars; rather, the mass and each chunk of the mass are equally concrete and available to the senses. ^(16){ }^{16} 无定形实体分布在各个地方,可以以各种方式划分,而可数名词(例如狗)则带有预定的计数单位。我可以有“一只狗,两只狗,三只狗”等等,但是“一杯,一夸脱,两池”水。这个建议引起了一些恐慌,因为它比古汉语更适合现代汉语的语法(事实上,名词前面通常有一个特殊的量词来指示所指示的名词的数量),在古汉语中可以指示可数实体无需求助于量词。然而,在古代和现代汉语中,缺乏表示单数和复数的特殊形式,在这种情况下仍然很重要。关键是,如果一个名词主要表示世界各地该物质的全部质量,那么将个体成员与一般类别联系起来的问题就消失了。如果每只狗实际上只是分布在世界各地的狗形物质的一勺,那么就没有必要将个体狗与通用的犬类本质统一起来。这意味着,我们不是通过组装个体并整理其相似性来累积派生出一个累加类,而是从整体中“划分”并临时选择细分部分以供更仔细的考虑。这里不需要两层的本体论,其中抽象的本质或共性或形式可以被智力所触及,但不能被感官所触及,“参与”并统一具体的细节;相反,质量和质量的每一块都同样具体且可供感官使用。 ^(16){ }^{16}
Hansen’s insights are particularly important for setting the agenda of the present work. He notes in particular the circumvention of both Platonic ideas and mentalist ideas in classical Chinese thinking. The mind is not a representational faculty that entertains ideas or perceives the intelligible realm of ideas. There are no universals, just stuff-kinds. The mind is a faculty of actively distinguishing among these real kinds. The epistemology functions on the basis of only names and stuffs; no other entities, such as properties, attributes, essences, universals, or particulars, are necessary. However, in spite of his affirmation of stuffs as real kinds, Hansen continues to speak of this view as a kind of nominalism. He notes that the notion of “a class” is employed by nominalists as a way of avoiding these abstract entities beloved of Realist epistemology. But, Hansen adds, classes, with the exception of Russell and Lesniewski’s mereological notion of class, are themselves abstract entities. A class is not necessary to the whole-part stuff ontology, he thinks. ^(17){ }^{17} But the stuff-kinds are at least viewed by Hansen as real kinds existing in nature, independently of the distinguishing function of the dynamic human mind, which can thus divide either correctly or incorrectly. They are thus real in a strong sense, and not merely conventional, although still for Hansen fully concrete. But this concreteness ends up being of a very strange kind, indeed of so strange a kind that it raises questions about all 汉森的见解对于制定当前工作的议程尤为重要。他特别指出中国古典思想中对柏拉图思想和唯心主义思想的规避。心智不是一种接受思想或感知思想的可理解领域的表征能力。没有普遍性,只有东西种类。心灵是一种主动区分这些真实种类的能力。认识论的运作仅基于名称和内容;没有其他实体,例如性质、属性、本质、共性或特殊性,是必要的。然而,尽管汉森肯定事物是真实种类,但他仍然将这种观点视为一种唯名论。他指出,唯名论者使用“阶级”的概念来避免这些现实主义认识论所钟爱的抽象实体。但是,汉森补充道,除了罗素和莱斯涅夫斯基的类的分体概念之外,类本身就是抽象实体。他认为,对于整体-部分的事物本体来说,类并不是必需的。 ^(17){ }^{17} 但汉森至少将物质种类视为自然界中存在的真实种类,独立于动态人类思维的区分功能,因此可以正确或错误地进行划分。因此,它们在很强的意义上是真实的,而不仅仅是传统的,尽管对汉森来说仍然是完全具体的。但这种具体性最终变成了一种非常奇怪的类型,确实如此奇怪,以至于它引发了关于所有问题的问题。
concreteness. For like a universal, it is instantiated in multiple noncontiguous times and places, and it seems to allow of no distinction between being partially instantiated and being fully instantiated (it is not claimed that it is only “partially present” when it is identified as present in any of its “parts”). The same oddness would then pertain even to contiguous applications of “the same” name to all the parts of any concrete object (for every object is actually multilocal, spanning more than a mathematical point of space), if the name can be applied in whole to each part. The problem is again exactly what we could possibly actually mean by oneness and difference, conceived as mutually exclusive, as we have argued is the real problem lurking at the back of all questions of nominalism and realism. But the assertion of the view that the stuffs are entities present in their entirety, rather than only partially, in every place they are present, and which are capable of warranting so strong a naturalism of real kinds, raises questions about whether it is not misleading to still call it a nominalism in any normal sense. For as we argued in the prequel, the nominalism/realism issue is interestingly readable as ultimately an offshoot of the more fundamental issue of the relation of oneness and otherness, of what constitutes actual sameness and difference and whether these can be thought of as mutually exclusive. A real oneness of any kind that is thinkable in abstraction from and exclusive of otherness, which could be undividedly present in more than one location, is, we would claim, ipso facto an abstract entity in the relevant sense. 具体性。因为像一个普遍性一样,它在多个不连续的时间和地点被实例化,并且它似乎不区分部分实例化和完全实例化(当它被识别为存在时,并没有声称它只是“部分存在”)在其任何“部分”)。如果名称可以整体应用,那么同样的奇怪现象甚至适用于将“相同”名称连续应用到任何具体对象的所有部分(因为每个对象实际上都是多局部的,跨越的空间超过一个数学点)到每个部分。问题又正是我们所说的同一性和差异性可能真正意味着什么,被认为是相互排斥的,正如我们所说的,这是潜伏在所有唯名论和实在论问题背后的真正问题。但是,断言这些东西是整体存在的实体,而不是仅部分存在于它们存在的每个地方,并且能够保证如此强烈的真实自然主义,这引发了这样的问题:它是否具有误导性在任何正常意义上仍然称其为唯名论。因为正如我们在前传中所讨论的,唯名论/实在论问题是有趣的,它最终是更基本问题的一个分支,即同一性与他性的关系、什么构成了实际的相同性和差异性以及这些是否可以被认为是相互排斥的。 。我们认为,任何一种真正的统一性,只要是从他性中抽象出来并排除他性的,都可以被认为是不可分割地存在于多个地点的,事实上,在相关意义上,它本身就是一个抽象实体。
GRAHAM AND THE ABSENT COPULA
AND CORRELATIVE THINKING 格雷厄姆和缺席系动词
和关联思维
A. C. Graham slightly amends Hansen’s suggestion, in a passage we also quoted in Ironies of One and Many: AC Graham 稍微修改了 Hansen 的建议,我们也在《一与多的讽刺》中引用了一段话:
We might say that while the English translations use count nouns for individuals or classes, the Chinese uses mass nouns which carry with them instructions as to where the primary division is to be made. There are also words, some of them important in philosophy (chi’, tao, li) which carry no such instructions, so that there is no contradiction in dividing out Yin and Yang as “the 2 ch’i” yet also picking out as “the 5 ch’i” the Five Phases, or the 5 atmospheric influences, whatever one chooses to select from the mass. On this approach a lei “kind,” such a jen “man” or ma “horse,” is a mass like cattle exhaustively divisible into similar parts (like Greek genos “genus” in its original sense of a race which could die out, not a class which may become empty of members): the shih “object” which . . . we described as “concrete and particular” is a chunk 我们可以说,虽然英文翻译使用可数名词来表示个人或类别,但中文使用的是集体名词,这些名词带有关于在哪里进行主要划分的指示。还有一些词,其中一些在哲学中很重要的词(“气”、“道”、“理”)没有这样的指示,因此将阴阳划分为“二气”并不矛盾,但也将其选为“二气”。 “五气”即五个阶段,或五种大气影响,无论人们选择从质量中选择什么。按照这种方法,lei“种类”,例如 jen“人”或 ma“马”,是像牛一样的群体,可以完全分为相似的部分(就像希腊语 genos“属”,其原始含义是一个可能灭绝的种族,不是一个可能会变成空成员的类):shih“对象”。 。 。我们所说的“具体和特殊”是一个块
out of a mass which is no less concrete than itself. This does not of course alter the fact that, irrespective of language, discontinuous and constant objects enforce on us a priority over divisions we can make as we please. Even if a shih “object” is a chunk out of a mass, the most convenient examples of it will be individuals-in the Mohist account of naming . . . not a pool or drop of water but a horse. But that the objects are indeed conceived as divisions is confirmed, as Hansen notices, but the fact that where we would speak of class and member or whole and part the Mohist logic uses only a single pair, chien and tit i, and defines tit i as a “a division in a chien” (Canon AC ti, fen yu chien ye). ^(18){ }^{18} 是从一个不比它本身更具体的物体中产生的。这当然不会改变这样一个事实:无论语言如何,不连续和恒定的对象都强制我们优先于我们可以随意进行的划分。即使“物”是整体中的一块,最方便的例子也将是墨家命名中的个体。 。 。不是一池水或一滴水,而是一匹马。但是,正如汉森所注意到的那样,这些对象确实被视为划分,这一点得到了证实,但事实是,当我们谈论阶级和成员或整体和部分时,墨家逻辑只使用一对,即“干”和“干”。 tit i ,并定义 tit i 作为“a Division in a chien”(Canon AC ti, fen yu chien ye)。 ^(18){ }^{18}
As noted in the previous volume, Graham here accepts the implication that the Chinese tendency is to divide down from the whole, adding however that these wholes often come with built-in instructions about where the main “cuts” or divisions were to be made, and that in several important cases there are more than one possible way to legitimately make these divisions. The idea of “built-in instructions about how to cut something up” will be quite a useful hint for us in considering the ways in which coherence comes to be understood, and all the more so the idea that several alternate, even incompatible, sets of instructions might be not only applicable, but indeed built in, with the full authority of objectivity, as it were. 正如前一卷中所指出的,格雷厄姆在这里接受了中国人倾向于从整体中分裂的暗示,但他补充说,这些整体往往带有关于在哪里进行主要“削减”或划分的内置指令,并且在一些重要的情况下,有不止一种可能的方式来合法地进行这些划分。 “关于如何切割某些东西的内置指令”的想法对于我们考虑如何理解连贯性来说将是一个非常有用的提示,更重要的是,几个交替的,甚至不相容的集合的想法指令可能不仅适用,而且实际上是内置的,具有充分的客观性权威。
Graham makes another suggestion relating to this question. The Chinese language, he notes, lacks any collapse of existential and predicative sense of “being” such as is peculiar to Indo-European languages. The broadest term for “being” (有 you), literally “having, possession,” implies primarily “presence in the world,” and does not neatly apply to abstract entities, predicates, or uncontextualized substances. Moreover, its use to say “X exists” actually puts the " X " in the object position of the sentence, thereby positing an implicit subject, a further entity that “possesses” X: 格雷厄姆针对这个问题提出了另一个建议。他指出,汉语没有像印欧语系语言那样对“存在”的存在感和谓语感的崩溃。最广泛的术语“存在”(有你),字面意思是“拥有、拥有”,主要意味着“存在于世界上”,并且并不完全适用于抽象实体、谓词或无语境的实体。此外,它用来说“X存在”实际上将“X”放在句子的宾语位置,从而设置了一个隐含的主语,一个“拥有”X的进一步实体:
[T]he subject of the English “is” corresponds to the object of the Chinese yuy u [有 you]. In Indo-European Languages a thing simply is, without implying anything outside it, and it is the most abstract entities which the Platonic tradition most willingly credits with being. In Chinese, on the other hand, one approaches the thing from outside, from the world which “has” it, in which “there is” it. From this point of view, the more concrete a thing is, the more plainly the world has it; for example, one can emphasize the absolute non-existence of X by saying . . . “The world does not have X” (more literally, “There is no X under the sky”). In this respect, as in the absence of the copulative function of “to be,” yuy u is like “exist,” [T]英语的主语“is”对应汉语的宾语 yuy u [有你]。在印欧语言中,事物只是存在,不暗示其之外的任何事物,并且它是柏拉图传统最愿意认为存在的最抽象的实体。另一方面,在汉语中,人们从外部、从“有”它、在其中“有”它的世界来看待事物。从这个角度来看,越是具体的事物,世界就越是明晰的;越是具体的事物,就越是明晰的。例如,可以通过说 来强调 X 绝对不存在。 。 。 “世界上没有X”(更确切地说,“天空下没有X”)。在这方面,由于缺乏“to be”的系辞功能, yuy u 就像“存在”一样
which also implies a concrete thing with a background from which it stands out (exsistit). But there remains the difference that “exists,” like “is,” is attached to a subject and not to an object. . . . This is the source of one of the most striking difference between Chinese thinking about yuy u and wuw u and Western thinking about Being. In English, a table is a thing, exists, is; Beauty is not a thing, does not exist, but we can still say it is. Having the verb “to be” (esse), we can form a noun from it and say that Beauty, although not a thing, is an “entity” (ens, entitas). We can also form an adjective from “thing” (res) and say that it is “real.” To indicate the kind of being which is not existence we can invent “subsistence.” Beauty, that real, subsisting entity, is assimilated as closely as possible to the table, that real, existing thing. As a last refinement, we may find reasons for claiming that such an immaterial entity more truly is, is more real, than the phenomena perceived by the senses. . . . In Chinese, on the other hand, the word yuy u is used primarily of concrete things. . . . ^(19){ }^{19} 这也意味着有一个具体的事物,它有一个突出的背景(存在)。但仍然存在区别,即“存在”与“是”一样,附属于主体而不是客体。 。 。 。这是中国人思维方式最显着差异之一的根源。 yuy u 和 wuw u 以及西方对于存在的思考。在英语中,桌子是一个东西,存在,是;美不是一个东西,不存在,但我们仍然可以说它是。有了动词“to be”(esse),我们就可以从它组成一个名词,说“美”虽然不是一个东西,但却是一个“实体”(ens,entitas)。我们还可以从“事物”(res)组成一个形容词,并说它是“真实的”。为了表明不存在的存在,我们可以发明“存在”。美,那个真实的、存在的实体,被尽可能地同化于桌子,那个真实的、存在的东西。作为最后的改进,我们可能会找到理由来声称这样一个非物质实体比感官所感知的现象更真实,更真实。 。 。 。另一方面,在中文中,这个词 yuy u 主要用于具体事物。 。 。 。 ^(19){ }^{19}
This relates directly to our problem. In classical Chinese we literally cannot say something exists without simultaneously positing something larger in which it exists. This has obvious implications for the question of the Omnipresent, and with it the notions of unconditioned determinateness and the relation between classes, as discussed in the previous volume. It also discourages the development of a two-tiered metaphysic and any decontextualized absolutes. It points us further directly toward the “dyadic a priori,” discussed in Ironies, and the self-overcoming of coherence into its ironic effacement, as we’ll see below. 这直接关系到我们的问题。在文言文中,我们确实不能说某物存在,而不同时假定它存在于其中的更大的东西。正如前一卷所讨论的,这对无所不在的问题以及随之而来的无条件确定性和阶级之间的关系的概念有着明显的影响。它还阻碍了两层形而上学和任何脱离语境的绝对的发展。它进一步直接将我们引向《讽刺》中讨论的“二元先验”,以及自我克服连贯性使其讽刺性消失,正如我们将在下面看到的。
We may note another use of the “to be” verbs in some Indo-European languages which is notably and importantly absent in Chinese: the use of “to be” in passive constructions. In English, for example, we transform the active “to see” into the passive “to be seen.” It is worth pausing to consider what kind of connection between being and passivity, or perhaps objectivity, is implied by this grammatical peculiarity. In classical Chinese, purely passive constructions might be expressed by auxiliary verbs indicating receiving, wearing, carrying, bearing or, a bit later, being the locus of the action of a main verb (e.g., 被 bei and 所 suo). But in many cases the same verb is used to indicate both passive and active aspects of the same action without morphological distinction, or with an alternate pronunciation that continues to attribute the action to the supposed recipient. “To see” (見 jian), for example, is written in classical texts in the same way as “to be manifested, to be seen” (見 xian). We also have the important and often misconstrued usage of xiang 相 to make a verb transitive without indicating its object. ^(20){ }^{20} 我们可能会注意到一些印欧语言中“to be”动词的另一种用法,这在汉语中明显且重要地没有:在被动结构中使用“to be”。例如,在英语中,我们将主动的“to see”转变为被动的“to be see”。值得停下来考虑一下这种语法特性暗示着存在与被动性或客观性之间的联系。在文言文中,纯粹的被动结构可以用助动词来表达,这些助动词表示接受、佩戴、携带、承载,或者稍后,作为主要动词的动作轨迹(例如,被被和所所)。但在许多情况下,同一个动词用于表示同一动作的被动和主动方面,没有形态上的区别,或者使用替代发音继续将动作归因于假定的接受者。例如,古典文献中的“见”与“见”的写法相同。我们还有重要且经常被误解的“相”用法,使动词成为及物动词而不指示其宾语。 ^(20){ }^{20}
