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beyond oneness and difference
超越同一性和差异性

LI 理 AND COHERENCE IN
理与连贯

CHINESE BUDDHIST THOUGHT AND ITS ANTECEDENTS
中国佛教思想及其渊源



brook ziporyn 布鲁克·齐波伦

BEYOND ONENESS
AND DIFFERENCE
超越合一 与差异

SUNY series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture
纽约州立大学中国哲学与文化系列

Roger T. Ames, editor 罗杰·T·艾姆斯,编辑

BEYOND ONENESS
AND DIFFERENCE
超越合一 与差异

Li 理 and Coherence in
理与连贯

Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its Antecedents
中国佛教思想及其渊源

BROOK ZIPORYN 布鲁克·兹波林

Published by 发布者:State University of New York Press, Albany
纽约州立大学出版社,奥尔巴尼

c 2013 State University of New York
c 2013年纽约州立大学
All rights reserved 版权所有Printed in the United States of America
美国印刷

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.
未经书面许可,不得以任何方式使用或复制本书的任何部分。未经出版商事先书面许可,本书的任何部分均不得存储在检索系统中或以任何形式或任何方式(包括电子、静电、磁带、机械、影印、录音或其他方式)传输。

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State University of New York Press, Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
欲了解信息,请联系 纽约州立大学出版社,纽约州奥尔巴尼 www.sunnypress.edu 劳里·塞尔制作 营销,安妮·瓦伦丁 美国国会图书馆出版数据编目

Ziporyn, Brook, 1964- 布鲁克·兹波林,1964 年-
Beyond oneness and difference : L i L i LiL i and coherence in Chinese Buddhist thought and its antecedents / Brook Ziporyn.
超越同一性和差异性: L i L i LiL i 中国佛教思想及其前身的连贯性/Brook Ziporyn。

pages cm . - (SUNY series in Chinese philosophy and culture)
页码 厘米 . - (纽约州立大学中国哲学文化系列)

Includes bibliographical references and index.
包括参考书目和索引。

ISBN 978 1 4384 4817 6 978 1 4384 4817 6 978-1-4384-4817-6978-1-4384-4817-6 (alk. paper)
国际标准书号 978 1 4384 4817 6 978 1 4384 4817 6 978-1-4384-4817-6978-1-4384-4817-6 (普通纸)
  1. Li. 2. Philosophy, Chinese. 3. Truth-Coherence theory. I. Title.
    李。 2.哲学,汉语。 3.真理一致性理论。一、标题。
B127.L5Z565 2013
181 '. 112 dc 23 112 dc 23 112-dc23112-\mathrm{dc} 23 181'。 112 dc 23 112 dc 23 112-dc23112-\mathrm{dc} 23
2012045682
This book is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, one I. Ziporyn, immigrant, autodidact, Spinozist, and author of Cosmo-Retardation: A Brief Introduction To A Theory Which Shows The Possibility Of Cosmic Function In A Continuum Devoid Of Energy, a work that received, as far as I know, a total of one printed review, in the journal Philosophy of Science, published by the University of Chicago, July 1940.
本书谨献给我的祖父,一位移民、自学者、斯宾诺莎主义者 I. 齐波林 (I. Ziporyn),也是《宇宙迟滞:显示宇宙功能在缺乏能量的连续体中的可能性的理论简介》一书的作者,据我所知,这项工作在芝加哥大学 1940 年 7 月出版的《科学哲学》杂志上总共收到了一篇印刷评论。
Here is the entire review, consisting of a single sentence: “The mystic use of scientific terms prevents making head or tail of anything in this book. W. M. M.”
这是整个评论,由一句话组成:“科学术语的神秘使用使本书中的任何内容都无法得到头或尾。西玛”
On second thought: this book is dedicated collectively to I. Ziporyn and this reviewer, “W.M.M.,” in the Borgesian hope that they have by now turned out, in the afterlife, to be two aspects of a single soul.
再想一想:这本书集体献给 I. Ziporyn 和这位评论家“WMM”,博尔赫斯式的希望,他们在来世,现在已经成为一个灵魂的两个方面。

CONTENTS 内容

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS … xi 致谢……xi
INTRODUCTION 介绍
Li 理 and Coherence: Recap of Ironies of Oneness and
理与连贯:统一性和连贯性的讽刺回顾

Difference and Terminological Clarifications … 1
差异和术语说明……1

CHAPTER ONE 第一章
Li 理 as a Fundamental Category in Chinese Thought … 21
理作为中国思想的基本范畴……21

Needham and Organic Pattern … 30
李约瑟和有机模式…… 30

Hansen and the Mass Noun Hypothesis … 31
汉森和大众名词假说…… 31

Graham and the Absent Copula and Correlative Thinking … 33
格雷厄姆和缺席的 Copula 以及关联思维…… 33

Peterson and Coherence … 38
彼得森和连贯性...... 38

Hall and Ames and the Focus/Field … 40
霍尔和艾姆斯以及焦点/领域…… 40

CHAPTER TWO 第二章
The Advent of Li, Ironic and Non-Ironic … 49
李的出现,讽刺和非讽刺…… 49

Li as “Greatest Coherence” in the Xunzi … 49
《荀子》中“理”为“大同”…… 49

“Heavenly Principle” (天理 tianli) Ironic and Non-Ironic
“天理”(天理 tianli) 讽刺与非讽刺

in the “Inner Chapters” of the Zhuangzi and
在《庄子》的《内篇》中

“The Record of Music” … 59
“音乐唱片”……59

Li in the “Wings” to the Zhouyi … 64
《周易》《翅膀》中的李……64

Li and Centrality in Dong Zhongshu (179-104 BCE) … 68
董仲舒(公元前 179-104 年)中的李和中心地位 … 68

CHAPTER THREE 第三章
The Development of Li in Ironic Texts … 71
反讽文本中“李”的发展……71

Li and Non-Ironic Coherence in the Later Parts of the
李与后面部分的非讽刺连贯性

Zhuangzi: Integrating the Non-Ironic … 71
庄子:整合非讽刺……71

First Type: Li and Dao Both Non-Ironic … 72
第一种:理、道皆非反语……72

Second Type: Dao Ironic, Li Non-Ironic … 73
第二种:道反讽、理非反讽……73

Third Type: Dao and Li Both Ironic … 79
第三种:道理皆反……79

Integrating Types Two and Three … 82
集成类型二和类型三…… 82

CHAPTER FOUR 第四章
The Advent of Li as a Technical Philosophical Term … 107
作为技术哲学术语“理”的出现…… 107

Toward the Ironic: Li in the Pre-Ironic Daoism of the
走向反讽:前反讽道教中的李

Guanzi … 108 管子 … 108
Li Defined: The Later Two-and-a-half Chapters of the Guanzi … 118
李定义:《管子》后两章半……118

The Hanfeizi Commentary on the Laozi: Li as Division and the
韩非子老子评:理为师

Yielding Dao … 125 屈服刀……125
Cosmological Dao and Its Li in the Huainanzi … 131
《淮南子》宇宙道及其理……131

CHAPTER FIVE 第五章
Li as the Convergence of Coherence and Incoherence in
理作为连贯与非连贯的汇合

Wang Bi and Guo Xiang … 137
王弼、郭象……137

Subjective Perspectivism in Wang Bi: The Advent of Ti and
王弼的主观视角主义:钛与物的出现

Yong 體用 as Ironic Structure … 149
勇体用作为讽刺结构… 149

Applications of the Multiplicity of Li in Wang’s
黎的多重性在王氏作品中的应用

Laozi Commentary … 155 老子注释……155
Convergence of Coherence and Incoherence in Guo Xiang:
《郭象》中连贯与非连贯的融合:

Li as “Just the Way It Is,” as Limit, and as
李作为“本来就是这样”,作为极限,作为

Vanishing Convergence … 157
消失的收敛……157

Unintelligible Coherence: Vanishing and Merging into Things … 168
难以理解的连贯性:消失和融入事物...... 168

Ironic Li as Non-Ironic Li in Guo Xiang … 170
讽刺李作为非讽刺李在郭象...... 170

CHAPTER SIX 第六章
Beyond One and Many: Li in Tiantai and Huayan Buddhism … 185
超越一与多:天台礼与华严宗……185

How Emptiness Became Li … 185
空如何变成理……185

Tiantai on Truth, Threefold … 194
天台论真理,三重……194

Li in Early Tiantai: Center as Convertibility of Determinate
天台早期的李:中心为确定的可转换性

and Indeterminate … 210 和不确定……210
Appearance and Reality in Huayan and Tiantai … 220
华严天台的表象与实相……220

Existence and Nonexistence in Tiantai and Huayan … 230
天台华严的存在与不存在……230

Wave and Water in Huayan: “Beyond” Li … 235
华严中的波与水:“超越”李……235

Wave, Water, and Mud in Tiantai: Inherent Entailment
天台浪、水、泥:内在蕴涵

as Omniavailability … 241
作为全方位可用性…… 241

Summary of Differences between Tiantai and Huayan, and the
天台与华严的区别总结及

Irony of Coherence in the Tiantai and Huayan
天台华严连贯的讽刺

Classifications of Teachings … 256
教义分类……256

CHAPTER SEVEN 第七章
Mind, Omnipresence, and Coherence in Tiantai and Huayan … 261
天台华严的心、无所不在、连贯……261

The Pure Mind and the Deluded Mind in Huayan Thought … 261
华严思想中的清净心与迷心……261

Mind and the Nature in Tiantai Thought … 268
天台思想中的心性……268

The Three Thousand Lis and the Three Thousand Events … 293
三千里三千事……293

CONCLUSION 结论
The Vertex of the Vortex … 307
漩涡的顶点……307

EPILOGUE 结语
Toward Li in Neo-Confucianism … 321
新儒学中的礼……321

NOTES … 345 注释……345
BIBLIOGRAPHY … 379 参考书目……379
INDEX … 389 索引 … 389

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 致谢

The acknowledgments section is the customary place in books such as this where the reader, perhaps out of some benevolent combination of default ritual indulgence and behind-the-music curiosity, is prepared to let the author rattle off an invocation of all his or her debts to those persons, places, and things that made the book possible. This is an author’s opportunity to reflect a little on how humblingly enormous a portion of what has come about in his or her work has depended on unpredictable external factors, the seemingly almost infinite chain of encounters and supports necessary to bring any finished thing into the world. Though wary of the cringe-making awkwardness that seems likely if not inevitable in such public displays of the private, I will gladly comply with this custom. In addition to those specific persons and institutions I thanked at the beginning of the previous volume, Ironies of Oneness and Difference-and whom I thank anew, with renewed fervor, here and now, adding to the list also Jonathan Sim and Hiromi Okaue for their help preparing the manuscript-I feel these days an ever more insistent impulse to honor this noble tradition of acknowledgment in a more expansive or even global way; for there are so many more acknowledgeable facts and circumstances and things and fortuities left out of such specificities, and though these abstract inanimates and accidents don’t care, I still want to acknowledge them, to thank them, to extend some kind of gratitude, or whatever is the equivalent of gratitude when applied to unintentional and inanimate abstract quasi-entities, to the whole mysterious and random concatenation of forces that has made it on the one hand possible and on the other hand permissible for me to write books such as this at all.
致谢部分是此类书籍中的常见位置,读者可能出于默认仪式放纵和音乐背后的好奇心的某种善意结合,准备让作者滔滔不绝地援引他或她的所有债务那些使这本书成为可能的人、地点和事物。这是一个作者的机会,让他反思一下他或她的作品中所发生的事情有多么令人谦卑地依赖于不可预测的外部因素,以及将任何成品带入世界所必需的看似几乎无限的遭遇和支持链。 。尽管我担心在这种私人的公开展示中可能会出现令人尴尬的尴尬,但我还是很乐意遵守这一习惯。除了我在上一卷《统一与差异的讽刺》一开始所感谢的那些特定的个人和机构之外,我在这里和现在以新的热情再次感谢他们,在名单中还添加了乔纳森·西姆(Jonathan Sim)和博美·奥考伊(Hiromi Okaue),感谢他们的贡献。帮助准备手稿——这些天我感到一种更加强烈的冲动,以更广泛甚至全球的方式尊重这一崇高的致谢传统;因为在这些特殊性之外还有很多值得承认的事实和情况以及事物和偶然性,尽管这些抽象的无生命和意外事件并不关心,但我仍然想承认它们,感谢它们,表达某种感激之情,或者任何相当于感激之情的东西,当应用于无意识和无生命的抽象准实体时,应用于整个神秘而随机的力量串联时,这些力量一方面使我能够写出这样的书,另一方面也使我能够写出这样的书根本不。
Gratitude, however misplaced, is also a fact to be acknowledged. I can only gape in wonder at this seeming stroke of dumb luck, the fact that, having somehow against all odds stumbled upon something I feel both inclined and able to do, I’ve so far also been permitted to continue to do it, even to get paid for it, rather than being arrested or lynched or tarred and feathered for it. How many lifeforms ever get so fortunate, to find themselves seemingly unchangeably and unjustifiably constituted in a certain way, and yet also to live in a time and place in which that way of being is viewed as an acceptable way to be, rather than as an atrocity that warrants community wrath, destruction, quarantine, or ridicule? Imagine a person
感恩,无论用在什么地方,也是一个必须承认的事实。我只能惊讶地看着这看似愚蠢的运气,事实是,尽管困难重重,我偶然发现了一些我觉得既愿意又能够做的事情,到目前为止,我也被允许继续这样做,甚至并为此获得报酬,而不是因此而被捕、私刑、涂柏油和羽毛。有多少生命形式如此幸运,发现自己以某种方式构成,看似不可改变且不合理,但又生活在这样一个时间和地点,这种存在方式被视为一种可以接受的存在方式,而不是一种存在方式。是否有暴行导致社区愤怒、破坏、隔离或嘲笑?想象一个人

who, for reasons as yet unanalyzed but quite possibly mildly pathological, seems to have always had some kind of ironclad mental block in every situation against doing “the assigned reading,” as it were-who was too autistic or distracted or arrogant or cowardly or shy or contrarian to listen to anything any living person was trying to teach him, especially persons such as teachers in classrooms. Some kind of nonnegotiable resistance to the very idea of receiving instruction-rooted in an obscure but unshakeable doubt that human minds are alike enough for any single mind’s desires and truths to be likely to be applicable to those of another-drives him to the written word, where the sample size is larger and the distance is greater.
出于尚未分析的原因,但很可能是轻微病态的,他似乎在任何情况下都总是有某种铁定的心理障碍,反对做“指定的阅读”,可以说——谁太自闭,要么心烦意乱,要么傲慢,要么胆怯,要么害羞或逆反地聆听任何活着的人试图教他的任何东西,尤其是像教室里的老师这样的人。对接受指导这一想法的某种不可协商的抵制——植根于一种模糊但不可动摇的怀疑,即人类的思想足够相似,任何一个思想的愿望和真理都可能适用于另一个人的愿望和真理——驱使他去书写文字,其中样本量越大,距离也越大。
But the ban falls quickly also even on books written in the past hundred years or so, in any language he has heard spoken in the flesh; the familiarity of the methods and assumptions of the authors make them too easily imaginable as living presences, and therefore repellent. Here is this person who can only listen to and learn from people who have long been safely dead for a long time, who don’t remind him of anyone he knows (i.e., of anyone who, as he sees it in his paranoia, assumes it’s perfectly fine to try to impose their ideas of what is true and what is good, their facts and values, on him), a person who can only dialogue with people who are far enough away from him in every sense. In the self-imposed intellectual isolation that comes with this condition, after many dismal experiments, it turns out there is only one thing that brings intellectual enlargement and some mental companionship: walking around in solitude, preferably in a city or country where no one knows who he is, reading classical Chinese texts, looking up characters in dictionaries, trying out various possible hypotheses to resolve the seemingly endless thrilling ambiguities, pondering them, trying to make sense of them, then making alternate sense of them, then growing the eyes to look at the world through the blossoming of each of these sets of new ideas that erupt as a result of these phantom encounters.
但即使是在过去一百年左右写成的书籍,无论是用他亲耳听到的任何语言写成的书籍,禁令也很快就会失效。作者对方法和假设的熟悉使他们太容易被想象为活生生的存在,因此令人厌恶。这个人只能倾听那些早已安全死去很长一段时间的人的声音并向他学习,这些人不会让他想起任何他认识的人(即,任何人,正如他在偏执狂中看到的那样,假设试图将他们关于什么是真、什么是善的想法、他们的事实和价值观强加给他是完全可以的),一个只能与在任何意义上都离他足够远的人对话的人。在这种情况所带来的自我强加的智力孤立中,经过多次惨淡的实验,事实证明,只有一件事可以带来智力的扩展和一些精神上的陪伴:孤独地走来走去,最好是在一个无人知晓的城市或国家。他是谁,阅读古典文本,查字典,尝试各种可能的假设来解决看似无穷无尽的令人兴奋的歧义,思考它们,试图理解它们,然后做出替代的意义,然后培养眼睛通过这些幻觉相遇所爆发的每组新想法的绽放来观察世界。
That was me. At some point in those years I got lucky enough to have the opportunity to read closely through some of the texts I loved most with some great old-school footnote-free classical-type scholars; it was the deep rootedness in the careful procession through these texts, which were already a part of my private universe, and the new vistas the greater expertise of these mentors opened up in this already beloved territory, that made this a newly viable way to learn to think new thoughts. The slow and methodical burrowing into the texts was an end in itself, with a very large noncoercive space for working through implications and connections that spontaneously emerged from this kind of extended simmering. I internalized the example of those teachers: one went about one’s work, one’s encounter with the text, looking neither right nor left, neither criticizing nor praising anyone else’s encounter with the text, which would be noticed, reluctantly, only when
那是我。在那些年的某个时刻,我很幸运有机会与一些伟大的老派无脚注古典学者一起仔细阅读一些我最喜欢的文本;正是这些文本的仔细阅读中根深蒂固的,它们已经成为我私人宇宙的一部分,以及这些导师在这个已经心爱的领域中开辟的新视野和更丰富的专业知识,使这成为一种新的可行的学习方式思考新的想法。缓慢而有条不紊地深入文本本身就是目的,有一个非常大的非强制性空间来研究从这种长期酝酿中自发出现的含义和联系。我内化了那些老师的例子:一个人做自己的工作,一个人与课文的接触,不左顾右盼,不批评也不赞扬别人与课文的接触,只有在不情愿的时候才会被注意到。

one’s own already internalized resources, the backlog of associations already crystallized from reading hundreds of other such texts, came to a snag, which happened only rarely. For the first and only time, I got knowledge and pleasure from being a student of another human being, and could imagine exchanging ideas with another person in a way that didn’t drive me to despair over the abyss of incommensurability concealed in aggressive assumptions about some form or other of “common sense” or “good will” or “shared goals” or “universal truths.”
一个人自己已经内化的资源,以及通过阅读数百本其他此类文本而结晶的积压的联想,遇到了障碍,这种情况很少发生。第一次也是唯一一次,我从成为另一个人的学生中获得了知识和乐趣,并且可以想象与另一个人交换想法,而不会让我对隐藏在侵略性假设中的不可通约性深渊感到绝望。某种形式的“常识”或“善意”或“共同目标”或“普遍真理”。
What I thought I was doing, and what I loved to do, didn’t feel as if it had anything to do with finding out the truth, becoming more rigorous, joining the ongoing conversation of an existing field of research or inquiry, getting anything right, clarifying history, improving the quality of anything, coming to a consensus, or, god forbid, learning any facts or values from anyone else or making them learn them from me. I liked having new ideas, being able to think new thoughts; tarrying long and intensely with these old Chinese texts seemed to be what facilitated that effect better than anything else I could find. Slowly, as part of this same walk-around-foreign-city-reading policy, a handful of old and long-backburnered European philosophical works also entered my orbit, and, since no one was telling me to read them and it was not my responsibility to do so, and the authors were all good and dead by then, they started to have analogous effects on me, became objects of obsessive study, and I fell in love with them in exactly the same way. My motivation was still very naive and simpleminded: to forge new lenses for looking, to find ways to think about everything I encountered in the world, alternatives to the ways I had previously been thinking about them. This did not at all mean I wanted to replace that first set of ways-of-thinking and lenses-for-looking, as one would replace an error with a truth. It was not an endeavor to fix my vision with a new prescription for my mental spectacles, or a kind of laser surgery to fix my organ of intellectual vision for good, but a greed to acquire as many cool new pairs of elaborate bifocals, trifocals, quadrifocals as I could find. . . .
我认为我正在做的事情,以及我喜欢做的事情,并不觉得与发现真相、变得更加严谨、加入现有研究或探究领域的持续对话、获得任何东西有任何关系。是的,澄清历史,提高任何事物的质量,达成共识,或者,上帝禁止,从其他人那里学习任何事实或价值观,或者让他们向我学习。我喜欢有新的想法,能够思考新的想法;长时间而深入地阅读这些古老的中国文本似乎比我能找到的其他任何东西都更能促进这种效果。慢慢地,作为这种在外国城市散步阅读政策的一部分,一些古老的、长期被搁置的欧洲哲学著作也进入了我的轨道,而且,因为没有人告诉我去读它们,而且这也不是我的。这样做的责任,而且那时作者们都已经死了,他们开始对我产生类似的影响,成为痴迷研究的对象,我以完全相同的方式爱上了他们。我的动机仍然非常天真和简单:打造新的观察视角,找到思考我在世界上遇到的一切的方法,以及我以前思考它们的方式的替代方案。这根本不意味着我想取代第一套思维方式和观察视角,就像用真理取代错误一样。这并不是为了用新的精神眼镜处方来修复我的视力,也不是为了永久修复我的智力视觉器官而进行的激光手术,而是一种贪婪地想要获得尽可能多的酷炫的新型精致双焦点、三焦点眼镜,我能找到的四焦点。 。 。 。
Then someone told me I could do something like this all the time and not have to get a real job if I went to graduate school. So I did that. My goal was then as now simply to have available more, not fewer, ways of thinking. Why? Because otherwise I would die of boredom. All these years later, it’s still the same, and I still love doing this. And I am insanely grateful that I am allowed to do this for a living, and that it has somehow or other turned out that some other people also like to get jostled around in this kind of process. It is true that the institution of formal education, with its notion of rewards and punishments meted out for one way of thinking over another, still seems to me intrinsically obscene, and the idea of one mind standing in judgment over another mind still instinctively revolts me, as much in a
然后有人告诉我,如果我读研究生,我可以一直做这样的事情,而不必找到一份真正的工作。所以我就这么做了。我当时的目标和现在一样,只是为了拥有更多而不是更少的思维方式。为什么?因为否则我会无聊死的。这么多年过去了,情况还是一样,我仍然喜欢这样做。我非常感激我能以这种方式谋生,而且不知何故,其他一些人也喜欢在这种过程中被推来推去。诚然,正规教育机构,其对一种思维方式对另一种思维方式给予奖励和惩罚的概念,在我看来本质上仍然是淫秽的,而一种思想对另一种思想进行评判的想法仍然让我本能地感到反感。 ,就像在一个

classroom as in the idea of a theistic cosmos. But to my surprise, I find that being in this environment-schools-which I detested so much as a student is now sometimes a place to meet really smart, interesting people, both students and colleagues, with strange and intricate minds that in certain places intersect and resonate and ricochet with mine, and that to watch and interact with these people sometimes, if I keep the right distance and the right closeness, can have something of that old new-thought-evoking effect. There’s a tension and a contradiction there, and in the formal setting I’ve still felt it necessary to avoid too much involvement in precisely those fields of inquiry in which I personally have the most mental investment, but nonetheless, I cannot but be grateful for this mysterious circumstance. So that’s gratitude number one.
课堂就像有神论宇宙的观念一样。但令我惊讶的是,我发现在这种我作为学生时非常厌恶的环境——学校——现在有时会成为一个结识真正聪明、有趣的人的地方,包括学生和同事,他们的思想在某些地方是奇怪而复杂的。与我的交叉、共鸣和反弹,有时观察这些人并与之互动,如果我保持适当的距离和适当的亲密程度,可以产生某种旧的唤起新思想的效果。那里存在着紧张和矛盾,在正式场合,我仍然觉得有必要避免过多地参与那些我个人投入最多精力的探究领域,但尽管如此,我还是不得不感激这种神秘的情况。所以这是第一位的感激之情。
On the other hand, this puts me in a funny situation sometimes, and I suspect, or at least hope, that I am not the only one in this funny situation. I still don’t want the truth about things to turn out to be only a single way, or for any philosophical position to be so right that it puts all other positions out of business. I fear any monopolizing convergence of truth that would eliminate errors and mistakes and alternatives. I still think of thinking as Spinoza did, as a kind of activity, a skill, a power to do more and more stuff, correlative to a way of moving one’s body in more ways, rather than as a means of arriving somewhere or getting something (“truth”? “the right answer”? “the best theory”?). I still don’t like this assumption that thinking is a means by which some ideas are found to be truths and entirely other ideas are found to be errors, the former to be honored and preserved and the latter to be reviled and dispelled, such that the possibilities of moving around, mentally and physically, are reduced rather than expanded. I still have no sympathy with the academic goal of consilience of knowledge, or what strikes me as the totalitarian yearning for everyone to share the same view of what is so and of what is good, of what is true and of what they should be doing, to construct arguments and marshal evidence with the purpose of compelling everyone to agree about as much as possible. And I still can’t read or learn anything someone else tells me to read or learn. Though it’s now my job, a lot of the time the professionalization of philosophy (or of sinology, or of Buddhology) leaves me feeling the way I imagine a nymphomaniac who has chosen to make her living as a prostitute must feel-someone who had foolishly thought, Hey, what better way to beat the system, my job will be the exact thing I love doing anyway! It turns out, duh, that making a rent-paying job of something you had originally loved, so that now it must be done on demand, under coercion, in a style dictated by the desires of strangers with their own alien libidinal agendas, can, um, kind of ruin it. One of my main concerns in reading, in writing, in teaching is to find a way to steer clear of this fate.
另一方面,这有时会让我陷入一种有趣的境地,我怀疑,或者至少希望,我不是唯一处于这种有趣境地的人。我仍然不希望事情的真相只有一种方式,或者任何哲学立场都如此正确以至于使所有其他立场都出局。我担心任何垄断性的真理趋同都会消除错误和替代方案。我仍然认为像斯宾诺莎那样的思考是一种活动、一种技能、一种做越来越多事情的能力,与以更多方式移动身体的方式相关,而不是作为到达某个地方或得到某物的一种手段(“真理”?“正确答案”?“最好的理论”?)。我仍然不喜欢这样的假设,即思考是一种手段,通过这种手段,一些想法被认为是真理,而另一些想法则被认为是错误,前者受到尊重和保留,后者受到辱骂和消除,这样精神上和身体上移动的可能性减少而不是增加。我仍然不认同知识一致性的学术目标,或者让我印象深刻的极权主义渴望,即每个人都对事实、善行、真理以及他们应该做的事情持有相同的看法,构建论点并整理证据,目的是迫使每个人尽可能达成一致。我仍然无法阅读或学习别人告诉我要阅读或学习的任何内容。 虽然现在这是我的工作,但很多时候哲学(或汉学或佛教)的专业化让我感觉就像我想象的一个选择以妓女为生的花痴的感觉一样——一个愚蠢地拥有过性行为的人。我想,嘿,还有什么更好的方法来击败这个系统呢,无论如何,我的工作将是我喜欢做的事情!事实证明,呃,把你原来喜欢的东西做一份付租金的工作,所以现在它必须按需完成,在胁迫下,以一种由陌生人的欲望决定的风格,他们有自己的异类力比多议程,可以,嗯,有点毁了它。我在阅读、写作和教学中主要关心的问题之一就是找到一种方法来避免这种命运。
Which brings us to this book. At the beginning of the previous volume, I made some general methodological clarifications that were not unrelated to these concerns-addressing matters of polyessentialism, presentism, truth-as-interest, hermeneutics as a kind of shelf-handy rhyming dictionary, maximal neglect of fallacy as excavation of ever-present but never-complete coherence, and so on-and these same considerations apply to this volume, which continues the work begun there. But I would here like to reinstate some further remarks that I deleted from that discussion, at the time due to a perhaps misguided desire to avoid causing embarrassment to various people, including but by no means limited to myself. These remarks have to do with the always touchy topic of a writer’s relation to other writers. Quite often, people who find themselves engaged in this kind of workprofessional scholars, I mean, who labor long and intensely with certain texts and ideas-have a vague but understandable hope to see their own works universally accepted, or, failing that, at least acknowledged with approval. Or failing that, at least cited. It is thus very human, and very forgivable, for an academic, when faced with a work that purports to discuss a text or topic he or she has spent years researching and writing about, to turn immediately to the index or bibliography in search of his or her own name. I do it too. It is frustrating not to find that name there, after laboring so long, and it would be churlish to censure anyone too harshly for venting a bit of this frustration, either as global hostility or as an ad hoc self-advertisement offered in refutation, when evaluating those works that seem to snub them.
这让我们想到了这本书。在上卷的开头,我做了一些与这些关注点不无关系的一般方法论澄清——解决了多本质主义、当下主义、真理即兴趣、解释学作为一种现成的押韵词典、最大限度地忽视谬误等问题。例如挖掘始终存在但从未完全的连贯性,等等——这些同样的考虑也适用于本书,它继续了从那里开始的工作。但我想在这里恢复我当时从讨论中删除的一些进一步的言论,当时可能是出于避免给各种人(包括但不限于我自己)造成尴尬的错误愿望。这些言论与作家与其他作家的关系这一始终敏感的话题有关。很多时候,那些发现自己从事这种工作的人,我的意思是,那些长期、紧张地研究某些文本和思想的专业学者,都有一个模糊但可以理解的希望,希望看到自己的作品被普遍接受,或者,如果做不到这一点,至少承认并批准。或者如果做不到这一点,至少被引用。因此,对于一名学者来说,当面对一本旨在讨论他或她花了数年时间研究和写作的文本或主题的著作时,立即转向索引或参考书目来寻找他或她的观点是非常人性化的,也是非常可以原谅的。或者她自己的名字。我也这样做。经过这么长时间的努力,在那里找不到这个名字是令人沮丧的,而且如果有人因为发泄了一点这种挫败感而过于严厉地谴责任何人,无论是作为全球敌意还是作为反驳中提供的临时自我广告,那将是无礼的,当评估那些似乎冷落他们的作品。
And no one would deny that the “literature survey,” where a student is supposed to demonstrate mastery of what is quaintly referred to as “the field” by reading all available secondary literature on a given topic, summarizing and perhaps evaluating all the positions previous scholars have put forth on a given text, is a valuable exercise in postgraduate training. It is perhaps for these reasons that it remains an academic custom, richly punished in the breach, to go through the motions of citing all one’s contemporary colleagues when taking up any much-researched topic, respectfully acknowledging the positions put forth there, but then giving a reason why one rejects them in favor of the one currently being advanced. I’ve made some ritual deference to this custom in this book and the prequel, but have tried to keep it to a minimum. For there is good reason to think this practice is—in addition to being enormously onerous, insincere, and self-serving-a wasteful allocation of time and energy. The pretense is that, being a member of one and the same “field,” one has objectively considered the alternate arguments about all the topics that comprise it, and decided on some mutually agreed-upon grounds that a certain argument-one’s own, naturally-is better than the others. This may, indeed, be possible for some cases in some fields. But it is not likely to be possible for all cases in all fields.
没有人会否认“文献调查”,学生应该通过阅读有关特定主题的所有可用的二手文献,总结并可能评估之前的所有立场来展示对所谓“领域”的掌握。学者们所提出的论据,是研究生培养中的宝贵练习。也许正是由于这些原因,在讨论任何经过深入研究的主题时,都会引用所有当代同事的动议,恭敬地承认那里提出的立场,但随后给出一个人拒绝他们而支持目前正在推进的人的原因。我在本书和前传中对这一习俗做出了一些仪式性的尊重,但试图将其保持在最低限度。因为我们有充分的理由认为这种做法除了极其繁重、不真诚和自私之外,也是对时间和精力的浪费。假装是,作为一个同一个“领域”的成员,一个人客观地考虑了构成该领域的所有主题的替代论点,并根据一些共同商定的理由做出了决定,即某个论点——一个人自己的,自然地-比其他人都好。对于某些领域的某些情况来说,这确实是可能的。但这不太可能适用于所有领域的所有情况。
More to the point, and putting aside all my personal reasons for disliking this sort of practice as rehearsed above, I am not at all convinced that adopting these procedures of compulsive citation and review of all prior interpretative expositions would serve, in disciplines other than the hard sciences, as a mechanism to ensure the cumulative advance of knowledge, even if that were something we all agreed we wanted. When it does, as in the narrowing of range of possibilities through the exclusion of failed and discarded approaches, or through the handy clarification of philological and historical confusions, it is mainly as a device for the saving of unnecessary labor, whose value is therefore mainly economical in the broadest sense of helping to allocate wisely our limited resources of energy and attention, rather than a positive building block in the constructing of a system of knowledge that either can or should progress in a single direction and toward an ideal completeness and unanimity. So I have tried to cite and discuss only those works that I have found genuinely pertinent to the task of clarifying, rather than justifying, my readings of the texts at hand; I have tried to avoid citing for citing’s sake, or even pointing out the obvious radical divergences of my interpretative framework from some others that have been advanced.
更重要的是,抛开我个人不喜欢上面所演练的这种做法的所有原因,我根本不相信采用这些强制引用和审查所有先前解释性说明的程序会在非学科领域发挥作用。硬科学,作为确保知识累积进步的机制,即使这是我们都同意我们想要的东西。当它这样做时,就像通过排除失败和废弃的方法来缩小可能性的范围,或者通过方便地澄清语言学和历史的混乱一样,它主要是作为节省不必要劳动的一种手段,因此其价值主要是从最广泛的意义上讲,经济是帮助明智地分配我们有限的精力和注意力资源,而不是构建知识体系的积极组成部分,知识体系可以或应该朝着单一方向并朝着理想的完整性和一致的方向发展。因此,我试图只引用和讨论那些我发现真正与澄清而不是证明我对手头文本的阅读有关的作品;我试图避免为了引用而引用,甚至指出我的解释框架与其他一些已经提出的框架存在明显的根本分歧。
I find it necessary to declare in all sincerity that this is not meant as a sign of disrespect or criticism of the interpretations developed by my esteemed peers. Rather, it is my hope that it will be apparent to readers just how pointless it would be, in the context of the present project, to express an opinion about every one of these interpretations. These works may well be very useful, successful, intelligent, persuasive, and in all ways good for the human race. They may connect in interesting ways with the approach I am taking here, or conversely, raise points that conflict irreconcilably with the conclusions I draw here. But in either case, it is very likely too soon for such conclusions to be drawn, and it is doubtful that any of the participants in a debate of this type have the necessary critical distance to give a useful overview of the issues involved. These are things to be decided by readers of both this work and those works not now, but maybe fifty years from now, by a future generation of scholars who are competent in reading the original texts for themselves with the benefit of all the conflicting hypotheses in their arsenal of interpretative tools-if they are still interested, which of course no one can force them to be. I hope I will be forgiven for expressing the heretical suspicion that, in reality, contemporaneous scholars don’t really write for each other: we write for the future, for the fresh readers who will take up these problems with their own enthusiasms and their own fresh encounters with the original texts.
我发现有必要真诚地声明,这并不是对我尊敬的同行所提出的解释的不尊重或批评。相反,我希望读者能够清楚地看出,在当前项目的背景下,对这些解释中的每一种表达意见是多么毫无意义。这些作品很可能非常有用、成功、聪明、有说服力,而且在各方面对人类都有好处。他们可能会以有趣的方式与我在这里采取的方法联系起来,或者相反,提出与我在这里得出的结论不可调和的冲突的观点。但无论哪种情况,得出这样的结论都很可能为时过早,并且此类辩论的任何参与者是否具有必要的批判距离来对所涉及的问题提供有用的概述是值得怀疑的。这些事情应该由本书和那些作品的读者来决定,不是现在,而是也许五十年后,由未来一代的学者决定,他们有能力自己阅读原文,并受益于书中所有相互冲突的假设。他们的解释工具库——如果他们仍然感兴趣的话,当然没有人可以强迫他们这样做。我希望大家能够原谅我表达了异端怀疑,即事实上,同时代的学者并不是真正为彼此写作:我们为未来而写作,为那些将以自己的热情和自己的热情来解决这些问题的新读者而写。与原文的新鲜邂逅。
What proves useful to future readers survives; what does not, does not. It is for these future students to read and study and consider the possible interactions between parallel interpretations of a given era, if they so desire.
对未来读者有用的内容会被保留下来;什么不,不。如果这些未来的学生愿意的话,他们可以阅读和研究并考虑特定时代的平行解释之间可能的相互作用。
We, and our own first-generation students, are probably too close to the matter to say anything meaningful about it. It requires a “big picture” perspective. A point-by-point comparison of two alternate present-day interpretations, for example, of a particular line in the Analects would be not altogether meaningless, but likely an expenditure of time and energy more fruitfully applied elsewhere; both interpretations belong to a total orientation, with its own set of assumptions, goals, methods, which alone conveys its coherence, its persuasiveness, its value-and which is at present still a work in progress, the final contours of which are not yet discernible.
我们,以及我们自己的第一代学生,可能对此事太过了解,无法对此发表任何有意义的言论。它需要“大局观”。例如,对《论语》中某一行的两种不同的当今解释进行逐点比较并非完全没有意义,但可能花费时间和精力在其他地方更有效;两种解释都属于一个总体方向,有其自己的一套假设、目标、方法,仅靠这些就可以传达其连贯性、说服力和价值——而且目前仍在进行中,其最终轮廓尚未确定。可辨别的。
I propose what to my mind is a more “Confucian” alternative, with all due respect, to my colleagues: let us no longer feel honor-bound to read each others’ work merely out of a concern for base covering, professional obligation, or obsessive scorekeeping. It is not an insult, it is not a disgrace, it need no longer be a shameful secret for us to need to close our ears to each other at times. The type of work we are involved in here is different in kind from the sorts for which it is important to pool knowledge and adjudicate between error and accuracy. If we were training engineers to do mathematics, there would be both a clear standard and a strong motive for stern policing: it would be determinable and would matter whether we did it right or wrong, whether our conclusions were accurate or not, because someone might build a bridge or a helicopter on the basis of our calculations. Lives would be at stake.
带着应有的尊重,我向我的同事们提出了一个在我看来更“儒家”的替代方案:让我们不再仅仅出于对基础覆盖、职业义务或其他方面的考虑而感到荣幸地阅读彼此的作品。痴迷的记分。这不是一种侮辱,这不是一种耻辱,对于我们来说,有时需要互相捂住耳朵,这不再是一个可耻的秘密。我们在这里参与的工作类型与那些重要的是汇集知识并在错误与准确性之间进行裁决的工作类型不同。如果我们训练工程师做数学,就会有一个明确的标准和严格监管的强烈动机:它是可以确定的,并且无论我们做得对还是错,无论我们的结论准确与否,都至关重要,因为有人可能根据我们的计算建造一座桥梁或一架直升机。生命将受到威胁。
No such condition applies to work in the humanities-or at least, if in some loosely analogous sense there are reasons why it might matter which interpretation prevails, it would involve an exponentially slower and subtler set of parameters. Indeed, it could be argued that the thriving of a multiplicity of interpretations is actually a healthier outcome, from an analogously pragmatic point of view. I propose that we drop this whole charade of having a duty to be each others’ watchdogs, and regard ourselves instead as an eccentric guild of obsessives who happen to be smitten with the same compulsion. We can agree to disagree, or even to simply neglect each other while observing all the signs of mutual ritual respect-and do so in all sincerity, as fellow enthusiasts, fellow lovers, and adventurers of the same seas-and leave the hashing out of the better or worse to coming generations.
这样的条件不适用于人文学科的工作——或者至少,如果在某种松散的类似意义上,有理由说明哪种解释占主导地位可能很重要,那么它将涉及一组指数级缓慢且微妙的参数。事实上,可以说,从类似的实用主义角度来看,多种解释的蓬勃发展实际上是一个更健康的结果。我建议我们放弃这种有义务成为彼此监督者的伪装,而将自己视为一个由恰好被同样的强迫所困扰的古怪强迫症患者组成的行会。我们可以同意不同意见,甚至干脆互相忽视,同时遵守相互尊重仪式的所有迹象——而且是真诚地这样做,就像同一个海洋的热衷者、恋人和冒险家一样——并且不去争论。对子孙后代来说是好是坏。
It goes without saying that there is a danger of abuse in granting this exemption to oneself and one’s peers, an opening for laziness, shoddy workmanship and self-righteous ignorance on the one hand or fruitlessly frenetic wheel-reinvention on the other. But these dangers are perhaps outweighed by the worry that our premature compromises and mutual translations into one another’s idioms will snuff out the buddings of innovations that will prove to have unsuspected ramifications when allowed
不言而喻,给予自己和同事这种豁免存在滥用的危险,一方面为懒惰、粗制滥造和自以为是的无知提供了机会,另一方面也为毫无结果的疯狂的轮子重新发明提供了机会。但这些危险或许被人们的担忧所抵消,即我们过早的妥协和相互翻译将扼杀创新的萌芽,而一旦允许,创新将被证明会产生意想不到的后果。

to grow unhindered into their full bloom, and indeed that a wheel reinvented from its first foundations may end up rolling somewhat differently from its unnoticed prototype. To assume otherwise, I think, presupposes precisely the kind of uniform “sameness” among wheels that I would like to bring into question in this very work. In any case, I have tried to steer a middle course between obsessive engagement and hubristic disregard, and I hope the results will be found neither irrelevant nor obstructive to the works of my fellow-enjoyers, both now and in the future. To them, for that hope, for letting me do this kind of thing, for their distant company, for their very cacophony of incompatible views and their strident resistance to each other, for their will to victory and the effulgence of multiplicities that are its unintended side effects, I offer my gratitude. The spaces between us, but also that between which the spaces are, have made this book possible.
事实上,从最初的基础上重新发明的轮子最终可能会与它未被注意到的原型有所不同。我认为,否则的假设恰恰以轮子之间的统一“相同性”为先决条件,我想在这项工作中对此提出质疑。无论如何,我试图在痴迷的参与和傲慢的漠视之间找到一条中间路线,我希望结果既不会与我的同行们的作品无关,也不会妨碍他们现在和将来的工作。为了他们,为了那种希望,为了让我做这样的事情,为了他们遥远的陪伴,为了他们不相容的观点的刺耳声音和他们对彼此的强烈抵制,为了他们的胜利意志和意想不到的多样性的光辉副作用,我表示感谢。我们之间的空间,以及空间之间的空间,使得这本书成为可能。

INTRODUCTION 介绍

LI 理 AND COHERENCE 理与连贯

Recap of Ironies of Oneness and Difference and Terminological Clarifications
统一与差异的讽刺回顾以及术语澄清

In a previous work, called Ironies of Oneness and Difference, I tried to unravel the development of notions of coherence in early Chinese thought as an alternative to models of thinking, mainly Greek and European in origin, that build upon the assumption that words such as “same” and “different” describe facts about the world and refer to real attributes of things, that the distinction between “sameness” and “difference” is in some way absolute-in other words, that things, or certain aspects of things, or facts, or qualities, simply are the same as certain other things or facts or aspects, and different from certain other things or facts or aspects. It was necessary to trace the various alternatives to this way of viewing things in Chinese thought in such a seemingly abstract and thoroughgoing manner, I believe, in order to comprehend the later development of various understandings and usages of the term Li 理 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} in Chinese thought. Most students of the Chinese philosophical tradition have probably noticed that again and again they come up against a repeated tendency toward two kinds of counterintuitive claims that present persistent interpretive problems: first, assertions concerning the relation between oneness and manyness, which do not seem to be applied consistently or intelligibly, or to separate from one another neatly, and second, the surprising importance everywhere-in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and axiology-of negations and negative formulations, which are given a positive value, serving often as groundings of affirmations. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} These are the two main problems I am hoping to clarify with the concepts of “ironic coherence” and “non-ironic coherence” and their relation to Li; for I hope
在之前的一部名为《统一与差异的反讽》的著作中,我试图揭示早期中国思想中连贯性概念的发展,作为思维模式的替代品,这些思维模式主要起源于希腊和欧洲,其基础是这样的假设: “相同”和“不同”描述了关于世界的事实,指的是事物的真实属性,“相同”和“不同”之间的区别在某种程度上是绝对的——换句话说,事物或事物的某些方面,或事实或品质,只是与某些其他事物或事实或方面相同,并且与某些其他事物或事实或方面不同。我认为,有必要以如此看似抽象而彻底的方式追溯中国思想中这种看待事物的方式的各种替代,才能理解后来对“理”一词的各种理解和用法的发展。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 在中国人的思想中。大多数研究中国哲学传统的学生可能已经注意到,他们一次又一次地遇到两种反直觉主张的反复倾向,这两种主张提出了持续存在的解释问题:第一,关于单一性和多性之间关系的主张,这些主张似乎并不符合逻辑。一致或可理解地应用,或者巧妙地彼此分开,其次,否定和否定表述在形而上学、认识论、伦理学和价值论中无处不在,具有令人惊讶的重要性,它们被赋予积极的价值,常常作为肯定的基础。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 这是我希望通过“反讽连贯”和“非反讽连贯”的概念及其与李的关系来澄清的两个主要问题;因为我希望

to show that the one-many problem and the negation problem, and also the related problem of omnipresence, are all closely intertwined, and that this intertwining is most evident in the interplay of ironic and non-ironic coherence that comes to be embodied in the term Li . That is what I’ll be trying to do in this book. So before launching into the discussion of Li , I would like to repeat the summary of my conclusions about “coherence” from that earlier work.
表明一对多问题和否定问题,以及相关的无所不在的问题,都是紧密交织在一起的,这种交织在反讽和非反讽连贯性的相互作用中最为明显,而反讽和非反讽的连贯性体现在术语李。这就是我在本书中将尝试做的事情。因此,在开始对李的讨论之前,我想重复一下我对早期作品中关于“连贯性”的结论的总结。
In that work I attempted to draw attention to several emergent conceptions of coherence in early Chinese thought, conceived of as a fundamental category accounting for the presence, value, sustainability, and intelligibility of things. This involved delineating two intertwining variants of this conception, the non-ironic and the ironic. In both, we identified coherence as a founding, fundamental category, from which sameness and difference are negotiable, non-ultimate derivatives. Why are things what they are, as they are, able to continue being what they are, and having the values they have? Because of the way they cohere. If they cohere differently, they are different things, have different identities. Harmonizing in a certain way allows things to manifest in a particular way, and this is the ultimate category beyond which no further specification of their ontic status can be made. Their “value,” on the other hand, is itself merely another kind of coherence: a function solely of the relation between these manifested identities and certain human desires and endeavors, a second-order coherence between two first-order coherences. In sum, to be seen, known, shown as having a certain identity and value derives from a relation to a particular context, most centrally a context of human desires and the discerning, exemplary eye of a sagely person steeped in coherence with a tradition of other such persons. These reflections will put us in a position to see how “centrality” and “coherence” converge into the meaning of Li, and how this sort of notion developed through various partial prefigurements in Confucian and Daoist thought.
在那部作品中,我试图引起人们对中国早期思想中几个新兴的连贯性概念的关注,这些概念被认为是解释事物的存在、价值、可持续性和可理解性的基本范畴。这涉及到描述这一概念的两个相互交织的变体,即非讽刺性和讽刺性。在这两者中,我们都将连贯性视为一个创始的、基本的范畴,其中相同性和差异性是可以协商的、非最终的衍生品。为什么事物现在如此,能够继续如此,并具有它们所拥有的价值?因为他们的凝聚力。如果它们的结合方式不同,那么它们就是不同的事物,具有不同的身份。以某种方式协调允许事物以特定的方式显现,这是最终的类别,超出这个类别就无法对其本体状态进行进一步的说明。另一方面,它们的“价值”本身只是另一种连贯性:仅是这些表现出来的身份与某些人类欲望和努力之间关系的函数,是两个一阶连贯性之间的二阶连贯性。总而言之,被看到、知道、显示为具有一定的身份和价值,源自与特定背景的关系,最核心的是人类欲望的背景以及圣人的洞察力、典范性的眼睛,与传统的一致。其他此类人士。这些反思将使我们看到“中心性”和“连贯性”如何汇聚到“理”的含义中,以及这种概念是如何通过儒家和道家思想中的各种局部预兆而发展起来的。
In the Analects, we saw Confucius described as “not having any constant teacher” 何常師之有, and yet finding his teacher everywhere. Here we see already the structure of centrality and coherence. Confucius himself is the “center,” the determinant of the coherence, the “pattern,” the “principle,” the value. But he neither subjectively creates this value ex nihilo nor acts as a mere passive mirror of an objectively existing truth. The value he creates is a coherence, a readable converging, of aspects available everywhere, combined by the selective filter of Confucius’s own responses and evaluations. His discernment is a selective frame that creates/finds coherence, the value-endowed style of culture, which is omniavailable, present in more than one place, not strictly reiterable except in the special sense of being continuable. We have here already the sprout of a model of a
在《论语》中,我们看到孔子“无常师之有,而处处有师”。在这里我们已经看到了中心性和连贯性的结构。孔子本人就是“中心”,是连贯性、“模式”、“原则”、价值的决定者。但他既不主观地无中生有地创造这种价值,也不充当客观存在真理的被动镜子。他创造的价值是一种连贯性,一种可读的融合,无处不在的各个方面,并通过孔子自己的反应和评价的选择性过滤结合起来。他的洞察力是一种选择性框架,它创造/发现连贯性,即赋予价值的文化风格,它是无所不在的,存在于多个地方,除了可延续的特殊含义外,严格来说不可重复。我们这里已经有了一个模型的萌芽

multilocality that is neither nominalist (i.e., denying the existence of any causally relevant multiply instantiated entities in our final ontology) nor realist (i.e., asserting the existence of causally relevant and repeatably instantiatable selfsame entities in our final ontology), manifesting in a cognition that is neither a correspondence with univocally preexisting objective facts nor a baseless projection of subjective fancies. These teachers are really there, and really making available a multiply instantiated something called the Dao of Kings Wen and Wu with its own independent causal relevance, providing models, standards, justifications and even psychological rewards, and constituting a whole that has a constitutive role to play in the essential characteristics inhering in each of the parts that comprise it. But that causal relevance overrides alternative available relevances only when Confucius sees it there, links up to it, names it, desires it, coheres with it, continues it.
多局性既不是唯名论的(即否认我们最终本体中存在任何因果相关的多重实例化实体),也不是实在论的(即断言我们的最终本体中存在因果相关且可重复实例化的同一个实体),表现在这样的认知中:既不是与明确预先存在的客观事实的对应,也不是对主观幻想的毫无根据的投射。这些老师是真实存在的,真正提供了一个多重实例化的东西,即文武王之道,它有自己独立的因果关系,提供了模型、标准、理由甚至心理奖励,并构成了一个具有构成作用的整体。发挥组成它的每个部分所固有的基本特征。但只有当孔子看到它、联系它、命名它、渴望它、与之一致、延续它时,这种因果相关性才会凌驾于其他可用的相关性之上。
The Mencius, we saw, continues this trend in the key passage at 7B24, awarding the honorary normative title “the Nature [of human beings]” (性 xing) to only a subset of the existing inborn capabilities of the human animal, which is thus neither a preexisting objective fact about humans (one could equally have selected out a different subset of these existing tendencies to be named “human nature,” i.e., our defining inborn essence) nor a subjective projection (since this subset too is indeed really there). The criteria for making this selection were made more explicit here: precisely those spontaneous human tendencies that allow for coherence, that is, those that are appealing to (valued by) and discernible to other humans, and that create interpersonal cohesion among humans, are to be called the Nature. Examining the usage of the term xing in the rest of the text, we found that these are, more specifically, the desires that can be satisfied independently of external material conditions, that allow for the other (for example, material) desires to be equally nurtured and developed, the enjoyment of which is increased rather than decreased when shared, and so on. The desires for sensory gratification, on the other hand, are to be called “the Decree” (ming 命) only because they are not conducive to coherence in this sense: they isolate, they create strife because their satisfaction depends on external material resources, which may be in short supply, their enjoyment is decreased when shared, and so on. Thus, the class name “Human nature” is for Mencius neither objective nor subjective, neither nominalist nor realist; and here again we have a “center” embodied by a living human agent, the sage, whose manifestation of these virtues makes him the hub, the center, around which this style of being, humanity, converges. The presence of this center literally actualizes the normative coherence “humanity,” the quality of humanness and equally the really existing community of human beings, just as Confucius’s presence actualized the presence of his “teachers” in all people in his environment.
我们看到,《孟子》在 7B24 的关键段落中延续了这一趋势,仅将“性”这一荣誉规范称号授予人类动物现有先天能力的一个子集,即因此,既不是关于人类的预先存在的客观事实(人们同样可以从这些现有倾向中选出一个不同的子集,命名为“人性”,即我们定义的先天本质),也不是主观的投射(因为这个子集也确实存在) )。做出这种选择的标准在此更加明确:正是那些允许一致性的自发人类倾向,即那些吸引其他人(重视)并为其他人所辨别的倾向,以及在人类之间创造人际凝聚力的倾向,是被称为自然。考察本文其余部分中“性”一词的用法,我们发现,更具体地说,这些欲望是可以独立于外部物质条件而得到满足的欲望,允许其他欲望(例如物质)平等地得到满足。培育和发展,分享时的乐趣会增加而不是减少,等等。另一方面,对感官满足的欲望之所以被称为“命”,只是因为它们不利于这种意义上的连贯性:它们孤立,它们制造冲突,因为它们的满足依赖于外部物质资源,这些东西可能供不应求,分享时他们的乐趣就会减少,等等。 因此,“性”这个类名对于孟子来说,既不是客观的,也不是主观的,既不是唯名论的,也不是实在论的;在这里,我们再次看到了一个由活生生的人类代理人——圣人——所体现的“中心”,他对这些美德的表现使他成为枢纽、中心,而这种存在风格——人性——则围绕着这个中心而汇聚。这个中心的存在确实实现了“人性”的规范一致性、人性的品质以及人类真实存在的共同体,正如孔子的存在实现了他的“老师”在他的环境中的所有人中的存在一样。
In the Xunzi, we find a seeming conflict between a nominalistic and a realist theory of naming, which is resolved once again by recourse to a human center, in this case the tradition of the sages and exemplary persons who literally give order to the cosmos through mandated ritual. But this too is neither creation nor passive reflection of coherence, neither purely objective nor purely subjective: in Xunzi’s view, there are an overabundance of real distinctions, groupings, coherences in the world, for which the sages serve as a selective filter, propagating some while ignoring others, enforcing their standardized names in the same way that weights and measures are to be enforced in the marketplace. Omnipresence is here no longer mere “omniavailability” as it had been for Confucius and Mencius, but the “great coherence” (dali 大理), the value present in all parts of the organized whole that results from the exemplary man’s selective ritual regulations determining which of the really occurring groupings of nature may be grouped into a valued whole, that is, a whole that creates the maximal compossible satisfaction of the entire range of human desires. Although this Great Coherence is not present without human cultural intervention, it is, once created, a causatively non-inert entity which really exists, instantiated in noncontiguous particular events and things, not merely normatively but descriptively, for it includes in its order not only the human but also the natural world. When seen and named so as to become coherent with the maximally coherent set of human desires, the natural cosmos becomes not merely seen and named in a coherent way, but actually endowed with a kind of order that is fully present in more than one instance and also has causal efficacy, such as contributing to keeping the world going in the way that suits human need, inspiring exultations of awe and aesthetic joy, guiding action, and serving as a standard, support, ground, encouragement and guarantor of human virtue.
在《荀子》中,我们发现唯名论和实在论的命名理论之间存在表面上的冲突,这一冲突再次通过诉诸人类中心来解决,在这种情况下,圣贤和模范人物的传统通过字面上的方式给宇宙带来秩序。强制仪式。但这也既不是创造,也不是连贯性的被动反映,既不是纯粹客观的,也不是纯粹主观的:在荀子看来,世界上存在着过多的真正的区别、分组和连贯性,圣人为此充当了选择性过滤器,传播了一些东西。在忽略其他名称的同时,以与市场上执行度量衡相同的方式执行它们的标准化名称。这里的无所不在不再是孔子和孟子所说的“无所不在”,而是“大理”,即存在于组织整体的各个部分中的价值,这种价值是由模范之人选择性的礼制决定的。自然界中真实存在的群体可以被归为一个有价值的整体,即一个创造人类全部欲望的最大可能满足的整体。虽然这种伟大的一致性在没有人类文化干预的情况下不会出现,但它一旦被创造出来,就是一个真正存在的因果非惰性实体,在不连续的特定事件和事物中实例化,不仅是规范性的,而且是描述性的,因为它不仅包括在其秩序中人类,也包括自然世界。 当人们对自然宇宙的观察和命名与人类欲望的最大程度的连贯一致时,自然宇宙不仅以连贯的方式被观察和命名,而且实际上被赋予了一种在多个实例中完全存在的秩序。也具有因果功效,例如有助于保持世界以适合人类需要的方式运转,激发敬畏和审美愉悦的狂喜,指导行动,以及作为人类美德的标准、支持、基础、鼓励和保证。
In the Laozi tradition, we have the advent of ironic coherence: the idea of a form of togetherness (coherent) which is necessarily also unintelligible, unreadable (incoherent). The unhewn is the source, the stuff, the course/ orienter and the end of all intelligible, determinate “hewn” entities, from which they emerge and toward which they all converge, negating them all and supporting them all, and through this negation and the course of arising from and return to this negation of themselves, it is also what unifies them all. This unity of all possible names, forms, values, entities brings them all together but only by being itself unhewn, unnamed, that is indiscernible. This is the ultimate cohering, also the ultimate value, from which lesser values/ coherences emerge. The motif of the center is here transformed from the exemplary center of Confucianism, the model that inspires those around it to modify themselves because it is seen and valued, to the invisible center, which creates togetherness and value precisely by not being seen, not being valued. To be valued is to inspire imitation, which is to inspire competi-
在老子传统中,我们出现了讽刺性的连贯性:一种团结(连贯)形式的观念,但它也必然是难以理解、无法阅读(不连贯)的。未凿成的东西是所有可理解的、确定的“凿成”实体的源头、材料、路线/导向器和终点,它们从中出现,并向其汇聚,否定它们并支持它们,并通过这种否定和支持它们。从这种对自身的否定中产生并返回的过程,也是将它们统一起来的原因。所有可能的名称、形式、价值、实体的这种统一将它们全部聚集在一起,但只有其本身是未凿成的、未命名的,这是不可辨别的。这是最终的凝聚力,也是最终的价值,从中出现了较小的价值/凝聚力。中心的主题在这里从儒家的模范中心(由于它被看到和重视而激励周围的人改变自己的模式)转变为无形的中心,它通过不被看到、不被重视而精确地创造团结和价值。有价值的。受到重视就激发模仿,进而激发竞争

tion, which is to create strife, which is to undermine ultimate coherence. To be seen is to be cut out from a background that is unseen, which means again a loss of the greatest coherence. Coherence is “ironic” in that the true coherence (value, togetherness, the unhewn or devalued from which the valued grows, which is inseparable from the valued, which accounts for the cycle of reversal from value to anti-value, and which is omnipresent in both the valued and the devalued) is by definition incoherent (indiscernible, invisible, indeterminate).
化,这就是制造冲突,这就是破坏最终的一致性。被看见就是从看不见的背景中被剔除出来,这又意味着失去最大的连贯性。连贯性是“讽刺的”,因为真正的连贯性(价值、团结性、未经雕琢的或贬值的东西,有价值的东西从中成长,它与有价值的东西密不可分,它解释了从价值到反价值的逆转循环,它是无所不在的从定义上看,无论是有价值的还是贬值的,都是不连贯的(难以辨别的、不可见的、不确定的)。
The writings of Zhuang Zhou present to us an overabundance of differing perspectives, each positing its own standard of rightness (是 shi), which is intrinsic to being anything at all, to being a particular something, to being a “this” (also 是 shi) at all. Being a “this,” it is intelligible (coherent) only by virtue of its contrast to some “that,” which is itself also a “this,” and hence its own new perspective. This positing of the other perspective is intrinsic to being a perspective at all: to be a this is to also contradict being this. This and not-this thus necessarily “cohere,” and it is only by doing so that they are intelligible (coherent). But this is again a specifically ironic coherence: any determinate entity (this) is coherent as what it is (this) by cohering with its own intrinsic positing of not-this. The coherence of any entity is thus always an ironic coherence. Zhuang Zhou’s “wild card” perspective “responds but does not store”: it reflects and affirms the “rightness” presented by each new situation, but does not consider this rightness, which is always both a shi and a fei (非), to be mutually exclusive with the opposite perspective, the opposed shi/fei, since the latter, the negation of itself, is intrinsic to its very intelligibility. Shi is “this,” which is coherence, value, intelligibility; but in positing its own negation, which in turn negates “this,” every coherence is also necessarily an incoherence, which again affirms Laozi’s ironic coherence: value which is togetherness which is unintelligibility: what Zhuangzi calls “the torch of slippage and doubt” (滑疑之耀 guyizhiyao). The “togetherness” here comes in not as an overriding convergence of all things in a single vision (as in Xunzi’s “Great Coherence” or even the ironic version in Laozi’s “unhewn”) but resides in a new application of the motif of the center, already prefigured in Mencius’s critique of “clinging to the center but without altering by circumstance.” (執中無權 zhizhong wuquan) (7A26). Zhuang Zhou introduces the idea of the pivot of Dao (道樞 daoshu), which is also the pivot of daos: the point where opposed shi/feis are not opposed, not mutually exclusive, precisely because of their mutual positing, and hence, in not “storing,” they flow freely into one another. The center allows one to “travel two roads at once” (兩行 liangxing): this special kind of value bilocality is Zhuang Zhou’s distinctive contribution to the problematic of coherence, universality, and omnipresence (as omniavailability of value) in Chinese thought. In the ironic conception of coherence, in both the Laozian
庄周的著作向我们展示了过多的不同观点,每种观点都提出了自己的正确标准(是是),这是任何事物、特定事物、“此”所固有的标准。 shi)完全没有。作为一个“这个”,它只有通过与某个“那个”的对比才能被理解(连贯),而“那个”本身也是一个“这个”,因此它有自己的新视角。这种对另一种观点的定位是作为一种观点所固有的:成为一个这个也与成为这个相矛盾。因此,这个和非这个必然是“连贯的”,只有这样做,它们才是可理解的(连贯的)。但这又是一种特别具有讽刺意味的连贯性:任何确定的实体(这个)通过与其自身的非此的内在定位相一致,就其本身(这个)而言是连贯的。因此,任何实体的连贯性始终是一种讽刺性的连贯性。庄周的“通配符”视角“反应而不储存”:它反映并肯定了每一个新情况所呈现的“正确性”,但没有考虑到这种正确性,这种正确性永远是“是”和“非”。与相反的观点是相互排斥的,对立的是/非,因为后者,对自身的否定,是其可理解性所固有的。势是“此”,即连贯性、价值性、可理解性;但在提出自己的否定,进而否定“此”时,每一种连贯性也必然是一种不连贯性,这再次肯定了老子讽刺的连贯性:价值即是一体性,又是难以理解的:庄子所说的“滑动和怀疑的火炬”(滑疑之耀(guyizhiyao)。 这里的“一体”并不是所有事物在一个单一视野中的压倒性的融合(如荀子的“大同”,甚至是老子的“未凿”中的讽刺版本),而是存在于中心主题的新应用中,早在孟子批判“居中而不移”中就已预示。 (执中无权 zhizhong wuquan)(7A26)。庄周提出了“道枢”的概念,这也是道的枢轴:对立的势/非不对立,不相互排斥,正是因为它们的相互定位,因此,它们不是“存储”,而是自由地相互流动。该中心允许人们“两行良行”:这种特殊的价值二方性是庄周对中国思想中的连贯性、普遍性和无所不在(作为价值的无所不在)问题的独特贡献。在具有讽刺意味的连贯性概念中,在老子的著作中,

and the Zhuangzian versions, the value, sustainability, and identity of things is seen as coming from their connection with other things (i.e., their own negation, in Laozi), or with particular human perspectives (in Zhuangzi). But here the aspect of intelligibility is denied: the true value and cohesion of things precludes their intelligibility as definitive particular identities. When identified definitively, they are falsified, and indeed lose the cohesion with all things, the value, the sustainability they originally enjoyed. The true X , then, is a non-X.
在庄子的版本中,事物的价值、可持续性和同一性被视为来自于它们与其他事物的联系(即,在《老子》中,它们自身的否定),或者来自特定的人类视角(在《庄子》中)。但这里可理解性的方面被否认了:事物的真正价值和凝聚力排除了它们作为明确的特定身份的可理解性。当被明确识别时,它们就被伪造了,并且确实失去了与万物的凝聚力、价值和它们最初享有的可持续性。那么,真正的 X 是一个非 X。
A notion is thus here developed of a kind of invisible center and its derivative totality that unifies (makes coherent) and brings entities to identifiable being (makes coherent) and gives value (makes coherent with human desire), but is itself coherent only in an ironic sense, that is, unifies and yet is itself unseen, unmanifest, unintelligible. In Liji texts such as the “Daxue” and “Zhongyong,” as also in the Yin-Yang systems of the commentaries to the Zhouyi and Yang Xiong’s Taixuanjing, we find a domestication of this notion of an unseen centering that functions for each emergent coherence as a creator and preserver, thereby accounting for and legitimizing all observable order and consistency (coherence). Overall coherence works through local pockets of invisibility or ironic coherence: the as-yet-unseen sprouts, the unmanifest but constant Inner Coherence (誠 cheng) which reveals itself in all individual affects and actions but never shows itself simpliciter, or as the least manifest aspect of a hexagram-situation, or as the Yin side of a Yin-Yang dyad which, however, works toward and is subordinated to the manifestation and purposes of the Yang. Yin-Yang represents a cohesion between ironic coherence-as-unintelligibility, value as necessarily nonexplicit (Yin), and non-ironic coherence-as-intelligibility, value as explicit (Yang). In all these systems (even, contrary to appearances, Yang Xiong’s Taixuanjing, which gives definite values to things in spite of emphasizing the unintelligibility, xuan 玄, of the ultimate whole), the role of the unintelligible, the background, the unreadable togetherness in which value is rooted is here acknowledged and integrated into the system of Great Coherence, Xunzi’s univocal view of a maximally coherent whole. These are non-ironic integrations of the ironic: the final word, the ultimate value, lies with the non-ironic, the definite and normative values and identities of nonnegotiable individual and collective coherences. We have thus begun to see the development of one form of compromise between these two positions, finding a place for this built-in mysteriousness pertaining to all possible identities without thereby conceding the possible nihilistic consequences of the ironic tradition, which would seem to undermine the value of tradition, moral instruction, and human endeavor, or at least make it troublingly negotiable.
因此,这里发展出一种概念,它是一种无形中心及其派生整体,它统一(使之连贯)并将实体带入可识别的存在(使连贯)并赋予价值(使与人类欲望连贯),但其本身仅在以下方面连贯:讽刺意义,即统一性,但其本身是看不见的、不明显的、不可理解的。在《大学》和《中庸》等《礼记》文本中,以及《周易》和扬雄的《太玄经》注释的阴阳系统中,我们发现了这种看不见的中心概念的驯化,它为每个新兴的连贯性发挥着作用。作为创造者和保护者,从而解释并合法化所有可观察到的秩序和一致性(连贯性)。整体连贯性是通过局部的隐形或讽刺连贯性发挥作用的:尚未见的萌芽,不明显但持续的内在连贯性(诚诚),它在所有个人的情感和行为中展现自己,但从未表现得更简单,或作为最不明显的表现。卦象的一个方面,或者阴阳二元组的阴面,然而,它朝着阳的表现和目的努力并从属于阳的表现和目的。阴阳代表了作为不可理解性的反讽连贯性、作为必然不明确的价值(阴)和作为可理解性的非反讽连贯性、作为明确的价值(阳)之间的凝聚力。在所有这些体系中(甚至与表面相反,杨雄的《太玄经》尽管强调最终整体的不可理解性,但仍赋予事物明确的价值),不可理解性、背景、不可理解的整体性在其中所扮演的角色。其价值的根源在这里得到承认并融入到大连贯体系中,即荀子关于最大连贯整体的明确观点。 这些是讽刺性的非讽刺性整合:最终的词、最终的价值在于非讽刺性的、明确的、规范的价值观以及不可协商的个人和集体一致性的身份。因此,我们开始看到这两种立场之间的一种妥协形式的发展,为这种与所有可能的身份有关的内在神秘性找到了一个位置,同时又不承认反讽传统可能产生的虚无主义后果,这似乎会破坏反讽传统的虚无主义后果。传统、道德指导和人类努力的价值,或者至少使其具有令人不安的可协商性。
These conclusions rested on certain theoretical considerations about coherence as such, and the peculiarities of classical Chinese conceptions of it. One trope that was particularly useful for illuminating this issue was based on a passage in the writings of Qian Mu, my translation of which I will reproduce here:
这些结论基于对连贯性本身的某些理论考虑,以及中国古典概念的特殊性。对于阐明这个问题特别有用的一个比喻是基于钱穆著作中的一段话,我将在这里转载我的翻译:
Wherever there is a circle or a pendulum range, there will be what can be called a center. This center is not on the two sides, nor anywhere outside, but rather lies within [the range of the swing of the pendulum]. A pendulum swing or a cyclic progress never actually comes to rest at that center, but the center is always there, and is always still and solid as a center. It is as if the center were controlling the motion. The ceaseless and infinite motion seems eternally to be under the command of the center, completely controlled by the center, and thus we can say that it is perfectly moving and perfectly still, perfectly changing and perfectly constant. . . . Confucians want to point out a fixed center in this infinite cyclical back and forth, and they call this center “human nature.” This is also what the Neo-Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties liked to call “the Center which has not yet become manifest,” “knowing the resting place,” “stillness,” “the master,” “the constant.” The Song Neo-Confucians said that this human Nature is precisely Li [coherence], but were unwilling to say that the Nature is qi [vital energyl, because qi is just the motion, whereas Li is the Center of that motion. If there were truly pure qi with no Li , it would be like an unbridled horse-no one knows where it will run to. Heaven and earth would not be able to become heaven and earth, humans and things would not be able to become humans and things. There would be absolutely no way of handling or explaining the myriad different types and forms of things. The reason we now have this “Heaven and Earth,” and these “humans” and these “things,” is because within the qi there is this Li . Because there is Li in qi, there is constancy and predictability, which is called “the Nature” when viewed as active and emerging from within, and as “the Decree” when viewed as passive and coming from without. But in reality this one motion is at once active and passive, internal and external, indivisibly, which is why the Nature and the Decree are seen to have a common source. Both are ways of describing this motion itself, but emphasizing different aspects of it.
凡是有圆或摆范围的地方,就有所谓的中心。这个中心不在两侧,也不在外面,而是在[钟摆摆动范围]之内。钟摆的摆动或循环的进程实际上永远不会停在该中心,但该中心始终在那里,并且始终是静止且坚固的中心。就好像中心在控制运动一样。永不停息​​、无限的运动似乎永远都在中心的指挥之下,完全受中心的控制,因此我们可以说它是完美的运动和完美的静止,完美的变化和完美的恒定。 。 。 。儒家想在这种无限循环中指出一个固定的中心,他们把这个中心称为“人性”。这也就是宋明理学家所喜欢的“未显中”、“知其处”、“寂”、“主”、“常”。宋理学家说,人性就是理,而不愿意说性就是气,因为气只是运动,而理是运动的中心。如果真有纯气而无理,就如一匹不受缰绳的马,谁也不知道它会跑到哪里去。天地不能成为天地,人与物不能成为人与物。绝对没有办法处理或解释无数不同类型和形式的事物。我们现在之所以有这个“天地”、这些“人”、这些“物”,就是因为气里有这个理。 因为气中有理,所以有恒常性和可预测性,从主动的、从内而出的,称为“自然”;从被动、从外来的,称为“法令”。但实际上,这一运动既是主动的,也是被动的,是内在的,也是外在的,不可分割的,这就是为什么自然和法令被视为有共同的根源。两者都是描述该动议本身的方式,但强调其不同方面。

“The Good” is what we call the constancy in this eternal change, the center in this unceasing motion, this relatively easily
“善”就是我们所说的这种永恒变化中的恒定性,这种不断运动的中心,这种相对容易的

grasped and known nature. Good is just the constant tendency of this motion. . . . Whatever is separated from it by a great distance is called bad. Good is just the center of this motion, evil is nothing but going beyond it or not coming up to it. . . . Although human affairs also go through endless transformations and never stay the same, there is a constancy or a center to them. If you try to separate yourself from this constancy or center and just move straight forward, you will find that it is impossible. For example, peace and struggle are phenomena that arise alternately in human life; they usually form a cycle, a back and forth, moving from peace to struggle and then from struggle back to peace. Within this process too there is a center or a constancy. Struggle must search for peace, and peace must resist struggle (that is, must not be afraid of struggle). So peace which is close to struggle and struggle that is close to peace are both capable of continuing, and both can be called good. But struggle that is far removed from peace and peace that is far removed from struggle are both far removed from the center, so that neither can form a constancy or attain any continuity. Going too far and not coming up to it are equally bad, and both of these can be called evil. Evil is just whatever cannot be constant (sustainable). The same is true of sickness and health. Usually people think a healthy person is free of sickness, but in reality if there were no sickness, how could there be the work of metabolism, assimilating and excreting? The function of excretion is a type of sickness that is not far removed from health (and hence is good). The same is true of work and rest; to rest so much you can no longer work is evil and not good, and to work so much you can no longer rest is equally evil and not good. But people usually think of life as positive, death as negative, peace as positive and struggle as negative, health and work as positive and sickness and rest as negative, and then they start thinking that the positive side is good and the negative side is evil. But according to the theory we are developing here, as long as evil stays close to good, it is no longer evil, and indeed, if good is too far removed from evil it is no longer good. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
掌握并认识自然。好的只是这个运动的持续趋势。 。 。 。凡是与它相距很远的东西都称为恶。善只是这个运动的中心,恶不过是超越它或达不到它。 。 。 。人间的事物虽然也有无穷无尽的变化,永远不会一成不变,但都有一个恒定性或一个中心。如果你试图将自己从这种坚定性或中心中分离出来,直接向前迈进,你会发现这是不可能的。例如,和平与斗争是人类生活中交替出现的现象;它们通常形成一个循环,一个来回,从和平走向斗争,然后从斗争回到和平。在这个过程中也有一个中心或一个恒常性。斗争必须寻求和平,和平必须抵制斗争(即不能害怕斗争)。所以接近于斗争的和平和接近于和平的斗争都是能够持续的,都可以称为善。但远离和平的斗争,与远离斗争的和平,都远离中心,所以都不能形成恒久,也不能取得连续性。走得太远和达不到同样不好,这两者都可以称为恶。邪恶就是一切不能恒定(可持续)的事物。疾病和健康也是如此。通常人们认为健康的人就没有疾病,但实际上如果没有疾病,怎么会有新陈代谢、吸收和排泄的工作呢?排泄功能是一种与健康相去不远的疾病(因此是好的)。 作息也是如此;休息太多而不能再工作是恶而不是善,工作太多而不能再休息同样是恶而不是善。但人们通常认为生是积极的,死亡是消极的,和平是积极的,斗争是消极的,健康和工作是积极的,疾病和休息是消极的,然后他们开始认为积极的一面是好的,消极的一面是邪恶的。但根据我们在这里发展的理论,只要恶与善接近,它就不再是恶,事实上,如果善与恶相距太远,它就不再是善。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
I will repeat what I said there about this trope, which I will refer to henceforth as “Qian Mu’s Pendulum.” I quote this passage at length because we will have many occasions to refer back to it in the pages that follow. I do not claim that this model applies perfectly for all Chinese thinkers. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Rather, I would like to suggest that in considering each Chinese thinker we are better off searching for something like this model and the ways in which he diverges from it than assuming something along the lines of the
我将重复我在那里所说的关于这个比喻的内容,我将在下文中将其称为“钱穆的钟摆”。我详细地引用了这段话,因为我们将在接下来的几页中多次引用它。我并不是说这个模式完全适用于所有中国思想家。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 相反,我想建议,在考虑每一位中国思想家时,我们最好寻找类似这个模型的东西以及他与这个模型的分歧方式,而不是沿着这个模型假设一些东西。

universal/particular model, or a whole/part model, or a substance/accident model, and the particular handlings of sameness into difference that they tend to imply. For this brilliant metaphor gives us a key by which to unlock many of the problems that we will find confronting us there, to be contrasted with the basic metaphors of mimesis, or imposing a shape onto a material that informs the Greek speculations. It is crucial to note, first of all, that the sort of “coherence” indicated here necessarily includes both sustainability and value, which are here seen as one and the same, as synonyms, and inseparably connected to the idea of intelligibility (the graspability of the still, virtual center as opposed to the motion of the pendulum itself) and to “centrality,” a neutral point connecting to two extremes conceived as a dyadic opposition. It also provides us with a strong sense of why it is preferable to speak of “coherence” for such ideas, rather than simply some form of “harmony.” For what is at stake here is literally the holding together of the parts, their grouping with one another as a condition of their being present at all, their identifiability as what they are. If any part flies off to too great a distance from the center, and from the opposite extreme, it ceases to be sustainable as itself, ceases to be itself (e.g., health too far from sickness ceases to be health). It is the coherence between the parts that not only sustains the whole, but sustains each of the parts as what it is, or as anything at all (whatever it may become after “flying off” would, on this model, be determined by its relation to some other center and the corresponding opposite to which it would thus be connected). And this coherence with the whole, and with the center, is really just a shorthand way of designating the relation to the other parts, or better, the opposite part. The “center” is picked out and privileged because it alone provides “coherence” in the other sense: intelligibility, identity, definite characteristics. The whole can be identified, grasped, predicted, only through the center. The center is what “shows up” to observing awareness of the circulation between the extremes.
普遍/特殊模型,或整体/部分模型,或物质/事故模型,以及它们往往暗示的将相同性转化为差异的特殊处理。因为这个绝妙的隐喻为我们提供了一把钥匙,可以用来解开我们将在那里遇到的许多问题,与模仿的基本隐喻形成鲜明对比,或者将形状强加给希腊推测的材料。首先,需要注意的是,这里所指的“连贯性”必然包括可持续性和价值,它们在这里被视为同一个同义词,并且与可理解性(可理解性)的概念密不可分。静止的、虚拟的中心,而不是钟摆本身的运动)和“中心性”,一个连接两个极端的中性点,被视为二元对立。它还让我们强烈地意识到为什么最好将这些想法称为“连贯性”,而不是简单地某种形式的“和谐”。因为这里真正关键的是各个部分的结合,它们彼此的组合作为它们存在的条件,以及它们作为它们本身的可识别性。如果任何部分飞离中心和相反的极端太远,它就不再是其自身的可持续性,不再是它自己(例如,健康距离疾病太远就不再是健康)。部分之间的连贯性不仅维持了整体,而且维持了每个部分的本来面目或任何事物(在这个模型中,无论“飞走”后它可能变成什么,都将由其本身决定)与某个其他中心的关系以及因此与其连接的相应对立面的关系)。 这种与整体和中心的一致性实际上只是指定与其他部分(或者更好的是,相反部分)关系的一种简写方式。 “中心”被挑选出来并享有特权,因为它本身就提供了另一种意义上的“连贯性”:可理解性、同一性、明确的特征。整体只有通过中心才能被识别、把握、预测。中心是观察极端之间循环的意识“显现”的地方。
We might note also the rather approximate nature of this center as a summing up of the motion involved: it is determinative, in that “too great” a distance from it will lead to a part’s demise. But this does not necessarily specify the exact range of each motion, which might be more or less distant in any case, swinging a little erratically from time to time, as long as it doesn’t exceed a certain range. In other words, the “control” of the center, on this model, allows for a certain randomness. It is not conceived here as control in the sense of the issuing of a command that must be exactly obeyed, or laying down a track guiding every detail of the activity. Note also the manner in which this centrality is both immanent and transcendent: it is a function of the two poles, does not really preexist them, and has only a virtual existence, but at the same time it is their “controller” in the sense that their behavior and determinate identities are derivable
我们还可能注意到该中心作为所涉及运动的总结的相当近似的性质:它是决定性的,因为距它“太大”的距离将导致零件的灭亡。但这并不一定指定每个运动的确切范围,在任何情况下,运动的范围可能或多或少,不时地有点不稳定地摆动,只要不超过一定的范围即可。换句话说,在这个模型上,中心的“控制”允许一定的随机性。这里,它并不被认为是发出必须严格遵守的命令或制定指导活动的每个细节的轨道意义上的控制。还要注意这种中心性既是内在的又是超越的:它是两个极点的函数,并不真正先于它们而存在,只有虚拟的存在,但同时它是它们的“控制器”他们的行为和确定的身份是可以推导的

from their relation to this virtual center. In this sense it plays a role similar to that of a “transcendent” fundamental reality, the independent variable that determines the behavior of everything related to it. But the pendulum model also allows us to intuit the manner in which it is simultaneously not transcendent at all. The center does not belong to a separate ontological realm, being itself merely a certain fact about the two poles, namely, a way of describing their relation to one another.
从他们与这个虚拟中心的关系来看。从这个意义上说,它扮演着类似于“超越的”基本现实的角色,即决定与其相关的一切行为的自变量。但钟摆模型也让我们能够凭直觉了解它同时又不是超越的。中心并不属于一个单独的本体论领域,它本身只是关于两个极点的某个事实,即描述它们彼此关系的一种方式。
In Ironies of Oneness and Difference some effort was also made to address some of the founding metaphors underlying the classical Greek methods of conceiving the relations among things in terms of their sameness and difference. These typically had to do with notions of a strictly and precisely repeatable Form being imprinted into a formless Matter, or of a selfsame Substance underlying a multitude of diverse Accidents or Attributes-some notion of a particular self-standing entity with a variety of aspects “belonging” to it as “properties,” or, grammatically and logically, a single identical subject with various genuinely distinct predicates. All such notions offer us certain presuppositions about the relation between sameness and difference. In the case of Form and Matter and the various derivatives of this notion, such as the concepts of “essence” and “instantiation,” we noted that while Form as such irreducibly involves in itself both a sameness and a difference, it is at the same time a device for keeping this sameness and this difference perfectly separate: a shared self-same essence remains mathematically one and the same in every instantiation, while maintaining absolute difference from every other essence. This attempted perfect continence among essences, however, cannot be maintained absolutely, for the commonality between diverse essences continues to leak into any thinking process that attempts to relate them, to wit, in any instance of thinking qua thinking. Hence, we have the stopgap of subsuming species into genus, of nested essences arranged in a single unchanging hierarchical taxonomy, imagined as a downward-branching tree. By means of this expedient, the aspect of sameness and the aspect of difference among any entities can be made to appear to remain perfectly distinct facts. Hence “Dog” and “Horse” are “the same” in that they share the selfsame essence of “Animal, Vertebrate, Mammal,” etc., but differ in that each has a specific essence modified by its distinguishing feature. By introducing the notion of various “respects” as if it were an ontological fact, by distinguishing “the respect in which” they are the same and “the respect in which” they are different, the ontological ultimacy of sameness and difference as final facts can be maintained. The essence is the same, simpliciter, in every instantiation, but this essence is different, simpliciter, from every other essence, and from its instantiations qua instantiations.
在《统一与差异的反讽》中,还努力解决了古典希腊方法中的一些基本隐喻,这些隐喻是根据事物的相同性和差异来构思事物之间的关系。这些通常与严格且精确地可重复的形式被印入无形物质的概念有关,或者与多种不同的事故或属性背后的同一个物质的概念有关——具有多种方面的特定独立实体的一些概念“属于”它作为“属性”,或者,从语法上和逻辑上来说,一个相同的主语具有各种真正不同的谓词。所有这些概念都为我们提供了关于相同性和差异性之间关系的某些预设。就形式和物质以及该概念的各种派生词而言,例如“本质”和“实例化”的概念,我们注意到,虽然形式本身不可简化地涉及同一性和差异性,但它处于同时,一种保持这种相同性和这种差异完全分离的装置:共享的同一本质在数学上在每个实例中都保持一致,同时保持与其他本质的绝对差异。然而,这种本质之间完美克制的尝试并不能绝对维持,因为不同本质之间的共性继续渗透到任何试图将它们联系起来的思维过程中,也就是说,在任何作为思维的思维实例中。因此,我们有权宜之计,将物种归入属,将嵌套的本质排列在单一不变的分层分类法中,想象为一棵向下分支的树。 通过这种权宜之计,可以使任何实体之间的相同方面和不同方面看起来仍然是完全不同的事实。因此,“狗”和“马”是“相同的”,因为它们具有“动物、脊椎动物、哺乳动物”等相同的本质,但不同之处在于,它们各自具有由其区别特征修饰的特定本质。通过引入各种“方面”的概念,就好像它是一个本体论事实一样,通过区分它们相同的“方面”和不同的“方面”,相同和不同的本体论终极性作为最终事实可以维持。在每一个实例中,本质都是相同的、更简单的,但这个本质与所有其他本质以及它作为实例的实例都是不同的、更简单的。
Indeed, we may go so far as to suggest that the entire idea of the so-called “law” of non-contradiction is a further expression of this tendency.
事实上,我们甚至可以认为,所谓的不矛盾“法则”的整个思想就是这种倾向的进一步表达。
The Law of Non-Contradiction is given by Aristotle in three forms, according to the accepted doxa: the ontological form, the logical form, and the psychological form. The “ontological version” (Metaphysics IV 3 1005b1923) concerns what predicates can belong to the same subject. “The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.” The logical version (Metaphysics IV 3 1011b13-14) concerns two contradictory propositions: they cannot both be true at once. The psychological version (Metaphysics IV 3 1005b23-25) concerns two beliefs: one cannot believe both two contradictory claims at once. The latter two versions are dependent on the first version; if the first version were false, the other two would also be false. But in the context of our present discussion, we might notice an enormous red flag in Aristotle’s: it is the words translated “at once,” “at the same time,” and “in the same respect.” With these words, the entire principle puts itself under the suspicion of being a world-historical instance of gerrymandering hand waving. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} What is a “respect”? A “respect in which something is asserted” is, perhaps, the part or side or aspect of some matter that is to be considered of relevance in a particular instance, as determined by a set of relations, or a context, abstracting one aspect or part of the item in question and addressing that alone, in isolation from the other aspects or parts of that very same thing or fact or topic. How do we determinate which among all the characteristics and relations of the thing, and how many of them, get to count as a single “respect”? Answer: only those relations and characteristics that produce a non-contradictory set of predicates count as a single respect. Therefore, “in the same respect” is a circular condition. I allow only as much into a “respect” as can turn out to be non-contradictory. Whatever leads to a contradiction I simply relegate to another “respect.” The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, for what it means to say something is true “in one sense” and untrue “in another sense.” Indeed, less intuitively but nonetheless just as damagingly, the same can be said about the qualifications concerning time, that is, that something might be true “at one time” and untrue “at another time.” How long is one “time”? Unless moments are dimensionless simples, which would present insuperable metaphysical difficulties, the duration of a “time” in this sense must be variable, and the same problems about their definition applies: however much time can include a set of events or predicates or actions that are non-contradictory in whatever sense is under examination will be what counts as a single time in that case. The Law of Non-Contradiction is true only in the same way that the “law” that there are twelve inches to a foot is true. Whatever exceeds twelve inches is considered part of the next foot. This gives us no ontological information at all. We should be no more amazed to find it always true than we are amazed to find that, no matter where we might search throughout the
根据公认的doxa,亚里士多德以三种形式给出了不矛盾律:本体论形式、逻辑形式和心理学形式。 “本体论版本”(形而上学 IV 3 1005b1923)关注哪些谓词可以属于同一主题。 “同一属性不能同时属于和不属于同一主体、同一方面。”逻辑版本(形而上学 IV 3 1011b13-14)涉及两个矛盾的命题:它们不可能同时为真。心理学版本(形而上学 IV 3 1005b23-25)涉及两种信念:一个人不能同时相信两种相互矛盾的主张。后两个版本依赖于第一个版本;如果第一个版本是错误的,那么其他两个版本也将是错误的。但在我们当前讨论的背景下,我们可能会注意到亚里士多德的一个巨大的危险信号:它是翻译为“立即”、“同时”和“在同一方面”的词。有了这些话,整个原则就被怀疑是世界历史上不公正划分选区的挥手例子。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 什么是“尊重”? “断言某事的方面”也许是某些事物的部分或侧面或方面,在特定情况下被认为是相关的,由一组关系或上下文确定,抽象出一个方面或问题的一部分,并单独解决该问题,与同一事物、事实或主题的其他方面或部分隔离。我们如何确定事物的所有特征和关系中的哪一个以及其中多少个可以算作一个“尊重”?答案:只有那些产生一组不矛盾的谓词的关系和特征才算作单一方面。 因此,“在同一方面”是一个循环条件。我只允许在不矛盾的情况下给予“尊重”。无论什么导致矛盾,我都简单地将其归结为另一种“尊重”。同样的道理,经过必要的修改,可以说“在某种意义上”是真实的,而“在另一种意义上”是不真实的。事实上,虽然不那么直观,但同样具有破坏性,关于时间的限定也可以这样说,即某件事可能“在某一时刻”为真,而“在另一时刻”则不真实。一个“时间”有多长?除非时刻是无量纲的简单,这会带来无法克服的形而上学的困难,否则这个意义上的“时间”的持续时间必须是可变的,并且关于它们的定义也存在同样的问题:无论多少时间可以包括一组事件或谓词或动作,这些事件或谓词或动作在任何意义上都是不矛盾的,在这种情况下,被检查的将被视为一次。不矛盾定律的正确性与“英尺等于十二英寸”的“定律”的正确性是一样的。任何超过十二英寸的东西都被视为下一英尺的一部分。这根本没有给我们任何本体论信息。我们不应该惊讶地发现它总是正确的,就像我们惊讶地发现,无论我们在整个世界的哪个地方寻找一样。

cosmos, however many billions of light-years away, we always find that every foot of space has exactly twelve inches in it, no more and no less. It tells me nothing about the world, other than the finitude and conditionality of anything determinate (i.e., that there are always more inches than twelve available for counting). The Law of Non-Contradiction does not tell me that the world, or any actual entity in the world, or any truth about the world, is non-contradictory, nor that there are really samenesses and differences, simpliciter, in the world. It just tells me that wherever I can describe two contrary characteristics as coexistent in some composite, I will describe that coexistence as a non-contradictory complexity of a single entity, and whenever the elements in a composite entity fail to be capable of coexisting, due to a conflict between them, I will simply define the elements as no longer belonging to a single entity. As a matter of policy, we separate out whatever can be subsumed into a single concept as a sameness and name that the essence, and call whatever is leftover the difference. Every thing is thus both the same and different from every other thing, but “in different respects.”
宇宙,无论距离有多少亿光年,我们总是发现每一英尺的空间正好有十二英寸,不多也不少。除了任何确定的事物的有限性和条件性(即总是有比十二英寸更多的英寸可供计数)之外,它没有告诉我任何关于世界的信息。不矛盾定律并没有告诉我,世界,或者世界上的任何实际实体,或者关于世界的任何真理,都是不矛盾的,更简单地说,世界上也没有真正存在相同和差异。它只是告诉我,只要我可以将两个相反的特征描述为在某个组合中共存,我就会将该共存描述为单个实体的非矛盾复杂性,并且每当组合实体中的元素无法共存时,由于对于它们之间的冲突,我将简单地将元素定义为不再属于单个实体。作为一项政策,我们将所有可以归入单一概念的东西作为相同点分离出来,并将其称为本质,并将剩下的称为差异。因此,每件事物都与其他事物既相同又不同,但“在不同方面”。
Thus, we see an entire logical system built up on this circular law, which requires us to separate the shared essence from the differing instantiations. The “Realist” interpretation of this arrangement will emphasize the reality of the sameness of the shared essence, which will have to be considered some kind of genuinely selfsame entity that can be instantiated unchanged in more than one time and place, and which continues to be exactly what it is whether or not it is so instantiated. This would mean that its existence has a kind of availability that is independent of whether one or more human beings ever makes mentions or experiences it. Moreover, the Realist essence must be causally relevant, that is, it must be real at least in the sense of playing some actual causal role in making at least some actual entities be what they are and do what they do, while the “Nominalist” will emphasize the difference between individual species or individual members of a species as what is ultimately real, denying that there are any nonparticular or nonconcrete entities that are as ultimately real or that are as causally relevant, in our final ontology of both the natural and human worlds, as particular and concrete entities. But in either case, what is the same and what is different really pertains to these existing things, a definitive, nonnegotiable something that has an unchanging identity in all contexts.
因此,我们看到一个完整的逻辑系统建立在这个循环定律之上,这要求我们将共同的本质与不同的实例分开。对这一安排的“现实主义”解释将强调共享本质的同一性的现实,这必须被视为某种真正相同的实体,可以在多个时间和地点不变地实例化,并且继续存在无论它是否被实例化,它到底是什么。这意味着它的存在具有一种可用性,独立于一个或多个人是否曾经提及或经历过它。此外,现实主义的本质必须是因果相关的,也就是说,至少在使至少某些实际实体成为其所是并做其所做的事情中发挥某种实际因果作用的意义上,它必须是真实的,而“唯名论”则必须是真实的。将强调个体物种或物种个体成员之间的差异作为最终真实的东西,否认在我们自然和人类的最终本体论中存在任何最终真实或因果相关的非特定或非具体实体世界,作为特殊而具体的实体。但无论哪种情况,相同和不同实际上都属于这些现有的事物,是一种确定的、不可协商的事物,在所有情况下都具有不变的身份。
It is useful to consider, in contrast, how same and different are to be conceived on the pendulum model. Again, although of course it would be possible to describe this situation in terms of a sameness (what the two extremes “have in common” is the characteristic of “not being too far from the center”), this description is clearly less useful here than one that stresses a certain sui generis manner of interfusion of same and different. We have
相反,考虑在摆模型上如何设想相同和不同是有用的。再说一遍,虽然当然可以用同一性来描述这种情况(两个极端的“共同点”是“离中心不太远”的特征),但这种描述在这里显然没有什么用处。而不是强调相同与不同的某种独特的融合方式。我们有

an alternate way of organizing sameness and difference here, which is reducible neither to the dividing off of sameness and difference in the manner of Form and Matter, nor of Substance and Accident, nor again of Whole and Part or of a Totality and its Aspects. Nor do we have a total transcendence of all pairs of opposites typical of negative theologies or philosophies of the Absolute (i.e., where all finite determinations, including same and different, are deemed inadequate to describe the truly real, the Absolute, which as infinite can be neither “this” nor “that”). For built into the idea of the extremes and the center in Qian Mu’s pendulum model is the sense that what constitutes the difference between these two extremes is precisely continuity with its opposite, the fact that they share a neutral connecting center. Conversely, what constitutes their own specifiable identities and sustainability as what they are, as well as their continuity with one another, is precisely their concrete non-exclusion of their opposites, their continual tendency to veer back toward their opposites, their connection to and contact with the difference that excludes them, their interaction, interface, and overlap with difference. What joins them as members of this coherence is not so much sharing a certain characteristic, but rather precisely the harmonic coherence of their differences from one another. What makes health health? Its non-exclusion of sickness. What makes sickness sickness (rather than death, which would be the end of sickness)? Its non-exclusion of health. What makes health and sickness belong to the same coherence? Not their sharing of a single essence, but rather their complementarity. On this model, are health and sickness absolutely different from one another, “different” as the total exclusion of sameness? They cannot be, because a health from which all sickness is expunged here ceases to exist as health, and vice versa. The same? But if the two sides are the same, there is no swing, and thus no center, and thus no two sides. Are they different from the center? But the intelligibility of each is merely an aspect of the intelligibility of this center: what we see is only this one thing, identified by the character of the intelligible center; the rest is an unknowable blank. The same? But the center is a merely virtual, approximate point defined by the swing between the extremes, such that a pendulum resting at the center point would cease to function as the center. If it were “all center,” it would be “no center.” What this single concrete image perhaps most clearly shows us is how profoundly inappropriate these questions about same and different are to the case at hand.
这里有一种组织相同性和差异性的另一种方式,它既不能还原为形式与物质、实质与偶然、整体与部分、整体性及其方面的相同性与差异性的划分。我们也没有完全超越典型的消极神学或绝对哲学的所有对立面(即,所有有限的决定,包括相同的和不同的,都被认为不足以描述真正的真实,绝对,作为无限可以既不是“这个”也不是“那个”)。因为钱穆钟摆模型中的极端和中心的概念中蕴藏着这样一种感觉,即构成这两个极端之间的差异的恰恰是与其相反的连续性,即它们共享一个中立的连接中心。相反,构成他们自身特定身份和可持续性的东西,以及他们彼此之间的连续性,恰恰是他们对对立面的具体不排斥、他们不断转向对立面的倾向、他们与他人的联系和接触。与排除它们的差异、它们的相互作用、界面以及与差异的重叠。作为这种连贯性的成员,将他们结合在一起的并不是共享某种特征,而是他们彼此之间的差异的和谐连贯性。是什么让健康变得健康?其不排除疾病。是什么让疾病成为疾病(而不是死亡,死亡才是疾病的终结)?它不排除健康。是什么让健康和疾病属于同一个连贯性?它们不是共享单一本质,而是它们的互补性。 在这个模型中,健康和疾病是否完全不同,“不同”是完全排除相同性?它们不可能是这样,因为在这里消除了所有疾病的健康不再作为健康而存在,反之亦然。相同?但如果两侧相同,则没有摆动,因此没有中心,因此没有两侧。他们和中心有什么不同吗?但每一个的可理解性都只是这个中心的可理解性的一个方面:我们所看到的只是这一件事,由可理知中心的特征所识别;其余的都是不可知的空白。相同?但中心只是一个虚拟的、由极端之间的摆动定义的近似点,因此位于中心点的钟摆将不再发挥中心的作用。如果是“全中心”,那就是“无中心”。这个单一的具体形象也​​许最清楚地向我们展示的是,这些关于相同和不同的问题对于当前的情况是多么不恰当。
Perhaps more to the point, if we consider closely the point about intelligibility, we can see how this notion inevitably tends toward an idea of nested identities that connects to what we will be calling the ironic model of coherence. For whatever is identifiable, on Qian’s model, is always a center. Activity that does not yet turn around, that does not revert into a finite range, that is continually moving forward and hence is constitutively unfinished,
也许更重要的是,如果我们仔细考虑关于可理解性的观点,我们可以看到这个概念如何不可避免地倾向于一种嵌套身份的想法,这种想法与我们所说的连贯性的讽刺模型相关。因为在钱的模型中,任何可识别的东西总是一个中心。尚未扭转的活动,未恢复到有限范围的活动,不断向前推进的活动,因此本质上是未完成的活动,

cannot be identified and known. Knowing per se depends on the presence of cycles, oscillations, which are intelligible only as their approximate centers. But this means that when we speak of “health” and “sickness,” say, as the two extremes within one cycle, identified perhaps as the center intelligible as “physical life,” each of these two extremes must be a kind of center in its own right (for they have been identified, and identification is only of centers). Hence, within the larger vortex of “physical life,” we have the two smaller vortices of “health” and “sickness.” This sort of nesting would have to go on indefinitely, as long as there are identifiable elements. As an aid to visualizing this, we might expand the pendulum model into three dimensions, somewhat along the line of the Rutherford model of atomic structure (it should go without saying that this is merely a heuristic device; I do not mean to suggest that the early Chinese had in any way anticipated the knowledge of atomic structure-quite the contrary). The cloud of vibrating electrons is knowable only as a unit, which is located at and as the nucleus. But if we focus on trying to identify any further component, say an electron, on this model we will find another swarm of vibrations grouped around a virtual center, as which this swarm is identified. Expanding outward, we will find that the entire “atom” is an electron-in this case, one of two extremes of a pendulum swing-in a larger “atom.” Each element is a vortex. Its center is the vertex by which it is grasped and known. This sense of mutual inclusion might play out, as in the non-ironic conception of coherence later found in, for example, the schematic charts of the sixty-four hexagrams of the Zhouyi broken down into their Yin-Yang line components, as a one-way subsumption model, superficially similar to the taxonomy of species and genus we find on the universal/particular model, or set and set-membership model. But the composition of each level by means of the vortex of mutually entailing opposites, each of which is also composed of some pair of opposites, skews this comparison decisively, particularly with respect to the highest level, but also in terms of the interconnections between the lower levels. In the full-blown ironic version, this will be pushed to the point of undermining any fixed or nonnegotiable knowability concerning the ultimate identity of any of the components. But even in the non-ironic version, there will be many interesting complications to the conception of sameness and difference among the component parts, which we will be examining in detail on a case by case basis in the pages that follow.
无法被识别和知晓。认识本身取决于周期、振荡的存在,而这些只有作为它们的近似中心才能被理解。但这意味着,当我们谈到“健康”和“疾病”时,比如说,作为一个周期内的两个极端,可能被认为是可理解为“物质生命”的中心,这两个极端中的每一个都必须是一种中心。它自己的权利(因为它们已被识别,并且仅识别中心)。因此,在“物质生活”这个更大的漩涡中,我们有“健康”和“疾病”两个较小的漩涡。只要存在可识别的元素,这种嵌套就必须无限期地持续下去。为了帮助可视化这一点,我们可以将摆模型扩展到三个维度,有点类似于原子结构的卢瑟福模型(不言而喻,这只是一个启发式装置;我并不是说建议无论如何,早期中国人都预见到了原子结构的知识——恰恰相反)。振动电子云只能作为一个单位来认识,它位于原子核处并且作为原子核。但是,如果我们专注于尝试识别任何进一步的组件,例如电子,在这个模型上,我们会发现另一个围绕虚拟中心分组的振动群,该振动群就是通过该虚拟中心来识别的。向外扩展,我们会发现整个“原子”都是一个电子——在这种情况下,钟摆的两个极端之一摆动着一个更大的“原子”。每个元素都是一个漩涡。它的中心是它被把握和认识的顶点。 这种相互包容的感觉可能会发挥出来,就像后来在《周易》六十四卦分解成阴阳线组成部分的示意图中发现的非讽刺的连贯概念一样,作为一个整体-方式包含模型,表面上类似于我们在普遍/特殊模型或集合和集合成员模型上发现的物种和属的分类。但是,每个层次的构成都是由相互关联的对立面的漩涡组成的,每个对立面也由一对对立面组成,这决定性地扭曲了这种比较,特别是相对于最高层次而言,而且还就各层次之间的相互联系而言较低的水平。在全面的讽刺版本中,这将被推到破坏有关任何组件的最终身份的任何固定或不可协商的可知性的地步。但即使在非讽刺的版本中,各组成部分之间的相同性和差异性概念也会存在许多有趣的复杂性,我们将在接下来的几页中根据具体情况详细研究这些问题。
Centrality in this sense is itself value, is itself the connection of diverse and opposed particulars, is itself intelligibility: the three meanings of coherence with which we have been grappling. Only a center is what unifies, is discernible, and bestows value (sustainability), as Qian’s analysis suggests. As we shall see in the pages that follow, whenever we talk about Li, we will have to think first and foremost about this idea of a center.
从这个意义上说,中心性本身就是价值,本身就是不同和对立的细节的联系,本身就是可理解性:我们一直在努力解决连贯性的三个含义。正如钱的分析所表明的,只有一个中心才是统一的、可辨别的、并赋予价值(可持续性)的。正如我们将在接下来的几页中看到的,每当我们谈论李时,我们都必须首先考虑这个中心的概念。
We should thus highlight two points about coherence as so conceived. Coherence means both “balance” or equilibrium and “productivity” or the ability to continue in new forms into the future. As balance, a quantitative relation is implied here, a proper proportion, as between the two extremes in the swing of Qian’s pendulum. When either goes too far quantitatively, it disrupts the balance, loses its connection to the center and to the other extreme. Maintaining this proportion, and the ability to revert to the opposite, is precisely what allows both sides to continue forward in time, and it is this that constitutes value. The resulting vaguely quantitative but never strictly quantified sense of balancing of contrasted elements has been justly described as an “aesthetic order,” 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} in contrast to “logical order.” For it involves an aesthetic sense of altering quantitative proportions “by feel” in order to produce a qualitative change, as in the cutting of jade to make it a marketable product, or the adjustment of mixtures of ingredients in a recipe, or the adjustment of tones into an experienced harmony. It is especially noteworthy that this balance is generally conceived, as in the pendulum model, in terms of the proportioning of two opposite qualities, a dyad of terms. This sense of coherence as the production of quality by changes in quantity is of great significance, and it is in this sense that we will understand harmony and equilibrium here.
因此,我们应该强调关于如此设想的一致性的两点。连贯性既意味着“平衡”或平衡,也意味着“生产力”或以新形式延续到未来的能力。作为平衡,这里暗示着一种数量关系,一种适当的比例,就像钱钟摆摆动的两个极端之间一样。当任何一个在数量上走得太远时,它就会破坏平衡,失去与中心和另一个极端的联系。保持这个比例,并且能够回复到相反的状态,正是让双方能够在时间上继续前进,也正是这个构成了价值。由此产生的模糊定量但从未严格量化的对比元素平衡感被公正地描述为“美学秩序”。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 与“逻辑顺序”相反。因为它涉及一种“凭感觉”改变数量比例以产生质变的审美意识,如切割玉石使其成为适销对路的产品,或调整配方中的成分混合物,或调整音调变成经验丰富的和谐。特别值得注意的是,这种平衡通常是根据两个相反性质的比例(即一对项)来构思的,就像在钟摆模型中一样。这种量变产生质的连贯感具有重要意义,正是在这个意义上我们才会理解这里的和谐与均衡。
Second, the quantitatively produced qualities are said to be productive of further coherences-of more equilibrium, or more life, in a state of intelligible continuity with the past-the production of progeny, culturally and biologically. Equilibrium implies here both life (preservation of the currently intelligible coherence) and continuity (furtherance of related coherences in the future, forming among them another intelligible coherence). It also means the production of larger, more inclusive coherences, as between members of larger and more complex social groups, as we tried to show in the discussion of the Mencius and the Xunzi in the previous volume.
其次,据说数量上产生的品质能够产生进一步的一致性——更多的平衡,或者更多的生命,处于与过去可理解的连续性状态——文化上和生物学上的后代的产生。平衡在这里意味着生命(当前可理解的连贯性的保存)和连续性(未来相关连贯性的进一步发展,在它们之间形成另一种可理解的连贯性)。它还意味着在更大、更复杂的社会群体的成员之间产生更大、更具包容性的一致性,正如我们在上卷中对孟子和荀子的讨论中试图展示的那样。
Coherence in the sense used here is thus not merely consistency among elements of a whole, in the sense that they can coexist without interfering in one another’s continued existence, or are mutually compatible and not contradictory. It is also not merely the relation of coherence in the logical sense of mutual support or mutual entailment of a number of elements. Among available conceptual constructs, our notion of coherence perhaps comes closest to the notion of a Gestalt, which is a combination of elements which form a relation that emerges as a single readable figure, an intelligible whole, which also has some sense of value attached to it, which attracts the eye and the mind through the release of tension and reduction of dissonance, and through its relatively easy assimilation into the current project of the viewer (“a strong Gestalt”). There is also an important element of ambiguity to a Gestalt, as illustrated by the well-known images of
因此,此处所用意义上的连贯性不仅仅是整体各要素之间的一致性,即它们可以共存而不干扰彼此的持续存在,或者相互兼容而不矛盾。它也不仅仅是多个要素相互支持或相互蕴含的逻辑意义上的连贯关系。在可用的概念构造中,我们的连贯性概念可能最接近格式塔的概念,格式塔是形成一种关系的元素的组合,该关系以单个可读的图形、可理解的整体的形式出现,并且还具有某种附加的价值感。它通过释放紧张和减少不和谐以及相对容易地融入观众当前的项目(“强大的格式塔”)来吸引眼睛和思想。格式塔还有一个重要的模糊性因素,正如众所周知的图像所说明的那样

the vase faces, or Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit, which can point us toward the development of the ironic sense of coherence. It is possible but not so inevitable to include a sense of continuance to the value implication of the strong Gestalt. But the quantitative balance between dyadic opposites (the opposite poles of the pendulum swing), and with it the sense of temporal periodicity, does not seem to be as clearly a part of the basic notion of a Gestalt as it will be in the Chinese notions of coherence to be dealt with here. Nor indeed does the idea of a Gestalt lend itself quite so easily to the notion of inclusion of the observer, and thus the multiplication of further inclusive Gestalts growing around the original one. A Gestalt is more usually conceived as something viewed from outside, as an objective presence. The Chinese ideas of coherence would be more like a Gestalt that includes not only, say, the lines on the page that can form the emergent figure of a triangle, but also the eyes, nervous system, and prevailing desires of the living being experiencing that triangle. A coherence would then be a sort of 3-D Gestalt, but with the dyadic periodicity, the ability to create further Gestalts which form a larger Gestalt with the original one, the inclusion of the observer, and the value element stressed and developed to a much greater degree. With these adjustments, we can perhaps view coherence as a modified version of the notion of Gestalt.
花瓶的面孔,或者维特根斯坦的鸭兔,它们可以为我们指明反讽连贯感的发展。强格式塔的价值含义有可能包含延续感,但并非不可避免。但是,二元对立(钟摆摆动的相对两极)之间的数量平衡,以及随之而来的时间周期性的感觉,似乎并不像中国概念中那样明显地成为格式塔基本概念的一部分。这里要处理的是一致性问题。事实上,格式塔的概念也不太容易适用于包含观察者的概念,因此围绕原始格式塔生长的进一步包容性格式塔的倍增。格式塔通常被认为是从外部观察的事物,作为客观的存在。中国人的连贯性观念更像是格式塔,它不仅包括页面上可以形成三角形图形的线条,还包括眼睛、神经系统和生物体经历的普遍欲望。三角形。连贯性将是一种 3-D 格式塔,但具有二元周期性,能够创建进一步的格式塔,与原始格式塔形成更大的格式塔,包括观察者,以及强调和发展为价值元素的价值元素。程度更大。通过这些调整,我们或许可以将连贯性视为格式塔概念的修改版本。
One of the key themes of the discussion of coherence in the aforementioned work was the distinction between ironic and non-ironic coherence, and the various sorts of compromises between them that emerged in the early Chinese tradition. This has been briefly alluded to already, but given its prominence in the analysis to follow, it seems worthwhile to repeat the more thorough exploration of these terms and their implications.
上述著作中讨论连贯性的关键主题之一是反讽连贯性和非反讽连贯性之间的区别,以及中国早期传统中出现的它们之间的各种妥协。这已经被简单地提到过,但考虑到它在接下来的分析中的重要性,似乎值得重复对这些术语及其含义进行更彻底的探索。
We can note in the above reflections an implicit tension in the idea of coherence, which will serve as an engine of many further developments. For what after all is the criterion for coherence? It is not just any set of items that stick together. In early Chinese thinking, it must always be a set of things that form a coherent grouping also with some human desire. This will give us two criteria for coherence:
我们可以在上述反思中注意到一致性理念中隐含的张力,这将成为许多进一步发展的引擎。连贯性的标准到底是什么?它不仅仅是粘在一起的任何一组物品。在早期的中国思想中,它必然是一组事物,它们形成一个连贯的组合,也带有某种人类的欲望。这将为我们提供两个一致性标准:
  1. A grouping counts as a coherence when it creates pleasure, like the harmonious enjoyment of a flavor or a musical harmony. This pleasure may be described as a further coherence, a meta-coherence, for it is the cohering of this togetherness with some human desire. Usually, it is associated also with (a) stability, balance, or equilibrium (since to join with what destabilizes the health and stability of the organism would be experienced as displeasure), generally conceived as a balance of two opposite qualities in a roughly quantitative but not strictly quantified
    当一个组合创造出快乐时,就被视为一种连贯性,就像对某种味道或音乐和声的和谐享受。这种快乐可以被描述为一种进一步的连贯性,一种元连贯性,因为它是这种团结与某种人类欲望的连贯性。通常,它还与(a)稳定性、平衡或均衡相关(因为加入破坏有机体健康和稳定的事物会被体验为不愉快),通常被认为是粗略定量的两种相反品质的平衡。但没有严格量化

    sense, and (b) progeny, growth, continuance. Indeed, this sense of coherence as implying life, continuation, and growth runs through the tradition in various forms, from Mencian reflections on xing or Human Nature, on the one hand, into the NeoConfucian glosses of Li as ceaseless production and reproduction (生生不息 sheng sheng bu xi),as derived from the “Great Commentary” to the Zhouyi. It is a balancing of contraries that must keep within a certain “distance” of one another, “neither too far nor too near,” in order to maintain their existence, which is to say, less metaphorically, which must be able to change into one another, with neither too much nor too little resistance to this transformation. This is what makes it intelligible as possessing some particular identity, and this is also the source of its value, its ability to sustain itself and create beyond itself.
    意义,以及 (b) 后代、成长、延续。事实上,这种意味着生命、延续和成长的连贯感以各种形式贯穿于传统,一方面从孟子对“性”或人性的反思,到新儒家对“理”的诠释,即不断的生产和再生产。息生生不息),出自《周易》《大注释》。这是一种对立的平衡,彼此之间必须保持一定的“距离”,“既不太远,也不太近”,以维持它们的存在,也就是说,不那么隐喻,它必须能够转变为彼此之间,对这一转变的阻力既不太大也不太小。这就是它被理解为拥有某种特定身份的原因,这也是它的价值的源泉,它能够维持自身并超越自身进行创造。
  2. But there is, as it were, a flip side of the notion of continuance and ceaseless progression-seen instead as an infinite regress. In terms of coherence as readability, we notice immediately that when a discernible characteristic becomes fully intelligible, one passes smoothly over it, it is no longer noticed. Since its presencing as coherence depends on desire, interest, human concern, once it is entirely unproblematic, it ceases to be noticed. Phenomenologically, perfectly intelligible presence erases itself; perfect presence passes into non-presence. Removed from its instability, its flow back toward its opposite, the problem of maintaining its delicate balance, it ceases to be present at all. What is stably present is no longer present. In terms of coherence as grouping, the irony can be discerned in a related but slightly different way: when parts cohere perfectly, they become a whole forming a part in a larger whole, demanding a larger context, until the largest whole is reached. But the largest whole is necessarily incoherent, unintelligible, for it has no further outside context from which it can be distinguished and to which it can be contrasted-and distinguishing and contrasting are alone what make a thing intelligible and coherent as some particular essence rather than another, as having any characteristics at all. Perfect togetherness and harmony of parts presses forward to a greater whole, and points already toward the all-inclusive largest whole, which must itself be indeterminate, since determination derives from contextualization within a whole. In terms of coherence as pleasure: when a specific desire is consummated, it is no longer desired, but enjoyed,
    但可以说,连续性和不断进步的概念也有其反面——相反,它被视为无限的倒退。就作为可读性的连贯性而言,我们立即注意到,当一个可辨别的特征变得完全可理解时,人们可以顺利地跳过它,它就不再被注意到。由于它作为连贯性的存在取决于欲望、兴趣、人类的关心,一旦它完全没有问题,它就不再被注意到。从现象学的角度来看,完全可理解的存在会抹去自身;完美的存在转变为不存在。摆脱了它的不稳定性、它的流向它的对立面、以及维持其微妙平衡的问题,它就不再存在了。稳定存在的东西不再存在。就作为分组的连贯性而言,讽刺可以通过一种相关但略有不同的方式来辨别:当各部分完美地连贯时,它们就成为一个整体,形成一个更大整体的一部分,需要更大的背景,直到达到最大的整体。但是,最大的整体必然是不连贯的、不可理解的,因为它没有进一步的外部背景可以将其区分开来,也可以与之进行对比——只有区分和对比才能使事物作为某种特定的本质而变得可理解和连贯,而不是另一个,因为根本没有任何特征。各部分的完美结合与和谐推动形成一个更大的整体,并已指向包罗万象的最大整体,而这个整体本身必定是不确定的,因为决定性源于整体内的情境化。就作为快乐的连贯性而言:当一个特定的愿望得以实现时,它不再是渴望的,而是享受的,

    incorporated into experience rather than held out as an object of pursuit and attention; the desire as such thereby dies. Perfect harmonic coherence between a human desire and some object eliminates the relationship between them altogether. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} Once all the parts cohere into a single something, readable as a “one,” this means that it has been absorbed as a single unit into something else, a part of another, larger whole. The search for ever more coherence is, in other words, inherent in coherence, and thus ceaseless. Each coherence cries out for further context. The parts can only cohere if the whole coheres with a greater context, and then this context becomes a new whole in search of a yet larger context. We judge something to be coherent only when it coheres with an outside (in the first example, with some of our desires) —but this proposition alone ensures an infinite regress, for once the new coherence is found it becomes the inside seeking a new outside. Since the most all-inclusive totality is necessarily incoherent (i.e., unintelligible, unnameable, devoid of determinate identity or characteristics, all of which necessarily derive from contextualization within a larger whole), and the identity of all lesser coherences depends on their relation to this larger context, the ultimate intelligibility of any definitive identity must be questioned. I call this “ironic” because it means that any attribution of identity can only be meant ironically, since all of them depend on relation to a context that is itself necessarily incoherent (the whole), such that every coherence is itself ultimately incoherent, and this incoherence is not added on to the original coherence, but is the actual principle of its being coherent in the first place, its relation to its context: each identity, fully realized, reveals itself to be an effacement of its original putative identity. It is this “ironic” treatment of coherence that we will find in the Daoist works, where suddenly we find a spate of claims about how any positively valued (i.e., coherent) term (e.g., accomplishment, influence, long-lastingness, knowledge, virtue) is accomplished only in its apparent negation, for example, most famously in slogans such as the Daodejing’s “doing nothing and yet thereby leaving nothing undone” (無為而無不為 wuwei er wubuwei), “Guiding courses can be taken as guides, but if so they fail to reliably guide” (道可道非常道 daokedaofeichangdao), “noticeable values can be valued, but if so they fail to have reliable values” (名可名非常名 mingkemingfeichangming), and “the highest virtue attains no virtue” (上德不德 shangde bude) and
    融入经验而不是作为追求和关注的对象;欲望本身就这样消失了。人类欲望与某些物体之间完美的和谐一致性完全消除了它们之间的关系。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 一旦所有部分凝聚成一个单一的东西,可读为“一个”,这意味着它已经作为一个整体被吸收到其他东西中,成为另一个更大整体的一部分。换句话说,对一致性的追求是一致性所固有的,因此是永无休止的。每一个连贯性都需要进一步的背景。只有当整体与更大的背景相一致时,各个部分才能一致,然后这个背景就成为一个新的整体,以寻找更大的背景。只有当某物与外部相一致时(在第一个例子中,与我们的一些愿望),我们才判断它是连贯的——但这个命题本身就确保了无限的回归,因为一旦发现新的连贯性,它就变成了寻求新外部的内部。由于最包罗万象的总体性必然是不连贯的(即难以理解、无法命名、缺乏确定的身份或特征,所有这些都必然源自更大整体的情境化),并且所有较小连贯性的身份取决于它们与此的关系在更大的背景下,任何确定身份的最终可理解性都必须受到质疑。 我称其为“讽刺”,因为这意味着任何身份归属都只能具有讽刺意味,因为所有这些都依赖于与本身必然不连贯的背景(整体)的关系,因此每一个连贯性本身最终都是不连贯的,并且这种不连贯性并不是添加到原来的连贯性上,而是它首先是连贯的实际原则,它与其背景的关系:每个身份,在充分实现后,都揭示了自己是对其原始假定身份的抹杀。我们会在道家著作中发现这种对连贯性的“讽刺”处理,突然我们发现大量关于任何积极评价(即连贯)术语(例如,(成就、影响、长久、知识、美德)只有在其明显的否定中才能实现,例如,最著名的口号是《道德经》中的“无为而无不为无为二”。 “无不为”,“道可道非常道,可以作为指导,但如果这样的话,就没有可靠的指导”。名非常名 mingkemingfeichangming),以及“上德不德 shangde bude”

    the hundreds of similar claims found in these works. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} What all these claims have in common is a doubled structure which at once affirms and denies the same term, denying X X XX in its literal sense and affirming thereby the ironic sense of X as it emerges from this very lack of literal X. I suggested in the prequel that the double irony of these claims can best be understood on the model of a prospective picnic goer on rainy day sayings, “Oh, this is great weather for a picnic!” “Great weather” is meant ironically: the pouring rain is precisely not great weather for a picnic. But even this irony is itself ironic: for ultimately rain is in fact great weather for a picnic, “in another sense”: without such weather, there could be no picnics, for there could be no food, for there could be no growth of plants, on which all our picnics depend directly or indirectly. So because this weather is not literally great weather, it is great weather. It fulfills the original demand set up by the term “great,” but does so precisely by failing to satisfy it in the original, non-ironic sense. The same is true of Dao, the ironic Dao which is the failure of all literal small-d daos: it does what small-d daos are suppose to do (bring order, sustainability, harmony, satisfaction) but does so precisely by not providing them literally in the expected way. Real values are attained by failing to attain value as originally conceived: this is ironic value. Real virtue, the virtuosity implicitly promised by the ideal of virtue, is attained by failing to attain that ideal virtue literally. This is ironic virtue. Real coherence (sticking together, harmony, value, continuance, sustainability) is attained, ironically, by failing to attain literal coherence (intelligibility, definite togethernesses of particular groupings, literal harmony, literal virtues, literal continuance as some particular thing). Ironic coherence will continue to be the central theme of interest in Neo-Daoism and Chinese Buddhism works as well, finally made into an explicit principle of all experience in Tiantai Buddhism, under the name of the Three Truths, where (local) coherence and (global) incoherence are literally identified as synonyms, alternate ways of stating the same fact. But Confucian texts such as the “Great Learning” and “Doctrine of the Mean,” and indeed the entire Yin-Yang system of the Zhouyi commentaries, sketch out some non-ironic solutions to the same kind of difficulty, non-ironic incorporations of ironic motifs. Ironies of Oneness and Difference can be consulted for a fuller and more detailed exposition of these categories and their range of application. In the pages
    在这些作品中发现了数百个类似的主张。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 所有这些主张的共同点是双重结构,既肯定又否定同一个术语,否定 X X XX 我在前传中建议,这些主张的双重讽刺可以通过一个未来的下雨天野餐者的模型来最好地理解说:“哦,这是野餐的好天气!” “好天气”具有讽刺意味:倾盆大雨恰恰不适合野餐。但即使是这种讽刺本身就是讽刺:因为归根结底,下雨实际上是野餐的好天气,“在另一种意义上”:没有这样的天气,就不可能有野餐,因为不可能有食物,因为不可能有植物生长。我们所有的野餐都直接或间接依赖于植物。因为这种天气并不是字面上的好天气,但它确实是好天气。它满足了“伟大”一词所提出的原始要求,但恰恰是因为未能在原始的、非讽刺的意义上满足它。 Dao 也是如此,具有讽刺意味的 Dao 是所有字面上的小 d 道的失败:它做了小 d 道应该做的事情(带来秩序、可持续性、和谐、满足),但恰恰是通过不提供他们确实以预期的方式。真正的价值是通过未能获得最初设想的价值而获得的:这是讽刺性的价值。真正的美德,即美德理想隐含承诺的精湛技艺,是通过未能从字面上获得理想美德而获得的。这是具有讽刺意味的美德。 具有讽刺意味的是,真正的连贯性(粘在一起、和谐、价值、连续性、可持续性)是通过未能实现字面连贯性(可理解性、特定群体的明确团结、字面和谐、字面美德、字面连续性作为某种特定事物)而获得的。讽刺性的连贯性将继续成为新道教和中国佛教作品感兴趣的中心主题,最终成为天台佛教所有经验的明确原则,以三谛的名义,其中(局部)连贯性和(全球)不连贯从字面上被视为同义词,是陈述同一事实的替代方式。但是,诸如《大学》和《中庸》之类的儒家文本,乃至《周易》注释的整个阴阳体系,都为同样的困难勾勒出一些非讽刺性的解决方案,非讽刺性地将具有讽刺意味的图案。有关这些类别及其应用范围的更全面、更详细的阐述,请参阅《统一性与差异性的讽刺》。在页面中

    that follow we will trace out the various convergences of ironic and non-ironic coherence, which take many forms, including the opposite compromise, namely, the ironic incorporation of non-ironic motifs.
    接下来,我们将追溯反讽和非反讽连贯性的各种融合,它们有多种形式,包括相反的妥协,即非反讽主题的反讽结合。
Now that we have reviewed the stage-setting, we may turn to the problem of Li in Chinese thought.
回顾了舞台背景,我们可以转向中国思想中的礼问题。

ONE 

LI 理 AS A FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORY
IN CHINESE THOUGHT
理作为一个基本范畴 中国人的思想

The term Li has a strange history. It came into prominence as the central metaphysical category rather gradually, seemingly through the intervention of Buddhist uses, taking on its decisive role only in the thought of the Cheng Brothers (Cheng Hao 程顥, 1032-1085, and Cheng Yi 程頣, 1033-1107), and further developed by Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200), read back into the pre-Buddhist tradition, although its actual appearance in the early texts is sparse and problematic. Thereafter, the term Li becomes the focus of several explicit controversies in the history of Chinese philosophy. These are well known. Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucians (i.e., those following the line developed by Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi ) critique Buddhists for understanding Li as only Emptiness. On the other hand, they critique Lu-Wang Confucians (i.e., those following the approach of Lu Xiangshan 陸象山, 1139-1192, and Wang Yangming 王陽明, 1472-1529) for understanding Li directly as Mind. Cheng-Zhu Confucians themselves, according to the standard interpretation, understand Li as the “principle” of all things, manifested more or less clearly and completely in each instance according to the balance and purity of the constituent qi of that thing. It is present in its entirety in each thing as that thing’s true nature, accounting for the vitality and integrity of that thing as such. In man, it is the good human nature, the nature of heaven and earth, which is not the mind per se but discoverable as an aspect of mind, its pure unmanifest and balanced underpinning, from which the empirical human mind may deviate. As we shall see presently, it is this Cheng-Zhu usage, and its various aftermaths, that has been the primary target for modern writers trying to make sense of the term in the context of the encounter with Western philosophy that began in the twentieth century. Finally, the Qing Confucians, such as Dai Zhen 戴震and Duan Yucai 段玉裁,critique both the Cheng-Zhu and the Lu-Wang Neo-Confucians for understanding
“李”一词有着一段奇怪的历史。它作为形而上学的核心类别逐渐受到重视,似乎是通过佛教用途的介入,仅在程氏兄弟的思想中发挥了决定性作用(程浩,程纲,1032-1085,程頣,1033) -1107),并由朱熹(朱熹,1130-1200)进一步发展,重新回顾了前佛教传统,尽管它在早期文本中的实际出现很少且存在问题。此后,“理”一词成为中国哲学史上几个明显争议的焦点。这些都是众所周知的。程朱新儒家(即那些遵循程颐和朱熹发展路线的人)批评佛教徒将理理解为空。另一方面,他们批评陆王儒家(即那些追随陆象山(1139-1192)和王阳明(1472-1529)方法的人)将理直接理解为心。根据标准解释,成朱儒家本身将理理解为万物的“原理”,根据该事物构成之气的平衡和纯净,在每个实例中或多或少地清晰和完整地表现出来。它作为事物的真实本性完整地存在于每件事物中,说明了该事物本身的活力和完整性。在人身上,它是善良的人性,天地的本质,它不是心灵本身,而是作为心灵的一个方面而被发现的,它是纯粹的未显化和平衡的基础,经验性的人类心灵可能会偏离它。 正如我们稍后将看到的,正是这种程朱的用法及其各种后果,一直是现代作家在与二十世纪开始的西方哲学相遇的背景下试图理解该术语的主要目标。 。最后,清代儒家,如戴震、段玉裁,对成朱理学和陆王理学的理解进行了批判
Li as an omnipresent universal principle of all things (whether Mind or the Nature), whereas its real, original meaning, they claimed, on the basis of classical etymological studies, was of the differentiating, particular forms of individual things, the “cuts” between them, not the bridges over these gaps. It is less known that a controversy about the unity and multiplicity of Li also emerges within Tiantai Buddhism, with the so-called Shanjia 山家 or “Home Mountain” school, represented most vocally by Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960-1024), asserting that Li is both a unity and as multiplicity (known respectively as 理總 lizong and 理別 libie), and each phenomenon similarly serves both as a unifier and as one of many items unified in any other phenomenon (known as 事總 shizong and 事別 shibie, respectively), while his opponents, the so-called Shanwai 山外 or “Off-Mountain” school, take Li purely as unity, with diversity accounted for solely by 事 shi, as in Huayen thought (that is, allowing only 理總 lizong and 事別 shibie, though as we shall see later in this book, what is really lacking here is only 理別 libie; both Huayan and the Off-Mountain Tiantai writers do actually acknowledge 事總 shizong). The term Li clearly has not only exceptional importance, but also exceptional ambiguity. What has allowed it to play these multiple roles?
理是万物(无论是心灵还是自然)无所不在的普遍原理,而他们在古典词源学研究的基础上声称,其真正的、本源的意义是个别事物的区分的、特殊的形式,即“切”。他们之间,而不是跨越这些差距的桥梁。鲜为人知的是,天台宗内部也出现了关于礼的统一性和多样性的争论,所谓的山家或“家山”学派,以思明直隶四明知礼(960-1024)为代表。主张理既是一个统一体又是多重性(分别称为“理总 lizong”和“理别 libie”),并且每种现象同样既是一个统一体,又是统一在任何其他现象中的许多项目之一(称为“事总 shizong”和“理别 libie”)。 ”只有“理总 lizong”和“事别 shibie”,尽管我们将在本书后面看到,这里真正缺少的只是“理别 libie”;华严和山外天台的作者实际上都承认“事总 shizong”。 “李”一词显然不仅具有非凡的重要性,而且也具有非凡的模糊性。是什么让它能够扮演这些多重角色?
Before making our own attempt to answer this question, we need to examine a few of the previous attempts at understanding this problem, on some of which we will be building, and the history of the term Li in classical Chinese texts prior to the advent of the brand-name philosophers. In particular, we must make clear what we mean when offering “coherence” as a way of explaining the meaning of Li , and the related problems, or absence thereof, of universals and particulars, form and matter, classes and class membership, nominalism and realism, relativism and natural-kinds, and so on.
在我们自己尝试回答这个问题之前,我们需要回顾一下之前为理解这个问题所做的一些尝试(我们将在其中一些尝试的基础上进行构建),以及在“礼”出现之前中国古典文本中“礼”一词的历史。名牌哲学家。特别是,当我们提供“连贯性”作为解释理的含义时,我们必须明确我们的意思,以及相关的问题或缺乏,普遍性和特殊性,形式和质料,阶级和阶级成员,唯名论和实在论、相对论、自然类等等。
Fung Yulan 馮友蘭 famously and rather rashly declared that the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian notion of “Li” 理 was the traditional Chinese equivalent of the Platonic Forms, based on their putative transcendence to their instantiations, and their essence-like role as a criterion by which to define the identity of these instances. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} This suggestion quickly aroused refutations, as the many points of disharmony between the two doctrines became apparent. Most obvious among these is the fact that, while the Platonic forms are many, although perhaps somehow grounded in a greater unity, the Neo-Confucian Li seem to be simultaneously both one and many. Zhu Xi, for example, states at times both that there is only one Li , and that each thing has its own specific defining L i L i LiL i, and that somehow all these particularized Li are one and the same Li (which is also called the Great Ultimate, 太極 taiji). The entire supreme Li is contained in each differentiated entity, Zhu Xi tells us in other contexts, as the reflection of the moon
冯友兰著名且相当鲁莽地宣称,成朱新儒家的“理”概念是柏拉图形式的传统中国等同物,基于它们对实例化的假定超越,以及它们作为标准的本质类角色通过它来定义这些实例的身份。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 这一建议很快引起了反驳,因为两种学说之间的许多不和谐之处变得显而易见。其中最明显的事实是,尽管柏拉图式的形式有很多,尽管也许以某种方式建立在更大的统一之上,但新儒家的理似乎同时既是一又是多。例如,朱熹有时会说“只有一个理”,而且每个事物都有自己特定的定义。 L i L i LiL i ,并且不知何故所有这些特殊的理都是同一个理(也称为太极太极)。朱熹在其他语境中告诉我们,整个至高之理包含在每个不同的实体中,就像月亮的倒影一样

is reflected completely in a multitude of bodies of water. It is not just that Li per se is both one and many; the multiplicity of it is not limited only to the multiple universals, but also to each and every particular thing. It is not just that Li is at once equivalent to the all-inclusive “Form of the Good” and to the particular universals “Blue,” “Red,” “Justice,” “Love,” but that it is also the specific Li of this blue chair and that red hat, including also man-made objects as much as natural objects. Li includes as much every individual existence as it does universals—Du Fu’s collected works, for example, or the existence of a particular individual person: all these things have their Li 2 2 Li 2 2 Li^(2)^(2)\mathrm{Li}^{2}{ }^{2} The Li of this boat is what makes this boat this boat, while the Li of boats is what makes boats boats. Li are not in any straightforward sense universals. Indeed, as we shall see, the one-many distinction is precisely what the concept of Li has the least use for, in keeping with the lack of a grammatical distinction between singular and plural in the language in which the idea was developed. If these statements are taken as assertions of definitive doctrine, we have an obvious mismatch with the concept of Platonic ideas. The handling of the one-many problem in Plotinus may be less of a problem here than it is in Plato himself; for in Plotinus, the oneness of The One seems to also be instantiated precisely as the Form-ness, so to say, of the many Forms that collectively comprise its first emanation. Even here, however, the forms remain self-identical across their many instantiations in particular things, unaffected by how or where they are instantiated, and thus do not seem to be able to include indifferently both classes and individuals on equal footing as Forms. That is, the unity or oneness formed by an individual entity instantiating many Forms, which are themselves many diversified instantiations of oneness, cannot be a oneness in the same sense, as would appear to be the case for the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucians.
完全反映在众多水体中。不仅“理”本身既是一又是多;而且“理”本身既是一又是多。它的多样性不仅限于多重共相,还包括每一个特定的事物。理不仅等同于包罗万象的“善的形式”和特定的共相“蓝”、“红”、“正义”、“爱”,而且它也是特定的理。这把蓝色的椅子和那顶红色的帽子,包括人造物体和自然物体。理既包含了每个个体的存在,也包含了普遍的事物——例如杜甫的文集,或者某个特定个体的存在:所有这些事物都有其自身的存在。 Li 2 2 Li 2 2 Li^(2)^(2)\mathrm{Li}^{2}{ }^{2} 此船之理,使此船成为此船,而船之理,则使船成为船。从任何直接意义上来说,“理”都不是普遍现象。事实上,正如我们将看到的,一对多的区别恰恰是“理”概念最没有用处的地方,因为在发展这个概念的语言中,单数和复数之间缺乏语法上的区别。如果这些陈述被视为明确学说的断言,那么我们与柏拉图思想的概念明显不匹配。普罗提诺对一对多问题的处理在这里可能不像柏拉图本人那样成为问题。因为在普罗提诺那里,“一”的统一性似乎也被精确地实例化为“形式性”,可以说,是共同构成其最初流散的许多形式的形式性。然而,即使在这里,形式在特定事物的许多实例化中仍然是自我同一的,不受它们实例化的方式或地点的影响,因此似乎无法将类和个人与形式平等地包括在内。 也就是说,由个体实体实例化许多形式而形成的统一或统一性,而这些形式本身就是统一性的许多多样化的实例化,不可能是同一意义上的统一性,就像程朱新儒家的情况那样。
Another discrepancy lies in the fact that the Platonic forms may or may not have an evaluative force to them. They do when they define, for example, a virtue, but a universal quality such as “redness” seems to be purely descriptive. There is, of course, a derivative though perhaps pervasive axiological sense in that a putative instantiation of a given form will be judged to be deficient if it fails to meet the definition embodied by the form; a chair is not a “good” chair, which is to say, a real chair, unless it accords with the Form of the chair. This axiological dimension is perhaps reflected in the role given to the sun-like Form of the Good in the Republic, and the implied equation between Being and Goodness that is easily derived from the Platonic position. Still, the axiological dimension of the Neo-Confucian Li is clearly front and center, to such an extent that they have been cited as a classic example of the traditional Chinese “fusion of fact and value.” 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} The Li of a thing is both “what makes it so” (所以然之理
另一个差异在于,柏拉图形式可能有也可能没有评价力。例如,当他们定义一种美德时,他们确实这样做了,但诸如“红色”之类的普遍品质似乎纯粹是描述性的。当然,存在一种派生的虽然可能普遍存在的价值论意义,即给定形式的推定实例如果不符合该形式所体现的定义,将被判断为有缺陷;椅子不是一把“好”椅子,也就是说,不是一把真正的椅子,除非它符合椅子的形式。这种价值论的维度也许反映在《理想国》中赋予太阳般的善形式的角色,以及从柏拉图立场很容易导出的存在与善之间隐含的等式。尽管如此,理学家的价值论维度显然仍然处于前沿和中心位置,以至于它们被引用为中国传统“事实与价值融合”的经典范例。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 事物的理既是“所以然之理”

suoyiran zhi li) and “how it should be” (當然之理 dangran zhi li), and ethical norms are derived directly from this fusion of “is” and “ought.” As Graham astutely notes of Li as used by the Cheng brothers, it accounts “not for the properties of a thing but for the task it must perform to occupy its place in the natural order.” 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Not its passive qualities, but an activity to be done; not the properties it has in isolation, but its ways of relating to what is around it; not solely what it is, but a task, what it must do to continue to occupy the role it plays in the context of the whole. Here, we have the properties of thing only to the extent that properties are considered to be relations, the essence of a thing only to the extent that it is considered a conatus to continue to perform the task of maintaining a certain set of relationships. It is this in which the “chairness” of a chair is seen to reside: the “ness” is not a Platonic essence or a universal of “chair” that iterates identically in all chairs, but the possibility of doing the work required to continue to coexist in a certain set of relations. This could apply either to an individual entity performing the task of maintaining the individual relations that allow it to continue to perform the role of being what it is, or to a class of thing maintaining its relation with other classes, or with individual instances of that class, or with the whole of all objects and purposes.
“当然之理当然之力”和“当然之理当然之力”,而道德规范则直接源于“是”与“应该”的融合。正如格雷厄姆敏锐地注意到程氏兄弟所使用的“理”,“它解释的不是事物的属性,而是它必须执行的任务以在自然秩序中占据其位置”。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 不是它的被动性质,而是一项需要完成的活动;不是它孤立的属性,而是它与周围事物的联系方式;不仅仅是它是什么,而是一项任务,它必须做什么才能继续在整体中发挥其作用。在这里,我们只有在属性被认为是关系的情况下才拥有事物的属性,只有在它被认为是继续执行维持一组特定关系的任务的conatus的情况下,我们才拥有事物的本质。正是在这一点上,椅子的“椅子性”被视为存在:“椅子性”不是柏拉图式的本质,也不是在所有椅子上都相同的“椅子”的普遍性,而是完成继续下去所需的工作的可能性在一定的关系中共存。这可以适用于执行维持个体关系任务的个体实体,使其能够继续发挥其本来的作用,也可以适用于维持与其他类或该类的个体实例的关系的一类事物。类,或所有对象和目的的整体。
For these and many other reasons, it has been notoriously difficult for Western interpreters to find a fitting interpretation for Li. Leibniz was the first Western thinker to try to do so, and with results as problematic as Fung’s later attempt from the other side. Leibniz records that the Jesuits had learned that Li is described by “the Chinese” (actually, the canonical Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian sources) as equivalent to the following philosophical categories: the first principle, Reason, the foundation of all nature, the most universal reason and substance, the supreme being than which nothing is greater nor better. Li, Leibniz tells us, is pure, motionless, rarefied, without body or shape, and can be comprehended only through the understanding. It is the law that directs all things and is the intelligence that guides them. It is the Law and universal Order, according to which Heaven and Earth were formed, the origin, source, and principle of all things. It is the sole cause which moves Heaven in a uniform motion, sufficient unto itself, giving all species of being the ability to reproduce their kind, “this virtue not being in the nature of the things themselves and not depending at all upon them but consisting and residing in this Li.” It has dominion over all, is present in all things, governs and produces the world as its absolute master. It is Being, Substance, Entity, infinite, eternal, uncreated, incorruptible. It is the principle of both physical and moral existence. It is indivisible and yet contains the most perfect multiplicity; it is the Grand Void but also the sovereign plenitude. It is compared to a circle, it is the Nature of things, it
由于这些以及其他许多原因,西方翻译家很难为李找到合适的解释。莱布尼茨是第一个尝试这样做的西方思想家,其结果与冯后来从另一方的尝试一样存在问题。莱布尼茨记录说,耶稣会士了解到,“中国人”(实际上是经典的程朱新儒家来源)将理描述为相当于以下哲学范畴:第一原理、理性、一切自然的基础、最普遍的理性和本质,是至高无上的存在,没有什么比它更伟大或更好。莱布尼茨告诉我们,“理”是纯粹的、静止的、稀薄的、没有身体或形状的,只有通过理解才能被理解。指导万物的是法则,引导万物的是智慧。它是法则和宇宙秩序,天地根据它而形成,是万物的起源、根源和原则。它是使天堂以均匀运动的方式移动的唯一原因,它本身就足够了,赋予所有物种繁殖其同类的能力,“这种美德不存在于事物本身的本质中,也不依赖于它们,而是由事物组成。”且住于此黎。”它主宰一切,存在于万物之中,作为世界的绝对主宰统治和创造世界。它是存在、物质、实体、无限、永恒、非创造、不朽坏。这是物质和道德存在的原则。它是不可分割的,但却包含着最完美的多样性;它是伟大的虚空,也是至高无上的充实。它比作一个圆,它是事物的本质,它

is truth and goodness. In short, it is the supreme being, endowed with "all manner of perfections, so that there can be nothing more perfect."5
是真理和善良。简而言之,它是至高无上的存在,被赋予“一切完美的方式,因此没有比这更完美的了。”5
Some of the Jesuits had argued that, in spite of these attributes, Li in the Chinese conception does not mean what the Christian tradition means by God, because it also is said to lack will, activity, life, design, and consciousness. Rather, it is Primal Matter, or at best the Primal Form, the Soul of the World in the sense employed by classical pagan thinkers.
一些耶稣会士认为,尽管有这些属性,中国概念中的“理”并不意味着基督教传统中上帝的意思,因为据说它也缺乏意志、活动、生命、设计和意识。相反,它是原始物质,或者充其量是原始形式,是古典异教思想家所采用的意义上的世界灵魂。
Leibniz, however, argues that this cannot be so, that Li is indeed precisely what Christian philosophers mean by divinity. Leibniz asserts that, given the supreme attributes ascribed to Li , the denial that it has life, consciousness, will, and activity “must” mean merely that it lacks these things in their ordinary sense. It means that Li actually has these attributes in a much greater degree, in what theologians call the “eminent” sense, just as some negative theologians had denied “Being” to God, calling him instead beyond Being, or super-ens, hyperousia. The unquestioned assumption on both sides of this debate is that there is an excluded middle between activity and passivity, spirit and matter, dependence and transcendence. If something is active, it cannot be passive; if it is spiritual, it cannot be matter; if it is transcendent, it cannot be dependent on the world. In all his arguments, Leibniz relies on the assumption of the excluded middle, and presumes that the philosophical categories into which Li is being translated are the only ones possible. “I do not at all see how it could be possible for the Chinese to elicit from prime matter-as our philosophers teach it in their schools, as purely passive, without order or form-the origin of activity, of order and of all forms. I do not believe them to be so stupid or absurd.” 6 6 ^('6){ }^{\prime 6} Given the qualification offered in the phrase between the dashes (“purely passive, without order or form”), this is quite true. But it also begs the question. For the real issue here, of course, is whether there could be any other sets of assumptions with which to consider these questions, not premised on a prior separation of form from matter, active from passive, order from chaos, for instance, a separation that requires an absolute ontological difference with no overlap. (Ironically, as we shall see in the “Conclusion” to this book, Leibniz himself introduced a concept into philosophy that, in my view, comes much closer than any other in the European philosophical lexicon to actually describing the character of Li specifically in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism: not hyperousia, much less divinity, nor anything like consciousness, design, or will, but rather the concept of compossibility. Important qualifications are of course necessary concerning the nature of the com- here, and the absence of a God who stands above and beyond compossibility and, for Leibniz, must then go on to make a choice to make the preexisting compossibles actually exist, which will be addressed at the end of this book.)
然而,莱布尼茨认为事实并非如此,“理”确实正是基督教哲学家所说的神性。莱布尼茨断言,鉴于“理”具有至高无上的属性,否认它有生命、意识、意志和活动“必然”仅仅意味着它缺乏通常意义上的这些东西。这意味着李实际上在更大程度上具有这些属性,在神学家所谓的“杰出”意义上,正如一些消极神学家否认上帝的“存在”,而是称他超越存在,或super-ens,hyperousia。这场辩论双方毫无疑问的假设是,在主动与被动、精神与物质、依赖与超越之间存在着一个被排除的中间地带。如果某件事是主动的,那么它就不可能是被动的;如果某件事是主动的,那么它就不可能是被动的。如果它是精神的,它就不可能是物质;如果它是超然的,它就不能依赖于世界。在莱布尼茨的所有论证中,他都依赖于排中论的假设,并假设李所翻译的哲学范畴是唯一可能的。 “我完全不明白中国人如何可能从原始物质中引出——正如我们的哲学家在他们的学校中所教导的那样,纯粹是被动的,没有秩序或形式——活动、秩序和所有形式的起源。我不相信他们如此愚蠢或荒谬。” 6 6 ^('6){ }^{\prime 6} 考虑到破折号之间的短语所提供的限定(“纯粹被动,没有顺序或形式”),这是完全正确的。但这也引出了一个问题。 当然,这里真正的问题是是否可以有任何其他假设来考虑这些问题,而不是以形式与物质、主动与被动、秩序与混乱的事先分离为前提,例如,形式与物质、主动与被动、秩序与混乱的分离。这需要绝对的本体差异,没有重叠。 (具有讽刺意味的是,正如我们将在本书的“结论”中看到的那样,莱布尼茨本人在哲学中引入了一个概念,在我看来,这个概念比欧洲哲学词典中的任何其他概念都更接近于实际描述李的性格,特别是在《程》中。 ——朱理学:不是超性,更不是神性,也不是意识、设计或意志之类的东西,而是共存性的概念,这对于共同性的本质和不存在性来说当然是必要的。对于莱布尼茨来说,超越共存性的上帝必须继续做出选择,使预先存在的共存物真正存在,这将在本书的结尾处讨论。)
The word L i L i LiL i is indeed an odd one, with an odd history. Without attaching undue importance to it, readers not proficient in Chinese might get some sense of the semantic range of this term by looking at the compounds in which it appears in the modern Chinese language, remembering that this cannot be used as reliable evidence for its meaning in the classical language of any particular period. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} Pondering these usages, we may notice the range of senses spanning over our notions of “knowing,” “noticing,” “reason,” “thinking,” “rightness,” “reasonability,” “ordering,” “pattern,” “managing,” and “standard of value.” The connection between “noticing,” “responding to,” and “ordering” should particularly pique our interest here. We should note also that the standard modern translation of Plato does indeed use the term lixing 理型 (Li-form) to translate “Idea” in the Platonic sense. We should note also the easy transference of the nominal and verbal usage of the term in modern language.
这个词 L i L i LiL i 这确实是一个奇怪的现象,有着一段奇怪的历史。不需过分重视,不精通中文的读者可能会通过查看该术语在现代汉语中出现的复合词来了解该术语的语义范围,记住这不能作为其含义的可靠证据任何特定时期的古典语言。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 思考这些用法,我们可能会注意到涵盖“知道”、“注意”、“理性”、“思考”、“正确”、“合理性”、“秩序”、“模式”、“管理”等概念的各种含义。 ”和“价值标准”。 “注意到”、“响应”和“命令”之间的联系应该特别引起我们的兴趣。我们还应该注意到,柏拉图的标准现代翻译确实使用了“理型”一词来翻译柏拉图意义上的“Idea”。我们还应该注意到现代语言中该术语的名义和口头用法的容易迁移。
The most useful starting point for probing more deeply the philosophical implications of the term Li is perhaps still Tang Junyi’s seminal essay “Yuan Li” (原理 Tracing the Origin of Li ), originally published in 1955 but later used as the opening chapter of the first volume of Tang’s massive history of Chinese Philosophy. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} In this work, Tang attempts a comprehensive overview of the usages of Li throughout the history of classical Chinese philosophy, separating out six distinct meanings of the term while also tracing its etymological bases. Tang’s six senses of the term are: wenli (文理 Li in the context of cultural activities), mingli(名理 Li in logical reasoning about abstract philosophical attributes, considered by Tang to be synonymous in its usage with 玄理 xuanli, abstruse or metaphysical Li), kongli (空理 Li as Emptiness), xingli (性理 Li as Human Nature), shili (事理 Li pertaining to events or affairs), and wuli (物理 Li pertaining to concrete empirical things). Tang’s discussion is illuminating, in particular his discussion of the role of human activity in the definition of Li even in its apparently most concrete and objective usages; the distinction between “pattern” as a simple fact found in an object and Li as a kind of interface between human subjectivity and the structure of the surrounding world will be crucial to our discussion below. Tang also brings into focus the problem of unity versus multiplicity that formed one of the essential points of contention between Song-Ming Neo-Confucians on the one hand (Li as the unifying principle of all things) and their later critics among Qing Confucians on the other ( Li as the separating, distinguishing forms of individual things). Tang’s analysis is rooted, quite reasonably, in one of the earliest extant usages of the term L i L i LiL i, a passage from the “Minor Odes” 小雅 section of the Shiijing,詩經(“The Book of Songs”), Ode 210, “Xin nanshan” 信南山,where we find the following verse:
要更深入地探讨“理”一词的哲学含义,最有用的起点也许仍然是唐君毅的开创性文章“原理追究理的起源”,该论文最初发表于 1955 年,后来用作第一章的开篇章节。唐氏巨著《中国哲学史》。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 在这部著作中,唐试图全面概述“理”在中国古典哲学史上的用法,区分出该词的六种不同含义,同时追溯其词源基础。唐的六种含义是:文理(文化活动中的文理)、名理(关于抽象哲学属性的逻辑推理中的名理),唐认为其用法与玄理玄理、深奥或形而上的理同义。 )、空理(空理)、性理(性理)、事理(事理)、物理(物理理)。唐的讨论很有启发性,特别是他对人类活动在礼的定义中的作用的讨论,甚至在其显然最具体和客观的用法中;作为在物体中发现的简单事实的“模式”与作为人类主体性和周围世界结构之间的一种界面的“理”之间的区别对于我们下面的讨论至关重要。唐还关注了统一与多元的问题,这一问题构成了宋明新儒家(礼为万物统一原则)与后来清代儒家批评者之间争论的焦点之一。其他(“理”是个体事物的分离、区分形式)。唐的分析相当合理地植根于该术语现存最早的用法之一 L i L i LiL i 摘自《诗经》小雅篇第210篇《信南山》,有如下诗句:

信彼南山、維禹甸之。畇畇原暃、曾孫田之。我疆我理、南東其畝。
信彼南山、维禹甸之。畇畇原暃、曾孙田之。我疆我理、南东其田。

Truly, the region of that southen hill
确实,那座南山一带

Was governed so as to bring forth crops by Yu.
受禹统治,以生产农作物。

The lands of those marshes and plains
那些沼泽和平原的土地

Are now made into fields by his distant descendants.
现在已被他的远方后裔开垦成田。

We separate them, we divide them
我们把他们分开,我们把他们分开

Into acres stretching to the south and to the east.
绵延数英亩,向南和东延伸。

Li is here used as a verb, not a noun. It is parallel with the term 疆 jiang, “to divide or make a border.” Li here seems to be a verb meaning “to separate into groups, to divide into sections,” but with an implication of doing so for a particular purpose: in this case, the division of a field in order to cultivate crops, and the creation of pathways of access to these fields. The implication is that here Li means “to cut and divide in a way which is consistent with a particular human value,” or a coherence that also necessarily coheres with some human desires or inclinations. Hall and Ames also make much of this passage, but seem to blur this crucial aspect when they characterize this usage as meaning, “dividing up land into cultivated fields in a way consistent with the natural topography.”" But the point here is surely not that the field is simply being cut “in a way consistent with the natural topography.” Rather, what is most evident is the human action and desire and valuation involved. We would perhaps be closer to the implication if we said, “cutting in a way that is consistent with both the topography and, even more decisively, with human need, desire, valuation, and response.” Indeed, this is closer to the “Nominalist” implication Hall and Ames wish to see in the tradition, as we shall discuss in more detail presently.
Li在这里用作动词,而不是名词。它与“疆疆”一词平行,意为“划分或建立边界”。这里的“理”似乎是一个动词,意思是“分成几组,分成几部分”,但也暗示这样做是为了特定的目的:在这种情况下,为了种植庄稼而划分田地,并进行创造进入这些领域的途径。其含义是,这里“理”的意思是“以符合特定人类价值的方式进行切割和划分”,或者说是一种也必然与某些人类欲望或倾向相一致的连贯性。霍尔和艾姆斯也对这段话给予了很大的重视,但当他们将这种用法描述为“以符合自然地形的方式将土地划分为耕地”时,似乎模糊了这一关键方面。”但这里的要点肯定不是这片土地只是“以符合自然地形的方式”被切割。相反,最明显的是人类的行为、欲望和价值,如果我们说,“以符合地形、甚至更决定性地符合人类需求的方式进行切割,欲望、评价和反应。”事实上,这更接近霍尔和艾姆斯希望在传统中看到的“唯名论”含义,正如我们现在将更详细讨论的那样。
Tang notes this point as well in his discussion of this ancient usage, stressing above all the subjective and active/temporal sense of Li as primary, with its objective and static/spatial aspects as derivative: Li as a verb rather than as a noun. He also notes, importantly, the role of human will, a human project, in all these early usages of Li ; that is, the essential connection with value and valuation. Tang sees Li in its earliest meaning above all as the purposive, humanly motivated act of cutting, tailoring, which connects its various aspects and phases as means toward this end. It is primarily a human activity, and only derivatively the patterns that emerge from this activity. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} However, Tang’s discussion is excessively beholden to the mutually exclusive categories of subjective and objective, concerned in an almost Bergsonian way with establishing Li as subjective rather than objective (in certain primary usages) and temporal/active rather than spatial/passive. But in fact it is obvious that both sides of what we would call the subject/object split are necessarily involved. Li is here “cutting in a way which is consistent
唐在对这种古代用法的讨论中也注意到了这一点,首先强调“礼”的主观和主动/时间意义是主要的,其客观和静态/空间方面是衍生的:礼作为动词而不是名词。重要的是,他还指出了人类意志、人类计划在“礼”的所有这些早期用法中的作用;即与价值和估价的本质联系。唐认为“理”的最早含义首先是有目的的、人为动机的裁剪、剪裁行为,它将其各个方面和阶段连接起来,作为实现这一目标的手段。它主要是人类活动,并且只是从该活动中衍生出的模式。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 然而,唐的讨论过度依赖于主观和客观相互排斥的范畴,以一种近乎柏格森式的方式关注将理确立为主观而非客观(在某些主要用法中)以及时间/主动而非空间/被动。但事实上,很明显,我们所说的主体/客体分裂的双方都必然涉及。李在这里“以一致的方式进行切割”

with both the topography and human value,” or the overlap of the two. We have here again the inclusion of human response in the overall pattern of coherence. And this is how we will be understanding Li in almost every case throughout the tradition, including Buddhist and Neo-Confucian uses. Li always means, “coherence between a set of disparate items, which necessarily includes both nonhuman reality and human responses to that reality (desires and cognitions).”
兼具地形和人文价值”,或者两者的重叠。我们在这里再次将人类的反应纳入整体的连贯性模式中。这就是我们在整个传统中几乎所有情况下理解礼的方式,包括佛教和新儒家的用法。李总是意味着“一组不同的事物之间的一致性,这必然包括非人类现实和人类对该现实的反应(欲望和认知)。”
This implication is very much in evidence in the definition of Li in the earliest Chinese dictionary, Xu Shen’s 許慎 Shuowen jiezi 說文解字. Li is there defined simply as “the treating of jade” (治玉也 zhi yu ye). But jade is not “treated”-i.e., cut, polished, and shaped-merely in accordance with its “natural topography” or its own “inherent lines of pattern,” as we would understand “its own” under the force of the ontological split between the subjective and the objective. Rather, as the great Qing commentator Duan Yucai 段玉裁 says of this entry, "When jade has not yet been treated (理 L i L i LiL i ), it is called p u p u pup u 朴, the unhewn raw stuff. Li here [is a verb and] means to cut it open and break it apart. Although jade is supremely hard, it is not difficult for it to be made into a vessel (器 qi) if one can find its lines of division along its edges and corners (腮理 saili), 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} and this is what is meant by Li. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} Duan is writing with a very specific polemical intent here: he wants to distinguish the original meaning of Li , and its proper sense in true Confucian thought, from the Buddhist and Daoist uses of the term, and the corruption of the term in the perverted Buddhified Confucianism of Zhu Xi and others. The crux of this polemic, however, lies in his imputation of “separation”-cutting, dividing, differentiating-as the primary sense of the term Li in its verbal sense, which brings with it the stress on the sense of differentiation and division of proper roles when it is used in its nominal sense. This is contrasted to the Buddhist, Daoist, and latter-day Confucian interpretation of the term as pointing above all to “unity,” to what is shared, to what is in fact omnipresent. Whatever we may think of Duan’s polemic purposes, it must be admitted that he has identified an unmistakable shift in the meaning of the term. And here we have the crux of our present problem: How is it that a term meaning cutting and differentiating comes to mean the undifferentiated omnipresent? And with this comes a related problem: how does a term meaning originally deliberate human shaping of raw material come to mean the state of the thing prior to human intervention? For Li develops not only from meaning “divided” to “all-inclusive,” but also from “to order” to “the interface between human intentions and the material to be ordered,” and finally to “the true state of the thing prior to deliberate human interference, free of one-sided, private bias.” It is in this last sense that Li tempts the translation “objective Truth” as opposed to subjective emotion. In this it seems to run from the subjective to the subjective-objective and finally to the objective.
这种含义在最早的汉语词典《许慎说文解字》中对“礼”的定义非常明显。礼在这里被简单地定义为“治玉也zhi yu ye”。但玉并没有被“处理”——即切割、抛光和成型——仅仅按照它的“自然地形”或它自己的“固有的图案线条”,就像我们在本体论的力量下理解的“它自己的”一样。主观和客观之间的分裂。相反,正如清代伟大的评论家段玉裁在谈到此条目时所说的那样:“当玉尚未经过处理时(理 L i L i LiL i ),它被称为 p u p u pup u 朴,未开凿的原料。这里的“离”是动词,意思是把它切开,把它拆开。玉虽然坚硬无比,但若能找到其棱角的分界线,则制成器气并不难。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 这就是李的意思。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 段在这里的写作带有非常具体的争论意图:他想区分“礼”的本义及其在真正儒家思想中的正确含义,与佛教和道教对该术语的使用,以及该术语在歪曲的佛教中的腐败。朱熹等人的儒家思想。然而,这场论战的症结在于,他把“离”——割断、分裂、区分——归为“理”一词的动词本义,从而强调了“离”的区分和区分意义。当它按其名义意义使用时,应发挥适当的作用。这与佛教、道教和近代儒家对该术语的解释形成鲜明对比,后者首先指向“统一”,指向共享的东西,指向实际上无所不在的东西。 无论我们如何看待段的争论目的,必须承认他已经确定了该术语含义的明显转变。现在问题的症结就在这里:一个意味着切割和差异化的术语怎么会变成意味着无差异的无所不在呢?随之而来的一个相关问题是:一个最初意味着人类对原材料的塑造的术语如何意味着人类干预之前事物的状态?因为“理”的含义不仅从“分”发展到“包罗万象”,而且从“秩序”发展到“人的意图与被秩序的物质之间的界面”,最后发展到“事物先前的真实状态”。故意进行人为干预,避免片面的、私人的偏见。”正是在这最后一个意义上,李尝试将其翻译为“客观真理”,而不是主观情感。这似乎是从主观到主客观,最后到客观。
Of course there is no reason why a term cannot in the course of time, or even in different contexts, change its meaning, and indeed take on an opposite meaning, although “meaning” is such that it must do so by pivoting off continuity with its preexisting denotations and connotations in some way or other. But the fact is that the term Li points to a notion of separation and differentiation that runs smoothly into a concept of undifferentiated omnipresence, and from subjectivity to objectivity. It points to a set of concepts of “coherence” which structures these apparently opposed ideas of differentiated finiteness and undifferentiated omnipresence in a distinctive intertwining, a notion of separation that also points to a joining and vice versa, a notion of subjectivity that also points to objectivity and vice versa. The point I will be trying to make here is that these terms one, many, subjective, objective-are of very limited value when walking about Li , and need to be superseded if we want to understand its history.
当然,一个术语没有理由不能随着时间的推移,甚至在不同的上下文中,改变它的含义,甚至呈现相反的含义,尽管“含义”必须通过与以下内容的连续性来实现这一点:它以某种方式预先存在的外延和内涵。但事实是,“理”一词所指的是一种分离和区分的概念,它顺利地转化为一种无差别的无所不在的概念,从主观性到客观性。它指向一组“连贯性”概念,这些概念以独特的交织方式构建了这些明显对立的有区别的有限性和无区别的无所不在的观念,一种分离的概念也指向一种结合,反之亦然,一种主观性的概念也指向客观性,反之亦然。我在这里要指出的一点是,这些术语“一”、“多”、“主观”、“客观”——在谈论“礼”时价值非常有限,如果我们想了解它的历史,就需要被取代。
Tang Junyi’s analysis is particularly astute on this point. For if the primary sense of Li in pre-Qin texts is what Tang calls 文理 wenli, taken to mean initially the action of making cultural patterns, as expressed especially in social interactions but also in pragmatic skill-activities such as field division and jade treating, then we have in hand a powerful model for understanding the intertwining of unity and differentiation in this concept, as Tang notes in his critique of the Dai Zhen/Duan Yucai “division-only” position. The unification here refers to the end, the goal of the activity, as present in each differentiated and even contrasting particular operation in the procedure. The diversity refers to the various individual means used to achieve this end. Tang stresses, importantly, that the unity here is temporal, not the joining of an array of differentiations but the unity of a single orienting intention governing a complex process. So in treating jade I may sometimes cut and sometimes polish, sometimes sharpen a corner and sometimes dull an edge. “Sharpening” and “dulling” are diverse opposite operations, but they are unified, not as objects in space as in an enveloping container, or instantiations of a universal to which they bear some morphological mimetic similarity, but as immediate phases of the total process of shaping the jade. The presence of the unifying “universal” orientation, the willed, value-informed human activity of creating a coherent pattern, is wholly present in each of these aspects of the process, not partially present, but it is not for that reason replicated as distinct instances of this orientation. Li implies both unity and differentiation in this distinct sense: it is temporal, purposive human activity, orienting means around a definite intended end.
唐君毅在这一点上的分析尤为精辟。因为如果先秦文献中“礼”的主要含义就是唐所说的“文理文礼”,那么最初的意思是创造文化模式的行为,尤其是在社会交往中表达,但也表现在诸如田野划分和玉器处理等实用技能活动中。 ,那么我们就掌握了一个强有力的模型来理解这一概念中统一性与分化性的交织,正如唐在批评戴震/段玉才“唯分”立场时所指出的那样。这里的统一是指活动的结束、目标,存在于程序中每个有区别的甚至是对比的特定操作中。多样性是指为达到这一目的而采用的各种个体手段。唐强调,重要的是,这里的统一是暂时的,不是一系列差异的结合,而是控制复杂过程的单一定向意图的统一。所以在处理玉石时,我有时会切割,有时会抛光,有时会尖角,有时会磨钝边缘。 “锐化”和“钝化”是不同的对立操作,但它们是统一的,不是作为空间中的物体,而是作为包围容器中的物体,也不是它们具有某种形态模仿相似性的普遍性的实例,而是作为整个过程的直接阶段来塑造玉石的形状。统一的“普遍”方向的存在,即创造连贯模式的有意愿的、基于价值的人类活动,完全存在于该过程的每个方面,而不是部分存在,但它并不是因此而被复制为独特的这种取向的实例。 “礼”在这个独特的意义上既意味着统一,又意味着差异:它是暂时的、有目的的人类活动,围绕明确的预期目的制定手段。
Tang’s comments here are a crucial starting point. But again, I believe he has overstressed the sense of subject/object dichotomy, and with it the means/end dichotomy, which I think is alien to the case. We make more progress by following his further implication that what we are talking about here is not really the subjective so much as the intersubjective, the social
唐的评论是一个重要的起点。但我再次认为,他过分强调了主体/客体二分法,以及随之而来的手段/目的二分法,我认为这与本案无关。通过遵循他的进一步暗示,我们取得了更多进展,即我们在这里谈论的并不是真正的主观,而是主体间性、社会性。

interactions of humans within a given community. But this changes the contours of the situation decisively, and allows us to conceive the relation of subject and object, and of unity and differentiation, somewhat differently. We can begin to pick up the thread of the problem from Duan’s comment above. Pu, the unhewn, and qi, vessel, are key terms in the Laozi, as explored in Ironies, and part of Duan’s intent here is to contrast his reading of Li with a “Daoist”- or “Buddhist”-leaning reading that identifies it with the one undivided universal universal, the unhewn, the whole, the encompassing background, the unifying, the omnipresent, as contrasted to individualized vessels. For a “vessel” is a culturally valued object which has been cut out of the unhewn raw material for a particular reason-i.e., because it has an intersubjectively recognized “market value” (whether ritual or economic), to put it crudely.
特定社区内人类的互动。但这决定性地改变了形势的轮廓,使我们能够以不同的方式来理解主体与客体、统一与分化的关系。我们可以从段先生上面的评论中开始了解问题的脉络。正如《讽刺》中所探讨的那样,“未开凿的浦”和“器皿”是《老子》中的关键术语,段在这里的部分意图是将他对“理”的解读与“道家”或“佛教”倾向的解读进行对比,后者认为它具有不可分割的普遍性、未开凿的、整体的、包容的背景、统一的、无所不在的,与个体化的容器形成鲜明对比。因为“器皿”是一种具有文化价值的物体,它出于某种特定原因而从未凿成的原材料中被切割出来——粗略地说,因为它具有主体间认可的“市场价值”(无论是仪式还是经济)。
In many early Daoist works, this cutting of culturally valued “vessels” out of the natural unhewn raw material is seen as a kind of violence to that raw material, damaging it and destroying its true value. Duan’s point here is that certain of the patterns-not necessarily all of the patterns-found “naturally” in the raw material can be used as guidelines to facilitate the creation of a vessel with human cultural value. Both the “objective” and “subjective” sides of coherence are relevant here, but it is the points at which these two types of coherence themselves “cohere” or overlap which makes Li. Li would then mean “second-order coherence between found coherences in the world and coherent clusters of human evaluation.” The question of to what degree these “found coherences” are really in the world, or are themselves effects of the organizing teleology of human evaluations, is left open here, and, as we shall see, to a large extent rendered irrelevant.
在许多早期的道教作品中,这种从天然未开凿的原材料中切割出具有文化价值的“器皿”的做法被视为对原材料的一种暴力,破坏了它并破坏了它的真正价值。段在这里的观点是,原材料中“自然”发现的某些图案(不一定是所有图案)可以用作指导,以促进创造具有人类文化价值的器皿。连贯性的“客观”和“主观”方面在这里都是相关的,但正是这两种连贯性本身“连贯”或重叠的点才构成了Li。那么,李的意思是“世界上发现的一致性与人类评价的连贯性集群之间的二阶一致性”。这些“发现的一致性”在多大程度上确实存在于世界中,或者它们本身是人类评价的组织目的论的结果,这个问题在这里仍然悬而未决,而且,正如我们将看到的,在很大程度上变得无关紧要。
Before pursuing these points through a textual analysis of the early philosophical usages of the term, however, it is worthwhile to clarify our approach to some of these points by taking a quick tour of some of the most suggestive of the attempts to reinterpret and translate the term by recent Western sinologists, which are of especial relevance here since our primary concern is with the mismatch of the Chinese and the Western categories, Of particular interest will be the works of Joseph Needham, Chad Hansen, A. C. Graham, Willard Peterson, and Roger Hall and David Ames, all of whom have contributed crucial insights to the present approach to be taken in the pages to that follow.
然而,在通过对该术语的早期哲学用法进行文本分析来探讨这些观点之前,有必要通过快速浏览一些最具启发性的重新解释和翻译该术语的尝试来澄清我们对其中一些观点的方法。最近西方汉学家提出的术语,在这里特别重要,因为我们主要关注的是中国和西方类别的不匹配,特别感兴趣的是约瑟夫·李约瑟、查德·汉森、AC·格雷厄姆、威拉德·彼得森和罗杰的著作霍尔和大卫·艾姆斯,他们都对当前的方法提出了重要的见解,这些见解将在接下来的几页中采用。

NEEDHAM AND ORGANIC PATTERN
李约瑟和有机模式

As noted, Fung Yulan had suggested that Li be translated as “Platonic Form,” and Form in the Aristotelian sense has also been proposed as a translation, along with Reason, and Law of Nature. Joseph Needham, in his classic work
如前所述,冯玉兰建议将“Li”译为“柏拉图形式”,亚里士多德意义上的“形式”也被提议与“理性”和“自然法则”一起翻译。李约瑟在他的经典著作中
Science and Civilization in China, rejects these suggestions, again with mainly the Neo-Confucian usage in mind, in developing his own overall account of the distinctive nature of traditional Chinese thinking. For Needham, all of these terms are misleading in that they suggest a heteronomous source of order, either form as imposed upon passive matter, or natural law as enforced by God as legislator, in both cases implying a transcendent source of order standing outside the things that are ordered, bearing a different ontological status. He suggested instead the terms organization, or better, organism, as modeled on the interrelation of parts in an animal organism, viewed as spontaneously interacting and organizing themselves around each other. In the West, Needham said, even organism always had to have an extrinsic “guiding principle,” due to the basic belief in a personal god or gods who directed things. In the Chinese context, Needham thought, “cooperation of the component parts was spontaneous, even involuntary, and this alone was sufficient.” 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} As Hall and Ames point out, this is a rather unusual understanding of the English word organism. In Western thought, even in Whiteheadian thought, which informs Needham’s understanding, organic order is understood as profoundly teleological: "[T]his term is most generally associated with living things conceived as complex arrangements of parts function with respect to some end or aim. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} This characterization leads, they note, to "a classification of ends or aims which would then undergird a [single, unambiguous, synordinate] taxonomic organization of ‘natural kinds.’ 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} —precisely what is lacking in the Chinese case. Still, Needham’s intention is clear; he wants to understand Li as spontaneous pattern brought to bear not by extrinsic coercion, even by a “guiding principle,” but by the spontaneous, involuntary cooperation and reciprocal adjustment of the members in any group. The antitranscendentalist perspective is stressed here. It is not clear, however, that this model can do all the work Needham wants it to do. In particular, the normativity, definiteness, simultaneous oneness and manyness of Li , and its application to human ethics, remain for the most part mysterious on this reading.
《中国科学与文明》在发展他自己对中国传统思想独特性的总体描述时,拒绝了这些建议,同样主要考虑到新儒家的用法。对于李约瑟来说,所有这些术语都具有误导性,因为它们暗示了秩序的异律来源,要么是强加于被动物质的形式,要么是上帝作为立法者强制执行的自然法,在这两种情况下都意味着存在于事物之外的超验秩序来源它们是有序的,具有不同的本体论地位。相反,他建议使用术语“组织”,或者更好的“有机体”,以动物有机体各部分的相互关系为模型,被视为自发地相互作用并围绕彼此组织起来。李约瑟说,在西方,即使是有机体也总是必须有一个外在的“指导原则”,因为人们基本相信有一个或多个指导事物的神。李约瑟认为,在中国的背景下,“各个组成部分的合作是自发的,甚至是非自愿的,仅此一点就足够了”。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 正如霍尔和艾姆斯指出的那样,这是对英语单词“organism”的一种相当不寻常的理解。在西方思想中,甚至在为李约瑟的理解提供信息的怀特海思想中,有机秩序也被理解为具有深刻的目的论:“这个术语最普遍地与生物联系在一起,生物被认为是为了实现某种目的而发挥功能的复杂安排。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 他们指出,这种特征导致了“对目的或目标的分类,从而巩固‘自然种类’的[单一、明确、同步]分类组织。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} ——这正是中国案例所缺乏的。 尽管如此,李约瑟的意图还是很明确的。他想把“理”理解为自发的模式,不是通过外在强制,甚至不是通过“指导原则”,而是通过任何群体成员自发的、非自愿的合作和相互调整。这里强调反先验主义的观点。然而,目前尚不清楚该模型是否可以完成李约瑟希望它完成的所有工作。特别是,“理”的规范性、确定性、同时性和多重性,以及它在人类伦理中的应用,在这种解读中大部分仍然是神秘的。

HANSEN AND THE MASS NOUN HYPOTHESIS
汉森和大众名词假说

Chad Hansen, in a controversial study of ancient Chinese logical paradoxes, suggests one reason why the question of universals might not have developed in China in a way that is at all comparable to its development in the West. It should be noted that Hansen was not directly addressing the question of how to interpret or translate Li, whether in Neo-Confucianism or elsewhere, but the more general issue of classes and their members in Chinese thought. Hansen suggests that classical Chinese nouns function more like mass nouns than like count nouns. Mass nouns (e.g., “water”) refer to one pervasive
查德·汉森(Chad Hansen)在对中国古代逻辑悖论进行的一项有争议的研究中提出了一个原因,即为什么普遍性问题在中国的发展方式可能无法与西方的发展相媲美。应该指出的是,汉森并没有直接解决如何解释或翻译“礼”的问题,无论是在新儒学还是其他地方,而是在中国思想中更普遍的阶级及其成员问题。汉森认为,古典汉语名词的功能更像是质量名词,而不是可数名词。质量名词(例如“水”)指的是一种普遍存在的物质。

amorphous entity that is spread out in various places, and can be divided up in various ways, while count nouns (e.g., dog) come with predetermined units for counting. I can have “one dog, two dogs, three dogs” and so on, but “one cup, one quart, two pools” of water. This suggestion has caused some consternation in that it fits better the grammar of modern Chinese (where indeed nouns are generally preceded by a special measure word to indicate the amount of that noun which is being indicated) than classical Chinese, where countable entities can be indicated without recourse to measure words. The lack of special forms indicating singular and plural in both ancient and modern Chinese, however, remains significant in this context. The point is that if a noun indicates primarily the entire mass of that substance, everywhere in the world, the problem of relating individual members to the general class disappears. There is no need to unify individual dogs with a universal canine essence if each dog is really just one dog-shaped scoop of the dog-substance spread out throughout the world. The implication is that rather than an additive class derived cumulatively by assembling individuals and collating their similarities, we are “dividing down” from the whole and provisionally selecting out subdivisions for closer consideration. There is no need for a two-level ontology here, where abstract essences or universals or forms, accessible to the intellect but not to the senses, “participate in” and unify concrete particulars; rather, the mass and each chunk of the mass are equally concrete and available to the senses. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
无定形实体分布在各个地方,可以以各种方式划分,而可数名词(例如狗)则带有预定的计数单位。我可以有“一只狗,两只狗,三只狗”等等,但是“一杯,一夸脱,两池”水。这个建议引起了一些恐慌,因为它比古汉语更适合现代汉语的语法(事实上,名词前面通常有一个特殊的量词来指示所指示的名词的数量),在古汉语中可以指示可数实体无需求助于量词。然而,在古代和现代汉语中,缺乏表示单数和复数的特殊形式,在这种情况下仍然很重要。关键是,如果一个名词主要表示世界各地该物质的全部质量,那么将个体成员与一般类别联系起来的问题就消失了。如果每只狗实际上只是分布在世界各地的狗形物质的一勺,那么就没有必要将个体狗与通用的犬类本质统一起来。这意味着,我们不是通过组装个体并整理其相似性来累积派生出一个累加类,而是从整体中“划分”并临时选择细分部分以供更仔细的考虑。这里不需要两层的本体论,其中抽象的本质或共性或形式可以被智力所触及,但不能被感官所触及,“参与”并统一具体的细节;相反,质量和质量的每一块都同样具体且可供感官使用。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
Hansen’s insights are particularly important for setting the agenda of the present work. He notes in particular the circumvention of both Platonic ideas and mentalist ideas in classical Chinese thinking. The mind is not a representational faculty that entertains ideas or perceives the intelligible realm of ideas. There are no universals, just stuff-kinds. The mind is a faculty of actively distinguishing among these real kinds. The epistemology functions on the basis of only names and stuffs; no other entities, such as properties, attributes, essences, universals, or particulars, are necessary. However, in spite of his affirmation of stuffs as real kinds, Hansen continues to speak of this view as a kind of nominalism. He notes that the notion of “a class” is employed by nominalists as a way of avoiding these abstract entities beloved of Realist epistemology. But, Hansen adds, classes, with the exception of Russell and Lesniewski’s mereological notion of class, are themselves abstract entities. A class is not necessary to the whole-part stuff ontology, he thinks. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} But the stuff-kinds are at least viewed by Hansen as real kinds existing in nature, independently of the distinguishing function of the dynamic human mind, which can thus divide either correctly or incorrectly. They are thus real in a strong sense, and not merely conventional, although still for Hansen fully concrete. But this concreteness ends up being of a very strange kind, indeed of so strange a kind that it raises questions about all
汉森的见解对于制定当前工作的议程尤为重要。他特别指出中国古典思想中对柏拉图思想和唯心主义思想的规避。心智不是一种接受思想或感知思想的可理解领域的表征能力。没有普遍性,只有东西种类。心灵是一种主动区分这些真实种类的能力。认识论的运作仅基于名称和内容;没有其他实体,例如性质、属性、本质、共性或特殊性,是必要的。然而,尽管汉森肯定事物是真实种类,但他仍然将这种观点视为一种唯名论。他指出,唯名论者使用“阶级”的概念来避免这些现实主义认识论所钟爱的抽象实体。但是,汉森补充道,除了罗素和莱斯涅夫斯基的类的分体概念之外,类本身就是抽象实体。他认为,对于整体-部分的事物本体来说,类并不是必需的。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 但汉森至少将物质种类视为自然界中存在的真实种类,独立于动态人类思维的区分功能,因此可以正确或错误地进行划分。因此,它们在很强的意义上是真实的,而不仅仅是传统的,尽管对汉森来说仍然是完全具体的。但这种具体性最终变成了一种非常奇怪的类型,确实如此奇怪,以至于它引发了关于所有问题的问题。

concreteness. For like a universal, it is instantiated in multiple noncontiguous times and places, and it seems to allow of no distinction between being partially instantiated and being fully instantiated (it is not claimed that it is only “partially present” when it is identified as present in any of its “parts”). The same oddness would then pertain even to contiguous applications of “the same” name to all the parts of any concrete object (for every object is actually multilocal, spanning more than a mathematical point of space), if the name can be applied in whole to each part. The problem is again exactly what we could possibly actually mean by oneness and difference, conceived as mutually exclusive, as we have argued is the real problem lurking at the back of all questions of nominalism and realism. But the assertion of the view that the stuffs are entities present in their entirety, rather than only partially, in every place they are present, and which are capable of warranting so strong a naturalism of real kinds, raises questions about whether it is not misleading to still call it a nominalism in any normal sense. For as we argued in the prequel, the nominalism/realism issue is interestingly readable as ultimately an offshoot of the more fundamental issue of the relation of oneness and otherness, of what constitutes actual sameness and difference and whether these can be thought of as mutually exclusive. A real oneness of any kind that is thinkable in abstraction from and exclusive of otherness, which could be undividedly present in more than one location, is, we would claim, ipso facto an abstract entity in the relevant sense.
具体性。因为像一个普遍性一样,它在多个不连续的时间和地点被实例化,并且它似乎不区分部分实例化和完全实例化(当它被识别为存在时,并没有声称它只是“部分存在”)在其任何“部分”)。如果名称可以整体应用,那么同样的奇怪现象甚至适用于将“相同”名称连续应用到任何具体对象的所有部分(因为每个对象实际上都是多局部的,跨越的空间超过一个数学点)到每个部分。问题又正是我们所说的同一性和差异性可能真正意味着什么,被认为是相互排斥的,正如我们所说的,这是潜伏在所有唯名论和实在论问题背后的真正问题。但是,断言这些东西是整体存在的实体,而不是仅部分存在于它们存在的每个地方,并且能够保证如此强烈的真实自然主义,这引发了这样的问题:它是否具有误导性在任何正常意义上仍然称其为唯名论。因为正如我们在前传中所讨论的,唯名论/实在论问题是有趣的,它最终是更基本问题的一个分支,即同一性与他性的关系、什么构成了实际的相同性和差异性以及这些是否可以被认为是相互排斥的。 。我们认为,任何一种真正的统一性,只要是从他性中抽象出来并排除他性的,都可以被认为是不可分割地存在于多个地点的,事实上,在相关意义上,它本身就是一个抽象实体。

GRAHAM AND THE ABSENT COPULA
AND CORRELATIVE THINKING
格雷厄姆和缺席系动词 和关联思维

A. C. Graham slightly amends Hansen’s suggestion, in a passage we also quoted in Ironies of One and Many:
AC Graham 稍微修改了 Hansen 的建议,我们也在《一与多的讽刺》中引用了一段话:
We might say that while the English translations use count nouns for individuals or classes, the Chinese uses mass nouns which carry with them instructions as to where the primary division is to be made. There are also words, some of them important in philosophy (chi’, tao, li) which carry no such instructions, so that there is no contradiction in dividing out Yin and Yang as “the 2 ch’i” yet also picking out as “the 5 ch’i” the Five Phases, or the 5 atmospheric influences, whatever one chooses to select from the mass. On this approach a lei “kind,” such a jen “man” or ma “horse,” is a mass like cattle exhaustively divisible into similar parts (like Greek genos “genus” in its original sense of a race which could die out, not a class which may become empty of members): the shih “object” which . . . we described as “concrete and particular” is a chunk
我们可以说,虽然英文翻译使用可数名词来表示个人或类别,但中文使用的是集体名词,这些名词带有关于在哪里进行主要划分的指示。还有一些词,其中一些在哲学中很重要的词(“气”、“道”、“理”)没有这样的指示,因此将阴阳划分为“二气”并不矛盾,但也将其选为“二气”。 “五气”即五个阶段,或五种大气影响,无论人们选择从质量中选择什么。按照这种方法,lei“种类”,例如 jen“人”或 ma“马”,是像牛一样的群体,可以完全分为相似的部分(就像希腊语 genos“属”,其原始含义是一个可能灭绝的种族,不是一个可能会变成空成员的类):shih“对象”。 。 。我们所说的“具体和特殊”是一个块

out of a mass which is no less concrete than itself. This does not of course alter the fact that, irrespective of language, discontinuous and constant objects enforce on us a priority over divisions we can make as we please. Even if a shih “object” is a chunk out of a mass, the most convenient examples of it will be individuals-in the Mohist account of naming . . . not a pool or drop of water but a horse. But that the objects are indeed conceived as divisions is confirmed, as Hansen notices, but the fact that where we would speak of class and member or whole and part the Mohist logic uses only a single pair, chien and t i t i tit i, and defines t i t i tit i as a “a division in a chien” (Canon AC ti, fen yu chien ye). 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
是从一个不比它本身更具体的物体中产生的。这当然不会改变这样一个事实:无论语言如何,不连续和恒定的对象都强制我们优先于我们可以随意进行的划分。即使“物”是整体中的一块,最方便的例子也将是墨家命名中的个体。 。 。不是一池水或一滴水,而是一匹马。但是,正如汉森所注意到的那样,这些对象确实被视为划分,这一点得到了证实,但事实是,当我们谈论阶级和成员或整体和部分时,墨家逻辑只使用一对,即“干”和“干”。 t i t i tit i ,并定义 t i t i tit i 作为“a Division in a chien”(Canon AC ti, fen yu chien ye)。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
As noted in the previous volume, Graham here accepts the implication that the Chinese tendency is to divide down from the whole, adding however that these wholes often come with built-in instructions about where the main “cuts” or divisions were to be made, and that in several important cases there are more than one possible way to legitimately make these divisions. The idea of “built-in instructions about how to cut something up” will be quite a useful hint for us in considering the ways in which coherence comes to be understood, and all the more so the idea that several alternate, even incompatible, sets of instructions might be not only applicable, but indeed built in, with the full authority of objectivity, as it were.
正如前一卷中所指出的,格雷厄姆在这里接受了中国人倾向于从整体中分裂的暗示,但他补充说,这些整体往往带有关于在哪里进行主要“削减”或划分的内置指令,并且在一些重要的情况下,有不止一种可能的方式来合法地进行这些划分。 “关于如何切割某些东西的内置指令”的想法对于我们考虑如何理解连贯性来说将是一个非常有用的提示,更重要的是,几个交替的,甚至不相容的集合的想法指令可能不仅适用,而且实际上是内置的,具有充分的客观性权威。
Graham makes another suggestion relating to this question. The Chinese language, he notes, lacks any collapse of existential and predicative sense of “being” such as is peculiar to Indo-European languages. The broadest term for “being” (有 you), literally “having, possession,” implies primarily “presence in the world,” and does not neatly apply to abstract entities, predicates, or uncontextualized substances. Moreover, its use to say “X exists” actually puts the " X " in the object position of the sentence, thereby positing an implicit subject, a further entity that “possesses” X:
格雷厄姆针对这个问题提出了另一个建议。他指出,汉语没有像印欧语系语言那样对“存在”的存在感和谓语感的崩溃。最广泛的术语“存在”(有你),字面意思是“拥有、拥有”,主要意味着“存在于世界上”,并且并不完全适用于抽象实体、谓词或无语境的实体。此外,它用来说“X存在”实际上将“X”放在句子的宾语位置,从而设置了一个隐含的主语,一个“拥有”X的进一步实体:

[T]he subject of the English “is” corresponds to the object of the Chinese y u y u yuy u [有 you]. In Indo-European Languages a thing simply is, without implying anything outside it, and it is the most abstract entities which the Platonic tradition most willingly credits with being. In Chinese, on the other hand, one approaches the thing from outside, from the world which “has” it, in which “there is” it. From this point of view, the more concrete a thing is, the more plainly the world has it; for example, one can emphasize the absolute non-existence of X by saying . . . “The world does not have X” (more literally, “There is no X under the sky”). In this respect, as in the absence of the copulative function of “to be,” y u y u yuy u is like “exist,”
[T]英语的主语“is”对应汉语的宾语 y u y u yuy u [有你]。在印欧语言中,事物只是存在,不暗示其之外的任何事物,并且它是柏拉图传统最愿意认为存在的最抽象的实体。另一方面,在汉语中,人们从外部、从“有”它、在其中“有”它的世界来看待事物。从这个角度来看,越是具体的事物,世界就越是明晰的;越是具体的事物,就越是明晰的。例如,可以通过说 来强调 X 绝对不存在。 。 。 “世界上没有X”(更确切地说,“天空下没有X”)。在这方面,由于缺乏“to be”的系辞功能, y u y u yuy u 就像“存在”一样

which also implies a concrete thing with a background from which it stands out (exsistit). But there remains the difference that “exists,” like “is,” is attached to a subject and not to an object. . . . This is the source of one of the most striking difference between Chinese thinking about y u y u yuy u and w u w u wuw u and Western thinking about Being. In English, a table is a thing, exists, is; Beauty is not a thing, does not exist, but we can still say it is. Having the verb “to be” (esse), we can form a noun from it and say that Beauty, although not a thing, is an “entity” (ens, entitas). We can also form an adjective from “thing” (res) and say that it is “real.” To indicate the kind of being which is not existence we can invent “subsistence.” Beauty, that real, subsisting entity, is assimilated as closely as possible to the table, that real, existing thing. As a last refinement, we may find reasons for claiming that such an immaterial entity more truly is, is more real, than the phenomena perceived by the senses. . . . In Chinese, on the other hand, the word y u y u yuy u is used primarily of concrete things. . . . 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
这也意味着有一个具体的事物,它有一个突出的背景(存在)。但仍然存在区别,即“存在”与“是”一样,附属于主体而不是客体。 。 。 。这是中国人思维方式最显着差异之一的根源。 y u y u yuy u w u w u wuw u 以及西方对于存在的思考。在英语中,桌子是一个东西,存在,是;美不是一个东西,不存在,但我们仍然可以说它是。有了动词“to be”(esse),我们就可以从它组成一个名词,说“美”虽然不是一个东西,但却是一个“实体”(ens,entitas)。我们还可以从“事物”(res)组成一个形容词,并说它是“真实的”。为了表明不存在的存在,我们可以发明“存在”。美,那个真实的、存在的实体,被尽可能地同化于桌子,那个真实的、存在的东西。作为最后的改进,我们可能会找到理由来声称这样一个非物质实体比感官所感知的现象更真实,更真实。 。 。 。另一方面,在中文中,这个词 y u y u yuy u 主要用于具体事物。 。 。 。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
This relates directly to our problem. In classical Chinese we literally cannot say something exists without simultaneously positing something larger in which it exists. This has obvious implications for the question of the Omnipresent, and with it the notions of unconditioned determinateness and the relation between classes, as discussed in the previous volume. It also discourages the development of a two-tiered metaphysic and any decontextualized absolutes. It points us further directly toward the “dyadic a priori,” discussed in Ironies, and the self-overcoming of coherence into its ironic effacement, as we’ll see below.
这直接关系到我们的问题。在文言文中,我们确实不能说某物存在,而不同时假定它存在于其中的更大的东西。正如前一卷所讨论的,这对无所不在的问题以及随之而来的无条件确定性和阶级之间的关系的概念有着明显的影响。它还阻碍了两层形而上学和任何脱离语境的绝对的发展。它进一步直接将我们引向《讽刺》中讨论的“二元先验”,以及自我克服连贯性使其讽刺性消失,正如我们将在下面看到的。
We may note another use of the “to be” verbs in some Indo-European languages which is notably and importantly absent in Chinese: the use of “to be” in passive constructions. In English, for example, we transform the active “to see” into the passive “to be seen.” It is worth pausing to consider what kind of connection between being and passivity, or perhaps objectivity, is implied by this grammatical peculiarity. In classical Chinese, purely passive constructions might be expressed by auxiliary verbs indicating receiving, wearing, carrying, bearing or, a bit later, being the locus of the action of a main verb (e.g., 被 bei and 所 suo). But in many cases the same verb is used to indicate both passive and active aspects of the same action without morphological distinction, or with an alternate pronunciation that continues to attribute the action to the supposed recipient. “To see” (見 jian), for example, is written in classical texts in the same way as “to be manifested, to be seen” (見 xian). We also have the important and often misconstrued usage of xiang 相 to make a verb transitive without indicating its object. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
我们可能会注意到一些印欧语言中“to be”动词的另一种用法,这在汉语中明显且重要地没有:在被动结构中使用“to be”。例如,在英语中,我们将主动的“to see”转变为被动的“to be see”。值得停下来考虑一下这种语法特性暗示着存在与被动性或客观性之间的联系。在文言文中,纯粹的被动结构可以用助动词来表达,这些助动词表示接受、佩戴、携带、承载,或者稍后,作为主要动词的动作轨迹(例如,被被和所所)。但在许多情况下,同一个动词用于表示同一动作的被动和主动方面,没有形态上的区别,或者使用替代发音继续将动作归因于假定的接受者。例如,古典文献中的“见”与“见”的写法相同。我们还有重要且经常被误解的“相”用法,使动词成为及物动词而不指示其宾语。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
It is interesting to note that the passive construction does later come to be written with wei, beginning in translations from Buddhist sutras, possibly to try to echo the use of the copulative “be” construction for passive voice in Indic source languages. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
有趣的是,被动结构后来确实用“wei”来书写,从佛经的翻译开始,可能是试图呼应印度源语言中被动语态的系词“be”结构的使用。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
Putting these points together, we may suggest that to say that something exists in Chinese always implies that it is actively present and that it is so in some context. The general tendency to divide down from the whole, noted by both Hansen and Graham, is again in evidence here. While it is true, as Graham points out, that this makes Chinese thinkers particularly hesitant to attribute “being” to abstract or nonsensory entities (such as Li ), preferring to call them 虛 xu “tenuous,” 空 kong “empty,” 無 wu “nothingness,” or 非有非無 feiyoufeiwu “beyond being and Non-Being,” it does not positively exclude the abstract from the category of being. But it does make the notion of pure transcendence, or unconditionality, problematic: it is immediately obvious that anything determinate (i.e., divided down from a larger context and deriving its identity from contextualization in that whole) cannot be unconditional. It ensures, in effect, that even abstract entities will be thought of as primarily contextualized, perhaps making the later Buddhist idea that abstract entities are perceived by the intellect in a way not fundamentally distinct from the way the senses perceive their objects easily assimilable: the mind is a sense organ that perceives ideas and thoughts, which also always come with a context, and are therefore not simply and completely determinate. This circumvents the “determinate but unconditional” paradox noted in the previous volume.
将这些观点放在一起,我们可以认为,在中文中说某物存在总是意味着它是积极存在的,并且在某些上下文中是如此。汉森和格雷厄姆都指出,从整体上分裂的普遍趋势在这里再次得到证明。正如格雷厄姆指出的那样,这确实使中国思想家特别犹豫是否将“存在”归因于抽象或非感官实体(例如“理”),而更愿意称它们为“虚”“脆弱”,“空”“空”,“无” “无”,或者“非有非无”,“超越存在与非存在”,它并没有积极地将抽象排除在存在的范畴之外。但它确实使纯粹超越性或无条件性的概念变得有问题:很明显,任何确定的东西(即从更大的背景中划分出来并从整体的背景化中得出其身份)不可能是无条件的。实际上,它确保了即使是抽象实体也将被认为是主要情境化的,也许使得后来的佛教思想认为,抽象实体被智力所感知的方式与感官感知其对象的方式没有本质上的区别,很容易被同化:心灵是一种感知观念和思想的感觉器官,它们也总是带有背景,因此不是简单且完全确定的。这规避了上卷中提到的“确定但无条件”的悖论。
Graham translates Li as “pattern,” which he specifies as meaning the “recurring” patterns in which things are organized, the sorting out of which is the thinking which belongs to the realm of man. We will have to return to the question of recurrence below. The possibility of iterability of “the same” anything in different times and places is, in normal Western usage, predicated on the existence of some kind of universal that can subsume and recur identically in many instances. For this reason, I would like to bracket “recurrence” in the strong sense for the moment. For a Daoist, Graham thinks, these Li-patterns would include things such as "the relative positions of heaven and earth and the alternations of Yin and Yang, rise and fall, birth and death; they do not include standards of conduct, which a [Daoist] denies in principle. 222 222 ^(222){ }^{222} He describes Li in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism as “the universal pattern branching by division from the Supreme Ultimate (T’ai-chi) [太極 taiji], setting the lines along which things move,” which is opposed to 氣 qi as the "universal fluid out of which things condense and into which they dissolve, freely moving when fine or inert when coarse, active as the Yang or passive as the Yin. 123 Li 123 Li ^(123)Li{ }^{123} \mathrm{Li} in this system are "the pat-
格雷厄姆将“Li”翻译为“模式”,他将其定义为事物组织的“循环”模式,对这种模式的整理是属于人类领域的思维。我们将不得不回到下面的复发问题。在西方的正常用法中,“相同”任何事物在不同时间和地点的可重复性的可能性是基于某种普遍性的存在,这种普遍性可以在许多情况下相同地包含和重复出现。出于这个原因,我想暂时将强意义上的“复发”括起来。格雷厄姆认为,对于道教徒来说,这些理模式将包括诸如“天地相对位置、阴阳交替、盛衰、生死等内容;它们不包括行为标准,这是【道家】原则上否认。 222 222 ^(222){ }^{222} 他将成朱理学中的“理”描述为“从太极太极中分叉出来的普遍模式,设定了事物运动的路线”,这与“气”相对立。 “宇宙流体,事物从其中凝结并溶解于其中,细时自由移动,粗时惰性,活跃为阳,被动为阴。 123 Li 123 Li ^(123)Li{ }^{123} \mathrm{Li} 在这个系统中是“pat-

terns which regularize things and events. 124 124 ^(124){ }^{124} Again we may reserve judgment especially about the implications of the term regularize here.
使事物和事件规则化的燕鸥。 124 124 ^(124){ }^{124} 我们可能会再次保留判断,特别是对于此处“正则化”一词的含义。
Graham provides a distinctive solution to the descriptive/normative problem. In general, he asserts, Chinese thought assumes that we are already spontaneously moved in various directions before any prescriptive moral discourse comes to us. But these spontaneous promptings are alterable; they change when we are aware of more or other things. The point of ethical culture in China then was to expand awareness of all relevant implications, so that we would be spontaneously moved in a different way. The ultimate standard was the way the wisest and most fully aware persons, the sages, were spontaneously moved. In terms of Li in Neo-Confucianism, this helps Graham explain why struggle is needed to attain the sage’s lucid spontaneity, and why Li can be spoken of both as “what makes things what they are”-a matter of simple fact-and “how things should be”-a prescriptive norm (the “fact/value fusion” alluded to above). Graham says, "To the extent that I remain ignorant, the dense ch’i [qi] of my organism runs blindly in the broad channels of the l i l i lil i where it happens to be; but by moral training I refine my substance to greater transparency and penetrate into the finer veins of the universal pattern, so that my spontaneous reactions change as the rarified ch’i out of which the denser goes on being generated adjusts to newly perceived li. The assumption is that if I still fail to respond in the full light of my knowledge, it is because a l i l i lil i has permeated just far enough to awaken a spontaneous inclination along its path, but not yet to articulate the motions of the organism as a whole. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} One is always proceeding according to some portion of the overall Li however one is moved and whatever one is doing; moral value attaches only to how much or little of the Li one has penetrated. Right and wrong is a matter of greater and lesser penetration of Li. If one continues only in the “coarser veins” of Li where one “happens to be,” one has failed to live up to the Li of being a human being, which is exemplified by the sages, who have shown that man’s mind is able to penetrate the entirety of Li . When one fails to do so, one is a “not really a human being”-not fully realizing the Li of being a human, but only the less comprehensive Li of being an animal, for example. We will be returning to, and partially adopting, this interpretation of Li’s ethical implications in the pages to follow.
格雷厄姆为描述性/规范性问题提供了独特的解决方案。他断言,总的来说,中国思想认为,在任何规定性的道德话语出现之前,我们就已经自发地走向不同的方向。但这些自发的提示是可以改变的。当我们意识到更多或其他事情时,它们就会改变。当时中国伦理文化的重点是扩大对所有相关含义的认识,以便我们会自发地以不同的方式受到感动。最终的标准是最有智慧、最有觉知的人——圣人——自发地感动的方式。就新儒家的理而言,这有助于格雷厄姆解释为什么需要斗争才能获得圣人的清醒自发性,以及为什么理可以被称为“是什么使事物成为它们的样子”——这是一个简单的事实——和“事情应该如何”——一种规定性规范(上面提到的“事实/价值融合”)。格雷厄姆说:“在我仍然无知的情况下,我的有机体的浓密气在广阔的通道中盲目地运行。 l i l i lil i 它恰好在哪里;但通过道德训练,我将自己的本质提炼到更大的透明度,并渗透到宇宙模式的更细的脉络中,这样我的自发反应就会随着稀有的气而变化,其中更密集的气不断产生适应新感知的理。假设是,如果我仍然无法根据我的知识做出回应,那是因为 l i l i lil i 已经渗透到足以唤醒其路径上的自发倾向,但尚未阐明整个有机体的运动。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 无论人如何移动,无论做什么,总是按照整个礼的某个部分进行;道德价值只取决于礼的渗透程度。是非在于理透程度的大小。如果一个人只在“理”的“粗脉”中继续“恰巧”,就达不到做人的理,圣贤就是例证,他们证明了人的心是能够做到的。能够渗透到整个黎国。当一个人做不到这一点时,他就“不是一个真正的人”——例如,没有完全实现作为人的理,而只是不太全面的作为动物的理。在接下来的几页中,我们将返回并部分采用这种对李的道德含义的解释。
Graham describes Zhu Xi’s Li as
格雷厄姆将朱熹的《礼》描述为

a vast three-dimensional structure which looks different from different angles. In laying down the lines along which everything moves, it appears as the Way (Tao); in that the lines are independent of my personal desires, it imposes itself on me as Heaven (T’ien);
一个巨大的三维结构,从不同的角度看起来都不同。在规定万物运行的路线时,它表现为“道”;因为这些线条独立于我个人的欲望,它把自己强加给我作为天(T'ien);

as a pattern which from my own viewpoint spreads out from the sub-pattern of my own profoundest reaction, it appears as my own basic Nature (hsing). Looking down from the Supreme Ultimate, at the apex of which its branches join, it first divides as the Way of the first two diagrams of the Changes, Ch’ien and K’un, patterning the ch’i in its Yang and Yin phases; but from my own viewpoint, the major lines which connect me with the whole are the principles of conduct, Benevolence, Duty, Manners, Wisdom [i.e., 仁義禮智, ren yi li zhi, the four cardinal Mencian and Neo-Confucian virtues]. Each person, peering into the vast web from his own little corner of it, may, if his ch’i is perfectly transparent, see all the way to the Supreme Ultimate at its farthest limits. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
作为一种模式,从我自己的观点来看,它是从我自己最深刻的反应的子模式中展开的,它表现为我自己的基本本质(性)。从太极往下看,其枝干的顶端,先分为干、坤的前二图变化之道,塑造气的阳、阴相。 ;但从我自己的角度来看,连接我与整体的主要线索是行为的原则,仁义礼智,即孟子和新儒家的四项基本美德。 。每个人,从自己的小角落凝视浩瀚的网络,如果他的气是完全透明的,就可以一路看到至高无上的极限。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
Of crucial importance in this interpretation, which makes admirable sense of the “one-many” question, is Graham’s claim that the “subjectivising, Chinese” assumption that “the knowing of a li [is] inseparable from the reactions it patterns.” 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} The organic pattern is not merely an objective network to be observed and studied from without; our own reactions are also parts of this network of connections. The mind is not set aside as a separate ontological category, but is part of the whole. This insight will serve us well in the considerations below.
这种解释使“一对多”问题具有令人钦佩的意义,在这种解释中至关重要的是格雷厄姆的主张,即“主观化的中国式”假设“对理的认识与它所形成的反应密不可分”。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 有机模式不仅仅是一个可以从外部观察和研究的客观网络;我们自己的反应也是这个联系网络的一部分。心灵并没有被视为一个单独的本体论范畴,而是整体的一部分。这种见解对于我们下面的考虑很有帮助。
Graham also develops a notion of Chinese thinking, particularly from the Han on, as marked by “correlative” or analogic, rather than “analytic” or “causal” pattern formation. We will return to this suggestion in the discussion of the treatment of these problems by Hall and Ames below.
格雷厄姆还发展了中国思维的概念,特别是从汉族开始,其特点是“相关”或类比,而不是“分析”或“因果”模式形成。我们将在下面讨论霍尔和艾姆斯对这些问题的处理时回到这一建议。

PETERSON AND COHERENCE 彼得森和一致性

In his 1986 article “Another Look at Li,” Willard Peterson made a breakthrough suggestion on how to translate, and understand, the term Li in Neo-Confucianism. The translation he suggests is the English word coherence. By coherence, Peterson means " the quality or characteristic of sticking together,’ with the connotations of varying according to context." 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} The contextualizing implication is perhaps not analytically derivable from the notion of “coherence” as such, but it is a qualification that fits well with the points we have considered above, and indeed the two parts of this definition bring into sharp relief the crux of the problem. For indeed, coherence does suggest contextualization, if “sticking together” is meant to apply not only to the parts of the entity in question, but to the way the entity as a whole “sticks together” with what surrounds it. Coherence, then, means both the coherence of the parts of any whole with each other and the coherence of
威拉德·彼得森 (Willard Peterson) 在 1986 年的文章《再看礼》中,就如何翻译和理解理学中的“礼”一词提出了突破性的建议。他建议的翻译是英文单词coherence。彼得森所说的连贯性是指“粘在一起的品质或特征”,具有根据上下文而变化的含义。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} 语境化的含义也许不能从“连贯性”的概念本身分析得出,但它是一个与我们上面考虑的观点非常吻合的限定条件,事实上,这个定义的两个部分使问题的症结变得清晰起来。问题。事实上,如果“粘在一起”不仅意味着适用于所讨论的实体的各个部分,而且还适用于实体作为一个整体与其周围的事物“粘在一起”的方式,那么连贯性确实意味着情境化。那么,连贯性既意味着任何整体的各部分之间的连贯性,也意味着整体的连贯性。

this whole with all other things that are related to it, which contextualize it. Peterson notes that this interpretation allows many of the mysteries surrounding the Cheng-Zhu use of Li to disappear. He makes the following points about the Cheng-Zhu use of Li as coherence:
这整体以及与之相关的所有其他事物,将其置于上下文中。彼得森指出,这种解释使得许多围绕成朱使用“礼”的谜团消失了。关于成朱使用“礼”作为连贯性,他提出以下几点:
  1. "There is coherence for each and every thing, whether that thing is taken as heaven-and-earth as a whole, or a thing smaller than a cricket, an ant, or a blade of grass. 229 229 ^(229){ }^{229} Each thing, to be the thing it is, must have its own coherence, and this applies both to any whole as a whole and to each part as a part.
    “每一个事物都具有连贯性,无论该事物被视为天地整体,还是比蟋蟀、蚂蚁或一片草叶还要小的事物。 229 229 ^(229){ }^{229} 每一个事物,要成为它本来的样子,就必须有其自身的连贯性,这既适用于作为整体的任何整体,也适用于作为部分的每个部分。
  2. “Coherence is unitary.” This solves the one-many problem: “[W]e can speak of the coherence of my puppy, the coherence of all dogs, the coherence of all living things, and so on, without involving ourselves in a verbal dilemma over the relationship between the ‘different’ levels or envelopes of coherence.” 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
    “连贯性是统一的。”这解决了一对多问题:“我们可以谈论我的小狗的连贯性、所有狗的连贯性、所有生物的连贯性等等,而不必让自己陷入关于之间关系的语言困境。 “不同”的连贯性水平或范围。” 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
  3. "Coherence of object or phenomena is not locatable independently of ch’i. 31 31 ^('^(31)){ }^{\prime{ }^{31}} Here we have the immanence of Li to qi.
    “物体或现象的连贯性不能独立于气而定位。 31 31 ^('^(31)){ }^{\prime{ }^{31}} 这里我们有理气的内在性。
  4. "Coherence is categorically distinct from the ch’i of which things are constituted. 332 332 ^(332){ }^{332} Here we have the transcendence of Li to qi.
    “连贯性与构成事物的气有着绝对的区别。 332 332 ^(332){ }^{332} 这里我们有理对气的超越。
  5. “Coherence is transcendent as well as immanent.” This is a restatement of the previous two points.
    “连贯性是超越性的,也是内在的。”这是对前两点的重申。
  6. "Coherence is that by which a thing is as it is."34 It is descriptive, and also explanatory, in the sense of being “that by virtue of which a thing is what it is, rather than any other thing.”
    “连贯性是事物之所以如此的原因。”34它是描述性的,也是解释性的,意思是“事物凭借其而成为其本来面目,而不是任何其他事物”。
  7. "Each phenomenon has its associated ultimate or ‘perfect coherence’ (chih li [zhi Li]), which may or may not be attained. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
    “每种现象都有其相关的终极或‘完美连贯’(chih li [zhi Li]),它可能会实现,也可能不会实现。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
This is meant to solve the problem of the simultaneous descriptive and normative use of “coherence.” Peterson explains his understanding of this connection as follows: "The logic is simple. There is the coherence of all that is. There is the coherence of what will be or ought to be, usually expressed as the perfect coherence. As an aspect of that which we now are, we have the coherence of what we ought to be and the allied capacity to attain that ultimate, the full realization (ch’eng) of our potential. The puppy becomes a dog, what it ought to be, if it acts in a manner congruent with fulfilling that potential coherence within it (e.g., if it does not run under the wheel of a truck) and is not otherwise interfered with. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
这是为了解决“连贯性”的描述性和规范性同时使用的问题。彼得森解释了他对这种联系的理解如下:“逻辑很简单。存在所有事物的连贯性。存在将要发生或应该发生的事情的连贯性,通常表示为完美的连贯性。作为其中的一个方面我们现在的样子,我们有我们应该成为的样子的连贯性,并且有能力实现我们的潜力的最终,充分实现(ch'eng)小狗变成了狗,如果它应该是什么。以符合实现其内部潜在一致性的方式行事(例如,如果它不在卡车的车轮下运行)并且不会受到其他干扰。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
This last point is the only part of Peterson’s rather brilliant exposition of Li as coherence, which I will otherwise be adopting and building from here, with which I will be taking issue. The imputation of a distinction between “potential” and “actual” coherence invoked here, it seems to me, implies an abstract transcendentalism that undermines the power of the coherence model. Peterson tries to circumvent this implication by suggesting that the former is an “aspect” of the former, and indeed, both can be subsumed under the concept of “coherence.” As Peterson puts it, Zhu Xi is "urging us to understand as a coherent whole both what a man is now and what he might be in the future."37 This restatement continues to rely on the distinction of “is” and “might,” but the whole point of having recourse to the concept of coherence is surely that it reaches across these putatively separate categories of potentiality and actuality. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} Indeed, Peterson makes the point that Li must be understood as standing on both sides of the pair “potential” and "realized or actualized."39 But the implications of this claim remain to be explored, and we will have to pay careful attention to the question of Li as potential, particularly in the Buddhist contexts, later.
最后一点是彼得森对“理”作为连贯性的相当精彩的阐述的唯一部分,否则我将从这里采用和构建它,我将对此提出异议。在我看来,这里引用的“潜在”和“实际”连贯性之间的区别暗示着一种抽象的先验主义,它破坏了连贯性模型的力量。彼得森试图通过暗示前者是前者的一个“方面”来规避这种含义,事实上,两者都可以包含在“连贯性”的概念之下。正如彼得森所说,朱熹“敦促我们将一个人现在是什么以及他将来可能是什么作为一个连贯的整体来理解。”37这一重述继续依赖于“是”和“可能”的区别,但诉诸连贯性概念的全部意义在于,它跨越了这些假定的独立的潜力和现实类别。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} 事实上,彼得森指出,李必须被理解为站在“潜力”和“已实现或已实现”这对的两边。39但这一说法的含义仍有待探讨,我们必须仔细注意稍后,特别是在佛教背景下,“理”的潜力问题。

HALL AND AMES AND THE FOCUS/FIELD
霍尔和艾姆斯以及焦点/领域

Hall and Ames also have a problem with the putative “transcendentalism” of Peterson’s notion of coherence, which was of course intended only as an explication of the term’s use in Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, not in the entire tradition of Chinese thought, early and late. Hall and Ames state that they wish to adopt this interpretation for pre-Qin thought, but leaving out the transcendentalism, which they take to be applicable only to post-Buddhist, Neo-Confucian uses of the term. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} (This radical separation of Buddhist uses from other Chinese uses, which in fact dates back to the Neo-Confucian critiques of Buddhism, is one of the issues the present work hopes to reconsider.) Hall and Ames’s discussion of Li comes in the context of their overall interpretation of the dominant modes of “Han thinking” as a whole, which they characterize as privileging what Graham had identified as the “correlative, analogical, metaphorical” mode of classification over the “analytic, causal, metonymic” mode, as we discussed at length in Ironies of One and Many. Correlative groupings are loose, metaphorical, and ad hoc in character, producing concepts that are “image clusters in which complex semantic associations are allowed to reflect into one another in such a way as to provide rich, indefinitely “vague” meanings. Univocity is, therefore, impossible. Aesthetic associations dominate.” 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} These associations are nominalist, pragmatic, historicist, thus always necessarily ambiguous and negotiable. Hall and Ames see one of the most important examples of this in the “seemingly ubiquitous distinction between yin and yang,” which is
霍尔和艾姆斯也对彼得森的连贯性概念假定的“先验主义”有疑问,这当然只是为了解释该术语在程朱理学中的使用,而不是在整个中国思想传统中。并且迟到了。霍尔和艾姆斯表示,他们希望对先秦思想采用这种解释,但排除超验主义,他们认为超验主义仅适用于后佛教、新儒家对该术语的使用。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40} (佛教用途与其他中国用途的彻底分离,实际上可以追溯到新儒家对佛教的批判,这是本书希望重新考虑的问题之一。)霍尔和艾姆斯对“礼”的讨论是在以下背景下进行的:他们对整个“汉族思维”的主导模式的总体解释,他们将其描述为赋予格雷厄姆所认为的“关联、类比、隐喻”分类模式相对于“分析、因果、转喻”模式的特权,正如我们《一与多的讽刺》中有详细讨论。相关分组在性质上是松散的、隐喻的和临时的,产生的概念是“图像簇,其中复杂的语义关联被允许以一种提供丰富的、无限的“模糊”含义的方式相互反映。因此,单一性是不可能的。审美联想占主导地位。” 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} 这些关联是唯名论的、实用主义的、历史主义的,因此总是必然是模糊的和可协商的。霍尔和艾姆斯在“阴阳之间看似无处不在的区别”中看到了最重要的例子之一,即

“no more than a convenient way or organizing ‘thises’ and ‘thats.’ This is clearly a consequence of the nominalistic character of Chinese intellectual culture.”$42 Correlative thinking, we are told, allows a freeform association of items that might “cohere” with a given class, again very much including the subjective or cultural axiological reactions to things experienced together with them.
“只不过是一种方便的方式或组织‘这个’和‘那个’。这显然是中国知识文化唯名论特征的结果。”42 我们被告知,关联思维允许对可能与特定阶级“一致”的项目进行自由形式的关联,同样在很大程度上包括对特定阶级的主观或文化价值论反应。和他们一起经历的事情。
It is in this context that Hall and Ames adopt and modify Peterson’s notion of Li as coherence. Li , they say, is "the inherent formal and structural patterns in things and events, and their intelligibility. In expressing this notion of coherence and intelligibility, no severe distinction is made between ‘natural’ coherence (tianli [天理] or daoli [道理]) and ‘cultural’ coherence (wenli [文理] or daoli [道理]) . . . each is integral to li. . . . [It is] the fabric of order and regularity immanent in the dynamic process of experience . . . li in defining order confounds the familiar distinction between rational faculty and the underlying principles it searches out. Li has neither an exclusively subjective nor objective reference. 343 343 ^(343){ }^{343} Moreover,
正是在这种背景下,霍尔和艾姆斯采用并修改了彼得森的“理”的连贯性概念。他们说,理是“事物和事件固有的形式和结构模式,以及它们的可理解性。在表达这种连贯性和可理解性的概念时,‘自然’连贯性(天理 [天理] 或道理 [真理]”之间没有严格的区别。 ])和“文化”连贯性(文理),都是“理”的组成部分。理在定义秩序时混淆了理性能力和它所寻找的基本原则之间的熟悉区别,理既没有完全主观的参考,也没有完全客观的参考。 343 343 ^(343){ }^{343} 而且,
Li establish the ethos of a given community. As such li may never be considered as independent of context. There are no transcendent li. . . . In the absence of teleological guidance, there is only an ongoing process of correlation and negotiation. . . . Things are continuous with one another, and thus are interdependent conditions for each other. In a tradition which begins from the assumption that existence is a dynamic process, the causes of things are resident in themselves as their conditions, and the project of giving reasons for things or events requires a tracing or mapping out of the conditions that sponsor them. . . Li constitutes an aesthetic coherence in the sense that it begins from the uniqueness of any particular as a condition of individuation, and is at the same time a basis for continuity through various forms of collaboration between the given particular and other particulars with which, by virtue of similarity or productivity or contiguity, it can be correlated. 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
李建立了特定社区的精神风气。因此,li 永远不会被认为是独立于上下文的。没有超越的礼。 。 。 。在没有目的论指导的情况下,只有持续不断的关联和谈判过程。 。 。 。事物是相互连续的,因而是相互依存的条件。在一种从存在是一个动态过程的假设开始的传统中,事物的原因作为它们的条件而存在于其自身之中,而为事物或事件给出理由的项目需要追踪或绘制出支持它们的条件。 。 。理构成了一种审美的连贯性,因为它始于作为个体化条件的任何特殊性的独特性,同时也是通过给定特殊性与其他特殊性之间各种形式的协作而连续性的基础,通过这种协作,相似性或生产力或连续性,它可以是相关的。 44 44 ^(44){ }^{44}
This antitranscendental emphasis on process, and on reciprocal action (to which we will resort again at length in what follows) gives a different implication to the notion of “coherence”:
这种对过程和互惠行为(我们将在下文中再次详细讨论)的反先验强调给“连贯性”的概念带来了不同的含义:
Process entails uniqueness, and makes any notion of strict identity problematic. As such, coherent unities are characterized in terms of a relative continuity among unique particulars. And such continuity is open-ended rather than systematic; it is contingent rather than necessary; it is correlative rather than causal. This is can include
过程需要独特性,并且使任何严格身份的概念都成为问题。因此,连贯的统一体以独特细节之间的相对连续性为特征。而且这种连续性是开放式的,而不是系统性的。它是偶然的而不是必然的;它是相关的而不是因果的。这可以包括

aspects which, if entertained simultaneously, would seem inconsistent or even contradictory, yet when entertained in process, are well within the boundaries of continuity. 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
如果同时考虑这些方面,就会显得不一致甚至矛盾,但在过程中考虑时,它们完全在连续性的范围内。 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45}
The stressing of contextualization, mutual determination of the focus and the field, negotiability, provisionality, reciprocity, and immanence of coherence here, in a correlative cosmology, are crucial insights for understanding Li. However, I would like to stress an aspect of the ad hoc nature of Li which is underplayed a bit here, although it can be seen as an extension of the claim that Li has neither an exclusively subjective nor objective reference. For taken in all seriousness, this statement allows us to avoid a misunderstanding of the previous claim that Li includes equally cultural and natural patterns, as if these were two different realms included within the larger set of Li. This cannot be correct, even by the standards set by Hall and Ames themselves. As we shall see, there simply are no natural Li that are not also cultural, and no cultural Li which are not also natural. If we must divide these two ideal sets of possible coherences, we would perhaps do better to speak of Li as a kind of intersection or overlap between the two. But this is really a backward way of putting it. For what is at stake here, as we shall see, are the full implications of the inclusion of “subjective” reactions in the overall pattern of Li , as noted by Graham: the nondistinction between the concrete and the abstract, and the necessity of contextualization.
在相关宇宙论中,强调情境化、焦点和领域的相互确定、可协商性、临时性、互惠性和连贯性的内在性,是理解李的重要见解。然而,我想强调李的临时性质的一个方面,尽管它可以被视为李既没有完全主观也没有完全客观参考的主张的延伸,但这里有点被低估了。严肃地说,这一说法使我们避免了对先前主张的误解,即“理”同样包含文化和自然模式,就好像它们是更大的“理”集合中包含的两个不同领域。即使按照霍尔和艾姆斯自己设定的标准,这也是不正确的。正如我们将要看到的,没有一种自然礼不是文化礼,也没有一种文化礼不是自然礼。如果我们必须划分这两个理想的可能的连贯性集合,我们也许最好将“理”视为两者之间的一种交叉或重叠。但这确实是一种落后的说法。因为正如我们将看到的,这里的关键在于将“主观”反应纳入“理”的整体模式中的全部含义,正如格雷厄姆所指出的:具体与抽象之间的不区分,以及情境化的必要性。
We can sum up in advance what we will adopt and what reject from the giants on whose shoulders we stand here, and what we will find, in the readings that follow, needs to be added.
我们可以提前总结我们将采用的内容和我们所站在的巨人肩膀上拒绝的内容,以及我们将在接下来的阅读中发现的内容需要添加的内容。
From Needham we accept that Li is somehow autonomous rather than heteronomous, not a principle imposed from without. But we reject the idea of organism and the idea of pattern; organism implies a fixed ends-means teleology of organs, while pattern implies strict repeatability, neither of which can be found in Li .
从李约瑟那里,我们承认理在某种程度上是自主的而不是他律的,不是一个从外部强加的原则。但我们拒绝有机体的观念和模式的观念;有机体意味着固定的目的——器官的目的论,而模式则意味着严格的可重复性,这两者在《李》中都找不到。
From Hansen we accept the claim that the Chinese notion of knowledge tends to be primarily of a dividing out from a context, connected to an ontology based on dividing down rather than accumulation of distinct particulars. We also adopt the staunch rejection of the necessity of any two-tiered metaphysics that this model implies. But Hansen’s model seems to leave the vicissitudes of the dividing process up in the air, susceptible to the usual conflict between nominalism and realism, which we do not find to be applicable as a strict either/or in the Chinese case.
我们接受汉森的观点,即中国的知识概念往往主要是从语境中分离出来,与基于分离而不是不同细节的积累的本体论相关联。我们还坚决拒绝该模型所暗示的任何两层形而上学的必要性。但汉森的模型似乎将分裂过程的变迁悬而未决,容易受到唯名论和现实主义之间常见冲突的影响,我们发现这种冲突不适用于中国的情况。
From Graham we adopt the emendation of Hansen, the “built-in instructions” for dividing, which we call “perforations.” We will make much of the possible multiplicity and incompatibility of these perforations within any stuff. We also wish to amplify on his insight about the inclu-
我们采用了格雷厄姆对汉森的修正,即划分的“内置指令”,我们称之为“穿孔”。我们将充分利用任何东西中这些穿孔可能存在的多样性和不兼容性。我们还希望进一步阐述他对包容性的见解

sion of human inclinations within the scope of the given, and the clue this provides to solving the descriptive/normative problem for Li. But we will amend his notion of “pattern,” “regularizing,” and “reiterability,” as well as the depiction of Li as a sort of passive channel in which qi may flow. Our emendation comes from further emphasizing the perforation idea, combining it with the notion of Li . Li are these perforations, and the flowing of qi is also its rearrangement. Li must include also the notion of dividing and unifying, not just as a network branches apart but also interconnects, but rather as material is rearranged, divided into groups, so as to cohere, stick together, in a certain way. The “flow” of qi must be understood as the way Li reorganizes it.
在给定的范围内人类倾向的变化,以及这为解决李的描述性/规范性问题提供了线索。但我们将修改他的“模式”、“规范化”和“可重复性”的概念,以及将理描述为一种气可以流动的被动通道。我们的修正来自于进一步强调穿孔思想,并将其与理的概念相结合。理就是这些穿孔,气的流动也是它的重新排列。理还必须包括分裂和统一的概念,不仅是一个网络分支,而且是相互连接的,而是材料被重新排列,分成组,以便以某种方式凝聚、粘在一起。气的“流动”必须被理解为李重组它的方式。
From Peterson we adopt the crucial idea of Li as coherence, meaning both the sticking together of the parts of a thing and its way of sticking together with its environment. The multiple levels of nesting this conception allows will be crucial to developing Graham’s “perforation” idea, as well as the unity/multiplicity and immanent/transcendent dilemmas concerning Li , along with the negotiable identities of all terms that are so crucial to Hall and Ames’s insights on this matter. The use of this paradigm to solve the third crucial dilemma-the descriptive/normative-is, we feel, not yet accomplished in Peterson, and it is this angle we would like to augment.
从彼得森那里,我们采用了“理”作为连贯性的关键概念,既意味着事物各部分的粘连在一起,也意味着它与环境粘在一起的方式。这一概念所允许的多层嵌套对于发展格雷厄姆的“穿孔”思想,以及关于李的统一性/多样性和内在/超越的困境,以及对霍尔和艾姆斯来说至关重要的所有术语的可协商身份,都至关重要。对这个问题的见解。我们认为,使用这一范式来解决第三个关键困境——描述性/规范性——在彼得森身上还没有完成,而我们想要增强的正是这个角度。
From Hall and Ames, we adopt the addition of the sense of coherence as “intelligibility” to Peterson’s model, the inclusion of human and natural within its scope (continuing Graham’s point), and the greater emphasis on the ad hoc nature of these coherences, their shifting and always negotiable character. We also would like to build on the focus/field model, and the ars contextualis that goes with it. However, we would like to add several things to this model, while substantially agreeing with its overall intent. First, to the senses of “coherence,” we add and stress a fourth: value. Coherence, in Li , must cover at least these four senses: sticking together of parts, sticking together with the environment, intelligibility, and value. In stressing this point, we find that the ad hoc and purely nominalist rendering of the model is perhaps misleading; for these coherences are genuinely multilocal, instantiated in many separate events, and have actual causal efficacy as the wholes that play a decisive role in the constitution and character of their parts, albeit in an unusual way that does not amount to a realism either, and does indeed invite the kind of shifting focal contextualization that Hall and Ames concentrate on. For us, Li is neither nominalist nor realist in character, neither an absolute objective presence nor a subjectively projected invention. Li are neither purely invented nor purely discovered, and the extent to which we continue to think of these as mutually exclusive and exhaustive of all possible relations to coherent experiences will be the extent to which we still struggle with the meaning of Li . The Li, too, are
从霍尔和艾姆斯那里,我们采用了在彼得森模型中添加“可理解性”的连贯性意识,将人类和自然纳入其范围内(继续格雷厄姆的观点),并更加强调这些连贯性的特殊性质,他们的性格多变且总是可以协商。我们还希望建立焦点/领域模型,以及与之相伴的上下文环境。然而,我们希望在这个模型中添加一些内容,同时基本上同意其总体意图。首先,对于“连贯性”的含义,我们添加并强调第四个含义:价值。在《理》中,连贯性必须至少涵盖这四种含义:各部分的粘连、与环境的粘连、可理解性和价值。在强调这一点时,我们发现该模型的临时和纯粹唯名论的渲染可能会产生误导;因为这些连贯性确实是多地域的,在许多单独的事件中实例化,并且作为整体具有实际的因果效力,在其各部分的构成和特征中发挥决定性作用,尽管以一种不寻常的方式,也不等于现实主义,并且确实会引发霍尔和艾姆斯所关注的那种转移焦点的情境化。对我们来说,李在本质上既不是唯名论者,也不是实在论者,既不是绝对客观的存在,也不是主观投射的发明。 “理”既不是纯粹发明的,也不是纯粹发现的,我们继续认为这些与连贯经验的所有可能关系相互排斥和详尽的程度,将在多大程度上我们仍然与“理”的含义作斗争。李家也是

really there, and really transcendent to any concrete instantiation, and have real causal efficacy in their multilocality precisely as determining wholes, which always involves also a relation to some human conation as part of the determining holistic totality of the coherence in a way that a purely nominalist description tends to obscure. There can be many patterns in the world and many intelligible togethernesses that are not Li: those that a human being, in according with, will not come together with the world in such a way as to satisfy his specifically human desires. That is, unless cohering with it allows you to cohere with the world more coherently, it is not a Li . This is perhaps the crucial emendation: we would like to assert that Li is beholden to a reference to a second-order coherence. That is, it is only those coherences that cohere in a certain way with certain other coherences (i.e., human beings) that qualify as Li. This is to some extent already implicit in Peterson’s use of the term, and implied strongly by Graham. But it is still far too easy to imagine Li simply as some sort of pattern to be apprehended, without considering the subjective position of the apprehender. Li is not just any togetherness: it is a valued togetherness. Value, however, is also a togetherness: it is a relation between a desire and its object. The valuer is already implicated. The intelligibly coherent thing must cohere with certain human inclinations, which must themselves cohere with other inclinations in a valued way-i.e., as we shall see, “harmoniously.”
真实存在,并且真正超越任何具体的实例化,并且在其多地点性中具有真正的因果效力,精确地作为确定的整体,这总是涉及与某些人类意象的关系,作为连贯性的确定的整体性整体的一部分,以一种纯粹的方式唯名论的描述往往晦涩难懂。世界上可能有许多不属于“理”的模式和许多可理解的共同性:人类根据这些模式,不会以满足他特定的人类欲望的方式与世界结合在一起。也就是说,除非与它连贯可以让你与世界更加连贯,否则它就不是理。这也许是关键的修正:我们想断言李受到二阶相干性的引用。也就是说,只有那些以某种方式与某些其他连贯性(即人类)连贯的连贯性才有资格称为“理”。这在某种程度上已经隐含在彼得森对该术语的使用中,并且格雷厄姆也强烈暗示了这一点。但如果不考虑理解者的主观立场,就很容易将“理”简单地想象成某种需要理解的模式。礼不仅仅是一种团结:它是一种有价值的团结。然而,价值也是一种整体性:它是欲望与其对象之间的关系。评估师已经受到牵连。可理解的连贯性事物必须与某些人类倾向相一致,而人类的倾向本身也必须以一种有价值的方式与其他倾向相一致——即,正如我们将看到的,“和谐地”。
Lastly, we would like to augment the Hall and Ames field/focus model with a reference to Qian Mu’s pendulum model. This is to some extent already adumbrated in the idea of “focus” as a point that serves as a center toward which there is a convergence, as Hall and Ames already note. We may regard this idea of convergence as the crucial paradigm shift that unlocks much of Confucian thought, and returns in the Tiantai identification of “Centrality” (中 zhong) per se with Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} —valued coherence—means center in this sense, as Zhiyi also tells us. Centrality is itself value, is itself the connection of diverse and opposed particulars, is itself intelligibility: the three meanings of Li as coherence with which we have been grappling. A center unifies, is discernible, and is value (sustainability), as Qian’s analysis suggests. With the identification of the terms L i L i LiL i and Center in Tiantai, we have the bridge to the Neo-Confucian usage of the term Li to denote this kind of centrality. We will return to this in our discussion of Tiantai below and also when we briefly discuss the status of Li in Neo-Confucianism in the Conclusion.
最后,我们想参考钱穆的摆模型来增强霍尔和艾姆斯场/焦点模型。正如霍尔和艾姆斯已经指出的那样,这在某种程度上已经在“焦点”的概念中得到了预示,即作为一个中心的点,朝着这个中心汇聚。我们可以将这种趋同的观念视为关键的范式转变,它解锁了儒家思想的大部分内容,并在天台对“中中”本身的认同中回归 Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} “重视连贯性”在这个意义上意味着中心,正如志毅也告诉我们的那样。中心性本身就是价值,本身就是不同的和对立的细节的联系,本身就是可理解性:我们一直在努力解决“理”作为连贯性的三个含义。正如钱的分析所表明的,中心是统一的、可识别的、并且是价值(可持续性)的。随着术语的识别 L i L i LiL i 和中心在天台,我们有桥梁到新儒家使用“礼”一词来表示这种中心性。我们将在下面讨论天台山以及结语中简要讨论理在新儒家思想中的地位时回到这一点。
That is, there is a dyadic character to the force field, a certain circular form and rotating motion, which must be further stressed. Fields come in dyads, with two extremes ranged around a center. Hall and Ames perhaps allude to this in their discussion of Yin and Yang as a “this/that” pair, but it seems insufficiently integrated into their field/focus model, and their descrip-
也就是说,力场具有二元性,有一定的圆形和旋转运动,必须进一步强调这一点。场分为二元组,两个极端围绕一个中心。霍尔和艾姆斯也许在他们对阴阳作为“这个/那个”对的讨论中提到了这一点,但它似乎没有充分融入他们的场/焦点模型,以及他们的描述-

tion of Li, still, as a kind of “pattern.” To stress the dyadic character of the field and the “centrality” of the focus, as well as some sense of a pull of force, a center of gravity, in the organizing process, I will suggest instead a model of vertex and vortex. This vortex must be thought of as intrinsically dyadic in structure, bringing together opposed ingredients on the model of Qian Mu’s pendulum, but taking place in several nested dimensions at once: a sort of multi-dyadic vortex. Taking a further step, we stress that these vertices are lines of perforation inviting human action, the action of making a division, hence making something intelligible and articulate, organizing the material at hand in a particular way, grouping it. By dividing along a certain perforation, a Li, we join the totality into a certain harmonious whole-harmonious in the sense that it harmonizes with our senses (perception) and inclinations (actions and values). Here, the further model of the acupuncture meridian must be used to supplement the still too objectivist picture of vertex and vortex. In this way we can perhaps return to the notion of a “coherence” in general as developed prior to the advent of Li , modeled on the three-dimensional Gestalt that incorporates also the cognitions and desires of the human observer as part of the same Gestalt. A Li is a vertex making coherent a multi-dyadic vortex of which we are ourselves a constitutive part.
仍然将李视为一种“模式”。为了强调场的二元特征和焦点的“中心性”,以及组织过程中的某种拉力感、重心感,我将建议使用顶点和涡流模型。这种漩涡必须被认为本质上是二元结构,将钱穆钟摆模型上的相反成分聚集在一起,但同时发生在几个嵌套的维度中:一种多二元漩涡。更进一步,我们强调这些顶点是邀请人类行动的穿孔线,进行划分的行动,从而使某些东西变得可理解和清晰,以特定的方式组织手头的材料,将其分组。通过沿着某种穿孔(即“理”)进行划分,我们将整体连接成某种和谐的整体——和谐是指它与我们的感官(感知)和倾向(行动和价值观)相协调。这里,必须使用进一步的针灸经络模型来补充仍然过于客观的顶点和涡旋图。通过这种方式,我们也许可以回到李出现之前发展起来的“连贯性”概念,以三维格式塔为模型,将人类观察者的认知和欲望纳入同一格式塔的一部分。 。李是一个顶点,它使一个多二元漩涡连贯起来,而我们自己就是其中的一个组成部分。
Above and beyond these emendations, we will be identifying an ironic and a non-ironic usage of all the key terms concerning coherence, without which the apophatic adaptations of these terms in Taoist and Buddhist thought cannot be understood, rendering the grain of Chinese intellectual history unintelligible.
除了这些修正之外,我们将识别所有有关连贯性的关键术语的讽刺和非讽刺用法,否则就无法理解这些术语在道教和佛教思想中的背离改编,从而呈现中国思想史的脉络难以理解。
From the above considerations, I will be able to offer a general schema that can be applied to many of the diverse usages of Li to be considered below, broad and indeterminate enough for us to trace the continuities in usage without asserting that the word literally “means” the “same” thing in all eras, traditions and texts: Li will be viewed as a harmony which, when harmonized with by a human being, leads to further harmonies. These further harmonies may involve the original harmony, the human being, or both. I can restate the definition by replacing the word harmony with coherence in each instance, emphasizing thus that one of the ways in which a harmony can harmonize with a human being is for the human being to know it, to be aware of it, to pick it out and identify it, for it to be intelligible to him. Both terms imply a togetherness of diverse terms. Harmony emphasizes the experience of pleasure, and the quality of balance implied in this togetherness. Coherence implies the intelligibility in this togetherness. So more completely, but less elegantly, we may say: Li is a harmonious coherence, which, when a human being becomes harmoniously coherent with it, leads to further harmonious coherence.
从上述考虑出发,我将能够提供一个通用模式,该模式可以应用于下面要考虑的“李”的许多不同用法,其广泛性和不确定性足以让我们追踪用法的连续性,而无需断言该词字面意思是“ “礼”在所有时代、传统和文本中都意味着“相同”的事物:礼将被视为一种和谐,当人类与之和谐时,会带来进一步的和谐。这些进一步的和谐可能涉及原始和谐、人类或两者。我可以通过在每种情况下用连贯性代替“和谐”一词来重述这个定义,从而强调和谐与人类和谐相处的方式之一是让人类了解它、意识到它、选择它。把它找出来,辨认出来,让他能够理解。这两个术语都意味着不同术语的结合。和谐强调快乐的体验,以及这种团结所隐含的平衡品质。连贯性意味着这种一致性的可理解性。因此,更完整但不太优雅的是,我们可以说:理是一种和谐的连贯性,当一个人与它和谐地连贯时,就会导致进一步的和谐连贯。
In its simplest sense, Li is “how to divide things up so they fit together well.” Not “how they are divided up,” but “how to divide them up.” “To fit together well by being divided up in a certain way” is the basic idea of coherence. But the little word well in this definition leads to a further wrinkle, for “well” here means another fitting together: to “fit together well” is to “fit together in a way that is desired,” which is to say, “that fits together in a way that fits together with a desire or ideal.” Hence, this “fitting together” always involves (1) the dividing up of the parts of an object into dyadic balances so that the object as a whole fits together sustainably, creating an object that can reproduce itself and continue into the future; (2) the dividing up of value and desire so that they fit together pleasurably and lastingly satisfyingly, creating a sustainable object of desire; and (3) the dividing up of known and knower so that they fit together intelligibly, creating an intelligible object of knowing. Hence, we note that three distinct levels of harmonious coherence are thus necessary for any item, X , to qualify as Li. At each level there is a requirement of harmony, but this already introduces the broad variability involved in the many usages of the term: for what must be harmonized with at each level can vary widely. Above all, one of these levels is always a coherent harmony between some given human desires and some situation; since these desiderata can vary extremely in different systems of thought, the implications of Li will vary just as broadly. The three levels can be spelled out more explicitly as follows:
从最简单的意义上来说,理就是“如何将事物分开,使它们能够很好地结合在一起”。不是“如何划分”,而是“如何划分”。 “分而合之”是连贯性的基本思想。但是这个定义中的“well”这个小词导致了进一步的问题,因为“well”在这里意味着另一种装配在一起:“fit Together well”是“以期望的方式装配在一起”,也就是说,“那个以一种与愿望或理想相契合的方式结合在一起。”因此,这种“拼合”总是涉及(1)将物体的各个部分分割成二元平衡,使物体作为一个整体可持续地拼合在一起,创造出一个可以自我复制并延续到未来的物体; (2)将价值和欲望分开,使它们愉快地、持久地令人满意地结合在一起,创造出一个可持续的欲望对象; (3)将已知者和认知者分开,使它们能够以可理解的方式组合在一起,创造出可理解的认知对象。因此,我们注意到,对于任何项目 X 来说,要符合 Li 的条件,就需要三个不同级别的和谐连贯性。每个级别都有和谐的要求,但这已经引入了该术语的许多用法所涉及的广泛可变性:因为每个级别必须协调的内容可能有很大差异。最重要的是,这些层次之一始终是某些特定的人类欲望和某些情况之间的连贯和谐;由于这些需求在不同的思想体系中可能存在极大差异,因此“礼”的含义也会有很大差异。这三个级别可以更明确地表述如下:
  1. The harmonious coherence (togetherness) of
    和谐的连贯性(团结性)

    a. the parts of X with one another, and
    一个。 X 的各个部分彼此相连,并且

    b. X as such and as a whole with its environment.
    b. X 本身及其环境作为一个整体。
  2. The harmonious coherence between X and a desiring human perceiver:
    X 与渴望的人类感知者之间的和谐一致:

    a. The given desires of the human being must harmoniously cohere with X ; that is, X must satisfy some human desires or other.
    一个。人类的既定欲望必须与 X 和谐一致;也就是说,X 必须满足人类的某些欲望或其他欲望。

    b. Human awareness harmoniously coheres with X ; that is, X is intelligible to human awareness.
    b.人类意识与X和谐一致;也就是说,X 是人类意识可以理解的。
  3. The harmonious coherences that result when " 1 " above harmoniously coheres with " 2 " above. These can be of any number of types:
    当上面的“1”与上面的“2”和谐一致时所产生的和谐一致。这些可以是任意数量的类型:

    a. Marketability or social utility of X ( X adheres with economic demand and market desires);
    一个。 X的市场性或社会效用(X符合经济需求和市场愿望);

    b. Harvest of crops (nutrition available to humans, which harmonious cohere with their needs);
    b.农作物的收获(人类可获得的营养,与他们的需求和谐一致);

    c. Progeny and continuation of the clan or species (harmonious coherence of past and present);
    c.氏族或物种的后代和延续(过去和现在的和谐一致);

    d. Grouping together of the clan or species (harmonious coherence of its members);
    d.氏族或物种的组合(其成员的和谐一致);

    e. Skill in human relations, or practical prowess or skill of any kind (coherence of ends and means);
    e.人际关系技巧,或任何形式的实际能力或技巧(目的和手段的一致性);

    f. Liberation from suffering (Nirvana), and enlightenment into further intelligible coherences (“wisdom”).
    f.从痛苦中解脱(涅槃),并获得进一步可理解的连贯性的启蒙(“智慧”)。
Li is any harmonious coherence of the type described in 1 that can harmoniously cohere with human beings in the sense of 2 , leading to further harmonious coherences of the type described in 3.
理是1中描述的类型的任何和谐连贯性,它可以在2的意义上与人类和谐一致,从而导致3中描述的类型的进一步和谐连贯性。
In its earliest uses, Li is a verb meaning to organize raw material by dividing it up in some particular way, including dividing it up by cutting something away from a background, and to shape it into a coherent object that further coheres with some human values. When used as a stative verb it can usually be translated as “ordered” and when used as a transitive verb as “to put in order,” with the qualification a particular notion of order is implicit in the term: the arrangement of the parts of a thing, separating them into groupings and regions, so that it becomes a coherent whole, meaning a whole that more effectively interfaces-coheres-with human needs and human awareness. It means to put something into a humanly palatable form. In its earliest nominal usages, Li seems to be translatable roughly as “a valued way of cohering,” or “value-laden coherence.” This can mean the lines along which the cutting, articulation, and divisions must be done in order for the thing to be “ordered” in the above sense, its implicit perforations, or by a further extension, the resulting network of articulations. In this case, we can speak of “following” (循 xun) or “tracing” (緣 yuan) along the Li, which in this context translates easily as “pattern,” if we again recall that this implies a humanly valuable pattern, not necessarily any configuration that happens to repeat at regular intervals. Nor does it in any way imply strict repetition: instead, what matters is continuity, which is to say, coherence. This pattern of articulations is valuable or healthy for humans; it is also intelligible to humans, and healthy for humans to pay attention to. A further item that fits into the same set of articulations in an equally healthy way may be said to be part of the same Li , and to recognize this interconnection or harmony between these two items, or events, is to recognize the “same Li.” We could also in this sense speak of “the Li of X ,” which would denote the way of
在其最早的用法中,“理”是一个动词,意思是通过以某种特定方式划分原材料来组织原材料,包括通过从背景中切掉某些东西来将其划分,并将其塑造成一个连贯的物体,进一步与某些人类价值观相一致。当用作静态动词时,它通常可以翻译为“有序的”,当用作及物动词时,可以翻译为“按顺序排列”,带有限定条件的术语中隐含着特定的顺序概念:一个事物,将它们分成不同的组和区域,使其成为一个连贯的整体,这意味着一个更有效地与人类需求和人类意识相结合的整体。它的意思是把某些东西变成人类可口的形式。在其最早的名义用法中,“Li”似乎可以粗略地翻译为“一种有价值的凝聚方式”或“充满价值的连贯性”。这可能意味着必须沿着这些线进行切割、连接和分割,以便使事物在上述意义上“有序”,其隐含的穿孔,或者进一步延伸,由此产生的连接网络。在这种情况下,我们可以说“循循”或“缘缘”,在这种情况下,它很容易翻译为“模式”,如果我们再次回想起这意味着一种人类有价值的模式,不一定是任何定期重复的配置。它也不以任何方式意味着严格的重复:相反,重要的是连续性,也就是说,连贯性。这种发音方式对人类来说是有价值的或健康的。它也是人类可以理解的,并且值得人类关注,是健康的。 以同样健康的方式融入同一组关节的另一个项目可以说是同一个“理”的一部分,并且认识到这两个项目或事件之间的这种相互联系或和谐,就是认识到“同一个理”。在这个意义上,我们也可以说“X 的理”,它表示

viewing X so that its organizing articulations are evident, the ways in which it is optimally divided and grouped. To see the Li of X would be to see it subdivided in that optimal way for our understanding and handling of it, our integration (coherence) of it into our other experiences and purposes, rather than in some alternate way. In this sense, the term principle can be a tempting and often appropriate translation. We can restate this, as noted above, given the relativistic and pragmatic concept of value in play here, as a coherence that coheres also with human desires and inclinations, or ways of being together that are in harmony with some human evaluative stance. This may also imply an effect on the relation among those desires-making them, of course, more harmoniously coherent with one another in just this sense. Also implied is some reciprocity or mutuality between these desires or inclinations and these forms of togetherness in the world. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
观察X,使其组织结构清晰可见,即它的最佳划分和分组方式。看到 X 的 Li 就会看到它以我们理解和处理它的最佳方式细分,我们将它整合(连贯)到我们的其他经验和目的中,而不是以某种替代方式。从这个意义上说,“原则”一词可能是一个诱人且通常合适的翻译。如上所述,考虑到此处发挥的相对主义和实用主义价值概念,我们可以重申这一点,作为一种连贯性,也与人类的欲望和倾向相一致,或者与某些人类评价立场相一致的在一起方式。这也可能意味着对这些欲望之间关系的影响——当然,正是在这个意义上,使它们彼此更加和谐一致。还暗示着这些愿望或倾向与世界上的这些团结形式之间的某种互惠或相互关系。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
It is in this context that the idea of the Omnipresent emerges, not as either the universal universal or as what is left out of all universals, as we saw (in Ironies of Oneness and Difference) underlie the competing notions of omnipresence in Western thought, but rather as the Great Coherence, which is non-ironically called Dao, the guiding course; or, alternately, the Incoherent Coherence, which is ironically called Dao. The former simply means the maximum coherence fitting the above definition, allowing human tradition, human society, natural groupings, and human desires to cohere, with a particular notion of human desires as the defining criterion. It is omnipresent in the sense of omniavailable, and in the sense that whatever falls outside of it cannot be said to really exist in any meaningful way for human beings. The latter, ironic coherence, is the literal inclusion and togetherness of all possible contents and contexts, the raw material and background from which they are cut and which is therefore itself never thematizable except as the detritus left over after any given cutting something out of raw material to make value, any act of Li-ing, of making usably coherent; it is therefore necessarily incoherent, valueless, and unintelligible, but which is all the more the great coherence in the sense of the togetherness and value of all things. At various times and places we have the attempted appropriation of one of these sense of omnipresence by the other; but this oscillation is in any case quite different from the oscillation and mutual refutation between the two opposite senses of the Omnipresent derived from the occidental notion of universals.
正是在这种背景下,无所不在的观念出现了,它既不是普遍的普遍性,也不是所有普遍性中被遗漏的东西,正如我们在西方思想中无所不在的竞争概念的基础上所看到的那样(在《统一与差异的讽刺》中),而是作为大连贯性,毫不讽刺地称为“道”,指导方针;或者,相反,不连贯的连贯性,讽刺地被称为“道”。前者仅仅意味着符合上述定义的最大连贯性,允许人类传统、人类社会、自然群体和人类欲望一致,以人类欲望的特定概念作为定义标准。从无所不在的意义上说,它是无所不在的,从某种意义上说,无论落在它之外的东西都不能说以对人类有意义的方式真正存在。后者是具有讽刺意味的连贯性,是所有可能的内容和背景、它们被切割的原材料和背景的字面包容和结合,因此它本身永远不会被主题化,除非是从原始材料中切割出某些东西后留下的碎屑。创造价值的材料,任何Li-ing的行为,使可用的连贯性;因此,它必然是不连贯的、毫无价值的、难以理解的,但从万物的共同性和价值的意义上来说,它更是伟大的连贯性。在不同的时间和地点,我们都试图将其中一种无所不在的感觉挪用为另一种。但无论如何,这种摇摆与源自西方共相概念的无所不在的两种相反含义之间的摇摆和相互驳斥是截然不同的。
Let us now turn to the slow development of this notion, growing from the soil of the prior conceptions of coherence already considered in Ironies of Oneness and Difference, in the work of particular thinkers and traditions.
现在让我们转向这个概念的缓慢发展,它是从先前的一致性概念的土壤中生长出来的,这些概念已经在《统一与差异的反讽》中、在特定思想家和传统的著作中得到了考虑。

TWO 

THE ADVENT OF LI,
IRONIC AND NON-IRONIC
李的出现, 讽刺与非讽刺

I have mentioned that Li is not yet a central philosophical category in the earliest texts from the formative years of the Chinese philosophical traditions. However, there are some relatively nontechnical but nonetheless telling uses of the term in those contexts, prior to its self-conscious adoption as a specialized philosophical term, which it will be useful for us to consider. We will thus begin with those texts, with an eye specifically to the gathering storm of Li as it is taking shape in the gradual thickening of the associations of the term in its still vague ordinary meaning of “order.” The discussion is organized thematically rather than strictly chronologically. In this chapter I will address relatively undiluted expressions of what I take to be the non-ironic usages of Li from the Xunzi, and in late Warring States texts such as the “Yueji” (“Record of Music”) in the Liji and the canonical commentaries to the Zhouyi, and even the works of Dong Zhongshu (179-104 BCE) in the Han. In the next chapter, we will consider ironic appropriations of non-ironic themes as expressed around the usages of Li , considering them responses to non-ironic trends, even though some of the texts treated there certainly predate some of the texts treated here. The assumption is that we can thus trace a trajectory within the non-ironic line of thinking that exists in some form, and thus is capable of serving as a stimulus to thinkers with an orientation toward the ironic tradition, even before some of its written expressions, and even before all its ramifications have been fully developed.
我已经提到,在中国哲学传统形成时期的最早文本中,“理”还不是一个中心哲学范畴。然而,在自觉地采用该术语作为专门的哲学术语之前,该术语在这些背景下有一些相对非技术性但仍然有意义的用法,这对我们来说是有用的。因此,我们将从这些文本开始,特别关注正在聚集的“礼”风暴,因为“礼”一词的联想在其仍然模糊的“秩序”普通含义中逐渐加深,正在形成。讨论是按主题组织的,而不是严格按时间顺序组织的。在本章中,我将讨论我所认为的《荀子》和战国晚期文献中对“礼”的非讽刺性用法的相对纯粹的表达,例如《礼记》中的《乐记》和《乐记》。 《周易》的经典注释,甚至汉代董仲舒(公元前 179-104 年)的著作。在下一章中,我们将考虑围绕“李”的用法表达的非讽刺主题的讽刺挪用,考虑它们对非讽刺趋势的反应,尽管那里处理的一些文本肯定早于这里处理的一些文本。我们的假设是,我们可以在以某种形式存在的非讽刺思维路线中追踪一条轨迹,因此能够刺激那些以讽刺传统为导向的思想家,甚至在它的一些书面表达出现之前,甚至在其所有后果完全发展之前。

LI AS "GREATEST COHERENCE" IN THE XUNZI
《荀子》中“理”是“最通”

In Ironies of Oneness and Difference, I noted in passing that among the texts of the non-ironic tradition, it is in the Xunzi that we see the beginning of the
在《同异反讽》中,我顺便指出,在非反讽传统的文本中,我们在《荀子》中看到了反讽的开端。

advent of Li as an important and common term, with an exponential surge of frequency of usage as compared with earlier texts: a total of 106 appearances in the text as a whole. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} Prior to this, we do have the key non-ironic, though sparse, usages of the term, still completely unflagged as any kind of special term, in the Mencius, in which the term occurs a whopping total of seven times. Four of these occur in the phrase 條理 tiaoli, “stripelike orderliness,” used to describe the harmony of music in both its beginning and its end, a way to praise the timeliness of Confucius as expressed in his “wisdom” and his “sageliness,” signifying the starting and finishing harmony respectively (Mencius 5B7). The meaning here is simply orderliness, with the important implication of harmony, as related to music, and of a coherence not only synchronically (harmony of various instruments and tones at any given time) but also diachronically (between the beginning and end of the piece), related explicitly to the combination of dyadically opposed virtues in the timeliness of Confucius.
“礼”作为一个重要而常用的术语出现,与早期文本相比,使用频率呈指数级增长:全文中总共出现了 106 次。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 在此之前,我们确实在《孟子》中找到了该术语的关键非讽刺性用法,虽然稀疏,但仍然完全没有被标记为任何特殊术语,其中该术语出现了多达七次。其中四个出现在“条理条理”一词中,“条理条理”,用于描述音乐在开始和结束时的和谐,以此来赞扬孔子的及时性,即他的“智慧”和“圣贤”。 ”分别表示和谐的开始和结束(《孟子》5B7)。这里的含义只是秩序,具有与音乐相关的和谐的重要含义,以及不仅是同步的连贯性(在任何给定时间各种乐器和音调的和谐)而且是历时的连贯性(在乐曲的开头和结尾之间) ),与孔子时代的二元对立美德的结合明确相关。
The other significant usage compares the way delicious flavors please the mouth with the way “coherence and rightness” (理,義 l i , y i l i , y i li,yil i, y i ) please the heart/mind (Mencius 6A7). The close linkage of these two terms is to be noted here: coherence is, as we shall soon see in detail, in the non-ironic sense directly related to “rightness” in the sense of the fulfillment of one’s specific role and its duties. The coherence of parts is related to their separation into their separate duties, and their ability to discharge those roles without overstepping them. Note also that for Mencius the term is unabashedly related here, as in the musical example, to a kind of visceral pleasure.
另一个重要的用法是将美味的味道与“理,义”的方式进行比较 l i , y i l i , y i li,yil i, y i )请心/头脑(孟子 6A7)。这里要注意这两个术语的密切联系:正如我们很快将详细看到的那样,在非讽刺意义上,连贯性与履行一个人的特定角色和职责意义上的“正确性”直接相关。各部分的连贯性与它们各自职责的分离以及它们在不超越职责的情况下履行这些职责的能力有关。还要注意的是,对于孟子来说,这个词在这里毫不掩饰地与一种发自内心的快乐相关,就像在音乐的例子中一样。
Let us now turn to Xunzi’s much more frequent deployments of the term L i L i LiL i, to unearth what kind of thinking required him to begin reaching for this word so much more often than any of his predecessors had. Xunzi most commonly uses the term Li as a stative verb, meaning “ordered” or “coherent” in a positively valued way; it is one of his words for the order that counts as Xunzi’s highest nonnegotiable value. That is, while Xunzi treats many things as having a variable value, there are a small number of things that are for him nonnegotiable, and Li makes its appearance as one of those items. As I argued in Ironies, “order” per se is for Xunzi a near-synonym for value: as I read him, when Xunzi says “bad,” he means disordered, that is, incoherent in the sense of self-conflicted. This applies also to Xunzi’s famous claim about human nature. When he says it is bad, he does not mean there is nothing that can be put to good use in it; he just means that in its native state it is disordered, incoherent, self-conflicted, thus self-weakening. Hence, there is no contradiction in Xunzi saying both “Human nature is bad” and “The source of goodness lies in human nature.” An incoherent whole can have some elements that are good or neutral or ambiguous. Ultimate value for Xunzi is very simply the maximal satisfaction of human desires. This
现在让我们看看荀子对该术语的更频繁的运用 L i L i LiL i ,以揭示什么样的思维需要他比任何前任都更频繁地使用这个词。荀子最常用“理”这个词作为静态动词,意思是“有序的”或“连贯的”,以积极的方式表达。这是他对荀子的最高不可协商价值的命令之一。也就是说,虽然荀子认为许多事物具有可变的价值,但也有少数事物对他来说是不可协商的,而礼就是其中之一。正如我在《反讽》中所说,“秩序”本身对于荀子来说几乎是价值的同义词:当我读到他时,当荀子说“坏”时,他的意思是无序,即自我冲突意义上的不连贯。这也适用于荀子关于人性的著名主张。他说它不好,并不是说它没有什么用处,而是说它没有什么用处。他只是说,在其自然状态下,它是无序的、不连贯的、自我冲突的,因而是自我削弱的。因此,荀子所说的“性恶”和“善的根源在于性”并不矛盾。一个不连贯的整体可能有一些好的、中立的或模糊的元素。荀子的终极价值很简单就是人类欲望的最大满足。这

can only be achieved by human strength over other creatures and over nature, which can only be achieved by human teamwork, which can only be achieved by division of labor and privileges among humans, which can only be achieved by social ritual. These are the nonnegotiable values, including both the ultimate value (the satisfaction of desires being a self-justifying autotelic value) and the instrumental values leading thereto. Ritual is nonnegotiable, but it has value because it leads to social divisions that lead to human togetherness and teamwork. These are the non-ironic coherence that Xunzi prizes. It is of value because it means being free of self-undermining social conflict, so that humans can be strong enough to get what they want. But all those qualities that might or might not contribute to ritual can be good or bad; whatever contributes to ritual coherence at some time or place is in that time or place good; whatever obstructs it is bad. These are the negotiable items, which include all sorts of human dispositions, emotions, institutions, habits: if properly fitted into the ritual coherence, they are good, but if not, they are bad. This allows Xunzi to give the most comprehensive possible picture of coherence, the Greatest Coherence, which can incorporate a wide range of apparently conflicting qualities and tendencies and behaviors: ritual itself serves as the “center” that unifies the two extremes of any given exemplar of Qian Mu’s pendulum swing: advance and retreat, heaven and man, softness and hardness, cultural refinement and material austerity. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} The negotiable items are valued differently according to how well or poorly they serve the nonnegotiable items; their desirability is purely a function of how well they cohere with the latter. It is this coherence itself, however, that really constitutes the nonnegotiable values.
只有通过人类对其他生物、对自然的力量才能实现,只有通过人类的团队合作才能实现,只有通过人类之间的分工和特权才能实现,只有通过社会仪式才能实现。这些是不可协商的价值观,包括最终价值(欲望的满足是一种自我证明的自得其乐的价值)和导致其的工具性价值观。仪式是不容谈判的,但它具有价值,因为它会导致社会分裂,从而促进人类团结和团队合作。这些都是荀子所推崇的非讽刺的连贯性。它是有价值的,因为它意味着摆脱自我破坏的社会冲突,这样人类就可以强大到足以得到他们想要的东西。但所有那些可能有助于也可能不会有助于仪式的品质可能是好是坏。任何在某个时间或地点有助于仪式连贯性的事物在该时间或地点都是好的;任何阻碍它的东西都是不好的。这些是可以谈判的项目,其中包括人类的各种性格、情感、制度、习惯:如果适当地适应仪式的连贯性,它们是好的,但如果不符合,它们就是坏的。这使得荀子能够给出最全面的连贯性图景,即最大的连贯性,它可以包含广泛的明显冲突的品质、倾向和行为:仪式本身作为“中心”,统一了任何给定范例的两个极端。钱穆的摆摆:进退、天人、刚柔、文化的精进和物质的俭朴。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 可流通物品的价值根据其为不可流通物品提供的好坏而不同;他们的需求纯粹取决于他们与后者的融合程度。 然而,正是这种一致性本身才真正构成了不可协商的价值观。
A typical but maximally simple example would be this description of the noble person (君子 junzi): “When he is joyful he is harmonious and orderly, when he is worried he is still and orderly” (喜則和而理,憂則靜而理 xi ze he er li, you ze jing er li). 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} This comes in a list of descriptions of the junzi, showing how in each of two apparently oppositely valued situations or moods he is still exemplifying value, that is, order. He can be either joyful or worried, but each is part of a larger whole that alters its resultant moral quality, which allows it to succeed in being Li, coherent or orderly, and thus a positive rather than a negative characteristic. Li in this passage is parallel to the following stative verbs: 道,節,類,法,止,齊,明,詳(dao,jie, lei, fa, zhi, qi, ming, and xiang), meaning “guiding,” “regulated,” “classified,” “lawful,” “still,” “even,” “clear,” and “well-articulated.” When expansive he is heavenlike and serves as a guide; when small-minded or careful he is fearful of rightness and regulated, and so on. All of these describe forms of value for Xunzi: one may be expansive or careful, clever or dull, successful or unsuccessful, joyful or worried, but as long as one is orderly, so that all one’s parts and functions form one coherent whole and this whole coheres
一个典型但最简单的例子就是对君子的描述:“喜则和而理,忧则静而”。理西则何而礼,尤则敬而礼)。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 这是对君子的一系列描述,表明在两种明显相反的价值观或情绪中,他仍然体现了价值,即秩序。他可以是快乐的,也可以是忧虑的,但每一个都是一个更大整体的一部分,这个整体改变了其最终的道德品质,这使得它能够成功地成为礼,连贯的或有序的,因此是一个积极的而不是消极的特征。这段话中的“理”与以下静态动词平行:道、节、类、法、止、齐、明、详(dao、jie、lei、fa、zhi、qi、ming、想),意思是“引导、 “受监管”、“机密”、“合法”、“仍然”、“均匀”、“清晰”和“清晰”。当他扩张时,他就像天堂一样,可以作为指导者;当他心胸狭隘或小心谨慎时,他就会害怕正义和规则,等等。所有这些都描述了荀子的价值形式:一个人或大或谨慎,或聪明或迟钝,或成功或失败,或快乐或忧虑,但只要有秩序,使一个人的各个部分和功能形成一个连贯的整体,这就是一个人的价值。整体连贯

harmoniously with the world and with the ancient traditions in these ways, it is still a positively valued aspect of the noble man’s existence. Li is one way of describing this orderliness; some of its other aspects are acting as guide, being regulated, classifying into types, being stable, and being intelligible-all ideas folded into our non-ironic notion of coherence: value, intelligibility, and orderly unification of diverse elements, balance of contrasted qualities, such that continuance is possible.
通过这些方式与世界和古老传统和谐相处,它仍然是贵族存在的一个积极有价值的方面。 “礼”是描述这种秩序的一种方式。它的其他一些方面是作为指导、受到规范、分类、稳定和可理解的——所有的想法都被纳入我们非讽刺的连贯性概念中:价值、可理解性、不同元素的有序统一、对比的平衡的品质,使得持续性成为可能。
It is significant that among these parallel terms we here see, for the first time, the notorious lei, that is, “categorization,” the division into types. Xunzi spells out the relation between Li and lei-types more explicitly elsewhere: “Viewing things exhaustively by means of the Way, past and present conform to a single measure. When types do not contradict each other, then even over a long span of time they form the same Li [類不悖雖久同理 leibubei suijiu tong li]. Hence, one can face deviations and twists without being confused.” 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} A qualifying condition is provided here, indicating that some but not all types may come together to form a Li: if they cohere with one another over a sufficiently long period of time, they can be considered a Li. Not all lei count as Li . At the same time, it is not the repetition of a pattern that serves as the criterion that classifies them as Li , not a strict sameness or the participation in an isomorphic standard. It is rather a horizontal consistency, a coherence, between parts: the parts are not in revolt against one another, they do not contravene one another: the coherence of a Li is a harmony, not a sameness.
值得注意的是,在这些平行术语中,我们第一次看到了臭名昭著的“lei”,即“分类”,即类型的划分。荀子在其他地方更明确地阐述了礼与类之间的关系:“以道穷观事物,古今合一。当类型彼此不矛盾时,即使经过很长一段时间,它们也会形成同一个理。如此,才能面对偏差和曲折,而不至于迷茫。” 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 这里提供了一个限定条件,表明某些但不是所有类型可以聚集在一起形成李:如果它们在足够长的时间内相互结合,则可以将它们视为李。并不是所有林雷都算黎。同时,并不是某种模式的重复作为将它们归类为“理”的标准,也不是严格的相同或参与同构标准。相反,它是各部分之间的一种水平一致性、一种连贯性:各部分并不相互反抗,也不相互冲突:理的连贯性是一种和谐,而不是千篇一律。
But this is an abbreviated way of describing the criterion for making a Li out of the available lei. Xunzi gives us a little more detail elsewhere: “The benevolent man uses loyalty and trustworthiness as the material of which he is made [質 zhi], dignity and respect to form his controlling unifier [統 tong], ritual and rightness to form his patterned ornamentation [文 wen], and human relations and type-categories to form his Li. [忠信以為質,端除以為統,禮義以為文,倫類以為理 zhongxin yiwei zhi, duanque yiwei tong, liyi yiwei wen, lunlei yiwei li].” We are being told here precisely how one goes about making L i L i LiL i, that is, forming an intelligible and harmoniously coherent order capable of serving as a guideline for action, a perforation along which to cut so as to sustain and continue this order: it is formed from (1) human relations and (2) types existing in the world. In other words, where these two contrary and pressing demands overlap, the benevolent man makes a Li. When human social relations on the one hand and natural groupings of feeling and response in nature come together, he makes a selective judgment call, thereby producing the value-laden orderliness of coherence, Li. The parallelisms with zhi, tong, and wen also help us fill out the notion of Li here: zhi and wen are a standard opposition, as in Analects 6:18, while wen and Li are commonly linked as closely related terms. This suggests that zhi
但这是描述从可用的 lei 中生成 Li 的标准的一种缩写方式。荀子在别处给了我们更多的细节:“仁者以忠信为质,以尊严敬为统统,以礼义为纲。纹饰[文 wen],与人伦、类型范畴形成其礼。 [忠信以为质,端除以为统,礼义以为文,伦类以为理中心意为,端鹊意为通,理义意为文,论类意为里]。我们在这里被准确地告知一个人如何制作 L i L i LiL i ,也就是说,形成一种可理解的、和谐一致的秩序,能够作为行动的指导方针,沿着它进行切割以维持和延续这种秩序:它是由(1)人际关系和(2)现有类型形成的在世界上。换句话说,当这两种相反而紧迫的要求重叠时,仁者就造出了“礼”。当人类的社会关系与自然界中的感觉和反应的自然分组结合在一起时,他做出选择性的判断,从而产生了充满价值的连贯性有序性“Li”。与“知”、“同”和“文”的对应关系也有助于我们在这里充实“理”的概念:“知”和“文”是标准的对立关系,如《论语》6:18,而“文”和“理”通常作为密切相关的术语联系在一起。这表明智

and tong stand together here against wen and Li , and each pair bears roughly the same internal relation. Zhi is to wen as tong is to Li . Zhi is the foundation of wen, wen gives aesthetic expression to zhi; so controlling unification is the foundation of Li , and Li gives aesthetic expression to this unification. Li is the intelligible, discernible, visible expression of this totalizing unification. Wen and Li are visible to the eye, discernible, coherent, while zhi and tong are internal and hidden, to be inferred rather than perceived. Li is the intelligible aspect of value-bearing coherence.
和通在这里站在一起对抗文和李,每一对都具有大致相同的内在联系。知之于文,通之于礼。志是文的基础,文赋予志以审美表现;所以控制统一是礼的基础,礼又赋予这种统一以审美的表现。理是这种总体统一的可理解、可辨别、可见的表达。文和理是肉眼可见的、可辨别的、连贯的,而知和通是内在的、隐藏的,是可以推断的,而不是感知的。理是价值连贯性的可理解的方面。
Xunzi speaks repeatedly of Li as something that can be “threaded together” (貫 guan), 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} as something that can be followed (循 xun), 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} and as something that simplifies a complex situation and makes it intelligible, or easy to discern (簡然易知 jianran yizhi). 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} Threaded together, various smaller coherences form the “Greatest Coherence” 大理 dali, Xunzi’s word for the largest coherent whole. Coherence here functions like a mass noun, as both Hansen and Peterson would predict. Many coherences together still form coherence-for the “together” is precisely the coherence. That Li can be followed and easily discerned go with the meaning of coherence as intelligibility; the common trope of “following” Li further supports our understanding of Li as harmony rather than sameness. One does not repeat it, one rather traces its contour and continuity among diverse instances; this is done not by matching to a model isomorphically, but by moving along the channel, tracing the path of contiguity. Where various elements join together harmoniously, allowing for a smooth transition from one to another, we have a “traceable” Li.
荀子多次谈到“理”是可以“贯贯”的东西, 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 作为可以遵循的东西(循xun), 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 以及将复杂情况简化并使其易于理解或易于辨别的事物(简然易知 jianran yizhi)。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 各种较小的连贯性串联在一起,形成了“大理大理”,荀子用这个词来表示最大的连贯整体。正如汉森和彼得森所预测的那样,这里的连贯性就像一个质量名词。许多连贯性加在一起仍然形成连贯性——因为“在一起”正是连贯性。理可循而易辨,符合连贯、可解之义; “追随”李这个常见的比喻进一步支持了我们对“李”的理解,即和谐而不是千篇一律。人们不会重复它,而是在不同的实例中追踪它的轮廓和连续性;这不是通过与模型同构匹配来完成的,而是通过沿着通道移动、追踪邻近路径来完成。当各种元素和谐地结合在一起,从一种元素到另一种元素的平滑过渡时,我们就有了“有迹可循”的李。
Li is for Xunzi a harmonious continuity, a discernible, valued coherence, but it is not simply “found” in the world; rather, as we described in our discussion of Xunzi’s notion of coherence in Ironies, 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} it is formed and chosen from among all available groupings by the selective act of the authoritative sage. We saw there a seeming contradiction in Xunzi’s “Rectification of Names” chapter, which seemed on the one hand to affirm the existence of real samenesses and differences distinguished by human sensory perception-something like “natural kinds”-and on the other an affirmation of the social construction, or regulation, of what words designate and distinguish. The naturalism of the former point would, in isolation, seem to rest on the recognition of some entities called Natural Kinds, which I claim would have to be in some sense genuinely identical wherever they are instantiated, possessing the causal efficacy not only of warranting their recognition as noncontiguous instantiations of the selfsame thing, but also of constituting genuine holistic totalities upon whose characteristics the identities of their parts are ontologically dependent, thus implying a kind of Realism. The conventionalism of the latter point, in isolation, would seem to recognize only the individual entities as objectively real, and their
对荀子来说,理是一种和谐的连续性,一种可辨别的、有价值的连贯性,但它并不是简单地在世界中“发现”的;相反,正如我们在讨论荀子的反讽中的连贯概念时所描述的, 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} 它是通过权威圣人的选择性行为从所有可用的群体中形成和选择的。我们在荀子的《正名》篇中看到了一个表面上的矛盾,它一方面肯定了人类感官知觉所区分的真正同异的存在——类似于“自然类”——另一方面又肯定了词语指定和区分的社会建构或规则。前一点的自然主义,孤立地看,似乎依赖于对一些称为自然类的实体的认识,我声称,在某种意义上,无论它们在何处被实例化,它们都必须是真正相同的,拥有因果效力,不仅保证它们的因果效力承认是同一事物的不连续实例,但也构成了真正的整体性整体,其各部分的身份在本体论上依赖于其特征,因此暗示了一种现实主义。后一点的约定论,孤立地看,似乎只承认个体实体是客观真实的,并且它们的实体是客观存在的。

unity, their grouping under a particular name, as something that has reality only if applied from outside of these individual entities themselves, that can be added or withdrawn at will without changing anything about their real character, and hence implies a kind of Nominalism. To resolve this tension, interpreters sometimes suggest that Xunzi embraces a sort of “weak nominalism”: the distinctions actually exist once and for all in the physical world, but human convention decides what particular sound and symbol is used to denote them. The groupings remain the same, and admit of a strict dichotomous right and wrong, but social regulation needs to determine which particular words denote each grouping in each community. We found in our analysis, however, that this solution oversimplifies the text. Xunzi is saying something somewhat more interesting. Our conclusion in Ironies was that for Xunzi there is an overabundance of possible ways to group things in the world, all of which have some warrant in the actual behavior of the objective world, but which stand in potential conflict with one another: the world as such, prior to human intervention, forms no single synordinate coherence. To recap that example, there is a real grouping in the physical world that puts whales in the same class as fish-to wit, they all really live in the water; there is another real grouping in the physical world that puts whales in a class with mammals-that is, they all really give birth to live young and produce milk. Both of these groupings are genuinely present, and both of them constitute genuine unities that, considered in themselves, are multiply instantiating and causally real in providing warrant for accurately naming these entities in this way. Indeed, as coherences, they are multiply instantiating entities that have causal efficacy also in actually holding the members of the coherence together in this way and enabling their relations in the manner described. That is, the totality of aquatic animals is, say, a holistic ecosystem, a genuine coherence in which the identities of its members are constituted only by their participation in that ecosystem, and the same is true, in another way, of the holistic totality of milk-producing and live young-bearing organisms. Both are coherences in the sense of wholes that can be accurately viewed as having a determining role to play in the actual constitution of the existence and identities of their members, bestowing a multiply instantiated character that inheres in each of these members. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} Modern biology seems to imply that the former is an erroneous grouping, missing the true essence of these animals, while the latter is the true grouping that uniquely carves nature at its joints. Xunzi would say that both can be true, but that a human society, guided by regulations from a king guided by the tradition of sage kings, must choose one or the othersomewhat in the way kilograms and pounds both pick out physical realities, and yet if both systems are used, or if values are randomly or inconsistently assigned to them without being regulated by social conventions and even
统一,即它们在特定名称下的分组,作为只有从这些个体实体本身之外应用时才具有现实性的东西,可以随意添加或撤回而不改变它们的真实特征,因此暗示了一种唯名论。为了解决这种紧张关系,解释者有时建议荀子拥抱一种“弱唯名论”:这些区别实际上在物质世界中一劳永逸地存在,但人类的惯例决定了使用什么特定的声音和符号来表示它们。这些分组保持不变,并承认严格的二分法是非,但社会监管需要确定哪些特定词表示每个社区中的每个分组。然而,我们在分析中发现,该解决方案过于简化了文本。荀子说的是更有趣的事情。我们在《反讽》中的结论是,对于荀子来说,对世界上的事物进行分组的可能方法有太多,所有这些方法都对客观世界的实际行为有一定的依据,但它们之间存在潜在的冲突:世界作为在人类干预之前,这种情况不形成单一的协调一致性。回顾一下这个例子,在物理世界中存在一个真实的分组,将鲸鱼与鱼归为同一类——也就是说,它们实际上都生活在水中;物质世界中还有另一个真实的群体,将鲸鱼与哺乳动物归为一类——也就是说,它们都确实生下幼崽并产奶。这两个分组都是真实存在的,并且它们都构成了真正的统一体,就其本身而言,它们是多重实例化的且因果真实的,为以这种方式准确命名这些实体提供了保证。 事实上,作为连贯性,它们是多重实例化实体,这些实体也具有因果功效,实际上以这种方式将连贯性的成员保持在一起,并以所描述的方式实现它们的关系。也就是说,水生动物的整体是一个整体的生态系统,是一种真正的连贯性,其中其成员的身份仅由他们参与该生态系统构成,从另一个角度来说,整体的整体也是如此。产奶和活的幼崽生物体。两者都是整体意义上的连贯性,可以准确地视为在其成员的存在和身份的实际构成中发挥决定性作用,赋予每个成员固有的多重实例化特征。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 现代生物学似乎暗示,前者是一个错误的分组,忽略了这些动物的真正本质,而后者则是真正的分组,在其关节处独特地雕刻了自然。”两种系统都被使用,或者如果值被随机或不一致地分配给它们,而不受社会惯例的监管,甚至

sanctions, the marketplace will be in chaos. The Greatest Coherence is the maximal coherence that can be created, not by the world alone nor by human beings alone, but by a certain selective overlap of the two: those among all nonhuman systems of grouping which can form a second-order coherent harmony with human desires and cognitions. But again, not all human desires and cognitions: only those that can form a coherent whole with those of the traditions of the sage-kings on the one hand and the surplus-ordered (i.e., chaotic, because it is possesses an overabundance of competing orders) nonhuman world. The Greatest Coherence is the intersection of the ways in which things are grouped by the nonhuman world, the tradition of the sage-kings and the present sensory and affective experiences of living human beings. This is the locus of true value. As Xunzi remarks, “Human trouble is always a matter of being restricted to one corner of things and ignoring the Greatest Coherence [大理 da Li].” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
制裁的话,市场就会混乱。最大的连贯性是可以创造的最大连贯性,不是单独由世界或人类单独创造,而是通过两者的某种选择性重叠:所有非人类的分组系统中的那些可以与其他系统形成二阶连贯和谐的系统。人类的欲望和认知。但同样,并非所有的人类欲望和认知:只有那些一方面能够与圣王传统和剩余秩序(即混乱,因为它拥有过多的竞争性)形成一个连贯整体的欲望和认知。命令)非人类世界。最伟大的连贯性是非人世界、圣王传统和人类当前感官和情感体验的组合方式的交集。这就是真正价值的所在。正如荀子所说:“人的烦恼,总是局限于事物的一角而忽视了大理。” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
This can perhaps be more clearly grasped from the connections drawn between Li and tong and lei, as well as xing, Human Nature, in the following passage:
从下面这段话中“理”、“通”、“类”以及“性”之间的联系,或许可以更清楚地理解这一点:
That which knows things is Human Nature [人之性 ren zhi xing]. That which can be known is the coherences of things [物之理 wu zhi Li]. If we seek to know the coherences of things with this human nature which is able to know, without any point of consolidation or resting point [i.e., point of orientation], then even if one continues to study all one’s life one will never get all of it. Even though one may string together coherences numbered in the millions, it will never be sufficient to go through all the changes of the ten thousand things, and one will still be no better off than the ignorant. . . . Thus study must have its endpoint, its point of orientation. Where shall it come to rest? In the perfect sufficiency. And what is this perfect sufficiency? The sage kings. “Sage” means those who penetrate to the utmost the relations of things, and “king” means those who regulate things to the utmost. When these two are both brought to the utmost, it is adequate to serve as the utmost standard of the world. Thus in our study we must take the sage kings as our teachers, according with the regulations of the sage kings as our patterns, emulating these patterns in order to unify types [統類 tong lei], and to come to resemble them as people. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
知事者,即人之性。能被认识的,就是事物的连贯性。如果我们以这种人性能够知道的方式来寻求事物的连贯性,而没有任何巩固点或休息点(即方向点),那么即使一生不断地研究,也永远无法得到全部它的。虽能串起千万的连贯性,但仍不足以经历万事的变化,仍不比无明者好。 。 。 。因此,研究必须有它的终点、它的方向。它会在哪里安息呢?在完美的充足性中。什么是完美的充足性?诸圣王。 “圣”是指最大限度地洞察事物关系的人,“王”是指最大限度地调节事物的人。当这两者都发挥到极致时,就足以作为世界的最高标准了。所以我们学习,必须以圣王为师,以圣王之规为范,效仿这些范式,以统一类类,以类人。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
There is no end to the multiplicity of possibly relevant coherences out there in the world; the only way to select out from among them that are relevant is to follow the sage-kings. It is this alone that makes of them a single overarching, synordinate coherence, with genuine value. The point
世界上可能相关的一致性的多样性是无穷无尽的。从其中选出相关的唯一方法就是跟随圣王。正是这一点使它们具有单一的总体性、协调性的一致性,具有真正的价值。重点

is driven home most emphatically in a passage that has caused interpreters great trouble: the question has tended to be, Is the order of the universe discovered-a preexisting normative code-or is it invented by the noble man? Xunzi seems to be saying both. But in fact he is saying neither: order neither preexists nor is it created ex nihilo by the sages. Rather, it is that overlap of the man and nature that forms the Greatest Coherence. Here is one of Xunzi’s most striking formulations of this point, which recapitulates the seeming tension between realism and nominalism, between preexisting order to be discovered and the human creation of order in the universe:
在一段给解释者带来巨大麻烦的段落中,这一点被最有力地阐明了:问题往往是,宇宙的秩序是被发现的——一种预先存在的规范代码——还是由高贵的人发明的?荀子似乎是在说这两件事。但事实上他并没有说:秩序既不是预先存在的,也不是由圣人无中生有地创造的。相反,正是人与自然的重叠形成了最大的一致性。以下是荀子对这一点最引人注目的表述之一,它概括了实在论与唯名论之间、待发现的先存秩序与人类在宇宙中创造秩序之间的表面张力:
Thus Heaven and Earth produce noble men, and noble men bring coherence to [ l i ] [ l i ] [li][l i] Heaven and Earth. Noble men are those who join into and form a triad with Heaven and Earth, the controlling unifiers of the ten thousand things, the fathers and mothers of the people. Without noble men, Heaven and Earth would be incoherent [buli], ritual and rightness would fail to form a totality. There would be no rulers and teachers above, no fathers and sons below. This is what is called the utmost disorder. The relation of lord and minister, of father and son, of elder and younger brother, of husband and wife-these begin and then end, end and then begin, joining in the same coherence [tongli] with heaven and earth, joining in the same lastingness with ten thousand generations. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
故天地生君子,君子以和 [ l i ] [ l i ] [li][l i] 天地。君子,是与天地并为三者,主宰万事,为人民的父母。没有君子,天地不和,礼义不能一体。上无君师,下无父子。这就是所谓的最乱。君臣、父子、兄弟、夫妻,始而终,终而始,与天地同理,与天地同理。与万代同恒。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
故天地生君子,君子理天地;君子者,天地之參也,萬物之摠也,民之父母也。無君子,則天地不理,禮義無統,上無君師,下無父子,夫是之謂至亂。君臣、父子、兄弟、夫婦,始則終,終則始,與天地同理,與萬世同久。
故天地生君子,君子理天地;君子者,天地之参也,万物之摠也,民之父母也。无君子,则天地不理,礼义无统,上无君师,下无父子,夫君臣、父子、兄弟、夫妇,始则终,终则始,与天地理同,与万世同久。
It is tempting to identify this specific passage in Xunzi as the precise place in Chinese thought where the term Li is elevated from among the throng of possible words with which to denote some of the various forms and dimensions of the coherence and its sometimes conflicted implications, which had preoccupied thinkers up to that time, as we traced in detail in Ironies of Oneness and Difference, to its candidacy for a more specific, technical term by which to indicate a specific second-order form of coherence among coherences, providing a wedge that opens the way to many future developments, problems, and solutions. Noble men produce the coherence of Heaven and Earth, and yet the system they create also “joins in the same coherence” as Heaven and Earth.
人们很容易将《荀子》中的这段特定段落视为中国思想中的确切位置,其中“理”一词是从众多可能的词语中升华出来的,用这些词来表示连贯性的各种形式和维度及其有时相互冲突的含义,正如我们在《统一与差异的讽刺》一书中详细追溯的那样,直到那时,它一直困扰着思想家,它是一个更具体的技术术语的候选者,通过这个术语来表示连贯性之间的连贯性的特定二阶形式,提供了一个楔子,为许多未来的发展、问题和解决方案开辟了道路。君子创造了天地的相通,而他们所创造的体系也与天地“同相”。
Heaven and Earth are a first-order coherence in the sense in which we have defined it: a dyadically conceived whole that is continually pro-
天地在我们所定义的意义上是一阶连贯性的:一个二元构想的整体,不断地促进

ductive of what become new parts of itself, nonidentical continuations of itself which continue to cohere with the initial coherence, neither same nor different from it, both adding to it and included within it. The relationship each new part has to this whole is what gives those parts their existence and identity, and each of these parts has some way of organizing its activity toward this whole, and thus organizing this whole around it; this manner in which each part coheres with and continues the whole, extending the whole in a new way but also included within it, is what constitutes each part’s proto-evaluative act, as it were, its way of prioritizing and organizing and valuing the other elements of the whole in such a way that it is maximally sustaining to itself, although these different ways of valuing may or may not be consistent with one another. One of their parts, their productions, their continuations, is the noble man, a certain kind of human being, who also continues and coheres with the whole in his own way, thereby organizing it around his own self-maximizing evaluative orientation.
归纳出成为自身新部分的东西,自身的不同延续,继续与最初的连贯性保持一致,既不相同也不不同,既增加了它又包含在它之内。每个新部分与这个整体之间的关系赋予了这些部分其存在和身份,并且每个部分都有某种方式组织其针对这个整体的活动,从而围绕它组织这个整体;每个部分与整体相结合并延续的方式,以新​​的方式扩展整体,但也包含在其中,这就是构成每个部分的原始评估行为的方式,可以说,是其优先考虑、组织和评价另一部分的方式尽管这些不同的评估方式可能彼此一致,也可能不一致,但整体的各个要素都以一种最大限度地维持自身的方式进行。它们的一部分、它们的产物、它们的延续,是高贵的人,某种人类,他也以自己的方式延续并与整体融为一体,从而围绕着他自己的自我最大化的评价方向来组织它。
But Heaven and Earth themselves are not yet an example of the second-order coherence between coherences that Xunzi calls a Li, or of the greatest totality of these, the da L i L i LiL i, the Greatest Coherence. If they were, the noble men could not themselves be said to produce this Li. But nor are they definitively excluded from being included in the subsequent Greatest Coherence; they form an element that can be integrated into a Greatest Coherence once it has been created. At least some subset of what exists prior to human beings, some elements of the productive coherence of the physical world that produced them, can be incorporated into the fabric of this second-order continuity, which is the Greatest Coherence created by the noble men. Thus is the tension between apparent Realism and apparent Nominalism resolved here, just as in the case of Natural Kinds in general, as discussed in Ironies and recapped above.
但天地本身还不是荀子所说的“理”之间的二阶相干性的例子,也不是这些相干性的最大整体“大”的例子。 L i L i LiL i ,最大的一致性。如果是的话,就不能说是贵族们自己产生了这个礼。但也没有明确排除它们被包含在随后的“最大一致性”中;它们形成了一个元素,一旦被创建,就可以融入到最大的一致性中。至少在人类之前存在的某些子集,产生人类的物质世界的生产一致性的某些元素,可以纳入这种二阶连续性的结构中,这是由高贵的人创造的最大一致性。因此,表面的实在论和表面的唯名论之间的紧张关系在这里得到了解决,就像一般自然类的情况一样,正如《反讽》中所讨论的和上面概述的那样。
This coherence of Li is real, multiply instantiated, and has a determinative power retrospectively even on the nature of its elements and on the conditions of its own production, which makes it genuinely productive of the new identity of Heaven and Earth as they exist within the value-producing coherence and continuity of this new whole. Heaven and Earth are now, as instantiations of this Li created by the noble men, elements that causally contribute to the sustaining of the physical world in the specific form that is maximally sustaining to human beings, as well as serving as genuine moral guidelines, serving actively as cooperative guarantors of model normativities. In fact, the noble men unify existing coherences, groupings, in the physical world, existing lei, selectively, and thereby create the Greatest Coherence. This is a way of “joining in” the same coherence as Heaven and Earth, which is to be clearly distinguished from following a preexistent coherence. This coherence coheres with some subset of those coherences, forming the Greatest Coherence possible. This is where the dichotomous
理的这种连贯性是真实的,是多重实例化的,并且甚至对其元素的性质和其自身产生的条件也具有回顾性的决定性力量,这使得它真正产生了存在于宇宙中的天地的新身份。这个新整体的价值创造一致性和连续性。天地现在,作为圣人创造的理的实例,是因果性地有助于以特定形式维持物质世界的元素,最大限度地维持人类,并作为真正的道德准则,服务于人类。积极作为示范规范的合作保证者。事实上,高贵的人们有选择地统一物质世界中现有的一致性、分组、现有的花环,从而创造出最大的一致性。这是一种与天地一样“合”的方式,与遵循先在的连贯性有着明显的区别。这种一致性与这些一致性的某些子集相一致,形成了可能的最大一致性。这就是二分法的地方

conception of “same and different” that we struggled to dispel in Ironies can lead to such interpretative havoc: the “same” (tong) here is prevented from being a dichotomous sameness by its connection with the “join” ( y u y u yuy u ) and the “coherence” ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}). It does not mean following a single preconstituted principle that is “the same” in all instantiations. This would make the claim that “noble men produce” this principle, this order, this coherence ( Li ) incomprehensible. Xunzi means rather a joining up with a single unbroken continuity, which is constituted by both sameness and difference: the overlap of some part of what is coherent in tradition, some part of what is coherent in human cognition, and some part of what is coherent in the physical world to form the greatest available coherence.
我们在反讽中努力消除的“相同和不同”的概念可能会导致这种解释上的混乱:这里的“相同”(同)通过与“连接”的联系而避免成为二分法的相同性( y u y u yuy u )和“连贯性” ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) 。它并不意味着遵循在所有实例中“相同”的单一预先构成的原则。这就使得“君子产生”这种原则、这种秩序、这种连贯性的说法变得难以理解。荀子的意思更确切地说是一种单一的、不间断的连续性的结合,这种连续性是由相同和差异构成的:传统中连贯的某些部分、人类认知中连贯的某些部分和人类认知中连贯的某些部分的重叠在物理世界中形成最大的可用一致性。
Note also that maintenance and continuance here again go hand in hand with finding those coherent relations in humans that in turn cohere with some aspect of the world. Human social codes are those among the natural coherences that must not be altered: “Music/joy refers to those harmonies [和 he] which must not be changed; ritual means those coherences [Li] which must not be changed. Music joins the same, while ritual divides the different. The unity of ritual and music is controlled by the heart-mind of man.” 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} The parallelism between “harmony” and “coherence” should be especially noted here. Xunzi contrasts and pairs ritual and music by noting that ritual stresses division, while music stresses harmony, or difference and sameness, which where at the heart of his theory of general terms and his theory of real but conflicting groupings in the world. Here again, he states explicitly that their unity lies in the mind of man. This jibes closely with our analysis of the problem above. Li is here still the divisions, the fixed roles, the determinate particularities, as opposed to the harmonizing, the joining and merging, of harmony. But Xunzi’s intertwining of the two reveals the manner in which this dividing is also a joining, and this joining is also a dividing. Both harmony and coherence are a matter of separating into interrelated groups. When we divide, we unite; when we unite, we divide.
还要注意,这里的维持和延续再次与在人类中寻找那些连贯的关系齐头并进,而这些关系反过来又与世界的某些方面相一致。人类社会准则是那些不可改变的自然连贯性:“音乐/欢乐指的是那些不可改变的和谐[和他];礼是指那些不可改变的连贯性。音乐将同一的结合起来,而仪式则将不同的分开。礼乐的统一,是由人心所支配的。” 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 这里要特别注意“和谐”与“连贯”之间的平行关系。荀子将礼与乐进行对比和配对,指出礼强调分,而乐强调和谐或异同,这是他的一般术语理论和世界上真实但相互冲突的群体理论的核心。在这里,他再次明确指出,它们的统一性在于人的心灵。这与我们对上述问题的分析非常吻合。这里的“理”仍然是分裂、固定的角色、确定的特殊性,而不是和谐的协调、结合和融合。但荀子对两者的交织揭示了这种分裂也是一种结合,这种结合也是一种分裂。和谐和连贯都是将其分成相互关联的群体的问题。当我们分裂时,我们团结;当我们团结时,我们就会分裂。
This passage is also of particular interest to us here because of the way it determines the relationship between ritual and Li. Ritual is a subset of Li. Among all the possible Li, those which cannot be changed are the authoritative rituals. If Li meant anything like “reason” or “truth” or “principle” or “order,” we would expect the exact opposite claim: Li would be those eternal truths that can be culled from human rituals, the unchangeable moral principles. Xunzi’s view is the reverse. There are many many types of coherence out in the world, many ways in which things group together. Among these, man chooses out some subset that are crucial to maximizing his own power. These are the authoritative rituals, and they cannot be changed in the sense that they must not be changed. This claim, of course, has a brother: the other coherences can be changed. They do not form a
这段话对我们来说也特别有趣,因为它决定了礼与礼之间的关系。礼是礼的一个子集。在所有可能的礼中,不能改变的就是权威的礼。如果理的意思是“理性”、“真理”、“原则”或“秩序”,我们会期待完全相反的说法:理将是那些可以从人类仪式中剔除的永恒真理,不可改变的道德原则。荀子的观点则相反。世界上有许多种连贯性,事物组合在一起的方式也有多种。其中,人类选择了一些对于最大化自己的力量至关重要的子集。这些都是权威的仪式,不能改变的意思是它们不能改变。当然,这个主张有一个兄弟:其他连贯性是可以改变的。他们不形成一个

single consistent synordinate system applying at all times. Xunzi allows for timeliness of the application of “principles,” the grouping into coherences, as long as they do not violate the nonnegotiable subset of coherences, the socially mandated rituals. I may call the whale a fish or a mammal as the situation demands, as long as I do so in the ritually prescribed manner, and these will be true descriptions of real coherences in nature in either case. This is one of the strongest pieces of evidence for the rejection of the idea of Li as principle or law of nature in Xunzi.
始终适用单一一致的协调系统。荀子允许及时应用“原则”,将其分组为连贯性,只要它们不违反不可协商的连贯性子集,即社会强制的仪式。我可以根据情况需要将鲸鱼称为鱼类或哺乳动物,只要我按照仪式规定的方式这样做,无论哪种情况,这些都将是对自然界真正连贯性的真实描述。这是驳斥《荀子》中“理”作为原则或自然法则的观念的最有力的证据之一。
Xunzi says elsewhere: "When Benevolence is maintained with a sincere heart, it becomes externally manifest. When manifest it becomes spiritual, when spiritual it is able to transform others. When Rightness is practiced with a sincere heart, there is second-order coherence [Li]. When thus coherent, it becomes manifest [明 ming], and thus able to transform with circumstances. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} The internal coherence of one member of the group becomes outwardly apparent, and this makes it capable of forming larger coherences within the group, both by inspiring others to emulate it and by gaining the ability to coherently contextualize itself (transform with circumstances). In sum, Xunzi exhorts us, "In whatever you do, establish what is beneficial to creating coherence [Li], and discard whatever is not beneficial to creating coherence. 116 Li 116 Li ^(116)Li{ }^{116} \mathrm{Li} has here become a word for ultimate, nonnegotiable value.
荀子另有言:“仁心存诚,则外显;显则灵,灵则能化人。义诚则行,则二通”。当如此连贯时,它就变得明显,从而能够随环境而变化。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 团体中一名成员的内部连贯性变得显而易见,这使得它能够在团体内形成更大的连贯性,既可以激励其他人效仿它,也可以通过获得连贯地语境化自身的能力(随环境而变化)。总而言之,荀子告诫我们:“凡事,立有利于和的,舍弃不利于和的。 116 Li 116 Li ^(116)Li{ }^{116} \mathrm{Li} 在这里已成为终极的、不可协商的价值的代名词。

"HEAVENLY PRINCIPLE"(天理 TIANLI) IRONIC AND NON-IRONIC IN THE "INNER CHAPTERS" OF THE ZHUANGZI AND "THE RECORD OF MUSIC"
《庄子》《内篇》与《乐录》中的“天理”反讽与非反讽

With the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, we are squarely in the heart of the hardcore ironic tradition, as discussed at length in Ironies of Oneness and Difference. The term Li plays very little role in this development, as we have noted; where the term really explodes into its full development is in the incorporations of non-ironic themes into the framework of the ironic tradition, as expressed in the “Outer” and “Miscellaneous” Chapters of the Zhuangzi, as will be analyzed at length in the next chapter. But Li does occur in the “Inner Chapters” (1-7) of the Zhuangzi, exactly one time. This is the only occurrence of the character in either the Laozi or the “Inner Chapters,” the core texts of the ironic tradition. It is a very important usage, the very first time in the tradition that the two characters 天理 tianli are used together, giving the appearance of what would later become a set binome and a very central term of much of later Chinese philosophical Confucianism and Daoism, a term that is sometimes translated “heavenly principle.” In the “Inner Chapters,” however, this would be a rather misleading way to construe the phrase. The meaning of tianli here is perhaps closer
通过《庄子内章》,我们正好处于核心讽刺传统的核心,正如《同异反讽》中详细讨论的那样。正如我们所指出的,“李”一词在这一发展中发挥的作用很小。这个术语真正得到充分发展的地方在于将非讽刺主题纳入讽刺传统的框架中,正如《庄子》的“外”和“杂”章所表达的那样,这将在《庄子》中详细分析。下一章。但“礼”确实出现在《庄子》的“内章”(1-7)中,而且只出现过一次。这是讽刺传统的核心文本《老子》或《内章》中唯一出现的人物。这是一个非常重要的用法,在传统中第一次将“天理天理”两个字一起使用,给出了后来成为一组二元组的外观,并且是后来中国儒家和道家哲学中的一个非常中心的术语。这个术语有时被翻译为“天理”。然而,在“内章”中,这将是一种相当误导性的解释该短语的方式。这里天力的意思或许更接近

to something like, “spontaneous (nonfabricated, nonarranged, nonteleological) coherence.” This term still seems strongly to suggest the existence of genuine natural kinds or real coherences in the world, but we have argued at length, in the prequel, that Zhuangzi’s perspectivism entails a thoroughgoing rejection of natural kinds. Is this consistent?
类似于“自发的(非捏造的、非安排的、非目的的)连贯性”。这个术语似乎仍然强烈地表明世界上存在真正的自然类或真正的连贯性,但我们在前传中详细论证了庄子的视角主义意味着对自然类的彻底拒绝。这是一致的吗?
Yes. The reason is simple. Zhuangzi’s perspectivism is not the denial of natural coherences, but the assertion of an overabundance of real coherences, which cannot be combined into an exhaustive single synordinate meta-system of non-ironic coherence (a point accepted and responded to by Xunzi). The passage in question is Cook Ding’s description of how he cuts up an ox: "I meet it with my spirit and don’t look with my eyes; my organ-knowledge [官知 guanzhi, teleological deeming knowledge, more or less equivalent to the 知 zhi or eye-knowledge of the Laozi] stops and my spiritual desires [roughly equivalent to Laozi’s stomach-“clarity” 明 ming] proceed. I depend on the heavenly coherences [依乎天理 yihutianli] and cut through the large gaps, guided by the big channels; I go by the inherent rightnesses [因其固然 yinqiguran]."17 I am inclined to read “depend on the heavenly coherences” and “go by the inherent rightnesses” as roughly parallel, and thus as mutual glosses. Li would then be parallel to ran, which we have seen to mean, in the “Qiwulun,” “to affirm as this and as right.” The nonarranged, nonteleological coherences would then be the same as the inherent rightness of each position, perspective, and thing, and hence none other than their “heavenly,” untidied state prior to deliberate interference: what Zhuangzi calls “the radiance of drift and doubt” (滑疑之耀 guyi zhi yao). To “go by the inherent rightnesses”(因固然 yin guran) of each perspective is precisely “to go by the this,” (因是 yinshi), that is, the coherence set up temporarily by each perspective on the basis of its own self-affirming thisness. They are “heavenly” or “nonarranged” in the sense that they are not made to cohere with any single, overarching, synordinate coherence of a uniquely privileged whole. The practical implication is simply that there are natural coherences, and that by following them in each case one can flow along without contention in each particular case, and then go on to follow an entirely different noncontrived coherence when encountering the next “this.” Each “this” brings with it its own coherence, necessarily. This implies nothing about a single overall system of “overall coherence” or “heavenly principle,” singular. Each position creates, indeed is, the coherence of all that is around it; the coherent whole is formed within each particular member, not around or above them. Zhuangzi’s tianli is not Xunzi’s dali. It is, rather, its ironic counterpart-the inescapable parody of overall coherence. With this ironic usage of tianli, we have made the step into what appears to be the “objective” sense of Li . It is what is opposed to individual, private bias, to preconceived ideas, to clinging to a particular
是的。原因很简单。庄子的视角主义并不是对自然连贯性的否定,而是对过多的真实连贯性的断言,这种连贯性不能被组合成一个详尽的、非反讽连贯性的单一并列元系统(荀子接受并回应了这一点)。这段话是丁厨对他如何宰牛的描述:“我用我的精神来迎接它,而不是用我的眼睛看;我的器官知识[官知观智,目的论的知识,或多或少相当于老子的“知之”停止,而我的精神欲望(大致相当于老子的胃-“明明”)继续前进,我依靠天理(依乎天理)来切断巨大的间隙, ”17 我倾向于将“依天理”和“依固有正”理解为大致平行,因而是相互注释。 。这样,“理”就与“然”平行,我们在《其五论》中看到“然”的意思是“肯定这样、这样正确”。这种无序的、非目的论的连贯性将与每个立场、观点和事物固有的正确性相同,因此无非是它们在故意干扰之前的“天国”、杂乱状态:庄子所说的“漂移和怀疑的光芒” ”(滑疑之耀guyi zhi yao)。各观点的“因固然”正是“因是因时”,即各观点根据自己的观点暂时建立起来的连贯性。自我肯定这一点。它们是“天堂般的”或“无安排的”,因为它们并不是为了与一个独特的特权整体的任何单一的、总体的、协调的一致性而结合在一起的。 实际意义很简单,那就是存在自然的连贯性,通过在每种情况下遵循它们,人们可以在每种特定情况下毫无争议地继续前进,然后在遇到下一个“这个”时继续遵循一种完全不同的非人为的连贯性。每个“这个”都必然具有其自身的连贯性。这并不意味着单一的“整体连贯性”或“天理”的整体系统是单一的。事实上,每个位置都创造了其周围所有事物的连贯性。连贯的整体是在每个特定成员内部形成的,而不是在它们周围或之上。庄子的天理不是荀子的大理。相反,它是其讽刺性的对应物——对整体连贯性的不可避免的模仿。通过对“天理”的这种讽刺性用法,我们已经迈进了“理”的“客观”意义。它反对个人的、私人的偏见、先入为主的想法、坚持特定的观点。

perspective. We are told to follow it rather than impose something upon it. In these points, it sounds like “objective truth,” the real as opposed to the merely apparent, the objective as opposed to the subjective. But my point here is that in this usage we are witnessing what Richard Rorty would call a live metaphor, and in particular, a still stinging irony. Tianli is initially a deliberate contradiction in terms. Tian is what things are like before they are Li-ed. The Li of Tian are like the Dao that cannot be a dao. To follow them is to follow the unfollowable. They are anything but objective truths; rather, we are told to follow them the way the monkey trainer is told to follow along with the monkeys in Zhuangzi’s second chapter. This is not because the monkeys are objectively right-quite the contrary. The monkeys are as subjective as they can be-one-sided, biased, irrational. As we discussed at length in Ironies, the reason for following their values is not that they are objectively true, but because that is how the wild card works, and sustains itself. This is how the term L i L i LiL i, originally meaning the imposition of order onto a raw material, comes to bleed into what sounds like a sense of the suspension of one’s own deliberate intentions to follow along with something external. What looks like the advent of a notion of objective truth is rather an instance of sovereign Zhuangzian irony. We will see this sense developed further in the Guo Xiang commentary to the Zhuangzi, and reinvested with a stronger sense of normativity by some Buddhists and Neo-Confucians. But despite appearances, objectivity in its usual sense is never what is meant by this term.
看法。我们被告知要遵循它,而不是强加于它。在这些方面,它听起来像是“客观真理”,是真实的而不是仅仅明显的,客观的而不是主观的。但我在这里的观点是,在这种用法中,我们正在见证理查德·罗蒂所说的生动的隐喻,特别是仍然刺痛的讽刺。天理最初是一个故意矛盾的术语。 Tian是事物在Li-ed之前的样子。天之理,犹如道,不能为道。追随他们就是追随不可追随的事物。它们绝不是客观真理;相反,我们被告知要跟随它们,就像庄子第二章中驯猴师被告知跟随猴子一样。这并不是因为猴子客观上是正确的——恰恰相反。猴子是主观的,他们可能是片面的、有偏见的、非理性的。正如我们在《反讽》中详细讨论的那样,遵循它们的价值观的原因并不是它们客观正确,而是因为这就是通配符的运作方式和维持方式。这就是这个词的用法 L i L i LiL i “秩序”最初的意思是对原材料强加秩序,但后来却逐渐渗透到一种听起来像是悬置了一个人自己的刻意意图而追随外部事物的感觉。看起来客观真理概念的出现实际上是庄子的至高无上的讽刺的一个例子。我们将看到这种意义在郭象的《庄子注》中得到进一步发展,并被一些佛家和新儒家重新注入了更强的规范性意义。但尽管表面上如此,但通常意义上的客观性从来都不是这个术语的含义。

“The Record of Music” (樂記 “Yueji”), which forms part of the 禮記 Liji, is the site of the one other classical use of this same term tianli, “heavenly coherence.” The text shows signs of being a relatively late Warring States work, certainly later than both Zhuangzi and Xunzi, with clear influences from the latter. The passage in question gives a general theory of man’s relation to the external world, using a phraseology similar to that of both the Xunzi and the “Great Commentary” to the Zhouyi:
《礼记·礼记》的一部分《乐记》(《乐记》)是“天理”一词的另一个经典用法。有迹象表明,该文本是相对较晚的战国著作,当然晚于《庄子》和《荀子》,明显受到后者的影响。这段话给出了人与外部世界关系的一般理论,使用了类似于《荀子》和《周易》的“大论”的措辞:
Thus the reason the former kings created ritual and music was not to extend to the utmost [極 j i ] j i ] ji]j i] the desires of the mouth, stomach, ears and eyes, but to teach the people to even out their likes and dislikes and return to the proper Way of human beings. Human beings are in a state of stillness when born; this is their Heavenly nature [天性 tianxing]. They are touched off by [external] things and [only then] move; these are the desires belonging to their nature [性之欲 xing zhi y u y u yuy u ]. But after things arrive, the [faculty of] knowledge [知 zhi] apprehends them-only then do likes and dislikes take shape therein. If likes and dislikes have no regulation within, and the [faculty of] knowledge is enticed from without, [human beings] can
故先王之所以创礼乐,不为至极。 j i ] j i ] ji]j i] 口、胃、耳、眼之欲,而教民调平好恶,回归人间正道。人一出生,就处于静止状态;这就是他们的天性。他们被[外部]事物所触动,[才]移动;这是本性的欲望 y u y u yuy u ]。但事到了之后,知知了之,好恶才在其中形成。若好恶无内定,而知受外诱,则能

not reflect upon themselves, and the Heavenly coherence [天理 tian l i ] l i ] li]l i] is destroyed. Now if the touching off of human beings by things is without limit, and their likes and dislikes have no regulation, then this is a matter of things arriving and people being transformed by things. For people to be transformed by things is to destroy the Heavenly coherence and for [their truly] human desires [i.e., the "desires belonging to their nature, mentioned above] to meet with exhaustion [i.e., failure to be fulfilled]. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} Because of this they have the disposition for rebellion and deception, and the activities of excessive indulgence and creation of disorder. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
不反省自己,与天理天 l i ] l i ] li]l i] 被摧毁了。现在如果说人对物的触动是没有限度的,人的好恶没有规律的话,那就是物到人被物化的问题了。人被物所化,就是破坏了天道的连贯性,就是人的欲望(即上述“本性的欲望”)的疲惫(即无法实现)。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 正因如此,他们就有了叛逆、欺骗的性情,以及放纵、制造混乱的行为。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
It would seem that “the nature” and even “Heaven” are positively valued here, but not unambiguously so; in a somewhat Xunzian manner, it is merely asserted that man’s initial quiescence and his response to external things with desire are Heavenly, inborn, unavoidable. The value dimension is flagged by the term L i L i LiL i, the coherence that can be made from these desires, particularly through the education in coherence as harmony and division that comes through music and ritual. That this Li is nonetheless called Heavenly may seem un-Xunzian, or an extension of Xunzi’s prior concession to the ironic tradition, as is the emphasis on the initial stillness of man when undisturbed by external things. The solution here, however, is not a reclaiming of this initial stillness, which is presumably regarded as impossible, but a regulation of the responses to the world so that they cohere with real values, so that man remains true to the coherence-the balance and harmonious self-sufficiency-of this stillness, not the stillness itself. As the text says later, even music is to be considered “still” or quiet because “it comes from within.” The regulated desires are “still” in the same sense, that is, consistent with the inner nature of man. We may think here again of Qian Mu’s comment about the “stillness” of the Center of the pendulum swing, which means not that there is no swinging but that the swinging is balanced and regulated by its relation to this constant center.
在这里,“自然”甚至“天堂”似乎得到了积极的评价,但并非如此明确;以某种荀子的方式,它只是断言人最初的平静和他对外部事物的欲望反应是天性的、天生的、不可避免的。值维度由术语标记 L i L i LiL i ,可以从这些愿望中实现连贯性,特别是通过音乐和仪式带来的和谐与分裂的连贯性教育。尽管如此,这种“理”仍被称为“天”,这似乎不符合荀子的观点,或者是荀子先前对讽刺传统的让步的延伸,就像强调人在不受外界事物干扰时最初的静止一样。然而,这里的解决方案并不是恢复这种最初的静止,这大概被认为是不可能的,而是调节对世界的反应,使它们与真正的价值观相一致,从而使人保持真正的连贯性——平衡。和谐的自给自足——这种静止,而不是静止本身。正如后面的文字所说,即使是音乐也被认为是“静止的”或安静的,因为“它来自内部”。被调节的欲望在同样意义上是“静止的”,即与人的内在本性相一致。这里我们可以再想起钱穆关于钟摆摆动中心“静止”的评论,这并不是说没有摆动,而是说摆动是由它与这个恒定中心的关系来平衡和调节的。
Nonetheless, the sense of prior existence of this Heavenly coherence may be interpreted as indeed privileging this original stillness in a way that Xunzi would not. For the idea seems to be that in the regulation of the desires, man regains the coherence he had when he was still and not “transformed by” external things, by the likes and dislikes created when the interaction of things is directed by the faculty of knowledge as subordinated to external things. Note that, at least as I am reading it, the passage asserts that the loss of this Heavenly coherence makes it impossible for the truly human desires to be fulfilled, namely, the desires that remain consistent with the original stillness of man’s nature, the proper Way of man, the desires of his nature. A very similar idea occurs in the opening lines of another
尽管如此,这种天道一致性的先存在感可以被解释为确实以荀子所不会的方式赋予了这种原始静止的特权。因为这个想法似乎是,在欲望的调节中,人恢复了他静止时所拥有的连贯性,而不是被外部事物“改变”,被事物相互作用时所产生的好恶所“改变”。知识从属于外部事物。请注意,至少在我读到它时,这段文字断言,这种天堂一致性的丧失使得真正的人类欲望无法实现,即与人性的原始静止保持一致的欲望,适当的欲望。人之道,其性欲也。另一个非常相似的想法出现在开场白中
Liji text, the famous “Zhongyong,” as discussed in Ironies: the central balance 中 zhong prior to the activation of the emotions (presented in the form of pairs of contrasted opposites, joy and anger, sorrow and pleasure) is regained or mirrored in a modified form in the post-activation state by “hitting the proper measure” (中節 zhongie—note the echoing pun on zhong). The extremes of the pendulum swing maintain their “centrality” by each finding the proper measure, the extent that will allow them to swing back and retain the capability of the opposite state. In the “Record of Music,” the “regulated” version of these interactions between desires and external things is described as Li , a harmonious coherence in our sense, for precisely the reason given in the lines that follow: desiring in the way that has lost man’s proper path interferes with the harmonious coherence of the social group, leading to rebellion and disunity. Li here again means a coherence that must cohere with a given set of human desires to produce further coherences.
《礼记》中著名的“中庸”,正如《讽刺》中所讨论的:情感激活之前的中心平衡(以成对对立的喜怒哀乐的形式呈现)在《反讽》中得到恢复或反映。激活后状态下的一种修改形式,通过“采取适当的措施”(中节 zhongie——注意 zhong 上的双关语)。钟摆摆动的极端通过各自找到适当的措施来保持其“中心性”,即允许它们向后摆动并保留相反状态能力的程度。在《乐录》中,欲望与外在事物之间相互作用的“调节”版本被描述为“理”,一种我们意义上的和谐连贯性,其原因正是在下面几行中给出的:欲望以一种迷失的人的正确道路干扰了社会群体的和谐凝聚力,导致叛逆和不团结。理在这里再次意味着一种一致性,它必须与一组特定的人类欲望相一致,以产生进一步的一致性。
The text goes on to describe music and ritual as creating unity and differentiation, respectively. Unity brings intimate togetherness, differentiation brings mutual respect. Music comes from within, and so is still; ritual comes from without, and so is culturally patterned. Great music is “easy,” great ritual is “simple” (易,簡,yi,jian)—a trope used also in the “Great Commentary” to the Zhouyi for Qian and Kun, pure Yang and pure Yin, respectively. Music shares in the “harmony” (和 he) of heaven and earth, ritual in their “regulation” (節 jie) or “sequential orderings” (序 x u x u xux u ). Benevolence is close to music, righteousness is close to ritual. This unity and division are the two sides of the creation of the groupings and coherences of nature. As in the “Great Commentary,” we are told that things group according to type; here this is said to be the function of the “differentiations of heaven and earth” (天地之別 tiandi zhi bie), which ritual embodies. Indeed, the text echoes the proclamation we noted in the Xunzi that “Ritual is those coherences [ L i ] [ L i ] [Li][L i] which must not be changed.” Ritual is a subset of coherence, the one that a society cannot afford to alter. At the same time, the mutual chafing of the Yin and Yang, the harmonies that transform all things, are the workings of the harmony of heaven and earth, and are embodied in music. We are told that the coherences ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) of the remote and intimate, the young and old, the male and female, are all manifested in music. The stress here is once again on Li as the divisions of these pairs of opposites, but significantly these Li are said to be manifested in the harmony of music. Li once again suggests then the harmonious coherence of divided groups, and these Li account for the mutual responsiveness and harmony in the whole. “Harmonization responds to singing, so that the turning and perverse, the twisted and straight all return to their own allotments, and so the coherence of the ten thousand things [萬物之理 wanwu zhi Li] all move each other according to type [類 lei].” Here we have a usage of Li that might seem not
文本继续将音乐和仪式描述为分别创造统一和差异。团结带来亲密,差异带来相互尊重。音乐由内而生,静亦如此;仪式来自外部,因此具有文化模式。大乐是“易”,大礼是“简”(易,简,易,简)——《周易》的《大注》中也使用了这个比喻,分别表示干和坤,纯阳和纯阴。分享天地的“和”,礼的“节”或“序” x u x u xux u )。仁近于乐,义近于礼。这种统一和分裂是自然的分组和连贯性创造的两个方面。正如在《大注释》中,我们被告知事物按照类型进行分组;这里说这是礼所体现的“天地之别”的功能。事实上,这段文字呼应了我们在《荀子》中提到的“礼者,礼也”的说法。 [ L i ] [ L i ] [Li][L i] 这绝对不能改变。”仪式是一致性的一个子集,是一个社会无法改变的。同时,阴阳的相互摩擦,化生万物的和谐,是天地和谐的运作,体现在音乐中。我们被告知,一致性 ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) 远近、亲密、年轻、年老、男性、女性,都在音乐中表现出来。这里的重点再次放在“理”上,作为这些对立面的划分,但值得注意的是,这些“理”据说表现在音乐的和声中。 理再次暗示了不同群体之间的和谐一致,而这些理则说明了整体的相互响应和和谐。 “和应于歌,曲曲曲直皆归其所,万物之理万物之理,皆依类而动”。林雷]。” 这里我们有一个 Li 的用法,看起来似乎不是这样的。

to be directly related to value. Even the twisted and perverse have their “Li” which account for the mutual response of members of a type, so that perverse music creates a harmful effect in people hearing it. But the point is that Li here is that by which the negative can be known and effectively dealt with. By perceiving the mutual responses, and knowing the psychological effects that will inevitably be created by such and such a music, one can make the adjustments-in this case, prohibiting such music-that will allow for greater human social coherence and harmony. Li even in this sense still accords with our definition of Li as a harmonious coherence (evil sounds with evil emotion) that, if cohered with (known), leads to further harmonious coherence (adjustment leading to greater social harmony). The accord between evil sound and evil emotion is still a “harmony” within its own sphere. The problem with it is that it fails to cohere with the context that surrounds it, unless properly known and responded to. It is a Li because, if accorded with (that is, known), it leads to responses that allow one to handle it so as to create these broader harmonies. Hence, there is no contradiction when the text goes on to explicitly link “harmony” and “coherence” ( Li ) ) )) in a parallelism, describing the way in which music “moves the harmonies of the qi of the four [seasons] and manifests the coherence [Li] of the ten thousand things.”
与价值直接相关。即使是扭曲的、乖僻的东西,也有它的“理”,它说明了同一类型成员之间的相互反应,所以乖僻的音乐对人们听到它产生了有害的影响。但重点是,这里的“礼”是可以认识负面情况并有效处理的东西。通过感知相互的反应,并了解某种音乐不可避免地产生的心理影响,人们可以做出调整——在这种情况下,禁止这种音乐——从而实现更大的人类社会凝聚力和和谐。即使在这个意义上,礼仍然符合我们对礼的定义,礼是一种和谐的连贯性(邪恶的声音与邪恶的情感),如果与(已知)连贯,就会导致进一步的和谐连贯(调整导致更大的社会和谐)。邪恶的声音和邪恶的情感之间的和谐仍然是其自身范围内的“和谐”。它的问题在于,除非得到正确的了解和回应,否则它无法与周围的环境相一致。它是一种理,因为如果符合(即已知),它会导致人们能够处理它的反应,从而创造出更广泛的和谐。因此,当文本继续明确地将“和谐”与“连贯”联系起来时,并不存在矛盾(李 ) ) )) 以排比的方式描述了音乐“动四气之和,显万事相通”的方式。
We have seen the further application of this type of nesting of levels of coherence in the discussion of the Zhouyi in Ironies. Let us turn back to that text now with an eye to its role in the development of the meanings of Li .
我们已经在反讽《周易》的讨论中看到了这种连贯层次嵌套的进一步应用。现在让我们回到该文本,着眼于它在“礼”含义发展中的作用。

LI IN THE "WINGS" TO THE ZHOUYI
李在《周易》的“翅膀”中

In Ironies of One and Many, we presented an analysis of the thinking of the “Great Commentary” to the Changes, focusing on its concept of ultimate value: “The great virtuosity of Heaven and Earth is generation”(天地之大德之謂生 tiandi zhi da de zhiwei sheng) (II.1). And again, “Constant generation and regeneration is what is meant by Change” (生生之謂易 shengsheng zhiwei yi) (I.5). As I indicated there, the crux of the value theory operating in the “Great Commentary” is indicated in the following well-known passage: “One Yin and one Yang-this is called Dao. Its continuance is the Good. Its completion is human nature. The benevolent see it and call it benevolent; the wise see it and call it wise; the ordinary folk use it every day and yet are not aware of it. Thus the way of the exemplary man is rare indeed. It manifests as benevolence, but is concealed in all processes [or activities of the ordinary folk]. It drums the ten thousand things forward and yet does not worry itself as the sage must. This is the ultimate of flourishing virtue and great vocation!”
在《一多反讽》中,我们对《易经大论》的思想进行了分析,重点分析了其终极价值观念:“天地之大德之谓”。生天地之大的之味胜)(II.1)。又曰:“生生之谓易shengsheng zhiwei yi”(I.5)。正如我在那里所指出的,《大论》中所运用的价值论的症结体现在以下著名的段落中:“一阴一阳,此谓道。它的延续就是善。它的完成是人性。仁者见之,谓之仁;仁者见之,谓之仁。智者见之,谓之智。普通人每天都在使用它,但却没有意识到它。故君子之道实为难得。它表现为仁,但隐藏在一切过程中。鼓动万事前进,而不忧自圣人。这就是功德昌盛、事业伟大的终极境界!”
The meaning of this is made clear in a key passage of the commentary, which after much analysis we translated as follows: “The process of alternation of the emergence of intelligible coherences and the necessary incoherence with which it must cohere, of the active and the structive, of beginnings and finishes, such that they are always leading to each other, implying each other, and mixed with each other, is called the Way. When this alternation occurs in a proportion that is consistent with its own continuance, so that it does not get caught in a dead-end of unceasing dominance of either one side or the other, this harmony is called goodness, or value. What completes this harmony, both in the sense of being its pinnacle and of being the agent of its completion in the universe, is human nature. This principle of value is most obvious in what is called benevolence and wisdom, which is why the Way may one-sidedly be called benevolent or wise by those focused on these qualities, but it is the source and foundation of all activity in the cosmos, in a less obvious form, even in the daily activities of the common folk.”
注释的一个关键段落阐明了这一点的含义,经过大量分析,我们将其翻译如下:“可理解的连贯性和它必须与之连贯的必要的不连贯性的出现的交替过程,主动和非连贯性的交替过程。结构性的,有始有终,常相引,相引,相混,名曰道。当这种交替发生的比例与其自身的连续性相一致,从而不会陷入一方或另一方不断占主导地位的死胡同时,这种和谐就被称为善或价值。完成这种和谐的因素是人性,无论是在其巅峰还是在宇宙中完成这种和谐的推动者的意义上。这一价值原理在所谓仁智上表现得最为明显,因此,注重仁智的人可能会片面地称道为仁智,但它却是宇宙一切活动的源头和基础。即使在普通民众的日常活动中,也以一种不太明显的形式出现。”
This was explained in terms of non-ironically valued coherence and its relation to disvalued unintelligibility with which it must nonetheless cohere. Valued coherence is a proportion between Beginnings and Finishes, between the active and the responding-structive, or, we may say, between the apparently positively valued (Yang, coherence in the first-level, naive sense, which brings things into being) and the apparently negatively valued (Yin, first-level, naive incoherence, which brings things to their finishes, marks an end of a given continuity), a proportion that allows both to continue to exist in a proportion that will allow them to continue to coexist, and so ad infinitum. It so happens that this proportion is one that usually involves the (non-quantitative) dominance and primacy of the apparently positive over the apparently negative, giving a ruling and superior role in the hierarchy, while at the same time, perhaps, granting the quantitative predominance to the apparently negative, modeled on the small number of rulers contrasted to the large number of the ruled. But this is of value only because it allegedly allows both to flourish. Beginnings and finishes should be arranged such that beginnings and finishes, that is, the creation of things and situations, continue to occur afterward, so that, in other words, no finish is final. The dominance of a finish, Yin, would spell the end of both beginnings and finishes, for to finish is to bring a coherence into incoherence, to end a continuity. Likewise, the total dominion of beginnings (Yang) that never lead anywhere, are never picked up, given structure, brought to completion, would also disturb the formation of things, the process of beginning and finishing, of making coherent. For to finish is also to make fully formed, to make fully coherent.
这是用非讽刺性的连贯性及其与被贬低的不可理解性的关系来解释的,尽管如此,它必须与之保持一致。有价值的连贯性是开始和结束之间、主动和回应结构之间的比例,或者,我们可以说,是表面上积极评价的(阳,第一层的连贯性,朴素意义上的连贯性,它使事物成为现实)和表面上受到负面评价的(阴,第一层,天真的不连贯性,它使事物最终完成,标志着给定连续性的结束),一个允许两者继续存在的比例,使它们能够继续共存,如此无穷无尽。碰巧的是,这一比例通常涉及表面上积极的事物相对于表面上消极的事物的(非定量的)主导地位和首要地位,在等级制度中赋予统治和优越的作用,同时,也许,赋予定量的表面上消极的占主导地位,以少数统治者与大量被统治者的对比为模型。但这之所以有价值,只是因为据称它可以让两者蓬勃发展。开始和结束的安排应使开始和结束,即事物和情况的创造,在之后继续发生,因此,换句话说,没有结束是最终的。结束的主导地位,阴,将意味着开始和结束的结束,因为结束就是将连贯性带入不连贯性,结束连续性。同样,从不通向任何地方、从不被拾取、给定结构、完成的开始(阳)的完全统治,也会扰乱事物的形成、开始和结束的过程、使连贯的过程。 因为完成也是使完全形成、使完全连贯。
This gives us a clear understanding of how Yin is both negative in itself (the finish, death, the end of all being) and a part of the necessary process of creation of things (since “finish” here has both the sense of “to make an ending” and “to bring to its final form”-to complete or perfect, to bring to its proper end). It brings us to a way of understanding a form of “complementarity” that could be complementary with, and not in conflict with, “conflict.” The complementarity of Yin and Yang presupposes their conflict. They are both conflicting opposites and two necessary parts of a single process, and there is no conflict between these two levels. Yin, as “finishing,” is both negatively valued (in conflict with Yang and with the whole process) and positively valued (complementary to Yang and the whole process). 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
这让我们清楚地理解“阴”本身是消极的(结束、死亡、一切存在的终结),又是事物创造的必要过程的一部分(因为“完成”在这里既有“完成”的意思,也有“结束”的意思)。做出一个结局”和“达到其最终形式”——完成或完善,达到其适当的结局)。它为我们带来了一种理解“互补”形式的方式,这种“互补”可以与“冲突”互补而不是冲突。阴阳的互补性是以它们的冲突为前提的。它们既是相互冲突的对立面,又是同一过程的两个必要部分,这两个层面之间不存在冲突。阴,作为“完成”,既具有消极的价值(与阳和整个过程相冲突),又具有积极的价值(与阳和整个过程相补充)。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
The implication is that a dominance of Yin would kill off both Yin and Yang, and this alone is the source of its ultimate disvalue. The continuance of both is the determinant of what sort of relationship between them is desirable. Humanity’s role is to make sure that this proportion prevails, lest the cosmos go askew, veering into a dominance of Yin that would end the alternating process of Yin and Yang. This, and not the eradication of Yin, nor even its suppression in every situation, is the aim of moral endeavor. Moreover, and crucially, there exist situations where the dominance of Yang would endanger the continuing flourishing of both, when it would lead to a monopoly that would eradicate Yin or itself. In these cases, the dominance of Yin is identical to value. The “one thread” running through all value is then: the relationship that will allow relationships to continue to exist, coherence that coheres with further coherence. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
这意味着阴的统治会消灭阴阳,仅此一点就是其最终贬值的根源。两者的持续性决定了它们之间什么样的关系是可取的。人类的作用是确保这个比例占上风,以免宇宙歪斜,转向阴的主导地位,从而结束阴阳的交替过程。这才是道德努力的目标,而不是根除阴,甚至不是在任何情况下压制阴。此外,最重要的是,在某些情况下,阳的主导地位会危及两者的持续繁荣,当它会导致垄断时,会消除阴或其本身。在这些情况下,阴的主导地位与价值相同。那么,贯穿所有价值的“一条线索”就是:让关系继续存在的关系、与进一步连贯性相一致的连贯性。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21}
The implications of all this for the way the order of things in the world is to be conceived are nowhere more stunningly portrayed than in another of the classical “Wings” to the Zhouyi, the “Shuogua” (“Explanations of the Trigrams”), as we discussed at length in Ironies. The text attempts to sum up the implications of the system of trigrams and hexagrams comprising the Zhouyi. Here is how the general statement of the procedure used by the sages to devise that system:
所有这一切对于世界事物秩序的理解方式的影响,没有比《周易》的另一部经典“翼”《说卦》(“卦象解释”)更令人震惊地描述了。正如我们在讽刺中详细讨论的那样。本文试图总结构成《周易》的卦卦系统的含义。以下是圣贤们用来设计该系统的程序的一般说明:
Viewing the transformations of Yin and Yang [in the sky, i.e., Heaven], they established the trigrams. Developing the further implications of the hard and soft [of the Earth], they produced the individual lines. Harmonizing it to make it comply [和順 heshun] with the [human] Dao and its Virtue, they separated into coherent groups what was appropriate to each [理於義 l i y u l i y u liyul i y u yi]. Fully exhausting this coherence they plumbed the depths of Human Nature, until it reached the Decree [Fate]. In ancient times when the sages created the Changes, they were attempting to comply with these coherences of human nature and its Decree, and so they established the Dao
他们观察阴阳的变化,从而制定卦象。他们进一步发展了[地球]的硬和软的含义,制作了单独的线条。协调它以使其符合[人]道及其美德,他们将适合每个[理于义]的东西分成连贯的组。 l i y u l i y u liyul i y u 伊]。他们充分耗尽了这种一致性,探索了人性的深处,直到到达了法令[命运]。古时圣人创变,就是为了顺应这些人性与法则的契合,所以创立了道。

of Heaven, calling it Yin and Yang; established the Dao of Earth, calling it the soft and the hard; and established the Dao of Man, calling it Benevolence and Rightness. Encompassing all three primal powers and applying this doubleness to each, they exchanged the six lines [in all possible ways] and made them into the hexagrams. Dividing Yin from Yang, alternately applying the soft and the hard, they transformed six positions [in various ways] and made them into the visible figures.
天,谓之阴阳;立地道,谓之柔、刚;并创立了人道,称为仁义。囊括了三元之力,并运用此二元之力,交换六行,而成卦。分阴阳,软硬交替,变换六位,而为可见形。
A two-termed “pendulum range” is here observed in three parallel realms: Heaven, Earth, and Man. Each has its own Dao, its “course,” by means of which it proceeds. In each case, a dyadic alternation is observed as what is necessary to its sustainability. Heaven alternates between dark and light, night and day, Yin and Yang. The terrain of the earth alternates between soft and hard (e.g., mountains and waters, obstructions and passages). Human action alternates between the accepting lovingness of Benevolence and the judgmental severity of Rightness. It is the overlap of these three subsystems that yields the final system: those elements of the natural processes of celestial and earthly oscillations that can be made to “harmonize and comply” with the human course of benevolence and rightness, the course and its virtuosities, by means of the hexagram system. This is what is meant, it seems, by “separated into coherent groups what was appropriate to each [理於義 li yu yi].” That is, a “Li”-grouping emerges wherever the oscillation of the moral-pragmatic needs of man and the oscillations of the light and dark of the sky and the obstruction and passages of the earth overlap and coincide; we can imagine this as a kind of interference pattern of three types of waves, perhaps along the lines of the “double-slit experiment” used to demonstrate the wave-function of photons. Where these three types of oscillation “sync up,” we have a Li , a valued coherence. I have briefly discussed the details of the sorts of things that count as this sort of “Li” in this text in the prequel to this book, Ironies of One and Many. Just how far from any familiar notion of “reason” or indeed of “order” this turns out to be can be easily observed from that discussion. This text, particularly its concluding statements about the ways the trigrams help to classify things in the world, seemed to its earliest occidental readers to be the pinnacle of ridiculous nonsense. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} But we can now begin to understand in just what sense these classifications are meant to exemplify something called “separating things into coherent groups as appropriate.” The appropriateness in question has to do with the matching or fitting between these three heterogeneous systems of oscillation: the temporal rhythm of the sky, the variations of the terrain of the earth, and human moods, intentions, and moral dispositions. When all these things come together, we have Li.
这里在三个平行领域观察到两个术语的“摆范围”:天、地和人。每个人都有自己的道,都有自己的“路线”,通过它来前进。在每种情况下,二元交替被认为是其可持续性所必需的。天堂在黑暗与光明、黑夜与白天、阴与阳之间交替。地球的地形在软和硬之间交替(例如山和水、障碍物和通道)。人类的行为在仁慈的接受之爱和正确的严厉判断之间交替。正是这三个子系统的重叠产生了最终的系统:天地振荡自然过程的那些元素可以“协调和遵守”人类的仁义进程、进程及其精湛技艺,通过卦象系统。看来,这就是“理于义 li yu yi”的意思。也就是说,凡是人的道德实用需要的波动与天明暗通、地梗通行的波动重叠、重合的地方,就出现了“理”群。我们可以将其想象为三种波的干涉图案,也许类似于用于演示光子波函数的“双缝实验”。当这三种类型的振荡“同步”时,我们就有了 Li,一种有价值的一致性。我在《一与多的反讽》的前传中简要讨论过这种“理”的细节。从那次讨论中可以很容易地观察到,这与任何熟悉的“理性”或“秩序”概念有多大差距。 这篇文章,特别是它关于卦象如何帮助对世界上的事物进行分类的结论性陈述,在其最早的西方读者看来是荒谬的废话的顶峰。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 但我们现在可以开始理解这些分类在什么意义上是为了例证所谓的“适当地将事物分成连贯的组”。这里所讨论的适当性与这三个异质振荡系统之间的匹配或契合有关:天空的时间节奏、地球地形的变化以及人类的情绪、意图和道德倾向。当所有这些事情加在一起时,我们就有了李。

LI AND CENTRALITY IN DONG ZHONGSHU (179-1O4 BCE)
《董仲舒》中的礼与中心地位(公元前 179-1O4 年)

Let us skip ahead to take a quick look at the way some of these ideas take shape in the thought of Dong Zhongshu, the great systemizer of Han ideology and of what becomes the default non-ironic position, in resistance to which later theorists resurrect the ironic tradition. Dong’s calendrical and geomantic model for understanding Yin and Yang, typical of Han thought, leads to a further development of the idea of Centrality and Harmony, explicitly linking them with Li , as will often be the case in the development of this term. Here again we see the force of the conception of coherence as harmony around a center. In Chapter 77 of the same work, entitled “Following the Way of Heaven,” Dong writes:
让我们跳到前面,快速浏览一下其中一些想法在董仲舒思想中形成的方式,董仲舒是汉族意识形态的伟大系统化者,也是默认的非讽刺立场的形成者,后来的理论家对此进行了抵制,复活了讽刺的传统。董氏理解阴阳的历法和风水模型是汉族思想的典型,导致中心性和和谐思想的进一步发展,明确地将它们与“理”联系起来,就像这个术语的发展中经常出现的情况一样。在这里,我们再次看到了围绕中心和谐的一致性​​概念的力量。在同一著作的第 77 章《循天道》中,董写道:
Following the Way of heaven in order to nourish one’s person is called the Way. Heaven has two Harmonies, which complete its two Centers [中 zhong]. When the year establishes its Centers, its function is endless. That is: the function of the Center of the North joins with Yin, and only then do things begin to move what is below. The function of the Center of the South joins with Yang, and only then does its nourishment begin to beautify what is above. The motion below cannot be produced without the Harmony of the East, namely, the Mid-spring (Spring Equinox, literally Center of Spring). The nourishing above cannot be completed without the Harmony of the West, namely, the Mid-Autumn (Autumn Equinox, Center of Autumn). So then what does the beauty of Heaven and Earth reside in? In the place of these two Harmonies, which accomplish and complete the activities of the two Centers when the latter return to them. Thus the East generates and the West completes, and thus the Harmony of the East is generated. What the North brings forth is completed by the Harmony of the West, and thus what is nourished by the South grows. What arises cannot be generated unless it reaches the Harmony. What is nourished and grows cannot come to completion unless it reaches the Harmony. What is completed in Harmony must have Harmony also at its inception. What is begun in Centrality must have Centrality also in its ending. The Center is what makes for all the ends and beginnings of Heaven and Earth. And Harmony is what makes for all the generations and completions of Heaven and Earth. For generally speaking, there is no greater virtuosity than Harmony, and no Way more correct than the Center. The Center is the unobstructed Coherence of the beauties of Heaven and Earth [中者天地之美達理也 zhongzhe tiandizhimeidali], and what the Sage
遵循天道以养身,谓之道。天有二和,构成天的两个中心。当年设立其中心,其功用无穷。即:北中之功与阴相合,万物始动于下。南中之功与阳相合,方能滋养其上而美化。如果没有东方的和谐,即仲春(春分,字面意思是春天的中心),就不可能产生下面的运动。上述滋养的完成,离不开西方的和谐,即中秋(秋分,秋天的中心)。那么天地之美在于什么呢?代替这两个和谐,当两个中心返回时,这两个和谐完成并完成两个中心的活动。故东方生,西方成,故东方之和而生。北方之生,西方之和而成,南方之滋养,故而生长。除非达到和谐,否则无法生成所出现的事物。凡是得到滋养和成长的东西,如果不达到和谐,就无法完成。和谐之事,其始亦必和谐。以中心性开始的事情,在其结局中也必须具有中心性。中心是天地一切终结和开始的根源。和则天地万代而圆满。一般来说,没有比和谐更精湛的了,没有比中心更正确的了。中者天地之美达理也,中者天地之美达理也,圣人何也?

preserves and holds to. The Odes say, “Neither firm nor yielding, he spreads forth his governance in all its excellence.” Is this not referring to the Center? For this reason, the virtuosity of he who can use Centrality and Harmony to coherently order [Li] the empire [以中和理天下 yi zhonghe li tianxia] will flourish, and the longevity of he who can use Centrality and Harmony to nourish his person will reach its ultimate of his allotted span.
保存并坚持。 《诗经》云:“不刚不柔,施政尽贤”。这不是指中央吗?是以中和理天下者,其德昌盛;以中和养其人,其寿也。人将达到其指定范围的极限。
The quotation from the Odes brings us a coded reference to Yin and Yang, here interpreted through their calendrical and geomantic associations, with some typical Dongian punning, to present an equation of Li with centrality as such, the point of balance that harmonizes the extremes of Yin and Yang. In this sense, in spite of his exaltation of Yang, the real ultimate value of Dong’s system is not Yang but Centrality, which he explicitly links with Li , a particular kind of coherence between the apparently valued and the apparently disvalued, the Yang and the Yin. Here as before, the criterion for what counts as Li is that it must be a coherence (in this case, between Yin and Yang, and also between their concrete forms as the four seasons and the four directions) which with humans can cohere (knowing it, using it to order the empire and the body) to bring about a further coherence (sustainability, continuance, longevity, flourishing). Here we have the full consolidation of the cluster of ideas around Li , and most notably, its direct association with the idea of the Center, the key non-ironic trope, which will subsequently be reclaimed for newly ironic purposes in Chinese Buddhism.
《诗经》中的引文为我们带来了对阴阳的编码参考,在这里通过它们的历法和风水关联以及一些典型的东亚双关语来解释,以呈现一个具有中心性的理方程,即协调极端的平衡点。阴阳。从这个意义上说,尽管他对“阳”的推崇,但董氏体系的真正最终价值不是“阳”,而是“中心性”,他明确地将其与“理”联系起来,即表面上被重视的与表面上被贬低的、“阳”与“非”之间的一种特殊的连贯性。阴。这里和以前一样,所谓礼的标准是它必须是与人类能够一致的连贯性(在这种情况下,阴阳之间,以及它们的具体形式如四时和四个方向之间)。它,用它来命令帝国和身体)带来进一步的一致性(可持续性、持续性、长寿、繁荣)。在这里,我们完全巩固了围绕“理”的一系列思想,最值得注意的是,它与中心思想的直接联系,这是关键的非讽刺比喻,随后将在中国佛教中为新的讽刺目的而重新利用。
This quick overview of the development of Li within the non-ironic tradition should put us in a position to understand the challenges faced by the ironic tradition in assimilating this development. Li is closely associated with the kind of division into groups that allow for a single overarching “Greatest Coherence” to operate as the locus of the highest value, constituted by an overlap of prior human and natural coherences. Li are here intelligible and plural, a way to talk about the specificities of particular coherences as an element in value. This is in contrast to the earliest ironic conception of coherence, which as yet allowed scant role for specific explanatory or moral intelligibles, locating highest value instead in precisely the abrogation of the same. It is to the integration of these two disparate visions that we now turn.
对李在非讽刺传统中的发展的快速概述应该使我们能够理解讽刺传统在吸收这种发展时所面临的挑战。李与这种群体划分密切相关,这种群体划分允许单一的总体“最大一致性”作为最高价值的轨迹,由先前的人类和自然一致性的重叠构成。 “礼”在这里是可理解的和复数的,这是一种谈论作为价值要素的特定连贯性的特殊性的方式。这与最早的具有讽刺意味的连贯性概念形成鲜明对比,该概念迄今为止还很少允许特定的解释性或道德可理解性发挥作用,而是将最高价值定位于恰恰是对同一性的废除。我们现在转向整合这两种不同的愿景。

THREE 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LI
IN IRONIC TEXTS
李的发展 在讽刺文本中