It is interesting to note that the passive construction does later come to be written with wei, beginning in translations from Buddhist sutras, possibly to try to echo the use of the copulative “be” construction for passive voice in Indic source languages. ^(21){ }^{21} 有趣的是,被动结构后来确实用“wei”来书写,从佛经的翻译开始,可能是试图呼应印度源语言中被动语态的系词“be”结构的使用。 ^(21){ }^{21}
Putting these points together, we may suggest that to say that something exists in Chinese always implies that it is actively present and that it is so in some context. The general tendency to divide down from the whole, noted by both Hansen and Graham, is again in evidence here. While it is true, as Graham points out, that this makes Chinese thinkers particularly hesitant to attribute “being” to abstract or nonsensory entities (such as Li ), preferring to call them 虛 xu “tenuous,” 空 kong “empty,” 無 wu “nothingness,” or 非有非無 feiyoufeiwu “beyond being and Non-Being,” it does not positively exclude the abstract from the category of being. But it does make the notion of pure transcendence, or unconditionality, problematic: it is immediately obvious that anything determinate (i.e., divided down from a larger context and deriving its identity from contextualization in that whole) cannot be unconditional. It ensures, in effect, that even abstract entities will be thought of as primarily contextualized, perhaps making the later Buddhist idea that abstract entities are perceived by the intellect in a way not fundamentally distinct from the way the senses perceive their objects easily assimilable: the mind is a sense organ that perceives ideas and thoughts, which also always come with a context, and are therefore not simply and completely determinate. This circumvents the “determinate but unconditional” paradox noted in the previous volume. 将这些观点放在一起,我们可以认为,在中文中说某物存在总是意味着它是积极存在的,并且在某些上下文中是如此。汉森和格雷厄姆都指出,从整体上分裂的普遍趋势在这里再次得到证明。正如格雷厄姆指出的那样,这确实使中国思想家特别犹豫是否将“存在”归因于抽象或非感官实体(例如“理”),而更愿意称它们为“虚”“脆弱”,“空”“空”,“无” “无”,或者“非有非无”,“超越存在与非存在”,它并没有积极地将抽象排除在存在的范畴之外。但它确实使纯粹超越性或无条件性的概念变得有问题:很明显,任何确定的东西(即从更大的背景中划分出来并从整体的背景化中得出其身份)不可能是无条件的。实际上,它确保了即使是抽象实体也将被认为是主要情境化的,也许使得后来的佛教思想认为,抽象实体被智力所感知的方式与感官感知其对象的方式没有本质上的区别,很容易被同化:心灵是一种感知观念和思想的感觉器官,它们也总是带有背景,因此不是简单且完全确定的。这规避了上卷中提到的“确定但无条件”的悖论。
Graham translates Li as “pattern,” which he specifies as meaning the “recurring” patterns in which things are organized, the sorting out of which is the thinking which belongs to the realm of man. We will have to return to the question of recurrence below. The possibility of iterability of “the same” anything in different times and places is, in normal Western usage, predicated on the existence of some kind of universal that can subsume and recur identically in many instances. For this reason, I would like to bracket “recurrence” in the strong sense for the moment. For a Daoist, Graham thinks, these Li-patterns would include things such as "the relative positions of heaven and earth and the alternations of Yin and Yang, rise and fall, birth and death; they do not include standards of conduct, which a [Daoist] denies in principle. ^(222){ }^{222} He describes Li in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism as “the universal pattern branching by division from the Supreme Ultimate (T’ai-chi) [太極 taiji], setting the lines along which things move,” which is opposed to 氣 qi as the "universal fluid out of which things condense and into which they dissolve, freely moving when fine or inert when coarse, active as the Yang or passive as the Yin. ^(123)Li{ }^{123} \mathrm{Li} in this system are "the pat- 格雷厄姆将“Li”翻译为“模式”,他将其定义为事物组织的“循环”模式,对这种模式的整理是属于人类领域的思维。我们将不得不回到下面的复发问题。在西方的正常用法中,“相同”任何事物在不同时间和地点的可重复性的可能性是基于某种普遍性的存在,这种普遍性可以在许多情况下相同地包含和重复出现。出于这个原因,我想暂时将强意义上的“复发”括起来。格雷厄姆认为,对于道教徒来说,这些理模式将包括诸如“天地相对位置、阴阳交替、盛衰、生死等内容;它们不包括行为标准,这是【道家】原则上否认。 ^(222){ }^{222} 他将成朱理学中的“理”描述为“从太极太极中分叉出来的普遍模式,设定了事物运动的路线”,这与“气”相对立。 “宇宙流体,事物从其中凝结并溶解于其中,细时自由移动,粗时惰性,活跃为阳,被动为阴。 ^(123)Li{ }^{123} \mathrm{Li} 在这个系统中是“pat-
terns which regularize things and events. ^(124){ }^{124} Again we may reserve judgment especially about the implications of the term regularize here. 使事物和事件规则化的燕鸥。 ^(124){ }^{124} 我们可能会再次保留判断,特别是对于此处“正则化”一词的含义。
Graham provides a distinctive solution to the descriptive/normative problem. In general, he asserts, Chinese thought assumes that we are already spontaneously moved in various directions before any prescriptive moral discourse comes to us. But these spontaneous promptings are alterable; they change when we are aware of more or other things. The point of ethical culture in China then was to expand awareness of all relevant implications, so that we would be spontaneously moved in a different way. The ultimate standard was the way the wisest and most fully aware persons, the sages, were spontaneously moved. In terms of Li in Neo-Confucianism, this helps Graham explain why struggle is needed to attain the sage’s lucid spontaneity, and why Li can be spoken of both as “what makes things what they are”-a matter of simple fact-and “how things should be”-a prescriptive norm (the “fact/value fusion” alluded to above). Graham says, "To the extent that I remain ignorant, the dense ch’i [qi] of my organism runs blindly in the broad channels of the lil i where it happens to be; but by moral training I refine my substance to greater transparency and penetrate into the finer veins of the universal pattern, so that my spontaneous reactions change as the rarified ch’i out of which the denser goes on being generated adjusts to newly perceived li. The assumption is that if I still fail to respond in the full light of my knowledge, it is because a lil i has permeated just far enough to awaken a spontaneous inclination along its path, but not yet to articulate the motions of the organism as a whole. ^(35){ }^{35} One is always proceeding according to some portion of the overall Li however one is moved and whatever one is doing; moral value attaches only to how much or little of the Li one has penetrated. Right and wrong is a matter of greater and lesser penetration of Li. If one continues only in the “coarser veins” of Li where one “happens to be,” one has failed to live up to the Li of being a human being, which is exemplified by the sages, who have shown that man’s mind is able to penetrate the entirety of Li . When one fails to do so, one is a “not really a human being”-not fully realizing the Li of being a human, but only the less comprehensive Li of being an animal, for example. We will be returning to, and partially adopting, this interpretation of Li’s ethical implications in the pages to follow. 格雷厄姆为描述性/规范性问题提供了独特的解决方案。他断言,总的来说,中国思想认为,在任何规定性的道德话语出现之前,我们就已经自发地走向不同的方向。但这些自发的提示是可以改变的。当我们意识到更多或其他事情时,它们就会改变。当时中国伦理文化的重点是扩大对所有相关含义的认识,以便我们会自发地以不同的方式受到感动。最终的标准是最有智慧、最有觉知的人——圣人——自发地感动的方式。就新儒家的理而言,这有助于格雷厄姆解释为什么需要斗争才能获得圣人的清醒自发性,以及为什么理可以被称为“是什么使事物成为它们的样子”——这是一个简单的事实——和“事情应该如何”——一种规定性规范(上面提到的“事实/价值融合”)。格雷厄姆说:“在我仍然无知的情况下,我的有机体的浓密气在广阔的通道中盲目地运行。 lil i 它恰好在哪里;但通过道德训练,我将自己的本质提炼到更大的透明度,并渗透到宇宙模式的更细的脉络中,这样我的自发反应就会随着稀有的气而变化,其中更密集的气不断产生适应新感知的理。假设是,如果我仍然无法根据我的知识做出回应,那是因为 lil i 已经渗透到足以唤醒其路径上的自发倾向,但尚未阐明整个有机体的运动。 ^(35){ }^{35} 无论人如何移动,无论做什么,总是按照整个礼的某个部分进行;道德价值只取决于礼的渗透程度。是非在于理透程度的大小。如果一个人只在“理”的“粗脉”中继续“恰巧”,就达不到做人的理,圣贤就是例证,他们证明了人的心是能够做到的。能够渗透到整个黎国。当一个人做不到这一点时,他就“不是一个真正的人”——例如,没有完全实现作为人的理,而只是不太全面的作为动物的理。在接下来的几页中,我们将返回并部分采用这种对李的道德含义的解释。
Graham describes Zhu Xi’s Li as 格雷厄姆将朱熹的《礼》描述为
a vast three-dimensional structure which looks different from different angles. In laying down the lines along which everything moves, it appears as the Way (Tao); in that the lines are independent of my personal desires, it imposes itself on me as Heaven (T’ien); 一个巨大的三维结构,从不同的角度看起来都不同。在规定万物运行的路线时,它表现为“道”;因为这些线条独立于我个人的欲望,它把自己强加给我作为天(T'ien);
as a pattern which from my own viewpoint spreads out from the sub-pattern of my own profoundest reaction, it appears as my own basic Nature (hsing). Looking down from the Supreme Ultimate, at the apex of which its branches join, it first divides as the Way of the first two diagrams of the Changes, Ch’ien and K’un, patterning the ch’i in its Yang and Yin phases; but from my own viewpoint, the major lines which connect me with the whole are the principles of conduct, Benevolence, Duty, Manners, Wisdom [i.e., 仁義禮智, ren yi li zhi, the four cardinal Mencian and Neo-Confucian virtues]. Each person, peering into the vast web from his own little corner of it, may, if his ch’i is perfectly transparent, see all the way to the Supreme Ultimate at its farthest limits. ^(26){ }^{26} 作为一种模式,从我自己的观点来看,它是从我自己最深刻的反应的子模式中展开的,它表现为我自己的基本本质(性)。从太极往下看,其枝干的顶端,先分为干、坤的前二图变化之道,塑造气的阳、阴相。 ;但从我自己的角度来看,连接我与整体的主要线索是行为的原则,仁义礼智,即孟子和新儒家的四项基本美德。 。每个人,从自己的小角落凝视浩瀚的网络,如果他的气是完全透明的,就可以一路看到至高无上的极限。 ^(26){ }^{26}
Of crucial importance in this interpretation, which makes admirable sense of the “one-many” question, is Graham’s claim that the “subjectivising, Chinese” assumption that “the knowing of a li [is] inseparable from the reactions it patterns.” ^(27){ }^{27} The organic pattern is not merely an objective network to be observed and studied from without; our own reactions are also parts of this network of connections. The mind is not set aside as a separate ontological category, but is part of the whole. This insight will serve us well in the considerations below. 这种解释使“一对多”问题具有令人钦佩的意义,在这种解释中至关重要的是格雷厄姆的主张,即“主观化的中国式”假设“对理的认识与它所形成的反应密不可分”。 ^(27){ }^{27} 有机模式不仅仅是一个可以从外部观察和研究的客观网络;我们自己的反应也是这个联系网络的一部分。心灵并没有被视为一个单独的本体论范畴,而是整体的一部分。这种见解对于我们下面的考虑很有帮助。
Graham also develops a notion of Chinese thinking, particularly from the Han on, as marked by “correlative” or analogic, rather than “analytic” or “causal” pattern formation. We will return to this suggestion in the discussion of the treatment of these problems by Hall and Ames below. 格雷厄姆还发展了中国思维的概念,特别是从汉族开始,其特点是“相关”或类比,而不是“分析”或“因果”模式形成。我们将在下面讨论霍尔和艾姆斯对这些问题的处理时回到这一建议。
PETERSON AND COHERENCE 彼得森和一致性
In his 1986 article “Another Look at Li,” Willard Peterson made a breakthrough suggestion on how to translate, and understand, the term Li in Neo-Confucianism. The translation he suggests is the English word coherence. By coherence, Peterson means " the quality or characteristic of sticking together,’ with the connotations of varying according to context." ^(28){ }^{28} The contextualizing implication is perhaps not analytically derivable from the notion of “coherence” as such, but it is a qualification that fits well with the points we have considered above, and indeed the two parts of this definition bring into sharp relief the crux of the problem. For indeed, coherence does suggest contextualization, if “sticking together” is meant to apply not only to the parts of the entity in question, but to the way the entity as a whole “sticks together” with what surrounds it. Coherence, then, means both the coherence of the parts of any whole with each other and the coherence of 威拉德·彼得森 (Willard Peterson) 在 1986 年的文章《再看礼》中,就如何翻译和理解理学中的“礼”一词提出了突破性的建议。他建议的翻译是英文单词coherence。彼得森所说的连贯性是指“粘在一起的品质或特征”,具有根据上下文而变化的含义。 ^(28){ }^{28} 语境化的含义也许不能从“连贯性”的概念本身分析得出,但它是一个与我们上面考虑的观点非常吻合的限定条件,事实上,这个定义的两个部分使问题的症结变得清晰起来。问题。事实上,如果“粘在一起”不仅意味着适用于所讨论的实体的各个部分,而且还适用于实体作为一个整体与其周围的事物“粘在一起”的方式,那么连贯性确实意味着情境化。那么,连贯性既意味着任何整体的各部分之间的连贯性,也意味着整体的连贯性。
this whole with all other things that are related to it, which contextualize it. Peterson notes that this interpretation allows many of the mysteries surrounding the Cheng-Zhu use of Li to disappear. He makes the following points about the Cheng-Zhu use of Li as coherence: 这整体以及与之相关的所有其他事物,将其置于上下文中。彼得森指出,这种解释使得许多围绕成朱使用“礼”的谜团消失了。关于成朱使用“礼”作为连贯性,他提出以下几点:
"There is coherence for each and every thing, whether that thing is taken as heaven-and-earth as a whole, or a thing smaller than a cricket, an ant, or a blade of grass. ^(229){ }^{229} Each thing, to be the thing it is, must have its own coherence, and this applies both to any whole as a whole and to each part as a part. “每一个事物都具有连贯性,无论该事物被视为天地整体,还是比蟋蟀、蚂蚁或一片草叶还要小的事物。 ^(229){ }^{229} 每一个事物,要成为它本来的样子,就必须有其自身的连贯性,这既适用于作为整体的任何整体,也适用于作为部分的每个部分。
“Coherence is unitary.” This solves the one-many problem: “[W]e can speak of the coherence of my puppy, the coherence of all dogs, the coherence of all living things, and so on, without involving ourselves in a verbal dilemma over the relationship between the ‘different’ levels or envelopes of coherence.” ^(30){ }^{30} “连贯性是统一的。”这解决了一对多问题:“我们可以谈论我的小狗的连贯性、所有狗的连贯性、所有生物的连贯性等等,而不必让自己陷入关于之间关系的语言困境。 “不同”的连贯性水平或范围。” ^(30){ }^{30}
"Coherence of object or phenomena is not locatable independently of ch’i. ^('^(31)){ }^{\prime{ }^{31}} Here we have the immanence of Li to qi. “物体或现象的连贯性不能独立于气而定位。 ^('^(31)){ }^{\prime{ }^{31}} 这里我们有理气的内在性。
"Coherence is categorically distinct from the ch’i of which things are constituted. ^(332){ }^{332} Here we have the transcendence of Li to qi. “连贯性与构成事物的气有着绝对的区别。 ^(332){ }^{332} 这里我们有理对气的超越。
“Coherence is transcendent as well as immanent.” This is a restatement of the previous two points. “连贯性是超越性的,也是内在的。”这是对前两点的重申。
"Coherence is that by which a thing is as it is."34 It is descriptive, and also explanatory, in the sense of being “that by virtue of which a thing is what it is, rather than any other thing.” “连贯性是事物之所以如此的原因。”34它是描述性的,也是解释性的,意思是“事物凭借其而成为其本来面目,而不是任何其他事物”。
"Each phenomenon has its associated ultimate or ‘perfect coherence’ (chih li [zhi Li]), which may or may not be attained. ^(35){ }^{35} “每种现象都有其相关的终极或‘完美连贯’(chih li [zhi Li]),它可能会实现,也可能不会实现。 ^(35){ }^{35}
This is meant to solve the problem of the simultaneous descriptive and normative use of “coherence.” Peterson explains his understanding of this connection as follows: "The logic is simple. There is the coherence of all that is. There is the coherence of what will be or ought to be, usually expressed as the perfect coherence. As an aspect of that which we now are, we have the coherence of what we ought to be and the allied capacity to attain that ultimate, the full realization (ch’eng) of our potential. The puppy becomes a dog, what it ought to be, if it acts in a manner congruent with fulfilling that potential coherence within it (e.g., if it does not run under the wheel of a truck) and is not otherwise interfered with. ^(36){ }^{36} 这是为了解决“连贯性”的描述性和规范性同时使用的问题。彼得森解释了他对这种联系的理解如下:“逻辑很简单。存在所有事物的连贯性。存在将要发生或应该发生的事情的连贯性,通常表示为完美的连贯性。作为其中的一个方面我们现在的样子,我们有我们应该成为的样子的连贯性,并且有能力实现我们的潜力的最终,充分实现(ch'eng)小狗变成了狗,如果它应该是什么。以符合实现其内部潜在一致性的方式行事(例如,如果它不在卡车的车轮下运行)并且不会受到其他干扰。 ^(36){ }^{36}
This last point is the only part of Peterson’s rather brilliant exposition of Li as coherence, which I will otherwise be adopting and building from here, with which I will be taking issue. The imputation of a distinction between “potential” and “actual” coherence invoked here, it seems to me, implies an abstract transcendentalism that undermines the power of the coherence model. Peterson tries to circumvent this implication by suggesting that the former is an “aspect” of the former, and indeed, both can be subsumed under the concept of “coherence.” As Peterson puts it, Zhu Xi is "urging us to understand as a coherent whole both what a man is now and what he might be in the future."37 This restatement continues to rely on the distinction of “is” and “might,” but the whole point of having recourse to the concept of coherence is surely that it reaches across these putatively separate categories of potentiality and actuality. ^(38){ }^{38} Indeed, Peterson makes the point that Li must be understood as standing on both sides of the pair “potential” and "realized or actualized."39 But the implications of this claim remain to be explored, and we will have to pay careful attention to the question of Li as potential, particularly in the Buddhist contexts, later. 最后一点是彼得森对“理”作为连贯性的相当精彩的阐述的唯一部分,否则我将从这里采用和构建它,我将对此提出异议。在我看来,这里引用的“潜在”和“实际”连贯性之间的区别暗示着一种抽象的先验主义,它破坏了连贯性模型的力量。彼得森试图通过暗示前者是前者的一个“方面”来规避这种含义,事实上,两者都可以包含在“连贯性”的概念之下。正如彼得森所说,朱熹“敦促我们将一个人现在是什么以及他将来可能是什么作为一个连贯的整体来理解。”37这一重述继续依赖于“是”和“可能”的区别,但诉诸连贯性概念的全部意义在于,它跨越了这些假定的独立的潜力和现实类别。 ^(38){ }^{38} 事实上,彼得森指出,李必须被理解为站在“潜力”和“已实现或已实现”这对的两边。39但这一说法的含义仍有待探讨,我们必须仔细注意稍后,特别是在佛教背景下,“理”的潜力问题。
HALL AND AMES AND THE FOCUS/FIELD 霍尔和艾姆斯以及焦点/领域
Hall and Ames also have a problem with the putative “transcendentalism” of Peterson’s notion of coherence, which was of course intended only as an explication of the term’s use in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, not in the entire tradition of Chinese thought, early and late. Hall and Ames state that they wish to adopt this interpretation for pre-Qin thought, but leaving out the transcendentalism, which they take to be applicable only to post-Buddhist, Neo-Confucian uses of the term. ^(40){ }^{40} (This radical separation of Buddhist uses from other Chinese uses, which in fact dates back to the Neo-Confucian critiques of Buddhism, is one of the issues the present work hopes to reconsider.) Hall and Ames’s discussion of Li comes in the context of their overall interpretation of the dominant modes of “Han thinking” as a whole, which they characterize as privileging what Graham had identified as the “correlative, analogical, metaphorical” mode of classification over the “analytic, causal, metonymic” mode, as we discussed at length in Ironies of One and Many. Correlative groupings are loose, metaphorical, and ad hoc in character, producing concepts that are “image clusters in which complex semantic associations are allowed to reflect into one another in such a way as to provide rich, indefinitely “vague” meanings. Univocity is, therefore, impossible. Aesthetic associations dominate.” ^(41){ }^{41} These associations are nominalist, pragmatic, historicist, thus always necessarily ambiguous and negotiable. Hall and Ames see one of the most important examples of this in the “seemingly ubiquitous distinction between yin and yang,” which is 霍尔和艾姆斯也对彼得森的连贯性概念假定的“先验主义”有疑问,这当然只是为了解释该术语在程朱理学中的使用,而不是在整个中国思想传统中。并且迟到了。霍尔和艾姆斯表示,他们希望对先秦思想采用这种解释,但排除超验主义,他们认为超验主义仅适用于后佛教、新儒家对该术语的使用。 ^(40){ }^{40} (佛教用途与其他中国用途的彻底分离,实际上可以追溯到新儒家对佛教的批判,这是本书希望重新考虑的问题之一。)霍尔和艾姆斯对“礼”的讨论是在以下背景下进行的:他们对整个“汉族思维”的主导模式的总体解释,他们将其描述为赋予格雷厄姆所认为的“关联、类比、隐喻”分类模式相对于“分析、因果、转喻”模式的特权,正如我们《一与多的讽刺》中有详细讨论。相关分组在性质上是松散的、隐喻的和临时的,产生的概念是“图像簇,其中复杂的语义关联被允许以一种提供丰富的、无限的“模糊”含义的方式相互反映。因此,单一性是不可能的。审美联想占主导地位。” ^(41){ }^{41} 这些关联是唯名论的、实用主义的、历史主义的,因此总是必然是模糊的和可协商的。霍尔和艾姆斯在“阴阳之间看似无处不在的区别”中看到了最重要的例子之一,即
“no more than a convenient way or organizing ‘thises’ and ‘thats.’ This is clearly a consequence of the nominalistic character of Chinese intellectual culture.”$42 Correlative thinking, we are told, allows a freeform association of items that might “cohere” with a given class, again very much including the subjective or cultural axiological reactions to things experienced together with them. “只不过是一种方便的方式或组织‘这个’和‘那个’。这显然是中国知识文化唯名论特征的结果。”42 我们被告知,关联思维允许对可能与特定阶级“一致”的项目进行自由形式的关联,同样在很大程度上包括对特定阶级的主观或文化价值论反应。和他们一起经历的事情。
It is in this context that Hall and Ames adopt and modify Peterson’s notion of Li as coherence. Li , they say, is "the inherent formal and structural patterns in things and events, and their intelligibility. In expressing this notion of coherence and intelligibility, no severe distinction is made between ‘natural’ coherence (tianli [天理] or daoli [道理]) and ‘cultural’ coherence (wenli [文理] or daoli [道理]) . . . each is integral to li. . . . [It is] the fabric of order and regularity immanent in the dynamic process of experience . . . li in defining order confounds the familiar distinction between rational faculty and the underlying principles it searches out. Li has neither an exclusively subjective nor objective reference. ^(343){ }^{343} Moreover, 正是在这种背景下,霍尔和艾姆斯采用并修改了彼得森的“理”的连贯性概念。他们说,理是“事物和事件固有的形式和结构模式,以及它们的可理解性。在表达这种连贯性和可理解性的概念时,‘自然’连贯性(天理 [天理] 或道理 [真理]”之间没有严格的区别。 ])和“文化”连贯性(文理),都是“理”的组成部分。理在定义秩序时混淆了理性能力和它所寻找的基本原则之间的熟悉区别,理既没有完全主观的参考,也没有完全客观的参考。 ^(343){ }^{343} 而且,
Li establish the ethos of a given community. As such li may never be considered as independent of context. There are no transcendent li. . . . In the absence of teleological guidance, there is only an ongoing process of correlation and negotiation. . . . Things are continuous with one another, and thus are interdependent conditions for each other. In a tradition which begins from the assumption that existence is a dynamic process, the causes of things are resident in themselves as their conditions, and the project of giving reasons for things or events requires a tracing or mapping out of the conditions that sponsor them. . . Li constitutes an aesthetic coherence in the sense that it begins from the uniqueness of any particular as a condition of individuation, and is at the same time a basis for continuity through various forms of collaboration between the given particular and other particulars with which, by virtue of similarity or productivity or contiguity, it can be correlated. ^(44){ }^{44} 李建立了特定社区的精神风气。因此,li 永远不会被认为是独立于上下文的。没有超越的礼。 。 。 。在没有目的论指导的情况下,只有持续不断的关联和谈判过程。 。 。 。事物是相互连续的,因而是相互依存的条件。在一种从存在是一个动态过程的假设开始的传统中,事物的原因作为它们的条件而存在于其自身之中,而为事物或事件给出理由的项目需要追踪或绘制出支持它们的条件。 。 。理构成了一种审美的连贯性,因为它始于作为个体化条件的任何特殊性的独特性,同时也是通过给定特殊性与其他特殊性之间各种形式的协作而连续性的基础,通过这种协作,相似性或生产力或连续性,它可以是相关的。 ^(44){ }^{44}
This antitranscendental emphasis on process, and on reciprocal action (to which we will resort again at length in what follows) gives a different implication to the notion of “coherence”: 这种对过程和互惠行为(我们将在下文中再次详细讨论)的反先验强调给“连贯性”的概念带来了不同的含义:
Process entails uniqueness, and makes any notion of strict identity problematic. As such, coherent unities are characterized in terms of a relative continuity among unique particulars. And such continuity is open-ended rather than systematic; it is contingent rather than necessary; it is correlative rather than causal. This is can include 过程需要独特性,并且使任何严格身份的概念都成为问题。因此,连贯的统一体以独特细节之间的相对连续性为特征。而且这种连续性是开放式的,而不是系统性的。它是偶然的而不是必然的;它是相关的而不是因果的。这可以包括
aspects which, if entertained simultaneously, would seem inconsistent or even contradictory, yet when entertained in process, are well within the boundaries of continuity. ^(45){ }^{45} 如果同时考虑这些方面,就会显得不一致甚至矛盾,但在过程中考虑时,它们完全在连续性的范围内。 ^(45){ }^{45}
The stressing of contextualization, mutual determination of the focus and the field, negotiability, provisionality, reciprocity, and immanence of coherence here, in a correlative cosmology, are crucial insights for understanding Li. However, I would like to stress an aspect of the ad hoc nature of Li which is underplayed a bit here, although it can be seen as an extension of the claim that Li has neither an exclusively subjective nor objective reference. For taken in all seriousness, this statement allows us to avoid a misunderstanding of the previous claim that Li includes equally cultural and natural patterns, as if these were two different realms included within the larger set of Li. This cannot be correct, even by the standards set by Hall and Ames themselves. As we shall see, there simply are no natural Li that are not also cultural, and no cultural Li which are not also natural. If we must divide these two ideal sets of possible coherences, we would perhaps do better to speak of Li as a kind of intersection or overlap between the two. But this is really a backward way of putting it. For what is at stake here, as we shall see, are the full implications of the inclusion of “subjective” reactions in the overall pattern of Li , as noted by Graham: the nondistinction between the concrete and the abstract, and the necessity of contextualization. 在相关宇宙论中,强调情境化、焦点和领域的相互确定、可协商性、临时性、互惠性和连贯性的内在性,是理解李的重要见解。然而,我想强调李的临时性质的一个方面,尽管它可以被视为李既没有完全主观也没有完全客观参考的主张的延伸,但这里有点被低估了。严肃地说,这一说法使我们避免了对先前主张的误解,即“理”同样包含文化和自然模式,就好像它们是更大的“理”集合中包含的两个不同领域。即使按照霍尔和艾姆斯自己设定的标准,这也是不正确的。正如我们将要看到的,没有一种自然礼不是文化礼,也没有一种文化礼不是自然礼。如果我们必须划分这两个理想的可能的连贯性集合,我们也许最好将“理”视为两者之间的一种交叉或重叠。但这确实是一种落后的说法。因为正如我们将看到的,这里的关键在于将“主观”反应纳入“理”的整体模式中的全部含义,正如格雷厄姆所指出的:具体与抽象之间的不区分,以及情境化的必要性。
We can sum up in advance what we will adopt and what reject from the giants on whose shoulders we stand here, and what we will find, in the readings that follow, needs to be added. 我们可以提前总结我们将采用的内容和我们所站在的巨人肩膀上拒绝的内容,以及我们将在接下来的阅读中发现的内容需要添加的内容。
From Needham we accept that Li is somehow autonomous rather than heteronomous, not a principle imposed from without. But we reject the idea of organism and the idea of pattern; organism implies a fixed ends-means teleology of organs, while pattern implies strict repeatability, neither of which can be found in Li . 从李约瑟那里,我们承认理在某种程度上是自主的而不是他律的,不是一个从外部强加的原则。但我们拒绝有机体的观念和模式的观念;有机体意味着固定的目的——器官的目的论,而模式则意味着严格的可重复性,这两者在《李》中都找不到。
From Hansen we accept the claim that the Chinese notion of knowledge tends to be primarily of a dividing out from a context, connected to an ontology based on dividing down rather than accumulation of distinct particulars. We also adopt the staunch rejection of the necessity of any two-tiered metaphysics that this model implies. But Hansen’s model seems to leave the vicissitudes of the dividing process up in the air, susceptible to the usual conflict between nominalism and realism, which we do not find to be applicable as a strict either/or in the Chinese case. 我们接受汉森的观点,即中国的知识概念往往主要是从语境中分离出来,与基于分离而不是不同细节的积累的本体论相关联。我们还坚决拒绝该模型所暗示的任何两层形而上学的必要性。但汉森的模型似乎将分裂过程的变迁悬而未决,容易受到唯名论和现实主义之间常见冲突的影响,我们发现这种冲突不适用于中国的情况。
From Graham we adopt the emendation of Hansen, the “built-in instructions” for dividing, which we call “perforations.” We will make much of the possible multiplicity and incompatibility of these perforations within any stuff. We also wish to amplify on his insight about the inclu- 我们采用了格雷厄姆对汉森的修正,即划分的“内置指令”,我们称之为“穿孔”。我们将充分利用任何东西中这些穿孔可能存在的多样性和不兼容性。我们还希望进一步阐述他对包容性的见解
sion of human inclinations within the scope of the given, and the clue this provides to solving the descriptive/normative problem for Li. But we will amend his notion of “pattern,” “regularizing,” and “reiterability,” as well as the depiction of Li as a sort of passive channel in which qi may flow. Our emendation comes from further emphasizing the perforation idea, combining it with the notion of Li . Li are these perforations, and the flowing of qi is also its rearrangement. Li must include also the notion of dividing and unifying, not just as a network branches apart but also interconnects, but rather as material is rearranged, divided into groups, so as to cohere, stick together, in a certain way. The “flow” of qi must be understood as the way Li reorganizes it. 在给定的范围内人类倾向的变化,以及这为解决李的描述性/规范性问题提供了线索。但我们将修改他的“模式”、“规范化”和“可重复性”的概念,以及将理描述为一种气可以流动的被动通道。我们的修正来自于进一步强调穿孔思想,并将其与理的概念相结合。理就是这些穿孔,气的流动也是它的重新排列。理还必须包括分裂和统一的概念,不仅是一个网络分支,而且是相互连接的,而是材料被重新排列,分成组,以便以某种方式凝聚、粘在一起。气的“流动”必须被理解为李重组它的方式。
From Peterson we adopt the crucial idea of Li as coherence, meaning both the sticking together of the parts of a thing and its way of sticking together with its environment. The multiple levels of nesting this conception allows will be crucial to developing Graham’s “perforation” idea, as well as the unity/multiplicity and immanent/transcendent dilemmas concerning Li , along with the negotiable identities of all terms that are so crucial to Hall and Ames’s insights on this matter. The use of this paradigm to solve the third crucial dilemma-the descriptive/normative-is, we feel, not yet accomplished in Peterson, and it is this angle we would like to augment. 从彼得森那里,我们采用了“理”作为连贯性的关键概念,既意味着事物各部分的粘连在一起,也意味着它与环境粘在一起的方式。这一概念所允许的多层嵌套对于发展格雷厄姆的“穿孔”思想,以及关于李的统一性/多样性和内在/超越的困境,以及对霍尔和艾姆斯来说至关重要的所有术语的可协商身份,都至关重要。对这个问题的见解。我们认为,使用这一范式来解决第三个关键困境——描述性/规范性——在彼得森身上还没有完成,而我们想要增强的正是这个角度。