We have turned back to the earlier texts of the non-ironic tradition to find the gradual emergence of the term Li , and its connection to the notion of coherence understood in the non-ironic sense there, also tracing the development of the non-ironic notion of Li a few steps forward in time. We now turn our eyes to Li in the late Warring States ironic texts. The term appears only the once in the “pure” ironic texts, the Daodejing and the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi. But we find it emerging as a key term in the later developments of that tradition, which we may regard as a kind of mirror image of the “appropriations of the ironic into the non-ironic” considered in Ironies of Oneness and Difference, namely, the Liji texts "Daxue"大學 and “Zhongyong” 中庸 and the Yin-Yang compromise as developed in the canonical commentaries to the Zhouyi 周易. In those works, we saw ironic themes and insights adopted and integrated into a non-ironic framework, enlisted to serve non-ironic ultimate values. In the later ironic texts, we find the parallel situation in reverse: they make a place for some of the concerns and insights of the non-ironic tradition, arriving at a compromise position of their own, where non-ironic values are subordinated to ironic ultimate values. Li turns out to be a central tool in effecting this form of the rapprochement of the two traditions. However, as we shall see, this development spans a number of distinct phases, which can be found scattered throughout these works.
我们回到非反讽传统的早期文本,寻找“理”一词的逐渐出现,以及它与非反讽意义上的连贯概念的联系,同时也追溯了非反讽传统的发展。李的观念及时前进了几步。我们现在把目光转向战国晚期讽刺文本中的李。这个词只在“纯粹的”反讽文本《道德经》和《庄子内篇》中出现过一次。但我们发现它成为该传统后来发展中的一个关键术语,我们可以将其视为《统一与差异的讽刺》中所考虑的“讽刺性进入非讽刺性”的镜像,即, 《礼记》中的《大学》和《中庸》以及《周易》经典注释中所发展的阴阳妥协。在这些作品中,我们看到讽刺性的主题和见解被采用并融入到非讽刺性框架中,服务于非讽刺性的最终价值观。在后来的讽刺文本中,我们发现了相反的平行情况:它们为非讽刺传统的一些关注和见解提供了一席之地,达到了自己的妥协立场,即非讽刺价值观从属于讽刺价值观。终极价值观。事实证明,李是实现这两种传统和解的核心工具。然而,正如我们将看到的,这种发展跨越了许多不同的阶段,这些阶段分散在这些作品中。

LI AND NON-IRONIC COHERENCE IN THE LATER PARTS OF THE ZHUANGZI: INTEGRATING THE NON-IRONIC
《庄子》后期的礼与非讽连贯:整合非讽

The perspectivism of Zhuangzi’s “Inner Chapters,” as we saw in Ironies of Oneness and Difference, entails a strong denial of the existence of unique,
正如我们在《同异反讽》中看到的那样,庄子“内章”的透视主义强烈否认独特的、

univocal natural kinds: the world considered in isolation of human beings possesses no privileged ways of cohering. The predictive and normative functions of knowledge are there dismissed; what was so in the past is no guide for what will happen in the future, and what happens here, or for me, is no guarantee of what happens there, or for you. There can be no generally formulized rules about things or actions, not even in the rough and ready, pragmatic sense. In the Laozi, Dao did have a weak “predictive” and “normative” sense; it suggested that a general and predictable course for all things was the reversing rise and fall from not-being-there to being-there to not-being-there, and that this told us something important on how best to deal with things in general. Still, the nature of this single course was necessarily ironic with respect to any more specific determinate (coherently intelligible) course or generalizations about particular things. Only coherence in the new, ironic sense of the term is left.
单义的自然类型:孤立于人类的世界不具有特殊的凝聚方式。知识的预测和规范功能被忽视了;过去的情况并不能指导未来会发生什么,这里或对我来说发生的事情并不能保证那里或对你来说会发生什么。关于事物或行为,不可能有普遍的公式化规则,即使是在粗略、现成、务实的意义上也是如此。在《老子》中,道确实具有较弱的“预见性”和“规范性”意义;它表明,所有事物的一般且可预测的过程是从“不存在”到“存在”再到“不存在”的反转兴衰,这告诉我们一些重要的信息,即如何最好地处理一般事物。尽管如此,相对于任何更具体的确定的(连贯可理解的)课程或对特定事物的概括,这一单一课程的本质必然具有讽刺意味。只剩下该术语新的、讽刺意义的连贯性。
As we have already seen, this was not an insurmountable problem for those who wished to defend the non-ironic sense of coherence. One reason for this was because coherence already involved a perspectival element from the beginning, even in the non-ironic tradition, in that it always implied coherence with human desires in particular. Another reason is that Zhuangzi’s argument doesn’t really entail the denial of real coherences, but rather the overabundance of them, and the impossibility of combining them into a single mega-coherence. This implication is granted and responded to by Xunzi, as we saw above: the sage-kings simply pick out the best coherences from the multitude of coherences really available in the world, best here meaning those which lead to the maximal coherence with those desires within human psychology and tradition that are themselves maximally coherence-making for human society.
正如我们已经看到的,对于那些希望捍卫非讽刺连贯感的人来说,这并不是一个不可克服的问题。其原因之一是连贯性从一开始就涉及一种视角元素,即使在非讽刺传统中也是如此,因为它总是意味着与人类尤其是欲望的连贯性。另一个原因是,庄子的论点实际上并不是否认真正的连贯性,而是真正的连贯性过多,并且不可能将它们组合成一个单一的巨大连贯性。荀子承认并回应了这一含义,正如我们在上面看到的:圣王只是从世界上真正可用的众多连贯性中挑选出最好的连贯性,这里最好的意思是那些导致与内心欲望最大程度连贯的那些。人类心理和传统本身就为人类社会提供了最大程度的一致性。
But several other positions were developed in the early Chinese traditions to accommodate both the ironic and non-ironic applications of coherence, forming new syntheses. In this chapter I will discuss several compromises between ironic and non-ironic coherence that can be described as attempting to accommodate the latter to the former. These can be divided into three types, all found already within the later parts of the extant Zhuangzi text. In all of them, as in the Xunzi, the term Li plays a newly prominent role.
但早期中国传统中还发展了其他几种立场,以适应连贯性的反讽和非反讽应用,形成新的综合。在本章中,我将讨论讽刺和非讽刺连贯性之间的几种妥协,这些妥协可以被描述为试图使后者适应前者。这些可分为三种类型,都已在现存《庄子》文本的后期部分中找到。在所有这些著作中,就像在《荀子》中一样,“礼”一词扮演着新的突出角色。

FIRST TYPE: LI AND DAO BOTH NON-IRONIC
第一类:理和道都是非讽刺的

The first type of combination of ironic and non-ironic in the Zhuangzi that begins to make use of the term Li is a simple extension of a slightly modified non-ironic. We see this non-ironic incorporation of the ironic in some of what Graham calls the “syncretic” chapters of the Zhuangzi. In Chapter 16,
《庄子》中开始使用“离”一词的第一种反讽与非反讽的组合,是对非反讽稍加修改的简单延伸。我们在格雷厄姆所说的《庄子》的一些“合一”章节中看到了讽刺与非讽刺的结合。在第16章中,

“Shanxing” 繕性 (“Mending the Nature”), we can see clearly how Li begins to be deployed in this context. Here we find a positive and noninverted relationship between (real, non-ironic) Li and the traditional non-ironic virtues:
从《复原性》中,我们可以清楚地看到李是如何开始在这种背景下展开的。在这里,我们发现(真实的、非讽刺的)礼与传统的非讽刺美德之间存在着积极的、非倒置的关系:
The ancient practitioners of the Course used placidity to nourish their knowledge. To refrain from action based on knowledge once this knowledge is born [from this placidity] is called nourishing the placidity together with that knowledge. When knowledge and placidity thus nourish one another, harmony and coherence grow out of the inborn nature [知與恬交相養,而和理出其性 zhi yu tian jiao xiangyang, er he li chu qi xing]. Virtuosity is harmony. The Course is what makes coherent. When Virtuosity is all inclusive, it is Benevolence. When the course makes everything coherent, it is Rightness. Virtuosity is harmony. The Course is coherence. [夫德,和也;道,理也 fude, heye, dao, liye] When Virtuosity is all-inclusive, it is Benevolence. When the Course makes everything without exception coherent, it is Rightness. [德無不容,仁也;道無不理,義也 dewuburong, renye, daowubuli, yi ye] 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
古代的课程修行者用平静来滋养他们的知识。一旦这种知识(从这种平静)诞生,就避免基于知识的行动,这称为与该知识一起滋养平静。当知与静如此互相滋养时,和谐与连贯就从与生俱来的本性中生长出来。德行即和谐。课程使内容变得连贯。德能包罗万象,就是仁。当课程使一切变得连贯时,那就是正确的。德行即和谐。课程具有连贯性。 [夫德,和也;道,理也fude, heye, dao, liye] 德兼而有之,就是仁。当课程使一切毫无例外地一致时,它就是正确的。 [德无不容,仁也;道无不理,义也德吾不荣,仁也,道吾不离,亦也] 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1}
Here Dao is equated directly with Li, with De, the Virtuosity that is the attainment of Dao, is equated with harmony. Dao is straightforwardly the orderliness with which all things cohere, and there is no hint of any indeterminacy, irony, self-cancellation, or unintelligibility to Dao, Li, De, or harmony: all can be known and practiced. Dao is the coherent whole of coherent Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} is here consistent with and expressed by y i y i yiy i, the rightness of each thing keeping to its own place within the coherent whole, rather than necessarily undermined by these definite norms of rightness, as we will see in the properly ironic usages of Li . Here the role of knowledge is problematized: knowledge and non-knowledge are to nourish each other, but while non-knowledge (“placidity”) nourishes knowledge directly, serving as the source from which it emerges, knowledge only nourishes non-knowledge by not interfering in it after emerging from it-by not trying to control it or indeed know it. This way of thinking, and the use of Li within its exposition, is consistent with the general outlook of the Guanzi chapters, as we shall see in the next chapter.
这里“道”直接等同于“礼”、“德”,“德”即“道的成就”,与“和谐”等同。道,就是万物相依的秩序,道、理、德、和,没有任何不确定性、讽刺性、自我取消性、不可理解性:一切皆可知、可行。道是连贯的整体 Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} 这里与 一致并表达为 y i y i yiy i ,每件事物在连贯的整体中保持其自己的位置,而不是必然被这些明确的正确性规范所破坏,正如我们将在李的适当讽刺的用法中看到的那样。在这里,知识的作用受到了质疑:知识和非知识是相互滋养的,但非知识(“平静”)直接滋养知识,作为知识出现的源泉,而知识只是通过不在摆脱它之后干预它——不试图控制它或真正了解它。这种思维方式,以及在其论述中使用“理”,与《管子》各章的总体观点是一致的,我们将在下一章中看到。

SECOND TYPE: DAO IRONIC, LI NON-IRONIC
第二类:道反讽,离非反讽

But something new begins to happen in the second type of ironic/non-ironic relation we find in the later parts of the Zhuangzi: the assimilation of Li in the non-ironic sense into an ironic sense of coherence. That is, in this second stratum, we find an attempt to make room for some kind of generally
但我们在《庄子》后半部分发现的第二种反讽/非反讽关系中开始发生一些新的事情:非反讽意义的“理”同化为连贯的反讽意义。也就是说,在第二层中,我们试图为某种普遍存在的事物腾出空间。

assertable modes of togetherness with some rough and ready pragmatic reliability, as applied to particular things in the realm of experience, but retain a strong sense of the provisionality and limitedness of these groupings and rules, subordinated to the ironic sense of coherence in general which makes its appearance in the consideration of the uppermost category, Dao-which one could almost describe here as universally applicable irony itself. In more old-fashioned and approximate language, here we will be looking at Daoist assimilations of Confucian ideas, to be contrasted with the previous volume’s examination of exactly the opposite case as seen in the technical Yin-Yang systems: Confucian accommodations of Daoist irony.
可以断言的团结模式,具有一些粗略和现成的实用可靠性,适用于经验领域中的特定事物,但保留了这些分组和规则的临时性和局限性的强烈意识,服从于一般连贯性的讽刺感,这使得它出现在对最高类别“道”的考虑中——人们在这里几乎可以将其描述为普遍适用的讽刺本身。用更老式和近似的语言,这里我们将讨论道教对儒家思想的同化,与前一卷对技术阴阳系统中完全相反的情况的考察进行对比:儒家对道家反讽的适应。
I have in mind in particular certain passages from the later chapters of the Zhuangzi itself. The later sections of the present Zhuangzi text develop some of the ideas of the “Inner Chapters,” and sometimes diverge from them. The radicalism of Zhuang Zhou’s relativistic perspectivism is effaced, sometimes in favor of a fixed picture of the distinction between benefit and harm, or of the division between the spontaneous and the deliberate-the standard fault lines of older Daoism. The text includes both critiques of Confucian values and praises of them, syncretic systems and extremist primitivisms, anarchism and conservatism, “rationalizing” and “irrationalizing” tendencies (as Graham put it), all of which stand side by side in the text as a whole as it currently exists.
我特别想到《庄子》后面几章的某些段落。本《庄子》文本的后面部分发展了“内章”的一些思想,有时又与它们有所不同。庄周的相对主义视角主义的激进主义被抹杀了,有时转而支持一种关于利益与伤害之间的区别,或者自发与故意之间的划分的固定图景——这是旧道教的标准断层线。文本既包括对儒家价值观的批评,也包括对儒家价值观的赞扬,融合体系和极端原始主义,无政府主义和保守主义,“理性化”和“非理性化”倾向(正如格雷厄姆所说),所有这些在文本中并存,作为一个整体。当前存在的整体。
For example, in the chapter “Autumn Floods” (秋水 “Qiushui”), characterized by Graham as a “rationalizing” chapter, we find a systematic expansion of the relativism of the Zhuang Zhou writings. Nothing is big or small or good or bad in itself, in this exposition; we call something big when it is bigger than something else, and thus “big” is a predicate that can apply to anything at all, and does not pertain to the thing itself. The same goes for all predicates. Similarly, each thing affirms itself and negates all others, meets its own standard and fails to live up to the standards embodied in other things-an idea derived from the “this/right” conflation in the “Inner Chapters” of the Zhuangzi, convincingly attributed to Zhuang Zhou himself. But at the end of this discussion in the “Autumn Floods” version, we are told that these considerations give some real knowledge about how things are (namely, things are free of intrinsic characteristics, susceptible to relative valuations and attributions, etc.), and that this knowledge aids a person in living well in the world, in understanding what is truly harmful and beneficial. This is a step back from the Zhuang Zhou writings, a subtle shift that nonetheless alters the significance of this whole line of thought significantly. The text then, in direct contradiction to Zhuang Zhou, sets up a fixed division between the “human” and the “heavenly” (or natural), that is, the deliberate and the spontaneous, as if these could be known in a way that was not purely perspective-dependent. The text asserts this categori-
例如,在被格雷厄姆称为“理性化”章节的《秋水》一章中,我们发现了庄周著作中相对主义的系统扩展。在这个阐述中,没有什么本身是大或小、好或坏;当某物比其他东西大时,我们称它为大,因此“大”是一个可以应用于任何事物的谓词,而不属于事物本身。所有谓词也是如此。同样,每一个事物都肯定自己并否定所有其他事物,满足自己的标准,而无法达到其他事物所体现的标准——这一观点源于《庄子》内篇中的“此/正确”合并,令人信服地证明了这一点。归功于庄周本人。但在“秋水漫漫”版本的讨论结束时,我们被告知,这些考虑因素提供了一些关于事物本质的真实知识(即事物没有内在特征,容易受到相对评价和归因等的影响),这些知识可以帮助人们在这个世界上过上美好的生活,了解什么是真正有害的和有益的。这是对庄周著作的后退一步,虽然是一个微妙的转变,但却显着改变了整个思路的意义。然后,与庄周直接矛盾的是,该文本在“人”和“天”(或自然)之间建立了固定的划分,即刻意的和自发的,仿佛这些可以通过以下方式来认识:并不纯粹依赖于视角。文本断言了这一类别——

cally: the heavenly is “the internal,” the human is the “external,” and we are to privilege the heavenly over the human, which alone is the source of all virtue. The distinction between them is perfectly clear and unambiguous: a horse has four feet-that is the natural, the spontaneous, the heavenly; a horse has a saddle on its back and a bit in its mouth-that is the human, the artificial. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} Where Zhuang Zhou had said, “How do I know that what I really call heaven is not man, and vice versa?” 3 and even “How do I know that what I call knowing is not not-knowing, and vice versa?” - the author of this chapter tells us once and for all what is spontaneous and what not. Where Zhuang Zhou had, after suggesting that the human not be allowed to interfere with or try to help along the spontaneous, gone on to describe the state of the Genuine Person where, as Zhuang Zhou’s sixth chapter puts it, “neither heaven nor man wins out over the other” (天與人不相勝 tianyuren buxiangsheng), 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} this later chapter, evidently from another hand, stops at the first step without taking the second.
重要的是:天是“内在的”,人是“外在的”,我们应该优先考虑天的优先于人,因为只有人才是所有美德的源泉。它们之间的区别是非常清楚和明确的:马有四足,这是自然的,自发的,天性的;马有四足,这是自然的,自发的,天性的;马的背上有一个马鞍,嘴里有一个马衔——这就是人类,人造的。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 庄周曰:“吾何以知所谓天非人,反之亦然?” 3,甚至“我怎么知道我所说的知道不是不知道,反之亦然?” - 本章作者一劳永逸地告诉我们什么是自发的,什么不是。庄周在建议人不可干涉或试图帮助自发性之后,接着描述了真人的状态,正如庄周第六章所说,“天人不胜”。天与人不相胜 tianyuren buxiangsheng), 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 后面的这一章显然是出自另一人之手,只停留在第一步,而没有迈出第二步。
The term Li is crucial to this discussion, and we should pause to look at how it is used here. The Xunzian binome 大理 dali appears non-ironically: “Now you have come out of your little river and seen the great ocean, thus knowing your own ugliness. Now I can speak to you about the Great Coherence [dali].” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} When the content of this great coherence is indicated, however, we find it closely connected with the perspectival relativism of the Inner Chapters, as formulated here, however, in terms of the Yin-Yang pair: “If you try to take right [是 shi] as your master and eliminate wrong [非 fei], or take good-order as your master and eliminate disorder, that would just mean you were unclear about the coherence of heaven and earth [天地之理 tiandi zhi Li] and the real condition of the ten thousand things [萬物之情 wan wu zhi qing]. This would be like taking heaven as your master and eliminating earth, or taking Yin as your master and eliminating Yang; the impossibility of it is obvious.” " " ^("){ }^{"} Here the necessary coupling and inseparability of each coherence with its paired opposite, including the contextualizing of coherence per se by what undermines it into incoherence, is taken as the Great Coherence itself. This is how the balance of both sides of each dyad, which in the Inner Chapters entails also the non-dominance even of the Heavenly, is appropriated here: coherence-incoherence is given a metalevel definition as Great Coherence itself. This is indeed the standard ironic move, used to make the very notion of coherence ironic. That this is here in contrast meant, oddly, non-ironically is clear from the following: “The Dao has no end or beginning, but things must go through death and life, and their completion as such-and-such can not be depended on. Now empty, now full, their forms not holding to any one position. The years cannot be held on to, the times cannot be stopped. Things wax and wane, fill and empty, ending and then bringing a new beginning. This is the means
“李”这个词对于这个讨论至关重要,我们应该停下来看看它在这里是如何使用的。荀子的二元组《大理大理》的出现并非讽刺:“今汝出小河,见大海,知己丑。现在我可以和你谈谈大理。” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 然而,当这种伟大的连贯性的内容被指出时,我们发现它与内章的透视相对主义密切相关,正如这里用阴阳对所阐述的那样:“如果你试图采取正确的[是]以“师”为师,消除非非,或者以“顺”为师,消除无序,那就说明你不清楚天地之理和真实的情况。万事之情。犹如以天为主而灭地,或以阴为主而灭阳一样。显然这是不可能的。” " " ^("){ }^{"} 在这里,每个连贯性与其成对的对立面之间必要的耦合和不可分离性,包括通过将连贯性破坏为不连贯性而将连贯性本身置于语境中,被视为大连贯性本身。这就是每一对的双方的平衡的方式,在内章中甚至意味着天上的非支配性,在这里被挪用:连贯性-不连贯性被赋予了一个元层面的定义,作为大连贯性本身。这确实是标准的讽刺举动,用来使连贯性的概念变得讽刺。此处的对比意味着,奇怪的、非讽刺的是,从以下内容中可以清楚地看出:“道无始无终,而事物必须经过死和生,其完成如此这般不能依赖”在。 时而空,时而满,它们的形状不固定在任何一个位置。岁月无法挽留,时代无法停止。事物有盛有衰,有满有空,有结束又有新的开始。这就是手段

by which we can speak of the method of the Great Rightness [大義之方 da yi zhi fang], and discuss the Li of the ten thousand things [萬物之理 wan wu zhi Li].” 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} The parallelism of fang and Li is susceptible to several interpretations here: fang can mean “direction,” “locus,” “recipe,” or “method,” and also “square,” that is, with clearly delineated edges and sides, as opposed to the more amorphous shape of a circle, which cannot be so simply divided into separate parts. The sense of “direction,” “method,” or “recipe” resonates with Li in the sense of a guideline to be traced, the built-in way in which something can be divided and carved, the perforations along which work is to be done to create maximum value (i.e., maximum coherence). The sense of “locus” and “squareness” brings out the sense of coherence as “definite intelligibility.” At the same time, we have an association (through a kind of skewed parallelism) of the typical unironic coupling of Li and y i y i yiy i, coherence and rightness, just as we see in the Mencius and Xunzi, and in the Guanzi “Techiniques of the Heart/mind.”
以此可以讲大义之方大义之方,论万物之理万物之理。” 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 方与理的平行关系在这里可以有多种解释:方可以表示“方向”、“轨迹”、“配方”或“方法”,也可以表示“方形”,即具有清晰描绘的边缘和侧面,如与更加无定形的圆形相反,圆形不能简单地分为单独的部分。 “方向”、“方法”或“配方”的含义与李产生共鸣,因为它是一种可追踪的指南,一种可以分割和雕刻某物的内在方式,一种工作所沿着的穿孔。这样做是为了创造最大价值(即最大一致性)。 “轨迹”和“方正”的感觉带来了“明确的可理解性”的连贯感。同时,我们有一个典型的单反耦合的关联(通过一种倾斜的并行性)Li 和 y i y i yiy i 连贯、正确,正如我们在孟子、荀子以及管子的“心术”中看到的那样。
The final non-ironic use of Li in this passage is even more instructive. In answer to the question, “What then is valuable about the Dao,” we get, “He who knows the Dao will necessarily comprehend the coherence of things [必達於理 bi da yu Li]; he who comprehends the coherence of things will necessarily be clear about the shifting balances of things [權 quan]. He who is clear about the shifting balances of things will not allow things to harm himself. . . . He investigates the safe and the dangerous, is at peace in both disaster and good fortune, is careful in what he approaches and avoids, and so none can harm him.” 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} Understanding of the Great Coherence, that is, the way things fit together, what was just described as the principles of constant change and the inseparability of each coherence and its negation, leads to careful calculation of what goes with what, where and when harm will come, and how to maintain the shifting balances, but always in reference to the unchanging perspective of harm to oneself. We see here an attempt to combine the inseparability of coherence and incoherence typical of the ironic approach, the copresence of any perspective with the opposed perspective, which negates it and undermines its original coherence, with a single Great Coherence and a single unchanging perspective, which, as in the Confucian context, has mainly to do with a certain stable set of human desires of the observer. It seems that the assumption is now once again, as in the Mencius, that humans share the same basic desires, or at least that any person over time will have some desires that necessarily apply at all times (i.e., concerning his personal benefit and harm)—two premises that are both rejected by the more radical perspectivism of the Inner Chapters. One could argue perhaps that only temporary definitions of benefit and harm, as dependent on any given perspective, are meant by the present passage too, but the overall treatment of the Great Coherence seems to militate against this reading.
这段话中最后对李的非讽刺性使用更具启发性。对于“道的可贵之处”的回答是:“知道者,必达于理bi da yu Li;知道者,必达于理bi da yu Li”。懂得事物的连贯性的人,必然能够清楚事物的变化平衡。清楚事物的变化平衡的人不会让事物伤害自己。 。 。 。察安危,平祸福,谨慎趋避,故无人能害。” 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} 对大连贯性的理解,即事物结合在一起的方式,刚才所描述的不断变化的原则以及每种连贯性及其否定的不可分割性,导致仔细计算什么与什么相伴、何时何地会产生伤害。来,以及如何保持不断变化的平衡,但始终参考对自己造成伤害的不变观点。我们在这里看到一种尝试,将反讽方法中典型的连贯性和不连贯性的不可分割性、任何观点与对立观点的共存(这否定了它并破坏了其原始的连贯性)与单一的伟大连贯性和单一不变的观点结合起来,这正如在儒家语境中一样,主要与观察者的一系列稳定的人类欲望有关。看来,现在又像孟子那样,假设人类具有相同的基本欲望,或者至少任何人随着时间的推移都会有一些必然适用于任何时候的欲望(即,关于他个人的利益和伤害) )——这两个前提都被内章中更激进的观点主义所拒绝。 也许有人会争辩说,目前的段落也仅意味着利益和伤害的临时定义,因为取决于任何给定的观点,但对大一致性的整体处理似乎不利于这种解读。
This sort of containment of the ironic has practical consequences as well. Another set of texts collected in the current Zhuangzi, characterized by Graham as the “Primitivist” chapters (Chapters 8 10 8 10 8-108-10 and the first part of Chapter 11), adopts a similarly fixed definition of the spontaneous and the artificial, buttressed somewhat by some of the anti-civilization riffs in the Laozi, considering all pursuit of objects of conscious knowledge or valuation as disruptions or disturbances of man’s original spontaneous nature. This applies equally to material gain and to morality, both of which are “external” to man’s true nature. Here the division between “inner” and “outer,” and between “natural” and “artificial,” is regarded as knowable and fixed. Zhuang Zhou had suggested that by following along with the shifting perspectives, “the radiance of drift and doubt” 滑疑之耀 guyi zhi yao, one could "do good while remaining far from the reach of fame, do evil while remaining far from the reach of punishment"為善無近名,為惡無近刑 weishan wujinming, wei’e wujinxing. By this he meant, it seems, that one might find oneself doing what is defined as good or evil according to some perspective at any given time, but that one would not be committed to any single course of action to the extent that would bring one to the extremes of either fame for goodness or punishment for evil in any case, either of which would require cumulative, extended, consistent behavior according to a particular fixed value perspective. The author of the “Primitivist” chapters of the Zhuangzi, on the other hand, tells us that he would be ashamed to commit either good or evil, understood here in the fixed conventional sense of benevolence and righteousness on the one hand and “excessive or perverse conduct” on the other; both disturb his true, spontaneous nature, identified with the Dao as a metaphysical absolute. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
这种对讽刺的遏制也产生了实际后果。现存《庄子》中收集的另一组文本,被格雷厄姆称为“原始主义”章节(章节 8 10 8 10 8-108-10 以及第11章的第一部分),采用了对自发和人工的类似固定定义,在某种程度上受到《老子》中一些反文明即兴重复的支持,认为所有对有意识的知识或评价对象的追求都是对自然的破坏或干扰。人的原始自发本性。这同样适用于物质利益和道德,两者都是人的真实本性的“外在”。在这里,“内部”与“外部”、“自然”与“人工”之间的划分被认为是可知的和固定的。庄周提出,随着观点的转变,“滑疑之耀古义之耀”,可以“为善而远离名誉,为恶而远离名誉”。为善无近名,为恶无近刑,为善无金名,为恶无金星。他的意思似乎是,一个人可能会发现自己在任何特定时间都在做根据某种观点被定义为善或恶的事情,但一个人不会致力于任何单一的行动方针,以至于会导致一个人的行为。在任何情况下,无论是善恶名誉还是恶行惩罚,都需要达到极端,无论哪种极端,都需要根据特定的固定价值视角累积、扩展、一致的行为。 另一方面,《庄子》“原始”篇的作者告诉我们,他会羞于行善或行恶,这里一方面理解仁义的固定传统意义,另一方面“过分或过分”。反之亦然的“不正当行为”;两者都扰乱了他真实的、自发的本性,将道视为形而上的绝对。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
From these examples we can see some of the ambiguities involved in the Zhuangzian line of thought, and the variety of conclusions to which it can lead when subtle shifts are made in its premises. With these shifts, it becomes possible to incorporate a more non-ironic respect of definite coherences and fixed goals, the lineaments of common sense in general. We have a definitionally incoherent Dao, the largest and most unsurpassable whole, the togetherness of all things that is necessarily incoherent; all of that is standard ironic fare. But here a compromise has been struck which allows this incoherent whole to ground and support intelligible specific, coherent patterns and guidelines that make for successful activity as construed by commonsensical values. It should be noted in passing that this structure mirrors that found in HuangLao texts which view Dao as the source of Law or authoritative regulation (法 fa)—a point we will return to in discussing the Hanfeizi below. Li is in these examples precisely a way of indicating this intelligible pattern that is grounded in and somehow expresses the unintelligible whole, accessing it and providing the ideal way of inhabiting it.
从这些例子中,我们可以看到庄子思想中的一些含糊之处,以及当其前提发生微妙的变化时,它可以得出各种各样的结论。有了这些转变,就有可能纳入对明确的连贯性和固定目标的更加非讽刺的尊重,即一般常识的轮廓。我们有一个定义上不连贯的道,最大和最不可超越的整体,所有事物的整体必然是不连贯的;所有这些都是标准的讽刺。但这里已经达成了妥协,允许这个不连贯的整体奠定基础并支持可理解的具体、连贯的模式和指导方针,这些模式和指导方针有助于常识性价值观所解释的成功活动。顺便指出,这种结构反映了黄老文本中的结构,即认为“道”是法律或权威规则的根源——这一点我们将在下面讨论《韩非子》时回到这一点。在这些例子中,“理”正是表明这种可理解的模式的一种方式,这种模式植根于并以某种方式表达了不可理解的整体,访问它并提供居住它的理想方式。
We see echoes of this type of thinking scattered throughout the later chapters of the Zhuangzi, though expressed less intricately and extensively. In the “Tiandi” (“Heaven and Earth”) chapter, for example, we find the following passage:
我们在《庄子》的后面几章中看到这种思想的回响,尽管表达得不那么复杂和广泛。例如,在《天地》一章中,我们发现以下段落:
In the Great Beginning there existed non-existence, without existence and without name. From this the One arose. The One existed but had no form. When things obtain it [得 de] and thus came to life, this is called the thing’s Virtuosity [德 de]. When the formless divides into separate parts, with some temporary rough continuity [且然無間 qieran wujian] to each, it is called the ordained Life [命 ming] of each thing. From the stopping and moving creatures were born, and when these creatures form in such a way as to generate a coherence [物成生理 wu cheng sheng Li] it is called physical form [形 xing]. In the physical form spirit is preserved, each with its own rule, which is called its nature [性 xing]. If the nature is cultivated so it returns to the Virtuosity, the Virtuosity can be made to be the same as the Beginning. In being the same, it is empty. In being empty, it is vast, joining with the chirpings of the birdbeaks. When the birdbeak chirpings are joined, one has joined with heaven and earth. This joining is muddled and dim, as if stupid or half-conscious. This is called the Dark [hidden, unintelligible] Virtuosity, which means being the same as the Great Flow. 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
太初有无、无有、无名。从此,“一”诞生了。独一存在但没有形式。物得之而生,谓之物德。当无形体分成不同的部分,且各部分具有暂时的粗略连续性时,就称为各物的命命。从静止和移动的生物中诞生,当这些生物以产生连贯性的方式形成时,它被称为物理形态。形体中存有神,各有其规律,称为性。若修性而返于精,则精可与始同。因相同而空。空旷中,它是广阔的,与鸟嘴的鸣叫声融为一体。鸟喙齐鸣,天地合一。这种结合是混乱而模糊的,仿佛愚蠢或半自觉。这就是所谓的暗妙,就是和大流一样。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11}
Individual entities are here depicted as deriving from a division within the original Non-Being, the unintelligible whole. Each entity obtains this formlessness, which becomes its Virtuosity (virtue), from which derives the coherence of its physical form, from which derives its internal regularity, its “nature.” It is noteworthy that the determinate nature of a thing is derived from its physical form, not vice versa. Virtuosity would seem to be not any specific form or nature, but merely the concretized version of the formlessness of Dao itself, formlessness that has been “obtained.” We may perhaps think of this simply as formlessness as seen from the perspective of any particular form, the unintelligibility standing at the root of, and in the past and future of, any intelligible coherence, regarded by that coherence as its own root, beginning and end. We will have a further development of this idea in the Guanzi chapters and in the Hanfei commentary on the Laozi, to be discussed momentarily. If this Virtuosity is “returned to,” the individual being is reconnected with the formless, unintelligible Beginning, entering a state of dimness, and muddledness, which can join together in a new way with the determinate entities of the formed world (the “birdbeaks”
个体实体在这里被描述为源自原始非存在(不可理解的整体)内的分裂。每个实体都获得了这种无形性,这变成了它的Virtuosity(美德),从中衍生出其物理形式的连贯性,从中衍生出其内部规律性,即其“本质”。值得注意的是,事物的确定性质是由其物理形式得出的,而不是相反。技艺似乎不是任何特定的形式或性质,而仅仅是道本身无形的具体化版本,是“获得”的无形。我们也许可以简单地将其视为从任何特定形式的角度来看的无形性,不可理解性位于任何可理解的连贯性的根源,并且在过去和未来,任何可理解的连贯性被视为其自身的根源,开始和未来。结尾。我们将在《管子》篇章和《韩非老子注》中进一步发展这一思想,暂且讨论。如果这种精湛技艺被“回归”,个体的存在就会与无形的、难以理解的“开端”重新连接起来,进入一种昏暗和混乱的状态,它可以以一种新的方式与已形成的世界的确定实体(“鸟嘴”)结合在一起。 ”

here perhaps referring to the expression of various determinate words and positions as described in the “Qiwulun”). Coherence here is formed from and by incoherence, and has as its goal the reappropriation and reintegration of this original incoherence; in this version of the ironic tradition’s appropriation of non-ironic coherence, the real coherence is rooted in incoherence.
这里或许指的是《齐物论》中描述的各种确定的词语和立场的表达。这里的连贯性是由不连贯性形成的,其目标是重新利用和重新整合这种原始的不连贯性。在这个反讽传统对非反讽连贯性的挪用中,真正的连贯性植根于不连贯性。

THIRD TYPE: DAO AND LI BOTH IRONIC
第三种:道、礼皆反讽

An interesting contrast to these non-ironic usages of Li can be found in other later chapters of the Zhuangzi, where we find the third type of usage of Li in the text, bringing the meaning of coherence itself, even on the specific micro-level, fully into the realm of the ironic. Chapter 22, 知北遊 “Zhibeiyou” (“Knowledge Wandered North”) is among the chapters classified by Graham as representing an “Irrationalizing” development of Zhuangzian themes, as contrasted to the “Rationalizing” tendency of the “Autumn Floods” (“Qiushui”) chapter-a contrast that we can reframe in terms of our ironic/non-ironic schema. In this chapter, the term Li appears in several interesting contexts, very helpful for understanding the implications of the “ironic” deployment of this term. The first of these runs as follows:
与这些非讽刺性用法的有趣对比可以在《庄子》的其他后续章节中找到,我们在文本中发现了第三种“理”用法,带来了连贯本身的含义,甚至在特定的微观层面上也是如此。 ,完全进入了讽刺的境界。 《知北游》第22章“知北游”被格雷厄姆归类为代表庄子主题“非理性化”发展的章节之一,与“秋水漫漫”的“理性化”倾向形成鲜明对比。 《秋水》)一章——我们可以根据讽刺/非讽刺图式重新构建一个对比。在本章中,“李”一词出现在几个有趣的上下文中,对于理解该术语“讽刺”部署的含义非常有帮助。其中第一个运行如下:
Heaven and earth have great beauty [大美 da mei], but do not speak of them. The four seasons have unconcealed regularities [明法 ming fa] but do not dispute about them. The ten thousand things have perfectly completed coherences [成理 cheng L i L i LiL i ], but do not explain them. The sage traces the beauty of heaven and earth back and arrives at the coherences of the ten thousand things [緣天地之美而達萬物之理 yuan tiandi zhi mei er da wanwu zhi Li]. Thus the perfect man has no deliberate action, the great sage does not initiate anything, which is what is meant by watching heaven and earth. . . . Once things have died or been born, become square or round, no one knows their root. Floatingly the ten thousand things emerge from the past and have their certain existences. The vastness of the six directions is still within [this root], and tininess of an autumn hair relies on it to form a particular body. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
天地有大美,但不可言说。四时有明法明法,但不争。万事圆满相通 L i L i LiL i ],但不解释它们。圣人追溯天地之美,而达万物之理。故至人无为,大圣无为,是谓观天地。 。 。 。物一旦死生,方圆,无人知其根。万事从过去浮现出来,有其一定的存在。六方之广大,仍在其内,秋毫之细,依之而成一体。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
Beauty, regularities (i.e., regulations, patterns to be followed, statutes) and coherence ( m e i , f a , L i m e i , f a , L i mei,fa,Lim e i, f a, L i ) are all standard non-ironic values, and are presented as parallel here. Each is here contrasted with some form of intelligible expression: speaking, disputing, explaining. The contrastive “and yet” in each phrase suggests that normally beauty, regularity, and coherence
美感、规律性(即规则、要遵循的模式、法令)和连贯性( m e i , f a , L i m e i , f a , L i mei,fa,Lim e i, f a, L i )都是标准的非讽刺值,并在此处以并行方式呈现。这里每一个都与某种形式的可理解的表达形成对比:说话、争论、解释。每个短语中的对比“然而”表明通常美丽、规律性和连贯性

would be expected to be accompanied by intelligibility. The “great” beauty, “unconcealed” regularizations, and “perfectly formed” versions, however, are precisely those that lack intelligible expression. Note that “great,” “unconcealed,” and “fully formed” are all normally terms for visibility or ease in apprehension, the state of things easily seen-forms of coherence. This is exactly the point of the contrast: the real coherence is incoherent. This is a clear indication of the wedge between the valuable/balanced/togetherness aspect and the intelligibility aspect, the wedge that marks the ironic usage of these terms in Daoism. The truly valuable, balanced and inseparable coherence is that which is nonintelligible, and it is this that is instantiated in the non-action of the sage described in the remainder of the passage.
预计会伴随着可理解性。而“大美”、“无掩饰”的正则、“形体完美”的版本,恰恰是缺乏可理解的表达。请注意,“伟大”、“无蔽”和“完全形成”通常都是表示可见性或易于理解的术语,是事物容易看到的状态——连贯的形式。这正是对比的重点:真正的连贯性是不连贯的。这清楚地表明了有价值/平衡/团结方面和可理解性方面之间的楔子,这个楔子标志着这些术语在道教中的讽刺用法。真正有价值的、平衡的和不可分割的连贯性是不可理解的,而正是这一点在本文其余部分描述的圣人的无为中得到了体现。
The second example comes a few passages later in the same chapter, put into the mouth of Laozi, speaking to Confucius. After explaining that the bright (intelligible) comes from the dark (unintelligible), the formed from the unformed, and that the sage preserves that which remains unaugmented when added to and undiminished when taken from (i.e., the indeterminate unhewn Dao), he says:
第二个例子出现在同一章稍后的几段中,是从老子口中对孔子讲话的。在解释了光明(可理解的)来自黑暗(不可理解的),由未成形而形成的,以及圣人保留了增而未增、取而未减的东西(即不确定的未凿之道)之后,他说:
This Middle Kingdom is populated with “human beings,” but such creatures are ultimately neither Yin nor Yang. For they dwell between heaven and earth only temporarily assuming the form of a human being, always just on the verge of returning to their source. From the point of view of its root, life is just a temporarily congealed thing. Although some are long lived and some die young, how much of a difference is there really? It’s all a matter of no more than a single instant-what room is there for the rightness of Yao and the wrongness of Jie? Every fruition has its own coherence [果苽有理 guo luo you Li]. Although humans encounter difficulties in their interactions with one another, this is precisely how they are able to interlock. The sage meets them without rebelling, lets them pass without holding on to them. To respond to them after harmonizing them is a matter of Virtue, but to respond to them as if it were pure happenstance is a matter of the Way. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
这个中央王国虽然居住着“人类”,但这些生物最终既不是阴也不是阳。因为他们只是暂时以人的形式居住在天地之间,总是处于回归源头的边缘。从其根源来看,生命只是暂时凝结的东西。虽然有些人长寿,有些人英年早逝,但究竟有多大区别呢?只不过是一瞬间的事情而已,尧的对和桀的错还有什么余地呢?每一个果实都有它自己的连贯性[果苽有理guo luo you Li]。尽管人类在彼此互动时会遇到困难,但这正是他们能够相互联系的方式。圣人遇之不逆,放之不留。和而应之,是德;若应其纯然,则是道。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
The difficult, passing reference to Li here is one of the few places in the pre-Qin corpus where the term is used with an implication of its all-pervasiveness, as a term for the Omnipresent, a notion to be of great importance in both Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, where Li serves as the totalizing “universal universal” which is present everywhere. This passage is followed immediately by Zhuangzi’s famous “Dao is everywhere, even
这里对“礼”的艰难而短暂的提及是先秦语料库中为数不多的地方之一,该术语的使用暗示着其无所不在,作为无所不在的术语,这一概念在两方面都非常重要。在佛教和新儒家中,理是无处不在的总体性“普遍普遍性”。紧接着这段话的是庄子著名的“道无处不在,甚至

in the piss and shit” passage, further lending support to this interpretation, albeit circumstantially. It is important, however, that the text does not say simply that every insignificant object, no matter how small or neglected, has “Li” in it or to it, but that every “fruition” does. The term translated here as fruition is the binome guoluo. Guo denotes the fruits that grow on trees, luo those that grow on vines. If this is chosen not as a haphazard random example of any given object, the implication is perhaps that there is coherence to anything that comes to completion, to fruition, that, in other words, fruition is coherence. This would mean that when anything-whether a sage such as Yao or a villain like Jie-reaches its completion, it has its own sticking together, its intelligibility, its balanced harmony, its connection to its environment, and its value. The implication is brought home by the otherwise rather obscure following line: “Although humans encounter difficulties in their interactions with one another, this is precisely how they are able to interlock.” This is to say that “the difficulties,” like the villain Yao, are themselves a kind of fruition, a kind of coherence. What seems to lack inner harmony and balance, and doesn’t seem to cohere smoothly with the environment, which are not experienced with pleasure as non-ironic coherence is supposed to be, also have their coherence-they are the very means by which the humans interlock, that is, cohere (literally, interlock like teeth). This means that every formation and situation in a context, no matter how discordant, is also a way of cohering with a context, and this is the real (ironic) coherence that brings about the more readily recognizable forms of non-ironic coherence.
在“小便和大便”段落中,进一步支持了这种解释,尽管是间接的。然而,重要的是,文本并没有简单地说每一个微不足道的物体,无论多么小或被忽视,其中或对它都有“理”,而是每个“果”都有。这里翻译为“果”的术语是“binome guoluo”。果指的是树上的果子,罗指的是藤上的果子。如果这不是被选择作为任何给定对象的随意的例子,那么这可能意味着任何完成、实现的事物都具有连贯性,换句话说,实现就是连贯性。这就是说,任何事物,无论是尧这样的圣人,还是桀这样的小人,在完成时,都有它自己的凝聚力、它的可理解性、它的平衡和谐性、它与环境的联系和它的价值。下面那句晦涩难懂的台词让我们明白了这一含义:“尽管人类在彼此互动时遇到困难,但这正是他们能够相互联系的方式。”这就是说,“困难”就像小人姚一样,本身就是一种成果,一种连贯。看似缺乏内在的和谐与平衡,似乎与环境不和谐一致,没有像非讽刺的连贯性所应有的愉快体验,也有其连贯性——它们正是实现这一目标的手段。人类互锁,即凝聚(字面意思是像牙齿一样互锁)。这意味着语境中的每一种形式和情况,无论多么不和谐,也是与语境相一致的一种方式,这是真正的(反讽)连贯性,它带来了更容易识别的非反讽连贯性形式。
The full thrust of the ironic conception of Li is spelled out even more explicitly elsewhere in our text:
李的反讽概念的全部主旨在我们文本的其他地方得到了更明确的阐述:
To delight in clear vision is to be corrupted by visible forms. To delight in sharp hearing is to be corrupted by sounds. To delight in Humanity [ren] is to disorder Virtuosity. To delight in Rightness [ y i ] [ y i ] [yi][y i] is to violate Coherence [ L i ] . 14 [ L i ] . 14 [Li].^(14)[L i] .{ }^{14}
享受清晰的视觉就会被可见的形式所腐蚀。因听觉敏锐而感到高兴,就会被声音所腐蚀。乐于仁,则扰乱德。以正义为乐 [ y i ] [ y i ] [yi][y i] 就是违反一致性 [ L i ] . 14 [ L i ] . 14 [Li].^(14)[L i] .{ }^{14}
Notice here how the wedge is driven between Rightness and coherence, which were so intimately linked in the Mencius, and as we shall see again in the Guanzi texts and in the non-ironic tradition generally, where they tend to function as aspects of one another, and in the “Qiushui” passage of the Zhuangzi quoted above. Here, ironically, the explicit form of coherence, namely, Rightness, the separation into appropriate divisions, is a direct violation of genuine Coherence, which is necessarily unarticulated.
请注意这里的“正确”与“连贯”之间的楔子是如何形成的,它们在《孟子》中是如此紧密地联系在一起,并且正如我们将在《管子》文本和一般的非讽刺传统中再次看到的那样,它们往往作为彼此的各个方面发挥作用,以及上面引用的《庄子》的“秋水”段落。具有讽刺意味的是,在这里,连贯性的明确形式,即正确性,分成适当的部分,直接违反了真正的连贯性,而真正的连贯性必然是未明确表达的。
In another late chapter, we are told:
在后面的另一章中,我们被告知:
The sage’s birth is the process of Heaven, and his death is the transformation of things. At rest he shares in the Virtue of Yin, in motion he flows in the waves of Yang. He does not make himself a precursor of good fortune or an initiator of ill fortune. He responds only after feeling a stimulus, moves only when forced to move. He starts things only when there is no other choice. He discards knowledge and precedent, following only the coherences of Heaven [天理 tianli]. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
圣人的诞生是天的过程,他的死是事物的变化。静则分阴德,动则行阳波。他不会让自己成为好运的前兆或厄运的始作俑者。他只有在感受到刺激后才会做出反应,只有在被迫移动时才会移动。他只有在别无选择的情况下才开始做事。他抛弃知识和先例,只遵循天理天理。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
Here the “coherences of Heaven” (tianli) are explicitly contrasted with “knowledge and precedent,” which would be aspects of coherence and intelligibility in the non-ironic tradition. To follow genuine coherence means to discard the apparent coherent; real coherence is ironic coherence. These examples may be considered consistent with the “Irrationalizing” trend but at odds with the “Rationalizing” trend.
这里,“天理”与“知识和先例”明确对比,这将是非讽刺传统中的连贯性和可理解性的方面。遵循真正的连贯性意味着放弃表面上的连贯性。真正的连贯性是讽刺性的连贯性。这些例子可以被认为与“非理性化”趋势一致,但与“理性化”趋势不一致。
Many further examples of this turn of thought could be adduced within the developed ironic tradition; in all of them, we find a practical application, from the point of view of the individual existences, of the overall incoherence of real coherence. This is a compromise position that allows for a guideline to be established for action, circumventing the full-fledged Zhuangzian skepticism, but a rule that incorporates the non-ironic notion of coherence only to undermine it at the highest level, or to use this irony itself as a guiding rule for creating real coherence-value-in the world.
这种思想转变的许多进一步的例子可以在发达的讽刺传统中引用。在所有这些中,我们从个体存在的角度发现了真正连贯性的整体不连贯性的实际应用。这是一个妥协的立场,允许为行动建立一个指导方针,规避成熟的庄子怀疑论,但这一规则包含了一致性的非讽刺概念,只是为了在最高层面上破坏它,或者使用这种讽刺它本身就是在世界上创造真正的一致性价值的指导规则。
In the “irrationalizing” passages, then, we see a radical extension of the ironic usage that is, I think, consistent with the Laozi and Inner Chapters approach. Nonetheless, I classify it here as a “compromise” usage because of its willingness to suggest specific individual coherences with some application to particular things and classes, while excluding others, or at least the general acceptability of certain middle-level generalizations located somewhere between the unintelligibility of the Dao and the momentary coherence of individual experiences.
那么,在“非理性化”的段落中,我们看到了讽刺用法的彻底延伸,我认为这与《老子》和《内章》的方法是一致的。尽管如此,我在这里将其归类为“折衷”用法,因为它愿意建议特定个体与特定事物和类别的某些应用的一致性,同时排除其他事物,或者至少排除位于两者之间的某些中层概括的普遍可接受性。道的不可理解性和个人经验的短暂连贯性。

INTEGRATING TYPES TWO AND THREE
集成类型 2 和类型 3

This tendency is most explicitly marked in one more dialogue from the later parts of the Zhuangzi that must be considered here, since it addresses the question of natural kinds and coherences straight on, and may perhaps be regarded as an attempt to reconcile these two opposed attitudes-the rationalizing and the irrationalizing-toward local coherences within an ironic context. It comes in Chapter 25, and is considered by Graham to belong to the same school of thought as the “Autumn Floods” dialogue. However, we shall see that its treatment of the problem at hand differs significantly.
这种倾向在《庄子》后期部分的另一段对话中表现得最为明显,这里必须予以考虑,因为它直接讨论了自然种类和连贯性问题,并且也许可以被视为调和这两种对立态度的尝试。 -在讽刺的背景下对局部一致性的合理化和非理性化。它出现在第 25 章,格雷厄姆认为它与“秋季洪水”对话属于同一流派。然而,我们将看到它对当前问题的处理方式有很大不同。
The “Community Words” dialogue 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} begins by explicitly raising the question of what categories are, how things of the same type are grouped together into a single coherence:
“社区话语”对话 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 首先明确提出什么是类别、相同类型的事物如何组合在一起形成单一连贯性的问题:
Know-little asked Great Universal Reconciliation, “What is meant by ‘Community Words’ [丘里之言 qiu li zhi yan]?”
小知问大同:“丘里之言是什么意思?”
Great Universal Reconciliation replied, "A community is the joining of ten (family) surnames and a hundred (individual) names to form a set of customs [風俗 fengsu]. The different [異 yi] is joined into the same [同 tong], the same is dispersed into the different. For example, you can point to the hundred parts of a horse’s body and never come up with a horse, and yet the horse is right there, tethered in front of you; it is precisely through establishing the hundred parts that we call it ‘horse.’ For this reason, hills and mountains pile up the low to make the high, the Yangtse and the Yellow River join the small 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} to make the large. The great man joins and brings [things] together to make the universal [公 gong].
大和解曰:“十姓百名相合,为风俗,异异而同同,为共同体。”例如,你可以指着马身体的一百个部分,但永远也找不到一匹马,而马就在那里,拴在你的面前,正是通过建立;我们称之为“马”的一百个部分。故丘陵山峦叠低成高,长江黄河汇小。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 使大。伟大的人结合并汇集[事物]以形成普遍[公功]。
An observation is here made about recognizable grouping of things into types that share a single name-what we’d be inclined to call class names, general terms, universals, types, or natural kinds. These are explained, very significantly, by comparing words to communities. Communities, we are told, are the joining of individual human beings into a collectivity, forming customs that have a discernible identity. This is “the joining of the different into a unity,” which at the same time can be viewed in terms of its elements, the individuals that make up the community. As we have seen, it is characteristic of early Chinese thinking that in considering how singularities can be joined into a coherent unity, even when the ultimate topic of the discussion is the logical concepts of difference and sameness (異,同 yi,tong,terms used commonly by both the Mohist and the non-Mohist logicians), and “universal” or general terms, the initial concept is derived from the workings of human society, the interpersonal relations that take place in the social realm. Indeed, one of the most fundamental meanings of the word which I take loosely to mean universality or generality here (公 gong) is “public,” and its immediate sense has more to do with the lack of bias or partiality pertaining to the social totality, what is public, common or generally accepted (as opposed to the views or practices of some subgroup or individual), than with the logical notion of universality as a category or Form embracing a set of particulars. The undeniable fact that individuals gather together and come to form coherent social unities that in some sense transcend the sum of their parts is here used as the starting point for a discussion of how the same process occurs also in nature (e.g., in the horse and its parts), in
这里的观察是关于将可识别的事物分组为共享一个名称的类型——我们倾向于将其称为类名称、通用术语、共相、类型或自然类型。通过将词语与社区进行比较,可以非常有意义地解释这些问题。我们被告知,社区是将个体人类加入到一个集体中,形成具有可辨别身份的习俗。这是“将不同的事物结合成一个整体”,同时也可以从构成社区的各个元素来看待。正如我们所看到的,中国早期思维的特点是,在考虑如何将奇点连接成一个连贯的统一体时,即使讨论的最终主题是差异和相同的逻辑概念(异,同,同,术语)墨家逻辑学家和非墨家逻辑学家常用)和“普遍”或一般术语,最初的概念源自人类社会的运作,即社会领域中发生的人际关系。事实上,这个词最基本的含义之一是“公共”,我在这里宽泛地理解它的普遍性或普遍性,而它的直接含义更多地与社会整体性的缺乏偏见或偏袒有关。 ,什么是公共的、共同的或普遍接受的(而不是某些小组或个人的观点或做法),而不是用普遍性的逻辑概念作为包含一组细节的类别或形式。不可否认的事实是,个体聚集在一起并形成连贯的社会统一体,在某种意义上超越了各个部分的总和,这里被用作讨论相同过程如何在自然界中发生的起点(例如,在马及其部位),在

language, in the state, and finally, by way of contrast, in something called “Dao.”
在语言中,在国家中,最后,通过对比,在称为“道”的东西中。
The primary model for thinking of the relations between things here is not that of inert parts of an objective whole, a thing from which the observer stands abstracted, a whole whose parts are closely interrelated but still mutually exclusive, but rather the relation between members of a community. These interrelate in a very different way from members of a class of objects, particulars subsumed under a universal, or even parts of a whole. The whole/part relation here is cast in terms of the relation of a community’s customs, the forms of conventional behavior that allow its component members to communicate and cooperate and characterize it for other groups, pervading the individual participants and their specific social role identities. Each individual in a community in a sense fully instantiates, by virtue of his unconscious absorption and execution of generally accepted norms of behavior (風俗 fengsu, customs), the specific identity of this entire community. These customs are internal to and constitutive of each member’s behavior and identity. This involves more than just a shared characteristic or shared membership in a whole, or indeed the mere fact of harmonizing coherently: what makes them part of this whole is not only that they all are able to continue being a part of it, but that each has the total system of customs within himself. This is a way of describing how each part is in a certain sense the whole: as a son who internalizes the customs and norms of the father-son relation is joined to that relationship by the total system of norms, including those that pertain to the father to which he must respond, and the same is true of the father. Being a father requires an internalization of the entire father-son relation, and the same is true of being a son. Something like this model is applied more broadly here to an entire community: each one keeps to his role, but in so doing each is saturated with all the roles. The individual members share beliefs, ideas, customs, practices, which constitute each of the members differently and yet in such a way that they are not prevented from being a part of the content of one as much as of another.
这里,思考事物之间关系的主要模型不是一个客观整体的惰性部分的模型,一个观察者从中抽象出来的事物,一个其各部分密切相关但仍然相互排斥的整体,而是一个客观整体的成员之间的关系。一个社区。它们以一种非常不同的方式相互关联,不同于一类对象的成员、包含在普遍性之下的细节,甚至是整体的一部分。这里的整体/部分关系是根据社区习俗的关系来表达的,传统行为的形式允许其组成成员进行交流和合作,并为其他群体表征,渗透到个体参与者及其特定的社会角色身份中。在某种意义上,一个共同体中的每个个体凭借其无意识地吸收和执行普遍接受的行为规范(风俗风俗),充分实例化了整个共同体的特定身份。这些习俗是每个成员的行为和身份的内在组成部分。这不仅仅是一个整体的共同特征或共同成员资格,或者实际上是连贯协调的事实:使他们成为这个整体的一部分的不仅是他们都能够继续成为这个整体的一部分,而且每个人都能够成为这个整体的一部分。他自己有一套完整的习俗体系。这是描述每个部分在某种意义上如何成为整体的一种方式:作为一个将父子关系的习俗和规范内化的儿子,通过整个规范体系(包括那些与父子关系有关的规范体系)将父子关系与这种关系结合起来。他必须回应父亲,父亲也是如此。作为父亲需要将整个父子关系内化,作为儿子也是如此。 像这样的模型在这里更广泛地应用于整个社区:每个人都坚守自己的角色,但这样做时每个人都被所有角色所饱和。各个成员共享信仰、想法、习俗、实践,这些信仰、想法、习俗、做法构成了每个成员的不同,但以这样一种方式,它们不会被阻止成为一个成员的内容的一部分,就像另一个成员的内容的一部分一样。
This socially conceived convergence of oneness and difference of the parts joined into a whole is further compared to a horse’s body, which can be analyzed into its component parts, or seen as a totality, a horse. When thinking of it as merely these hundred parts, we cannot perceive how it can be a single unified horse, for these parts appear to be disparate and mutually exclusive; nonetheless, it is due to these very parts that we get the horse. As Graham points out, 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} this is an explicit rejection of the adequacy of the whole-part relation as usually conceived, and amounts to saying that the whole, the horse, is more than the sum of its parts, and can never be understood in terms of analysis into these parts, which, thus analyzed, remain
这种社会观念中各部分连接成一个整体的统一性和差异性的融合被进一步与马的身体进行了比较,马的身体可以被分析为它的组成部分,或者被视为一个整体,一匹马。当我们把它仅仅看作这一百个部分时,我们无法理解它如何能够成为一匹统一的马,因为这些部分看起来是不同的、相互排斥的;尽管如此,正是由于这些部分,我们才得到了这匹马。正如格雷厄姆指出的那样, 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 这是对通常所设想的整体与部分关系的充分性的明确拒绝,相当于说整体,即马,大于其各部分的总和,并且永远不能通过对这些部分的分析来理解,如此分析,仍然是

exclusive of and separate from one another. Nonetheless, we can identify and separate these parts in thought, and at the same time see that these differences are joined, and in fact do in some sense equal the whole, for there is no whole apart from these very parts. What is more, to anticipate what is to come, the very functioning of the parts together in terms of their interactions with one another may be said to express the “horsiness” of each of the parts, just as the interactions of the role identities in the society are expressive of the customs that characterize that society. This is the second step of the argument, another vivid example of how differences are joined into coherences, and the paradoxes to which this relation leads when thought about in overly rigid terms, in terms of the mutual exclusivity of objects. We can understand the joining of these parts into a whole that is greater than their analyzable sum, the dialogue suggests, only by analogy to the joining of individuals to form customs in a community. To apply the original analogy, the community is not the sum of its members; on the contrary, there is something more to the community than the atomistic and disparate individual members considered in themselves. This something more is precisely the customs (fengsu) which are part of the makeup of each of them, which bind them into one organically functioning whole, a whole that is complete, in an adumbrated form, in each of its parts. This is how it comes about that “the different is joined to make the same, the same scattered to make the different.”
彼此排斥并分开。尽管如此,我们可以在思想上识别和分离这些部分,同时看到这些差异是相连的,实际上在某种意义上等于整体,因为除了这些部分之外,没有任何整体。更重要的是,为了预测即将发生的事情,各个部分在彼此相互作用方面的共同运作可以说表达了每个部分的“马性”,就像角色身份的相互作用一样。社会表达了该社会特有的习俗。这是论证的第二步,是另一个生动的例子,说明如何将差异结合成连贯性,以及当以过于严格的术语(即对象​​的相互排他性)来思考这种关系时会导致的悖论。对话表明,我们只能通过类比个体在社区中结合形成习俗来理解这些部分结合成一个大于其可分析总和的整体。套用原来的类比,社区并不是其成员的总和;而是社区的整体。相反,对于共同体来说,除了原子性的、不同的个体成员本身之外,还有更多的东西。更确切地说,这就是风俗,它是每个人构成的一部分,将它们结合成一个有机运作的整体,一个在每个部分都以一种暗示的形式完整的整体。这就是“异而同,同散而异”的道理。
Grand Universal Reconciliation continues by extending this principle to other natural phenomena, and finally to the “Great Man” himself. Mountains are a unification of the low into the high, rivers are the unification of the small into the great. These natural things are described here as the unification of qualitative opposites, of small and large, or rather as the unification of the small to form the large, just as a community collects the different to form the same. It is of the essence that we strive to understand this strange assertion. This comparison works on a number of levels; small and large are opposites, as are different and same, individuals and communities; the two poles are joined in each case by showing how one pole actually consists of the other: the large is just the unification of the small, oneness is just the joining of the diverse. What is essential in all this is just this ability to join the things in question, and thereby to create a completely new quality: the joining of the small produces, not just more smallness, but its opposite, largeness, just as the joining of individual identities yielded not just a bunch of individuals, but something quite different, a community distinguished by an identifiable set of customs, or as the unity of parts yielded not just a collection of parts, but its opposite, a whole. Behind both these images is the primary sense of joining individuals human beings together to form collective groups with pervasive norms, that is, something that comes
大宇宙和解继续将这一原则扩展到其他自然现象,并最终扩展到“伟人”本人。山是低到高的统一,河是小到大的统一。这些自然事物在这里被描述为大小对立的统一,或者更确切地说,是小到大的统一,就像一个社区收集不同的形成相同的一样。我们努力理解这个奇怪的断言是至关重要的。这种比较适用于多个层面;小和大是对立的,个体和群体是不同和相同的;在每种情况下,两个极点都通过展示一个极点实际上如何由另一个极点组成而结合起来:大只是小的统一,统一只是多样化的结合。所有这一切的本质就是这种将所讨论的事物结合在一起的能力,从而创造出一种全新的品质:微小的结合产生的不仅是更小的,而且是相反的,大的,就像个体的结合一样身份不仅产生了一群个体,而且产生了一些完全不同的东西,一个以一套可识别的习俗为特征的社区,或者部分的统一不仅产生了部分的集合,而且产生了它的对立面,一个整体。这两个图像背后的主要意义是将人类个体结合在一起,形成具有普遍规范的集体群体,也就是说,某种东西

to be shared within each of them, and indeed is as constitutive of them as they are of it, but involves a transformation thereby into the opposite: this is the essence of the ironic move (by being more X , more coherently X , it ceases to be X ). We may view it as a development of the “balance of opposites” entailed in the non-ironic view of the Center, of the type seen in Qian Mu’s pendulum example, into something more radical, an actual convergence of the opposites.
在它们每个人内部共享,并且确实是它们的构成要素,但涉及到相反的转变:这是讽刺性举动的本质(通过成为更多 X ,更连贯 X ,它停止为 X )。我们可以将其视为对中心的非讽刺观点所包含的“对立平衡”的发展,即钱穆钟摆例子中所见的类型,发展为更激进的东西,对立面的实际融合。
The role of man, and thus of language, is brought back explicitly in the next line, stating that the Great Man joins disparate things together and arrives at universality, generality, impartiality, publicness (gong, echoing the name of the imaginary being who is speaking). This term may be taken to imply, as we shall see in more detail below, the unbiased totality of a community that shares customs which in their entirety are lodged in each member, interfusing and constituting the identity of each, as well as enabling their interactions. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} The Great Man brings this interfusion to all things, joining them all into a whole that is constitutive of all its parts. Here we have the introduction of a particular kind of coherence of all things, gong, a relation explicitly compared to that between the customs of a community and the members of that community. The Great Man embodies the coherence of these customs, dwelling within them, and thereby bestows a greater coherence on the community itself, as we saw in the Mencius, and beyond the human also into the community of nature, as we saw in the Xunzi.
人的角色,以及语言的角色,在下一行中被明确地带回来,指出伟人将不同的事物连接在一起,并达到普遍性、普遍性、公正性、公开性(功,与想象中的存在的名字相呼应)请讲)。正如我们将在下面更详细地看到的那样,这个术语可以被认为是一个社区的公正整体,该社区具有共同的习俗,这些习俗完全存在于每个成员中,融合并构成了每个成员的身份,并促进了他们的互动。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 伟人将这种融合带到了万物中,将它们连接成一个由各个部分组成的整体。这里我们引入了一种特殊的万事万物的连贯性,即“功”,这种关系明确地类似于一个社区的习俗和该社区成员之间的关系。大人体现了这些习俗的连贯性,寓于其中,从而赋予共同体本身更大的连贯性,正如我们在孟子中看到的那样,并且超越人类也进入了自然共同体,正如我们在荀子中看到的那样。
But here this involves a necessary reversal, irony, incoherence to this greatest coherence. To see what is here meant by this joining of all things into coherence, and how the Great Man goes about it, we must read on:
但在这里,这涉及到对这种最大连贯性的必要逆转、讽刺和不连贯。要了解万物一体连贯的含义,以及伟人是如何做到这一点的,我们必须继续阅读:
For this reason, that which comes in [to him] from without has a host to receive it without being [exclusively] clung to. What comes from within [him] is able to rectify [affect other things] without being rejected.
因此,从外面进来的东西,有主人接受它,而不是执着。从[他]内部出来的东西能够纠正[影响其他事物]而不被拒绝。
The great man joins all things into universality, 公 gong: this is the “community word” par excellence, one that also describes the characteristic function of communities and of community words. Here we see the further implications of his mastery of these community words, and the universality they bring with them. In light of the entire passage, I interpret the “for this reason” here to mean, “Because the Great Man has grasped this idea of gong, i.e., interfusing and constitutive totality, the relation of customs to a member of a community . . .” Here I believe the discussion is returning to the original topic, namely, words. The words of a great man are community words, they are gong, and thus he interacts with his community in
伟人将万物合而为一,“公公”:这是最优秀的“共同体词”,也描述了共同体和共同体词的特有功能。在这里,我们看到了他对这些社区词汇的掌握的进一步含义,以及它们带来的普遍性。结合整段文字,我把这里的“因此”解释为:“因为伟人掌握了这个功的概念,即交融性和构成性的整体性,习俗与共同体成员的关系……”。 。 ”。我想这里的讨论又回到了最初的话题,即文字。伟人的言语是共同体的言语,是功,所以他与共同体的互动是

the way described here. “That which comes in to him from without”-that is, the words other members of his community address to him-“has a host to receive it”-that is, can be understood and properly apprehended, since the customs and conventions underlying these words are present in both the speaker and the listener-“but is not exclusively clung to”-since he has apprehended the totality and its constitution of all the parts, he is not misled by a partial perspective from one particular member of the community, but sees also its connection to the whole, to the words and beliefs of the community, which may include contrary beliefs or ideas from the ones explicitly expressed at any particular time. “What comes from within him”-i.e., his own words-“has that which it rectifies”-again, because the entirety of the community’s customs and conventions is complete in each of its members, so that the custom-based universality in his words corresponds with that in the listener, and is able to affect and transform, to influence other members of the community-“and is not rejected”-for his words tally with those customs and accord with the sentiment of the whole; hence, all the members of the community accept his words. These are community words in two senses; they are words that are in actual practice gong, since they are accepted and practiced by the total group. They are also community words in that they bring all things together, gather the individual inanimate objects of various kinds and unify them into single terms and expressions, what we would be tempted to call universals. But even here it is to be stressed that this universality has the primary significance of being a shared part of the experience of the community, rather than any indication of a real kind or abstract class of objects in the world. Moreover, this gong is explicitly linked with its instantiation in the person of an authoritative individual; it is the entirety of the community not as such, but as made coherent via his gaze. A user of words has correctly grasped them as “community words” if he understands them as corresponding in this unbiased manner with the total usage of the word in the community, so that as a listener he is impartial and undeceived, and as a speaker he is convincing. These, and not any kind of correspondence or accuracy, are the standards by which the appropriateness of his words are to be judged. We may be reminded here of Xunzi’s proposed regulation of general terms; they are right when the community agrees upon them. In Xunzi’s case, of course, this was to be effected by directives from above, whereas in the current passage the suggestion is that the Great Man finds the real commonalities of reference of his community within himself, and speaks accordingly, thereby creating a discourse that has real efficacy within that community-indeed, making that community cohere to an extent (i.e., his words are not rejected, a coherence between himself and his community is created) through his own verbal continuations of its incipient commonalities.
这里描述的方式。 “从外部进入他的东西”——也就是说,他的社区的其他成员对他说的话——“有一个主人来接受它”——也就是说,可以被理解和正确理解,因为背后的习俗和惯例这些话在说话者和听者身上都存在——“但并非完全执着”——因为他已经理解了整体及其所有部分的构成,所以他不会被社会中某一特定成员的片面观点所误导。 ,但也看到它与整体、与社区的言论和信仰的联系,其中可能包括与在任何特定时间明确表达的信仰或想法相反的信仰或想法。 “来自他内心的东西”——即他自己的话——“有它所纠正的东西”——再次,因为社区的整个习俗和惯例在其每个成员中都是完整的,因此,基于习俗的普遍性在他的成员中是完整的。言语与听者的言语相符,能够影响、转化、影响社会的其他成员——“而不被排斥”——因为他的言语符合那些习惯,符合全体的情感;因此,社区所有成员都接受他的话。这些是有两种含义的社区词汇:这是实实在在的炼功的话,是全组都接受、炼的。它们也是共同体词,因为它们将所有事物聚集在一起,聚集各种单独的无生命物体并将它们统一为单个术语和表达方式,我们很想称之为共相。 但即使在这里,也需要强调的是,这种普遍性的主要意义是成为社区经验的共享部分,而不是世界上真实的或抽象的物体类别的任何指示。而且,这个功与它在权威人士身上的体现有明确的联系。它不是整个社区本身,而是通过他的目光而变得连贯的。如果一个词语的使用者将它们理解为以这种公正的方式与该词在社区中的总体用法相对应,那么他就正确地把它们理解为“社区词”,因此作为听者,他是公正的和不被欺骗的,作为说话者,他是公正的和不被欺骗的。是有说服力的。这些,而不是任何形式的对应或准确性,才是判断他的话是否恰当的标准。这里我们可能会想起荀子提出的对一般术语的规定;当社区同意他们时,他们就是对的。当然,在荀子的例子中,这是通过来自上面的指令来实现的,而在当前的段落中,建议是伟人在自己内部找到了他的社区的真正共同点,并据此说话,从而创造了一种话语在该社区内具有真正的效力——事实上,通过他自己对早期共性的口头延续,使该社区在一定程度上具有凝聚力(即,他的话语没有被拒绝,他和他的社区之间建立了一致性)。
In sum, the Great Man is here depicted as a part within the whole who nonetheless represents or encompasses the whole, that is, the universal, custom, identity of whole, and hence he fosters the effective interaction between the parts of the whole, via the analogy of these words/information which serve as tokens of the universal/custom/identity of the whole. A similar doubleness to the meaning of “universality” is discernible, as we have seen, in the Mencius, where the “nature” (xing) proper to the human species is both (1) what all humans have in common at birth, and what distinguishes them from other species, and (2) what actively unifies them as a group, in that the perfect exemplification of this nature, its complete development and display as accomplished by a sage, necessarily attracts, binds, subdues, and transforms all the other members of this group, inspiring them to rally around him and become a true community which shares the salutary customs he embodies. A similar conception, structuring the concept of universality on the model of the “universal man” within the community, can be discerned in many Warring States works, which perhaps suggests that we may single it out as a premise shared widely, which can partially account, as it does here, for some of the unexpected turns of thought in works from this period.
总之,伟人在这里被描述为整体中的一部分,但他仍然代表或包含整体,即整体的普遍性、习惯性、同一性,因此,他通过以下方式促进了整体各部分之间的有效互动:这些词语/信息的类比,作为整体的普遍/习俗/身份的象征。正如我们在《孟子》中所看到的,“普遍性”含义的类似双重性是显而易见的,其中人类特有的“性”既是(1)所有人类出生时所共有的,也是(1)所有人类在出生时所共有的。是什么将它们与其他物种区分开来,以及(2)是什么将它们积极地统一为一个群体,因为这种本质的完美体现,它的完整发展和展示,如圣人所完成的,必然吸引、束缚、征服和转变所有的生物。该群体的其他成员,激励他们团结在他周围,成为一个真正的社区,分享他所体现的有益习俗。在许多战国作品中都可以看到类似的概念,即以共同体内的“普遍人”的模式构建普遍性概念,这或许表明我们可以将其单独作为一个广泛共享的前提,这可以部分解释正如这里所做的那样,这一时期的作品中出现了一些意想不到的思想转变。
It is in this context that the text finally introduces the term Li , and drives home the irony of the overriding conception of Dao at work in this exposition of the “unbiased”:
正是在这种背景下,本文最终引入了“理”一词,并在“无偏”的阐述中揭示了道的压倒性概念的讽刺意义:
The four seasons have their different breaths, but Heaven is not partial 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} to any of them, and thus the year comes into being. The five bureaus of government have their different duties, but the ruler is not partial to any of them, and thus the state is well governed. Literature and war [are different skills], 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} but the Great Man is partial to neither, and hence his virtue is complete. All things have their different coherences, but Dao is not partial to any of them, and thus it has no name [萬物殊理,道不私,故無名 wanwushuli daobusi guwuming]. Since it has no name, it has no activity. It has no activity, but there is nothing it does not do.
四时有不同的气息,天却不偏不倚 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 对于他们中的任何一个人来说,这一年就这样诞生了。五官各司其职,而君主不偏袒其中任何一个,所以国家治理得很好。文学和战争[是不同的技能], 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 大人不偏爱,所以德圆满。万物有其不同的相性,而道不偏于任何一种,因而无名。因为它没有名字,所以它没有活动。它没有任何活动,但没有什么是它不做的。
At this point, the argument undergoes a slight shift in direction. We have just been speaking about the behavior of the Great Man, how he joins things together in words, and how these words tally with the community at large, thus bringing them together as well. Now, however, we are told of the processes of nature and government, and from there of Dao itself. These are all asserted to be analogous to the behavior of the Great Man just adduced, to wit, his use of community words. Specifically, they are analogous because these things also come to completion by means of “not being partial” to any
至此,争论的方向发生了轻微的转变。我们刚才谈到了伟人的行为,他如何用言语将事物联系在一起,以及这些言语如何与整个社会相符,从而将它们联系在一起。然而现在,我们被告知自然和政府的过程,以及道本身的过程。这些都被认为与刚才列举的伟人的行为类似,即他对社区词语的使用。具体来说,它们是相似的,因为这些事情也是通过“不偏”于​​任何事物来完成的。

part. The Great Man, in his use of language, apprehends the whole (the total set of linguistic customs and their entire unifying scope embracing all things as they cohere with this particular community) inherent in each of the parts (a particular word spoken by a particular member of the community at a particular time), and his words tally with this totality, thereby not being biased toward any one part, and including the opposite side of each particular that happens to be before him. This is because the model of part/whole relations here is still that of the member to his community, where the entire set of customs is embodied, intuitively known, and enacted by each individual member. In the same way, in the “community” of words, each single word or linguistic act has “within” it, as its meaning context, the entire system of speech and names, the “customary” behavior of the words and their custom-based unifications within that linguistic community. The opposite of this particular word is involved in that this opposite is also included in the whole adumbrated therein; whatever else besides the particular part being explicitly articulated at the moment is in the totality is also in each of the parts, and this is what is expressed in the community words of the Great Man. To the Great Man, all words spoken by members of the community have ultimately only one referent: the coherence of this community itself, the customs that makes this community a coherent whole. Thus, the parts are not mutually exclusive, since each contains within itself the totality, including the opposites of itself. Here we may see an expansion on Zhuang Zhou’s point in the “Inner Chapters” about opposites as entailing one another, where each part contains the entirety of the opposition.
部分。伟人在使用语言时,理解了每个部分(特定的人所说的特定词)所固有的整体(语言习惯的总集及其整个统一范围,包含与这个特定社区相一致的所有事物)。特定时间的社区成员),并且他的话语符合这一整体,因此不偏向任何一个部分,并且包括恰好在他面前的每个特定的相反方面。这是因为这里的部分/整体关系模型仍然是成员与其社区的模型,其中整套习俗由每个成员具体体现、直观地了解和制定。同样,在词语的“共同体”中,每个词语或语言行为的“内部”都有作为其意义语境的整个言语和名称系统、词语的“习惯”行为及其习惯。基于该语言社区内的统一。这个特定词的反义词涉及到这个反义词也包含在其中所暗示的整体中;除了现在所明确表达的特定部分之外,其他的一切都在整体中,也在各个部分中,这就是伟人的社区语言所表达的。对于伟人来说,社区成员所说的所有话语最终都只有一个所指:这个社区本身的连贯性,使这个社区成为一个连贯整体的习俗。因此,这些部分并不是相互排斥的,因为每个部分本身都包含着整体,包括其自身的对立面。在这里,我们可以看到庄周在《内篇》中关于对立面相互蕴含的观点的扩展,其中每一部分都包含了对立面的整体。
Similarly, the text suggests, the total year is in the spring, in that it was the year as a whole, the alternation of all four seasons, that make spring what it is; the same is true for each of the other members of the group, the other three seasons. The year is to them what the totality of customs of the community are to each individual member of the community, or what the total community’s language is to a single speech act. By allowing each of these partial manifestations, showing no special preference to any, hence applying this “universality” or generality, this principle of impartiality and constitutive totality complete in each part-the principle reflected in the Great Man’s use of community words-nature makes the totality of the year. The same pattern is visible in the relation between the ruler and the bureaus of government, and to the Great Man himself in his cultivation of particular virtues; the opposites and contrasts are seen as complementary, mutually implicating and interpenetrating, and thus partiality is avoided. All this is the same principle as that implicit in the Great Man’s use of words, which likewise embrace the universality of things, the totality of customs and conventions of the community and its collective apprehension of things, and thus his words, the names he uses,
同样,文本表明,全年都是在春天,因为正是一年作为一个整体,所有四个季节的交替,才使春天成为了它的样子。对于该团体的其他成员以及其他三个赛季来说也是如此。对他们而言,年份就如同社群的整体习俗之于社群的每个个体成员,或者社群的整体语言之于单一的言语行为。通过允许这些部分的表现中的每一个,对任何一个不表现出特殊的偏好,从而应用这种“普遍性”或普遍性,这种公正性和构成整体性的原则在每一部分中都得到了完善——这体现在伟人使用共同体语言中的原则——自然使一年的总和。同样的模式也体现在统治者与政府部门之间的关系中,以及伟人本人在培养特殊美德时的关系中。对立和对比被视为互补、相互牵连、相互渗透,从而避免偏颇。所有这些都与伟人的用词所隐含的原则相同,同样包含事物的普遍性、社会习俗和惯例的总体性以及对事物的集体理解,因此他的言语、他使用的名称,

are unifiers of opposites, bring all things and people into oneness, are gong like Heaven and the ruler of the state.
是对立的统一体,使万物和人成为一体,是功如天,是国家的主宰。
But then, when we begin to speak of Dao, there comes an important difference. At first the relation between Dao and all things, with their coherences, is exactly parallel to that of the last three cases. But the conclusion is somewhat surprising: we are told, not that Dao is complete or universal due to its not being partial to any one principle, but rather that it therefore “has no name.” Here, unlike in the “Autumn Floods” dialogue, we are dealing with coherence in its ironic sense. This is a jump; for were we not just told that precisely names had the ability to be impartial, to join things together in this special way? Why then does Dao’s comprehensiveness preclude name, since words, in the arguments so far advanced, are precisely the conveyers of comprehensiveness, of intercommunication and interpenetration of the community and of the objects of its experience?
但是,当我们开始谈论“道”时,就出现了一个重要的区别。首先,道与万物的关系及其连贯性,与后三种情况完全平行。但结论有些令人惊讶:我们被告知,道之所以是完整的或普遍的,并不是因为它不偏向于任何一个原则,而是因为它因此“无名”。在这里,与“秋水漫漫”的对话不同,我们正在处理具有讽刺意义的连贯性。这是一个跳跃;因为我们不是刚刚被告知,正是名字有能力公正地、以这种特殊的方式将事物连接在一起吗?那么,为什么道的全面性排除了名称,因为在迄今为止的论证中,文字恰恰是共同体及其经验对象的全面性、相互交流和相互渗透的传达者?
The answer is that this assertion acknowledges another property of words; not the integrating function of language as a communal unifier, but the specifying function of any one particular word qua particular-Zhuang Zhou’s point about terms such as “this” and “I.” To put it another way, this assertion acknowledges the flip side of the integrating function of language, its “shadow,” which is the fact that in language this unification must always be accompanied by simultaneous division and separation. To specify any one determination in particular is to contrast it to what it is not, to negate something. To identify a given class or universal (hence unifying a group of particulars), by means of a name, is to distinguish (hence separate) it from other classes; to use a word is always simultaneously to compare and contrast things, two meanings conveniently summed up in the Chinese word bi, as we shall see below. What we see in this turn of the argument is a sort of bringing of the principle so far elaborated as pertaining to community words, namely, the ability to join individual members into a whole, enabling their interactions, sustaining them as a comprehensive entity, to its logical conclusion: What about the most comprehensive unity of all? Does the same thing still apply? Here a self-generated surprise emerges: in the case of Dao, the largest comprehensiveness or gong, the very same process implies its own opposite (a sort of metalevel joining of opposites). What combined individuals into some distinctive “name” (an indwelling comprehensiveness unifying the members, and identifying the whole) now results precisely in “namelessness.” Dao’s comprehensive inclusivity necessarily precludes the assignation of any one name to it. Since Dao is “not partial” to any given intelligible coherence ( L i L i LiL i ), it can have no particular name, for this would specify one particular meaning to the exclusion of all others and hence be an instance of just such partiality. Thus, the comprehensiveness of the community words used by the Great Man, which brings differences into oneness,
答案是这个断言承认了词语的另一个属性:不是语言作为公共统一词的整合功能,而是任何一个特定词作为特定词的指定功能——庄周关于“此”和“我”等术语的观点。换句话说,这一断言承认了语言整合功能的另一面,即它的“影子”,即在语言中,这种统一必然总是同时伴随着分裂和分离。特别指定任何一项决定,就是将其与它所不存在的事物进行对比,否定某事物。通过名称来识别给定的类别或普遍性(从而统一一组特殊事物),就是将其与其他类别区分开来(从而将其分开);使用一个词总是同时对事物进行比较和对比,这两个含义可以方便地概括在中文词“bi”中,正如我们将在下面看到的。我们在这一论点中看到的是一种迄今为止所阐述的与社区词语有关的原则,即,将个体成员连接成一个整体的能力,使他们能够互动,维持他们作为一个综合实体,以它的逻辑结论是:最全面的统一又如何呢?同样的事情仍然适用吗?这里出现了一个自我产生的惊喜:就“道”而言,最大的综合性或“功”,同样的过程意味着它自己的对立面(一种对立面的元层次结合)。将个体组合成某种独特的“名称”(一种内在的综合性,将成员统一起来,并识别整体)现在恰恰导致了“无名”。道的全面包容性必然排除给它指定任何一个名称。 由于道“不偏向”任何给定的可理解的连贯性( L i L i LiL i ),它可以没有特定的名称,因为这将指定一个特定的含义而排除所有其他含义,因此成为这种偏爱的一个实例。因此,伟人所用的社会用语的全面性,使差异化为统一,

is still only a partial comprehensiveness, dependent still on contrast to what is outside itself in any given instance; when this principle of all-inclusivity is extended to its logical conclusion, in the case of the Dao, it overcomes itself into namelessness, into unintelligibility, indiscernibility. So far here, as in the second type of ironic incorporation of non-ironic themes seen above, we have Li and Dao in a kind of part/whole relation, where Li are the individual, discernible, limited coherences, and Dao is the overarching coherence of these coherences, which is for that reason unlimited and indiscernible, incoherent, nameless. Dao is ironic coherence, but Li are non-ironic coherences.
仍然只是部分全面性,仍然依赖于在任何特定情况下与自身之外的事物的对比;当这种包罗万象的原则延伸到其逻辑结论时,就道而言,它就会克服自身变得无名、不可理解、不可辨别。到目前为止,正如上面看到的第二种非讽刺主题的反讽结合,我们把理和道置于一种部分/整体的关系中,其中理是个体的、可辨别的、有限的连贯性,而道是总体性的。这些连贯性的连贯性,因此是无限的、不可辨别的、不连贯的、无名的。道是反讽的连贯性,而礼是非反讽的连贯性。
This namelessness, moreover, is here asserted to be somehow analogous to the completion of the year, the governing of the state, and the perfection of individual power or virtue. And the relation of Dao to individual coherences is analogous to the relation between heaven and the seasons, the ruler and the bureaus, the Great Man and his virtues. This suggests what is confirmed in the following lines, to wit, that this namelessness is not yet the total eradication of language, but rather another particular case of inclusivity, which includes other such cases, all of language and all particularity, within itself-hence, “there is nothing it does not do.” The impartiality of nature in making the year does not eradicate spring and autumn; it merely eradicates the mutual exclusion or sunderedness of each of them with respect to the other. The same is true of Dao and language, or specific names, accomplishments, or non-ironic intelligible coherences. “Because it has no name it does nothing. It does nothing, but there is nothing it does not do.” The latter is one of two instances in the entire Zhuangzi where this famous phrase of the Laozi is quoted, but the context gives this familiar Daoist truism new implications. To be everything and nothing, to be all names and no names, to accomplish everything and nothing is here asserted to be analogous to being a horse and yet the parts of a horse, or being the customs of a community and yet being the role behavior of all its individual members. Because it has no particular name, nothing particular can be predicated of it, hence it cannot be said to “do” anything in particular. But this non-doing is unnamable precisely because it is a doing and being of everything, and is partial to none; hence, it has no negation, nothing outside itself with which to be contrasted, and thus no determination, no name. This non-doing is not the exclusion of all activity, but precisely the inclusion of all activity, just as the customs are not the exclusion of the behavior of the individuals, the year is not the exclusion of the seasons and the namelessness is not the exclusion of all meanings, but rather their comprehensive impartial inclusion, and indeed the glue immanent in each member which enables them to function together. It is their coherence, in the sense of their sticking together, and in the sense of what
此外,这里断言这种无名在某种程度上类似于年份的结束、国家的治理以及个人权力或美德的完善。道与个人连贯性的关系,类似于天与季节、君与官、伟人与德的关系。这表明以下几行所证实的内容,即这种无名性还不是语言的彻底根除,而是包容性的另一种特殊情况,其中包括其他此类情况,所有语言和所有特殊性,都在其自身之内——因此,“没有什么是它做不到的。”大自然造年的公正性,不消灭春秋;它只是消除了彼此之间的相互排斥或分裂。对于道和语言,或者具体的名称、成就或者非讽刺的可理解的连贯性来说,也是如此。 “因为它没有名字,所以什么也不做。它什么也没做,但也没有什么是它不做的。”后者是整个《庄子》中引用《老子》这句名言的两个例子之一,但上下文赋予了这一熟悉的道家真理新的含义。既是一切又是无名,是有名又无名,是有名又无名,是有名又无名,是有名又无名,既是一匹马又是马的一部分,或者是一个社会的风俗却又是角色行为。其所有个人成员。因为它没有特定的名称,所以不能谓之有任何特定的东西,因此不能说它“做”任何特定的事情。 但这种无为是不可名状的,因为它是一切事物的作为和存在,并且不偏向任何事物。因此,它没有否定,没有任何外部事物可以与之对比,因此没有规定,没有名称。这种无为并不是排斥一切活动,而是包容一切活动,正如风俗不排斥个人的行为,年份不排斥季节,无名不排斥一样。排除所有意义,而是将它们全面、公正地包含在内,实际上是每个成员内在的粘合剂,使它们能够共同发挥作用。这是他们的连贯性,从他们粘在一起的意义上来说,从他们的意义来说

makes them function “coherently” as themselves, as particular coherently intelligible identities. The inclusiveness of community words here reaches its ultimate culmination, which also happens to be the apparent contradiction of itself-and indeed, the joining of such contradictions is precisely what can be accomplished by the unities brought about by the Great Man’s community words and Dao’s nameless nonactivity which does everything.
使它们作为自身“连贯地”发挥作用,作为特定的连贯可理解的身份。共同体语言的包容性在这里达到了极致,而这也恰好是其自身表面上的矛盾——事实上,这种矛盾的结合正是伟人共同体语言与道无名所带来的统一所能达到的。无所作为。
To sum up, we are told here that “Universal/custom/identity” means “unbiased to any part,” and moreover that it is precisely the presence of this in each of the parts which allows the communication between parts, the intelligible identity of each part, and the effective function of the whole. The whole is a whole because it is inherent in each part. Given this premise, Dao is adduced as the largest of all categories, the universal of universals, the universal/impartial/public/custom/identity present in each being and unifying all beings, that is, all actions, things, principles and names, that is, all parts, which enables them to function together, to interact, to form a whole. But, as the customs are not identifiable with any family or individual customary roles in the community, nor the horse with any part or combination of parts of horse-parts, Dao, as unbiased, can have no particular name, action, or identity. Thereby it enables all actions, names, identities. The function of names and words, as unifying, here reaches its ultimate term and in so doing negates and overcomes itself: the ultimate unifying word, “community word,” Dao, can be no word. The ultimate coherence cannot be coherent. It can only be adduced in an ironic sense. We have here the ironic idea of omnipresence combined with a non-ironic ideal of sagehood, the Great Man, who is able to embody the totality through other means, as in the pre-ironic texts.
综上所述,这里告诉我们“通用/定制/同一性”意味着“对任何部分不偏不倚”,而且正是在每个部分中存在这一点,才使得部分之间能够进行交流,从而实现了可理解的同一性。每个部分以及整体的有效功能。整体之所以是整体,是因为它是每个部分所固有的。在这个前提下,道被推论为所有类别中最大的,普遍性的普遍性,普遍/公正/公共/习俗/身份存在于每个存在中并统一所有存在,即所有行为,事物,原则和名称,也就是说,所有部分能够共同发挥作用、相互作用、形成一个整体。但是,由于习俗不能与社区中任何家庭或个人的习惯角色相一致,马也不能与马的任何部分或部分组合相一致,所以道作为公正的,不可能有特定的名称、行为或身份。从而它使得所有的动作、名字、身份成为可能。名称和词语的功能,作为统一,在这里达到了它的终极术语,并在此过程中否定和克服了自身:最终的统一词语,“共同体词语”,“道”,不可能是词语。最终的连贯性不可能是连贯的。只能以讽刺的方式来引用它。我们在这里将无所不在的讽刺观念与圣人的非讽刺理想相结合,即伟人,他能够通过其他方式体现整体性,就像在前讽刺文本中一样。
To appreciate the distinctiveness of what has been asserted so far, we may construct the following table, showing all the “whole/part” relations that are here claimed to be strictly analogous:
为了理解迄今为止所断言的独特性,我们可以构建下表,显示此处声称严格类似的所有“整体/部分”关系:
WHOLE PART
Customs/Community 海关/社区 Families and Individuals 家庭和个人
Same 相同的 Different 不同的
Horse  Horse Parts 马零件
High 高的 Low 低的
Large 大的 Small 小的
Universal/Public/Unbiased (gong)
通用/公共/公正(锣)
[Particular Things?] [具体的事情?]
Heaven's Year 天年 Qi of Seasons 四季之气
Ruler's State 统治者的国家 Government Bureaus and Duties
政府决策局及职责
Great Man's Virtue 伟人的美德 Civil Culture and Warfare
公民文化与战争
Dao  Coherences of Things 事物的连贯性
Namelessness 无名 Names 名称
Swamp 沼泽 Trees and Plants 树木和植物
Mountain  Rocks and Trees 岩石和树木
WHOLE PART Customs/Community Families and Individuals Same Different Horse Horse Parts High Low Large Small Universal/Public/Unbiased (gong) [Particular Things?] Heaven's Year Qi of Seasons Ruler's State Government Bureaus and Duties Great Man's Virtue Civil Culture and Warfare Dao Coherences of Things Namelessness Names Swamp Trees and Plants Mountain Rocks and Trees| WHOLE | PART | | :--- | :--- | | Customs/Community | Families and Individuals | | Same | Different | | Horse | Horse Parts | | High | Low | | Large | Small | | Universal/Public/Unbiased (gong) | [Particular Things?] | | Heaven's Year | Qi of Seasons | | Ruler's State | Government Bureaus and Duties | | Great Man's Virtue | Civil Culture and Warfare | | Dao | Coherences of Things | | Namelessness | Names | | Swamp | Trees and Plants | | Mountain | Rocks and Trees |
It is the counterintuitiveness and leaps involved in moving the analogy from one of these pairs to the other that has led us to the conclusions about words and Dao we have reached so far, and which has located the presence of Dao in each thing, as that which gives them their life. As we shall shortly see, the presence of Dao manifest precisely as the Dao-like paradoxicality operative in each thing, and it is just this that gives all beings their being: the ironic use of Li as pertaining to individual coherences. The text continues:
正是将类比从其中一对转移到另一对所涉及的反直觉和跳跃,使我们得出了迄今为止所得出的关于文字和道的结论,并在每件事物中找到了道的存在,因为这给了他们生命。正如我们很快就会看到的,“道”的存在恰恰表现为在每件事物中运作的“道”似的悖论,而正是这一点赋予了所有存在者它们的存在:讽刺地使用“理”来表示个体的连贯性。正文继续:
The seasons have their ends and beginnings, generations have their alternations and transformations. Disaster and prosperity, paired together, come flowing over; whatever is thwarted is also [in some other sense] suited. Each particular thing spontaneously follows a different direction; whatever is just right is [in some other sense] deficient. [Alternate translation: Whenever something is thwarted, something (else) is suited; whenever something is just right, something (else) is deficient.] It can be likened to a great swamp, where all the different trees alike dwell; 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} one can see this also in contemplating a great mountain, taken as a foundation for trees and rocks alike. This is what is called Community Words.
季节有其结束和开始,世代有其更替和转变。祸与福,相伴而至;任何受到阻碍的事物[在某种意义上]也都是适合的。每个特定的事物都会自发地遵循不同的方向;任何恰到好处的东西[在某种意义上]都是有缺陷的。 [替代翻译:每当某事受挫时,某事(其他)就会适合; ] 它可以比作一个大沼泽,所有不同的树木都居住在那里;每当某件事恰到好处时,就会有一些(其他)不足。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 人们在思考一座大山时也可以看到这一点,这座山被视为树木和岩石的基础。这就是所谓的社区词。
This passage is a bit more straightforward than the last, but still rife with interpretative possibilities and significant points. Again, the general idea is a description of the joining of contraries (disaster and prosperity, thwarting and suiting, just right and deficient, trees and rocks) into one totality. This seems at first to be a description of Dao’s doing all, in spite of its doing nothing in particular; since it does nothing in particular, and is not determined as any particular action, it negates no action, and hence includes all contraries in its activity. However, this is only partly true. In my opinion, the focus switches from the Dao and its nonactive activity, described in the first two lines, to the position of the individual, and his community words, within this process of change. This switch of focus from the activity of Dao to the words and experience of the individual comes with the lines I have rendered as “Whatever is thwarted is also [in some other sense] suited . . . whatever is just right is [in some other sense] deficient.” 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} Disaster and prosperity can only pertain to parts, not the whole. The point here is that, to the extent that either of the two applies to any part, the other will as well; what was disaster to part X will be prosperity to it in the due course of transformation; or is prosperity to part Y, or is already in one sense prosperity and in another disaster.
这段话比上一段更简单,但仍然充满了解释的可能性和重要观点。同样,总体思想是对对立事物(灾难与繁荣、阻碍与适宜、恰到好处与不足、树木与岩石)结合成一个整体的描述。乍一看,这似乎是对道无所不为的描述,尽管它没有做任何特别的事情;因为它不做任何具体的事情,也没有被确定为任何特定的行动,所以它不否定任何行动,因此在其活动中包括了所有的对立面。然而,这只是部分正确。在我看来,在这个变化的过程中,焦点从前两行描述的道及其非主动活动转向了个人的立场及其社区话语。这种焦点从道的活动到个人的言语和经验的转变伴随着我所表述的“凡是被阻碍的东西也[在某种其他意义上]适合……”。 。 。任何恰到好处的东西[在某种意义上]都是有缺陷的。” 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 灾难和繁荣只能属于部分,而不属于整体。这里的要点是,只要两者中的任何一个适用于任何部分,另一个也适用。在适当的转型过程中,对 X 部分来说是灾难的东西将成为它的繁荣;或者对 Y 部分来说是繁荣,或者在某种意义上已经是繁荣,而在另一种意义上是灾难。
I take the meaning of the passage to be as follows: Dao, in its nameless, nonactive activity, brings about the turning of the seasons and the
我认为这段话的意思是:道,以其无名的、无为的活动,带来了季节的更替和万物的更替。

generations without partiality. From the individual human perspective, this means that disaster and prosperity are both included, bundled up together, so that where there is one there is the other, where there is thwarting there is also suiting. One’s situation at any given time is in one sense thwarted with respect some particular aspect, but is also always necessarily suited to something else. This interpretation is in keeping with the ironic sense of coherence and the perspectivism of the “Inner Chapters.” Each of these things goes off in its own direction, but wherever it goes, it cannot escape being at all times both just right and deficient, for Dao is not partial to either of these, gives both to each entity. We saw before that the real presence of the whole in the part was not only what identified the whole but, on the model of customs to the individuals in the community, is what in fact allows the parts to function at all, and to interact effectively with one another. We were then told that the ultimate whole, Dao, is necessarily paradoxical, a name that is no name, a doing which does nothing. Here we see the consequence of bringing these two premises together. Thus, it is not only Dao itself that is like a great swamp or mountain, which necessarily includes opposites within it; the same is true of each individual within this totality. Each individual includes the totality, just as each member of the community possesses the totality of its customs within him-this, again, is the paradigm, not that of objective whole and parts, the former being impartial and the latter partial and finite. Because the individual has this union of opposites necessarily within him, his words can be community words, words that embrace the totality and join the members together, all of whom contain completely within themselves the same body of customs and conventions. After the previous passage, which described the presence of the whole in the parts as what enabled the activity and interaction of the parts, we are here given a description of this enabled function, of the “nothing it [Dao] does not do.” Dao, as the ultimate gong which must therefore be nameless and meritless, is thus paradoxical in that it does all and does nothing. Its presence within the parts, therefore, which enables them to live and function, is manifested as this paradoxicality pertaining to the parts themselves. Hence, we have an emphasis on polar, temporal transformations, contradiction, balance, and ultimate irresolvable ambiguity pertaining not only to the whole, but also to each part.
世代无偏。从人类个体的角度来看,这意味着灾难和繁荣是包含在一起的,捆绑在一起的,有其一,其彼,有碍,亦有顺。一个人在任何给定时间的处境在某种意义上会因某些特定方面而受到阻碍,但也总是必然适合于其他方面。这种解释与“内章”的连贯性和透视主义的讽刺感是一致的。这些东西各有各的方向,但无论走到哪里,都不能免于时时恰到好处,又时时不足,因为道不偏待其中任何一个,而将两者给予各实体。我们之前看到,整体在部分中的真实存在不仅是识别整体的因素,而且根据社区中个体的习俗模型,实际上使部分能够发挥作用并有效地相互作用与彼此。然后我们被告知,最终的整体“道”必然是矛盾的,一个无名的名字,一个无能为力的行为。在这里,我们看到了将这两个前提结合在一起的结果。因此,不仅道本身像一座大沼泽或大山,其中必然包含着对立面;对于这个整体中的每个个体来说也是如此。每个个体都包含了整体,就像社会的每个成员都拥有其习俗的整体一样——这又是范式,而不是客观整体和部分的范式,前者是公正的,后者是局部的和有限的。 因为个人内在必然具有这种对立面的结合,所以他的语言可以是共同体语言,是包含整体并将成员结合在一起的语言,所有这些成员在其内部完全包含相同的习俗和惯例。前面的段落描述了整体在部分中的存在,从而使各部分能够活动和相互作用,在此之后,我们在这里描述了这种启用功能,即“没有它[道]不做的事情”。道,作为最终的功,因此必然是无名无功的,因此是矛盾的,它既无所作为,又无所作为。因此,它在部件中的存在,使部件能够生存和发挥作用,就表现为与部件本身有关的这种悖论。因此,我们强调极性、时间的转变、矛盾、平衡,以及最终无法解决的模糊性,不仅涉及整体,而且涉及每个部分。
The text up to this point acknowledges the relative value of words as a unifying force, and as something that has legitimacy within the realm of things; indeed, we may say that language is here given a kind of cosmic significance, as being at least isomorphic with Dao and with the whole-making of nature itself. Words are to social man what Dao is to nature, in a very precise sense: they are the imminent totalizing whole within the parts which binds the parts together. But, as we see in what follows, the text goes on
到目前为止,文本承认文字作为一种统一力量的相对价值,并且作为事物领域内具有合法性的东西。事实上,我们可以说语言在这里被赋予了一种宇宙意义,因为它至少与道同构,与自然本身的整体形成同构。从非常精确的意义上来说,言语之于社会人就如同道之于自然:它们是各个部分之间即将形成的整体,并将各个部分结合在一起。但是,正如我们在下文中看到的,文本继续

to sharply repudiate the suggestion that words are in any way adequate to describe Dao, which is much more than simply the unification of opposites and particulars accomplished by community words:
严厉驳斥这样的观点,即词语在任何方面都足以描述“道”,而“道”不仅仅是通过社区词语实现的对立和细节的简单统一:
Know-little said, “This being the case, are [these Community Words] sufficient to be called the Dao?” Great Universal Reconciliation said, "No. If we calculate the number of things, it does not stop at ten thousand, and yet we set a limit by calling them ‘The Ten Thousand Things’-this is just to speak of them with a provisional name due to their great quantity. Thus Heaven and Earth are the vast among forms, Yin and Yang are the vast among forces [氣 qi], the Dao is the impartiality and unity among activities [為之公 wei zhi gong]. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} To use [the word Dao] as a provisional name for the vastness involved is permissible; but once you have [these words] you take [Dao] as being comparable and contrastable [比 bi] to something! To dispute and distinguish on this basis is to compare [the Dao to a class outside itself], like [the comparisons between finite categories like] dogs and horses [in the manner of the logicians]. This misses it by a wide margin. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
小知道:“既如此,够称为道吗?”大同调道:“不是,如果计算事物的数量,不止于万,而我们却以‘万事’为界限,这只是暂时说一下而已。”故天地为形之浩,阴阳为气之浩,道为之公为公。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 以“道”为代名,其广大是可以的;但一旦你有了[这些词],你就将[道]视为与某物可比和对比[比bi]!在此基础上进行争论和区分,就是将[道与自身之外的类别进行比较],如[以逻辑学家的方式比较]狗和马等有限类别。这大大错过了它。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
This passage, on my interpretation, asserts that although words-local socially determined and intelligible coherence-and Dao-global, unintelligible, incoherent coherence-are similar in that both embrace opposites, universalize, combine things into a oneness, they are different in that Dao is truly universal, not only a particular universality such as the meaning of any given word, but also each individual contingent thing, and all things, with nothing outside to which it could be compared or contrasted. No word, even a community word such as gong or “namelessness” or “Dao,” is sufficient for this true universality, since any word gets its meaning from comparison and contrast ( b i b i bib i ), from encompassing less than all and more than one, and the true universality of Dao is by definition not comparable or contrastable to anything, as we have already suggested in establishing the inherent paradoxicality of Dao, above. Comparison implies that there must be something external to be compared to, which is impossible for a true universality that includes everything within itself, partial to no particular meaning or principle, as our text pointed out above. In the other direction, Dao will embrace the irreducible uniqueness of individual events, as we shall see below, which words can never reach, since words are always the bringing-together-into-a-class of similars. Dao cannot be named simply with the name of universality, even though to universalize is part of what it does, for this name still contains comparison and contrast in its meaning-the name universal is not universal enough, the name unbiased is
根据我的解释,这段话断言,虽然词语——局部的社会决定的、可理解的连贯性——和道——全局的、不可理解的、不连贯的连贯性——相似之处在于两者都拥抱对立、普遍化、将事物结合成一体,但它们的不同之处在于道是真正普遍的,不仅是特定的普遍性,例如任何给定词的含义,而且还包括每个单独的偶然事物以及所有事物,没有任何外部事物可以与它进行比较或对比。没有任何一个词,即使是诸如“功”或“无名”或“道”之类的社区词,也不足以实现这种真正的普遍性,因为任何词都从比较和对比中获得其含义( b i b i bib i ),从涵盖少于所有和多于一,而道的真正普遍性根据定义与任何事物都不可比较或对比,正如我们在上面建立道的内在悖论时所建议的那样。比较意味着必须有一些外在的东西可以进行比较,而对于真正的普遍性来说,这是不可能的,因为真正的普遍性包括其自身的一切,不偏向于任何特定的意义或原则,正如我们上面的文本所指出的。另一方面,道将拥抱个体事件不可简化的独特性,正如我们将在下面看到的那样,这是言语永远无法达到的,因为言语总是将相似的事物聚集在一起。道不能简单地用普遍性的名称来命名,尽管普遍性是它所做的一部分,因为这个名称的含义仍然包含比较和对比——普遍性的名称不够普遍,无偏性的名称是

too biased. Comparisons like those to the swamp and the mountain above (introduced with the same word, b i b i bib i ) are only provisionally adequate; they work for the universality of community words, but not that of Dao. Even the name namelessness, as shown above, is simply a name for this universality, for the lack of partiality toward any particular meaning, comparable to the universality of heaven with respect to the seasons and the community with respect to its members, and thus even this name is to be considered inadequate, as we shall see below.
太偏颇了。像沼泽和上面的山的比较(用同一个词引入, b i b i bib i )只是暂时足够的;他们致力于共同体语言的普遍性,而不是道的普遍性。即使是无名的名字,如上所示,也只是这种普遍性的一个名称,因为没有偏向于任何特定的含义,类似于天堂在季节方面的普遍性和社区在其成员方面的普遍性,因此甚至正如我们将在下面看到的,这个名称被认为是不充分的。
A sharp distinction is here still being drawn between the finite and the infinite. Words-which exemplify the type of universality or non-partiality similar to the community and its customs’ universality with respect to the individual members of the community, joining them all together and appearing complete in each-can indeed resemble Dao; indeed, the Great Man’s words, and the words he receives, penetrate perfectly, so that they reach to others without being refused. But this is a far cry from the real omnipresence of Dao. To use words, even a word meaning omnipresence, is still to miss omnipresence; for to have meaning a word must be particularized. This is the case in the logician’s disputes, where an attempt at all-inclusiveness, such as Huizi’s “Great Unity,” which has “nothing outside it,” is the closest one can come to the all-inclusiveness of Dao. But this merely corresponds to the concept universality, which is given its meaning according to the function of general terms such as dog and horse, standard examples of the Mohist logicians, given meaning by contrast to one another. To take Dao as simply one such general term is to reduce it to the status of finite things. We call it Dao because it is gong as the ten thousand things are “ten thousand.” It certainly is gong, but it is not limited to this, as the ten thousand things are ten thousand but not only ten thousand. If we take gong, its universality, its relation to individual things as customs of the community relate to individual members of the community, as its definitive mark, we will be badly mistaken, just as if we were to insist that there were only ten thousand things. We may take this as a strong denial of the apodictic standard of knowledge in general, and also of the reality of determinate universals, that is, anything short of “the universal universal.” Any claim of knowledge is to be understood in this sense; when I say, “The sky is blue,” or, “Filial piety is good,” it is no more literally or apodictically true than the statement that there are just thousand things. This does not mean we should never say such things, or that there are no coherences to be spoken of any more; rather, every statement and every coherence is to be regarded as tentative, merely pragmatic, or, better, ironic, always indicating also its opposite.
这里,有限与无限之间仍然存在着明显的区别。言——它体现了类似于共同体的普遍性或无偏性,以及其习俗对于共同体个体成员的普遍性,将它们连接在一起,在每个个体中显得完整——确实可以类似于道;确实,伟人的言语和他所接受的言语,都具有完美的穿透性,因此能够到达他人而不会被拒绝。但这与真正无所不在的道相去甚远。使用词语,即使是一个意味着无所不在的词语,仍然会错过无所不在;为了使一个词有意义,必须对其进行特殊化。逻辑学家的争论就是如此,其中一种包罗万象的尝试,如惠子的“大一”,“无外乎”,是最接近于道的包罗万象的。但这仅仅对应于普遍性这一概念,普遍性的含义是根据一般术语(例如狗和马)的功能而赋予的,这是墨家逻辑学家的标准例子,通过相互对比而赋予含义。把“道”简单地当作这样一个通用术语,就是把它简化为有限事物的状态。我们说它是“道”,因为它是“功”,万事就是“万”。固然是功,但又不限于此,万物是万,而不仅仅是万。如果我们把功、它的普遍性、它与个体事物的关系,就像社会习俗与社会个体成员的关系一样,作为它的决定性标志,我们就大错特错了,就像我们坚持认为只有一万个一样。事物。 我们可以将此视为对一般知识的必然标准的强烈否认,也是对确定共性(即任何缺乏“普遍共性”)现实的强烈否认。任何关于知识的主张都应从这个意义上来理解;当我说“天是蓝的”或者“孝道是好的”时,这并不比“万物有千”这句话更真实。这并不意味着我们永远不应该说这样的话,或者不再有任何连贯性可言;相反,每一个陈述和每一个连贯性都应被视为试探性的、仅仅是务实的,或者更好的是,具有讽刺意味的,总是表明其反面。
What then are the things about which words can speak, if they cannot speak of Dao itself? What is there to say strictly within the realm of the finite? The dialogue continues:
如果文字不能言说道本身,那么文字能言说的是什么?严格来说,在有限的领域内有什么可说的?对话继续:
Know-little said, “[In that case,] within the four directions and the six realms, how does the arising of the ten thousand things come about?” Great Impartial Reconciliation said, “Yin and Yang shine on each other, injure each other, heal each other. The four seasons replace each other, give birth to each other, slaughter each other. Desire and aversion, dismissal and approach arise bridged between these. The joining of male and female like paired halves becomes a regular presence amidst these. Safety and danger replace each other, disaster and prosperity give birth to each other, leisure and hurry grind against each other, aggregation and dispersal complete one another. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} This is the realm of which names and objects can be recorded, of which even the most subtle can be registered. The coherent mutual ordering of things as they follow in succession [隨序之相理 suixu zhi xiangli], the mutual influence of things in their bridge-like motions, that they revert when they reach exhaustion, that they begin again when they come to an end, this is what there is inherent in the realm of things, what words can exhaust, what knowledge can reach to-it gets to the ultimate limit of things and no further. He who sees the Dao doesn’t follow after them when they are discarded nor trace them back to where they arise-this is where discussion comes to an end.”
小无知曰:“四方六界之中,万事如何生起?”大公和解曰:“阴阳相照,相伤,相愈。四个季节互相更替,互相诞生,互相残杀。欲望与厌恶、排斥与接近在这些之间架起桥梁。男性和女性像成对的一半一样的结合成为其中的常见现象。安与险相替,祸与盛相生,闲与匆相磨,聚与散相成。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 这是可以记录名称和物体的领域,甚至可以记录最微妙的事物。顺序之相理随序之相理,事物之间的相互影响,如桥梁般的运动,到了穷就回复,到了又开始。其目的,是事物境界所固有的,言语所能穷尽,知识所能达到的,至于事物的终极极限,而止于此。见道者,不随废去而追随,也不追究其生处,此是议论的结束。”
This is the realm of things, and what can be said with words. Surprisingly, it is quite a lot, and still represents a retreat from what Lee Yearly has called the “radical Zhuangzi”-the hardcore ironic position. For here, words can indeed be accurately and legitimately used to describe a certain amount of what goes on in the world. Here we see the nature of the compromise between the ironic and non-ironic senses of coherence, once again pivoting on the Yin-Yang dyad and the “constructive” application of the inescapable self-undermining dyadic structure so crucial to the ironic position. Dao, the ultimate ground of things, does not enter into this discussion of “how” things come to be. We are told rather literally the manner in which they come to be, and this manner once again points to the Dao-like paradoxicality which also inheres in things themselves. Nonetheless, words, as themselves creators of coherence among disparate parts, are able to accommodate a certain amount of this paradoxicality: words, as “community words,” have some of this paradoxicality built into them, as we saw in the opening of the dialogue. There are certain linguistically identifiable patterns to things, patterns also derived from the idea of the joining of opposites so important in the first part of the dialogue. These more or less follow the conception in the Laozi of what is assertable about individual things: they return, they go back and forth, they follow a bell-shaped curve. They go through patterns
这就是事物的境界,也是可以用言语来表达的。令人惊讶的是,数量相当多,而且仍然代表着对李年所说的“激进庄子”——硬核讽刺立场的退却。因为在这里,文字确实可以准确、合法地用来描述世界上发生的一定数量的事情。在这里,我们看到了讽刺性和非讽刺性连贯感之间妥协的本质,再次以阴阳二元为中心,以及对讽刺立场至关重要的不可避免的自我破坏二元结构的“建设性”应用。道,事物的终极基础,不涉及事物“如何”产生的讨论。我们被相当字面地告知它们是如何形成的,而这种方式再次指出了事物本身所固有的道式悖论。尽管如此,单词本身作为不同部分之间连贯性的创造者,能够在一定程度上容纳这种悖论:单词作为“社区单词”,内置了一些这种悖论,正如我们在对话开头看到的那样。事物有某些语言上可识别的模式,这些模式也源自对话第一部分中非常重要的对立面结合的想法。这些或多或少遵循老子中关于个体事物的可断言的概念:它们返回,它们来回,它们遵循钟形曲线。他们经历模式

of alternation and mutual response of opposite poles, they arise bridged between these various sets of opposites. This image of the bridge is apt: all things rise and descend, supported over an abyss by having one foot on each of two opposite shores, by being rooted in both Yin and Yang, growth and decline; if either were removed, they would collapse. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} The existence of things is, in fact, a rising and falling joining of opposites-a bridge. The self-undermining dyadic alternation is now asserted as a generally adequate way of describing what will take place in the empirical world, and constitutes about all we can reliably assert. That is what we can know about them, and that is, for human purposes, adequate. That, however, is not Dao. As we recall, the coherence accomplished by words is merely a local or restricted version of its own principle, the principle of universality, the harmonizing of the different. When the principle involved in all words is extended to its logical conclusion, the most comprehensively coherent type of coherence, we have Dao, which by that very token has no name, is unintelligible, incoherent. What we have here then is, as it were, merely a “horizontal” explanation of the arising of things, and how they “cohere by ordering one another” (相理 xiangli); any kind of vertical explanation, that is, in terms of how existing things per se come to exist, the ultimate reason why there is any Being at all, rather than how individual things bring each other to be, is not, according to the author of this passage, possible within the realm of discussion, of words. Dao, as that which is “doing all while doing nothing,” would seem to be a likely candidate for first cause or vertical explanation of all beings, but it cannot be legitimately invoked in this way. It cannot be asserted to exist as a coherent named identity. He who sees Dao does not search after this kind of explanation, inquiring into what becomes of things after their disappearance or before their arising. No single unifying quality/name/determinacy can be applied as the explanatory principle for the existence of things, in the “vertical” sense. The unbiased/undifferentiated whole, which is what one would logically wish to adduce as the ultimate cause of the being and function of all the parts, cannot be adduced as the “cause” of the parts, for the very reason that it is truly unbiased and comprehensive, and hence not identifiable as anything in particular. Nor do the parts cause the whole. Again we see an emphasis on contradiction, joining of opposites, balances, polar transformations, for this alone is the true presence of Dao in things, which, like the presence of any whole in its parts, operates like customs and language in a community: it is what allows them to be and to function at all.
由于对立两极的交替和相互反应,它们在这些不同的对立面之间架起桥梁。桥的形象恰如其分:万物起落,两岸各一足,支撑深渊,根植于阴阳,盛衰;如果其中任何一个被移除,它们就会崩溃。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 事实上,事物的存在就是对立面的升起和落下的结合——一座桥梁。现在,自我破坏的二元交替被认为是描述经验世界中将发生的事情的一般充分的方式,并且构成了我们可以可靠断言的一切。这就是我们对它们所能了解的,也就是说,对于人类的目的来说,这是足够的。然而,那不是道。正如我们所记得的,通过文字实现的连贯性仅仅是其自身原则、普遍性原则、不同事物的协调的局部或有限版本。当所有词语所涉及的原则延伸到其逻辑结论时,即最全面连贯的连贯性类型,我们就有了“道”,而正是因为这个原因,“道”没有名称,是不可理解的、不连贯的。那么,我们在这里所拥有的,可以说只是对事物产生的“横向”解释,以及它们如何“相理相理”;根据作者的说法,任何一种垂直解释,即存在的事物本身如何存在,以及存在的最终原因,而不是个体事物如何彼此存在,都不是。这段话的内容,可能在讨论、文字的范围内。 道,作为“无所作为”的东西,似乎是所有存在的第一因或垂直解释的可能候选者,但它不能以这种方式合法地援引。不能断言它作为一个连贯的命名身份存在。见道之人,不求这种解释,不求事物消失后或生前的变化。在“垂直”意义上,没有任何一个统一的质量/名称/确定性可以用作事物存在的解释原则。无偏见/无差异的整体,即人们在逻辑上希望归纳为所有部分存在和功能的最终原因,不能被归纳为部分的“原因”,因为它确实是无偏见的。且全面,因此无法识别为任何特定的东西。部分也不会导致整体。我们再次看到对矛盾、对立结合、平衡、极性转变的强调,因为仅此就是道在事物中的真实存在,就像任何整体在其部分中的存在一样,它像社区中的习俗和语言一样运作:这就是它们得以存在并发挥作用的原因。
Special notice should be taken of the appearance of the character Li in this context, in the phrase “the coherent mutual ordering of things as they follow in mutual succession” (suixu zhi xiangli). The word is unambiguously a verb here, and applied specifically to the reciprocal limiting of things in
在此背景下,“事物相互依序”(“岁序之相礼”)一词中出现的“离”字值得特别注意。这个词在这里毫无疑问是一个动词,专门用于事物的相互限制。

the horizontal dimension, especially the relation between the two members of any opposed dyad. In terms of our previous discussion, we can interpret this phrase to mean, “the reciprocal making-coherent of the two sides of each dyad as they succeed each other.” They limit each other, cut each other out from the whole, make the quantitative adjustments of one another that provide each with its qualitative value. The original meaning of Li is very much in force here, and its application to the horizontal interaction of the poles of a dyad is to be recalled, particularly when we come to consider the Hanfeizi commentary on the Laozi, which will have something similar to say about the relation between Dao and Li.
水平维度,尤其是任何对立二元体的两个成员之间的关系。根据我们之前的讨论,我们可以将这句话解释为“每个二元体的两侧相互继承时的相互一致”。它们互相限制,互相将对方从整体中剔除,互相进行定量调整,从而为各自提供其定性价值。理的本义在这里非常有效,并且它在二元极的水平相互作用中的应用值得回忆,特别是当我们考虑韩非子对老子的评论时,其中会有类似的话关于道与理的关系。
The next exchange in the dialogue runs as follows:
接下来的对话内容如下:

Know-little said, “Between Jizhen’s theory that no one does it and Jiezi’s theory that something causes it, which contention is right on the mark about the real conditions of these [things] [正於其情 zheng yu qi qing], and which is a partial apprehension of their coherence [偏於其理 pian yu qi Li]?” Great Impartial Reconciliation said, “Chickens squawk, dogs bark-this is something people know. But even someone with the greatest knowledge cannot describe in words that from which they come to be thus, nor can he plumb by thought what they will do next. We can go on splitting and analyzing things further, until 'the subtlety reaches the point where there are no more divisions possible, the vastness reaches the point where it cannot be encompassed. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} [But even so], the theories that ‘something causes it’ or ‘nothing does it’ don’t yet get out of the realm of things, and in the end fall into error. ‘Something causes it’ implies something substantial; ‘Nothing does it’ implies total emptiness. The idea of having a name and a real substance refers to the presence of things; the idea of namelessness and emptiness depends on the spaces between things. One can speak and think about these, but the more one talks the farther away one gets.”
小知曰:“季真之说无人为之,介子之说有因之说,其实情之论,何者正于其情”。这是对它们的连贯性的部分理解吗?大公和曰:鸡叫狗叫,这是人们都知道的事。但即使是知识最渊博的人也无法用语言描述他们是从何而来,也无法通过思想来了解他们下一步会做什么。我们还可以继续分解、分析,直到“微妙到无法再分,博大到无法包容为止”。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} 但即便如此,“有因”或“无因”的理论仍然没有脱离事物的范畴,最终会陷入错误。 “某事导致它”意味着某种实质性的事情; “无为”意味着完全的空虚。有名有实,是指事物的存在;无名和空虚的概念取决于事物之间的空间。这些可以说,可以想,但说得越多,距离就越远。”
Before taking a closer look at this, we should pause to note the use of the term Li in the posing of this question. As a way of inquiring “Which is right and which is wrong?” we have instead, “which contention is right on the mark about the real conditions of these [things] [zheng yu qi qing], and which is a partial apprehension of their coherence [pian yu qi Li]?” Two crisscrossing contrasts are used here: zheng (right on the mark, upright, straight, balanced) versus pian (one-sided, biased) and qing (real condition) versus Li (coherence). The use of Li to mean a true proposition that can be an object of knowledge or understanding, moreover-the Li of X or Y , meaning an idea about X or Y that one can “get” or “not get,” and which it is deemed
在仔细研究这一点之前,我们应该停下来注意一下在提出这个问题时使用了“李”一词。作为询问“哪个是对的,哪个是错的?”的一种方式。相反,我们有“关于这些事物的真实状况,哪种说法是正确的,哪种说法是对它们的连贯性的片面理解?”这里使用了两个纵横交错的对比:正(正中,正直,正直,平衡)与偏(片面,偏颇)以及清(真实情况)与理(连贯)。使用 Li 来表示一个真命题,它可以成为知识或理解的对象,此外,X 或 Y 的 Li 表示一个人可以“得到”或“不能得到”的关于 X 或 Y 的想法,并且它是被视为

to be important to understand-is also destined to become more and more prevalent. We have an opportunity to see both of these standard tropes used here when they were still startling, still live metaphors. In Buddhism, as we shall see, qing will mean something like deluded partial attachments, with a decided implication of passion and emotion (which soon becomes a standard meaning of the word), and Li will mean liberating truth. In this passage, however, the double parallelism suggests that qing and Li are synonyms, and the difference between getting it right and getting it wrong resides purely in zheng and pian, balanced on-the-mark comprehensiveness as opposed to lopsided bias or partiality. This is, of course, especially significant in that the topic under discussion here is the extent to which a comprehensively balanced coherence can be intelligible at all. This is also the standard of truth and falsehood found in the “Jiebi” chapter of the Xunzi and in the “Tianxia” chapter of the Zhuangzi: comprehensiveness versus one-sidedness. Comprehensiveness, however, implies balance, the relation to a center, an idea that will become more and more important in the implications of Li as time goes by. A balanced apprehension of qing, real condition of all beings (including, we may say, the passions and emotions-the desires-of human beings), is the apprehension of their coherence, their “truth,” their “principle.” Here we have the advent of a usage of Li that tempts the translation as “truth.” But fundamentally, it still means “the Great Coherence,” dali. Here, the question is, which statement fits into the Great Coherence of Heaven and Earth, or Dao, or of all things, or the function of all things: does someone do it, or does no one do it? The possessive pronoun qi is important here, even if its exact reference is somewhat ambiguous. The question is, which description is balanced with, takes in all relevant sides of, the “genuine state,” meaning, the state of a thing before being manipulated for some specific (i.e., partial) deliberate purpose. Something might be genuine, the qing or indeed a coherent Li, without quite being the “truth”: to be the truth, it must also be zheng with respect to that qing or Li. A partial apprehension of some limited coherence, or some limited genuine state, would not yet be “true” on the gong/si epistemology of this passage and many like it. So either of these alternatives might “have” coherence (you Li ), but still be “one-sided” with respect to (all relevant) Lis, and thus still would not count as an acceptable proposition.
理解这一点很重要——也注定会变得越来越普遍。我们有机会看到这两个标准比喻在这里使用,当时它们仍然是令人震惊的、仍然鲜活的隐喻。在佛教中,正如我们将要看到的,“情”的意思是类似迷惑的部分执着,带有明显的激情和情感的含义(很快就成为这个词的标准含义),“离”的意思是解脱真理。然而,在这篇文章中,双排暗示“情”和“理”是同义词,正确与错误的区别纯粹在于正与偏,平衡的切中要害的全面性,而不是片面的偏见或偏颇。当然,这一点尤其重要,因为这里讨论的主题是全面平衡的连贯性在多大程度上可以被理解。这也是《荀子》解弼篇和《庄子》天下篇中的真假标准:全面还是片面。然而,全面性意味着平衡,意味着与中心的关系,随着时间的推移,这一理念在“理”的含义中将变得越来越重要。对情的平衡理解,即一切众生的真实状况(包括,我们可以说,人类的激情和情感——欲望),就是对它们的连贯性、它们的“真理”、它们的“原则”的理解。在这里,我们出现了一种“Li”的用法,很容易被翻译为“真相”。但从根本上来说,它仍然意味着“大理”。这里的问题是,哪一种说法符合天地大同、道大同、万物大同、万物之用:是有人做,还是无人做? 所有格代词“气”在这里很重要,尽管它的确切指称有些模糊。问题是,哪一种描述是平衡的,考虑了“真实状态”的所有相关方面,即事物在出于某些特定(即部分)故意目的而被操纵之前的状态。有些东西可能是真实的,比如情,或者确实是一个连贯的理,但并不完全是“真理”:要成为真理,就那个情或理而言,它也必须是正。对某些有限的连贯性或某些有限的真实状态的部分理解,在这段经文的公/司认识论上还不是“真实的”,许多人都喜欢它。因此,这些替代方案中的任何一个都可能“具有”连贯性(你李),但相对于(所有相关的)李来说仍然是“片面的”,因此仍然不能算作一个可接受的命题。
In this passage, two alternatives are posed with respect to the ultimate question, the question left over after the answer to the previous query has been given, about the mutual ordering-making coherent-of individual things as the reciprocal limiting of opposites. A “vertical” explanation is asked for about the existence of the universe as a whole, the Great Coherence. But this passage rejects the possibility of providing a coherent answer
在这篇文章中,针对最终问题(在给出前一个问题的答案后留下的问题)提出了两种选择,即个体事物的相互排序(使个体事物变得连贯)作为对立面的相互限制。对于整个宇宙的存在,即大连贯性,需要一个“垂直”的解释。但这段话否认了提供连贯答案的可能性

to any such ultimate question about Dao, and even, be it noted, about the origin of individual things in the universe.
任何关于道的终极问题,甚至值得注意的是,关于宇宙中个体事物的起源的问题。
To indicate the inadequacy of any ultimately intelligible explanation of the world, the text first cites, not the self-contradiction of reason when confronted with ultimate questions, but the squawking of chickens and the barking of dogs-i.e., immediate, everyday experiences, particular finite parts of the infinite totality. Unlike the more general rules adduced in the previous section, these concrete particulars are asserted to be themselves ultimately mysterious, unsusceptible to verbal accounts of their origin and destiny. The ultimate mysteriousness of the world is apparent not only in the fact that we cannot get a grasp on whether time has a beginning or not, but more viscerally, in the fact that we cannot even comprehend or predict a chicken’s squawk. Here we find that both the totality, Dao, and individual things, a chicken’s squawk, are similar in that both can be partially described by words but ultimately cannot be accounted for verbally. In particular, the question of their arising and passing away is in both cases unfathomable. Words work for the intermediate realm of specific universals-the general laws of Yin/Yang interactions described in the previous passage. But the two extremes, the real totality and the real particulars, the limit cases of the union of opposites evident in a less radical form in the general laws, overflow this realm of words. Both the greatest and the smallest coherences turn out to be ultimately incoherent.
为了表明对世界的任何最终可理解的解释的不足,文本首先引用的不是理性面对终极问题时的自相矛盾,而是鸡叫狗叫——即直接的日常经验,特别是无限整体的有限部分。与上一节中引用的更一般的规则不同,这些具体细节被认为本身最终是神秘的,不受对其起源和命运的口头描述的影响。世界的终极神秘不仅在于我们无法掌握时间是否有开始,更在于我们甚至无法理解或预测鸡的叫声。在这里我们发现,整体“道”和个体事物“鸡叫”的相似之处在于,两者都可以部分地用语言描述,但最终不能用语言来解释。尤其是,它们的生灭问题在这两种情况下都是深不可测的。词语适用于特定普遍性的中间领域——上一篇文章中描述的阴阳相互作用的一般规律。但是两个极端,即真正的总体性和真正的特殊性,对立统一的极限情况在一般法则中以不那么激进的形式表现出来,超出了这个文字领域。最大的连贯性和最小的连贯性最终都被证明是不连贯的。
The whole passage thus breaks conveniently into four sections: first, the extent to which words are adequate to describe the operations of Dao (as gong, etc.), followed by a caveat about the inadequacy of these verbal determinations for the real fullness of Dao (the word Dao being like the “ten thousand” of the “ten thousand things”). Then the same pattern in the discussion of things, namely, what can be said about them and then what cannot. The realms of Dao and things, then, after being strictly separated, do not remain separate. On the contrary, they serve almost as aspects of one another. Dao is the indescribable aspect of things, things are the describable aspect of Dao. Dao qua thing is describable; Dao qua Dao is not. Things qua things are describable; things qua Dao are not. This last category is the most surprising, and it is just this that depends on the special whole/ part relations we have been discussing. For the individual entity shares this quality of doubleness with the totality. It both can and cannot be spoken of, it is in the realm of words and out of it, just like Dao. All things are coherent only in an ironic sense. Once again. the individual shares the quality of the whole. Words work for general rules and tendencies, for classes of more than one and less than all. For it is these classes that both bind together individuals into groups and contrast these groups with groups
因此,整篇文章很方便地分为四个部分:首先,词语足以描述道的运作(如功等)的程度,其次是关于这些词语对道的真正完整的规定的不足的警告(“道”字如“万事”中的“万”)。然后在讨论事物时采用同样的模式,即关于它们什么可以说,然后什么不能说。道与物的境界,则严格分开后,就不再分开了。相反,它们几乎是彼此的不同方面。道是事物不可描述的一面,事物是道可描述的一面。道作为事物是可以描述的;道去道则不然。事物本身是可以描述的;所谓“道”的东西不是。最后一类是最令人惊讶的,而正是这一类取决于我们一直在讨论的特殊的整体/部分关系。因为个体实体与整体共享这种双重性。它既可以说,也不能说,它在言语之内,又在言语之外,就像道一样。所有事物只有在讽刺意义上才是连贯的。再次。个体共享整体的质量。词语适用于一般规则和倾向,适用于多于一个或少于全部的类别。因为正是这些类别将个体结合成群体,并将这些群体与群体进行对比

outside themselves. This is what community words are good for; they tell us that Dao unifies all contraries in itself, and that all things arise generally from the interaction of these contrary forces. But this cannot explain the fullness, nor the arising and perishing, of either (1) a single one or (2) the whole, that is, what is not yet unified in these words, or what has nothing outside itself, in contrast to which it can be defined. At the same time, both of these extremes interface with the intermediate level of general terms, and to this extent are speakable-as gong, on the side of Dao, and as the individual joining of opposite forces, determinate general tendencies, on the side of individual things. But the living, particular spontaneity of a particular chicken’s squawk cannot be described in words or predicted in thoughts. For these “community” words and thoughts describing the horizontal relations and general principles of these things relate to individual instances only as the collective customs relate to individual members of the community. They do indeed join together opposites and particulars, but at the same time they miss the main thing, the unsearchability of the origin and outcome of this chicken’s squawk here and now, the actuality of the interface between this particular coherence and its manner of cohering with the context that makes it what it is. Here we return to Zhuang Zhou’s sensitivity to the unknowability of the origin or beginning of any particular event. Community words may tell us the general “customs” that are present in each member of the community called “chickens”-i.e., they squawk at dawn, or when hungry, or when seeking a mate. The words chickens squawk unify a vast number of chickens and a vast number of squawks, and the experiences of a vast number of members of the linguistic community who use such words. The words unify the community’s customs with respect to these chickens and squawks, and the unification accomplished by them is an aspect of the unity of these customs. This type of unity of particulars into a whole, implicit in the universalization accomplished by socially accepted words, is adequate to a certain extent, but not fully adequate. It is as adequate to the description of these chickens as “ten thousand things” is adequate to describe all things in the world. In the present case, our knowledge of chickens does not get us inside any particular squawk, in its contingency at this particular moment, as the untraceable impulse of a particular chicken in a particular time and place. And why is this? Because whatever laws or tendencies may accurately apply to the being and behavior or this chicken, these tendencies themselves are subsumed under Dao, which is nameless, that is, devoid of positive non-ironic identity, saturated with irony. This chicken here may instantiate the smaller general categories (transformations of Yin and Yang, etc.), as determinate and specifiable unities of contraries, but in so doing it must also be instantiating the comprehensiveness that comprehends even these lesser tendencies, namely, Dao. To instantiate Dao, however, is to instanti-
在他们自己之外。这就是社区词汇的用处;他们告诉我们,道统一了所有对立的事物,而万物都是从这些对立的力量的相互作用中产生的。但这不能解释(1)单一的或(2)整体的圆满性,也不能解释其生灭,即在这些词中尚未统一的东西,或在其自身之外没有任何东西的东西,与它可以被定义。同时,这两个极端都与一般术语的中间层次相结合,并且在某种程度上是可以说的——作为功,在道方面,作为对立力量的个体结合,确定总体倾向,在道方面。个别事物。但是,一只特定的鸡的叫声的生动、特别的自发性无法用语言描述或在思想中预测。因为这些“共同体”的词语和思想描述了这些事物的横向关系和一般原则,仅与个体实例相关,就像集体习俗与共同体的个体成员相关一样。他们确实将对立面和细节结合在一起,但同时他们错过了主要的事情,即此时此地这只鸡的叫声的起源和结果的不可探索性,这种特定的连贯性和它的连贯方式之间的界面的现实性。使其成为现实的背景。在这里,我们回到庄周对任何特定事件的起源或开始的不可知性的敏感性。社区词汇可能告诉我们每个被称为“鸡”的社区成员都有的一般“习俗”,即它们在黎明时、饥饿时或寻找配偶时发出叫声。 鸡叫声这个词统一了大量的鸡和大量的叫声,以及语言界中使用这些词的大量成员的经历。这些词语统一了社区对这些鸡和叫声的习俗,而它们所实现的统一是这些习俗统一的一个方面。这种将细节统一为整体的方式,隐含在社会接受的词语所实现的普遍化之中,在一定程度上是足够的,但还不够充分。形容这些鸡就如同“万事”足以形容世间万物一样。在目前的情况下,我们对鸡的了解并不能让我们了解任何特定的叫声,在这个特定时刻的偶然情况,作为特定时间和地点的特定鸡的不可追踪的冲动。这是为什么呢?因为无论什么法则或倾向可以准确地适用于这只鸡的存在和行为,这些倾向本身都被归入“道”之下,而“道”是无名的,也就是说,缺乏积极的、非讽刺的身份,充满了讽刺。这里的这只鸡可以将较小的一般类别(阴阳的变化等)实例化为确定的、可指定的对立统一体,但这样做时,它也必须实例化甚至包含这些较小倾向的全面性,即“道”。然而,实例化 Dao 就是实例化

ate paradoxicality, namelessness, doing all which doing nothing, being all which is being nothing. Hence, what makes this particular chicken live, Dao, is also what makes it slip out of whatever determinate categories might be partially applicable to it. What makes it describable-membership in some “community” or general tendency as a whole immanent in each part which unifies particulars-is also what makes it indescribable-membership therefore in the largest community, the immanence of Dao. When the word chicken is used, all other members of the community of words suddenly appear implicit within it. It is thrown into relation with those other things, made “universal” (gong), and this leaves us back in the horizontal question, the question that is answered by the interrelation between opposites implied by this (custom-like) universality implicit in all particular parts. It is indeed true of this particular squawk that it is a union of contrary forces, just as it is true that Dao is universal. But it is also something more than this, something that cannot be spoken in words. The vertical question, concerning the ultimate source of this particular squawk, remains unanswered for the particular thing as it does for the whole, whereas it is answerable for general tendencies-Yin comes from Yang, Yang comes from Yin, etc. (indeed, this is just what we mean by a “horizontal” explanation). The particular is more like the whole than the intermediate general terms are.
吃了悖论、无名、无所作为的一切、无所作为的一切。因此,是什么让这种特殊的鸡活下来,道,也是让它脱离可能部分适用于它的任何确定类别的原因。使它可描述的——某种“共同体”的成员资格,或作为一个整体的整体趋势,内在地统一了具体的各个部分——也使它成为不可描述的——因此,在最大的共同体中的成员资格,即道的内在性。当使用“鸡”这个词时,词界的所有其他成员突然都隐含在其中。它被投入到与其他事物的关系中,成为“普遍”(功),这让我们回到了横向问题,这个问题是通过对立面之间的相互关系来回答的,而这种(类似习俗的)普遍性隐含在所有事物中。特定部分。这种特殊的叫声确实是对立力量的结合,正如道确实是普遍的一样。但它还不止于此,是无法用言语表达的。垂直问题,关于这个特定的尖叫声的最终来源,对于特定的事物和整体来说仍然没有答案,而它可以回答一般趋势——阴来自阳,阳来自阴,等等(事实上,这个这正是我们所说的“水平”解释的意思)。与中间的一般术语相比,特殊术语更像整体。
The assertion is made that both the alternative answers to the question about the origin of things are merely restricted to the realm of things. Even to speak of nothing is just to speak of the spaces between things. That is to say, the concept “nothing does it” is completely conditioned by thinking about things. It merely means a conception of where the things are not, which is still described by the shape of the things themselves. The mind cannot conceive of a nothingness except in contrast the presence of existent things. Both the things and the spaces between them are interwoven to form the fabric we call “the realm of things.” To focus on one rather than the other as the ultimate source does not get us outside this realm. Moreover, it is one-sided, since the totality, the “universal community” of this realm is based on the “bridge-like” interaction of the two extremes of spaces and substances. Both being and not-being are in the category of being. Hence, these two views each occupy only one corner of the realm of things. It is here that we are told also that total “namelessness” is just as inadequate to Dao as having a particular name. Namelessness, cited as actually merely an example of a community word above, simply a conceptualization of the lack of partiality of Dao, is also only one extreme, complete Non-Being, the side of “Nothing does it,” the spaces between things, which thus does not get beyond “the realm of things,” and remains in only one corner of things. Namelessness, we may say, is the space between names, just as nothing was just the space between things-that is, namelessness is completely defined
有人断言,关于事物起源问题的两种替代答案都仅局限于事物领域。即使不谈论任何事物,也只是谈论事物之间的空间。也就是说,“无为”这个概念完全是由对事物的思考而决定的。它仅仅意味着事物不存在的概念,它仍然由事物本身的形状来描述。除非存在事物的存在,否则心灵无法想象虚无。事物及其之间的空间交织在一起,形成了我们称之为“事物领域”的结构。专注于其中一个而不是另一个作为最终来源并不会让我们脱离这个领域。而且,它是片面的,因为整体性,这一领域的“普遍共同体”是建立在空间和物质两个极端的“桥式”相互作用的基础上的。存在和不存在都属于存在的范畴。因此,这两种观点只占据事物领域的一个角落。正是在这里,我们还被告知,完全的“无名”对于道来说就像有一个特定的名字一样是不够的。无名,实际上只是上述社区词的一个例子,只是道的不偏性的概念化,也只是一种极端的、完全的非存在,“无为”的一面,事物之间的空间,因此,它并没有超出“事物的领域”,而只停留在事物的一个角落。我们可以说,无名是名称之间的空间,就像没有什么只是事物之间的空间一样——也就是说,无名是完全被定义的

by the outlines of the names, an integral part of the realm of names and unable to get us outside it. Silence, in the end, is no better than speech. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
从名字的轮廓来看,它是名字领域的一个组成部分,无法让我们脱离它。归根结底,沉默并不比言语更好。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
The dialogue continues: 对话继续:
“What has not yet been born cannot be prohibited from coming, what has already died cannot be stopped from going. Life and death are not distant, and yet their coherence [Li] cannot be apprehended. These theories that ‘something causes it’ or ‘nothing does it’ are merely what doubt avails itself of. I gaze at its root, and its antecedents go back without end; I seek its furthest developments, and their coming stretches forward without stop. Having no end and no stop-these are negations within the scope of language, and thus share the same coherences [ L i ] [ L i ] [Li][L i] with things themselves. ‘Something causes it’ and ‘Nothing does it’-these are attributions of the root [of things], which remain within the scope of language, and thus they merely end and begin with things. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} Dao cannot be considered existent, nor can it be considered non-existent. The name ‘Dao’ [Way] is what we avail ourselves of so as to walk on it. ‘Something causes it’ and ‘Nothing does it’ each occupy only one corner of things. What do they have to do with the Great Method?”
“未生者不可不来,已死者不可阻止去。生与死并不遥远,但其连贯性却无法把握。这些“某事导致它”或“什么都没有造成它”的理论只不过是怀疑所利用的而已。我观其根,其来历无穷无尽;我求其最远的发展,而它们的到来却绵延不绝。没有结束、没有停止——这些都是语言范围内的否定,因此具有相同的连贯性 [ L i ] [ L i ] [Li][L i] 与事物本身。 “有因”和“无为”——这些都是根源的归属,仍然在语言的范围之内,因此它们只是以事物为结束和开始。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} 道不能认为是存在的,也不能认为是不存在的。 “道”这个名字,就是我们赖以行走的东西。 “有因”和“无因”只占据事物的一个角落。和大法有什么关系?”
The passage goes on to cite something else that is very commonplace and nearby, and yet inexplicable and unalterable, to undermine the adequacy of words and wordlessness: life and death, the origin and disappearance of individual entities. The coherence even of something as close and omnipresent as life and death cannot be apprehended with speech and thought, nor even by the total negation of these by such terms as “namelessness” and such hypotheses as “Nothing does it,” which ultimately remain still within the realm of words and thought. Li of individual events here is also ironic coherence, unintelligible coherence, a sticking together that cannot be described. Why? In looking at the antecedents and consequences of any individual things, we find them stretching out infinitely into the past and the future, in spite of the appearance and disappearance of this particular entity. This endlessness, the text tells us, is what we are referring to when we negate the existence of an origin of things, or assert Dao to be “nameless,” but this endlessness is merely something about things themselves, and has not yet gotten us beyond the realm of things to the question of their source. This refers to positing nothing at all about the origin of things-but even this cannot be thought of as a way of getting beyond the finitude of things, for it only reflects the formulable principle of things themselves. On the other hand, definitive theories about the root of things, such as “Something causes it” and “Nothing does it,” also merely end and begin
这段话接着引用了其他一些非常常见和附近的东西,但却无法解释和不可改变,以破坏言语和无言的充分性:生与死,个体实体的起源和消失。即使像生与死这样紧密和无所不在的事物的连贯性也无法通过言语和思想来理解,甚至也不能通过诸如“无名”之类的术语和诸如“无事可做”之类的假设的完全否定来理解,这些术语最终保持静止。在言语和思想的范围内。这里个别事件的理也是一种讽刺的连贯性,难以理解的连贯性,一种无法描述的粘连。为什么?在观察任何个体事物的前因和后果时,我们发现它们无限地延伸到过去和未来,尽管这个特定实体的出现和消失。文本告诉我们,当我们否定事物的起源的存在,或者说道是“无名”时,所指的就是这种无尽,但这种无尽只是事物本身的东西,还没有达到我们的目的。超越事物的领域而触及其根源的问题。这指的是对事物的起源根本不做任何假设——但即使这样也不能被认为是超越事物有限性的一种方式,因为它只反映了事物本身的公式化原理。另一方面,关于事物根源的确定性理论,例如“某事导致它”和“没有什么造成它”,也只是结束和开始

with things, also do not get us beyond their finitude. Neither words nor silence is adequate. Hence, Dao cannot be taken to be either existent or nonexistent-such is the inadequacy of words. On the other hand, we still depend on the word Dao, meaning a way or path, in order to walk it, in order to position ourselves in the world-our need to avail ourselves of this name indicates the inadequacy of silence.
对待事物,也不要让我们超越它们的有限性。无论是言语还是沉默都是不够的。所以,道不能说有,也不能说无,这是言语的不足。另一方面,我们仍然依赖“道”这个词,意思是一条道路或道路,以便行走它,以便在世界上定位自己——我们需要利用这个名字表明沉默的不足。
Hence, the passage finishes with the following words:
因此,这篇文章以下面的话结束:

If words were completely adequate, one could speak all day and all of it would be about Dao. If words were completely inadequate, one could speak all day and all of it would be about things. The ultimate reaches of Dao and things cannot be carried by either words or silence. Only where there is neither words nor silence does discussion really come to its ultimate end.
如果言语完全足够,可以说一整天,都是关于道的。如果言语完全不够用,说一整天都是事。道与物的终极境界,是言语或沉默所无法承载的。只有在没有言语、没有沉默的地方,讨论才真正达到最终目的。
We saw above that words were accepted as adequate for describing the general behavior of things; here however, we are told that they are inadequate, not only to describe the infinite Dao or the origin of all things, but to describe even the quite finite squawking of a chicken. Here, the strict division between the two realms, established earlier in the passage, is finally broken down. The immediate behavior of the individuals, outside what can be described in community words of their general laws, is also the inexplicableness of Dao. Here we see that the part still adumbrates the whole, just as in the paradigm of community/member we began with. The beyond-words-trans-universality of Dao is present also in each of its parts, such that each of them is also indescribable in words in certain aspects, while being describable in others (i.e., on the question of “in what manner” things in general arise). Thus, any given entity is both beyond words and describable in words, just like Dao itself, which is both describable by the word gong and not merely gong. The squawking of a chicken is both a thing and not merely a thing, that is, not merely what is referred to by the community word thing. This is what the end of the passage refers to as the “the ultimate reaches of Dao and things”; this margin is the self-transformation of all things, their forming of themselves, their irreducible individuality and unpredictability in spite of general categories and laws. As things (i.e., the referent of some community word), they are some already-completed entity, and members of some general community or class; as Dao, each is an inexpressible coming to be and transformation of this particular thing happening here. The joining of these two, the ultimate reach of both which is also their interface (際 j i j i jij i ), is the squawking of a chicken, that is, a particular unpredictable act, both linked to the general laws and beyond them. This is what we face at every moment of our experience, this is
我们在上面看到,词语被认为足以描述事物的一般行为。然而,在这里,我们被告知它们不仅不足以描述无限的道或万物的起源,而且甚至无法描述鸡的相当有限的叫声。在这里,之前在通道中建立的两个领域之间的严格划分终于被打破了。个体的直接行为,除了可以用集体语言描述的一般规律之外,也是道的不可解释性。在这里我们看到,部分仍然预示着整体,就像我们一开始的社区/成员范式一样。道的超言超普遍性也体现在它的每一个部分中,以至于每一个部分在某些方面也是无法用语言描述的,而在其他方面却是可以描述的(即“以什么方式”的问题)一般事物都会出现)。因此,任何给定的实体都是无法用语言来描述的,就像道本身一样,它既可以用“功”一词来描述,而不仅仅是用“功”来描述。鸡的叫声既是一个事物,又不仅仅是一个事物,也就是说,不仅仅是社区词“事物”所指的事物。这就是文末所说的“道物的终极境界”。这个边缘是万物的自我转变、它们自身的形成、它们不可还原的个性和不可预测性,尽管有一般的范畴和法则。作为事物(即某个社区词的所指对象),它们是一些已经完成的实体,以及某个一般社区或阶级的成员;作为道,每一个都是这里发生的特定事物的不可言喻的生成和转变。 这两者的结合,两者的最终达到,也是它们的接口(际 j i j i jij i ),是鸡的叫声,即一种特殊的不可预测的行为,既与一般规律相关,又超出一般规律。这就是我们在经历的每一刻所面对的,这就是

in fact our entire world. For this, neither words nor silence are adequate. Silence is adequate for the wholly abstract Dao, which is partial to no one principle and has no name. Words are adequate for the communal laws of the interaction of things, their alternations and unifications of opposites. If words were completely adequate, we would always be speaking of nothing but Dao; if they were completely inadequate, we would always be speaking of nothing but things. But the fact is that we are always talking about both, no matter what we do: our speech never gets beyond the finitude of things, and yet we also indicate something beyond what we say when we speak of the squawking of chickens, point to the general manner of their arising and vanishing, which is the Dao we speak of in order to walk it. Things are beyond any determinate identity because identity is the presence of an opposite-unifying whole within the part. Things are beyond any identity because of their identity, and have an identity because they are beyond any identity. Things are speakable because they are unspeakable, and unspeakable because they are speakable.
事实上我们的整个世界。为此,无论是言语还是沉默都是不够的。对于完全抽象的道来说,沉默就足够了,它不偏向任何原则,也没有名称。言语足以表达事物相互作用、事物交替和对立统一的共同法则。如果言语完全足够,我们就永远只谈论“道”;如果它们完全不充分,我们就永远只谈论事物。但事实是,无论我们做什么,我们总是在谈论两者:我们的言语永远不会超出事物的有限性,但当我们谈到鸡的叫声时,我们也表明了一些超出我们所说内容的东西,指向它们生灭的一般方式,就是我们所说的为行之道。事物超越任何确定的同一性,因为同一性是在部分内存在一个对立统一的整体。事物因其同一性而超越任何同一性,并因其超越任何同一性而具有同一性。事物之所以可言,是因为它们不可言说,又不可言说,因为它们可言说。
With this, we have reached a new level of thought on the question of coherence, a type of convergence of ironic and non-ironic conceptions of Li that eliminates the strict division between the whole and the part. Here, it is not that the overriding coherence is ironic while the individual coherences are non-ironic, as in the second type of treatment of Li above, nor that both overriding coherence and individual coherences are both fully ironic, as in the third. Rather, both the overriding and the particular coherences, Dao and Li, are at once in one sense ironically coherent and in one sense non-ironically coherent. Both are speakable and both are unspeakable. It is in the direction of this intensified interfusion of ironic and non-ironic, their convergence and ultimately the overcoming of their mutual exclusivity, that we will see the term Li developing through the works of Xuanxue and Chinese Buddhist thinkers in the chapters that follow. But first we must consider the advent of self-conscious deployments of the term Li as a special philosophical term, and the attempts to give it a formal definition, which we will find in a few texts on the periphery of the Legalist tradition, that is, in certain sections of the Guanzi and the Hanfeizi.
至此,我们对连贯性问题的思考达到了一个新的水平,连贯性是李的反讽和非反讽概念的融合,消除了整体和部分之间的严格划分。这里,并不是说压倒性的连贯性是反讽的,而个体连贯性是非反讽的,如上面对李的第二种处理方式,也不是说压倒性的连贯性和个体连贯性都是完全反讽的,如第三种处理方式。相反,最重要的连贯性和特殊的连贯性,即“道”和“理”,在某种意义上既具有讽刺性的连贯性,又在某种意义上具有非讽刺性的连贯性。两者皆可言,皆不可言。正是朝着反讽与非反讽的强化融合、它们的融合以及最终克服它们的相互排他性的方向,我们将在接下来的章节中看到“理”一词通过玄学和中国佛教思想家的著作而发展。但首先我们必须考虑将“理”一词自觉地运用为一个特殊的哲学术语的出现,以及给它一个正式定义的尝试,我们可以在法家传统边缘的一些文本中找到这一定义,即,在《管子》和《韩非子》的某些章节中。
FOUR 

THE ADVENT OF LI AS A
TECHNICAL PHILOSOPHICAL TERM
LI AS A 的出现 技术哲学术语

We have seen the gradual thickening of associations around the term Li, first in non-ironic usage, as in the X u n z i X u n z i XunziX u n z i, and then a parallel development among writers within the ironic tradition, using this term as an increasingly important token by which to formulate a response to the non-ironic tradition and by which to incorporate some its elements into the universe of ironic discourse. We have seen within the variety of texts collected in the Zhuangzi several ways in which this seems to have been attempted, each with its own distinctive usage of Li: (1) the extended non-ironic usage with a beginning of ironic tendency in the emphasis on mental stillness and quietude, where both Dao and Li are used in a basically non-ironic sense; (2) a fully ironic usage that takes both Dao and Li ironically, regarding both-the totality of coherence and each particular coherence-as intrinsically self-undermining, accomplished only by their subversion, each being a coherence as a value-bearing grouping of opposed elements found only in unintelligibility; and (3) a compromise position that incorporates a non-ironic notion of Li , intelligible specific coherences, as somehow operating under and even deriving from the ironic unintelligible coherence of Dao. A further development from the last of these moves forward another step: (4) a view of both macro and micro coherence, Dao and Li , as each being at once in a sense intelligible and in a sense unintelligible. We may view these developments as reverse mirror images to the incorporations of ironic notions of coherence into a non-ironic framework, as seen in some of the Liji texts such as the “Daxue” and “Zhongyong,” and in the “Great Commentary” to the Zhouyi, as discussed in Ironies of Oneness and Difference. Although Li seems to be an increasingly important focal point in framing these discussions, we still have not witnessed its advent into a consciously singled-out philosophical term, considered abstractly and as such, and given an abstract and general
我们已经看到围绕“李”一词的联想逐渐加深,首先是在非讽刺用法中,如 X u n z i X u n z i XunziX u n z i ,然后在反讽传统的作家之间并行发展,使用这个术语作为一个日益重要的标志,通过它来制定对非反讽传统的回应,并将其一些元素纳入反讽话语的宇宙中。我们在《庄子》中收集的各种文本中看到了几种似乎试图这样做的方式,每种方式都有其独特的“礼”用法:(1)扩展的非讽刺用法,并在强调中开始具有讽刺倾向。关于精神的静止和安静,其中“道”和“理”基本上都是在非讽刺的意义上使用的; (2)一种完全讽刺的用法,讽刺地看待道和理,将两者——连贯性的整体和每个特定的连贯性——本质上视为自我破坏,只有通过它们的颠覆才能实现,每一个连贯性都是作为价值承载的群体的连贯性。对立的元素只存在于难以理解的地方; (3)一种折衷立场,其中包含非讽刺性的“理”概念,可理解的特定连贯性,作为某种方式在“道”的讽刺性难以理解的连贯性下运作,甚至源自于“道”的讽刺性难以理解的连贯性。后者的进一步发展又向前迈进了一步:(4)宏观和微观连贯性、道和理的观点,因为两者同时在某种意义上是可理解的和在某种意义上是不可理解的。我们可以将这些发展视为将反讽的连贯概念纳入非反讽框架的反向镜像,如《大学》、《中庸》等一些《礼记》文本以及《大论》中所见。正如《同异讽刺》中所讨论的那样,《周易》。尽管“理”似乎成为这些讨论框架中越来越重要的焦点,但我们仍然没有见证它成为一个有意识地单独提出的哲学术语,被抽象地考虑,并被赋予抽象和普遍的概念。

definition. This seems to happen first in some texts of a syncretic character, mainly in the interface of Legalist and Daoist thinking as found in the Guanzi and the Hanfeizi, continued in later texts of mixed provenance such as the Huainanzi. It is to this development that we now turn.
定义。这似乎首先发生在一些具有合一性质的文本中,主要是在《管子》和《韩非子》中发现的法家和道家思想的交汇处,并在后来的混合出处的文本中继续存在,例如《淮南子》。我们现在正转向这一发展。

TOWARD THE IRONIC: LI IN THE PRE-IRONIC DAOISM OF THE GUANZI
走向反讽:《管子》前反讽道教中的“礼”

In Ironies of Oneness and Difference, I attempted a tentative dating of certain chapters of the Guanzi-“Neiye” 內業 (“Inner Training”), "Xinshu shang"心術上 (“Techniques of the Heart/mind, Part 1”),“Xinshu xia” 心術下 (“Techniques of the Heartmind, Part Two”), and “Baixin” 百心 (“Purifying the Heart/mind”)—characterizing some parts of them—namely, the “Neiye” and the first part of “Xinshushang”-as belonging to what might be described as a kind of “pre-ironic Daoism.” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} If this early dating is correct, placing these texts well prior to the Xunzi, it would make these texts among the earliest texts to make extensive use of the term Li in its non-ironic sense. Since I am by no means certain about this early dating, however, the conclusions of this part of the discussion must be regarded as highly speculative. But even if these texts postdate the Xunzi, and thus are not to be taken as indicative of the early formation of the non-ironic sense of Li , they are all the more notable for the microcosmic use of the crypto-Xunzian sense of Li , modified by a proto-ironic notion of how that coherence is created, which brings us insight right into the heart of the thinking that would later produce the full-fledged ironic turn. For these reasons I leave the question of dating tentative, but treat these texts after treating the Xunzi and the Zhuangzi, in spite of the strong possibility of an earlier date for at least some of the material therein, to highlight and unravel the gradual move toward the ironic implications of Li, which can only be made intelligible on the basis of a firm understanding of the kind of straight non-ironic usage of the term of the kind we have spelled out in the case of the Xunzi and “Yueji.” Based on the development of the ideas in these works, and in particular the developments of thinking on Li through a deepening complexity of ironic/ non-ironic interaction, my best guess on these texts is that the “Neiye” and first part of “Xinshu shang” could predate the Xunzi and Zhuangzi, perhaps, as some scholars have speculated, 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} representing the thought of Jixia Daoism or in particular Song Xing 宋鈃, the famous laugher mentioned in Zhuangzi’s first chapter (who thus obviously predates both Zhuangzi and Xunzi) or a member of his school. Here, Li is still an ordinary, nontechnical term. The second half of “Xinshu shang,” which begins to give explicit glosses on the terms and statements used in the first half, would then read as a somewhat later commentary on the first half, written after some of the
在《同异反讽》中,我尝试对《管子》的某些章节进行了初步的年代测定——“内业”、“心术上”(“心术上”) 、“心术下”(“心术第二部分”)和“百心”(“净化心灵”)——表征其中的某些部分——即“内业”和第一个属于“心书商”的一部分,属于一种“前反讽道教”。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 如果这个早期年代是正确的,将这些文本放在《荀子》之前,那么这些文本将成为最早广泛使用“礼”一词的非讽刺性文本。然而,由于我对这种早期约会并不确定,因此这部分讨论的结论必须被视为高度推测性的。但即使这些文本的年代晚于《荀子》,因此不能被视为非讽刺“礼”意义的早期形成的标志,但它们对于“礼”的隐秘荀子意义的微观运用更为引人注目。这种连贯性如何被创造的原始反讽概念所修改,这使我们能够洞察到后来产生成熟的反讽转向的思想的核心。出于这些原因,我暂时搁置了约会问题,但在处理《荀子》和《庄子》之后处理这些文本,尽管其中至少某些材料的日期很可能更早,以强调和阐明逐渐走向理的讽刺含义,只有在对我们在《荀子》和《乐记》的例子中阐明的那种术语的直接非讽刺用法有深刻理解的基础上,才能被理解。”基于这些作品中思想的发展,特别是通过反讽/非反讽互动的深化复杂性对李的思考的发展,我对这些文本的最佳猜测是“内也”和“的第一部分” 《心书商》可能早于《荀子》和《庄子》,或许,正如一些学者推测的那样, 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 代表稷下道教的思想,特别是宋钘,庄子第一章中提到的著名笑者(因此显然早于庄子和荀子)或其学派的成员。在这里,“礼”仍然是一个普通的、非技术性的术语。《新书商》的后半部分开始对前半部分使用的术语和陈述进行明确的注释,因此可以读作对前半部分稍晚一些的评论,是在一些内容之后写的。

developments we have covered in the last two chapters. For it is here that we find the first explicit attempt at a real definition, in the formal sense, of Li as a philosophical term. The “Xinshu xia,” on the other hand, looks like a loose commentary on the “Neiye.” So we will examine the earlier stratum (“Neiye” and “Xinshu shang”) as one unit, coming before the development of the full ironic and non-ironic usages of Li , and their various intertwinings as seen in the last chapter; then we will look at the ascension of the term into a conscious and explicit philosophical term in the second stratum, notable in the latter part of the “Xinshu shang.”
我们在前两章中介绍了这些进展。因为正是在这里,我们第一次明确地尝试对“理”这个哲学术语进行形式意义上的真正定义。另一方面,《新书下》看起来像是对《内夜》的松散注释。因此,我们将把较早的阶层(“内业”和“新书商”)作为一个整体来考察,这是在“礼”的完整反讽和非反讽用法的发展之前,以及它们的各种交织(如上一章所示)之前;然后我们将看看这个术语在第二层中如何提升为一个有意识的、明确的哲学术语,特别是在《心书商》的后半部分。
The “Neiye” starts by presenting the idea of the “vital essence” (jing) as what produces and gives life (weisheng) to all things: the stars above, the grains below, the spirits flowing between heaven and earth. “Life” is here clearly understood in a very broad sense, including the movement and brightness of the heavenly bodies and the growth of crops; it seems to be a generally vitalistic notion of life energy, which can manifest in a great variety of diverse forms. The sage is a person who holds this vital essence, in its full potency, within his own breast (藏於胸中 cang yu xiongzhong). As the text proceeds, it casually redescribes this vitality as “this qi” (ciqi)—it is one certain type of q i q i qiq i, it would seen, the quintessential form of q i q i qiq i in its full potency. Now for anyone who wishes to become a sage by holding this q i q i qiq i in his own breast there is a difficulty: it cannot be held onto or retained within oneself by force, but only by “Virtuosity.” (是故此氣也, 不可止以力, 而可安以德 shigu ci qi ye buke zhi yi li, er ke an yi de). This Virtuosity, when accomplished, produces wisdom, and all the other traditional virtues that spring therefrom. How can one accomplish it? By eliminating the emotional disturbances-worry, joy, anger, desire-that interfere with the spontaneous self-formation of the harmony (he) of the mind in its full Virtuosity and potency.
《内业》首先提出了“精”的概念,它是万物产生和赋予生命的根源:上有星辰,下有谷粒,有天地之间流动的神灵。这里的“生命”有着非常广泛的含义,包括天体的运动和亮度以及庄稼的生长;它似乎是生命能量的普遍活力论概念,可以以多种不同的形式表现出来。圣人是一个将这种生命本质充分发挥在自己胸中的人。随着文本的继续,它不经意地将这种生命力重新描述为“这种气”——它是一种特定类型的生命力。 q i q i qiq i ,它的典型形式是 q i q i qiq i 充分发挥其效力。现在对于任何想通过持有这个成为圣人的人 q i q i qiq i 在他自己的心中有一个困难:它不能通过武力来保持或保留在自己体内,而只能通过“精湛技艺”。 (是故此气也,不可止以力,而可安以德是故其也不可之义力,而可安一德)。这种精湛技艺一旦实现,就会产生智慧,以及由此产生的所有其他传统美德。一个人怎样才能做到这一点呢?通过消除情绪干扰——忧虑、喜悦、愤怒、欲望——这些干扰干扰心灵和谐(他)的自发自我形成,充分发挥其精湛技艺和效力。
The text then introduces the term Dao, which seems to be another redescription, with a slightly different emphasis, of the “vital energy” or qi just discussed. We are told that this Dao is “that by which the form is filled” (夫道者所以充形也 fudaozhe suoyi chong xing ye). This term has been discussed in the previous volume; here I’d only like to say that “form” seems to mean not only the physical body but determinate mental states and attitudes, which are described in similar terms, but more specifically as a process of spontaneous formation and filling out, earleir in the text. The problem is, again, that human beings are unable to keep the totality of this Dao or vital essence or energy in its self-forming power, its power to generate life, whole and intact within themselves, due to their emotional disturbances. The text offers a definition of the Dao as what is abundantly overflowing everywhere, born together with oneself, but systematically elusive, with no fixed sound or form, and yet which “accomplishes things in
文本随后介绍了“道”一词,这似乎是对刚才讨论的“元气”或“气”的另一种重新描述,只是强调的重点略有不同。据说,此道是“夫道者所以充形也”。该术语已在前卷中讨论过;在这里我只想说,“形式”似乎不仅意味着物质身体,还意味着确定的精神状态和态度,它们用类似的术语描述,但更具体地说是一种自发形成和充实的过程,早期在文本。问题再次在于,由于情绪的困扰,人类无法将这条道或生命本质或能量的整体保持在其自我形成的力量中,其在自身内部产生生命的力量,是完整和完整的。文本对道的定义是:到处充溢,与自身同生,但系统性难以捉摸,没有固定的声音或形式,但“成事于”

an orderly sequence” (而序其成謂之道。er xu qi cheng wei zhi dao). It is in this context that the text asserts a relation between Dao and Li: “All Dao is without particular locus, but he who is skilled in using the mind dwells in it peacefully: 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} when the mind is still, and the qi is [thus] coherently ordered [心靜氣理 xinjing qi Li], Dao comes to stay in it.” 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} Qi, the energy that constitutes the living body, is made “orderly” ( Li ) ) )) by the stillness of the mind, and this is the precondition of the experience of Dao coming to dwell in the mind, or is perhaps synonymous with it. The formlessness and elusiveness of Dao, its having no “locus” (所 suo) and thus being inaccessible to the ordinary modes of acquisition and knowing, has been noticed and accentuated here. It “has no locus” both in the sense that it has no one particular form, cannot be located in one sound or sight, and also in that “people are unable to hold it fast” in its full potency by means of intention and force. This systematic elusiveness to knowledge of Dao is here, however, only a minor problem, not yet something that pushes all the way into the ironic tropes of “knowing only through non-knowing,” “obtained only by not being attained,” “taught only by non-teaching,” and so on. Rather, its elusiveness as a specific cognitive object can be overcome by a certain state of mind, possibly associated with some kind of yogic practice: the “Virtuosity” of an undisturbed mind. When the mind is stilled, the qi is “Li”-ed automatically in response, and this orderly qi (note the intimate Li / Li / Li//\mathrm{Li} / qi pairing!) is the attainment of Dao. Li here is still a stative verb: it means something like, “ordered in a desirable way.” Qi being ordered in this way seems here to be a synonym for Dao, at the very least the specific dao, right way, of qi. Qi following its dao, its way of optimal function, is for qi to be ordered/Li. Dao is the spontaneous form-giving life force that fills the body and gives shape to the mind, forms the body and mind. Li is how Dao forms things when not interfered with by emotional disturbances and desires, above all by the desire to attain it. We have a straightforward non-ironic conception here, naturalized and tilted slightly by the emphasis on systematic elusiveness and the slightly paradoxical need for not-seeking of Dao in order to attain Dao that qualifies this text as “proto-ironic.” Li is still a nontechnical term here meaning “harmoniously ordered,” but with an emphasis on this as a result of spontaneity, of not being disturbed. Note that in this context, as contrasted to what we will see in the “ironic” appropriations such as the Hanfeizi commentary to the Laozi, Dao is associated only with life and success: “[B]y losing it people die, by gaining it people live; by losing it affairs fail, by gaining it, affairs succeed” (人之所失以死,所得以生也。事之所失以敗,所得以成也。renzhisuoshi yisi,suode yishengye; shizhisuoshi yibai, suode yichengye).
而序其成谓之道。而序其成为之道。正是在这样的背景下,文本断言了道与理之间的关系:“一切道无特定所在,而善用心者安居其中: 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 心静而气理顺,道就住于其中。” 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 气,构成生命体的能量,被变得“有序”(李 ) ) )) 心的宁静,这是道体验驻留在心的前提,或者也许是它的同义词。道的无形和难以捉摸,它没有“所所”,因此无法通过普通的获取和认识方式获得,在这里已经被注意到和强调了。它“没有轨迹”,既是因为它没有一种特定的形式,不能在一种声音或景象中定位,也因为“人们无法通过意图和力量来抓住它的全部效力” 。然而,这种对道的知识的系统性的难以捉摸只是一个小问题,还没有完全推向“非知而知”、“非得而得”、“教而为之”的讽刺比喻。仅通过非教学”等等。相反,它作为特定认知对象的难以捉摸性可以通过某种心态来克服,这可能与某种瑜伽练习有关:不受干扰的心灵的“精湛技艺”。当心静下来时,气就会自动响应而“理”,而这种有序的气(注意亲密关系) Li / Li / Li//\mathrm{Li} / 气对!)是道的成就。这里的“Li”仍然是一个静态动词:它的意思是“以理想的方式排序”。“气”在这里似乎是“道”的同义词,至少是“气”的具体“道”、“正道”。气循其道,其最佳作用之道,是气之令/礼。道是自然赋形的生命力,充身形心,形成身心。理是道在不受情感干扰和欲望(尤其是获得它的欲望)干扰时形成事物的方式。我们在这里有一个简单的非讽刺概念,由于强调系统性的难以捉摸性和为了获得道而不寻求道的稍微矛盾的需要,自然化并略有倾斜,这使本文成为“原始讽刺”。 “理”在这里仍然是一个非技术术语,意思是“和谐有序”,但强调这一点是自发性、不受干扰的结果。请注意,在这种情况下,与我们在韩非子对《老子》的注释等“讽刺”挪用中看到的内容形成对比,道只与生命和成功相关:“失之则亡,得之则亡”。人们生活;人之所失以死,所得以生也。事之所失以败,所得以成也。人之所是一思,所得一胜业;十所所所一白,所得一成业。 。
This general picture is expanded upon in the opening trope of the “Xinshu shang,” representing what I regard as the oldest material in the text:
《新书商》的开头比喻对这一总体图景进行了扩展,代表了我认为文本中最古老的材料:
The mind’s position in the body is that of the ruler; the different jobs of the nine apertures [of qi-flow] have the divided roles of the organ-functionaries [官 guan]. When the mind is rightly positioned in its Dao, the nine apertures follow the divisions that allow them to cohere harmoniously [循理 xun Li]. When preferences and desires overflow, however, the eye cannot see forms and the ear cannot hear sounds. Thus it is said that when the one above departs from his Dao, the ones below lose their proper tasks. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
心在身体中的位置是主宰者;九窍的不同工作,有官官的分工。当心在其道中正确定位时,九窍随分而行,使它们和谐地结合在一起。然而,当喜好和欲望泛滥时,眼睛就看不见色,耳朵就听不到声音。故曰上者失道,下者失其应任。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5}
心之在體,君之位也。九憿之有職,官之分也。心處其道,九竅循理。嗜欲充益,目不見色,耳不聞聲。故曰:上離其道,下失其事。
心之在体,君之位也。九憿之有职,官之分也。心处其道,九窍循理。嗜欲充益,目不见色,耳不闻声。故曰:上离其道,下失其事。
The mind is the lord, the other parts of the body are its “officials” or functionaries. The role of the mind is then described here as in the “Neiye” as consisting in quietude, as not interfering or trying to do the jobs of the other parts. It is to be quieted, made still, cleared, emptied of desires and emotional attachments: this is “its Dao.” This Dao is “not far” but difficult to bring to fruition, copresent with human beings but hard to attain, again as in the “Neiye.” It is only when the mind is “made empty” that “spirit” another casual synonym, it seems, for Dao, jing and qi,-comes to “reside” in it (虛其欲, 神將入舍 xu qi yu shen jiang ru she).
心是主,身体的其他部分是它的“官员”或官员。心的作用在这里被描述为“内野”,在于安静,不干扰或试图做其他部分的工作。使其安静、静止、清净、清空欲望和情感执着,这就是“其道”。此道“不远”而难成,与人同在而难得,又如“内业”。只有当心“空”时,“神”(道、精、气的另一个随意同义词)才会“居”在其中。姜如蛇)。
The text continues to assert that it is this “emptiness” that is the true origin of the traditional virtues, of all the things humans desire, which it lists and defines:
经文继续断言,正是这种“空”才是传统美德、人类所欲求的一切事物的真正根源,它列出并定义了这一点:
People all desire wisdom, but they never seek out how wisdom comes about. Wisdom! Wisdom! It is what he who casts about for it beyond the oceans can never snatch, what he who seeks it can never succeed in dwelling in. The upright person rather does not seek it at all, and thus is able to be empty and totally bereft. Emptiness which it totally bereft of any form is called Dao. What transforms and grows all things is called Virtuosity. The human tasks of lord and servant and of father and son are called Rightness (Duty). Properly bowing and yielding while ascending and descending so that there is a distinction between noble and base, so that those more and less closely related form a single body, is called Ritual. Simplifying all things down to the smallest so that they follow a single Dao, using violence, prohibition and punishment, is called Law. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
人们都渴望智慧,但却不去探究智慧是如何产生的。智慧!智慧!是远方投求者,不能夺取;求之者,不能安居。正直的人宁可不求,也能空虚无有。完全没有任何形式的空性称为道。使万物变化、生长的,叫做精巧。君臣父子之人事,谓之义(义)。上下适当的礼让,以有贵贱之别,使亲疏之亲为一体,谓之礼。将万物简化为一道,用暴力、禁止、惩罚,这就是法。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
Note that Dao is here only the emptiness of mind itself, the proper Way of the mind in its role as Lord of the body. The function of nourishing
请注意,这里的道只是心本身的空性,是心作为身体之主的正确之道。滋补功能

and transforming all things is attributed rather to Virtuosity, which grows out of the mind properly following its own role of emptiness and stillness. The list of virtues are depicted as what comes forth from this process, fully articulated, as the content of the “wisdom” that can only be attained by this emptying of the mind which depends on not seeking wisdom-constituting the proto-irony of this conception. This picture of the human body as a social hierarchy in microcosm, which persists in the Mencius and all the way down the centuries into Song and Yuan dynasty Daoist Internal Alchemy (內丹 neidan) and thereafter, is extended to assert that the mind need only be quiet, “nonacting,” to put the organs of perception and interaction with the world, the nine apertures, “in order” ( Li ) spontaneously. Like a sage ruler who has mastered either the ritual wuwei of Shun in Analects 15:5 or the later Daoist anti-ritual extension of the same idea, the mind should not overstep its bounds and start meddling in the individual affairs of the various organs. Taken with the statement just quoted from the “Neiye,” this suggests that the qi becomes Li -coherent, harmonious, organized-as a spontaneous correlative to the stillness of the mind. This coherence among the parts, their formation of a coherent whole, seems closely related to the idea of each of the organs doing only its own job, following “the division of individual roles” (分 fen), just as in Xunzi’s conception of social coherence. Indeed, Li here means nearly the same thing: the division of individual roles. The following of Li means staying within its proper limits. Li is, we might say, the articulations of these limits, the grain of the body that separate its organs into specific jurisdictions of qi-flow. Note that the mind is in the position of the unifying totality, and thus is said to follow “its Dao”; the individual organs are in the role of specific functions, and what they follow is their Lis, the divisions that allow them to cohere. We will encounter this whole/part picture of the Dao/Li relation many times below, conceived in various ways. Here, the organs and the qi “follow the guidelines making for coherence ( Li )” when the eye can see sights and the ear can hear sounds, when these are not interfered with by the purposive desires and preferences of the mind, which is failing to be properly still and wu-wei (無為). Conscious willing and purpose are a problem because they interfere with the stillness of the mind. This stillness is what makes the qi genuinely Li-ed-orderly, coherent, harmonious. This in turn creates the virtuosity (德 de) which is the presence and attainment of Dao, and this is the true source of real values, including here the traditional Confucian virtues: they are attained by not actively seeking them, but rather stilling the mind so that the qi is made into the kind of coherence that serves as their spontaneous matrix, which is what truly produces them.
而改变一切事物则归因于精巧,精巧是从心灵中适当地遵循其空寂的角色而产生的。美德清单被描述为从这个过程中产生的东西,被充分阐明,作为“智慧”的内容,只有通过这种依赖于不寻求智慧的清空心灵才能获得——构成了这一点的原始讽刺。概念。这种将人体视为社会等级制度的微观世界的观点,在孟子中一直存在,并一直延续到宋元的内丹内丹及其后的几个世纪,延伸到断言心灵只需要安静,“无为”,让感知器官和与世界互动的九个孔穴,自发地“有序”(理)。就像圣人掌握了《论语》十五章五节中舜的礼无为或后来道家反礼的延伸一样,心不应该越界而开始干涉各个器官的个别事务。结合刚才引用的《内业》中的说法,这表明气变得理——连贯、和谐、有组织——作为与心灵静止的自发相关。这种各部分之间的连贯性,它们形成一个连贯的整体,似乎与每个器官只做自己的工作、遵循“分分”的观念密切相关,正如荀子的社会概念一样。连贯性。事实上,“礼”在这里的意思几乎是一样的:个人角色的划分。追随礼,就是保持在适当的限度之内。我们可以说,理是这些界限的表达,是身体的纹理,将其器官划分为特定的气流管辖范围。 请注意,心处于统一整体的位置,因此据说遵循“其道”;各个器官都发挥着特定的功能,它们遵循的是它们的“Lis”,即使它们凝聚在一起的划分。我们将在下面多次遇到这种以各种方式构思的道/理关系的整体/部分图景。在此,脏腑气“遵循理”,眼能见色,耳能闻声,不受心意欲望和喜好的干扰,这是失败的。保持适当的静止和无为。有意识的意愿和目的是一个问题,因为它们干扰心灵的宁静。这种静止使气真正变得有序、连贯、和谐。这反过来又创造了德,即道的存在和成就,这是真正价值的真正来源,包括这里的传统儒家美德:它们不是通过主动寻求而是通过静心来获得的这样气就变成了一种凝聚力,作为它们的自发基质,这才是真正产生它们的原因。
Note that the engine for full ironic Daoism is already in place here: we want the Dao (here meaning explicitly the proper role of the mind as
请注意,完全讽刺的道教的引擎已经就位:我们想要道(这里明确表示心灵的正确角色

ruler, but clearly also still implying that this must be the basis of the full course of traditional virtues, as their listing demonstrates), but we can only get it by not willing it, not trying to attain it. Our purposes are achieved by renouncing our purposes. We cannot “Li” our qi by trying to manipulate it directly, arranging it so that it runs in its proper channels, but rather by ceasing to attempt to so regulate it. But the full consequences of this paradox are not yet drawn. There is still something we can apparently straightforwardly “do”: still the mind. In these texts this “order” seems to mean specifically the separation into specific groupings, forming a coherent whole: unity of the whole via division of the parts into separated roles.
统治者,但显然也仍然暗示这必须是传统美德全部过程的基础,正如它们的清单所表明的那样),但我们只能通过不愿意、不试图获得它来获得它。我们的目的是通过放弃我们的目的来实现的。我们不能通过试图直接操纵它、安排它以使其在适当的通道中运行来“理”我们的气,而是通过停止试图如此调节它来“理”它。但这一悖论的全部后果尚未显现。显然,我们仍然可以直接“做”一些事情:保持头脑。在这些文本中,这种“秩序”似乎具体意味着分成特定的分组,形成一个连贯的整体:通过将各部分划分为独立的角色来实现整体的统一。
Expanding on this, the “Neiye” gives an interesting disquisition on the topic of what “unity” means as coherence and harmony of differentiated roles, giving us perhaps the earliest explicit crossing of the “division” and “unification” motifs intertwined in the notion of Li:
在此基础上,《内野》对“统一”意味着不同角色的连贯与和谐这一主题进行了有趣的讨论,为我们提供了也许是最早明确地交叉交织在这一概念中的“分裂”和“统一”主题。李的:
A single thing that is capable of transforming other things is called spirit. A single affair that is capable of changing other things is called wisdom. But to be able to transform and change things without altering one’s own vital energy or wisdom can only be accomplished by the noble man who holds to unity. Holding to unity without losing it, you can rule over the ten thousand things. The noble man controls things and is not controlled by them: this is the ordered coherence among things that comes from his attaining unity [得一之理 deyi zhi li). With an orderly mind within, orderly words issue from his mouth, and orderly deeds are applied to others, and it is thus that the world becomes orderly. When by attaining a single word the world submits, when by fixing a single word the world obeys, this is what is meant by being unbiased (gong).
能够改变其他事物的单一事物称为精神。能够改变其他事物的一件事叫做智慧。但能在不改变自身元气、智慧的情况下,去改变事物,只有坚持统一的圣人才能做到。持一而不失,则能治万事。君子能驾驭事物而不被事物所驾驭,这就是得一之理得一之理。心有秩序,口出有秩序的言,行有秩序的人,所以世界就秩序了。得一言天下就服,定一言天下就顺,这就是无偏(功)。