From Hall and Ames, we adopt the addition of the sense of coherence as “intelligibility” to Peterson’s model, the inclusion of human and natural within its scope (continuing Graham’s point), and the greater emphasis on the ad hoc nature of these coherences, their shifting and always negotiable character. We also would like to build on the focus/field model, and the ars contextualis that goes with it. However, we would like to add several things to this model, while substantially agreeing with its overall intent. First, to the senses of “coherence,” we add and stress a fourth: value. Coherence, in Li , must cover at least these four senses: sticking together of parts, sticking together with the environment, intelligibility, and value. In stressing this point, we find that the ad hoc and purely nominalist rendering of the model is perhaps misleading; for these coherences are genuinely multilocal, instantiated in many separate events, and have actual causal efficacy as the wholes that play a decisive role in the constitution and character of their parts, albeit in an unusual way that does not amount to a realism either, and does indeed invite the kind of shifting focal contextualization that Hall and Ames concentrate on. For us, Li is neither nominalist nor realist in character, neither an absolute objective presence nor a subjectively projected invention. Li are neither purely invented nor purely discovered, and the extent to which we continue to think of these as mutually exclusive and exhaustive of all possible relations to coherent experiences will be the extent to which we still struggle with the meaning of Li . The Li, too, are 从霍尔和艾姆斯那里,我们采用了在彼得森模型中添加“可理解性”的连贯性意识,将人类和自然纳入其范围内(继续格雷厄姆的观点),并更加强调这些连贯性的特殊性质,他们的性格多变且总是可以协商。我们还希望建立焦点/领域模型,以及与之相伴的上下文环境。然而,我们希望在这个模型中添加一些内容,同时基本上同意其总体意图。首先,对于“连贯性”的含义,我们添加并强调第四个含义:价值。在《理》中,连贯性必须至少涵盖这四种含义:各部分的粘连、与环境的粘连、可理解性和价值。在强调这一点时,我们发现该模型的临时和纯粹唯名论的渲染可能会产生误导;因为这些连贯性确实是多地域的,在许多单独的事件中实例化,并且作为整体具有实际的因果效力,在其各部分的构成和特征中发挥决定性作用,尽管以一种不寻常的方式,也不等于现实主义,并且确实会引发霍尔和艾姆斯所关注的那种转移焦点的情境化。对我们来说,李在本质上既不是唯名论者,也不是实在论者,既不是绝对客观的存在,也不是主观投射的发明。 “理”既不是纯粹发明的,也不是纯粹发现的,我们继续认为这些与连贯经验的所有可能关系相互排斥和详尽的程度,将在多大程度上我们仍然与“理”的含义作斗争。李家也是
really there, and really transcendent to any concrete instantiation, and have real causal efficacy in their multilocality precisely as determining wholes, which always involves also a relation to some human conation as part of the determining holistic totality of the coherence in a way that a purely nominalist description tends to obscure. There can be many patterns in the world and many intelligible togethernesses that are not Li: those that a human being, in according with, will not come together with the world in such a way as to satisfy his specifically human desires. That is, unless cohering with it allows you to cohere with the world more coherently, it is not a Li . This is perhaps the crucial emendation: we would like to assert that Li is beholden to a reference to a second-order coherence. That is, it is only those coherences that cohere in a certain way with certain other coherences (i.e., human beings) that qualify as Li. This is to some extent already implicit in Peterson’s use of the term, and implied strongly by Graham. But it is still far too easy to imagine Li simply as some sort of pattern to be apprehended, without considering the subjective position of the apprehender. Li is not just any togetherness: it is a valued togetherness. Value, however, is also a togetherness: it is a relation between a desire and its object. The valuer is already implicated. The intelligibly coherent thing must cohere with certain human inclinations, which must themselves cohere with other inclinations in a valued way-i.e., as we shall see, “harmoniously.” 真实存在,并且真正超越任何具体的实例化,并且在其多地点性中具有真正的因果效力,精确地作为确定的整体,这总是涉及与某些人类意象的关系,作为连贯性的确定的整体性整体的一部分,以一种纯粹的方式唯名论的描述往往晦涩难懂。世界上可能有许多不属于“理”的模式和许多可理解的共同性:人类根据这些模式,不会以满足他特定的人类欲望的方式与世界结合在一起。也就是说,除非与它连贯可以让你与世界更加连贯,否则它就不是理。这也许是关键的修正:我们想断言李受到二阶相干性的引用。也就是说,只有那些以某种方式与某些其他连贯性(即人类)连贯的连贯性才有资格称为“理”。这在某种程度上已经隐含在彼得森对该术语的使用中,并且格雷厄姆也强烈暗示了这一点。但如果不考虑理解者的主观立场,就很容易将“理”简单地想象成某种需要理解的模式。礼不仅仅是一种团结:它是一种有价值的团结。然而,价值也是一种整体性:它是欲望与其对象之间的关系。评估师已经受到牵连。可理解的连贯性事物必须与某些人类倾向相一致,而人类的倾向本身也必须以一种有价值的方式与其他倾向相一致——即,正如我们将看到的,“和谐地”。
Lastly, we would like to augment the Hall and Ames field/focus model with a reference to Qian Mu’s pendulum model. This is to some extent already adumbrated in the idea of “focus” as a point that serves as a center toward which there is a convergence, as Hall and Ames already note. We may regard this idea of convergence as the crucial paradigm shift that unlocks much of Confucian thought, and returns in the Tiantai identification of “Centrality” (中 zhong) per se with Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} —valued coherence—means center in this sense, as Zhiyi also tells us. Centrality is itself value, is itself the connection of diverse and opposed particulars, is itself intelligibility: the three meanings of Li as coherence with which we have been grappling. A center unifies, is discernible, and is value (sustainability), as Qian’s analysis suggests. With the identification of the terms LiL i and Center in Tiantai, we have the bridge to the Neo-Confucian usage of the term Li to denote this kind of centrality. We will return to this in our discussion of Tiantai below and also when we briefly discuss the status of Li in Neo-Confucianism in the Conclusion. 最后,我们想参考钱穆的摆模型来增强霍尔和艾姆斯场/焦点模型。正如霍尔和艾姆斯已经指出的那样,这在某种程度上已经在“焦点”的概念中得到了预示,即作为一个中心的点,朝着这个中心汇聚。我们可以将这种趋同的观念视为关键的范式转变,它解锁了儒家思想的大部分内容,并在天台对“中中”本身的认同中回归 Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} “重视连贯性”在这个意义上意味着中心,正如志毅也告诉我们的那样。中心性本身就是价值,本身就是不同的和对立的细节的联系,本身就是可理解性:我们一直在努力解决“理”作为连贯性的三个含义。正如钱的分析所表明的,中心是统一的、可识别的、并且是价值(可持续性)的。随着术语的识别 LiL i 和中心在天台,我们有桥梁到新儒家使用“礼”一词来表示这种中心性。我们将在下面讨论天台山以及结语中简要讨论理在新儒家思想中的地位时回到这一点。
That is, there is a dyadic character to the force field, a certain circular form and rotating motion, which must be further stressed. Fields come in dyads, with two extremes ranged around a center. Hall and Ames perhaps allude to this in their discussion of Yin and Yang as a “this/that” pair, but it seems insufficiently integrated into their field/focus model, and their descrip- 也就是说,力场具有二元性,有一定的圆形和旋转运动,必须进一步强调这一点。场分为二元组,两个极端围绕一个中心。霍尔和艾姆斯也许在他们对阴阳作为“这个/那个”对的讨论中提到了这一点,但它似乎没有充分融入他们的场/焦点模型,以及他们的描述-
tion of Li, still, as a kind of “pattern.” To stress the dyadic character of the field and the “centrality” of the focus, as well as some sense of a pull of force, a center of gravity, in the organizing process, I will suggest instead a model of vertex and vortex. This vortex must be thought of as intrinsically dyadic in structure, bringing together opposed ingredients on the model of Qian Mu’s pendulum, but taking place in several nested dimensions at once: a sort of multi-dyadic vortex. Taking a further step, we stress that these vertices are lines of perforation inviting human action, the action of making a division, hence making something intelligible and articulate, organizing the material at hand in a particular way, grouping it. By dividing along a certain perforation, a Li, we join the totality into a certain harmonious whole-harmonious in the sense that it harmonizes with our senses (perception) and inclinations (actions and values). Here, the further model of the acupuncture meridian must be used to supplement the still too objectivist picture of vertex and vortex. In this way we can perhaps return to the notion of a “coherence” in general as developed prior to the advent of Li , modeled on the three-dimensional Gestalt that incorporates also the cognitions and desires of the human observer as part of the same Gestalt. A Li is a vertex making coherent a multi-dyadic vortex of which we are ourselves a constitutive part. 仍然将李视为一种“模式”。为了强调场的二元特征和焦点的“中心性”,以及组织过程中的某种拉力感、重心感,我将建议使用顶点和涡流模型。这种漩涡必须被认为本质上是二元结构,将钱穆钟摆模型上的相反成分聚集在一起,但同时发生在几个嵌套的维度中:一种多二元漩涡。更进一步,我们强调这些顶点是邀请人类行动的穿孔线,进行划分的行动,从而使某些东西变得可理解和清晰,以特定的方式组织手头的材料,将其分组。通过沿着某种穿孔(即“理”)进行划分,我们将整体连接成某种和谐的整体——和谐是指它与我们的感官(感知)和倾向(行动和价值观)相协调。这里,必须使用进一步的针灸经络模型来补充仍然过于客观的顶点和涡旋图。通过这种方式,我们也许可以回到李出现之前发展起来的“连贯性”概念,以三维格式塔为模型,将人类观察者的认知和欲望纳入同一格式塔的一部分。 。李是一个顶点,它使一个多二元漩涡连贯起来,而我们自己就是其中的一个组成部分。
Above and beyond these emendations, we will be identifying an ironic and a non-ironic usage of all the key terms concerning coherence, without which the apophatic adaptations of these terms in Taoist and Buddhist thought cannot be understood, rendering the grain of Chinese intellectual history unintelligible. 除了这些修正之外,我们将识别所有有关连贯性的关键术语的讽刺和非讽刺用法,否则就无法理解这些术语在道教和佛教思想中的背离改编,从而呈现中国思想史的脉络难以理解。
From the above considerations, I will be able to offer a general schema that can be applied to many of the diverse usages of Li to be considered below, broad and indeterminate enough for us to trace the continuities in usage without asserting that the word literally “means” the “same” thing in all eras, traditions and texts: Li will be viewed as a harmony which, when harmonized with by a human being, leads to further harmonies. These further harmonies may involve the original harmony, the human being, or both. I can restate the definition by replacing the word harmony with coherence in each instance, emphasizing thus that one of the ways in which a harmony can harmonize with a human being is for the human being to know it, to be aware of it, to pick it out and identify it, for it to be intelligible to him. Both terms imply a togetherness of diverse terms. Harmony emphasizes the experience of pleasure, and the quality of balance implied in this togetherness. Coherence implies the intelligibility in this togetherness. So more completely, but less elegantly, we may say: Li is a harmonious coherence, which, when a human being becomes harmoniously coherent with it, leads to further harmonious coherence. 从上述考虑出发,我将能够提供一个通用模式,该模式可以应用于下面要考虑的“李”的许多不同用法,其广泛性和不确定性足以让我们追踪用法的连续性,而无需断言该词字面意思是“ “礼”在所有时代、传统和文本中都意味着“相同”的事物:礼将被视为一种和谐,当人类与之和谐时,会带来进一步的和谐。这些进一步的和谐可能涉及原始和谐、人类或两者。我可以通过在每种情况下用连贯性代替“和谐”一词来重述这个定义,从而强调和谐与人类和谐相处的方式之一是让人类了解它、意识到它、选择它。把它找出来,辨认出来,让他能够理解。这两个术语都意味着不同术语的结合。和谐强调快乐的体验,以及这种团结所隐含的平衡品质。连贯性意味着这种一致性的可理解性。因此,更完整但不太优雅的是,我们可以说:理是一种和谐的连贯性,当一个人与它和谐地连贯时,就会导致进一步的和谐连贯。
In its simplest sense, Li is “how to divide things up so they fit together well.” Not “how they are divided up,” but “how to divide them up.” “To fit together well by being divided up in a certain way” is the basic idea of coherence. But the little word well in this definition leads to a further wrinkle, for “well” here means another fitting together: to “fit together well” is to “fit together in a way that is desired,” which is to say, “that fits together in a way that fits together with a desire or ideal.” Hence, this “fitting together” always involves (1) the dividing up of the parts of an object into dyadic balances so that the object as a whole fits together sustainably, creating an object that can reproduce itself and continue into the future; (2) the dividing up of value and desire so that they fit together pleasurably and lastingly satisfyingly, creating a sustainable object of desire; and (3) the dividing up of known and knower so that they fit together intelligibly, creating an intelligible object of knowing. Hence, we note that three distinct levels of harmonious coherence are thus necessary for any item, X , to qualify as Li. At each level there is a requirement of harmony, but this already introduces the broad variability involved in the many usages of the term: for what must be harmonized with at each level can vary widely. Above all, one of these levels is always a coherent harmony between some given human desires and some situation; since these desiderata can vary extremely in different systems of thought, the implications of Li will vary just as broadly. The three levels can be spelled out more explicitly as follows: 从最简单的意义上来说,理就是“如何将事物分开,使它们能够很好地结合在一起”。不是“如何划分”,而是“如何划分”。 “分而合之”是连贯性的基本思想。但是这个定义中的“well”这个小词导致了进一步的问题,因为“well”在这里意味着另一种装配在一起:“fit Together well”是“以期望的方式装配在一起”,也就是说,“那个以一种与愿望或理想相契合的方式结合在一起。”因此,这种“拼合”总是涉及(1)将物体的各个部分分割成二元平衡,使物体作为一个整体可持续地拼合在一起,创造出一个可以自我复制并延续到未来的物体; (2)将价值和欲望分开,使它们愉快地、持久地令人满意地结合在一起,创造出一个可持续的欲望对象; (3)将已知者和认知者分开,使它们能够以可理解的方式组合在一起,创造出可理解的认知对象。因此,我们注意到,对于任何项目 X 来说,要符合 Li 的条件,就需要三个不同级别的和谐连贯性。每个级别都有和谐的要求,但这已经引入了该术语的许多用法所涉及的广泛可变性:因为每个级别必须协调的内容可能有很大差异。最重要的是,这些层次之一始终是某些特定的人类欲望和某些情况之间的连贯和谐;由于这些需求在不同的思想体系中可能存在极大差异,因此“礼”的含义也会有很大差异。这三个级别可以更明确地表述如下:
The harmonious coherence (togetherness) of 和谐的连贯性(团结性)
a. the parts of X with one another, and 一个。 X 的各个部分彼此相连,并且
b. X as such and as a whole with its environment. b. X 本身及其环境作为一个整体。
The harmonious coherence between X and a desiring human perceiver: X 与渴望的人类感知者之间的和谐一致:
a. The given desires of the human being must harmoniously cohere with X ; that is, X must satisfy some human desires or other. 一个。人类的既定欲望必须与 X 和谐一致;也就是说,X 必须满足人类的某些欲望或其他欲望。
b. Human awareness harmoniously coheres with X ; that is, X is intelligible to human awareness. b.人类意识与X和谐一致;也就是说,X 是人类意识可以理解的。
The harmonious coherences that result when " 1 " above harmoniously coheres with " 2 " above. These can be of any number of types: 当上面的“1”与上面的“2”和谐一致时所产生的和谐一致。这些可以是任意数量的类型:
a. Marketability or social utility of X ( X adheres with economic demand and market desires); 一个。 X的市场性或社会效用(X符合经济需求和市场愿望);
b. Harvest of crops (nutrition available to humans, which harmonious cohere with their needs); b.农作物的收获(人类可获得的营养,与他们的需求和谐一致);
c. Progeny and continuation of the clan or species (harmonious coherence of past and present); c.氏族或物种的后代和延续(过去和现在的和谐一致);
d. Grouping together of the clan or species (harmonious coherence of its members); d.氏族或物种的组合(其成员的和谐一致);
e. Skill in human relations, or practical prowess or skill of any kind (coherence of ends and means); e.人际关系技巧,或任何形式的实际能力或技巧(目的和手段的一致性);
f. Liberation from suffering (Nirvana), and enlightenment into further intelligible coherences (“wisdom”). f.从痛苦中解脱(涅槃),并获得进一步可理解的连贯性的启蒙(“智慧”)。
Li is any harmonious coherence of the type described in 1 that can harmoniously cohere with human beings in the sense of 2 , leading to further harmonious coherences of the type described in 3. 理是1中描述的类型的任何和谐连贯性,它可以在2的意义上与人类和谐一致,从而导致3中描述的类型的进一步和谐连贯性。
In its earliest uses, Li is a verb meaning to organize raw material by dividing it up in some particular way, including dividing it up by cutting something away from a background, and to shape it into a coherent object that further coheres with some human values. When used as a stative verb it can usually be translated as “ordered” and when used as a transitive verb as “to put in order,” with the qualification a particular notion of order is implicit in the term: the arrangement of the parts of a thing, separating them into groupings and regions, so that it becomes a coherent whole, meaning a whole that more effectively interfaces-coheres-with human needs and human awareness. It means to put something into a humanly palatable form. In its earliest nominal usages, Li seems to be translatable roughly as “a valued way of cohering,” or “value-laden coherence.” This can mean the lines along which the cutting, articulation, and divisions must be done in order for the thing to be “ordered” in the above sense, its implicit perforations, or by a further extension, the resulting network of articulations. In this case, we can speak of “following” (循 xun) or “tracing” (緣 yuan) along the Li, which in this context translates easily as “pattern,” if we again recall that this implies a humanly valuable pattern, not necessarily any configuration that happens to repeat at regular intervals. Nor does it in any way imply strict repetition: instead, what matters is continuity, which is to say, coherence. This pattern of articulations is valuable or healthy for humans; it is also intelligible to humans, and healthy for humans to pay attention to. A further item that fits into the same set of articulations in an equally healthy way may be said to be part of the same Li , and to recognize this interconnection or harmony between these two items, or events, is to recognize the “same Li.” We could also in this sense speak of “the Li of X ,” which would denote the way of 在其最早的用法中,“理”是一个动词,意思是通过以某种特定方式划分原材料来组织原材料,包括通过从背景中切掉某些东西来将其划分,并将其塑造成一个连贯的物体,进一步与某些人类价值观相一致。当用作静态动词时,它通常可以翻译为“有序的”,当用作及物动词时,可以翻译为“按顺序排列”,带有限定条件的术语中隐含着特定的顺序概念:一个事物,将它们分成不同的组和区域,使其成为一个连贯的整体,这意味着一个更有效地与人类需求和人类意识相结合的整体。它的意思是把某些东西变成人类可口的形式。在其最早的名义用法中,“Li”似乎可以粗略地翻译为“一种有价值的凝聚方式”或“充满价值的连贯性”。这可能意味着必须沿着这些线进行切割、连接和分割,以便使事物在上述意义上“有序”,其隐含的穿孔,或者进一步延伸,由此产生的连接网络。在这种情况下,我们可以说“循循”或“缘缘”,在这种情况下,它很容易翻译为“模式”,如果我们再次回想起这意味着一种人类有价值的模式,不一定是任何定期重复的配置。它也不以任何方式意味着严格的重复:相反,重要的是连续性,也就是说,连贯性。这种发音方式对人类来说是有价值的或健康的。它也是人类可以理解的,并且值得人类关注,是健康的。 以同样健康的方式融入同一组关节的另一个项目可以说是同一个“理”的一部分,并且认识到这两个项目或事件之间的这种相互联系或和谐,就是认识到“同一个理”。在这个意义上,我们也可以说“X 的理”,它表示
viewing X so that its organizing articulations are evident, the ways in which it is optimally divided and grouped. To see the Li of X would be to see it subdivided in that optimal way for our understanding and handling of it, our integration (coherence) of it into our other experiences and purposes, rather than in some alternate way. In this sense, the term principle can be a tempting and often appropriate translation. We can restate this, as noted above, given the relativistic and pragmatic concept of value in play here, as a coherence that coheres also with human desires and inclinations, or ways of being together that are in harmony with some human evaluative stance. This may also imply an effect on the relation among those desires-making them, of course, more harmoniously coherent with one another in just this sense. Also implied is some reciprocity or mutuality between these desires or inclinations and these forms of togetherness in the world. ^(46){ }^{46} 观察X,使其组织结构清晰可见,即它的最佳划分和分组方式。看到 X 的 Li 就会看到它以我们理解和处理它的最佳方式细分,我们将它整合(连贯)到我们的其他经验和目的中,而不是以某种替代方式。从这个意义上说,“原则”一词可能是一个诱人且通常合适的翻译。如上所述,考虑到此处发挥的相对主义和实用主义价值概念,我们可以重申这一点,作为一种连贯性,也与人类的欲望和倾向相一致,或者与某些人类评价立场相一致的在一起方式。这也可能意味着对这些欲望之间关系的影响——当然,正是在这个意义上,使它们彼此更加和谐一致。还暗示着这些愿望或倾向与世界上的这些团结形式之间的某种互惠或相互关系。 ^(46){ }^{46}
It is in this context that the idea of the Omnipresent emerges, not as either the universal universal or as what is left out of all universals, as we saw (in Ironies of Oneness and Difference) underlie the competing notions of omnipresence in Western thought, but rather as the Great Coherence, which is non-ironically called Dao, the guiding course; or, alternately, the Incoherent Coherence, which is ironically called Dao. The former simply means the maximum coherence fitting the above definition, allowing human tradition, human society, natural groupings, and human desires to cohere, with a particular notion of human desires as the defining criterion. It is omnipresent in the sense of omniavailable, and in the sense that whatever falls outside of it cannot be said to really exist in any meaningful way for human beings. The latter, ironic coherence, is the literal inclusion and togetherness of all possible contents and contexts, the raw material and background from which they are cut and which is therefore itself never thematizable except as the detritus left over after any given cutting something out of raw material to make value, any act of Li-ing, of making usably coherent; it is therefore necessarily incoherent, valueless, and unintelligible, but which is all the more the great coherence in the sense of the togetherness and value of all things. At various times and places we have the attempted appropriation of one of these sense of omnipresence by the other; but this oscillation is in any case quite different from the oscillation and mutual refutation between the two opposite senses of the Omnipresent derived from the occidental notion of universals. 正是在这种背景下,无所不在的观念出现了,它既不是普遍的普遍性,也不是所有普遍性中被遗漏的东西,正如我们在西方思想中无所不在的竞争概念的基础上所看到的那样(在《统一与差异的讽刺》中),而是作为大连贯性,毫不讽刺地称为“道”,指导方针;或者,相反,不连贯的连贯性,讽刺地被称为“道”。前者仅仅意味着符合上述定义的最大连贯性,允许人类传统、人类社会、自然群体和人类欲望一致,以人类欲望的特定概念作为定义标准。从无所不在的意义上说,它是无所不在的,从某种意义上说,无论落在它之外的东西都不能说以对人类有意义的方式真正存在。后者是具有讽刺意味的连贯性,是所有可能的内容和背景、它们被切割的原材料和背景的字面包容和结合,因此它本身永远不会被主题化,除非是从原始材料中切割出某些东西后留下的碎屑。创造价值的材料,任何Li-ing的行为,使可用的连贯性;因此,它必然是不连贯的、毫无价值的、难以理解的,但从万物的共同性和价值的意义上来说,它更是伟大的连贯性。在不同的时间和地点,我们都试图将其中一种无所不在的感觉挪用为另一种。但无论如何,这种摇摆与源自西方共相概念的无所不在的两种相反含义之间的摇摆和相互驳斥是截然不同的。
Let us now turn to the slow development of this notion, growing from the soil of the prior conceptions of coherence already considered in Ironies of Oneness and Difference, in the work of particular thinkers and traditions. 现在让我们转向这个概念的缓慢发展,它是从先前的一致性概念的土壤中生长出来的,这些概念已经在《统一与差异的反讽》中、在特定思想家和传统的著作中得到了考虑。
TWO 二
THE ADVENT OF LI,
IRONIC AND NON-IRONIC 李的出现,
讽刺与非讽刺
I have mentioned that Li is not yet a central philosophical category in the earliest texts from the formative years of the Chinese philosophical traditions. However, there are some relatively nontechnical but nonetheless telling uses of the term in those contexts, prior to its self-conscious adoption as a specialized philosophical term, which it will be useful for us to consider. We will thus begin with those texts, with an eye specifically to the gathering storm of Li as it is taking shape in the gradual thickening of the associations of the term in its still vague ordinary meaning of “order.” The discussion is organized thematically rather than strictly chronologically. In this chapter I will address relatively undiluted expressions of what I take to be the non-ironic usages of Li from the Xunzi, and in late Warring States texts such as the “Yueji” (“Record of Music”) in the Liji and the canonical commentaries to the Zhouyi, and even the works of Dong Zhongshu (179-104 BCE) in the Han. In the next chapter, we will consider ironic appropriations of non-ironic themes as expressed around the usages of Li , considering them responses to non-ironic trends, even though some of the texts treated there certainly predate some of the texts treated here. The assumption is that we can thus trace a trajectory within the non-ironic line of thinking that exists in some form, and thus is capable of serving as a stimulus to thinkers with an orientation toward the ironic tradition, even before some of its written expressions, and even before all its ramifications have been fully developed. 我已经提到,在中国哲学传统形成时期的最早文本中,“理”还不是一个中心哲学范畴。然而,在自觉地采用该术语作为专门的哲学术语之前,该术语在这些背景下有一些相对非技术性但仍然有意义的用法,这对我们来说是有用的。因此,我们将从这些文本开始,特别关注正在聚集的“礼”风暴,因为“礼”一词的联想在其仍然模糊的“秩序”普通含义中逐渐加深,正在形成。讨论是按主题组织的,而不是严格按时间顺序组织的。在本章中,我将讨论我所认为的《荀子》和战国晚期文献中对“礼”的非讽刺性用法的相对纯粹的表达,例如《礼记》中的《乐记》和《乐记》。 《周易》的经典注释,甚至汉代董仲舒(公元前 179-104 年)的著作。在下一章中,我们将考虑围绕“李”的用法表达的非讽刺主题的讽刺挪用,考虑它们对非讽刺趋势的反应,尽管那里处理的一些文本肯定早于这里处理的一些文本。我们的假设是,我们可以在以某种形式存在的非讽刺思维路线中追踪一条轨迹,因此能够刺激那些以讽刺传统为导向的思想家,甚至在它的一些书面表达出现之前,甚至在其所有后果完全发展之前。
LI AS "GREATEST COHERENCE" IN THE XUNZI 《荀子》中“理”是“最通”
In Ironies of Oneness and Difference, I noted in passing that among the texts of the non-ironic tradition, it is in the Xunzi that we see the beginning of the 在《同异反讽》中,我顺便指出,在非反讽传统的文本中,我们在《荀子》中看到了反讽的开端。
advent of Li as an important and common term, with an exponential surge of frequency of usage as compared with earlier texts: a total of 106 appearances in the text as a whole. ^(1){ }^{1} Prior to this, we do have the key non-ironic, though sparse, usages of the term, still completely unflagged as any kind of special term, in the Mencius, in which the term occurs a whopping total of seven times. Four of these occur in the phrase 條理 tiaoli, “stripelike orderliness,” used to describe the harmony of music in both its beginning and its end, a way to praise the timeliness of Confucius as expressed in his “wisdom” and his “sageliness,” signifying the starting and finishing harmony respectively (Mencius 5B7). The meaning here is simply orderliness, with the important implication of harmony, as related to music, and of a coherence not only synchronically (harmony of various instruments and tones at any given time) but also diachronically (between the beginning and end of the piece), related explicitly to the combination of dyadically opposed virtues in the timeliness of Confucius. “礼”作为一个重要而常用的术语出现,与早期文本相比,使用频率呈指数级增长:全文中总共出现了 106 次。 ^(1){ }^{1} 在此之前,我们确实在《孟子》中找到了该术语的关键非讽刺性用法,虽然稀疏,但仍然完全没有被标记为任何特殊术语,其中该术语出现了多达七次。其中四个出现在“条理条理”一词中,“条理条理”,用于描述音乐在开始和结束时的和谐,以此来赞扬孔子的及时性,即他的“智慧”和“圣贤”。 ”分别表示和谐的开始和结束(《孟子》5B7)。这里的含义只是秩序,具有与音乐相关的和谐的重要含义,以及不仅是同步的连贯性(在任何给定时间各种乐器和音调的和谐)而且是历时的连贯性(在乐曲的开头和结尾之间) ),与孔子时代的二元对立美德的结合明确相关。
The other significant usage compares the way delicious flavors please the mouth with the way “coherence and rightness” (理,義 li,yil i, y i ) please the heart/mind (Mencius 6A7). The close linkage of these two terms is to be noted here: coherence is, as we shall soon see in detail, in the non-ironic sense directly related to “rightness” in the sense of the fulfillment of one’s specific role and its duties. The coherence of parts is related to their separation into their separate duties, and their ability to discharge those roles without overstepping them. Note also that for Mencius the term is unabashedly related here, as in the musical example, to a kind of visceral pleasure. 另一个重要的用法是将美味的味道与“理,义”的方式进行比较 li,yil i, y i )请心/头脑(孟子 6A7)。这里要注意这两个术语的密切联系:正如我们很快将详细看到的那样,在非讽刺意义上,连贯性与履行一个人的特定角色和职责意义上的“正确性”直接相关。各部分的连贯性与它们各自职责的分离以及它们在不超越职责的情况下履行这些职责的能力有关。还要注意的是,对于孟子来说,这个词在这里毫不掩饰地与一种发自内心的快乐相关,就像在音乐的例子中一样。
Let us now turn to Xunzi’s much more frequent deployments of the term LiL i, to unearth what kind of thinking required him to begin reaching for this word so much more often than any of his predecessors had. Xunzi most commonly uses the term Li as a stative verb, meaning “ordered” or “coherent” in a positively valued way; it is one of his words for the order that counts as Xunzi’s highest nonnegotiable value. That is, while Xunzi treats many things as having a variable value, there are a small number of things that are for him nonnegotiable, and Li makes its appearance as one of those items. As I argued in Ironies, “order” per se is for Xunzi a near-synonym for value: as I read him, when Xunzi says “bad,” he means disordered, that is, incoherent in the sense of self-conflicted. This applies also to Xunzi’s famous claim about human nature. When he says it is bad, he does not mean there is nothing that can be put to good use in it; he just means that in its native state it is disordered, incoherent, self-conflicted, thus self-weakening. Hence, there is no contradiction in Xunzi saying both “Human nature is bad” and “The source of goodness lies in human nature.” An incoherent whole can have some elements that are good or neutral or ambiguous. Ultimate value for Xunzi is very simply the maximal satisfaction of human desires. This 现在让我们看看荀子对该术语的更频繁的运用 LiL i ,以揭示什么样的思维需要他比任何前任都更频繁地使用这个词。荀子最常用“理”这个词作为静态动词,意思是“有序的”或“连贯的”,以积极的方式表达。这是他对荀子的最高不可协商价值的命令之一。也就是说,虽然荀子认为许多事物具有可变的价值,但也有少数事物对他来说是不可协商的,而礼就是其中之一。正如我在《反讽》中所说,“秩序”本身对于荀子来说几乎是价值的同义词:当我读到他时,当荀子说“坏”时,他的意思是无序,即自我冲突意义上的不连贯。这也适用于荀子关于人性的著名主张。他说它不好,并不是说它没有什么用处,而是说它没有什么用处。他只是说,在其自然状态下,它是无序的、不连贯的、自我冲突的,因而是自我削弱的。因此,荀子所说的“性恶”和“善的根源在于性”并不矛盾。一个不连贯的整体可能有一些好的、中立的或模糊的元素。荀子的终极价值很简单就是人类欲望的最大满足。这