一物能化謂之神,一事能變謂之智,化不易氣,變不易智,
一物能化谓之神,一事能变谓之智,化不易气,变不易智,

惟執一之君子能為此乎!執一不失,能君萬物。君子使物,
执一不失,能君万物。君子使物,

不為物使。得一之理,治心在於中,治言出於口,治事加於人,
不为物使。得一之理,治心驻中,治言出于口,治事加于人,

然則天下治矣。一言得而天下服,一言定而天下聽,公之謂也.7
然则天下治矣。一言得而天下服,一言定而天下听,公之谓也.7

一物能化謂之神,一事能變謂之智,化不易氣,變不易智,惟執一之君子能為此乎!執一不失,能君萬物。君子使物,不為物使。得一之理,治心在於中,治言出於口,治事加於人,然則天下治矣。一言得而天下服,一言定而天下聽,公之謂也. 7
一物能化谓之神,一事能变谓之智,化不易气,变不易智,唯执一之君子能故乎!执一不失,能君万物。君子使物,不为物使得一之理,治心驻中,治言由此口,治事加于人,则天下治矣。一言得而天下服,一言定而天下听,公之谓也。 7
Note that Li here means not the “principle” of holding to unity, but the condition of controlling rather than being controlled by things. This is precisely the meaning of the unity, the coherence, here. This is what is attained by stillness of mind: the mind takes its proper role of the mind as ruler, and thereby rules. “Holding to unity” could mean either “keeping concentrated on its own proper task, undistracted by anything else: in this case, the task of the mind, which is to maintain stillness.” It could also be read as referring to the unity that is attained among all the organs of the
注意,这里的“理”并不是指坚持统一的“原则”,而是控制而不是被事物控制的状态。这正是这里的统一、连贯的含义。这就是心的寂静所达到的效果:心以心作为统治者的正确角色,从而进行统治。 “保持统一”可能意味着“保持专注于自己正确的任务,不受其他任何事情干扰:在这种情况下,心灵的任务就是保持静止。”它也可以被理解为指在所有机构之间实现的统一。

entire mind when the mind does this: they become unified as a single coherent whole. “Attaining the unity” can thus mean both the keeping to the proper role of the part and the resultant continuity and coherence of the whole. Li thus could conceivably still be read here as meaning “the specific, divided-out role, limitation”-in this case, the proper role of the heart/ mind or of the ruler, which is to hold to unity and thus maintain stillness, and thus bring order-the playing of their proper roles-to the rest of the organs of the body. Coherence is at the same time a result of “holding to unity,” which is to say, the stillness of the “ruler,” the mind, which causes the other organs to unify around it by being still, by not interfering in their functions. Li here means both the limited role of one part-the ruler/ mind-and also the omnipresent effect of this holding-to-the-limit evident in the unity of the body as a whole: it makes all the organs keep to their separate roles, their Li , the guidelines of separation into groups that allow for coherence. It is coherence in the sense of division, clear articulation, that leads to coherence in the sense of unity, omnipresence, coming-together. This trick is performed by means of the special character of the limited role of the mind specifically: stillness, non-doing, the eschewing of any specific contents or purposes beyond the purely formal one of not interfering in any other role, not doing any other organ’s job for it. Here we have another version of the basic motor of Daoist thought that continues mutatis mutandis straight through the hardcore ironic writers all the way into the Guo Xiang commentary to the Zhuangzi. In the case under discussion here, it is a coherence that is also hierarchical—a ruling and organizing of all the types around a single center, to which they are unambiguously subordinate. This is clearly non-ironic coherence. The unity of coherence, of each playing its role harmoniously, is manifested as the ruler’s relation to his various subordinates, or the mind to the various organs and the qi: because of its unity (concentration, stillness), they form a coherent oneness that serves it, rather than making him a servant of it. Again, this is present as a direct and unproblematic consequence of the mind constraining itself to its proper Li-limitation, to wit, playing the role of a noninterfering and purposeless ruler, thus attaining stillness and unity.
当头脑这样做时,整个头脑就会变得统一:它们成为一个连贯的整体。因此,“达到统一”既意味着保持部分的适当作用,也意味着整体的连续性和连贯性。因此,理在这里仍然可以被理解为“特定的、划分的角色、限制”的意思——在这种情况下,心/头脑或统治者的正确角色,即保持统一,从而保持静止,从而使身体的其他器官秩序井然,发挥其应有的作用。连贯性同时也是“保持统一”的结果,也就是说,“统治者”——心灵的静止,使其他器官通过静止、不干扰它们的功能而统一在它周围。 。这里的“理”既指的是一个部分(统治者/心灵)的有限作用,也指的是这种对身体作为一个整体的统一所表现出的这种对极限的无所不在的影响:它使所有的器官保持各自的独立。角色、他们的 Li 、分组准则以保持连贯性。正是分裂意义上的连贯性、清晰的表达,才导致了统一、无所不在、聚合意义上的连贯性。这一技巧是通过头脑的有限角色的特殊性来实现的:静止、无为、避开任何特定的内容或目的,超出不干涉任何其他角色、不做任何其他行为的纯粹形式的内容或目的。器官的工作。在这里,我们看到了道家思想基本动力的另一个版本,它比照一直贯穿于铁杆讽刺作家中,一直延伸到郭象的《庄子注》中。 在这里讨论的例子中,这是一种等级性的连贯性——所有类型围绕一个中心进行统治和组织,并且它们明确地服从于这个中心。这显然是非讽刺的连贯性。调和的统一,各司其职,表现为君与诸下的关系,或心与各脏腑气的关系:因其统一(定、静)而形成连贯的一体,为它服务,而不是让他成为它的仆人。再次,这表现为心灵将自己限制在适当的礼限内的直接且没有问题的结果,也就是说,扮演一个不干涉和无目的的统治者的角色,从而获得平静和统一。
Li is here the order that is taken by q i q i qiq i when it is not interfered with or manipulated by mental purposes and desires. It is the arrangement of qi when no purposive arrangement is made to qi, when there is no human (i.e., subjective mental) interference in it. As such it may seem to be a good analogue of a kind of objective order: the order of things when not manipulated by and subordinated to the one-sided subjective purposes of any particular agent. I have claimed, however, that Li is never simply the order of nature, but always the overlap or interaction between human coherence and nonhuman coherence, as we have seen prototypically in the case of the
李是这里的订单 q i q i qiq i 当它不受心理目的和欲望干扰或操纵时。它是对气没有刻意的安排,没有人的(即主观心理)干扰的情况下的气的安排。因此,它似乎是一种客观秩序的一个很好的类比:事物的秩序不受任何特定主体片面主观目的的操纵和服从。然而,我声称,理从来不是简单的自然秩序,而总是人类连贯性和非人类连贯性之间的重叠或相互作用,正如我们在
Xunzi above. But even in this case, examined carefully, we really do have a form of human-nonhuman overlap in the notion of Li ; it is confusing, however, precisely because it is a proto-ironic version of this overlap. That is, the order of non-purposive q i q i qiq i in the role-divisions of the organs and their functions is not a simple fact, nor a pure normative ideal, but is in fact the result of a human disposition: that of stillness and noninterference of mind. To make the paradox more stark: the spontaneous order of q i q i qiq i as it is when free of subjective purposive human interference is the result of the condition of the human. It is not just “so” irrespective of what humans do or think; it exists only when humans do and think in a certain way, namely, non-doing and non-thinking. This is of course precisely the irony so central to the politics of the Laozi: to cite the most obvious of many examples, the highest ruler is the one who makes the people say “We did it ourselves!” (我自然 woziran) (DDJ 17). This lack of a felt presence of the ruler, and the resulting perfect and spontaneous order, is due to the way the ruler is. The natural order of the qi, the spontaneous nondisturbed Li , is a conditional state: it is conditioned by the presence of a mind, but one which is in the state of “non-mindlikeness,” that is, stillness and freedom from desire. In this irony we see the coherence of the human and the natural again, but in its proto-ironic form as the ironic attainment of (human) purpose through purposelessness-just as rain is “great weather” for a picnic.
荀子同上。但即使在这种情况下,仔细检查一下,我们在“理”的概念中确实存在某种形式的人类与非人类的重叠;然而,它令人困惑,正是因为它是这种重叠的原始讽刺版本。也就是说,无目的的顺序 q i q i qiq i 器官及其功能的角色划分并不是一个简单的事实,也不是一个纯粹的规范理想,而实际上是人类性格的结果:心灵的平静和不干涉。让这个悖论变得更加明显:自发的秩序 q i q i qiq i 正如当不受主观有目的的人类干扰是人类状况的结果时一样。无论人类做什么或想什么,这不仅仅是“如此”;而是“如此”。只有当人类以某种方式做事和思考时,即“不做”和“不思考”,它才存在。这当然正是老子政治的核心讽刺之处:举许多例子中最明显的一个,最高统治者就是让人民说“我们自己干的!”的人。 (我自然woziran)(DDJ 17)。缺乏统治者的存在感,以及由此产生的完美和自发的秩序,是由于统治者的行事方式造成的。气的自然秩序,自发的不受干扰的理,是一种因缘状态:它以心的存在为条件,但处于“无心”的状态,即静止和无欲的状态。在这种讽刺中,我们再次看到了人类与自然的一致性,但其原始讽刺形式是通过无目的实现(人类)目的的讽刺——就像下雨是野餐的“好天气”一样。
What is this coherence that is brought about by noninterference of mental purpose? The text states flatly: “The life of man is formed by the joining of the essential qi from heaven and a shape from earth. With harmony, there is life. Without harmony, there is no life. Seeking out the Dao of harmony, we find that its subtlety is invisible, its minuteness is beyond any categorization.” 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} Life, continuation, is a result of harmony. The “Neiye” makes this most emphatic: “The real condition of that thing called the heart/ mind is such that its ease is benefited by quietude. Just don’t disturb or disorder it, and its harmony forms of itself.” Harmony here is, like Li, the state into which things settle if freed of disturbances; Li is just this harmonious self-coherence. We may again note the self-forming durability and continuance that are attributed to harmony here. Similarly, the “Neiye” states flatly: "The life of man is formed by the joining of a seminal quintessence (精 jing) put forth by Heaven and a physical shape put forth by Earth. When there is harmony [between them], there is life. Without harmony, there is no life."9 Moreover, this harmony is intrinsically related to pleasure; repeating the same sentence structure, the text goes on to state, "The life of man necessarily depends on his pleasure [凡人之生, 必以其歡 fanren zhi sheng, bi yi qi huan]. With sorrow he loses the proper measure, with anger he loses the starting point. When he is disturbed by sorrow, misery, joy or anger, Dao has no place to dwell in him."10 Dao is here again a spontaneous result of the
这种不干扰心理目的所带来的一致性是什么?文中平淡地写道:“人的生命,是天之精气与地之形相合而成的。有和谐,就有生命。没有和谐,就没有生命。求和之道,其微妙是无形的,其细微是无法归类的。” 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 生命的延续,是和谐的结果。 《内业》最强调这一点:“所谓心之物,其真实状态,是由清静而受益其自在。只是不要打扰或扰乱它,它会自然形成和谐。”这里的“和谐”,就像“礼”一样,是指没有任何干扰,一切都安定下来的状态。理就是这种和谐的自我连贯性。我们可以再次注意到这里归因于和谐的自我形成的持久性和持续性。同样,《内业》也平淡地说:“人的生命,是天之精气与地之形相合而成。和而有之。”没有和谐,就没有生命。”9此外,这种和谐本质上与快乐相关;没有和谐,就没有生命。重复相同的句子结构,文本接着说:“人的生活必然取决于他的快乐[凡人之生,必应欢fanren zhi sheng,bi yi qi huan]。随着悲伤,他失去了适当的尺度,当他被悲伤、痛苦、喜悦或愤怒所扰乱时,道就没有地方居住在他里面了。”10 道在这里又是自然的结果。

removal of disturbance: it is the Li-ing or ordering of qi that results when the mind is no longer disturbed by purposes that interfere in the separation of roles of the various organs. This harmony is already characterized here quite concretely as a following of the Mean, the Center: in the matter of nutrition, to be specific, it is a result of eating neither too little nor too much. Harmony and pleasure (though not excited joy and active desire) is here conceived as a quantitative but unquantified center that balances two extremes, and is here given a foundational role as the basis of life.
排除干扰:当心不再受到干扰各器官作用分离的目的的干扰时,就会产生理气或气的秩序。这种和谐在这里已经被非常具体地描述为遵循中庸、中庸:在营养方面,具体来说,它是吃得不多也不少的结果。和谐与快乐(尽管不是兴奋的喜悦和积极的欲望)在这里被视为平衡两个极端的定量但未量化的中心,并在这里被赋予作为生命基础的基础性作用。
This introduces a crucial point that will come back again and again in many forms. I have spoken about coherence with human desires as a criterion of Li. However, here we have a distinction between some human affects and others. In this case at least, certain human desires and emotions are apparently not among those with which these external coherences must cohere to count as Li . What is the criterion by which we can make this judgment? The “Inner Training” says that these emotions “disturb” the stillness that allows the qi to settle, to become “Li”-ed. This is further described as a losing of the proper “measure.” Here we see a very obvious answer taking shape: just as some but not all of the available coherences out in the world count as Li -i.e., those that cohere with human desires-likewise, some but not all of human desires count as Li-ed: those that cohere with the world, and with each other, in a balanced way. Anything that knocks the grouping of human drives out of balance, or resonates and overlaps with no groupings in the world, is to be excluded or moderated or modified. The Center is here already the implicit criterion. Failing to cohere with existing conditions in the world will upset the balance between extremes, the centering. But any pair of extremes implies a center; how do we locate the relevant center? Given the equation between balanced coherence and pleasure, smoothness of activity and continuance, this line of thinking expands easily into a related criterion: the spontaneous, non-premeditated springs of action are in a state of inner and outer coherence, while the deliberate, stubbornly object-pursuing desires are not. We see these two lines of thinking, mutatis mutandis, and with various degrees of emphasis, put to many diverse uses, from Laozi’s “stomach/eye” (腹/目 fu/mu) distinction (DDJ 12),to Zhuangzi’s distinction between “preferences and desires” (嗜慾 shiyu—the same term is already used in the “Xinshu shang” to name the harmful human affects) (in Zhuangzi, Chapter 6), or “goal oriented organ knowledge” (官知 guanzhi) on the one hand and “the spontaneous springs of Heaven” (天機 tianji) or “spirit-like desire” (神慾 shenyu) on the other (as in Zhuangzi, Chapter 3), all the way up to sharp divide between the “human desires” (人慾 renyu) or “selfish desires” (私慾 siyu, literally one-sided or private desires) and “the Li of Heaven” (天理 tianli) in Neo-Confucianism. It is only that subset of both the internal inclinations and the external group-
这引入了一个关键点,它将以多种形式一次又一次地出现。我讲过以合乎人的欲望为礼的标准。然而,在这里我们区分了一些人类影响和其他影响。至少在这种情况下,某些人类欲望和情感显然不属于这些外部连贯性必须一致才能算作“理”的欲望和情感。我们做出这个判断的标准是什么? 《内功》说,这些情绪“扰乱”了气的静定,成为“离”。这被进一步描述为失去了适当的“措施”。在这里,我们看到一个非常明显的答案正在形成:就像世界上一些但不是全部可用的一致性算作“理”一样,即那些与人类欲望一致的东西,同样,人类欲望的一些但不是全部算作“理” ed:那些以平衡的方式与世界以及彼此之间保持一致的。任何使人类驱力分组失去平衡,或与世界上任何分组产生共鸣和重叠的事物,都应被排除、缓和或修改。中心在这里已经是隐含的标准。无法与世界现有条件保持一致将会破坏极端之间的平衡,即中心。但任何一对极端都意味着一个中心;我们如何找到相关的中心?考虑到平衡的连贯性与愉悦感、活动的流畅性与连续性之间的等式,这种思路很容易扩展到一个相关的标准:自发的、非预谋的行动源泉处于内在和外在连贯的状态,而刻意的、顽固的行动则处于内在和外在连贯的状态。追求对象的欲望则不然。 我们看到这两种思路,比照后,有不同程度的强调,并有多种不同的用途,从老子的“胃/目”(腹/目fu/mu)区别(DDJ 12),到庄子的“ “嗜欲是欲”(《心术上》中已用此词来指称有害的人类情感)(《庄子》第六章),或“官知观知”一方面是“天机天机”,另一方面是“神欲”(如《庄子》第三章),一直到“人性”之间存在着尖锐的鸿沟。理学中的“人欲”或“私欲”和“天理”。这只是内部倾向和外部群体的子集——

ings that “cohere,” thus requiring no deliberate scheming and seeking, that counts as Li. The excluded category generally means, whatever desires I may have that impede either my own harmony as a psycho-physical whole, my harmony with my environment (unattainable desires with which no object corresponds, which cause me longing and frustration), or the coherence of my social group (attainable but with antisocial consequences). Again and again, we will see this related to the idea of balance and moderation as opposed to bias or one-sidedness, and to the spontaneous and non-purposive as opposed to the deliberate and purposive.
凡事“连贯”,无需刻意谋求,这就是礼。被排除的类别通常意味着,我可能拥有的任何欲望,这些欲望要么妨碍我作为一个身心整体的和谐,要么妨碍我与环境的和谐(无法实现的欲望,没有物体与之对应,这导致我渴望和沮丧),或者阻碍我与环境的一致性。我的社交群体(可以实现,但会产生反社会后果)。我们将一次又一次地看到,这与平衡和适度的观念有关,而不是偏见或片面性;它与自发和无目的的观念有关,而不是故意和有目的的观念。
The early part of the “Xinshu shang” text includes another very telling remark about the relation between Dao and Li:
《心术上》文本的前半部分还有一个关于道与礼关系的非常生动的评论:
Strength cannot succeed in all cases; wisdom cannot plan all affairs successfully. Things have their definite forms, and forms have their definite names. One who names them properly is called a sage. Thus it is only after one knows the deed consisting of wordlessness and nonactivity that one can know the ruling string of Dao. It diversifies their shapes and tendencies, but does not join in/differ from the different coherences ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) of the ten thousand things [殊形異勢,不與萬物異理 shuxingyishi,buyuwanwuyili]. Thus "it can be considered the beginning of the world."11
实力不可能在所有情况下都成功;智慧不能成功地计划所有的事情。事物有一定的形式,形式也有一定的名称。能正确命名它们的人称为圣人。所以只有知道了无言无为的行为之后,才能知道道的主弦。它使它们的形状和倾向多样化,但不加入/不同于不同的连贯性 ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) 万事之异形异势,不与万物异理数形异义,不语万物异理。因此“它可以被认为是世界的开始。”11
Note that I give two exactly opposite interpretations of the last line of this passage: it can be read to mean either “it does not ‘participate’ ( yu ) ) )) in the different Li of the ten thousand things” or, just the opposite, “it does not take any Li (coherence) that is different from ( y u ) ( y u ) (yu)(y u) the ten thousand things.” It is of great interest that these two opposite grammatical options yield the same metaphysical picture for us-a mark of the ironic structures into which we are beginning to enter here. Note that it mirrors exactly the ambiguity of unity and division noted above with respect to the role of the mind: by keeping to its proper role as a particular part (stillness), it unifies the whole and affects all the other parts. By keeping away from them, and limiting itself, it pervades and participates in them. If we may venture an interpretation of the thought of this passage, it would seem to imply that Li refers to the differences of the forms and tendencies of individual things, while Dao is the all-pervasive beginning of these differences, which both diversifies them and remains aloof from their differences. Here again we have Li meaning the division of roles, the limitations between things. And yet, to do justice to the other reading, this amounts to no more than saying that it forms no coherence of its own apart from them, that it shares in all their coherences: by its silence and noninterference, it lacks any agenda of its own, any coherent character, any Li , and yet
请注意,我对这段话的最后一行给出了两种完全相反的解释:它可以被解读为“它不‘参与’”( yu ) ) )) 在万事的不同理中”或者恰恰相反,“它不需要任何与万事不同的理(连贯性) ( y u ) ( y u ) (yu)(y u) 万事”。非常有趣的是,这两个相反的语法选项为我们产生了相同的形而上学图景——这是我们在这里开始进入的讽刺结构的标志。请注意,它准确地反映了上面提到的关于心灵的作用的统一和分裂的模糊性:通过保持其作为特定部分(静止)的适当作用,它统一了整体并影响所有其他部分。通过远离它们并限制自己,它渗透并参与其中。如果我们大胆地解释一下这段话的思想,似乎意味着“理”指的是个体事物的形式和趋势的差异,而“道”是这些差异的普遍开端,它既使它们多样化,又使它们多样化。对他们的分歧保持冷漠。这里又提到了“理”,意思是角色的划分,事物之间的限制。然而,公正地对待另一种解读,这无非是说,除了它们之外,它没有形成自己的连贯性,它分享了它们的所有连贯性:通过它的沉默和不干涉,它缺乏它的任何议程。自己的,任何连贯的字符,任何李,但

it is just this that accomplishes the coherence of the whole, each playing its separate role. By being completely different from them all, from every specific Li (since as stillness, as the work of wordlessness and non-doing, it is a nothingness, a total lack of Li ) it is able to be no different from any of them: there is nothing there to differ from them, it is able to join into them all unobstructedly. Its transcendence is its immanence and vice versa. That is the true hallmark of the ironic notion of Dao, as we analyzed it in the discussion of Laozi in the previous volume. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} Dao, like the non-doing mind discussed above, remains still and does not interfere in them; it is, for this very reason that which gives-allows?-them their diversification. Here again we have the same structure of unity and division. The Dao does not participate in the individual limited Lis, and thus it makes these separate Lis, and their coherence into a whole, possible. The later “commentarial” section of “Xinshu shang” interprets this to mean that ordinary people are moved by “precedent” (故gu), which along with “wisdom” is contrasted to “following things” and “not acting in advance of things” in the rest of the text. The commentarial section states that it is in being free of precedent that the sage is different from all other things and people. It is this difference that allows him to be “empty,” and it is this emptiness which is the Dao, the beginning of all things.
正是这样,实现了整体的连贯性,每个角色都发挥着各自的作用。通过与它们全部完全不同,与每一个特定的理(因为作为静止,作为无言和无为的工作,它是虚无,完全缺乏理),它能够与它们中的任何一个没有什么不同:与它们没有什么不同,它能够毫无障碍地融入它们。它的超越性就是它的内在性,反之亦然。正如我们在上卷讨论老子时所分析的那样,这就是道的反讽观念的真正标志。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 道,如前所述的无为心,保持静止,不干涉它们;正是由于这个原因,它们才得以多样化。这里我们又看到了同样的统一和分裂的结构。道不参与个别有限的理,因此它使这些单独的理以及它们的连贯性成为一个整体成为可能。 《新书商》后来的“注释”部分将其解释为普通人被“故古”所感动,“故古”与“智慧”相对照“从事”和“不先于事”。 ”在文本的其余部分。注释部分说,圣人之所以异于一切事物和人,就在于没有先例。正是这种差异,才让他成为“空”,而这个空,就是道,万物之始。
We begin to press further toward the ironic implications here. Names, and the purposive values that they betoken-such as strength and wisdomdo not cover everything; the wordless teaching and the non-doing activity are needed to attain comprehensiveness, which, as it were, bridges and connects, as well as giving coherent being to, these individual instances. The true origin of the formed/valued is in the formless/valueless, which overflows them. It makes them differ, but does not itself become different along with them. Li denotes their differences, while Dao denotes the overflowing background that bestows these differences, stays out of them, and thereby unifies them into a coherent whole. Note again that sagehood consists of both a grasp of namelessness and the ability to bestow and use the proper names for things. We will see divergent echoes of this kind of thinking in the ironic treatment of these themes in the Hanfeizi commentary to the Laozi and its interpretation of “yielding” and “pliancy.”
我们开始进一步探讨这里的讽刺含义。名字,以及它们所代表的有目的的价值——比如力量和智慧,并不能涵盖一切;为了达到全面性,需要无言的教学和无作为的活动,这可以说是桥梁和连接,并赋予这些个体实例连贯的存在。有形/有值的真正起源在于无形/无值,它溢出了它们。它使它们有所不同,但它本身并不会随着它们而变得不同。理表示它们的差异,而道则表示赋予这些差异、远离它们、从而将它们统一为一个连贯整体的充溢的背景。再次注意,圣人既包括对无名的把握,也包括赋予和使用事物正确名称的能力。我们会在《韩非子注老》对这些主题的反讽处理以及对“屈服”和“柔”的解释中看到这种思想的不同呼应。

LI DEFINED: THE LATER TWO-AND-A-HALF CHAPTERS OF THE GUANZI
李释:《管子》后两章半

Now let us take up the remaining two-and-a-half chapters: the second part of the “Xinshu shang,” the “Xinshu xia,” and the “Baixin.” These take an approach roughly consistent with that of the “type two” appropriations in the Zhuangzi: Dao is ironic, Li is non-ironic. Both linguistically and doctrin-
现在我们来说说剩下的两章半:《心书上》下半、《心书下》、《百心》。它们采取的方法与《庄子》中的“二类”拨款大致一致:“道”是反讽的,“礼”是非反讽的。无论是在语言学上还是在教义上

ally, it seems reasonable to assume that they come from a later stratum of thought than the “one-and-a-half chapters” of pre-ironic Daoism discussed above. It is in this later part of the “Xinshu shang,” as noted, that we find what is probably the earliest attempt at a formal definition of Li, marked off with the “X 也者 yezhe . . 也 ye” form. This is an expanded commentary on the first section of the older section, quoted above, including the attempted definition of the traditional virtues of a ruler up to and including Law as deriving from the emptiness and stillness of the mind. One additional term is added in this later stratum, however: the term Li . The passage is worth quoting at length:
总的来说,我们可以合理地假设它们来自比上面讨论的前反讽道教的“一章半”更晚的思想阶层。如前所述,正是在《新书商》的后半部分中,我们发现了可能是对“礼”的正式定义的最早尝试,并用“X也者也者”进行了标记。 。 也也”的形式。这是对上面引用的旧部分第一部分的扩展评论,包括尝试将统治者的传统美德定义为源自心灵的空虚和寂静的法律。然而,在后面的这一层中添加了一个附加术语:术语 Li 。这段话值得详细引用:
Dao in the midst of Heaven and Earth is so vast that there is nothing outside it, so small that there is nothing inside it. Thus it is said to be “not far and yet difficult to fully realize.” Empty space is never separated from human beings, and yet only the sage can attain the Dao of empty space. Thus it is said that “it is copresent with us and yet difficult to attain.” . . . The Dao of Heaven is empty and formless. Empty, it cannot be conquered; formless, it has no position or obstruction. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} Having neither position nor obstruction, it flows through all things but never changes. Virtuosity [德 de] means the dwelling of the Dao [in oneself]. Things attain it to live and continue [生生 sheng sheng]; knowledge attains it to know 14 14 ^(14)^{14} the vital essence of Dao. Thus virtuosity means to attain it [得 de]. Attainment here means what they attain in order to be what they are. Non-doing is Dao, and dwelling in it [so that Dao dwells in oneself] is Virtuosity. Hence there is no separation between Dao and Virtuosity, and the two are spoken of here together without any distinction. The coherences [Li] that stand between them [間之理 jian zhi Li], however, refer to what allows [Dao] to have a [specific, individuated] dwelling place. Rightness means each thing being positioned appropriately. Ritual means according with unpremeditated human dispositions [人之情 ren zhi qing], following along with the coherence of their rightnesses, and creating restraining proportions and patterns [節文 jiewen] 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} from them. Thus Ritual means to have coherent articulations [which allow coherence among the things articulated] [禮者謂有理也 lizhe youli ye]. Coherence [Li] means the divisions made explicit so as to disclose rightness [理也者明分以諭義之意也 liyezhe mingfen yi yuyi zhi yi ye]. Hence ritual derives from rightness, rightness derives from Li , and Li follows appropriateness [禮出乎義,義出乎理,理因乎宜 l i c h u h u y i , y i l i c h u h u y i , y i lichuhuyi,yil i c h u h u y i, y i chu hu li, li y i n h u y i n h u yinhuy i n h u yi]. Law is that whereby sameness is produced, and what cannot be otherwise. Thus violence, prohibition and punishment are used to
天地之中的道,其大而无其外,其小而无其内。故曰“不远而难矣”。虚空不离于人,但只有圣人才能得虚空之道。所以说“它与我们共存,却难以达到”。 。 。 。天道是虚无无形的。空,不可胜;它无形无相,没有位置或障碍。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 无位无碍,流于万物而不变。德,就是道的居所。事物得其生存并延续[生生sheng sheng];知识获得它去知道 14 14 ^(14)^{14} 道的本质。因此,“德”的意思是“得德”。这里的成就是指他们为了成为自己而获得的东西。无为即是道,居于其中即是德。故道与德不分,二者在此并说,无分别。然而,它们之间的连贯性[间之理 jian zhi Li] 指的是让[道]有一个[具体的,个体化的]居所。正确意味着每件事物的位置都得当。礼,是指顺应人之情,顺其理,创制节文节文。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 来自他们。因此礼的意思是有连贯的表达[礼者谓有理也lizhe有礼也]。理也者明分以谕义之意也 liyezhe mingfen yi yuyi zhi yi ye 。 故礼出于义,义出于礼,礼出于礼。 l i c h u h u y i , y i l i c h u h u y i , y i lichuhuyi,yil i c h u h u y i, y i 出胡里 y i n h u y i n h u yinhuy i n h u 伊]。法则是产生相同性的东西,否则就不可能产生这种东西。因此,暴力、禁止和惩罚被用来

unify them. Thus deeds must be overseen by Law, which emerges from the power to make judgments [權 quan], which emerges from Dao. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
将它们统一起来。因此,行为必须受到法的监督,法产生于判断力,而判断力则产生于道。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
In the earlier sections of the Guanzi texts, Dao is still non-ironic, signifying the harmony of q i q i qiq i; it has no fixed “locus,” to be sure, but this was only a minor problem for anyone seeking to obtain it: all that was needed was mind as ruler of the body taking its proper role as quietude, which would allow all the other parts of the person to settle into their own roles, thereby producing a coherence of the whole body which would produce the traditional virtues of a ruler, including the recourse to Law. The emergence of specific roles and identities from the Dao was not a problem, in spite of its “having no locus”-for this meant only that it was found in no single place, and thus could not be gained by force, but rather pervaded the totality as their harmonious order, attained only by emptying the mind of desire to attain it in one particular form. In this passage, on the contrary, the transition has become more problematic and requires a specific and convoluted explanation. We have an attempt at a transition from the purely ironic Dao, unintelligible and indeterminate, to the definite and determinate forms of coherence, signified by the term Li. These include the patterns of concrete behavior-ritual, Confucian virtues, coercive laws-seen as rooted somehow in this formless indescribable Dao. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} That indescribability has here been intensified, so that the simpler solution offered in the pre-ironic stratum of these texts is no longer sufficient. There, Dao had no one locus, meaning that it, as the life force engendering all types of being, could not be located in any particular practice or role that one might desire and adopt; the problem was to find a specific role or task for the mind that could at the same time effect this order in the totality, and that task turned out to be the mildly ironic one of not desiring and thus settling into quietude. Here, Dao has neither position nor form, no specific identity, not even directly as the orderly harmony of the parts; but human and concrete beings relate to it, position themselves in it, via “Virtuosity.” Virtuosity is the concretization of Dao, giving it a definite non-ironic shape and form, perhaps something like a scoop or vessel that gives shape to the formless Dao, like a vessel that scoops up water and makes it shaped and useful. But it also means the way of “obtaining” Dao so that it does dwell within oneself, which was impossible through deliberate activity and a busily desiring mind. De originally relates to “daos” in the non-cosmic sense as virtuosity relates to a course of study that is guiding one’s endeavor, a dao; de means mastery of a Dao. Here we have the formless Dao that is positioned nowhere, made concrete by the mastery or virtuosity of beings that live and know by dwelling in, and thereby “attaining,” this Dao, so that it dwells in them. In themselves
在《管子》文本的前几节中,“道”仍然是非讽刺的,象征着和谐。 q i q i qiq i ;诚然,它没有固定的“轨迹”,但这对于任何寻求获得它的人来说只是一个小问题:所需要的只是作为身体统治者的心灵发挥其作为安静的适当作用,这将允许所有其他人的各个部分适应自己的角色,从而产生整个身体的连贯性,从而产生统治者的传统美德,包括诉诸法律。道中特定角色和身份的出现并不是问题,尽管它“无轨迹”——因为这只是意味着它不是在任何一个地方被发现的,因此不能通过武力获得,而是普遍存在的。整体性作为它们的和谐秩序,只有通过清空以一种特定形式获得它的欲望才能获得。相反,在这段话中,转变变得更加成问题,需要具体而复杂的解释。我们试图从纯粹反讽的难以理解和不确定的道过渡到由“理”一词所表示的明确和确定的连贯形式。其中包括具体的行为模式——仪式、儒家美德、强制性法律——被视为以某种方式植根于这种无形的、难以描述的道。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 这种不可描述性在这里得到了强化,因此这些文本的前反讽阶层中提供的更简单的解决方案不再足够。 在那里,道没有单一的轨迹,这意味着它作为产生所有类型存在的生命力,不能定位于人们可能渴望和采取的任何特定实践或角色;问题是为心灵找到一个特定的角色或任务,同时可以在整体上影响这一秩序,而这项任务被证明是一种略带讽刺的任务,即不渴望,从而陷入安静。在这里,道既没有位置,也没有形式,没有特定的身份,甚至不直接作为各部分的有序和谐;但人类和具体存在通过“技艺”与之相关,将自己置于其中。技艺是道的具体化,赋予它一个明确的、非讽刺的形状和形式,也许像一把勺子或器皿,赋予无形的道以形状,就像一个器皿,舀水并使之成形并有用。但它也意味着“获得”道的方式,使其确实居住在自己的内心,这是通过刻意的活动和忙碌的欲望头脑不可能实现的。 “德”最初与非宇宙意义上的“道”相关,因为技艺涉及指导一个人努力的学习过程,即“道”;德的意思是掌握道。在这里,我们有无形的道,它无处可寻,是通过居住在其中并认识的生命的掌握或精湛技艺而具体化的,从而“获得”了这条道,使其居住在他们之中。在他们自己

there is no separation between the two. Dao is compared to the empty space that surrounds us, the clarity and non-obstruction that is an image of the sage’s desire-free mind, always immanently at hand but resistant to possession and not limited to any one locus. It is the Dao of this emptiness, the Way of becoming empty, that is the Dao of the mind of the sage. It is only indirectly, through the associations developed in the rest of the discussion, that this can play the role of life-giving vital essence for all things. For as we have seen, it is by being completely different from them, not participating in their affairs, that it is able to generate, sustain, and give life to them: it is the ruler that does not interfere in their specific roles and activities. The specific activities of these concrete beings, including their needs and desires, are thus contrasted sharply to the formless, empty, omnipresent Dao. This is where the term Li is introduced: what stands at the interface between Dao and its simultaneous participation and absolute difference from De, its concrete instantiation dwelling as the life force in individual things, is here said to be Li, the specific coherences of each of these individual things in their divided separate roles. Here this is not a betrayal of its formlessness and omnipresence, as in the more radical forms of ironic Daoism, but rather a derivation of it. The term used to denote this transition to the concrete division into roles is Li . This is what allows them to dwell in it and allows it to dwell in them-what makes for the possibility of De or virtuosity, which is originally no different from Dao and thus absolutely distinct from any particular role or activity.
两者之间没有分离。道被比作我们周围的虚空,它是圣人无欲心的形象,它的清澈和无阻碍,总是内在地触手可及,但不被占有,不限于任何一个地方。就是这个空的道,成空的道,就是圣人的心之道。只有间接地,通过其余讨论中发展出的联想,这才能起到赋予万物生命本质的作用。因为正如我们所看到的,正是通过与他们完全不同,不参与他们的事务,它才能够产生、维持并赋予他们生命:统治者不干涉他们的特定角色和活动。因此,这些具体存在的具体活动,包括他们的需要和欲望,与无形、空虚、无所不在的道形成鲜明对比。这就是“理”一词的引入:位于道及其同时参与和与德的绝对区别之间的接口处,其作为个体事物的生命力的具体实例化居所,在这里被称为“理”,每个事物的特定连贯性。这些单独的事物具有各自不同的角色。在这里,这并不是像讽刺道教的更激进形式那样背叛其无形和无所不在,而是对其的衍生。用于表示这种向具体角色划分的转变的术语是“礼”。这就是让他们居住在其中并允许它居住在他们身上的原因——这使得德或技巧的可能性成为可能,而德或技巧本来与道没有什么不同,因此与任何特定的角色或活动绝对不同。
Division, pattern, restraining proportions: these are the ideas we get packaged with Li here. We are told that there is a Li within “appropriateness” (宜 y i y i yiy i ), meaning a “fit” between a thing and its environment, directly pointing to the notion of Li as coherence with a context. Li has to do with limitation, with constraint and positioning within a specific role. Moreover, the centrality of unpremeditated human disposition and response 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} to this context is made quite explicit here. The equation is that ritual is the division, pattern, and restraining measures that result when unpremeditated human emotion and desire are added to the appropriateness of things in their contexts, in their proper places. This is the adding of a further coherence, that which factors in human desire, to the original coherence between a thing and its proper environment. Ritual divisions of roles, forming a harmonious coherence of parts in a whole, is what makes Li , value-bearing coherence, present; this is the making of formless Dao present, palpable in the coherence of the whole.
划分、模式、限制比例:这些是我们在这里与李一起包装的想法。据说“宜”中有一个“礼” y i y i yiy i ),意思是事物与其环境之间的“契合”,直接指向“理”的概念,即与上下文的连贯性。力与限制有关,与特定角色内的限制和定位有关。此外,无意识的人类性格和反应的中心地位 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 此处对此上下文的说明非常明确。等式是,仪式是当无意识的人类情感和欲望被添加到事物在其背景和适当位置的适当性时所产生的划分、模式和限制措施。这是在事物与其适当环境之间的原始一致性上添加了进一步的一致性,即人类欲望的因素。仪式上的角色分工,形成整体中各部分的和谐连贯,是礼(价值承载连贯性)得以呈现的原因;这是无形之道的形成,在整体的连贯性中显而易见。
We have here almost the transformation from the verbal to nominal sense of Li in process, as it were. Life is harmony, coherence, equilibrium, and continuance. This is what is made present by the embodying of Li in ritual and rightness: appropriateness between a thing and its environment,
在这里,“礼”的从动词意义到名义意义的转变几乎正在进行中。生命是和谐、连贯、平衡和持续的。这就是礼义所体现的礼义:事物与环境的适宜性,

the fitting together of real human responses with the appropriateness of a thing in its own role, in its own environment. The final statement, however garbled it may be in the received text, is particularly telling: Li means following along with appropriateness. Coherence that brings value, the sticking together of human emotions (pleasure) and the divisions between things, is what is meant by Li. It is the interface between Dao and Virtuosity, which at once separates and joins them. Li is the transition between the formlessness of Dao and the usable form of virtuosity. This is present as the divisions between individual roles forming a coherent whole around the nonacting mind of stillness, or the formless Dao. The “making intelligible of rightness” (明義 mingyi) accomplished by these role divisions points again to the human intentionality, the inclusion of subjectivity, in the formation of these apparently objective patterns of division. Li are the coherences that make appropriate (1) fits among things and (2) between those things and human responses (3) intelligible and clear to human minds-each of these three being a form of coherence.
将真实的人类反应与事物在其自身角色和环境中的适当性相结合。最后的陈述,无论收到的文本中多么混乱,都特别能说明问题:“礼”的意思是遵循适当。带来价值的连贯性,人类情感(快乐)的凝聚和事物之间的区分,就是礼的意思。它是道与精之间的界面,既分离又结合。理是无形的道与可用的技艺之间的过渡。这表现为个体角色之间的划分,围绕静止的无为心或无形的道形成一个连贯的整体。这些角色划分所实现的“明义明义”再次指向了人类的意向性,即在这些明显客观的划分模式的形成中包含了主观性。理是使(1)事物之间适合以及(2)这些事物与人类反应之间(3)人类头脑可理解和清晰的适当的连贯性——这三者中的每一个都是连贯性的一种形式。
This linkage between Li and 情 qing is found repeatedly in these texts, as in the “Community Words” dialogue. Qing in early texts signifies the actual unpremeditated condition of things, and later comes to denote human emotions as what are genuine, not yet subjected to deliberate manipulation in accordance with conscious purposes. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} The “Xinshu shang” states: "Because his hates do not lose their Li , and his desires do not go beyond [過 guo] their qing, he is called an exemplary man [junzi]."20 We have a parallelism here that suggests that the emotions of hate and desire have their own proper Li , coherence or balance, and qing, real spontaneous condition, which must be matched harmoniously by “not going too far” (guo). This is reminiscent of the contrast of 正 zheng and 偏 pian in the final question of the “Community Words” dialogue.
这种“理”和“情”之间的联系在这些文本中反复出现,如“群言”对话中。早期文本中的“情”表示事物的实际、无预谋的状况,后来逐渐表示人类的情感是真实的,尚未受到根据有意识的目的的刻意操纵。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 《心书商》云:“因其恨不失其礼,其欲不逾其情,故曰君子。”20 这里有一个平行句,表明嗔、欲之情有其​​应有的理(理)、清(真实的自发状态),必须与“过”相协调。这让人想起“共同体词”对话最后一个问题中正正与偏偏的对比。
The “Baixin” says, "By tracing things back to their beginnings their reality can be calculated, which stands as the foundation of what it generates. Knowing their image we can seek out their palpable form, tracing their Li we know their qing, searching out their beginning we know their names. 211 211 ^(211){ }^{211} In this passage, Li are something that can be “traced” (緣 yuanoften the verb used for apprehension of Li , suggesting lines of pattern) to attain the deeper knowledge of their qing, their actual state prior to consciously purposive interference. But this linkage of qing and Li suggests again the overstepping of any neat subjective/objective division. For qing is not “real” in the sense of objective, but in the sense of sincere: the condition of a thing prior to intervention, prior to deliberate, purposive manipulation. Li stands to qing here as image to form, and beginning to name. In each case we have a typical sprout-blossom type of manifestation structure: what begins obscurely as Li later becomes fully manifest as qing.
《百信》云:“溯其本源,可算其实,为生成之本也。知其象,可求其形,溯其理,可知其情,探其形,可知其情,知其象,可求其形,追其理,可知其情,求其形,可知其情。”从他们一开始我们就知道他们的名字。 211 211 ^(211){ }^{211} 在这篇文章中,“理”是可以被“追踪”的东西(缘元通常用于理解“理”的动词,暗示图案的线条),以获得对它们的“情”的更深入的了解,即它们在有意识的有目的的干扰之前的实际状态。但“情”与“理”的这种联系再次表明了对任何纯粹的主观/客观划分的超越。因为情不是客观意义上的“真实”,而是真诚意义上的“真实”:事物在干预之前、在深思熟虑、有目的的操纵之前的状况。礼立于此以清为象而形成,并始名。在每一种情况下,我们都有一个典型的萌芽开花型的表现结构:开始时模糊的“理”,后来完全显现为“情”。
Makeham translates this passage as follows: “Trace things back to their origins and determine what their shi (actualities) are; make one’s foundation that which gave birth to things. If you want to know something’s image, then you search its form; if you follow something’s distinguishing marks, then you will come to know its essential qualities; if you search back to its starting point, then you will come to know its name.” Note that he translates Li as “distinguishing marks,” and qing as "essential qualities."22 The “reality” referred to in the first line is not the “names,” as Makeham wants to say in order to claim an essentialist theory of language here. Rather, it is the unseen, the unmanifest. It is typical of the ironic appropriation of the non-ironic that we have here an intermediate level of unmanifestness grounding, and making coherent, the more crudely manifest. In straight ironic Daoism, the grounding unmanifestness is simply the Dao-nothing, the nameless, and the like. It cannot be multiple or specific. Here, we have multiple specific groundings for particular things, which themselves further trace back to the even more unmanifest Dao. Images, beginnings and Li : these form the intermediate stratum between the fully unintelligible Dao and the fully intelligible and concrete world of palpable forms, real conditions, and names. Li here seems to take on the sense of a kind of potentiality, a principle, a blueprint according to which realities come to be produced. But the parallelism points us toward the way this is consistently understood in the ironic appropriations of the non-ironic sense of Li: the cutting is the beginning of the cut thing. The cut thing, the finished product, is the result of the cutting. The Li is this cutting, or the lines along which this cutting must occur to provide the coherence of the finished product. It is intelligible, but less distinctly intelligible than the final, chiseled out product. Li is the intermediate state between the pure formlessness of Dao and the finished separation of individual forms.
马克汉姆将这段话翻译如下:“追根溯源,定其实;为事物的诞生奠定基础。欲知其象,则求其形;欲知其形,则求其形;欲知其形,则求其形。追随事物的特征,就会知道它的本质;追随事物的特征,就会知道它的本质。追寻其起点,便知其名。”请注意,他将“理”翻译为“区别标记”,将“庆”翻译为“本质品质”。22第一行中提到的“现实”并不是“名称”,正如马克汉姆为了主张本质主义理论而想说的那样。这里的语言。相反,它是看不见的、未显现的。这是典型的对非讽刺性的讽刺性挪用,我们在这里有一个中间水平的不显性基础,并使连贯性更加明显。在直接讽刺的道教中,基础的不显化仅仅是道无、无名等等。它不能是多个或特定的。在这里,我们对特定的事物有多个特定的基础,这些基础本身可以进一步追溯到更不显化的道。图像、开端和理:它们构成了完全不可理解的道与完全可理解的具体世界(可触摸的形式、真实条件和名称)之间的中间层。这里的“理”似乎具有一种潜力、一种原则、一个蓝图的意义,现实正是根据它而产生的。但这种平行性为我们指出了在李的非讽刺意义上的讽刺挪用中一贯理解这一点的方式:切割是切割事物的开始。切割出来的东西,成品,就是切割的结果。 Li就是这种切割,或者是这种切割必须沿着的线,以提供成品的连贯性。它是可以理解的,但不如最终的、轮廓分明的产品那么明显。理是道的纯粹无形与个体形式的完全分离之间的中间状态。
Indeed, it is possible to read this passage as referring not to inanimate things, but to quasi-animate creatures; indeed, in early sources, the qing of a thing generally refers to the way it behaves, what it tends toward and away from, rather than a static characteristic, 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} in which case it might mean something like, “When we see the way something 'Li’s-the way it divides and groups things into coherences for its own consumption-we can thereby come to apprehend its qing, its spontaneous unmanipulated condition and responses to the world.” Conversely, we can interpret this to mean, “When we see the way this object groups in order to cohere with our own coherence, for our own consumption, we will come to apprehend the true condition it has in our world, the truly relevant facts about it for us, what it, left to itself, does to or for or in relation to us.” In either case, a direct link between the way things are grouped and the way the groupers of those things feel about them is established. We have encountered similar ideas in the Liji texts (“Great Learning,” “Doctrine of the Mean,” “Record of Music”)
事实上,可以将这段话理解为不是指无生命的事物,而是指准生命的生物。事实上,在早期的资料中,事物的“情”通常指的是它的行为方式,它趋向和远离什么,而不是静态的特征, 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 在这种情况下,它的意思可能是这样的:“当我们看到某种‘理’的方式时——它为了自身的消费而将事物划分和组合成连贯性的方式——我们可以因此来理解它的情、它自发的、不受操纵的状态以及对事物的反应。”世界。”相反,我们可以将其解释为:“当我们看到这个物体的组合方式,以便与我们自己的连贯性相一致,为了我们自己的消费,我们将开始理解它在我们的世界中的真实状况,真正相关的事实关于它对我们来说,它对我们做了什么,或者为我们做了什么,或者与我们有关。”无论哪种情况,事物的分组方式和这些事物的分组者对它们的感受方式之间都建立了直接联系。我们在《礼记》文本中也遇到过类似的想法(《大学》、《中庸》、《乐记》)

in Ironies of Oneness and Differences. We see here both the intermediate position of Li in the ironic appropriations of the non-ironic, the semi-manifest intelligibility of the act of division or perforations in accordance to which divisions will produce coherence, and the manner in which this oversteps the objective/subjective distinction.
在《统一与差异的讽刺》中。我们在这里既看到了李在非讽刺性的讽刺性挪用中的中间立场,也看到了分裂或穿孔行为的半明显可理解性,根据这种划分将产生连贯性,以及这种超越客观/的方式。主观区分。
These Guanzi texts have sometimes been regarded as representing a kind of intermediate position between Daoism and Legalism, closely related to the “HuangLao” tradition, and perhaps even the work of the crypto-Daoists or proto-Legalists Peng Meng, Tian Peng, and/or Shen Dao. We have seen the direct linkage of Law to Dao in the Guanzi texts, deriving the former from the latter via the medium of Li . The HuangLao texts famously declare that “Dao generates the Laws,” which has sometimes been seen as an assertion of a real, objective cosmic law rooted in the absolute Dao, something akin to the European notion of “Natural Law.” In light of the above analysis, however, we have serious reasons to doubt this reading. For what we have seen in the above passages is very consistent with the words put into the mouth of the same Peng Meng, found in the text Yinwenzi: “The person of the Sage comes from himself; the Laws of the Sage, however come from Li. Li comes from his self, but his self is not Li. His self can put forth Li , but the Li are not himself(理出于己,己非理也。己能出理,理非己也。Lichuyuji, jifeiliye. Jinengchuli, lifeijiye). Thus the rule of the person of the sage puts only himself in order, while the rule of the Laws of the Sage puts all things in order.” The first sentence here seems to assert a strict division between the person of the sage and the Laws; one is subjective, the other is objective. But the following explanation undermines this neat division. Law comes from Li , but Li itself comes from the sage. Peng Meng is not asserting that the Li , or the Laws that derive from them, are purely objective, inscribed in nature, as opposed to the person of the sage. Rather, he as stating that, although the Li come from the person of the sage, they are not one and the same as the person of the sage. They are, as we have said, the interface between his particular sagely viewpoint and the realities of the world, between individual Virtuosities and the formless empty Dao, which is the role of the mind as desireless ruler that brings coherence to them by not interfering in them. They are neither subjective nor objective. They continue to be dependent on the sage, as he who is able to discern, embody, and actualize them-indeed, in an important sense, to create them, selectively whittling down from among the available groupings in the world, as we saw also in the Xunzi. They are the coherences between his own coherences and the coherences of the world. This is not inconsistent with the claim that “Dao generates the Laws.” For the sage too is not separate from Dao. The sage is the one who perfectly practices Dao, embodies it, actualizes it. The Laws in question are not “Natural Law”: they are the punitive laws
这些《管子》文本有时被认为代表了道家与法家之间的一种中间立场,与“黄老”传统密切相关,甚至可能是隐秘道家或原始法家彭蒙、田彭和/或的著作。或慎道。我们在《管子》文本中看到了法与道的直接联系,前者通过礼的媒介从后者衍生出来。 《黄老》经典宣称“道生法则”,有时被视为对植根于绝对道的真实、客观的宇宙法则的断言,类似于欧洲的“自然法”概念。然而,根据上述分析,我们有充分的理由怀疑这一解读。因为我们在上述段落中所看到的内容与《殷文子》中同一蓬蒙口中所说的非常吻合:圣人之法,却出自礼。理来自于他的自我,但他的自我却不是理。己能出理,而理非己(理出于己,己非理也。己能出理,理非己也。立出于己,己非理也。济能出力,力竭基业)。故圣人之治只能治其身,圣人之治则治万物。”这里的第一句话似乎断言了圣人与法律之间的严格划分;一个是主观的,另一个是客观的。但下面的解释破坏了这种简洁的划分。法出自礼,礼本身又出自圣人。彭蒙并不是断言“礼”或由礼而来的法则是纯粹客观的、刻在自然中的、与圣人相对的。 而是说,礼虽然来自圣人之人,但与圣人之人不是同一的。正如我们所说,它们是他独特的圣人观点与世界现实之间的界面,是个体技巧与无形空道之间的界面,这是心灵作为无欲统治者的角色,通过不干涉而使它们保持一致。他们。它们既不是主观的,也不是客观的。它们继续依赖于圣人,因为圣人能够辨别、体现和实现它们——实际上,在重要的意义上,创造它们,有选择地从世界上可用的群体中削减,正如我们也看到的那样于荀子。它们是他自己的连贯性与世界的连贯性之间的连贯性。这与“道生法”的说法并不矛盾。故圣人亦不离道。圣人是完美地践行道、体现道、实现道的人。所讨论的法律不是“自然法”:它们是惩罚性法律

used by the Daoist-Legalist ruler in his society, which in the “Xinshu shang” are directly related to his “power to make judgments,” 權 quan.
道法统治者在其社会中使用的权力,在《新书商》中与他的“判断权”直接相关。

THE HANFEIZI COMMENTARY ON THE LAOZI: LI AS DIVISION AND THE YIELDING DAO
韩非子老子注:礼为师、让道

Many of the later chapters of the Zhuangzi include quotations from the existing Laozi text, and function as glosses to them. A more direct and formal commentary on parts of the Laozi, the earliest in the tradition, is found in the Hanfeizi text. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} There we find the following attempt to define the relation between Dao and Li as used in the “ironic tradition,” where Dao is ironic but Li is non-ironic, a way of relating specific determinate coherences to the necessary incoherence of the Dao’s indeterminacy:
《庄子》的许多后续章节都引用了现存的《老子》文本,起到了注释的作用。对《老子》部分内容的更直接、更正式的注释是传统中最早的,可以在《韩非子》文本中找到。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 在那里,我们发现了以下尝试定义“反讽传统”中使用的“道”和“理”之间的关系,其中“道”是反讽的,而“理”是非反讽的,这是一种将特定的确定性连贯性与道的不确定性的必然不连贯性联系起来的一种方式:
Dao means that by which all the ten thousand things are as they are, where all the ten thousand coherences [ Li ] [ Li ] [Li][\mathrm{Li}] join and meet, and become discernible [所嵇 suo ji]. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} Coherence means the patterns found in fully formed things, while Dao means that by which things come to be formed. Thus we say, Dao is what “separates and coheres” them [道理之者也 Dao Lizhizhe ye]. Each thing is coherent, so they do not infringe upon one another. Thus coherence is the cutting and limitation [制 zhi] between things. Each thing has its own different coherence, and Dao joins together, making intelligible, the coherences of all things. Hence they necessarily transform. Because they must transform, none can maintain the same form of activity for long. Because of this, the energies of their life and death are received from it, various types of wisdom are scooped and poured from it, various affairs arise and collapse into it. . . . Dao is wise with Yao and Shun, is crazy with Jieyu, perishes with Jie and Zhou, flourishes with Tang and Wu. . . . The real condition of Dao, in all cases, is without any limit or special form of its own; it is yielding and supple, following along with the times, according with each coherence. All things attain it to accomplish both their defeats and their successes. Dao can be compared to water; the drowned are those who die by drinking too much of it, while the thirsty may live by drinking of it in the proper amount. . . . Thus it is by gaining it that they die and by gaining it that they live, by gaining it that they fail and by gaining it that they succeed. . . . Coherences mean the divisions between square and round, short and long, coarse and fine, firm and fragile. Thus only when coherences are fixed can Dao be attained. Thus the fixed coherences [定理 dingli] divide existing from perishing, death from life, flourishing from declining. For
道是指万事万物如其本来面目,万事万物相通之处。 [ Li ] [ Li ] [Li][\mathrm{Li}] 相聚相见,变得可辨[所嵇suo ji]。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 连贯是指完全形成的事物的模式,而道是指事物形成的方式。因此我们说,“道”是它们的“分离和凝聚”。每件事都是连贯的,所以它们不会互相侵犯。因此,连贯就是事物之间的切割和限制。万物有其不同的相通性,而道则相合,使万物相通。因此它们必然会发生转变。因为它们必须转变,所以没有人能够长期保持相同的活动形式。是故,生死之气从其中受,各种智慧从中汲取、倾注,各种事在其中生灭。 。 。 。道之智与尧、舜,狂与介宇,亡与介、周,盛与唐、武。 。 。 。道的真实状态在任何情况下都是没有任何限制或特殊形式的;它柔顺而柔顺,与时俱进,各相契合。一切事物都达到它的目的,以完成它们的失败和成功。道可以比作水;溺水者饮多而死,口渴者饮适量可活。 。 。 。故得之而死,得之而生,得之而失败,得之而成。 。 。 。连贯是指方与圆、短与长、粗与细、刚与脆弱的区别。因此,只有当一致性固定时,才能获得“道”。 因此,定理定理区分存在与灭亡、死亡与生、盛与衰。为了

things now sometimes survive and sometimes perish, suddenly die or suddenly come to life, first flourish and then later decline; they cannot be called constant. Only that which was born together with the separation of Heaven and Earth and which does not perish even when they are destroyed can be called Constant. The constant never alters but has no fixed coherence [無定理 wudingli]. Having no fixed coherence, it has no constant locus and thus cannot be expounded. . . . It is contrasted dyads of long and short, large and small, square and round, firm and fragile, light and heavy, white and black that are called “coherences.” It is when their coherences are fixed that things are made easy to cut and tailor. . . . 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
现在事物有时存,有时灭,忽死忽生,先盛后衰。它们不能称为常数。唯有天地分离而生,灭而不灭,才称为恒。常数永远不会改变,但没有固定的连贯性。由于没有固定的连贯性,它没有恒定的轨迹,因此无法被阐述。 。 。 。长与短、大与小、方与圆、刚与脆弱、轻与重、白与黑的对比,称为“连贯性”。当它们的连贯性被固定时,事情就变得容易切割和定制。 。 。 。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
In this passage, Li , coherence, is defined as the differentiating limits, or as the determinate marking off of the two sides of each determinate dyad. Li are differentiated cuts, pointing to the limits and differences between things. Dao is the name for the totality that transcends these limits, and for that reason has no definite intelligible identity and cannot be named as the one or the other of any contrasting pair. Dao is for this reason here also identified as the process of formation, while Li are the specific completed formations. Dao is the process of becoming coherent, and the undifferentiated incoherence from which they emerge, while Li is the coherences that result. These coherences are balanced proportions, quantitative measures and limits that make each thing what it is, here as always presented in terms of pairs of opposites. As the last line of the citation stresses, this still very much implies a coherence with human purposes and desires; the coherences in things show where they can easily be “cut” to suit human purposes.
在这篇文章中,Li(连贯性)被定义为区分极限,或者每个确定二元组两侧的确定标记。理是异切,指出事物之间的界限和差异。道是超越这些限制的整体的名称,因此没有明确的可理解的身份,不能被命名为任何对比对中的一个或另一个。因此,道在这里也被确定为形成的过程,而理则是具体的已完成的形成。道是变得连贯的过程,以及它们从中出现的无差别的不连贯性,而礼是由此产生的连贯性。这些连贯性是平衡的比例、定量的度量和限制,使每件事物成为它的样子,在这里一如既往地以对立面的形式呈现。正如引文的最后一行所强调的,这仍然非常暗示与人类目的和愿望的一致性;事物的连贯性表明它们可以很容易地被“切割”以适应人类的目的。
Li here is very clearly construed as the quantitative/qualitative limit of X , beyond which it ceases to be X , is destroyed, becomes non- X . Li is the regulative division between the two members of a matched, inconstant pair. This implies a cycle and a condition of reciprocity, reciprocal limiting, which is reminiscent of the term 相理 xiangli, mutual ordering or mutually making coherent, which we encountered in the “Community Words” passage from the Zhuangzi cited in the previous chapter.
这里的 Li 被非常清楚地解释为 X 的定量/定性极限,超过该极限,它就不再是 X ,被破坏,变成非 X 。礼是配对的、不稳定的一对中的两个成员之间的调节性划分。这意味着一种循环和一种互惠、互惠限制的条件,这让人想起我们在上一章引用的《庄子》中的“共同体词”段落中遇到的术语“相理相利”,即相互排序或相互使连贯。
Dao, on the other hand, is what goes beyond these proper defining measures, but produces and grounds them. Dao is the indeterminacy that undermines each particular determinacy, each half of a dyad, and in this sense is what cuts them into coherent chunks. The undermining overflow of any determinacy is Dao, and this undermining is how they are limited, divided off from the opposite number of the dyad. Dao in this sense contributes to the division of things into coherent chunks. Li are those coherent chunks. But Dao is also that from which they are cut, the unhewn. This follows closely the logic of the Laozi, as we have analyzed it in the prequel: Dao
另一方面,道超越了这些适当的定义措施,但却产生并奠定了它们的基础。道是一种不确定性,它破坏了每一个特定的确定性,即二元体的每一半,从这个意义上说,道是将它们切成连贯的块的东西。任何确定性的破坏溢出就是道,而这种破坏就是它们如何受到限制,与二元的相反数量分开。从这个意义上说,“道”有助于将事物划分为连贯的块。 Li是那些连贯的块。但道也是它们被切割出来的、未砍伐的东西。这与《老子》的逻辑密切相关,正如我们在前传中所分析的那样:

is both the “stuff” and the “source” of all things, as the unhewn is both the stuff and the source of the hewn. It is thus also their “course”-the process of return embedded in each of them, which is simply the undermining of each coherent identity embedded in each identity. All knowable identities, all coherences, are thus relative, partial, unstable. Dao alone is sustainable (常 chang) and comprehensive, overreaching the limits of any given identity or coherence in both space and time. Li implies value and coherence. Dao has more value than value, it coheres more than coherence, it is more Li than Li , but for that reason it is unintelligible. This is the ironic double meaning typical of the Laozi text: true “order” negates/transcends order.
既是万物的“物质”又是万物的“源头”,正如未凿成的东西既是物质又是被凿成的源头。因此,这也是他们的“历程”——嵌入在他们每个人身上的回归过程,这只是对嵌入在每个身份中的每个连贯身份的破坏。因此,所有可知的同一性、所有的连贯性都是相对的、局部的、不稳定的。道本身就是可持续的和全面的,超越了空间和时间上任何特定身份或连贯性的限制。理意味着价值和连贯性。道的价值大于价值,它的凝聚力大于凝聚力,它的理大于理,但因此它是不可理解的。这是老子文本典型的讽刺双重含义:真正的“秩序”否定/超越秩序。
Note here that Dao and Li are contrasted: one is ironically coherent, that is, incoherent, while Li are now the locus of all the specific coherences of things, including all that can be said and known about them and also how best to deal with them, how to tailor them for human purposes. For this reason Dao is beyond value, has only an ironic meta-value. Unlike what we saw in the “Neiye” from the earliest pre-ironic Daoism, Dao is now what brings both death and life, both failure and success. The difference, as the example of water to the drowning suggests, is in how it is doled out, the measure and limitations, the quantities: in other words, the value of Dao is entirely on the side of the Li , which are what makes it digestible to human purposes. Dao is ironic: it has “value” because it is beyond value; Li are non-ironic, have value for human beings. The “Inner Training” described Dao as what is gained in life and what is lost in death. The Hanfei commentary, on the other hand, tells us that Dao flourishes with the flourishing and perishes with the perishing; it is as present in failure, death, and insanity as it is in success, life, and virtue. It is what all these things, positive or negative, must depend on and attain in order to be what they are. We may regard this as a more thoroughgoing conception of omnipotence that overcomes the qi-as-life force derivation of pre-ironic Daoism, and the axiocentric omniavailability of non-ironic Confucianism. On the other hand, as we shall see, it does not exactly make of Dao a value-neutral creator or source of all things that eliminates all possibility of value, as in a thoroughgoing pantheism. We are told here that Dao is “supple and yielding” in that it follows the particular coherences of things-in the sage it is wise, in the fool it is folly. This is why “all things attain it to accomplish both their defeats and their successes.” Dao does not “cause” things to be wise or foolish, or to display any other particular coherence-to serve as a cause in this way would be to act as master, commander, wei-ing, being rigid and assertive rather than soft and yielding. Rather it is “attained” by whatever coherences are there, and accords with them, making them “coherent” but not determining which coherence they will be. In other words, the role of Dao in cutting out coherences is severely limited. Dao is the indeterminate, Li are determinate. What
请注意,道与理是对比的:道与理是具有讽刺意味的连贯性,即不连贯性,而理现在是事物所有特定连贯性的所在地,包括所有可以说和知道的事物以及如何最好地处理它们他们,如何根据人类的目的定制它们。因此,道是超越价值的,只有讽刺性的元价值。与我们在最早的前反讽道教的“内业”中看到的不同,现在的“道”既带来死亡,又带来生命,带来失败和成功。正如水与溺水的例子所表明的,区别在于它的分配方式、尺度和限制、数量:换句话说,道的价值完全站在礼的一边,这就是道的价值所在。它易于人类消化。道是讽刺的:它具有“价值”,因为它超越价值;它具有“价值”,因为它超越价值;理是非讽刺的,对人类有价值。 《内功》把“道”描述为生之所得、死之失。汉非子注则告诉我们,道随盛而盛,随亡而亡;道随兴而盛,随亡而亡。它既存在于失败、死亡和精神错乱中,也存在于成功、生命和美德中。这就是所有这些事物,无论是积极的还是消极的,都必须依赖并达到它们才能成为它们的样子。我们可以认为这是一种更彻底的全能概念,克服了前反讽道教的气作为生命力的推导,以及非反讽儒家的轴心​​全能性。另一方面,正如我们将看到的,它并不完全使道成为价值中立的创造者或万物的源泉,消除了所有价值的可能性,就像彻底的泛神论那样。 这里告诉我们,道是“柔顺”的,因为它遵循事物的特定连贯性——圣人为智,愚人为愚。故“万物得之,既成其败”。道并不“导致”事物变得明智或愚蠢,或表现出任何其他特定的连贯性——以这种方式作为原因将是充当主人、指挥官、威王,是僵硬而自信的,而不是柔软和软弱的。屈服。相反,它是通过存在的任何连贯性“获得”的,并与它们一致,使它们“连贯”,但不决定它们将是哪种连贯性。换句话说,道在切断连贯性方面的作用受到严重限制。道是不确定的,礼是确定的。什么

is the transition from the indeterminate to the determinate? Indeterminacy is inherently process, since it is an undermining of any given determinacy. But it is not a controlling process, and thus does not lead to a deterministic cosmos. Dao is not a creator: it is that which enables self-creation. It is that which is constantly available, and even mandatorily always impinging upon any limited determinacy, forcing it beyond its limits and into new limits, a kind of internal pressure to overflow divisions, to swing back to the other side of the pendulum, and in that sense is a motive force. But it would seem to be the prior determinacy of things themselves that does the “scooping and pouring” from this ever-present source of energy and action. Dao must be channeled by Li to become determinate. When the text says that Dao is the process by which they cohere, it seems to mean that Dao provides only “coherence” as such, not the specificity of each particular coherence. They might cohere in any other way, but these coherences would not be Li, the specific overlap of that set of possible coherences in nature and the coherence with human desires, the need to divide things so that they are “easy to cut.” Dao is an opportunity for Li , the availability of Li , but is “weak and yielding”: it does not provide the determinacy in any given case, but rather is the infinite ability to “follow along” with any specific determinacy, to enable and accomplish it.
是从不确定到确定的过渡吗?不确定性本质上是一个过程,因为它会破坏任何给定的确定性。但这不是一个控制过程,因此不会导致确定性的宇宙。道不是创造者:它是能够自我创造的东西。它是不断可用的,甚至强制性地总是冲击任何有限的确定性,迫使其超越其极限并进入新的极限,一种溢出分歧的内部压力,摆回钟摆的另一侧,并在这种感觉是一种动力。但似乎是事物本身的先验决定性从这种永远存在的能量和行动源泉中进行了“舀取和倾倒”。道必须经过礼的引导才能确定。当文本说“道”是它们凝聚的过程时,似乎意味着“道”只提供“连贯性”本身,而不是每个特定连贯性的特殊性。它们可能以任何其他方式连贯,但这些连贯性不会是理,即自然界中那组可能的连贯性和与人类欲望的连贯性的特定重叠,以及将事物划分为“易于切割”的需要。道对于理来说是一个机会,是理的可用性,但它是“弱而屈服的”:它不提供任何特定情况下的确定性,而是“遵循”任何特定确定性的无限能力,以实现和实现完成它。
Where do these specific determinations come from? This problem had already been vaguely touched on in Chapter 51 of the Laozi, which stresses the double status of Dao in the ironic tradition:
这些具体的决定从何而来?这个问题在《老子》五十一章中已经隐约触及,强调了讽刺传统中道的双重地位:
Dao generates them; Virtuosity husbands them; things form them; tendencies 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} complete them. For this reason, all things honor the Dao and esteem Virtuosity. But the honoring and esteeming of Dao and Virtuosity are not brought about because someone commands them, but are always spontaneous. Dao generates them, husbands them, 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} grows them, nourishes them, houses them, matures them, feeds them, shelters them. [Dao] generates them without possessing them, makes them but without being depended on. It grows them without being their master. This is called the Unmanifest Virtuosity. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
道产生它们;他们的技艺精湛;事物形成它们;倾向 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 完成它们。故万物尊道,尊德。但对道、德的尊崇、推崇,却不是由人命令而产生的,而总是自发的。道产生他们,管理他们, 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28} 种植它们、滋养它们、安置它们、使它们成熟、喂养它们、庇护它们。道生而无有,造而无依。它在不成为它们的主人的情况下培育它们。这被称为未显的精湛技艺。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
This passage begins by giving us a division of labor; Dao merely generates, no more. As for the specific forms of things, this comes from Virtuosity, things, tendencies-all activities from the agency of already formed individual things. In the case of the emergence of any new determinacy, there are prior determinacies that serve as determinants of this newly emerging determinacy. We are speaking, then, not about a creation ex nihilo of all things at the beginning of time, but rather of the constant and begin-
这段经文首先给我们划分了劳动分工;道只是生成,不再有。至于事物的具体形式,这来自于灵性、事物、趋势——所有的活动都来自于已经形成的个体事物的作用。在任何新的决定性出现的情况下,都有先前的决定性作为这个新出现的决定性的决定因素。那么,我们谈论的不是万物在时间之初的无中生有的创造,而是恒定的和开始的——

ningless process of creation, focusing on the beginning and emergence of any particular entity. Virtuosity is here somewhat like what the Hanfeizi commentary calls Li, particular coherences, what each generated thing has “attained” (de), its particular coherent form of continuance and function. So Dao, here as in the “Inner Chapters” of the Zhuangzi, is just a name for indiscriminate generation as such, where the particular determinacies are due to the agency of the things so generated themselves. It is not merely a receiving, but an “attaining” from Dao, and it is the things themselves that do the attaining which makes them so. As the “Qiwulun” put it, "The Heavenly piping blows forth the ten thousand differences, allowing each to be itself. But since they all choose themselves, who is the blower?"30 If we give a cosmological read to the famous “windstorm” story in the second chapter of Zhuangzi, it would seem that the “wind” represents Dao, and the sounds of the indentations represent individual creatures. The wind just makes sound sound; it does not determine what the particular sounds are. This is done by the shape of the holes themselves. The universal Universal of Dao is just the process of manifesting newness as such, of generation per se (生而已 sheng er yi, as Chapter 6 of the Zhuangzi says of “what Heaven does”), but does not make them thus and so-they accomplish that themselves. But since the individual determinacies all make themselves and are not commanded or determined to be so by Dao, what is this Dao? It cannot be a determinate something at all, cannot even be said to have any intelligible content, even definitely to “exist” or “be there” at all, and thus reduces in the Zhuangzi into the “vague,” ironic “Who?” Thus far, this might seem like a radical dualism: the shapes of the holes are derived from a source unrelated to the wind, at least within the confines of this metaphor. Even if we were to suppose that they were created by the wearing-away effect of wind upon the objects in the forest, the differences would still have to be accounted for by the initial conditions of the objects blown upon. But the ironic “Who?” addresses this dualism, the indeterminacy of the Dao, its weakness and yielding. For this dualism holds only as long as we take “indeterminacy” as itself some definite determinacy, that is, as an unchanging “one” that is the same everywhere: then we have the unsolvable problem of transitioning from the same to the different. But the indeterminacy of Dao is precisely not some one determinate characteristic-just as, in Zhuangzi’s metaphor, the wind is not “the same” everywhere, but would presumably blow differently at different times and places. But this difference is random fluctuation, simply an implication of that very indeterminacy that is Dao’s constancy. The constancy, in other words, is not a monolithic “one,” a sameness. It is indeterminable as any particular characteristic (it has no Li of its own), and thus any particular Li can be its direct expression. Precisely
无休止的创造过程,专注于任何特定实体的开始和出现。这里的精巧有点像《韩非子》注释中所说的“理”,即特定的连贯性,即每个生成的事物所“得”的东西,其连续性和功能的特定连贯形式。所以,这里的“道”,就像在《庄子》的“内章”中一样,只是无差别生成本身的一个名称,其中特定的决定性是由于事物如此生成本身的作用而产生的。它不仅仅是一种接受,而是一种对道的“得”,而正是事物本身实现了“得”,才使得它们如此。正如《器物论》所云:“天管吹万异,各自其性。然皆自择,谁吹之?”30如果我们用宇宙论来解读著名的“暴风雨”,从《庄子》第二章的故事来看,“风”似乎代表着“道”,而凹痕的声音则代表着个体的生灵。风只会发出声音;它不能确定特定的声音是什么。这是通过孔本身的形状来完成的。道的普遍普遍性只是表现出新性本身、生成本身的过程(生而已,正如《庄子》第六章所说的“天行之道”),但并不使它们如此这般——他们自己完成了这一点。但既然个体的决定性都是自己产生的,而不是由道命令或决定的,那么这个道是什么?它根本不可能是一个确定的东西,甚至不能说有任何可理解的内容,甚至根本不能肯定地“存在”或“在那里”,从而在《庄子》中沦为“模糊的”、讽刺的“谁?到目前为止,这似乎是一种激进的二元论:孔的形状源自与风无关的来源,至少在这个比喻的范围内是这样。即使我们假设它们是由风对森林中物体的磨损作用产生的,这些差异仍然必须由被吹过的物体的初始条件来解释。但讽刺的是“谁?”解决了这种二元论、道的不确定性、道的弱点和屈服性。因为只有当我们将“不确定性”本身视为某种明确的确定性,即视为一个到处相同的不变的“一”时,这种二元论才成立:那么我们就面临着从相同到不同的过渡问题。但道的不确定性恰恰不是某种确定性的特征——正如庄子所比喻的,风并非处处“相同”,而可能在不同的时间和地点吹出不同的风。但这种差异是随机波动,只是道的恒常性的不确定性的暗示。换句话说,恒常性并不是一个单一的“一”,一种千篇一律的东西。它与任何特定的特征一样是不可确定的(它没有自己的 Li),因此任何特定的 Li 都可以是它的直接表达。恰恰

because Dao “produces without owning,” because it “issues no commands” on how it is to be used, because it is “soft and yielding” and accords with whatever use individual creatures put it to, will cohere this way or that at their pleasure, it is “spontaneously honored by them in all their activities.” Thus, Chapter 51 , quoted here, finishes by contradicting itself, delivering a typical Laozian ironic twist: it turns out that, precisely because the Dao does not account for the particular coherences, it does so: Dao generates them, but also husbands them, grows them, nourishes them, houses them, matures them, feeds them, shelters them. The Dao does all the things that Virtuosity, things, and tendencies were said to do above, more or less. It does them by not doing them. It gets credit for them by taking no credit. The initial division of labor is abrogated by the indeterminacy of Dao, which is the doer of all that it does not “do,” of all that other preexisting determinacies of things themselves “do.”
因为道“产生而不拥有”,因为它“不发出命令”如何使用它,因为它“柔软而屈服”,并且符合个体生物对其的任何使用,会以这种或那种方式凝聚在他们的身上。快乐,“他们在所有活动中自发地感到荣幸”。因此,这里引用的第 51 章以自相矛盾结束,传达了典型的老子讽刺转折:事实证明,正是因为道没有解释特定的连贯性,所以它这样做了:道产生了它们,但也管理了它们,种植它们、滋养它们、安置它们、使它们成熟、喂养它们、庇护它们。道或多或少地做了上面所说的功德、事物和倾向所做的所有事情。它通过不做来实现它们。它通过不接受功劳而为他们赢得功劳。最初的劳动分工被道的不确定性所废除,道是所有它不“做”的事情的执行者,也是事物本身“做”的所有其他预先存在的决定性的执行者。
So what makes each coherence what it is? Literally, it would seem, just chance, circumstance, other things, other coherences. But because each of these things is generated by a noncommanding Dao, the deeds of these others are also construable as the nonaction/action of the incoherent coherence of the Dao. Dao is their stuff, their source, their end, and their tendency to revert into each other. It is what limits them in this sense, and this limiting is what determines what they are. The intervention of another thing to limit this thing is thus also readable as this thing’s internal limiting of itself when it reaches its extreme, which is thus also readable as its inherent tendency to revert-which is Dao.
那么是什么让每一个连贯性成为现实呢?从字面上看,这似乎只是偶然、环境、其他事物、其他连贯性。但因为这些事物中的每一个都是由非命令性的道产生的,所以其他这些事物的行为也可以解释为道的不连贯连贯性的无为/有为。道是他们的东西,他们的源头,他们的结局,以及他们相互回归的倾向。从这个意义上说,它限制了它们,而这种限制决定了它们是什么。另一个事物对这个事物的介入也可以理解为这个事物在达到极限时对自身的内部限制,因此也可以理解为它内在的回归倾向——即“道”。
Concomitant with this careful differentiation of the meanings of Dao and Li in the Hanfeizi commentary, specifying the former as indeterminate and the latter as the locus of all determinacy, we find the advent of the binome 道理 daoli, occasionally used in Xunzi and other earlier texts but without yet attaining there the full force of a definite bit of terminology. This might surprise us at first glance: Dao and Li are, after all, here opposites; how can they then be combined into a single term? But the ironic structure we have just elucidated should dispel this surprise. Dao and Li are indeed opposites, and it is just for this reason that they now become a definite explanatory principle. Daoli are the Li of things as rooted in Dao, which has the specific ironic meaning of “the determinacies of things as emerging from and always embodying their own undermining, their inconstancy, their reciprocal relation to their opposites and tendency to revert into each other, their way of fitting together, determinacies as a departure from the indeterminacy of Dao which, because of that very indeterminacy, turns out to also be accomplished by the indeterminacy from which they depart”-the ironic appropriation of non-ironic coherence. Daoli as such is always inherently a union of opposites.
伴随着《韩非子注释》中对“道”和“理”含义的仔细区分,将前者指定为不确定性,将后者指定为所有确定性的场所,我们发现二元论“道理”的出现,偶尔在荀子和其他早期文本中使用但还没有达到某个特定术语的全部力量。乍一看,这可能会让我们感到惊讶:毕竟,道和礼在这里是对立的;那么如何将它们组合成一个术语呢?但我们刚刚阐明的讽刺结构应该会消除这种惊讶。道与理确实是对立的,正因为如此,它们才成为一个明确的解释原则。道理是植根于道的事物之理,它具有特定的讽刺意义:“事物的决定性是从自身的破坏性、无常性、与对立面的相互关系和相互回复的倾向中产生的,他们组合在一起的方式,确定性是对道的不确定性的背离,而由于这种不确定性,道也正是通过它们所背离的不确定性来实现的”——对非讽刺连贯性的讽刺性挪用。道理本身始终是对立统一的。

COSMOLOGICAL DAO AND ITS LI IN THE HUAINANZI
《淮南子》宇宙道及其理

We may discern a development of this line of thinking in the cosmological reflections of the first chapter, the “Daoyuanxun,” of the Huainanzi, a text compiled by Liu An (180-122 BCE), grandson of Han dynasty founder Liu Bang, in 139 BCE, possibly written partially by Liu himself but most likely compiled in consultation with a large group of syncretically inclined Daoist thinkers patronized and supported by him, who may have written the individual chapters themselves. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} As such, the first chapter of this text gives us a nice overview of the “state of the field” of Daoist-leaning speculation in the early Han dynasty, and the ways in which the scraps and fragments of the pre-Qin Daoist ironists were being assembled into systematic pronouncements, attempting to present an ordered univocal picture of the universal cosmological process. Here as in the Hanfeizi, and in contrast to the earlier Guanzi texts, Dao is the what must be attained to attain both life and death, both success and failure, not merely life and success; we are squarely in realm of ironic appropriations of the non-ironic. Any coherence qua coherence is rooted in the indeterminacy of Dao, and yet specifications are now possible about these determinate coherences, which can serve as reliable guides for behavior. Li plays a prominent role in the deliberations of the whole Huainanzi collection, both as a mental object to be cognized-X zhi li, the Li “of” something or other, that is, the guideline this something provides, as well as the entrenchment of Hanfeizi’s term daoli. This is the sense of the term normally translated as “the principle of X.” We also find a near-verbatim recapitulation of the use of tianli in the sense it has taken on in the “Record of Music,” discussed above, namely, tianli as something that can be destroyed by overindulgence in programmatic likes and dislikes. Common also are many applications of Li in its original verbal sense, meaning “to put in order.” The most telling usage, however, occurs in this first cosmological chapter, and provides its own version of the linkage between these opposed terms Dao and Li that we saw in the Hanfeizi commentary to Laozi, denoting the formless oneness and the formed divisions respectively. Indeed, the first Huainanzi chapter twice uses daoli (道理) as a binome:
我们可以从汉朝创始人刘邦的孙子刘安(公元前 180-122 年)编撰的《淮南子》第一章“道元训”的宇宙论反思中看出这一思路的发展。公元前139年,可能部分由刘本人撰写,但最有可能是在与他赞助和支持的一大群具有融合倾向的道教思想家协商后编写的,这些思想家可能自己撰写了各个章节。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 因此,本文的第一章很好地概述了汉初道家思辨的“状况”,以及先秦道家讽刺家的残片和片段是如何被整理出来的。被整合成系统的声明,试图呈现出普遍宇宙学过程的有序、明确的图景。这里与《韩非子》一样,与早期的《管子》文本相反,“道”是达到生与死、成功与失败所必须达到的目标,而不仅仅是生和成功;我们完全处于非讽刺性的讽刺性挪用领域。任何作为连贯性的连贯性都植根于道的不确定性,但现在可以对这些确定的连贯性进行规范,这可以作为行为的可靠指南。 “理”在整个《淮南子》全集的审议中扮演着突出的角色,它既是一个被认知的心理对象——X之理,“某物”或“其他”的“理”,即该事物提供的指导,也是该事物的巩固。韩非子术语“道里”。这就是通常翻译为“X 原理”的术语的含义。我们还发现对天理的使用进行了近乎逐字的重述,其含义与上面讨论的《乐谱》中所呈现的含义相同,即,天理是一种可以通过过度沉迷于程序化的好恶而被摧毁的东西。 “理”的许多原始动词含义也很常见,意思是“整理”。然而,最有说服力的用法出现在宇宙论的第一章中,它提供了我们在韩非子《老子注》中看到的对立术语“道”和“理”之间的联系的自己的版本,分别表示无形的统一和有形的划分。事实上,《淮南子》第一章两次使用“道理”作为二元组:
Thus if you depend on the abilities of a single person, it will be insufficient to manage even a holding of three acres’ extent. But if you work with the measure of the specific coherences as rooted in their incoherence [修道理之數 xiudaoli zhi shu], following the self-so of Heaven and Earth, none in the six directions will be able to equal you. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}
因此,如果仅靠一个人的能力,即使拥有三英亩的土地,也不足以管理。若以修道理之数,顺天地之自性,则六方莫能与也。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}
The contrast here, as in the Hanfeizi commentary, is between one-sided limitations on the one hand (the skills of a single person) and a system for integrating all opposed limitations into their mutual relations, as centered in the indeterminacy that undermines them. What is new here is the association of these daoli with shu, literally “number,” signifying “calculability” and more specifically “measure.” This points to a determinate quantitative limit that is fully intelligible, and thus can be known and relied upon. Harold Roth translates the key phrase, “But if you comply with the norms of the Way.” 33 “Norms” is meant to translate shu, as Roth’s footnote 17 to the same chapter indicates: "The norms (shu 數) appear to be the characteristic patterns of things. For example, in 12.1, the ‘norms’ of the way are detailed as follows: 'Non-action responded, “The way that I know can be weak or strong, can be soft or hard, can be yin or yang, it can be dark or bright, it can embrace or contain Heaven and Earth, it can respond to or await the Limitless. These are the norms by which I know the Way.” "34 Shu here obviously means the mutual limiting of opposites in any dyad, the two extremes of the pendulum swing. It indicates their measure, the quantitative limits that mark them off from one another and at the same time ensure their reciprocity and their tendency to veer into one another. “Norms” is thus a rather misleading translation. Even “balance” might be better. The point, of course, is that Li are specifically these mutually limiting coherences rooted in Dao, that is, in the indeterminacy that forces all determinacies to undermine themselves and transform into their opposite. But these determinacies are now truly grounded in the indeterminacy, as in the Hanfeizi commentary, and thus are truly discernible, truly reliable, truly determinate: they have a definite “calculable measure” (shu) to them. They have become definite and knowable-real coherences, genuinely intelligible. Non-ironic coherence has been integrated into an ironic overall cosmology.
正如《韩非子》评论中那样,这里的对比是一方面的片面限制(单个人的技能)与一种将所有对立的限制整合到相互关系中的系统,该系统以破坏它们的不确定性为中心。这里的新内容是这些“道理”与“数”的联系,字面意思是“数”,表示“可计算性”,更具体地说是“度量”。这指向一个完全可理解的确定的数量限制,因此可以被了解和依赖。哈罗德·罗斯 (Harold Roth) 翻译了这句话:“但如果你遵守道路的规范。” 33 “Norms”意为翻译“shu”,正如罗斯在同一章的脚注 17 中指出的那样:“规范(shu 数)似乎是事物的特征模式。例如,在 12.1 中,方式的‘规范’是详述如下:‘无为答曰:‘吾知之道,可弱可强,可软可硬,可阴可阳,可暗可明,可包容天地,能应无极,能候无极,是我知道之规范。” “34术在这里显然意味着任何二元体中对立面的相互限制,即钟摆摆动的两个极端。它表明了他们的衡量标准,即数量限制,将他们彼此区分开来,同时确保他们的互惠性和他们转向彼此的倾向。因此,“规范”是一个相当具有误导性的翻译。甚至“平衡”可能会更好。当然,关键在于,理是植根于道的这些相互限制的一致性,也就是说,在不确定性中,迫使所有确定性破坏自身并转化为相反的东西。 但这些确定性现在真正扎根于不确定性,正如《韩非子》注释中那样,因此是真正可辨别的、真正可靠的、真正确定的:它们有一个明确的“可计算的尺度”。它们已经变得明确且可知——真实的连贯性,真正可理解的。非讽刺性的连贯性已经融入到讽刺性的整体宇宙论中。
The other occurrence of this binome comes in the context of a recommendation for “following,” that is, responding rather than acting first, being behind others rather than in front of them, reacting rather than taking initiative. The text then says, qualifying this recommendation:
这种二元组的另一个出现是在“跟随”建议的背景下,即响应而不是首先行动,落后于他人而不是领先于他们,做出反应而不是采取主动。然后文本说,限定该建议:
What I call being in the rear does not mean being stagnant and doing nothing, congealed and tied up and unflowing; rather it is a way of valuing a comprehensive relation to all measured limits (shu) which can thus always match the needs of the time. For if you pair up with every change by firmly holding to the determinacies-rooted-in-indeterminacy [執道理以耦變 zhidaoli yi oubian], then the one in front can control the one in the rear, and the one in the rear can also control the one in the front. Why? Because you
我所说的“在后”,并不是停滞不前、无所事事、凝结束缚、不流动的意思;相反,它是一种评估与所有测量极限(shu)的综合关系的方法,因此始终可以满足时代的需要。因为如果你对每一个变化都牢牢把握执着道理以耦合变之道里一欧变,那么前面的可以控制后面的,后面的也可以控制。还可以控制前面的那个。为什么?因为你

don’t use that by means of which one is able to control others, and thus no one can control you. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
不要用它来控制别人,这样就没有人可以控制你。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
Here again, the usage of daoli is specifically associated with the matching of opposites and their tendency to transform into one another: it is the limitation of coherent things-Li-as rooted in and embodying the overflow of that limitation in indeterminacy, Dao, thus providing the point outside either of the two extremes from which to accomplish the proper (human) management of them. Here, as in the Guanzi texts, we have this associated with “controlling others without being controlled by them.” This undermines the one-sided attachment only to following and staying in the rear; the text makes clear that this is really only a means of finding the central point beyond both front and rear, which can transform freely into either, and thus remains in command of them, the central indeterminate point between the two swinging extremes of a dyadic pendulum. It is a coherence that is rooted in its own incoherence, and yet provides a guideline by which to enable successful and definite activity in the world-the coherence with human cognition and desire. It is an ironic appropriation of non-ironic coherence.
在这里,“道理”的使用又与对立面的匹配及其相互转化的倾向具体相关:它是连贯事物“理”的限制,植根于并体现了这种不确定性限制的溢出,“道”,因此提供两个极端之外的点,以实现对它们的适当(人性)管理。在这里,就像在《管子》文本中一样,我们将其与“控制他人而不被他人控制”联系在一起。这破坏了仅仅跟随和停留在后方的片面依恋;文本清楚地表明,这实际上只是寻找超越前部和后部的中心点的一种方法,它可以自由地转变为任何一个,从而保持对它们的控制,即二元摆的两个摆动极端之间的中心不确定点。它是一种根植于自身不连贯性的连贯性,但却提供了一种指导方针,使世界能够成功而明确的活动——与人类认知和欲望的连贯性。这是对非讽刺连贯性的讽刺挪用。
This idea plays a newly important role in the Huainanzi’s more comprehensive cosmological reflections, particularly in the meaning it gives to the idea of “unity” or “oneness.” The opening chapter tells us:
这一思想在《淮南子》更全面的宇宙论反思中发挥着新的重要作用,特别是在它赋予“统一”或“一体”思想的含义方面。开篇的章节告诉我们:
Formlessness is what we call the One. What we call One is what has no counterpart in the world, which stands toweringly alone, a solitary mass onto itself, above permeating the Nine Heavens and below threaded through the Nine Regions, round but not charted by any compass, square but not charted by any carpenter’s square, for all are vastly mixed together to make up this One, free of all restraints and resting on no root, bagging together all of Heaven and Earth as the open gate of the Dao. Mysterious, vague, hidden, dark, its unmixed Virtuosity is preserved in solitude, spreading out without finish, functioning without exhaustion. Thus it is not found when looked for, not heard when listened for, no identity is found for it when sought. It is the formlessness in which form is generated, the silence in which the Five Tones resound, the flavorlessness in which the Five Flavors take shape, the colorlessness in which the Five Colors come to be. Thus beings arises from Non-Being, the substantial emerges from the Empty. Encircling the world, all names and realities coexist within it. The number of tones does not exceed five, yet their variations are inexhaustible. The harmony
无形就是我们所说的“一”。所谓“一”,天下无双,孤高耸立,自成一团,上通九天,下贯九域,圆而不为罗盘,方而不为罗盘。凡木匠方,皆大杂而成此一,不受一切束缚,无根而立,囊括天地,为道之门。神秘、模糊、隐秘、黑暗,其纯粹的精湛技艺保存在孤独中,绵延不绝,发挥不竭。故寻之不见,听之不闻,寻之亦无其身。以无色而生色,以寂静而五音回响,以无味而形五味,以无色而成五色。故有生于无,实生于空。环绕着世界,所有的名字和现实共存于其中。声调的数量不超过五种,但其变化却无穷无尽。和谐

of the flavors does not exceed five, yet their transformations are inexhaustible. The number of the colors does not exceed five, yet their variations are inexhaustible. For among tones, when the gong tone is established, all Five Tones take shape; among flavors, when sweetness is established, all Five Flavors take their places; among colors, when white is established, all Five Colors come to be. Dao means that when this One is established, all things are generated. For this reason, the Coherence [Li] of the One is put into effect everywhere within the four seas, and the division of the One separates Heaven and Earth [是故一之理施四海,一之解際天地 shigu yizhili shi sihai yizhijie ji tiandi]. Its wholeness is pure, like unworked wood; its scattered parts are confused and mixed, like turgid water. It turgidity slowly clears; its emptiness slowly fills. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
滋味不超过五种,而其变化却无穷无尽。颜色的数量不超过五种,但其变化却无穷无尽。因为音中,当锣音成立时,五声就成形了;诸味中,甘已成,五味就位;色中,白既成,则五色皆成。道,就是此一成立,万物就生成了。是故一之理施四海,一之解际天地 shigu yizhili shi sihai 《一枝界纪天地》].其整体纯净,如未经加工的木头;其分散的部分混乱而混杂,如浑浊的水。浑浊慢慢消散;它的空虚慢慢地被填满。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
Both the solitariness and the inclusiveness of the One are stressed here, the inexhaustible ramifications and variations that emerge out of the most formless, the smallest number, the one. This is possible because the One is formlessness per se, the indeterminacy of the ironic Dao. It has no identifiable form, no specific identity; it overflows all individual forms, like Laozi’s pre-cut unhewn raw material, the unworked wood. Its oneness is ironic; in fact it is neither one nor many, it has no specific determinations, and for this reason is it is omnipresent in all particular forms, murky like turgid water. The establishment of this peculiar n / n / n//\mathrm{n} / oneness brings with it the generation of all specific, limited, identifiable things. It makes them what they are in the sense discussed above, precisely by being formless, not interfering, being soft and yielding, not contributing to their limitations. The establishment of the one “background” tone, flavor, or color is here like Laozi’s unhewn which is at once “B as opposed to A” and “both A and B” and “neither A nor B,” as we saw in Ironies, both one among many, the totality of all the many, and the none which stands beyond any, and thus entails the formation of all the other tones, flavor, and colors, because of its irony: its simultaneous determinacy and indeterminacy, the non-Dao which is also a Dao, which guides by not guiding, which is ironically good by not being good, the source and the course and the whole of the others. What is new here, in the explicit incorporation of the new developments of non-ironic coherence as Li, is the specification that this oneness is thus also a kind of separating, an ordering, a Li-ing, and it is precisely this kind of Li-ing that is capable of being omnipresent throughout the world, indeterminacy as present in all determinacies through their mutual limiting and overflowing into one another, the way they interlock through their inconstancy, the Dao that is present in Li , daoli. Note that Li is here parallel to 解 jie, also
这里强调“一”的孤独性和包容性,以及从最无形、最小的数字“一”中产生的无穷无尽的分支和变化。这是可能的,因为“一”本身是无形的,是讽刺道的不确定性。它没有可识别的形式,没有特定的身份;它溢出了所有个体的形式,就像老子预先切割的未砍伐的原材料,未加工的木材。它的单一性是讽刺性的;事实上,它既不是一也不是多,它没有特定的规定,因此它以一切特定的形式无所不在,浑浊如浊水。这个奇特的机构的成立 n / n / n//\mathrm{n} / 一体性带来了所有具体的、有限的、可识别的事物的产生。它使它们成为上面讨论的意义上的它们,正是因为它们是无形的,不干涉,柔软和屈服,不增加它们的局限性。在这里,一种“背景”的基调、味道或色彩的建立,就像老子的未开凿一样,即“乙与甲”、“既是甲又是乙”、“非甲非乙”,正如我们在《讽刺》中看到的那样。 ,既是众多之中的一者,是所有众多的总体,又是超越任何事物的无一,因此,由于其讽刺性,它导致了所有其他音调、风味和颜色的形成:它同时具有确定性和不确定性,非——道亦是道,以不导而导,以不善而反善,是一切的源头、过程和整体。 这里的新鲜之处在于,在明确地将非反讽连贯性的新发展纳入“理”的过程中,说明这种统一性因此也是一种分离、一种秩序、一种理,而正是这种“理”。理能够在世界各地无所不在,不确定性存在于所有确定性中,通过它们的相互限制和相互溢出,它们通过它们的无常性相互交织,道存在于理,道里。请注意,Li 在这里与解 jie 平行,也

meaning to untangle or separate, and the omnipresence is presented as an omnipresence of division, the omnipresence of a grouping, an ordering, a coherence: the function of the Li of oneness is parallel to the “separation” of Heaven and Earth. The act of separating them, their mutual limitation, their finitude, is what is omnipresent, what unifies them. Note also that the wholeness, the oneness/noneness as such, is unhewn, unidentifiable, but again it functions in the individual limited entities as their “mixed-up-ness,” their inability to be purely what they are and stay cleanly within their own limitations. This is another way of indicating their tendency to return, to overstep their borders, the function of the formless Dao as reversion, as a course of behavior, as their constant Way.
其意义是解开或分离,而无所不在表现为分裂的无所不在、分组的无所不在、秩序的存在、连贯性的存在:一理的作用与天地的“分离”平行。将它们分开的行为、它们的相互限制、它们的有限性,是无所不在的,也是将它们统一起来的。还要注意,整体性、一体性/无性本身是未经切割的、无法识别的,但它再次在个体有限的实体中发挥作用,作为它们的“混合性”,它们无法纯粹地成为它们自己,也无法干净地留在它们的内部。自身的局限性。这是他们回归、超越边界的倾向的另一种方式,无形的道的功能是回归,作为一种行为过程,作为他们不变的道路。
So Li and related terms throughout these ironic appropriations of non-ironic coherence signify the limit beyond which a thing reverts or crashes, the limit of coherence that the Dao both forms and undermines. This notion of reversal when a thing reaches its “limit” combines a notion of balanced proportion-proper measure-with an idea of reciprocity, the mutual limiting of individual things. A comparative note is perhaps in order here. Measure, for Hegel, was the most sophisticated and complete idea possible for monistic philosophies that posited no intelligible realm or reality behind appearances. Reciprocity, similarly, was the most sophisticated and complete category by which two-tiered metaphysical systems could think about the world-encompassing and sublating ideas of identity and difference, appearance and reality, substance and attribute, cause and effect and so on. Beyond both of these was the realm of the Concept (Begriff), which dealt with syllogistic thinking and thinking itself, Reason, as the ultimate reality, a realm reached only by the comprehension of the Idea, the realm of forms in their true signification as understood by Hegel, namely, pure thought as the self-positing purposive activity of the absolute as both subject and substance. But in the ironic tradition in early China, “Measure” and “Reciprocity” are matched with Dao as a third dimension unknown to Hegel, not a crypto-Platonic intelligible realm, since it is by definition indeterminate, but something that nonetheless “does the work” thereof (that of which one should remain cognizant in order to come to grips with something, cognitively or pragmatically), the indeterminate source and encompasser (which unifies, includes them) of all the specific, contrary Li. Its relation to particular Li is soft and yielding, making them only by generating and allowing them, and present in them only in according with their own mutual limiting. This is the relation between the Dao and individual coherences, to be contrasted sharply to “instantiation” or “inclusion” in the sense of a universal, form, or whole, or determination (formal “cause”) as in the case of an essence, form, or Idea in Greek thought. These convergences of
因此,在这些对非讽刺连贯性的讽刺性挪用中,“理”和相关术语意味着事物恢复或崩溃的极限,即道形成和破坏的连贯性的极限。当事物达到其“极限”时,这种逆转的概念将平衡比例的概念(适当的措施)与互惠的概念(个体事物的相互限制)结合起来。这里也许需要进行比较说明。对于黑格尔来说,度量是一元论哲学可能最复杂、最完整的概念,一元论哲学在表象背后不提出任何可理解的领域或现实。同样,互惠是两层形而上学体系思考同一与差异、表象与实在、实质与属性、因果等包罗万象和扬弃世界的最复杂、最完整的范畴。超越这两者的是概念(Begriff)的领域,它涉及三段论思维和思维本身,理性作为最终的现实,只有通过对理念的理解才能达到的领域,形式的领域以其真正的意义为黑格尔认为,纯粹思想是作为主体和实体的绝对的自我定位的有目的的活动。但在中国早期的讽刺传统中,“尺度”和“互惠”与“道”相匹配,作为黑格尔未知的第三个维度,不是一个隐秘的柏拉图式的可理解领域,因为它在定义上是不确定的,但仍然“它是所有特定的、相反的“理”的不确定来源和包容者(统一、包括它们)。 它与特定的Li的关系是柔软的和屈服的,只有通过生成和允许它们才能使它们存在,并且仅根据它们自身的相互限制而存在于它们之中。这是道与个体连贯性之间的关系,与普遍、形式或整体意义上的“实例化”或“包容性”形成鲜明对比,或者在本质的情况下与决定性(形式“原因”)形成鲜明对比。希腊思想中的、形式或观念。这些收敛

coherence and its incoherence will be the focus of development of the further intensified role of the term Li as we move into the world of post-Han thought, in particular in the representative “Xuanxue” thinkers, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.
随着我们进入后汉思想世界,特别是在“玄学”思想家王弼、郭象的代表中,“理”一词的作用进一步强化,其连贯性和非连贯性将成为发展的焦点。

FIVE 

LI AS THE CONVERGENCE OF COHERENCE AND INCOHERENCE IN WANG BI AND GUO XIANG
理是王弼与郭象的连贯与非连贯的汇合

Xuanxue 玄學, literally “dark” or “mysterious” learning, sometimes translated as “Neo-Daoism” or even “Metaphysical Studies,” is the name traditionally given to the Post-Han revival of speculative thought, taking its name from the renewed interest in reinterpreting the Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Zhouyi, known at the time as the “Three Abstruse (Texts)” (三玄 sanxuan). The movement is seen as in some manner attempting to fill the void left by the fall of the Han dynasty, and with it the undermining of the official cosmological and political ideology, rooted in the thought of Dong Zhongshu. The Zhouyi, of course, played a major role in this ideology, but only as subjected to a particular esoteric mode of interpretation, closely linked to calendrical and political correlative schemes. Characterizing this text as “abstruse” and also linking it with the Laozi and Zhuangzi, the key sources of ironic thought, viewed as heterodox by the Han ideologues, Xuanxue rejects the previously prevailing “clarity” of interpretation of the text: it had been seen as something already comprehended and incorporated, now it is again asserted to have unplumbed mysteries parallel to those of the ironic texts, which had already been relegated to husks whose few useful insights had already been harvested and incorporated harmlessly into the Yin-Yang correlative schemes (Yin having its origin as a mark of non-ironic incorporation of ironic coherence, as we have seen in Ironies of Oneness and Difference). Xuanxue can thus be seen as a reclaiming of the untamed implications of the Zhouyi, and an attempt to read that text in close dialogue with the Laozi and the Zhuangzi instead of through the lens of the correlative schemes of the Han. As such, we have here a rethinking of the relation between the two streams of the tradition, a reshuffling of the ironic and non-ironic
玄学,字面意思是“黑暗的”或“神秘的”学问,有时被翻译为“新道教”甚至“形而上学”,传统上是对汉后思辨思想复兴的称呼,它的名字来源于新的兴趣重新阐释了老子、庄子、周易,被称为“三玄”。该运动被认为在某种程度上试图填补汉朝灭亡后留下的空白,并破坏根植于董仲舒思想的官方宇宙论和政治意识形态。当然,《周易》在这种意识形态中发挥了重要作用,但只是受到一种特定的深奥解释模式的影响,与历法和政治相关方案密切相关。玄学将这篇文章描述为“深奥”,并将其与讽刺思想的主要来源——老子和庄子联系起来,被汉族思想家视为异端,玄学拒绝了以前盛行的对该文本解释的“清晰”:它已经被看到了。作为一种已经被理解和融合的东西,现在它再次被断言具有与讽刺文本平行的未探明的奥秘,这些奥秘已经被降级为外壳,其一些有用的见解已经被收获并无害地融入到阴阳关联方案中(正如我们在《统一与差异的反讽》中所看到的那样,“阴”的起源是反讽一致性的非反讽结合的标志。因此,《玄学》可以被视为对《周易》的野性含义的回收,并试图通过与老子和庄子的密切对话来阅读《周易》文本,而不是通过汉书的相关方案来解读该文本。因此,我们在这里重新思考传统的两个流派之间的关系,讽刺和非讽刺的重新洗牌。

cards to produce a new attempt at a synthesis-one that of course makes use of some of the moves devised by former attempts at mediation of the two trends, but makes significant innovations.
卡片产生了一种新的综合尝试——当然,这种尝试利用了之前调解这两种趋势的尝试所设计的一些举措,但做出了重大创新。
We have already seen some of the developments of the notion of Li in non-ironic traditions, and their incorporations into ironic systems, taking place in the Han. Recapping them chronologically, we had the Huainanzi’s continuation of the use of Li as part of the ironic incorporation of non-ironic coherence in the Hanfeizi commentary to the Laozi, itself a continuation of one of the trends found in the later parts of the Zhuangzi, where Li serves as the word for limited non-ironic coherences contrasted to but also deriving from the largest coherence, Dao, which is, however, ironically coherent, that is, definitionally unintelligible and unknowable. We had also the revival of the straight non-ironic use of Li, with the ironic element safely incorporated into a highly rigidified version of the Yin-Yang system, in Dong Zhongshu, where both the Great Coherence of the whole and particular intelligible coherences were both construed as ultimately non-ironic. And we saw in Yang Xiong’s Taixuan system an ingenious new mode of incorporation of the ironic notion of coherence as unintelligible-the “Great Mystery” of the title of his work. In Yang’s system, the necessarily contrarian aspect of all coherence, Laozi’s bell-shaped rise and fall structure of reversal, was accepted by Yang but systemized as the triplicity of (1) incipience, (2) development into intelligible coherence, and (3) contravening decline. There, this originally ironic structure is assimilated into a system of non-ironic Great Coherence. Lip service is given to the unintelligibility of the Great Mystery as the greatest whole, but far from undermining the knowability of particular coherences, this unknowable is present in them as their very triadic structure and interrelations. In this way, although the unknowable is called “unknowable,” it is arrayed in a perfectly determinate manner: it is Yang’s book itself. This set of determinations is presented as cohering much more directly with nature than the system of determinations found in the Zhouyi, in that the intermediary of coherence with the tradition of the sages is annulled by the fact that Yang Xiong creates his own system from scratch. The overabundance of coherences chosen out by human sages is no longer an issue here. We have a single-ordered cosmos, which incorporates the self-contravening of each coherence and hence its inevitable rootedness in unintelligibility into a single coherence, as process rather than as relativity. In contrast, in the Huainanzi, developing tendencies found in the “Community Words” dialogue and other later sections of the Zhuangzi, the Hanfeizi reading of Laozi, and the later parts of the Guanzi chapters, we found non-ironic coherence, marked explicitly as Li and defined as the separating boundaries between things in dyadic pairs which confer on them their determinacy, explicitly incorporated into an ironic overall struc-
我们已经看到了非反讽传统中“理”概念的一些发展,以及它们在汉代发生的反讽体系的融合。按时间顺序回顾它们,我们看到《淮南子》继续使用“礼”,作为《韩非子》对《老子》注释中非讽刺连贯性的讽刺性结合的一部分,这本身就是《庄子》后期部分中发现的趋势之一的延续,其中“理”一词代表有限的非反讽连贯性,与最大的连贯性“道”形成鲜明对比,但也源自“道”,然而,“道”具有讽刺性的连贯性,也就是说,在定义上是不可理解和不可知的。在《董仲舒》中,我们还复兴了对“理”的直接非反讽的使用,将反讽元素安全地融入到高度僵化的阴阳体系中,其中整体的大连贯性和特定的可理解的连贯性都得到了体现。两者最终都被认为是非讽刺的。我们在杨雄的太玄体系中看到了一种巧妙的新模式,将具有讽刺意味的连贯概念融入到难以理解的事物中——他的作品标题的“大谜”。在杨的体系中,所有连贯性的必然逆向方面,即老子的钟形反​​转的升降结构,被杨所接受,但被系统化为三重性:(1)起始,(2)发展为可理解的连贯性,(3)违背衰退。在那里,这种原本具有讽刺意味的结构被同化为一个非讽刺性的大连贯性系统。人们口头上承认伟大的神秘作为最伟大的整体是不可理解的,但这种不可知性并没有破坏特定连贯性的可知性,而是作为它们的三元结构和相互关系而存在于其中。 这样,不可知的东西虽然被称为“不可知”,但却被完全确定地排列起来:它就是杨的书本身。这套规定被认为比《周易》中的规定体系更直接地与自然相一致,因为扬雄从头开始创建了自己的体系,从而消除了与圣人传统相一致的中介。人类圣人选择的过多的连贯性在这里不再是问题。我们有一个单一有序的宇宙,它把每一个相干性的自我矛盾以及因此不可避免的不可理解性根源融入到一个单一的相干性中,作为过程而不是相对性。相比之下,在《淮南子》中,《庄子》的“群词”对话和其他后期章节、《韩非子》对老子的解读以及《管子》章节的后期部分中发现的发展趋势,我们发现了非讽刺的连贯性,明确标记为Li 并将其定义为二元对中的事物之间的分离边界,这些边界赋予它们确定性,明确地融入到具有讽刺意味的整体结构中。

ture, maintaining the ironic incoherence of Dao and thus emphasizing the changeability even of the non-ironic coherences derived therefrom, while still allowing a recognizable workable coherence to them.
道的反讽性不连贯性,从而强调甚至由此衍生的非反讽性连贯性的可变性,同时仍然允许它们具有可识别的、可行的连贯性。
Historians like to point to the new political situation of the unified Han empire to account for divergences like this. Although I am deeply uncomfortable about positing a direct causal relationship between these kinds of correlated developments, it is perhaps worth noting that, while Yang’s work, coming in the middle of the Han, shows no particular innovations in the actual usage of the term Li per se, we do see some decisive changes taking place during this period. In particular, as Mizoguchi Yûzô has pointed out, Liu Xiang ( 77 76 77 76 77-7677-76 BCE) seems to be the first person to use Li as a self-standing, independent term, functioning as an unmodified subject rather than implicitly as the predicate of something else. It is no longer the verbal “to Li,” meaning “to order,” nor the patterning that results, nor “the Li of something,” nor the opposite counterpart of Dao in the pair Dao-Li, the limited as opposed to the limitless, as in the Hanfeizi commentary, nor as a derivative intermediary of Dao in its intersection with particular things and with human needs, as in the “Xinshu shang.” Nor is it just the “Li of X” posited as an object to be cognized, analogous to “the principle of X,” as we have also begun to see here and there. In Liu Xiang’s 戰國筗 Zhanguoce, “Qiguo,” we find the statement: "The event that necessarily arrives is death [or alternately: What all events necessarily arrive at is death]. The Li that is fixedly so [or: what all Lis fixedly accept as so] is that wealth and status are what one strives toward and poverty and lowliness are what one avoids. This is what is necessarily so of events, what is fixedly so of Li " (事之必至者死也。理之固然者富貴就之,貧賤去之。此事之必然,理之固然 shizhibizhizhe siye, lizhiguranzhe fuguijuzhi, pinjianquzhi, ci zhizhibiran, lizhiguran)。 Here, Li is a stand-alone noun. Elsewhere in that work, a military victory is explained by saying, “It was all a case of the strategy taking shape and the tendencies working advantageously. The Li was spontaneously that way—how could it require the presence of any spirits?”(皆計形勢利,自然之理,何神之有 jiejixingshili,ziranzhili,heshenzhiyou). In the Hanshu, Emperor Wen is depicted as declaring, “Death is the Li of heaven and earth, the self-so of things (死者天地之理,物之自然 sizhe tiandizhili, wuzhiziran), and hence should cause us no extreme sorrow.” 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} This extends the same sort of parallelism to the term ziran, self-so, seemingly as a gloss of Li. Elsewhere, the same text states, “In general, that a thing which flourishes must decay is a self-so Li (夫物盛必衰,自然之理 fuwushengbishuai,ziranzhili)。” Mizoguchi is right to note a new usage in these examples, Li as unmodified subject-and also apparently one of the first usages of the phrase ziranzhili, and of the coupling of Li and 事 shi. But he is perhaps too quick to identify it with a concept of Li as a metaphysical principle in its own right, serving as
历史学家喜欢用统一汉帝国的新政治形势来解释这种分歧。尽管我对在这些相关发展之间建立直接因果关系深感不安,但也许值得注意的是,虽然杨的作品出现在汉代中期,但在“礼”一词的实际使用中没有显示出任何特别的创新。因此,我们确实看到这一时期发生了一些决定性的变化。特别是,正如沟口雄三所指出的,刘翔( 77 76 77 76 77-7677-76 BCE)似乎是第一个使用“Li”作为独立术语的人,它作为一个未经修饰的主语而不是隐含地作为其他事物的谓语。它不再是动词“至理”,意思是“命令”,也不再是结果的模式,也不再是“某事物的理”,也不再是“道理”对中“道”的对立面,即有限的而不是有限的。道是无限的,如《韩非子》注解中所描述的那样,也不是像《心书商》中那样作为道与特定事物和人类需求相交的派生中介。它也不仅仅是“X的理”被假定为一个被认知的对象,类似于“X的原理”,正如我们也开始在这里和那里看到的那样。刘向的《战国筗战国策》中有这样一句话:“凡事必至死。”事之必至者死也。理之。固然者富贵就之,贫贱去之。 事项之必然,理之固然是指必知者四业,力之固然者富贵居之,品鉴取之,词之必然,理之固然)。 在这里,Li是一个独立的名词。在那本书的其他地方,军事胜利是这样解释的:“这都是战略正在形成和趋势发挥有利作用的情况。黎自然如此,何须有神在?” 《汉书》中,文帝说:“死者天地之理,物之自然,无止自然,故不宜过度哀伤。” ”。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 这将同样的平行关系延伸到“自然”这个词上,“自然”,似乎是对“李”的注解。同一文本的其他地方也指出:“夫物盛必衰,自然之理fuwushengbishuai,ziranzhili)。”沟口在这些例子中指出的新用法是正确的。 ,“理”作为未修饰的主语——显然也是“自然之理”一词的最早用法之一,也是“理”和“事是”的结合。但他也许太快地将其等同于“理”的概念,它本身就是一种形而上学原理,作为一种形而上学原理。

a causal determinant of events and serving to explain why they are as they are. Mizoguchi’s reading would seem to interpret the phrase lizhiguran from the first-cited Zhanguoce passage as “This is what is definitely so (because of the) Li,” or perhaps, “This is a definite principle.” But the parallelism in the first statement, and particularly the use of 之 zhi rather than 然 ran the first time through, shows us the contours of this still formative sense of Li. That is, there is still an implicit plurality to both the “events” and the “Lis” here. We would do better to interpret this statement literally, either as, “What all events must come to is death,” or, alternately, “The one event that necessarily comes is death.” Similarly, “What all Lis definitely share in affirming is self-interest,” or alternately, “The Li that is always definitely affirmed is self-interest.” The ran implies both a sense of “being so” and “being accepted, being affirmed as right.” There is still something perspectival about this statement, and an implication of the active participation of those who do the affirming. It is because they are as they are that they can cohere with this coherence, and this “being as they are” is still something independent of what is made so by the Li in question. They are not simply passively determined to be so, to posses this attribute, by the presence of this metaphysical principle. The latter reading does imply something like universality, but it still presupposes that there are more than one Li. This particular Li of self-interest is the one that is affirmed from everywhere. This coherence is the one that coheres with every other coherence, and every other event. This is not the same thing as positing something called “the Li,” or even “a Li of self-interest,” and then saying that what it makes so is that all beings are self-interested.
事件的因果决定因素并用于解释事件为何如此。沟口的解读似乎将第一个引用的战国策段落中的“lizhiguran”一词解释为“这就是肯定如此(因为)Li”,或者也许是“这是一个明确的原则”。但第一个陈述中的平行,特别是第一次使用“之”而不是“然”,向我们展示了这种仍在形成的“礼”意义的轮廓。也就是说,这里的“事件”和“事件”仍然存在隐含的复数性。我们最好从字面上解释这句话,要么是“所有事件都必须发生的是死亡”,要么是“必然发生的一个事件就是死亡”。同样,“所有李都明确肯定的是利己”,或者换句话说,“总是明确肯定的李就是利己”。 “跑”既意味着“如此”,又意味着“被接受、被肯定是正确的”。这种说法仍然有一定的前瞻性,并且暗示着那些做出肯定的人的积极参与。正是因为它们如其所是,它们才能与这种连贯性相一致,而这种“如其所是”仍然是独立于所讨论的李所造成的东西。他们并不是简单地被动地决定如此,通过这种形而上学原则的存在而拥有这种属性。后一种解读确实暗示了某种普遍性,但它仍然预设了不止一个“礼”。这种利己之理是得到各方肯定的。这种连贯性与其他所有连贯性以及其他所有事件都具有连贯性。 这与提出“理”,甚至“自利之理”,然后说一切众生都是自利的,并不是一回事。
The linkage to 固然 guran and its parallel 必然 biran, and further, to 自然 ziran, is indeed quite significant. This brings us closer, I think, to the implication of the term here. It is indeed no longer merely something like “valued way of grouping” or “order,” but neither is it a principle determining phenomenal events. Rather, it is the way things go when left to themselves, what they tend toward (e.g., wealth and status, death), the way they must, as long as they are themselves and because they are themselves, go. That is, it is still what they cohere with, what their being-themselves coheres with. This is “necessary” because as long as they are themselves, they will do what they themselves do; it is somewhat like the statement, “Wherever I go, there I am.” But a kind of continuity and exceptionless reliability is attributed to this tendency, which is rooted not in the Li but in what the “self” in question is here, and hence the “self-so.” We may note that the term is contrasted with the intervention of a spirit. It is what is so when no particular agent deliberately makes something so, when things are left to themselves. Significantly, this is still clearly a question of coherence-for example, the coming together of things and that which they tend toward, or
与“固然固然”及其平行的“必然必然”,进而与“自然自然”的联系,确实是相当重要的。我认为,这使我们更接近该术语的含义。它确实不再仅仅是“有价值的分组方式”或“秩序”之类的东西,但它也不是决定现象事件的原则。相反,它是事物发展的方式,当它们自行其事时,它们趋向于什么(例如,财富和地位,死亡),只要它们是它们自己,并且因为它们是它们自己,它们就必须遵循它们的方式。也就是说,这仍然是他们所认同的,他们的存在本身所认同的。这是“必要的”,因为只要他们是他们自己,他们就会做他们自己所做的事情;这有点像“无论我走到哪里,我就在那里”这句话。但这种倾向具有一种连续性和无可比拟的可靠性,它的根源并不在于“理”,而在于这里所讨论的“我”,因而也是“我如此”。我们可能会注意到,该术语与精神的干预形成对比。当没有特定的代理人故意制造某事时,当事情被留给他们自己时,情况就是如此。值得注意的是,这显然仍然是一个一致性问题——例如,事物的结合以及它们趋向于什么,或者

of tendencies and strategies. The idea of a convergence of multiple events, as opposed to a single particular agency, and hence the idea of something beyond the deliberate control of either intentions or conscious desires of any particular being, is what pushes us toward the idea of Li as something like “objectivity” and even “truth” here: that is, it is indeed what is so whether you like it or not, what is inescapable in all cases, what is necessary and universal. But this is to a significant degree a deceptive appearance, as can be seen by the development of this usage of Li -as convergence and as “the Li of the self-so”—in the post-Han Xuanxue thinkers, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang.
的趋势和策略。多个事件聚合的想法,而不是单一的特定机构,以及因此超出任何特定存在的意图或有意识欲望的故意控制的想法,正是推动我们将李视为类似的想法这里的“客观性”甚至“真理”:也就是说,无论你喜欢与否,它确实就是这样,在任何情况下都是不可避免的,是必然的和普遍的。但这在很大程度上是一种欺骗性的表象,从后汉玄学思想家王弼和郭沫若中“理”作为聚合和“自所以之理”的这种用法的发展就可以看出这一点。翔。
Let us begin with Wang Bi, author of what became canonical commentaries to both the Zhouyi and the Laozi, whose work may also be classified as a non-ironic incorporation of the ironic, but with significant structural innovations. Wang is thus the architect of a new reading of the Zhouyi in light of the Laozi, and vice versa, which opens up the way to a new approach to thinking about the relation of the ironic and non-ironic traditions. Wang too finds a way of bridging the gap between the Omnipresent, the universal universal, the great coherence, where the problem of unintelligibility is most pressing, and the individual coherences of particular situations and things, thus putting the ironic tradition to use in creating and predicting coherences. The inner mechanism of this move in Wang’s case is most clearly enunciated in his interpretative strategy with respect to the Zhouyi. The essence of Wang’s approach, his key insight, lies in his view of each hexagram in the Zhouyi as a yin-yang chart depicting a temporary mini-cosmos with its own mini-Dao, a move that bears considerable resemblance to Yang Xiong’s approach. In the opening section of his 周易略例 Zhouyilueli, “Illuminating the ‘Judgments,’” his methodological mission statement for the reading of the Zhouyi, Wang puts his key point this way:
让我们从王弼开始,他是《周易》和《老子》经典注释的作者,他的作品也可以被归类为讽刺与非讽刺的结合,但具有重大的结构创新。因此,王是根据《老子》对《周易》进行新解读的建筑师,反之亦然,这为思考讽刺与非讽刺传统之间的关系开辟了新途径。王也找到了一种弥合无所不在、普遍普遍性、巨大连贯性(其中难以理解的问题最为紧迫)与特定情况和事物的个体连贯性之间的差距的方法,从而将反讽传统用于创造和预测一致性。王氏这一举动的内在机制在他对《周易》的解释策略中得到了最清晰的阐述。王氏方法的精髓,他的关键见解,在于他将《周易》中的每个卦视为一个阴阳图,描绘了一个具有自己的小道的临时小宇宙,这一举措与杨雄的方法非常相似。在他的《周易略例》《周易略例》的开篇部分“阐释‘判断’”中,王先生提出了他阅读《周易》的方法论使命,他这样阐述了他的要点:
What is the Judgment of a hexagram? It is the overall discussion of the whole hexagram’s structure [體 t i ] t i ] ti]t i], illuminating the master that it follows. The many cannot rule the many; the many are ruled by the fewest of the few. The moving cannot control the moving; all the world’s motions are controlled by the stable and unified [and thus still]. Thus it is only because their master necessarily makes them one that the many can coexist, and it is only because their source necessarily is not-two that all the various motions can proceed. Things do not happen haphazardly; they necessary all proceed from their particular coherence [“principle,” Li]. There is a source and master that unifies them, an origin which brings them together [統之有宗,會之有元 tongzhi you zong, huizhi you yuan]. Thus they are complex but not chaotic, manifold but not confused. Thus the way the six lines of any hexagrams impinge upon one another can
卦象的判断是什么?是对整个卦象结构的整体论述[体 t i ] t i ] ti]t i] ,照亮它所追随的主人。多数人无法统治多数人;多数人由少数人中最少的人统治。移动无法控制移动;世界上所有的运动都是由稳定和统一的[因而静止]控制的。故其主必使之为一,故众能共存;惟其源必非二,故诸动能行。事情的发生并不是偶然的;它们都必须从其特定的连贯性出发[“原则”,李]。有一个来源和主人将它们统一起来,有一个将它们聚集在一起的根源。因此,它们复杂但不混乱,多样但不混乱。因此,任何卦象的六行相互碰撞的方式都可以

be made intelligible by one [among them] The way the firm and the yielding support one another can be fixed by setting up their master. . . . For the scarce is what the abundant esteem; the few is what the many take as their source and master. When a hexagram has five Yang lines and one Yin line, the yin line is its master. If it has five Yin lines and one Yang line, the Yang line is its master. For Yang is what is sought by Yin, and Yin is what is sought by Yang. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
可以通过[其中]之一来理解公司和屈服者相互支持的方式可以通过建立他们的主人来固定。 。 。 。因为稀缺就是丰富的尊重;少数人被多数人视为自己的源泉和主人。卦有五阳一阴,则以阴为主。若有五阴一阳,则以阳为主。因为阴所求的是阳,阳所求的是阴。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3}
A hexagram, in Wang’s view, is a graphic representation of the yin-yang structure of a given situation in which a person might find himself, a given moment in time. A hexagram that, viewed as a whole from without, has the pervasive character of being “Yang,” is in its inner structure precisely lacking in Yang. As a whole it relates to other hexagrams in a Yangish manner precisely because it lacks inner Yangness, and thus all its elements seek Yang, cohere around Yang, express the emergent total character of Yangishness. Its coherence both as the togetherness of its parts and as its togetherness with things outside it (its effect on them and the way it appears to them) is a direct effect of what is least intelligible, least findable and discernible, in its parts. The more Yin a hexagram is quantitatively, the more Yang it is qualitatively. The more Yang it is, the more Yin it is. What is least in evidence in that situation, the least prominent element in that hexagram, is the master of that situation, which truly determines its character. Like Dao in the world, what is least manifest is most powerful; what is least discernible is the source of the discernibility of all the other things in the world, the principle of their convergence. What is least coherent (least intelligible) is what makes all the elements cohere intelligibly. But these incoherent elements are themselves given a name and described as having a character in the “Judgments” to the Hexagrams. Moreover, there is not just one unintelligible incoherent coherer of the world; there are many of them, one for each of the sixty-four hexagrams, at least. It is not an absolutely incoherent and unintelligible void, then, but merely the least evident force in the situation. All elements in that particular situation flow toward it, “seek” it, orient themselves around it. This is what gives it unity, consistency, what makes its parts cohere as this rather than anything else. This is its coherence. It is not the visible and intelligible coherence as such which is their real organizing structure. Rather, each situation has its “coherence” ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) in what is least apparent in it, what it most lacks. Li here begins to function somewhat like the term principle, which from here on becomes a marginally feasible translation of the term, in that it is called the zong or ancestor of the situation, and is its “master,” as arche is the “first form” or “beginning” and “ruler” of a thing in Greek thought. There is an immanent teleological element implied as well, in that Wang
在王看来,卦象是对特定情境的阴阳结构的图形表示,在特定情境中,一个人可能会在特定的时刻发现自己。一个卦象,从整体上看,具有普遍的“阳”性,但其内在结构恰恰是缺乏阳的。从整体上看,它与其他卦的关系是阳的,正是因为它缺乏内在的阳,所以它的所有元素都寻求阳,围绕着阳,表现出阳气的整体特征。它的连贯性既作为其各部分的结合性,又作为其与外部事物的结合性(它对它们的影响以及它对它们的呈现方式),是其各部分中最难理解、最难发现和辨别的东西的直接影响。六卦在数量上越阴,在质上越阳。阳越多,阴越多。在那种情况下,最不明显的东西,在那个卦中最不突出的元素,是那种情况的主人,它真正决定了它的性质。犹如世间之道,最不显的,最有威力;最不可辨别的是世界上所有其他事物的可辨别性的根源,即它们的聚合原则。最不连贯(最难理解)的是使所有元素都清晰地连贯的东西。但这些不连贯的元素本身被赋予了名称,并被描述为在卦象的“判”中具有特征。而且,世界上不只有一个难以理解、语无伦次的连贯者;还有一个。其数量很多,至少六十四卦各有一个。那么,它并不是一种绝对不连贯和难以理解的空虚,而只是这种情况下最不明显的力量。 特定情况下的所有元素都流向它,“寻找”它,围绕它定位。这就是赋予它统一性、一致性的原因,是什么让它的各个部分像这样而不是其他任何东西那样凝聚在一起。这就是它的连贯性。它们真正的组织结构并不是可见的、可理解的连贯性。相反,每种情况都有其“连贯性” ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) 在于它最不明显的东西,它最缺乏的东西。 “理”在这里的作用有点像“原则”一词,从这里开始,“原则”成为该术语的一个勉强可行的翻译,因为它被称为情况的宗或祖先,并且是它的“主人”,因为arche是“第一”希腊思想中事物的“形式”或“开始”和“统治者”。还隐含着一种内在的目的论因素,王

speaks of the hexagram lines as “seeking after” their opposite, their master, which applies to them both severally and as the newly emergent coherence as a whole. Still, it is clearly not temporal priority that is meant by “source” here, not even to the degree that it had been in Yang Xiong, and even “logical priority” does not seem to be an accurate description of what Wang has in mind. The principle is not a self-standing element to which the totality is ultimately reducible, as in the pre-Socratic first principles of fire, water, and the like. Rather, the notion of a convergence is here not a reducibility into a primal stuff, but a center which unifies heterogeneous elements into an organizational unity. It is as if the Laozian Dao is particularized into the sixty-four hexagrams, with mini-Daos for each situation and thing. These mini-Daos are called Li. Li are explicitly what “unify” 統 and “bring together” 會 the elements of the situation: they make it “cohere,” and they make it cohere “coherently.” They are what order that situation, unify it, make it intelligible, knowable as having this particular character. Moreover, they are unlike Aristotelian principle most centrally in the sense in which “to rule,” a characteristic closely associated with arche as well, is understood here. Arche in Greek has an etymological link to archos, “ruler,” signifying sovereignty, power, domination (still found in English words like “monarchy,” “patriarchy,” and so on). We may note that “principles” are etymologically related with “principalities” and “princes,” just as “patterns” are to “paternal.” Wang’s metaphor is also political and genetic, speaking of “masters” and “ancestors.” But the derivative notion of a “principle” will bear the mark of the political ideal from which the metaphor is drawn. For Li in Wang’s view do not rule except in the Daoist sense of not-ruling, by being scarce and invisible, by being the lacked object of desire sought by the rest, even if they are unaware of it, that is, even if it is their “stomach desire,” which genuinely orients them. Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover is also a ruler that brings all things toward it by doing nothing, by letting them converge in its direction rather than by directly “ruling” them by “rules” imposed upon them, and thus a daring interpretation of even the particular rules that characterize teleological final causes as rules to particular beings might be attempted on the same model, though I believe this would be an unconventional reading of Aristotle. Nonetheless, the attraction exerted by the unmoving Good does seem to be conceived of as something cognized, or at the very least cognizable. The ruling attraction it exerts is dependent on its definiteness as something that can be desired. The opposite seems to be the case for the form of “teleology” operative in Wang Bi’s thought. For an “object” of desire that is nonetheless invisible is the Dao, the correlate of “stomach desires.” Wang says “scarce,” of course, not “unintelligible” “invisible,” or completely lacking, and this is what allows him to particularize his mini-Daos, and put them to use. Coherence ( Li ) had always implied value,
说卦象线是“寻找”它们的对立面,即它们的主人,这既适用于它们单独的情况,也适用于新出现的整体连贯性。不过,这里的“来源”显然不是时间优先,甚至没有达到杨雄那里的程度,甚至“逻辑优先”似乎也不能准确描述王的想法。 。该原理并不是一个独立的元素,整体最终可以还原为一个独立的元素,就像前苏格拉底的火、水等第一原理一样。相反,这里的融合概念并不是还原为原始的东西,而是将异质元素统一为组织统一体的中心。就好像老子道具体化为六十四卦,每一种情况、每件事都有小道。这些迷你道被称为“理”。理显然是“统一”“统”和“将局势的要素”“聚集在一起”:它们使之“一致”,并且使其“连贯地”一致。它们使情况变得有序、统一,使其变得可理解、可知,并具有这种特定的特征。此外,它们与亚里士多德原则的最核心不同之处在于,这里理解“统治”,这一特征也与古代密切相关。希腊语中的 Arche 与 archos(“统治者”)有词源联系,表示主权、权力、统治(在“君主制”、“父权制”等英语单词中仍然可见)。我们可能会注意到,“原则”在词源上与“公国”和“王子”相关,就像“模式”与“父系”相关一样。王的比喻也是政治性和基因性的,谈到“大师”和“祖先”。但“原则”的派生概念将带有隐喻所源自的政治理想的印记。因为在王看来,除了道家意义上的“不统治”之外,“礼”并不是统治,因为它是稀有的、看不见的,是其他人所寻求的缺乏的欲望对象,即使他们没有意识到这一点,也就是说,即使它是其他人所追求的。是他们的“胃欲”,它真正引导着他们。亚里士多德的“不动的推动者”也是一位统治者,他通过什么都不做,让万物朝着它的方向汇聚,而不是通过强加于它们的“规则”直接“统治”它们,从而将所有事物带到它的身边,从而甚至对特定的规则进行了大胆的解释将目的论的最终原因描述为特定存在的规则可能会在同一模型上尝试,尽管我相信这将是对亚里士多德的非传统解读。尽管如此,不动的善所施加的吸引力似乎确实被认为是某种可认知的东西,或者至少是可认知的。它所发挥的主导吸引力取决于它作为某种可被渴望的事物的确定性。王弼思想中的“目的论”形式似乎恰恰相反。因为欲望的“对象”虽然是看不见的,但它就是“道”,与“胃欲”相关。王说的“稀缺”,当然不是“不可理解”“看不见”或完全缺乏,这就是他能够将他的小道具体化并加以运用的原因。连贯性(Li)始终具有隐含价值,

as we have seen, and here this is incorporated into the “valuing” of the scarce line by the abundant lines, and by the ethical implications of the hexagrams. The Li is what all the parts of the situation value, what they lack, what they want, and this is what makes them what they are. But this wanting is not a conscious wanting of an object first cognized as desirable; it is, rather, desirable in the Daoist manner precisely because of its unintelligibility, its incoherence, the “empty space” it provides to beings for them to move into with their own particular coherences intact. As mini-Dao, the Li are here like the “womb” or the “valley” or the “empty hub” of the Laozi, which attract and unify by providing an empty space for other things to move into, a slot into which they can enter and thereby connect with one another coherently.
正如我们所看到的,在这里,这被纳入了丰富线条对稀缺线条的“评价”,以及卦象的伦理含义。礼是情境中所有部分所看重的、他们缺乏的、他们想要的,这就是他们之所以成为现在这样的原因。但这种渴望并不是有意识地渴望某个最初被认为是可取的东西;而是一种对某种事物的渴望。相反,它在道教方式中是令人向往的,正是因为它的不可理解性、不连贯性,以及它为众生提供的“空的空间”,让他们可以完整地进入自己独特的连贯性。作为迷你道,礼在这里就像老子的“子宫”或“山谷”或“空枢纽”,通过为其他事物提供一个可以进入的空间来吸引和统一,一个它们可以进入的槽位。可以进入并因此彼此连贯地联系。
The aspect of coherence as intelligibility is thus given a twist, in that any situation or thing can indeed be known, but only precisely as what it is not, what it lacks, what organizes all its parts around their desire for it. It can be known from the outside, in the context of a greater coherence of this situation with the knowing consciousness and with the entire sequence of situations, only as the particular “coherence” that generally names the whole hexagram. But this is precisely, quantitatively or materially speaking, what it is “not,” what it lacks. An example from optics might be helpful here: when an object appears red to us, it is because that object is absorbing all the colors of the spectrum except for red; hence, the red is bouncing off of it, rejected, reflected, and deflected outward to our eyes. Hence, the way it appears externally is an index of exactly the opposite of what it contains. The color that it “has” least of internally is the color that it, as a totality seen from outside, “is.”
因此,作为可理解性的连贯性方面被赋予了一种扭曲,因为任何情况或事物确实都可以被认识,但只能准确地知道它不是什么,它缺乏什么,什么围绕着他们对它的渴望组织它的所有部分。在这种情况与知觉意识以及整个情况序列的更​​大一致性的背景下,它可以从外部被了解,仅作为通常命名整个卦的特定“一致性”。但从数量上或物质上来说,这恰恰是它“不”的东西,它所缺乏的东西。光学的一个例子可能会有所帮助:当一个物体对我们来说呈红色时,这是因为该物体吸收了光谱中除红色之外的所有颜色;因此,红色从它上面反射、拒绝、反射并向外偏转到我们的眼睛。因此,它的外部表现方式与其所包含的内容完全相反。它内部“拥有”最少的颜色就是它从外部看到的整体“存在”的颜色。
This example, however, loses the most distinctive part of Wang’s analysis, the idea of the parts of a situation “seeking” what is least, or what is lacking. “Is” and “ought” are brilliantly combined here, for the “is” equals “what it is knowable as,” which in this case equals precisely “what it is not, but wants to be.” All things are the opposite of what they appear to be, but the precise and determinate opposite, as a thing appears red because it absorbs all colors except red. The twist to the one-many relationship is along the same lines: all “principles” are the same principle-nothingness, lack-but different, in that they are, as it were, holes in different things. In the Hanfeizi commentary, the knowable Li were opposed to the unknowable Dao. The Li were the individual coherences of particular things and situations, their finiteness, their limits, while the Dao was the limitless, the overflowing of all limits. The former were knowable, describable, coherent, while the latter was unintelligible, incoherent. The incoherent Dao was what made the coherent Lis what they are, and also what undermined them, but the determinacy and the indeterminacy of the two sides of the
然而,这个例子失去了王分析中最独特的部分,即情况的各个部分“寻求”最少的东西或缺乏的东西的想法。 “是”和“应该”在这里巧妙地结合在一起,因为“是”等于“它是可知的”,在这种情况下,它恰好等于“它不是但想要成为的东西”。所有事物都与它们看起来的样子相反,但是精确而确定的相反,就像一个事物看起来是红色的,因为它吸收了除红色之外的所有颜色。一对多关系的扭曲是沿着同样的思路:所有“原则”都是相同的原则——虚无、缺乏——但不同,因为它们可以说是不同事物中的漏洞。在《韩非子》注释中,可知的理与不可知的道相对。理是特定事物和情况的个体连贯性,它们是有限的,它们的界限,而道是无限的,是所有界限的溢出。前者是可知的、可描述的、连贯的,而后者是不可理解的、不连贯的。不连贯的“道”造就了连贯的“理”,也破坏了“理”,但道的两侧的确定性和不确定性

relationship remained very clear-cut. Wang has devised a way of bringing the indeterminacy right into the heart of the determinacy, so that they are no longer opposed, no longer two different things. Rather, the way in which the unintelligible causes the intelligibility has become immanent; the absence of what is lacking is the presence of what is present. From the outside, it is intelligible as X ; from the inside, everything is oriented around and derives from its flagrant non-Xness. Xness, in all its specificity, means precisely “the ruling presence of non-Xness as the specific absence of X.” This is a huge and decisive step in the integration of the ironic and non-ironic traditions.
关系仍然非常明确。王想出了一种方法,将不确定性带入确定性的核心,使它们不再是对立的,不再是两个不同的东西。相反,不可理解的事物导致可理解的方式已经成为内在的。缺少的东西的不存在就是现在的东西的存在。从外部看,可理解为 X ;从内部看,一切都围绕着其公然的非X性而导向并源自其公然的非X性。 Xness 就其所有特殊性而言,准确地意味着“非 Xness 的主导存在作为 X 的具体缺失”。这是讽刺与非讽刺传统融合的一个巨大而决定性的一步。
Implicit in this conception is the call for a new kind of knowing, which is, as in the “Great Commentary” to the Zhouyi itself, once again asserted to be possible only through the hexagrams and the sagely judgments on them, the coherence of and with the tradition. Nonetheless, the idea of necessity (必 bi) in the hard sense is certainly more evident in Wang Bi’s description than it was in the “Great Commentary” itself, where the appeal to the specific wisdom of the sages is presented as the ultimate guarantee of the coherence of the text in the face of its multiple sets of contradictory rules. Wang Bi’s Li are necessary in a more built-in, less “culture-specific” way. Again, the Hanfeizi gave us a fairly simple whole/part relation between Dao and Li, where the Dao is the indescribable limitless and the Lis are the describable contents between limits. The Dao’s participation in the individual Lis of things, their knowable coherences, derived from the Laozi’s raw material/vessel relation, where the raw material is nameable as none of the particular vessels, but is identical with them nonetheless as their stuff, and as the source, end, and course of their activities. By being none in particular, it was present in all, but only as a “gentle and yielding” material that allowed itself to be temporarily shaped and determined by whatever vessel it formed a part of, and the shaping course of their inevitable overflow back toward it, producing their dyadic relation to their own opposites. Because it is nothing (in particular), its addition to any particular something does not add any further determinations to it: it goes along with the Li, enabling strength in the strong, weakness in the weak, life in life, death in death, success in success, failure in failure. For Wang Bi, in contrast, this nothingness has taken on a new, more vital, structuring function. Its ironic non-ruling isn’t presence merely as “following” or “yielding” or “pliancy,” it doesn’t just let itself be shaped; rather, it is the center of gravity of the shaping process, the process of converging and cohering. Each Li is the Dao of its situation. The Hanfeizi commentary already hinted in this direction with its claim that the Dao is what makes Lis, or what forms the divisions between things, but this is still depicted as a vague process of mitosis in the context of the overall orienting and cohering activities of the Dao in its relation to the world as a whole. These individual coherences are the by-products
这一概念隐含着对一种新认识的呼唤,正如《周易》本身的《大注》一样,它再次断言只有通过卦象和对卦象的明智判断、卦象与卦象的连贯性才可能实现。与传统。尽管如此,王弼的描述中肯定比《大论》本身更明显地体现了硬意义上的必然性概念,在《大论》本身中,诉诸圣人的特定智慧被视为最终的保证。面对多组相互矛盾的规则时文本的连贯性。王弼的礼以一种更内在的、更少“文化特定”的方式是必要的。再次,《韩非子》给了我们一个相当简单的“道”与“礼”之间的整体/部分关系,其中“道”是不可描述的无限,“礼”是有限之间可描述的内容。道参与事物的个体理,它们可知的连贯性,源于老子的原材料/器皿关系,其中原材料不能被命名为任何特定的器皿,但仍然与它们相同,作为它们的材料,并且作为他们活动的来源、目的和过程。由于它不是特别的,所以它存在于所有人中,但只是作为一种“温和而屈服”的材料,允许其自身暂时被塑造并由它所组成的任何容器决定,并且它们不可避免地溢出的塑造过程返回到它,产生了他们与自己的对立面的二元关系。因为它什么都不是(特别的),所以它对任何特定的东西的添加并不会增加任何进一步的规定:它与礼相随,使强者强,弱者弱,生中生,死中死,成功中的成功,失败中的失败。 相比之下,对于王弼来说,这种虚无已经呈现出一种新的、更重要的结构功能。它具有讽刺意味的非统治性不仅仅是“跟随”或“屈服”或“柔顺”的存在,它不仅仅让自己被塑造;相反,它是塑造过程、汇聚和凝聚过程的重心。每一理,就是其处境之道。 《韩非子》注释已经暗示了这个方向,它声称道是“理”,或者说是事物之间的划分,但这仍然被描述为在事物的整体定向和凝聚活动的背景下的一个模糊的有丝分裂过程。道与整个世界的关系。这些个体的一致性是副产品

of the global course of rise and return which is the process of the Dao in the world, fully present in them only in the ironic sense pertaining to its nothingness, its unnameability: the “whole” nothingness is present in each particular in the form of its yielding to it, allowing the particular’s name to be affixed to it. We will see a similar line of thought in the Huayan school of Buddhism. For Wang Bi, on the contrary, it is not just “the” Dao that makes coherences; it is Daoishness, namely, whatever aspect of the situation is playing the Daoish role of being the least, the most invisible, the lowest. The entire quality of Daoishness is now fully, not partially, present in and as each situation, in all its specificity. The Dao is at once one and many, not just in the sense of being divided up into specific entities to which the One Dao remains immanent, but in that, in a very real sense, there are many Daos, diverse and specific Daos that are nonetheless also Dao, the “leastness” per se. The many Li are now literally many Daos. There is a different hole in each being which is its Dao, but all holes are the same hole, precisely, lack, which is everywhere indistinguishable. The distinguishable and indistinguishable, the coherent and the incoherent, the non-ironic and the ironic begin to really converge here. This is a decisive step toward the working through of another, more thoroughgoing, kind of omnicentrism, which we will see developed in the Tiantai school.
整体的上升和回归过程,也就是道在世界上的过程,只有在与它的虚无、它的不可命名性有关的讽刺意义中才充分地呈现在它们之中:“整体”虚无以它屈服于它,允许将特定的名字附加到它上面。我们在佛教华严宗中也会看到类似的思路。相反,对于王弼来说,产生连贯性的不仅仅是“道”,还有“道”。就是道性,即无论什么方面,都扮演着道家的角色,是最微不足道的、最不可见的、最低等的。道教的全部品质现在完全而不是部分地呈现在每种情况中,以其所有的特殊性。道既是一又是多,不仅是在被划分为具体实体的意义上,一道仍然是内在的,而且在非常真实的意义上,有许多道,不同的和特定的道,它们是尽管如此,道还是“最小”本身。现在的许多理实际上就是许多道。每个生命都有一个不同的孔,这是它的道,但所有的孔都是同一个孔,确切地说,缺乏,无处不在。可区分的和不可区分的、连贯的和不连贯的、非讽刺的和讽刺的开始在这里真正汇聚。这是走向另一种更彻底的全中心主义的决定性一步,我们将看到这种全中心主义在天台宗中得到发​​展。
Tang Junyi’s comments on the passage cited above are particularly useful for our purposes here. Tang notes:
唐君毅对上述段落的评论对于我们在此的目的特别有用。唐注:
This passage on “Illuminating the Judgments” originally comes simply from an attempt to say that in interpreting a hexagram one should stress the whole hexagram’s essence, and seek out its smallest and most condensed line as the ruling line, and thus makes the point that all things have their Li which serves as “a source and master that unifies them, an origin which brings them together.” People always try to speculate about what this Li is, but this approach does not accord with Wang Bi’s text. Actually, if we read this text carefully, we can see that this Li is precisely “the many tending toward the few, the abundant tending toward the least, the complex tending toward the simple” itself. This “tending toward the few and the simple” is precisely “tending toward the master, toward the origin.” We need not seek any other Li to serve as the “master that unifies them, the origin which brings them together.” Thus when Wang Bi says, “Things do not happen haphazardly; they necessary all proceed from their particular Li,” he means that the reason a particular thing is actually like this or like that is because of the principle [Li] of “the many tending toward the one, the abundant tending toward the few, the complex tending toward the simple and
这段《明判》,原意是想说,解释卦象时,应强调整个卦象的本质,并找出其中最小、最浓缩的一条线作为界线,从而表明:事物有其理,它是“统一它们的源头和主人,使它们聚集在一起的根源”。人们总是试图猜测这个李是什么,但这种做法并不符合王弼的文字。其实,如果我们仔细读一下这段文字,我们就会发现,这个礼正是“多趋于少,多趋于少,繁趋于简”本身。这种“趋少而朴”,正是“趋主、趋本”。我们不需要寻找任何其他李作为“统一他们的主人,使他们聚集在一起的根源”。所以王弼说:“事无偶然,事无偶然。”他的意思是说,某一事物之所以如此或那样,是因为“多趋一、多趋少、多趋少”的道理。复杂趋于简单

thus interacting and converging.” Guo Xiang, in his commentary to Zhuangzi’s “Dechongfu,” says, “Things do not happen haphazardly; they are all the coming together [會 hui] of heaven and earth, the convergence [趣 qu] of the ultimate coherence [Li].” This comment, explaining Li in terms of convergence [huiqu], precisely grasps Wang Bi’s idea, and serves as good evidence for my claim here. Precisely this convergence [huiqu] is what makes a thing what it is. It is also what makes an activity or and event what it is. . . It is unnecessary to go beyond this master or origin and try to think about a single original qi or heavenly deity, or any objectively existing metaphysical substance, or a self-subsistent metaphysical principle, to serve as this master or source of things. The things or events formed by this tendency of the many converging toward the one and so on are each individual concrete events and activities, that is, concrete situations, like the “difficult” situation described in the Tun hexagram. But this situation, or any situation, is always a single convergence, “a many tending toward a one, an abundance tending toward the few, a complexity tending toward a simplicity.” But in calling it a convergence, we note that it possesses a singularity, which constitutes its fewness or its simplicity. Whenever people look squarely at a situation as a whole, they always unify it, reduce it to fewness, simplify it, which is to say, they unify it in a single master or source, and thus know the Li that it comes from. This Li is just “what it comes from,” just as Dao is a “what things come from.” Where we find the sense in which it is a motion “from” the many to the few, “from” the abundant to a one, “from” the complex to the simple, we find the Li , the principle, the Dao of Change. Thus we can say that this “fromness” resides in neither the complex nor in the simple, not in the one nor in the many, not in the abundant nor in the few. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
从而相互作用和融合。”郭象在注释庄子《德崇赋》时说:“事无偶然,事无偶然。”皆是天地之会,至趣之会。”此话以汇曲解理,准确把握了王弼的思想,为我在此主张提供了很好的佐证。正是这种趋同,才造就了事物的本来面目。它也是活动或事件的本质所在。 。 。没有必要超越这个主宰或本源,去想一个单一的元气或天神,或任何客观存在的形而上的实体,或一个自存的形而上的原理,作为这个主宰或事物的本源。这种多趋一等所形成的事物或事件,都是个别的具体事件和活动,即具体情境,如敦卦所描述的“困难”情境。但这种情况,或任何情况,总是单一的趋同,“多趋于一,丰富趋于少数,复杂趋于简单”。但在称其为收敛时,我们注意到它具有奇点,这构成了它的少数性或简单性。人正视整体时,总是统一它、化简它、简化它,即统一于一主、一源,从而知道它的理出处。这个理就是“从何而来”,正如道就是“事物从何而来”。当我们找到“从”多到少、“从”多到一、“从”复杂到简单的意义时,我们就找到了“理”、“理”、“道”。改变。因此我们可以说,这个“本”不在于复杂,也不在于简单,不在于一,不在于多,不在于多,也不在于少。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
Tang’s point about Li is extremely important: for Wang, Li is really not that which “controls” these convergences, or a separate realm of the One, but rather a way of describing these concrete processes of convergence toward the least represented element in each situation. “One” here is not the One, but the lowest number, the least. There is not any single “One,” then, but rather a different one, least, simple, implicit in any situation, which structures that situation. “Ones” are multiple, not one. Tang is surely right to further stress the implications of Wang’s view in the stress on “stimulus” (感 gan, as reflected in his commentary to the 咸 xian hexagram) and interactivity, with its emphasis on “emptiness” (i.e., psychologically and morally speaking, humility) as a development of this idea of “seeking” and
唐关于理的观点极其重要:对于王来说,理实际上并不是“控制”这些融合的东西,也不是“一”的一个单独的领域,而是一种描述这些具体的趋同过程的方式,以在每种情况下代表最少的元素。这里的“一”不是“一”,而是最低的数、最少的数。那么,不存在任何单一的“一”,而是有一个不同的、最少的、简单的、隐含在任何情况下的、构成该情况的“一”。 “一个”是多个,而不是一个。唐进一步强调王氏观点的含义当然是正确的,即强调“感感”(反映在他对咸咸卦的注释中)和互动性,强调“空”(即心理上和道德上的)说话,谦卑)作为“寻求”这一理念的发展,

“wanting” embedded in the hexagram structures. It is this mutual seeking, interacting, responding to stimulus that allows things to structure themselves around the least present aspect of the situation, the object of desire. This in turn provides a novel insight into the problem of stimulus and response (感應 ganying), which is now conceived as neither response to the same type nor to different type; the emptiness (虛 x u x u xux u ) of the participants allows them to manifest as their opposite, across types. As Tang says, commenting on Wang’s commentary to the xian hexagram, for the male and female to interact, the male must temporarily abandon his maleness and take the role of the female (e.g., in humbling himself to go forth and receive his bride). 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} This sort of reciprocity, convergence, interactivity is the locus of Li for Wang, which is thus different in each situation, and manifest in a multitude of ways along with the multitude of situations. There are many Lis, each serving as a miniature Dao for that particular situation.
“想要”嵌入六芒星结构中。正是这种相互寻求、相互作用、对刺激做出反应,使得事物能够围绕情境中最不存在的方面(即欲望的对象)来构建自身。这反过来又为刺激和反应(感应ganying)问题提供了新的见解,现在认为刺激和反应既不是对相同类型的反应,也不是对不同类型的反应;空虚(虚 x u x u xux u )的参与者允许他们在不同类型中表现出相反的一面。正如唐在评论王氏对咸卦的注释时所说,为了使男性和女性互动,男性必须暂时放弃男性身份并扮演女性的角色(例如,谦卑地前去迎接他的新娘)。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 这种互惠性、融合性、互动性是王之理的核心,因而在每种情况下都不同,并随着情况的多样性而以多种方式表现出来。理有很多,每一个都是针对特定情况的微型刀。
Unfortunately, in discussing Wang Bi’s interpretation of the Laozi as opposed to the Zhouyi, Tang backpedals a bit on his interpretation, reverting to a “Single Dao” reading, which he compares to the trackless space in which airplanes or birds may fly, but which is not for that reason the path of airplane or bird. On this reading, Dao is once again transcendent to individual situations, unaffected by them, a single encompassing universal emptiness in which many different particulars may come and go. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} But I would like to claim here that Tang would have done better to recall his own interpretation of “emptiness” and “oneness” in his discussion of Wang’s hexagram interpretation and applied this to his understanding of Wang’s Laozi commentary. Indeed, the idea of oneness as “the least” rather than as “the all-encompassing One” is already present in the Laozi, but with a stress on the “least” in the world as a whole, rather than to each situation. We see this for example in Chapter 39 of that text, the most extensive discussion of “the One” therein, which after describing how various entities gain their own specific coherent characters by “gaining the One” (note that again they themselves attain the One, rather than merely receiving some determinacies from it) goes on to conclude explicitly by saying, “Thus the esteemed take the humble as their base, the lofty take the lowly as their foundation” (故貴以賤為本,高以下為基 gu gui yi jian we ben, gao y ixia wei ji). The “humble” and “lowly” is the One: it is the lack of the specific value represented by each of these entities themselves. This allows this “least” to also serve, ironically, as the all-encompassing One, as the unity both of the parts of each entity cohering so as to make it sustainably what it is, and also its way of linking to the coherence with its opposite, and with all other entities, through its contact with what is least itself, least represents its own value, its own opposite. In the same sense, for Wang the “least” in any situation, since it structures the whole situation, is what is all-encompassingly present in
不幸的是,在讨论王弼对《老子》而不是《周易》的解释时,唐在他的解释上有点后退,回到了“一道”解读,他将其比作飞机或鸟类可以飞翔的无轨空间,但因此,这不是飞机或鸟类的路径。在这种解读中,道再次超越个体情况,不受个体情况的影响,是一种单一的包容性普遍空性,其中许多不同的细节可以来来去去。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 但我想在此指出,汤最好回忆一下他自己在讨论王卦解释时对“空”和“一”的解释,并将其应用到他对王老子注释的理解中。事实上,“一”的观念是“最小”而不是“包罗万象”,这一观念在《老子》中已经存在,但强调的是整个世界的“最小”,而不是每种情况。例如,我们在该文本的第39章中看到了这一点,其中对“一”进行了最广泛的讨论,在描述了各种实体如何通过“获得一”来获得自己特定的连贯特征之后(请注意,它们自己再次获得了“一”) ,而不是仅仅从中得到一些确定性)接着明确地总结道:“故贵以贱为本,高以下为基”(故贵以贱为本,高以下为基)古鬼一剑我们本,高一下魏记)。 “卑微”和“卑微”就是“一”:它缺乏这些实体本身所代表的特定价值。 具有讽刺意味的是,这使得这个“最小”也可以作为包罗万象的一个,作为每个实体的两个部分的统一体,从而使其可持续地保持其本来面目,以及它与与它的对立面,以及与所有其他实体的对立面,通过它与最少本身的接触,最少代表了它自己的价值,它自己的对立面。同样的意义,对于王来说,任何情况下的“最小”,因为它构成了整个情况,所以是包罗万象地存在的。

that situation, what that situation appears to be “when viewed squarely as a whole,” as Tang puts it. Indeed, Wang even describes this coherence of what a situation wants but is not, what it tends toward, in the full ontological sense as “the coherence that makes it what it is” (所以然之理 suoyiran zhi Li ) Li ) Li)\mathrm{Li}) : “When one recognizes the motion of things, the coherences [Li] that make them what they are can all be attained.” 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} That is, the convergence around what is lacking in them is the Li that makes them what they are. The Li is both this process of converging and this least-present element, just as Laozi’s Dao was both the unintelligible background of raw stuff and the process of reverting to this raw stuff. To clarify the implications of this, let us now look at Wang Bi’s approach to the Laozi.
正如唐所说,这种情况“从整体上看”似乎是这样的。事实上,王甚至在完整的本体论意义上将这种情况想要什么但不想要什么以及它趋向什么的连贯性描述为“使之成为现实的连贯性”(所以自然之理所依然之) Li ) Li ) Li)\mathrm{Li}) :“当一个人认识到事物的运动时,就可以实现使它们成为现实的连贯性[Li]。” 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 也就是说,围绕它们所缺乏的东西的聚合是使它们成为现在的样子的理。理既是这个聚合的过程,又是这个最不存在的元素,正如老子的道既是难以理解的原始物质的背景,又是回归原始物质的过程。为了澄清其含义,现在让我们看看王弼对《老子》的看法。

SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVISM IN WANG BI:
THE ADVENT OF TI AND YONG 體用 AS IRONIC STRUCTURE
《王弼》中的主观视角: TI和YONG体用作为反讽结构的出现

Somewhat surprisingly, Tang Junyi characterizes Wang Bi as stressing the “subjective” meaning of Dao in the Laozi, pushing this beyond what he sees as the strictly political and more objective sense of Dao in the interpretation of the text by HuangLao Daoists, in his concept of “embodying Non-Being” (tiwu 體無). It is here that Tang sees the most distinctive feature of Wang’s apparent stress on the Dao as “substance” ( t i ) t i ) ti)t i) : not as a reference to what Tang calls the objective and transcendent metaphysical substance of Dao (道體 daoti), but as a subjective mode of relating to the Non-Being of Dao. Wang’s interpretation is loftier than the earlier ones, Tang says; in a sense, he says, Wang thus overestimates Laozi, seeing only his loftiest meaning. For Wang’s reading is not an accurate reclaiming of the objective sense of Dao as metaphysical reality that Tang sees in the Laozi itself; Tang praises Wang for going beyond the previous types of interpretations, but also criticizes him for reducing the full complexity of Laozi’s Dao, shortchanging the multiplicity of its original objective implications. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
有点令人惊讶的是,唐君毅将王弼描述为强调《老子》中“道”的“主观”意义,这超出了他在黄老道家对文本的解释中所认为的严格政治和更客观的“道”意义。 “体无”(tiwu 体无)。正是在这里,唐看到了王氏明显强调“道”为“体”的最显着特征( t i ) t i ) ti)t i) :不是指唐所说的客观的、超越的形而上学的道体(道体),而是一种与道的非存在相关的主观模式。唐说,王的解释比早期的解释更为崇高。他说,从某种意义上说,王因此高估了老子,只看到了老子最高的意义。因为王的解读并不是对唐在《老子》本身中看到的作为形而上现实的道的客观意义的准确再现;唐赞扬王氏超越了以前的解释类型,但也批评他降低了老子之道的全部复杂性,缩短了其原始客观含义的多样性。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
This critique may seem out of place, given the generally accepted doxa on Wang’s development of a theory of “original Non-Being” (benwu 本無) as the origin of all things, which seems to suggest an objective orientation to Dao. But a close reading of Wang’s commentary actually reveals the acuity of Tang’s analysis. This is nowhere more evident than in the apparent advent of the categories of 體 t i t i tit i and 用 yong as a paired dyad in Wang’s commentary to Laozi 38. This is the text to which we are most commonly directed when searching for the origin of this pair of categories, which would have such an important role to play in subsequent Chinese metaphysics, crucial particularly for what Tang would call the formulation of objective metaphysics; Tang calls this chapter’s commentary the summary of Wang Bi’s thought on the relation between Dao and De. But when we
这种批评似乎有些不合时宜,因为普遍接受的观点是王发展了“本无”理论作为万物的起源,这似乎暗示了道的客观取向。但仔细阅读王的评论,其实可以看出唐分析的敏锐性。这一点在体范畴的明显出现中表现得最为明显。 t i t i tit i 在王氏《老子注》38中,用“用”作为一对。这是我们在寻找这对范畴的起源时最常被指向的文本,这在后来的中国形而上学中将发挥如此重要的作用,对于唐所说的客观形而上学的表述尤其重要;唐把这一章的注释称为王弼关于道德关系思想的总结。但当我们

turn to this text, we find that Wang has not presented the familiar ti/yong pair as metaphysical categories at all. In fact, t i t i tit i and yong are not yet used systematically as technical philosophical terminology by Wang Bi. Rather, as Tang’s analysis notes, the use of both terms in this passage is thoroughly subjective. Tang does not explain, however, the exact way in which Wang is tweaking the crucial tropes in the passage. The Laozi (11) had suggested, in a set of striking metaphors, that Non-Being ( w u w u wuw u 無) gives all things their “function” (yong 用), just as it is the empty space in a room, or at the hub of a wheel, that gives these things their function, their “use.” This is contrasted, not to “body” or “substance” ( t i t i tit i 體), but to “advantage” ( l i l i lil i 利), which derives from the presence or Being (you 有) of these things. Since their function derives from the Non-Being, the empty hubs and passages that make a space for other things, we practitioners of the Way must ourselves “make use of” of the receptive empty spaces, the Non-Being, in ourselves in dealing with things.
翻到这段文字,我们发现王根本没有把我们熟悉的体用对作为形而上的范畴来呈现。实际上, t i t i tit i 王弼尚未系统地使用“用”和“用”作为技术哲学术语。相反,正如唐的分析指出的那样,这段话中这两个术语的使用完全是主观的。然而,唐没有解释王在调整段落中关键比喻的确切方式。 《老子》(11)用一系列引人注目的隐喻暗示,非存在( w u w u wuw u 无)赋予所有事物其“功能”(用),就像房间中的空旷空间或轮子的轮毂赋予了这些事物其功能和“用途”一样。这不是与“身体”或“物质”形成对比的( t i t i tit i 体),但为了“优势”( l i l i lil i 利),它源自这些事物的存在或存在(你有)。由于它们的功能源自于“无”,即为其他事物腾出空间的空的枢纽和通道,所以我们修道者必须自己“利用”我们自身的接收性空空间,即“无”来处理事情。与事物。
Wang Bi pairs this with ti, adding a third level beyond the preferred yong and less-favored li, in his commentary to Laozi 38 . He pushes the trope of “making use of Non-Being” a step further by combining it with another theme in the Laozi, non-deliberate action (wuwei 無為). The Daoist tradition in general, as we have seen, views the deliberate and explicit embrace of ideals, and the purposive action that follows from it, as an obstacle to the truly spontaneous and richest realization of those very ideals. Laozi 38, as Wang reads it, warns against taking even Daoist virtuousity (de 德) as an explicit ideal, a mental object held in mind as a maxim of behavior, to be taken as a guide for action and consciously followed, of which one might deliberately make use, saying, “The highest Virtue does not do Virtue” (shangde bude 上德不德), and so on. For as the highest Dao is a Dao that is not known or deliberately embraced as a Dao, the highest use or function of Dao is not a deliberate “making use of” the Dao, or Non-Being. Wang thus suggests in his commentary that it is necessary rather to merge thoroughly with Non-Being, to the point where it is no longer an object of deliberate use: “Although it is valuable to take Non-Being as function [i.e., as something to be used], it does not enable one to let go of it [as something deliberately ‘made use of’] so that one can [instead] embody it as one’s own substance. If one is unable to let go of Non-Being so as to [instead] embody it as one’s own substance, it loses that which makes it truly great”(雖貴以無為用,不能捨無以為體也。不能捨無以為體,則失其為大矣 sui gui yi wu wei yong, buneng she wu yiwei ti ye. Buneng she wu yiwei ti, ze shi qi wei da y i y i yiy i ). The crucial thing to notice in this passage, often glossed over but effectively underlined in Tang’s analysis, is that in this, their earliest usage as a pair in the entire Chinese philosophical tradition, ti and yong though technically used as nouns are really best understood through the sense of
王弼在《老子》38 的注释中将其与体配对,在首选的用和较不受欢迎的礼之外增加了第三个层次。他将“无为”这一比喻与《老子》中的另一个主题“无为”相结合,将其进一步推进。正如我们所看到的,道教传统一般认为,对理想的刻意而明确的拥抱,以及随之而来的有目的的行动,是真正自发和最丰富地实现这些理想的障碍。正如王所读的那样,《老子》第 38 章警告我们不要将道家的德行视为一种明确的理想,一种作为行为准则而牢记在心的精神对象,并将其作为行动的指南并自觉地遵循,其中一个可能会故意用“上德不德”之类的话。因为最高的道是不为人所知或故意接受为道的道,所以道的最高用途或功能不是故意“利用”道或非存在。因此,王在他的评论中建议,有必要与非存在彻底融合,直到它不再是故意使用的对象:“尽管将非存在视为功能是有价值的[即,作为某种东西”被使用],它并不能让人放弃它[作为故意“利用”的东西],以便人们可以[相反]将其体现为自己的实体。若不能放下无,而将无为本体,则失其大”(虽贵以无为用,不能舍无以为体也。不能舍无)以为体,则失其为大矣,遂归一无为用,不能舍无一为体也。不能舍五一味,则其气大 y i y i yiy i )。这段话中需要注意的关键一点是,在整个中国哲学传统中,体和用最早作为一对使用,虽然在技术上被用作名词,但在唐的分析中经常被掩盖但有效地强调,体和用实际上是通过以下方式得到最好的理解:的感觉

these words as verbs. This verbal sense of t i 體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin t i  體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin  ti(" 體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin ")/()t i \frac{\text { 體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin }}{} texts. It is usually translated as “embody,” meaning to merge with, to form one body with, or simply, as Alan Chan has suggested in his discussion of this passage, to “be one with” something. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} But this remains an obscure metaphor: What does it mean to be “one with,” or to “form one body with” something such as Non-Being, or Benevolence, or Dao? An examination of the contexts in which this usage of t i t i tit i is deployed in early texts can help us specify at least three implications of this interesting term. To “embody” means (1) "to give concrete form to (to concretize, to body forth),"10 (2) “to fully integrate and present in its completeness,” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} and, most crucially to Wang Bi’s usage, (3) "to stand in the position of, and to see and act from that position."12 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} This last sense implies embodiment in the sense of taking something as one’s own body, inhabiting something rather than confronting it, so that we see and respond to the world “from the position of” this thing, such that it is not an object in our world but rather in the “subject” position.
这些词作为动词。这种言语上的感觉 t i 體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin t i  體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin  ti(" 體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin ")/()t i \frac{\text { 體 is occasionally used in pre-Qin }}{} 文本。它通常被翻译为“体现”,意思是与某物融合,与某物形成一个整体,或者简单地,正如陈幼坚在讨论这段话时所建议的那样,与某物“成为一体”。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} 但这仍然是一个晦涩的隐喻:“与”诸如“无”、“仁”或“道”之类的东西“一体”或“形成一体”是什么意思?对这种用法的上下文的检查 t i t i tit i 在早期文本中使用可以帮助我们明确这个有趣术语的至少三个含义。 “体现”意味着 (1) “赋予具体形式(具体化、体现)”10 (2) “充分整合并呈现其完整性”, 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 而且,对王弼的用法来说最重要的是,(3)“站在……的立场上,从那个立场上看问题并采取行动。”12 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 最后一个含义意味着体现,即把某物当作自己的身体,居住在某物中而不是面对它,以便我们“从该物的位置”看待世界并对其做出反应,这样它就不是我们心中的一个物体。世界,而是处于“主体”的位置。
What is important here is to see the way this metaphor plays into the deployment of negation in the Laozi passage, the effacement of thematic or explicit appearance of something, meant as an explanation of why the “highest virtue” is “non-virtue.” That is, “forming one body” with X does not merely mean integrating X into one’s preexisting body or self, so that it becomes, as it were, an organ of one’s own body, like one’s hands and feet; nor does it mean simply that one is integrated into it, becomes a part of it. Rather, concomitant to this integration is the capacity for a reversal of position, where the object becomes, as it were, the subject. One stands in the position of X , sees the world, including oneself, as X sees the world. Virtue does not see virtue. Thus, when a person “is” Virtue, there “is” [to that person] no Virtue.
这里重要的是要看到这个隐喻在《老子》段落中否定的部署中发挥的作用,即消除某些事物的主题或明确的外观,旨在解释为什么“最高的德性”是“非德性”。也就是说,与X“合而为一”,不仅仅意味着将X融入到自己原有的身体或自我中,使之成为自己身体的一个器官,就像自己的手脚一样,而是指将X融入到自己原有的身体或自我中,使其成为自己身体的一个器官,就像自己的手脚一样。它也不仅仅意味着一个人融入其中,成为其中的一部分。相反,与这种整合相伴随的是位置逆转的能力,即客体变成了主体。一个人站在X的立场上,以X看待世界的方式看待世界,包括自己。德不见德。因此,当一个人“是”美德时,[对该人来说]就“没有”美德了。
When Wang Bi speaks of “taking Non-Being as” either function or substance, he means just that: to subjectively take them as such. It is not a reference to “the function of Non-Being (Dao)” and “the Substance of Non-Being” as objective or metaphysical realities. They are not descriptions of aspects of existing things, nor of the Dao, but rather of two subjective ways of relating to the Dao: inhabiting it or using it. The former phrase, in fact, is exactly equivalent to Wang’s explicit use of the verbal sense of the word t i t i tit i in other places, with Non-Being as its object: “embodying Non-Being” (ti wu 體無). This refers to a full internalization, a nondeliberate identification with Dao. The three verbal senses of t i t i tit i all apply here: it means “standing in the place of” Non-Being, “giving it concrete form” as its embodiment, and “presencing Non-Being in its integrated totality,” leaving out no aspect of it, rather than grasping it in some partial form from some specific angle. It means standing in the place of Non-Being as its full living embodiment-being Non-Being in the flesh, as it were, inhabiting
当王弼说“以无为”,无论是功能还是实体时,他的意思就是:主观地认为它们是这样的。它并不是将“非存在(道)的功能”和“非存在的实体”视为客观或形而上的现实。它们不是对现有事物各方面的描述,也不是对道的描述,而是与道相关的两种主观方式:居住它或使用它。前一个短语实际上完全等同于王明确使用该词的动词意义 t i t i tit i 有的地方则以无为对象:“体无”。这是指完全内化,不刻意地认同道。言语的三种意义 t i t i tit i 都适用于此:它的意思是“站在非存在的地方”,“赋予它具体的形式”作为其体现,以及“呈现非存在的整体”,不遗漏它的任何一个方面,而不是抓住它从某些特定角度以某种部分形式。它意味着站在非存在的位置,作为其完整的活生生的体现——非存在在肉体中,可以说,居住在
Non-Being and acting “from” there, rather than “using” it in one’s actions as a standard or guide. “Using the Dao,” or Non-Being, or any of the Virtues listed in Chapter 38, is the deliberate, purpose-driven application of this Dao to specific uses, necessarily standing at a distance from it, separated from it, so that it is before us, among the objects confronting us “at-hand.” We do not, after all, exactly “use” our own body as we use other things: we do not have to make a plan and devise a strategy to beat our own hearts, or to lift our hands. We “inhabit” our bodies effortlessly, without noticing it (if it is functioning well). It is things outside of ourselves that we notice, identify, and deliberately make use of for one purpose or another. In the same way, Wang Bi tells us we must “embody” or “inhabit” (ti) the Dao, thereby effacing it as a definite and determinate entity. It is this full inhabiting of the Dao as one’s own body that truly allows it to function well; this is the “mother” of the function or use of the Dao, and hence of all things.
非存在并“从”那里行动,而不是在一个人的行动中“使用”它作为标准或指南。 “用道”,或“非存在”,或第 38 章中列出的任何美德,是有意识地、以目的为导向将该道应用于特定用途,必须与它保持一定距离,与之分离,以便它就在我们面前,就在我们“眼前”所面对的物体之中。毕竟,我们并不像使用其他东西一样“使用”自己的身体:我们不必制定计划和制定策略来击败我们自己的心脏或举起我们的手。我们毫不费力地“居住”在我们的身体中,而没有注意到它(如果它运转良好的话)。我们注意到、识别并故意利用自身之外的事物来达到这样或那样的目的。同样,王弼告诉我们,我们必须“体现”或“居于”道,从而消除它作为一个确定的、确定的实体。正是把道充分的寄生在自己的身体上,才真正能够发挥其作用。这是道的功能或用途的“母”,因此也是万物的“母”。
The best gloss on the meaning of this verbal use of t i t i tit i can be found in the famous anecdote in Wang Bi’s biography where he compares Laozi unfavorably to Confucius, a watershed in the history of Chinese thought, precisely this phrase is used: the Sage, Confucius “embodied Non-Being” (tiwu 體無), which is why he did not have to talk about it, making him superior to Laozi, whose failure to embody it was what compelled him to discuss it. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} Non-Being, when fully embodied, ceases to appear as an object to be “used,” discussed, analyzed—even known. Similarly, as Chan Buddhists would later never tire of saying, the eye does not see itself: “embodying” the eye, being the eye, means never seeing the eye. The absence of the eye from one’s experience is the proof that one is oneself the eye. The absence of Non-Being from one’s experience is the proof that one is oneself Non-Being, has embodied it. Here, the full realization of something, conceived on the subjective praxis and ethical cultivation, is exactly equivalent to its phenomenological absence. We have here a dialectic of self-negation that superficially resembles the contours of negative ontology, that is, the notion that the Absolute or the infinite, as an objective reality, is a kind of nothingness, transcends being, since all predications of being are relative and finite. To this extent, we must agree with Tang’s judgment that Wang’s comments, even when seemingly focused on the metaphysics of nothingness, are ultimately derived from and oriented toward the subjective and the ethical.
对这种口头用法的含义的最好解释 t i t i tit i 王弼传记中著名的轶事,将老子与孔子相比较,这是中国思想史上的分水岭,正是用了这样一句话:圣人,孔子“体无”,这就是为什么他不必谈论它,这使他优于老子,因为老子未能体现这一点,所以他不得不讨论它。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} 当非存在被充分体现时,它就不再作为一个被“使用”、讨论、分析——甚至被认知的对象出现。同样,正如禅宗后来不厌其烦地说的那样,眼睛看不到自己:“体现”眼睛,成为眼睛,意味着永远看不到眼睛。一个人的经验中没有眼睛,就证明他自己就是眼睛。一个人的经验中“非存在”的缺失证明了一个人本身就是“非存在”,并且体现了它。在这里,基于主观实践和伦理修养而构想的某种事物的充分实现,恰好等同于它的现象学缺席。我们在这里有一种自我否定的辩证法,表面上类似于否定本体论的轮廓,也就是说,绝对或无限作为客观现实,是一种虚无,超越存在,因为存在的所有谓词都是相对且有限的。从这个意义上说,我们必须同意唐的判断,即王的评论即使表面上关注的是虚无的形而上学,但最终还是源于并指向主观和伦理。
Oddly, however, Tang does not seem to appreciate the distinction between t i t i tit i and yong in Wang’s commentary, treating “embodying Non-Being” and “using Non-Being” as nearly synonymous. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} Tang understands “embodying Non-Being” to be merely an emphatic way of saying, “using only Non-Being, following only Non-Being,” and the like, rather than seeing “embodying” and “using” as two strictly contrasted modes of relating to the Non-Being. In my humble opinion, this is an enormously consequential
然而奇怪的是,唐似乎并没有意识到两者之间的区别。 t i t i tit i 王注中的“和勇”将“体现非存在”和“利用非存在”几乎视为同义词。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 唐将“体现无”理解为“唯用无,唯从无”之类的强调方式,而不是将“体现”与“用”视为两种严格对比的模式与非存在相关的。以我的拙见,这是一个非常重要的事件

oversight. Hence, we must agree with Tang on the importance of this passage, and on the ultimately subjective meaning of ti. But we must insist, against Tang, on the importance of the distinction and contrast between the two terms, and seek here the solution to some of the shortcomings Tang sees in Wang’s reading, as well as the source of some of the most distinctive moves in later Chinese metaphysics.
监督。因此,我们必须同意唐关于这段经文的重要性以及“ti”的最终主观意义的观点。但我们必须反对唐,坚持这两个术语之间的区别和对比的重要性,并在此寻求解决唐在王的解读中看到的一些缺点的解决方案,以及一些最独特的举动的根源。后来的中国玄学。
This contrast between “embodying” (ti) and “use/function” (yong) is developed, through some complex turns in Wang’s discussion, into the mother/child relation: the manifest usefulness or function of Non-Being (seen in the space of a room or the hub of a wheel) is derived from the more thorough embodiment of Non-Being, which does not make of it a “something” to be used. The phenomenological absence of Non-Being, that is, the inhabiting of Non-Being, is the source of its phenomenological presence as Non-Being used. But for Wang this is not merely a deriving of one thing from another where the “offspring” can exist separately from its foundation. Rather, in accordance with Laozi 52, Wang goes on in this passage to assert that the mother and child are here inseparable, like an infant at the mother’s breast. Hence, Wang pushes the metaphor another step, comparing embodiment/ mother to the root of a plant, and use/offspring to its branches. The goal is still to make these roots, these children, these functions, maximally effective. But the way to do so, ironically, is not to simply use them, but to turn one’s attention to their root, their mother, their embodiment, in which they are seemingly effaced. A dialectic of maximization through negation takes shape, but in a thoroughly practical sense. In this way, a kind of root/branch relation is sketched between t i t i tit i (body, substance) and yong (use, function). The branches are many and the root is one. The branches depend on, grow out of, and express the root. At the same time, the root is the negation of the branches, the opposite of the branches, the phenomenological absence of the branches, their effacement as determinate objects.
“体现”(ti)和“使用/功能”(yong)之间的这种对比,通过王讨论中的一些复杂的转变,发展成了母子关系:非存在的明显有用性或功能(见于空间)房间或轮子的轮毂)源自于非存在的更彻底的体现,它并不使它成为一个可供使用的“东西”。非存在的现象学缺席,即非存在的居住,是其作为非存在使用的现象学存在的根源。但对于王来说,这不仅仅是一种事物从另一种事物中衍生出来的过程,其中“后代”可以脱离其基础而存在。相反,根据《老子》52,王在这段话中继续断言母亲和孩子在这里是不可分离的,就像母亲怀里的婴儿一样。因此,王将这个隐喻推向了另一个层次,将体现/母亲比作植物的根,将使用/后代比作其枝条。我们的目标仍然是使这些根、这些孩子、这些功能发挥最大的作用。但具有讽刺意味的是,这样做的方法并不是简单地使用它们,而是将注意力转向它们的根源、它们的母亲、它们的化身,而它们似乎在其中被抹去了。通过否定实现最大化的辩证法已经形成,但是是在彻底的实践意义上。这样,之间就勾画出了一种根/枝关系。 t i t i tit i (身体、物质)和用(用途、功能)。枝为多,根为一。枝依赖于根,从根中生长出来,并表达根。同时,根源是对枝条的否定,是枝条的对立面,是枝条在现象学上的缺席,是枝条作为确定对象的消失。
The branches and root taken together form one whole; they are complementary. They are also, strictly speaking, opposites, and mutually exclusive: the branches are the embodiment of Non-Being, where Non-Being ceases to manifest as any kind of object to awareness, while the branches are Non-Being as an object, a guide, a goal to be used. Thus far, we have, already, a quite odd philosophical structure: a complementary but asymmetrical set of parts, where one part depends on the other but not vice versa, forming a single whole, which are moreover mutually exclusive and opposed. This coincides with Laozi’s image of the spokes of a wheel and its empty hub in Laozi 11.
枝与根合而为一;它们是互补的。严格来说,它们也是对立的和相互排斥的:分支是非存在的化身,其中非存在不再表现为任何一种意识对象,而分支则是作为对象的非存在,指南,要使用的目标。到目前为止,我们已经有了一个相当奇怪的哲学结构:一组互补但不对称的部分,其中一个部分依赖于另一个部分,但反之亦然,形成一个整体,而且是相互排斥和对立的。这与《老子》十一章中的轮辐空轮毂形象不谋而合。
However, there is another, seemingly opposed implication to Wang’s use of these terms. The root/branch idea suggests complementary and inseparable parts of a single whole, a fundamental and unified root and diversified
然而,王使用这些术语还有另一个看似相反的含义。根/枝的概念表明一个整体中互补且不可分割的部分,一个基本的、统一的根和多样化的

and derivative branches. But at the same time, in Wang’s original usage, both the root and the branch were the same (non-) entity, simply viewed in two different ways, through two contrasted modes of relating: Non-Being, viewed either as embodied or as deliberately put to a particular use. Wang understands this Non-Being, according to Tang, in a primarily subjective sense: it is the stillness and emptiness, the flavorless, the purposelessness at the root of every particular purpose, which alone gives them their function. To put this to use, objectifying it, is to actively and purposefully employ stillness and purposelessness, a secondary or even inauthentic application of the purposelessness, emptiness and Non-Being that is the Dao. But this is not only derivative of Dao-as-embodied-true purposelessness and stillness-and the opposite of it (phenomenologically present as “stillness and emptiness” rather than absent): it is even, in some sense at least, the selfsame thing, in two different modes or contexts.
及衍生分支​​。但与此同时,在王最初的用法中,根和枝都是同一个(非)实体,只是通过两种对比的关联模式以两种不同的方式来看待:非存在,要么被视为体现,要么被视为故意用于特定用途。根据唐的说法,王从主要主观的意义上理解了这种“非存在”:它是每一个特定目的的根源的寂静和空虚、无味、无目的,只有这些才赋予它们功能。运用这一点,将其具体化,就是积极地、有目的地运用静止和无目的,这是对无目的、空虚和非存在即道的次要甚至不真实的应用。但这不仅是道的衍生——真正的无目的和静止——而且是它的对立面(现象学上表现为“静止和空虚”而不是缺席):甚至,至少在某种意义上,它是同一事物,在两种不同的模式或上下文中。
Here we see the problem before us: ti and yong are both (1) two complementary parts of a larger whole; (2) mutually exclusive opposites; and (3) two names for the same thing, viewed in two different contexts or applications. These categories would go on to become an omnipresent tool in later Chinese metaphysics, especially Chinese Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. We will often see Li as part of a pair of terms formulated on this model: Li and shi in Chinese Buddhism, and sometimes also in Neo-Confucianism, where we also find, most notably, the Li/qi pair at times explicated as a kind of ti/yong structure. It is crucial to see here at the advent of this pair of categories the intrinsic subjectivity involved in the notion of t i t i tit i, for this will help us guard against construing Li too as a kind of objective law or principle. Affect and perspective, and a certain ironic self-undermining structure endemic to subjectivity, remain deeply woven into this category, and the same will be true for the various deployments of Li that we will find in the later tradition. Here we may note the way Wang’s original deployment of t i t i tit i and yong as a pair echoes the structure of Li as derived from his reading of the structure of the hexagrams. In both cases, we are looking at a center of convergence that at once makes the whole coherent and is the negation of that coherence. That is, it is structurally necessary that this unifying center not be intelligible in the same way that the whole it unifies is. In the case of t i t i tit i and yong, t i t i tit i is the unifying single “mother” or “root” of a set of diverse expressions, but is also the subjective internalization of the character of those expression which does not appear to itself as any of them, which is not visible to itself; it is the locus of any X where X disappears, where even its identifying Xness is seen as an alienated and partial view of it from outside, premised on a distortedly deliberate attitude toward that X . The t i t i tit i of X will be non-Xish, will be the unifying center where it does not “read out” as X, with the understanding that it
这里我们看到了摆在我们面前的问题:体和用都是(1)一个更大整体的两个互补部分; (2) 相互排斥的对立面; (3)同一事物的两个名称,在两种不同的上下文或应用中查看。这些范畴将继续成为后来中国形而上学,尤其是中国佛教和理学中无所不在的工具。我们经常将“理”视为根据此模型制定的一对术语的一部分:中国佛教中的“理”和“势”,有时也在新儒家中,最值得注意的是,理/气对有时被解释为一种体用结构。至关重要的是,在这对类别的出现时,我们要看到包含在概念中的内在主观性。 t i t i tit i ,因为这将有助于我们防止将理也解释为一种客观规律或原则。情感和视角,以及主观性所特有的某种讽刺性的自我破坏结构,仍然深深地融入到这一范畴中,我们在后来的传统中发现的李的各种部署也是如此。这里我们可以注意到Wang最初的部署方式 t i t i tit i 和勇作为一对,与李的结构相呼应,这是从他对卦象结构的解读中得出的。在这两种情况下,我们都在寻找一个聚合中心,它既使整体变得连贯,又否定了这种连贯性。也就是说,从结构上来说,这个统一中心不能像它所统一的整体一样是可理解的。 如果是 t i t i tit i 和勇, t i t i tit i 是一组不同表达的统一的单一“母亲”或“根源”,但也是那些表达特征的主观内化,这些表达本身并不表现为它们中的任何一个,对它自己来说是不可见的;它是任何X的轨迹,其中X消失了,甚至它的识别X性也被视为从外部对它的异化和片面的看法,前提是对那个X的扭曲的、刻意的态度。这 t i t i tit i X 的 X 将是非 Xish,将是它不会“读”为 X 的统一中心,但要理解的是,它

really means to be X. Yong will be the deliberate deployment of this same quality in some particular situation as a partial expression, mistakenly made the object of a deliberate intention and cognition, which will thus always be susceptible to crashing back into the center, the ti, where that expression and that coherence is effaced. For some help in intuiting what might be meant here, we may think again of Qian Mu’s pendulum. In the case of Li , we have the lack or hole at the center of vortex, the vertex around which it converges and takes shape, again necessarily lacking precisely what is coherent as the resulting whole. The opposition between coherence and incoherence, or between the non-ironic and ironic senses of coherence (as intelligibility and unification), approaches a new level of clarity here; they are given a structural inseparability built into the key terminology, which will shape the future of the Chinese metaphysical tradition.
真正的意思是成为X。勇将在某些特定情况下故意部署这种相同的品质作为部分表达,错误地成为故意意图和认知的对象,因此总是容易撞回中心,即ti,这种表达和连贯性被抹去了。为了帮助我们直观地理解这里的含义,我们可以再想想钱穆的钟摆。就李的情况而言,我们在涡旋中心(涡旋围绕其汇聚并形成的顶点)处存在缺失或空洞,同样必然缺乏作为最终整体的连贯性。连贯性和不连贯性之间的对立,或者连贯性的非讽刺性和讽刺性意义(如可理解性和统一性)之间的对立,在这里达到了一个新的清晰水平;它们在关键术语中被赋予了结构上的不可分割性,这将塑造中国形而上学传统的未来。

APPLICATIONS OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF
LI IN WANG'S LAOZI COMMENTARY
多重性的应用 王老子注中的李

Let us now turn back for a closer look at Wang Bi’s actual usage of the term Li . It is most significant that Wang speaks of Li , coherences, in the plural, in spite of his alleged interest in the encompassing, the omnipresent Dao. This is the contribution made by his interest in the Zhouyi, which here combines with the Laozian influence to create room for the individual coherences and principles of particular things, which are at once both situational expressions of the single incoherent unintelligible universal Dao and coherent, differentiated, particular principles of the sixty-four hexagrams. It is perhaps significant in this connection to note the use of Li in its verbal sense that predominates in Wang’s commentary to the Laozi. Combined with the overall sense of the noninterfering and nonintelligible (nonapparent) universal coherence of Dao, as variously expressed in particular things and events, this brings to the fore the sense of “reciprocal ordering” in the use of Li as a verb, connected closely with the sense of “balance,” which can be noted in the concept of Li / Li / Li//\mathrm{Li} / coherence throughout the tradition. Dao makes coherent by its own incoherence and by not actively making anything coherent, by not interfering, so it is evident only in the mutual making-coherent of individual things, as in the Hanfeizi’s notion of the manner in which opposite terms limit and order each other. Hence, Wang says in his commentary to Laozi 5, “Heaven and Earth follow the self-so, doing nothing and creating nothing. The ten thousand things thus naturally order and limit each other/make-each-other-coherent [萬物自相治理 wanwu zixiang zhili]. Thus [Heaven and Earth] are described as ‘not benevolent.’ . . . When one abandons himself and goes along with the things themselves, all of them are ordered/made coherent [棄己任物則莫不理 qiji renwu ze mo bu li].” 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} The
现在让我们回过头来仔细看看王弼对“礼”一词的实际用法。最重要的是,尽管王声称对包罗万象、无所不在的道感兴趣,但他谈到了复数的“理”,即连贯性。这是他对《周易》的兴趣所做出的贡献,在这里,《周易》与老子的影响相结合,为特定事物的个体连贯性和原则创造了空间,这些连贯性和原则既是单一的、不连贯的、难以理解的普遍道的情境表达,又是连贯的、有区别的。 ,六十四卦的特殊原理。在这方面,注意到在王对《老子》的注释中占主导地位的“礼”的言语意义的使用也许是很重要的。结合道的不干涉和不可理解(不明显)的普遍连贯性的整体意义,在特定的事物和事件上有不同的表达,这就突出了“理”作为动词使用时的“相互顺序”的意义,紧密相连具有“平衡”的意义,这可以在概念中注意到 Li / Li / Li//\mathrm{Li} / 整个传统的连贯性。道通过其自身的不连贯性以及不主动地使任何事物连贯、不干涉而使连贯,因此,它仅在个体事物的相互连贯性中才明显,正如韩非子关于对立术语限制和命令彼此的方式的概念。其他。因此,王在《老子五》注中说:“天地自所以,无为无为。万事自然而然地相互秩序、相互制约。故曰“天地”“不仁”。 。 。 。 弃己任物则莫不理 qiji renwu ze mo bu li 。” 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}

connection of this to the ironic tradition’s problematik of intelligibility is made clear in a comment to Laozi 15: “When darkness is used to order [Li] things, they attain their brightness [明 ming].” That is, when they are not forced into coherence from above, when no overall principle of coherence is evident interfering with them and working to make them cohere, they attain their particular intelligible coherence through spontaneous mutual limitation. Even in this verbal use of Li , we see Wang Bi’s distinctive notion of Li as the opposite of the intelligible aspect of each particular thing: by making darkness the Li of a thing, that thing as a whole attains its brightness. The ironic is assimilated to the non-ironic here: the unintelligible Li is what makes present the particular intelligible Lis, or rather, the unintelligible Li of each situation-its least visible aspect-is what makes it intelligible as this situation. The use of the darkness to make-bright and make-cohere means allowing the process of convergence around the unseen least present element.
这与讽刺传统的可理解性问题的联系在《老子》第十五章的评论中得到了明确的阐述:“当用黑暗来秩序[Li]事物时,它们就获得了[明明]。”也就是说,当它们没有从上面被迫保持一致时,当没有明显的总体一致原则干扰它们并努力使它们一致时,它们通过自发的相互限制获得了特定的可理解的一致性。即使在这种对“理”的口头使用中,我们也能看到王弼独特的“理”概念,即与每个特定事物的可理解方面相反的概念:通过将黑暗作为事物的理,该事物作为一个整体就获得了光明。反讽在这里被同化为非反讽:不可理解的“理”使得呈现出特定的可理解的“理”,或者更确切地说,每种情况的不可理解的“理”——它最不可见的方面——使得它成为可理解的这种情况。利用黑暗来使明亮和凝聚意味着允许围绕不可见的最不存在的元素进行聚合的过程。
This verbal sense of the term allows us to understand Wang’s occasional use of the nominal sense of the term in this commentary. “I do not force others to follow, but rather use their self-so, adducing their own perfect coherence [用夫自然舉其至理 yong fu ziran, ju qi zhi li]. Following it necessarily leads to good fortune, while transgressing it necessarily leads to bad fortune” (42). The Li of each thing is its self-so, what it is like when unforced, their way of cohering and converging. But in this usage we see Li deployed in a way that is amenable to the “Great Coherence” sense of the non-ironic tradition, as the overriding principle that one must know to operate effectively, to attain one’s value, and as an object of understanding. Elsewhere in the commentary, Wang even states, “The Dao has a great constancy, and coherences have a great consistency [道有大常,理有大致 dao you da chang, li you da zhi]. . . . If one can attain the place things tend toward [之 zhi], they can be known through consideration even if one does not go forth to them. If one recognizes the ruling ancestor [宗 zong] of things, the coherence of their right and wrong [是非之理 shi fei zhi li] can be attained and named even if they are not seen.” 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} Here we see the connection to Wang’s conception of the Li as the mini-Daos of the particular hexagrams in the Zhouyi: the principle of a thing, as a noun, an intelligible object of knowledge and understanding, is this thing it lacks and tends toward, which rules its motion, its own mini-Dao, which discloses its own right and wrong, the values implicit in it. One attains one’s own desires, one’s own right and wrong, by going along with this inherent right and wrong of the things themselves, their own values, their tendencies to seek the thing they lack. This tendency toward the opposite of itself is the grounding for the verbal use of the term as reciprocal ordering. We see this also in the comment to Chapter 79: “If one does not comprehend the Li [does not make the
该术语的这种动词意义使我们能够理解王在这篇评论中偶尔使用该术语的名义意义。 “我不强迫别人效仿,而是用他们自己,引出自己完美的连贯性。”遵循它必​​然带来福报,违反它必然带来厄运”(42)。每件事物的理都是它的自性,不受强迫时的样子,它们凝聚和聚合的方式。但在这种用法中,我们看到李以一种符合非讽刺传统的“大连贯性”意义的方式部署,作为一个人必须知道有效运作、实现个人价值的压倒性原则,并作为一个对象理解。在注释中,王甚至说:“道有大常,理有大致,道有大常,理有大治”。 。 。 。若能达到事物趋向的地方,即使不趋向,也能通过思考而知道。若认事物之主宗,是非之理是非之理,虽未见,亦能得名。” 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 在这里,我们看到了与王的“礼”概念的联系,即《周易》中特定卦象的迷你道:事物的原理,作为一个名词,一个知识和理解的可理解的对象,是它所缺乏和倾向于的东西,它统治着它的运动,它自己的小道,它揭示了它自己的对与错,以及其中隐含的价值观。一个人通过顺从事物本身、他们自己的价值观以及他们寻求自己所缺乏的东西的倾向,来实现自己的欲望、自己的对错。 这种与自身相反的倾向是该术语作为相互排序的口头使用的基础。我们在第 79 章的评论中也看到了这一点:“如果一个人不理解礼[不做

coherence intelligible, 不明理 bu ming li], one’s contractual agreements will cause great resentment.” Wang’s unexpected reach for the term Li in this humble intersubjective context, in discussing the interaction of conflicting points of view on what is right and what is wrong, is revealing, and perhaps can help us tie together the new implications he gives to the term, with its roots in his notion of the crypto-social convergence of the various lines, construed as desiring Yin-Yang beings, of a hexagram toward their center. That is, the violation of the rights and wrongs of those with whom one enters into agreements will lead to resentment. The Li in question here is what the parts of the situation want, what they lack. This determines what they consider right and wrong. Wang Bi’s new conception of Li here allows him to make a kind of non-ironic incorporation even of Zhuangzian perspectivism of multiple rights and wrongs of the ironic tradition, which, in its notion of the “axis of Dao” (道樞 daoshu) standing at the “center of the circle” of various contrasting rights-and-wrongs but thereby enabled to respond to and harmonize with them (in the manner of the famous monkey keeper of Zhuangzi’s second chapter) had established perhaps the earliest prototype of this notion of a center which unifies by being at once a negation and a harmonization of that which it unifies. In the unalloyed ironic vision of Zhuangzi, this center was mirrorlike, empty, devoid of any specific determinations. Wang Bi has taken this same structure and put it at the heart of each particular entity, as the t i t i tit i that is this entity being what it is in its specificity, embodying it and unifying it around itself as the unseen center, but only by negating that specificity. Each thing and each situation has its own axis, making for a multitude of axes that are neither one nor many, and the name of these axes, forming the unifying center in which each situation is truly embodied and thus verges into its own negation, is Li.
连贯可懂,不明理不明理],契约约定会引起极大的怨恨。”王在这种卑微的主体间语境中出人意料地使用了“理”一词,在讨论对错观点的相互作用时,具有启发意义,也许可以帮助我们将他赋予这个词的新含义联系起来,其根源在于他的各种线条的隐秘社会融合概念,被解释为渴望阴阳生物,朝向其中心的六芒星。也就是说,违反协议者的权利和错误会引起怨恨。这里所说的“李”是指情况的各个部分想要什么,他们缺乏什么。这决定了他们认为什么是对的,什么是错的。王弼在这里对“理”的新概念使他能够对反讽传统的多重是非的庄子视角进行一种非反讽的融合,这种反讽传统的“道枢”概念处于各种对立对错的“圆圈中心”,但因此能够对它们做出反应并与之协调一致(以庄子第二章中著名的养猴人的方式),也许建立了这种概念的最早原型。一个统一的中心,既是它所统一的事物的否定,又是它所统一的事物的协调。在庄子纯粹的讽刺视野中,这个中心就像镜子一样,空虚的,没有任何具体的规定。王弼采用了同样的结构,并将其置于每个特定实体的核心, t i t i tit i 也就是说,这个实体以其特殊性而存在,体现它并将其统一在作为看不见的中心的自身周围,但只能通过否定这种特殊性来实现。 每件事物和每种情况都有自己的轴,形成了许多既不是一个也不是多的轴,而这些轴的名称形成了统一的中心,每种情况都在其中真正体现,从而接近其自身的否定。李。

CONVERGENCE OF COHERENCE AND INCOHERENCE IN GUO XIANG: LI AS "JUST THE WAY IT IS," AS LIMIT, AND AS VANISHING CONVERGENCE
郭象中连贯性与非连贯性的融合:理是“本来的样子”,是极限,是消失的融合

Let us now turn to the usage of the term Li by the other great luminary of the Xuanxue movement, Guo Xiang. With Guo Xiang, we come to a real turning point, a kind of limit case of the indigenous development, where the ironic and non-ironic traditions converge to a sort of “singularity” in the sense in which that term is used in physics. Guo is famously the person who brings the ironic cosmology of Daoism to its completion, reaching its most explicitly ironic summit in an actual ironic ontology. Where the traditional Daoist irony focused on value, action, guiding, coherence, and order, Guo’s focuses on existence per se and knowledge per se. The Dao of Laozi and Zhuangzi is ironically a dao; it is a Dao that ironically guides only because
现在让我们看看玄学运动的另一位伟大人物郭象对“理”一词的使用。有了郭象,我们来到了一个真正的转折点,一种本土发展的极限情况,其中讽刺性和非讽刺性传统汇聚成一种“奇点”,就该术语在物理学中的使用而言。众所周知,郭先生将道教的讽刺宇宙论完善起来,在真正的讽刺本体论中达到了最明确的讽刺顶峰。传统的道家讽刺侧重于价值、行动、指导、连贯性和秩序,而郭的讽刺则侧重于存在本身和知识本身。老庄之道是反讽的道;它是一条具有讽刺意味的指导的道,只是因为

it does no guiding (“dao”-ing), an order that orders because it orders nothing, a coherence that makes things coherently intelligible by remaining unintelligible, a unity that holds things together by being utterly unlike them, a source of value because it has and gives no value. But the Dao of Guo exists as a source of all being only because it is literally nonexistent: it is only ironically existent. It is what exists and produces all things only by not existing: it exists only in the ironic sense that its nonexistence is what allows any event to take place at all. Dao, in Guo’s view, is not the origin of things. It is, rather, a way of asserting the absence of any such entity:
它没有引导(“dao”-ing),一种秩序,因为它什么也不秩序,一种连贯性,通过保持难以理解的方式使事物变得连贯可理解,一种通过完全不同的事物将它们结合在一起的统一体,一种价值的源泉,因为它没有任何价值。但郭道作为万物之源而存在,只是因为它实际上不存在:讽刺的是它存在。它是存在的东西,并且仅通过不存在而产生万物:它仅在讽刺意义上存在,即它的不存在才允许任何事件发生。在郭先生看来,道并不是事物的本源。相反,它是断言不存在任何此类实体的一种方式:
The Dao has no power. When the text says, “They attained it from the Dao,” this is merely to show that they spontaneously attained it. It is simply spontaneously auto-attained; the Dao cannot make them attain it. What I have not attained, I cannot make myself attain. Thus whatever is attained [i.e., whatever qualities one has], externally do not depend on the Dao, internally do not come from my self; it is simply abruptly self-attained and self-right [自得 zide] and transforming on its own [獨化 duhua]. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
道没有力量。文中所说的“从道而得”,只是说明他们自然而然地得了而已。它只是自发地自动获得的;道不能使人得之。我没有达到的,我无法让自己达到。故所得者,外不依道,内不自己;简直就是突然自得自正、独化独化。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
It is not just that the Dao is powerless. Guo rejects any existence for any first cause, a point argued most explicitly in his rejection of a creator of things (造物者 zaowuzhe), in spite of Zhuangzi’s allowance for some of his characters to use this fanciful phrase as one of many shorthand terms for Dao (though one that is quickly replaced, in the same dialogue, by alternate nicknames of exactly opposite connotation). But the argument Guo uses would apply just as well to a primal impersonal first cause as to a conscious creator:
不只是道无能为力。郭拒绝任何第一因的存在,这一点在他对造物者造物者的拒绝中得到了最明确的论证,尽管庄子允许他的一些人物使用这个奇特的短语作为“造物者造物者”的许多速记术语之一。道(尽管在同一对话中很快就被含义完全相反的其他昵称所取代)。但郭使用的论点同样适用于原始的、非个人的第一因,也适用于有意识的创造者:
Some in the world say that the penumbra is dependent on the shadow, the shadow is dependent on the physical form, and the physical form is dependent on the Creator. But I ask: As for this Creator, is he existent, or is he nonexistent? If he is nonexistent, how can he create things? If he is existent, having a definite form himself, then he is not qualified to form all forms. Thus only after you understand that all forms form themselves can you understand what is meant by creation. Hence of all things involved in the realm of existence, even the penumbra, there has never been one that did not transform itself entirely on its own, constantly positioned in the realm where all agency vanishes. Thus creation is without any lord or master, and each thing creates itself. 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
世上有人说,半影取决于影子,影子取决于物质形态,物质形态取决于造物主。但我问:这位造物主是存在的,还是不存在的?如果他不存在,他怎么能创造事物呢?如果他是存在的,并且自己有一定的形体,那么他就没有资格形成一切形体。所以只有当你明白一切形式都是自生自成之后,你才能明白什么是创造。因此,在存在领域的所有事物中,即使是半影,也从来没有一个不是完全自行转变的,始终位于所有能动性消失的领域中。因此,创造没有任何主宰或主宰,一切事物都创造自己。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18}
A creator of all existence, or even a real preexistent source of things such as the Dao of earlier Daoism, would have to be prior to all existing
一切存在的创造者,甚至是诸如早期道教的道之类的事物的真正先存源头,都必须先于一切存在

things. Prior to all existing things, it could not be an existent thing itself, for then it would fail to be prior to all existing things, not being prior to itself. Not existing, it could not do anything of any kind at all. Unable to do anything, it could not be a creator of anything, much less of all existence. The notion of a creator of all things is, Guo thinks, inherently self-contradictory. But rather than conclude therefore that there is one all-embracing priorly existing indestructible monistic Being that creates or transforms into all particular beings, that has the special status of self-creation and thus can at least produce all beings other than itself, Guo seems to take this as having implications for being per se: if the notion of a self-creating being is unavoidable in thinking about beings, then beings might as well all be granted this character of self-creation, for the notion of being is for Guo univocal. The problem necessarily arises in the very idea that things must be formed by something other than themselves. Hence, the problem is solved by dropping this assumption entirely. For Guo, this implies that being per se is necessarily ungrounded in anything else, and this ultimately applies to any individual instance of being as much as it does to Being-as-a-whole. Though there may be a particular chain of connection between some particular being and prior beings, since ultimately this chain can never lead back to any ultimate grounding, the entire process of trying to ground one thing on another comes to naught, and we are better off abandoning it entirely when considering what things ultimately are; in the end the totality of things and thus each thing turns out to be causeless.
事物。先于所有存在的事物,它本身就不可能是存在的事物,因为那样的话,它就不能先于所有存在的事物,而不是先于它自己。它不存在,根本无法做任何事情。它无法做任何事,它不可能成为任何事物的创造者,更不可能成为一切存在的创造者。郭认为,万物创造者的概念本质上是自相矛盾的。但郭并没有因此得出结论,认为存在一种包罗万象的先前存在的坚不可摧的一元存在,它创造或转变为所有特定的存在,具有自我创造的特殊地位,因此至少可以产生除自身以外的所有存在。将此视为对存在本身的含义:如果在思考存在时,自我创造存在的概念是不可避免的,那么存在也可能被赋予这种自我创造的特征,因为存在的概念对于郭来说是单义的。 。问题必然出现在“事物必须由事物本身以外的事物形成”这一观念中。因此,通过完全放弃这个假设来解决问题。对于郭来说,这意味着存在本身必然是没有任何其他基础的,这最终适用于任何个体的存在实例,就像它适用于整体存在一样。尽管某些特定的存在和先前的存在之间可能存在特定的联系链,但由于最终这条链永远无法返回任何最终的基础,因此试图将一件事扎根于另一件事的整个过程都会化为泡影,我们的情况会更好当考虑事物最终是什么时,完全放弃它;最终,事物的整体性以及每件事物都变得无因。
The upshot of this is that, thought through to the bottom, being qua being is groundless, uncaused, beyond reason or purpose. Each entity can thus ultimately be described only as self-so (自然 ziran). This fact is equivalent to the fact that there is no Dao, that no creator and no source exists. This fact of its nonexistence is the ironic “existence” of the Dao. The existence of Dao is like the goodness of rain for the picnic: where the valuelessness of Dao was always ironically its real value, now its literal absence is its real presence. The self-so of entities is the absence of Dao, which is ironically the only real presence of Dao.
其结果是,从根本上来说,作为存在的存在是毫无根据的、无原因的、超越理性或目的的。因此,每个实体最终只能被描述为自然(自然自然)。这个事实相当于没有道、没有创造者、没有源头存在的事实。它的不存在这一事实正是道的讽刺“存在”。道的存在就像野餐时的雨水一样:讽刺的是,道的无价值始终是它的真正价值,而现在,它字面上的缺席却是它真正的存在。实体的自性是道的缺失,讽刺的是,道却是唯一真实的存在。
Concomitantly, the only real “itself” of any given entity is just this self-so: its true essence is its unknowability in terms of chains of causality or networks of explanation and description. No fact coheres with any other fact as its explanatory context or cause or goal, and thus all facts remain incoherent. Leaving such connections aside, it is a self-so event. No more can or need be said or known about it. It is not made the way it is by connection to some other thing (a goal or purpose) that is supposed to follow it, nor by some other thing (a cause or reason) that is supposed to precede it, nor even through its position in the midst of a totality of other entities (a context). To be self-so is to have nothing to do with such cognizable
随之而来的是,任何给定实体唯一真实的“自身”就是这种自我:其真正本质是其在因果链或解释和描述网络方面的不可知性。没有一个事实与任何其他事实作为其解释背景、原因或目标是一致的,因此所有事实仍然是不连贯的。抛开这些联系不谈,这是一个自我事件。对此我们不能或不需要再说或知道。它的形成不是通过与应该跟随它的其他事物(目标或目的)的联系,也不是通过应该在它之前的其他事物(原因或理由),甚至也不是通过它的位置在其他实体的整体(上下文)之中。自我就是与这些可认知的事物无关

connections to other entities, either as conscious will or as a relation to a definitely knowable external cause or precedent or context.
与其他实体的联系,要么作为有意识的意志,要么作为与明确可知的外部原因、先例或背景的关系。
This results in a fully ironic epistemology and axiology to go with Guo’s ironic ontology. There is really nothing to be known about where anything comes from or where it’s going or what it should do or what it is. But precisely this is non-knowing is, ironically, true knowledge of the thing: knowledge of its self-so. This is also its real value, which means only its perfect coincidence with whatever is unintentionally happening and its freedom from beholdenness to any outside standard or cause or purpose. This pertains both to its being and to its value. For the self-so in this sense is its self, and also its being right (然 ran) to itself, which is testified to by its being comfortable and fit (適 shi), and therefore not conscious of itself. Non-knowledge of it is correct knowledge of it; and its own non-knowledge of itself is the source and sign of its own value. This last line of reasoning derives from the following passage in the Zhuangzi:
这就产生了一种完全反讽的认识论和价值论,与郭的反讽本体论相一致。对于任何东西从哪里来、要去哪里、应该做什么或它是什么,确实一无所知。但讽刺的是,这恰恰是“无知”,是对事物的真正认识:对其自身的认识。这也是它的真正价值,这意味着它与无意中发生的任何事情完美吻合,并且不受任何外部标准、原因或目的的约束。这既涉及到它的存在,也涉及到它的价值。因为这个意义上的“自我”就是它的自我,也是它对自身的正确(然然),这可以通过它的适适(适时)来证明,因此没有意识到自己。不了解它就是正确了解它;不了解它就是正确了解它。而它对自身的不认识则是其自身价值的来源和标志。最后一行推理源自《庄子》中的以下段落:
To forget the feet indicates the fitness [or comfort, shi] of the shoes; to forget the waist indicates the fitness of the belt; when consciousness forgets right and wrong it indicates the fitness of the mind. . . . He who begins in fitness and is never unfit has the comfortable fitness of forgetting even fitness.
忘记脚,表示鞋子的合脚性;忘记腰,说明腰带的合身;当意识忘记是非时,表明心的健康。 。 。 。始于健身而从不健身的人,拥有连健身都忘记的舒适健身。
Guo comments: 郭评:
When all the parts of the body are fit, one forgets the body. . . . Right and wrong are born from unfitness. . . . He who still has consciousness of fitness is not yet really fit. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
当身体的所有部分都适合时,人们就会忘记身体。 。 。 。是非是由不适合而生的。 。 。 。尚有健身意识的人,还不是真正的健康。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19}
To be conscious of anything indicates a problem, a lack of fit, a mismatching deviation of some kind. Hence, the sign of anything’s self-so as its rightness (然 ran) to itself(自 zi) is precisely the lack of reflexive consciousness of it, knowing that embeds one thing in a chain of causes, reasons, and purposes. This relating of “one thing” to “other things” is a function of regarding not the self-so, but the “traces” (跡 ji) left by prior self-so events. It is this kind of knowing that leads to the positing of explicit values and goals as well as the kind of knowledge that attempts to identify and account for things by placing them in a causal or contextual network of “other” entities. These values and this knowledge, however, are the antithesis of real value and knowledge, which resides precisely in forgetting identities, causes, purposes: the fitting comfortableness of the traceless self-forgetting self-so. But Guo’s critique of the invalidity of trace-cognition means not only that knowledge is never the efficient cause of anything actually hap-
意识到任何事情都表明存在问题、缺乏适应性、某种不匹配的偏差。因此,任何事物的“自然”的标志恰恰是缺乏它的反身意识,知道将一个事物嵌入到一系列原因、原因和目的之中。 “一件事”对“其他事物”的区分,不是关注“自我”,而是关注先前“自我”事件留下的“痕迹”,正是这种认识导致了“痕迹”的定位。明确的价值观和目标,以及试图通过将事物置于“其他”实体的因果或上下文网络中来识别和解释事物的知识,然而,这些价值观和这种知识是真正价值和知识的对立面。恰恰在于忘记身份、原因、目的:无痕的自我忘记的舒适感如此,但郭对痕迹认知无效性的批判不仅意味着知识从来不是任何实际发生的事情的有效原因。

pening; it’s that no possible object of knowledge is ever the efficient cause of anything actually happening. Both the subject and the object of knowledge are hopeless alienations from the self-so, and as such both are entirely without real efficacy, which rests entirely in self-so process. What are objects of possible knowledge? They and they alone are determinate facts. It follows that no single determinate fact is the actual cause of anything being so. This would very much include abstract facts such as the “nature” or “essence” of something, or a “principle.” Such things cannot be what makes anything so.
佩宁;也就是说,任何可能的知识对象都不是实际发生的任何事情的有效原因。知识的主体和客体都是与“本我”无可救药的异化,因此两者都完全没有真正的功效,而真正的功效完全依赖于“本我”的过程。可能知识的对象是什么?它们并且只有它们才是确定的事实。由此可见,没有任何一个确定的事实是任何事物如此的实际原因。这在很大程度上包括抽象事实,例如某事物的“本质”或“本质”,或者“原则”。这些事情不可能成为任何事情的原因。
Thus, Guo’s key notion of “self-so” (自 然ziran) pertains, again, both to the being and to the value of things. Both are now fully ironic: the real identity of things is their lack of any definite being, and ironically this does provide what was originally sought when we sought their being; what is really valuable is not having any specific value, which ends up providing what the effort to find value was seeking. It is crucial, then, to understand that when Guo says “self-so,” then, he emphatically does not mean, “What I myself make so, by an act of volition or knowledge.” There is no self, no identity, above and beyond the unidentifiable and incoherent self-so. Guo tells us:
因此,郭的“自然自然”的关键概念再次涉及事物的存在和价值。现在两者都充满讽刺意味:事物的真正同一性是它们缺乏任何确定的存在,而讽刺的是,这确实提供了我们在寻求它们的存在时最初所寻求的东西;真正有价值的不是具有任何特定的价值,而是最终提供了寻找价值的努力所寻求的东西。因此,至关重要的是要理解,当郭说“自如此”时,他强调的意思并不是“我自己通过意志或知识的行为而使之如此”。没有自我,没有身份,超越了无法识别和不连贯的自我。郭告诉我们:
My life is not generated by me; thus my whole life long, within [my] hundred years, whether I sit, stand, walk, stop, move, or stay still, whatever I take or renounce, all my feelings, my innate determinacy, my knowledge, my abilities, whatever I have, whatever I don’t have, whatever I do, whatever I encounter, none of it is [because of] me; it is all simply self-so. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
我的生命不是由我创造的;因此我的一生,在我的百年之内,无论我坐、站、走、停、动、静,无论我接受或放弃,我所有的感受,我与生俱来的决定性,我的知识,我的能力,无论什么我拥有的,我没有的,我所做的,我遇到的,都不是我;一切都只是自我如此。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
Thus even that which I knowingly “do” ultimately rests not upon not knowing and willing, nor on my “self.” “These merely come to be of themselves; they are not made so by their selves” (自生耳。非我生也 zisheng er; fei wosheng ye). 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} Now it is true that “not made by me” initially signifies a negation of Guo’s two archenemies, knowledge and deliberate intention. Hence, this kind of claim is taken to mean that things are not made what they are by (1) Heaven or Dao or any transcendental creator, or (2) my own will, intention, and action. Both of these are correct inferences. But it is too often assumed that this means they are instead made by something neither totalizing (Heaven and so on) nor consciously intentional (such as a “self” or “knowledge” or “intention”) but rather by a singular, unconscious “principle” or “nature” of each individual. This is thought to escape Guo’s strictures about what can make something else. But in fact this is an enormous mistake. For Guo rejects not only the knower and willer as a determinant, but also the willed and known. That is, Guo’s epistemology of traces excludes not only the subject of knowledge, but also the object of
因此,即使是我故意“做”的事情,最终也不取决于不知道和不愿意,也不取决于我的“自我”。 “这些只是自然形成的;非我生也。非我生也。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 诚然,“非我所为”最初意味着对郭的两大宿敌——知识和蓄意的否定。因此,这种主张被认为意味着事物不是由(1)天、道或任何超验的创造者,或(2)我自己的意志、意图和行为造成的。这两个都是正确的推论。但人们常常认为,这意味着它们是由某种既不是总体性的(天堂等)也不是有意识地有意为之(例如“自我”或“知识”或“意图”)的东西制成的,而是由单一的、无意识的“每个人的原则”或“本性”。这被认为是为了逃避郭对什么可以制造其他东西的限制。但事实上这是一个巨大的错误。因为郭不仅拒绝将知者和意志者作为决定因素,而且拒绝将意志者和已知者作为决定因素。也就是说,郭的痕迹认识论不仅排除了知识的主体,而且排除了知识的客体。

knowledge; anything that could be known, any knowable fact, is excluded as a potential determinant. For knowables are merely traces, just as much as knowers are. To be knowable means to be determinate, to have a definite essence waiting to be known, which one could be correct or incorrect about. In denying trace-knowledge as providing any information about efficient causes, Guo is denying that there is any entity (i.e., something knowable even at least in theory) such as fixed nature or principle even of individual things that makes them so. This means there is no definite and determinate thing, whether a Li (“principle”?) or Nature (xing) that accounts for things being as they are. “Self-so” means not made so by any determinate (i.e., knowable or knowing) other entity. “Self-so” means not done by me, nor by anyone or anything else. This distinction is to be kept in mind whenever Guo speaks of things “creating themselves.” This term has a purely negative significance for Guo; it means simply that nothing cognizable as an entity makes it so. Thus, he says:
知识;任何可以知道的事情,任何已知的事实,都被排除在潜在的决定因素之外。因为可知事物只是痕迹,就像认识者一样。可知意味着是确定的,有一个明确的本质等待被认识,它可能是正确的,也可能是错误的。在否认痕迹知识提供任何关于有效原因的信息时,郭否认存在任何实体(即,即使至少在理论上是可知的),例如使个体事物如此的固定性质或原理。这意味着不存在确定的、确定的事物,无论是理(“理”?)还是性(性)来解释事物的存在。 “自我如此”意味着任何确定的(即可知的或知道的)其他实体都不会这样做。 “自我如此”意味着不是我做的,也不是任何人或其他任何事做的。每当郭谈到事物“创造自身”时,都要牢记这一区别。这个词对郭来说纯粹是负面的意义;它只是意味着没有任何可认知的实体可以使它如此。因此,他说:

Although [the text] has the term, “What makes things what they
尽管[文本]有这样一个术语:“是什么使事物成为它们的样子?”

are” [物物者 wu wu zhe], this is meant merely to show that things
是”[物物者 wu wu zhe],这只是为了表明事物

make themselves what they are [物之自物 wu zhi ziwu]; ultimately
物之自物 wu zhi ziwu最终

there is no thing that makes things what they are. . . Once we
没有任何东西可以使事物成为其本来面目。 。 。一旦我们

have understood that there is no thing that makes things what
已经明白没有什么东西可以使事物变成这样

they are, we should also understand that neither can things make
他们是,我们也应该明白,事物也不能创造

themselves what they are [物之不能自物 wu zhi bu neng ziwu]. But
他们自己是什么[物之不能自物wu zhi bu neng ziwu]。但

then who is it that does it? They are all unconsciously and abruptly
那么是谁干的呢?他们都在不知不觉中突然

thus 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} and self-so. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} (Guo 1983, 754)
因此 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 并且自我如此。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} (郭1983,754)

Although [the text] has the term, “What makes things what they are” [物物者 w u w u wuw u wu zhe], this is meant merely to show that things make themselves what they are [物之自物 wu zhi ziwu]; ultimately there is no thing that makes things what they are. . . Once we have understood that there is no thing that makes things what they are, we should also understand that neither can things make themselves what they are [物之不能自物 wu zhi bu neng ziwu]. But then who is it that does it? They are all unconsciously and abruptly thus 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} and self-so. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} (Guo 1983, 754)
虽然[文本]有一个术语,“是什么使事物成为它们的样子”[物物者 w u w u wuw u 物之自物wu zhi ziwu;归根结底,没有任何东西可以使事物成为其本来面目。 。 。一旦我们了解了没有任何事物可以使事物成为它们的样子,我们也应该明白事物也不能使自己成为它们的样子。但那么是谁干的呢?他们都在不知不觉中突然就这样 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 并且自我如此。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} (郭1983,754)
Thus, we see that when Guo says that all things are “self-so” he means that they are what they are without being made so by anything apprehendable by any consciousness, be it their own conscious volition or a transcendental Dao, or anything else that may be taken as a cause as a definite entity, which can only be a figment of trace-cognition. Principles are excluded as much as intentions or knowledge or a Creator or a Dao or Heaven.
因此,我们看到,当郭说一切事物都是“自所以”时,他的意思是,它们是它们的本来面目,而不是由任何意识所能理解的任何事物所造成的,无论是它们自己的意识意志还是超然的道,或者其他任何东西。可以将其视为一个确定实体的原因,而它只能是痕迹认知的虚构。原则被排除在外,就像意图、知识、造物主、道或天堂一样。
At the same time, this unconsciousness of their becoming so, their becoming so as rooted in what is necessarily inaccessible to any trace-cognition, is precisely what makes this becoming self-so in the other sense, namely, self-right, and what gives it its intrinsic, self-forgetting, uncognized value to itself. This applies also to a “nature” or a “principle”: no nature or principle makes things as they are. It is this point that is crucial to the understanding of Guo’s use of the term Li. These considerations must also make us reconsider the charges of a fixed predetermined fatalism that are often leveled against Guo Xiang. But Guo is definitely no fatalist. In fact, he is said to have authored, in addition to the Zhuangzi commentary,
与此同时,他们变得如此的无意识,他们的变得如此植根于任何痕迹认知必然无法接近的东西,正是使这种成为另一种意义上的自我如此的原因,即自我正确,以及什么赋予它内在的、忘我的、未被认识到的价值。这也适用于“自然”或“原则”:没有任何自然或原则使事物保持原样。正是这一点对于理解郭对“礼”一词的使用至关重要。这些考虑也必须让我们重新考虑经常针对郭象提出的固定宿命论的指控。但郭绝对不是宿命论者。事实上,据说除了《庄子》之外,他还撰写了《庄子》注释:

a work entitled 吉凶由己論 “Jixiong youji lun,” (“Good and bad fortune come from oneself”) as an explicit repudiation of fatalism, a work that is, unfortunately, no longer extant. But in this capacity, we should note the relevant multiplicity of senses of the term self-so (ziran) in his writings. For self-so means equally necessity, freedom, and chance. Guo uses it to mean all three, but in each case the other two are also implied. It is not merely that these three aspects can be identified for each and every thing, but that the three notions themselves are in their deepest meaning identical: for what these three concepts have in common is their self-so. Here ziran signifies the free necessity of chance, and all of these may be regarded as nothing but three different ways of viewing and describing what is at bottom one simple concept, that of being self-so. To be self-so means not to be grounded in anything-that is chance. It means to be what one is without being grounded in anything else, hence not contingent on or changeable by anything else-that is necessity. It means in this sense to be grounded only in oneself, or only in one’s present moment of action and determinacy, and that is a definition of freedom. Entities are self-so; this means they are what they are and cannot be otherwise: self-so is necessity. There can be no ultimate explanation of their being-so: self-so is chance. They themselves are being-so, not made so by others and themselves experiencing this spontaneous becoming-so from within: self-so is freedom.
一部题为《吉凶由己论》的著作《吉凶有吉论》(“吉凶由己论”)明确否定了宿命论,不幸的是,该著作已不复存在。但就此而言,我们应该注意到他的著作中“自然”一词的相关多重含义。对于自我来说,如此意味着同样的必然性、自由和机会。郭用它来表示所有三个,但在每种情况下也暗示了其他两个。不仅这三个方面可以被识别为每件事物,而且这三个概念本身在最深层的含义上是相同的:因为这三个概念的共同点是它们的自性。这里的自然意味着偶然的自由必然性,所有这些都可以被视为只不过是三种不同的方式来看待和描述本质上一个简单的概念,即“自我”。如此自我意味着不以任何事物为基础——这就是机会。它意味着成为一个人,不以任何其他事物为基础,因此不依赖或改变任何其他事物——这是必然性。从这个意义上说,它意味着只立足于自己,或者只立足于一个人当前的行动和决心,这就是自由的定义。实体是自我的;这意味着它们就是它们所是的,并且不可能是其他的:自我也是必然的。对于它们的存在不可能有​​最终的解释:自我如此是偶然的。他们自己就是如此,而不是由他人和他们自己从内部经历这种自发的成为如此:自我如此就是自由。
As in the case of the Xunzi, we see in Guo’s text, in purely quantitative terms, an exponential increase in occurrence of the character Li per se: according to Kitahara Mineki’s concordance, a total of 174 occurrences, far outstripping the occasional usage in Wang Bi or in the Zhuangzi text upon which Guo is commenting. I am in full agreement with Mizoguchi that Guo’s usage of Li marks a decisive watershed in the development of the tradition, but my interpretation of this sea change is directly opposed to the position taken by Mizoguchi, who sees Li as denoting an immanent determinative principle within each thing. This interpretation, which is shared by many modern interpreters who see Guo as positing something called “the Nature” or “the Principle” of each thing as what makes it what it is, clashes sharply with Guo’s insistence that there is no ruler of things, no Dao that makes things so, as well as Guo’s specific statements about what this “Nature” or “Li” actually refers to. Mizoguchi is aware of this problem, and tries, following Togawa Yoshiro, to solve it simply by saying that, while Guo denies an external determinative principle controlling things, he posits in its place an internal one. But this solves precisely nothing; as long as there is a determining of one fact by another fact, a relationship of control and determination, we have, strictly speaking, an external relationship. The “internal” here ends up meaning nothing at all. It is a failure to think through the meaning of “immanence” of Li to things themselves, which
与《荀子》的情况一样,我们在郭的文本中看到,从纯粹的数量角度来看,“李”字本身的出现次数呈指数增长:根据北原峰木的索引,总共出现了 174 次,远远超过了《王》中偶尔使用的次数。毕或郭所评论的庄子文本中。我完全同意沟口的观点,即郭对礼的使用标志着这一传统发展的决定性分水岭,但我对这种巨大变化的解释与沟口所采取的立场直接相反,沟口认为礼是表示传统中的内在决定性原则。每件事。这种解释被许多现代解释者所认同,他们认为郭把事物的“本质”或“原理”作为事物的本质,这与郭坚持的事物没有统治者的观点发生了尖锐的冲突。无道而为之,以及郭对这个“性”或“理”究竟指的是什么的具体表述。沟口意识到了这个问题,并试图效仿外川义郎的做法,简单地解决这个问题,他说,虽然郭否认控制事物的外部决定性原则,但他提出了一个内部决定性原则。但这并不能解决任何问题。只要存在一个事实对另一个事实的决定,即一种控制和决定的关系,严格来说,我们就有一种外部关系。这里的“内部”最终毫无意义。未能思考“理”对事物本身的“内在性”意义,
Mizoguchi correctly identifies as one of the most distinctive contributions of Six Dynasties thinking, particularly that of Guo Xiang. Mizoguchi thus ends up admitting that the sense of “principle” as an independent agent in Guo’s usage of Li is “still very weak,” overshadowed by the stronger sense of patterning and ordering, but this leads to an even starker contradiction with Guo’s antimetaphysical immanentism in that Mizoguchi claims that this ordering is an attribute of an absolute substance of some kind. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
沟口正确地将其视为六朝思想,尤其是郭象思想最独特的贡献之一。因此,沟口最终承认郭对“理”的使用中作为独立主体的“原则”感“仍然非常弱”,被更强烈的模式和秩序感所掩盖,但这导致了与郭的反形而上内在论更加鲜明的矛盾沟口声称这种顺序是某种绝对实体的属性。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
The problem with all such interpretations is that they completely misunderstand the meaning of the term 自 然ziran in Guo’s thought. Guo takes Wang Bi’s reconfiguring of the Dao/Li relation a step farther, playing out in a new way the incipient association of Li and ziran already seen in the Han sources quoted above. With Wang, full Daoishness comes to operate as the very coherence of each individual situation. For Guo, the Li is the situation itself. It is strictly synonymous with ziran, which is not a principle but the equivalent of the empty tautological phrase, “The way it is.” Its function is not to provide an explanation of anything, nor to denote that which determines anything, controls anything, or makes anything so. It is rather precisely the opposite, a way of asserting the uselessness and impossibility of any such explanation, and why we humans are better off relinquishing any attempt to find one.
所有这些解释的问题在于,他们完全误解了郭氏思想中“自然自然”一词的含义。郭将王弼对道/礼关系的重新配置更进一步,以一种新的方式展现了上述汉族资料中已经看到的礼与子然的早期联系。对于王来说,完整的道家思想是作为每个个体情况的连贯性而发挥作用的。对于郭来说,“礼”就是情况本身。它严格来说是“自然”的同义词,“自然”不是一个原则,而是一个空洞的同义反复短语“本来就是这样”。它的功能不是提供任何事物的解释,也不是表示决定任何事物、控制任何事物或使任何事物如此的东西。恰恰相反,这是一种断言任何此类解释都是无用和不可能的方式,以及为什么我们人类最好放弃任何寻找解释的尝试。
This has been poorly understood in recent studies of Guo’s thought. Many readers have been misled, I believe, by the fact that Guo tells us ad nauseum that each thing has its own “nature” (性 xing, perhaps better translated here as “determinacy”), “allotment” (分 fen), “limits” (極 ji)—and also, it would seem, its own Li . The first three terms come to be more or less synonymous in Guo’s usage. In fact, they give us precisely the meaning of Guo’s usage of the term Li. Perhaps forgivably, many scholars have taken these terms to have their more usual meaning here: a fixed nature, allotment, limit, or principle that serves as the determining underlying character of a thing, persisting over time and standing behind the phenomenal flux of appearances. This is then taken to be Guo’s substitute for the Dao as determining creator, which all scholars admit he banishes from his thought. Guo’s outspoken and virulent opposition to any metaphysical unity or Absolute would make him the least likely candidate for the use of Li in the sense of a single overriding “Great Coherence.” Indeed, Guo often unambiguously speaks of what appear to be “principles” ( Li ) ) )) in the explicit or implied plural, for example, in the expression 萬理 wanli, “ten thousand coherences/ principles,” or when he uses it as a parallel with 物 wu (things) or 事 shi (events). In this sense, we must admit the truth of the standard doxa that Guo stresses multiplicity rather than the single overriding Li (the latter usually attributed to Wang Bi), at least superficially. As Guo says, "What [Zhuangzi] calls leveling [齊 qi]—why should it require making their forms
最近对郭思想的研究对此知之甚少。我相信,郭先生令人作呕地告诉我们,每件事物都有自己的“性”(性,也许在这里翻译为“决定性”更好)、“分配”(分分)、“限制”(极吉)——而且,似乎还有它自己的“礼”。前三个术语在郭的用法中或多或少是同义词。事实上,它们准确地告诉了我们郭使用“礼”一词的含义。也许可以原谅的是,许多学者将这些术语视为具有更常见的含义:固定的性质、分配、限制或原则,作为事物的决定性基本特征,随着时间的推移而持续存在,并站在表象的现象变化背后。这被认为是郭作为决定性创造者的道的替代品,所有学者都承认他将道从他的思想中消除了。郭对任何形而上学的统一或绝对的直言不讳和恶毒的反对,将使他成为最不可能在单一压倒性的“大连贯性”意义上使用“理”的候选人。事实上,郭经常毫不含糊地谈论看似“原则”的东西(李 ) ) )) 显式或隐含的复数形式,例如,在“万理万理”一词中,或者当他将其与“物物”或“事事”平行使用时。从这个意义上说,我们必须承认标准信念的真实性,即郭强调多样性,而不是单一的压倒性的李(后者通常归因于王弼),至少表面上如此。正如郭所说:“(庄子)所说的齐齐——为什么要要求其形式

and shapes uniform, all matching the same compass and T-square? Thus vertical and horizontal, ugly and beautiful, things ribald and shady and grotesque and strange, each affirms what it affirms [各然其所然 ge ran qi suo ran], each considers acceptable what it considers acceptable, and thus although there are a thousand differences between their various principles/ coherences [ L i ] [ L i ] [Li][L i], they are one in attaining and being right in their own determinacies [性同得 xing tong de], thus [the text] says, ‘The Dao unifies them all.’ 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} In this sense, it is correct to note that Li is used in the plural, and denotes for Guo Xiang the multiple Lis of individual things, which would seem to differ from one another. As in the Hanfeizi commentary, Lis play the role of indicating multiplicity and specificity, the limitations of particular things, separation, finitude, difference.
形状统一,都匹配相同的指南针和丁字尺?是故纵横,丑美,下流阴暗怪异,各有其所肯定的,各各认为可以的,所以虽有他们的各种原则/连贯性之间存在千差万别 [ L i ] [ L i ] [Li][L i] 性同得,故曰:“道统一之”。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 从这个意义上说,正确地注意到“礼”以复数形式使用,并且对于郭象来说,表示个体事物的多个“礼”,这似乎彼此不同。正如《韩非子注》中的“理”所起到的作用是表明多重性和特殊性、特定事物的局限性、分离性、有限性、差异性。
But the view that Li are for Guo therefore fixed individual natures or principles that stand inside or behind existent things, determining them, is insupportable. Guo tells us explicitly, again and again, that what a thing “encounters” (遇 y u y u yuy u ) and what it “does” are in exactly the same boat when it comes to the “nature” or “Li” or “limits” of the thing-they are both internal to it, and neither can ever be changed. This refutes the idea that there is some “internal” principle behind the flux of an entity’s experience, making it what it is. His insistence that the limits, nature, Li , and allotment of a thing can never be changed is matched by his equally shrill insistence that everything is constantly changing, instant by instant, to the point where even identity is not continuous between moments: the former me is not the present me: “The previous I is not the I of the present moment. ‘I-ness’ moves along together with the present moment; how could one constantly hold on to the old?”(向者之我非復今我也。我與今俱往。豈常守故哉 xiangzhezhiwo feifujinwoye, woyujinjuwang, qichangshouguzai). There is no particular content to selfhood, either as a Nature or as an “immanent” Principle that remains the same behind its changes and which would therefore determine what those changes are. Rather, “selfhood” is purely a form, meaning whatever is going on at the present moment, regarded as “self” in Guo’s distinctive sense of the self-so. Thus, Guo later says, of the various changes that might be encountered or undergone: "I ‘self’ them all [吾皆吾之 wujiewuzhi], and hence there is no loss of selfhood; since there is nothing I do not consider myself, the inner and outer are obliteratingly unified, past and present are strung along one thread, I am daily renewed along with all changes; how could I know wherein resides my ‘self’?"26 The self in question here is again the self-so, which means simply whatever is going on right now apart from what is made so by either objectified objects of knowledge or deliberate acts of will. To “self” them, as a transitive verb, means just to merge into them comfortably, to vanish them and oneself into the self-so, forgetting the determinate traces of both, for whatever is forgotten is the self(-so).
但是,认为“李”代表“郭”的观点是固定存在事物内部或背后的个体本性或原则,并决定它们,这是站不住脚的。郭先生一次又一次明确地告诉我们,什么是“遭遇”(遇) y u y u yuy u )和它“做”的事情,当谈到事物的“性质”或“理”或“限制”时,它们是完全一样的——它们都是事物的内在,并且都无法改变。这驳斥了这样一种观点,即实体的经验流动背后存在某种“内部”原则,使其成为现实。他坚持认为事物的界限、本质、理和分配永远不会改变,与之相匹配的是他同样尖锐地坚持一切都在不断变化,瞬息万变,以至于连身份在时刻之间都不是连续的:前者我不是现在的我:“过去的我不是现在的我。 “我”与当下时刻一起移动;岂常守故哉向者之我非福金沃野,我与金句望,其常受古哉。自我没有什么特定的内容,无论是作为一种自然,还是作为一种“内在”原则,在其变化背后保持不变,因此决定了这些变化是什么。相反,“自我”纯粹是一种形式,指的是当下发生的一切,在郭先生独特的“自我”意义上被视为“自我”。 因此,郭后来在谈到可能遇到或经历的各种变化时说:“我皆吾之wujiewuzhi],因此不会失去自我;因为没有什么我不认为自己是我自己。”内在与外在泯灭地统一,过去与现在被一根线串起来,我随着一切的变化而日新月异,我怎么能知道我的‘自我’在哪里呢?”26这里所说的自我又是自我;因此,这意味着除了客观的知识对象或故意的意志行为之外,现在正在发生的任何事情。作为及物动词,“自我”它们,意味着舒适地融入它们,将它们和自己消失在“自我”中,忘记两者的确定痕迹,因为被遗忘的就是“自我”(-so)。
It is not a true self, a real or original Nature, that persists beneath appearances and remains the same. Even being some particular thing, for example a human, is itself "just one encounter amongst the ten thousand changes [人形乃是萬化之一遇耳 renxing naishi wanhua zhi yi yu er]."27 The idea of a metaphysical essence, or set of multiple essences, behind changing things that makes them what they are or makes them change as they do would also make a hash of Guo’s insistence that each principle is self-so (自然 ziran)—indeed, is ziran-ness itself—and reestablish the same metaphysical quandary cited by Guo to overthrow the notion of the Dao as a real entity, a creator, or an actual source of all things. So on the one hand the nature, limits, or allotment of each thing can never be changed, and are absolutely separate and different; but on the other, everything is constantly changing, and all are simply self-so. How is this apparent contradiction to be resolved?
它不是一个真实的自我,一个真实的或原始的本质,在表象之下持续存在并保持不变。即使是某种特定的事物,例如人类,其本身也“只是万变中的一个遭遇[其中之一是万化耳遇仁兴乃世万华之一羽儿]。”27形而上本质的观念,或多种本质的集合,在改变事物的背后,使它们成为它们的样子或使它们改变,这也会使郭坚持的每一个原则都是自然的(自然自然)——事实上,自然本身——并重建郭引用的相同形而上学困境,推翻了道作为真实实体、创造者或万物实际来源的概念。因此,一方面,每件事物的性质、界限或分配永远不会改变,并且是绝对独立和不同的;但另一方面,一切都在不断变化,一切都只是自我如此。如何解决这个明显的矛盾呢?
The answer is surprisingly simple. A “thing” is, as with Zhuangzi and Yang Xiong and Wang Bi and, later, Wang Yangming, a situation. For Guo, this idea is radicalized: the situation lasts only one moment: it is an “encounter.” It has certain limits. It is an eternal fact. That I am here doing this right now at this exact moment in time and nothing else cannot be changed; by the time I am aware of it, and exert my will toward it, it is already gone. This means it is what it is, and it can never be changed. It can transform into something else, and it must transform, but it cannot be transformed. That is, it can never be the object of deliberate or determinate alteration brought about by some other thing, some other situation. Guo regards all knowable objects, all non-ironic coherences, as “traces”-the effect of one spontaneous event or moment on another, held over due to erroneous valuation and thereby potentially disturbing the second entity’s self-so nature, its own character, limits, allotment, coherence. Any arrangement of determinate entities into a greater, synordinate whole, for example, as a discernible causal nexus, would be, for him, merely projection of this illegitimate epistemological confusion, based on the imposition of one moment onto another, creating aspiration, purpose, will, and valuation, all of which he calls “knowing” (知 zhi) and its concomitant, deliberate doing (為 wei). Guo sometimes calls this unchangeable but always changing fitting-and-thus-uncognized-way-it-is-happening-now “the allotment,” which also means “division,” (fen), because it is just this much and no more. Its “nature” is its “limits” is its “allotment”-which is this thing-this situation, this encounter-itself. Each thing has its own limits, its own nature, its own allotment; but once purposive knowing and doing are eliminated, this “having” of limits is simply being self-so, and the self-so is the real pre-trace “self” of any event, its vanishing convergence with all other unintentional, unnoticed pre-trace self-so events going on the time.
答案出奇的简单。正如庄子、杨雄、王弼以及后来的王阳明所说,“物”是一种情况。对于郭来说,这个想法是激进的:这种情况只持续一瞬间:这是一次“相遇”。它有一定的局限性。这是永恒的事实。我现在就在此时此地做这件事,没有什么是无法改变的;当我意识到它并用我的意志去追求它时,它已经消失了。这意味着事情就是这样,永远无法改变。它可以转变为别的东西,它也必须转变,但它不能转变。也就是说,它永远不可能成为由其他事物、其他情况引起的故意或确定的改变的对象。郭将所有可知的物体、所有非讽刺性的连贯性视为“痕迹”——一个自发事件或时刻对另一个事件或时刻的影响,由于错误的评估而被保留下来,从而可能扰乱第二个实体的自我本性、它自己的性格,限制、分配、一致性。任何将确定的实体排列成一个更大的、协调的整体,例如,作为一个可辨别的因果关系,对他来说,都只是这种不合法的认识论混乱的投射,基于将一个时刻强加到另一个时刻,创造愿望、目的、意志、评价,所有这些他称之为“知”(知之)以及与之相伴的“为为”(为 wei)。郭有时称这种不可改变但总是在变化的、不为人知的方式现在发生的“分”,也有“分”的意思,因为就这么多,仅此而已。 。它的“本质”就是它的“界限”,就是它的“分配”——就是这个东西——这个情境,这个遭遇——本身。 每件事都有它自己的限度、它自己的本质、它自己的分配;但是,一旦有目的的认识和行为被消除,这种“拥有”的限制就只是自我如此,而自我如此是任何事件的真正的预痕迹“自我”,它与所有其他无意识的、未被注意到的预感的融合消失了。 - 追踪当时发生的自我事件。
Hence, Guo says, “The heavenly nature (天性 tianxing) that each one receives has its original determinate portion (本分 benfen); it cannot be escaped, nor can it be added to” (Guo 1983, 128). At first glance, such statements suggest the most inexorable predetermined fixity. But we must read carefully; Guo does not say that one’s determinacy stays always the same, that it does not change; he says explicitly that it cannot be “escaped” or “added to”-both of which terms unmistakably point to conscious deliberate activity, attempts to change what one is, acting upon oneself as an agent upon a patient. One’s determinacy changes, but it cannot be changed by extrinsic action upon it. Deliberate action cannot change it; it is “fixed” within a given moment, and that moment cannot be otherwise. However, as Guo is wont to repeat, "(Things) take self-attainment as ‘right’ and self-loss as ‘wrong,’ take what suits their own determinacy comfortably as good order and what loses such harmony as disorder. But things have no fixed limits [物無定極 w u w u wuw u wu ding ji], and selves have no constantly comfortable fits [我無常適 wo wu chang shi]; different determinacies come to have different conveniences, and thus right and wrong have no constant master. 128 128 ^(128){ }^{128} What is right or so in a particular moment is just what fits the determinacy of that moment, and this rightness changes as that determinacy changes, which it must, since things have no fixed limits or determinacies. Things always "follow their allotted determinacies [分fen], and thus what they do is not constant."29 Sticking to their own “allotted determinacies” necessarily implies change. Hence, Guo says, "When we examine the alternations of fullness and emptiness, we come to understand that there is no constancy in the attainments of allotments [分 fen]. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} The point is that all things are always changing of themselves, and hence do not require extrinsic activity upon them to change them. Their changes, even when apparently coming from outside, are to be considered the intrinsic and spontaneous transformations of their allotted determinacy: "He whom the age regards as worthy becomes a lord; he whose talents do not match his generation becomes a vassal. This is like heaven’s being high of itself, earth being low of itself, the head spontaneously being above and the foot spontaneously being below; how could they replace each other? Although they take no pains to be right they are necessarily self-right. 131 131 ^(131){ }^{131} In saying that the above and the below cannot change places he does not mean they are fixed in their places for all time, or that they are destined to be where they are by the material they are made of; rather, he states that they are given their positions purely due to their chance relation to the times in which they happen to live, and whether the present generation esteems them. Circumstances at this particular point in time happen to put every one in some particular place, and when Guo states that they cannot be otherwise, he merely means
故郭说:“人所受之天性,有其本分;它不能被逃脱,也不能被添加”(Guo 1983,128)。乍一看,这样的说法表明了最不可阻挡的预定固定性。但我们必须仔细阅读;郭并不是说一个人的决心始终保持不变,不会改变;而是说,一个人的决心永远不会改变。他明确表示,它不能被“逃避”或“添加”——这两个术语都明确地指向有意识的刻意活动,试图改变一个人的本质,作为病人的代理人对自己采取行动。一个人的决心会改变,但它不能因为外在的行动而改变。刻意的行动无法改变它;它在某一时刻是“固定的”,而那个时刻不可能是其他的。然而,正如郭经常重复的那样,“(事物)以得己为‘是’,以失己为‘错’,以适合自己意志的为良序,以不和谐为乱。但事物没有固定的界限 [物无定极] w u w u wuw u wu ding ji],而自己没有永远的舒适感[我无常适wo wu chang shi];不同的决定性有不同的便利性,因此正确和错误没有固定的主人。 128 128 ^(128){ }^{128} 在特定时刻什么是正确的或如此,正是适合该时刻的确定性的东西,并且这种正确性随着确定性的变化而变化,这是必然的,因为事物没有固定的限制或确定性。事物总是“遵循其分配的决定性[分分],因此它们所做的事情不是恒定的。”29坚持自己的“分配的决定性”必然意味着变化。 因此,郭说:“当我们考察满空的交替时,就会知道分分的获得没有恒定性。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} 要点是,所有事物总是在自身变化,因此不需要外在活动来改变它们。他们的变化,即使表面上是来自外部,也应被视为其所赋予的决定性的内在和自发的变化:“适时者为君,才不伦者为臣。这就是犹如天自高,地自低,头自在上,脚自在下,何以互相取代呢? 131 131 ^(131){ }^{131} 当他说上面和下面不能改变位置时,他并不意味着它们永远固定在它们的位置上,或者它们注定是由它们构成的材料决定的。相反,他指出,他们之所以获得这样的地位,纯粹是因为他们与所处时代的偶然关系,以及当代人是否尊重他们。在这个特定的时间点上的情况恰好把每个人都放在了一个特定的位置上,当郭说不可能是这样的时候,他只是意味着

that in this moment they cannot be otherwise. Further, this circumstantial becoming such is what Guo calls “self high, self low,” and so on; precisely this is self-so. The constancy of things means only that they self-transform in Guo’s sense, they spontaneously change into what they become rather than being deliberately changed, not that they do not transform at all. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} As Guo puts it elsewhere, “If one acts upon or [deliberately] refrains from acting upon them, this ruins their self-transformation.” 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
此时此刻,他们不可能是别的样子。进而,这种因势而变,就是郭所说的“自高自低”等等。正是如此。事物的恒常性只是指郭先生意义上的事物的自我变化,它们自发地变化成它们所成为的样子,而不是刻意地变化,而不是说它们根本不变化。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 正如郭在其他地方所说的那样,“如果一个人对他们采取行动或(故意)不采取行动,就会破坏他们的自我转变。” 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}

UNINTELLIGIBLE COHERENCE:
VANISHING AND MERGING INTO THINGS
难以理解的连贯性: 消失并融入事物

Before trace-cognition, the explanation of a thing’s source or nature in terms of “other” things, is applied to it, a self-so even is what Guo describes as a “vanishing merging” (冥 ming) of all things, the comfortably uncognized encounter itself. “Vanishing” means it is unknowable as a determinate object, because it is entirely within its own limits. “Merging” means that all of heaven and earth are involved in producing it, not as determinate objects of consciousness, but simply as the prereflexive coming-together, the event of an encounter:
在痕迹认知(用“其他”事物来解释事物的来源或本质)应用于事物之前,自我甚至是郭所描述的万物的“冥合”,即舒适地不被认知的遭遇本身。 “消失”意味着它作为一个确定的对象是不可知的,因为它完全在它自己的范围内。 “融合”意味着整个天地都参与了它的产生,不是作为意识的确定对象,而只是作为前反射性的聚集,相遇的事件:

Abstract 抽象的

Although man’s body is small and insignificant, it takes all of heaven and earth to collectively offer it up. Thus of the ten thousand things in heaven and earth, each entity cannot lack any one of the others for even one day. If even one thing were not present, then whatever comes to be would have no way to come to be. If even one coherence [Li] failed to arrive, then its heavenly years would have no way to reach their proper end. But Knowing [zhi] does not know everything that is present in the body, and Doing [wei] does not accomplish everything that is kept in coherence. Thus what Knowing knows is little but what the body possesses is much; what Doing does is few but what coherence keeps is many. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34}
人的肉身虽然渺小,却需要天地之力共同奉献。故天地万物,一日不可缺。如果连一件事都不存在,那么无论发生什么,都无法发生。若连一理未能到达,则天年便无法到达其应有的终点。但知并不知道体内存在的一切,而行也不完成一切保持连贯的事情。因此,知所知道的很少,而身体所拥有的却很多;行动所做的事情很少,但保持一致性的事情却很多。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34}

Here we have perfectly conveyed the ironic concept of coherence: unknowability, convergence, and value. As in Wang Bi, knowing pertains what a thing is for-others, the outside, and Li to what it is to-itself, the inside. Here as there, these two are directly and perfectly opposed. But for Guo the outside is the realm of “traces” and is always mistaken and pernicious, and all determinate content without exception falls into this category. The inside has no determinate content at all: it is the self-so, which is the strict antithesis of the traces, what is so outside of the interference of knowing and doing. This, simply stated, is the meaning of Li for Guo Xiang: whatever is not known or done.
在这里我们完美地传达了连贯性的讽刺概念:不可知性、趋同性、价值性。正如王弼所说,“知”涉及事物对于他人、外部的含义,而“理”涉及事物对于自身、内部的含义。无论在哪里,这两者都是直接而完全对立的。但对于郭来说,外部是“痕迹”的境界,总是错误的和有害的,所有确定的内容无一例外都属于这一范畴。内部根本没有确定的内容:它是“自我如此”,它是痕迹的严格对立面,是在知行干扰之外的“如此”。简单来说,这就是“礼”对郭象的意义:未知、未做的事情。
We can see how easily this notion could be confused with an idea of objective truth or real principles independent of the subjective, that is to say, what is not done by any particular agent. The point here, though, is that nothing makes it so, and nothing explains it; thus, there is nothing to say about what is “so” of it. Here we see also the advent of a further implication of the term Li , which was to have great influence in subsequent Buddhist usages: Li as potentiality. Since Li is defined in opposition to knowing and deliberation action, whatever is present-converging to be present here-but is not explicitly known to awareness is Li. If we add the sense of value always associated with the term, we have here the derivation of the idea of Li as an unrealized potential for the value, something that is present but as yet unutilized. This is, of course, not far from the first stratum of nominalized meaning of the term: those fault lines, among all that may be present in nature, that, if cut along, create a coherent-i.e., intelligible and valuable-object. Those perforations are present, but as yet uncut. Hence, the Li is present, the value is “here,” but it is unrealized until Li in the verbal sense-the selective cutting-is applied to it.
我们可以看到,这个概念很容易与客观真理或独立于主观的真实原则的观念相混淆,也就是说,什么不是由任何特定的代理人做的。但这里的要点是,没有任何东西可以使之如此,也没有任何东西可以解释它。因此,对于它的“如此”,没有什么可说的。在这里,我们还看到了“理”一词的进一步含义的出现,这对后来的佛教用法产生了巨大影响:“理”是潜力。由于“理”的定义是与认知和深思熟虑的行动相对立的,所以任何存在的东西——会聚于此——但意识没有明确地知道的就是“理”。如果我们添加始终与该术语相关的价值感,我们就可以得出“Li”的概念,即价值的未实现潜力,即存在但尚未利用的东西。当然,这与该术语的名义化含义的第一层相去不远:自然界中可能存在的所有断层线,如果被切断,就会创造出一个连贯的——即可理解的和有价值的——物体。这些穿孔存在,但尚未切割。因此,理是存在的,价值是“这里”,但只有在言语意义上的理——选择性切割——应用到它时,它才得以实现。
Indeed, for Guo Li means precisely “the cut,” the limitation of the event, its absolute separation from all “others.” This is, however, the full incoherent merging with all things qua ziran. Because each event is limited, it is not infringed on by anything else, and hence is self-so. This is called Li because it is divided out from all else, is absolutely singular, and also, as we’ll see, because it is of value for us to pay heed to this aspect of the situation. It is called our “nature” because it cannot be changed-by knowing and doing. The term nature is here used in its usual sense, as we see also in the Xunzi: it is the opposite of purposive activity (為 wei) or the artificial (偽wei)—hence, Guo also sometimes calls it the “genuine nature” (真性 zhenxing). Whatever happens without purpose and unmotivated by purposive knowing is the nature. It is neither within nor without, and makes no distinction between what is encountered and what is emitted. It is called “the allotment,” which also means “division,” (fen), because it is just this much and no more. It is called the limit because it is finite. Its “nature” is its “limits” is its “allotment” is its “coherence”-which is this thing, this situation, this encounter itself. Each thing has its own limits, its own nature, its own allotment, its own coherence; but once purposive knowing and doing are eliminated, this “having” of limits is simply being self-so, and the self-so is the real pre-trace “self” of any event, its vanishing merge of all that is so without anyone doing it: “I self whatever I encounter.” The object of ming can be almost anything; Guo speaks repeatedly of “merging with the time,” “merging with change,” “merging with things,” “merging with one’s own nature,” “merging with one’s own allotment,” “merging with one’s own limits,” “merging with whatever one encounters,” and these expression are
确实,对于郭力来说,它恰恰意味着“切断”,即事件的限制,即它与所有“他者”的绝对分离。然而,这完全是与自然万物的不连贯的融合。因为每一事件都是有限的,所以不受其他任何事物的侵害,因而是自然的。之所以称为“理”,是因为它与其他一切不同,是绝对独特的,而且,正如我们将看到的,因为它对我们关注这方面的情况是有价值的。它被称为我们的“本性”,因为它无法通过认识和行动来改变。 “自然”一词在这里按其通常的含义使用,正如我们在《荀子》中看到的那样:它与有目的的活动(为为)或人造的(α为)相反——因此,郭有时也称其为“真正的自然” (真性振兴)。任何没有目的、没有目的性认知的动机而发生的事情都是自然。它既不在里面,也不在外面,不分遭遇和发出。称为“分”,也有“分”的意思,因为仅此而已。之所以称为极限,是因为它是有限的。它的“本质”就是它的“界限”,就是它的“分配”,就是它的“连贯性”——这就是这个东西、这个情境、这个遭遇本身。每件事都有它自己的限度、它自己的本质、它自己的分配、它自己的连贯性;但是,一旦消除了有目的的认识和行为,这种“拥有”的限制就只是“自我”,而“自我”是任何事件的真正的前踪“自我”,它是没有任何人的一切的消失融合。这样做:“无论遇到什么,我都会自我。” 命的对象几乎可以是任何东西;郭先生多次讲到“与时俱进”、“与变化相结合”、“与事物相结合”、“与自己的本质相结合”、“与自己的分配相结合”、“与自己的界限相结合”、“与自己的界限相结合”、无论遇到什么,”这些表达是

strictly synonymous. To vanishingly merge with whatever one encounters is to vanishingly merge with one’s own nature, with one’s own limits, with one’s own allotment. In this sense the term the nature or the coherence is an ironic empty term for Guo, just as “Dao” or “nothingness” is. The Dao is literally nonexistent, and thus ultimately “a collective name for all things.” Similarly, the Nature, Li, the self-so, is really nothing more than a collective name for all encounters, all vanishing merges, all particular events themselves: they are ways of indicating the fact that nothing and no one controls or determines or gives value to events, and that this fact is itself what makes them what they are and gives them their inalienable value. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}
严格同义。与一个人所遇到的一切消失地融合,就是与自己的本性、自己的限制、自己的分配消失地融合。从这个意义上说,“本质”或“连贯性”这个词对郭来说是一个讽刺性的空词,就像“道”或“虚无”一样。道实际上是不存在的,因此最终是“万物的统称”。同样,自然、理、自我,实际上只不过是所有遭遇、所有消失的融合、所有特定事件本身的集体名称:它们是表明这样一个事实的方式:没有任何东西、没有人控制、决定或给予。事件的价值,而正是这一事实本身造就了事件的本质,并赋予了事件不可剥夺的价值。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35}

IRONIC LI AS NON-IRONIC LI IN GUO XIANG
《国象》中的反讽李作为非反讽李

But Guo pushes this one step farther: after making the distinction between knowing/doing/traces on the one hand and the self-so/determinacy/limits/ vanishing on the other, he annuls it at a higher order of abstraction:
但郭将这一点推得更远:一方面区分了知/做/迹,另一方面区分了自我/决定性/限制/消失,他在更高的抽象层次上废除了它:
One cannot do by “doing” Doing. Doing does spontaneously. One cannot Know by “doing” Knowing. Knowing knows spontaneously. It is just this spontaneous self-so Knowing, and thus it is really non-Knowing. Thus Knowing comes out of non-Knowing. It is just this spontaneous self-so Doing, and thus it is really non-Doing. Thus Doing comes out of non-Doing. Doing comes out of non-Doing, and thus non-Doing is the master. Knowing comes out of non-Knowing, and thus non-Knowing is the source [zong]. Thus the True Man discards Knowing and yet knows; he does not Do and yet does. Things are self-so generated, attained through sitting and forgetting. It is for this reason that the name “Knowing” is cut off and the term “Doing” is discarded. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
一个人不能通过“做”做来做事。做事是自发的。一个人无法通过“做”了解来了解。知道自然而然地知道。这只是这种自发的自我如此了解,因此它实际上是无知的。因此,“知”是从“无知”中产生的。这就是这种自发的自我如此做,因此它实际上是无为。因此,“做”是从“不做”中产生的。有为出于无为,所以无为为主。知是从无知中产生的,所以无知是本源。是故真人舍去知而知;他没有做,但还是做了。事物是自生的,是通过坐忘而获得的。正因如此,“知”名被削去,“行”名被废弃。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
Here, Guo is asserting that even Doing and Knowing are themselves self-so. Although actions and cognitions still take place, they are not properly called Doing and Knowing, since they are ultimately still subsets of non-doing and non-knowing, that is, of ziran. One cannot decide to decide, one cannot deliberately determine to have a deliberate purpose. This would lead to an infinite regress of the kind Guo rejects in his critique of a creator. One just spontaneously finds oneself having deliberate purposes and making decisions. The free-will theorist might say, “Since it is possible to regard one’s own sense of freedom as either illusory or true, there is a choice involved even in the adoption of the idea that one has no choice: freedom cannot be escaped even in the attempt to deny it. I cannot abstain from deliberate purposes and actions, from making choices; even so abstaining is itself a
郭在这里断言,即使是“行”和“知”本身也是自我的。尽管行动和认知仍然发生,但它们不适合称为“行”和“知”,因为它们最终仍然是“无为”和“无知”的子集,即自然的子集。一个人无法决定去决定,一个人无法刻意地决定有一个深思熟虑的目的。这将导致郭在批评创造者时所拒绝的那种无限倒退。人们只是自发地发现自己有深思熟虑的目的并做出决定。自由意志理论家可能会说,“既然一个人可以认为自己的自由感是虚幻的或真实的,那么即使在接受一个人别无选择的想法时也包含着一种选择:即使在试图否认它。我无法放弃深思熟虑的目的和行动,无法做出选择;即便如此,弃权本身就是一种

choice.” Guo accepts this and draws the opposite conclusion: since whether I choose or do not choose I am in either case actually choosing, I have no choice: I cannot but be choosing, and therefore I cannot choose between choosing and not-choosing. I am not free to decide to be free. Because I am “condemned to be free,” my freedom is itself a spontaneous fact not of my choosing. Hence even when I am doing, I am really, ultimately, non-doing, and even when I am knowing, I am really, ultimately, non-knowing. This means there is no need to actually eliminate knowing and doing, or to change one’s behavior in any way whatsoever. The acknowledgment of the Li, the self-so, is simply a noticing of this second-order spontaneity that pervades even my deliberate activity and knowing, a focusing on a different level of the doing and knowing itself. To focus on the self-so aspect of any situation, the beyond-knowing-and-doing process that it is, its vanishing convergence that cannot go outside itself to any external objects of knowing or goals of doing, its limitedness to its own limits, even in its doing and knowing, is to know its Li , no more and no less.
选择。”郭接受了这一点,并得出了相反的结论:因为无论我选择还是不选择,我实际上都在选择,所以我别无选择:我不能不选择,因此我无法在选择和不选择之间做出选择。我不能自由地决定自由。因为我“注定是自由的”,所以我的自由本身就是一个自发的事实,而不是我的选择。因此,即使当我在做时,我实际上是最终无为;即使当我知道时,我实际上也是最终无知道。这意味着没有必要真正消除知行,或以任何方式改变一个人的行为。承认“理”,即“自我”,只是注意到这种二阶自发性,它甚至渗透到我刻意的活动和认知中,关注于行为和认知本身的不同层面。专注于任何情况的自我方面,它是超越知行的过程,它消失的趋同性不能超越自身而达到任何外部的认知对象或行为目标,它对自身极限的限制乃至其行知,亦知其礼,不多也不少。
This is why, although Guo can speak of many Lis or of the one Li of the self-so, he means the same thing in either case. It is in Guo that Li seems to take on the sense of “principles,” but we can now see that these Lis or this Li be spoken of as “principles” only in the most ironic possible sense. When we probe more deeply into what is actually meant by these “principles,” we find that in all cases they resolve immediately into a single principle, that is, the self-so, and given our definition of what a “principle” is, this makes the “many principles” claim deeply problematic. A principle, in the normal sense of the word as used in ordinary English speech, would have to be a reliable linking of at least two entities, a way of predicting a replication or a constancy. What applies to one entity only is not a principle. Guo’s use of Li is the ne plus ultra of a certain ambiguity: it applies to all entities without exception, but only by limiting itself so extremely to each particular entity that it has no specific content, can never be applied to another case, and thus ceases to be a principle at all. It is omnipresent, but only in the sense of absolute non-replicable limitation to each moment. The Li of the event is really just the event itself, not a principle added to explain or describe the event. But it is a Li in the normal Chinese sense, for Li means a coherence not only in the sense of a coming together, but in the sense of something that can serve as an object of consciousness, and which is worth paying attention to, inasmuch as it will lead to the optimal way of relating to that thing. Guo’s Li is not really a “coming together” of discernible and determinate entities, for these, considered as others, are for him merely traces. It is, rather, the vanishing of things into each other when they follow their own self-so and ignore the traces of one another. It is thus a greater togetherness and a lesser togetherness, and it is greater because it is
这就是为什么郭虽然可以说“多理”,也可以说“一理”,但无论哪种情况,他的意思都是一样的。在郭的身上,李似乎带有“理”的意义,但我们现在可以看到,这些李或这个李只能在最具讽刺意味的意义上被称为“理”。当我们更深入地探讨这些“原则”的实际含义时,我们发现在所有情况下它们都立即分解为一个原则,即“自我”,并且考虑到我们对“原则”的定义,这使得“许多原则”的主张存在很大的问题。在普通英语演讲中使用的该词的正常含义中,原则必须是至少两个实体的可靠链接,是预测复制或恒定性的一种方式。只适用于一个实体的东西并不是一项原则。郭对“理”的使用是某种模糊性的补充:它无一例外地适用于所有实体,但只是将其自身极其限制于每个特定实体,以至于它没有特定的内容,永远不能应用于其他情况,因此根本不再是一个原则。它是无所不在的,但只是在对每个时刻绝对不可复制的限制的意义上。事件的理实际上只是事件本身,而不是为了解释或描述事件而添加的原理。但它是中国普通意义上的“理”,因为“理”不仅意味着连贯性,还意味着某种东西可以作为意识的对象,并且值得关注,因为因为它将导致与该事物相关的最佳方式。郭的“离”并不是真正可辨认的、确定的实体的“聚集”,因为这些对于他来说只是痕迹。 相反,当事物遵循自己的自我而忽略彼此的痕迹时,事物就会消失在彼此之中。因此,它是一个更大的团结和一个较小的团结,它之所以更大,是因为它是

lesser, lesser because it is greater. But it is still naturally describable as Li in that it is the practical object to be focused on in the sense that it is what we should be aware of in order to live most effectively. It is the locus of real value. However, there is only one thing to know, and it is precisely the effacement of any possibility of knowing of principles in the ordinary sense. The absolute uniqueness of each individual thing means that its principle collapses into itself; this does not amount to multiple principles, but no principles at all. If asked why something is the way it is, Guo would answer like one of Vonnegut’s Tralfamadorians: “There is no why. The moment is just structured that way.” This “structure,” which is the very opposite of an answer to “Why?” is what Guo means by Li.
较小,因为较大而较小。但它仍然可以自然地被描述为“理”,因为它是需要关注的实际对象,因为它是我们应该意识到的,以便最有效地生活。这是真正价值的所在。然而,只有一件事需要知道,那就是消除任何了解普通意义上的原理的可能性。每个事物的绝对独特性意味着它的原则会崩溃到自身;这并不是多重原则,而是根本没有原则。如果被问到为什么事情会是这个样子,郭会像冯内古特的特拉法马多主义者一样回答:“没有为什么。这一刻就是这样构建的。”这种“结构”与“为什么?”的答案恰恰相反。郭说的就是李的意思。
Thus, we must not be misled when we find Guo using the term Li , quite frequently, in the sense of an intelligible object of knowledge, again smoothly but rather misleadingly translatable as “principle.” For examining the context and implications again, we find that the principle to be so recognized is always the principle of “self-so,” which for Guo signifies precisely ultimate unintelligibility. The 自然之理 ziran zhi li which one is called upon to recognize is not “the coherence of the self-so” in the sense of “the way nature hangs together spontaneously,” except in the limited sense of the reciprocal ordering and reciprocal limiting of entities in individual cases. Much less is it “the principle of Nature” or “the principle of Spontaneity” in the sense of some definite fact that is meant to explain things. The “coherences of self-so” are in one sense multiple; we are to recognize each thing’s self-so. But “multiplicity” in the sense of the presence of “others” is precisely what self-so is a way of denying. So this very multiplicity is the effacement of multiplicity. We might say that the multiplicity is so extremely multiple that it is utterly incommensurable, and thus effaces the matrix of togetherness of discrete othernesses that is required for “multiplicity.” Multiplicity, pushed to its extreme, overcomes multiplicity. Division, pushed to its extreme, is the only cure for division. Here again, we find a crucial precursor for Tiantai thinking. A thing’s self-so is none other than that thing itself; it is its true self, the very process of its becoming what it is without intending to and without reference to any intelligible causal matrix, efficient or final. The thing that fits into the causal nexus, or hangs together with other things, is not the real thing itself, not its self-so; it is rather its “trace,” which is the way this process of spontaneity impacts on other spontaneities, other moments, other beings. The thing itself is not even a “thing”: it is just the self-so, and no further predications can be made about it. All predications about things, and all the moreso about principles describing the ways in which things are related to each other, are by definition a matter of the traces, which are a distortion of the reality of the self-so. The self-so is in this sense described
因此,当我们发现郭经常在可理解的知识对象的意义上使用“理”一词时,我们一定不要被误导,再次顺利但相当误导性地翻译为“原理”。再次审视其语境和含义,我们发现,被如此认识的原则始终是“自所以”原则,而这对于郭来说恰恰意味着最终的不可理解性。人们被要求认识到的自然之理自然之力,不是“自然自发地结合在一起的方式”意义上的“自我的连贯性”,除非是在相互有序和相互限制的有限意义上。个别情况下的实体。更不用说它是某种旨在解释事物的明确事实意义上的“自然原理”或“自发性原理”。 “自我的连贯性”在某种意义上是多重的;在某种意义上,“自我的连贯性”是多重的。我们要认识到每件事物的自性。但“他者”存在意义上的“多重性”恰恰是自我否定的一种方式。因此,这种多样性就是对多样性的消除。我们可以说,多重性是如此的极端多重,以至于它是完全不可通约的,从而抹去了“多重性”所需的离散他者的共同性矩阵。多样性被推向极端,就会克服多样性。分裂达到极致,是解决分裂的唯一方法。在这里,我们再次找到了天台思想的重要先驱。事物的自性就是事物本身;它是它的真实自我,是它成为它本来面目的过程,而不是有意为之,也没有参考任何可理解的因果矩阵,无论是有效的还是最终的。 符合因果关系的事物,或者与其他事物联系在一起的事物,并不是真实的事物本身,也不是它的自身;相反,它是它的“痕迹”,这是这种自发性过程影响其他自发性、其他时刻、其他存在的方式。事物本身甚至不是“事物”:它只是自我,无法对它做出进一步的预测。所有关于事物的预测,尤其是关于描述事物相互关联方式的原则,从定义上来说都是痕迹的问题,这是对自我现实的扭曲。自我如此在这个意义上被描述

as a “vanishing” (ming) into things, which is also a vanishing of the identifiable individual “things” themselves-that is, of their traces.
作为对事物的“消失”,这也是可识别的个体“事物”本身的消失——即它们的痕迹的消失。
In the context of Guo’s overall philosophy, we often find him speaking of ziran zhi Li in a way that does superficially suggest that he is providing some sort of an explanation for why things are so. For example, we find him telling us that "it is a self-so Li that there are some things that are brought to completion by the accumulation of habitual practice."37 Or again, "It is a self-so Li that there are also some things that require smelting and forging to become implements. 38 38 ^('38){ }^{\prime 38} But it is important that we not allow the form of these pronouncements to confuse us as to what is really being intended here. For when Guo tells us such things-“It is the Li of the self-so that all things follow each other,” and the like-he is really not trying to give a reason why these things are so but rather to reject the very possibility of giving a reason for them. This is made clear in the following passage, among many others:
在郭的总体哲学背景中,我们经常发现他在谈论自然之力时,表面上确实表明他正在为事情为何如此提供某种解释。例如,我们发现他告诉我们,“有些事情是通过习惯练习的积累而完成的,这是一种自我如此理。”37或者,“这是一种自我如此理,有些事情是通过习惯的积累而完成的。”还有一些东西需要熔炼锻造才能成为器物。 38 38 ^('38){ }^{\prime 38} 但重要的是,我们不能让这些声明的形式使我们对这里真正的意图感到困惑。因为当郭告诉我们这样的事情时——“是自我之理,所以万物相随”之类的话——他实际上并不是试图给出这些事情如此的原因,而是要拒绝这些事情的根本原因。给出理由的可能性。以下段落以及其他许多内容都清楚地表明了这一点:
It is a self-so Li [i.e., a fact of things with no explanation, ziran zhi li] that when one moves, a shadow follows, and when one speaks, an echo follows. When one smoothly follows along with things [順物 shun wu], traces in the form of names are established; but he who was going along with things did not do it for the name. Not doing it for a name is perfection, but ultimately the name could not be avoided; who then could release him (from this consequence)? Thus names are shadows and echoes; and shadows and echoes are the fetters of forms and sounds. When one understands this, the name-traces can be done away with; once this is done, the esteeming of others [尚彼 shangbi] can be cut off, and once this is done, one’s own nature and life can be kept whole. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
行则影随,言则有回声,这是自然之理。顺物顺物,名迹立矣。但随波逐流的人并不是为了名而做的。不为名而行固然完美,但最终还是免不了名;那么谁能把他(从这个后果中)释放出来呢?因此,名字是影子和回声;影子和回声是形式和声音的束缚。明白了这一点,名迹就可以消除。做到了这一点,就能断绝他人的尊崇,做到了这一点,就能保全自己的性命。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
The point of recognizing that this is a “self-so principle” is not to understand its inner structure so as to allow us to utilize it in terms of some teleological project of our own, as is the case for the non-ironic usage of Li, and indeed even for Wang Bi’s synthesis of the ironic and non-ironic usages. Rather, it is to allow us to abandon any attempt at an explanation, or of fitting this thing into an account of the universe as a whole, or into our own project as a whole, or indeed to make it “cohere” into any kind of whole at all. It is to allow us to “follow along” with things, and thus keep our own nature and life intact, which means to preserve the self-so-ness of one’s own present determinacy, which is indeed for Guo the only thing really worth doing. Following along is ironic coherence; the esteeming of others is non-ironic coherence. By dropping all attempts to locate particular things within a global matrix of meanings and explanations, we eliminate
认识到这是一个“自我原则”的要点并不是要理解它的内部结构,以便让我们能够在我们自己的一些目的论项目中利用它,就像非讽刺地使用“自我原则”一样。李,甚至王弼对讽刺和非讽刺用法的综合。相反,它是为了让我们放弃任何解释的尝试,或者放弃将这个东西纳入对整个宇宙的解释,或纳入我们自己的整体计划,或者实际上使其“凝聚”成任何类型的尝试。完全不完整。就是让我们能够“顺其自然”,从而保持自己的本性和生命完整,也就是保持自己当下的决定性的本然性,这对郭来说确实是唯一真正值得做的事情。 。跟随是讽刺的连贯性;尊重他人是非讽刺的连贯性。通过放弃在意义和解释的全局矩阵中定位特定事物的所有尝试,我们消除了

any value-implications of the thing, any need to either emulate or avoid it. Emulation or suppression of external things is what disturbs our own self-so. Hence, to recognize the unintelligibility and meaninglessness of things, we preserve ourselves, attain true value: recognizing a principle is, ironically, a way of realizing the “principle” (self-so-ness) and value of our own existence. “Principle” or coherence here is thus not a ground that makes things so, but the fact that it is important for us to recognize that there is no way to know what makes them so, that the category of “ground” or “principle” is both meaningless and harmful-the ironic tradition of unintelligibility as real coherence given a new twist. Realizing this particular fact about any thing is what will allow one to adopt the maximally satisfying attitude toward it. Li simply means here what it is good to notice about a thing: always the fact that it is self-so.
事物的任何价值含义,任何模仿或避免它的需要。对外部事物的模仿或压制会扰乱我们的自我。因此,认识到事物的不可理解性和无意义性,我们就保存了自己,获得了真正的价值:讽刺的是,认识到一个原则,是实现我们自身存在的“原则”(自我如此)和价值的一种方式。因此,这里的“原则”或连贯性并不是使事物如此的基础,而是一个事实,即我们无法知道是什么使事物如此,“基础”或“原则”的范畴对我们来说很重要。既无意义又有害——具有讽刺意义的难以理解的传统被赋予了新的扭曲作为真正的连贯性。认识到任何事情的这一特殊事实将使人们对它采取最大程度的满意态度。 “理”在这里的意思只是指注意到一件事的好处:总是它是自我的这一事实。
This is true even when Guo seems to be asserting a global orderliness or necessity pertaining to the universe as a whole; here too, the purpose is to free us from the need of assigning meanings and values and knowable characters of things-for this is the only way to attain value, which is what the recognition of a Li is supposed to do, thus giving us a perfect example of the ironic notion of Li. For example, Guo asserts:
即使郭似乎在断言与整个宇宙有关的全球秩序或必然性,情况也是如此。在这里,目的也是为了让我们摆脱赋予事物意义、价值和可知特征的需要——因为这是获得价值的唯一途径,这也是对理的认识应该做的,从而给我们一个李的讽刺观念的完美例子。例如,郭断言:
The Li of things is inherently right, and cannot be avoided. Man, in being born, is never mistakenly born, and whatever there is in his life is not there senselessly [非妄有 fei wang you]. . . Thus whatever is not encountered cannot be encountered, and whatever is encountered cannot not be encountered; whatever is not done cannot be done and whatever is done cannot be not done; thus we give all things over to their self-rightness [自當 zidang]. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
事物之理本来就是对的,是无法回避的。人之生,无误生,其生所有,非妄有非妄有。 。 。所以,没有遇到的就不能遇到,遇到的也不能不遇到;不做的事不能做,已做的事不能不做;所以我们把一切都交给了自当。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
The point here is not to assert the rationality of the cosmos for its own sake, as something that could and should come to be understood in its particular, necessary relations. Rather, the point is given in the last line of the citation: seeing this fact about things allows us to give all things over to their self-rightness, and thus preserve our own self-rightness. Seeing Li accomplishes value. But there is only one thing one need notice, no matter what the thing or situation facing one may be: the self-so of the thing, the fact that it has no discernible cause, meaning, identity, or goal. To recognize this one fact is the sole locus of value. The particularities of the structure of the thing are irrelevant: what is truly Li, namely, the coherence that it is valuable to focus on, that allows one to deal with things in the ideal way, is always the same: the self-so. In this sense, Guo Xiang really recognizes only one Li.
这里的要点并不是为了宇宙本身而断言其合理性,因为宇宙可以而且应该在其特定的、必然的关系中被理解。相反,引文的最后一行给出了这一点:了解事物的这一事实使我们能够将所有事物交给它们的自以为是,从而保持我们自己的自以为是。看到李就实现了价值。但无论人们面对的事物或情况如何,只有一件事需要注意:事物的自我,即它没有明显的原因、意义、身份或目标。认识到这一事实是唯一的价值所在。事物结构的特殊性无关紧要:真正的理,即值得关注的连贯性,使人能够以理想的方式处理事物,始终是相同的:自我如此。从这个意义上来说,郭象确实只认得一个李。
We can see that it is difficult to speak of Guo as either an ironic appropriation of the non-ironic, or vice versa. For in Guo, the idea of
我们可以看到,很难说郭是对非讽刺的讽刺挪用,反之亦然。对于郭来说,

non-ironic definite coherence as such and of ironic unknowable coherence as such come to be identical. For the first time in Chinese thought, we can state directly that coherence as such is incoherence as such, that the unity of things is also their separation, that determinacy and indeterminacy are synonymous-which will be, as we shall see shortly, the foundation stone of Tiantai thinking. The term Li is central to this development, and here its two opposed directions converge: to know Li has always meant to know what it is most valuable to know, and it still means that for Guo. But what is valuable to know is now that there is nothing to know, and that no knowledge has value. To know the Li about any thing is to know there is nothing to know about it: this is the Li of the self-so. Since this means absolutely isolating any event from any connections that will make it intelligible or valuable, this signifies a kind of absolute division. But at the same time, it is the most radical unity, cohering, of all events; this is not only because the self-so is the one fact that is universally true of every event without exception, but more crucially because for Guo it also signifies “vanishing merging,” an ironic form of togetherness of all events, which is no longer seen through the lens of mutual externality, which he sees as resulting purely from the ignorance of the self-so and the involvement of trace-cognition. Thus, the self-so is also in a sense a complete unity. Coherence in the non-ironic sense meant, at the very least, (1) harmonious unification of a thing with its environment, (2) value, and (3) intelligibility. In the ironic sense, it meant at the least harmonious unification that had value because of its unintelligibility as harmony or unification or value. For Guo, the value of each thing is its forgetting of value, the only thing to be intelligibly known about it is its lack of intelligibility, and it joins together with other things harmoniously only when it recognizes no other things as causes or contexts. Li now becomes the marker of this coherence qua incoherence, incoherence qua coherence.
非反讽的确定连贯性本身和反讽的不可知连贯性本身是相同的。在中国思想中,我们第一次可以直接指出,连贯性本身就是不连贯性,事物的统一也是事物的分离,确定性和不确定性是同义的——正如我们很快就会看到的,这将是基础天台思维石。 “礼”这个词是这一发展的核心,在这里它的两个相反的方向汇合在一起:“知礼”始终意味着知道什么是最有价值的,对于郭来说仍然意味着这一点。但知道的价值在于,现在已经没有什么可知道的了,任何知识都没有价值。知道任何事物的理,就知道它没有什么可知道的:这就是自我的理。因为这意味着将任何事件与任何使其变得可理解或有价值的联系绝对隔离,这意味着一种绝对的划分。但与此同时,它是所有事件中最彻底的统一和凝聚力。这不仅因为“自我如此”是所有事件无一例外地普遍存在的事实,更重要的是因为对于郭来说,它还意味着“消失的融合”,一种讽刺性的所有事件的共同形式,它不再是他认为这种外部性纯粹是由于对自我的无知和痕迹认知的参与而产生的。因此,自性在某种意义上也是一个完整的统一体。非讽刺意义上的连贯性至少意味着(1)事物与其环境的和谐统一,(2)价值,以及(3)可理解性。在讽刺意义上,它至少意味着和谐的统一,因为它作为和谐、统一或价值而难以理解,因此具有价值。 对于郭来说,每件事物的价值在于它对价值的遗忘,唯一可以被理解的事情是它的缺乏可理解性,只有当它不承认其他事物作为原因或背景时,它才能与其他事物和谐地结合在一起。现在,李成为这种连贯性与不连贯性、不连贯性与连贯性的标志。
Li , for Guo, always means ziran, which is called Li because it is what is best to notice about any thing. Li in other Chinese texts means what is intelligible, what brings together the elements of an object coherently, the locus of its value, and what human activity should focus upon when dealing with the thing in question. It is in these senses that the self-so is Li. What makes human interaction with things maximally effective is to notice their freedom from any explanatory principle that is knowable, and which makes them come together to be what they are: this then is their “principle.” Hence, Guo tells us:
理,对郭来说,总是指自然,之所以称为理,是因为它是观察任何事物最好的地方。在其他中文文本中,“理”意味着可理解的事物、将物体的各个元素连贯地结合在一起的事物、其价值所在以及人类活动在处理相关事物时应关注的事物。正是在这些意义上,“自我”就是“理”。使人类与事物的互动最有效的方法是注意到它们不受任何可知的解释性原则的约束,这使得它们组合在一起成为它们本来的样子:这就是它们的“原则”。因此,郭告诉我们:
That which causes no harm to things does not do so because it is practicing benevolence, but the trace “benevolence” moves in it; that which makes every principle hit the mark is not practicing
不伤害事物,并不是因为它在行仁,而是有“仁”的痕迹在里面;使每一个原则都切中要害的不是实践

righteousness, but the effect “righteousness” appears in it. Thus hitting the mark and causing no harm are not brought about by benevolence and righteousness. But the world goes running after [these traces], discarding themselves to follow others so that they lose their ever-so [i.e., their self-so]. Therefore the disordering of the mind does not come from what is ugly but always from beautiful appearances; the disruption of the world does not come from evil, but always from benevolence and righteousness. Thus benevolence and righteousness are tools for the disruption of the world. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}
义,但其中却出现了“义”的效果。所以中肯、不造成伤害,不是仁义带来的。但世界却追随[这些痕迹],抛弃自己而追随他人,以致他们失去了本来的样子[即他们的自我]。因此,心的混乱并非来自于丑陋,而总是来自于美丽的外表。世界的破坏并非来自邪恶,而总是来自仁义。所以仁义是破坏世界的工具。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41}
The non-ironic “principles” of benevolence and righteousness are not the true principles; in fact, they are the precise opposites of the sole real principle, the ironic principle, the self-so, the lack of any explanation or teleology or determining principle of things: the lack of any principles. To see a thing and deal with it, without reference to its value or any explanatory account of its coming-to-be, is to correctly relate to it, to allow oneself to vanish (into) it and maintain the optimal human condition.
非讽刺的仁义“理”,并不是真正的理,而是真正的理。事实上,它们是唯一真实原则、反讽原则、自我如此、缺乏任何解释或目的论或事物决定原则的精确对立面:缺乏任何原则。看到一件事并处理它,而不考虑它的价值或对其形成的任何解释性说明,就是正确地与它建立联系,让自己消失(进入)它并保持最佳的人类状态。
This does not prevent Guo Xiang from sometimes seeming to address specific principles. In a small number of cases, and in a manner that can be described as very ad hoc, Guo appears to be invoking the term “Li” as the explanation for some specific connection between facts in the world, something that is closer to a “principle” or “account” that actually serves as a determining law and can be used to explain some fact. In this sense, we can discern the sense of Li as “division,” its older sense, and the one which so many scholars single out as distinctive to Guo’s position. For example, we find Guo saying, in explanation of the differences in the natural habitats of massive Peng and the little birds who ridicule him in Zhuangzi’s first chapter: "This is all to explain that Peng flies so high only because of his huge wings. A being of small substance cannot depend on the large for its support, and thus a being of large substance cannot depend on the small as its provisions. Thus principles have their perfect divisions; things have their fixed limits [理有至分,物有定極 Li you zhi fen, wu you ding ji]. Since each is sufficient to the task at hand, the assistance they respectively provide to these beings is equal. 322 322 ^(322){ }^{322} I have provided emphases for two items in this citation. One is the connective “thus,” and the other is the sentence that suggests the idea of principle as individual separate principles of particular things. In the latter, we find “principle” used parallel to “things,” which does indeed suggest that both terms should be read in the plural and as indicating something case-specific. The principle of entity A would here seem to differ from the principle of entity B, with a “perfect division” between them, just as these two entities themselves have a fixed limit between them. But the fen can
这并不妨碍郭象有时似乎在讲具体的原则。在少数情况下,郭似乎以一种非常临时的方式援引“理”一词来解释世界上事实之间的某种特定联系,这更接近于“理”。原则”或“帐户”,实际上起到了决定性的作用,可以用来解释某种事实。在这个意义上,我们可以看出“李”的含义是“分”,它是它的旧含义,也是许多学者认为与郭的立场不同的含义。例如,郭在解释《庄子》第一章中大鹏与嘲笑他的小鸟在自然栖息地的差异时说:“这都是为了说明鹏飞得那么高,只是因为他有巨大的翅膀。小体不能以大为养,大体不能以小为养,故理有至分,物有其限。定极离有之分,无有定基]既然每个人都足以完成手头的任务,那么他们分别为这些众生提供的帮助是平等的。 322 322 ^(322){ }^{322} 我在这篇引文中强调了两个项目。一个是连接词“因此”,另一个是暗示原则概念作为特定事物的单独原则的句子。在后者中,我们发现“原则”与“事物”平行使用,这确实表明这两个术语都应该以复数形式理解,并表示特定情况的事物。 这里,实体A的原则似乎与实体B的原则不同,它们之间有“完美的划分”,就像这两个实体本身之间有一个固定的界限一样。但芬可以

also be understood not as the division but as what lies between limits, that is, a role. In this sense, we might perhaps venture to interpret the first four characters, 理有至分, as still referring to Li in the singular, that is, to the one Li , ziran: “Li, the self-so, has perfectly continent roles and divisions within it.” More simply, we can naturally read this to mean, “Each Li entails a perfect division into its role.” Li as ziran, free of interference from traces of otherness, is precisely that separation into allotted divisions. That would mean, it is self-so, “principle,” for things to be perfectly different from one another, not that there are separate principles for each thing. This question is what makes Guo’s odd “thus,” also italicized in my translation, significant. For he does not just state that “the large need large things, the small need small things,” but rather that “because the small need small things, therefore (we can infer) the large need large things.” This “thus” actually refers to the same principle being operative in both cases, just as the “assistance” to the two types of beings is equal, as stated at the end of the citation. The same principle, ziran, is all that ever applies anywhere. This is the only kind of hanging-together of the world that Guo acknowledges; not an array of individual, knowable principles, but rather the same operation performed over and over again. Because this is self-so, we can deduce that that is self-so: this is the true application of what we would call a “principle,” but it turns out to be an ironic principle: the principle here is always the same principle: the self-so, which means no-principle.
也不能被理解为划分,而是被理解为界限之间的东西,即角色。从这个意义上说,我们也许可以冒险将前四个字“理有至分”解释为仍然指单数的“理”,即“理”,即自然:“理,自我如此,具有完美的大陆”其中的角色和部门。”更简单地说,我们自然可以理解为“各礼各尽其职”。理如自然,不受他者痕迹的干扰,正是那种划分为分配的部分。这意味着,事物彼此完全不同是自成一体的“原则”,而不是每件事都有单独的原则。这个问题使得郭的奇怪的“因此”(在我的翻译中也用斜体字)显得意义重大。因为他不仅说“大需大事,小需小事”,而是“因为小需小事,所以(我们可以推断)大需大事”。这个“如此”实际上是指在这两种情况下都适用相同的原则,正如引文末尾所指出的,对两种众生的“帮助”是相等的。同样的原则,自然,在任何地方都适用。这是郭承认的唯一一种世界的团结;不是一系列单独的、可知的原则,而是一遍又一遍地执行相同的操作。因为这是自所以,我们可以推断出那是自所以:这就是我们所说的“原理”的真正应用,但结果却是一个讽刺的原理:这里的原理始终是同一个原理:自我如此,即无原则。
Guo makes this explicit, employing the traditional terminology of root and branch, but in such a way as to make eminently clear the negligibility of specific principles: “The root includes the branch, just as the arm includes the hand. If the body as a whole is harmonious, all the individual joints will be at ease; if the Way of Heaven goes smoothly, then both root and branch will be unobstructed. Thus as soon as we have the single [ Li [ Li [Li[\mathrm{Li} of] non-doing, all the many Lis are simultaneously present.” 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} This could perhaps be read to imply that these many principles are all present in the one principle of the self-so; but in fact Guo’s point is reductive. There is no need to bother with the other Lis, for the single Li “self-so” covers them all. It is what all so-called principles resolve into, and indeed all that provides the “principle-ness” of any principle. It is all one needs to know.
郭先生用传统术语“根与枝”来明确这一点,但以这样的方式明确了具体原则的可忽略性:“根包含枝,正如臂包含手。如果身体整体和谐,那么各个关节就会舒畅;如果身体整体和谐,那么各个关节就会轻松;天道顺则根枝无碍。因此,一旦我们有了单一的 [ Li [ Li [Li[\mathrm{Li} 的]无为,所有的许多Li同时存在。” 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} 这也许可以理解为暗示这许多原则都存在于一个“自我”原则中。但事实上郭的观点是还原性的。不用理会其他的李,因为一个李的“自所以”就涵盖了所有的人。它是所有所谓原则的归结,事实上,它提供了任何原则的“原则性”。这是人们需要知道的一切。
In this connection, we should consider the following passage:
就此而言,我们应该思考以下这段话:

Nothing but the dark ocean would be sufficient to move his body; nothing but ninety thousand miles would be sufficient to support his wings. How is this worth considering strange? It’s just that a big entity is necessarily [必 bi] self-born [自生 zisheng] in a vast location, and a vast location will necessarily self-generate this vast
除了黑暗的海洋之外,没有任何东西足以移动他的身体。只有九万里,才足以支撑他的翅膀。这怎么值得考虑奇怪呢?只不过,一个大的东西,必然是自生于广阔的地方,而广阔的​​地方,必然会自生这个广阔。

entity. The Li is definitely self-so [理固自然 li gu ziran]; one need not fear it failing to be the case. So what need is there to work one’s mind through these things 344 344 ^(344){ }^{344}
实体。理固自然理固自然;理固自然理固自然;理固自然理固自然。人们不必担心情况并非如此。那么,有什么必要去思考这些事情呢? 344 344 ^(344){ }^{344}
Here again we may be tempted to consider this a statement about a definite, particular principle about things in the world, which differs from other principles, that is, Li here meaning “the principle that things are adapted to their environments, such that large creatures live in large habitats.” This would be a justified inference, particularly given Guo’s use of the robust “necessarily” ( b i ) b i ) bi)b i) and his unusual reversal of the terms principle and self-so, such that the former is the subject and the latter an adjectival description of it. Usually, for Guo, Li is the self-so, or we are told about “the Li of self-so-ness” (自然之理 ziran zhi li), where ziran seems to be the more substantial and prior term. Here, however, principle is something that is described as self-so, which gives the impression of hypostasizing principle in a stronger sense. This impression is strengthened by Guo’s revelation of what it means for a principle to be “definitely self-so”: it is a reliable predictor: one need not fear it failing to be the case. All these factors suggest definite individual principles.
在这里,我们可能会再次认为这是关于世界上事物的一个明确的、特定的原则的陈述,它与其他原则不同,也就是说,“理”的意思是“事物适应其环境的原则,使得大型生物生活在大型栖息地。”这是一个合理的推论,特别是考虑到郭使用了强有力的“必然”( b i ) b i ) bi)b i) 他对原则和自我如此这两个词的不同寻常的颠倒,使得前者是主语,后者是对其的形容词描述。通常,对于郭来说,“理”就是“自我”,或者我们被告知“自然之理自然之理”,其中“自然”似乎是更实质性和更优先的术语。然而,这里的原则是被描述为自我如此的东西,这给人以更强烈的意义上实体化原则的印象。郭对“绝对自我”原则的含义的揭示强化了这种印象:它是一个可靠的预测器:人们不必担心情况并非如此。所有这些因素都表明了明确的个人原则。
However, Guo’s characteristic insertion of the modifier " z i z i ziz i " self, a shorthand for self-so, before the crucial verb (to generate), complicates this picture considerably. We can interpret this to mean that a large place “naturally” or “spontaneously” or “self-so-ishly” generates a large entity. But Guo’s use of this term, as I have argued elsewhere, 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} has a more intricate significance; this z i z i ziz i is the true self of the being in question, it is “self-generation” when it generates “self-so-ishly,” because its real self is just the process of vanishing of any determinate self into the traceless process of self-so itself. “A big place” is not the true self of a big place, but rather just the “traces” of the big place on other entities. The generation of a big entity there is really not a linking of two distinct entities, but a revelation of the self-so, namely, the true, indeterminable self of both. In this sense, it cannot be a principle in the strict sense, in that a principle must reliably link the behavior of at least two genuinely distinct entities. The real import of Guo’s invocation of this “necessary” principle is thus not to provide a reliable guideline for making deductions, but rather to put an end to any such deductions, and this is exactly indicated in the last line of the citation: the upshot of knowing that a “self-so principle” will never fail to be so is not that one should thus use this as a guideline for making predictions, or for refining one’s thinking process, but to assure one that there is no need to worry oneself about it. A Li, by being self-so, means the end of thinking about it. What’s good about Li is that it leads away from intelligibility, not toward it. The point here is to keep an eye on both implications when Guo uses the term Li: in
然而,郭氏特有的插入了修饰语“ z i z i ziz i “ self 是 self-so 的简写形式,出现在关键动词(生成)之前,使这一情况变得相当复杂。我们可以将其解释为意味着一个大地方“自然地”或“自发地”或“自我如此地”生成但郭对这个词的使用,正如我在其他地方所论证的那样, 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} 具有更复杂的意义;这 z i z i ziz i 是所讨论的存在的真实自我,当它“如此地自我”产生时,它就是“自我生成”,因为它的真实自我只是任何确定的自我消失到无痕的自我如此过程中的过程。本身。 “大地方”并不是大地方的真实自我,而只是大地方在其他实体上的“痕迹”。那里的一个大实体的产生实际上并不是两个不同实体的联系,而是对自我的揭示,即两者的真实的、不可确定的自我。从这个意义上说,它不能是严格意义上的原则,因为原则必须可靠地将至少两个真正不同的实体的行为联系起来。因此,郭援引这一“必要”原则的真正意义不是为扣除提供可靠的指导,而是结束任何此类扣除,这一点在引文的最后一行中得到了明确的说明:知道“自我原则”永远不会失败,并不是说人们应该以此为指导进行预测,或者改进自己的思维过程,而是要让人们确信自己无需担心关于它。阿离,所谓“自如”,就是想念的结束。理的好处在于它远离可理解性,而不是走向可理解性。这里的要点是,当郭使用“李”一词时,要注意这两种含义:

this instance, we could translate li gu ziran (inelegantly) as “The absolutely separate coherence of this entity joining mergingly with its large place is reliably self-so and thus something that no inquiries or explanations need be applied to” or “this principle is definitely spontaneously so, and thus absolutely reliable,” and they would mean the same thing. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that we can speak of “definite principles” in the thought of Guo Xiang: a complete convergence of coherence and incoherence, of togetherness and separateness, of intelligibility and unintelligibility.
在这种情况下,我们可以将“离谷自然”翻译为“这个实体与它的大地方融合在一起的绝对独立的连贯性是可靠的自然性,因此不需要任何询问或解释”或“这个原则是绝对是自发的,因此绝对可靠”,它们的意思是一样的。正是在这个意义上,也只有在这个意义上,我们才能说郭象思想中的“定理”:连贯与非连贯、合一与分离、可理解与不可理解的完全融合。
Of particular interest for understanding this point is Guo’s unusual use of the term Li together with a modifier, which seem to point to specific principles or Li. The three most notorious examples are 人理 renli,和理 heli, and 我理 woli, denoting, respectively, the principle/coherence of human beings, of harmony, and of the self. In all cases, these are ad hoc coinages glossing a phrase from the Zhuangzi; heli is used when the text says something about harmony (he); renli when a the texts speaks of humanity, for example, in contrast to Heaven; and woli is used as a gloss on a text referring to the self. For example, commenting on Zhuangzi’s line, “Thus it is not sufficient to distort his harmony,” Guo says, “If one understands that one’s own character and life are necessarily right, then through all the thousands and ten thousands of changes, through life and death, success and failure, one remains blandly oneself, and possesses the principle of harmony [heli] within himself.” 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} The other examples all follow this ad hoc pattern. Nonetheless, we find Guo making some interesting assertions here:
理解这一点特别有趣的是郭对“理”一词与修饰语的不同寻常的使用,这似乎指向特定的原则或“理”。最臭名昭著的三个例子是“人理renli”、“和理heli”和“我理woli”,分别表示人类、和谐和自我的原则/连贯性。在所有情况下,这些都是特意创造的新词,对《庄子》中的一个短语进行注释。当文本谈到和谐(he)时,使用 heli;例如,当经文谈到人性时,与天相对照; woli 用作对涉及自我的文本的注释。例如,郭先生评论庄子的诗句“故其和而不足矣”,“若知其性格命理必然是正的,则历经万千变迁,历经一生”。生与死,成功与失败,保持温和的自我,并拥有内心和谐的原则。” 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} 其他示例都遵循这种特殊模式。尽管如此,我们发现郭在这里做出了一些有趣的断言:
Each thing attains its Way, and the principle of harmony [heli] spontaneously fits it comfortably. 47
万物得其道,和理自然而然地适合它。 47
Knowledge without doing does not harm one’s tranquility; tranquility combined with doing that comes of its own accord does not harm knowledge. This can be called their mutual nourishing [of knowledge and tranquility]. When these two nourish each other, how could the allotment of the principle of harmony [heli] come from the outside. 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78}
知而不行,不伤清静;宁静与自然而然的行动相结合,不会损害知识。这可谓相辅相成。二者相养,和理何以从外来分配。 78 78 ^(78){ }^{78}

“The principle of harmony” here seems to be synonymous with “harmony,” a way of nominalizing the concept of harmony. But we could equally say that harmony is joined with Li here as a kind of synonymous binome; the two terms are meant to meant the same thing. That is, when the text says he, Guo wants us to know that this harmony is just what he means by Li: the incoherent merging of all things in the self-so of any event. For harmony is very closely related to the idea of Li as coherence; we have mentioned the sense of Li as a coming together, and Guo’s distinctive twist
这里的“和谐原则”似乎与“和谐”同义,是和谐概念的名义化。但我们同样可以说,和谐在这里与礼结合在一起,成为一种同义的二元组;这两个术语的意思是相同的。也就是说,当文本说“他”时,郭想让我们知道这种和谐正是他所说的“理”的意思:所有事物在任何事件的自我中的不连贯的融合。因为和谐与“理”的连贯性观念密切相关。我们已经提到了李作为一个聚集的感觉,以及郭的独特扭曲

on this sense of the term: the vanishing (into) things, which is the function of the self-so once it is freed of its involvement in “traces” (teleological and foundational explanatory structures). “The principle of harmony” is just a word for the self-so itself.
在这个术语的意义上:消失(进入)事物,这是自我的功能,因此一旦它摆脱了“痕迹”(目的论和基础解释结构)的牵涉。 “和谐的原则”只是自我本身的一个词。
A more likely candidate for an individual principle is the term renli. Guo says:
个人原则更可能的候选者是“仁理”一词。郭说:
In terms of the self-so, there is no difference between great men and petty men. But in terms of the principles of humanity itself [renli], he who depends on heaven may be called an exemplary person. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
就自我而言,没有什么大人和小人之分。但就人理本身而言,依靠天的人可以称为君子。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
Here a contrast is clearly being made between the self-so (or the heavenly) and another principle: the principle of human beings as such. In terms of the self-so, there are no distinctions of greater and lesser value: all are equal, each is perfectly right to itself, because all are equally self-so. But here Guo introduces another standard by which things might be judged. Explaining Zhuangzi’s own expression of praise, he gives an explanation. “Human principles” would seem to denote what is truly valuable to man himself, that is, what is “coherent with” human interests, what is conducive to optimal human experience. And what is it that is the human principle? Recognizing the self-so, to wit, “following heaven.” Here we have an early form of a paradox that takes form often in Chinese Buddhism. In terms of the self-so itself, it makes no difference whether or not we recognize or live according to the self-so, or ignore it and get lost in the traces. Both of these are equally self-so, both of these are equally self-right. The only difference between them is how they affect us. What is healthy for humans is “human principle,” which means not only being self-so (which is in any case unavoidable), but recognizing the self-so as a principle, which means to see the futility of all principles, all explanations. “Human principle” means to free oneself from emulation of traces, abandon all value judgments and explanations of the causes or purposes of things, follow along with the self-so. Once again, we find a convergence between an individual principle and the sole real principle, the self-so. This is also the singularity, the convergence, of the ironic and non-ironic senses of coherence, or determinacy and indeterminacy. Hence, Guo says explicitly:
这里明显地在自我(或天堂)和另一个原则:人类本身的原则之间进行了对比。就自性而言,没有大小之分:一切都是平等的,每个人都是完全正确的,因为一切都是同样的自性。但郭在这里引入了另一个判断事物的标准。对于庄子自己的赞美之词,他给出了解释。 “人类原则”似乎指的是对人本身真正有价值的东西,即与人类利益“一致”的东西,有利于人类最佳体验的东西。那什么是人类的原则呢?认识自我,即“从天”。这里我们看到了中国佛教中经常出现的悖论的早期形式。就自性本身而言,我们是否认识自性、按照自性生活,或者忽略它而迷失在痕迹中,都没有什么区别。这两者同样是自以为是的,这两者同样是自以为是的。它们之间唯一的区别在于它们如何影响我们。对人类来说健康的是“人理”,它不仅意味着自我如此(这在任何情况下都是不可避免的),而且意味着将自我如此视为一种原则,这意味着看到所有原则、所有解释都是徒劳的。 。 “人理”就是摆脱追随的痕迹,放弃对事物原因或目的的一切价值判断和解释,随从自我。我们再一次发现个体原则和唯一真实原则——自我——之间的趋同点。这也是连贯性或确定性和不确定性的讽刺性和非讽刺性意义的奇点和融合。因此,郭明确表示:
If one moves in accordance with the heavenly nature, then the human principles [人理 renli] are also kept complete… 50 50 ^(50)^{50}
如果人的行为符合天性,那么人理也就完整了…… 50 50 ^(50)^{50}
This is in keeping with the “root-branch” metaphor cited above, and is equally reductive. Guo certainly will allow for “human principles”-such as the divisions between ruler and subject, father and son, and the like, in other
这与上面引用的“根-枝”比喻是一致的,并且同样是简化的。郭先生当然会在其他方面允许“人理”——比如君臣、父子之分等等。

words, conventional morality, which Guo elsewhere calls 明教 mingiao, the teaching of names. But that is arguably not what he means by renli here. Rather, whenever he uses this term, he links it to the human accord with the overriding “principle,” principle proper, the self-so. Li always means what it is important to notice, and renli means what is important for human beings to notice. What is supremely important for human beings to notice is not the specific principles of human life, but once again the self-so. Attention to the self-so will make those specific human relationships function smoothly; hence, there is no need to pay any special heed to them as principles in their own right. They are not worth noticing, and hence are not Li.
言语,传统道德,郭在别处称之为“明教”,即名称的教义。但他在这里所说的“人力”可能不是这个意思。相反,每当他使用这个术语时,他都会将其与人类与压倒一切的“原则”、正确的原则、自我如此联系起来。理总是意味着需要注意的事情,而人理意味着人们需要注意的事情。对人类来说,最重要的不是关注人类生活的具体原则,而是再次关注“自我”。关注自我会让那些特定的人际关系顺利运转;因此,没有必要特别注意它们本身的原则。他们不引人注目,因此不是李。
This same reversal from the particular to the universal is found in Guo’s use of an even more particulate sounding term, woli, the coherence or principle of the self: "When one turns back and holds to the principle of self ( 我理 oli), this principle of self spontaneously penetrates all."51
这种从特殊到普遍的逆转也体现在郭使用了一个听起来更具体的术语“woli”,即自我的连贯性或原则:“当一个人回头并坚持自我原则(我理oli)时,这种自我原则自发地渗透到一切。”51
It would seem as if the “principle of self” might be a specific individual principle. But the conclusion points us right back to the self-so: the principle of “selfness,” its truth, is just its self-so, which means its lack of intelligibility, its freedom from the causal nexus of explanations and principles that constitutes the world of traces. This is why the principle of self “spontaneously penetrates all” other entities, for all of them have only this one “principle,” the self-so, as their true being, their true selves, which are no knowable self at all.
似乎“自我原则”可能是一种特定的个人原则。但结论让我们回到了“自我”:“自我”的原则,即它的真理,就是它的“自我”,这意味着它缺乏可理解性,它摆脱了构成“自我”的解释和原则的因果关系。痕迹的世界。这就是为什么自我的原则“自发地渗透到所有”其他实体,因为所有其他实体都只有这个“原则”,即自我,作为他们的真实存在,他们的真实自我,而它们根本不是可知的自我。
We may have noticed in these usages a kind of two-tiered structure, where Li-proper is the self-so as such, and X - li is X considered in its self-so nature. I insist that Li always means self-so because it is the self-so-ness of X that makes it a Li. But this can then be applied on any level to any particular thing, for each is indeed the self-so. We have here an incipient version of the problematic of the one and the many in later Chinese Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, most famously the Huayan-Tiantai “one is many” idea and derivatively Zhu Xi’s notion that there is only one principle-the Great Ultimate (太極 taiji)—which is, in its entirety, also manifest in each thing, as the particular individuating Li of that thing, which defines both its character and its inner teleology. We can perhaps discern the contours of a similar way of thinking, mutatis mutandis, in Guo’s use of the idea of the “perfect” or “ultimate principle,” literally the “arrived principle” (至理 zhili), 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} which is contrasted with any more local or limited type of principle, that is, what would normally be called a Li by someone besides Guo Xiang. The perfect Li is what is like those Lis (a coherent and intelligible coming together, a harmonizable harmony, which can lead to value if harmonized with, i.e., recognized), but moreso what really does what the term Li promises: the ironic Li as the fulfillment of the non-ironic Lis. This is the standard move of the ironic tradition: the real Dao is the non-“Dao,” the ultimate Li
我们可能已经注意到这些用法中的一种两层结构,其中 Li-proper 本身就是 self-so,而 X - li 是 X 考虑到其 self-so 本质。我坚持认为,Li 总是意味着 self-so,因为正是 X 的 self-soness 使其成为 Li。但这可以在任何层面上应用于任何特定事物,因为每个事物确实都是自我。我们在这里看到了后来中国佛教和理学中的“一”和“多”问题的早期版本,最著名的是华严天台的“一是多”思想以及衍生的朱熹的“只有一个原则——伟大”的观念。终极(太极太极)——就其整体而言,也体现在每个事物中,作为该事物的特定个体力,它定义了其特征及其内在目的论。我们或许可以从郭文贵对“至理”或“至理”概念的使用中看出类似的思维方式的轮廓。 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} 这与任何更局部或有限类型的原则形成鲜明对比,即通常被郭象以外的人称为“理”的原则。完美的“理”就像那些“理”(一种连贯的、可理解的组合,一种和谐的和谐,如果协调一致,即被认可,就可以产生价值),但更重要的是,它真正做到了“理”一词所承诺的:具有讽刺意义的“理”非讽刺性的李的实现。这是反讽传统的标准动作:真道是非“道”,是终极的理。

is the non-Li. It is significant that this term is also reversed, suggesting that “perfect Li” also means the “arrival of Li” (理至 lizhi). Perfect Li is ziran, in relation to any lesser particular non-ironic Li. But here again, the point is the collapse of all Lis into this one Li. Hence, we find Guo saying, “Just go along with allowing to it be itself, and the Li will arrive of itself.” And again, "The perfect Li is exhausted in self-attainment"53 (the latter phrase being another mutation of self-so). Or again, "Things have their self-so, and Li have their ultimate perfection; in following along with this they move directly forward [直往 zhiwang] 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} and thus vanishingly self-cohere [冥然自合 mingran zihe]."55
是非黎。值得注意的是,这个词也被颠倒过来,表明“至理”也意味着“理至理至”。完美的李是自然,相对于任何不太特殊的非讽刺李。但这里的重点又是所有李都瓦解为这一个李。所以,郭说:“顺其自然,礼自至”。再说一次,“完美的李在自我成就中耗尽了”53(后一个短语是自我的另一种变异)。又或曰:“物有其自所以,理有其至善,随之而行”。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54} 从而消失地自我凝聚[冥然自合mingran zihe]。”55
In all these cases, the “perfect Li” is self-so, which is precisely non-principle, the negation of what would normally be called a principle. This is what leads to vanishing self-cohesion, self-attainment, moving directly forward, and so on, all of which are synonyms for value here. By recognizing a principle, one attains value. To recognize the perfect principle is to ignore all other so-called principles (as the constant Dao is the Dao that is no Dao, and so on). In doing so, one attains value-the arrival of principle ( Li as value).
在所有这些情况下,“至理”都是自我的,这恰恰是无理的,是对通常所说的理的否定。这就是导致自我凝聚力、自我成就感、直接前进等等消失的原因,所有这些在这里都是价值的同义词。通过认识到一项原则,一个人就会获得价值。认识完美的原则就是忽略所有其他所谓的原则(如不变的道是无道的道,等等)。这样做,就获得了价值——原则的到来(礼即价值)。
The standard textbook doxa on the understanding of Li (“principle,” “pattern,” “coherence”) in Wang Bi and Guo Xiang is still perhaps that suggested long ago by Wing-tsit Chan: “The major concept [in Guo Xiang] is no longer Dao, as in Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi], but Nature (Tzu-jan) [ziran, self-so]. Things exist and transform themselves spontaneously and there is no other reality or agent to cause them. Heaven is not something behind this process of Nature but is merely its general name. Things exist and transform according to principle, but each and every thing has its own principle. Everything is therefore self-sufficient and there is no need of an over-all original reality to combine or govern them, as in the case of Wang Pi [Wang Bi]. . . . While Wang Pi emphasizes the one, Kuo [Guo] emphasizes the many. To Wang Pi, principle transcends things, but to Kuo, it is immanent in them.” W6 W6  ^("W6 "){ }^{\text {W6 }} The implication seems to be that for Wang “principle” (Li) is one, but for Guo it is many-each thing has its own “principle.” This suggests that for Wang there is one overriding Dao, a shared principle of all things, while for Guo, each thing has its own particular principle, its own Li . We have here, to say it again, an embryonic form of the controversies over the status of Li in later Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, focused on the question of whether Li is to be understood as the unifying principle of all things or the distinguishing principles of each individual thing, what unifies or what divides. We have seen, however, that in an important sense it is truer to say that it is Wang Bi who develops a theory of distinctive individual principles of things, while Guo puts forth only a single principle for all things without exception: the principle of the self-so, ziran. On the other
王弼和郭象关于理(“理”、“范”、“连贯”)理解的标准教科书doxa也许仍然是陈永捷很久以前提出的:“(郭象的)主要概念”不再是庄子中的“道”,而是“自然”(ziran,self-so)。事物自发地存在和转变,没有其他现实或媒介来导致它们。天并不是这个自然过程背后的东西,而只是它的总称。事物的存在和变化都有其规律,但每一个事物都有其规律。因此,一切都是自给自足的,不需要一个整体的原始现实来结合或统治它们,就像王辟的情况一样。 。 。 。王辟重一,郭重多。对王丕来说,理是超越事物的,但对郭来说,理是内在的。” W6 W6  ^("W6 "){ }^{\text {W6 }} 言外之意似乎是,王的“理”(理)是一,而郭的“理”是多——每种事物都有自己的“理”。这表明,对于王来说,有一个压倒一切的道,是万物共有的原则,而对于郭来说,每个事物都有自己特定的原则,它自己的理。再说一遍,这就是后来佛教和理学中礼的地位之争的雏形,主要集中在礼是理解为万物的统一之理还是区别之理的问题。每个单独的事物,什么是统一的,什么是分裂的。然而,我们已经看到,在一个重要的意义上,更正确的说法是,王弼发展了一种独特的事物个别原理的理论,而郭沫若只提出了一个适用于所有事物的单一原理,即无一例外的原理。自我如此,自然。另一方面

hand, as we have also seen, there is indeed a sense in which this amounts to an assertion by Guo of each thing having its own unique principle: but a truly unique principle is no longer a principle at all, it is unshared with any other entity, and in fact it is not even the essence of this one thing, but rather is that thing itself in its very unidentifiable becoming as the merging and vanishing of all things into it. Hence, we must take exception to Wing-tsit Chan’s understanding of the difference between Wang and Guo, namely, that Wang emphasizes “the One” while Guo emphasizes “the many.” Our analysis here shows that just the opposite is closer to the truth: for Wang, there are many actual, specific principles, the knowable and intelligible mini-Daos embodied in the hexagrams, which determine the nature of qualitatively different situations, while for Guo, there is really only one Li , one coherence-worth-noticing, namely, the self-so of any situation or thing, which is always characterized precisely as an effacement of intelligibility and knowledge. We can also see now the irony of Tang Junyi’s citation of Guo’s gloss on Wang’s statement that “things never happen haphazardly,” from which Tang extracts his crucial term “convergence” (會趣 huiqu). It applies more directly to Wang’s understanding of Li as the mini-Dao of any situation, the convergence toward the “least,” which is also the valued or the desired. For Guo himself, however, it is less obvious in what sense the single principle of self-so has anything to do with convergence toward the lacked and therefore valued. Nonetheless, there is perhaps a way to understand this. The self-so, for Guo, is the operation of all things in separation from their “traces,” the objects of consciousness left by one self-so occurrence on another. This is the type of “convergence” which for Guo is a “small” principle, the non-ironic principle of individual things, that is, explanatory connections elucidating cause and effect, or ends and means relationships. The real principle, the self-so, is the contrary of this, the omission of all reference to traces. But this too is a kind of convergence: an ironic convergence. This is what Guo calls “vanishing (into) (ming),” which is indeed a kind of coming together, but one that effaces the specific identities of individual entities above and beyond their self-so, which is at once the most general and the most uncompromisingly unique in each case. So the real principle (self-so) is the absence of all so-called principles, and the real convergence (vanishing into each other) is the absence of all so-called convergences (interconnections between traces). The real Dao is the non-Dao, and the real value is the absence of all valuation. Li means a convergence that is intelligible and important to notice for the attaining of value. But for Guo it is an ironic convergence, an ironic intelligibility, an ironic noticing, and an ironic value. Principle is one in the sense of none, which is why Guo’s “one” seems so much like a “many,” and indeed it does point to an emphasis on individual uniqueness pushed to the point where
另一方面,正如我们也看到的,在某种意义上,这确实相当于郭先生断言每件事物都有其独特的原则:但真正独特的原则根本不再是原则,它与任何其他原则都是不共享的。事实上,它甚至不是这一事物的本质,而是该事物本身,随着所有事物的合并和消失而变得不可识别。因此,我们不能不同意陈永捷对王郭的区别的理解,即王强调“一”,郭强调“多”。我们在这里的分析表明,恰恰相反,才更接近事实:对于王来说,卦中有许多实际的、具体的原理,即可知易懂的小道,它们决定了不同性质的情况的性质,而对于郭来说,实际上只有一种理,一种值得注意的连贯性,即任何情况或事物的自我,它总是被准确地描述为对可理解性和知识的抹杀。我们现在还可以看到唐君毅引用郭对王的说法“事无偶然”的注释的讽刺意味,唐君毅从中提取了他的关键术语“会趣”。它更直接地适用于王对礼的理解,即任何情况下的迷你道,趋向于“最小”,这也是受重视或渴望的。然而,对于郭本人来说,在何种意义上,单一的自我原则与趋向于缺乏的、因此受到重视的事物有关,这一点就不那么明显了。尽管如此,也许有一种方法可以理解这一点。 对郭来说,自然是万物脱离其“痕迹”的运作,即一种自然事件在另一件事上留下的意识对象。这就是一种“趋同”,对于郭来说,这是一种“小”原则,是个体事物的非讽刺性原则,即阐明因果关系的解释性联系,或者目的与手段的关系。真正的原则,即“自我如此”,与此相反,即省略所有对痕迹的提及。但这也是一种趋同:一种讽刺性的趋同。这就是郭所说的“消失”,这确实是一种聚集,但是抹去了个体实体超越其自我的特定身份,这既是最普遍的,也是最普遍的。在每种情况下都是最不妥协的独特之处。所以真正的理(自所以)是没有一切所谓的理,真正的会聚(互相消失)是没有一切所谓的会聚(痕迹之间的相互联系)。真正的道是非道,真正的价值是没有一切评价。理意味着一种可理解的、对于实现价值而言很重要的趋同。但对郭来说,这是一种讽刺的聚合,一种讽刺的可理解性,一种讽刺的关注,一种讽刺的价值。原则是“无”意义上的“一”,这就是为什么郭的“一”看起来很像“多”,事实上,它确实表明了对个体独特性的强调,达到了这样的程度:

no principle is any longer possible, nor indeed any discernible identifiable differences (traces), which is why his “many” seems so much like a “one.” In sum, Wang’s development of the idea of Li in his Zhouyilueli, expanding on ideas put forth in the Hanfeizi commentary to the Laozi and Wang’s own understanding of the Zhouyi, introduces the idea of multiple individual Lis as “mini-Daos,” bearing the same relation to each discrete situation that the Dao bears to the world as a whole. The overriding principle of organization here is based on the idea of “rule by the fewest,” rooted in a social-political paradigm in which all elements of a situation actively “seek” whatever is most scarce among them. The unseen, the absent, the Dark, being the most scarce in any situation, is the principle of that situation’s coherence. But this is particularized by the individual mode of scarcity relevant in that time and place, thus yielding a multiplicity of determinate principles, all of which converge in the overriding Dao. In the case of Guo Xiang, on the contrary, we have a critique of explanatory principles as such, ostensibly in order to affirm the uniqueness of each individual self-so event; but the theoretical result of this turn away from metaphysics, within the realm of discourse at least (as opposed to praxis), is in fact that affirmation of a single, abstract metaphysical principle that applies indiscriminately to all possible situations: the self-so. This continues to be the case for most of Chinese Buddhism, where the one coherence worth noticing is Emptiness, dependent co-arising. The one exception to this, as we shall see, is the Tiantai school, which posits also a sense in which Li is simultaneously multiple. It is to the Buddhist usages of Li that we now turn.
不再有任何原则,也不再有任何可辨别的可识别差异(痕迹),这就是为什么他的“多”看起来如此像“一”。总而言之,王在《周易略礼》中对礼思想的发展,在《韩非子注老》中提出的思想以及王自己对《周易》的理解的基础上,引入了作为“小道”的多个个体“礼”的思想。道与整个世界的每一个离散的情况都有同样的关系。这里的组织的首要原则是基于“最少的统治”的理念,植根于一种社会政治范式,在这种范式中,一种情况的所有要素都积极“寻求”其中最稀缺的东西。看不见的、缺席的、黑暗,在任何情况下都是最稀有的,是该情况的连贯性原则。但这是由于与当时和地点相关的个体稀缺模式而特殊化的,从而产生了多种确定的原则,所有这些原则都汇聚在压倒性的道中。相反,在郭象的例子中,我们对解释原则本身进行了批判,表面上是为了肯定每个个体自我事件的独特性;实际上,我们对解释原则本身进行了批判。但至少在话语领域(相对于实践),这种背离形而上学的理论结果实际上是对一个单一的、抽象的形而上学原则的肯定,该原则不加区别地适用于所有可能的情况:自我如此。对于大多数中国佛教来说,情况仍然如此,其中值得注意的一个连贯性是空性、缘起性。正如我们将看到的,天台学派是一个例外,它也提出了一种“理”同时是多重的意义。我们现在转向佛教对“礼”的用法。