can only be achieved by human strength over other creatures and over nature, which can only be achieved by human teamwork, which can only be achieved by division of labor and privileges among humans, which can only be achieved by social ritual. These are the nonnegotiable values, including both the ultimate value (the satisfaction of desires being a self-justifying autotelic value) and the instrumental values leading thereto. Ritual is nonnegotiable, but it has value because it leads to social divisions that lead to human togetherness and teamwork. These are the non-ironic coherence that Xunzi prizes. It is of value because it means being free of self-undermining social conflict, so that humans can be strong enough to get what they want. But all those qualities that might or might not contribute to ritual can be good or bad; whatever contributes to ritual coherence at some time or place is in that time or place good; whatever obstructs it is bad. These are the negotiable items, which include all sorts of human dispositions, emotions, institutions, habits: if properly fitted into the ritual coherence, they are good, but if not, they are bad. This allows Xunzi to give the most comprehensive possible picture of coherence, the Greatest Coherence, which can incorporate a wide range of apparently conflicting qualities and tendencies and behaviors: ritual itself serves as the “center” that unifies the two extremes of any given exemplar of Qian Mu’s pendulum swing: advance and retreat, heaven and man, softness and hardness, cultural refinement and material austerity. ^(2){ }^{2} The negotiable items are valued differently according to how well or poorly they serve the nonnegotiable items; their desirability is purely a function of how well they cohere with the latter. It is this coherence itself, however, that really constitutes the nonnegotiable values. 只有通过人类对其他生物、对自然的力量才能实现,只有通过人类的团队合作才能实现,只有通过人类之间的分工和特权才能实现,只有通过社会仪式才能实现。这些是不可协商的价值观,包括最终价值(欲望的满足是一种自我证明的自得其乐的价值)和导致其的工具性价值观。仪式是不容谈判的,但它具有价值,因为它会导致社会分裂,从而促进人类团结和团队合作。这些都是荀子所推崇的非讽刺的连贯性。它是有价值的,因为它意味着摆脱自我破坏的社会冲突,这样人类就可以强大到足以得到他们想要的东西。但所有那些可能有助于也可能不会有助于仪式的品质可能是好是坏。任何在某个时间或地点有助于仪式连贯性的事物在该时间或地点都是好的;任何阻碍它的东西都是不好的。这些是可以谈判的项目,其中包括人类的各种性格、情感、制度、习惯:如果适当地适应仪式的连贯性,它们是好的,但如果不符合,它们就是坏的。这使得荀子能够给出最全面的连贯性图景,即最大的连贯性,它可以包含广泛的明显冲突的品质、倾向和行为:仪式本身作为“中心”,统一了任何给定范例的两个极端。钱穆的摆摆:进退、天人、刚柔、文化的精进和物质的俭朴。 ^(2){ }^{2} 可流通物品的价值根据其为不可流通物品提供的好坏而不同;他们的需求纯粹取决于他们与后者的融合程度。 然而,正是这种一致性本身才真正构成了不可协商的价值观。
A typical but maximally simple example would be this description of the noble person (君子 junzi): “When he is joyful he is harmonious and orderly, when he is worried he is still and orderly” (喜則和而理,憂則靜而理 xi ze he er li, you ze jing er li). ^(3){ }^{3} This comes in a list of descriptions of the junzi, showing how in each of two apparently oppositely valued situations or moods he is still exemplifying value, that is, order. He can be either joyful or worried, but each is part of a larger whole that alters its resultant moral quality, which allows it to succeed in being Li, coherent or orderly, and thus a positive rather than a negative characteristic. Li in this passage is parallel to the following stative verbs: 道,節,類,法,止,齊,明,詳(dao,jie, lei, fa, zhi, qi, ming, and xiang), meaning “guiding,” “regulated,” “classified,” “lawful,” “still,” “even,” “clear,” and “well-articulated.” When expansive he is heavenlike and serves as a guide; when small-minded or careful he is fearful of rightness and regulated, and so on. All of these describe forms of value for Xunzi: one may be expansive or careful, clever or dull, successful or unsuccessful, joyful or worried, but as long as one is orderly, so that all one’s parts and functions form one coherent whole and this whole coheres 一个典型但最简单的例子就是对君子的描述:“喜则和而理,忧则静而”。理西则何而礼,尤则敬而礼)。 ^(3){ }^{3} 这是对君子的一系列描述,表明在两种明显相反的价值观或情绪中,他仍然体现了价值,即秩序。他可以是快乐的,也可以是忧虑的,但每一个都是一个更大整体的一部分,这个整体改变了其最终的道德品质,这使得它能够成功地成为礼,连贯的或有序的,因此是一个积极的而不是消极的特征。这段话中的“理”与以下静态动词平行:道、节、类、法、止、齐、明、详(dao、jie、lei、fa、zhi、qi、ming、想),意思是“引导、 “受监管”、“机密”、“合法”、“仍然”、“均匀”、“清晰”和“清晰”。当他扩张时,他就像天堂一样,可以作为指导者;当他心胸狭隘或小心谨慎时,他就会害怕正义和规则,等等。所有这些都描述了荀子的价值形式:一个人或大或谨慎,或聪明或迟钝,或成功或失败,或快乐或忧虑,但只要有秩序,使一个人的各个部分和功能形成一个连贯的整体,这就是一个人的价值。整体连贯
harmoniously with the world and with the ancient traditions in these ways, it is still a positively valued aspect of the noble man’s existence. Li is one way of describing this orderliness; some of its other aspects are acting as guide, being regulated, classifying into types, being stable, and being intelligible-all ideas folded into our non-ironic notion of coherence: value, intelligibility, and orderly unification of diverse elements, balance of contrasted qualities, such that continuance is possible. 通过这些方式与世界和古老传统和谐相处,它仍然是贵族存在的一个积极有价值的方面。 “礼”是描述这种秩序的一种方式。它的其他一些方面是作为指导、受到规范、分类、稳定和可理解的——所有的想法都被纳入我们非讽刺的连贯性概念中:价值、可理解性、不同元素的有序统一、对比的平衡的品质,使得持续性成为可能。
It is significant that among these parallel terms we here see, for the first time, the notorious lei, that is, “categorization,” the division into types. Xunzi spells out the relation between Li and lei-types more explicitly elsewhere: “Viewing things exhaustively by means of the Way, past and present conform to a single measure. When types do not contradict each other, then even over a long span of time they form the same Li [類不悖雖久同理 leibubei suijiu tong li]. Hence, one can face deviations and twists without being confused.” ^(4){ }^{4} A qualifying condition is provided here, indicating that some but not all types may come together to form a Li: if they cohere with one another over a sufficiently long period of time, they can be considered a Li. Not all lei count as Li . At the same time, it is not the repetition of a pattern that serves as the criterion that classifies them as Li , not a strict sameness or the participation in an isomorphic standard. It is rather a horizontal consistency, a coherence, between parts: the parts are not in revolt against one another, they do not contravene one another: the coherence of a Li is a harmony, not a sameness. 值得注意的是,在这些平行术语中,我们第一次看到了臭名昭著的“lei”,即“分类”,即类型的划分。荀子在其他地方更明确地阐述了礼与类之间的关系:“以道穷观事物,古今合一。当类型彼此不矛盾时,即使经过很长一段时间,它们也会形成同一个理。如此,才能面对偏差和曲折,而不至于迷茫。” ^(4){ }^{4} 这里提供了一个限定条件,表明某些但不是所有类型可以聚集在一起形成李:如果它们在足够长的时间内相互结合,则可以将它们视为李。并不是所有林雷都算黎。同时,并不是某种模式的重复作为将它们归类为“理”的标准,也不是严格的相同或参与同构标准。相反,它是各部分之间的一种水平一致性、一种连贯性:各部分并不相互反抗,也不相互冲突:理的连贯性是一种和谐,而不是千篇一律。
But this is an abbreviated way of describing the criterion for making a Li out of the available lei. Xunzi gives us a little more detail elsewhere: “The benevolent man uses loyalty and trustworthiness as the material of which he is made [質 zhi], dignity and respect to form his controlling unifier [統 tong], ritual and rightness to form his patterned ornamentation [文 wen], and human relations and type-categories to form his Li. [忠信以為質,端除以為統,禮義以為文,倫類以為理 zhongxin yiwei zhi, duanque yiwei tong, liyi yiwei wen, lunlei yiwei li].” We are being told here precisely how one goes about making LiL i, that is, forming an intelligible and harmoniously coherent order capable of serving as a guideline for action, a perforation along which to cut so as to sustain and continue this order: it is formed from (1) human relations and (2) types existing in the world. In other words, where these two contrary and pressing demands overlap, the benevolent man makes a Li. When human social relations on the one hand and natural groupings of feeling and response in nature come together, he makes a selective judgment call, thereby producing the value-laden orderliness of coherence, Li. The parallelisms with zhi, tong, and wen also help us fill out the notion of Li here: zhi and wen are a standard opposition, as in Analects 6:18, while wen and Li are commonly linked as closely related terms. This suggests that zhi 但这是描述从可用的 lei 中生成 Li 的标准的一种缩写方式。荀子在别处给了我们更多的细节:“仁者以忠信为质,以尊严敬为统统,以礼义为纲。纹饰[文 wen],与人伦、类型范畴形成其礼。 [忠信以为质,端除以为统,礼义以为文,伦类以为理中心意为,端鹊意为通,理义意为文,论类意为里]。我们在这里被准确地告知一个人如何制作 LiL i ,也就是说,形成一种可理解的、和谐一致的秩序,能够作为行动的指导方针,沿着它进行切割以维持和延续这种秩序:它是由(1)人际关系和(2)现有类型形成的在世界上。换句话说,当这两种相反而紧迫的要求重叠时,仁者就造出了“礼”。当人类的社会关系与自然界中的感觉和反应的自然分组结合在一起时,他做出选择性的判断,从而产生了充满价值的连贯性有序性“Li”。与“知”、“同”和“文”的对应关系也有助于我们在这里充实“理”的概念:“知”和“文”是标准的对立关系,如《论语》6:18,而“文”和“理”通常作为密切相关的术语联系在一起。这表明智
and tong stand together here against wen and Li , and each pair bears roughly the same internal relation. Zhi is to wen as tong is to Li . Zhi is the foundation of wen, wen gives aesthetic expression to zhi; so controlling unification is the foundation of Li , and Li gives aesthetic expression to this unification. Li is the intelligible, discernible, visible expression of this totalizing unification. Wen and Li are visible to the eye, discernible, coherent, while zhi and tong are internal and hidden, to be inferred rather than perceived. Li is the intelligible aspect of value-bearing coherence. 和通在这里站在一起对抗文和李,每一对都具有大致相同的内在联系。知之于文,通之于礼。志是文的基础,文赋予志以审美表现;所以控制统一是礼的基础,礼又赋予这种统一以审美的表现。理是这种总体统一的可理解、可辨别、可见的表达。文和理是肉眼可见的、可辨别的、连贯的,而知和通是内在的、隐藏的,是可以推断的,而不是感知的。理是价值连贯性的可理解的方面。
Xunzi speaks repeatedly of Li as something that can be “threaded together” (貫 guan), ^(6){ }^{6} as something that can be followed (循 xun), ^(7){ }^{7} and as something that simplifies a complex situation and makes it intelligible, or easy to discern (簡然易知 jianran yizhi). ^(8){ }^{8} Threaded together, various smaller coherences form the “Greatest Coherence” 大理 dali, Xunzi’s word for the largest coherent whole. Coherence here functions like a mass noun, as both Hansen and Peterson would predict. Many coherences together still form coherence-for the “together” is precisely the coherence. That Li can be followed and easily discerned go with the meaning of coherence as intelligibility; the common trope of “following” Li further supports our understanding of Li as harmony rather than sameness. One does not repeat it, one rather traces its contour and continuity among diverse instances; this is done not by matching to a model isomorphically, but by moving along the channel, tracing the path of contiguity. Where various elements join together harmoniously, allowing for a smooth transition from one to another, we have a “traceable” Li. 荀子多次谈到“理”是可以“贯贯”的东西, ^(6){ }^{6} 作为可以遵循的东西(循xun), ^(7){ }^{7} 以及将复杂情况简化并使其易于理解或易于辨别的事物(简然易知 jianran yizhi)。 ^(8){ }^{8} 各种较小的连贯性串联在一起,形成了“大理大理”,荀子用这个词来表示最大的连贯整体。正如汉森和彼得森所预测的那样,这里的连贯性就像一个质量名词。许多连贯性加在一起仍然形成连贯性——因为“在一起”正是连贯性。理可循而易辨,符合连贯、可解之义; “追随”李这个常见的比喻进一步支持了我们对“李”的理解,即和谐而不是千篇一律。人们不会重复它,而是在不同的实例中追踪它的轮廓和连续性;这不是通过与模型同构匹配来完成的,而是通过沿着通道移动、追踪邻近路径来完成。当各种元素和谐地结合在一起,从一种元素到另一种元素的平滑过渡时,我们就有了“有迹可循”的李。
Li is for Xunzi a harmonious continuity, a discernible, valued coherence, but it is not simply “found” in the world; rather, as we described in our discussion of Xunzi’s notion of coherence in Ironies, ^(9){ }^{9} it is formed and chosen from among all available groupings by the selective act of the authoritative sage. We saw there a seeming contradiction in Xunzi’s “Rectification of Names” chapter, which seemed on the one hand to affirm the existence of real samenesses and differences distinguished by human sensory perception-something like “natural kinds”-and on the other an affirmation of the social construction, or regulation, of what words designate and distinguish. The naturalism of the former point would, in isolation, seem to rest on the recognition of some entities called Natural Kinds, which I claim would have to be in some sense genuinely identical wherever they are instantiated, possessing the causal efficacy not only of warranting their recognition as noncontiguous instantiations of the selfsame thing, but also of constituting genuine holistic totalities upon whose characteristics the identities of their parts are ontologically dependent, thus implying a kind of Realism. The conventionalism of the latter point, in isolation, would seem to recognize only the individual entities as objectively real, and their 对荀子来说,理是一种和谐的连续性,一种可辨别的、有价值的连贯性,但它并不是简单地在世界中“发现”的;相反,正如我们在讨论荀子的反讽中的连贯概念时所描述的, ^(9){ }^{9} 它是通过权威圣人的选择性行为从所有可用的群体中形成和选择的。我们在荀子的《正名》篇中看到了一个表面上的矛盾,它一方面肯定了人类感官知觉所区分的真正同异的存在——类似于“自然类”——另一方面又肯定了词语指定和区分的社会建构或规则。前一点的自然主义,孤立地看,似乎依赖于对一些称为自然类的实体的认识,我声称,在某种意义上,无论它们在何处被实例化,它们都必须是真正相同的,拥有因果效力,不仅保证它们的因果效力承认是同一事物的不连续实例,但也构成了真正的整体性整体,其各部分的身份在本体论上依赖于其特征,因此暗示了一种现实主义。后一点的约定论,孤立地看,似乎只承认个体实体是客观真实的,并且它们的实体是客观存在的。
unity, their grouping under a particular name, as something that has reality only if applied from outside of these individual entities themselves, that can be added or withdrawn at will without changing anything about their real character, and hence implies a kind of Nominalism. To resolve this tension, interpreters sometimes suggest that Xunzi embraces a sort of “weak nominalism”: the distinctions actually exist once and for all in the physical world, but human convention decides what particular sound and symbol is used to denote them. The groupings remain the same, and admit of a strict dichotomous right and wrong, but social regulation needs to determine which particular words denote each grouping in each community. We found in our analysis, however, that this solution oversimplifies the text. Xunzi is saying something somewhat more interesting. Our conclusion in Ironies was that for Xunzi there is an overabundance of possible ways to group things in the world, all of which have some warrant in the actual behavior of the objective world, but which stand in potential conflict with one another: the world as such, prior to human intervention, forms no single synordinate coherence. To recap that example, there is a real grouping in the physical world that puts whales in the same class as fish-to wit, they all really live in the water; there is another real grouping in the physical world that puts whales in a class with mammals-that is, they all really give birth to live young and produce milk. Both of these groupings are genuinely present, and both of them constitute genuine unities that, considered in themselves, are multiply instantiating and causally real in providing warrant for accurately naming these entities in this way. Indeed, as coherences, they are multiply instantiating entities that have causal efficacy also in actually holding the members of the coherence together in this way and enabling their relations in the manner described. That is, the totality of aquatic animals is, say, a holistic ecosystem, a genuine coherence in which the identities of its members are constituted only by their participation in that ecosystem, and the same is true, in another way, of the holistic totality of milk-producing and live young-bearing organisms. Both are coherences in the sense of wholes that can be accurately viewed as having a determining role to play in the actual constitution of the existence and identities of their members, bestowing a multiply instantiated character that inheres in each of these members. ^(10){ }^{10} Modern biology seems to imply that the former is an erroneous grouping, missing the true essence of these animals, while the latter is the true grouping that uniquely carves nature at its joints. Xunzi would say that both can be true, but that a human society, guided by regulations from a king guided by the tradition of sage kings, must choose one or the othersomewhat in the way kilograms and pounds both pick out physical realities, and yet if both systems are used, or if values are randomly or inconsistently assigned to them without being regulated by social conventions and even 统一,即它们在特定名称下的分组,作为只有从这些个体实体本身之外应用时才具有现实性的东西,可以随意添加或撤回而不改变它们的真实特征,因此暗示了一种唯名论。为了解决这种紧张关系,解释者有时建议荀子拥抱一种“弱唯名论”:这些区别实际上在物质世界中一劳永逸地存在,但人类的惯例决定了使用什么特定的声音和符号来表示它们。这些分组保持不变,并承认严格的二分法是非,但社会监管需要确定哪些特定词表示每个社区中的每个分组。然而,我们在分析中发现,该解决方案过于简化了文本。荀子说的是更有趣的事情。我们在《反讽》中的结论是,对于荀子来说,对世界上的事物进行分组的可能方法有太多,所有这些方法都对客观世界的实际行为有一定的依据,但它们之间存在潜在的冲突:世界作为在人类干预之前,这种情况不形成单一的协调一致性。回顾一下这个例子,在物理世界中存在一个真实的分组,将鲸鱼与鱼归为同一类——也就是说,它们实际上都生活在水中;物质世界中还有另一个真实的群体,将鲸鱼与哺乳动物归为一类——也就是说,它们都确实生下幼崽并产奶。这两个分组都是真实存在的,并且它们都构成了真正的统一体,就其本身而言,它们是多重实例化的且因果真实的,为以这种方式准确命名这些实体提供了保证。 事实上,作为连贯性,它们是多重实例化实体,这些实体也具有因果功效,实际上以这种方式将连贯性的成员保持在一起,并以所描述的方式实现它们的关系。也就是说,水生动物的整体是一个整体的生态系统,是一种真正的连贯性,其中其成员的身份仅由他们参与该生态系统构成,从另一个角度来说,整体的整体也是如此。产奶和活的幼崽生物体。两者都是整体意义上的连贯性,可以准确地视为在其成员的存在和身份的实际构成中发挥决定性作用,赋予每个成员固有的多重实例化特征。 ^(10){ }^{10} 现代生物学似乎暗示,前者是一个错误的分组,忽略了这些动物的真正本质,而后者则是真正的分组,在其关节处独特地雕刻了自然。”两种系统都被使用,或者如果值被随机或不一致地分配给它们,而不受社会惯例的监管,甚至