BEYOND ONE AND MANY 超越一和多

Li in Tiantai and Huayan Buddhism
天台宗与华严宗的理

HOW EMPTINESS BECAME LI 空如何变成理

I will be considering mainly the Huayan and Tiantai schools of Chinese Buddhism here, as the two most elaborately systematic and also most “sinitic” of the Chinese traditions of Buddhist doctrine, and also because it is here that the term Li is given its most distinctive, elaborate, and influential developments. Prior to the advent of these schools, Li had begun to be used grammatically in the sense of notice-worthy coherence, as intelligibility, and, in this extended sense, as a “principle” or idea that is to be known and understood, as something that is so prior to the intervention of deliberate volitions, and thus in some cases as a pervasive fact which may or may not enter consciousness. This is true even in the more specialized and highly developed usages of Wang Bi and Guo Xiang just examined, though with important ironic twists. In Guo’s contrast of Li to “knowing” and “doing,” as what is so within the limits of a thing prior to its overstepping these limits by means of trace-cognition and trace-volition, the implication of a potentiality that has not yet been realized or brought to awareness is especially highlighted, a dimension of the term that will come to play a larger role in the Buddhist usages. For Guo this aspect was pushed to the point of a kind of ironic self-overcoming: Li was not merely as-yet-unknown, but literally unknowable, and thus this “potential” and “principle” ended up being no principle at all, not even a genuine “fact” with any determinate content, but merely noncognizability per se. The Tang Daoist apocryphal text 關尹子 Guanyinzi opens with a gloss on the first line of the Daodejing that effectively summarizes the position to which Guo’s innovation has brought
我在这里主要考虑的是中国佛教的华严宗和天台宗,它们是中国佛教教义中最系统、最“中国化”的两个传统,也因为正是在这里,“理”一词被赋予了最独特的含义。 、详尽且有影响力的发展。在这些流派出现之前,“理”已经开始在语法上被用来指值得注意的连贯性、可理解性,以及在这种扩展意义上,作为一种“原则”或需要被认识和理解的想法,如这是在有意的意志干预之前发生的事情,因此在某些情况下是一个可能进入意识也可能不进入意识的普遍事实。即使在刚才考察的王弼和郭象的更专业和高度发展的用法中也是如此,尽管有重要的讽刺性的曲折。郭将“理”与“知”和“行”进行对比,即事物在通过痕迹认知和痕迹意志超越这些界限之前的界限之内,隐含着一种尚未发生的潜力。特别强调了“已被认识”或“被认识”,该术语的一个维度将在佛教用法中发挥更大的作用。对于郭来说,这一点被推到了一种讽刺性的自我克服的地步:“理”不仅是未知,而且是字面上的不可知,因此这个“势”和“理”最终变得根本不是理。甚至不是一个具有任何确定内容的真正的“事实”,而仅仅是本身的不可认知性。唐代道教伪文本《关尹子》在《道德经》的第一行以注释开头,有效地总结了郭的创新所带来的地位

philosophical Daoism: “It is not that there is a Dao which cannot be spoken or thought: unspeakableness and unthinkability are themselves Dao” (非有道不可言,不可言即道;非有道不可思,不可思即道 feiyoudaobukeyan, bukeyan ji dao; fei you dao bu ke si, bu ke si ji dao). 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} For Guo, Li is this very unthinkability and nothing more. Similarly, and again with highly intensified irony, this meant that in a sense it was not merely potential, but always actual: the self-so operates even in its opposite, in deliberate activity and knowledge. But it must be remembered especially that these usages never for an instant depart from Li’s connection with value, with soteriology in the broad sense. It is not just a principle, a common fact, a potentiality, or a coherence among and applicable to a number of particulars, but rather is one that is being asserted to be worthy of notice and attention because of the role it can play in attaining a specific human goal.
道家思想:“非有道不可言,不可思,不可言不可思,即是道”。不可言几道;非有道不可思,不可思极道)。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 对于郭、李来说,这是非常不可想象的,仅此而已。类似地,再次具有高度讽刺性的是,这意味着在某种意义上它不仅是潜在的,而且总是现实的:自我甚至在其对立面,在刻意的活动和知识中运作。但必须特别记住的是,这些用法丝毫没有脱离李与价值、与广义的救世论的联系。它不仅仅是一项原则、一个共同事实、一种潜力或一系列细节之间的连贯性并适用于许多细节,而是因为它在实现目标方面所发挥的作用而被断言值得关注和关注。特定的人类目标。
In the Buddhist case, this is generally the soteriological goal of transcending samsâra, attaining Nirvana, overcoming suffering. As Aramaki Noritoshi has shown, early Chinese Buddhist thinkers such as Zhu Daosheng (360?-434) and Xie Lingyun (385-433) began to use the term Li as synonymous with “dharmatā”-法性 dharma-nature-and by extension, Buddha-nature: it is that which must be realized in order to become a Buddha. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} Kan’no Hiroshi has further pointed out that a certain conflation of Li with Ultimate Truth, and with Buddhahood itself, also occurs in Zhu Daosheng’s writings, mapping the 理事 Li / Li / Li//\mathrm{Li} / shi pair onto the Ultimate Truth/ Conventional Truth structure of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. 3 Li 3 Li ^(3)Li{ }^{3} \mathrm{Li} is the fact about things-in this case, about all things without exception, hence the omnipresent universal universal—attention to which will lead to liberation. For those schools that consider Emptiness to be ultimate truth, or what needs to be realized in order to obtain the optimal human value-Buddhahood— Li is accordingly Śūnyatā, Emptiness, conditioned co-arising, and with it the consequent facts of impermanence, suffering, the Four Noble Truths, and so on. It is as non-ironic value-laden intelligibility that this is called Li, coherence, here, but it also happens that this intelligibility is asserted to be intelligible in every single instance of experience without exception, thus bringing in the sense of coherence as unification and universality. But that the value-aspect in particular is what qualifies this particular fact about things to be called Li is made most clear by 吉藏 Jizang (549-623), the great theoretician of the 三論 Sanlun (Three Treatise) school, who here as in many cases addresses the root issue with unusual clarity. In Jizang’s 大乘玄義 Dasheng Xuanyi (Abstruse Meaning of the Mahayana) we find the following question and answer:
就佛教而言,这通常是超越轮回、达到涅槃、克服痛苦的救世目标。正如荒牧德俊所表明的那样,早期中国佛教思想家如朱道胜(360?-434)和谢灵运(385-433)开始使用“理”一词作为“dharmatā”(法性法性)的同义词,并由此延伸、佛性:是成佛所必须证悟的。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2} 菅野博进一步指出,在朱道生的著作中,也出现了“理”与究竟真理以及佛性本身的某种混淆。 Li / Li / Li//\mathrm{Li} / shi 配对印度大乘佛教的胜义谛/世俗谛结构。 3 Li 3 Li ^(3)Li{ }^{3} \mathrm{Li} 是关于事物的事实——在这种情况下,是关于所有事物无一例外的事实,因此是无所不在的普遍普遍性——对它的关注将导致解放。对于那些认为空性是究竟真理,或者是为了获得最佳的人类价值——佛果而需要证悟的学派来说,理就是空性,空性,有为共生,以及随之而来的无常、痛苦的事实。 、四圣谛等等。正是这种非讽刺性的、充满价值的可理解性,在这里被称为“理”,但也碰巧的是,这种可理解性被断言在每一个经验实例中都是可理解的,无一例外,从而带来了作为统一的连贯感。和普遍性。但是,三论三论派的伟大理论家吉藏·吉藏(549-623)最清楚地阐明了价值方面是什么,限定了被称为“理”的事物的这一特殊事实。在许多情况下,以异常清晰的方式解决根本问题。在地藏的《大乘玄义》中,有如下问答:
Q: In the first [of the above] explanations, you specified Existence [有 you] as the Substance [體 ti] and Emptiness [空 kong] as its
问:在第一个解释中,您将“有你”指定为“体ti”,将“空”指定为“空”。
Function [用 yong]. Can we also then take Existence as Li and Emptiness as its Function? [A:] Substance is simply another name for Li; so when we specify Existence as the Substance, we are already specifying Existence as the Li. But all realize the Way [i.e., Bodhi, enlightenment] by perceiving Li. If we were to say that Existence is Li, it would mean that perceiving Existence [leads to] realization of the Way. But in fact all the sages cut off their karmic entanglements by perceiving Emptiness, so we know clearly that Emptiness is Li. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
功能[用勇]。那么我们是否也可以以有为理,以空为用呢? [答:] 物质只是李的别称;因此,当我们指定存在为物质时,我们已经指定存在为理。但皆以知理而证道。若说有即理,则知有有而悟道。但事实上,一切圣人都是通过觉悟空性来断除业障的,所以我们清楚地知道空性就是理。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4}
The point here is eminently clear. Here as in Wang Bi, ti is already expected to be in some sense synonymous with Li . Ti is paired with yong, and when correlated with Existence and Emptiness, Existence is the real omnipresent term, hence the ti, while Emptiness is one aspect of all existence that is being picked out and focused upon in a particular context, and thus goes in the yong position. Emptiness is simply one fact among many about every Existence. But this is where the synonymity with Li and shi breaks down: Li is specifically t i t i tit i as value. If it were merely a matter of objective omnipresence, or ontological grounding, Existence would be a predicate as worthy of the name Li as Emptiness; it is synonymous with Substance, and Existence is Substance in the sense of what function depends upon, or what is given concrete particular (partial) expression by function. This means simply that wherever the function in question is found (in this case, Emptiness), it will be associated with some traceably prior Existence. Existence is a universal term as much as Emptiness is; it is applicable everywhere, and is thus equally qualified to be the omnipresent universal universal. But the term Li indicates precisely the dimension of value and intelligibility: it is not just what is universal, or universal within a given class or group, but what it is worthwhile to notice about that class, or about all things. In the Buddhist case, it is usually Emptiness that one must understand in order to be liberated, and therefore Emptiness is called Li .
这里的要点非常明确。这里和王弼一样,“体”在某种意义上已经被认为是“理”的同义词。体与用配对,当与存在和空相关时,存在是真正无所不在的术语,因此是体,而空是在特定上下文中被挑选和关注的所有存在的一个方面,因此进入勇位。空性只是每一种存在的众多事实中的一个。但这就是“礼”和“是”的同义词被打破的地方:礼是具体的 t i t i tit i 作为价值。如果它只是一个客观无所不在或本体论基础的问题,那么“存在”将是一个与“空”一样名副其实的谓词;它是实体的同义词,而存在是实体,就功能所依赖的东西或功能所赋予的具体特定(部分)表达的意义而言。这仅仅意味着无论在哪里找到所讨论的函数(在本例中为空),它都将与一些可追溯的先前存在相关联。存在与空性一样,都是一个普遍的术语。它适用于任何地方,因此同样有资格成为无所不在的普遍普遍性。但“理”一词恰恰表明了价值和可理解性的维度:它不仅仅是普遍的东西,或者某个特定阶级或群体中普遍存在的东西,而是关于该阶级或所有事物值得关注的东西。在佛教中,为了解脱,通常必须了解空性,因此空性被称为“理”。
It is important to understand, then, how this seemingly very abstract usage of the term Li, which lends itself rather persuasively to translation as something such as big P “Principle,” or as “potential,” still accords with the definition of Li in the indigenous tradition as we have characterized it above. We said that Li is a harmonious coherence that, if harmoniously cohered with by a human being, leads to further harmonious coherence. Emptiness is Li because it is a potential object of knowledge and practical realization. It can be “accorded with” in one’s cognitions and behaviors. When this is done, one achieves liberation from the disharmony of samsâra, from suffering. So although it is true that Emptiness is the omnipresent “common trait” shared by all existences, and in that sense the unifying category that joins them, this is not what qualifies it to be called Li. The unification and
那么,重要的是要理解,“Li”一词看似非常抽象的用法,相当有说服力地翻译为诸如大P“原则”或“潜力”之类的东西,但仍然符合《Li》中对Li的定义。正如我们上面所描述的土著传统。我们说,理是一种和谐的连贯性,如果一个人能够和谐地连贯性,就会导致进一步的和谐连贯性。空性之所以是理,是因为它是知识和实际证悟的潜在对象。它可以“符合”一个人的认知和行为。当做到这一点时,人们就从轮回的不和谐、痛苦中解脱出来。因此,虽然空性确实是一切存在所共有的无所不在的“共同特征”,并且在这个意义上是连接它们的统一范畴,但这并不是它被称为“理”的资格。统一和

oneness of all things denoted by the term Emptiness as L i L i LiL i is rather a sort of by-product. The point is the way in which a human being may himself “cohere harmoniously” with all existences without exception (in this case, apprehending them without attachment), merely by harmoniously cohering with (knowing, realizing) this one particular, Emptiness, Li. Li becomes the omnipresent universal universal, the abstract trait or category shared by all things, here as in Guo Xiang, only secondarily. Nothing is implied here about Emptiness as a kind of “night where all cows are black,” the undifferentiated oneness that is the real reality into which all other things are reducible, in contrast to which all things are illusion, except in this derivative, pragmatic sense.
一切事物的统一性,用空性一词来表示 L i L i LiL i 而是一种副产品。关键在于,一个人可以无一例外地与所有存在“和谐地结合”(在这种情况下,不带任何执着地理解它们),仅仅通过和谐地结合(了解,实现)这个特殊的空性,理。理成为无所不在的普遍普遍性,万物共有的抽象特征或范畴,在这里就像在郭象那里一样,只是次要的。这里没有暗示空性是一种“所有牛都是黑色的夜晚”,无差别的一体性是所有其他事物都可以还原为的真实现实,与之相反,所有事物都是幻觉,除了在这种派生的、实用的方面之外。感觉。
That said, it is also true that the specific content of this particular Li , Emptiness, is precisely nonduality, itself an effacement of apparent separateness, a kind of unity. This is the first level of coherence in our threefold definition of Li: sticking together. For Emptiness means the absence of any definitive self-nature for any entity, the unintelligibility of the borders that separate it from what is other than it. It so happens that in Buddhism this is regarded as what needs to be seen in order to achieve liberation. The reasons for this, and the implications of “unity” in this more radical sense in the Chinese Buddhist understanding of Li, must be clearly understood before we continue. For in Tiantai and Huayan, we will see the deployment of Li as implying first and foremost “nonobstruction” between differentiated parts of existence, in a way that affirms both unity and differentiation; it is here that it becomes feasible to simply cut straight to the chase and translate Li as something such as “Wholeness” or “Whole,” as James Behuniak has recently suggested: the wholeness of the whole which is whole at every locus, manifesting as the wholeness of any possible individual being, which exists thereby as an individual whole that is at once a part within the overall whole. 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} To understand what kind of whole this is, and why this is important, however, we must examine the basic Buddhist problematic of soteriology, which here gives Li its meaning as liberating. For as we shall see, we have here to do with a kind of wholeness that forms no total static whole with definite characteristics, an ironic wholeness that does have the efficacy of wholeness (the subsumption, transcending, and integration of the parts) precisely by not being any determinate whole at all. But this will come in at least two distinct types in the Tiantai and Huayan cases: the former will present us with a vision of local coherence and global incoherence rooted in the indigenous Chinese mereologies of whole and part, developing some of the ironies and ironic-non-ironic relations derived therefrom, while the latter will present something quite new in China, something perhaps closer to the Indo-European roots of Buddhist thought: a two-tiered ontology not of wholes and parts but of real (though ironic) conceptual universals (or
也就是说,这个特殊的“理”(空性)的具体内容也确实是不二性,本身就是对表面分离的消除,一种统一。这是我们对“礼”的三重定义中的第一层一致性:团结一致。因为空性意味着任何实体都没有任何明确的自性,将其与其他事物分开的边界是不可理解的。恰好,在佛教中,这被认为是获得解脱所需要看到的。在我们继续之前,必须清楚地理解其中的原因,以及中国佛教对礼的理解中这种更激进意义上的“统一”的含义。因为在《天台》和《华严》中,我们会看到理的部署首先意味着存在的差异部分之间的“无碍”,以一种既肯定统一又差异的方式;正是在这里,我们可以直接切入正题,将 Li 翻译为“整体性”或“整体”之类的东西,正如詹姆斯·贝胡尼亚克 (James Behuniak) 最近所建议的那样:整体的整体性在每个位置都是整体的,表现为任何可能的个体存在的整体性,因此作为个体整体而存在,同时又是总体整体的一部分。 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 然而,为了理解这是什么样的整体,以及为什么这很重要,我们必须研究佛教救恩论的基本问题,这里赋予“理”解脱的含义。 因为正如我们将看到的,我们在这里涉及到一种整体性,这种整体性不形成具有明确特征的完全静止的整体,一种具有讽刺意义的整体性,它确实具有整体性的功效(部分的包容、超越和整合),恰恰是通过根本不是任何确定的整体。但在天台和华严的案例中,这至少会出现两种不同的类型:前者将向我们展示一种植根于中国本土的整体和部分分体论的局部一致性和全球不一致性的愿景,并发展出一些讽刺和反讽——由此衍生出非讽刺关系,而后者将在中国呈现一些全新的东西,也许更接近佛教思想的印欧根源:一种不是整体和部分的两层本体论,而是真实的(尽管具有讽刺意味的)概念普遍性的本体论(或者

rather, one such universal: the universal universal, the indeterminate as such) straining to become a form of radical immanence by means of the uniquely ironic nature of its universal (not “whole”). We will see, however, that the Huayan project arguably never really breaks totally free of the kind of dichotomous transcendence encoded in its origins in two-tiered ontological thinking, as is most evident in the dichotomy it continues to maintain, in sharp contrast to Tiantai, between reality and appearance, a typical concomitant of two-tiered universal-particular as opposed to one-tiered whole-part thinking.
相反,这样一个普遍性:普遍的普遍性,不确定性本身)通过其普遍性(而不是“整体”)的独特讽刺性质,竭力成为一种激进的内在性形式。然而,我们将看到,华严计划可以说从未真正完全摆脱其起源中编码的两层本体论思维中的二分超越,这一点在它继续维持的二分法中最为明显,与天台山形成鲜明对比,在现实与表象之间,是两层普遍-特殊思维的典型伴随物,而不是一层整体-部分思维。
If we take Abidharma as an accurate representative of early Buddhist thinking, we can say that we have there one of the most radical assertions of “simple location” in the history of the world, and one that does not shrink from drawing the full consequences of this doctrine and denying any reality to universals or coherences or unities at all. The Abidharmic conception of the momentariness of dharmas, for example, stipulates that each moment of experience is genuinely separate from all others, that putative continuities in matter or mind are merely misperceived pluralities, such that not even a meager universal such as “this table” exists (in reality, there are a stream of similar but not identical experiences that are erroneously grouped together to form the conception of the stable table here), let alone some kind of Platonic Table as such. For “thing” is itself, in this sense, just another universal, as is “this.” Each dharma disappears as soon as it appears, and these are the ultimate constituents of reality. Given this state of affairs, we might consider the emergence of Mahayana doctrines that could countenance either the universal universal (the omnipresent) or any other real coherence in the world with some wonderment. How did this come about? The story is indeed an amazing one.
如果我们将阿比达摩视为早期佛教思想的准确代表,我们可以说,我们拥有世界历史上最激进的“简单位置”主张之一,并且毫不犹豫地得出了这一点的全部后果。这一学说并否认任何普遍性、连贯性或统一性的现实。例如,阿比达摩的佛法瞬间性概念规定,每个体验时刻都与其他所有时刻真正分开,物质或心灵中假定的连续性只是被误解的多元性,因此即使是像“这张桌子”这样的微不足道的普遍性也不是。存在(实际上,有一系列相似但不相同的经验被错误地组合在一起形成稳定表的概念),更不用说某种柏拉图表了。因为从这个意义上说,“事物”本身就是另一个普遍性,“这个”也是如此。一切法一出现就消失,这些都是实相的究竟成分。鉴于这种情况,我们可能会惊讶地考虑大乘教义的出现,这些教义可以支持普遍普遍性(无所不在)或世界上任何其他真正的一致性。这是怎么发生的?这个故事确实是一个令人惊奇的故事。
To understand the way Chinese Buddhist use the term Li, which is intrinsically linked to what is valued, and why it is identified with omnipresent characteristics such as Emptiness, or with other forms of omnipresence, we first have to grasp what value is for the Buddhist tradition. Sentient beings experience both suffering and pleasure. These happen at different times. Simply stated, value in Buddhism always means something about ending the suffering of sentient beings. Early Buddhism, however, claims that all conditional things are suffering-not merely that they are marked by suffering, which would already be quite radical when predicated of all possible experiences, but that finite, conditional things, to the extent that they are finite and conditional, are ipso facto suffering itself: “When a dharma arises, it is only suffering that arises; when a dharma perishes, it is only suffering that perishes” (Samyutta-Nikâya III.134). Why is this claim made? It is the arising and perishing itself that is the suffering. Abidharmic literature expresses this with the doctrine of the three types of suffering,
要理解中国佛教如何使用“礼”这个词,这个词与所珍视的事物有着内在的联系,以及为什么它被等同于无所不在的特征,如空性,或其他形式的无所不在,我们首先必须了解佛教的价值是什么。传统。众生都会经历痛苦和快乐。这些发生在不同的时间。简单地说,佛教的价值总是意味着结束众生的痛苦。然而,早期佛教声称,所有有条件的事物都是苦——不仅是它们以苦为标志,当以所有可能的经验为基础时,这已经是相当激进的了,而且是有限的、有条件的事物,在某种程度上,它们是有限的、有条件的。苦本身就是有缘的:“法生起时,只是苦生起;当佛法灭亡时,灭亡的只是痛苦”(《相应部》III.134)。为什么提出这样的主张?生灭本身就是苦。阿比达米文献用三种痛苦的教义表达了这一点,

which together cover the whole range of temporal experience: (1) The suffering of suffering (dukkha-dukkha,苦苦 kuku); (2) The suffering of decay (viparinama-dukkha, 壞苦 huaiku); (3) The suffering of conditionality per se (sankhāra-dukkha 行苦 xingku) The first is literal suffering. The second is all experiences that are not suffering: pleasure and neutral sensations. These are called suffering because, inasmuch as they are conditional and therefore impermanent, they will necessarily decay, and the decaying of nonsuffering is by definition to that extent the advent of suffering. The third is the global term for this state of alternation itself, the fact that pain and pleasure alternate, their intrinsic instability, inasmuch as suffering has just been shown to pervade the entire suffering-nonsuffering spectrum. Their instability signifies that they cannot be controlled, that they are something beyond the power of any will, and thus that they are imposed upon experience, they are literally suffered. Thus, suffering is merely a restatement of the other “marks of the Dharma” in early Buddhism: “impermanence” (anicca) and non-self (anatta). “Non-self” simply means that no single cause can account for the arising of any fact. If one could, that cause would ipso facto be a self, for self here signifies above all control. This possibility is excluded by the key theoretical insight of early Buddhism, “dependent co-arising” (pratītyasamutpāda). This signifies not merely that all events are causally conditioned, but that no single cause produces an effect on its own. Heterogeneous causes and conditions are required for the arising of an effect, a premise accepted in early Buddhism and given a more rigorous theoretical justification in Mahayana theory. So whatever arises cannot be in the control of any single cause, and thus will necessarily contravene, and thus cause suffering to, any single willed agenda, sooner or later.
它们共同涵盖了所有现世经验: (1) 苦中之苦 (dukkha-dukkha,苦苦 kuku); (2) 坏苦 (viparinama-dukkha, 坏苦 huaiku); (3)因缘苦(sankhāra-dukkha 行苦) 第一个是字面的苦。第二个是所有非痛苦的体验:快乐和中性的感觉。这些之所以被称为苦,是因为它们是有条件的,因此是无常的,它们必然会衰变,而无苦的衰变根据定义,在某种程度上就是苦的出现。第三个是这种交替状态本身的全球术语,即痛苦和快乐交替的事实,以及它们内在的不稳定性,因为痛苦刚刚被证明遍及整个痛苦与非痛苦的范围。它们的不稳定意味着它们无法被控制,它们超出了任何意志的力量,因此它们被强加于经验,它们实际上是受苦的。因此,痛苦只是早期佛教中其他“佛法标记”的重述:“无常”(anicca)和无我(anatta)。 “无我”只是意味着没有任何单一原因可以解释任何事实的产生。如果可以的话,这个原因本身就是一个自我,因为这里的自我首先意味着控制。这种可能性被早期佛教的关键理论洞见“缘起”(pratītyasamutpāda)所排除。这不仅意味着所有事件都是有因果关系的,而且没有任何单一原因会单独产生结果。果的产生需要异质的因和条件,这是早期佛教所接受的前提,并在大乘理论中给出了更严格的理论依据。 因此,无论发生什么,都无法由任何单一原因控制,因此迟早必然会违反任何单一意志的议程,从而给任何单一意志的议程带来痛苦。
Obviously, from the other side, since the point is that an absolutely continent separation between suffering and pleasure can never be enforced, that neither can be in control of the entire range of experience, we could equally say that pleasure pervades the entire field, and, in a way, this is just what the Mahayana will go on to do. But pleasure is not the problem. Suffering is. Hence, the focus is on suffering as a given fact, and value is defined as the ending of suffering. Conditionality per se is suffering. Hence, the definition of what alone is really valuable, in Buddhism, is unconditionality. This is called Nirvana, the ending of the conditional, of the impermanent, of suffering. In early Buddhism, it is conceived of as what is left over when the conditional is allowed to fade away, the negation and elimination of the conditional. As such, it is strictly indeterminable, for a determination is by definition conditional; indeed, determination is itself conditionality per se. Hence we get only apophatic characterizations of it in early texts: it is not greed, hatred, or delusion, it is not earth, air, fire, or wind, it is not this world or any other world, it is not this, not that.
显然,从另一方面来看,既然问题是痛苦和快乐之间的绝对大陆分离永远不可能被强制执行,两者都无法控制整个经验范围,所以我们同样可以说快乐遍及整个领域,并且,在某种程度上,这正是大乘将要继续做的事情。但快乐不是问题。苦是。因此,重点是将痛苦作为既定事实,而价值被定义为痛苦的结束。条件本身就是痛苦。因此,在佛教中,真正有价值的定义是无条件的。这称为涅槃,是有为、无常、苦的终结。在早期佛教中,它被认为是当条件被允许消失时所剩下的东西,即条件的否定和消除。因此,它是严格不可确定的,因为根据定义,确定是有条件的;事实上,决定本身就是条件。因此,我们在早期的经文中只能得到对它的否定性描述:它不是贪、瞋、痴,它不是地、风、火或风,它不是这个世界或任何其他世界,它不是这个世界,也不是其他世界。那。
However, there remains the problem that the unconditional is thus contrasted to the conditional, which it seems to exclude. Strictly speaking, this makes the unconditional itself conditional: it is conditioned by the absence of the “conditional.” Mahayana philosophy can be seen in part as an attempt to reconsider this problem, taking the unconditioned as truly unconditional, and therefore in some manner copresent with or inclusive of the conditional. Nirvana is no longer the negation of samsâra: instead, the Mahayana sutras begin to assert that Nirvana and samsâra, form and Emptiness, sentient beings and Buddhas are nondual. In some sense or other, the unconditional is already present: as the Emptiness (lack of self-nature) that is the ultimate characteristic of all conditioned states, as Buddha-nature, which is already everywhere, as the preexistent Original Mind, or what have you. The unconditional is, hence, in any of these versions, truly omnipresent in all times, places, and states. For to be present in only some times, places, and states would mean to depend for its presence on the condition of “being in those times, places, and states,” hence to be conditional. Hence, value and omnipresence become synonymous. Omnipresence is a kind of continuity between apparently separate things, a togetherness, a bringing together, a unification: a kind of coherence. It is also, as unconditioned and not limitable to any particular predicate as contrasted to that predicate’s exclusion, beyond the reach of ordinary speech and perception: the unintelligible. Here we have all the ingredients of the traditional Chinese concepts of Li: value, the cohering of apparently diverse things (non-ironic cohering), unintelligibility (ironic coherence), that which the attention is to focus on for ultimate value to be attained (intelligibility). Of course, this presents new theoretical and practical difficulties, which the each of the Chinese Buddhist schools attempt to handle in their own distinctive ways.
然而,仍然存在一个问题,即无条件与条件相对立,而条件似乎被排除在外。严格来说,这使得无条件本身成为有条件的:它以“条件”的缺失为条件。大乘哲学可以部分地被视为重新考虑这个问题的尝试,将无条件视为真正无条件,因此以某种方式与有条件共存或包含在内。涅槃不再是对轮回的否定,大乘经典开始主张涅槃与轮回、色与空、众生与佛不二。在某种意义上,无为已经存在:如空性(缺乏自性),它是所有有为状态的最终特征,如佛性,它已经无处不在,如先存的本心,或者什么你。因此,在任何这些版本中,无条件在所有时间、地点和状态中都真正无所不在。因为仅存在于某些时间、地点和状态意味着其存在依赖于“存在于那些时间、地点和状态”的条件,因此是有条件的。因此,价值和无所不在成为同义词。无所不在是表面上独立的事物之间的一种连续性、一种结合、一种聚集、一种统一:一种连贯性。与谓词的排除相比,它也是无条件且不受任何特定谓词限制的,超出了普通言语和感知的范围:难以理解的。 这里我们拥有中国传统理概念的所有成分:价值、明显不同事物的凝聚力(非讽刺凝聚力)、不可理解性(讽刺凝聚力)、注意力要集中在要实现最终价值的事物上(可懂度)。当然,这提出了新的理论和实践困难,中国佛教各宗派都试图以自己独特的方式来解决这些困难。
Typically, however, even when this coextension of the conditioned and the unconditioned was aggressively asserted in Indian Buddhism, as in the works of Nāgārjuna, a different kind of distinction between them was made by means of the notion of “Two Truths.” The question of what kinds of statements may count as legitimate is the only standard of truth in this Buddhism, and this is thoroughly determined by the overriding soteriological aims of the entire Buddhist tradition. Every statement and every practice are justified solely in terms of their utility for the goal of diminishing suffering. That means that both Buddhist epistemology and Buddhist ethics are thoroughgoingly pragmatic: what is true is what is conducive to ending suffering, and what is good is action that is conducive to ending suffering. In early Buddhism, we may conceive these along the lines delineated in the “parable of the raft”: what helps one get across is good, is useful, is valid, is to be clung to for the duration of one’s journey. What is on the other shore is neither true nor untrue, neither good nor bad; all such terms pertain only
然而,通常情况下,即使印度佛教中积极主张有为与无为的共延,如龙树菩萨的著作,他们还是通过“二谛”的概念对它们进行了不同类型的区分。什么样的说法才算合法,这是佛教真理的唯一标准,而这完全是由整个佛教传统的救世论目标决定的。每一种说法和每一种做法的合理性都仅仅在于它们对于减少痛苦这一目标的效用。这就是说,佛教认识论和佛教伦理学都是彻底的实用主义:有利于灭苦的才是真,有利于灭苦的行才是善。在早期佛教中,我们可以按照“木筏寓言”中所描述的思路来理解这些:能帮助人渡过难关的东西是好的、有用的、有效的,是在旅途中要紧握的东西。彼岸的事物,无真无假,无好无坏;所有此类术语仅适用于

to the intermediate realm of what is relevant for the goal of ending suffering-and, of course, this means mainly Buddhist doctrines and practices. This is the realm where it is meaningful to speak of good and bad or true and false, and in which one is pragmatically faced with a choice between them. True is different from false, as clinging to the raft is different from sinking. But this has nothing to do with contradiction; it has to do with utility in the goal of ending suffering, which is accomplished by ending attachment to desire and definitive views about reality. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
与结束痛苦的目标相关的中间境界——当然,这主要指的是佛教教义和修行。在这个领域中,谈论好与坏或真与假是有意义的,人们务实地面临着在它们之间做出选择。真与假不同,正如执木筏与沉没不同。但这与矛盾无关。它与结束痛苦目标的效用有关,这是通过结束对欲望的执着和对现实的明确看法来实现的。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
When this model develops in the hands of Nāgārjuna to the full-fledged Two Truths model, we have the same structure expanded and articulated with greater precision. Here too, “conduciveness to ending suffering” is the sole criterion for “truth.” But in Conventional Truth, Nāgārjuna includes two things: ordinary speech (I, you, cause, effect, world, time, entities, etc.) and specifically Buddhist doctrines (Four Noble Truths, no-self, nirvana, suffering, dependent co-arising, etc.). The criterion for including both of these under the heading of “truth” is exactly the same: not that they correspond to an external reality or can be consistently unpacked without self-contradiction, but that speaking and acting in accordance with them is conducive to the ending of suffering. Without ordinary language, it is impossible to give instructions on how to end suffering, to point out the problem of suffering, to point out the doctrines and practices of Buddhism, even those that contradict them.
当这个模型在龙树手中发展为成熟的二谛模型时,我们就以更精确的方式扩展和阐明了相同的结构。在这里,“有利于结束痛苦”也是“真理”的唯一标准。但在世俗真理中,龙树包括两件事:普通言语(我、你、因、果、世界、时间、实体等)和具体的佛教教义(四圣谛、无我、涅槃、苦、缘起)。的产生等)。将这两者归入“真理”的标准是完全相同的:不是它们符合外在的现实,或者可以前后一致地解开而不自相矛盾,而是按照它们来说话和做事,有利于真理的实现。苦难的结束。如果没有平常的语言,就不可能指导如何止息、​​指出痛苦的问题、指出佛教的教义和修行,甚至是与之相矛盾的教义和修行。
Then there is ultimate truth. Ultimate truth cannot be spoken or conceptualized, but can only be experienced: it is the end of suffering itself, liberation of mind, rather than any cognitive information about the world. Liberation of mind is not allegiance to any picture of how the world is. In fact, it is described only negatively, precisely as the lack of any identifiable predicates. The possibility of a definitive right view about reality, the bare “being-so” of any state of affairs, falls with the belief in self-nature. For “being-so” would have to be something that is warranted by the state of affairs itself, acting as a single cause, and this is just what the denial of self-nature, of a definite essence, denies. The state of affairs would be the cause, the fact that the state of affairs is thus and so, is unambiguously one way or another, would be the effect-a one to one causality that is definitely excluded by all Buddhist theory from the Abidharma on. “This cup is red,” means, “this cup alone is the cause of the redness attributed to the cup.” Essence is singlehanded causality. Emptiness of essence really means simply ontological ambiguity: not the usual epistemological ambiguity, where we assume that in itself each thing is simply what it is, but our perception of it is vague or admits of multiple readings; rather, ontological ambiguity, where any possible something is in and of itself incapable of simply being one way or another to the exclusion of other ways, where to be is to be ambiguous.
然后就是终极真理。终极真理无法言说或概念化,只能体验:它是痛苦本身的终结、心灵的解放,而不是关于世界的任何认知信息。思想的解放并不是忠于世界的任何图景。事实上,它只是被负面描述,确切地说是缺乏任何可识别的谓词。对现实的明确正确看法的可能性,即任何事态的赤裸裸的“存在”,取决于对自性的信仰。因为“如此”必须是由事态本身作为单一原因所保证的某种东西,而这正是对自性、对确定本质的否认所否认的。事物的状态是因,事物的状态如此这般,明确地是这样或那样的事实,将是结果——一对一的因果关系,这是所有佛教理论都明确排除在《阿毗达磨》之外的。 。 “这个杯子是红色的”,意思是“这个杯子本身就是红色的原因”。本质是单一的因果关系。本质的空性实际上意味着本体论的模糊性:不是通常的认识论模糊性,我们假设每个事物本身就是它的本质,但我们对它的感知是模糊的或允许多种解读;相反,本体论的模糊性,任何可能的事物本身都不能简单地以一种或另一种方式存在,而排除其他方式,存在就是模糊的。
Definitive views about reality-that any given thing simply is one way or another, is this or that, in isolation from a relation to other things-are shown to be incoherent, and actually meaningless. We are told not to “cling to” the view of Emptiness, that to regard Emptiness as a view describing how things really are is worse than self-views as vast as Mt. Sumeru (as the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra says). Those who cling to the view of Emptiness are declared incurable (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 13:8). Emptiness is the ultimate truth, but “emptiness” is only the highest (i.e., most powerfully effective) conventional truth. Emptiness is itself not a description of any facts, and regarded as a description it is merely a conventional truth. Ultimate truth is neither “emptiness” nor “not-emptiness.” These are, as they say, mere “concepts.” But a concept of a certain type (a “true” one) is precisely what we normally call a truth: a proposition about what predicates actually, unambiguously, in all contexts, from all perspectives, apply to a particular entity: the essence or marks of that thing, which it alone, simply by being what it is, makes so. This is what “objective” means: that things are so on their own, without the participation of some other, some observer, some perspective. To regard the cup as red, or as empty, is clinging, is delusion. Redness is something that emerges momentarily through the cooperation of the cup and my cognitive apparatus. Emptiness, as a concept, is also something that emerges momentarily through the cooperation of the world and my cognitive apparatus. To regard reality as contradictory, or non-contradictory, is delusion. Clinging to emptiness, attachment to emptiness means no more and no less than regarding emptiness as objectively true. “Clinging” and “regarding something to be objectively [i.e., more than pragmatically] true” are synonyms. There is of course an obvious self-contradiction here, the usual relativism paradox: Is it true that there is no truth? The answer is: it is true only in the way in which truth is defined in Buddhism: saying so is conducive for the liberation from suffering of living beings.
关于现实的确定性观点——任何给定的事物只是这样或那样,是这样还是那样,与其他事物的关系无关——被证明是不连贯的,实际上是毫无意义的。我们被告知不要“执着”空性见,认为空性是描述事物真实面貌的见地,比须弥山广大的自我见更糟糕(如《维摩诘涅槃经》所说)。那些坚持空性观点的人被宣布为不可治愈的(Mūlamadhyyamakakārikā 13:8)。空性是究竟真理,但“空性”只是最高的(即最有力的)世俗真理。空性本身并不是对任何事实的描述,而作为一种描述,它只是世俗真理。究竟真理既不是“空”,也不是“非空”。正如他们所说,这些仅仅是“概念”。但某种类型的概念(“真”概念)正是我们通常所说的真理:关于谓词实际上、明确地、在所有上下文中、从所有角度适用于特定实体的命题:本质或标记事物的本质,它本身,仅仅通过它的本质,就使得它如此。这就是“客观”的含义:事物是独立存在的,没有其他人、观察者、观点的参与。视杯子为红色或空,是执着,是痴。红色是通过杯子和我的认知器官的配合而暂时出现的东西。空性作为一个概念,也是通过世界和我的认知器官的配合而暂时出现的东西。认为现实是矛盾的或不矛盾的,就是妄想。执着于空性、执着于空性,无异于视空性为客观真实。 “坚持”和“认为某件事客观地[即,不仅仅是务实地]真实”是同义词。当然,这里有一个明显的自相矛盾,即通常的相对主义悖论:真的没有真理吗?答案是:只有佛教所定义的真理才是正确的:这样说有利于众生脱离痛苦。
But here we have the older conditioned/unconditioned problem reconstituted in a new way: the divide between apophatic real truth and all possible determinations is now absolute. That real truth still has to be unconditional to be the end of suffering, and thus really should somehow pervade all conditional determinations. Although Nāgārjuna will say that the extent of Nirvana (the unconditional, the end of suffering) and the extent of samsâra (the conditional, suffering) are identical, this is interpreted in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism in terms of the Two Truths: the referent of the two is the same, the entire realm of experience, but they say absolutely different things about that same referent. Unconditional Truth says nothing about it, while all possible determinations about it are relegated to either falsehood or Conventional Truth. We have the same problem in a new, more elaborate form. It is this problem that Tiantai sets out to solve.
但在这里,我们以一种新的方式重构了旧的条件/非条件问题:否认的真实真理和所有可能的决定之间的鸿沟现在是绝对的。真正的真理仍然必须是无条件的,才能成为痛苦的终结,因此确实应该以某种方式遍及所有有条件的决定。虽然龙树菩萨会说涅槃的程度(无条件的,痛苦的终结)和轮回的程度(有条件的,痛苦)是相同的,但在印度藏传佛教中,这是用二谛来解释的:两者是相同的,整个经验领域,但他们对同一个所指对象的说法完全不同。无条件真理对此只字不提,而有关它的所有可能的决定都被归结为谎言或传统真理。我们以一种新的、更复杂的形式遇到了同样的问题。天台致力于解决的正是这个问题。

TIANTAI ON TRUTH, THREEFOLD
天台论真理,三重

We will begin with the usage of Li in early Tiantai, primarily in the works of the de facto founder of the school, Zhiyi 知顗 (538-597), since these develop earlier in time than the Huayan usages, although the latter are, as we shall, considerably more straightforward and easier to grasp. My account of Tiantai will mainly draw from the works of its three key figures, as it has traditionally defined itself, namely, Zhiyi, Jingxi Zhanran 荊溪湛然 (711782), and Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960-1028). Tiantai thinking begins, we may say, by adapting the above Nagurjunian ideas about Emptiness, and their translation into the terminology of Li by Zhu Daosheng, Jizang, and others, to ideas about the relation between provisional and ultimate truth as suggested by the Lotus Sutra (Saddharmapundarīkasūtra, 妙法蓮華經). This text appears to be the product of some sectarian infighting, between a still relatively new Mahayana movement and the “Śrāvakas” or disciples of the “Hinayana” (a pejorative Mahayana term meaning “Small Vehicle”), aggressively selling the idea that, contrary to the “Hinayana” claim, the goal of Buddhist practice is not the extinction of individual existence and suffering in Nirvana, thereby becoming an Arhat, but rather to be a Bodhisattva, to practice the Mahayana ideal of the Bodhisattva path, to work toward eventually becoming a Buddha, which means to be endlessly engaged in the project of knowing, interacting with, relating to, guiding, educating, and liberating all sorts of sentient beings, coming up with lots of different ways of edifying them in accordance with their particular dispositions and desires. But the polemic takes an odd turn in that the claim is not that the Śrāvakas are just plain wrong, but rather that they themselves, precisely in denying the goal of Bodhisattvahood, are in fact practicing the Bodhisattva path, are on their way to becoming Buddhas, are in fact already educating, transforming, setting an example for sentient beings, and at the same time working their way step by step toward Buddhahood, without knowing it. This disjunction between “what you are really accomplishing” and “the goal you have in mind in order to make that accomplishment possible” is the distinctive contribution of the Lotus Sutra, a motif that may remind us of Guo Xiang’s disjunction between goal-oriented Knowing and Li. The sutra proceeds to suggest, in effect, that all beings are Bodhisattvas, that being and Bodhisattvahood are in a way convertible terms, and, further, that there is really no difference between a Buddha-the end of the process of the Bodhisattva path—and a Bodhisattva-the means; the Buddha himself is eternally a Bodhisattva, being born, taking on various forms, educating beings, striving to find the truth, becoming enlightened and dying over and over again. This is significant because of the collapsing of the ends-means relation implied, made possible by the content of Bodhisattvahood (and
我们将从早期天台山的“礼”用法开始,主要出现在该学派事实上的创始人知顗(538-597)的著作中,因为这些用法比华严用法发展得更早,尽管后者是,正如我们将要看到的那样,这更加简单且更容易掌握。我对天台山的描述将主要取材于天台山三位关键人物的作品,正如天台山传统上所定义的那样,即郅一、荆溪湛然(711782)和四明知礼四明知礼(960-1028)。我们可以说,天台思想的开始,是通过将上述那古尔朱尼关于空性的思想,以及朱道生、地藏等人将其翻译成“理”的术语,与《法华经》所建议的关于临时真理和究竟真理之间关系的思想相结合。 (《妙法莲华经》)。这篇文章似乎是一些宗派内讧的产物,发生在相对较新的大乘运动和“声闻”或“小乘”(大乘贬义术语,意为“小乘”)的弟子之间,积极推销这样的观点:就“小乘”主张来说,佛教修行的目的不是要涅槃灭尽个体的存在和痛苦,从而成为阿罗汉,而是要成为菩萨,修行大乘菩萨道的理想,努力走向最终的境界。成佛,意味着无休止地致力于认识、互动、关联、引导、教育和解脱各种有情众生,并根据他们的特殊性情想出许多不同的方法来教化他们和欲望。 但争论出现了奇怪的转折,因为这种说法并不是说声闻者完全错误,而是他们自己,恰恰否认了菩萨的目标,实际上正在修行菩萨道,正在成佛的路上。事实上,他们已经在教化众生、转化众生、为众生树立榜样,同时也在不知不觉中一步步走向成佛。这种“你真正要成就的事”和“你为了实现这个成就而心中所想的目标”之间的分离,是《法华经》的独特贡献,这一主题可能会让我们想起郭象的分离:以目标为导向的认识与目标导向的认识之间的分离。和李。事实上,这部经继续表明,一切众生都是菩萨,众生与菩萨在某种程度上是可转换的术语,而且,佛陀之间实际上没有区别——菩萨道过程的终点——及菩萨——方便;佛陀本身就是永恒的菩萨,一遍又一遍地出生、化现、教化众生、努力寻找真理、成道和灭亡。这是很重要的,因为暗示的目的与手段关系的瓦解,通过菩萨的内容而成为可能(以及

thus, here, also Buddhahood): it means (1) to assume an infinity of forms, in accordance with the needs of other sentient beings, in order to (2) liberate and enlighten them so that they may do the same, thereby (3) educating oneself and moving toward Buddhahood. If all of these are going on at the same time, it means that both participants in any relation are simultaneously in the role of the deluded sentient being and of the enlightening Bodhisattva, taking on this deluded form without knowing it, as the Lotus says is possible, to enlighten in all directions, both self and others. The possibilities opened up here for reconceiving the relation between affirmation and negation, self and others, and oneness and manyness, are to be noted. This is also where a new solution to Guo Xiang’s problem is offered. Guo attempted to reunite Li and goal-oriented knowing by reducing both to Li, the non-deliberate self-so, at their ultimate level. The Lotus, on the other hand, reunites them by asserting that deliberate goal-oriented activity, while it is always ipso facto alienated from the truth, is also actually realizing the truth by means of that very alienation. The Śrāvakas affirm, embody, practice Bodhisattvahood, not in spite of denying it, but by denying it, neglecting it, knowing nothing about it, or even actively rejecting it. That is (a part of) their Bodhisattva practice. They are Bodhisattvas in the form of the antithesis or rejection of Bodhisattvas. They are Bodhisattvas as non-Bodhisattvas. This is precisely how they are going about doing the three things listed above which constitute the work of a Bodhisattva: taking on various forms (in this case, as a Śrāvaka), enlightening other beings, and working toward Buddhahood.
因此,在这里,也是佛性):它的意思是(1)根据其他有情众生的需要,呈现无边无边的形相,以便(2)解脱和启发他们,以便他们也能这样做,从而( 3)修养自己,走向成佛。如果所有这些同时发生,则意味着任何关系中的双方都同时扮演迷惑众生和觉悟菩萨的角色,在不知不觉中呈现这种迷惑形象,正如莲花所说:可能,全方位地启发自己和他人。值得注意的是,这里为重新构想肯定与否定、自我与他人、单一性与多重性之间的关系提供了可能性。这也为郭襄的问题提供了新的解决办法。郭试图将理和目标导向的认识重新统一起来,将理和目标导向的认识还原为理,即非刻意的自我,达到最终的水平。另一方面,莲花通过断言刻意的目标导向活动将它们重新团结起来,虽然它总是本身就与真理疏远,但实际上也通过这种疏远来实现真理。声闻们肯定、体现、修行菩萨道,不是否认它,而是否认它、忽视它、不知道它、甚至主动拒绝它。这是他们菩萨修行的一部分。他们是菩萨的对立或排斥形式的菩萨。他们是菩萨,也是非菩萨。这正是他们正在做的上述三件事,构成了菩萨的工作:呈现各种形体(在这种情况下,作为声闻),启发其他众生,并致力于成佛。
Tiantai takes the clue from this sutra, filters it through the category of Emptiness developed by Nāgārjuna, and arrives at what it calls the Three Truths: Emptiness, Provisional Positing, and The Center (空諦 kongdi,假諦 jiadi, 中諦 zhongdi). It is important to note that the textual tradition from which Tiantai derives its understanding of Nāgārjuna’s thought differs decisively from the Indian and Tibetan traditions due primarily to the existence in Chinese of the 大智度論 Dazhidulun, a text attributed to Nāgārjuna (although most likely written in Chinese by its ostensible translator, Kumārajīva), which was regarded as offering the most extensive and authoritative interpretive lens through which to interpret Nāgārjuna’s treatment of topics treated more cursorily in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Of particular interest for us is the relation between the Two Truths, which bears directly on how we are to interpret key Mūlamadhyamakakārikā texts such as 23:6, stating that both self and non-self are preached by the Buddha. Read without the context of the Dazhidulun, this claim was usually understood in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism to mean that “self” is taught in Conventional Truth and “non-self” in Ultimate Truth, and these remain unambiguously separate and hierarchically valued. The Dazhidulun approaches these issues
天台宗以这部经为线索,通过龙树所开的空性范畴过滤,得出所谓空谛、假谛、中谛三谛。 。值得注意的是,天台宗对龙树思想的理解所依据的文本传统与印度和西藏的传统有决定性的不同,这主要是因为汉语中存在《大智度论》,这是一部归因于龙树的文本(尽管很可能是书面形式)其表面上的译者鸠摩罗什 (Kumārajīva) 的中文译本)被认为提供了最广泛和权威的解释镜头,通过它来解释龙树对《摩拉摩迪亚玛卡卡里卡》中更粗略处理的主题的处理。我们特别感兴趣的是二圣谛之间的关系,它直接关系到我们如何解释关键的穆拉玛迪亚玛卡卡里卡 (Mūlamadhyyamakakarikārikārikārikārikārikārikārikārikārikārikā) 经文,例如 23:6,其中指出佛陀宣讲自我和无我。如果不考虑《大智都论》的背景,这一说法在印度藏传佛教中通常被理解为“世俗真理”中教导“自我”,而胜义真理中教导“无我”,而这些仍然是明确分开的,并具有等级价值。 《大智都论》探讨这些问题

rather differently. Most simply stated, it sets the stage for the collapse of Conventional Truths into the rubric of upāya, “skillful means,” the freely created and extremely various methods used by a Bodhisattva to instruct all the many diverse varieties of sentient beings. This collapse of upāya and Conventional Truth is one of the key moves of the Tiantai tradition. One of the key procedures by which this is done is found in the Dazhidulun’s doctrine of the Four Siddhantas. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} We should note here that the second and third Siddhantas already take the step of completely relativizing Conventional Truths: there is no single univocal internally consistent set of Conventional Truths spoken by the Buddha, but rather an unlimited array of situational possibilities that may count as “appropriate speech,” that is, soteriologically useful, liberative speech. If someone believes the world is made of bleu cheese or was created by God, the Buddha may preach to him in those terms, accepting the premise of a bleu-cheese-composed or God-created world, according to the Second Siddhanta, or in a polemically anti-bleu-cheese or anti-God way according to the Third. The authorized conventional truths preached by a Buddha may thus contradict one another; the contradiction is not only between Conventional Truth and Ultimate Truth, but necessarily exists among Conventional Truths-i.e., in this conception, upāyas-themselves. The second thing to note here is that the Fourth Siddhanta is still a Siddhanta, that is, is included unproblematically among the rhetorical strategies of a Buddha’s preaching: “Ultimate Truth,” including the preaching of Emptiness and so on, is also a pragmatic soteriological device. The upshot of this approach to the Two Truths is well expressed in the second chapter of the “Sutra of Infinite Meanings” (無量義經 wuliangyijing)another Chinese forgery unknown in India or Tibet, but often quoted by Zhiyi and traditionally read as the “opening sutra” for the Lotus Sutra in many Tiantai and Tendai inspired traditions:
完全不同。最简单地说,它为将世俗真理瓦解为“方便方便”的标题奠定了基础,“方便方便”是菩萨用来指导所有种类的众生的自由创造的、极其多样的方法。 upaya和世俗真理的崩溃是天台宗传统的关键举措之一。实现这一目标的关键程序之一可以在《大智都伦》的四悉丹塔教义中找到。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 在这里我们应该注意到,第二和第三悉丹塔已经采取了将世俗真理完全相对化的步骤:佛陀所说的不存在单一的、内部一致的世俗真理,而是无数可被视为“适当”的情境可能性。言语”,即在救世论上有用的、解放性的言语。如果有人相信世界是由蓝纹奶酪组成的或由上帝创造的,佛陀可能会用这些术语向他宣讲,接受蓝纹奶酪组成的或上帝创造的世界的前提,根据第二席丹塔,或在根据第三种观点,这是一种有争议的反蓝纹奶酪或反上帝的方式。因此,佛陀所宣讲的公认的世俗真理可能会相互矛盾。这种矛盾不仅存在于世俗真理和究竟真理之间,而且也必然存在于世俗真理之间——即,在这个概念中,upāyas——本身。这里要注意的第二件事是,第四悉丹塔仍然是悉丹塔,也就是说,毫无问题地包含在佛陀说法的修辞策略中:“究竟真理”,包括空性等的说法,也是一种实用的救世论。设备。这种对待二谛的方法的结果在《无量义经》的第二章中得到了很好的表达,《无量义经》是另一本在印度或西藏未知的中国伪造品,但经常被智一引用,传统上被解读为“无量义经”。许多天台和天台启发传统中的《法华经》开篇经:
The dispositions and desires of various sentient beings are innumerable, and thus the modes of preaching of the Dharma are also innumerable. Because the modes of preaching of the Dharma are innumerable, its meanings are also innumerable. These innumerable meanings are generated by a single dharma. That dharma is simply freedom from [any single fixed] attribute. Such freedom from fixed attribute enables every attribute without exception to be attributed [i.e., manifests as every manifestation]. Being predicable neither by attributes nor by the exclusion of attributes [i.e., neither manifesting nor not-manifesting], this is called the Real-Attribute. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
诸众生的性欲无边,因而说法的方式亦无边无边。因为佛法的说法有无数种,所以它的意义也有无数种。这些无数的意义都是由单一的佛法产生的。佛法就是摆脱[任何单一固定]属性。这种摆脱固定属性的自由使得每个属性无一例外地都可以被归因(即表现为每个表现形式)。既不能通过属性来预测,也不能通过属性的排除来预测[即,既不显现也不不显现],这被称为真实属性。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
The result here is that there is not only one type of Conventional Truth, nor merely several progressively transcending sets of Conventional Truth, but
这里的结果是,不仅存在一种类型的世俗真理,也不仅仅是几种逐渐超越的世俗真理,而是存在

literally infinite numbers of potentially mutually contradictory Conventional Truths. But something more has happened here, which is very relevant to our problems of oneness and difference. For these infinite contradictory Conventional Truths are at the same time described as being merely different aspects of a single truth, seen in different ways. Any single dharma has all these infinite contrasting meanings: these alternate meanings are meanings of the same thing. The sutra later states this emphatically in the paradigmatic case of words and meanings: “The words used are identical, but the meanings differ [in the ears of different listeners]” (文辭是一,而義差異 wenci shi yi, er yi chayi). 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} Any one word means many contrary things. One must note also that there are only meanings in contexts-specifically, in intersubjective contexts. There are only truths where there are meanings, and there are only meanings where there are sentient beings. Since sentient beings differ in innumerable ways, meanings and truths will also differ in innumerable ways. But all these meanings are the meaning of attributelessness, the Emptiness of any essential attributes belonging to any entity-all these meanings are what “attributeless” really means-for that is the only kind of meaning there is, the only kind of meaning that means anything. Put otherwise, the essence of any thing is to be essenceless-which means also to have infinite contradictory essences. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} Any determination is one particular thing, no particular thing, and infinitely many things, all possible things. This provides us with a good template for the Tiantai Three Truths: provisionally posited, empty, and the Center (空 kong, 假 jia, 中 zhong).
实际上是无限数量的潜在相互矛盾的传统真理。但这里还发生了更多的事情,这与我们的同一性和差异性问题非常相关。因为这些无限矛盾的传统真理同时被描述为仅仅是单一真理的不同方面,以不同的方式看待。任何单一的佛法都具有所有这些无限对比的含义:这些替代的含义是同一事物的含义。后来《经》在词义的范式中强调了这一点:“文辞是一,而义差异”。 )。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9} 任何一个词都意味着许多相反的事情。我们还必须注意到,只有在语境中才有意义——具体来说,在主体间语境中。有意义才有真理,有众生才有意义。因为众生有无量差别,所以义理也有无量差别。但所有这些意义都是无属性的意义,属于任何实体的任何基本属性的空性——所有这些意义都是“无属性”的真正含义——因为这是唯一存在的意义,唯一意味着任何事物。换句话说,任何事物的本质都是无本质的——这也意味着具有无限矛盾的本质。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 任何决定都是一件特定的事情,没有特定的事情,以及无限多的事情,所有可能的事情。这为我们提供了一个很好的天台三真谛的模板:空、假、中。
To understand this, we must see how this Lotus Sutra angle on truth changes things decisively, and in ways that are quite relevant to our current discussion. Simply stated, if we assume this Nāgārjunian model of truth, the distinction between the three categories of Nāgārjuna’s Two Truth system fall apart (not to be confused with the Tiantai Three Truths). Again, those three are: (1) just plain false statements, such as the metaphysical and religious theories of non-Buddhists, absolutist claims of science, etc.-all theory, in short; (2) untheorized commonsensical everyday language, which says I and you and cause and effect but without claiming a theory or systematic objective worldview to unpack them consistently, fuzzy around the edges; and (3) Buddhist rhetoric. The criterion of truth, recall, was “what is conducive to liberation from suffering”-which means, what will, if given full play, contradict and cancel itself, serving as a vehicle by which to pass beyond itself, like a raft. So 2 and 3 are both truths (Conventional Truth), while 1 is just false. Ultimate Truth, on the other hand, is the end of suffering, and thus also given, honorifically as it were, the name of truth, though it has no determinate propositional content. So it stands for Nāgārjuna.
为了理解这一点,我们必须看到《法华经》的真理角度如何决定性地改变事物,并且以与我们当前讨论非常相关的方式。简单地说,如果我们假设这种龙树真理模型,那么龙树二谛体系的三个类别之间的区别就分崩离析了(不要与天台三谛混淆)。再说一遍,这三个是:(1)只是简单的错误陈述,例如非佛教徒的形而上学和宗教理论,科学的绝对主义主张等等,简而言之,都是理论; (2)非理论化的常识性日常语言,它说的是“我”和“你”以及因果关系,但没有声称有理论或系统的客观世界观来一致地解开它们,边缘模糊; (3)佛教辞典。回忆起来,真理的标准是“什么有利于从痛苦中解脱”——这意味着,如果充分发挥作用,什么就会矛盾并取消自身,成为超越自身的载体,就像木筏一样。所以2和3都是真理(传统真理),而1只是错误的。另一方面,终极真理是痛苦的终结,因此也被尊称为真理之名,尽管它没有确定的命题内容。所以它代表龙树。
In Tiantai, however, this same criterion is now applied across the boards. Category 1 also can serve as a “raft”-and in fact, all purported
然而,在天台,同样的标准现在已全面应用。第 1 类也可以充当“木筏”——事实上,所有这些都被认为是

metaphysical systems, while claiming to arrive at a consistent, non-self-contradictory complete objective view of the universe, can all be shown to fail in their own terms: they can be shown to contradict themselves when taken absolutely seriously and when their key theoretical terms are absolutized. Tiantai theory uses the Nāgārjunian method to perform these reductio ad adsurdums on all existing theories. But these are not to show that they are false; this is precisely what shows that they are true. For “true,” as we’ve seen, means simply, “capable of leading beyond itself, capable of destroying itself, conducive to the move beyond all clinging to fixed views, conducive to ending suffering.” When a metaphysical view is shown to involve contradictions, it is shown to be a conventional truth rather than a mere falsehood: it serves as a raft to the abandoning of views. Furthermore, categories 2 and 3 are also not always effective as rafts. There are infinite sentient beings with infinite differing needs, and in some circumstances one view will work (i.e., will bring about both its own cancellation and the elimination of all other views) while in other circumstances others will work. Even “ordinary speech” and “Emptiness” are not always true (for true means only "conducive to . . "). All three categories can serve as rafts leading beyond themselves, while none of them always does so. So the Buddha preaches self and non-self, not because one is conventional and the other is ultimate truth: both are conventional truths, meaning both can, in given circumstances, lead to the dropping of both views. Neither is intrinsically more true than the other (for to be “intrinsically” anything would be to have a self-nature). Hence, we have the other enormous change in Tiantai: ultimate truth is no longer “beyond” conventional truth, no longer a “higher” truth. They are equal, and in fact the very idea of “ultimate truth” is itself a conventional truth. However, they are not only equal. The most radical Tiantai move is that conventional and ultimate truth are identical. They have exactly the same content. Whatever is conventional truth is also ultimate truth, and vice versa.
形而上学系统虽然声称对宇宙达成了一致的、不自相矛盾的完整客观观点,但都可以证明它们自己的术语是失败的:当绝对认真地对待它们并且当它们的关键理论被证明时,它们可以被证明是自相矛盾的。条款被绝对化。天台理论使用Nāgārjunian方法对所有现有理论进行还原。但这些并不表明它们是错误的;而是表明它们是错误的。这恰恰表明它们是真实的。因为“真实”,正如我们所见,简单地意味着“能够超越自身,能够毁灭自身,有助于超越一切固执己见,有助于结束痛苦。”当一种形而上学的观点被证明包含矛盾时,它就被证明是一种世俗真理,而不仅仅是一个谎言:它充当了放弃观点的木筏。此外,第 2 类和第 3 类作为筏也并不总是有效。有无限的众生,有无限不同的需求,在某些情况下,一种观点会起作用(即,会带来它自己的取消和所有其他观点的消除),而在其他情况下,其他观点会起作用。甚至“平常语”和“空性”也并不总是真实的(因为真实的意思只是“有助于……”)。这三个类别都可以充当超越自身的木筏,但没有一个类别总是这样做。因此,佛陀宣讲我与无我,并不是因为一个是世俗真理,另一个是究竟真理:两者都是世俗真理,意味着在特定情况下,两者都可以导致两种观点的放弃。两者本质上并不比另一个更真实(因为“本质上”任何事物都具有自性)。 于是,天台就有了另一个巨大的变化:究竟真理不再是“超越”世俗真理,不再是“更高”的真理。它们是平等的,事实上“究竟真理”的观念本身就是世俗真理。然而,它们不仅是平等的。天台最根本的招数是世俗真理与胜义真理是同一的。它们的内容完全相同。凡是世俗真理也是究竟真理,反之亦然。
This point is illustrated nicely in the Tiantai interpretation of the story of the lost son from the Lotus Sutra (Chapter 4). 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} The key point to note here, in the context of our present discussion, is, as Zhiyi points out, that the status of the “skillful means” is configured here very differently than it is in the Two Truths schema of Emptiness theory, the “raft” model, where the means are transcended and discarded once the goal is reached. The resources of the estate are what the father uses as a skillful means to draw his son to the final recognition of his own status, to his final enlightenment-the servants, the buildings, the treasury. But these are not abandoned when the son finally does come into his inheritance. On the contrary, these are the inheritance. This means that what one is enlightened to when one is enlightened is not the dropping away of all skillful means, the letting go of the raft, the transcendence of all determinate phenomenal
天台对《法华经》丧子故事的解释(第四章)很好地说明了这一点。 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 在我们目前讨论的背景下,这里需要注意的关键点是,正如智一所指出的,“方便”的地位在这里的配置与空性理论的二谛模式中的“方便”的状态非常不同。 “木筏”模式,一旦达到目标,就超越并放弃手段。庄园的资源是父亲用来吸引儿子最终认识自己的地位、最终启蒙的巧妙手段——仆人、建筑物、金库。但当儿子最终继承遗产时,这些并没有被放弃。相反,这些都是继承。这就是说,一个人开悟时所开悟的,不是舍弃一切方便、放下木筏、超越一切有定现象。

concepts, ideas, practices, forms. Rather, these things are the very content of enlightenment. Enlightenment is not the renunciation of skillful means. Enlightenment is the mastery of all skillful means, the integration of skillful means, the more thorough possession of them rather than the discarding or elimination of them. Conventional Truth is not what you renounce when you reach Ultimate Truth, as in the parable of the raft and the Two Truths theory. The Other Shore to which the raft rafts us, allowing us to renounce the raft, turns out to be another raft, which rafts us to an infinity of other rafts-and we ourselves, who are rafting on these rafts, are like all other entities only raft-rafting rafts. Conventional Truth is what you get when you reach Ultimate Truth. The content of the two is the same. Ultimate Truth is simply a name for the totality of conventional truths, and the virtuosic mastery of being able to move from one conventional truth to another unobstructedly, as the situation demands, the comprehension of the way they fit together or can function together, or the way in which they are each, as it were, “versions” of each other. Ultimate truth is the nonobstruction between conventional truths, the fact that they all interpenetrate, that in their non-absoluteness each is simply a different way of saying what the others say. Ultimate truth is the free flow of conventional truths, their copresence in spite of their apparent oppositeness (e.g., you are a poor worker, you are a rich son).
概念、想法、实践、形式。相反,这些东西正是开悟的内容。开悟并不是放弃善巧方便。开悟是一切善巧方便的掌握、融会贯通、更彻底地拥有而不是舍弃或消灭它们。世俗真理并不是当你达到终极真理时你所放弃的东西,就像木筏的寓言和两个真理理论中那样。木筏把我们漂流到的彼岸,让我们放弃木筏,结果却是另一只木筏,它把我们漂流到无数其他木筏上——而我们自己,在这些木筏上漂流,就像所有其他实体一样仅限木筏漂流。世俗真理是当你达到终极真理时你所得到的。两者的内容是一样的。终极真理只是传统真理整体的一个名称,以及能够根据情况的需要,从一种传统真理无障碍地转移到另一种传统真理的精湛技艺,理解它们如何组合在一起或如何共同发挥作用,或者可以说,它们都是彼此的“版本”。终极真理是传统真理之间的无障碍,它们都是相互渗透的事实,在它们的非绝对性中,每个真理都只是表达其他真理的不同方式。最终的真理是传统真理的自由流动,尽管它们表面上是对立的,但它们却共存(例如,你是一个贫穷的工人,你是一个富家子弟)。
But the Tiantai view is not only that are they identical in content: it turns out, further, that once the very idea of conventionality-“provisional positing”-is unpacked, it reveals itself to mean nothing more or less than what the very idea of ultimate truth-“Emptiness” of any intrinsic attributes, indeterminacy-means. What they both mean, unpacked, is the Center, the very convertibility between provisional positing and emptiness, between determinacy and indeterminacy, such that by adducing any one of these three, all three are implied. It is only this that enables the free convertibility between any one conventional truth and any other. Whatever determination can be adduced is nothing more than a conventional truth ( = = == is valid, leading to the reduction of attachments, in some but not all contexts), but therefore is also empty (not valid in all contexts, not solely and context-independently able to maintain its characteristic effects) and is also neither-provisional-nor-empty, something that can be read either in its affirmative aspect (“valid in some contexts”) and its negative aspect (“not valid in some contexts”), which both mean the same thing (“valid in some contexts”). But this “Centrality” also implies something more profound, which stands as the solution to the paradox of Nirvana and omnipresence in earlier Buddhism: for “Center” here also means “absolute,” unconditional as conditional, conditional as unconditional. We will have much to say about the implications of the Tiantai Three Truths and their precise
但天台观不仅在于它们在内容上是相同的:而且,事实证明,一旦约定俗成的观念——“临时定位”——被解开,它所揭示的本身就与这个观念本身的含义一样多或更少。终极真理——任何内在属性的“空性”、不确定性——意味着。拆开来看,它们的意思都是中心,即临时设定与空性之间、确定性与不确定性之间的可转换性,这样,通过引用这三者中的任何一个,就暗示了所有三者。只有这样才能实现任何一种传统真理与任何其他真理之间的自由转换。无论能得出什么结论,都不过是世俗真理( = = == 是有效的,在某些情况下但不是所有情况下会导致附件的减少),但因此也是空的(并非在所有情况下都有效,不仅能够与情况无关地保持其特征效果)而且也不是临时的-也非空,可以从肯定方面(“在某些情况下有效”)和消极方面(“在某些情况下无效”)来解读,两者都意味着同一件事(“在某些情况下有效”) 。但这个“中”也意味着更深刻的东西,它是早期佛教涅槃与普遍存在悖论的解决方案:因为“中”在这里也意味着“绝对”,无条件即有条件,有条件即无条件。关于天台三谛的含义及其精确性,我们将有很多话要说。

content below; but put simply, we have here a formulaic crystallization of the affirmation/negation relation described above in the Lotus, where to be something (first and foremost, a Bodhisattva) and not to be that thing (to be a Śrāvaka and avoid being a Bodhisattva), and of their reversible “asness” (being a Bodhisattva as a Śrāvaka and being a Śrāvaka as a Bodhisattva). This “asness” of the two extremes, each being expressible as the other, is what is here called the Center (中 zhong). We must pause here to note the resonance of this notion of Centrality with the “empty hub” in the Laozi, and various notions of ironic coherence we have seen emerging from it, including Wang Bi’s mini-Daos as t i t i tit i and Li , and Guo Xiang’s incommensurable-singularity-which-is-nothing-determinate-but-all-thingsconverging as the Li of the self-so.
内容如下;但简单地说,我们在这里得到了上述莲花中肯定/否定关系的公式化结晶,其中成为某物(首先是菩萨)而不是那个东西(成为声闻并避免成为菩萨) ),以及他们可逆的“无相”(作为声闻的菩萨和作为菩萨的声闻)。这种两个极端的“同性”,可以互相表达,就是这里所谓的“中”。我们必须在这里暂停一下,注意这种中心性概念与《老子》中的“空枢纽”的共鸣,以及我们看到的从中出现的各种讽刺连贯性概念,包括王弼的迷你道 t i t i tit i 与理,与郭象的不可通约奇性,即无定而万物会聚为自性之理。
Where Nāgārjuna had Two Truths, with a clear hierarchy between them, based on a one-way means-end relation-conventional truth is subordinate to ultimate truth, deriving its value solely therefrom, by being a means thereto, which is to be dispensed with once the end is attainedwhich allowed a third category (plain heretical untruth), Tiantai claims the Two Truths are exactly equivalent in value, equally ultimate, identical in content, and ultimately synonymous, and that this constitutes the third truth about them. In fact, they are not two separate realms or claims at all, but two alternate restatements of the same fact, namely, conditioned co-arising itself. “Provisional Positing” implies “Emptiness,” and vice versa, just as “equilateral triangle” and “equiangular triangle” are merely different ways of describing the same fact, emphasizing now one and now another aspect.
龙树有两个真理,它们之间有清晰的层次结构,基于单向的手段-目的关系——世俗真理从属于终极真理,仅从终极真理中获得其价值,作为达到终极真理的手段,这是可以被免除的一旦达到允许第三种(明显的异端谎言)的目的,天台声称二谛在价值上完全相同,同样终极,内容相同,最终同义,这构成了关于它们的第三个真理。事实上,它们根本不是两个独立的领域或主张,而是同一事实的两种交替重述,即缘起共生本身。 “暂定”意味着“空”,反之亦然,正如“等边三角形”和“等角三角形”只是对同一事实的不同描述,时而强调一个方面,时而强调另一个方面。
This means the differentiations between things, their conventional designations, as well as any crazy philosophical or religious theory or personal illusion about them, are just as ultimately true and non-true as their Emptiness or their beyond-conceptualization Suchness, and also that both of these aspects are just as ultimate as the fact that these two aspects are simply aspects of one another. This is the interfusion of the Three Truths, which means even the Center is not more ultimate than the other two. To indicate any of the three is to indicate all three; they are three ways of saying the same thing. Hence, Tiantai goes beyond what it calls the “Exclusive Center” (但中 danzhong), which sees the Center as a sort of tertium quid beyond the two extremes of Emptiness and Provisional Positing, which grounds them both and expresses itself as both, to the point of the “Non-exclusive Center” (不但中 budanzhong), which makes it possible to say that any of the three, taken alone, already says all there is to say about the other two, and entails all the functions of the other two. The Center is the convertibility of the truths of Emptiness and Provisional Positing, their mutual reducibility, which also maintains their distinction, as we shall see below.
这意味着事物之间的区别,它们的传统名称,以及任何疯狂的哲学或宗教理论或关于它们的个人幻觉,就像它们的空性或超越概念化的真性一样,最终是真实的和不真实的,而且两者都存在。这些方面与这两个方面只是彼此的方面这一事实一样重要。这是三圣谛的融合,这意味着即使是中心也不比其他两个圣谛更终极。表示三者中的任何一个即表示全部三者;它们是同一件事的三种表达方式。因此,天台超越了它所称的“但中丹中”,即把中心视为一种超越空性和临时定位两个极端的第三元物,它使两者都立足并表达自己为两者, “非独中”这一点,使得可以说,这三者中的任何一个,单独来看,已经说明了另外两个的全部内容,并且包含了该中心的所有功能。另外两个。中心是空性真理和临时定位真理的可转换性,它们的相互还原性,这也保持了它们的区别,正如我们将在下面看到的。
Each of the Three Truths is a way of talking about the fact that all determinate entities are dependently co-arisen (緣起 yuanqi). That is, each determination necessarily appears in experience “together with” other such determinations, upon which it depends for its existence. This observation is developed into the assertion of the Emptiness, Provisional Positing, and Centrality of each entity. Provisional Positing means they are dependently co-arisen, necessarily arise together with othernesses, that is, with something that is qualitatively different, with an alternate determinateness. The othernesses that necessarily arise with a particular determinacy are either (1) its components (which are qualitatively other); (2) its antecedents in time or efficient causes; or (3) its conceptual or perceptual concepts, the background of “not-this” which makes any “this” experienceable as such. Its coherence is dependent on these other coherences as conditions, but if all other coherences whatsoever are taken into account, as they would have to be if this same consideration were now applied to these other coherences (they have their own necessary othernesses), the original coherence is effaced; it is coherent as such only locally, in relation to a limited set of such conditions. Their Emptiness means that such arising therefore is never derived from an essence as single cause: one fact is never enough to make it so. Therefore, its being thus-and-so is always variable according to what other entities contribute: it is context-dependent. This means it is never the arising of an unambiguous particular entity with a uniquely decidable nature. That is, every putatively determinate “this” arises together with its “not-this,” but the interface separating and joining these two discrete entities cannot be construed coherently in any unambiguous terms, or as a particular self-determining existent. To be determinate, full stop, requires being self-determining, and this is impossible.
三圣谛中的每一个都是一种谈论所有确定实体都是缘起元气这一事实的方式。也就是说,每个决定必然与其他这样的决定“一起”出现在经验中,它的存在依赖于这些决定。这一观察发展为对每个实体的空性、临时定位和中心性的断言。临时定位意味着它们是依存共生的,必然与他者一起出现,也就是说,与质上不同的事物一起出现,具有替代的确定性。具有特定确定性而必然出现的差异性是(1)其组成部分(在质量上是不同的); (二)其时间前因或者有效原因; (3)它的概念或感性概念,“非此”的背景使得任何“此”本身都是可体验的。它的连贯性依赖于这些其他连贯性作为条件,但是如果所有其他连贯性都被考虑在内,就像如果现在将同样的考虑应用于这些其他连贯性(它们有自己必要的差异性),那么原始的连贯性就必须如此。连贯性被抹杀;它仅在局部、与一组有限的此类条件有关时是一致的。它们的空性意味着,因此,这种产生永远不会源自作为单一原因的本质:一个事实永远不足以使其如此。因此,它的存在总是根据其他实体的贡献而变化:它是依赖于上下文的。这意味着它永远不会产生具有独特可判定性质的明确特定实体。 也就是说,每一个假定确定的“这个”都与它的“非这个”一起出现,但是分离和连接这两个离散实体的界面不能以任何明确的术语连贯地解释,也不能解释为特定的自我决定的存在。要下定决心,完全停止,需要自我决定,这是不可能的。
We may restate this by noting that all coherences are only locally coherent. It is what it is only because the horizon of relevant contexts has been arbitrarily limited, but the fact that all being is necessarily contextualized (arises with qualitative othernesses) means that any such limit is ultimately arbitrary, and there are more relevant contexts that can be brought to bear in every case. Hence, each coherence is intelligible as such and such only when all the relevant contexts are not taken into account. Any entity’s being determinately thus and so is dependent on its being experienced within a limited horizon of relevance. It is coherent as this rather than something else only locally. Provisional Positing means that all coherences are merely local coherences.
我们可以通过指出所有相干性只是局部相干来重申这一点。之所以如此,只是因为相关语境的视野被任意限制,但所有存在都必然被语境化(以定性的差异性出现)这一事实意味着任何这样的限制最终都是任意的,而且还有更多相关的语境可以被在每种情况下都适用。因此,只有在不考虑所有相关上下文的情况下,每种连贯性本身才是可理解的。任何实体的存在都取决于它在有限的相关范围内的体验。它本身就是连贯的,而不是仅局部的其他东西。临时定位意味着所有的一致性都只是局部的一致性。
Emptiness, on this interpretation, means that all local coherences are globally incoherent, and indeed that local coherence as such just is global incoherence. What is determinate when viewed in some particular local
根据这种解释,空性意味着所有局部连贯性都是全局不连贯的,事实上,局部连贯性本身就是全局不连贯性。在某些特定的地方观察时,什么是确定的

context turns out to be ambiguous, indeterminate, lacking any definitive self-nature, when all relevant contexts are taken into account: it is ontologically ambiguous, not merely epistemologically ambiguous. As a simplistic example, we may consider the way the figure " O " may be read as the letter “oh” when seen in the local context of a string of letters, or as the number zero when seen in the context of a string of numbers, but if both contexts are taken into account simultaneously, the figure no longer has any single identity. Locally, it is coherent, but globally, it is incoherent, it has no single consistent identity. For its identity is entirely dependent on context, and at every moment it is in more multiple contradictory contexts.
当考虑到所有相关的背景时,背景就会变得模糊、不确定、缺乏任何明确的自性:它在本体论上是模糊的,而不仅仅是在认识论上模糊的。作为一个简单的例子,我们可以考虑这样的方式:当在字母串的本地上下文中看到数字“O”时,它可以被读作字母“oh”,或者当在字符串的上下文中看到时,数字“O”可以被读作数字零。数字,但如果同时考虑两种背景,则该数字不再具有任何单一身份。在局部上,它是连贯的,但在全球范围内,它是不连贯的,它没有单一一致的身份。因为它的身份完全依赖于语境,并且每时每刻都处于更加多重矛盾的语境中。
To put this point another way, let us say that to “be” originally means to be definitively, to be determinate, to be finite, to have simple location-to have borders or boundaries. To appear in experience at all, X must be “non-all,” must be contrasted to some non-X, must have an “outside.” Otherwise, it cannot be experienced or felt, it cannot be experienced in any form or on any level (even “abstractly”). To be present is to be determinately, which is to “be-with” an outside. But to necessarily have an outside means the outside is not really outside. The relation between the internal and the external is itself internal. We can always ask of the border, Is it part of the inside or the outside? Does the outside come to an end before making contact with the inside or not? If there is a gap, what is the relationship between them? Does this “relationship” exist or not? If it exists, it must be a determinate something with borders of its own, separating it from what is other than it. This means there must be another border between the relationship and the things of which it is the relationship. But then we have the same problem over again, an infinite regress, and the necessary relationship is lacking. If there is no gap between the boundary and the bounded, what makes this the boundary rather than the bounded? Does one end before the other begins? Is there another border between the boundary and the bounded? There is no coherent way to answer these questions, if “to exist” is assumed to mean "to be located in some specifiable time and place, within some specifiable limits."12 Hence, the interface always proves unintelligible, and the outside proves both ineradicable and paradoxically impossible, since it always proves to really be equally internal, and hence not an outside at all. Therefore, the determination of the inside, the X X XX, is equally ineradicable and impossible. Since it is only its borders that make this X what it is, that provide its determinate coherence, the unintelligibility of these boundaries is tantamount to the (global) incoherence of this (local) coherence. It cannot have any one particular fixed identity or coherence. It is ontologically ambiguous.
换句话说,“存在”最初的意思是明确的、确定的、有限的、有简单的位置——有边界或界限。为了出现在经验中,X必须是“非全部”,必须与某些非X相对立,必须有一个“外部”。否则,它就无法被体验或感受到,它无法以任何形式或在任何层面上(甚至“抽象地”)被体验。存在就是确定地存在,也就是与外界“在一起”。但必然有一个外部就意味着这个外部并不是真正的外部。内在与外在的关系本身就是内在的。我们总是可以问边界,它是内部的一部分还是外部的一部分?在与内部接触之前,外部是否已经结束?如果有差距,它们之间是什么关系?这种“关系”究竟存在与否?如果它存在,它一定是一个有自己边界的确定的东西,将它与它以外的东西分开。这意味着关系和关系所属的事物之间必定存在另一个边界。但随后我们又遇到同样的问题,无限倒退,并且缺乏必要的关系。如果边界和有界之间没有间隙,那么是什么使它成为边界而不是有界呢?一个会在另一个开始之前结束吗?边界和界限之间是否还有另一个边界?如果“存在”被假定为“位于某个特定的时间和地点,在某些特定的限制内”,那么就没有连贯的方法来回答这些问题。“12因此,界面总是被证明是不可理解的,而外部被证明是不可根除的,而且自相矛盾的是不可能的,因为它总是被证明是真正同样内部的,因此根本不是外部。因此,内部的决定, X X XX ,同样是无法根除的,也是不可能的。由于只有它的边界才使这个 X 成为它的样子,并提供其确定的连贯性,因此这些边界的不可理解性就等于这种(局部)连贯性的(全局)不连贯性。它不能具有任何一种特定的固定特性或连贯性。它在本体论上是含糊的。

“The Center” signifies that these two are merely alternate statements of the same fact, which necessarily appears in these two contrasted ways.
“中心”意味着这两者只是同一事实的交替陈述,而这一事实必然以这两种对比的方式出现。
We may rename it the intersubsumption of coherence and incoherence, or of determinateness and indeterminateness, entailing their necessary mutual reducibility. It is the “center” between these two extremes, coherence and incoherence. The Center signifies that determinateness, thought through to the end, turns out to be ambiguity, and vice versa. This means ambiguity and determinateness are no longer “other” to one another, and hence each is itself, just as it is, “absolute,” that is to say, free of dependence on a relationship to an outside. Where this determination ends is its negation; but if there is no way to distinguish the determination from its negation, the determination is as present where it is supposedly present as where it is supposedly absent: it is omnipresent, unconditional, absolute. Therefore “determinateness” is a synonym for “ambiguity,” and either, further, is a synonym for “the Center” itself. Any of these always signifies all three aspects: determinateness, ambiguity, and absoluteness. If anything is determinate, it is therefore also ambiguous and absolute, and, moreover, its determinateness is its ambiguity and its absoluteness, and vice versa.
我们可以将其重新命名为连贯性和非连贯性的相互包容,或者确定性和不确定性的相互包容,从而必然导致它们的相互还原性。它是连贯性和不连贯性这两个极端之间的“中心”。中心意味着确定性,思考到底,结果是模糊性的,反之亦然。这意味着模糊性和确定性不再是彼此的“他者”,因此它们本身就是“绝对的”,也就是说,不依赖于与外部的关系。这个决定结束的地方就是它的否定;但如果没有办法区分决定和它的否定,那么决定在它被认为存在的地方和它被认为不存在的地方一样存在:它是无所不在的、无条件的、绝对的。因此,“确定性”是“模糊性”的同义词,而且也是“中心”本身的同义词。其中任何一个总是意味着所有三个方面:确定性、模糊性和绝对性。如果任何东西是确定的,那么它也是模糊的和绝对的,而且,它的确定性就是它的模糊性和绝对性,反之亦然。
It is from the idea of the Center that the Tiantai tradition derives the key ideas of interpervasion (互遍 hupian), interinclusion (互攝 hushe), mutual entailment (互具 huju), the claim that all things are everywhere at once, that every possible determination pervades all times and places, is copresent in and as every other, and vice verse. The motivation for this move must be understood: every entity must be omnipresent because only then can it be genuinely unconditional. Unconditionality is value in Buddhism, as we have seen. The Tiantai Center signifies this absoluteness, this unconditionality, this value. It is this idea of the simultaneous omnipresence of all possible entities that overcomes the Abidharmic notion of the simple location and absolute separateness of moments of experience (rather than the idea of universals or forms, which can be in more than one place at a time, which is used to compensate for atomism in Greek and subsequent occidental thought), and with it solves the “paradox of Nirvana” in early Buddhism and the isomorphic “paradox of the mutual exclusivity of the Two Truths” of later Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. It is this key idea that will be the focus of further developments and modifications by Huayan Buddhists, as we shall see presently.
正是从这个中心的思想中,天台传统衍生出了互遍、互摄、互具、万物皆同时存在的核心思想。每一种可能的决定都遍及所有时间和地点,与其他决定同时存在,反之亦然。必须理解这一举​​措的动机:每个实体都必须无所不在,因为只有这样它才能真正无条件。正如我们所见,无条件是佛教的价值。天台中心象征着这种绝对性、这种无条件性、这种价值。正是这种所有可能实体同时无所不在的想法克服了阿比达米的简单位置和经验时刻的绝对分离的观念(而不是共相或形式的观念,它们一次可以出现在多个地方,用来弥补希腊及后来西方思想中的原子论),从而解决了早期佛教的“涅槃悖论”和后来印藏佛教的同构“二谛互斥悖论”。正如我们稍后将看到的,正是这个关键思想将成为华严佛教进一步发展和修改的焦点。
The Tiantai notion of “Center” signifies not only the center transcending and encompassing the two extremes of coherence and incoherence (determinateness and indeterminateness), and their intersubsumption; it also signifies that each coherence is the “center” of the entire array of other coherences, the intersubsumption between any two local coherences. For if to be definitively X and not-to-be definitively X are merely alternate ways of stating the same fact about X X XX, the contrast between the absence and presence of X is annulled, and X is no more present “here and now”
天台山的“中”,不仅意味着超越和包容连贯与非连贯(确定性与非确定性)两个极端及其相互包容的中心;它还意味着每个相干性是整个其他相干性阵列的“中心”,即任何两个局部相干性之间的相互包含。因为“如果肯定是X”和“不肯定是X”只是陈述同一事实的另一种方式。 X X XX ,X的不存在和存在之间的对比被取消,并且X不再存在“此时此地”

than it is present “there and then.” It is “simply located” at neither locus, but “virtually located” at both. It pervades all possible times and places to exactly the extent that it is present here at all. It can be read into any experience, and is here and now only because it has been so read into the here and now. X , in other words, is eternal and omnipresent, but only as “canceled,” divested of the putative opacity of its simple location. It is necessary and universal, precisely because it is not empirically discoverable or unambiguously “present” at all, like “space.” Hence, coherence X and coherence Y are both equally present at any locus. Each is the center of all existence, which can be read as any and all coherences, all of which are reducible to this coherence, revealed as aspects of it, expressing it, as which it is appearing.
比它“此时此地”的存在更重要。它“简单地位于”两个位点,但“虚拟地位于”两个位点。它遍及所有可能的时间和地点,其程度与它出现在这里的程度完全一样。它可以被解读为任何经验,并且存在于此时此地只是因为它已经被如此解读为此时此地。换句话说,X 是永恒且无所不在的,但只是“取消”了,剥夺了其简单位置的假定不透明性。它是必要的和普遍的,正是因为它不像“空间”那样可以凭经验发现或明确地“存在”。因此,相干性 X 和相干性 Y 在任何轨迹上都同等存在。每一个都是所有存在的中心,可以被解读为任何和所有的连贯性,所有这些都可以还原为这种连贯性,作为它的各个方面来揭示、表达它、呈现它。
The Tiantai tradition speaks of the interpervasion not just of “all things,” but specifically of “the Three Thousand,” a number derived from the multiplication of certain traditional Buddhist scriptural categories: the ten realms, each of which possesses these same ten realms again, multiplied by the ten suchnesses, multiplied again by the three worlds. The “Three Thousand” means all possible determinacies, with all their specific differences, divided according to various levels of greed, anger and delusion, suffering and pleasure, transcendence, compassion and comprehension, and also the copresence of all these specific different determinacies in one another, as experienced from all possible perspectives. Specifically, Zhiyi pulls ten “realms” or conditioned states of sentient beings from the scriptures: purgatory, hungry ghosts, animals, Asuras (belligerent egotistical titans), humans, gods, ascetic Buddhist disciples of the Srāvaka vehicle who attain transcendence of life and death through renunciation, independent cultivators who attain transcendence of life and death through contemplation of conditionality, Bodhisattvas who reenter life and death out of altruistic compassion, and Buddhas, who are beings who are aware that their wisdom, liberation, eternity, freedom, bliss, and beauty transcend the categories of finitude that define them, and hence pervade all times and places and express themselves in the other nine realms. These ten are multiplied by the ten “Suchnesses” from the Lotus Sutra: Such appearances, Such natures, Such substances, Such powers, Such activities, Such causes, Such conditions, Such effects, Such responses, and Such equality from beginning to end. We now have one hundred types of determinacy. These are further multiplied by three: each of these in terms of components of the sentient being in question, in terms of the illusory sentient being himself, and in terms of his specific environment. Note that already each sentient being has been counted twice, as a whole and as its constituent parts. We are counting not a flat array of simply located objects, not the actual substances that make up the world, but all ways of experiencing multiperspectival reality. We now have three
天台传统不仅谈到“万物”的渗透,而且特别谈到“三千”,这个数字源自某些传统佛教经典类别的乘法:十界,每个界又拥有同样的十界。 ,乘以十如,再乘以三世界。 “三千”是指一切可能的决定,及其具体的差异,根据贪、嗔、痴、苦、乐、超越、悲、解的不同层次而划分,以及所有这些特定的不同决定同时存在于一个之中。另一个是从所有可能的角度体验到的。具体来说,智一从经典中提取了十个“境界”或众生的有为状态:炼狱、饿鬼、畜生、阿修罗(好战的自我泰坦)、人、天、证得超越生死的声闻乘苦行僧。通过出离心而达到超越生死的独立修行者,通过利他慈悲而重新进入生死的菩萨,以及通过智慧、解脱、永恒、自在、快乐和自由而觉知自己的众生。美超越了定义它们的有限范畴,因此遍及所有时间和地点,并在其他九个领域中表达自己。此十法,乘以《法华经》十法:如是相、如是性、如是色、如是力、如是行、如是因、如是缘、如是果、如是应、如是自始至终平等。我们现在有一百种确定性。 这些再乘以三:每一个都以相关众生的成分而言,以虚幻众生本身而言,并以他特定的环境而言。请注意,每个有情众生已经被计算两次,作为整体和其组成部分。我们计算的不是简单定位的物体的平面阵列,不是构成世界的实际物质,而是体验多视角现实的所有方式。我们现在有三个

hundred types of determinacies. But now we go on to multiply again by the ten realms of sentient beings. This is because each realm inherently entails the other nine. So we have hell as hell, hell as animal, hell as hungry ghost, and so on, up to hell as Buddha. Similarly, we have Buddha as hell, Buddha as hungry ghost, and so on, up to Buddha as Buddha. Hence, the finite number three thousand is meant to indicate not only a simply flat array of particulars, but also the necessary interpervasion of these particulars. The use of this term, the Three Thousand, emphasizes the specificity of the actual existents in the world, the ineradicability of all the various subjective aspects of these existents—purgatories are as real and as interpervasive as the Buddha-realms, a point that will be of some importance below in contrasting this view to the Huayan understanding of interpenetration.
一百种决定性。但现在我们又继续增长十界众生。这是因为每个领域本质上都包含其他九个领域。所以我们有地狱为地狱、畜生地狱、饿鬼地狱等等,直至佛陀地狱。同样的,我们有佛为地狱,佛为饿鬼,等等,直至佛为佛。因此,有限的数字三千不仅意味着简单的平面排列的细节,而且还意味着这些细节的必要渗透。 “三千”这个词的使用,强调了世间实际存在的特殊性,以及这些存在的各种主观方面的不可磨灭性——炼狱与佛界一样真实、普遍,这一点下面将这种观点与华严对相互渗透的理解进行对比,具有一定的重要性。
This term also brings with it also the “traditionalism” of the non-ironic tradition-i.e., these are the ten realms and ten suchnesses that are pointed out by the Buddha in the scriptures as being particularly relevant for human practice. We might think here of the way the authority of the ancient sages worked in the Zhouyi tradition to narrow down which set of interpretative rules were applicable in any given case. We may also note the continued importance of the factoring in of human desire here; as in the earlier tradition, what is truly “coherent” is not merely what is objectively there, but what forms a coherence harmonious with human need, desire, and praxis. Zhiyi states that this Three Thousand could equally be called any number-three billion, three trillion, infinity, zero-but this particular number is used in accordance with what is beneficial to sentient beings trying to achieve liberation, in accordance with the wise guidance provided in the scriptures by the Buddhas.
这个术语还带来了非讽刺传统的“传统主义”,即佛陀在经典中指出的与人类修行特别相关的十界和十如。我们在这里可能会想到古代圣人的权威在《周易》传统中的工作方式,以缩小适用于任何特定情况的解释规则集。我们还可以注意到,在这里考虑人类欲望的因素仍然很重要。正如早期的传统一样,真正的“连贯性”不仅仅是客观存在的东西,而是与人类的需要、欲望和实践形成和谐的连贯性的东西。智一说,这个三千可以被称为任何数字——三十亿、三万亿、无边、零——但这个特定的数字是根据有利于众生解脱的,根据所提供的明智指导而使用的。于诸佛经中。
The ends-means loop, and the peculiar epistemology involved, where “provisional” and “ultimate” truth end up being identical, so that the provisional is never simply dispensed with, but instead is “made ultimate,” (i.e., themselves absolute and unconditional) is handled in a distinctive way in Tiantai exegesis. Crucially, this means that “identity” here also always involves a moment of difference: we have a oneness which is also a difference, a difference which is also a oneness. The two “aspects” are after all first distinguished, and only then, and only because of this distinguishing, can they be identified, just as the Srāvakas are only identical to Bodhisattvas by means of their denial of it, their separation from it. This is a peculiar type of “sameness,” and we cannot understand in what sense this sameness implies “all possible entities converge into and are findable in” the Mean, the second of the new ideas in Tiantai Three Truths theory, unless we understand in just what sense these two are “the same.” This peculiar mode of sameness is explained in the Tiantai doctrine of “opening the provisional to reveal the real” (開權顯實 kaiquan xianshi). This is a way of further specifying the
目的-手段循环,以及所涉及的特殊认识论,其中“临时”和“最终”真理最终是相同的,因此临时永远不会被简单地抛弃,而是“成为最终”(即,它们本身是绝对的和无条件)在天台训诂中有着独特的处理方式。至关重要的是,这意味着这里的“同一性”也总是涉及到差异的时刻:我们的同一性也是差异,差异也是同一性。这两个“方面”毕竟首先是区分的,只有那时,只有因为这种区分,它们才能被识别,就像声闻只是通过否认它、分离它而与菩萨相同一样。这是一种特殊的“同”,我们无法理解这种“同”在什么意义上意味着“一切可能的实体都汇聚于并可在中”(天台三真理论的第二个新思想)中,除非我们理解这两者“相同”到底有什么意义呢?这种奇特的同一模式在天台教“开权显实”中得到了解释。这是进一步指定的一种方式

relation between local coherence and global incoherence, illustrating the way in which they are not only synonymous, but also irrevocably opposed, and indeed identical only by means of their opposition. Provisional truth is the antecedent, the premise, and indeed in a distinctive sense the cause of ultimate truth, but only because it is the strict exclusion of ultimate truth. This effect is itself none other than the cause recontextualized. The Center is Ultimate Truth is Provisional Truth recontextualized: unchanged but simultaneously radically different.
局部一致性和全局不一致性之间的关系,说明了它们不仅是同义的,而且是不可逆转的对立的,实际上只有通过对立才能达到同一性。临时真理是终极真理的前因、前提,而且确实在独特的意义上是终极真理的原因,但只是因为它是对终极真理的严格排除。这种结果本身就是重新情境化的原因。中心是终极真理,是重新语境化的临时真理:没有改变,但同时又截然不同。
The Tiantai exegetical technique is a process of bringing this out for any given content. “Opening the provisional to reveal the ultimate” (開權顯實 kaiquanxianshi) consists of a recontextualization of provisional propositions to reveal their further implications, which allow them to always already have been saying the ultimate truth, without having to be changed in the least. The Lotus Sutra tells us precisely this kind of story again and again. We have children who think they are running toward promised toys, but when more of the situation is revealed, these very steps toward the toys, which don’t really exist, turn out to have been steps out of the danger of a fire and toward a much more magnificent reward (Chapter 3). We have, as mentioned, a worker whose toil for minimum wage turns out to be, when the full context is revealed, actually a process of preparing himself to accept his status as son and heir to the household, who was already in possession of the treasury from which his meager salary was doled out (Chapter 4). We have travelers whose steps toward an illusory city are revealed to have been steps toward a treasure beyond it (Chapter 7). We have of course the Srāvakas whose practice of “Hinayana” Buddhism is revealed to be part of a larger Mahayana Bodhisattva practice (Chapter 2). All activities are to be regarded as recontextualizable to reveal that they have always been Bodhisattva practices both expressing and leading to Buddhahood; hence, a Bodhisattva says to the Śrāvakas who scoff at his prediction that they will become Buddhas, “I do not disparage you, since you are thereby practicing the Bodhisattva path, and will all become Buddhas” (Chapter 20). That is, their very practices, even the rejection of Bodhisattva, can be recontextualized by this very claim to be revealed to be Bodhisattvahood. In Tiantai exegesis, we find a method that corresponds to this feature of the sutra, which is first to make intricate divisions and contrasts, establishing various qualities and characteristics of things by means of their differentiations, and then “opening them up” to reveal their identity in and by means of this very division. They are identical only because of, and as, their very difference.
天台训诂术就是对任何给定的内容提出这一点的过程。 “开权显实”是指将临时命题重新语境化,以揭示其进一步的含义,使它们始终已经在说出最终的真理,而无需进行任何改变。 。 《法华经》一再告诉我们的正是这样的故事。我们有一些孩子,他们认为自己正在奔向承诺的玩具,但当更多的情况被揭露时,这些向玩具(实际上并不存在)迈出的脚步,原来是为了摆脱火灾的危险,走向成功。更丰厚的回报(第3章)。正如所提到的,我们有一个工人,他为最低工资而辛劳的工作,当整个背景被揭示出来时,实际上是一个准备接受他作为儿子和家庭继承人的地位的过程,他已经拥有了家庭的财产。他微薄的薪水就是从国库中发放的(第四章)。我们有一些旅行者,他们迈向一座虚幻城市的脚步,却被揭示为迈向城外宝藏的脚步(第 7 章)。当然,我们有声闻者,他们的“小乘”佛教修行被揭示为更大的大乘菩萨修行的一部分(第二章)。所有活动都应被视为可重构的,以揭示它们一直是菩萨的修行,既表达佛性又导向佛性;因此,菩萨对那些嘲笑他预言成佛的声闻们说:“我不轻视你们,因为你们如此修行菩萨道,都会成佛”(第20章)。 也就是说,他们的修行,甚至是对菩萨的拒绝,都可以通过这种被揭示为菩萨的主张来重新语境化。在天台训诂中,我们找到了符合经论这一特点的方法,即先进行细致的区分对比,通过事物的区别来确立事物的各种性质和特性,然后“开”显其本质。身份在这种划分中并通过这种划分。它们之所以相同只是因为它们的不同。
The clearest way to explain this structure is to compare it to the contrasting relation between the setup and the punch line of a joke. To use a suitably silly example:
解释这种结构的最清晰的方法是将其与笑话的设置和妙语之间的对比关系进行比较。使用一个适当愚蠢的例子:
Setup: It takes money to make money.
设定:赚钱需要钱。

Punch line: Because you have to copy it really exactly.
妙语:因为你必须非常准确地复制它。

Let’s talk about that structure. When I said, “it takes money to make money,” it seemed as if, and it was interpreted as, a serious remark, a real piece of information, perhaps about investment strategies or the like. It had the quality of seriousness, of factuality, of non-ironic information. It does not strike anyone as funny; there is nothing funny about that statement. But, when the punch line comes, retrospectively, that setup is funny. That setup is funny because it has been recontextualized by the pun on the word make, which is made to have more than one identity when put into a new context.
我们来谈谈这个结构。当我说“赚钱需要钱”时,它似乎是并且被解释为一个严肃的言论,一个真实的信息,也许是关于投资策略之类的。它具有严肃性、真实性和非讽刺性信息的品质。任何人都不会觉得这很有趣。这句话没有什么好笑的。但是,当妙语出现时,回想起来,这种设置很有趣。这种设置很有趣,因为它已经通过“make”一词的双关语重新语境化了,当放入新的上下文时,它具有多个身份。
The interesting thing here, most closely relevant to relation of identity between Conventional and Ultimate in the Tiantai Three Truths, is that it is precisely by not being funny that the setup was funny. In other words, if it were already funny, if you didn’t take it seriously for at least a moment, the contrast between the two different meanings of this thing could never have clashed in the way that is necessary to make the laughter, to create the actual effect of humorousness. We have a setup which is serious and a punch line which is funny, but when you look back at the setup from the vantage point of having heard the punch line, that setup is also funny. After all, we don’t say that just the punch line is funny. We say the whole joke is funny. The setup is funny, however, in the very strange mode of “not being funny yet.” It is only funny because it wasn’t funny. This is the sense in which the Third Truth, the Mean, reveals the “identity” between Provisional Positing and Emptiness. Provisional Positing is Emptiness only inasmuch as it is the very opposite of Emptiness, the temporary exclusion of Emptiness. It is by being Non-Empty (i.e., something in particular) that it is Emptiness (i.e., devoid of any unambiguous or unconditionally self-determining self-nature). It is only because it is Locally Coherent that it is Globally Incoherent. Its Global Incoherence is present as Local Coherence, just as Humor is present in the deadpan setup as seriousness. This same form of “identity”-really neither identity nor difference, or both identity and difference-then applies at the metalevel between the Mean itself and the other Two Truths: they “are” the Mean precisely because they are not the Mean, because they are the two opposed extremes.
这里有趣的是,与天台三真谛中的世俗与究竟之间的同一性关系最密切相关的是,正是因为不搞笑,所以这个设定才有趣。换句话说,如果它已经很有趣,如果你至少有一段时间没有认真对待它,那么这件事的两种不同含义之间的对比就永远不会以产生笑声、产生笑声所必需的方式发生冲突。创造幽默的实际效果。我们有一个严肃的设置和一个有趣的妙语,但是当你从听到妙语的有利位置回顾这个设置时,那个设置也很有趣。毕竟,我们并不是说只有妙语才有趣。我们说整个笑话很有趣。然而,这个设置很有趣,以一种非常奇怪的“还不好笑”的模式。这只是因为不好笑才好笑。这就是第三谛——中庸——揭示了暂置与空性之间的“同一性”。临时定位之所以是空性,只是因为它与空性正好相反,是对空性的暂时排除。正是由于非空(即特定的事物),它才是空性(即没有任何明确或无条件的自决自性)。仅仅因为它是局部一致的,所以它是全局不连贯的。它的整体不连贯性表现为局部连贯性,就像幽默在面无表情的设置中表现为严肃性一样。这种相同形式的“同一性”——实际上既不是同一性也不是差异,或者既是同一性又是差异——然后适用于中庸本身和其他两个真理之间的元层面:它们“是”中庸,正是因为它们不是中庸,因为他们是两个对立的极端。
The same structure is applied in the Tiantai reading of the Lotus Sutra. You’re Enlightened! That is what Mahayana Buddhism keeps saying in one form or another: everyone is Enlightened! Everybody is a Buddha! Samsara is already Nirvana! All Dharmas are Nirvanic! But the way in which you are a Buddha is the way in which the setup of a joke is funny: you are a
《法华经》的天台读法也采用同样的结构。你开悟了!这就是大乘佛教不断以这样或那样的形式说的:每个人都是开悟的!每个人都是佛!轮回已经涅槃了!一切法皆涅槃!但你成为佛的方式就是一个笑话的设置很有趣的方式:你是一个
Buddha precisely by not being a Buddha. By struggling toward buddhahood, toward something else, toward something you are not, but by revisualizing or recontextualizing or expanding awareness, which has been the preferred technique in Buddhism all along, those very things that are the details of daily life, of the struggles to interact, to deal with conditions and suffering and lack of control are not just a means to buddhahood. They are themselves buddhahood qua the life of a sentient being, expressing itself in the form of the life of a sentient being, as the funniness of a joke is expressed in, present in, the serious unfunniness of its setup.
佛正是因为不是佛。通过努力争取成佛,争取其他的东西,争取你不是的东西,而是通过重新形象化或重新语境化或扩展意识,这一直是佛教中首选的技巧,这些正是日常生活的细节,是为实现目标而奋斗的细节。互动、处理状况、痛苦和缺乏控制不仅仅是成佛的一种手段。它们本身就是众生生命的佛果,以众生生命的形式表现出来,就像一个笑话的滑稽表现在其严肃的无趣之处。
The “provisional,” conventional truth, local coherence, is the setup. The “ultimate truth,” Emptiness, global incoherence, ontological ambiguity, is the punch line. What is important here is to preserve both the contrast between the two and their ultimate identity in sharing the quality of humorousness that belongs to every atom of the joke considered as a whole, once the punch line has been revealed. The setup is serious, while the punch line is funny. The funniness of the punch line depends on the seriousness of the setup, and on the contrast and difference between the two. However, once the punch line has occurred, it is also the case that the setup is, retrospectively, funny. This also means that the original contrast between the two is both preserved and annulled: neither funniness nor seriousness means the same thing after the punch line dawns, for their original meanings depended on the mutually exclusive nature of their defining contrast. Is the setup serious or funny? It is both: it is funny as serious, and serious as funny. Is the punch line serious or funny? It is both, but in an interestingly different way. It is obviously funny, but is it also serious? Yes. Why? Because now that the setup has occurred, both “funny” and “serious” have a different meaning. Originally, we thought that “funny” meant “what I laugh when I hear” or something like that, and “serious” meant “what gives me non-funny information” or something similar. But now we see that “funny” can also mean, “what I take to be serious, what I am not laughing about, what I am earnestly considering, or crying over, or bewailing even.” But this means also that “serious” means “what can turn out to be either funny or serious.” So both “funny” and “serious” now both mean “funny-and-serious, what can appear as both funny and serious.” Each is now a center that subsumes of the other; they are intersubsumptive. As a consequence, the old pragmatic standard of truth is applied more liberally here: all claims, statements, and positions are true in the sense that all can, if properly recontextualized, lead to liberation-which is to say, to their own self-overcoming. Conversely, none will lead to liberation if not properly contextualized.
“临时的”、传统的真理、局部的一致性,就是设置。 “终极真理”、空性、整体的不连贯性、本体论的模糊性,是妙语。这里重要的是,一旦妙语被揭晓,在分享属于整个笑话的每个原子的幽默品质时,保持两者之间的对比和他们的最终身份。设定很严肃,而妙语却很有趣。妙语的滑稽程度取决于设置的严肃性,以及两者之间的对比和差异。然而,一旦出现了妙语,回想起来,这个设置也是很有趣的。这也意味着两者之间的原始对比既被保留又被取消:在妙语出现之后,滑稽和严肃都不再意味着同一件事,因为它们的原始含义取决于它们定义对比的相互排斥的性质。这个设定是严肃的还是有趣的?两者兼而有之:既有趣又严肃,又严肃又有趣。妙语是严肃的还是有趣的?两者都是,但以一种有趣的不同方式。这显然很有趣,但也是严肃的吗?是的。为什么?因为现在设定已经发生,“搞笑”和“严肃”都有了不同的含义。最初,我们认为“有趣”意味着“当我听到什么时我会笑”或类似的东西,而“严肃”意味着“给我提供非有趣信息的东西”或类似的东西。但现在我们发现,“有趣”也可以意味着“我认为严肃的事情,我不笑的事情,我认真考虑的事情,或者哭泣,甚至哀悼的事情。”但这也意味着“严肃”意味着“可能变得有趣或严肃的事情”。所以“有趣”和“严肃”现在都意味着“有趣又严肃,既有趣又严肃的东西”。现在,每个人都是一个包含另一个人的中心;它们是相互包容的。因此,旧的实用主义真理标准在这里得到了更自由的应用:所有的主张、陈述和立场都是真实的,因为如果适当地重新语境化,一切都可以导致解放——也就是说,他们自己的自我解放。克服。相反,如果没有适当的情境化,任何方法都不会带来解放。
We can restate the above somewhat more formulaically as follows:
我们可以更公式化地重述上述内容如下:

Every phenomenal object is a coherence. That is, it is a joining (cohering) of disparate elements-either (1) the factors that comprise it, its internal parts, or (2) its temporal antecedents, or (3) its contrasting
每一个现象物体都是一种连贯性。也就是说,它是不同元素的结合(凝聚)——要么(1)构成它的因素、它的内部部分,或者(2)它的时间前因,或者(3)它的对比

conceptual contexts (i.e., its qualitative contrast to whatever it is “not,” which is regarded as essential to its determination as this particular entity). Context and content are in the same boat on this view, in that for this object to appear phenomenally-to be “coherent” or legible, discernible-requires the coming together of multiple factors: figure and ground, elements in a structure, causal conditions. All that is necessary here is that these factors are heterogeneous, and phenomenally differ in some discernible way from the object they come to constitute. The conditions that make something so are distinct from what they make so.
概念背景(即,它与“不”的东西的定性对比,这被认为对于确定其作为特定实体至关重要)。在这个观点中,背景和内容是同一条船,因为要使这个物体出现现象——“连贯”或清晰、可辨别——需要多个因素的结合:图形和背景、结构中的元素、因果条件。这里所需要的只是这些因素是异质的,并且在某种明显的方式上与它们所构成的对象不同。使事物如此的条件与事物如此的条件是不同的。
Provisional Positing (jia) means conditionality, pratītyasamutpāda: it means that the conditions must thus always be not only distinct from the conditioned, but heterogeneous among themselves, and hence no solitary cause can have an effect, and hence no entity has any essence. Whatever they appear to be is posited only provisionally, and since this applies to any essence-candidate, all determinations are only provisional posits, indicating no essences. Whatever is so is so merely “in a manner of speaking.” All claims are implicitly parameterized. This means that every coherence is a local coherence: it remains coherent as such and such only within a limited horizon of relevance (i.e., taking into account some but not all of the possible manners of speaking, which are by definition not limitable to any finite set). That is, its legibility depends on the fixing of a certain scale, frame, or focal orientation; its identity as this precise thing depends phenomenally on restricting the ways in which it is viewed, or the number of other factors that are viewed in tandem with it.
临时定位(jia)意味着条件性,pratītyasamutpāda:它意味着条件不仅必须始终与条件不同,而且彼此之间是异质的,因此没有单独的原因可以产生效果,因此没有实体具有任何本质。无论它们看起来是什么,都只是临时假定的,并且由于这适用于任何本质候选者,所以所有决定都只是临时假定,表明没有本质。无论是什么,都只是“从某种意义上来说”。所有声明都隐式参数化。这意味着每一个连贯性都是局部连贯性:它仅在有限的相关范围内保持连贯性(即,考虑一些但不是全部可能的说话方式,根据定义,这些方式不限于任何有限的说话方式)放)。也就是说,它的易读性取决于一定的比例、框架或焦点方向的固定;它作为这个精确事物的身份在很大程度上取决于限制人们看待它的方式,或者与之相关的其他因素的数量。
Emptiness (kong) also means conditionality, pratītyasamutpāda: it means that every local coherence is globally incoherent, that it is thus and so in some manners of speaking but not in others. There are always further parameters. If all parameters (senses, respects, times) were taken into account at once, and all applications and aspects brought to bear, the original coherence would vanish into ambiguity.
空性(kong)也意味着条件性,pratītyasamutpāda:它意味着每一个局部的连贯性在整体上都是不连贯的,在某些说话方式中是这样,但在另一些方式中却不是。总是有更多的参数。如果所有的参数(意义、方面、时间)都被考虑在内,并且所有的应用和方面都发挥作用,那么原来的连贯性就会消失得模糊不清。
The Center (zhong) also means conditionality, pratītyasamutpāda: it means that Provisional Positing and Emptiness are alternate statements of the same fact, which is conditionality. It is a further insight into the nature of conditionality as such, showing that it is necessarily always also unconditional, and that conditionality and unconditionality are always copresent, and that this can be derived from a close examination of the nature of conditionality per se. It means that conditionality is unconditional, that every conditional state is interchangeable with its own absence and thus as present when absent as when present, and thus that every conditional thing is always also unconditionally present.
中(zhong)也意味着缘起,pratītyasamutpāda:它意味着临时定位和空性是同一事实的交替陈述,这就是缘起。它是对条件性本身的进一步洞察,表明它必然总是无条件的,并且条件性和无条件性总是共存的,而这可以从对条件性本身的本质的仔细考察中得出。它意味着条件性是无条件的,每一个有条件的状态都可以与其自身的缺席互换,因此缺席时和存在时都一样存在,因此每一个有条件的事物也总是无条件地存在。
The Non-exclusive Center (budanzhong) also means conditionality, pratītyasamutpāda: The arising of any coherence is the arising of every other coherence, as any attempt to limit it to a finite set of determinations will
非排斥中心(budanzhong)也意味着条件性,pratītyasamutpāda:任何连贯性的产生都是所有其他连贯性的产生,因为任何将其限制为一组有限决定的尝试都会导致

fail: any totality, if determinate, will imply a further totality beyond it. Any coherence plus its constitutive context is a new X , which requires, and thus in the same way again “is,” a further context, and so ad infinitum. Any conditional thing is not only copresent in its absence as such, but in every other possible coherence. Conditional X is not only also unconditional because it is also always present in and as an abstract “non-X,” but because it is also always present in and as every Y, Z, A, B, C. Every determination expresses every other determination. Every globally incoherent local coherence subsumes all other local coherences. Every subsuming is an intersubsumption. Each entity is readable as every other entity, as part of every other entity, and as the whole that subsumes all other entities as its parts. Each entity is identifiable, ontologically ambiguous, and as all-pervaded as all-pervading.
失败:任何总体性,如果是确定的,都将意味着超越它的进一步总体性。任何连贯性加上其构成上下文都是一个新的 X ,它需要(因此以同样的方式再次“是”)进一步的上下文,如此循环往复。任何有条件的事物不仅在其缺席时共存,而且在所有其他可能的连贯性中共存。有条件的 X 不仅是无条件的,因为它总是存在于抽象的“非 X”中并且作为抽象的“非 X”,而且因为它也总是存在于每个 Y、Z、A、B、C 中并且作为每个 Y、Z、A、B、C。每个确定都表达其他所有确定决心。每一个全局不连贯的局部连贯性都包含了所有其他局部连贯性。每一个包含都是一个相互包含。每个实体都可以像其他实体一样可读,可以作为其他实体的一部分,也可以作为包含所有其他实体作为其部分的整体来读取。每个实体都是可识别的,本体论上是模糊的,并且是无所不在的。

LI IN EARLY TIANTAI: CENTER AS CONVERTIBILITY OF DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE
天台早期的理:以确定与不确定的可转换性为中心

From the above, we can perhaps guess what the primary usage of Li in Tiantai will be. For Zhiyi, the basic meaning of Li is “Centrality” per se. Here we have a decisive step in the development of the concept of Li in Chinese thought, picking up a set of associations and meanings we have already seen slowly taking shape in previous chapters. Li is still what must be seen in order to achieve value. But here we are told what it is that needs to be perceived in order to achieve value, in this case Buddhist liberation: Centrality. Centrality means here unconditionality, which is the only ultimate value in Buddhism, the only end of suffering. It means absoluteness, inextricability from all possible conditions, omnipresence. The Center means what is tipped neither toward one extreme nor the other, which is equally present in the two opposite extremes, remains unchanged in and as either. In this sense, the center is the overcoming of oppositeness per se, of all oppositions: it is what is as present on both sides of any apparent mutual exclusivity, any divide. Hence, it is the unlimited, the absolute, the omnipresent. As such, it is what is virtually present throughout the vortex that is centered around and by it. For Tiantai, all things are Central: this means literally that every possible determination is unlimited, absolute, omnipresent, unconditional, present in and as all other entities, and conversely, as that in which all other entities can equally be found, their place of convergence.
从上面我们或许可以猜到“理”在天台的主要用途是什么。对于志毅来说,“礼”的基本含义就是“中心”本身。在这里,我们在中国思想中“礼”概念的发展中迈出了决定性的一步,拾取了我们在前几章中已经看到的一系列联想和含义。礼仍然是要实现价值必须看到的东西。但在这里我们被告知为了实现价值需要感知什么,在本例中是佛教的解脱:中心性。中心性在这里意味着无条件,这是佛教中唯一的终极价值,也是痛苦的唯一终点。它意味着绝对性、与所有可能条件的不可分割性、无所不在。中心意味着既不偏向一个极端,也不偏向另一个极端,它同样存在于两个相反的极端中,并且在其中任何一个中都保持不变。从这个意义上说,中心是对立本身、所有对立的克服:它是任何明显的相互排他性、任何分歧的双方都存在的东西。因此,它是无限的、绝对的、无所不在的。因此,它实际上存在于整个漩涡中,以它为中心并以它为中心。对于天台来说,一切事物都是中心:这从字面上意味着每一个可能的决定都是无限的、绝对的、无所不在的、无条件的、存在于所有其他实体中并作为所有其他实体存在,反之,正如所有其他实体都可以平等地在其中找到的那样,它们的位置收敛。
This is value because it implies omnipresence, hence unconditionality: a Center is what is present indirectly but discernibly in all the peripheral elements it incorporates. To say that X is a Center is to say that all non- X entities are also versions of X ; hence, X is omnipresent, unconditional, and in the Buddhist sense, therefore, value: liberation from suffering. They are “versions” of X, meaning they are X as some non-X determination. They are
这就是价值,因为它意味着无所不在,因此是无条件的:中心是间接但明显存在于它所包含的所有外围元素中的东西。说 X 是中心就是说所有非 X 实体也是 X 的版本;因此,X是无所不在的、无条件的,因此,在佛教意义上,它的价值是:从痛苦中解脱。它们是 X 的“版本”,这意味着它们是作为某种非 X 确定的 X。他们是

both X, the Center itself, and a particular non-X “expression” of Xness. We may note that the ruling image by which the notion of class membership or the application of a “principle” would have to be understood here is not the arraying of terms under a heading, or the inclusion of particulars within a circumscribed region, but of balanced sets of peripheral terms organized around a center, and deriving their character, both in their specific difference from the center and their copresence with and expression of the center, from their relation to this center. “All things are central” means all things are coherences that organize other things around themselves, which express themselves in the form of other things, as other things: to say X is central is to say that X is a “principle,” a Li , in this sense. The cup as Central is the cup as Li , which means the cup as the principle of all other beings, as that which they are all reducible to, toward which they converge, which is expressing itself in them and is the inner secret of their determinate presence. Li as principle and Li as a bringing-together and Li as what is needful for salvation and Li as omnipresent potential are all seen as one and the same here. We may consider this as the essential Tiantai insight into the matter. That is, to be Li is to be what is present in more than one place, what remains itself in spite of instantiation in difference-doing in this sense what is normally done by what we call a principle, a universal, a form, and essence. This is itself what is salvific, because in this way the conditionality which Buddhism identifies as the true kernel of all suffering, the simple location in one place opposed to its other, is overcome.
既是 X,中心本身,又是 Xness 的特定非 X“表达”。我们可能会注意到,这里必须理解的阶级成员概念或“原则”的应用的主导形象不是标题下术语的排列,也不是在限定区域内包含细节,而是围绕一个中心组织的平衡的外围术语集,并从它们与该中心的关系中派生出它们的特征,包括它们与中心的特定差异以及它们与中心的共存和表达。 “一切事物都是中心”意味着所有事物都是连贯性的,它们将其他事物组织在自身周围,并以其他事物的形式表达自己,就像其他事物一样:说X是中心就是说X是一个“原则”,一个Li ,从这个意义上说。杯为中,杯为礼,意思是杯是所有其他存在的原则,作为它们都可以还原的东西,它们汇聚到的东西,它在它们身上表达自己,是它们确定的内在秘密。在场。作为原则的“理”、作为聚合的“理”、作为救赎所需的“理”以及作为无所不在的潜力的“理”在这里都被视为同一个。我们可以认为这是天台宗的根本见解。也就是说,成为“理”就是存在于多个地方的东西,尽管存在差异的实例化,但仍然保持自身的东西——在这个意义上,做通常由我们所谓的原则、普遍性、形式和形式来完成的事情。本质。这本身就是救赎性的,因为通过这种方式,佛教所认为的所有痛苦的真正核心的条件性,即在一处相对于另一处的简单位置,就被克服了。
The image of Centrality is to be understood in terms of a metaphor that goes back to the Zhuangzi’s idea of the “pivot of Dao” (道樞 daoshu) the center of a circle of opposed “thises” and “thats,” rights and wrongs, points of view, where none of them “find their opposites”(是非莫得其偶 shifei mo de qi ou), that is, where fixed oppositeness per se has been transcended. This idea is well expressed by Qian Mu’s metaphor of the pendulum, as quoted earlier, rooted in the non-ironic adaptation of the notion of centrality in the “Zhongyong” (“Doctrine of the Mean”). Center means balance, impartiality, not limited to any one side of a pair of opposed terms, and also is associated with the point by which these erratic and ex-centric particulars can be grasped, understood, and used toward human value purposes-in the Buddhist case, liberation. Centers are what unify particulars, transcend simple location and hence conditionality, make things intelligible, and embody value. That is, Centers are the locus of coherence, centers are Li.
中心性的形象可以用一个隐喻来理解,这个隐喻可以追溯到庄子的“道枢”观念,即对立的“这”和“那”、正确与错误的圆的中心,观点,其中没有一个“是非莫得其偶是非莫得其偶”,即固定的对立性本身已经被超越。正如前面所引用的,钱穆的钟摆比喻很好地表达了这一思想,其根源在于对《中庸》中中心性概念的非讽刺性改编。中心意味着平衡、公正,不限于一对对立术语的任何一方,并且还与可以掌握、理解这些不稳定和偏心的细节并将其用于人类价值目的的点相关联。佛案,解脱。中心能够统一细节,超越简单的位置和条件,使事物变得易于理解并体现价值。也就是说,中心是相干点,中心是理。
To see the Center is to see not only the Center but all three of the Three Truths, and not separately but rather in their intersubsumptive relationship. In the Tiantai case, then, Li is sometimes described simply as Center, and sometimes as “the Three Truths.” But the Three Truths are related to each other, and to all things, by means of the upayic structure of
要看到中心,不仅要看到中心,还要看到三圣谛的全部,而且不是分开的,而是在它们相互包容的关系中。那么,在天台宗案件中,李有时被简单地描述为“中心”,有时被描述为“三真”。但是,三圣谛通过以下的 Upayic 结构相互关联,并与一切事物关联。

the Lotus Sutra, which complicates the picture considerably. We will find that in Zhiyi’s works, the term Li is used in at least the following diverse senses:
《法华经》使情况变得相当复杂。我们会发现,在志毅的作品中,“理”一词至少有以下多种含义:
  1. The Three Truths as what it is valuable to realize, a cognitive object waiting to be understood and accorded with. It is in this sense that it is “eternal,” independent of the knower, something like a preexistent “truth” to be known, a preexistent perforation in the world as guide for possible optimal action: “Whether a Buddha exists or not, the Nature [性 xing] and Li are constantly abiding. Because one is confused about this Li , the delusions of life and death arise. If one contemplates in accordance with Li , it is called wisdom.” 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
    三圣谛是值得认识的东西,是一个等待被理解和符合的认知对象。正是在这个意义上,它是“永恒的”,独立于认识者,就像是一个已知的先在“真理”,是世界上先在的穿孔,作为可能的最佳行动的指南:“无论佛陀存在与否,性性、理常住。因迷惑此理,而生生死妄想。若依理思惟,则名智慧。” 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
  2. Potential as opposed to realization, as in the Tiantai doctrine of the “Six Identities” (六即 liuji), or anything merely known rather than fully realized. Here again we may think of perforations waiting to be recognized and utilized. "The Six Identities: identity in Li , in name, in contemplation in practice, in similarity, in partial realization and in ultimate realization. . . . The identity in Li is that one moment of experience is identical to the Li of the Storehouse of the Thus-Come [i.e., the tathāgatagarbha] [一念心即如來藏理 yinianxin ji rulai zang li]. Because it is Such [如 r u r u rur u ] it is Empty, because it is a storehouse [藏 zang] [of multiplicity] it is Provisional Positing, because it is Li it is the Center. . . . The identity in name means the state in which, although one is identical in Li , and one uses it everyday without realizing it, for one has not yet heard of the Three Truths and is completely ignorant of the Buddhadharma. . …114 But “potential” is really a misleading term here. This usage in fact still means simply “a coherent object of true knowledge,” or “the truth.” It means something that is now in fact truly so, not merely potentially so, but which we do not see clearly. If there is a lump of gold buried in my back yard right now, which I cannot see, it is not merely “potentially” there. It is a fact yet to be known. When someone tells me about it, I might half-believe it or totally accept this, which would be equivalent to “identity in name.” If I went out to the back yard and noticed a strange lump in a certain place, or began to dig and hit something hard with my shovel, it would be equivalent to the identities in practice, and when I see it myself, remove it, polish it, bring it to the jeweler’s for appraisal, it is fully
    潜力与实现相反,如天台教义中的“六即六极”,或任何仅仅已知而不是完全实现的东西。在这里,我们可能会再次想到等待被识别和利用的穿孔。 “六同一性:理同一性、名同一性、行思同一性、相似性同一性、部分证悟性同一性、究竟证悟性同一性……理同一性是一刹那的经验与藏经的理同一性。如来[即如来藏][一念心即如来藏理yinianxin ji rulai zang li]因为是如是[如]。 r u r u rur u ] 是空,因为是库藏,所以是临位,因为是礼,所以是中心。 。 。 。名义上的同一,是指虽然理同,但日用而不觉,因为尚未闻三谛,对佛法一无所知。 。 ……114 但“潜力”在这里确实是一个误导性的术语。事实上,这种用法仍然简单地意味着“真正知识的连贯对象”或“真理”。它意味着现在事实上确实如此的东西,不仅仅是潜在的,而且我们还没有清楚地看到。如果我的后院现在埋着一块我看不到的金子,那么它不仅仅是“潜在”在那里。这是一个尚不可知的事实。当有人告诉我这件事时,我可能半信半疑,也可能完全接受,这相当于“名义上的身份”。如果我走到后院,发现某个地方有一个奇怪的肿块,或者开始用铲子挖并敲击一些坚硬的东西,那就相当于实践中的身份,当我自己看到它时,将其移走,打磨一下,拿去珠宝商鉴定一下,完全可以

    realized, but the gold has always actually, not potentially, been there and legally mine. We are identical to the Buddha (and all other beings) in fact now, not merely potentially, but this is called “only in Li” in the sense that is a fact to be known which is not yet known.
    已实现,但黄金实际上一直存在,而且是合法开采的,而不是潜在的。事实上,我们现在与佛陀(以及所有其他众生)是相同的,不仅仅是潜在的,但这被称为“仅在理”,意思是这是一个尚未知道的已知事实。
  3. Li as the second-order interpervasive unity of the Three Truths themselves, as opposed to the misapprehension of them as non-synonymous. This is evident, for example, when Zhiyi singles out the Center as Li , as against the other two truths, in the exegesis of the Identity of Li in the previous citation. This converging of the two other truths into the Center is the interpervasion of Provisional Positing and Emptiness, local coherence and global incoherence. But it is also the converging of all local coherences into any particular local coherence. As noted above, this is what gives us the clearest sense of what qualifies something as a Li for Zhiyi: Centrality per se is Li-ness. Centrality of X means that, in the formula seized upon by Zhili from the Kumārajīva’s translation of the larger Prajnâpâramitâ Sutra in this connection, “All dharmas converge ultimately into X, but never go beyond it” (一切法趣 X , 是趣不過 yiqiefaqu X X XX, shiqubuguo). 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} This applies to every conceivable X. The converging-around-a-center is what defines Li . It is Li in the traditional sense: an intelligible coherence and a value. It is a coherence as a coming together. It is intelligible as this particular X. It is a value because for Buddhists unconditionality is defined as value, and this can only be possible if entities are interpervasive, readable as each other. It further absorbs the ironic conception of value, for in this mutual readability, the original coherence-intelligibility-of X is both established and effaced. In the Three Truths, moreover, we see precisely that the non-ironic coherence and the ironic coherence are intersubsumptive: any determination as coherent is identical to its indetermination, its positing as X is its emptiness of X , its local coherence is its global incoherence. As the formula from the Prajnâpâramitâ passage continues: “All dharmas converge into X , but never go beyond it. And why? Because X itself is unobtainable [i.e., Empty]-how much less, then, is there any convergence or non-convergence into it?”’ For Zhiyi, this means the Three Truths: any determination is ambiguous, readable always as (1) intelligible as some particular X , as (2) the absence of that X , and (3) all other determinations as expressions of or
    理是三圣谛本身的二阶渗透统一,而不是被误解为非同义词。例如,在前一引文中对李身份的注释中,当智一将中心单独挑出来为“李”时,与其他两个真理相对照,这一点就很明显了。其他两个真理向中心的汇聚是临时定位和空性、局部连贯性和全局不连贯性的交织。但它也是所有局部连贯性汇聚成任何特定的局部连贯性。如上所述,这让我们最清楚地了解什么是“至一”的“理”:中心性本身就是“理”。 X的中心性意味着,在智力从鸠摩罗什翻译的大般若经中所抓住的公式中,“诸法最终会聚到X,但永远不会超越它”(一切法趣X,是趣不过yiqiefaqu) X X XX ,失去不过)。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15} 这适用于每个可以想象的 X。围绕中心收敛就是定义 Li 的。这是传统意义上的理:一种可理解的连贯性和一种价值。这是一种凝聚力。它是可以理解的,就像这个特定的X一样。它是一个价值,因为对于佛教徒来说,无条件性被定义为价值,而这只有在实体相互渗透、相互可读的情况下才有可能。它进一步吸收了具有讽刺意味的价值概念,因为在这种相互可读性中,X的原始连贯性——可理解性——既被建立又被抹杀。 此外,在三谛中,我们准确地看到,非反讽的连贯性和反讽的连贯性是相互包容的:任何连贯的决定性与其不确定性是相同的,它作为X的定位是它的X的空性,它的局部连贯性是它的整体不连贯性。 。正如般若波罗密经中的公式继续说道:“一切诸法都汇聚于X,但决不超越它。为什么?因为X本身是不可得的[即空]——那么,它是否有收敛性或不收敛性呢?对于Zhiyi来说,这意味着三个真理:任何决定都是模糊的,可读的总是作为(1)可理解为某个特定的X,(2)不存在该X,以及(3)所有其他决定作为或的表达

    aspects of that X X XX, such that X X XX is the ultimate unconditional fact about them, that they have no being beyond X .
    的方面 X X XX ,使得 X X XX 是关于它们的最终无条件事实,即它们没有超越 X 的存在。
  4. What a practitioner should think about or keep in mind while performing a ritual, as opposed to what one’s body is doing during it. “The repentance of event [事 shi] pertains to the path of suffering and karma, while the repentance of Li pertains to the path of delusion.” 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} Note here that, in terms of the Three Tracks, this means Li pertains to Emptiness and the track of Contemplation and Reflection (觀照軌 guanzhaogui, pertaining to the experience of realization), as opposed to Provisional Positing (the track of Conditions for Completion 資成軌 zicheng’gui, pertaining to practice leading to realization) and the Center (the track of the Real Nature 真性軌 zhenxing’gui, pertaining to the preexistent truth to be realized). Li is here again an intelligible coherence to be recognized by the mind.
    练习者在进行仪式时应该思考或记住什么,而不是在仪式过程中身体在做什么。 “事忏是苦业道,礼忏是迷道。” 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 这里注意,就三轨而言,这是指属于空性和观照轨(观照轨,属于证悟经验)的“离”,而不是“临时定位”(“资成条件”的轨)。成轨自成轨,涉及修行导致证悟)和中心(真性轨真性轨,涉及要证悟的先在真理)。在这里,“理”再次成为一种可以被头脑识别的可理解的连贯性。
  5. Any object of cognition, inasmuch as all are ultimately Central, and thus all ultimately unconditional, and all of them are what it is necessary to recognize and realize in order to be liberated from suffering. This is where the truly distinctive Tiantai conception of Li is especially evident. Zhiyi says, “If we open up the gate of skillful means and reveal the ultimate reality [of them], [we see that] precisely the former bodies are the perfect eternal body, the previous teachings are the Integrated teaching, the previous practices and the previous Lis are all precisely the true ultimate reality.” 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} Note that Li are plural here, but also ultimately one, or as Zhiyi says elsewhere, “Li is not even one, how much less is it many?” 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} This is the application of the specifically Lotus Sutra problematic to the question of Li, which is indeed the heart of the matter in Tiantai. Zhiyi’s view is systematized in his doctrine of the “Four Onenesses” (四一siyi) and the Root and Traces (本跡 benji), developed most directly in the Fahuawenju. For these will allow us to see just what is meant by “oneness” in this context-i.e., how far it is from implying a homogenous sameness. Let us consider these in turn.
    任何认知的对象,因为一切都是最终的中心,因此一切最终都是无条件的,并且所有这些都是为了从痛苦中解脱而必须认识和实现的。这正是李氏真正独特的天台观的体现。智一说:“如果我们打开方便之门,揭示究竟实相,正是过去的身体是圆满的永恒身体,过去的教法是综合教法,过去的修行和先前的李氏,皆是真正的究竟实相。” 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 请注意,“理”在这里是复数,但最终也是“一”,或者正如志毅在别处所说的,“理都不是一,何况是多呢?” 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 这是将《法华经》的具体问题运用到理问题上,这确实是天台的核心问题。智一的观点系统化地体现在他的“四一”和“本迹”学说中,并在《法华文具》中得到了最直接的发展。因为这些将使我们能够明白在这种情况下“同一性”的含义是什么——即,它与暗示同质的同一性相去甚远。让我们依次考虑这些。
The Four Onenessess refer to the four aspects of Buddhist teaching just mentioned: the person practicing, the teaching he or she has heard, the practice he or she is doing, and the Li or ideas he is entertaining and striving to realize. Śrāvakas are Bodhisattvas, according to the Lotus Sutra. This is the oneness of person (人一 renyi); there are not Śrāvakas as opposed
四一是指刚才提到的佛法的四个方面:修行者、所听闻的教法、所行的修行、所修行的理或所要证悟的理。根据《法华经》,声闻是菩萨。这就是人一renyi;没有相反的声闻

to Bodhisattvas, but rather precisely this person here being a Śrāvaka is that person there being a Bodhisattva, and indeed the Buddha that this Bodhisattva will eventually become. As the Buddha tells Śarriputra in the Lotus Sutra, after describing the glorious Buddha that he will become in the future, “precisely that person there is you yourself” (彼即是汝身 bi jishi rushen). 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} The tenseless form of the Chinese here is important: not “he will be you” or “you will be him,” but “just he is you.” You “are” your own future, in the way that a setup “is” the funny like the punch line: precisely because it is not funny. You are “one” with that Buddha because you are doing what you are doing now, namely, being a Śrāvaka, specifically not trying to become a Buddha. Indeed, he is a Bodhisattva even while a Śrāvaka, precisely by being a Śrāvaka. This is not the Upanishadic “tat tvam asi” (“thou art that!”), which points to each diverse creature and asserts that the real essential self of each of them deep inside is the very self that lies deep inside yourself, one and unchanging in each being beneath all illusory differences as manifested in their diverse present thoughts, deeds, and situations. Here, they are one by being different, different by being one. It is not the inner essence of the Srāvaka that is secretly really a Buddha in essence: it is the Śrāvaka-cognitions, Śrāvaka-beliefs, Śrāvaka-deeds that are themselves also readable as Buddha-thoughts, Buddha-beliefs, Buddha-deeds, as the setup both brings about and is retrospectively readable as funny, precisely by means of its contrast to the funniness. But this means not only that the same person who is here a Śrāvaka is actually all along also a Bodhisattva and a Buddha, but also that the very same teaching he has accepted, the Śrāvaka teaching of the Hinayana, is the teaching of the Bodhisattva vehicle (the different teachings are, precisely as different, one and the same teaching), that his Śrāvaka practices themselves are Bodhisattva practices (the different practices are, precisely as different, one and the same practice), and finally that the truths he was realizing (Suffering, Impermanence, Emptiness of person, Nirvana as extinction, transcendence of Nirvana, self-benefit, and so on) are themselves, in their difference, one and the same as the truths of the Bodhisattva vehicle (the six perfections, the original vow to save all beings, Emptiness of dharmas and persons, the Emptiness of Emptiness, the Middle Way Buddha-nature, Mind-only, and so on)-this last being the sameness of Li. The structure to be recalled here is the setup/punch line interpervasion of difference and sameness explained in the previous section: they are the identical (both setup and punch line pervaded by both the seriousness of the setup and the funniness of the punch line) only by being different. The truth of the statement “all conditioned things are suffering” is the same as the truth of the statement “all dharmas are Emptiness.” These turn out to mean the same thing. The same goes even for diametrically opposed truths: for example, “Nirvana is extinction” and “Nirvana is not extinction.” The
是菩萨,而正是此人声闻,彼彼菩萨,乃至此菩萨终成佛。正如佛陀在《法华经》中告诉舍利弗的那样,在描述他未来将成为的荣耀佛陀之后,“彼即是汝身彼寂十如身”。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 这里中文的无时态形式很重要:不是“他将是你”或“你将是他”,而是“他就是你”。你“是”你自己的未来,就像妙语一样,设置“是”有趣的:正是因为它不好笑。你与佛陀是“一体”,因为你正在做你现在正在做的事情,即成为声闻,特别是不试图成为佛陀。确实,即使是声闻,他也是菩萨,正是因为他是声闻。这不是奥义书的“tat tvam asi”(“你就是那个!”),它指向每一种不同的生物,并断言它们每个人内心深处真正本质的自我就是你内心深处的自我,一个和一个每个存在体在所有虚幻的差异之下都是不变的,这些差异体现在他们当前不同的思想、行为和情况中。在这里,它们因不同而合而为一,因合一而不同。真正本质上的佛,并不是声闻的内在本质:而是声闻认知、声闻信仰、声闻行,它们本身也可以解读为佛思想、佛信仰、佛行,因为这种设置既带来了乐趣,又可以通过其与搞笑的对比来回顾性地阅读。 但这不仅意味着同一个人在这里是声闻,实际上自始至终都是菩萨和佛,而且他所接受的教法,即小乘的声闻教法,也是菩萨乘的教法。 (不同的教法,恰恰是不同的,同一个教法),他的声闻修行本身就是菩萨行(不同的修行,正是不同的,同一个修行),最后,他所证悟的真理(苦、无常、人空、涅槃灭度、超越涅槃、自利等)本身与菩萨乘法(六波罗蜜、本原)各异而同。发愿救度一切众生、法人空、空性空、中道佛性、唯心等),此后即是理同。这里要回忆的结构是上一节中解释的差异和相同的设置/妙语交织:它们是相同的(设置和妙语都渗透着设置的严肃性和妙语的滑稽性)通过与众不同。 “一切有为法皆苦”这句话的真理,与“诸法皆空”这句话的真理是一样的。事实证明它们的意思是一样的。即使对于截然相反的真理也是如此:例如,“涅槃就是灭度”和“涅槃不是灭度”。“ 这

truth of both statements is the same truth; they differ and yet are equally Li , the same coherence (valued harmony-producing object of cognition) the recognition of which is necessary for liberation. Zhili thus criticizes the notion that only the truth to be realized by the Mahayana can be called Li: "Since you call the fruition of the Mahayana the Great Li [大理 dali], why would you not take the fruition of the Hinayana as small Li [小理 xiaoli]? The opponent (Guangzhai) defends his view by saying, ‘Since the fruition aimed at by the Hinayana is not actual [according to the Lotus], we should not consider this fruition be any sort of Li.’ But if so, the same is true of the provisional teaching, practice and person: none of these is actual, [considered as such]. But if nonetheless we can speak of the provisional teaching, practice and person, we can also speak of the provisional Li. Moreover, if there were no Li to the provisional, the Conventional would not be called a Truth. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} Zhiyi’s interpretation, of course, also extends this to all persons, all teachings, all practices, all truths or cognitive objects. This is what makes it impossible to say if Li is one or many, or to limit its reference once and for all to any particular level. Greater and lesser swaths of coherence are all interpervasive and intersubsumptive, requiring precisely the ignorance of the larger and the concomitant limitation to the smaller in order to manifest later as the larger, as in the Lotus. A Bodhisattva must also at times limit his practice, his teaching, his person, his own understanding to the lesser, the truths of the Śrāvakas, in order to be a Bodhisattva at all: both as a phase of self-forgetting sometimes necessary in his Bodhisattva practice, as in the Lotus stories, and as a mastery of the viewpoints and truths accepted by the benighted sentient beings whom it is necessary to communicate with in order to practice the Bodhisattva Way. All objects of cognition are Li because all without exception are what is to be realized to liberate oneself from suffering, to become a Buddha.
两种说法的真实性是相同的;它们虽然不同,但同样是理,具有相同的一致性(有价值的、产生和谐的认知对象),认识到这种一致性是解放所必需的。直隶因此批判了只有大乘证得的真理才能称为礼的观念:“既称大乘果为大理,何不以小乘果为小礼”。对方(广斋)为自己的观点辩护说:“既然小乘所追求的果不是真实的(根据莲花),我们不应该认为这种果是任何一种理。”如果是这样的话,临教、修行和人也是如此:这些都不是真实的,但如果我们仍然可以谈论临教、修行和人,那么我们也可以谈论临行。况且,若无暂礼,则俗也不能称为真理。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20} 当然,智一的解释也将其延伸到一切人、一切教义、一切修行、一切真理或认知对象。这就是为什么不可能说Li是一还是多,或者将其指称一劳永逸地限制在任何特定的水平上。较大和较小的连贯性都是相互渗透和相互包容的,恰恰需要对较大的部分的无知以及随之而来的对较小部分的限制,以便稍后表现为较大的部分,就像在莲花中一样。 为了成为菩萨,菩萨有时也必须限制他的修行、他的教义、他的人格、他自己对较小的声闻真理的理解:这两者有时都是他的忘我阶段所必需的。菩萨修行,如莲花故事中那样,是对愚昧众生所接受的观点和真理的掌握,为了修行菩萨道,必须与愚昧众生进行交流。一切认识的对象都是理,因为无一例外都是为了解脱痛苦、成佛所要证悟的。
This level-shifting character of Li in Tiantai is what is explicated in the doctrine of “Roots and Traces.” In conformity with the Jizang’s Three Treatise usage considered above, he is happy to begin by defining Li as Emptiness, and opposing its unity to the diversity of particular beings. The Vimalakirti Sutra states, "All dharmas are established from the root of non-dwelling [從無住本立一切法 cong wuzhuben li yiqiefa]."21 Zhiyi, in the Fahuawenju, directly equates Li with Non-Dwelling: “Non-dwelling is the Li , all dharmas are the events (shi).” This is consistent with the pre-Tiantai understanding of Li in Chinese Buddhism. For Zhiyi, Li is “Non-Dwelling” in the specific sense of not dwelling in either of the two extremes, a synonym for the Center: not confined to either Provisional Positing or Emptiness, Being or Non-Being, this or that. Li means the absolute, the unconditional, the omnipresent, what is not confined to any simple location, and is thus discoverable everywhere and at all times. He clarifies this by saying, "Li is
天台礼的这种层次转换特征,正是“本迹”学说中所阐述的。根据上述《地藏三论》的用法,他很乐意首先将理定义为空性,并将其统一性与特定存在的多样性相对立。 《维摩诘经》云:“诸法从无住根本而立。”21 至一在《法华文举》中,直接将离与无住等同:“无住是理,诸法皆是事。”这与中国佛教天台前对礼的理解是一致的。对于执一来说,“离”的具体含义是不居于两个极端中的任何一个,是中心的同义词:不局限于临时定位或空性,有或无,这样或那样。 “理”意味着绝对、无条件、无所不在,不局限于任何简单的地点,因此随时随地都可以发现。他澄清说:“李是

true Suchness [真如 zhenru, tathata], and true Suchness is originally pure. Whether a Buddha exists or not, it is eternal and unchanging, so Li is called the real. Events means mind, attention, and consciousness and so on, which give rise to pure and impure karma. These change and move and are unfixed, so events are called provisional truth [權 quan]. Without Li there is nothing by which to establish events, without events there is no way to manifest Li. Events have the power to manifest Li 若非理無以立事。非事不能顯理。事有顯理之功. 322 322 ^(322){ }^{322}
真如真如,真如本来清净。佛无论有无,都是永恒不变的,所以理称为真实。事件是指心、注意力、意识等等,它们会产生清净和不清净的业力。这些变化、移动而不固定,所以事件称为权权。无理则无以立事,无事则无以显理。事件有力量,彰显理若非理无以立事。非事不能显理。事有显理之功。 322 322 ^(322){ }^{322}
So far this is all standard pre-Tiantai understanding, and even suggests a one-way dependence relation between Li and shi ( Li “establishes” shi but shi merely “manifests” Li), and the original purity of Suchness, all doctrines for which later Tiantai will criticize Huayan. 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} For it is just this way of understanding the situation that is supplanted by Zhiyi’s treatment here, evident in his the application of the categories of 權 quan and 實shi, provisional and ultimate truth, which situates the discussion in terms of the epistemology of the Lotus. For this move is precisely what is decisive. Hence, Zhiyi goes on in this passage to say, “In the relation between Li and teachings, we say the previously mentioned Li and events [事 shi] are both Li. For example, both ultimate and conventional truth are called truths-for it is by comprehending them that the Buddhas achieve their sagehood. . . .” Here, both Li and shi are collapsed into Li , in that both are “truths,” both provisional and ultimate truth are what has to be realized to achieve sagehood. In the new context, the meaning of Li shifts; as compared to the multiplicity of events, the unchanging essence of Suchness is Li, but as opposed to the activity of teaching, the Li is the content of teaching, the ideas to be realized, including both provisional and ultimate truths. These are all Li because these are all liberating coherences: that which must be realized in order to attain value, which in this case is liberation from suffering. As discussed in the previous section, all Conventional Truths, and a mastery of them due to realizing also their interpervasion, are what one realizes, not what one transcends and leaves behind, in enlightenment. Hence each and every coherence, every determination, is a Li.
到目前为止,这都是标准的天台之前的理解,甚至暗示了理与势之间的一种单向依赖关系(理“立”势而势只是“显”理),以及真如的原始纯粹性,所有学说都为之而存在。以后天台就会批评华严。 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23} 因为正是这种理解情况的方式被智一在这里的处理所取代,这在他对权权和实事、临时真理和究竟真理范畴的应用中显而易见,这将讨论置于莲花认识论的基础上。 。因为这一举动恰恰是决定性的。因此,执一在这段话中接着说:“在礼与教的关系上,我们说前面提到的礼和事都是礼。例如,胜义谛和世俗谛都被称为真理,因为佛陀正是通过了解它们才能证得圣果。 。 。 ”。在这里,礼和是都被压缩为礼,因为两者都是“真理”,临时真理和究竟真理都是实现圣人所必须实现的。在新的语境下,“礼”的含义发生了变化;相对于事件的多样性,真如的不变本质是理,但相对于教学活动,理是教学的内容,是要实现的理念,包括临时真理和究竟真理。这些都是理,因为这些都是解放的连贯性:为了获得价值而必须实现的东西,在这种情况下是从痛苦中解脱出来。正如上一节所讨论的,所有世俗真理,以及由于认识到它们的相互渗透而对它们的掌握,都是一个人在开悟中所认识到的,而不是一个人超越和留下的。所以每一个连贯,每一个决心,都是礼。
This is a consequence of the “shifting” structure-a kind of harvesting of Zhuangzi’s “slippage and doubt” 滑疑 motif-that can be observed in Zhiyi’s discussion of any set of terms. Indeed, we may say that to treat a set of definitions in this shifting, mitosis-producing way is precisely to explicate their L i L i LiL i, their non-dwelling. Zhiyi says:
这是“移”结构的结果——一种对庄子“滑疑”母题的收获——可以在知己对任何一组术语的讨论中观察到。事实上,我们可以说,以这种不断变化的、产生有丝分裂的方式来对待一组定义,恰恰是为了解释它们的定义。 L i L i LiL i ,他们的非住宅。志毅 说道:
The root is the one Real-Attribute, while the traces are everything else besides the Real-Attribute of all dharmas. Again, when Li is contrasted to event [shi], it is called the root, but once one is speaking of Li and event, both are to be called teachings, and thus traces.
根本是一实性,痕迹是一切法实性以外的一切。又,礼与事相对,谓之本,而一言礼与事,则谓之教,故称踪。
Again, both Li and event as teachings are to be called the root, and the practice of this teaching by those who receive it is to be called the trace; it is like a man who leaves footprints in going to his dwelling place: by following the footprints the dwelling place can be found. Again, practice is whereby one realizes substance, and substance is the root; when function arises in accord with this substance, this is the trace. Again, to truly attain substance and function is the root, and to provisionally put forth substance and function (in teachings and practice) is the trace. What manifests today is the root; but what is said in the past and future is the trace. . . First we will explain root and trace in terms of Li and events. “All dharmas are established from the root of non-dwelling.” The Li of non-dwelling is the ultimate truth of the Real-Attribute at the root time [i.e., from the perspective of the root] [本時實相真諦 benshi shixiang zhendi]. “All dharmas” here means the manifold of conventional truths at the root time. Because the Real-Attribute ultimate truth root hangs down into the conventional traces, examining these conventional traces reveals the ultimate truth. Although root and trace differ, they are alike in their inconceivability. . . . Second, we explain root and trace in terms of Li and teaching. Both of the two truths perceived in the root time are equally unspeakable, and so both are together called the root. The ancient Buddhas nonetheless spoke them via skillful means, producing the teachings of the Two Truths, and these teachings are called the traces. If there were no Two Truths in the root, there could not exist these two types of teachings. And without the traces revealed in the teachings, how could the truths of the root be revealed? Although the roots and traces differ, they are one in their inconceivability. . . . 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
又,理与事为法,谓之根本,受受者修行,谓之迹。就如一个人到他的住处留下脚印一样,顺着脚印就可以找到住处。又说,修行是体悟实质,实质是根本;当功能根据此物质而生起时,这就是痕迹。又如,实得体用是根本,暂发体用是迹。今日所显者,是根本;但过去和未来所说的都是痕迹。 。 。首先我们用理和事件来解释根和迹。 “诸法皆从无住根本而立。”无住之理,是本时实相真谛。这里的“一切法”,是指根本时间的种种世俗真理。因为实属性究竟真理根垂于世俗痕迹中,考察这些世俗痕迹就能揭示究竟真理。根与迹虽然不同,但不可思议的程度是一样的。 。 。 。其次,我们从礼、教的角度来解释根本和踪迹。在根本时间中所觉知的两种真理同样是不可言说的,因此两者一起称为根本。古诸佛仍以方便说,而生二谛法,名曰道。如果根本上没有二谛,就不可能存在这两种教法。如果没有教法中所揭示的痕迹,根本的真理又如何能够被揭示呢? 其根迹虽不同,但其不可思议性是一的。 。 。 。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24}
On the first level, Li and shi are distinguished; but relative to the second level, both Li and shi are collectively called Li . The introduction of the categories of root and trace, as abstracted from the Lotus, allow for a shifting multiplication of the applicability of the term Li. There is always another level, another more fundamental aspect, even when we are speaking of what is from another perspective the Li which grounds the shi. This is how the simple unilateral dependence relation is overcome here. Moreover, it does not simply reduce to a one-way hierarchy, but turns in upon itself. Root and trace mean here what Li and shi mean in Huayan-the independent and the dependent, as we shall see presently—but Li itself is merely one level in this development, which continues to mutate and split at each level to which we pay attention.
第一层是礼、是之分;第二层是礼、是之分;但相对于第二层而言,礼和势都统称为礼。从莲花中抽象出来的根和踪范畴的引入,允许“理”一词的适用性发生变化。即使我们从另一个角度谈论作为“势”基础的“理”,也总是存在另一个层次、另一个更基本的方面。这就是这里克服简单单方面依赖关系的方式。此外,它并不是简单地简化为单向层次结构,而是自转。这里的根和迹的意思就是《华严经》里的理和是的意思——独立和从属,正如我们现在将要看到的——但理本身只是这个发展中的一个层次,它在我们关注的每个层次上继续变异和分裂。 。
This indicates that in Tiantai Li is more like an empty-place marker, or a structural token, or an indicator that a certain structure will apply to any content without exception, rather than a term that denotes a particular content. In every relation, one side will be Li. Expanding the context, it is possible that the whole of the previous set, including both terms, will be Li. But Li will necessarily always be present, with some content or another, as a structural necessity. This is consistent with the initial definition of Li as “non-dwelling.” The Li that is posited along with any content will be the implicit self-transcendence that is necessarily posited at the same time. In other words, when X is posited as a determinate content-whether this is a concept, a practice, a deluded thought, or a Buddhist teaching-the ambiguity and absoluteness of this X, this X’s being non-X (Emptiness) and its being present in and as all other coherences (the Center), will be the corresponding Li . In this way, Li can always be said either to have a content-the Three Truths-or to have no particular content-for a particular content is a “dwelling.” Li is also for this reason inescapable whenever any content is posited. Since the Three Truths means that determinacy is ambiguity is absoluteness, any determinacy itself is always also precisely Li , as what has to be realized in order to be liberated from suffering.
这表明,在《天台礼》中,“理”更像是一个空位标记,或者是一个结构标记,或者是某种结构无一例外地适用于任何内容的指示符,而不是一个表示特定内容的术语。在每一种关系中,都有一方是李。扩大上下文,前一组的全部,包括这两个术语,可能都是李。但作为结构上的必要性,李必然会始终存在,并带有某种内容。这与最初对“非住宅”的定义是一致的。与任何内容一起提出的“理”,必然是同时提出的隐含的自我超越。换句话说,当X被设定为一个确定的内容时——无论是概念、修行、妄想还是佛法——这个X的模糊性和绝对性,这个X的非X(空性)及其存在于并且作为所有其他相干体(中心),将是相应的 Li 。这样,理总是可以说要么有内容——三真谛——要么没有特定的内容——因为特定的内容就是“住处”。因此,无论何时发布任何内容,李都不可避免。既然三谛意味着决定性就是模糊性就是绝对性,任何决定性本身也总是正是理,是为了从痛苦中解脱而必须证悟的东西。
The simultaneous deployment of these various levels of meaning entails considerable complexity. We find Zhanran emphasizing the multiple contrasted meanings directly: “It should be understood that deluded sentient beings have only the Li, while the Buddhas have attained the events [shi]; also, deluded sentient beings have only the events, while the Buddhas have realized the Li . Thus sentient beings have only the events and Li within delusion, while the Buddhas fully possess the [same] events and Li within enlightenment. Although they differ as to delusion and enlightenment, the events and the Li are the same entity in both cases.” 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
同时部署这些不同层次的意义会带来相当大的复杂性。我们发现湛然直接强调了多重对比的意义:“当知迷惑众生只有理,诸佛已得事;又迷众生唯事,诸佛证理。是故众生只有迷中事理,而诸佛则具觉中事理。虽然迷与悟的内容有所不同,但事件与理在这两种情况下都是同一实体。” 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
Sentient beings possess only the Li as “potential” in the qualified sense indicated above, but not the realization of this truth in “events.” But Buddhas are the ones who realize this Li , while sentient beings are stuck with only the deluded shi. Embracing both of these contrary meanings at the same time, as Zhanran does here, entails a reconfiguration of our understanding of the relation between “potentiality” and “actuality” as such, and this is the real point, for this is the real import of the doctrine of the Three Truths. For, as we saw in the second meaning of Li listed above, to say sentient beings have it “only in Li” means simply that “it is true of sentient beings that they are identical to Buddhas,” while having the “event” in this context means that Buddhas are those who (“genuinely”) know this as a temporal mental act of cognition with a beginning and end. But in the awareness of deluded sentient beings, there are only events-temporal
众生只具有上述限定意义上的“理”,而不具有“事件”中这一真理的实现。但诸佛皆证此理,而众生则只受迷惑之势所困。同时拥抱这两种相反的含义,就像展然在这里所做的那样,需要重新配置我们对“潜力”和“现实”之间关系的理解,这才是真正的重点,因为这才是真正的意义。三圣谛的教义。因为,正如我们在上面列出的“理”的第二个含义中所看到的,说众生“只在理中”意味着“众生确实与佛相同”,而“事件”在“理”中。这个上下文意味着佛陀是那些(“真正”)知道这是一种有开始和结束的暂时心理认知行为的人。但在迷惑众生的觉知中,只有时间事件。

conditioned facts with a beginning and end-and no Li , no inherent omnipresent coherences, no experience of the unconditioned: there, experience apprehends only the conditional and thus suffering. The conflation of the two senses yields a distinctive sense of the identity between Li and events. For whether or not one knows this truth about things as a temporal act of cognition, one’s “knowing” of it always exists as an inherent eternal fact, that is, in the guise of (“as”) whatever coherences one may be aware of. The eternal truth and the temporal events within delusion include the realization of truth itself as temporal event, while the same eternal truth and the same temporal events within enlightenment include the realization of truth as part of the eternal, always-occurring truth. The event of the Buddha’s coming-to-know-the-truth, in other words, exists in both cases, but in one case it is a simply located event with a beginning and end in time and applying only to a certain realm of space, and in the other as itself a Li , a fact that is omnipresent and eternal.
有开始和结束的有条件的事实——没有理,没有固有的无所不在的连贯性,没有无条件的经验:在那里,经验只理解有条件的,因此理解痛苦。这两种意义的融合产生了一种独特的“理”与事件之间的同一性感。因为无论一个人是否知道这个关于事物的真理作为一种暂时的认知行为,一个人对它的“了解”总是作为一个固有的永恒事实而存在,也就是说,以(“作为”)人们可能意识到的任何连贯性的形式存在。 。永恒真理和迷惑中的短暂事件包括对真理本身作为短暂事件的认识,而同样的永恒真理和证悟中相同的短暂事件包括对作为永恒、永远存在的真理的一部分的真理的认识。换句话说,佛陀证得真相的事件在两种情况下都存在,但在一种情况下,它是一个简单定位的事件,在时间上有开始和结束,并且只适用于某个空间领域。 ,而他者本身就是理,这是一个无所不在、永恒的事实。
In technical Tiantai terms, this important point, seeing every experienceable determination as itself the central unconditional Li that encompasses all other determinations both as Li and as shi, is addressed in Zhiyi’s comments and Zhanran’s subcomments on a line from Chapter 2 of the Lotus Sutra, which in Kumārajīva’s brilliant mistranslation states: “This dharma dwells in the dharma-position, and all the characteristics of the world dwell eternally”(是法住法位,世間相常住 shifazhufawei, shijianxiangchangzhu)。 But to understand the significance of these comments, in particular Zhanran’s subcomments, we must first take a look at the Huayan understanding of Li and event (shi).
用技术性的天台术语来说,这一重要的一点,即把每一个可体验的决定本身视为中心无条件的理,涵盖了所有其他既是理又是势的决定,在《法华经》第二章中的一行的智一的评论和湛然的补充评论中阐述了这一点:鸠摩罗什精彩的误译中说:“此法住法位,世间相常住 shifazhufawei, shijianyangchangzhu”。尤其是湛然的批注,我们首先要看看华严对礼和事的理解。

APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN HUAYAN AND TIANTAI
华严天台的表象与现实

Dushun 杜順 (557-640), a slightly younger contemporary of Zhiyi’s, is the nominal founder of the Huayan 華嚴 School of Buddhism, supposedly basing itself primarily on the Avatamsaka Sutra. But there is considerable doubt that the doctrinal works attributed to him can really be traced back to this historical Dushun. The “second patriarch” Yunhua Zhiyan 雲華智做 (602-668) is thought to have established some of the basic doctrines of the school, 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} but Xianshou Fazang 賢首法藏 (643-721) is usually fingered as the de facto founder or at least completer of the doctrinal system of the Huayan School. The works attributed to all of these figures, as well as later Huayan masters, all argue emphatically for mutual pervasion of events. Huayan thinkers developed many formulas for working out the various directions and implications of this interpervasion, as we shall see, but as a shorthand we can point to the typical Huayan formulation found in the famous slogan “non-obstruction between events” (事事無礙 shi shi wu
杜顺(557-640),与智一同时代的稍微年轻一些的人,是佛教华严宗名义上的创始人,据说主要以《华严经》为基础。但人们对他的教义著作能否真正追溯到这位历史上的杜顺颇有疑问。 “第二祖”云华智做(602-668)被认为建立了该学派的一些基本教义, 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 但贤首法藏(643-721)通常被认为是华严宗教义体系事实上的创始人或至少是完成者。所有这些人物以及后来的华严大师的作品都强调事件的相互渗透。正如我们将要看到的,华严思想家开发了许多公式来计算这种相互渗透的各种方向和含义,但作为速记,我们可以指出著名口号“事事无碍”中的典型华严公式。妨碍十五

ai, or 事事圓融 shi shi yuan rong), and the analogy of Indra’s net from the Avatamsaka Sutra itself, developed in the works attributed to Dushun. It is well documented that an important shift in Huayan doctrine takes place in the course of the Tang Dynasty, whereby the concept of the Tathagatagarbha (womb or embryo of the Tathatagata, usually equivalent to the concept of “Buddha-Nature”) and the notion of the “Original Pure Mind,” largely traceable to the Awakening of Faith 大乘起信論 (also probably of Chinese origin), become increasingly dominant. This tendency reaches its zenith in the thought of the “fifth patriarch” of the school, Guifeng Zongmi 圭峰宗密 (780-841), but is already subtly traceable in some of Fazang’s writings, and becomes more visible in the thought of the “fourth patriarch,” Qingliang Chengguan 清涼澄觀 (738-839). In Zongmi’s case, this has been interpreted as a shift from the emphasis on the interpenetration of events with other events to an emphasis on the interpenetration between Li and events (理事無礙 li shi wu ai), Li being identified with the Pure Original Mind itself, with the Buddha-nature or Tathagatagarbha. 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} This moves Huayan thought away from the Madhyamika principles used to argue for the omnipresence of every event as presented in Tiantai, not only in its robust idealism but also in establishing a fixed one-way relationship between the pure mind (indeterminate in itself) and all other determinacies (which are both identical to and nonidentical to this pure mind, which serves as their ontological basis). We will explore this problem in depth in the next chapter.
ai,或事事圆融 shi shiyuan rong),以及《华严经》本身中因陀罗网的类比,在杜顺的著作中得到发展。据记载,唐代华严学说发生了一个重要的转变,即如来藏的概念(如来的子宫或胚胎,通常相当于“佛性”的概念)和“如来藏”的概念。 “本初清净心”的思想,很大程度上可以追溯到《大乘起信论》(也可能起源于中国),变得越来越占主导地位。这种倾向在该学派的“第五祖”圭峰宗密(780-841)的思想中达到了顶峰,但在法藏的一些著作中已经可以微妙地追踪到,并且在法藏的思想中变得更加明显。 “四祖”清凉澄观(738-839)。在宗密的例子中,这被解释为从强调事件与其他事件的相互渗透到强调“理”与事件之间的相互渗透(“理”)的转变,“理”被认为是清净本心。本身,具有佛性或如来藏。 27 27 ^(27){ }^{27} 这使得华严思想远离了中观原理,中观原理主张天台所呈现的每一个事件的普遍存在,不仅在于其强大的唯心主义,而且还在于在清净心(本身不确定)与一切事物之间建立了一种固定的单向关系。其他决定性(与作为其本体论基础的纯粹心灵既相同又不同)。我们将在下一章深入探讨这个问题。
It should be noted, however, that in the works attributed to Dushun, there is no trace of this doctrine of the true essence of mind as the basis for the all-pervading omnipresence of each event. Rather, “Dushun” argues on the basis of a consideration of Emptiness. However, the manner in which this proceeds still differs significantly from the use of the Emptiness-expanded into the Three Truths-in Tiantai, discussed above. The difference can be best understood by reproducing Dushun’s argument for omnicentrism in his main work, the “Huayan Fajieguan” 華嚴法界觀. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
然而,应该指出的是,在杜顺的著作中,并没有这种以心的真实本质作为每一个事件无所不在的基础的学说的踪迹。相反,《独顺》是基于对空性的思考而论证的。然而,其进行的方式仍然与上面讨论的天台空性扩展为三真谛的使用方式有很大不同。通过再现杜顺在其主要著作《华严法界观》中关于全中心主义的论点,可以最好地理解这种差异。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
This work starts by considering the common Prajnâpâramitâ slogan, “Form is Emptiness, Emptiness is Form.” It gives three senses in which Form is Emptiness, and three senses in which Emptiness is Form. Each of these three senses, in both cases, is presented in the form: " X is identical to Y , because X is not identical to Y ." This claim is read in three different ways for each of the two cases, the conclusion being that, when finally understood in this complex mediated sense, Form is Emptiness, Emptiness is Form. From this is derived the idea of the mutual pervasion of all particulars, as expressed in a great variety of alternate ways. This is clearly analogous to the Tiantai attempt to establish the Center as both the identity and distinction between Emptiness and Provisional Positing. The Dushun work also takes pains to indicate that the “identicalness” of form and emptiness also includes their
这项工作首先考虑常见的般若波罗蜜口号:“色即是空,空即是色”。它给出了色即是空的三种意义,以及空即是色的三种意义。在这两种情况下,这三种含义中的每一种都以以下形式呈现:“X 与 Y 相同,因为 X 与 Y 不同。”对于这两种情况,可以用三种不同的方式来解读这一主张,结论是,当最终以这种复杂的中介意义理解时,色就是空,空就是色。由此衍生出所有细节相互渗透的观念,并以多种不同的方式表达出来。这显然类似于天台试图建立中心作为空性和临时定位之间的身份和区别。独顺作品还煞费苦心地表明,色与空的“同一”也包括了它们的存在。

difference. But this difference takes on a very non-Tiantai significance here.
不同之处。但这种差异在这里却具有非常非天台的意义。

The divergence from Tiantai thinking can be noted most clearly in the asymmetry in Dushun’s arguments for the claims that “Form is identical to emptiness, because form is not identical to emptiness,” on the one hand, and “emptiness is identical to form, because emptiness is not identical to form,” on the other. This takes place in the second iteration of each of these claims in the work. “Form is not emptiness” because the characteristic of “being form” and the characteristic of “being emptiness” are distinguishable; this is consistent with Tiantai thinking. But for “emptiness is not form,” Dushun suddenly introduces the category of dependence: he says that which depends (能依 neng yi, i.e., form, etc.) is not the same as that which is depended on (所依 suo yi, i.e., emptiness). Fazang uses the same vocabulary in his Huayanjing zhigui 華嚴經旨歸 to define Li and events (事 shi): "The contrast between Li and shi refers to the marks of events arising through dependent co-arising on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the True Li upon which they depend (所依真理 suo yi zhenli)."29 This suggests a one-way relation of dependence between form and emptiness, a sense in which emptiness is ontologically prior to or more fundamental than form. It is implied that emptiness does not require form in order to be emptiness, but form (and all other determinate quiddities) does require emptiness in order to be form. This asymmetry is what opens the door for a new understanding of the omnipresence of each particular that easily merges with the “Original Pure Mind” doctrine found in some forms of Chan, in one reading of the Awakening of Faith, and in other Tathagatagarbha works.
与天台思想的分歧最明显地表现在独顺的论证中的不对称性:一方面,“色同空,因为色异于空”,而“空同色,因为”空与色并不相同。”另一方面。这发生在工作中每个主张的第二次迭代中。 “色非空”,是因为“有色”的相与“有空”的相是有区别的;这与天台思想是一致的。但对于“空非色”,独顺突然引入了依止的范畴:他说“能依neng yi”,与“所依suo yi”不同。 ,即空性)。法藏在他的《华严经指归》中使用了相同的词汇来定义“理”和“事”:“理和事之间的对比,一方面是指通过缘起而产生的事件的标记,并且,另一方面,它们所依赖的真理(所依真理)。”29这表明色与空之间存在一种单向的依赖关系,在这种意义上,空性在本体论上先于或更根本。形式。这意味着空性并不需要有色才能成为空性,但是色(以及所有其他确定的本质)确实需要空性才能成为色。这种不对称性为我们打开了一扇新的大门,让我们对每个特殊性的无所不在有了新的理解,很容易与某些形式的禅宗、《起信论》以及其他如来藏著作中所发现的“本初清净心”教义融为一体。
This is the only point at which we would want to take exception to Tao Jiang’s excellent analysis of the meaning of Li in Huayan, which makes the useful and interesting suggestion that we interpret Li here not as a static whole, since it does not consist of shi as its parts, nor as something ontologically distinct from the shi, but rather as “activity” as such, “activity without an agent,” as opposed to shi as determinate “thing” regarded as the product of all such activity. Jiang suggests that Li may be best understood as a verb, invoking the inseparability between subject and verb to explain the inseparability and interpenetration of Li and shi, each being a partial abstraction from what is always a total situation involving both. Li in Jiang’s analysis of Huayan means “the ultimate verb, the absolute self-negating activity of the universe,” indivisible, boundless, neither reducible to nor separable from the concrete things that it negates (and establishes): sunyata itself. Li as sunyata is the self-negating activity which is inseparable from, even constitutive of, the determinateness of any “subject,” any noun, the self-affirmation of any definite determination. Li is the omnipresent act of negation itself, which necessarily accompanies any presence. This is a very useful way of approaching Huayan thought, allowing us to see Li as a tran-
这是我们唯一要对陶江对《华严经》里的意义的出色分析提出异议的一点,他提出了有用且有趣的建议,即我们不要将这里的“理”解释为一个静态的整体,因为它不包括势作为其组成部分,也不作为本体论上与“势”不同的东西,而是作为“活动”本身,“没有代理人的活动”,而不是作为被视为所有此类活动的产物的确定“事物”的“势”。姜建议,“理”最好被理解为一个动词,援引主语和动词之间的不可分离性来解释“理”和“是”的不可分离性和相互渗透性,每一个都是对总是涉及两者的整体情况的部分抽象。蒋对华严的分析中的“理”的意思是“终极动词,宇宙绝对的自我否定活动”,不可分割,无边无际,既不能还原也不能与它否定(和建立)的具体事物:空性本身。理作为空性是自我否定的活动,它与任何“主体”、任何名词的确定性、任何明确规定的自我肯定密不可分,甚至是构成的。理是无所不在的否定行为本身,它必然伴随着任何存在。这是理解华严思想的一个非常有用的方式,让我们将李视为一个超越的人。

scending of every “part” without reifying a resultant totalistic “whole” as a specific and determinate entity. Li is indeed for Huayan the indeterminacy of all finite parts as such, without implying a static and determinate whole of which they are parts. This a crucial amendation to Behuniak’s use of “wholeness” simpliciter to interpret Li in Huayan: the type of wholeness we have to do with here is ironic wholeness: a whole that is no whole, and which has the genuine functions of wholeness only by its failure to become any specific whole. But Jiang wants to assert that this “predicative” use of Li , as opposed to a substantive one, avoids both the reductionist and essential problems because in this conception the verb and the noun are equally foundational: as opposed to the usual commonsensical notion that the noun is primary and the verb secondary, Jiang’s version of Huayan grants perfect symmetry to the two: “There is no subject that is apart from verb and no verb apart from subject.” 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} But inseparability does not preclude asymmetry of foundational structure, ontological priority as a dependent/ independent relation, and this is the crux of the matter. The asymmetry of the Huayan nengyi/suoyi distinction suggests something closer to a straight reversal of the standard grammatical view: in actual Huayan writings, the verb is more fundamental than the subject, the noun (though they are indeed inseparable). The self-negating activity is more real than the defined affirmations it establishes and negates. It is also more important-indeed, what is of sole importance for the project of attaining enlightenment, value. As we shall see, the attempt to focus on concrete particulars is in Huayan actually ends up being a focus only on the interpenetration itself of these particulars, not their static isolation; in other words, we are still contemplating pure Li , even, or especially, when we are no longer explicitly referring to it, speaking only of “interpenetration of events.” The attempt to establish a perfect symmetry of Li and shi, in other words, which Huayan writers are undoubtedly aiming at, and believe they are attaining, is undermined by their own procedure and certain assumptions that show their influence only at particular points of stress in the exposition of the system. Let us now examine these in detail.
每个“部分”的提升,而不将由此产生的极权主义“整体”具体化为一个特定的、确定的实体。对于华严来说,理确实是所有有限部分本身的不确定性,而不意味着它们是静态的、确定的整体。这是对本胡尼亚克使用“整体”简单化来解释《华严》中的“理”的一个重要修正:我们在这里所涉及的整体类型是具有讽刺意义的整体:一个不是整体的整体,只有通过它的整体性,它才具有整体的真正功能。未能成为任何特定的整体。但江想要断言,这种“谓语”用法,而不是实质性用法,避免了还原论和本质问题,因为在这个概念中,动词和名词同样具有基础性:与通常的常识性概念相反,即“名词为主,动词为次,江版《华严》使两者完美对称:“没有主语可以脱离动词,也没有动词可以脱离主语。” 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30} 但不可分离性并不排除基础结构的不对称性、本体论的优先性作为依赖/独立关系,这才是问题的关键。华严能义/所义区别的不对称性表明,更接近于标准语法观点的直接逆转:在实际的华严著作中,动词比主语、名词更基本(尽管它们确实是不可分割的)。自我否定活动比它所建立和否定的明确肯定更为真实。更重要的是——事实上,对于获得启蒙的计划来说,唯一重要的是价值。 正如我们将看到的,《华严》试图关注具体的细节,实际上最终只是关注这些细节的相互渗透本身,而不是它们静态的孤立;换句话说,我们仍然在思考纯粹的理,甚至,或者特别是,当我们不再明确提及它,而只谈论“事件的相互渗透”时。换句话说,华严作家毫无疑问地致力于并相信他们正在实现的建立理与势的完美对称的尝试,被他们自己的程序和某些假设所破坏,这些假设仅在特定的压力点上显示出它们的影响。系统的阐述。现在让我们详细研究一下这些。
It is crucial to note the role of the categories of appearance and reality in this argument. The problem is, above all, epistemological; the difference between Tiantai and Huayan is ultimately a Three Truth versus Two Truth distinction, when all is said and done. Simply stated, adopting Jiang’s vocabulary again, we may say that even if charitably we were to read the Huayan position as asserting that the inseparability of the verb and subject is what is to be taken as ultimately real, as opposed to the delusion of verbless nouns or nounless verbs (though as we’ve seen, and will see again below, there is a definite tendency to assert instead the greater reality of the verbs and ontological priority of verb even in this inseparable noun-verb
注意到表象和现实范畴在这个论证中的作用是至关重要的。首先,这个问题是认识论的问题。总而言之,天台与华严之间的区别最终是三谛与二谛的区别。简单地说,再次采用蒋的词汇,我们可以说,即使我们宽容地理解华严的立场,也断言动词和主语的不可分离性才是最终的真实,而不是无动词名词的错觉。或无名词动词(尽管正如我们已经看到的,并将在下面再次看到,即使在这个不可分割的名词-动词中,也存在一种明确的倾向,即断言动词的更大现实和动词的本体论优先性

alloy), we would have the same problem, from a Tiantai point of view: the mutually exclusive relation between illusion and reality, between delusion and enlightenment, between truth and falsehood. This is to be distinguished from the Tiantai Three Truths epistemology, in which all illusions are themselves upāya and there is no category of “just plain falsehood” at all: there, “noun” alone would be a delusion, hence a conventional truth, hence the Absolute Truth, as we’ve seen above. In sharp contrast, interpervasion itself in Huayan is derived from the possibility of distinguishing what each dharma “really is”-namely, the absence of any determinate nature-from what it merely appears to be. When it is claimed that “it” interpenetrates, what is meant is that “what it really is” interpenetrates. “What it appears to be” does not interpenetrate, nor does it do anything else, for it simply does not exist. The result is that the only characteristic that really belongs to any dharma, that is, which is so of this dharma intrinsically, inalienably, under all conditions, from all perspectives and at all times, is the character of Emptiness. This “nature” of Emptiness thus constitutes the whole real being of each and every particular-not a part of its real being, but its entire real being, inasmuch as this simply means all that is really intrinsic to it. This character of Emptiness is indivisible. It cannot be partially possessed; to have this character is to have it in its entirety. The character of “being susceptible to otherness, to other characteristics” is thus possessed in its entirety by every being and state. The whole dharma is thus “really” nothing but this nature, and this nature is indivisible, which means that the dharma is indivisible and everywhere. But this is a mediated type of interpervasion, by which I mean that it must pass through the third term of the real nature, Emptiness. The illusory characteristics (i.e., all the characteristics other than Emptiness per se that the object may seem, from some sentient being’s deluded perspective, to possess) do not exist (except qua expressions of Emptiness, i.e., of the active non-exclusivity that takes on any apparent characteristic), and hence as such these characteristics cannot interpenetrate. We may say without hesitation that this is probably a more faithful understanding of the Indian Buddhist notion of appearance versus reality than that found in Tiantai, and perhaps it is worth remembering here that Fazang was fluent in Sanskrit, of which Zhiyi could read not a word.
合金),从天台的角度来看,我们也会遇到同样的问题:幻与实、迷与悟、真与假之间相互排斥的关系。这与天台三谛认识论不同,在天台三谛认识论中,一切幻象本身就是无明,根本不存在“纯妄”的范畴:在那里,“名”本身就是迷惑,因此是世俗真理,因此是世俗真理。绝对真理,正如我们上面所看到的。与此形成鲜明对比的是,《华严经》中的渗透本身源自于区分每种法的“真实本质”(即没有任何确定的本质)与它仅仅表现出来的可能性。当声称“它”相互渗透时,其意思是“它的真正本质”相互渗透。 “它看起来是什么”不会相互渗透,也不会做任何其他事情,因为它根本不存在。结果是,真正属于任何法的唯一特征,即该法在一切条件下、从一切角度、任何时候本质上、不可剥夺地如此,就是空性。因此,空性的“本质”构成了每一个具体事物的全部真实存在——不是其真实存在的一部分,而是其整个真实存在,因为这仅仅意味着它真正固有的一切。空性的这个特性是不可分割的。它不能被部分占有;拥有这个性格就等于拥有它的全部。因此,“易受他者、其他特征影响”的特征是每个存在和状态都完全拥有的。因此,整个佛法“实际上”只是这个本质,而这个本质是不可分割的,这意味着佛法是不可分割的、无处不在的。 但这是一种中介型的渗透,我的意思是它必须经过真实本质的第三个术语,即空性。幻相(即,从某些有情众生的迷惑角度看来,对象可能拥有除空性之外的所有特征)并不存在(空性的表现除外,即,主动的非排他性任何明显的特征),因此这些特征不能相互渗透。我们可以毫不犹豫地说,这可能是对印度佛教显相与实相观念的理解,比《天台山》中的更为忠实,也许值得记住的是,法藏精通梵文,而智一却一个字都看不懂。 。
The role of illusion is given its most systematic exposition in Huayan thinking in Fazang’s Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang 華嚴一乘教義分齊章. There, borrowing Yogācāra terminology, Fazang defines the “Three natures,” each of which has two aspects:
法藏的《华严一乘教义分齐章》对幻象在华严思想中的作用进行了最系统的阐述。在那里,法藏借用瑜伽行派的术语,定义了“三性”,每一性都有两个方面:
  1. The Perfect and Complete Real Nature (pariniṣpanna, 圓成實性 yuanchengshi xing), which is (a) unchanging (不變 bubian), but (b) follows conditions (隨緣 suiyuan).
    圆成实性,不变,但随缘随缘。
  2. The Other-dependently Arising (paratantra, 依他起性 yitaqi xing) Nature, which is (a) devoid of self-nature (無性 wuxing) but (b) appears to exist (似有 siyou).
    依他起性 yitaqi xing,即(a)无自性(无性)但(b)似有(似有似有)。
  3. The Wholly Imaginary Clung-to Nature (parikalpita, 遍計所執性 pianji suozhi xing), which is (a) nonexistent in Li (理無 liwu) but (b) existent in the deluded clinging sentiments of sentient beings (情有 qingyou).
    遍计所执性片极所至性,在理无中不存在,但在情有情中存在)。
Fazang tells us that (a) and (b) in each of these categories are actually identical to one another: in each case, (a) is a flip side way of saying the same thing as (b). Further, the (a) aspect in each is identical to the (a) aspect in the other two, and likewise for the (b) aspects in each category. Each refers to the same two aspects, which are really just flip sides of one another, but analyzed in each case in a different way. In 1., the unchanging nature is manifested only because it follows conditions, just as "the bright purity of a mirror is never lost even when it manifests both tainted and pure images . . . the manifestation of the tainted dharmas does not pollute the purity of the mirror; not only do they not pollute it-rather, it is only because of this that the bright purity of the mirror is manifested. . . . It is not only that the purity of the nature is manifested without destroying the taint and purity [of the manifestations]; it is only because the nature is pure
Fazang告诉我们,(a)和(b)在每个类别中实际上是彼此相同的:在每种情况下,(a)都是与(b)说同一件事的反面方式。此外,每一个中的(a)方面与另外两个中的(a)方面相同,对于每个类别中的(b)方面也是如此。每一个都指的是相同的两个方面,它们实际上只是彼此的反面,但在每种情况下都以不同的方式进行分析。一、不变性,唯因缘而现,如“明镜明净相,明净不失……浊法显现,不垢净”。不但不污染镜子,反而显现出明净的本性。清净[显现]只是因为本性清净;
the side (a) and side (b) pertains. But here, the category of appearance (似 si) comes into play: it is only because they “in reality” have no self-nature that their existence can be called “merely appearance.” So “to be appearance” means the same as “to not-really-exist,” because appearance means specifically “merely appearance.” The same applies even more clearly to level 3. It is only because they are really “nonexistent in Li” that they can be called “existent [merely] in the perception of clinging deluded beings.” Li here means “the truth to be recognized,” and more particularly, “what needs to apprehended to attain value: the content of enlightenment.” These perceived characteristics that are so prevalent in deluded experience are things that have no part in enlightened experience. They are literally unreal, do not cohere into the total body of truths, and are of no value. Fazang says, “It is as if one deludedly thought one saw a ghost when looking at a wooden table. The ghost ultimately does not exist in the table. If it did exist in the table, one could not call this ‘deludedly thinking’ a ghost is there, for it would exist in the table, and would not be there only because of deluded thinking. So here since it is deluded thinking, we know it is nonexistent in Li. Only because it is nonexistent in Li can it be called existent due to deluded thinking, and only because it exists due to deluded thinking do we
(a) 方和 (b) 方适用。但在这里,似“象”的范畴就发挥了作用:只是因为它们“实”无自性,所以它们的存在才可以称为“只是象”。因此,“成为表象”与“不真实存在”的意思相同,因为表象特指“仅仅是表象”。对于第三层来说,情况更明显。只是因为它们确实“不存在于理”,所以才可以称为“存在于执着迷惑众生的认知中”。理在这里的意思是“要认识的真理”,更具体地说,是“需要理解才能获得价值的东西:开悟的内容”。这些在迷惑经验中如此普遍的感知特征,在证悟经验中是不存在的。它们实际上是不真实的,不能凝聚成真理的整体,并且没有任何价值。法藏说:“就好像看到一张木桌就误以为看到了鬼一样。鬼魂最终并不存在于表中。如果它确实存在于桌子上,就不能称之为‘妄想’有鬼,因为它会存在于桌子上,而不会仅仅因为妄想而存在。所以这里既然是妄想,我们就知道在理里是不存在的。唯其在理中无有,才可称为妄想有,也唯有妄想有,才可称为妄想有。

know that it is nonexistent in Li. Hence they are nondual, and one solitary nature.” 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} Here, the “identity” between appearance and reality means not that whatever exists in appearance also exists in reality, that the content of the two is the same, much less that being-appearance means the same as being-reality, as in the Tiantai Three Truths, but rather that understanding appearance-as-appearance is the disclosure of the absence of these particular appearances in reality. To see appearance as appearance is to see reality-not because these appearances really pertain to reality, but because they do not. More precisely, appearance as such pertains to reality, and reality is only reality because it produces appearance (as in the production of tainted and pure appearances in the mirror analogy in level 1), but the specific determinations of each appearance do not pertain to reality. It is “presentation of appearance” that discloses reality, not “the appearances so disclosed.” Fazang finishes his discussion by showing that each of the three natures is to be conceived definitively as neither existent or nonexistent, both or neither, because each has these two aspects, and each pair is ultimately identical in the sense just described.
知道在黎里是不存在的。因此,它们是非二元的,并且具有一种孤独的本质。” 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32} 这里,表象与实相的“同一性”,并不是指表象中存在的东西,实际上也存在,两者的内容是相同的,更不是指天台中的表象与实相相同。三谛,而是将表象理解为表象,揭示了现实中这些特定表象的缺失。把表象看作表象就是看到现实——不是因为这些表象真的属于现实,而是因为它们不属于现实。更准确地说,表象本身属于实在,而实在之所以是实在,是因为它产生了表象(如第一层镜子类比中污染和纯净的表象的产生),但每个表象的具体决定并不属于实在。 。揭示现实的是“表象的呈现”,而不是“如此披露的表象”。法藏结束了他的讨论,表明三种性质中的每一种都应该被明确地理解为既不存在也不不存在,既不存在也不不存在,因为每一个都具有这两个方面,并且每一对在刚刚描述的意义上最终都是相同的。
This way of understanding the matter has profound implications. In the analysis of the “Six Marks” at the end of the same work, Fazang offers his famous analogy of the pillar and the house to explain the interpenetration and omnipresence of particulars. There, Fazang says that the pillar is precisely the house, because the one pillar alone is able to make the house. The reason for this is that if the pillar is lacking, the house cannot come into existence, and whenever the pillar exists, the house exists. This last point depends on a distinction between a “real pillar” and a mere plank of wood, and also on the distinction between a “good house” (好舍 hao she) and a “broken house” (破舍 po she)—the latter meaning not a real house, not a genuine, successful example of a house. This is another manifestation of the point just made about appearance and reality. For Fazang’s point is that, in the absence of the existing completed house, the apparent pillar is simply not a pillar-it is merely a plank of wood. It cannot be accurately named a pillar unless the whole house is there. The same argument is used to assert that the pillar is also identical to all the other parts of the house, each being identical to the whole house in the same way. For if the pillar is gone, the house cannot exist, and without the house, the walls, roof, and so on are not “really” walls, roof, and so on, but merely chunks of wood. This is a “mediated” identity, mediated by each part’s identity with the whole. It rests entirely on the enforcement of an absolute appearance/ reality dichotomy. This means that what interpenetrates in each case is not what we normally call a pillar, if we are deluded about interpenetration and think of it as a separable single part of the house. That pillar simply does not exist, and cannot interpenetrate with other particulars, or do anything
这种理解问题的方式具有深远的意义。在该书结尾处对“六象”的分析中,法藏提出了著名的柱子与房屋的比喻,来解释细节的相互渗透和无所不在。法藏在那里说,柱子就是房子,因为一根柱子就能盖房子。因为没有柱子,房子就不能存在,有柱子,房子就存在。这最后一点取决于“真正的柱子”和一块木板的区别,也取决于“好舍好舍”和“破舍”的区别——后者意味着不是真正的房子,不是真正的、成功的房子的例子。这也是刚才所说的表象与现实的观点的又一体现。法藏的观点是,在没有现成的房子的情况下,表面上的柱子根本就不是柱子——它只是一块木板。除非整个房子都在那里,否则不能准确地将其命名为柱子。同样的论点也被用来断言柱子也与房子的所有其他部分相同,每个部分都以同样的方式与整个房子相同。因为如果柱子消失了,房子就无法存在,而没有房子,墙壁、屋顶等就不是“真正的”墙壁、屋顶等,而只是大块木头。这是一种“中介”的身份,由每个部分与整体的身份来中介。它完全依赖于绝对表象/现实二分法的执行。这意味着,如果我们对相互渗透产生了迷惑,并将其视为房子的一个可分离的单一部分,那么在每种情况下相互渗透的东西就不是我们通常所说的柱子。该支柱根本不存在,无法与其他细节相互渗透,也无法做任何事情

else for that matter. The only pillar that qualifies as a pillar is the one that is already seen to be interpenetrating. Now, we can always move the analysis to other levels, and say that while the pillar-without-a-house is not really a pillar, it is really a plank of wood, and exists interpenetratingly in other totalities that way, namely, qua plank of wood but not qua pillar. But this recourse to “really qualifying to be called X” already introduces a level of final adjudication that limits the possibility of multiperspectivism and surreptitiously posits a metaperspective, with at best a one-way hierarchy of levels of reality and interpervasion.
除此之外。唯一有资格成为支柱的支柱是已经被视为相互渗透的支柱。现在,我们总是可以把分析转移到其他层面,说无房柱子虽然不是真正的柱子,但它实际上是一块木板,并且以这种方式相互渗透地存在于其他整体中,即作为木板,但不是柱子。但这种对“真正有资格被称为X”的诉求已经引入了一种最终裁决的水平,限制了多视角主义的可能性,并秘密地提出了一种元视角,最多具有现实和渗透水平的单向层次结构。
This has very serious consequences for epistemology. For example, in Fazang’s Huayanjing wenda 華嚴經問答,we find the following exchange:
这对认识论产生了非常严重的后果。例如,在Fazang的Huayanjing wenda 华严经问答中,我们发现以下交流:
Q: “One person practices, and all people attain Buddhahood”-what does this mean?
问:“一人修行,一切人成佛”是什么意思?
A: This is said in reference to the one person as dependently co-arising, because in that sense one person simply is all people, and all people are the one person. The same can be said of each practice: each practice is all practices, and all practices are the one practice. Thus they are the same.
答:这是针对一个人因缘而生而说的,因为从这个意义上来说,一个人就是所有人,而所有人就是一个人。每一个修行也是如此:每一个修行都是所有的修行,所有的修行都是一个修行。因此它们是相同的。
Q: But now we see manifestly one person practicing and the rest not practicing. It is just the one person, not anybody else. How can this be?
问:但是现在我们看到明显一个人炼,其他人不炼。这只是一个人,而不是其他任何人。怎么会这样呢?
A: What you are seeing is nothing more than Wholly Imaginary [遍計 pianji]. It has nothing to do with the dependently co-arising dharmas. It is not worth talking about [不關緣起之法,不足言也 buguan yuanqi zhi fa, buzuyanye]. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
答:你所看到的只不过是完全想象而已。它与缘起法无关。不关缘起之法,不足言也不关元气之法,不足言也。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33}
The deludedly seen dharmas, which exist in clinging imaginary perception but not in or as Li , have nothing to do with dependent co-arising, and are of no account. There is no better way to understand the different epistemologies of Tiantai and Huayan than to compare this response to that given by Zhanran to a similar question in the Zhiguanyili 止觀義例:
迷见诸法,存在于执想中,而不存在于理之中,与缘起无关,无足轻重。要理解天台和华严的不同认识论,没有比将这个回答与湛然对止观义例中类似问题的回答进行比较更好的方法了:
Q: Here we see manifestly black, yellow, red and white [i.e., separate differentiated things and characteristics]. In what sense are they the Dharma-realm of True Suchness?
问:这里我们明显看到黑、黄、红、白(即不同的事物和特征)。何谓真如法界?
A: When you speak of black and so on, this is what is seen by deluded attachment [情 qing]. When you speak of the Dharma-realm,
答:当你讲黑色等等的时候,这就是情执所看到的。当你说到法界的时候,

you are talking about according with Li . How can you use deluded attachment to challenge Li? Our present contemplation is to contravene deluded attachment and contemplate Li. One mustn’t go on to contravene Li and accord with deluded attachment.
你说的是按照李的说法。你怎么能用迷执去挑战李呢?我们现在的观照,是要破除迷执,观理。切不可继续违背理,随从妄执。
Thus far, Zhanran’s answer is more or less the same as Fazang’s: the separate, independent, non-interpenetrating things seen by the ordinary mind are just delusions. One is to ignore them and attend instead to the interpenetrations of Li. But Zhanran’s answer continues:
至此,湛然的回答与法藏的回答大致相同:凡夫心所见的分离、独立、互不相通的事物,只是妄想而已。一是忽视它们,而关注李的相互渗透。但湛然的回答还在继续:
Moreover, black and the rest are conventional truth, while the Dharma-realm is ultimate truth. Or again, black and the rest are a manifestation of a small portion of conventional truth[俗諦之少分 sudizhishaofen], while the Dharma-realm is a manifestation of the entirety of the Three Truths [三諦之全分 sandizhiquanfen]. Or again, black and the rest are a small portion of what is seen by the human and heavenly eyes, while the Dharma-realm is the entirety of what is seen by the Buddha-eye. Each eye is inherently equipped with (具 ju) all five eyes, so black and the rest inherently entail all dharmas. The same applies to the relationship between the one truth and the Three Truths. For these reasons, you cannot use [the manifestation of] black and the rest to undermine the existence of the Dharma-realm. . . . 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34}
而且黑色等都是世俗真理,法界则是胜义真理。或者说,黑等都是世俗真理的一小部分表现,而法界则是三谛全部的表现。或者说,黑色等只是人眼、天眼所见的一小部分,而法界则是佛眼所见的全部。每只眼本具五眼,故黑而其余本具一切法。一谛与三谛的关系也是如此。所以你不能用黑色等来破坏法界的存在。 。 。 。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34}
Here is the crux of the matter, the smoking gun. After the standard “reality versus appearance” answer, which is framed specifically with reference to the practice of contemplation, Zhanran reframes his answer, first, in terms of the Three Truths, and second, in terms of whole and part. We can now see what sort of whole and part relation applies in the Tiantai context. The separable independent things deludedly seen by ignorant beings are not “nonexistent,” but a small portion of the truth of Provisional Positing. Their interpenetration is the entirety of the Three Truths, which are the identity between Provisional Positing and Emptiness and the Center. Provisional Truth is Local Coherence: a deluded experience of a patch of blackness as an isolated entity is a locally coherent phenomenon, one among a vast number of conflicting conventional truths. As such, it is a small portion of the totality of conventional truths, which seen together simply are the Global Incoherence of Emptiness, which seen correctly is all Three Truths and each of these initially deluded patches of conventional truth as the unconditional Center of all other coherences. Significantly, Zhanran then turns the question toward the perspectivism of different perceivers; the dif-
这是问题的症结所在,也是确凿无疑的证据。在标准的“实相与表象”答案之后,展然重新构建了他的答案,首先是从三谛的角度,其次是从整体和部分的角度。我们现在可以看到天台语境中应用了什么样的整体和部分关系。无明众生所迷见的可分独立的事物,并不是“不存在”,而是临时定位真理的一小部分。它们的相互渗透就是三谛的整体,即临位与空性与中性的同一性。临时真理是局部连贯性:一片黑暗作为一个孤立实体的迷惑体验是一种局部连贯性现象,是众多相互冲突的传统真理之一。因此,它只是世俗真理整体的一小部分,简单地把它们放在一起看就是空性的整体不连贯性,正确地看它就是所有三圣谛,而这些最初被迷惑的世俗真理中的每一个都是所有其他真理的无条件中心。连贯性。值得注意的是,湛然随后将问题转向了不同感知者的视角。的差异

ferentiated marks are a small portion of what the human and heavenly eye see, subsumed in the greater scope perceived by the Buddha-eye. These perceivers are themselves identical, each eye entails the others, because of the Lotus Sutra relation of the practices and cognitions of the human and heavenly vehicles and the Bodhisattva practices and cognitions, the setup/punch line structure of the Four Onenesses discussed above. The independent differentiated things perceived by deluded beings are “opened and revealed” to be the interpenetrative Dharma-realm; they are not rejected as nonexistence, and thus unqualified to be discussed as either interpenetrating or failing to interpenetrate. I think it is safe to say that Fazang could say either that these events are the entirety of Li , or that they are not Li at all, or both, or neither, but he could never say that they themselves are “a small portion” of Li itself. The two-level ontology of Huayan thought entails an all or nothing approach; first, Li and shi are separate, given ontologically distinct definitions as the undividable non-self-nature and the differentiated events, respectively, and then they are recombined and shown to be wholly interpenetrating. So each event, seen as really being nothing other than L i L i LiL i, is the entirety of L i L i LiL i; and each event, as being the opposite of L i L i LiL i, is no Li at all. This is exactly what we would expect from a universal, a genuine concept, even if it is the undifferentiated “universal universal.” Conceptual universals have no parts: they are either instantiated or not instantiated, all or nothing. 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} The Tiantai view, on the other hand, deriving more directly from the indigenous Chinese mereological view derived from a whole/part model, is that each event is itself part of Li itself, and each part of Li is interpenetrative with all of Li . Li divides, Li has differentiations to it , in an important sense there are in fact many Li , which are then sublated, but there is no two-level ontology involved. What has whole and parts is not a concept but a given intuition, an actually present experience. What we have in Tiantai is an omnicentric whole: to be seeing anything is to be seeing a part of it, and to be seeing a part of it is to be seeing all of it. One simply cannot be not seeing it, full stop. Anything seen is a coherence (non-ironic, a seeable) a local coherence which as such is also global incoherence (the irony of this very coherence as it coheres with the “more parts” of the whole) and the interesubsumption of all the parts. The very colors and events we see with our human eyes are themselves Li; to see them is to see Li. We must remember here the basic meaning of Li : it is what must be cohered with to produce further coherences, or, in Buddhist terms, what must be realized and accorded with in order to realize liberation: the unconditional omnipresent that subsumes and manifests itself as all other things and conditions. These particulars we are seeing are what must be known in order to be enlightened.
光相只是人眼和天眼所见的一小部分,包含在佛眼所见的更大范围内。这些感知者本身是相同的,每只眼睛都包含其他眼睛,因为《法华经》中人天乘的修行和认知与菩萨的修行和认知的关系,以及上面讨论的四合一的设置/妙语结构。迷惑众生所见的独立分别的事物,“开显”,就是贯穿的法界;它们不会被视为不存在而被拒绝,因此没有资格被讨论为相互渗透或未能相互渗透。我认为可以肯定地说,法藏可以说这些事件是礼的全部,或者根本不是礼,或者两者都不是,或者都不是,但他绝不能说它们本身是“一小部分”李本身。华严思想的两层本体论意味着全有或全无的方法;首先,理和势是分开的,分别被赋予了本体论上不同的定义,分别为不可分割的非自性和有别事件,然后它们被重新组合并显示出完全的相互渗透。所以每一个事件,都被视为实际上只不过是 L i L i LiL i , 是整个 L i L i LiL i ;和每个事件,作为相反 L i L i LiL i ,根本就不是李。这正是我们所期望的普遍的、真正的概念,即使它是无差别的“普遍的普遍性”。概念共相没有部分:它们要么被实例化,要么未被实例化,要么全有,要么全无。 35 35 ^(35){ }^{35} 另一方面,天台观更直接地源自源自整体/部分模型的中国本土分体论观点,即每个事件本身都是理本身的一部分,并且理的每个部分都与理的所有部分相互渗透。理有分,理有分化,重要意义上其实有很多理,然后扬弃,但不涉及二级本体。整体和部分并不是一个概念,而是一种给定的直觉,一种实际存在的经验。我们在天台所拥有的是一个全中心的整体:看到任何事物就是看到它的一部分,看到它的一部分就是看到它的全部。人们根本不可能看不到它,句号。任何看到的东西都是一种连贯性(非讽刺性的,是可见的),一种局部的连贯性,本身也是全局的不连贯性(这种连贯性的讽刺之处在于它与整体的“更多部分”相一致)以及所有部分的相互包容。我们用肉眼看到的颜色和事件本身就是礼;看到他们就是看到李。这里我们必须记住“理”的基本含义:它是为了产生进一步的连贯性而必须结合的东西,或者用佛教的术语来说,为了实现解脱必须认识和符合的东西:无条件的无所不在,包含并显现为所有其他事物和条件。我们所看到的这些细节是为了开悟而必须了解的。

EXISTENCE AND NONEXISTENCE IN TIANTAI AND HUAYAN
天台华严的存在与不存在

The Huayan notion of reality and appearance allows for a concept of Non-Being in the absolute sense, the sense ironized by Guo Xiang, as opposed to the Laozi/Zhuangzi sense, the ironic sense that continues to prevail in Tiantai. That is, in Tiantai there is no such thing as an entity that may be adduced, raised for consideration, but which in the end can be concluded simply to not exist. The binary yes/no does not apply to the category of existence; it is not true to say that something either exists or it doesn’t. Just being able to be asked about already qualifies it for minimal existence in the Tiantai sense: anything that any sentient being perceives, however deludedly or however fleetingly. For indeed, by the Three Truths understanding of upāya on the Lotus Sutra model, whatever is entertained in the mind of any sentient being “exists” in at least that sense. No possibility is rejected on the basis of being a mere illusion, which “in reality” does not exist. In Huayan, as we have just seen, there are some possibles that “do not exist” in Li, and are thus of no account and not a part of enlightenment. These contrasting ideas of nonexistence play a crucial role in the differing conceptions of “the mutual identity of particulars” as deployed in the two schools.
华严的实相观念允许绝对意义上的“非存在”概念,这种意义上被郭象讽刺,而不是老子/庄子的意义上,即天台山中继续盛行的讽刺意义。也就是说,在天台,不存在这样的实体:可以被引证、提出来考虑,但最终可以断定它不存在。二元是/否不适用于存在范畴;说某物存在或不存在是不正确的。只要能够被问到,就已经符合天台意义上的最低限度的存在:任何有情众生所感知到的任何东西,无论多么迷惑或多么短暂。事实上,根据《法华经》模型对三谛的理解,任何有情众生心中所怀的一切,至少在这个意义上“存在”。任何可能性都不会因为“现实”中不存在的纯粹幻觉而被拒绝。正如我们刚才所看到的,在《华严》中,有一些可能性在《理》中“不存在”,因此不重要,也不属于开悟的一部分。这些截然不同的不存在观念在两所学校所采用的“细节的相互同一性”的不同概念中发挥着至关重要的作用。
Fazang’s discussion of “mutual identity” in the Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqi zhang focuses on the categories of “Emptiness and existence” (空有 kong you). The crux of his argument is given as follows:
法藏在《华严一生交义分期章》中对“互为”的论述,主要集中在“空有空”范畴。他的论点的核心如下:
Because when self exists, the other necessarily does not exist, the other is precisely the self. And why? Because the other has no self-nature, and is created by the self. Next, because when the self is empty, the other necessarily exists, the self is precisely the other. And why? Because the self has no self-nature, and is thus created by the other. Because these two existences and two nonexistences are never simultaneous, there is never any “other” out there with which one fails to be identical. Because [self] existing and [other] not existing, on the one hand, and [self] not existing and [other] existing, on the other, are nondual, thus they are forever mutually identical. 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
因为当自我存在时,他者必然不存在,他者正是我。为什么?因为他者无自性,是自性所造。其次,因为当我空时,他者必然存在,我正是他者。为什么?因为我没有自性,是他者所造的。因为这两种存在和两种不存在永远不会同时存在,所以永远不会有任何一个“他者”不能与之相同。因为,一方面存在,另一方面不存在,另一方面,不存在和存在,它们是非二元的,因此它们永远是相同的。 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36}
Existence and nonexistence are mutually exclusive here, and the identity between X X XX and Y Y YY means the reduction of X X XX to an aspect of Y Y YY or of Y Y YY to an aspect of X. Only one can “exist” at any time, or from any perspective. If X exists, Y does not. If Y exists, X does not. If X is viewed as existing, Y is merely an aspect of X , and hence there is no Y outside of X that it fails to be identical with. If Y is viewed as existing, X is merely an aspect of Y , and there is no X outside of Y that it fails to be identical with. These two
存在与不存在在这里是相互排斥的,并且两者之间的同一性 X X XX Y Y YY 意味着减少 X X XX 到某个方面 Y Y YY 或的 Y Y YY 到X的一个方面。在任何时候,或从任何角度,只有一个可以“存在”。如果 X 存在,则 Y 不存在。如果 Y 存在,则 X 不存在。如果 X 被视为存在,则 Y 只是 X 的一个方面,因此在 X 之外不存在与它不相同的 Y。如果Y被视为存在,那么X仅仅是Y的一个方面,并且在Y之外不存在不与它相同的X。这两个

contrary views of the matter “are never simultaneous.” This means that we can view it either one way or the other at any given time, but not both, and this is crucial to the argument for identity, since it means that whatever way we happen to be viewing the relationship at any given time, there will not be two coexisting beings counterposed and “other” to one another"there is never any other out there with which one fails to be identical."
对此事的相反看法“永远不会同时发生”。这意味着我们可以在任何特定时间以一种方式或另一种方式看待它,但不能同时使用两种方式,这对于同一性的论证至关重要,因为这意味着无论我们在任何特定时间碰巧以何种方式看待这种关系,不会有两个共存的存在,彼此对立和“他者”,“世界上从来没有任何其他存在是不完全相同的”。
The relation between these two alternate ways of viewing the matter is then described as “nondual.” Fazang does not give an explicit reason for this metalevel nonduality, but the implicit argument seems again to depend on non-simultaneity. The two views are reversible, but never simultaneous. This again means that at any given time they can never be in conflict with one another. Moreover, the fact that only one “exists” at any given time is “the same” in either case. In no case is there any other view, or other entity, in conflict with this view or this entity.
这两种看待问题的替代方式之间的关系被描述为“非对偶”。法藏并没有给出这种元层面的非对偶性的明确理由,但隐含的论证似乎又依赖于非同时性。这两种观点是可逆的,但永远不会同时发生。这再次意味着在任何给定时间它们都永远不会相互冲突。此外,在任何给定时间只有一个“存在”的事实在任何一种情况下都是“相同的”。在任何情况下,都不存在与该观点或该实体相冲突的任何其他观点或其他实体。
This same argument is reiterated, mutatis mutandis, for the other aspect of intercausality Fazang wishes to elucidate, namely, mutual entering (相入 xiangru), which focuses on “having power and lacking power” (有力,無力 youli, wuli). We notice immediately its resonance with the Zhuangzian argument about “this” and “that”: there is always only one “this,” and when X is “this,” non-X becomes “that,” and vice versa. But there is also something new and rather strange in this argument. We are told that the two views are never simultaneously entertained, and yet Fazang’s own discussion here is precisely a way of simultaneously entertaining them. Fazang has thus surreptitiously introduced a metaperspective, his own, which in fact enunciates a global view that comprehensively embraces the two supposedly mutually exclusive views. Explicit reference to Li has dropped out of the discussion here, as in the Dushun texts, apparently to concentrate directly on the interpervasion of particular events themselves without further mediation by Li. But ironically, what has happened here is that the suppression of explicit references to Li has allowed a single, synordinate comprehensive view of Li to define the field of discussion. For the nonduality of the two alternate views is established only within the embrace of this comprehensive view of the true enunciated by Fazang himself. This is a jumping out of perspectivism similar to the transition from the “Inner Chapters” to the “Autumn Floods” version of Zhuangzi’s relativism, as discussed in chapter 2 of this book.
法藏想要阐明因果关系的另一个方面,即相入(相入),其重点是“有力,无力有力,无力”。我们立即注意到它与庄子关于“这个”和“那个”的论证产生共鸣:总是只有一个“这个”,当X是“这个”时,非X就变成“那个”,反之亦然。但这个论点也有一些新的、相当奇怪的东西。我们被告知,这两种观点从来不会同时被接受,但法藏自己在这里的讨论恰恰是同时接受这两种观点的一种方式。法藏因此偷偷地引入了一种他自己的元视角,它实际上阐明了一种全面包含这两种据称相互排斥的观点的全球观点。正如在《杜顺》文本中一样,这里不再明确提及李,显然是为了直接集中于特定事件本身的相互渗透,而不需要李的进一步调解。但具有讽刺意味的是,这里发生的事情是,对李的明确提及的压制使得对李的单一、协调的综合观点得以定义讨论领域。因为只有在法藏本人所阐述的全面真实观的怀抱中,两种替代观点的非二元性才能成立。这是对视角主义的跳出,类似于本书第二章所讨论的庄子相对主义从“内章”到“秋水”版本的转变。
The Tiantai conception of mutual identity retains explicit reference to Li , with continually shifting levels of reference, without the assumption of absolute nonexistence as mutually exclusive with presence, and without a metaperspective. It is, I would claim, a more faithful expression of the Zhuangzian perspectivism in the “Inner Chapters.” This can be seen again by considering the treatment of identity between the Three Truths. Fazang says that when X exists, it means that non-X does not exist, is subsumed
天台的相互同一性概念保留了对“理”的明确提及,其参照层次不断变化,没有假设绝对不存在与存在相互排斥,也没有元视角。我认为,这是《内章》中庄子视角主义的更忠实的表达。通过考虑三谛之间同一性的处理,可以再次看到这一点。法藏说,当X存在时,就意味着非X不存在,被包含

into X because there is no “other” to fail to be identical with. But this would also mean, in the Tiantai view, that there is no other to be identical with, either. Indeed, this is precisely the crux of Zhili’s later critique of Huayan-inspired explications of the identity between delusion and enlightenment: they end up asserting that “one exists while the other does not” (一有一無 yiyouyiwu), and thus there is no actual identity established between different entities. 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} The further reversal of the situation does not change the basic structure, but rather complicates matters by introducing an unspoken overriding “principle,” which remains unrelativized because it simply never enters that discussion.
进入X,因为没有“其他”不能与之相同。但这也意味着,在天台看来,也没有其他事物可以与之相同。事实上,这正是直隶后来批判华严论迷与悟同一性解释的症结所在:他们最终断言“一有无一有一物”,因而不存在“一无一物”。不同实体之间建立的实际身份。 37 37 ^(37){ }^{37} 情况的进一步逆转并没有改变基本结构,而是通过引入一个不言而喻的压倒一切的“原则”而​​使事情变得复杂化,该“原则”仍然是非相对性的,因为它根本从未进入讨论。
In contrast, Zhiyi says that the Three Truths are mutually identical in that when one is Empty, all are Empty (一空一切空 yikong yiqiekong). When one is Provisionally Posited, all are Provisionally Posited(一假一切假 yijia yiqie jia). When one is the Center, all are the Center (一中一切中 yizong yiqiezhong). So there is no Emptiness or Provisional Positing which is not the Center, no Center and Emptiness which are not Provisional Positing, no Provisional Positing and Center which are not Empty. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} This is a discussion of the relationship between aspects of Li itself, not, it would seem, particular entities. But the point is that for Tiantai, all entities are just determinations, and the “abstract” determinations of the aspects of Li , the Three Truths, are in just the same boat as every other entity not matter how “concrete.” Li is, in a word, a “dharma,” like anything else: it is something coherently entertained in the experience of some sentient being. Why are the Three Truths “identical”? Not because “[w]hen Emptiness exists, Provisional Positing does not exist,” and vice versa, and then the reverse. Among these three, it is not the case that when X exists, the other two, non-Xs, therefore fail to exist, that they must always have opposite valences. Rather, the structure here is just the opposite. If any is X , all are X . If any is Y , all are Y . There is a built-in, constant level jumping here. Emptiness and Provisional Positing and the Center are three discernibly different determinations, but ones that always turn out to be mutually reducible, synonymous. If the determination “Emptiness” is viewed as Empty, this is a disclosure of a way of reading the determinations “Provisional Positing” and “the Center” equally as “Empty,” that is, as ambiguous. If the determination “Emptiness” is viewed as a Provisional Posit, the other two are thereby made readable in the same way, namely, as specific determinations. If it is viewed as the Center, the other two determinations are also readable as “the Center,” that is, as absolute. “Absoluteness” is a specific, ambiguous, and absolute determination. “Specific determinateness” is a specific, ambiguous, and absolute determination. “Ambiguity” is a specific, ambiguous, and absolute determination. Focus on the ambiguity of any brings to light the ambiguity of all, and so on.
相比之下,智一说三谛是互为同一的,一空一切空。一假一切假一假。当一为中心时,一切都是中心(一中一切中一宗一切中)。故无非中空、暂置,无中非非暂置,亦无非暂置中空。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38} 这是对理本身各个方面之间关系的讨论,而不是看起来特定实体之间的关系。但关键是,对于天台来说,一切实体都只是决定,而理三谛方面的“抽象”决定,无论多么“具体”,都与其他实体一样。简而言之,理是一种“佛法”,就像其他事物一样:它是某种有情众生的体验中连贯的感受。为什么三圣谛“相同”?不是因为“空性存在,暂定不存在”,反之亦然,反之亦然。在这三者中,并不是当X存在时,另外两个非X就不存在,而是它们必须始终具有相反的化合价。相反,这里的结构恰恰相反。如果有一个是 X ,则所有都是 X 。如果有一个是 Y ,则所有都是 Y 。这里有一个内置的、恒定的级别跳跃。空性、临时定位和中心是三个明显不同的决定,但总是可以相互简化、同义。如果“空”的判定被视为“空”,则这公开了一种将“临时定位”和“中心”的判定等同于“空”的理解方式,即,理解为模糊的。 如果“空”的判定被视为临时命题,那么其他两个判定就会以相同的方式变得可读,即作为具体判定。如果它被视为中心,那么其他两个决定也可以读作“中心”,即绝对的。 “绝对”是具体的、模糊的、绝对的确定。 “具体确定性”是具体的、模糊的、绝对的确定性。 “模糊”是具体的、模糊的、绝对的确定。关注任何一个的模糊性会揭示所有的模糊性,等等。
Because “specifically determinate” can never be merely a general determination, this same way of thinking applies to any particular provisional posit. Hence, we find Zhiyi saying, “The mind is empty: thus all things are empty. The mind is provisionally posited: thus all things are provisionally posited. The mind is the Center: thus all things are the Center.” Given that A is B B BB is C C CC, we can say that since X X XX is A A AA, all Y Y YY are A A AA; since X X XX is B B BB, all Y are B ; since X is C , all Y s are C . X is a ambiguous, so all Y s are also ambiguous; X X XX is specifically determinate, so all Ys are specifically determinate; X is absolute, so all Ys are absolute. It is not X being specific that makes all Ys disclose themselves as ambiguous, as we might expect. It is not that the fixity of one term in the field ambiguates all the other terms. Rather, when any one term is seen as fixed, this simultaneously fixes the meanings of all the others. As soon as one term is seen as ambiguous, all the others are suddenly also unsettled, ambiguated. When the reversibility and identity of these two, and therefore the absoluteness, is seen for one term, all other terms are also seen as absolute.
因为“具体确定”永远不可能只是一个普遍的确定,所以同样的思维方式适用于任何特定的临时假设。因此,知一云:“心空,故万物皆空。心是暂时设定的:因此,一切事物都是暂时设定的。心是中心:因此一切事物都是中心。”假设 A 是 B B BB C C CC ,我们可以说,自从 X X XX A A AA , 全部 Y Y YY A A AA ;自从 X X XX B B BB ,所有 Y 都是 B ;由于 X 是 C ,所以所有 Y 都是 C 。 X 是不明确的,因此所有 Y 也是不明确的; X X XX 是特定确定的,因此所有 Y 都是特定确定的; X 是绝对的,因此所有 Y 都是绝对的。正如我们所期望的那样,并不是 X 的具体性导致所有 Y 都表现得模棱两可。这并不是说某一术语在该领域的固定性会模糊所有其他术语。相反,当任何一个术语被视为固定时,这同时也固定了所有其他术语的含义。一旦一个术语被视为模棱两可,所有其他术语也会突然变得不稳定、模棱两可。当这两者的可逆性和同一性以及因此的绝对性被视为一个术语时,所有其他术语也被视为绝对性。
This is the precise opposite of saying, with Fazang: “Given that A and B are mutually exclusive, we can say that since X is A , all Y s are non-A; since X X XX is non-A, all Y Y YY s are A A AA. Therefore, X X XX is both A A AA and non- A A AA, and Y Y YY is also both A and non-A. The Aness and non-Aness of X and Y are never simultaneous, and thus never in conflict, although always mutually exclusive. X is thus Y , Y Y , Y Y,Y\mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{Y} is thus X .” Quite a different logic is at work in this Huayan formulation. It remains dependent on the relation between “unchanging and following conditions” (不變隨緣 bubian suiyuan) predicated of the Nature, that is, of Li itself. These are identical only in the qualified sense that “having changing, differing determinations” is a necessary property of the “unchanging real nature” of pure non-self-nature, lack of a determinate character. Any particular determination that might arise from the nature is always the whole nature in its entirety, disclosing the purity of that undetermined nature precisely by its ability to take on determinations, to arise, to make-present. This determination is a real part of the nature only in this sense, as “a presentation,” and in this sense it subsumes all others, it exists, while the others don’t. Its “existence” here is the existence of the nature, the undividable whole. As this determination itself, rather than as determination as such, it is an “existence within passionate attachment” (情有 qing you) only, and does not exist. For it is impossible for the nature to be in two places at odds with each other; it is entire in this X , and thus when this X is seen as the nature (as presenting-determination-as-such) all the other determinations “do not exist.” The consideration that this can, in turn, be applied to all the other determinations is alone what makes interpenetration work here. But this application of the same consideration
这与法藏所说的完全相反:“鉴于 A 和 B 是互斥的,我们可以说,由于 X 是 A ,所以所有 Y 都是非 A ;自从 X X XX 是非A,全部 Y Y YY A A AA 。所以, X X XX 两者都是 A A AA 和非 A A AA , 和 Y Y YY 也既是 A 又是非 A。 X 和 Y 的无性和非无性永远不会同时发生,因此永远不会发生冲突,尽管总是相互排斥。 X 因此是 Y , Y Y , Y Y,Y\mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{Y} 因此是 X ”。华严的表述采用了完全不同的逻辑。它仍然依赖于自然(即理本身)所断言的“不变随缘”之间的关系。这些只是在有限的意义上是相同的,即“具有变化的、不同的决定性”是纯粹非自性的“不变的真实本质”的必要属性,缺乏确定性。任何可能从自然中产生的特定决定始终是整个自然的整体,通过其接受决定、出现、呈现的能力,恰恰揭示了未决定的自然的纯粹性。只有在这个意义上,作为“呈现”,这种决定才是自然的真实部分,并且在这个意义上,它包含了所有其他的,它存在,而其他的则不存在。这里的“存在”是自然的存在,是不可分割的整体的存在。作为这个决心本身,而不是作为决心本身,它只是“情有情有”,并不存在。因为自然不可能存在于两个互相矛盾的地方。它在这个X中是完整的,因此,当这个X被视为本质(作为呈现决定本身)时,所有其他决定“都不存在”。” 考虑到这一点反过来可以应用于所有其他决定,这就是相互渗透在这里发挥作用的唯一原因。但这个应用同样考虑

to other determinations remains unthematized, an expression of the metaperspective of final truth adopted by Fazang himself.
其他决定仍然没有主题化,这是法藏本人所采用的最终真理的元视角的表达。
We still have not arrived at the Tiantai argument that X is Y here, however. It depends on the doctrine that establishing not only the “emptiness of the nature” (性空 xingkong) but also the “emptiness of attributes” (相空 xiangkong), and the fact that the Truth of Provisional Positing is never refers to just “specificness in general,” but always starts with some genuinely particular determination being experienced, as we have already mentioned. This does not mean that every determination can be deduced in advanced from this determination present to me here and now. It means rather that as experience proceeds, as new determinations arise, they are always seen also retrospectively as having been preexistent, as being further disclosures of the nature of the initial determination which are not arising anew, but are readable as eternal and absolute, as identical with every other determination. I will be arguing that this sense of retrospectively apprehended preexistence of particular determinations is precisely what is lacking in the Huayan account of interpenetration, which thus limits its understanding of Li .
然而,我们在这里仍然没有得出X是Y的天台论。取决于不仅建立“性空”,而且建立“相空”的学说,而临时定位的真理绝不只是指“正如我们已经提到的,“总体上的具体性”,但总是从所经历的一些真正特定的决心开始。这并不意味着每一个决定都可以从此时此地呈现在我面前的这个决定提前推断出来。相反,它意味着,随着经验的进展,随着新的决定的出现,它们总是被回顾性地视为已经存在的,作为对最初决定的性质的进一步揭示,这些决定不是重新出现的,而是可以被解读为永恒和绝对的,就像与所有其他决定相同。我认为,这种对特定决定的先在性的回顾性理解,正是华严论相互渗透的解释中所缺乏的,从而限制了其对理的理解。
What Zhiyi means by the interpenetration as identity can perhaps be understood more clearly from his incidental early works than from his more intricate mature works such as the Mohezhiguan 摩訶止觀, which seem to presuppose an understanding of the more basic points made in the earlier texts, expanding upon their implications, and exemplifying these doctrines as a method applied on all levels of analysis, rather than expounding them simply as a content of doctrine. In the Liumiaofamen 六妙法門—a text that also, unlike the Mohezhiguan, has the advantage of having been composed by Zhiyi himself, rather than cribbed from his lectures by his disciple Guanding 灌頂—Zhiyi discusses six types of practice: Counting (數 shu) (the breath), Following (隨 sui) (the breath), Stopping (止 zhi) (the mind), Contemplating (觀 guan) (mind and body), Returning (還 huan) (i.e., turning back to contemplate the contemplator), and Purity (淨 jing) (the elimination of all the fixed differentiations defining the previous steps). He first presents these six steps as successive phases in a meditation program, to be followed in the order given. Then he presents them as each being appropriate as a starting point for practitioners of various differing dispositions. Then he goes on to show how each gate actually encompasses or subsumes all the others, giving a good sense of what Zhiyi means when he says two qualitatively different dharmas are in fact “identical” to one another: “counting” as such includes following (one is following the breath as one counts it), stopping (one stops thinking of other things when thinking of the breath, and comes to rest [stop] in the breath), contemplating (one contemplates as one counts), returning (one keeps returning to the breath), and purity (all other differentiations and obstacles cease as one counts); to “count”
智一所指的“作为身份的渗透”也许可以从他早期附带的作品中比从他更复杂的成熟作品(例如《摩诃止观》)中更清楚地理解,这些作品似乎预设了对早期作品中更基本观点的理解。文本,扩展其含义,并将这些学说作为应用于所有分析层面的方法进行例证,而不是简单地将它们作为学说的内容进行阐述。在《六妙法门》中——与《摩诃止观》不同,它的优点是由智一本人撰写,而不是抄袭其弟子灌顶的讲授——智一讨论了六种修行: )(呼吸)、随(呼吸)、止(心)、观(身心)、还(即回身去思惟)沉思者)和净(消除定义先前步骤的所有固定差异)。他首先将这六个步骤呈现为冥想计划中的连续阶段,并按照给定的顺序进行。然后,他将它们分别介绍为适合不同性情的练习者的起点。然后,他继续展示每个门实际上如何包含或包含所有其他门,当他说两种性质不同的法实际上彼此“相同”时,很好地理解了“知一”的含义:“计数”本身包括以下内容(随呼吸而数数)、止(在念呼吸时停止思考其他事物,并在呼吸中休息[停止])、思惟(一边数数一边思惟)、回归(不断地思考)回到呼吸)和纯净(所有其他的差别和障碍都消失了);来“数数”

is already to “follow,” to “stop,” to “contemplate,” and so on. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} The same consideration is spelled out for the other steps: to “contemplate” is already to count, to follow, to stop, and so on. Note that in each case, we are considering a particular characteristic as such: “following” as such, ignoring the question of what is following what. The point is just this very dharma, which one was seeing as the quality “counting,” can equally be read as the quality “following” and so on. In each case, even the root case, it is only an interpretative act of seeing-as.
已经是“跟随”、“停止”、“沉思”等等。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} 对于其他步骤也有同样的考虑:“思惟”已经是计数、跟随、停止等等。请注意,在每种情况下,我们都考虑一个特定的特征:“跟随”本身,忽略什么跟随什么的问题。重点就在于这个佛法,人们将其视为“计数”的品质,同样可以解读为“跟随”的品质,等等。在每种情况下,即使是根本情况,也只是一种“视作”的解释行为。
After several mutations and combinations, he goes on to describe the relation between these six determinations and a seventh determination: the mind. Zhiyi tells us that this seventh determination, mind, is the “source” of all the others, but then continues to assert that each of them is identical to the mind. “Mind is the gate of following” is to be understood here not as an assertion of two separate things, the mind and following, one of which is in some sense the “gate” to the other. Rather, Zhiyi clearly means here that “mindness” is “followingness.” The entity formerly identified as “mind” is now recontextualized, looked at from another angle, and seen to be the entity “following.” The characteristics that allowed it to be identified as mind-awareness, discernment, etc.-can be redescribed so that they allow it to be identified as following. The coherence “mind” is equally readable as the coherence “number” or “following” or “stopping,” and vice versa, always in this same tenuous, metaphorical way; for it was only “mind” in this same tenuous, locally coherent way. It is in this sense that Tiantai conceives interpervasion and mutual identity of all dharmas: to exist is to exist-with-others, defined by the border between the inside and the outside, but this border proves impossible to comprehend coherently, so whatever determinations are posited on the outside-encountered in the world, accompanying this coherence in any way-are equally to be found on the inside, as the identity of this coherence. It is not because the existence of the one negates the existence of the other. We will have more to say about this passage, and about the general Tiantai conception of mind, creation by mind, mind-only, and the relationship of mind to Li , in the following chapter.
经过几次突变和组合,他继续描述这六个决定与第七个决定:心之间的关系。智一告诉我们,这第七个决定——心,是所有其他决定的“源头”,但随后继续断言它们中的每一个都与心相同。 “心是追随之门”在这里不应被理解为对心与追随这两个独立事物的断言,其中之一在某种意义上是通向另一个的“门”。相反,知一在此明确表示“心”就是“随”。以前被识别为“心灵”的实体现在被重新语境化,从另一个角度来看,并被视为“跟随”的实体。允许它被识别为心灵意识、洞察力等的特征可以被重新描述,以便它们允许它被识别如下。连贯性“头脑”与连贯性“数字”或“跟随”或“停止”同样具有可读性,反之亦然,总是以同样脆弱的隐喻方式;因为它只是同样脆弱、局部连贯的“心灵”。正是在这个意义上,天台构想了诸法的相互渗透和相互同一:存在就是与他共存,由内部和外部之间的界限所定义,但这个界限被证明是不可能连贯地理解的,所以无论什么决定置于外部的——在世界上遇到的,以任何方式伴随着这种一致性——同样可以在内部找到,作为这种一致性的同一性。并不是因为一个的存在就否定了另一个的存在。我们将在下一章更多地讨论这段经文,以及一般的天台心观、心造、唯心以及心与理的关系。

WAVE AND WATER IN HUAYAN: "BEYOND" LI
华严的波浪与水:“超越”李

The implications for the understanding of Li in the two schools of the above should be to some extent obvious. But we can get a clearer understanding of it by examining the deployment of the key metaphor of the waves and the water in the two schools.
上述两个流派对于理解李的含义在某种程度上应该是显而易见的。但通过考察两所学校对波浪和水的关键隐喻的运用,我们可以得到更清晰的理解。
The metaphor of the water and the waves is a well-known trope in Buddhist metaphysics. In the Lainkāvatāra Sūtra, the water represents the pure essence of mind, and the waves the phenomenal realm that disturbs
水和波浪的比喻是佛教形而上学中众所周知的比喻。在《莲伽梵经》中,水代表心的清净本质,而波浪则代表扰乱的现象界。

its tranquility, stirring it into determinate discriminating thoughts. The pure essence of the Eighth Consciousness is inseparably present in the other operations of the mind, but the disturbances must be removed for it to return to its pure, calm, unified state, which can reflect the phenomenal realm with mirrorlike clarity. The Awakening of Faith uses the metaphor in a similar way, but suggests that the disturbance is now derived from the “wind” of primal Ignorance. The Pure Mind, Suchness, the one, the undifferentiated, is the water. The many, the particular divided thoughts and phenomena as mental events, are the waves. Every experienced event is fully determined by Ignorance, is a wave, but is also a full presencing of the water itself. Yet the essence of mind is free from all thoughts, as the essence of water is free from waves.
它的宁静,激发它进入确定的分别念。第八识的清净本质与心的其他运作密不可分,但必须排除干扰,才能恢复到清净、平静、统一的状态,才能如镜般清晰地反映现象界。 《信仰的觉醒》以类似的方式使用了这个比喻,但表明现在的干扰来自于原始无知的“风”。清净心,如是,一,无分别,是水。作为心理事件的许多、特定的分裂思想和现象就是波浪。每一个经历过的事件都完全由无明决定,是波浪,但也是水本身的完整呈现。然而,心的本质不受一切念头的影响,正如水的本质不受波浪的影响一样。
This metaphor suggests that, although the waves are not the essence of water, the waves are nonetheless nothing but water. They need not be removed or replaced in order to restore the original character of Suchness. If their undifferentiated essence is seen, their undisturbed state can be attained. This could mean either that the waves must cease, or that seeing the wetness in the waves is itself tantamount to stilling them, even if they continue to exist. The Awakening of Faith seems to imply that the motion of the waves is not the real nature of water; its essence is, instead, wetness per se, which is never increased or diminished, no matter what state of waviness it may be in. In Huayan thought, the water represents Li and the waves events. Waves are entirely water, and this one quality of wetness is present in its entirety in each of the waves. Further, the water may be entirely waves. In some Huayen writings, it is possible to dismiss the implication that the waves must be stilled, leaving the water flat and calm. Rather, Li is entirely present in every event, and the events-the waves-are the way in which Li is expressed. Hence, each wave gives us the entirety of wetness-Li-which is all that all the waves are. In this sense, all waves are in each wave. Moreover, it is the nature of water to form waves. Li “does not hold onto its nature”-it must form waves. Water is waves and nothing besides, waves are water and nothing besides.
这个比喻表明,虽然波浪不是水的本质,但波浪只不过是水。不需要移除或更换它们来恢复如性的原始特征。如果见到它们无差别的本质,就可以达到它们的无扰状态。这可能意味着波浪必须停止,或者看到波浪中的湿润本身就等于使波浪静止,即使它们继续存在。 《信仰的觉醒》似乎暗示着波浪的运动并不是水的真实本质,而是水的本质。相反,它的本质是湿本身,无论它处于何种波浪状态,它都不会增加或减少。在华严思想中,水代表礼和波浪事件。波浪完全是水,而这种潮湿的品质完整地存在于每一片波浪中。此外,水可以完全是波浪。在一些华严著作中,我们可以忽略必须平息波浪、让水面平静的暗示。相反,理完全存在于每一个事件中,而事件——波浪——就是理的表达方式。因此,每一波都给我们带来了全部的湿气——Li——这就是所有波的全部。从这个意义上说,所有的波都在每个波中。此外,形成波浪是水的本质。理“不守其性”——必须形成波浪。水就是波,除此之外别无他物,波就是水,除此之外别无他物。
This is considered the apex of nonduality and antitranscendentalism in Huayan thought. Here, the metaphor is used to express what is sometimes called “nature-origination” (性起 xingqi). Tiantai writers use this term disparagingly, comparing it to their own doctrine of “inherent entailment” (性具 xingiu). These Tiantai writers also use the water and waves metaphor, but with an important modification. Rather, starting with Zhanran, we find not a two-termed metaphor, as in Huayan, exploring the relation between (1) wetness ( Li , sameness) and (2) wave (event, difference), but rather a three-termed metaphor, exploring the relation between (1) wetness ( Li ), (2) wave (events), and (3) various degrees of clarity and muddiness of the water
这被认为是华严思想中不二论和反先验主义的顶峰。这里,这个比喻用来表达有时被称为“性起”的东西。天台派作者轻蔑地使用这个词,将其与他们自己的“性具Xingiu”学说进行比较。这些天台山作者也使用了水和波浪的比喻,但做了重要的修改。相反,从湛然开始,我们发现的不是《华严》中那样的二项隐喻,探讨(1)湿(理,同)和(2)波(事件,差异)之间的关系,而是一个三项隐喻,探索(1)湿度(Li)、(2)波浪(事件)和(3)水的不同程度的清澈度和浑浊度之间的关系

(defilement). Through this modification of the metaphor, the Tiantai writers assert not that wetness is unchanging and one, while waves are changing and diverse, but rather that wetness is both one and many, waves are both one and many, and both are equally changing and unchanging, and further, that both defilement and purity are interpenetrating and omnipresent. This relates directly to the doctrine of “inherent entailment”: defilement is to be accepted as a brute, unchangeable fact, not an illusion. It is, in fact, omnipresent, indispensable even in Buddhahood. But at the same time, by virtue of this very fact, it is also permeated with purity. To get a grasp on what this means, let us examine the deployments of this trope in detail in the two schools.
(烦恼)。通过这一比喻的修改,天台派作者并不是断言湿是不变的、一的,而波是变化的和多样的,而是湿既是一又是多的,波是一又是多的,都是同样变化和不变的。进一步说,烦恼和清净都是相互渗透、无所不在的。这与“内在必然性”的教义直接相关:烦恼应被视为残酷的、不可改变的事实,而不是幻觉。事实上,即使在成佛的过程中,它也是无所不在、不可或缺的。但同时,也正因为如此,它也充满了纯粹。为了理解这意味着什么,让我们详细研究一下这两所学校对这一比喻的运用。
Another work attributed to Dushun, the Huayan wujiao zhiguan 華嚴五教止觀, defines Li and 事 shi in terms derived from the Awakening of Faith: “The Gate of the mind’s True Suchness is Li , the Gate of the mind’s arising and perishing is shi. This refers to the nonduality of Emptiness and Existence [空有無二 kong you wu er], self-sufficiently interfused. They are manifested and concealed differently, but ultimately are without any obstruction.”*0 We should carefully note the direct association of Li with Emptiness and shi with Existence, of both with aspects of “mind,” and of the further step asserting their nonobstruction in spite of differences of manifestation (隱顯 yinxian). This discussion comes in the third section of a five-part work, corresponding to the “Final Mahayana Teaching” in the Huayan classification of teaching. The same section goes on to connect this idea to the simultaneity of samatha and vipasyana in terms that suggest that it is an attempt to crystallize the Tiantai teaching-and then perhaps transcend it in the next two sections of the text, in which the discussion of Li drops out entirely, and we have a direct discussion of the interpervasion of event with event, without any further direct reference to Li. This is a crucial point to which I will return. In a nutshell, as has already been touched on in the previous section, my claim here is that the Huayan works of “Dushun” and Fazang commonly attempt to transcend Li altogether, using it as a stepping stone to move into a direct discussion of “the interfusion of event with event” which is supposed to disclose the full attention to the real particulars, but which instead ends up bringing in a surreptitious level of single-value Li (as standard of value and coherence) as the frame of the discussion, creating a synordinate one-perspective view, precisely by suppressing the explicit discussion of Li.
杜顺的另一部著作《华严五教止观》,用源自《起信论》的术语定义了理和事实:“心真如之门,是理,心生灭之门。是shi。这是指空有无二、自足交融的无二性。它们以不同的方式显现和隐藏,但最终没有任何障碍。”*0我们应该仔细注意理与空、势与存在的直接联系,两者都与“心”的各个方面以及进一步断言它们的无障碍有关。尽管表现形式不同(隐显阴线)。此讨论属于五部著作的第三部,对应华严教法中的“大乘究竟教”。同一部分继续将这个想法与奢摩他和毗婆舍那的同时性联系起来,表明这是一种使天台教法具体化的尝试,然后也许在文本的接下来的两节中超越它,其中讨论了李完全退出,我们直接讨论事件与事件的相互渗透,而没有进一步直接提及李。这是我将要回到的一个关键点。 简而言之,正如上一节已经谈到的那样,我在这里的主张是,《独顺》和《法藏》的华严作品通常试图完全超越“理”,以“理”为垫脚石,直接讨论“理”。事件与事件的融合”本应揭示对真实细节的充分关注,但最终却引入了一种隐秘的单值理(作为价值和连贯性的标准)作为讨论的框架,正是通过压制李的明确讨论,创造了一种协调的单一视角。
The text goes on to introduce a trope that will have a large role to play in later Huayan and Tiantai: the water and the waves. The Dushun text equates water with Li , waves with events. "It is like the metaphor of the water and the waves. The different characteristics and forms of high and low are the waves, the equal nature of wetness is the water. The waves are devoid of any waviness that is other than water, so we illuminate water precisely in
文本接着介绍了一个在后来的华严和天台中发挥重要作用的比喻:水和波浪。 《独顺》文本将水等同于礼,将波等同于事件。 “好比水与波的比喻,高低不同的特性和形态就是波,湿同性就是水。波没有水以外的任何波浪,所以我们精确地照亮水

the waves. The water is devoid of any water that is other than the waves, so it is precisely the water that becomes the waves. The water and waves are one, but this does not obstruct their difference; they are different, but this does not obstruct their oneness. Because their oneness is unobstructed, when you are in the water you are in the waves. Because their difference is unobstructed, when you are in the waves you are not in the water."¹ 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} The water and the waves are always copresent, so that whenever one is present the other is findable; but one can be aware of one without being aware of the other, so it is possible to say both that “being in the waves is being in the water” and “being in the waves is not being in the water.” The latter means that “being in the waves” is ultimately a different thought from “being in the water.” This amounts to saying that you can think of and experience the waves exclusively as water. They are distinguishable in thought, but when closer attention is paid, it is revealed that one always entails the other.
海浪。除了波浪之外,水里没有任何水,所以正是水变成了波浪。水与浪是一,但这并不妨碍它们的不同;他们是不同的,但这并不妨碍他们的同一性。因为它们的一体性是畅通无阻的,所以当你在水中时,你就在波浪中。因为它们的差异是显而易见的,所以当你在波浪中时,你就不是在水中。” 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 水和波浪总是同时存在的,因此只要其中一个出现,另一个就可以找到;但一个人可以意识到一个而不意识到另一个,因此可以说“在波浪中就是在水中”和“在波浪中不是在水中”。后者意味着“在波浪中”与“在水中”根本上是不同的想法。这等于说,你可以将波浪想象为水,也可以将其体验为水。它们在思想上是有区别的,但是当仔细观察时,就会发现其中一个总是包含另一个。
It is to be noted here that the waves represent differentiation, the water unity or equality. Waves stand for the differentiated particulars, water for the unifying omnipresence of the universal universal. Their interpenetration means both are present in every instance of waviness. Fazang uses the metaphor in exactly the same way, expanding further on the implications. As he says in the Huayanjing tanxuanji 華嚴經探玄記: “The non-obstruction of Li and events has two meanings: The first is that all the dharmas and teachings are wholly True Suchness [真如 zhenru], which does not obstruct the marks of the events being differentiated clearly from one another. The second is that True Suchness is wholly all dharmas, which doesn’t obstruct their being of a single flavor, transparently equal. The first is like the fact that although the waves are precisely water, this does not obstruct the characteristic of motion; the second is like the fact that although the water is precisely the waves, it does not lose its wetness. . . . Truly it is all because the events which are wholly Li are neither the same nor different from the Li which is wholly events. Because they are not the same, they are present in one another; because they are not different they are identical to one another.” 342 342 ^(342){ }^{342} Water represents Li , the still, the equal, the wetness; wave represents shi, events, the moving, the different. These are neither the same nor different, and hence both mutually implicative and mutually distinguishable.
这里要注意的是,波浪代表区别,水代表统一或平等。波浪代表差异化的细节,水代表普遍性的统一无所不在。它们的相互渗透意味着两者都存在于每一个波纹实例中。法藏以完全相同的方式使用这个比喻,进一步扩展了含义。正如他在《华严经探玄记》中所言:“礼事无碍,有二义:其一者,一切法教,皆是真如,不碍事。”事件的标记彼此明显区分开来。二是真如是一切法,不妨碍一味平等。第一个好比,虽然波浪正是水,但这并不妨碍运动的特性;第二个就像水虽然就是波浪,但它并没有失去它的湿润性。 。 。 。实在是因为,完全理的事件与完全事件的理既不相同,也不不同。因为它们不一样,所以它们同时存在于彼此之中;因为它们没有不同,所以彼此相同。” 342 342 ^(342){ }^{342} 水代表“离”,代表静止、平等、湿润;波代表事、事件、移动、不同。它们既不相同也不不同,因此既相互暗示又相互区分。
This reveals to us the basic notion of Li in Huayan. It should be noted that Fazang hopes to surpass this notion of Li , or see it as self-surpassing into the realm of “the mutual penetration of event with event.” This is supposed to be because of the fact that Li is itself emptiness, and thus gets subsumed completely into the particular, and need no longer be a focus of discussion. Fazang takes this idea very far. In the Huayanjing wenda 華嚴經問答 we find the following:
这向我们揭示了《华严经》中礼的基本概念。值得注意的是,法藏希望超越这种理的观念,或者说是自我超越,进入“事件与事件相互渗透”的境界。这应该是因为理本身就是空性,因而完全被纳入具体之中,不再需要成为讨论的焦点。法藏将这个想法走得很远。在 Huayanjing wenda 华严经问答中,我们发现以下内容:
Q: What is the difference between event and Li in the Three Vehicle Teaching and in the Universal [i.e., Huayan] teaching?
问:三乘教与华严教中的事与理有什么区别?
A: In the Three Vehicles, event means the mind that traces objects and the material form that is obstructive, and so on. Li means the True Suchness that is equal [everywhere]. Although event and Li differ, they are mutually identical and intermelding, and do not obstruct one another or damage one another. But the meaning of event is here still not the same as the meaning of Li [事義非理義也 shi yi fei li yi ye]. In the Universal Dharma’s teaching on event and Li , Li Li , Li Li,Li\mathrm{Li}, \mathrm{Li} is itself identical to event, and event to Li. Within [the very definition of] Li there is [the meaning of] event; in [the very definition of] event there is [the meaning of] Li [理即事,事即理,理中事,事中理 li ji shi, shi ji li, li zhong shi, shi zhong li]. Identity and being within-one-another are interchangeable [即中中即 j i j i jij i zhong zhong zi]. Although event and Li are unmixed, they vanish into one another without duality. Although they exhaust all words completely, words remain completely unexhausted. As Li is to event, so is event to Li. Speaking in terms of mind, all dharmas are mind; speaking in terms of form, all dharmas are form. . . . And why? Because of the Dharani of unobstructed dependently co-arisen dharmas, wherein the adducing of any one at random subsumes all, so that all are free and at ease, since when one is non-existent, all are non-existent. It is not so in the Three Vehicles; when it tries to disregard principle and speak of only events, it ends up involving no [real] events, precisely because the events [for them] are not free and at ease. When they try to speak of the teaching of the one mark, they end up establishing events in accord with deluded attachments, precisely because they don’t [really] understand Li thoroughly. . . .
答:三乘中,事件是指追随事物的心和障碍的色相等等。理的意思是平等的真如。事与理虽然不同,但相互相同、相融,互不阻碍、互不损害。但事件的含义在这里仍然与“事义非理义也shi yi fei li yi ye”的含义不同。在普世佛法关于事件和事件的教义中 Li , Li Li , Li Li,Li\mathrm{Li}, \mathrm{Li} 本身等同于事件,事件等同于李。礼中有事件,事件有事件。事件中有理[理即事,事即理,理中事,事中理li ji shi,shi ji li,li zhong shi,shi zhong li]。身份和彼此内在是可以互换的[即中中即 j i j i jij i 中中子]。事与理虽然不相混杂,但它们却彼此消失,没有二元性。尽管他们完全用尽了所有的言语,但言语仍然完全没有用尽。正如礼之于事件,事件之于礼也是如此。以心而言,一切法皆是心;从色相来说,一切法都是色相。 。 。 。为什么?因无碍缘起法陀罗尼,任意一引,包容一切,一切皆自在,无一则一切皆无。三乘则不然。当它试图不顾原则只讲事件时,结果却没有事件,正是因为事件不自由自在。当他们试图谈论一相教法时,他们最终根据迷惑执着来建立事件,正是因为他们没有彻底了解理。 。 。 。
Q: Then how are event and principle defined in the Universal Teaching?
问:那么普法中事件与理是如何定义的?
A: In terms of the temporary previous upāya, within material form the five-fathom body is defined as an event, while the unobstructedness of this body is defined as Li , and so on. But in the correct contemplation, we can also say that the five fathom body is the Li , and non-obstruction is the event, or the reverse. Within event, we can equally say that mind is defined as the obstructive, and that which traces along an object is defined as material form, and also the reverse. We can speak in whatever way is needed. 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
答:就过去的暂行而言,色身中的五寻身被定义为事件,而此身的无碍被定义为离,等等。但在正确的思惟中,我们也可以说,五寻身是理,无碍是事件,反之亦然。在事件中,我们同样可以说,心被定义为障碍,而沿着物体追踪的被定义为物质形式,反之亦然。我们可以用任何需要的方式说话。 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43}
In this passage Fazang’s treatment is thoroughgoingly reversible, and seems to be very much in accord with the Tiantai treatment of these problems. It should be noted that here the question of identity is treated in the "if one is X , then all are X " mode typical of Tiantai writing, not the “if one is X, then all are non-X” we saw in Fazang’s explication of mutual identity of particular events above. No fault could be found with the explication by a Tiantai writer, and it is passages such as this which have caused the greatest difficulty in finding the difference between Tiantai and Huayan treatments of these issues. But we must note here that this is an example of what Tiantai polemicists describe as Huayan using the words for mutual identity without grasping the meaning. We need to soberly consider whether such accusations are anything more than baseless sectarian polemicizing. The general construction of Fazang’s argument above suggests that there is something to the Tiantai objection. In particular, even this extreme claim of the interchangeability of Li and event can be understood in terms of the water/wave model of Huayan thought, which it appears to be surpassing, and indeed it is really only comprehensible in this way. What Fazang means, I believe, is that the definitions of event and Li are, in Huayan, mutually implicative. Event always implies and includes Li , Li Li , Li Li,Li\mathrm{Li}, \mathrm{Li} always implies and includes event. As we have seen in the explication of the Three Natures, to be the unchanging nature (water) is to present various dharmas following conditions (wave). Wave means water, water means wave, in that wave always means water-as-wave, and water always means wave-as-water. The further claim that “unobstructedness” can be called the event, and the five-fathom body the Li is thus still misleading, and mediated. For what is meant here is that the body “is really” itself nothing but the unobstructedness of conditioned co-arising, while unobstructedness “is really” itself nothing but unobstructed dharmas. Hence, we can say that wave is the principle and water is the event. But that this entire discussion still proceeds under the auspices of Emptiness as principle is proved by the further Q Q QQ and A A AA from this work, already cited, where Fazang says that the empirical difference between different bodies is merely delusion, having nothing to do with actual dependently co-arising dharmas. The body that is principle, in other words, is the body-as-dependently-arisen and hence unobstructed, not the deludedly conceived body as separate and obstructed, which is a mere deludely imagined appearance which in reality, and in Li, simply does not exist. “Wave” means principle only because wave is first understood as meaning only “water as wave,” not “wave which excludes all other waves.” Waviness as waviness itself, to wit, as deludedly conceived as merely itself and no other, does not serve as Li , that is, does not account for the interpenetration of all dharmas, is not what must be
这段话中法藏的治疗是彻底可逆的,似乎与天台对这些问题的治疗非常一致。需要注意的是,这里对同一性问题的处理是以天台文典型的“若一为X,则皆为X”的方式,而不是我们在《法藏》中看到的“若一为X,则皆为非X”。对上述特定事件的相互同一性的解释。天台作者的阐释无可挑剔,也正是这样的一段话,给天台与华严对这些问题的处理上的区别造成了最大的困难。但这里我们必须注意,这是天台论者所说的“华严”用词来相互认同而不掌握其意义的一个例子。我们需要清醒地思考,这种指责是否纯粹是毫无根据的宗派论战。法藏上述论证的总体结构表明,天台的反对是有一定道理的。尤其是这种“理”与“事”可以互换的极端主张,也可以用华严思想的水/波模型来理解,看起来似乎是超越的,实际上也只能这样理解。我认为,法藏的意思是,在华严经中,事与理的定义是相互暗示的。事件总是暗示并包括 Li , Li Li , Li Li,Li\mathrm{Li}, \mathrm{Li} 总是暗示并包括事件。正如我们在三性的阐释中所看到的,不变的本质(水)就是随缘(波)而呈现出各种法。波意味着水,水意味着波,因为波总是意味着水作为波,而水总是意味着波作为水。 进一步声称“无碍”可以称为事件,而李五噚体因此仍然具有误导性和中介性。因为这里的意思是说,身体“实际上”本身不过是无碍共生的无碍,而无碍本身“实际上”也不过是无碍的法。因此,我们可以说,波是原理,水是事件。但是,这整个讨论仍然是在空性作为原则的主持下进行的,这一点已被进一步的证明。 Q Q QQ A A AA 法藏在这部著作中说,不同身体之间的经验差异只是妄想,与实际的缘起法无关。换言之,本法之身是缘起之身,因而是无碍的,而不是妄想的分离、有碍之身,后者只是一种妄想的表象,在现实中,在理中,它只是不存在。 “波”仅意味着原理,因为波首先被理解为仅意味着“水作为波”,而不是“排除所有其他波的波”。” 波波本身,即妄想为波波本身,无他者,不为理,即不说明诸法相通,非必然。

seen to attain enlightenment. “Wave” is principle only because “wave” really means “water as wave,” and “water” in the same definition means “wave as water.”
所见即得开悟。 “波”之所以是原则,只是因为“波”的真正意思是“水是波”,而“水”在同一定义中的意思是“波是水”。
Fazang states very clearly that interpenetration cannot occur without both differentiation and undifferentiation, without event and Li. As he says in the Huayan zhigui 華嚴經旨歸, “If there were only event, there would be mutual obstruction and no mutual penetration. If there were only the Nature of Li , there would be only the one flavor, and again no mutual penetration. But now it is the intermelding of event and Li that entails this unobstructedness. This means that the event, which is non-different from Li , completely subsumes the nature of Li , so that all those many events, also non-different from Li , following that Li on which they depend [隨彼所依理 sui bi suo yi li], all of them being manifest within any one of them.” 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} Note however that the relation of dependence remains unchanged here. The same must be said of Fazang’s attempt to restructure his definition of Li and event so that dialectical equivocations are possible: it is not right simply to say that Li is undifferentiated and event is differentiated; rather, for each one must say it is, it isn’t, both and neither, precisely because of the inseparability of Li from event. Li is not simply undifferentiated because all Li is also necessarily event, and so on. But in spite of this admirably subtle attempt to avoid one-way transcendence, it must be said that when all is boiled down we have an unchanged relation of dependence of event upon Li. This will become even clearer when we consider the relation of Li to mind in Huayan, below.
法藏说得很清楚,没有分别和不分别,没有事件和理,就不可能发生互通。正如他在《华严经旨归》中所言:“唯有事件,则互相阻碍,不得互相渗透。若只有理性,则只有一味,又无相通之处。但现在正是事件与礼的融合才带来了这种畅通无阻。这就是说,与理无异的事件,完全包含了理的本质,所以所有那些与理无异的事件,都遵循它们所依赖的理。 yi li],所有这些都在其中任何一个中显现出来。” 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 但请注意,这里的依赖关系保持不变。法藏试图重构他对理和事件的定义,使辩证的模棱两可成为可能:简单地说理无差别而事件有差别是不正确的;相反,每个人都必须说它是,它不是,既是又不是,正是因为李与事件的不可分割性。理并不是简单地无差别的,因为所有的理也必然是事件,等等。但是,尽管有这种令人钦佩的微妙尝试来避免单向超越,但必须说,当一切归结为事件对李的依赖关系时,我们仍然保持着不变的关系。当我们考虑下面《华严经》中“理”与“心”的关系时,这一点就会变得更加清楚。

WAVE, WATER, AND MUD IN TIANTAI:
INHERENT ENTAILMENT AS OMNIAVAILABILITY
天台的波浪、水和泥: 作为无所不在的内在内涵

This point may seem vague and even perhaps unfair. It can be made clearer, and I think fully persuasive, by considering the way a similar metaphor is deployed in Tiantai. For in Tiantai, starting with Zhanran, we find not a two-termed metaphor as in Huayan, exploring the relation between (1) wetness ( = Li = Li =Li=\mathrm{Li}, sameness) and (2) wave ( = = == event, difference), but rather a three-termed metaphor, exploring the relation between (1) wetness ( = Li ) ( = Li ) (=Li)(=\mathrm{Li}), (2) wave (= events), and (3) various degrees of clarity and muddiness of the water ( = = == subjective delusion of sentient beings). Through this modification of the metaphor, the Tiantai writers assert not that wetness is unchanging and one, while waves are changing and diverse, but rather that wetness is both one and many, waves are both one and many, that both are equally changing and unchanging, and further, that both defilement and purity are interpenetrating and omnipresent.
这一点可能看起来含糊不清,甚至可能不公平。通过考虑类似的比喻在《天台山》中的运用方式,它可以变得更清楚,而且我认为完全有说服力。因为在《天台》中,从瞻然开始,我们没有发现像《华严经》那样的二义隐喻,探讨了(1)湿( = Li = Li =Li=\mathrm{Li} ,相同)和(2)波( = = == 事件、差异),而是一个三项隐喻,探索(1)湿度之间的关系 ( = Li ) ( = Li ) (=Li)(=\mathrm{Li}) 、(2) 波浪(= 事件),以及 (3) 水的不同程度的清澈度和浑浊度( = = == 众生主观妄想)。通过这种对比喻的修改,天台派作者并不是断言湿是不变的、一的,而波是变化的和多样的,而是说湿既是一又是多的,波是一又是多的,两者同样是变化和不变的。进一步说,烦恼和清净都是相互渗透、无所不在的。
Zhanran offers this metaphor in his discussion of "The Non-Duality of Taint and Purity"染淨不二門 in the famous Shibuermen 十不二門 section of the Fahuaxuanyishiqian 法華玄義釋籤:
湛然在著名的《法华玄义释签》十不二门部分的“染净不二门”的讨论中提出了这样的比喻:
If you recognize that the Dharma-nature has since beginningless time been present only as ignorance, you can comprehend how the ignorance of this present moment is precisely nothing but Dharma-nature. Ignorance creating all dharmas everywhere, with the participation of the Dharma-nature, is called taint. The Dharma-nature responding to all conditions everywhere, with the participation of Ignorance, is called purity. The water may be muddy or clear, but both the wave and the wetness are in any case no different. Although the water’s clarity or muddiness is due to conditions, this formation of muddiness has always been going on [濁成本有 zhuocheng benyou]. Although the muddiness has always been there, it is in its entire substance clear, because the Li of the two types of wave is omnipresently interconnected [通 tong], and the entirety of this substance [ h 2 h 2 [h^(2):}\left[h^{2}\right. 體 ti] manifests as [each] function [用 yong]. Thus all the Three Thousand, in all their various causes and effects, are called simply “dependent co-arising” [緣起 yuanqi]. The dependent co-arising of both delusion and enlightenment are inseparable from this present moment. The nature of this moment is eternal; the Li of dependent co-arising is one. But within this one Li there is [forever] a division of the pure and the impure. Looked at in terms of the divisions, six realms [purgatories, animals, hungry ghosts, Asuras, humans, and gods] are impure and [Śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, buddhas] are pure. But looked in terms of the omnipresence [of each] [通 tong], each one of the ten is both pure and impure [or, each is interconnected to both the pure and the impure]. Thus we know that the tainted substance of each moment is pure. . . . How could the person whose six sense organs are purified regard the ten realms as definitively and fixedly [定 ding] ten!?45
如果你认识到法性自无始以来只是以无明的形式出现,你就能了解此时此刻的无明正是法性。无明遍生诸法,法性参与,名为漏。法性随处随缘,有无明参与,名为清净。水可能是浑浊的,也可能是清澈的,但无论是波浪还是潮湿,无论如何都没有什么不同。虽然水的清澈或浑浊是由条件决定的,但这种浑浊的形成一直在持续。虽然浑浊一直存在,但其整体却是清亮的,因为两种波理是无所不在的,而这个整体的整体是相通的。 [ h 2 h 2 [h^(2):}\left[h^{2}\right. 体ti]表现为[各]功能[用yong]。故三千诸因、果种种,简称为“缘起元气”。无明与觉悟的缘起与当下密不可分。这一刻的本质是永恒的;缘起之理是其一。但在这一理之内,却有清净与不净之分。从划分上看,六界(炼狱、畜生、饿鬼、阿修罗、人、天)是不净的,而(声闻、辟支佛、菩萨、佛)是清净的。但从无所不在的角度来看,十者中的每一者都是清净和不清净的。因此我们知道每一刹那的染污本质是清净的。 。 。 。 六根清净者,怎能将十界定为十!?45
Zhanran tells us here, first, that Dharma-nature (法性 faxing)and Ignorance (無明 wuming) are mutually convertible: each one can appear as the other. Moreover, even when converted into one form or another, it always continues to function as both. Ignorance can appear as Dharma-nature, or vice versa, but in either case, a full description requires a reference to both. Each dharma always involves both Ignorance and the Dharma-nature. Purity and taint refer to the relation between them in any given instance. When Ignorance is central, it derives “assistance” (與 y u y u yuy u ) from its peripheral
湛然在这里告诉我们,第一,法性和无明是可以相互转化的,可以表现为对方。此外,即使转换为一种形式或另一种形式,它始终继续发挥两种形式的作用。无明可以表现为法性,反之亦然,但无论哪种情况,完整的描述都需要参考两者。每一种法总是包含着无明和法性。纯度和污点是指在任何给定情况下它们之间的关系。当无知成为中心时,它就会产生“帮助”(与 y u y u yuy u )从其外围

other form, Dharma-nature, to create all dharmas. In Zhili’s interpretation, this means that when the mind is entangled in conceptions of oneness and multiplicity, sameness and difference, as mutually obstructed, so that it dwells in and attaches to each moment of experience as a separate thing, it transforms and creates all dharmas: that is, it sees them as arising and perishing, coming into existence anew, standing separate from the continuity of the past and of the activities of the mind. When Dharma-nature is central, it derives assistance from peripheral Ignorance to respond to all conditionsi.e., to all the dharmas previously “created” by the tainted mind. Tainted creation is always prior and presupposed. According to Zhili, this purity means the interpenetration of oneness and manyness, sameness and difference, so that each moment of experience is released and abandoned into all others. Although Zhili rightly warns against interpreting this one-sidedly as asserting that, in all contexts, “taint equals creation, while purity equals response,” the difference in modality is noteworthy. Purity functions on the presupposition of the prior existence of impurity, by virtue of its contrast, thereby making it an aspect of its own purity. Both the contrast and the subsumption are essential to the function of purity, which thus both preserves and transforms the existence of impurity. I have above described this relation as parallel to that of a setup and punch line of a joke, and this metaphor will be extremely useful here. Impurity is the setup, Purity is the punch line. For it is this model that allows us to see how Zhanran can go on to claim both that the impurity is always there and yet also that it is always also pure, as the setup is necessarily always prior, always unfunny, always contrasted to the funniness of the punch line, but for that very reason enables the setup, which retrospectively pervades even the setup with its funniness.
另一种形态,即法性,以创造一切法。在智里的解释中,这意味着,当心纠缠于一与多、同与异的概念中,相互阻碍,以致于它作为一个单独的事物安住于每一个体验的瞬间时,它就转化并创造了一切法。 :也就是说,它认为它们是生灭的,重新存在的,与过去的连续性和心灵活动分开。当法性为中心时,它会从外围的无明中获得帮助,以应对所有条件,即所有先前由污染心“创造”的法。受污染的创造总是优先的和预设的。智力认为,这种纯粹意味着单一性与多元性、相同性与差异性的相互渗透,从而使每一个体验时刻都被释放并抛弃到所有其他时刻。尽管直隶正确地警告不要片面地解释这一点,因为在所有情况下,“污点等于创造,而纯洁等于回应”,但形式上的差异值得注意。纯洁性的作用是以不纯洁性的先前存在为前提的,凭借其对比,从而使其成为自身纯洁性的一个方面。对比和包容对于纯粹的功能都是至关重要的,从而既保留又改变了不纯的存在。我在上面将这种关系描述为类似于笑话的设置和妙语的关系,这个比喻在这里非常有用。杂质是设置,纯度是妙语。 因为正是这个模型让我们看到,湛然如何继续声称杂质总是存在,但也总是纯粹的,因为设置必然总是优先的,总是无趣的,总是与有趣的形成鲜明对比。妙语,但正是因为这个原因,使得这个设置得以实现,回顾起来,它甚至渗透到了整个设置中,充满了乐趣。
Moving into the metaphor of the waves and the water, Zhanran tells us that, for both the muddy wave and the clear (i.e., “pure”) wave, both the waviness and the wetness are unchanged.
进入波浪和水的隐喻,展然告诉我们,对于浑浊的波浪和清澈(即“纯净”)的波浪来说,波浪度和湿度都没有改变。

“Muddiness” represents taint or impurity: “Ignorance, with the assistance of the Dharma-nature, creating all dharmas.” Ignorance is in this case central, Dharma-nature is peripheral, but both are always present. “Clarity” represents purity: “Dharma-nature, with the assistance of Ignorance, responding to all conditions.” Dharma-nature is in this case central, Ignorance is peripheral, but both are always present. “Wave”-or better, waviness-represents “event” (shi), the conditioned arising of a particular occurrence at a particular time and place. More specifically, it is the Three Thousand causes and effects as “simply located” spatiotemporal events. “Wetness” represents Li , substance, the unchanging nature (理, 體, 性). This is neither one nor many, neither zero nor Three Thousand. It is the Three Truths, local coherence as global incoherence as intersubsumption. As discussed above, the upshot of this for the handling of sameness-difference relations is that
“浊”代表污秽或不洁:“无明,以法性助,生诸法。”在这种情况下,无明是核心,法性是次要的,但两者始终存在。 “明”代表清净:“法性,无明助,应一切缘。”在这种情况下,法性是中心,无明是次要的,但两者始终存在。 “波”——或更准确地说,波动——代表“事件”(shi),即在特定时间和地点发生特定事件的有条件的发生。更具体地说,它是“单定位”时空事件的三千因果。 “湿”代表理、物质、不变的本质(理、体、性)。这不是一,也不是多,不是零,也不是三千。这是三个真理,局部一致性、全局不一致性和相互包容。如上所述,处理同差关系的结果是:

all the Three Thousand discernible characteristics are each unchangeable and omnipresent. For this is what the Tiantai term 具 ju literally means: to be equipped with, that is, to have access to, to have available for use. Omnipresence here, as we saw was already the case in earliest Confucianism in the previous volume, really means omniavailability. Tiantai doctrine proclaims that “Evil entails goodness”: that means evil always has goodness available to it as a possibility and as a resource. “Goodness entails evil”: that means goodness always has available to it for its own utilization, can make good use of evil, is equipped with evil as a part of its upayic arsenal. When Tiantai says, " X is inherently equipped with Y ," X and Y are not conceived as objects with inert characteristics inhering in them that we observe from outside, over there inertly entailing other objects; these are activities that constitute the very being of all experiences comprising sentient beings, who in Buddhism generally have no inert substantial being, but are rather nothing but their own activities, their karma. We who are contemplating “entailment” are not outside of the object contemplated as entailing other objects: we are ourselves no more and no less than an activity, “a single moment of thought” (一念 yinian) “equipped with access to” (具 ju) the objects we contemplate, which are themselves aspects of this action. We are inside the system being considered in our description, not outside of it, and our contemplation of all objects addressed in our theorizing is already presaturated with desire and evaluative intentionality. Sentient beings are activities equipped with access to other activities, activities to whom other activities are available. To “entail” in this sense presupposes actively inhabiting, presupposes the activity constituting the sentient being to whom something is available as part of the reality of acting in this way. This is an extension of the tendency to include human subjectivity as part of the constitution of ultimate reality that we have seen also in one way or another in all the pre-Buddhist Chinese traditions we have discussed. The operative assumption is that desire and value are also built into simply being in any position, to “being” something. To be anything is to be an intentional desiring activity equipped with access to all other types of activity, to whom all other things are available for evaluation, use, reinterpretation, subsumption. Now, by our definition, whatever is always available as value, and whose availability is a necessary condition of a given value, is a Li. Each is available everywhere, and each intersubsumes all of the others. Hence, none has a definite identity (it can always be read as any of the others), but all of them are irrevocably available at any locus. Each is everywhere and nowhere. These Three Thousand unchangeable omniavailabilities are Li.
一切三千相,皆是不变、无所不在。因为这就是天台词“具具”的字面意思:具备,即可以得到、可以使用。这里的无所不在,正如我们在上卷中看到的最早的儒家思想中已经存在的情况一样,实际上意味着无所不在。天台教宣称“恶中生善”:这意味着恶总是有善可以作为它的可能性和资源。 “善必有恶”:这意味着善总是可以为自己所用,可以善用恶,并配备恶作为其武器库的一部分。当天台说“X本具Y”时,X和Y并不被认为是我们从外部观察到的具有内在特性的物体,在那里惰性地蕴含着其他物体;这些活动构成了所有众生经验的本质,在佛教中,众生一般没有惰性的实体存在,而只是他们自己的活动,他们的业力。我们这些正在思考“蕴含”的人并不在被思考为蕴涵其他对象的对象之外:我们自己只不过是一种活动,“一念一念”,“具备获得”的能力。 ju)我们沉思的对象,它们本身就是这个行动的各个方面。我们处于我们的描述所考虑的系统内部,而不是外部,并且我们对理论化中涉及的所有对象的沉思已经预先充满了欲望和评价意向性。有情众生是能够进行其他活动的活动,是可以进行其他活动的活动。 在这个意义上,“蕴含”预先假定了积极地居住,预先假定了构成有知觉的存在的活动,对有知觉的存在来说,某些东西可以作为以这种方式行动的现实的一部分。这是将人类主体性纳入最终现实构成部分的趋势的延伸,我们在所有我们讨论过的前佛教中国传统中也以这种或那种方式看到了这一点。有效的假设是,欲望和价值也内置于任何位置,“成为”某物。成为任何事物就是成为一种有意识的渴望活动,能够进行所有其他类型的活动,对所有其他事物都可以进行评估、使用、重新解释和包容。现在,根据我们的定义,任何始终可以作为价值使用的东西,并且其可用性是给定价值的必要条件,就是“理”。每一个都随处可见,并且每一个都包含所有其他的。因此,没有一个具有明确的身份(它始终可以被解读为任何其他身份),但所有这些都在任何位置不可撤销地可用。每一个都无处不在又无处可寻。此三千不变万能者,即是理。
This “one Li” is necessarily always inclusive of, divided into, both the pure and the impure. It is strictly neither one nor many. Conversely, taint and purity each includes all dharmas without exception. Taint is all dharmas,
这个“一理”必然总是包含、分为纯净和不纯净的。严格来说,它既不是一个也不是多个。反之,浊与清,皆包括一切法,无一例外。一切法皆有染污,

involving both Dharma-nature and Ignorance, seen under the category of “creation.” Purity is all dharmas, involving both Dharma-nature and Ignorance, seen under the category of “response.”
涉及法性和无明,见于“造化”范畴。清净即是一切法,包括法性与无明,见于“应”范畴。
Both purity and impurity refer to types of event (shi). Both take place at a particular time and place: they are mental activities of sentient beings and buddhas, respectively. Both the muddy wave and the clear wave are waves. Moreover, both involve both “water” and “dirt.” They are merely arranged differently in the two cases. A clear wave, after all, is not purely water; it is water and solidity arranged in a certain structure (all the water on top, all the mud packed on the bottom). Without the mud, the solid, there would be no “wave.” The wave cannot exist in empty space. A pure wave-Buddhahood-is the copresence of Ignorance and Dharma-nature in a particular structure. The impure wave-delusion-is the copresence of the same two in a different structure (the mud dispersed in the water).
纯洁和不纯洁都是指事件的类型(shi)。两者都发生在特定的时间和地点,分别是众生和佛的心理活动。浑波和清波都是波。而且,两者都涉及“水”和“污垢”。这两种情况只是排列方式不同。清澈的波浪毕竟不是纯粹的水,而是纯粹的水。它是按一定结构排列的水和固体(所有的水都在上面,所有的泥都堆积在下面)。没有泥土、固体,就不会有“波浪”。波不可能存在于真空中。清净波——佛果——是无明与法性在特定结构中的共存。不纯净的波浪——妄想——是相同的两者在不同的结构(分散在水中的泥)中的共存。
Both types of wave are entirely wetness. Wetness is a way of emphasizing the inseparability of Li , just as in the Huayan use of the metaphor. Wetness is putatively the same everywhere: each wave is not just partially wet, but entirely wet. Wetness is fully, not partially, instantiated in each wave. All wetness is involved in each wave.
两种类型的波浪都是完全湿润的。湿是强调“理”的不可分割性的一种方式,正如华严经中使用的比喻一样。假定各地的湿度都是相同的:每个波浪不仅是部分湿的,而且是完全湿的。湿度在每个波浪中被完全实例化,而不是部分实例化。所有的湿气都包含在每一波中。
All wetness is wavy, is in motion. All substance is function. All substance is involved in each function. The wetness of the clear wave and the wetness of the muddy wave are each omnipresent, fully present in both the clarity and the muddiness. But wetness is really just motion: slipperiness, instability, non-solidity-just as, as we saw above, Zhiyi had originally identified Li precisely with “non-dwelling” (無住 wuzhu). The sole reason for using this metaphor of wetness is to show the omnipresence of motion per se, which, as Zhili says, is a little harder to see, since it is also always particularized in some diverse way. Wetness is just a way of saying “waviness per se,” what Zhili calls “just the one nature of motion per se.” (zhi yi dong xing 只一動性). “Motion” here is another word for “dependent co-arising,” which is to say, conditionality, which is to say, instability, finitude, karma, activity, unfinished process, inescapable engagement with otherness, limitedness per se. The one nature all things share is conditionality. And this in turn is why each instantiation thereof must always be readable as both pure and tainted, irreducible to any single characteristic (such as purity). All motions are one motion, as we might say that one wave is all waves, in the manner that applies when, say, a person is throwing a ball: the motion of his arm and the tensing of his ankle are aspects of a single motion. One wave is like the hand, the other like the ankle. They are different, but they are joined-not by their static sharing of a single nature analyzed from without, not by their static participation as organs in a total organism, which differ but all serve as articulated parts within a larger whole to which they are
所有的湿气都是波浪形的,都在运动。一切物质都是功能。所有物质都参与每种功能。清波的湿和浑波的湿都是无所不在的,在清和浑中都体现得淋漓尽致。但湿实际上只是运动:滑溜的、不稳定的、非固体的——正如我们在上面看到的,志一最初将“理”准确地定义为“无住”。使用这种潮湿比喻的唯一原因是为了展示运动本身的无所不在,正如志力所说,这有点难以看到,因为它也总是以某种不同的方式特殊化。湿润只是“波纹本身”的一种表达方式,志力称之为“运动本身的本质”。 (只一动性)。这里的“动”是“缘起”的另一个词,也就是说,条件性,也就是说,不稳定、有限性、业力、活动、未完成的过程、不可避免的与他者的接触、本身的有限性。所有事物共有的一个本质是条件性。这反过来就是为什么它的每个实例必须始终可读为纯粹的和受污染的,不可还原为任何单一特征(例如纯度)。所有运动都是一个运动,正如我们可能会说的,一个波就是所有波,就像一个人扔球时所应用的方式一样:他的手臂的运动和脚踝的紧张是单个运动的各个方面。一波像手,另一波像脚踝。它们是不同的,但它们是结合在一起的——不是通过它们静态共享从外部分析的单一性质,也不是通过它们作为一个整体有机体中的器官的静态参与,它们各不相同,但都充当它们所隶属的更大整体中的铰接部分。

subordinated. It is neither a shared essence nor membership in a whole that makes them interpenetrate here: rather, it is specifically their “single nature of motion,” their action, their instability, their waviness, their finitude and impermanence per se. That they move, that they cannot stand still, that they must diverge, that they can never settle into any oneness, is what unifies them. Their differences are all in action at once, fully instantiated in one another. Each activity (of hand, of ankle) must be equipped with all the other activities just to be the activity it is; to be activity X is to have all the other activities available as aspects of what it is already doing, and to be available to all the other activities in the same way.
从属。使它们在这里相互渗透的既不是共同的本质,也不是整体的成员身份:相反,具体而言,是它们的“运动的单一本质”,它们的行动、它们的不稳定性、它们的波动性、它们的有限性和无常性本身。它们是移动的,它们不能静止不动,它们必须发散,它们永远不能形成任何统一,这就是它们的统一之处。它们的差异全部立即体现出来,并在彼此身上得到充分体现。每项活动(手、脚踝)都必须配备所有其他活动才能成为其活动;成为活动 X 就是让所有其他活动作为其已经在做的事情的一部分可用,并以相同的方式可供所有其他活动使用。
To clarify this, let us return to the Tiantai explanation of the passage from the Lotus quoted previously: “This dharma dwells in the dharma-position, and all the characteristics of the world dwell eternally”(是法住法位,世間相常住 shifazhufawei, shijianxiangchangzhu). For in the discussion of this passage we will find our water/wave metaphor again, related now to the tropes of “position” and “Suchness.” Zhiyi had said of this passage:
为了澄清这一点,让我们回到前面引用的天台对《莲花经》的解释:“此法住于法位,世间一切相常住”(是法住法位,世间相常住)十发诸发威,十见相长诸)。因为在这段经文的讨论中,我们将再次找到我们的水/波浪隐喻,现在与“位置”和“真实性”的比喻相关。志毅曾这样评价这段话:

[Deluded] sentient beings and the perfect enlightenment [of the Buddha] are but one Suchness, not two. None are outside Suchness, and it is this being-Such of all dharmas which is thus their “position.” “All the characteristics of the world dwell eternally,” because given that Suchness is the position in which transmundane perfect enlightenment dwells, Suchness is also its characteristics. Both the position [位 wei] and the characteristics [相 xiang] dwell eternally. Similarly, Suchness is also the position in which the mundane deluded sentient beings dwell, and it is also their characteristics. How could those not also dwell eternally. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
众生与圆觉,只是一如,非二。一切法皆不外于“如”,一切法的“如”即是诸法的“位”。 “世间一切相常住”,因为“如”是出世间圆觉所住的位置,“如”也是它的相。位置和特征都是永恒存在的。同样,真如也是世间迷惑众生的住处,也是他们的特性。那些人怎么可能不永远居住。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46}
Suchness is not only the “position” in which dharmas dwell-i.e., that beyond which they never go no matter how they change, what is constant to them, that in which they have their being. Suchness in this sense is a way of indicating the Emptiness of all dharmas, the one universal trait that is always “so, such” of them no matter what modifications they may undergo. But in another sense, Suchness itself is also their mark, their particular characteristics, just as Emptiness is also Provisional Positing, and is, indeed, every particular Provisional Posit. This is because “Suchness” simply means the being-such-and-such-of-dharmas, namely, being exactly as they are, the fact that dharmas are “such” unto themselves. “Being Such” is a way of saying what is unchanging about them, that no omnipresent universal can be attributed to them except the empty “like this,” because they are so unstable; but this is also a way of talking about what is most particular and transient about them, the fact that they are so particular that no universal
真如不仅是诸法所在的“位置”,即无论它们如何变化,都永远不会超越的位置,对它们来说是不变的,它们存在于其中。从这个意义上说,“如来”是表示一切诸法空性的一种方式,这是一种普遍的特征,无论它们经历什么变化,总是“如此,如此”。但从另一种意义上说,“真”本身也是它们的标记,它们的特殊特征,正如空性也是临时位置,而且实际上是每一个特定的临时位置。因为“如是”的意思就是诸法如是,即诸法如是,诸法本身就是“如是”。 “如此”是一种表达它们不变的方式,除了空洞的“像这样”之外,没有任何无所不在的普遍性可以归因于它们,因为它们是如此不稳定;但这也是谈论它们最特殊和最短暂的东西的一种方式,事实上,它们是如此特殊,以至于没有普遍的

term at all can be predicated of them, nothing can be said but the empty statement that they are “just as they are.” “Wetness” is a way of saying what is universal about all waves and also just a way of saying that all waves are thoroughly non-solid, non-dwelling, pure “motion,” incapable of assuming any final fixed form, any one single characteristic (even that of “wetness”) i.e., that they have nothing stable or universal about them. Emptiness is Provisional Positing. Suchness is characteristics. Wetness is waviness. The one unchanging fact about things is absolute change.
根本无法用任何术语来形容它们,除了“它们就是它们本来的样子”这一空洞的陈述之外,什么也不能说。 “湿性”是一种表达所有波的普遍性的方式,也是表达所有波都是完全非固体、非驻留、纯粹“运动”的一种方式,无法呈现任何最终的固定形式,任何单一的波都无法呈现出任何最终的固定形式。特征(甚至是“潮湿”的特征),即它们没有任何稳定或普遍的东西。空是暂时的定位。此类就是特征。湿润度是波纹度。关于事物唯一不变的事实是绝对的变化。
This may sound like the Huayan point that to be Li (undifferentiated constant Suchness) always implies also to be event (divided, changing particular), and thus “interpenetration” always involves both, but the reasoning is subtly different. For in Tiantai the relation between these two contrasted sides is not mutual implication but recontextualized synonymity. Another way of saying Li , suitable for other contexts, is to say event. To be determinate is to be locally coherent is to be globally incoherent; and equally, to be globally incoherent is already to be locally coherent. There is no global incoherence that is not (rather than merely “does not imply”) also local coherence. This being-locally-coherent is what never fails to be so of them, that they are always just as they are and exactly like themselves, they are always “Such.” To be such is to be “just like this,” and hence the “this” is the “such.” The difference between “what it is to be this” and “this” simpliciter on which the traditional metaphysical establishment of essence and universals depends is here annulled. As A. C. Graham has noted, the term 如 r u r u rur u as a translation of “Suchness,” suggests “being as (not what) it is,” comparable to isness in the sense of a predicative adjective (“He is tall,” in Graham’s example) rather than isness as existence (“There is a man”). 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} Zhiyi’s understanding of the term is consistent with this implication. As we put it above, to be is to be determinate, and to be determinate means not just to be determinate per se, but to be particularly determinate, to be Such, “just like this”-hence absolutely particular and not characterizable at all. To be determinate is to be indeterminate. To be coherent is to be incoherent. Hence, Zhanran comments on Zhiyi here:
这听起来可能像华严论的观点,即理(无差别的恒如)总是意味着事件(分裂的、变化的特殊),因此“相互渗透”总是涉及两者,但推理有微妙的不同。因为在《天台山》中,这两个对立面之间的关系不是相互暗示,而是重新语境化的同义词。适合其他上下文的另一种表达“Li”的方式是说“事件”。确定性就是局部一致,全局不一致;同样,全球不一致就已经是局部一致。没有一种全球性的不连贯性不是(而不仅仅是“不暗示”)局部的连贯性。这种局部连贯性对他们来说永远都是如此,他们总是像他们自己一样,完全像他们自己,他们总是“这样”。如此就是“就像这样”,因此“这个”就是“如此”。本质和共相的传统形而上学建立所依赖的“它是什么”和“这个”之间的区别在这里被取消了。正如 AC Graham 所指出的,术语如 r u r u rur u 作为“Suchness”的翻译,暗示“存在(而不是它是什么)”,相当于谓语形容词意义上的 isness(在格雷厄姆的例子中,“他很高”),而不是作为存在的 isness(“有一个男人”)。 47 47 ^(47){ }^{47} 志毅对这个词的理解与这个含义是一致的。正如我们上面所说的,存在就是确定的,而确定的意思不仅是本身确定,而且是特别确定的,是这样的,“就像这样”——因此绝对是特殊的,根本无法表征。 。确定就是不确定。连贯就是不连贯。于是,展然在这里对志毅的评价是:
Dharmas never go outside of Suchness, so Suchness is their “position.” Precisely this is what is true of deluded sentient beings in L i L i LiL i [i.e., as unchangeable omniavailability, though as yet unrealized], while precisely this is what the Buddhas have realized [so “precisely this” is what never changes whether one is deluded or enlightened]-this is what is meant by “dwelling.” . . . Sentient beings and Buddhas are the dharmas that do the dwelling in it. The single tainted and pure Suchness is what they dwell in. Because it is always limited, differentiated, fixed and determined, it is called a position.
诸法从来不脱离如来,所以如来就是它们的“位”。这正是迷惑众生的真实情况。 L i L i LiL i [即,虽然尚未证悟,但不变的普遍性],而这正是诸佛所证悟的[所以“正是如此”,无论迷惑或开悟,都不会改变]——这就是“住”的意思。 。 。 。众生、诸佛,是住其中的法。一浊清净如是其住处,因常有限、分别、定、定,故名位。

染淨一如是所住位。分局定限故名為位. 染净一如是所住位。分局定限故名为位。

In all cases, they are said to have a “position,” and it is for this reason that we speak of “the one Suchness.” They never leave Suchness, so they are limited to just this [state of “having a position,” i.e., being finite, determinate, locally coherent, and thus apparently simply located]. This limitation is omnipresent, is identical to interpenetration, since it pervades everywhere. It is the utmost limitation, and at the same time the fullest omnipresence.
在所有情况下,人们都说它们有一个“地位”,正因如此,我们才说“一如”。他们永远不会离开真如,因此他们仅限于这种状态[“拥有一个位置”的状态,即有限的、确定的、局部连贯的,因此显然是简单定位的]。这种限制是无处不在的,与相互渗透相同,因为它无处不在。它是最大的限制,同时也是最充分的无所不在。

不出真如故唯局此。此局即通遍一切故。局之極也。通之盛也.
无法真如故唯局此。此局即通遍一切故。局之极也。通之盛也.

It is like the “position” of a king in the mundane world. A person occupies this position, and the position is also the nature of this person, because it is unchangeable [as per the Tiantai definition of “the nature”], as a person’s royal nature remains unchanged whether he is clad in rough cloth or is ascending his throne. [So far, then], the “characteristics” may differ, but the nature is what remains the same. 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
就如同世间国王的“地位”一样。一个人占据了这个位置,这个位置也是这个人的本性,因为它是不变的,就像一个人无论穿粗布还是穿衣,他的王性都不会改变。登上他的王位。 [到目前为止],“特征”可能有所不同,但本质是一样的。 48 48 ^(48){ }^{48}
According to Zhanran, “position” (wei) means finitude, determination, and it is “being determined and limited” (and therefore “limited in this particular way”), which is meant by “being-Such.” By the argument rehearsed above, this being finite and determined, being (locally) coherent as such and such a particular entity, is identical to being all-pervasive and infinite, precisely by virtue of being finite, of having borders. That is, the position of all things, which they never leave, their constant nature, is the state of “having a position which is finite, simply located, and hence can never be dwelt in constantly.” One thing that is determinate and particular about them is that they are determinate and particular, but this particular determinate characteristic is true of any contrasting determinacy as well. Their unchanging nature is, in more traditional Buddhist terms, to change, which also implies to be limited (in time), finite (in space) and determinate. The state of being finite is the Suchness (just like this, some specific way) which they never leave, which is thus unchanging, is the case, no matter what specific “position” they may inhabit, which is thus applicable everywhere, is omnipresent, is universal, is infinite. Being is being Such is being finite is being everywhere and everywhen. Suchness is finitude, and finitude is infinity. To be is to be conditional, which is to be empty, which is to be unconditional. Provisional Positing is Empty is the Center, and all are alternate names for conditionality, finitude. This “being-finite” is the unchanging nature of all dharmas.
在湛然看来,“位”意味着有限、确定,它是“被确定和限制的”(因此“以这种特定方式受到限制”),即“如此”的意思。根据上面所阐述的论点,这种有限性和确定性,作为一个特定的实体(局部)一致,与无所不在和无限相同,正是由于有限性和边界性。也就是说,万物永远不会离开的位置,即它们不变的本质,是一种“具有有限的、简单的位置,因此永远无法持续居住的位置”的状态。它们的确定性和特殊性在于它们是确定性和特殊性,但这种特殊的确定性特征也适用于任何对比确定性。用更传统的佛教术语来说,它们不变的本质是变化,这也意味着有限(时间)、有限(空间)和确定。有限的状态是他们永远不会离开的真性(就像这样,某种特定的方式),因此是不变的,无论他们处于什么特定的“位置”,因此都是适用的,是无所不在的,是普遍的,是无限的。存在就是存在,有限就是无处不在。真实就是有限,有限就是无限。存在就是有条件的,就是空的,就是无条件的。临时定位以空为中心,都是条件性、有限性的别称。这个“无边”,就是诸法不变的本质。
Up to this point in Zhanran’s comment, we still have changing characteristics contrasted to an unchanging nature, and determination-as-such, specificness per se, rather than particular determinations. But this is not all. Zhanran continues:
到目前为止,在湛然的评论中,我们仍然有与不变的性质相对照的变化的特征,以及确定性本身,具体性本身,而不是特定的确定性。但这还不是全部。湛然继续说道:

“The characteristics of the world dwell eternally.” “Characteristics” means what can be outwardly flagged [i.e., whatever is distinguishable]. “The position” means what can be dwelled in enduringly. But the characteristics are none other than the position, whether of enlightenment or of delusion. When delusion is made explicit, it is seen to be precisely Li , and Li is precisely what dwells eternally. The Buddhas have already realized this eternity, while sentient beings are identical to it in Li [i.e., “potentially,” in terms of its preexistent omniavailability]. Hence both the characteristics and the position-of both sentient beings and of Buddhas-dwell eternally. Since the pure and tainted characteristics and positions are all one Suchness, the Li of characteristics and the Li of positions must be equivalent. The Buddhas cultivate and realize the supreme Li in accordance with the mundane world, which shows that the mundane world originally possesses this Li.
“世界的特征是永恒的。” “特征”是指可以从外部标记的内容[即,可区分的内容]。 “位”是指可以长久居住的地方。但其特征无非是证悟或迷惑的立场。当无明显明时,就见得正是理,而理正是常住之物。诸佛已证此永恒,而众生则与理相同。因此,众生与佛的相性与地位,都是永恒存在的。由于清净相、污相、位都是一真如,所以相理和位理必定是相等的。诸佛按照世间修行、证得无上之理,说明世间本来就有这个理。
Q: The position may be one [unchanging] Suchness. But how can the characteristics also be equal [and thus eternal]?
问:这个位置可能是一种[不变的]真性。但这些特征怎么可能是平等的(因而是永恒的)呢?
A: The position refers to the Li or Nature, which absolutely can never change. The characteristics refer to the following of conditions, which differ as to taint and purity. Although the conditions may differ, they are all instances of what is called “dependent co-arising.” It is like clear and muddied waves; their wetness is no different in either case. Since they are the same in that it is just the wetness that is deemed to be the waves, we say Suchness is their characteristic. Since they are the same in that it is just the waves that are deemed to be the wetness, we say that Suchness is their position. Thus the characteristics also share in the eternity [of the position]. Although they have the same name, since they differ as to taint and purity, it is necessary to make this distinction with respect to Suchness, the positions, as well.
答:位指的是理或性,是绝对不能改变的。这些特征是指以下条件,其在污染和纯度方面有所不同。尽管条件可能有所不同,但它们都是所谓“缘起”的实例。它就像清澈的波浪和浑浊的波浪;在这两种情况下,它们的湿度都没有什么不同。因为它们的相同之处在于,都只是将湿视为波浪,所以我们说如是它们的特性。由于它们的相同之处在于都只是波被认为是湿,所以我们说真如是它们的位置。因此,这些特征也具有[职位]的永恒性。虽然它们的名字相同,但由于它们的污浊和清净不同,所以在真性、立场方面也有必要做出这种区分。
The point is that it is not only the “position” or “Suchness” or “the wetness,” that is, “the Nature” that is one, everywhere equal, eternal, unchanging, omnipresent, but also the characteristics, the waves. In other words, not just “being-such” is constant, but, since being-such can only
关键在于,它不仅是“位”、“如是”或“湿”,即“本性”是一、处处平等、永恒、不变、无所不在的,而且是特征、波浪。换句话说,不仅“如此”是恒定的,而且因为“如此”只能

mean being finite and limited and determined in this particular way, the specific characteristics disclosed in all possible experience are also eternal. Conversely, Suchness itself is also differentiated. This is the crucial point; the way the Huayan writers set up this metaphor, and their general system, makes it increasingly difficult for them to make this claim about Li. Zhili comments on this metaphor:
意味着有限和有限,并以这种特定方式确定,所有可能的经验中揭示的特定特征也是永恒的。反过来说,真如本身也是有区别的。这是关键点;华严作家设置这个隐喻的方式,以及他们的一般体系,使得他们越来越难以对李做出这样的断言。直隶对这个比喻的评价是:
The muddied water represents the tainted mind in delusion. The clear water represents the pure mind after the attainment of Buddhahood. The waves represent the fact that the Three Thousand are all Function. The wetness represents the fact that the Three Thousand are all Substance [i.e., Li, the Nature]. It must be understood that although the water is muddied in the case of the tainted mind, there too the entire wave is nothing but wetness; when the water is clarified, how could this be some other wave or some other wetness? Thus when [Zhanran] says there is no difference between them, he means that both the wave and the wetness are always the same. . . . This is to explain how the characteristics of the world dwell eternally. But characteristics are originally what is changing and moving. To make clear in what sense they are nonetheless eternal, it is necessary to elucidate the matter in terms of their “position.” The entirety of each characteristic is nothing but the position, so if the position is eternal, the characteristics are also eternal. Hence the text says the position is nothing other than the characteristics. . . . Now I will explain Zhanran’s meaning: Since the question he poses for himself asks how each characteristic could be everywhere equal, it is clear that the answer is intended to show this constantly equal presence of the characteristics on the analogy of the omnipresence of having-a-position. . . . The intent is to show the constantly equal presence of the characteristics, but since the characteristics include both the tainted and the pure, their omnipresence is hard to reveal. Thus Zhanran first uses the wetness to talk about the position and its omnipresence, and also to reveal that all characteristics are nothing but the position, the entire waviness is nothing but wetness. The point is to allow us to understand the characteristics by analogy to the position and show how they are both equally present at all times. . . . Moreover, if we want to focus on the difference, how could it be that just the characteristics are different, and not the position as well? Thus this section of the text goes on to say, "since they differ as to taint and purity, it is necessary to make a distinctions concerning
浑水代表着迷惑中的污染心。清水代表成佛后的清净心。波浪代表着三千都是作用的事实。湿代表三千都是物质(即理,自然)。必须明白,虽然在污染心的情况下,水是浑浊的,但整个波浪也只不过是湿的。当水澄清时,这怎么可能是其他波浪或其他潮湿呢?因此,当[湛然]说它们之间没有区别时,他的意思是波浪和湿度总是相同的。 。 。 。这是为了解释世界的特性如何永恒存在。但特性本来就是变化的、动人的。为了弄清楚它们在什么意义上是永恒的,有必要从它们的“位置”来阐明这一问题。每个特征的整体不过是位置,所以如果位置是永恒的,那么特征也是永恒的。因此,经文说,位置只不过是特征。 。 。 。现在我解释一下湛然的意思:既然他给自己提出的问题是问每个特征如何能够处处相等,那么很明显,这个答案是为了以无所不在的类比来表明特征的这种恒定的平等存在—— -位置。 。 。 。其目的是要显示诸法相始终平等地存在,但由于诸法相同时包括浊法和清净法相,因此它们的无所不在很难揭示。 于是,湛然首先用湿来谈论位置及其无所不在,也揭示了一切特征都不过是位置,整个波纹也不过是湿。重点是让我们通过与职位的类比来理解这些特征,并展示它们如何在任何时候都平等地存在。 。 。 。而且,如果要重点区别的话,怎么可能只是特性不同,而不是立场不同呢?因此,这段经文接着说:“既然它们在污秽和纯洁上有所不同,那么有必要对它们作出区分。
Suchness and concerning the position as well." Is this not because the tainted characteristics necessarily take entangled Suchness [ 在纏真如 zaichan zhenru] as their position, and the pure characteristics take disentangled Suchness [出纏真如 chuchan zhenru] as their position? In terms of equality, since the clear and muddied waves are both one single wetness, we can also say they are one single waviness, because after the [muddied] waviness is purified, it is still the same motion and function [動用 dongyong] as when it was muddied. 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
如是,亦有关位。”这岂不是污相一定以缠真如在缠真如为立场,清净相一定以出缠真如出缠真如为立场吗?从平等的角度来说,既然清波和浑波都是一种单一的湿性,那么我们也可以说它们是一种单一的波纹,因为[浑]波纹净化后,仍然是与时相同的运动和作用。浑浊不堪。 49 49 ^(49){ }^{49}
The unchanging Suchness is not only the undepartable “position” of all dharmas; it is also, precisely, their characteristics as unchanging. Conversely, change and diversity are not only the characteristics of all dharmas; they are also, precisely, their Suchness as changing and diverse. A characteristic is nothing but a position-i.e., a set of boundaries. To be positioned is to be conditioned, to have a necessary outside. Conditions differ, but all are conditional. Any conditionality is a specific, differing conditionality-that is what it means to be conditional. To be conditional is to be specific, to be limited, to differ from others. But there is no “differing as such”-that would not be really differing, but still a universal sameness. To be merely “determinate as such” is still to be indeterminate. But it is precisely because this determinate characteristic as such is universal that each characteristic is all characteristics. Wetness is the unchanging nature of the changing, differing waves. But the presence of waviness (or dongyong 動用, “motion and function,” as Zhili puts it, or finitude, or determinateness, unstable unfinished other-engaging process, conditioned karmic activity) is also the same, whether the water is muddied or clear. The universality of wetness is adduced, Zhili says, merely to illustrate what the universal presence of a single attribute is like, what a universal is: the real point is to the universality of waviness, which is harder to see because of the difference in the shape and muddiness of the waves. But the wetness is precisely the waviness, and both remain the same everywhere, both pervade the entire sea. This is because to be a wave is to be moving, to be always different, and it is only in this sense that the clarified waviness is the same waviness as the muddied waviness it used to be. To be a particular wave is to be wetness is to be waviness is to be non-dwelling, unrestrictable to any simple location, equally discoverable in any location. As Zhanran said, their position is to have some limited position, be some “suchness,” and this position is never transcended. The muddy wave is the same wave as the clear wave in exactly the same sense in which even the muddy wave is “the same” as itself-because “wave” is just a way of indicating “waviness.” Hence, Zhili says clearly that both sameness and difference apply to both the wave (i.e.,
不变的真如,不仅是诸法不可离的“位”,也是诸法不可离的“位”。确切地说,它们的特征也是不变的。反过来说,变化和多样性不仅是诸法的特征,也是一切法的特征。准确地说,它们也是不断变化和多样化的本质。特征只不过是一个位置,即一组边界。定位就是要受到制约,要有必要的外在。条件不同,但都是有条件的。任何条件都是特定的、不同的条件——这就是有条件的含义。有条件就是具体、有限制、与他人不同。但不存在“不同本身”——这不会是真正的不同,但仍然是普遍的相同性。仅仅“确定本身”仍然是不确定的。但正是因为这种确定的特征本身是普遍的,所以每个特征都是特征。湿度是变化的、不同的波浪的不变本质。但是,无论水是浑浊的还是清澈的,波动性(或用智力所说的“动用”,“运动和功能”,或有限性,或确定性,不稳定的未完成的参与过程,有条件的业力活动)的存在也是相同的。志力说,引入湿度的普遍性只是为了说明单一属性的普遍存在是什么样子,普遍性是什么:真正的要点是波动性的普遍性,由于波动性的差异而很难看到。波浪的形状和浑浊度。但湿润正是波浪,两者在各处都是一样的,都弥漫在整个海洋中。 这是因为,波就是运动的,总是不同的,只有在这个意义上,澄清的波纹才与过去浑浊的波纹是相同的波纹。成为特定的波浪,就是湿润,就是波动,就是非驻留,不受任何简单位置的限制,在任何位置都同样可发现。正如展然所说,他们的立场就是有某种有限的立场,有某种“如是”,而这个立场是永远不会被超越的。浑浊的波浪与清晰的波浪在完全相同的意义上是相同的波浪,甚至连浑浊的波浪也与其本身“相同”——因为“波浪”只是表示“波纹度”的一种方式。因此,直隶明确指出,同与异既适用于波(即,

the waviness) and the wetness. As Zhili puts it, "The whole substance is clear, because the two waves, muddy and clear, are just the one motion, just one unchanging nature of movingness. 150 150 ^(150){ }^{150}
波纹度)和湿度。正如直隶所言:“整个物质是清晰的,因为浑浊和清晰的两波只是一动,只是一动不变的本质。 150 150 ^(150){ }^{150}
This “just one” must be understood in the sense of the “Four Onenesses” discussed above. The point is not that there is a single shared essence-motion or waviness or wetness-that is the secret identity of each apparently different wave. Motion, waviness, is indeed the nature of a wave (i.e., its intrinsic characteristic that identifies it as a wave, which is always so of it no matter what changes it may undergo). But being a wave is just being waviness. To be a wave is to be waviness, and even the identification of a single wave in two consecutive moments of muddiness is a partial construal focusing abstractly on the sameness (waviness) at the expense of the difference, both of which are equally applicable, and strictly speaking, synonymous. Any other wave is the “same” wave to just the same extent as “this” wave is the same wave in any two consecutive moments-that is, provisionally-although “different” is an equally accurate description in both cases. Any particular instance of conditionality “co-arises” with all instances. This is because “conditionality” cannot function as a normal universal, which remains other to its instances, which remains unchanging and the same as against its changing, differing instances. With this universal, both the universal and the instances are eternal, and simultaneously, both the universal and the instances are constantly changing. The universal too constantly changes, can never be one. Li is also multiple, just as much as it is singular.
这个“唯一”必须从上面讨论的“四一”的意义上来理解。重点不在于有一个共同的本质——运动、波纹或湿度——这是每个明显不同的波浪的秘密身份。运动、波动性确实是波的本质(即,将其识别为波的内在特征,无论它经历什么变化,波总是如此)。但成为波浪只是波浪。成为波就是波状,甚至在两个连续的浑浊时刻中识别单个波也是一种局部解释,抽象地聚焦于相同性(波状),而牺牲了差异,两者都是同样适用的,并且严格来说,是同义词。任何其他波都是“相同”的波,其程度与“这个”波在任何两个连续时刻是相同的波一样——也就是说,暂时的——尽管“不同”在这两种情况下都是同样准确的描述。任何特定的条件性实例都与所有实例“同生”。这是因为“条件性”不能作为正常的普遍性发挥作用,它仍然与其实例不同,相对于其不断变化的不同实例而言,它保持不变且相同。有了这个普遍性,普遍性和实例都是永恒的,同时,普遍性和实例都在不断变化。宇宙总是在变化,永远不可能合而为一。 Li 既是单数,也是复数。
Both difference and sameness are applicable at every level here-both purity and taint, both mutability and constancy. The muddiness is there from the beginning, but, as Zhili says, muddiness is not the nature of water. This is not because the nature of water is rather purity or unchangingness, a single pure nature, but because its nature is to be non-dwelling as either muddy or clear, its nature is finitude as interpenetration, determinacy as indeterminacy as the interchangeability of the two-the Three Truths. All the waves are both defiled and pure, because any single wave has the nature of moving, from muddy to clear and from clear to muddy. It is the “same” (different) wave that is muddy or is clear.
差异和相同性都适用于这里的各个层面——纯度和污点,可变性和恒定性。浑本来就有,但是,正如智里所说,浑不是水的本性。这并不是因为水的本质是清净、不变、单一的清净本质,而是因为它的本质是非住性,要么浑浊,要么清澈,它的本质既是有限性又是互通性,是确定性又是不确定性,就像水的可互换性一样。二、三谛。所有的波浪都是污浊的,也是清净的,因为任何单一的波浪都有运动的性质,从浑浊到清澈,从清澈到浑浊。这是浑浊或清澈的“相同”(不同)波浪。
In sum, given that the one shared nature is “movingness” (impermanence, dependent origination, conditionality, determinate finitude) itself, both “the nature” and “the characteristics” are eternal. The characteristics are, in the metaphor, the shape of a particular wave, its frothiness, its motion, its history, its progression. The difference between this same characteristic as “pure” and as “muddied” rests simply in how it is seen to be related to other characteristics. Nothing else about it changes. Muddiness here equals simply separation, obstructions, severing of contexts. In this
总而言之,既然共性就是“动”(无常、缘起、缘起、有定)本身,那么“性”和“相”都是永恒的。在隐喻中,特征是特定波浪的形状、泡沫、运动、历史和进展。 “纯粹”和“浑浊”的同一特征之间的区别仅仅在于它如何被视为与其他特征相关。其他方面没有任何改变。这里的混乱仅仅等于分离、障碍、环境的切断。在这个

sense, muddiness is “not the nature of water,” because “it is not the nature of waves”-the real nature of “movingness” itself. Mud here stands for the inertness, the solidity, the separation of the solid as opposed to the liquid. It is not the nature of “being a characteristic” qua characteristic to be isolated from other characteristics: that is, this is not the nature of being finite, of inhabiting a limited “position.” The muddiness is a nondisclosure of the real nature of what limitedness is, that is to say, what a limit is, what finitude is, what conditionality is, what locatedness is, what determinateness is. For to be determinate is, in Tiantai, to be locally coherent, which is to be globally incoherent: to be determinate is to be indeterminate, to be limited is to be connected to all other contexts. To be separated is actually another way of saying to be connected; separation, this thing being itself and none other, is only coherent in the context of its articulation within a group of other things, other characteristics. This thing being itself is a manifestation of its interconnection with other things, its inseparability from them. The Three Truths is a way of showing that the notion of a hard-and-fast border between any two characteristics is ultimately self-contradictory; they can be neither fixedly internal nor external to one another.
从某种意义上说,浑浊“非水性”,因为“非波性”——“动”本身的真实本质。这里的泥代表惰性、坚固性、固体与液体的分离。作为特征的“特征”的本质并不是与其他特征分离:也就是说,这不是有限的本质,也不是处于有限的“位置”的本质。浑浊是对有限性的真实本质的隐瞒,也就是说,什么是界限、什么是有限性、什么是条件性、什么是定位性、什么是确定性。因为在天台,确定就是局部连贯,全局不连贯:确定就是不确定,限制就是与所有其他环境相联系。分离实际上是联系的另一种说法;分离,即这个事物本身而不是其他事物,只有在它在一组其他事物、其他特征中表达的背景下才是连贯的。这个事物的存在本身就是它与其他事物相互联系、不可分割的体现。三真理是一种方式,表明任何两个特征之间的严格界限的概念最终都是自相矛盾的。它们既不能固定地位于彼此之内,也不能固定地位于彼此之外。
In simple terms, this means that the “what” of any event or thing never changes, any more than its “nature” does. This red cup falling to the floor is eternally red, eternally a cup, eternally falling. What changes when the broader contexts are also brought into consideration is not the “what” of the thing, either as to its distinguishing characteristics or its shared nature, but the “how.” It is now this same “what” in all the ramifications emerging from its connections with the rest of the waves and their wateriness. It is now red as interpenetrating, cup as interpenetrating, falling as interpenetrating. It is now red as white-ceramic, it is now cup as broken shards, it is now falling as past.
简单来说,这意味着任何事件或事物的“内容”永远不会改变,就像它的“本质”一样。这个掉落在地上的红色杯子是永远的红色,永远的杯子,永远的坠落。当更广泛的背景也被考虑在内时,发生变化的不是事物的“什么”,无论是其独特的特征还是其共同的性质,而是“如何”。现在,它与其他波浪及其水性的联系所产生的所有后果都是同样的“什么”。今红为互穿,杯为互穿,落为互穿。它现在像白色陶瓷一样红,现在像破碎的碎片一样杯子,现在像过去一样掉落。
Shall we see this as a second-order dualism? The “how” at least seems to change decisively, and can always be translated back into a “what”: it was formerly a fact that these characteristics were viewed qua isolated, while afterward this has been replaced by a new fact, the fact that these unchanged characteristics are viewed qua interpenetrating. But this view is a result of again failing to include the subjective inclinations and cognitive states among the phenomena that interpenetrate. This is precisely what Zhanran’s passage just quoted aims to prevent. “In terms of their differences, the six realms are defiled and the four realms are pure, but in terms of their omnipresence, all ten realms are defiled and all ten realms are pure.” Both sides of this equation must always be included in a complete account. If we imagine a single wave passing through ten stages of increasingly unmuddied water, we could say that the wave at the first position is entirely muddy while at the last position it is entirely clear. But we can also say of this wave and
我们是否应该将其视为二阶二元论? “如何”至少似乎发生了决定性的变化,并且总是可以被翻译回“什么”:以前这些特征被视为孤立的事实,而后来这已被一个新的事实所取代,即这些不变的特征被视为相互渗透的。但这种观点又是未能将主观倾向和认知状态纳入相互渗透的现象中的结果。这正是刚才引用的湛然这段话所要防止的。 “就其差别而言,六界是污秽的,四界是清净的;但就其遍在而言,则是十界都是污秽的,十界是清净的。”这个等式的两边必须始终包含在完整的帐户中。如果我们想象一个波浪穿过十级越来越不浑浊的水,我们可以说第一个位置的波浪完全浑浊,而最后一个位置的波浪完全清澈。但我们也可以说这一波

every wave that it is always both muddy and clear. For the whole motion from front to back is the same wave, and at all times part of the wave is the other waves before and behind it. Muddiness, solidity, is not the nature of water, of wetness, of waviness. But to push the metaphor, it of course the motion of the wave that stirs up the mud, that muddies it. And it is the further motion of the wave that finally clarifies it: the wave moves on from the muddy spot, it cannot stay there. And that is why the muddiness dwells eternally!
每一个波浪,它总是既浑浊又清澈。因为从前到后的整个运动是同一个波,并且在任何时候,波的一部分都是它之前和之后的其他波。浑浊、坚固,不是水、湿、波浪的本质。但为了推动这个比喻,当然是波浪的运动搅动了泥浆,使泥浆变得浑浊。正是波浪的进一步运动最终澄清了这一点:波浪从泥泞的地方继续前进,它不能停留在那里。这就是为什么泥泞永远存在的原因!
What we are to imagine in this metaphor, as used in Tiantai, then, is not the usual trope, as found in Indian Buddhist works, in the Awakening of Faith and in Huayan, which the Zhili’s disciple Kedu 可度 describes well as simply directly taking the waves to represent acquired characteristics, transformation, and function, and the water to represent the nature or the unchanging substance. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51} In the Tiantai version we have not two levels, but three. The clarity and muddiness represent the pure and defiled minds, each of which involves all dharmas, involves both Ignorance and Dharma-nature, structured differently (i.e., with a different “how” but not a different “what”). The waves represent the pure and defiled functions. The wetness represents the pure and defiled substance, or Li. Wetness is just a way of speaking of the omnipresence and thoroughgoingness of waviness. To be wet is simply to be wavy, to be slippery, to be in motion thoroughly and in every molecule. Wetness is obviously the same everywhere, but waviness is less clearly a “universal,” so this expedient is used to reveal waviness as omnipresent. In other words, Li is just a way of talking about the omnipresence of function, motion, dependent co-arising, conditionality. At every level, considered even in itself alone, we have both purity and defilement, both sameness and difference, both mutability and constancy. We have waves moving through both muddy and clear water. The water does not move, only the waves do. But it would be senseless to think of a “wave” that was simple statically muddy or clear; if we take a cross-section of a wave at a specific moment and free-frame it, cut off the rest of the motion, surrounded not by the rest of the ocean but instead by a blank white space, there is no wave there at all, only a formation of water standing still. This could not be water, but only, say, an ice statue of a wave. To be wet is to be wavy, which means to be moving through both clear and muddy water. To be a wave is to be in one specific place, but also, by definition, not to be only in that one place. Each single wave passes through both muddy and clear water. But it is not simply a matter of integrating the wave into the whole of the ocean, seeing it as part of the whole. Instead, the interconnection is accomplished precisely by the division. For a single unchanging ocean, considered as a static whole, would also not be wavy. For the wave to be a wave, it must be both separate,
那么,我们在《天台山》中所用的这个比喻中所想象的,并不是印度佛教著作、《起信论》和《华严经》中常见的比喻,直隶弟子克都可度描述得很好,直接直接地描述了这一比喻。以波代表后天的特性、变化和作用,以水代表自然或不变的物质。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51} 在天台版本中我们不是两个级别,而是三个。清净心与浊心代表清净心与染污心,两者都涉及一切法,都涉及无明与法性,结构不同(即“如何”不同,但“什么”不同)。波浪代表纯净和污浊的功能。湿代表纯净和污浊的物质,或者说“礼”。湿润只是表达波浪的无处不在和彻底性的一种方式。湿就是指波浪状、光滑、每一个分子都在彻底运动。湿度显然在任何地方都是相同的,但波纹度不太明显是“普遍的”,所以这个权宜之计被用来揭示波纹度是无所不在的。换句话说,理只是谈论无所不在的作用、运动、缘起、缘起的一种方式。在每一个层次上,甚至就其本身而言,我们都有纯洁和污秽,既有相同,也有差异,既有变化,也有恒定。我们有波浪穿过泥水和清水。水是不动的,只有波浪在动。 但是,单纯地认为“波浪”是静态的浑浊或清澈的,是毫无意义的。如果我们在特定时刻截取波浪的横截面并对其进行自由框架,切断运动的其余部分,周围不是海洋的其余部分,而是被空白的白色空间包围,那么在该时刻就没有波浪一切,只有一团静止的水。这不可能是水,而只能是波浪的冰雕。湿的意思是波浪状的,意思是在清水和泥水中移动。成为波浪就是在一个特定的地方,但根据定义,也不仅仅是在那个地方。每个波浪都穿过泥水和清水。但这不仅仅是将波浪融入整个海洋,将其视为整体的一部分的问题。相反,互连是通过划分精确完成的。对于一个不变的海洋来说,被视为一个静态的整体,也不会是波浪状的。为了使波成为波,它必须是分开的,

specific, distinguishable and interconnected. Wetness is motion, and motion is separation. Wetness is motion, and motion is interconnection. Separation is interconnection. Dependent co-arising, conditionality, is separation and specificity, being one thing rather than, and contrasted to, another. But dependent co-arising, conditionality, is interconnection, such that being just this thing in isolation would be failing to be this thing. The muddiness stays where it is, and the clarity stays where it is. They are perfectly and completely divided, each finite, dwelling in its own position. It is precisely because each stays right where and how it is, and never changes into the other, that they interpenetrate; indeed, this dwelling in their own position is their interpenetration. Their interpenetration is their division; as Zhanran says in the citation above, “the limitation is identical to interpenetration, since it pervades everywhere; it is the utmost finitude, and at the same time the fullest interpenetration.” The wetness is divided into muddied and clear wetness. Each wave is both a muddy and a clear wave, and is every other muddy and clear wave. The muddiness is entirely wet waviness as muddy. The clarity is completely wet waviness as clear.
具体的、可区分的和相互关联的。湿就是运动,运动就是分离。湿就是运动,运动就是互联。分离即是互连。缘起、缘起,是分离和特殊,是一件事而不是另一件事,并与另一件事相对立。但缘起、缘起,是相互联系的,因此,孤立地存在这个事物将无法成为这个事物。浑浊留在原处,清澈也留在原处。它们是完美且完全分开的,每一个都是有限的,居住在自己的位置上。正是因为每个人都保持原样,并且永远不会改变为另一个人,所以它们相互渗透;事实上,这种安居在他们自己的位置上就是他们的相互渗透。它们的相互渗透就是它们的分裂;正如占然在上面的引文中所说,“这种限制与相互渗透是相同的,因为它无处不在;它是最大的有限性,同时也是最充分的相互渗透。”湿分为浊湿和清湿。每个波浪既是浑浊的又是清澈的波浪,并且是其他所有浑浊和清澈的波浪。浑浊完全是湿波纹状的泥泞。透明度完全是湿波状的透明。
Hence, to be is to be determined, is to be finite, is to be indeterminable, is to be this particular thing and every particular thing as such, which is to say, as Such. In terms of praxis, this was to be realized in the contemplation of “the Three Thousand as each moment of experience” (一念三千 yinian sanqian). Not in each moment, not born from each moment, but as each moment. The Three Thousand are neither prior nor posterior to this experience; they are this determinate experience itself, as the characteristics of a thing, in particular the characteristics of its arising and perishing, are precisely that thing itself.
因此,存在就是被确定的,是有限的,是不可确定的,是这个特定的事物和每一个特定的事物本身,也就是说,本身就是这样的。从修行上来说,就是要在“一念三千一念三千”的思惟中体会到。不是在每个时刻,不是从每个时刻诞生,而是作为每个时刻。三千人既不先于这个经验,也不在这个经验之后。它们就是这种确定的经验本身,因为事物的特征,特别是其生灭的特征,正是该事物本身。
It is this eternity and omnipresence of X that is meant in Tiantai when X X XX is spoken of as being “inherent in the Nature,” or “X qua the Li.” It means “X as necessary, eternal and omnipresent.” Li in this context means the Three Truths. But here we can assert that any other specific determination is Li in a much more literal and unmediated sense than that put forth by Fazang even in his passage about “the body” above. In Tiantai, each particular, even every deludedly imagined, mutually obstructive particular, is really Li in the sense of what must become intelligible and accorded with in order to achieve enlightenment. It is just this that is at stake in Zhili’s insistence on the “two levels of whole and part, in Li and event” (理事兩重總別 lishi liangchong zongbie) To understand this, however, we must first consider the role of “mind” in the two teachings. Before taking that on, however, let us make a summary of the differences between the two schools explored so far, in relation to classifications of teachings in the two traditions, as they relate to the themes developed in this book.
天台山所表达的正是X的永恒和无所不在。 X X XX 被称为“自然固有的”或“X qua the Li”。它的意思是“X是必要的、永恒的和无所不在的”。在这种情况下,“理”的意思是“三谛”。但在这里我们可以断言,任何其他具体的规定都是“理”,其意义比法藏在上面关于“身体”的段落中所提出的更为字面和直接。在天台山中,每一个特殊的事物,甚至每一个妄想的、相互阻碍的特殊事物,在必须变得可理解、符合才能获得开悟的意义上,都是真正的理。正是这一点,才是直隶坚持“礼与事整体与部分两个层次”的关键所在。 然而,要理解这一点,我们必须首先考虑“领导两重总别”的作用。心”在二教中。然而,在讨论这个问题之前,让我们总结一下迄今为止探讨的两个学派之间的差异,这些差异与两个传统的教义分类有关,因为它们与本书所阐述的主题相关。

SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TIANTAI AND HUAYAN, AND THE IRONY OF COHERENCE IN THE TIANTAI AND HUAYAN CLASSIFICATIONS OF TEACHINGS
总结天台与华严的差异,以及天台与华严教法相通的讽刺

The Tiantai classification of teachings, in the terminology of Guanding’s (561-632) Tiantai bajiao dayi 天台八教大意(“Overview of the Tiantai Eight Teachings”) and Chegwan’s (Ch: Diguan 諦觀 d. 971) Tiantai Sijiaoyi 天台四教儀(“Tiantai’s Four Teaching Methods”), systemizing Zhiyi’s more expansive and diffuse treatment in his Sijiaoyi 四教義 (“The Meaning of the Four Teachings”), introduces eight categories, four of which apply to the contents of the teachings and four of which apply to the methods of teaching. The first group are “Dharma-teachings which convert beings” (化法四教 huafa sijiao) and are comprised of the Tripitaka Teaching, the Shared Teaching, the Separate Teaching, and the Integrated Teaching (藏教,通教,別教,圓教 zangjiao,tongjiao, biejiao, yuanjiao). The second group, the “Four Teaching-Forms of Conversion” (化儀四教 huayi sijiao), are the four methods of the Sudden, the Gradual, the Secret, and the Unfixed (頓,漸,秘密,不定 dun, jian, mimi, buding). These four methods apply only to the first four of the “five periods of teaching”: the Avatamsaka, the Tripitaka (“Hinayana”), the Vaipulya (方等 fangdeng) and the Prajnâpâramitâ. The Integrated Teachings as presented in the Lotus and Nirvana sutras are neither sudden nor non-sudden, gradual nor nongradual, and so on. The Sudden and Gradual mean the “Sudden” and complete disclosure of the whole truth in the Avatamsaka, the “gradual” disclosure in the upayic teachings. The last two methods refer to the way in which the teachings are understood differently by different listeners, either beknownst (as in the Unfixed method) or unbeknownst (as in the Secret method) to one another.
天台教义的分类,用观定(561-632)天台八教大意(“天台八教概述”)和切格万(Ch:Diguan ? 谛观 d. 971)天台四教一天台四教的术语表示。仪(“天台四教法”)系统化了知一在《四教义》中更为广泛和分散的论述,介绍了八个类别,其中四个适用于教法内容,四个适用于教法内容。适用于教学方法。第一类是“化法四教”,由藏教、通教、别教、圆教组成。教藏教,通教,别教,元教)。第二组“化仪四教”,即顿、渐、秘密、无定四种法门。 、咪咪、布丁)。这四种法门只适用于“五法”中的前四种:《华严经》、《三藏》、《方等方灯》、《般若波罗蜜》。法华经、涅槃经所讲的综合教法,不是突然、非突然、渐进、非渐进等。 “突然”和“渐进”是指《华严经》中全部真理的“突然”和完全揭示,即在乌帕伊教义中的“渐进”揭示。最后两种方法是指不同听者对教义的理解不同的方式,或者彼此已知(如在不固定方法中)或不知道(如在秘密方法中)。
Fazang’s classification uses five categories: the Hinayana (xiaoshengiiao), the Beginning Mahayana (dasheng shijiao), the Final Mahayana (dasheng zhongiiao), the Sudden (dunjiao), and the Integrated (yuanjiao). The final category is further subdivided into the Same-One-Vehicle Integrated Teaching (同教一乘圓教 tongiiao yisheng yuanjiao) and the Separate-One-Vehicle Integrated Teaching (別教一乘圓教 biejiao yisheng yuanjiao), the last being the Huayan teaching and the penultimate more or less equivalent to the Tiantai teaching. Fazang’s categories are equivalent to Zhiyi’s Four Dharmas of Conversion, that is, the four types of content, with the addition of the “Sudden” teaching, which in Zhiyi had been a name for a method, not a content. By rearranging the list so that the Sudden is placed in tandem with the other four Dharmas of Conversion, Fazang creates a parallelism that changes its implications considerably. For Fazang, the Sudden means the teaching that is beyond words, which cuts off all determinate thoughts, where a single moment of nonconceptualization is equivalent to Buddha-
法藏的分类有五类:小乘、大乘、大乘、顿教、圆教。最后一类又分为同教一乘圆教和别教一乘圆教,最后一类是华严教和倒数第二教或多或少相当于天台教。法藏的范畴相当于《至义》的《四化法》,即四种内容,加上“顿”法,而“顿”法在《至义》中是方法的名称,而不是内容。通过重新排列列表,将突然法与其他四种皈依法放在一起,法藏创造了一种平行关系,大大改变了其含义。对于法藏来说,突然意味着超越语言的教法,它切断所有确定的想法,其中一刹那的非概念化相当于佛陀 –

hood, with no gradual stages. The Huayan category of the Hinayana is equivalent to the Tiantai category Tripitaka, the Beginning Mahayana to the Shared, the Final Mahayana to the Separate, the Integrated to the Integrated. This equivalence is directly acknowledged by Chengguan, who remarks, "The reason Tiantai (Zhiyi) did not include the category of the Sudden is simply that for him each of the Four Teachings has a dimension of wordlessness to it. We separate it off now to allow the Sudden to manifest the wordless teaching as a separate category, a method appropriate to those with a capacity to separate from all thoughts, in accordance with the Chan school. 152 152 ^(152){ }^{152} But as Dong Ping has pointed out, this redefinition of a method into a content brings certain problems with it. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} In particular, it has profound implications for how the ironic aspect of coherence is understood in the two traditions. In accordance with the Three Truths doctrine, every determinate content without exception is also ambiguous, is indeterminable, is beyond words, for to be determinate is to be ambiguous, devoid of a univocally discernible identity. This is the aspect of Emptiness that pertains to any Provisional Posit as such. To make “beyond words” itself a content makes of it a particular determination, which would make it another “Provisional Posit.” This is, of course, consistent with Three Truths doctrine in that “Emptiness” is in fact a Provisional Posit-is itself specific, and thus is ambiguous, and is absolute. But sectoring it off as a separate content gives a misleading impression of setting up a wordlessness that does not work in the same way as the wordlessness “of” all contents, which is rather itself a content not susceptible to the same considerations as any other content, while also draining the wordless aspect out of the other teachings. Determinate and indeterminate are here set up as mutually exclusive, rejoined only by the integration of the Integrated Teaching. We see here a suggestion of mutual exclusivity of existence and nonexistence, in this case of determinations, which echoes the Huayan treatment of these concepts generally, as discussed above.
引擎盖,没有渐进的阶段。小乘华严类相当于天台类三藏,初大乘到共,末大乘到分,合到合。这种等同性得到了城观的直接承认,他评论道:“天台之所以不包括突然的范畴,只是因为对他来说,四教各有一个无言的维度。我们现在将其分开,以便按照禅宗的说法,允许突现无言法为一个单独的类别,一种适合于具有与一切思想分离能力的人的方法。 152 152 ^(152){ }^{152} 但正如董平所指出的,这种从方法到内容的重新定义带来了一定的问题。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53} 特别是,它对于如何理解这两个传统中一致性的讽刺方面具有深远的影响。根据三谛教义,一切确定的内容无一例外也是模糊的,是不可确定的,是无法言说的,因为确定就是模糊的,没有明确可辨的身份。这是与任何临时立场相关的空性的方面。使“超越言语”本身成为一种内容,使其成为一种特定的决定,这将使其成为另一个“临时立场”。当然,这与三谛教义是一致的,因为“空性”实际上是一个临时命题——它本身是具体的,因此是模糊的,是绝对的。 但是,将其划分为单独的内容会产生一种误导性的印象,即设置无字的方式与所有内容“的”无字的工作方式不同,而无字本身就是一个内容,不易受到与任何其他内容相同的考虑因素的影响,同时也排除了其他教义中无言的一面。确定性和不确定性在这里被设置为相互排斥的,只有通过综合教学的整合才能重新结合。我们在这里看到存在与不存在相互排斥的暗示,在这种决定的情况下,这与华严对这些概念的一般处理相呼应,如上所述。
This of course has implications for the issue of the “intelligibility” aspect of Li in general. For although Fazang of course also adds “speakable but not speakable, thinkable but not thinkable” to his description of the Integrated Teaching, the mere possibility of a content of teaching that is one and not the other (the “Sudden” Teaching as purely unspeakable) skews the field of discourse significantly. Similarly, in Fazang’s division of the Integrated Teaching into two types, the “Same Teaching” Vehicle, generally referring to the Lotus and Tiantai, is the Integrated Teaching seen as having no other content than the other teachings as upāyas, but reconfigured, while the “Separate Teaching” Vehicle, representing Fazang’s own Huayan position, is seen as a new and unique content on its own right. The issue here is really the status of intersubjectivity. If there can be a “Separate”
这当然对李的总体“可理解性”问题有一定的影响。因为虽然法藏在他对统法的描述中当然也加上了“可说而不可说,可想而不可想”,但仅仅是一种教学内容可能是一种而不是另一种(“突教”纯粹是不可言说的) )显着扭曲了话语领域。同样,法藏将统法分为两种,“同法”乘,泛指莲花和天台,是指统法除了其他法门之外,没有其他内容,只是重新配置,而“分教”车代表了法藏自身的华严立场,本身就是一个新颖独特的内容。这里的问题实际上是主体间性的地位。如果可以有一个“单独”

version of the Integrated Teaching, it means that real truth can, at least in principle, be conceived apart from the upāyas which led up to and express it in particular intersubjective situations, and indeed that enlightenment can at least be conceived as a content in a particular sentient being’s head, which has no necessary relation to the enterprise of communicating that content to other beings. In other words, intersubjectivity is not constitutive and inescapable for Fazang as it is for Zhiyi, and this is in keeping with the former’s notion of Li as a single indivisible whole (at least “in principle”).
综合教法的版本,它意味着,至少在原则上,真正的真理可以被理解为与导致并在特定的主体间情境中表达它的upayas分开,并且事实上,启蒙至少可以被视为一种内容特定众生的头部,与将该内容传达给其他众生的事业没有必然关系。换句话说,对于《法藏》来说,主体间性并不像《至异》那样是构成性的和不可避免的,这与前者的理作为一个不可分割的整体的观念是一致的(至少“原则上”)。
It will be noticed that the structure of this move is similar to several others we have considered. For Fazang, illusion can be separated from reality (that something is taken to exist in illusory clinging does not guarantee its existence in Li ), Being from Non-Being (when this dharma is seen as existing, all the others are seen as nonexistent), subjectivity from intersubjectivity (Separate Vehicle), intelligibility from unintelligibility (Sudden Teaching), at least conceptually or in principle. All of these dyads are, on the contrary, strictly inseparable, even interchangeable, for the Tiantai tradition. This puts us in a position to sum up the difference between the notion of coherence/Li in the two schools.
值得注意的是,这个动作的结构与我们考虑过的其他几个动作相似。对于法藏来说,幻可以与实相分离(在虚执中认为某物存在,并不能保证它在理中存在),有与无(当此法被视为存在时,所有其他法都被视为不存在) ,主体性与主体间性(分离载体),可理解性与不可理解性(突然教学),至少在概念上或原则上如此。相反,对于天台传统来说,所有这些二元关系都是严格不可分割的,甚至是可以互换的。这使我们能够总结两个流派的连贯/理概念之间的差异。
In a nutshell, in Tiantai, coherence is incoherence. That is, (local) coherence is (global) incoherence. All coherence, therefore, is “ironic” coherence. Now, “incoherence” itself, if it is anything, if it can be predicated of anything at all in any sense, is just one more coherence. Hence, it is only ironically coherent as “incoherence.” This is the meaning of the claim that Emptiness is not decisively (ding) Emptiness. This second-order “coherence” (harmonious togetherness, indeed interchangeability, identity) between coherence and incoherence is the Center. All there are anywhere, concretely or abstractly, mentally or physically, are coherences that are incoherences. They are coherent in the sense of “intelligible,” incoherent in the sense of “unintelligible,” also coherent in the sense of “sticking together” among intelligibles, also in the sense of the “sticking together” of coherence and incoherence. They are also coherence in the sense of the object to be known in order to become enlightened, that is, in order to create further harmonious coherence (salvific Buddha activity, responding to sentient beings, opening up all provisional views to reveal their identity to ultimate truth, etc.). Each event, particularly intelligible coherence (事 shi, having a beginning and end, an inside and an outside, and therefore a determinate intelligible) is just this same coherence ( Li ) seen partially, incompletely, dimly, hastily, unthoroughly. The perception of this table is an event (shi) that, if seen (intelligibly) more completely, is this table as Li, as salvific Coherence, as Eternal, Self, Blissful, Pure, (常樂我淨 chang le wo jing—i.e., the characteristics of the unconditional) engaged in eternal Bodhisattva activity, and every other type of activity. We have here a multitude of Lis,
简而言之,在天台,连贯就是不连贯。也就是说,(局部)一致性就是(全局)不一致性。因此,所有的连贯性都是“讽刺性的”连贯性。现在,“不连贯性”本身,如果它是什么,如果它可以在任何意义上断言任何东西,那么它只是又一种连贯性。因此,它只是具有讽刺意味的是“不连贯”。这就是空性非决空性的意义。连贯性与不连贯性之间的二阶“连贯性”(和谐一致,实际上是可互换性,同一性)就是中心。任何地方,无论是具体的还是抽象的,精神上的还是身体上的,都是连贯性和不连贯性。它们在“可理解”的意义上是连贯的,在“不可理解”的意义上是非连贯的,在可理解的事物之间“粘在一起”的意义上也是连贯的,在连贯和非连贯的“粘在一起”的意义上也是连贯的。它们也是为了开悟而要认识的对象意义上的连贯性,即为了创造进一步的和谐连贯性(佛陀的救度活动,回应众生,开放所有临时观点以揭示他们的身份最终)真相等)。每一个事件,特别是可理解的连贯性(事是,有开始和结束,有内部和外部,因此是确定的可理解的)正是这种相同的连贯性(Li)被部分地、不完全地、模糊地、仓促地、不彻底地看到。对这张桌子的感知是一个事件(shi),如果(可理解地)更完整地看到,这张桌子是否是理,救赎的连贯性,永恒,自我,幸福,纯粹,(常乐我净chang le wo jing-)即无缘的特征)从事永恒的菩萨活动,以及所有其他类型的活动。我们这里有很多 Lis,

coherences, which interpenetrate just as the events do, for they are the same Three Thousand, considered either as Three Thousand Li or Three Thousand shi. We might speak here of “the nonobstruction of Li with Li,” or “principle with principle,” “coherence with coherence.” We will discuss the implications of this at more length below.
连贯性,就像事件一样相互渗透,因为它们是相同的三千,被认为是三千里或三千石。这里我们可以说“礼与礼无碍”,或者“理与理”,“理与理”。我们将在下面更详细地讨论这一点的含义。
In Huayan, on the other hand, all particular existences are again nothing but coherence, but here in the sense of unobstructed, indivisible togetherness ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}). They are also “coherence itself” in the sense of “intelligibility itself,” that is to say, becoming present in awareness, which is where the marriage with mind-only comes in. But this unobstructed, indivisible togetherness which is intelligibility itself (not particular intelligibles), this “coherence itself,” is itself incoherent, that is, inconceivable, all-inclusive, hence having no outside; any particular intelligible designation divides this indivisible coherence. Hence “coherence (intelligibility) itself” is ironic, strictu senso unintelligible. But this “incoherence” is not itself a coherence here, as it is in Tiantai, and remains non-ironic. This is precisely because it is posited as a specific content that is supposed to be unproblematically aligned with the contents of the other teachings-i.e., it is definitively, unproblematically intelligible as “unintelligibility.” Similarly, Li appears to drop out of the picture in the Huayan Integrated Teaching, because Li as such is ironic, unintelligible as such. Each event is the disclosure of the entirety of Li in the sense that “intelligibility,” presencing, unobstructed togetherness of events, is disclosed as every event-but, “ironically,” in this seeing of Li completely in each event, Li is really not seen at all— Li is “seeing as such,” which cannot itself be seen. Here, we cannot speak of “the interpenetration of Li with Li ,” principle with principle, for there is no multiplicity of principles-Li is either none (unintelligible, ironic) or One (coherence as such).
另一方面,在《华严》中,所有特定的存在又只不过是连贯性,但在这里是指畅通无阻、不可分割的整体性。 ( Li ) ( Li ) (Li)(\mathrm{Li}) 。从“可理解性本身”的意义上来说,它们也是“连贯性本身”,也就是说,它们出现在意识中,这就是与唯心联姻的切入点。但是这种无障碍的、不可分割的整体性就是可理解性本身(不是这种“连贯性本身”本身就是不连贯的,也就是说,是不可想象的、包罗万象的,因此没有外在;任何特定的可理解的名称都会分割这种不可分割的连贯性。因此,“连贯性(可理解性)本身”是讽刺性的,严格意义上难以理解。但这种“不连贯”本身并不是一种连贯性,就像在天台一样,并且仍然是非讽刺的。这正是因为它被设定为一个特定的内容,应该毫无问题地与其他教义的内容一致——即,它是明确的、毫无问题地可理解的“不可理解性”。同样,《华严融通》中的李似乎也被排除在外,因为李本身就是讽刺性的,难以理解的。每个事件都是对整个“理”的揭示,即“可理解性”,事件的存在,无阻碍的整体性,被揭示为每个事件——但是,“讽刺的是”,在每个事件中完全看到“理”时,“理”实际上是根本看不见——李是“如是看见”,它本身是看不见的。在这里,我们不能说“理与理的相互渗透”,原则与原则的相互渗透,因为原则并不存在多重性——理要么是无(难以理解、具有讽刺意味),要么是一(连贯性本身)。

SEVEN 

MIND, OMNIPRESENCE, AND COHERENCE IN TIANTAI AND HUAYAN
天台华严的心性、无所不在和连贯性

THE PURE MIND AND THE DELUDED MIND IN HUAYAN THOUGHT
华严思想中的清净心与迷惑心

We turn now to the treatment of mind in the two schools. For it is in the context of a dispute about the status of the mind, and its relation to Li , that the Tiantai doctrine of the “Three Thousand as Li, Three Thousand as event”(理三千,事三千 li sanqian shi sanqian) is expounded by Siming Zhili, which is the occasion of the manifestation of the distinctive Tiantai treatment of Li, the culmination of our study. This is not accidental. We have treated the epistemologies and axiologies and theories of mind in the various thinkers already discussed in a passing way, but even there it has been clear that the understanding of Li involves a concealed reference to some kind of picture of what human subjectivity is. Li is a coherence that is knowable, intelligible to a human mind; it needs to harmonize in some way with the human cognitive apparatus to count as Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} is a coherence that is valued, wanted by the human mind; it needs to harmonize in some way with human desires to count as Li . The relation between mind and Li becomes more specifically addressed in the Buddhist context, because a particular state of mind is itself regarded as the highest value; indeed, in some forms of Chinese Buddhism, mind per se is value per se. How value is to be apprehended by humans-how mind can apprehend mind, how Li can apprehend Li, and whether it needs to do so-becomes a new kind of dilemma here. The relationship between the seeking of value and intelligibility-the mind that gropes for Li -and the Li so sought now opens up new vistas for controversy. The differing ways in which Li is understood will thus necessarily also involve differing conceptions of the mind-the seeking, knowing, valuing mind, on the one hand, and the mind as value-itself, on
现在我们来谈谈两所学校对心灵的治疗。因为正是在关于心的地位及其与理的关系的争论的背景下,天台学说的“理三千,事三千理三千事” 《三千》是四明至理所阐述的,是李家独特的天台治法得以体现的契机,也是我们研究的顶峰。这并非偶然。我们已经顺便讨论了不同思想家的认识论、价值论和心灵理论,但即使在这些思想家中,很明显,对李的理解也隐含着对人类主体性的某种描述。理是一种连贯性,对人的头脑来说是可知的、可理解的;它需要以某种方式与人类认知装置协调一致才能算作 Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} 是人类心灵所重视和需要的一致性;它需要以某种方式与人类的欲望相协调才能算作“礼”。在佛教语境中,心与理之间的关系变得更加具体,因为特定的心状态本身就被视为最高价值。事实上,在中国佛教的某些形式中,心本身就是价值本身。人如何理解价值——心如何理解心、理如何理解理、是否需要这样做——在这里成为一种新的困境。对价值的追求和可理解性——摸索理的心灵——以及如此寻求的理之间的关系现在为争议开辟了新的前景。因此,对理的不同理解方式必然也涉及不同的心概念——一方面是求、知、值的心,另一方面是作为价值本身的心。

the other-and its manner of apprehending Li. These varying conceptions of mind, conversely, can allow us to understand exactly what the implications of these differing conceptions of Li are, and what is at stake in these disagreements.
另一个——以及它对李的理解方式。相反,这些不同的思想观念可以让我们准确地理解这些不同的理观念的含义是什么,以及这些分歧的利害关系是什么。
We can give a schematic summary of the conclusions of the previous chapter here to anticipate the implications of this doctrine for our understanding of Li in the two schools. Zhili will be claiming that any determination, any coherence, any dharma, can be considered in four different ways:
我们可以在这里对上一章的结论进行一个概要性的总结,以预见这一学说对于我们理解两派“礼”的意义。直立声称任何决心、任何连贯性、任何佛法,都可以用四种不同的方式来考虑:
  1. As one specific part of the totality of events, one specific event (事別 shibie);
    作为整个事件的一个特定部分,一件特定事件(事别 shibie);
  2. As the event that serves as the totality of which all other events are parts (事總 shizong);
    作为事件的整体,所有其他事件都是其一部分(事总 shizong);
  3. As one specific part of the totality of Lis, one specific Li(理別 libie);
    作为Li整体的一个特定部分,一个特定的Li(理别libie);
  4. As the Li that serves as the totality of which all other Lis are parts (理總 lizong).
    作为一个整体的礼,所有其他礼都是其部分(理总)。
If we compare this to the famous “Four Dharmadhatus” of the Huayan school, we can quickly get a sense of what the issue is here. The Four Dharmadhatus are:
如果我们将此与华严宗著名的“四法性”相比较,我们很快就能明白问题所在。四法界是:
  1. The Dharmadhatu of events: all dharmas seen as events (事法界 shifajie);
    事法界:事法界事法界;
  2. The Dharmadhatu of Li: all events seen as Li (理法界 lifajie);
    理的法界:一切事物都视为理(理法界lifajie);
  3. The Dharmadhatu of the nonobstruction of Li and event (理事無礙法界 lishiwuaifajie);
    干涉无碍法界 lishiwuafajie;
  4. The Dharmadhatu of the nonobstruction of event and event (事事無愛法界 shishiwuaifajie).
    事事无爱法界shishiwuaifajie。
These are four alternate ways of viewing the totality of all that exists, representing ascending levels of spiritual attainment. All things can be seen as events, as Li , as events-that-are-Li, and as events-that-are-all-other-events. The Third Dharmadhatu here means seeing each event equally as some particular dharma and as itself identical to the one undividable Li. The Fourth Dharmadhatu means seeing each dharma equally as this particular event and as all other particulars subsumed into this event. If we compare the Tiantai and the Huayan schemas, we may say that the first category in the Tiantai scheme is equivalent to the first in the Huayan scheme-the ordinary world
这是看待一切存在整体的四种不同方式,代表着精神成就的提升水平。所有事物都可以被视为事件、理、事件即理、事件即所有其他事件。这里的第三法界是指将每一事件平等地视为某种特定的法,并且将其本身视为与不可分割的理相同。第四法界意味着将每一种法平等地视为这个特定事件以及包含在该事件中的所有其他细节。如果我们比较天台纲和华严纲,我们可以说,天台纲的第一范畴就相当于华严纲的第一范畴——凡夫世界。

of sundered particular events. The second Tiantai category, event as totality, is equivalent to the fourth Huayan category: the interpenetration of events. The third Huayan category, which sees each event equally as the total one Li , is equivalent to the fourth Tiantai category: Li as totalizer of all events, which allows them to interpenetrate to form one indivisible whole. But there is no Huayan equivalent for the third Tiantai category, a particular Li as part of the totality of Lis, subsumed into another Li. 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} Indeed, it is senseless, as we have just seen, to speak of a multitude of Lis in a Huayan context. Tiantai, on the other hand, strictly speaking has nothing that corresponds to the second Huayan category, the world as Li only. Peter Gregory has shown that Zongmi shifted the emphasis of the Huayan system from the Fourth category, interpenetration of events, to the third, interpenetration of Li and event, simultaneously identifying Li with the Original Pure Mind, the preexistent Original Enlightenment in all sentient beings. My claim here is that this difference in understanding of Li is what made this shift possible, and that even if an adjustment were made to return the focus to the interpenetration of events with one another, this still would not be equivalent to the Tiantai understanding of the relation between Li and event. The crux of the matter, again, is whether we can speak of more than one Li. The importance of this difference will become evident in consideration of the practice of mind-contemplation, to which I now turn.
被分割的特定事件。天台的第二个范畴,事件整体,相当于华严的第四个范畴:事件的相互渗透。华严第三宗,将诸事平等视为一理,相当于天台第四宗:理为一切事件的总和,使它们相互渗透,形成一个不可分割的整体。但第三个天台范畴没有华严对等物,即一个特定的理作为整个理的一部分,并包含在另一个理中。 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 事实上,正如我们刚才所看到的,在华严语境中谈论众多的李是毫无意义的。另一方面,严格来说,天台并没有对应于第二个华严范畴的东西,即只有理的世界。彼得·格雷戈里(Peter Gregory)表明,宗密将华严体系的重点从第四类(事件的相互渗透)转移到第三类(理与事件的相互渗透),同时将理与本初清净心、所有众生中先存的本觉等同起来。我在这里的主张是,正是这种对理的理解的差异才使得这种转变成为可能,而且即使进行调整,将焦点回归到事件之间的相互渗透上,这仍然不等于天台对理的理解。李与事件的关系。问题的关键还是在于我们是否可以谈论多个“礼”。当考虑到我现在要讨论的禅修修行时,这种差异的重要性就会变得显而易见。
The treatment of “mind” in Tiantai and Huayan undergoes a strange history. Mind is a much more central and constant topic of discussion in Zhiyi than in Fazang. It does not become a really central term in Huayan thought until Chengguan and Zongmi, probably under the influence of Chan and a particular reading, indeed, of Tiantai. But I will argue here both that the later Huayan treatment of mind is a distortion of the early Tiantai ideas on this topic, following an early Chan direction instead, and also that this reading of mind is overdetermined by Fazang’s admittedly ambiguous and scanty treatment of the problem, and the general features of Fazang’s thinking about the relation of Li to shi as outlined above.
天台、华严对于“心”的治疗经历了一段奇怪的历史。与《法藏》相比,《知意》中的“心”是更核心、更持续的讨论话题。直到城观和宗密,可能是受到禅宗和特定读物(实际上是天台山)的影响,它才成为华严思想中真正的中心术语。但我在这里要论证的是,后来的华严对心的治疗是对早期天台思想在这个主题上的歪曲,而是遵循早期禅宗的方向,而且这种对心的解读是由法藏公认的模糊和缺乏的治疗决定的。问题,以及上述法藏对于礼与势关系的思考的一般特征。
In fact, Fazang’s teacher Zhiyan had already defined the contours of Huayan thinking about mind. In his Huayan yisheng shixuanmen 華嚴一乘十玄門,purportedly representing the teaching of Dushun himself and giving the earliest Huayan exposition of the famous “Ten Wondrous Gates” (shixuanmen) of interpenetration, the ninth gate is called "Weixin huizhuan shanchengmen"唯心迴轉善成門(“Skillful Completion by the Turning of Mind-Only”). Zhiyan says:
事实上,法藏的老师智言早已界定了华严思想的轮廓。在他的《华严一乘十玄门》中,据说代表了杜顺本人的教义,并对著名的“十玄门”的相互渗透进行了最早的华严阐述,第九门被称为“威信会转山城门”唯心转善成门(“唯心转善成门”)。智彦 说道:
This is expounded with reference to the mind. When we say that it is only mind that turns, we mean that all the previous meanings and teachings are established by the Pure True Mind of the
这是参照心来阐述的。所谓唯心转,是指以前一切义法,皆是清净真心所立。
Nature of the Tathagatagarbha. Both good and evil follow the turnings of this mind, so it is called Skillful Completion by the Turning. Because there is no object outside the mind, it is called Mind-Only. If it turns with the flow [順轉 shunzhuan], it is called Nirvana. . . . If it turns against the flow [逆轉 nizhuan], it is called Samsara. . . . For this reason we cannot definitively say this nature is pure or impure. . . . Q: If there is no object outside the mind, and the existence or nonexistence of each thing is determined completely by the mind, then why is it that when a person first sees something placed beyond a barrier, and afterward someone else moves the thing away, the first person’s mind still thinks it exists there? At that time the thing is actually nonexistent there, so how can you say that it is made so or not so by the mind? A: If you are talking about the turnings of the false, deluded mind [虛妄心 xuwangxin] it can be said simultaneously that this thing beyond the barrier turns with the mind and equally the converse, that the mind turns with the presence or absence of the thing. But if you are talking about the True, Real, Pure Mind of the Tathagatagarbha Nature 如來藏性真實淨心 [rulaizangxing zhenshixin], this thing never leaves its original place, and yet its essence responds in all directions, its nature constantly turning. Even if it is moved to a different place, it is [in reality] constantly unmoved in its original place. 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
如来藏本质。善恶皆随此心转,故名转善圆。因为心之外没有任何目标,所以称为唯心。若顺转则名涅槃。 。 。 。如果逆流而行,就叫轮回。 。 。 。因此,我们不能明确地说此性是清净或不清净的。 。 。 。问:如果心外无任何物体,一切事物的存在或不存在完全由心决定,那么为什么当一个人第一次看到某个东西被放置在障碍之外时,然后别人把它移走? ,第一个人的心灵还认为它存在在那里吗?那时那个东西其实在那里是不存在的,怎么能说它是由心造成的或不是由心造成的呢?答:若说虚妄心虚妄心转,即谓此界外物随心转,反之亦然,心随有无而转。那件事。但若说如来藏性真清净心,此物不离其本处,而其本质随应八方,其性常转。即使它被移到了另一个地方,它仍然在原来的地方一动不动。 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
Here, a distinction is made between the Pure Mind and the Deluded Mind. All things are “turned” by the former in that it is the essence of all things, which pervades all times and places. It is the real ontological ground of all existence. But the deluded mind can only be said to “turn” things in an ambiguous sense; it both determines and is determined by external things. “Mind-only” is clearly asserted here primarily of the Pure Mind. The relation between these two minds remains a bit unclear; we can assume perhaps that they share the relation between any event and the true nature of Li , that is, they are identical and different from it, and identical because different, and different because identical, in the distinctive Huayan sense delineated by “Dushun” in the Fajieguan. But the reality determined by Mind-only in the strong sense is only the reality of interpervasion, of being everywhere at once, not, again, the divided, differentiated, here-and-not-there of ordinary experience. The existence of the latter is made so by the mind in one sense, namely, in that the deluded mind mistakenly takes them to be here and now rather than there and then, but in another sense it is the mind that is determined by these existences, which in some undisclosed way exist apart from it.
在此,清净心与迷惑心的区别。一切事物都是由前者“转动”的,因为它是万物的本质,遍及所有时间和地点。它是一切存在的真实本体论基础。但迷心只能说是在模糊的意义上“转变”事物;它既决定外在事物,又被外在事物决定。这里明确主张“唯心”主要是指清净心。这两种思想之间的关系仍然有点不清楚。我们或许可以假设,任何事件与理的本质之间都有联系,也就是说,它们既相同又不同,不同而相同,相同而不同,在“独顺”所描绘的独特的华严意义上在发结关。但强意义上的唯心所决定的实相只是渗透的实相、同时存在于各处的实相,而不是普通经验中分裂、分化、此地与彼地的实相。后者的存在,在某种意义上是由心造成的,也就是说,迷惑心错误地认为它们是此时此地,而不是彼时彼地,但在另一种意义上,则是心由这些存在所决定。 ,它以某种未公开的方式存在于它之外。
Yang Weizhong has pointed out that a similar ambiguity exists in Fazang’s discussions of mind. Fazang uses the term One Mind (一心 yixin)
杨伟中指出,法藏的心论也存在类似的模糊性。法藏用“一心一心”这个词

for the Pure Mind that is identical to Li , to the Tathagatagarba, to the Pure “Illumination” (明 ming) of the nature and so on. He uses “one’s own mind” (自心 zixin) for the Deluded Mind, the mind that makes distinctions and “creates” the world only in the weaker sense. According to Yang’s analysis, “one’s own mind” is used by Fazang to denote a mediator between the One Mind and the external objects of which it is the substance, the “existential condition” of the mind in the moment of the encounter between these two aspects of the True One Mind. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} Noting that Fazang changes Gate Nine of the Ten Wondrous Gates from Zhiyan’s “Mind-Only,” just quoted, to “Host and Companion of Perfect Illumination Replete with All Virtues” (主伴圓明具德門 zhuban yuanming jude men), which seems to indicate a turn away from the Mind-only implication of the previous formulation, or from the identification of Li with the Pure Mind as such, Yang goes on to point out that nonetheless the phrase “Perfect Illumination” (圓明 yuanming) used in this formulation continues to refer to the “Essence of Perfect Illumination of the Purity of the Self-Nature,” which is another name for Zhiyan’s Pure Mind, and thus “the sense of an idealistic ontology is not diminished one iota” by this change. 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} While that might be a slight overstatement-it does seem clear that Fazang was uneasy about the one-sided idealistic meaning, and made some efforts to counteract it-I think this judgment is ultimately correct. This can be seen by looking at Fazang’s admittedly scarce and ambiguous references to the role of the Pure Mind in his other works.
清净心与理、如来藏、自然清净明明等等。他用“自心”来指称迷心,即只在较弱的意义上做出区别和“创造”世界的心。根据杨的分析,法藏用“自心”来指代一心与外物之间的中介者,即二者相遇时心的“存在状态”。真实一心的各个方面。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 注意到法藏将十妙门中的九门,由刚才引用的智言的“一心”改为“主伴圆明具德门主伴圆明裘德门”,这似乎为了表明背离了先前表述中的唯心含义,或者背离了“理”与清净心本身的认同,杨接着指出,尽管如此,这里使用的“圆明圆明”一词提法仍沿指“自性清净圆照本质”,即智言清净心的别称,因而“唯心本体感不减一毫”。 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 虽然这样说可能有点夸张,但显然法藏对这种片面的理想主义意义感到不安,并做出了一些努力来抵消它,但我认为这个判断最终是正确的。从法藏在其他作品中对清净心角色的无可否认的稀少和含糊的提及就可以看出这一点。
In the Huayanjing tanxuanji, Fazang adopts the language of the Awakening of Faith (Qixinlun): 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} we have the “gate” of Mind as Suchness(真如門 zhenrumen) and of Mind as Arising and Perishing (生滅門 shengmiemen), that is, as temporal and conditional, each of which considered alone is said to subsume all dharmas, without being confused. Moreover, the two are themselves intersubsumptive. Significantly, Fazang adopts the metaphor of water and waves, discussed at length in the previous chapter, to explain this identity between two terms which nonetheless remain distinct: “The waves that subsume the water are not for that reason still, and the water which subsumes the waves is not for that reason moving.” 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} The opening words of his commentary to the text from which these terms are derived, the Dasheng Qixinlun yiji, makes the same equation of the “True Mind” with the unchanging, undifferentiated “water,” in other words, with Li. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} This would suggest that “mind as Suchness” is simply another name for Li, for the Pure Nature. Mind as arising and perishing would then be “one’s own mind,” maintaining again the two minds spoken of by Zhiyan, and asserting their identity and difference in accordance with the water/wave metaphor. It is “one’s own mind” that gives rise to things in the ambiguous second sense of adding differentiations to the undifferentiated nature of Suchness. The transforming, differentiating mind, “one’s own mind,” is the mind Fazang
在《华严经谈玄记》中,法藏采用了启心论的语言: 5 5 ^(5){ }^{5} 我们有真如门(真如门)和生灭门(生灭门),也就是说,作为时间和条件,每一个单独考虑都可以包容一切法,而不是使困惑。而且,两者本身就是相互包容的。值得注意的是,法藏采用了前一章详细讨论过的水和波浪的隐喻来解释这两个术语之间的同一性,尽管这两个术语仍然截然不同:因此波浪不会移动。” 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6} 他对衍生这些术语的文本《大圣七心论一集》的注释开篇就将“真心”与不变、无差别的“水”(换句话说,与理)等同起来。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7} 这表明“心如如来”只是“理”的别称,即“清净本性”。心如生灭,即是“自心”,又维持智言所说的二心,并按照水浪的比喻,断言它们的同一性和差异性。正是“自心”在模糊的第二种意义上产生了事物,即在如性的无差别本质上添加差别。变化、分别的心,“自心”,就是法藏心。

speaks of as standing in a relationship of interdependence with perceived dharmas: “Objects are not objects by themselves; they necessarily depend on the mind in order to be objects. The mind is not the mind by itself; it necessarily depends on objects to be the mind.” 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} The interdependence between this mind and all other entities is just like that between any other events, and their interpervasion follows the same contours. It is a 事 shi among shi. But both this mind and these events exist and pervade due to their identity with Li, which is here equated with the Mind as Suchness. Very near the climactic end of the Huayan yihseng jiaoyi fenqizhang, his most systematic work, after already expounding all the variations of interpenetration in his version of the Ten Wondrous Gates, Fazang gives us almost exactly the sentence we had found in the Zhiyan work: “The Gate of the Skillful Completion by the Turning of Mind-Only, this means that all the previous meanings are nothing but the turnings of the One Pure True Mind of the Self-Nature of the Tathagatagarbha.” 9 9 ^('9){ }^{\prime 9} Elsewhere, describing the Ocean Seal Samadhi (海印三昧 haiyin sanmei), he says, “This refers to original enlightenment. . . . This Mind subsumes all mundane and transmundane dharmas, and is the Dharma-gate Essence of the One Dharma-realm Universal Mark [總相 zong xiang]. It is only because of deluded thoughts that there are any differentiations. If all deluded thoughts are left behind, there is only the One True Suchness.” 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} This assertion is, of course, to be contrasted to Zhili’s later claim that differentiations exist even in the absence of deluded thoughts.
谈到与所感知的佛法处于一种相互依存的关系时:“物体本身并不是物体;它们必须依赖于心灵才能成为对象。头脑本身并不是头脑;头脑本身就是头脑。它必然依赖于物体来成为心。” 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8} 此心与所有其他实体之间的相互依存,就像任何其他事件之间的相互依存一样,它们的相互渗透遵循相同的轮廓。是事中的事。但此心和这些事件都因它们与理的同一性而存在和遍及,这里的理等同于心如如来。在他最系统的著作《华严一僧交义分期章》接近高潮的时候,在他的十妙门版本中已经阐述了所有相互渗透的变化之后,法藏给了我们几乎与我们在《智言》中找到的句子一样的句子:“唯意转善成门,是说先前一切义,皆是如来藏自性一清净心转。” 9 9 ^('9){ }^{\prime 9} 他在别处描述海印三昧时说:“此指本觉。 。 。 。此心包容一切世间法、出世间法,是一法界普相的法门本质。只是因为妄想,才会有分别。若断一切妄想,则唯一真如。” 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10} 当然,这种说法是与直隶后来声称即使没有迷惑思想也存在分别的说法相对照的。
However, Fazang’s “One True Mind” is not to be understood as a monolithic undifferentiated blank. In the Huayan yisheng jiaoyi fenqizhang, for example, he explains how the conception of mind differs in the Five Teachings. In the “Sudden Teaching,” “all dharmas are just the one Mind of True Suchness, all differentiated marks are obliterated, so it is free of words, cuts off thoughts, is unspeakable.” In the Integrated Teaching, "the focus is on the Perfect Illumination [圓明 yuanming] of the Ocean of the Nature, the dependent co-arising of the whole Dharma-realm, unobstructed and free, so that one is all, all are one, and host and companion are perfectly intermelded."11 All differentiations are gone in the sense that everything is now interpenetrating. Note that here the term mind is again replaced by “Perfect Illumination,” as Yang Weizhong notes, and if not for the context, which is a discussion of “Mind” in each of the Teachings, it would be easy to overlook any reference to a transcendent Mind here at all. The same term is used in the programmatic description of “The One Substance” in the Xiu Huayan aozhi wangiin huanyuan guan 修華嚴奧旨妄盡還源觀, usually but not definitively attributed to Fazang. The One Substance, according to this text, means, "the Substance of the Perfect Illumination which is Pure in its Own-nature. But this is precisely the substance of the Dharma-nature within the Tathāgatagarbha, which has from the beginning been perfect and
然而,法藏的“一心”不能被理解为一成不变的空白。例如,在《华严一生教义分期章》中,他解释了五教中心的概念有何不同。 《顿教》云:“一切法,皆是真如一心,一切相相皆灭,故无言,断念,不可言。”综合教中,“以自然海圆明圆明,一切法界缘起,无碍自在,一为一切,一切为一,宿主和伴侣完美地融合在一起。”11 所有的差异都消失了,一切事物现在都在相互渗透。请注意,这里的“心”一词再次被“圆明”所取代,正如杨伟中所指出的那样,如果没有上下文,即每个教法中对“心”的讨论,很容易忽略任何对“心”的提及。这里有一个超然的心灵。 《修华严奥旨妄尽还源观》中对“一物”的纲领性描述也使用了同样的术语,通常但不明确归因于法藏。一体,根据此文,是指:“自性清净的圆明体。而此,正是如来藏法性的体体,自始至终,圆满无缺。”

replete in its own nature. Situated within taint it remains unpolluted, in the practice of cultivation it remains unpurified, and thus we call it Pure in its Own-nature. The Substance of this Nature shines everywhere, so that all darknesses are lit up, and hence we call it the Perfect Illumination. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} It is unchanging and aware, so it is called pure and mindlike. As identical with the True Suchness of Li, this Pure Mind or Perfect Illumination remains the transcendent reason for the interpenetration of event with event. Fazang is sometimes quite explicit about this, as when he states flatly, “As for the many levels of inter-reflection within Indra’s Net, all these events and marks are made to be unobstructed because of the Perfect Intermelding of the Mind-consciousness Dharma-nature of the Tathagatagarbha” 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} (皆是心識如來藏法性圓融故,令彼事相如是無礙 jie shi xinshi rulaizang faxing yuanrong gu, ling bi shi xiang ru shi wu ai). Grammatically, it is not absolutely impossible to read this in a more “Tiantai” way, to wit, as “because of the perfect intermelding of the dharma-nature . . . of the [deluded] mental consciousness,” but the context, and Fazang’s other pronouncements on this topic, push us toward the other meaning. But in either case, the causal connection is quite clear, as evident in the blunt usage of the 令 ling in this passage; it is the same “neng yi/suo yi” (能依,所依 dependent, depended on) dichotomy between Li and event, understood as the undifferentiated (undividable, interpenetration per se) and the differentiated (separated, sundered), respectively, the asymmetrical dependence relation between Li and shi that we observed in Dushun’s Huayan fajieguan, and this seems never left behind in all the interpenetrations of the Huayan school. Note also that practice here seems to consist in attempting to view this Pure Mind itself functioning in all things, as displayed in their interpenetration.
充满了它自己的本质。于垢中,不染,修行时,不清净,故名自性清净。此性体普照一切,令一切黑暗皆光明,故名圆明。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12} 它是不变的,是有觉性的,所以叫做清净心。与理真如一样,清净心或圆明仍然是事件与事件相互渗透的超越原因。法藏有时对此相当明确,他直言不讳地说道:“至于因陀罗网内的多层次互映,所有这些事件和痕迹都因心识法圆融而得以畅通无阻——如来藏性” 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13} (皆是心识如来藏法性圆融故,令彼事相如是无碍解事新事如来藏传真圆容谷,令彼事相如是无爱)。从语法上来说,也不是绝对不可能用更“天台”的方式来解读,即“因为法性的完美交融……”。 。 。 ”但是上下文以及法藏关于这个话题的其他言论,将我们推向了另一个含义。但无论哪种情况,因果关系都是非常明显的,正如本文中“令”的直白用法所表明的那样;理与事件之间也是同样的“能依,所依”二分法,分别理解为不可分的(不可分割的,相互渗透的)和有分的(分离的,分裂的),我们在杜顺的华严法结观中观察到的理与势之间的不对称依赖关系,在华严学派的所有相互渗透中似乎从未被遗忘。 还要注意,这里的修行似乎在于试图观察清净心本身在一切事物中的作用,正如它们相互渗透所显示的那样。
However understated this stress on an absolute Pure Mind that is the source and ground of all phenomenal appearances is in Fazang, it is brought front and center in the writings of Chengguan and Zongmi, which is the version that comes to influence the Shanwai Tiantai writers of the Song dynasty most directly. This aspect of later Huayan thought is well documented, and we need not belabor the point here. The gist of this way of thinking is summed up succinctly by Chengguan, echoing Fazang’s formulation: “Mind is the universal mark [總相 zong xiang]. In the state of enlightenment it is called Buddha, completing dependent co-arising of the pure. In the state of delusion it makes sentient beings, completing the dependent co-arising of the tainted. Although there is taint and purity within dependent co-arising, the Substance of Mind does not differ [in them]. When one attains the fruition of Buddhahood one accords with this Mind, and becomes infinite (unendable) just like the True [i.e., Mind, Li]. Deluded dharmas come to an end (are finite), and so they are not spoken of here. The old translation [of the Avatamsaka sutra] says, ‘Mind, Buddhas and sentient beings-there is no
然而,《法藏》中对绝对清净心的强调是一切现象的根源和基础,但在城管和宗密的著作中却被置于首要和中心位置,这也是影响山外天台作家的版本。最直接的是宋朝。后期华严思想的这一方面已有充分记载,在此不再赘述。这种思维方式的要旨,被城观概括得简洁明了,与法藏的表述相呼应:“心是普相。在觉悟的境界中,称为佛,完成了清净的缘起。在无明状态中,它造就了众生,完成了烦恼的缘起。缘起虽有浊净,心体并无分别。得佛果时,随此心而无边无际,如真如理。迷法有尽(有限),所以这里不说。古译《华严经》云:‘心、诸佛、众生,无有。

difference among these three.’ This would mean that all three are infinite. But ‘infinite’ is precisely the mark of ‘non-differentiation’ [無別 wubie], so it should say rather that concerning Mind, Buddhas and sentient beings, the Substance and Nature [體性 tixing] of all of these is infinite and inexhaustible. Because the Substance of delusion is originally the True, it can [in this sense] also be said to be infinite and inexhaustible.” 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} This is further clarified by his flat assertion that “awareness is the Substance of mind [知即心體 zhi ji xinti]. Differentiating knowledge is not True Awareness, so True Awareness is uncognizable by ordinary consciousness. The arising of optical defects [creating illusions] is also not the True Awareness, so the latter is not a condition or object of mind [非心境界 fei xin jingie]. The Substance of Mind is free of thoughts [離念 linian], there are no thoughts in it to be destroyed, and thus we say that the nature is originally pure.” 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
这三者之间的区别。这意味着这三个都是无限的。但“无边”正是“无别”的标志,所以应该说,心、佛、众生,其体性是无边无际的。取之不尽、用之不竭。因为迷体本来就是真实的,所以也可以说是无边无际的。” 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14} 他的断言“知即心体 zhi ji xinti”进一步阐明了这一点。分别智不是正觉,所以正觉是普通意识无法认知的。光学缺陷的产生也不是真实的意识,所以后者不是心境或心境。心体离念,无念可灭,故曰性本清净。” 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
Mind is here the one Universal mark (總相 zongxiang). It is strictly and literally synonymous with Li . It is the Substance, the Nature, the ground of interpenetration and presence of all differentiated dharmas. It “creates” (造 zao) both delusion and enlightenment, and is unchanged in either state. It is precisely Non-dwelling, but this is understood as identical with Awareness (知 zhi), which is free of the transformations of thoughts (念 nian). Particular things are a function of these differentiated thoughts that arise and perish, which are infinite and inexhaustible in that their Substance remains always the same unchanging nature of non-dwelling awareness, but which are perishable, having perhaps a beginning but certainly an end, in their marks as particulars. Zongmi’s position follows more or less the same lines, as Peter Gregory’s extensive analyses have shown. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} Mind, pure awareness, is the unconditional, the omnipresent, for mind as pure “illumination,” as the awareness that does not rise and fall with the temporal coming and going of discrete thought-moments, is simply the fact of not being limited to any possible finite condition or state or perception or conception, the non-dwelling of any particular in itself, shining out always to an other, which it immanently pervades. This illumination, which is the pure and ever-present essence of mind, is itself precisely “nonobstruction between events,” interpervasion as such, what presences and unifies all particular things, is in its essence undifferentiated and interpenetrative, and this Mind as such, unchanging awareness, is the coherence of things (omnipresent unifying totality of all interpenetrative particulars) which must be realized in order to realize enlightenment-in other words, Mind as such is Li.
心在这里是唯一的普遍标记(总相宗相)。严格来说,它是“Li”的同义词。它是本体、本质、一切不同法相互渗透和存在的基础。它“造造”(造造)妄想和开悟,并且在任何一种状态下都没有改变。正是无住,但这被理解为与知(知)相同,知(知)不受念念(念)的变化。特定的事物是这些生起和灭亡的不同思想的函数,这些思想是无限的和取之不尽用之不竭的,因为它们的实质始终保持与无住觉性相同的不变本质,但它们是易灭的,也许有一个开始,但肯定有一个结束,在他们的标记作为细节。正如彼得·格雷戈里(Peter Gregory)的广泛分析所表明的那样,宗米的立场或多或少遵循相同的路线。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16} 心,纯粹的觉知,是无条件的,无所不在的,因为心作为纯粹的“光明”,作为不随着离散思想时刻的时间来去而升起或落下的觉知,仅仅是一个事实:不限于任何可能的有限条件、状态、知觉或观念,任何特殊性本身并不存在,总是向它内在弥漫的其他事物发出光芒。这种光明,是心的纯粹和永远存在的本质,本身正是“事件之间的无碍”,渗透本身,存在和统一所有特殊事物的东西,在本质上是无差别和相互渗透的,而这个心本身,不变的觉知,是事物的连贯性(所有相互渗透的细节的无所不在的统一整体),为了实现开悟,必须认识到它——换句话说,心本身就是理。