sanctions, the marketplace will be in chaos. The Greatest Coherence is the maximal coherence that can be created, not by the world alone nor by human beings alone, but by a certain selective overlap of the two: those among all nonhuman systems of grouping which can form a second-order coherent harmony with human desires and cognitions. But again, not all human desires and cognitions: only those that can form a coherent whole with those of the traditions of the sage-kings on the one hand and the surplus-ordered (i.e., chaotic, because it is possesses an overabundance of competing orders) nonhuman world. The Greatest Coherence is the intersection of the ways in which things are grouped by the nonhuman world, the tradition of the sage-kings and the present sensory and affective experiences of living human beings. This is the locus of true value. As Xunzi remarks, “Human trouble is always a matter of being restricted to one corner of things and ignoring the Greatest Coherence [大理 da Li].” ^(11){ }^{11} 制裁的话,市场就会混乱。最大的连贯性是可以创造的最大连贯性,不是单独由世界或人类单独创造,而是通过两者的某种选择性重叠:所有非人类的分组系统中的那些可以与其他系统形成二阶连贯和谐的系统。人类的欲望和认知。但同样,并非所有的人类欲望和认知:只有那些一方面能够与圣王传统和剩余秩序(即混乱,因为它拥有过多的竞争性)形成一个连贯整体的欲望和认知。命令)非人类世界。最伟大的连贯性是非人世界、圣王传统和人类当前感官和情感体验的组合方式的交集。这就是真正价值的所在。正如荀子所说:“人的烦恼,总是局限于事物的一角而忽视了大理。” ^(11){ }^{11}
This can perhaps be more clearly grasped from the connections drawn between Li and tong and lei, as well as xing, Human Nature, in the following passage: 从下面这段话中“理”、“通”、“类”以及“性”之间的联系,或许可以更清楚地理解这一点:
That which knows things is Human Nature [人之性 ren zhi xing]. That which can be known is the coherences of things [物之理 wu zhi Li]. If we seek to know the coherences of things with this human nature which is able to know, without any point of consolidation or resting point [i.e., point of orientation], then even if one continues to study all one’s life one will never get all of it. Even though one may string together coherences numbered in the millions, it will never be sufficient to go through all the changes of the ten thousand things, and one will still be no better off than the ignorant. . . . Thus study must have its endpoint, its point of orientation. Where shall it come to rest? In the perfect sufficiency. And what is this perfect sufficiency? The sage kings. “Sage” means those who penetrate to the utmost the relations of things, and “king” means those who regulate things to the utmost. When these two are both brought to the utmost, it is adequate to serve as the utmost standard of the world. Thus in our study we must take the sage kings as our teachers, according with the regulations of the sage kings as our patterns, emulating these patterns in order to unify types [統類 tong lei], and to come to resemble them as people. ^(12){ }^{12} 知事者,即人之性。能被认识的,就是事物的连贯性。如果我们以这种人性能够知道的方式来寻求事物的连贯性,而没有任何巩固点或休息点(即方向点),那么即使一生不断地研究,也永远无法得到全部它的。虽能串起千万的连贯性,但仍不足以经历万事的变化,仍不比无明者好。 。 。 。因此,研究必须有它的终点、它的方向。它会在哪里安息呢?在完美的充足性中。什么是完美的充足性?诸圣王。 “圣”是指最大限度地洞察事物关系的人,“王”是指最大限度地调节事物的人。当这两者都发挥到极致时,就足以作为世界的最高标准了。所以我们学习,必须以圣王为师,以圣王之规为范,效仿这些范式,以统一类类,以类人。 ^(12){ }^{12}
There is no end to the multiplicity of possibly relevant coherences out there in the world; the only way to select out from among them that are relevant is to follow the sage-kings. It is this alone that makes of them a single overarching, synordinate coherence, with genuine value. The point 世界上可能相关的一致性的多样性是无穷无尽的。从其中选出相关的唯一方法就是跟随圣王。正是这一点使它们具有单一的总体性、协调性的一致性,具有真正的价值。重点
is driven home most emphatically in a passage that has caused interpreters great trouble: the question has tended to be, Is the order of the universe discovered-a preexisting normative code-or is it invented by the noble man? Xunzi seems to be saying both. But in fact he is saying neither: order neither preexists nor is it created ex nihilo by the sages. Rather, it is that overlap of the man and nature that forms the Greatest Coherence. Here is one of Xunzi’s most striking formulations of this point, which recapitulates the seeming tension between realism and nominalism, between preexisting order to be discovered and the human creation of order in the universe: 在一段给解释者带来巨大麻烦的段落中,这一点被最有力地阐明了:问题往往是,宇宙的秩序是被发现的——一种预先存在的规范代码——还是由高贵的人发明的?荀子似乎是在说这两件事。但事实上他并没有说:秩序既不是预先存在的,也不是由圣人无中生有地创造的。相反,正是人与自然的重叠形成了最大的一致性。以下是荀子对这一点最引人注目的表述之一,它概括了实在论与唯名论之间、待发现的先存秩序与人类在宇宙中创造秩序之间的表面张力:
Thus Heaven and Earth produce noble men, and noble men bring coherence to [li][l i] Heaven and Earth. Noble men are those who join into and form a triad with Heaven and Earth, the controlling unifiers of the ten thousand things, the fathers and mothers of the people. Without noble men, Heaven and Earth would be incoherent [buli], ritual and rightness would fail to form a totality. There would be no rulers and teachers above, no fathers and sons below. This is what is called the utmost disorder. The relation of lord and minister, of father and son, of elder and younger brother, of husband and wife-these begin and then end, end and then begin, joining in the same coherence [tongli] with heaven and earth, joining in the same lastingness with ten thousand generations. ^(13){ }^{13} 故天地生君子,君子以和 [li][l i] 天地。君子,是与天地并为三者,主宰万事,为人民的父母。没有君子,天地不和,礼义不能一体。上无君师,下无父子。这就是所谓的最乱。君臣、父子、兄弟、夫妻,始而终,终而始,与天地同理,与天地同理。与万代同恒。 ^(13){ }^{13}
It is tempting to identify this specific passage in Xunzi as the precise place in Chinese thought where the term Li is elevated from among the throng of possible words with which to denote some of the various forms and dimensions of the coherence and its sometimes conflicted implications, which had preoccupied thinkers up to that time, as we traced in detail in Ironies of Oneness and Difference, to its candidacy for a more specific, technical term by which to indicate a specific second-order form of coherence among coherences, providing a wedge that opens the way to many future developments, problems, and solutions. Noble men produce the coherence of Heaven and Earth, and yet the system they create also “joins in the same coherence” as Heaven and Earth. 人们很容易将《荀子》中的这段特定段落视为中国思想中的确切位置,其中“理”一词是从众多可能的词语中升华出来的,用这些词来表示连贯性的各种形式和维度及其有时相互冲突的含义,正如我们在《统一与差异的讽刺》一书中详细追溯的那样,直到那时,它一直困扰着思想家,它是一个更具体的技术术语的候选者,通过这个术语来表示连贯性之间的连贯性的特定二阶形式,提供了一个楔子,为许多未来的发展、问题和解决方案开辟了道路。君子创造了天地的相通,而他们所创造的体系也与天地“同相”。
Heaven and Earth are a first-order coherence in the sense in which we have defined it: a dyadically conceived whole that is continually pro- 天地在我们所定义的意义上是一阶连贯性的:一个二元构想的整体,不断地促进
ductive of what become new parts of itself, nonidentical continuations of itself which continue to cohere with the initial coherence, neither same nor different from it, both adding to it and included within it. The relationship each new part has to this whole is what gives those parts their existence and identity, and each of these parts has some way of organizing its activity toward this whole, and thus organizing this whole around it; this manner in which each part coheres with and continues the whole, extending the whole in a new way but also included within it, is what constitutes each part’s proto-evaluative act, as it were, its way of prioritizing and organizing and valuing the other elements of the whole in such a way that it is maximally sustaining to itself, although these different ways of valuing may or may not be consistent with one another. One of their parts, their productions, their continuations, is the noble man, a certain kind of human being, who also continues and coheres with the whole in his own way, thereby organizing it around his own self-maximizing evaluative orientation. 归纳出成为自身新部分的东西,自身的不同延续,继续与最初的连贯性保持一致,既不相同也不不同,既增加了它又包含在它之内。每个新部分与这个整体之间的关系赋予了这些部分其存在和身份,并且每个部分都有某种方式组织其针对这个整体的活动,从而围绕它组织这个整体;每个部分与整体相结合并延续的方式,以新的方式扩展整体,但也包含在其中,这就是构成每个部分的原始评估行为的方式,可以说,是其优先考虑、组织和评价另一部分的方式尽管这些不同的评估方式可能彼此一致,也可能不一致,但整体的各个要素都以一种最大限度地维持自身的方式进行。它们的一部分、它们的产物、它们的延续,是高贵的人,某种人类,他也以自己的方式延续并与整体融为一体,从而围绕着他自己的自我最大化的评价方向来组织它。
But Heaven and Earth themselves are not yet an example of the second-order coherence between coherences that Xunzi calls a Li, or of the greatest totality of these, the da LiL i, the Greatest Coherence. If they were, the noble men could not themselves be said to produce this Li. But nor are they definitively excluded from being included in the subsequent Greatest Coherence; they form an element that can be integrated into a Greatest Coherence once it has been created. At least some subset of what exists prior to human beings, some elements of the productive coherence of the physical world that produced them, can be incorporated into the fabric of this second-order continuity, which is the Greatest Coherence created by the noble men. Thus is the tension between apparent Realism and apparent Nominalism resolved here, just as in the case of Natural Kinds in general, as discussed in Ironies and recapped above. 但天地本身还不是荀子所说的“理”之间的二阶相干性的例子,也不是这些相干性的最大整体“大”的例子。 LiL i ,最大的一致性。如果是的话,就不能说是贵族们自己产生了这个礼。但也没有明确排除它们被包含在随后的“最大一致性”中;它们形成了一个元素,一旦被创建,就可以融入到最大的一致性中。至少在人类之前存在的某些子集,产生人类的物质世界的生产一致性的某些元素,可以纳入这种二阶连续性的结构中,这是由高贵的人创造的最大一致性。因此,表面的实在论和表面的唯名论之间的紧张关系在这里得到了解决,就像一般自然类的情况一样,正如《反讽》中所讨论的和上面概述的那样。
This coherence of Li is real, multiply instantiated, and has a determinative power retrospectively even on the nature of its elements and on the conditions of its own production, which makes it genuinely productive of the new identity of Heaven and Earth as they exist within the value-producing coherence and continuity of this new whole. Heaven and Earth are now, as instantiations of this Li created by the noble men, elements that causally contribute to the sustaining of the physical world in the specific form that is maximally sustaining to human beings, as well as serving as genuine moral guidelines, serving actively as cooperative guarantors of model normativities. In fact, the noble men unify existing coherences, groupings, in the physical world, existing lei, selectively, and thereby create the Greatest Coherence. This is a way of “joining in” the same coherence as Heaven and Earth, which is to be clearly distinguished from following a preexistent coherence. This coherence coheres with some subset of those coherences, forming the Greatest Coherence possible. This is where the dichotomous 理的这种连贯性是真实的,是多重实例化的,并且甚至对其元素的性质和其自身产生的条件也具有回顾性的决定性力量,这使得它真正产生了存在于宇宙中的天地的新身份。这个新整体的价值创造一致性和连续性。天地现在,作为圣人创造的理的实例,是因果性地有助于以特定形式维持物质世界的元素,最大限度地维持人类,并作为真正的道德准则,服务于人类。积极作为示范规范的合作保证者。事实上,高贵的人们有选择地统一物质世界中现有的一致性、分组、现有的花环,从而创造出最大的一致性。这是一种与天地一样“合”的方式,与遵循先在的连贯性有着明显的区别。这种一致性与这些一致性的某些子集相一致,形成了可能的最大一致性。这就是二分法的地方
conception of “same and different” that we struggled to dispel in Ironies can lead to such interpretative havoc: the “same” (tong) here is prevented from being a dichotomous sameness by its connection with the “join” ( yuy u ) and the “coherence” (Li)(\mathrm{Li}). It does not mean following a single preconstituted principle that is “the same” in all instantiations. This would make the claim that “noble men produce” this principle, this order, this coherence ( Li ) incomprehensible. Xunzi means rather a joining up with a single unbroken continuity, which is constituted by both sameness and difference: the overlap of some part of what is coherent in tradition, some part of what is coherent in human cognition, and some part of what is coherent in the physical world to form the greatest available coherence. 我们在反讽中努力消除的“相同和不同”的概念可能会导致这种解释上的混乱:这里的“相同”(同)通过与“连接”的联系而避免成为二分法的相同性( yuy u )和“连贯性” (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) 。它并不意味着遵循在所有实例中“相同”的单一预先构成的原则。这就使得“君子产生”这种原则、这种秩序、这种连贯性的说法变得难以理解。荀子的意思更确切地说是一种单一的、不间断的连续性的结合,这种连续性是由相同和差异构成的:传统中连贯的某些部分、人类认知中连贯的某些部分和人类认知中连贯的某些部分的重叠在物理世界中形成最大的可用一致性。
Note also that maintenance and continuance here again go hand in hand with finding those coherent relations in humans that in turn cohere with some aspect of the world. Human social codes are those among the natural coherences that must not be altered: “Music/joy refers to those harmonies [和 he] which must not be changed; ritual means those coherences [Li] which must not be changed. Music joins the same, while ritual divides the different. The unity of ritual and music is controlled by the heart-mind of man.” ^(14){ }^{14} The parallelism between “harmony” and “coherence” should be especially noted here. Xunzi contrasts and pairs ritual and music by noting that ritual stresses division, while music stresses harmony, or difference and sameness, which where at the heart of his theory of general terms and his theory of real but conflicting groupings in the world. Here again, he states explicitly that their unity lies in the mind of man. This jibes closely with our analysis of the problem above. Li is here still the divisions, the fixed roles, the determinate particularities, as opposed to the harmonizing, the joining and merging, of harmony. But Xunzi’s intertwining of the two reveals the manner in which this dividing is also a joining, and this joining is also a dividing. Both harmony and coherence are a matter of separating into interrelated groups. When we divide, we unite; when we unite, we divide. 还要注意,这里的维持和延续再次与在人类中寻找那些连贯的关系齐头并进,而这些关系反过来又与世界的某些方面相一致。人类社会准则是那些不可改变的自然连贯性:“音乐/欢乐指的是那些不可改变的和谐[和他];礼是指那些不可改变的连贯性。音乐将同一的结合起来,而仪式则将不同的分开。礼乐的统一,是由人心所支配的。” ^(14){ }^{14} 这里要特别注意“和谐”与“连贯”之间的平行关系。荀子将礼与乐进行对比和配对,指出礼强调分,而乐强调和谐或异同,这是他的一般术语理论和世界上真实但相互冲突的群体理论的核心。在这里,他再次明确指出,它们的统一性在于人的心灵。这与我们对上述问题的分析非常吻合。这里的“理”仍然是分裂、固定的角色、确定的特殊性,而不是和谐的协调、结合和融合。但荀子对两者的交织揭示了这种分裂也是一种结合,这种结合也是一种分裂。和谐和连贯都是将其分成相互关联的群体的问题。当我们分裂时,我们团结;当我们团结时,我们就会分裂。
This passage is also of particular interest to us here because of the way it determines the relationship between ritual and Li. Ritual is a subset of Li. Among all the possible Li, those which cannot be changed are the authoritative rituals. If Li meant anything like “reason” or “truth” or “principle” or “order,” we would expect the exact opposite claim: Li would be those eternal truths that can be culled from human rituals, the unchangeable moral principles. Xunzi’s view is the reverse. There are many many types of coherence out in the world, many ways in which things group together. Among these, man chooses out some subset that are crucial to maximizing his own power. These are the authoritative rituals, and they cannot be changed in the sense that they must not be changed. This claim, of course, has a brother: the other coherences can be changed. They do not form a 这段话对我们来说也特别有趣,因为它决定了礼与礼之间的关系。礼是礼的一个子集。在所有可能的礼中,不能改变的就是权威的礼。如果理的意思是“理性”、“真理”、“原则”或“秩序”,我们会期待完全相反的说法:理将是那些可以从人类仪式中剔除的永恒真理,不可改变的道德原则。荀子的观点则相反。世界上有许多种连贯性,事物组合在一起的方式也有多种。其中,人类选择了一些对于最大化自己的力量至关重要的子集。这些都是权威的仪式,不能改变的意思是它们不能改变。当然,这个主张有一个兄弟:其他连贯性是可以改变的。他们不形成一个
single consistent synordinate system applying at all times. Xunzi allows for timeliness of the application of “principles,” the grouping into coherences, as long as they do not violate the nonnegotiable subset of coherences, the socially mandated rituals. I may call the whale a fish or a mammal as the situation demands, as long as I do so in the ritually prescribed manner, and these will be true descriptions of real coherences in nature in either case. This is one of the strongest pieces of evidence for the rejection of the idea of Li as principle or law of nature in Xunzi. 始终适用单一一致的协调系统。荀子允许及时应用“原则”,将其分组为连贯性,只要它们不违反不可协商的连贯性子集,即社会强制的仪式。我可以根据情况需要将鲸鱼称为鱼类或哺乳动物,只要我按照仪式规定的方式这样做,无论哪种情况,这些都将是对自然界真正连贯性的真实描述。这是驳斥《荀子》中“理”作为原则或自然法则的观念的最有力的证据之一。
Xunzi says elsewhere: "When Benevolence is maintained with a sincere heart, it becomes externally manifest. When manifest it becomes spiritual, when spiritual it is able to transform others. When Rightness is practiced with a sincere heart, there is second-order coherence [Li]. When thus coherent, it becomes manifest [明 ming], and thus able to transform with circumstances. ^(15){ }^{15} The internal coherence of one member of the group becomes outwardly apparent, and this makes it capable of forming larger coherences within the group, both by inspiring others to emulate it and by gaining the ability to coherently contextualize itself (transform with circumstances). In sum, Xunzi exhorts us, "In whatever you do, establish what is beneficial to creating coherence [Li], and discard whatever is not beneficial to creating coherence. ^(116)Li{ }^{116} \mathrm{Li} has here become a word for ultimate, nonnegotiable value. 荀子另有言:“仁心存诚,则外显;显则灵,灵则能化人。义诚则行,则二通”。当如此连贯时,它就变得明显,从而能够随环境而变化。 ^(15){ }^{15} 团体中一名成员的内部连贯性变得显而易见,这使得它能够在团体内形成更大的连贯性,既可以激励其他人效仿它,也可以通过获得连贯地语境化自身的能力(随环境而变化)。总而言之,荀子告诫我们:“凡事,立有利于和的,舍弃不利于和的。 ^(116)Li{ }^{116} \mathrm{Li} 在这里已成为终极的、不可协商的价值的代名词。
"HEAVENLY PRINCIPLE"(天理 TIANLI) IRONIC AND NON-IRONIC IN THE "INNER CHAPTERS" OF THE ZHUANGZI AND "THE RECORD OF MUSIC" 《庄子》《内篇》与《乐录》中的“天理”反讽与非反讽
With the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, we are squarely in the heart of the hardcore ironic tradition, as discussed at length in Ironies of Oneness and Difference. The term Li plays very little role in this development, as we have noted; where the term really explodes into its full development is in the incorporations of non-ironic themes into the framework of the ironic tradition, as expressed in the “Outer” and “Miscellaneous” Chapters of the Zhuangzi, as will be analyzed at length in the next chapter. But Li does occur in the “Inner Chapters” (1-7) of the Zhuangzi, exactly one time. This is the only occurrence of the character in either the Laozi or the “Inner Chapters,” the core texts of the ironic tradition. It is a very important usage, the very first time in the tradition that the two characters 天理 tianli are used together, giving the appearance of what would later become a set binome and a very central term of much of later Chinese philosophical Confucianism and Daoism, a term that is sometimes translated “heavenly principle.” In the “Inner Chapters,” however, this would be a rather misleading way to construe the phrase. The meaning of tianli here is perhaps closer 通过《庄子内章》,我们正好处于核心讽刺传统的核心,正如《同异反讽》中详细讨论的那样。正如我们所指出的,“李”一词在这一发展中发挥的作用很小。这个术语真正得到充分发展的地方在于将非讽刺主题纳入讽刺传统的框架中,正如《庄子》的“外”和“杂”章所表达的那样,这将在《庄子》中详细分析。下一章。但“礼”确实出现在《庄子》的“内章”(1-7)中,而且只出现过一次。这是讽刺传统的核心文本《老子》或《内章》中唯一出现的人物。这是一个非常重要的用法,在传统中第一次将“天理天理”两个字一起使用,给出了后来成为一组二元组的外观,并且是后来中国儒家和道家哲学中的一个非常中心的术语。这个术语有时被翻译为“天理”。然而,在“内章”中,这将是一种相当误导性的解释该短语的方式。这里天力的意思或许更接近
to something like, “spontaneous (nonfabricated, nonarranged, nonteleological) coherence.” This term still seems strongly to suggest the existence of genuine natural kinds or real coherences in the world, but we have argued at length, in the prequel, that Zhuangzi’s perspectivism entails a thoroughgoing rejection of natural kinds. Is this consistent? 类似于“自发的(非捏造的、非安排的、非目的的)连贯性”。这个术语似乎仍然强烈地表明世界上存在真正的自然类或真正的连贯性,但我们在前传中详细论证了庄子的视角主义意味着对自然类的彻底拒绝。这是一致的吗?
Yes. The reason is simple. Zhuangzi’s perspectivism is not the denial of natural coherences, but the assertion of an overabundance of real coherences, which cannot be combined into an exhaustive single synordinate meta-system of non-ironic coherence (a point accepted and responded to by Xunzi). The passage in question is Cook Ding’s description of how he cuts up an ox: "I meet it with my spirit and don’t look with my eyes; my organ-knowledge [官知 guanzhi, teleological deeming knowledge, more or less equivalent to the 知 zhi or eye-knowledge of the Laozi] stops and my spiritual desires [roughly equivalent to Laozi’s stomach-“clarity” 明 ming] proceed. I depend on the heavenly coherences [依乎天理 yihutianli] and cut through the large gaps, guided by the big channels; I go by the inherent rightnesses [因其固然 yinqiguran]."17 I am inclined to read “depend on the heavenly coherences” and “go by the inherent rightnesses” as roughly parallel, and thus as mutual glosses. Li would then be parallel to ran, which we have seen to mean, in the “Qiwulun,” “to affirm as this and as right.” The nonarranged, nonteleological coherences would then be the same as the inherent rightness of each position, perspective, and thing, and hence none other than their “heavenly,” untidied state prior to deliberate interference: what Zhuangzi calls “the radiance of drift and doubt” (滑疑之耀 guyi zhi yao). To “go by the inherent rightnesses”(因固然 yin guran) of each perspective is precisely “to go by the this,” (因是 yinshi), that is, the coherence set up temporarily by each perspective on the basis of its own self-affirming thisness. They are “heavenly” or “nonarranged” in the sense that they are not made to cohere with any single, overarching, synordinate coherence of a uniquely privileged whole. The practical implication is simply that there are natural coherences, and that by following them in each case one can flow along without contention in each particular case, and then go on to follow an entirely different noncontrived coherence when encountering the next “this.” Each “this” brings with it its own coherence, necessarily. This implies nothing about a single overall system of “overall coherence” or “heavenly principle,” singular. Each position creates, indeed is, the coherence of all that is around it; the coherent whole is formed within each particular member, not around or above them. Zhuangzi’s tianli is not Xunzi’s dali. It is, rather, its ironic counterpart-the inescapable parody of overall coherence. With this ironic usage of tianli, we have made the step into what appears to be the “objective” sense of Li . It is what is opposed to individual, private bias, to preconceived ideas, to clinging to a particular 是的。原因很简单。庄子的视角主义并不是对自然连贯性的否定,而是对过多的真实连贯性的断言,这种连贯性不能被组合成一个详尽的、非反讽连贯性的单一并列元系统(荀子接受并回应了这一点)。这段话是丁厨对他如何宰牛的描述:“我用我的精神来迎接它,而不是用我的眼睛看;我的器官知识[官知观智,目的论的知识,或多或少相当于老子的“知之”停止,而我的精神欲望(大致相当于老子的胃-“明明”)继续前进,我依靠天理(依乎天理)来切断巨大的间隙, ”17 我倾向于将“依天理”和“依固有正”理解为大致平行,因而是相互注释。 。这样,“理”就与“然”平行,我们在《其五论》中看到“然”的意思是“肯定这样、这样正确”。这种无序的、非目的论的连贯性将与每个立场、观点和事物固有的正确性相同,因此无非是它们在故意干扰之前的“天国”、杂乱状态:庄子所说的“漂移和怀疑的光芒” ”(滑疑之耀guyi zhi yao)。各观点的“因固然”正是“因是因时”,即各观点根据自己的观点暂时建立起来的连贯性。自我肯定这一点。它们是“天堂般的”或“无安排的”,因为它们并不是为了与一个独特的特权整体的任何单一的、总体的、协调的一致性而结合在一起的。 实际意义很简单,那就是存在自然的连贯性,通过在每种情况下遵循它们,人们可以在每种特定情况下毫无争议地继续前进,然后在遇到下一个“这个”时继续遵循一种完全不同的非人为的连贯性。每个“这个”都必然具有其自身的连贯性。这并不意味着单一的“整体连贯性”或“天理”的整体系统是单一的。事实上,每个位置都创造了其周围所有事物的连贯性。连贯的整体是在每个特定成员内部形成的,而不是在它们周围或之上。庄子的天理不是荀子的大理。相反,它是其讽刺性的对应物——对整体连贯性的不可避免的模仿。通过对“天理”的这种讽刺性用法,我们已经迈进了“理”的“客观”意义。它反对个人的、私人的偏见、先入为主的想法、坚持特定的观点。
perspective. We are told to follow it rather than impose something upon it. In these points, it sounds like “objective truth,” the real as opposed to the merely apparent, the objective as opposed to the subjective. But my point here is that in this usage we are witnessing what Richard Rorty would call a live metaphor, and in particular, a still stinging irony. Tianli is initially a deliberate contradiction in terms. Tian is what things are like before they are Li-ed. The Li of Tian are like the Dao that cannot be a dao. To follow them is to follow the unfollowable. They are anything but objective truths; rather, we are told to follow them the way the monkey trainer is told to follow along with the monkeys in Zhuangzi’s second chapter. This is not because the monkeys are objectively right-quite the contrary. The monkeys are as subjective as they can be-one-sided, biased, irrational. As we discussed at length in Ironies, the reason for following their values is not that they are objectively true, but because that is how the wild card works, and sustains itself. This is how the term LiL i, originally meaning the imposition of order onto a raw material, comes to bleed into what sounds like a sense of the suspension of one’s own deliberate intentions to follow along with something external. What looks like the advent of a notion of objective truth is rather an instance of sovereign Zhuangzian irony. We will see this sense developed further in the Guo Xiang commentary to the Zhuangzi, and reinvested with a stronger sense of normativity by some Buddhists and Neo-Confucians. But despite appearances, objectivity in its usual sense is never what is meant by this term. 看法。我们被告知要遵循它,而不是强加于它。在这些方面,它听起来像是“客观真理”,是真实的而不是仅仅明显的,客观的而不是主观的。但我在这里的观点是,在这种用法中,我们正在见证理查德·罗蒂所说的生动的隐喻,特别是仍然刺痛的讽刺。天理最初是一个故意矛盾的术语。 Tian是事物在Li-ed之前的样子。天之理,犹如道,不能为道。追随他们就是追随不可追随的事物。它们绝不是客观真理;相反,我们被告知要跟随它们,就像庄子第二章中驯猴师被告知跟随猴子一样。这并不是因为猴子客观上是正确的——恰恰相反。猴子是主观的,他们可能是片面的、有偏见的、非理性的。正如我们在《反讽》中详细讨论的那样,遵循它们的价值观的原因并不是它们客观正确,而是因为这就是通配符的运作方式和维持方式。这就是这个词的用法 LiL i “秩序”最初的意思是对原材料强加秩序,但后来却逐渐渗透到一种听起来像是悬置了一个人自己的刻意意图而追随外部事物的感觉。看起来客观真理概念的出现实际上是庄子的至高无上的讽刺的一个例子。我们将看到这种意义在郭象的《庄子注》中得到进一步发展,并被一些佛家和新儒家重新注入了更强的规范性意义。但尽管表面上如此,但通常意义上的客观性从来都不是这个术语的含义。
“The Record of Music” (樂記 “Yueji”), which forms part of the 禮記 Liji, is the site of the one other classical use of this same term tianli, “heavenly coherence.” The text shows signs of being a relatively late Warring States work, certainly later than both Zhuangzi and Xunzi, with clear influences from the latter. The passage in question gives a general theory of man’s relation to the external world, using a phraseology similar to that of both the Xunzi and the “Great Commentary” to the Zhouyi: 《礼记·礼记》的一部分《乐记》(《乐记》)是“天理”一词的另一个经典用法。有迹象表明,该文本是相对较晚的战国著作,当然晚于《庄子》和《荀子》,明显受到后者的影响。这段话给出了人与外部世界关系的一般理论,使用了类似于《荀子》和《周易》的“大论”的措辞:
Thus the reason the former kings created ritual and music was not to extend to the utmost [極 ji]j i] the desires of the mouth, stomach, ears and eyes, but to teach the people to even out their likes and dislikes and return to the proper Way of human beings. Human beings are in a state of stillness when born; this is their Heavenly nature [天性 tianxing]. They are touched off by [external] things and [only then] move; these are the desires belonging to their nature [性之欲 xing zhi yuy u ]. But after things arrive, the [faculty of] knowledge [知 zhi] apprehends them-only then do likes and dislikes take shape therein. If likes and dislikes have no regulation within, and the [faculty of] knowledge is enticed from without, [human beings] can 故先王之所以创礼乐,不为至极。 ji]j i] 口、胃、耳、眼之欲,而教民调平好恶,回归人间正道。人一出生,就处于静止状态;这就是他们的天性。他们被[外部]事物所触动,[才]移动;这是本性的欲望 yuy u ]。但事到了之后,知知了之,好恶才在其中形成。若好恶无内定,而知受外诱,则能
not reflect upon themselves, and the Heavenly coherence [天理 tian