MIND AND THE NATURE IN TIANTAI THOUGHT
天台思想中的心性

Let us now turn to the Tiantai understanding of mind and its role in Buddhist practice. For the doctrine most central to our inquiry into Chinese
现在让我们转向天台对心的理解及其在佛教修行中的作用。对于我们研究汉语最核心的学说

understandings of Li is Zhili’s assertion, in sharp contrast to the Huayan view of Li as undifferentiated totalizing subsumer and shi as differentiated subsumed part, that there are “two forms of subsumer and two types of subsumed” (理事兩重總別). Li is both subsumer and subsumed, and event (shi) is also both subsumer and subsumed. Each Li can be seen as the whole subsuming all other Lis and all events, or as a Li subsumed into another Li , or subsumed into an event. Similarly, each event can be viewed as both the whole subsuming all other events and all Lis, and also as a part subsumed into all Lis and into all other events.
直隶对礼的理解是直隶的断言,与华严学说的“礼是无差别的总体主体,势是有差别的主体部分”形成鲜明对比,认为有“两重总别”。理既是隶属者又是被隶属者,事件(事)也是既是隶属者又是被隶属者。每个礼可以被视为包含所有其他礼和所有事件的整体,或者一个礼包含在另一个礼中,或者包含在一个事件中。类似地,每个事件既可以被视为包含所有其他事件和所有 Lis 的整体,也可以被视为包含在所有 Lis 和所有其他事件中的一部分。
This doctrine is put forward in the context of a discussion of meditational practice, in controversies about the true meaning of mind-observation (觀心 guanxin) and inherence-observation (觀具 guanju) in Tiantai. To understand the fourfold schematic of Li/event relations in Tiantai, given above, we must look at the relation between “mind” and “the Nature” in Tiantai praxis. “Mind” is, in this context, the exemplar of an event, while “the Nature” is strictly synonymous with Li . That is, in contrast to the Huayan view of mind as Li, for Zhili’s Tiantai, mind is a series of shi, events that arise and perish in time (these events are nian 念, individual thought-instants or moments of sentience). The structure of the Mind/ Nature relation is precisely the structure of the shi/Li relation. And yet Tiantai accepts all the same extravagant Mahayana scriptural claims about mind as the creator, source, ground of all dharmas that Huayan does. Zhili’s position is that all these claims are ultimately pragmatic—as are all claims, statements, and propositions in a Tiantai context: they are true in some sense, they are locally coherent, they are upāyas. In this case, they are the Buddha’s instructions for a particularly effective form of meditation, the practice of mind-contemplation, in which the Three Thousand Li and the Three Thousand events “both take one moment of [deluded] experience qua event as their subsuming whole” (皆以事中一念為總 jieyishizhongyinianweizong). 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} As we will see in the final section of this chapter, Li is indeed what enables the event-in this case, a moment of mental experience-to subsume all things, but it is not Li directly that is observed doing the subsuming in this practice. Rather, what is to be observed is the untheorized, manifest fact that the mind does in fact subsume all events and all Li , which is, when understood through doctrinal considerations, then seen as manifesting Li , the interpenetration of all Li , and the interpenetration of all Li and all shi. The initial fact to be observed is the way one particular even-a moment of experience-turns out to have always been doing this odd subsuming, serving as totalizer, zong, to whatever it touches. This subsuming on the level of event is just the noticing that the nature of all consciousness, deluded or otherwise, involves a multiplicity-as-oneness, or a oneness-as-multiplicity, that all distinctions and characteristics experienced
这一学说是在讨论禅修、天台观心与观具真义的争论中提出的。要理解上述天台礼与事件关系的四重图式,我们必须看看天台修行中“心”与“性”的关系。在这种情况下,“心”是事件的范例,而“自然”严格来说是理的同义词。也就是说,与华严学的心观相反,对于直隶的天台来说,心是一系列的“时”,即随时间产生和灭亡的事件(这些事件是“念”,个体的思想瞬间或有知觉的时刻)。心性关系的结构正是势理关系的结构。然而,天台宗接受了所有同样奢侈的大乘经典关于心的主张,即华严所接受的所有诸法的创造者、源头和基础。直隶的立场是,所有这些主张最终都是实用的——就像天台语境中的所有主张、陈述和命题一样:它们在某种意义上是真实的,它们是局部连贯的,它们是upāyas。在这种情况下,它们是佛陀对一种特别有效的冥想形式的指示,即心观修行,其中三千里和三千事件“都以事件的一瞬间(迷惑的)经验作为它们的包容性”。皆以事中一念为总jieyishzhongyinianweizong。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17} 正如我们将在本章的最后一节中看到的那样,“理”确实使事件(在本例中是心理体验的一个时刻)能够包容所有事物,但在此实践中观察到的并不是直接进行包容的“理” 。 相反,要观察的是非理论化的、明显的事实,即心灵实际上包含了所有事件和所有理,当通过教义考虑来理解时,则将其视为显现理,所有理的相互渗透以及相互渗透所有的礼和所有的事。首先要观察的事实是,一个特定的偶数——经验的一个时刻——结果总是对它所触及的任何事物进行这种奇怪的包容,充当累加器、zong。这种在事件层面上的包容只是注意到所有意识的本质,无论是迷惑还是其他,都涉及到作为单一性的多重性,或者作为多重性的单一性,所有区别和特征都经历过这种情况。

as different are possible only as “dwelling together in a single moment of experience” (同居一念 tongjuyinian). 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} As we shall see, this simply means, for example, that whatever the mind turns its attention to, whether an isolated event or fact (i.e., as a shi), or a some particular quality as omnipresent and unconditional (thus, as a Li ), it finds that this quality and the seemingly antithetical character of “being-here-and-now-noticing-it”-the quality of mindedness-are copresent, mutually pervasive, coextensive: no boundary can be found separating subject and object, and if one existed, there could be no contact between them and thus no perception of the object by the subject. And yet subjectivity and objectivity are definitionally mutually exclusive. Mind and object of mind are one but different. Similarly, present moment and past and future moments are one but different. Any X and the non- X whose contrast to X allows X to manifest as X are one but different. Merely to experience a characteristic is to experience a difference, and the experience of a difference is only possible as this copresence of contraries and interpenetration, the Li of the Three Truths.
因为只有“同居一念同聚一念”才有可能实现不同。 18 18 ^(18){ }^{18} 正如我们将看到的,这仅仅意味着,例如,无论心灵将注意力转向什么,无论是孤立的事件或事实(即,作为“是”),还是某种无所不在和无条件的特定品质(因此,作为“理”) ),它发现这种品质和“此时此地注意到它”的看似对立的特征——心念的品质——是共存的、相互普遍的、同延的:找不到将主体和客体分开的边界,如果存在,它们之间就不可能有接触,因此主体无法感知该客体。然而主观性和客观性在定义上是相互排斥的。心和心的目标是一但不同的。同样,现在时刻与过去和未来时刻是一回事,但又有所不同。任何X和非X(其与X的对比允许X表现为X)是一但不同的。仅仅体验一种特性就是体验一种差异,而差异的体验只有在这种对立和相互渗透的共存,即三谛之理中才有可能。
It is on this particular shi/Li relation that the later Tiantai writers lavish the most attention, giving them the opportunity to explain what the “totality of Lis” and so on might mean. More specifically, it is in this context that we find the resources by which to understand the as yet unbroached topic of the relation between the four levels in the schematic above. In the Huayan system, as we might expect from its straightforward approach to the Two Truths, we have a simple progression; one’s insight develops, through Buddhist practice, from the First Dharmadhatu to the Fourth. In the Tiantai case, we will find Zhili asserting a kind of meta-identity as the ultimate goal of practice: the ability to see the identity between the four levels, so that the event as totalizer is seen as the Li as totalizer, and the differentiated events as the differentiated Li . To get at this crucial point, as I said, we must make a detour through the Tiantai descriptions of the relation between the mind and the Nature.
正是对这种特殊的“理”关系,后来的天台作家们给予了最多的关注,使他们有机会解释“理的整体”等可能意味着什么。更具体地说,正是在这种背景下,我们找到了资源来理解上图中四个级别之间关系的尚未触及的主题。在华严体系中,正如我们从其直截了当的二谛方法中所期望的那样,我们有一个简单的进展;通过佛教修行,一个人的洞察力从第一法界发展到第四法界。在天台的案例中,我们会发现智理主张一种元同一性作为修行的最终目标:能够看到四个层次之间的同一性,从而使积算事件被视为理积算,而分化事件为分化李。正如我所说,要到达这个关键点,我们必须绕道天台对心性关系的描述。
I have in mind in particular the use of the compound terms xinxing 心性 and what this tells us about the Tiantai conception of xing, which is synonymous, in these contexts, with the Tiantai conception of Li . The term xinxing appears frequently in Zhanran’s works, and the apparent ambiguity of his usage of this compound served as one of the primary sources of the "Shanjia/Shanwai "debates in the Northern Song dynasty, particular in regard to the understanding of Buddhist praxis. The interpretation of this binome is particularly important to the contested question of how to understand mind-observation. Zhili’s “Shanjia” position, which will be my focus here, can be clarified through an examination of his understanding of Zhanran’s crucial usage of the term xinxing in the Shibuermen. The following passage is the core text around which this debate revolves:
我特别想到复合词“心性”的使用,以及它告诉我们的“性”的天台概念,在这些上下文中,“性”与天台“理”概念是同义的。 “心性”一词在湛然的作品中频繁出现,而他对这个词的使用明显含糊不清,成为北宋“善家/善外”争论的主要根源之一,特别是在对佛教修行的理解方面。这个二元组的解释对于如何理解心灵观察这一有争议的问题尤为重要。直隶的“善甲”立场是我在此关注的焦点,可以通过考察他对《十不二门》中湛然对“心性”一词的重要用法的理解来澄清。以下段落是这场争论的核心文本:

[All the possible objects of knowledge presented by Zhiyi in the Fahuaxuanyi], from the realm of the Ten Suchnesses up to “Non-Truth,” can each be understood either in terms of the subsuming whole or the subsumed parts. The subsuming whole is a single instant of experience, while the subsumed parts are divided into physical and mental. . . . Once one understands the subsumed parts, the parts must be seen as subsumed into the subsuming whole: all dharmas without exception are xinxing. There is only this one Nature-but the single Nature is the absence of any Nature. Thereby the Three Thousand particular existences are all there as always. Thus it should be known that since mind-and-matter [qua the Nature] are here as the mind, 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} just the mind is what is meant by its transformations. These transformations are what is meant by the creation [by the mind of individual things, which are distinct from and opposed to mind]. Creation [in this sense] is what is meant by [the entire] substance [being expressed as] the function. Truly it is for this reason that there is neither mind nor matter, there is both mind and matter, there is only mind, there is only matter. 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
[至一在《法华玄义》中提出的所有可能的知识对象],从十如境界到“非真理”,都可以从包容整体或包容部分的角度来理解。包容的整体是单一的体验瞬间,而包容的部分则分为身体和精神两部分。 。 。 。一旦了解了各个部分,就必须把各个部分看作是包含在整体中的:一切法无一例外都是心性的。只有这一种自然——但单一自然就是没有任何自然。故三千特殊存在皆如常。因此应该知道,既然名色[作为自然]在这里作为心, 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 只有心才是它的转变的意思。这些转变就是所谓的创造(通过个体事物的心灵,它与心灵不同且相反)。 [在这个意义上]创造就是[整个]实体[被表达为]功能。确实是因为这个原因,既没有名色,也没有名色,只有名色,只有名色。 20 20 ^(20){ }^{20}
且十如境乃至無諦。一一皆有總別二意。總在一念。別分色心。。。。既知別已,攝別入總。一切諸法。無非心性。一性無性。三千宛然。當知心之色心,即心名變。變名為造。造䛿體用。是則非色非心。而色而心。唯色唯心。良由於此.
且十如境乃无谛。一一皆有总别二意。总在一念。别分色心。。。。既知别,摄别入总。一切诸法。无非心性。一性无性。三千宛然。当知心之色心,即心名变。变称为造。造䛿体用。是则非色非心。而色而心。唯色唯心。良因于此。
The binome xinxing in this phrase “All dharmas without exception are xinxing” can be interpreted in at least the five following ways:
“诸法无一皆心性”这句话中的二元心性至少可以有以下五种解读:
  1. Xinxing means “Mind-nature.” This is how the term will probably initially strike the eye of most readers familiar with the way in which this binome is usually used in other schools of Chinese Buddhism in this period of history. 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} Mind-nature would mean the constant defining characteristic or essence of mind, Mindness as such. “All dharmas are Mind-nature” would then mean that all constituents of experienced reality are, when understood truly, reduced to their ultimate essence, nothing but Mind. This means that what they really are, in spite of appearing as matter and other types of non-mind characteristics, is mind, the essence of mind, mindlikeness, mentalness. Saying all dharmas are “mind-nature” is equivalent to saying they are all mind, i.e., are “made of” mind, are reducible to mind-stuff. The true essence of matter, on this reading, is Mind. This, in highly oversimplified form, is more or
    心性的意思是“心性”。这就是大多数熟悉该二元组在这段历史时期的中国佛教其他流派中通常使用方式的读者最初可能会注意到的方式。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 心性意味着心的恒定的定义特征或本质,即心性。 “诸法皆心性”则意味着,当真正理解时,所体验到的实相的所有成分都被简化为它们的最终本质,除了心之外,别无其他。这意味着,尽管它们表现为物质和其他类型的非心智特征,但它们的真正本质是心、心的本质、心性、心性。说一切诸法是“心性”,等于说它们都是心,即是由心“构成”,可以还原为心色。根据这个解读,物质的真正本质是心灵。这,以高度过于简单化的形式,或多或少是

    less how the Shanwai writers read this passage, and, as shown above, how this term would be understood in a Huayan context.
    少说山外作家如何读这段话,以及如上所示,这个词在华严语境中如何理解。
  2. Xinxing means “mind’s nature.” This reading, while sounding very close to the first interpretation in both Chinese and English, actually denotes precisely the opposite meaning. “All dharmas are mind’s nature” would mean, not that the innermost essence of matter is mind, but conversely that the innermost essence of mind is matter, or all dharmas. The statement then answers the question, “What is the real essence of mind?” rather than, “What is the real essence of all dharmas?” That is, “all dharmas” are the real “nature” of “mind.” When the mind is analyzed to ferret out its true essence, this essence is found to be, not mind, but these dharmas, including matter or any other non-mind entity. It would mean that mind is ultimately, in its innermost nature, dharmas, matter, non-mind. This reading is closely related to the way Zhiyi himself had used this binome in certain contexts, to state in his case that the real nature of mind is not mind but rather, for example, Emptiness. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} Such passages also use this phrase to answer the question, “What is the essence of mind?” rather than, “What is the essence of all apparently non-mind dharmas?”
    心性的意思是“心性”。这种读法虽然听起来与中英文的第一种解释非常接近,但实际上所表达的意思恰恰相反。 “一切法皆心性”,不是指物质的最内在本质是心,而是说心的最内在本质是色,或者说是一切法。该陈述随后回答了“心的真正本质是什么?”的问题。而不是“诸法的真正本质是什么?”也就是说,“一切法”就是“心”的真实“性”。当分析心以找出其真正本质时,会发现这个本质不是心,而是这些法,包括物质或任何其他非心实体。这意味着心在其最内在的本质上究竟是法、色、非心。这种解读与智一本人在某些情况下使用这个二元组的方式密切相关,在他的例子中,心的真正本质不是心,而是空性。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22} 这些经文也用这句话来回答“心的本质是什么?”的问题。而不是“所有表面上非心法的本质是什么?”
  3. Xinxing means “mind and the Nature.” This takes the two characters xin and xing not as a binome, but as two separate terms. “All dharmas are mind and the Nature” could then expand into two separate (although of course intimately related) claims: “All dharmas are mind” and “All dharmas are the Nature.”
    心性的意思是“心与自然”。这并不将 xin 和 xing 这两个字符视为二元组,而是将其视为两个单独的项。 “一切法皆心性”可以扩展为两个独立的(尽管当然密切相关)主张:“一切法即心”和“一切法即性”。
  4. Xinxing means “mind, or the Nature.” This would mean that “mind” and “nature” are to be understood as synonymous terms, to be read simultaneously. “Mind” and “nature” are in this sense two names for the same thing. In a certain way, this comes close to the first reading: the Nature is Mind itself, and this is what all dharmas are being identified with. But it can also be understood as closely allied to the third reading: All dharmas are mind, and all dharmas are the Nature, and these two separate and different claims end up being mutually entailing, and ultimately identical to one another. The former (reading 4 as an elaboration of reading 1) indicates the Shanwai interpretation. The latter (reading 4 as an elaboration of reading 3) represents Zhili’s Shanjia interpretation.
    心性的意思是“心,或自然”。这意味着“心灵”和“自然”应被理解为同义术语,需要同时解读。从这个意义上说,“心灵”和“自然”是同一事物的两个名称。在某种程度上,这接近第一读:性即心本身,这是一切法所认同的。但它也可以被理解为与三读密切相关:一切法都是心,一切法都是性,这两种不同的主张最终相互蕴含,最终彼此相同。前者(读法4是读法1的阐述)表示山外解释。后者(阅读4作为阅读3的阐述)代表了直隶的善家解释。
  5. Xinxing means “the Nature-as-the-mind.” The “as” is what is crucial to this translation, providing a further elaboration of reading
    心性的意思是“心性”。 “as”对于这个翻译至关重要,它提供了阅读的进一步阐述

Abstract 抽象的

3. “All dharmas are the Nature-as-the-mind” would mean that all components of experience are identical to the Nature, but in the peculiar form of being identical to one’s own (deluded, temporally arising) mind. The English term as is, as I’ve said, a particularly useful device for translating Tiantai ideas, meaning here that a given entity has two identities at once; " X as Y " means it is truly X but also truly Y , where Y is one of many forms in which X can legitimately appear or present itself without losing its identity as X , and while also truly being Y. If I say, for example, that I am using a book “as” a doorstop, it can mean that this object remains truly a book, but also that it is really performing the function of a doorstop, is in fact stopping a door, is in reality a doorstop. “The Nature-as-the-deluded-mind” would then mean that it truly remains the Nature, but is just as truly the deluded mind. Concomitant to this claim in this case is the reversed claim, i.e., that all dharmas are also “the deluded-mind-as-the-Nature,” which would mean, as we shall see below, this moment of delusion, with all entities as its aspects, as omnipresent and eternal.
3. “诸法皆性如心”,意思是所有经验的组成部分都与自性相同,但以与自己(迷惑的、暂时生起的)心相同的特殊形式存在。正如我所说,英语术语as是翻译天台思想的一个特别有用的工具,在这里意味着一个给定的实体同时具有两个身份; “ X as Y ”意味着它是真正的 X ,但也是真正的 Y ,其中 Y 是 X 可以合法地出现或呈现自己而不会失去其作为 X 的身份的多种形式之一,同时也真正是 Y 。如果我说,对于例如,我使用一本书“作为”门挡,这可能意味着该物体仍然是真正的一本书,而且它实际上正在执行门挡的功能,实际上是挡住一扇门,实际上是一个门挡。那么,“自性即迷心”就意味着它确实仍然是自性,但也确实是迷心。在这种情况下,与这一主张相伴随的是相反的主张,即一切法也是“如性迷心”,这意味着,正如我们将在下面看到的,所有实体都处于迷惑的时刻。就其各个方面而言,无所不在且永恒。

The last reading comes closest to Zhili’s interpretation. But the question is complicated by the fact that this is a claim about the relation of “all dharmas” to this xinxing. The explicit claim in this particular passage is that all dharmas “are” xinxing, indicating a relation of identity. But the passage goes on to indicate that this claim implies other relations between all dharmas and xinxing. In particular, Zhili’s reading requires six distinct but related claims, three concerning the relation between dharmas and mind, and three concerning the relation between dharmas and the Nature. That is, all dharmas are:
最后的解读最接近直隶的解释。但问题就复杂了,因为这是一个关于“诸法”与这个心性关系的主张。这段话明确指出,一切诸法“都是”心性,表明一种身份关系。但这段话接着指出,这种说法暗示了诸法与心性之间的其他关系。尤其是直隶的读法,要求有六种截然不同而又相关的主张,其中三者是关于法与心的关系,三者是关于法与自然的关系。即一切法:
  1. created by the (deluded) mind (心造 xinzao);
    由(迷惑的)心所创造;
  2. inherently entailed in the (deluded) mind (心具 xinju);
    心具xinju;
  3. identical to the (deluded) mind (即心 jixin);
    即心即心;
  4. created by the Nature (理造 lizao); 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
    理造 lizao; 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
  5. inherently entailed in the Nature (性具 xingju); and
    本质上蕴含的(性具);和
  6. identical to the Nature(即性,即空即假即中 jixing,jikongjijiajizhong).
    同性(即性,即空即假即中济行,济空济家济中)。
Moreover, all six of these claims must be understood not as independent facts, but as mutually entailing and mutually illuminating, as is made
此外,所有这六项主张都不能被理解为独立的事实,而是相互关联和相互说明的,正如所提出的那样。

increasingly explicit in the writing of Zhili and his disciples. 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} This means that he understands reading 5 as, so to speak, involving all the four previous readings, which are seen as implying one another. His vociferous rejection of reading 1 (and the first version of reading 4) is due to his conviction that this alone is not what the statement “all dharmas are xinxing” is stating.
在直隶及其弟子的著作中,这一点越来越明确。 24 24 ^(24){ }^{24} 这意味着他将读法 5 理解为,可以这么说,涉及所有之前的四种读法,这些读法被视为相互暗示。他对读法1(以及读法4的第一个版本)的强烈反对是因为他坚信仅此而已并不是“诸法皆心性”的说法。
Zhili advocates, famously, the contemplation of the deluded mind (妄心觀 wangxinguan), which he explains as meaning “to manifest the Three-Thousand-Nature(s) in the aggregate mind” (於陰心顯三千性 y u y u yuy u yinxin xian sanqian xing), 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} as opposed to the contemplation of the “true mind” (enlightened mind, Buddha mind, pure mind) allegedly advocated by the Shanwai masters. That the object of contemplation should be the deluded mind, rather than the true mind, is not difficult to understand, and indeed is one of the least controversial of Zhili’s polemical slogans. The point is made quite commonsensically already by Zhiyi in the Mohezhiguan, not only in his frequent descriptions of the “one moment of mind arising from sense-object meeting sense organ,” but in the explicit Q Q QQ and A A AA in that text concerning the subject and object of contemplation. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} But the full implications of this idea become focal in Zhili’s polemical writings, hinging on developments made by Zhanran in his reworking of Zhiyi’s ideas, introducing new applications of borrowed terminology into the discussion. The treatment of xinxing in this passage is a case in point. As suggested in reading 3, Zhili states that "the two characters xin and xing are not different and yet different(心性二字,不異而異 xinxing er zi bu yi er yi)."27 Two separated claims then are involved: that all dharmas are mind, and that all dharmas are the Nature. In the opening paragraph of this section I alluded to two Tiantai meditational procedures: “mind-observation” and “inherence-observation.” The separation of these two procedures corresponds to the reading of xin and xing as fully distinct terms in this passage. To understand what is at stake here, however, we have to get a clearer grasp on what the terms the Nature and the mind denote in the context of Tiantai writings of this period. 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
直隶主张著名的妄心观,他将其解释为“于阴心显三千性”。 y u y u yuy u 银心线三千星), 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25} 与山外大师所宣扬的“真心”(觉心、佛心、清净心)观照相反。禅修的对象应该是迷心,而不是真心,这并不难理解,而且确实是直隶论战口号中争议最小的之一。知一在《摩诃止观》中已经以相当常识性的方式表达了这一点,不仅在他频繁描述“从感官对象与感官相遇而产生的一刹那心”中,而且在明确的 Q Q QQ A A AA 在那篇关于沉思的主题和客体的文本中。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26} 但这一思想的全部含义成为直隶论战著作中的焦点,这取决于湛然在对直隶思想的改造中所取得的进展,将借用术语的新应用引入讨论。这段话对心性的处理就是一个例子。正如阅读 3 中所建议的,《直隶》指出“心性二字,不异而异心性二字不一二一”。”27 那么这就涉及到两个独立的主张:一切法即心,一切法即性。在本节的开头,我提到了两个天台禅修程序:“心观”和“本性观”。这两个过程的分离对应于本文中将 xin 和 xing 解读为完全不同的术语。 然而,要理解这里的利害关系,我们必须更清楚地理解这一时期天台著作中“性”和“心”这两个术语的含义。 28 28 ^(28){ }^{28}
We start by considering Zhiyi’s teaching of “The Samadhi of Awareness of the Process of Attention” (覺意三昧 jueyisanmei), inherited from Huisi’s “Samadhi of Following One’s Own Attention” (隨自意三昧 suiziyisanmei), the centerpiece of the “Four Samadhis” from the Mohezhiguan and increasingly the focus of all Tiantai practice for Zhanran and the Song combatants. This particular practice must be understood in the context of two scriptural passages, which I will first consider here.
我们首先考虑智一的“觉意三昧觉三昧”,继承自惠思的“随自意三昧”,“四昧”的核心。来自摩诃之关的“三摩地”,日益成为湛然和宋军所有天台修行的焦点。这种特殊的做法必须在两段经文的背景下理解,我将在这里首先考虑这两段经文。
The locus classicus of the doctrine that “all dharmas are created by the mind” is the following passage from the “old translation” of the Avatamsaka Sūtra referred to already in the citation from Chengguan:
“诸法皆由心生”之说的经典,是城关引文中已提及的《华严经》“旧译”中的一段话:
It is like a skilled painter spreading out the various colors [on the canvas], who then deludedly takes them to be different forms [in
就像一个熟练的画家将各种颜色铺展在画布上,然后迷惑地把它们变成不同的形式。

the painting]. The four material elements [earth, water, fire, wind] are all the same [in each of the colors]. The four elements are not themselves colors, and colors are not themselves the four elements. And yet there are no other colors apart from the four elements. [In the same way], the mind is not the colors of the painting, and the colors of the painting are not the mind, but apart from the mind there are no colors in the painting, and apart from the colors in the painting there is no mind. That mind does not constantly dwell [in any mark]. It is infinite, difficult to comprehend, manifesting all colors, each of which knows not the others. It is like the skilled painter, who does not know his own painting mind. You must understand that the nature of all dharmas is also like this. The mind is like a skilled painter, painting forth all varieties of the five aggregates [i.e., forms, sensations, conceptions, volitions, discernments]. There is no dharma in all the worlds not created by it. As it is with the mind, so it is with the Buddha. As it is with the Buddha, so it is with all sentient beings. Mind, Buddha, sentient beings-there is no difference between these three. All the Buddhas realize that all is turned by the mind. Whosoever can see it this way sees the true Buddha. . . . The mind creates all the Tathāgatas. 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
画]。四种物质元素[地、水、火、风]都是相同的[每种颜色]。四界本身并不是颜色,颜色本身也不是四界。然而,除了四种元素之外,没有其他颜色。 [同理]心非画色,画色亦非心,但离了心,画中便无色,离了画色,便无色。就是没心思。那个心不会持续地安住于[任何标记]。它是无限的,难以理解,显现出所有颜色,每种颜色都不认识其他颜色。就像熟练的画家,不知道自己的画心一样。你要明白,一切诸法的本质也是如此。心就像一位熟练的画家,描绘五蕴的所有种类(即色、受、想、行、明)。一切世界,无有法不是由它所创造的。心如此,佛亦如此。佛如此,一切众生亦如此。心、佛、众生,三者无分别。诸佛皆知一切皆由心转。能如是见者,即见真佛。 。 。 。心生一切如来。 29 29 ^(29){ }^{29}
Mind creates all things, and is inseparable from all the things it creates. It is neither identical to nor different from its creations, just as the four elements are neither identical to nor different from the colors that are composed of them. “Element” as such is not “color” as such, and yet there are no colors that are not entirely made up of the elements. The reverse"no elements without color"-is not asserted in this part of the metaphor. Similarly, “mind” as such is not “all objects” as such, but there are no objects that are not entirely mind; in this case, we are told further that there is no mind separable from the forms it creates. Here, the mind in question seems to be the conditional, ordinary, deluded karma-creating mind, or at least the big M Mind in a state of severe delusion, since it knows not what it is doing, and like the painter “deludedly” takes its own creation for a new reality. It is a mind that is infinitely creative but gets lost in its own creativity. Its creativity seems to be linked to its lack of self-transparency, like that painter’s ignorance of his own painting mind, and the ignorance between the various forms of their common source. It must focus on its object, and forget itself, ignore the act of positing the object, in order for that object to be truly posited as an independent object.
心创造了一切事物,并且与它所创造的一切事物密不可分。它与其创造物既不相同也不不同,就像四种元素与其组成的颜色既不相同也不不同一样。 “元素”本身并不是“颜色”本身,但没有一种颜色不是完全由元素组成的。相反的“没有没有颜色的元素”——在隐喻的这一部分中没有断言。同样地,“心”本身并不是“一切物体”本身,但没有任何物体不完全是心;在这种情况下,我们进一步被告知,没有任何心灵可以与其所创造的形式分开。在这里,所讨论的心似乎是有缘的、凡夫的、迷惑的造业心,或者至少是处于严重迷惑状态的大M心,因为它不知道自己在做什么,就像画家“迷惑”一样。将自己的创造带入新的现实。它是一个具有无限创造力的头脑,但却迷失在自己的创造力中。它的创造力似乎与它缺乏自我透明性有关,就像画家对自己的画心的无知,以及对它们共同来源的各种形式的无知一样。它必须专注于它的对象,而忘记自己,忽略放置对象的行为,以便使该对象真正被放置为一个独立的对象。
This is also linked to the mind’s “not-dwelling” in any of the marks it creates. Taken as the deluded mind, of course, the assertion that this mind is “no different” from the Buddha is somewhat startling; this is precisely what Chengguan seeks to remedy in his adoption of the “New Translation,”
这也与心在其所创造的任何标记中的“不居住”有关。当然,如果把它当作迷心,说这个心与佛“无异”,就有些令人吃惊了。这正是城管通过《新译》所要解决的问题。

which specifies that it is just the “essence” (體性 tixing, literally “substance and nature”) of the mind-hence not its deluded creativity-which is infinite and identical to the Buddhas. The Tiantai reading, however, sticks to the literal paradox of the “old” translation; it is the deluded mind that is identical to the Buddhas and to Sentient Beings, and according to Zhili, this means each of these three “creates all things like a skilled painter,” is inseparable from all things, in a certain sense “is” all things, and so on. The fact that this mind is not transparent to itself, does not thoroughly "know itself’ or what it is doing, as in the metaphor of the inspired painter above, is particularly important for the Tiantai system, and also central to the next passage to be discussed.
它明确指出,它只是心的“本质”(体性,字面意思是“物质和本质”),因此不是其迷惑的创造力,它是无限的,与诸佛相同。然而,天台读法却坚持“旧”译的字面悖论。与诸佛、与众生相同的是迷心,根据智理的说法,这意味着这三者中的每一个都“如善画师般创造万物”,与万物不可分离,在某种意义上“是”所有的事情,等等。事实上,这个心对自身并不透明,没有彻底地“了解自己”或它在做什么,正如上面受启发的画家的比喻,这一事实对于天台体系特别重要,也是下一段的核心。进行讨论。
This second scriptural passage I wish to keep close to the discussion here is from Chapter Five, “Medicinal Herbs” (藥草品), of Kumārajīva’s Lotus itself. It is not often quoted in the context of the issue at hand here, as the above text is, but I think it sums up something very important in the understanding of reality which structures the Tiantai meditational system. The passage runs:
我希望与这里的讨论保持密切联系的第二段经文来自鸠摩罗什莲花本身的第五章“药草品”。正如上面的文字那样,它在当前问题的背景下并不经常被引用,但我认为它总结了一些对于理解构建天台禅修体系的现实非常重要的东西。段落如下:
The teachings preached by the Tathagata are all of one mark and one flavor, what is known as the mark of liberation, the mark of freedom, the mark of cessation. Ultimately all these teachings lead to the Knowledge of All Modes [i.e., the Buddha’s perfect enlightenment]. When a sentient being hears any of these preachings of the Tathagata, and remembers, reads, recites and practices them, the merit he thereby gains is unknown to himself. And why? Because only the Tathagata knows what the type, mark, essence and nature of this sentient being is, what he is thinking of [念何事 nian he shi], what he is cogitating, what he is practicing; how he is thinking [云何念 yunhe nian], how he is cogitating, how he is practicing; by virtue of what dharma he is thinking [以何法念 yi hefa nian], cogitating or practicing, and by what dharma he is attaining what dharma. Only the Tathagata knows without obstruction, accurately and clearly what stage a sentient being may be dwelling in. 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
如来所说法,皆一相一味,所谓解脱相、解脱相、灭相。最终,所有这些教义都会导致一切波门智(即佛陀的圆满觉悟)。若有众生听闻如来所说,忆念读诵修行,所获得的功德,自己是不知道的。为什么?因为只有如来知道这个众生的类型、相、本质、本质是什么,他在想什么、他在想什么、他在修什么。他如何思考,如何思考,如何修行;以什么法念、思惟、修行,以什么法得什么法。只有如来才能无碍地、准确地、清楚地知道众生所处的境界。 30 30 ^(30){ }^{30}
Leaving aside for the moment the local purposes this type of rhetoric might play in the context of the religious argument the sutra is making, it makes one essential assertion that is crucial to the focus of Tiantai meditation, already hinted at in the previous passage: the minds of sentient beings are not “transparent” to themselves. It is not just that we don’t know what reality is; it is that we don’t even know what we think reality is. We are not aware of the meaning of our own thoughts. We do not know what we are thinking; we may think we are thinking about X X XX, but in fact be mistaken,
暂且不谈这种修辞在佛经所提出的宗教论证背景下可能发挥的局部目的,它做出了一个对于天台禅修的重点至关重要的基本断言,这一点在前一段中已经暗示过:众生的心对自己来说并不是“透明”的。我们不仅不知道现实是什么;而且我们不知道现实是什么。而是我们甚至不知道我们所认为的现实是什么。我们不知道自己的想法的意义。我们不知道自己在想什么;我们可能认为我们正在考虑 X X XX ,但实际上是错误的,

and actually be thinking about Y. We don’t even know what the object we are currently making judgments about is, or what those judgments might be. In other words, we may believe that we are deeming S S SS to be P P PP, but in fact this is not at all the activity we are engaged in. We are rather, in fact, deeming S to be non-P, or T to be L , or N to be G . We may think we believe X, but in fact be mistaken about this; our belief in X X XX may be known by the Buddha to actually be a belief in Y. The very activity of deeming, of judging, is not a bare transparent datum. It is not a brute fact that “I judge S to be P.” Neither the thinker, the thought-of object, nor the thought itself has a decidable nature. The disambiguating act of thinking is itself ambiguous. This is the premise for Tiantai “awareness to attention.”
我们甚至不知道我们当前正在做出判断的对象是什么,或者这些判断可能是什么。换句话说,我们可能相信我们正在认为 S S SS 成为 P P PP ,但事实上这根本不是我们所从事的活动。事实上,我们认为 S 是非 P 的,或者 T 是 L 的,或者 N 是 G 的。我们可能认为我们相信X,但实际上这是错误的;我们的信念 X X XX 佛陀可能知道这实际上是对Y的信仰。思考、判断的活动本身并不是一个纯粹透明的数据。 “我判断S是P”并不是一个残酷的事实。思想者、思想对象和思想本身都不具有可判定的性质。思维的消除歧义行为本身就是歧义的。这是天台“觉知到注意”的前提。
It should be stressed that the mature Tiantai conception admits no function of mind above and beyond (念 nian), the forming of determinate thoughts; there is no room here for the kind of “space between thoughts,” or the indeterminate background behind all these particular thoughts, the space in which thoughts occur, which is invoked in many types of Buddhist practice, including certain forms of Chan, and even in the Huisi text just mentioned. 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} There is a crucial change on this point between Huisi, if indeed this text is correctly attributed to him, and Zhiyi’s mature position. The space between thoughts would be, for Zhiyi, merely another thought, another phase with a specific beginning and end. The “non-thought” here is always only an aspect of a particular thought, just as Emptiness (global incoherence) is always also some specific Provisional Posit (local coherence). Indeed, the “mind” itself is merely an aspect of a thought. The “mind” contemplated in Tiantai mind contemplation is the mind described in the Foshuo guan puxian pusa xingfa jing 佛說觀普賢菩薩行法經,an apocryphal scripture apparently of Chinese composition, frequently quoted by Zhiyi, and often attached to the Lotus as its “Afterword,” in which we find a passage used in the Tiantai practice of the Lotus Repentance, during which Zhiyi is said in some sources to have had a major “enlightenment experience.”
应该强调的是,成熟的天台观念不承认心的作用超越“念念”,即确定思想的形成;这里没有空间容纳那种“思想之间的空间”,或者所有这些特定思想背后的不确定背景,思想发生的空间,这在许多类型的佛教修行中都被引用,包括某些形式的禅宗,甚至刚才提到的会思文本中。 31 31 ^(31){ }^{31} 在这一点上,惠思(如果这篇文章确实是正确地归因于他)和智仪的成熟立场之间存在着一个至关重要的变化。对于志一来说,思想之间的空间只是另一个思想,另一个有特定开始和结束的阶段。这里的“非思想”始终只是特定思想的一个方面,正如空性(全局不连贯性)始终也是某种特定的临时位置(局部连贯性)一样。事实上,“心”本身只是思想的一个方面。天台心观中所观的“心”,就是《佛说观普贤菩萨行法经》中所描述的心,这是一部显然是汉文的伪经,被智者经常引用,并且经常附在莲花上。作为其“后记”,其中我们找到了莲花忏天台修行中使用的一段文字,据一些资料记载,在此期间,智一有过一次重大的“开悟经历”。
The mind means the thinking [念 nian] of all sorts of non-goods, creating the ten types of evil karma, and the five evils leading to the uninterrupted purgatories. It is like a monkey and also like glue, sticking covetously to everything everywhere in the six sense organs. The karma of these six organs spreads like branches and twigs and flowers and leaves outward to fill the Three Realms, the 25 types of being, all places of birth, with the ability to increase the twelve types of suffering from ignorance to old age and death, so that one goes through all the eight perversions and all the eight disasters. . . . Contemplate the mind as no mind, as arising from deluded thinking. Think of the mind with this mark of having arisen
心,是指种种不善的念念,造出十种恶业,以及五种恶业,通往不间断的炼狱。它像猴子一样,又像胶水一样,贪婪地粘着六根各处的一切。此六脏业,如枝条花叶,向外布满三界二十五众生一切生处,能增十二种无明老死苦。故得八颠倒、八灾尽。 。 。 。观心为无心,如由妄想所生起。思考带有此已生起标记的心

from deluded thought as resembling a wind blowing through empty space, having no dwelling place. Such a dharma and its attributes are neither born nor perish-what then is called sin, what merit? My mind is itself empty, and both sin and merit have no owner. All dharmas are the same way. They neither dwell nor perish. This kind of repentance is the contemplation of the mind as no mind, dharmas as not dwelling within dharmas, all dharmas as liberated, the Noble Truth of Cessation and quiescence. 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}
妄想如风吹虚空,无住处。如是法及其功德,不生不灭,何谓罪业,何为功德?我心本空,罪业皆无主。一切诸法皆如是。他们既不居住也不灭亡。这种忏悔,就是观心无心,观法不住于法,观一切法解脱,观灭寂圣谛。 32 32 ^(32){ }^{32}
Note that here it is the “deluded sinful mind” that creates all existence-the existence of suffering and delusion and karma. It is active, purposive “thinking” (nian), particularized mental activity, as opposed to the quiescent awareness of the Huayan True Mind, which is said to be “free of thoughts” (離念 linian), as in the Awakening of Faith. This active, purposive, biased thinking is the mind that is here contemplated as “no mind,” as “arising from deluded thinking.” A particular thought is the disambiguating “master signifier” that makes all other existences coherent and determinate. This depends on the determinateness of this thought itself. But this determinateness too is arbitrarily posited in the same act, is a by-product of this act of determining. This act itself, however, can be seen, when recontextualized by a further thought, as itself ambiguous (Empty). The act of determining itself and all other existences is itself indeterminate. Mind, the creator and owner of thoughts, is itself created by and owned by thoughts. That is, thoughts posit their own determinate substratum, from which they putatively emerge and to which they putatively accrue, but this is an erroneous, or at best provisional, positing. Thoughts posit the reference point in relation to which they have their meaning (the determinate nature of this particular act of determining, or the mind, the enduring owner of thought which brings these thoughts together into a single meaningfully coherent system), but this implies a delusory circularity-their positing of this reference point is itself not meaningfully established without the reference point so posited.
请注意,这里是“迷惑罪心”创造了一切存在——痛苦、迷惑和业力的存在。它是主动的、有目的的“念”(念),特殊的心理活动,与《起信论》中所说的“离念离念”的华严真心的静止意识相反。 。这种主动的、有目的的、有偏见的思维,就是这里所说的“无心”、“从妄想生起”的心。一个特定的思想是消除歧义的“主能指”,它使所有其他存在变得连贯和确定。这取决于这个思想本身的确定性。但这种确定性也是在同一行为中任意设定的,是这种决定行为的副产品。然而,当通过进一步的思考重新语境化时,可以看出这种行为本身是模棱两可的(空的)。决定自身和所有其他存在的行为本身是不确定的。心智是思想的创造者和拥有者,它本身是由思想创造和拥有的。也就是说,思想设定了它们自己确定的基础,它们被认为是从这个基础中出现的,并且它们被认为是积累的,但这是一个错误的,或者充其量是临时的假设。思想设定了与它们相关的参考点,它们具有自己的意义(这种特定的决定行为的确定性,或者思想,思想的持久所有者,它将这些思想汇集到一个有意义的连贯系统中),但这意味着虚幻的循环——如果没有如此设定的参考点,他们对这个参考点的定位本身就没有意义。
As we shall see, mature Tiantai praxis analyzes the mental process as going through the four phases of “not-yet-thinking,” “about-to-think,” “thinking,” and “done-thinking,” but it is made very clear that this always refers to some specific mental act, thinking of some particular object: “not-yet-thinking” does not refer, in Zhiyi at least, to any blank quiescent state of awareness prior to the arising of all thought. It means simply all the thoughts prior to the one in question, that is, whatever was going on when one was “not-yet-thinking” about this particular object. Moreover, all four of these phases are ontologically in the same boat, all are to be analyzed as Empty, Provisionally Posited, and the Center, and for exactly the same reason: all four phases have a beginning and end, are temporal events, and
正如我们将看到的,成熟的天台禅修将心理过程分析为经历“未想”、“将想”、“想”和“已想”四个阶段,但它是很明显,这总是指某种特定的心理活动,思考某个特定的对象:“未思考”至少在“知意”中并不指在所有思想产生之前的任何空白的静止意识状态。它仅仅意味着在所讨论的想法之前的所有想法,也就是说,当一个人“尚未思考”这个特定对象时发生的任何事情。而且,这四个阶段在本体论上都是同一条船,都可以分析为空、暂定、中,而且道理完全一样:这四个阶段都有始有终,都是时间事件,都是时间事件。

the ostensible borderlines between themselves and whatever precedes and succeeds them-which define them as being what they are and nothing besides-cannot be intelligibly understood, cannot possibly exist as simply located entities. 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} The “not-yet-arisen” is really an aspect seen from within some particular arisen moment of thought, not some putative other state that is entirely free from any thoughts. Moments of experience are not isolated atoms; indeed, they cannot be. If they were, on the Tiantai view, they would not be experienceable at all. The past moment, the not-yet that precedes this moment, is present here within this moment, internal to it, perceivable from within it. There is inexorable multiplicity within the apparent singularity of this moment. As we shall see, this necessary copresence of multiplicity and singularity is the essence of the Tiantai practice of mind-contemplation.
它们自身与它们之前和之后的任何事物之间的表面边界——这些边界将它们定义为它们本身,除此之外别无其他——无法被理解地理解,也不可能作为简单定位的实体而存在。 33 33 ^(33){ }^{33} “未生起”实际上是从某个特定的念头生起时刻所看到的一个方面,而不是某种完全不受任何念头影响的假定的其他状态。经历的时刻不是孤立的原子;事实上,他们不可能。如果是的话,在天台观中,他们就根本无法体验到。过去的时刻,在这一刻之前的尚未存在的时刻,都存在于此时此刻之中,在它的内部,可以从它的内部感知到。在这一刻表面上的单一性中存在着不可阻挡的多样性。正如我们将看到的,这种多样性和单一性的必然共存是天台禅修修行的本质。
It must be understood, then, to state it plainly, that when Tiantai writers state that “the mind creates all dharmas,” they do not mean that the mind-either the deluded mind or the putative pure mind-literally creates all dharmas, or any dharmas at all, in the normal sense of the term. “Create” here cannot mean to bring a previously nonexistent entity into existence ex nihilo. Indeed, in the strict sense, Tiantai denies that any entity at all is created, by mind or by any other agent; there is no genuine transition from nonexistence to existence, nor vice versa; both of these concepts, “existence” and “nonexistence,” are regarded by Tiantai doctrine as merely provisionally coherent, and having no correspondence to ultimate reality. However, in the key passage of the Mohezhiguan on the “Mind as the Inconceivable Object,” Zhiyi starts by introducing the theme of creation (造 zao) by mind, quoting the Avatamsaka Sutra passage just cited: “The mind is like a skilled painter, creating all different varieties of the five aggregates.” He then enumerates these various types of aggregates, the ten realms of sentient beings, in all their aspects, stating in each case that “the mind” inherently entails (具 j u j u juj u ) all of these aspects. But after stating categorically that the mind inherently entails all Three Thousand aspects of reality, he hastens to add that this does not mean that the mind is prior to these Three Thousand in any sense; rather, he states that their relation is like that between an object and the “eight characteristics” (八相 baxiang) that constitute its process of becoming (i.e., greater and lesser characteristics of arising, dwelling, changing, vanishing). This relation between identity, determinacy, and the process of arising and perishing is again to be noted here. The claim that “the mind creates all things” is thus immediately glossed as “the mind inherently entails all things,” which is then quickly amended to “precisely the mind is all dharmas, precisely all dharmas are the mind.” A moment later, Zhiyi indicates the implications of this claim for his previous statement about creation, that is, the way in which it undermines it: he states categorically
因此,必须明白,坦白地说,当天台派作者说“心创造一切法”时,他们并不是指心——无论是迷心还是假定的清净心——字面上创造了一切法,或者说,心创造了一切法。任何佛法,就该术语的正常意义而言。这里的“创造”并不意味着将一个以前不存在的实体从无到有地创造出来。事实上,从严格意义上来说,天台根本否认任何实体是由心灵或任何其他媒介创造的。不存在从不存在到存在的真正转变,反之亦然;天台教认为“存在”和“不存在”这两个概念只是暂时的连贯性,与究竟的现实没有对应关系。然而,在《摩诃止观》“心为不可思议物”的关键段落中,智一首先介绍了心造造的主题,引用了刚才引用的《华严经》:“心如善画者”。 ,创造出五蕴的所有不同种类。”然后,他列举了这些不同类型的五蕴、十有情众生的各个方面,并在每种情况下都指出“心”本质上包含着(具)。 j u j u juj u )所有这些方面。但是,在断然陈述心本质上包含了实相的所有三千面向之后,他急忙补充说,这并不意味着心在任何意义上先于这三千;而是说,心在任何意义上都先于这三千。相反,他指出它们的关系就像一个物体和构成其生成过程的“八相八象”(即生、住、变、灭的大小特征)之间的关系。 这里再次要注意同一性、决定性和生灭过程之间的关系。 “心生万物”的说法,立刻被粉饰为“心本具万物”,又很快修正为“正是心即是法,正是一切法就是心”。” 过了一会儿,志毅指出了这一主张对他之前关于创造的陈述的影响,即它破坏创造的方式:他断然地指出

that it is no more correct to say that “mind creates and entails all things” than to say “the objective conditions [緣 yuan] create and entail all things and cognitions.” Both of these statements are locally coherent (假 jia), but globally incoherent (空 kong); they fall under the “Four Propositions” (四句:我生,他生,共生,離生,i.e., that anything arises from itself, from another, from both or from neither) rejected by Nāgārjuna. 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} After a lengthy refutation of all possible positions, filtered through the standard Tiantai Three Truths epistemology, Zhiyi states, "If one grasps this meaning, all these descriptions are valid, and all descriptions are invalid. However, if one goes with the most convenient [i.e., useful, for meditative purposes] description, one should say that Ignorance gives determinate form to the Dharma-nature [無明法法性 wuming fa faxing], and this is what produces all dharmas. It is like the dharma of sleep giving determinate form to the mind, and thus producing all the events in a dream. The mind and external conditions join, and thus all the Three Thousand natures and characteristics of the world arise from the mind. 355 355 ^(355){ }^{355} Note the unusual verbal use of the word fa here; it is to be understood as a transitive verb not in the more usual sense of “to imitate, model oneself upon,” but rather in accordance with Zhiyi’s discussion of the term in the Fahuaxuanyi, where its primary meaning is “trackable” (可軌 kegui), 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} that is, capable of being tracked or followed, capable of serving as a model, or, more broadly, determinable, determinate. As a transitive verb, it means to make determinate, to make knowable, to give recognizable form to. Note also that the particular description of all things as “created and entailed by the mind,” then, is chosen as an expedient for the purpose of Buddhist practice, for mind-observation, after making clear that it is not to be taken literally. The term ignorance is here explicitly synonymous with the term mind, and the creation of all dharmas by the mind is here merely the way in which ignorance “gives determinate form” to the absolute reality, the Dharma-nature. It disambiguates by filtering down a preexistent overabundance of content, the Three Thousand. The multiplicity and particularity of this content is not a result of Ignorance or delusion; the distinctions themselves preexist in the ultimate reality. As Zhili says conclusively, "Even when Ignorance is removed, distinctions still exist [除無明有差別 chuwuming youchabie]. " 37 " 37 ^(")^(37){ }^{"}{ }^{37} This is of course what is meant by the Tiantai “inherent entailment” of the Three Thousand in the Nature (性具三千 xingiu sanqian). Where does this content, in all its intricate particularity, ultimately come from? Strictly speaking, no possible answer can be given to this search for a single unambiguous “source” of any kind. It is “beyond thought and comprehension,” and more specifically it is created neither by the Dharma-nature (法性), nor by Ignorance(無明), nor by both (共), nor by neither (離): it is not what is so, nor what is not so, nor both, nor neither. It is extremely important to see the sense in which
所谓“心生万物”,与“客观条件生万物、知万物”的说法并不正确。这两种说法都是局部一致的(“假家”),但全局不一致(“空岗”);它们属于被龙树拒绝的“四命题”(四句:我生,他生,共生,离生,即任何事物从自身生起,从他生生起,从两者生起,或两者皆不生起)。 34 34 ^(34){ }^{34} 在对所有可能的立场进行了长时间的驳斥之后,通过标准的天台三真谛认识论进行了过滤,智一说:“如果一个人掌握了这个意义,那么所有这些描述都是有效的,并且所有描述都是无效的。但是,如果一个人选择最方便的[是说,无明法性为法性,是诸法生起,如睡眠法性。形于心,而生梦中诸事,心与外缘相合,故世间一切三千性相,皆由心而生。 355 355 ^(355){ }^{355} 请注意此处“fa”一词的不寻常的口头用法;它应该被理解为一个及物动词,而不是更通常意义上的“模仿、模仿”,而是根据智一在《法华玄义》中对该术语的讨论,其主要含义是“可追踪”(可轨)。客贵), 36 36 ^(36){ }^{36} 也就是说,能够被跟踪或遵循,能够充当模型,或者更广泛地说,是可确定的、确定的。作为及物动词,它的意思是使确定、使可知、赋予可识别的形式。 还要注意的是,在明确不能按字面意思理解之后,选择“由心创造和产生”的特殊描述,作为佛教修行、观察心的目的的权宜之计。这里的“无明”一词显然与“心”一词同义,而心所创造的一切法在这里只是无明“给予究竟法性”的“确定形式”。它通过过滤掉先前存在的过多内容“三千”来消除歧义。该内容的多样性和特殊性并非无知或妄想的结果;这些区别本身就预先存在于最终的现实中。正如智力最后所说:“即使消除了无知,区别仍然存在。 " 37 " 37 ^(")^(37){ }^{"}{ }^{37} 这当然就是天台“性具三千”的“本质内涵”。这些具有复杂特殊性的内容最终来自哪里?严格来说,对于任何类型的单一明确“来源”的搜索,都无法给出可能的答案。它是“超越思想和理解”的,更具体地说,它不是法性(法性),也不是无明(无明),不是共(共),也不是(离):它不是什么是这样,什么不是,也不是两者,也不是两者都不是。明白其中的意义是极其重要的

this attribution of “creativity” to the mind is connected with the mind’s delusion, and how this connects to the question of truth and appearance in Tiantai epistemology. To say the mind is creating what it sees is to say that it is deluded.
这种将“创造力”归因于心的现象与心的迷惑有关,以及这如何与天台认识论中的真理和显现问题相关联。说心正在创造它所看到的东西,就是说它被迷惑了。
Zhanran clarifies the implications of this view in several of the other self-posed questions and answers in his Zhiguanyili:
展然在他的《知观轶事》中的其他几个自我提问和回答中阐明了这一观点的含义:
Q: [Zhiyi’s Mohezhiguan] says, “Believe only in the Dharma-nature; do not believe in anything else.” There is only the Dharma-nature; nothing else exists. But then what are all the diverse dharmas we see before us? And why is it also said that the Dharma-nature inherently entails all the many dharmas? A: Because sentient beings for long aeons have been exclusively attached to the diverse dharmas, and did not believe in the Dharma-nature, this statement is made as a corrective to destroy this ancient prejudiced way of calculating, so that in all the diverse dharmas they will see purely and only the Dharma-nature. But to see the Dharma-nature is to see that the Dharma-nature is purely and only all the diverse dharmas. This Nature that is also all the diverse dharmas is originally without either the one name or the other. It is called either [diverse] dharmas or [one] Nature in accordance with the need to refute or establish upayically. 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
问:【知一摩诃知观】云:“唯信法性,不信法性”。不要相信任何其他东西。”只有法性;没有其他存在。那么我们现在所看到的种种诸法是什么呢?为何又说法性本具一切诸法呢?答:因众生长久劫以来,专执诸法,不信法性,故此言,是为了纠正破除这种古老的偏见计算方式,使一切诸法中他们将纯粹地看到法性。但见法性,就是见法性清净,唯有一切诸法。此性亦即诸法,本无一名,亦无彼名。根据需要驳斥或建立的需要,称为[诸法]或[一]性。 38 38 ^(38){ }^{38}
Neither unity nor diversity is primary. It is not the case that the world appears to be multiform, deluded, and biased but is in reality one. Rather, either of these ways of stating the case is equally biased, and either is also equally valid, to be applied as a corrective to a previous bias. But it is the mind’s power to disambiguate this neither-same-nor-different into some determinate scheme of samenesses and differences that is the delusion that is to be focused on in Tiantai meditation:
统一性和多样性都不是首要的。世界并不是表面上看来是多种多样的、迷惑的、有偏见的,而实际上是一个。相反,这两种陈述方式中的任何一种都同样有偏见,并且也同样有效,可以用作对先前偏见的纠正。但正是心的力量将这种既不相同也不不同的歧义消除为某种相同和不同的确定方案,这就是天台禅修中要关注的妄想:
Q: All the texts say that mind and material form are nondual. But if we want to contemplate this, how do we set up our contemplation? A: Mind and material form are one substance; neither precedes the other. Each is the entire dharma-realm. But in the sequence of contemplation, we must start with the internal mind. Once the internal mind is purified, this pure mind will encounter all dharmas, and naturally meld with them all perfectly. Moreover, we must first understand that all dharmas are mind-only, and only then begin contemplating the mind. If you can comprehend all dharmas to the end, you will see that all dharmas are nothing but mind, and that all dharmas are nothing but material form. You must understand
问:所有经典都说名色不二。但如果我们想思惟这个问题,我们该如何去设置我们的思惟呢?答:心与色是一本体;两者都不先于另一个。每一个都是整个法界。但在禅修的顺序中,我们必须从内心开始。内心一旦清净,这个清净的心就会遇到一切法,自然而然地与一切法融为一体。又须先了解诸法唯心,然后才开始观心。若能究竟了悟一切法,则见一切法皆是心,一切法皆是色相。你必须明白

that every existence comes from the distinctions made by one’s own mind. When have dharmas themselves ever declared that they were the same as or different from one another? Hence the Zhanchajing says, “There are two types of contemplation. The first is Consciousness-only [唯識 weishi]. The second is of the Real-Attribute [實相 shixiang, i.e., of the ultimate reality].” The Real-Attribute [practice] is the contemplation of Li while the Consciousness-only [practice] works through individual events [事 shi]. Although Li and events are nondual, the ways for contemplating them are to be slightly separated. Only one who is able to understand this can be spoken to about the Way. 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
一切存在都来自自心的分别。诸法何时曾宣称它们彼此相同或不同?故《瞻茶经》曰:“思惟有二种。第一个是唯识唯识。其二是实相。”实属性[实践]是理的思考,而唯意识[实践]是通过个体事件[事件]进行的。理与事虽然不二,但思惟之道却要稍有分别。只有能明白这一点的人,才能谈论道。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39}
Again, reality is ultimately neither material nor mental. But the contemplation of mind is made primary for the sake of Buddhist praxis, precisely because it is mind that is the source of the problem of delusion and suffering for sentient beings. All is mind, all is matter. But in what sense are things said to be “mind” from the point of view of praxis? The mark of mind is the making of distinctions. Dharmas themselves do not distinguish themselves from one another, do not predicate sameness or difference of themselves. Zhanran here quotes a Chinese apocryphal sutra, the full title of which is Zhancha shan’e yebao jing(占察善惡業報經"The sutra of prognostication and investigation of good and evil karmic retribution"), which gives a fuller exposition of the practice of the “contemplation of consciousness-only,” as follows:
再说一次,现实最终既不是物质的,也不是精神的。但为了佛法的修行,把心观放在第一位,正因为心才是众生迷惑和痛苦问题的根源。一切都是心,一切都是物质。但从实践的角度来看,事物在什么意义上被称为“心”呢?心灵的标记是做出区分。诸法本身并不分别,不谓其同异。湛然这里引用了一部中国伪经,全称《占察善恶业报经》,对善恶报经有更全面的阐述。修习“唯识观”的方法如下:
In all times and places, wherever physical, verbal or mental karma is being created, you should observe and know that it is all mind only. This goes also for all objects and states: whenever the mind fixes its attention in some object of cognition, you should notice and be aware of it, never letting the mind go obliviously chasing after objects without noticing its own activity. Rather, observe each and every movement of the attention. Whenever the mind traces or attends to something, you should return it to make the mind follow after that act of attention itself, so the mind is aware of it. Know that your own inner mind is what is producing thoughts and acts of attention; it is not the objects themselves that have thoughts or make distinctions. That is to say, the inner mind produces countless views of long and short, beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, gain and loss, decay and advantage, existence and nonexistence and so on, while the objects themselves have never had thoughts which give rise to such distinctions. You should know that all objects are themselves devoid of any thoughts and distinctions, so they are
无论何时何地,无论身业、口业、意业正在生起,你应该观察并知道这一切都只是心而已。对于所有的对象和状态也是如此:每当心将注意力集中在某个认知对象上时,你应该注意并觉知它,切勿让心不知不觉地追逐对象而没有注意到它自己的活动。相反,观察注意力的每一个动作。每当心追踪或关注某件事时,你应该将其返回,以使心追随该关注行为本身,以便心意识到它。要知道,是你自己的内心产生了思想和注意力行为;并不是物体本身有思想或有区别。也就是说,内心生出无数的长与短、美与丑、是与非、得与失、衰与利、有与无等种种见地,而物体本身从来没有产生过思想。对于这样的区别。你应该知道,一切事物本身都是没有任何思想和分别的,所以它们是

themselves neither long nor short, neither beautiful nor ugly, and so forth, up to neither existent nor nonexistent. In themselves they are free of all marks. Thus you should observe that all dharmas are born from the thoughts of the mind. In the absence of this mind, there is no dharma and no mark that could view itself as being different from anything else. You should hold and attend to [this operation of your inner mind, and know that there are only these deluded thoughts and no real external objects. Attend to it without cease. This is called cultivating and learning the contemplation [that all is] mental consciousness only. If the mind is inattentive and does not realize that its own attention is operating, it believes there to be external objects before it. This is no longer called the contemplation [that all is] mental consciousness only. 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
它们本身不长不短,不美不丑,等等,乃至非有非无。它们本身没有任何标记。是故应观一切法,皆由心念而生。没有此心,就没有法、相可以自视与其他事物不同。你应该守住内心的这个运作,知道只有这些妄想,没有真正的外物。不间断地关注它。这就叫做修学唯识观。如果心不专心,没有意识到自己的注意力在运作,它就会相信在它面前有外在的物体。这不再仅称为意识观照。 40 40 ^(40){ }^{40}
The function of the mind is to make distinctions, which is what it is to make predications, including those of existence and nonexistence, that is, that there even is or is not an object here to be cognized, about which some predications might be made. It is fundamentally a faculty of dividing. It divides itself from the objects before it, reifying both, and simultaneously separates out the objects from one another, identifying them as this or that, and cognizing various characteristics inhering in them by which to distinguish them. Where it makes a border, it posits a determinate thing within the border. The act of cognition is here regarded in a way very consistent with indigenous Chinese epistemological theories: knowing is a skill in dividing things out of a larger context. Where there is no dividing, there is no thing. To be aware of a thing is here not conceived according to the metaphor of a receiving of an impression, or the lighting up of what was in darkness, or a clearing away of a blockage; it is not a kind of disclosing or illuminating, not a revealing or a reception, but rather a dividing. Where there is any quiddity or characteristic of any kind, there is a distinction, a parsing, a forming of boundaries between “this” and “another.” Without this bordering, no characteristics can exist. But things do not border themselves; it is a particular biased perspective and cognitive apparatus of a sentient being that decides to divide up the world in one way or another, setting the limits to how much of the given counts as “this thing” and how much as “that thing,” where things begin and end. This is what constitutes the world of shapes, colors, entities, characteristics. When contemplating mind, then, where is mind to be found? Mind cannot directly be an object of mind. By mind-contemplation, the attentiveness to, say, the stream of words and emotions through one’s “interior monologue” is not meant. These are mental objects, not the distinguishing function of mind as subject and perceiver. All these things are distinguishable, are perceivable, hence all belong to
心灵的功能是做出区分,这就是作出断言,包括存在和不存在的断言,也就是说,这里甚至存在或不存在一个需要认知的对象,可以对其做出一些断言。从根本上来说,它是一种分裂能力。它把自己与面前的物体分开,将两者具体化,同时将物体彼此分开,将它们识别为这个或那个,并认识到它们所固有的各种特征以区分它们。它在界定边界的地方,就在边界内放置了一个确定的事物。这里的认知行为与中国本土认识论理论非常一致:认知是一种将事物从更大的背景中分离出来的技能。没有分裂的地方就没有事物。在这里,对事物的觉知并不是根据接受印象、照亮黑暗、清除障碍等隐喻来理解的;而是通过感知事物来理解的。它不是一种揭示或启发,不是一种揭示或接受,而是一种分裂。只要存在任何本质或任何类型的特征,“这个”和“另一个”之间就会有区别、解析和界限的形成。没有这个边界,就不可能存在任何特征。但事物本身并没有边界;它是一种有感知力的、有偏见的观点和认知装置,它决定以这种或那种方式划分世界,对给定的事物有多少算作“这个东西”和有多少算作“那个东西”设定了限制,事情开始和结束的地方。这就是形状、颜色、实体、特征的世界的构成。那么,当观照心时,哪里可以找到心呢? 心不能直接成为心的对象。所谓心观,并不是指通过一个人的“内心独白”来关注言语和情感的流动。这些是精神对象,而不是心灵作为主体和感知者的区分功能。所有这些事物都是可区分的、可感知的,因此都属于

the realm of objects. Rather, wherever one notices a characteristic of any kind, any sort of definitive presence, one is to see the activity of mind. The greenness of green, the redness of red, the bookness of book, the spaciness of space: these are mind. And this mind is not the pure mind, but the deluded mind, the mind that makes arbitrary and biased distinctions. This deluded mind is the creator of all particular things, including the Buddha, and it is this deluded mind that is to be the object of contemplation in Tiantai practice.
物体的领域。相反,无论何时,只要一个人注意到任何一种特征、任何一种明确的存在,我们就是在看到心灵的活动。绿色的绿色,红色的红色,书的书性,空间的宽敞:这些是心。而这个心不是清净心,而是迷惑心,是任意分别的心。这个迷惑心是一切事物的创造者,包括佛陀,也正是这个迷惑心才是天台修行观修的对象。
But as we saw in the previous chapter, delusion in Tiantai means partial truth, not pure illusion, and further, by the Three Truths, that each partial truth is, on the one hand, completely false in the sense of failing to correspond to anything in reality, but also, on the other hand, definitely pragmatically useful in overcoming attachments (including the attachment to itself) in some contexts, and further, therefore, a revelation of the absolute and complete unconditional truth. Mind creates deludedly, because it is conditional and partial itself, situated in a certain way, predisposed in a certain way. I do not see the red of this flower as an ant crawling on it would see it, or as a bee coming to pollinate it would see it. What I see here is determined by my cognitive apparatus, the structure of my sense organs, and the kind of framing and focusing I am involved in at the moment due to my preoccupations, the desire-oriented project I am engaged in. I do not see the ultraviolet or infrared wavelengths that are present here, and so on; what I see is a small portion of what is actually present, as Zhanran said about the colors seen by the ordinary human eye in the passage cited in the previous chapter. It is not an ex nihilo mirage, but a narrowing down of what is really there to yield a very partial picture. By being here and being what I am, structured and disposed as I am right now, I create the phenomenal appearances that are manifesting to me. On the other hand, I do not create these determinacies out of thin air, based on nothing real. They are indeed a part of the real-but a part of the real, seen without reference to all its relevant contexts, is not exactly what that same part would appear to be if seen together with all relevant contexts. We have here again the “selecting out” process we’ve seen in earlier Chinese thought: delusion here means to “deem to be definitively same or different,” when in fact the reality before is both same and different, that is to say, is such that the mutually exclusive categories sameness and different do not accurately represent it. Hence, this moment of coming-to-see-as-X is “not created by the Dharma-nature, nor by ignorance, nor by both, nor by neither.” Dharma-nature would be the absolute truth, the total apprehension of the whole reality. Ignorance would be a purely arbitrary creation of something that is just plain false, which is in no sense at all really there. Neither of these is the case; what I see is neither truth nor illusion, which as we have seen are, taken without quali-
但正如我们在上一章中所看到的,天台中的迷是指部分真理,而不是纯粹的幻象,而且,根据三谛,每一个部分真理一方面是完全错误的,因为无法与任何事物相对应。在现实中,但另一方面,在某些情况下,在克服执着(包括对其自身的执着)方面也绝对有用,因此进一步揭示了绝对和完整的无条件真理。心智会迷惑地创造,因为它本身是有条件的、片面的,以某种方式定位、以某种方式预设。我看不到这朵花的红色,就像爬在上面的蚂蚁会看到的那样,或者蜜蜂来授粉时会看到的红色。我在这里看到的东西是由我的认知装置、我的感觉器官的结构以及我此刻由于我的全神贯注、我所从事的以欲望为导向的项目而参与的框架和聚焦的类型决定的。我不查看此处存在的紫外线或红外线波长,等等;我看到的只是实际存在的一小部分,正如前一章引用的段落中湛然所说的普通人眼看到的颜色。这不是无中生有的海市蜃楼,而是缩小了真实存在的范围,从而产生了一幅非常片面的画面。通过在这里并成为我现在的样子、结构和性格,我创造了向我显现的现象。另一方面,我并不是凭空创造这些决定性的,也不是基于任何真实的东西。它们确实是真实的一部分——但是,在不参考所有相关上下文的情况下看待真实的一部分时,如果将其与所有相关上下文一起查看,则与同一部分所呈现的样子并不完全相同。 这里又出现了我们在早期中国思想中看到的“选择”过程:这里的妄想意味着“认为肯定相同或不同”,而事实上之前的现实既相同又不同,也就是说,是这样的,相互排斥的类别“相同”和“不同”并不能准确地表示它。因此,这个见X的时刻“不是法性所造,也不是无明所造,也不是两者所造,也不是两者所造”。法性将是绝对真理,是对整个实相的全面理解。无知纯粹是任意创造出一些完全错误的东西,而这种东西根本不存在。但事实并非如此。我所看到的既不是真理,也不是幻象,正如我们所看到的那样,没有任何条件

fication, meaningless terms in Tiantai epistemology. It is a provisional posit, a local coherence, that is being created by this disambiguating moment of attention, of seeing-as. This is the truth and not the truth. What is crucial here, in the Tiantai sense, is that provisionally positing (jia), the characteristic of “Conventional Truth,” has to be understood in several different senses (not only as having different contents). As Zhili puts it, there is the “provisional positing” of conditional arising(緣生之假 yuansheng zhi jia), characteristic of the Tripitaka and Common teachings; this is standard mereological reductionism of early Buddhism and its refinements and further reversals and entailments in Indo-Tibetan Madhyamika; then there is the provisional positing of “establishing” (建立之假 jianli zhi jia), which refers to the Separate Teaching, encompassing both the positive creation of upāyas by Bodhisattvas and the type of claim found in Nagarjuna (MMK 24:20) that without Emptiness, nothing could exist; and finally there is “the wondrous provisional positing,” “the provisional positing identical to inherent entailment” (妙假,具即是假 miaojia, ju jishi jia) of the Integrated Teaching. 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} Jia of course means first and foremost “false,” but in the context of the Three Truths it also means, “upayically put forth” (temporary) and, further, “inherently entailed,” which is to say, the Center, the absolute, the whole truth This asserts the inextricability from any truth, fact, appearance-ultimate or provisional-of any other truth, fact, appearance, opinion: all are absolute truths in the precise sense of juedai 絕待 given by Zhiyi in the Fahuaxuanyi:42 they are instantiated everywhere, even in their own negation, in whatever is excluded by the contrast by means of which they are determinate at all. As Zhili says, 須即陰說具三千方為妙假:“We need to be able to speak of all Three Thousand as inherently entailed in the aggregates themselves before we can call it the Wondrous Provisional Positing.” 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} We have here a further development of the “whole/part” epistemology, centered on the process of selecting out samenesses and differences from an overabundant set of present alternatives, that undermined the Nominalism/Realist split all the way back to Mencius, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi.
虚构,在天台认识论中毫无意义的术语。它是一个临时的假设,一种局部的连贯性,是由这种消除歧义的注意力和视点时刻所创造的。这是事实,又不是事实。这里关键的是,在天台意义上,“世俗真理”的特征“暂定”必须有几种不同的意义(不仅仅是内容不同)来理解。正如直隶所说,有“缘生之假”,这是三藏和世俗教义的特征;这是早期佛教的标准分体还原论及其在印藏中观中的改进和进一步的逆转和蕴涵;然后是“建立之假 jianli zhi jia”的临时设定,它指的是别教,包括菩萨积极创造的 upāyas 和龙树菩萨的主张类型(MMK 24:20):没有空性,一切都无法存在;最后是综合教学的“妙假”、“妙假,具即是假”。 41 41 ^(41){ }^{41} 甲当然首先意味着“虚假”,但在三谛的背景下,它也意味着“无偿提出”(暂时的),更进一步,“固有的”,也就是说,中心,绝对,全部真理这断言与任何真理、事实、表象(最终的或临时的)与任何其他真理、事实、表象、观点的不可分割性:所有这些都是绝对真理,按照《法华玄义》中至一所给出的“待绝”的精确含义: 42它们无处不在,甚至在它们自己的否定中,在被对比所排除的事物中,而它们正是通过对比而被确定的。正如直隶所言,须即阴说具三千方为妙假:“我们必须能够说三千是五蕴本身所固有的,然后才可以称之为奇妙的临时位置。” 43 43 ^(43){ }^{43} 我们在这里得到了“整体/部分”认识论的进一步发展,其核心是从现有的大量选择中选择相同和差异的过程,这破坏了唯名论/实在论的分裂,一直追溯到孟子、庄子和荀子。
Now we can understand the relation of mind and the Nature, which is the relation between event and Li. Zhili spells out his understanding of the relation of xin and xing, what he means by “not different and yet different,” with a quote from Zhanran’s Zhiguandayi 止觀大意 which makes a very creative adaptation of Fazang’s terms 隨緣 suiyuan (following conditions) and 不變 bubian (unchanging). Zhanran says: "Although present in some particular, conditioned way, it is unconditioned and unchanging. Hence it is ‘the Nature.’ Although unconditioned and unchanging, it follows conditions [and hence manifests as this particular, conditioned presence]. Hence it is ‘the mind’ [隨緣不變故為性,不變隨緣故為心].“44 Bubian, unchanging, or as Zhili puts it, “what is originally there and is never altered”
现在我们可以理解心与自然的关系,也就是事与理的关系。直立引用了瞻然的《止观大意》,阐明了他对“心”与“性”关系的理解,即“不异而不同”,这对法藏的术语“随缘随缘”和“随缘随缘”进行了非常有创意的改编。不变 bubian(不变)。湛然说:“虽然以某种特定的、有为的方式存在,但它是无为的、不变的。所以它是‘自然’。”虽然无为而不变,但它遵循因缘[因此显现为这种特定的、有为的存在],因此它是“心”[随缘不变故为性,不变随为心]。“44不变,不变,或作为。直隶说:“本来就有,不曾改变”

(本有不改 benyoubugai), 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} the unconditional, is the primary denotation of the term the Nature. “Mind,” on the other hand, is used here to denote what does change, what “follows conditions,” the conditional, or rather a particular conditional event, the arising of a state of consciousness following upon the contact between a sense organ and a sense object. Zhili stresses that in fact “mind” here could be replaced by any particular conditional (i.e., determinate) object; we could equally say, “Although unconditioned and unchanging, it follows conditions. Hence it is ‘sentient beings,’” or “Although unconditioned and unchanging, it follows conditions. Hence it is ‘the Buddha.’” Only this full reversibility will match the claim, made in the Avatamsaka Sutra passage cited above, that " [ t ] [ t ] [t][t] here is no difference between mind, Buddha and sentient beings.” In the present case, mind is singled out because of its special relevance for meditation. 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} But in the distinctive Tiantai formulation used here, these two terms, the conditional and the unconditional, are such that they entail and imply one another. That is, both “mind” (or “the Buddha” or “sentient beings”) and “the Nature” are terms that include two opposed but mutually encompassing poles, with a difference in emphasis. Each name implies both meanings, and ultimately refers to the same double-faceted fact, as when we use “equilateral triangle” and “equiangular triangle” to refer to the same triangle, each term necessarily implying the other, but with the emphasis temporarily on one side or the other. The two opposed but ultimately mutually entailing poles in this case are “the conditioned particular (in this case, a moment of sentience, a particular temporal mental event)” and “the unconditioned omnipresent universal.” The unconditioned, the Nature, means what is findable everywhere, which is presencing under any and every condition (the “unchanging”).
(本有不改benyoubugai), 45 45 ^(45){ }^{45} 无条件的,是“自然”一词的主要含义。另一方面,“心”在这里用来表示什么会发生变化,什么“遵循条件”,有条件的,或者更确切地说,是一个特定的有条件的事件,在感觉器官和物体之间接触后出现的意识状态。一个感觉对象。直立强调,实际上这里的“心”可以用任何特定的有缘(即确定的)对象来代替;我们同样可以说:“虽然无为、不变,但它遵循因缘。故曰‘众生’”或“虽无为、不变,却随缘而行。因此它是‘佛陀’。”只有这种完全的可逆性才符合上面引用的《华严经》段落中的主张,即“ [ t ] [ t ] [t][t] 心、佛、众生,无有分别。”在目前的情况下,心灵被挑选出来是因为它与冥想有特殊的相关性。 46 46 ^(46){ }^{46} 但在此处使用的独特的天台表述中,有条件和无条件这两个术语是这样的,它们相互蕴涵和暗示。也就是说,“心”(或“佛”或“众生”)和“性”都是包含两个对立但又相互包容的极点的术语,只是侧重点有所不同。每个名称都隐含着两种含义,最终指的是同一个双面事实,就像当我们用“等边三角形”和“等角三角形”来指代同一个三角形时,每个术语都必然暗示另一个术语,但暂时强调一侧或另一侧。 在这种情况下,两个对立但最终相互关联的极点是“有条件的特殊性(在这种情况下,是感知的时刻,特定的暂时心理事件)”和“无条件的无所不在的普遍性”。无条件的自然意味着随处可见的东西,它在任何条件下都存在(“不变”)。
Xin and xing, then, are, among other things, opposite terms, and the declaration that all dharmas are xinxing must be understood as a deliberate paradox. This point must be stressed, as it is easily overlooked, and is certainly not the case for the usage of the term xinxing in most other schools of Chinese Buddhism. In Tiantai, as we shall see in more detail below, this statement is akin to saying “All things are square-circle,” or perhaps more to the point: “all things are finite-infinite,” or, “all things are permanent-impermanent” or “all things are conditioned-unconditioned” or “all things are relative-absolute.” All things are Ignorance-Dharmanature. All things are Samsara-Nirvana. All things are the event-Li, the Li-event.
因此,“心”和“性”是相反的术语,而“诸法皆心性”的说法必须被理解为故意的悖论。必须强调这一点,因为这一点很容易被忽视,而汉传佛教其他大多数宗派所使用的“心性”一词显然并非如此。在《天台山》中,正如我们将在下面更详细地看到的,这句话类似于说“万物皆方圆”,或者也许更切中要害:“万物有限无限”,或者“万物恒常”。 -无常”或“一切事物都是有为-无为的”或“所有事物都是相对-绝对”。一切法皆是无明法性。一切法皆是轮回涅槃。万物皆是理,理是事。
Thus, the deluded mind “creates” particular dharmas by selecting out from the ever-present ambiguity, the Three Thousand that are actually available at every possible locus, filtering out everything except some particular single entity, excluding all the others. It “creates” them by disambiguating them, deeming them, and itself, to be genuinely susceptible to the bivalent predicates “same” and “different.” This creation comes in two forms.
因此,迷惑的心通过从永远存在的模糊性中选择出实际上在每个可能的地方都可用的三千法来“创造”特定的法,过滤掉除了某个特定的单一实体之外的所有事物,排除所有其他实体。它通过消除它们的歧义来“创造”它们,并认为它们和它本身真正容易受到“相同”和“不同”二价谓词的影响。这种创作有两种形式。
Zhanran had said, "Creation [造 zao] of dharmas by the mind comes in two kinds: The first is in the context of Li , where creation means precisely inherent entailment [造即是具 zao jishi ju]. The second is in the context of events, which is a description of the transformations and creations of the ordinary people and the sages of past, present and future. . . . In all cases, it is only because these things are inherently entailed in Li that it can be created as a phenomenon [有理具方有事造 you liju fang you shizao]…"47 First there is “creation” in terms of Li. This doesn’t mean that an entity called Li creates things. It means that any entity is in one sense the Center, the omnipresent unconditional, “non-dwelling” not as such but the impossibility of this coherence being only this coherence, in isolation from all other coherences, free of all ambiguity. X is determined as X (provisional positing) by setting up boundaries around itself, but these prove to be ambiguous, rendering it impossible to give a determinate inside-outside division, means its identity as X is itself undermined (Emptiness), whereby it becomes impossible to exclude X from being read as any other coherence: its overflows into every other possible determination, which turn out on examination to be synonyms for it “in some sense.” As such, that specific entity, that determination, inherently entails all other determinations, which cannot be separated from it. That coherence in this way brings all other coherences into coherence with it; it is the union of all coherences. It is an activity that is inherently equipped with them as always-available dimensions of its own action. It creates all the others in the sense that it is readable as any of them. Hence, the equilateral triangle “creates” the equiangular triangle, for these are two names for one and the same triangle. This just means that the determination “equilateral,” correctly understood and thought through, leads unavoidably to the determination “equiangular,” and vice versa. Creation in Li is just another name for inherent entailment. Inherent entailment just means “non-dwelling”: the impossibility of dwelling in any particular form, the continual spilling over of any determination, its continual necessity to be something other than any particular determination that might be assigned to it.
瞻然云:“心造法,有二种:一是在理中,造即是具造即是具。二是在理中。事件的脉络,是对过去、现在和未来的普通人和圣人的转变和创造的描述,因为这些东西是理所固有的,所以它可以被创造。作为一种现象[有理具方有事造you liju fang you shizao]……”47 首先,在礼方面有“创造”。这并不意味着一个叫做李的实体创造了东西。这意味着任何实体在某种意义上都是中心,是无所不在的无条件的,“非居住”本身并非如此,但这种连贯性不可能只是这种连贯性,与所有其他连贯性隔离,没有任何模糊性。 X通过在自身周围设置边界来确定为X(临时设定),但事实证明这些边界是模糊的,无法给出确定的内外划分,意味着它作为X的身份本身被破坏(空性),从而变成不可能排除 X 被解读为任何其他连贯性:它溢出到所有其他可能的决定中,经过检查,这些决定“在某种意义上”是它的同义词。因此,那个特定的实体,那个决定,本质上包含了所有其他的决定,而这些决定不能与它分开。这种连贯性以这种方式使所有其他连贯性与其保持连贯性。它是所有一致性的结合。它是一种本质上配备有它们的活动,作为其自身行动的始终可用的维度。它创建了所有其他的,因为它可以像它们中的任何一个一样可读。 因此,等边三角形“创建”了等角三角形,因为这是同一个三角形的两个名称。这只是意味着,正确理解和思考后,“等边”的确定不可避免地会导致“等角”的确定,反之亦然。理中的创造只是内在蕴含的另一个名称。固有蕴涵仅仅意味着“非居住”:以任何特定形式居住的不可能性,任何决定的持续溢出,它持续成为可能被分配给它的任何特定决定之外的东西。
In fact, a Li is just a “non-dwelling root.” It is something that “transcends” its ingression in any particular form, that is, can be comprehended outside of these particular ingressions, remains what it is no matter what form it appears in. It “transcends” any particular determinate form, does not “dwell” in/as any of them. It is a “root” in that these particular determinations are nonetheless dependent-in the sense of inseparable, not in the sense of logical or temporal priority-on it for their existence or appearance in experience. The latter are reducible to it, grow out of it, such that, in fact, this non-dwelling root manifests completely in a particular form, with nothing left over. The wetness is just the waviness. But there is not some
事实上,离只是一个“无住根”。它是一种“超越”任何特定形式的进入的东西,也就是说,可以在这些特定的进入之外被理解,无论它以什么形式出现,它都保持原样。它“超越”任何特定的确定形式,不“居住在/作为他们中的任何一个。它是一个“根源”,因为这些特定的决定在经验中的存在或出现仍然依赖于它——在不可分割的意义上,而不是在逻辑或时间优先性的意义上。后者可以还原为它,从它中生长出来,这样,事实上,这个非居住的根完全以一种特定的形式显现出来,没有留下任何东西。湿润只是波纹。但没有一些

particular entity or nonentity called the non-dwelling root, as against a bunch of other entities that are dwelling (fixed determinacies, which can appear only in one time and place) and merely, as it were, “branches,” that is, dependent offshoots with no further productivity. Rather, every one of the Three Thousand Quiddities is the non-dwelling root to all other dharmas, and every other dharma also plays the role of the rooted and the fixed that express the non-dwelling root. Thus, we can continue to say, “looked at in terms of a dung beetle, all these things are the dung beetle’s realized functions,” to use another of Zhili’s formulations. Li is a non-dwelling root, and a non-dwelling root is a Center.
特定的实体或非实体称为非居住根,相对于一堆其他居住实体(固定的决定性,只能出现在一个时间和地点),并且仅仅是“分支”,即依赖的没有进一步生产力的分支。相反,三千法中的每一个都是其他诸法的无住根本,而其他所有的法也扮演着表示无住根本的根本和固定的角色。因此,我们可以继续说,“从粪甲虫的角度来看,这一切都是粪甲虫所实现的功能”,用智力的另一个说法来说。离是无住根,无住根是中心。
Then there is the creation in event, which means that this present moment of thought leads to further moments of thoughts, and the contents thereof; creation in events is the filtering out and parsing activity of the mind, the setting of limits which disambiguates this interpenetrative Li in any given instance. This specific manner of appearing conditions other specific manners of appearing, in a real-time sequence of events. The same two types of creation will apply equally to any dharma, mind or matter. It is not so much that Li creates events, but rather that Li means “inherent entailment of all entities in each entity,” the eternal availability of all entities as dimensions of the action that constitutes any entity, the fact that each action is inherently equipped with all the others while they are also equipped with it, that to act is to have available for subsumption all other actions which in turn makes oneself available for subsumption into them, and so this fact about dharma X will be what enables dharma Y to be dharma Y also. Dharma X’s Li (or, more strictly, dharma X as Li ) in this sense “creates” dharma Y, and vice versa. Their creation in event, on the other hand, is a way of singling out this same specific intentional disambiguating mental activity, and the world as it appears through the filter of this activity. The creation in activity is conditioned by inherent entailment in Li, but not single-handedly caused by it. The conditioned is conditioned but not caused by the unconditioned, for the unconditioned is, because unconditioned, not determinable as a single entity, and thus not capable of being a cause, that is to say, something single-handed capable of making any determinate fact “so.” Thus, as Zhili says, we must not one-sidedly cling to Zhanran’s statement that “it is only because these things are inherently entailed in Li that it can be created as a phenomenon” to set up a doctrine of the Pure Original Mind, or the Li per se, actually creating all dharmas. Instead, he says, we should know that Zhanran’s meaning is that the deluded phenomenal mind is itself Li , to wit, the function of Li 48 4 Li 48 4 Li^(48)^(4)\mathrm{Li}^{48}{ }^{4} The "function of Li " (理之用 li zhi yong) is another combination of opposite terms, equivalent to xinxing interpreted to mean “the Nature as the deluded mind,” “the mind as filtering down of the Nature,” the conditioned-unconditioned. Each event is the
然后是事件中的创造,这意味着当前的思想时刻会导致进一步的思想时刻及其内容;事件中的创造是心灵的过滤和解析活动,是在任何特定情况下消除这种相互渗透的“理”的歧义的限制的设置。在事件的实时序列中,这种特定的出现方式影响其他特定的出现方式。同样的两种创造类型同样适用于任何法、心或色。与其说“理”创造了事件,不如说“理”意味着“每个实体中所有实体的固有蕴涵”,所有实体作为构成任何实体的行动的维度的永恒可用性,每个行动都固有地配备的事实与所有其他人一起,同时他们也配备了它,行动就是可以包容所有其他行动,这反过来又使自己可以包容其中,因此关于达摩X的这一事实将使得达摩Y成为可能法Y也。 Dharma X 的 Li(或者更严格地说,dharma X 作为 Li )在这个意义上“创造”了 dharma Y,反之亦然。另一方面,它们在事件中的创造是一种挑选出这种特定的、有意消除歧义的心理活动的方式,以及通过这种活动的过滤器所呈现的世界。活动中的创造是以礼的内在必然性为条件的,但不是由礼单独造成的。有条件的东西是有条件的,但不是由无条件的东西引起的,因为无条件的东西,因为无条件的东西,不能作为一个单一的实体来确定,因此不能成为一个原因,也就是说,不能单独地做出任何确定的事实。 “所以。因此,正如直隶所言,我们不能片面固守湛然的“唯有理所蕴,方可创为现象”的说法来建立清净本心的学说。或理本身,实际上创造了一切法。相反,他说,我们应该知道湛然的意思是,迷惑的现象心本身就是理,即理的作用。 Li 48 4 Li 48 4 Li^(48)^(4)\mathrm{Li}^{48}{ }^{4} “理之用”是另一种对立术语的组合,相当于心性解释为“迷心之性”、“自然滤下的心”、“缘起之心”。无条件的。每个事件都是

unconditioned-conditioned, the conditioned-unconditioned, the unchanging that follows conditions, the following of conditions that is unchanging.
无为有为、有为无为、因缘之后不变、因缘跟随不变。
This does not mean the nature is prior and the appearance is posterior. When Zhili or Zhanran says, “It is only because there is inherent entailment of this thing in the nature that there can possibly be transformation into or creation of this thing in phenomena,” 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} they do not in any way imply a foundational priority of the nature over phenomenal events. Rather, they mean an induction similar to what we do when we come to realize that a certain triangle has three equal angles; we conclude that it must have three equal sides, because only if it had three equal sides could it possibly have three equal angles. This is not because the sides come first and the angles after, or vice versa; they are simultaneous, and mutually implicative. Whichever one we can realize first assures us of the existence of the other. So principle and phenomena are simultaneous, neither is the final ground of the other. But in Buddhist practice we look at our own mind as a deluded phenomenon, and from that see the structure of the rest of the situation, the mind and all dharmas as mutually subsumptive phenomena and as mutually subsumptive eternal objects.
这并不是说性在先,表象在后。当直隶或湛然说:“正是因为这个东西在本质上有内在蕴涵,所以现象上才有可能转化或创造出这个东西”。 39 39 ^(39){ }^{39} 它们无论如何并不意味着自然优先于现象事件。相反,它们意味着类似于我们意识到某个三角形具有三个相等的角度时所做的归纳;我们得出结论,它必须具有三个相等的边,因为只有当它具有三个相等的边时,它才可能具有三个相等的角。这并不是因为边在先而角在后,或者反之亦然;它们是同时发生的,并且相互关联。无论我们首先认识到哪一个,都可以确保另一个的存在。所以原理和现象是同时存在的,都不是对方的最终根据。但在佛教修行中,我们将自己的心视为一种迷惑的现象,并从中看到其余情况的结构、心和一切法作为相互包容的现象和相互包容的永恒对象。
Li, the Buddha-nature, Truth, Ultimate Reality, Original Enlightenment, the Non-dwelling root are not to be construed as some preexisting (in)determinate ground that single-handedly creates or emanates to form all phenomenal existences, the literal “source of all things.” Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that for Zhili each dharma-as-a-Li, not “Li as such,” is a condition of all experience in the precise sense of a Kantian a priori category. Zhili says the “one nature” is not a “fixed single nature,” which is equivalent to saying also that this “same nature” is not a “fixedly same nature.” It is not definitively “the same.” Rather, it is the nature in the sense of unchanging, but unchanging only in the sense of non-dwelling, which is the only sense in which it can serve as a ground or “root.” In fact, we can say it is a multitude of alternate “Ones” or different “Samenesses.” Which particular version of Li is now functioning, however, is entirely a function of what’s going on with my delusion at this moment: Li is loneliness right now because I am lonely. This is what Zhili says, that both the Three Thousand as-events and the Three Thousand as-Lis are unified by a single moment of deluded attention, by a particular event. It is the totality as event that unifies all Lis and all events, and also unifies Lis and events, such that they too are intersubsumptive. This moment of deluded determinateness is ineradicable, and is the premise for the rest of the contemplation. We start where we are. There is no limitedness as such: rather, as Zhanran says, “The Real-Attribute is necessarily all dharmas, and all dharmas are necessarily the Three Thousand” (實相必諸法,諸法必三千 shixiang bi zhufa, zhufa bi sanqian). Limitedness includes this particular limit; all the other limits, the
理、佛性、真理、究竟实相、本觉、无住根本,不应被解释为某种预先存在的、单独创造或散发形成一切现象存在的确定基础,即字面上的“源头”。万物。”事实上,更准确的说法是,对于直立来说,每一个法即理,而不是“理本身”,是康德先验范畴的精确意义上的所有经验的条件。直隶说“一性”不是“固定的单一性”,也就相当于说这个“同性”不是“固定的同一性”。这并不是绝对的“相同”。相反,它是不变意义上的自然,但只有在非居住意义上的不变,这是它可以作为基础或“根”的唯一意义。事实上,我们可以说它是众多交替的“一”或不同的“同一性”。然而,现在哪个版本的李正在发挥作用,完全取决于我此时此刻的错觉:李现在很孤独,因为我很孤独。这就是智理所说的,三千如事和三千如理都是由一刹那的迷惑、由一个特定的事件统一起来的。正是作为事件的整体统一了所有的理和所有事件,也统一了理和事件,因此它们也是相互包容的。这个迷惑决定性的时刻是无法根除的,并且是其余沉思的前提。我们从现在的位置开始。没有这样的限制,正如湛然所说:“实相必诸法,诸法必三千”。三千)。有限性包括这一特定限制;所有其他限制,
Three Thousand, are correlative to this limit I now deludedly experience as this determinate state.
三千,与我现在迷惑地体验为这种确定状态的这个极限相关。
That is, when one thing is determined as X , all other things are also Xish, no matter what X is. The universe is an infinity of alternate Onenesses. The Non-dwelling “One” nature is that by virtue of which all things are readable as “of the same nature as” whatever X might be adduced. This is the “one same nature”-not some particular characteristic that is “the same” in all cases, but the characteristic of “sameness-as-difference” as such. It is that all dharmas are the Same as any X that reveals their Emptiness; it is not that their sameness or inclusion in mind in particular is Emptiness, or that Emptiness is Mind. Emptiness is ambiguity, which means their ability to be something besides what they are. Emptiness is seen by means of their ability to converge as anything, not by whatever it is they happen to be converging as. Provisional Positing is the fact that in spite of converging into something, they remain themselves. The Center is the fact that these are one fact, not two facts, about them. Hence, at the next level both this sameness and this difference are the same for all dharmas, and moreover both are eternally different for all dharmas. This is the Three Truths all over again. For all Three Thousand are in one sense “the same” in all cases, applying everywhere as categories, as we’ll discuss in more detail momentarily. “Sameness” is one of the characteristics that is “the same” for all things, shared in all cases. “Difference,” however, is another one. But Zhili here points to the shared characteristic of “allowing all difference to be unified or read as the same one, no matter what that one is” as Li , because it is what allows us to come to see the undecidability, and hence the interpervasion, of all the other shared characteristics. In contemplation of the mind, we see that the phenomenal, determinate, simply located moment of mental experience unifies all other dharmas, that all dharmas converge here as this moment of experience and share its nature, that the border between this quality and the others which are internal-external to it can never be established. All dharmas have the nature of this moment of experience, which means they all have the characteristic of “being able to assimilate to and form a part of this determinate experience without ceasing to be what they are.” Matter is experienceable as mental, mind as material-in either case, what is important is their undecidability. That is, they are experienced here as this moment but also as something distinct from this moment (“converging as this moment” and “not losing their own essences”). This is the “event as totalizer,” sameness on the level of phenomenal occasions. The deluded mind transforms into and creates all things: this means that as soon as my mind becomes X X XX, it makes all things appear as aspects of X X XX, converge as X, as X’s inside-outside. This reveals something about both this experience and about all other things, as phenomenal occurrences. It reveals that X X XX is X X XX
也就是说,当一件事物被确定为 X 时,所有其他事物也都是 Xish,无论 X 是什么。宇宙是无限的交替的一体性。非居住的“一”本质是指,凭借它,所有事物都可以被解读为与可能引用的任何X“具有相同的本质”。这就是“同性”——不是某种在所有情况下都“相同”的特定特征,而是“同异”的特征本身。一切法与揭示其空性的任何 X 都是相同的;并不是说它们在心上的同一性或包容性就是空性,或者说空性就是心性。空性就是模糊性,这意味着它们有能力成为不同于它们本身的东西。空性是通过它们聚合为任何东西的能力来看到的,而不是通过它们碰巧聚合为任何东西来看到。临时定位是这样一个事实:尽管它们聚合成某种东西,但它们仍然是它们自己。中心的事实是,这些是关于他们的一个事实,而不是两个事实。因此,在下一层次中,这个相同和这个差异对于一切法来说都是相同的,而且对于一切法来说两者都是永恒不同的。这又是三谛。因为所有三千人在某种意义上在所有情况下都是“相同的”,作为类别在任何地方都适用,正如我们稍后将更详细讨论的那样。 “同一性”是所有事物“相同”的特征之一,在所有情况下都是共享的。然而,“差异”是另一回事。但这里的直立指出了与李一样“允许所有差异被统一或解读为同一事物”的共同特征,因为它使我们能够看到不可判定性,从而看到渗透性。 ,所有其他共同特征。 在心的观照中,我们看到心理体验的现象性的、确定性的、简单定位的时刻统一了所有其他的诸法,所有的诸法作为这个体验的时刻汇聚于此并共享其本质,这个性质与其他诸法之间的边界是由这个性质决定的。它的内部和外部永远无法建立。一切法都有当下体验的本质,也就是说,它们都具有“能同化而成为此有定体验的一部分,而不会停止其本来面目”的特性。物质作为精神是可体验的,心灵作为物质是可体验的——无论哪种情况,重要的是它们的不可判定性。也就是说,它们在这里被体验为此时此刻,但也被体验为不同于此时此刻的某种东西(“汇聚为此时此刻”和“不失去自己的本质”)。这就是“事件作为累加器”,现象级事件的同一性。迷惑心会转化并创造一切事物:这意味着一旦我的心变得 X X XX ,它使所有事物都表现为 X X XX ,收敛为 X,如 X 的内-外。这揭示了关于这种经历和所有其他事物的一些东西,作为现象发生。它揭示了 X X XX X X XX

in spite of being nothing but non-X. It also reveals that all non-Xs can be Xish without changing in the least, without ceasing to be non-Xish. This reveals that all of them are Li, that is, the Three Truths, which is to say, determinate only as undecidable, which is to say, categories, determinacies which are nowhere and everywhere, as we shall see below. The one Li may also be described as Three Thousand different, but intersubsuming, Lis. We may indeed say that all things are creations or aspects of some one particular-of mind, or of delusion, or of the Buddha-nature-but only to the extent that we are seeing this X as precisely also non-X, as subsuming all its internal-external conditions, thus, seeing it as principle. Mind creates all dharmas because mind is not only mind, but rather mind-matter, mind/non-mind. Thus, it can fulfill the “multiple conditions” stipulation of the doctrine of dependent co-arising. All things are produced by X because X can never be just X .
尽管只是非X。它还表明,所有非 X 都可以成为 Xish,而无需做出任何改变,也不会停止成为非 Xish。这揭示了它们都是理,即三谛,也就是说,只是作为不可判定的来决定的,也就是说,范畴、决定性是无处不在的,正如我们将在下面看到的。一礼也可以被描述为三千不同但相互包容的礼。我们确实可以说,一切事物都是某个特定的创造物或某些方面——心灵的、妄想的、或佛性的——但只是在我们看到这个X也恰好是非X的范围内,作为包含一切内外因缘,故视之为理。心创造一切法,因为心不仅是心,而且是名色、名/非名。因而,它可以满足缘起说的“多重条件”规定。所有事物都是由 X 产生的,因为 X 永远不可能只是 X 。
All things are xinxing, says Zhanran. In terms of mind-contemplation, for reasons too complicated to go into here, this is taken to mean that each perceived coherence is a function of the mind, hence an intrinsic unchangeable aspect of mind, hence the sole essence of mind, what mind really is and always has been, and thus equally what all other entities really are and have always been. 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} But in that case, Zhanran continues, all these natures, since they are all findable everywhere, are one and the same nature. Otherwise, there would be change from one to another; none of them would be truly unchangeable and findable everywhere if something were truly “other” to it, if the appearance of something could displace it. There cannot be multiple unconditioned existences, because in that case each would be limited-excluded-by the “condition” of the presence of the other. However, this means that there is no particular coherence one could point to that is unchangeable, that must be appearing simpliciter everywhere, or even anywhere. That means there cannot be only one specific unconditioned coherence. We have here a pure form of ironic coherence: it is one because it is none because it is many, it is many because it one because it is none. For the very same reason that they are all one nature, there is no specifiable nature at all: as Zhanran says, “one nature is no nature”(一性無性 yixingwuxing). For although a given X may be the nature, unchangeable and present everywhere, since X is equally Y , X Y , X Y,X\mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{X} need not be present anywhere at all as X itself, it might be present only as Y . There is no X one could point to that is unconditioned and present everywhere, that can be found under all conditions, except in the form of other coherences. Zhanran’s meaning here is clarified in his Zhiguanyili with a useful metaphor:
展然说,万物皆心性。就心灵沉思而言,由于过于复杂的原因,无法在此详细说明,这被认为意味着每个感知到的连贯性都是心灵的功能,因此是心灵的内在不变的方面,因此是心灵的唯一本质,即心灵真正的本质。现在是并且一直是,因此同样是所有其他实体真正是什么并且一直是。 50 50 ^(50){ }^{50} 但既然如此,展然又接着说道,所有这些性质,既然随处可见,那就是同一个性质。否则,就会有从一个到另一个的变化;如果某物确实与它“不同”,如果某物的出现可以取代它,那么它们中没有一个是真正不可改变的、随处可见的。不可能存在多个无条件的存在,因为在这种情况下,每个存在都会受到另一个存在的“条件”的限制(排除)。然而,这意味着没有任何特定的连贯性可以指出是不可改变的,必须在任何地方甚至任何地方都显得更加简单。这意味着不可能只有一种特定的无条件一致性。我们在这里有一种纯粹形式的讽刺连贯性:它是一,因为它是无,因为它是多,它是多,因为它是一,因为它是无。正因为它们都是一性,所以根本没有可指定的性:正如湛然所说,“一性无性”。因为虽然给定的 X 可能是本质,但不可改变且无处不在,因为 X 同样是 Y , X Y , X Y,X\mathrm{Y}, \mathrm{X} 根本不需要作为 X 本身出现在任何地方,它可能只作为 Y 出现。不存在任何人可以指出的 X 是无条件的、无处不在的、可以在所有条件下找到的,除了以其他相干性的形式。湛然的《直观遗理》中用一个有用的比喻阐明了这里的意思:
The clinging mind is originally itself all dharmas. In contemplating this clinging mind, we see that it is empty and false. The Three Thousand within this falseness are in their own essence devoid of
执着心本来就是一切法。当观照这个执着心时,我们会发现它是空虚和虚假的。此虚妄中的三千,其本质无有。

nature. They are themselves the inconceivable perfect Three Truths of the nature of mind. It is like the images of flowers in the sky. There is no difference in substance between the flowers and the empty sky. But this empty sky does not match either the name of “flower” or the name of “empty sky,” for the latter was originally posited in contradistinction to the flowers. This emptiness has no name. You should carefully extend this comparison in detail-it applies to all things. 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
自然。它们本身就是不可思议、圆满的心性三圣谛。就如天空中花朵的影像。花与空无实质区别。但这个空的天空既不符合“花”的名称,也不符合“空的天空”的名称,因为后者本来就是与花相对立的。这种空虚没有名字。你应该仔细地详细扩展这种比较——它适用于所有事物。 51 51 ^(51){ }^{51}
We might be tempted to think of the emptiness of the sky as the unconditioned: it is everywhere, it is present even in its absence, it is unremovable, it encompasses all things and indeed is present even where it appears to be displaced, in the filled-in spaces occupied by non-space things, such as the flowers. But for this very reason, we cannot use the name “empty sky” as a determinate name for the unconditional, because this discernible name “empty sky” was posited in contrast to the filled in spaces, the flowers. “Non-flowers” is internal to the original meaning of “empty sky,” and this contrast alone gives it its meaning. Once these are seen to be identical, because the objects doing the filling-in are in their substance also empty sky, empty sky is no longer a legitimate name for this nature, since it has nothing with which to be contrasted. As Zhanran says, this is the basic structure applying to everything in Tiantai thinking: precisely by succeeding in pervading, this determinate item-in this case, sky-is no longer that which is pervading; it annuls itself by its very success. So whatever name, characteristic, essence or “nature” is chosen for “the Nature” ipso facto ceases to be a legitimate name for the Nature. One nature is no nature. No specific nature can be the one unconditioned nature, and at the same time any particular coherence that appears in experience must be the entirety of this one nature. Hence, Zhanran concludes that each function is the entirety of the Nature, is in fact all Three Thousand quiddities appearing as this particular thing. The quiddity “mind” that pervades and is findable in all experienced entities, by virtue of its “creation” and “inherent entailment” of them, ceases to be meaningfully determinable as “mind” by virtue of that very fact, since mind is, by definition, what is set up in opposition, separated from, these quiddities. Thus, as our Zhanran concludes, one can say that there is mind and there is matter (the two names are contrasted), or that there is neither mind nor matter (no name fits the case), or that there is only mind, or that there is only matter (any name will equally do). To be a Li is to be unconditional. To be unconditional is to be omnipresent. To be omnipresent is to intersubsume all other determinations, copresent in and as all of them. Thus, as Zhili says, “the Substance/Nature,” this Li, is not
我们可能会倾向于认为天空的空性是无为的:它无处不在,即使在它不存在的情况下它也存在,它是不可移动的,它包含所有事物,并且即使在它看起来被移位的地方,它确实存在。被非空间物体(例如花朵)占据的填充空间。但正因为如此,我们不能用“空空”这个名字作为无条件的确定名称,因为“空空”这个可辨别的名字是与充满的空间、花朵相对立的。 “无花”是“空虚”本义的内在含义,只有这种对比才赋予它意义。一旦这些被认为是相同的,因为进行填充的物体本质上也是空虚的天空,空空的天空就不再是这种性质的合法名称,因为它没有任何可以与之对比的东西。正如湛然所说,这就是天台思想中适用于一切事物的基本结构:正是通过成功的遍及,这个确定的事物——在这里是天空——不再是遍及的东西;而是通过遍及的东西而存在。它因其成功而自我毁灭。因此,无论为“自然”选择什么名称、特征、本质或“自然”,事实上都不再是自然的合法名称。一种本性不是本性。没有任何特定的性质可以是单一的无条件的性质,同时经验中出现的任何特定的连贯性也必须是这一单一性质的整体。因此,湛然得出结论,每一个功能都是大自然的整体,实际上是所有三千本质都表现为这个特定的东西。 凭借其“创造”和它们的“内在蕴含”,渗透到所有有经验的实体中并在所有有经验的实体中找到的本质“心灵”,不再能够凭借这一事实而被有意义地确定为“心灵”,因为心灵是,根据定义,与这些本质相对立、分离的东西。因此,正如我们瞻然的结论,我们可以说有心有色(这两个名称是对比的),或者说无心无色(没有名称适合这种情况),或者只有心,或者只有物质(任何名字都可以)。做礼就是无条件的。无条件就是无所不在。无所不在就是包容所有其他决定,并作为它们共同存在。因此,正如直隶所说,“物质/自然”,这个“礼”,不是

a “Nature of oneness”: rather, it is a “Three Thousand Nature”(此性體非謂一性,蓋三千性也). 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} That is, it is Three Thousand intersubsuming Lis.
“一性”:确切地说,是“三千性”(此性体非谓一性,盖三千性也)。 52 52 ^(52){ }^{52} 即是三千里相容。

THE THREE THOUSAND LIS AND THE THREE THOUSAND EVENTS
三千故事和三千事件

In the Northern Song, as we have noted, some Tiantai writers, later called the “Shanwai,” began to express this eternity and omnipresence in terms of the privileging of “Awareness” (知 zhi) or Mind, which characterizes later Huayan thought (i.e., Chengguan and Zongmi, although, as we have seen, even in Fazang a similar tendency is discernible) and early Chan. Here, the Mind is a transcendent category that produces all phenomena, and of which all phenomena are transformations. It is in this sense at least conceptually prior to them, and is their ontological base, although it is not a definite objective entity. It is pure indeterminacy, pure subjectivity itself. Realizing this all-pervasive awareness as all things is awakening, and so this Mind is called Principle (Li). Praxis for the Shanwai writers means to see “the Three Thousand Quiddities” as this present moment of mind, which is the transformation of mind as such, with nothing left out. Principle is mind as the all-embracing “whole,” which is uniquely capable of producing, determining, containing, and unifying all differentiated existences. It is the only true category, the only universal, all-pervasive and undifferentiated. Some of the later Shanwai, such as Gushan Zhiyuan 孤山智圓 (976-1022), adopt Zhili’s critique of the xingqi doctrine attributed to Huayan: the idea that all dharmas “arise from” but are not “inherently included in” the Nature, that is, in Li. But for the Shanwai, the Three Thousand are inherently included not in “mind-and/or/as-the-nature” but only in “the nature of mind”-awareness as such-and the one-way ground-grounded relation between principle as such and the Three Thousand quiddities remains.
正如我们所注意到的,在北宋,一些天台作家,后来被称为“山外”,开始用“知”或“心”的特权来表达这种永恒和无所不在,这是后来华严思想的特征。即城管和宗密,尽管正如我们所见,即使在法藏中也可以看出类似的倾向)和早期的禅宗。在此,心是产生一切现象的超然范畴,一切现象都是心的变化。从这个意义上说,它至少在概念上先于它们,并且是它们的本体论基础,尽管它不是一个明确的客观实体。它是纯粹的不确定性,纯粹的主观性本身。当一切事物都在觉醒时,了知这种无所不在的觉知,所以这个心被称为理。山外作家的实践意味着将“三千精”视为当下的心,即心的转变,不遗漏任何东西。原则是作为包罗万象的“整体”的心灵,它具有独特的能力来产生、决定、包含和统一所有差异的存在。它是唯一真正的范畴,唯一普遍的、普遍的和无差别的。一些后来的山外学者,如孤山智圆(976-1022),采纳了直隶对华严的性气学说的批判:认为一切诸法“生于”自然,但并非“固有地包含在”自然之中。 ,即在李中。但对于山外来说,三千本质上并不包含在“心和/或/如性”之中,而只包含在“心性”中——觉知本身——以及两者之间的单向根基关系。原则本身和三千金仍然存在。
Zhili opposes this doctrine by asserting that the Three Thousand must be understood in two different senses, or levels, and that this alone expresses Zhiyi’s original meaning, as opposed to the Huayan and Chan versions which are verbally so similarly. Zhili writes:
直隶反对这一学说,声称“三千”必须从两种不同的意义或层次来理解,并且仅此一点就表达了“直义”的原始含义,而不是华严和禅宗的版本,两者在语言上非常相似。志立写道:
You should understand that the categories “subsuming whole” and “subsumed part” [總別 zong bie] each apply to both the Three Thousand as Lis and the Three Thousand as events. Only when these two [i.e., the subsuming whole and the subsumed parts of the Three-Thousand-as-Lis, on the one hand, and both of these for the Three-Thousand-as-events, on the other] are seen as identical is the Wondrous Contemplation accomplished. 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
你应该明白,“总别zong bie”这两个类别分别适用于“三千李”和“三千事件”。只有当这两者[即一方面,三千为理的包含整体和包含的部分,另一方面,三千为事件的这两者]被视为所成就的妙思惟也是如此。 53 53 ^(53){ }^{53}
Here we have the locus classicus for Zhili’s doctrine of the relation between the different levels of Li and event. Each of the Three Thousand coherences is to be simultaneously construed in four different ways, as Li-totality, as Li-particular, as event-totality, and as event-particular. Whether we are speaking in terms of Li or of events, there is interpervasion such that all the different particulars are subsumed into each other part, the latter serving in any given case as the unifying totality. But event-interpervasion is not the same as Li -interpervasion, although it is a one-sided revelation of the latter. Event-interpervasion is what we see in the creation by mind of all dharmas: there remains a one-sided relationship of creator to created, or of disambiguator and disambiguated. All other events are subsumed into the mind, not yet vice versa. If another event is considered, then all events are subsumed into this event and not vice versa. Li -interpervasion is not merely subsumption, but the further fact that all subsumption is also intersubsumption. To be subsumed is to subsume, and vice versa. When these two types of interpervasion are seen as one and the same interpervasion, when these Three Thousand are seen to be the selfsame Three Thousand, enlightenment is accomplished. This means the one-way subsumption of all coherences by this moment of spuriously creative experience, the interpervasion of events exemplified in “creation” by mind, which is one-sided in that “the mind” is the disambiguator and the external dharmas are the disambiguated, comes to be seen as none other than the bilateral intersubsumption of all Lis. For a Li is what both subsumes all particulars and is subsumed in all particulars.
这里我们找到了直隶学说的经典轨迹,即不同层次的理与事件之间的关系。三千连贯性中的每一个都可以同时以四种不同的方式被解释为“理整体”、“理特定”、“事件整体”和“事件特定”。无论我们用“理”还是“事件”来说话,都存在着一种渗透性,使得所有不同的细节都包含在彼此的部分中,后者在任何特定情况下都充当统一的整体。但事件穿插与李穿插并不相同,尽管它是后者的片面揭示。事件的渗透是我们在一切法的心创造中所看到的:创造者与创造者,或者消歧者与消歧者之间仍然存在着一种片面的关系。所有其他事件都被纳入头脑中,反之亦然。如果考虑另一个事件,则所有事件都包含在该事件中,反之亦然。理渗透不仅仅是包容,更进一步的事实是所有的包容也是相互包容。被包容就是包容,反之亦然。当这两种渗透被视为同一种渗透时,当这三千被视为同一三千时,证悟就完成了。这意味着这一虚假的创造性体验时刻对所有连贯性的单向包容,以心灵“创造”为例的事件的渗透,这是片面的,因为“心灵”是消歧者,而外在的佛法是消除歧义后,它被视为所有 Lis 的双边相互包容。因为“礼”既包含所有细节,又包含在所有细节之中。
Buddhist practice, then, begins with noticing that external objects are de facto internal to the mind, that mind in its ordinary operations subsumes all its objects. This subsumption of objects into mind is not enlightenment, but on the contrary, precisely the opposite: it is the very definition of delusion. The point of the practice is to see that this form of deluded subsumption turns out to have always already been identical to the other kind of subsumption: the subsumption of Lis, which is necessarily intersubsumption. Seeing the copresence of same and different in the de facto subsumption of conditional objects by conditional mind is what reveals that they are, in fact, not simply-located finite objects at all, but can only be provisionally posited as empty as the Center, that is, unconditional and intersubsumptive Lis. The mind thus discovers, in the process of this transition whereby the two forms of subsumption are seen to be identical, that it itself-this conditional event of mentation-is an unconditional Li , instantiated omnipresently even in and as its very absence, in the fashion of the self-forgetting of the Lotus Sutra; but more importantly, that all its conditional phenomenal objects are themselves also Lis, which in turn subsume it, and instantiate themselves in it, the phenomenal mind, by means of their very self-negation: each object too is provisionally posited as empty as the Center.
因此,佛教修行首先要注意外在物体实际上是心灵的内部,心灵在其日常运作中包含了所有的物体。这种将对象纳入心的做法并不是开悟,相反,恰恰相反:这正是迷惑的定义。实践的重点是要看到,这种形式的迷惑包容实际上已经与另一种包容:Lis的包容相同,这必然是相互包容。看到条件心事实上对条件对象的包容中相同与不同的共存,揭示了它们实际上根本不是简单定位的有限对象,而只能暂时被假设为与中心一样空的,即是,无条件且内在的 Lis。因此,在这两种形式的包容被视为相同的转变过程中,心灵发现,它本身——这种有条件的心理活动——是一个无条件的“理”,甚至在它不存在的情况下,也无处不在地被实例化。 《法华经》忘我风尚;但更重要的是,它的所有有条件的现象对象本身也是 Lis,而 Lis 反过来又包含它,并通过它们的自我否定在现象心智中实例化自己:每个对象也被暂时假定为空,就像中心。
Zhili goes on to define how these terms are to be understood:
志立接着定义了如何理解这些术语:

Abstract 抽象的

Above the “subsumed parts” were specified in accordance with the fact that all the dharmas retain their own essences [when they are unified into a “subsuming whole”]. Now we specify the “subsuming whole” by virtue of the fact that [all these parts] converge as a single moment of experience. They unceasingly maintain their own essences, and yet are unceasingly converging as some single moment. Thus the subsuming whole and the subsumed parts are mutually subsumptive, in terms of both all dharmas as inherent in the Nature [i.e., as eternal and omnipresent, as Lis], and all dharmas dependently co-arising [as events located at a particular time and place]. This does not mean that the subsumed parts are the phenomena and the subsuming whole is the Li. Moreover you should understand that the “subsuming whole” for both all-dharmas-as-Lis and all-dharmas-as-events is a single event, a phenomenal moment of experience. 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}
以上所说的“分部”,是根据诸法各有其本质而定的。现在,我们通过以下事实来指定“包容整体”:[所有这些部分]汇聚成一个单一的经验时刻。它们不断地保持着自己的本质,却又不断地汇聚成某个单一的时刻。因此,包容整体和包容部分是相互包容的,就一切法而言,它们都是自然固有的[即永恒和无所不在的,如Lis],并且所有法都是依存共生的[作为发生在特定时间的事件]。和地点]。这并不意味着所包含的部分是现象,所包含的整体是理。此外,你应该明白,一切法如理和一切法如事件的“包容整体”都是一个单一的事件,一个非凡的体验时刻。 54 54 ^(54){ }^{54}

It is not the case that the Li refers to the identical, the undifferentiated, the Universal, or the whole, as opposed to events as the diverse, the differentiated, the Particular or the parts, as Chengguan had stated. Rather, Li means all particular things as eternal and omnipresent, as universal and necessary, but still retaining their own identities, inasmuch as, by the Three Truths, their particularity is precisely their nonparticularity, which is precisely their all-pervasion. In the Tiantai use of the metaphor of the waves, we may recall, Li is represented by the wetness of the water, which is divided into muddy wetness and clear wetness, representing entangled Suchness and disentangled Suchness. Differentiation is thus inherent to Li as such; Li is differentiated. Phenomena means these same occasions viewed as having simple location, as having a definite beginning and end in time (arising at moment X and perishing at moment Y ) and in space (whether physical or “conceptual”-i.e., as filling only the expanses between certain definite borders that determinate it). This means both necessary mutation or process, and also necessary finiteness. These are the waves, muddy and clear. The oneness, sameness, or unity of these differentiated particulars is in both cases, in Buddhist practice, to be found in one phenomenal moment of experience, that is, one particular quiddity conceived as having a definite beginning and end, fluent and finite, contingently encountered, occurring right now, at this particular time and place-a particular muddy waviness.
理并不是像城官所说的那样,指的是同一的、无差别的、普遍的或整体,而不是指不同的、有差别的、特殊的或部分的事件。相反,理意味着所有特殊的事物都是永恒的、无所不在的、普遍的和必然的,但仍然保留它们自己的同一性,因为根据三谛,它们的特殊性正是它们的非特殊性,而非特殊性正是它们的普遍性。在天台山用波比喻时,我们可以回忆一下,“理”是用水的湿来表示的,水有浊湿和清湿之分,代表着缠如和解如。因此,差异化是李本身所固有的;李是有区别的。现象意味着这些相同的事件被视为具有简单的位置,在时间(在 X 时刻出现并在 Y 时刻消亡)和空间(无论是物理的还是“概念的”,即仅填充之间的范围)上具有明确的开始和结束。确定它的某些明确边界)。这既意味着必要的突变或过程,也意味着必要的有限性。这些是波浪,浑浊而清澈。在这两种情况下,在佛教修行中,这些不同细节的单一性、相同性或统一性都可以在经验的一个现象时刻中找到,也就是说,一个特定的本质被认为具有明确的开始和结束,流畅和有限,偶然性在这个特定的时间和地点遇到、发生在此时此刻——一种特定的泥泞的波浪。
But Zhili asserts that these two different forms of subsumption are “identical” to one another. This means that they must finally be seen to be both distinguishable and ultimately intersubsumptive, mutually reducible,
但志力断言,这两种不同形式的包容是彼此“相同的”。这意味着它们最终必须被视为既可区分又最终可相互包容、可相互还原、

themselves versions of one another. The two forms of subsumption subsume one another. This is only possible on the distinctive Tiantai premise of the Three Truths, which tell us that “to be determinate” really means just “locally coherent,” which means “globally incoherent,” which means indeterminate. This applies equally to the dharmas and to the relationships between them. It is this that makes possible the double status of all dharmas, such that each functions both as a Li and as event.
他们自己是彼此的版本。这两种形式的包容是相互包容的。这只有在三谛独特的天台前提下才有可能,它告诉我们,“确定”实际上意味着“局部一致”,这意味着“全局不一致”,这意味着不确定。这同样适用于诸法以及诸法之间的关系。正因如此,一切诸法才有可能具有双重地位,即各法既是理,又是事件。
To understand this, let us look further into Zhili’s text:
为了理解这一点,让我们进一步看一下直隶的文本:

“Mind” [or any other phenomenal dharma] and “the Nature” are both different and non-different. Since [Zhanran] says, “Mind means the conditioned manifestation of the unchanging,” we have here an event which is identical to Li. “The nature means the unchangingness of [each] conditioned appearance” thus means Li that is identical to each event. The two terms are used together here [i.e., in Zhanran’s text, which asserts that all dharmas, whether mental or material, are “the Mind/Nature”] in order to reveal Li precisely as the event itself. On this precedent we can also make the same assertion about any phenomenon in place of “Mind,” e.g., Buddha or Sentient Beings. You should understand that each of these is simultaneously to be known as- Li and as-event. This differs from the other [Shanwai] explanation, which holds that mind is specified as referring to Li , which is regarded as the subsuming whole, while Buddhas and Sentient Beings are specified as referring to events, which are regarded as the subsumed parts. . . . Although the nature is called one, it is not a definite single nature [無定一之性 wu dingyi zhi xing]. [I.e., there is no one definite single Li.] This is what allows all Three Thousand forms of matter and mind in all their specific appearances to remain just as they are. This is what [the Vimalakīrti Sūtra] means when it says “all dharmas are established from the non-dwelling root.” You should understand that this applies equally whether we are speaking in terms of Li or in terms of events. Thus Zhanran explains this by saying, “[Seeing all Three Thousand Quiddities] from the point of view of Li, they are the conditioning and illuminating cause of Buddha-nature as inherent properties [i.e., as eternal and omnipresent]. From the point of view of events, they are the threefold Buddha-nature 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} as cultivated [i.e., phenomenal, simply located, dependently co-arisingl properties. From the point of view of delusion, these are the cycle of the Three Paths (karma, delusion, and suffering). From the point of view of enlightenment, these are the supreme function of realized Buddhahood. All four
“心”[或任何其他现象法]与“性”既不同又无不同。既然[湛然]说:“心是不变的因缘显现”,我们这里就有一个与理相同的事件。 “性,是指因缘相的不变”,即是指与每一事件相同的理。这两个术语在这里一起使用[即在湛然的文本中,它断言一切法,无论是心法还是物质法,都是“心/自然”],以便将理准确地揭示为事件本身。根据这个先例,我们也可以对任何代替“心”的现象做出同样的断言,例如佛陀或众生。你应该明白,每一个都同时被称为“Li”和“as-event”。这与山外的另一种解释不同,后者认为心是指理,被视为概括整体;而佛、众生是指事件,被视为概括部分。 。 。 。性虽称为一,但不是确定的单一性。 [即,没有一个确定的单一的理。] 这就是使所有三千色法和心法的所有具体相都保持原样的原因。这就是《维摩诘经》所说的“诸法从无住根本而起”的意思。你应该明白,无论我们是用李的说法还是用事件的说法,这都是同样适用的。因此,湛然解释说:“从理的观点来看,它们是佛性作为固有属性(即永恒和无所不在)的制约和启发原因。 从事件的角度来看,它们是三重佛性 55 55 ^(55){ }^{55} 作为耕种的[即,非凡的、位置简单的、依赖性共生的财产。从无明的角度来看,这就是三道(业、无明、苦)的循环。从觉悟的角度来看,这些都是成佛的最高功用。所有四个

levels of analysis are established on the basis of the Ultimate Reality within delusion.”
分析的层次是建立在妄想中的终极实相的基础上的。”
Let me now interpret this passage. The Ultimate Reality within delusion is “the non-dwelling root.” This is what the present text [i.e., Zhanran’s “Ten Gates of Non-duality,” upon which Zhili is here commenting] refers to as “the one nature that is no-nature.” The four levels Zhanran indicates are “the establishment of all dharmas,” or what the present text calls “the Three Thousand appearing just as they are.” On the first level [i.e., seeing all things qua Lis], since the Buddha-nature as conditioning and illuminating cause plays the role of “all dharmas,” we must take the implication to be that the Buddha-nature as cause proper is playing the role of “the non-dwelling root.” In the three other levels [i.e., all dharmas in terms of events, either deluded or enlightened], phenomenal cultivations, as according with or violating the nature, play the role of “all dharmas,” so "the Three Buddha-natures collectively as the Nature [or as a Li, i.e., as eternal and omnipresent] must be what is playing the role of the “non-dwelling root.” Here we have the two types of subsuming whole and subsumed parts, so that these categories apply equally both to all things regarded as Li , and to all things regarded as events. 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56}
现在我来解释一下这段话。无明中的究竟实相是“无住根”。这就是本文所说的“一性非性”。湛然所指的四层次,就是“诸法立”,或本文所说的“三千如实现”。在第一层次上,既然佛性作为缘起因、明因起“一切法”的作用,我们就必须理解为佛性本因在起“一切法”的作用。 “非居根”的角色。在其他三层中,法行则以顺性或违性的方式,扮演“一切法”的角色,所以“三佛性合为一”。自然(或作为理,即永恒和无所不在)必定是扮演“无住根”角色的东西。这里我们有包含整体和包含部分的两种类型,因此这些范畴同样适用于所有被视为“理”的事物,以及所有被视为事件的事物。 56 56 ^(56){ }^{56}
Let us interpret this dense and complex passage. First, Zhili makes clear that mind is here merely an example of a particular phenomenon, stressed only for its convenience in the Buddhist practice of mind-contemplation in meditation. It has no special status; whatever can be said about it can also be said about any other phenomenal datum. What matters about it is that it is conditional, finite, temporal, fluent. It is indeed identical to Li , but not because it is somehow infinite or all-pervasive without also being finite, in contradistinction to all other dharmas, which are finite and simply located only, such that mind would be the totalizing whole and all other dharmas would be the subsumed parts. Rather, it is identical to Li in that, like any other finite fluent thing, this moment of experience is necessarily also readable as a L i L i LiL i, as eternal and omnipresent, or better, as categorical, as necessary and literally universal, as a value-bearing coherence with which it is valuable to cohere. Initially, as pure event, this moment of experience is evil-conditional, contingent, an instance of necessary suffering, whether it is pleasant or unpleasant. It subsumes all other events, in the manner of spurious mind-creation, the inalienable “in”-ness of all
让我们来解读这段密集而复杂的段落。首先,智理明确指出,心在这里只是一种特定现象的一个例子,强调它只是为了方便佛教禅修中的心观修习。它没有特殊地位;关于它可以说的任何东西也可以关于任何其他现象数据说。重要的是它是有条件的、有限的、暂时的、流畅的。它确实与理相同,但并不是因为它在某种程度上是无限的或普遍存在的,同时也是有限的,与所有其他法相反,其他法都是有限的并且只是简单定位的,因此心将是总体整体和所有其他法将是包含的部分。相反,它与 Li 的相同之处在于,像任何其他有限流畅的事物一样,这一时刻的经验也必然可以作为 L i L i LiL i ,作为永恒的和无所不在的,或者更好,作为绝对的,作为必要的和字面上普遍的,作为一种具有价值的连贯性,与之保持一致是有价值的。最初,作为纯粹的事件,这一刻的体验是邪恶的——有条件的、偶然的、必然的痛苦实例,无论它是愉快的还是不愉快的。它以虚假的心灵创造的方式包含了所有其他事件,以及所有事物不可剥夺的“内在性”

coherences within this coherence of “this moment of attention”: all “dwell together in this moment of attention” while also “retaining their individual essences.” As such, all of these events are still evil, still contingent, still conditional, still necessary suffering. This particular piece of suffering subsumes all other pieces of suffering, which turn out to be aspects of itself, and indeed unchangeably identical with itself. But with the experience of this one-way subsumption of all these instances of suffering, a turnaround occurs: this moment of attention, since it has the ability to appear as all other forms of suffering, is itself a Li . But the other events with which it is identical are thus also each a Li. I am sitting here feeling lonely. Loneliness is a conditional, contingent piece of suffering. But my loneliness subsumes its whole loneliness-surrounding world of coherences: the desolate coffee shop, the lingering words of rejection, the possibilities of not-being-lonely to which it is contrasted and for which it longs, which give it its coherent identity as loneliness. If these are contrasted to it, they are in relationship with it. If they are in relation to it, they must overlap with it somewhere. If they overlap with it, they must be “in” it. If they are “in” it, without simply replacing it so that no contrast and hence no identity-establishment is possible, then they must be identical to it: they must be it. Now, even “non-loneliness,” as a conditional fact ever-threatened by the loneliness to which it is contrasted, is still a form of suffering, an evil. But when the two are seen to be two names for the same nameless thing, when this loneliness is seen to be inextricable even from its contrasted non-loneliness, it is known not to be conditional at all, to be a the transcendence of conditionality, to be the overcoming of suffering sought by Buddhists: it is seen to be a Li. But what Li? We cannot call this Li “loneliness” or “mind” or “me” only-it is equally accurate to call this Li “non-loneliness” or “matter” or “you.” Each of these Li is the “Center” which subsumes all the others. The one-way subsumption of all beings by this moment of mind is seen to actually be the intersubsumption of all Lis. When these two are seen to be intersubsumptive, the contemplation is complete.
“此时此刻的注意力”的连贯性中的连贯性:所有人“都在这一时刻的注意力中共存”,同时也“保留了各自的本质”。因此,所有这些事件仍然是邪恶的,仍然是偶然的,仍然是有条件的,仍然是必要的痛苦。这种特殊的痛苦包含了所有其他的痛苦,而这些痛苦最终都是其自身的各个方面,并且实际上与自身不可改变地相同。但是,随着对所有这些痛苦实例的这种单向包容的体验,一个转变发生了:这个注意力的时刻,因为它有能力像所有其他形式的痛苦一样出现,所以它本身就是一种“理”。但与之相同的其他事件也因此各自为礼。我坐在这里感到孤独。孤独是一种有条件的、偶然的痛苦。但我的孤独包含了它整个围绕着孤独的连贯世界:荒凉的咖啡店,挥之不去的拒绝话语,它与之对比并渴望的不孤独的可能性,这赋予了它连贯的身份:孤独。如果这些与它相对立,那么它们就是与之相关的。如果它们与它相关,它们必定在某个地方与它重叠。如果它们与它重叠,它们一定在它“里面”。如果它们“在”其中,而不是简单地替换它,从而不可能形成对比,从而不可能建立身份,那么它们必须与它相同:它们必须是它。现在,即使是“非孤独”,作为一个不断受到与之对比的孤独威胁的有条件事实,仍然是一种痛苦、一种邪恶。 但是,当这两者被视为同一个无名事物的两个名字时,当这种孤独被视为即使与其对比的非孤独也无法摆脱时,我们就知道它根本不是有条件的,而是对条件的超越,佛教徒所追求的对痛苦的克服:可见是礼。但什么李?我们不能只称此为“孤独”或“心”或“我”——称此为“非孤独”或“物质”或“你”同样准确。这些礼中的每一个都是包含所有其他礼的“中心”。此刻心念对一切众生的单向包容,实际上是所有生命的相互包容。当这两者被视为相互包容时,沉思就完成了。
Hence, Zhili tells us that the “one nature” that is identical in all things is not a fixed single nature; it is not itself something determinate, or even determinately indeterminate. It is what Zhili later calls “not the one nature, but the Three-Thousand Nature”-or the Three Thousand Lis. These Three Thousand Lis are intersubsumptive: each is a name for all the others. But differentiation, multiple nameability, is inalienable even in the realm of Li. Like the wetness of the water, differentiation is applicable to it to exactly the same extent as to the phenomena; Suchness is divided in itself into entangled and disentangled, the wetness is also either muddy or clear, and Li too is not an undifferentiated unity. It is the “non-dwelling root.” Non-dwelling here means ambiguous, or capable of appearing in every possible form, as any particular
因此,《智礼》告诉我们,万物相同的“一性”,并不是固定不变的单一性,而是一种统一的性质。它本身并不是某种确定的东西,甚至不是确定的不确定的东西。这就是直隶后来所说的“非一性,而三千性”,即三千里。这三千里是相互包容的:每一个都是其他所有的名字。但即使在礼的领域,差异性、多重可命名性也是不可剥夺的。就像水的湿度一样,微分法适用于水的程度与适用于现象的程度完全相同。真如本身有缠结之分,湿亦有浑浊之分,离也非无分别的统一体。它是“无住根”。这里的“无住”意味着模棱两可,或者能够以各种可能的形式出现,如任何特定的形式。

dharma. It is a “root” because no matter what level of analysis is adopted, we can always locate this level of indeterminateness grounding the determinacy and expressed as the determinacy. There is always something playing this role; this “level of indeterminateness” is not some separate dharma in its own right, but one role that all dharmas play in relation to all other dharmas. It is simply the indeterminate relation of all other dharmas-as-principle to this particular dharma-as-phenomena. 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} It is called a “root” because it is what is expressing itself as these other, different dharmas, forming the foundation of their being and the ultimate meaning to which they are reducible (i.e., they can be viewed “as” forms of this root, as modes of its expression), readable into and discoverable in this apparently “other” determinacy, as its necessary inside-outside ground. Each thing, again, plays this role for all other things. When all things are looked on as eternal and omnipresent, as necessary and universal, this role is played by the Cause Proper Buddha-nature as omnipresent and eternal, expressing itself as the Conditioning Cause and Illuminating Cause Buddha-natures as omnipresent and eternal. It is “non-dwelling” because it can be viewed indeterminately as either of these forms. It is a “root” because it is the ground of their being, to which they are reducible and hence identical. When all things are looked at as finite conditional phenomena, the Three Buddha-natures collectively are the non-dwelling root, which can appear indeterminately as any particular phenomena (and hence is non-dwelling), and stand as their root. Zhili here stops his analysis at this level, but the principle is also to be extended further, consistently with general Tiantai treatment of the repeated applicability of all categories at all levels. So while Zhili says the Buddha-nature as a whole is the non-dwelling root of all phenomenal reality, it is equally implied that when all things are seen as delusion, it is karma, delusion, and suffering that pervade all times and places, assuming indefinitely any possible form, standing as the basis as all, while when these same things are seen as enlightenment, it is the function of realized Buddhahood that plays this role. Karma and delusive cognitive-emotional disturbances (klesha) are necessary and universal, as are enlightenment and liberation, as are my shoe and that patch of red. As Zhiyi says in the Sinianchu 四念處, "Delusive disturbance pervades all times and places, and thus all times and places are enlightenment. If one abandons this enlightenment, where else can enlightenment be sought? Similarly, the truth of samsaric suffering pervades all times and places, and all are [thus] Nirvana. 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} Zhanran picks up this crucial point in the Jingangpi 金剛錍, stressing again that it is only because the delusively disturbed mind pervades all times and places (i.e., is eternal and omnipresent) that we can conclude that the pure mind of enlightenment pervades all times and places. 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59} Similarly, in mind-contemplation, a single moment of conditional experience is seen as the non-dwelling root of all other dharmas, as which they are appearing, and vice versa.
法。之所以说它是“根”,是因为无论采用什么层次的分析,我们总能找到这一层次的不确定性,为确定性奠定基础,并表达为确定性。总有一些东西在扮演这个角色;这种“不确定性的层次”本身并不是某种单独的佛法,而是所有佛法相对于所有其他佛法所扮演的一个角色。它只是所有其他法理与这个特定法现象的不确定关系。 57 57 ^(57){ }^{57} 它被称为“根”,因为它表达自己为这些其他不同的佛法,形成它们存在的基础以及它们可还原的最终意义(即,它们可以被视为“作为”这个根的形式) ,作为其表达方式),在这种明显的“其他”确定性中可读并可发现,作为其必要的内外基础。同样,每件事物对所有其他事物都扮演着这个角色。当一切事物被视为永恒、无所不在、必然、普遍时,这个角色就由无所不在、永恒的正因佛性所扮演,表现为无所不在、永恒的缘因、明因佛性。它是“非居住”的,因为它可以被不确定地视为这两种形式中的任何一种。它是一个“根”,因为它是它们存在的基础,它们可以还原为基础,因此是相同的。当一切事物被视为有限的缘起现象时,三佛性统称为无住根本,它可以不确定地显现为任何特定的现象(因此是无住的),并作为它们的根本。 至理在此止于分析,但其理还须进一步引申,与一般天台论各层次诸类反复适用的道理一致。因此,虽然智理说整个佛性是一切现象的无住根本,但它同样意味着,当一切事物都被视为无明时,那就是遍及一切时空的业力、愚痴和痛苦。无限地呈现出任何可能的形式,作为一切事物的基础,而当这些相同的事物被视为觉悟时,正是证悟佛性的功能发挥了这一作用。业力和妄想性的认知情绪障碍(klesha)是必要的和普遍的,开悟和解脱也是如此,我的鞋子和那块红色也是如此。正如智者在《四念处》中所言:“妄扰遍及一切时处,故一切时处皆是菩提。若舍此菩提,何处可求菩提?同样,轮回苦谛遍及一切。”时间、地点,一切皆涅槃。 58 58 ^(58){ }^{58} 湛然在《金刚錍》中抓住了这一要点,再次强调,唯有迷惑心遍及一切时空(即永恒、无所不在),才能得出清净菩提心遍及一切时空的结论。地方。 59 59 ^(59){ }^{59} 同样地,在意念中,一刹那的因缘体验被视为所有其他诸法显现的无住根本,反之亦然。
Hence, Zhili goes on to clarify the difference between his claim and the Shanwai/Huayan claim that Li, Emptiness, Pure Mind is the only subsuming whole, in spite of his willingness to admit that Li is what is revealed by every act of subsumption, as the necessary condition of that subsumption. The question again reverts to oneness and difference, easier to put in English than Chinese; is it the Li that subsumes, or is it any Li that subsumes? Zhili asserts the latter, and that any event is, just by being an event, a Li a Li aLia \mathrm{Li} (not the Li). Zhili says:
因此,直隶继续澄清他的主张与山外/华严主张之间的区别,即理,空,清心是唯一的包容整体,尽管他愿意承认理是每一个包容行为所揭示的东西,作为该包含的必要条件。问题又回到了同一性和差异性,用英语比用汉语更容易表达;是礼包容,还是任何礼包容?直立主张后者,任何事件,仅仅因为它是一个事件, a Li a Li aLia \mathrm{Li} (不是李)。志立 说道:
Q: Since you end up positing the Real-Attribute within delusion as the One Nature, as opposed to the Three Thousand as the subsumed parts, you are precisely reading Li as the subsuming whole. Why do you take such pains to refute the other view [of the Shanwai, which adopts a version of the Huayan view, which also takes Li as the subsuming whole]?
问:既然你最终将妄想中的实属性视为一性,而不是将三千视为包容的部分,那么你正是将理解读为包容的整体。为什么你要煞费苦心地反驳另一种观点呢?
A: Because all dharmas share the same nature, when they are seen as conditioned as various particular dharmas, any one among them can be selected at random to be the universal whole that unifies all the others as its parts. The entirety of sentient beings have been in delusion since beginningless time. So if we just talk directly about the true nature or the subsuming whole, how will they be able to realize how each particular phenomenon inherently entails and absorbs all others into itself? . . . But if we show how a single phenomenal moment of experience unifies in itself all other dharmas, this allows us to reveal that they all share the same single true nature. . . You must understand that it is only because they share the same single nature that it is possible for them to dwell together as a single moment of experience. Hence we are using the observed fact that they dwell together as a single moment of experience to conclude [inductively] that they share the same single true nature. We are not simply taking this one moment of experience and calling it the ultimate truth. For is it not also true that they all dwell together as a single particle of matter, and does this not equally reveal the ultimate truth? The text earlier asserts that “the one nature is the universal subsuming whole”; later it says, “one moment of experience is the universal subsuming whole.” This reveals how Lis and events mutually illuminate each other. These two lines precisely reveal the reason that the subsumed parts are integrated into the subsuming whole. Because the one nature has no fixed nature, the Three Thousand as Li and as events are established. The two levels of Three Thousand, the Three Thousand as Lis and the Three Thousand
答:因为诸法具有相同的性质,所以当它们被视为各种特定法的因缘时,可以随意选择其中任何一种法作为统一所有其他法的整体。自无始以来,一切众生都在迷惑之中。那么,如果我们直接谈论真实的本质或包容的整体,他们如何能够认识到每个特定现象如何内在地包含和吸收所有其他现象? 。 。 。但是,如果我们展示单个现象般的体验时刻如何将所有其他佛法统一起来,这使我们能够揭示它们都具有相同的单一真实本质。 。 。你必须明白,只是因为它们具有相同的单一性质,它们才有可能作为单一的体验时刻生活在一起。因此,我们利用观察到的事实,即它们作为一个单一的经验时刻居住在一起,来得出结论:它们具有相同的单一真实本质。我们并不是简单地把这一刻的经验称为终极真理。因为它们不是都作为一个物质粒子居住在一起,这不同样揭示了最终的真理吗?文本早些时候断言“同一性质是普遍包容的整体”;后来它说:“一个瞬间的经验是普遍包容的整体。”这揭示了李和事件如何相互照亮。这两句台词恰恰揭示了所包含的部分融入整体的原因。因一性无定性,故三千为礼、为事而立。三千的两个层次,李三千和三千

as events, dwell together as a single moment of experience. How could this be the same as their doctrine which straightaway identifies one moment of Mind as the True Nature itself? 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
作为事件,作为单一的经历时刻而存在。这怎么可能与他们直接将心的一刹那认定为真实本质本身的教义相同呢? 60 60 ^(60){ }^{60}
The difference between the subsumption on the level of event and subsumption on the level of Li is that the latter involves the premise that subsumption is always intersubsumption. The subsumption of one content by another, for example, objects by mind, presents itself as a one-way includer/ included relation. This same relation is seen to be the zong and bie of Li when this one-sided one-way subsumption is seen to be identical to mutual subsumption, where each is included and each is includer. These two are seen to be identical: the spurious deluded one-way subsumption of all things by the deluded mind is the self-negated form, the set-up, by which the intersubsumption of mind and all objects, and the intersubsumption of all objects, accomplishes its omnipresence. This metalevel setup-punch line identity-as-difference between delusion and enlightenment is the crux of the Tiantai position. The intersubsumption of all objects, such that each is an omnipresent Li , is present here as its own negation, the spurious one-way subsumption of objects by mind, the domineering self that possesses and controls its world. Reversibility is the key. 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} The latter is now seen as a upāya, a miaojia 妙假, which is the very self-negating conditional manner in which the unconditional manifests itself, and which is thus itself seen to be inherently included and itself unconditionally omnipresent, a Li : what must be realized in order to end suffering.
事件层面的包容与理层面的包容的区别在于,后者涉及的前提是包容始终是相互包容。一种内容被另一种内容包含(例如,心灵的对象)本身表现为一种单向包含/被包含关系。当这种单方面的单向包含被视为与相互包含相同时,这种相同的关系被视为“理”的宗和别,其中每个都被包含并且每个都是包含者。这两者被视为相同:迷惑心对一切事物的虚假迷惑单向包容,是一种自我否定的形式,一种设置,通过这种方式,心与一切对象相互包容,以及一切对象相互包容。 ,实现其无所不在。这种元层次的设置——妙语——愚昧与开悟之间的区别——是天台立场的关键。所有物体的相互包容,使得每一个物体都是无所不在的“理”,在这里作为其自身的否定而存在,这是心灵对物体的虚假单向包容,是拥有和控制其世界的专横的自我。可逆性是关键。 61 61 ^(61){ }^{61} 后者现在被视为妙假,这是一种非常自我否定的有条件方式,无条件以这种方式显现出来,因此它本身被视为固有地包含在内,并且本身无条件地无所不在,“理”:必须为了结束痛苦而证悟。
Zhili sums up his point as follows:
志立将他的观点总结如下:

No single one of the Three Thousand mental or physical phenomena can ever change, and so each one is called “the Nature.” . . . So the subsuming whole and subsumed parts pertaining to Li (the Nature) are as follows: the originally inherent Three Thousand [i.e., the Three Thousand different but intersubsumptive Li, each of which is thus eternal and omnipresent] are the subsumed parts, and a single moment of phenomenal experience is the subsuming whole [本具三千為別,刹那一念為總 benjusanqian wei bie, chana yinian wei zong]. This is because the Three Thousand share the same single nature, which makes it possible for a single moment of experience to serve as the subsuming whole. . . .
三千名色法无一者能变,故一一称为“性”。 。 。 。因此,属于理(自然)的包容整体和包容部分如下:本来固有的三千[即三千不同但相互包容的理,因此每一个都是永恒的和无所不在的]是包容部分,而一个现象体验的单一时刻是包容整体[本具三千为别,刹那一念为总benjusanqian wei bie,chana yinian wei zong]。这是因为三千人具有相同的同一性质,这使得单一时刻的经验可以作为包容的整体。 。 。 。
The subsuming whole and the subsumed parts pertaining to phenomena are as follows: the transforming and created Three Thousand events are the subsumed parts, and, again, one moment of phenomenal experienced event is the subsuming whole [變造三千為別,刹那一念為總 bianzao sanqian wei bie, chana yinian
现象的包容整体和包容部分是这样的:化生三千事是包容部分,现象经历的一刹那是包容整体。为总编造三千未别,查那一年

wei zong]. This is also because the Three Thousand share the same nature, which allows them all to converge and reduce to a single moment of experience. . . . This nature and substance does not mean some single unified nature. We mean rather the "Three Thousand-Nature(s). 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}
魏宗].这也是因为三千人有着相同的本性,这使得他们都能够汇聚并归结为一瞬间的经验。 。 。 。这种性质和实质并不意味着某种单一的统一性质。我们指的是“三千性”。 62 62 ^(62){ }^{62}
Now we can see what Zhili means when he says, in the passage cited at the beginning of this section, “Only when these two [i.e., the subsuming whole and the subsumed parts of the Three Thousand-as-Li, on the one hand, and both of these for the Three-Thousand-as-phenomena, on the other] are seen as identical is the Wondrous Contemplation accomplished.” It is clarified by Zhili’s very pithy summary of Tiantai faith in his Xiuchanyaozhi 修懺要旨: “All dharmas are originally entailed [i.e., unchangeable Lis] in the mind itself, and are generated [as temporal phenomena] by the entirety of the mind. Temporal generation of dharmas requires no separate Li [outside of original entailment]: each is generated due to this original entailment itself. Entailment is not some separate entailment [outside of generation]; in each case it is just dependent co-arising itself”(生無別理,並由本具。具無別具,皆是緣生 sheng wu bie Li, bing you benju. Ju wu bie ju, jie shi yuansheng). 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} The two italicized sentences here give a strong restatement of what Zhili means by “the identity between Li and events,” and with it, the identity between Li-as-part-and-whole and event-as-part-and-whole. It is not that there exists an eternal set of forms or universals, an atemporal template of possible determinacies, which arise as temporal phenomena at a given time and place according to some additional principle or factor. Rather, temporal generation is itself the mutual entailment of the various Lis themselves, their mutual embrace as whole and part. X -as-event generates Y -as-event because X -as-Li entails (i.e., is another name for) Y-as-Li. The “slide” between X being present and Y being present is just like the seeing of, for example, a picture of two faces sliding into seeing a picture of a vase between them (in the popular gestalt drawing), according to the changes in attention and desire. “Faces” generates “vase” because of the original entailment of vase in faces; further, the act of seeing-as-faces generates the act of seeing-as-vase in just the same way. Conversely, there is no repository of the eternal universals stored up somewhere outside the flow of dependent co-arising. Rather, dependent co-arising itself is the storing up of all dharmas in each dharma. No second realm is required outside of the transient temporal occurrences of events to guarantee the eternal presence of each event, their universal presence as Lis. The very process of occurring of any event is the presencing of all dharmas-as-Lis. When an event occurs and absorbs all past, present, and future events as aspects of itself, this is at the same time their pervasion of all these temporal events as mutually entailing
现在我们可以明白直隶在本节开头引用的那段话中所说的意思了:“只有当这两个[即三千为礼的整体和所包含的部分,一方面,而这两者对于三千法来说,在另一方面]被认为是相同的,即完成了奇妙的冥想。”直隶在他的《修禅要志》修忏要旨中对天台信仰的精辟总结阐明了这一点:“诸法原蕴于心本身,由整个心所生。法的时间生成不需要单独的理(在原始蕴涵之外):每个法都是由于这个原始蕴涵本身而生成的。蕴涵不是某种单独的蕴含[在生成之外];生无别理,并由本具。具无别具,皆是缘生无别离,并由本具。居吾别居,皆始元生)。 63 63 ^(63){ }^{63} 这里的两个斜体句子有力地重申了直隶所指的“礼与事件的同一性”,以及礼作为部分和整体与事件作为部分和整体之间的同一性。这并不是说存在一组永恒的形式或共相,一个可能的决定性的非时间模板,它们根据一些额外的原则或因素在给定的时间和地点作为时间现象出现。相反,时间的生成本身就是各种理本身的相互蕴含,它们作为整体和部分的相互拥抱。 X-as-event 生成 Y-as-event,因为 X-as-Li 蕴涵(即,是 Y-as-Li)Y-as-Li。 X 存在和 Y 存在之间的“滑动”就像看到两张脸的图片滑入看到它们之间的花瓶图片(在流行的格式塔图中),根据关注和渴望。 “脸”产生“花瓶”,因为花瓶本来就蕴含在脸中;此外,“看脸”的行为以同样的方式产生“看花瓶”的行为。相反,在缘起共生流之外的某处,不存在永恒共相的储存库。相反,缘起本身就是一切法在每一法中的储存。除了事件的短暂发生之外,不需要第二个领域来保证每个事件的永恒存在,即它们作为 Lis 的普遍存在。任何事件发生的过程,就是诸法如理的出现。当一个事件发生并吸收所有过去、现在和未来的事件作为其自身的各个方面时,这同时也是它们作为相互蕴含的所有这些时间事件的渗透
Lis. Temporal arising of dependently co-arising events is the original entailment of these very determinacies as Lis, as universals being instantiated in events.
利斯.依存共生事件的时间产生是这些作为 Lis 的决定性的原始必然,作为在事件中实例化的共相。
Now we can perhaps understand more fully the Tiantai conception of Li , and its manner of apprehension by the human mind. Li is still and always value, coherence (totalizing), intelligibility, and the ironic effacement of intelligibility (ambiguity). The mind in Tiantai remains the anti-value par excellence, that which seeks value because it lacks it, and thereby posits and determines the nature of that value. Its essence is temporality, simple location, arising and perishing, conditionality, other-dependence. Concomitant to this is its function of seeking value-desiring, attaching, hating-and parsing the world to make it intelligible to its desire, making distinctions and separations, reifying possible objects of desire and avoidance. This state of mind is anti-value per se. The Li that alone can satisfy it is the unconditionality of all possible objects of experience in the manner described above: their value, coherence, intelligibility, and nonintelligibility. This anti-value mind, the deluded mind, apprehends this Li by realizing its identity to it, their intersubsumption. It is by virtue of its very conditionality that it intersubsumes the unconditional, realizes itself as an unconditioned quiddity in its own right, pervading all other conditions. The deluded mind is present as the truth to be realized, and the truth so realized is itself present as the deluded mind. It is in the recognition of its own conditionality that the deluded mind sees the truth, and that the truth sees the deluded mind. We can say equally that Li thinks, desires, sees, and suffers, as that suffering, seeing, desire, and thinking are themselves Lis. 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} As Zhili says, Tiantai insists that we can legitimately say that the universe is not only mind-only, or form-only, or scent-only, or arising-only, or perishing-only, but also “false views-only, attachment-only” (唯見唯愛 weijian wei’ai).
现在我们也许可以更全面地理解理的天台观,以及人心对它的理解方式。理始终是价值、连贯性(总体性)、可理解性以及对可理解性的讽刺性抹杀(模糊性)。天台的思想仍然是卓越的反价值,它因为缺乏价值而寻求价值,从而设定和决定该价值的本质。它的本质是时间性、简单位置、生灭、条件性、他者依赖性。与此相伴的是它寻求价值的功能——渴望、依恋、憎恨——并解析世界,使其能够被自己的欲望所理解,进行区分和分离,具体化可能的欲望和回避对象。这种心态本身就是反价值的。唯一能够满足它的“理”就是所有可能的经验对象以上述方式的无条件性:它们的价值、连贯性、可理解性和不可理解性。这种反价值的心,被迷惑的心,通过认识到它与它的同一性,即它们的相互包容,来理解这个理。正是由于它的条件性,它包容了无条件,将自己实现为一种无条件的本质,遍及所有其他条件。迷惑心作为要证悟的真理而存在,而如此证悟的真理本身作为迷惑心​​而存在。正是在认识到其自身的缘起性时,迷惑的心才能看到真理,真理才能看到迷惑的心。我们同样可以说,理思、欲、见、苦,因为苦、见、欲、思本身就是理。 64 64 ^(64){ }^{64} 正如智理所说,天台坚持认为,我们可以合理地说,宇宙不仅是唯心、唯色、唯香、唯生、唯灭,而且是“唯妄见、唯执着”。 -only”(唯见唯爱 weijian wei'ai)。
Phenomenal experience is thus a constant succession of new delusions, which are, ipso facto, the constant emergence of new Li . This means that every experience is a disclosure of a new cosmos, with a new set of rules, and even new a priori categories of experience and understanding, new ways of unifying all previous unifying conditions of experience. The Principle of Emptiness is not “a single, same principle,” as in Huayan, nor is there a fixed set of categories of understanding as in Kant, or of Reason as in Hegel, nor even the “primordial nature of God,” which possesses a certain set of eternal objects and no others, as the basic overall activity of creativity, the general activity that is not an occasion but rather analogous to Spinoza’s substance, assuming a primal determinateness, as in Whitehead. Rather, in a very real sense, as in the Lotus Sutra doctrine of universal Buddhahood, there is in Tiantai a new and different God, a new foundation and new telos
因此,现象经验是新妄想的不断延续,事实上,新妄想的不断出现。这意味着每一次体验都是对一个新宇宙的揭示,具有一套新的规则,甚至是新的先验类别的体验和理解,以及统一所有先前统一的体验条件的新方法。空性原理并不像华严学那样“单一的、相同的原理”,也不像康德那样有一套固定的理解范畴,也不像黑格尔那样有一套固定的理性范畴,甚至也不是“上帝的本性”。拥有一组特定的永恒物体,而不是其他物体,作为创造力的基本整体活动,这种一般活动不是偶然的,而是类似于斯宾诺莎的实体,假设具有原始的确定性,如怀特海的。相反,在非常真实的意义上,正如《法华经》中的普世成佛教义一样,天台有一个新的、不同的神、一个新的基础和新的目的。

of all possible activity, with each moment of experience. Every moment is a new Li , which by being deludedly dreamt to exist right here and right now ipso facto everywhere exists, has existed, will exist, for all eternity.
所有可能的活动,以及每一个体验时刻。每时每刻都是一个新的“理”,它被迷惑地梦想存在于此时此地,事实上到处都存在,已经存在,将永远存在。
Bringing the discussion back to the issue of ironic and non-ironic coherence, we may say that the Pure Mind position, whether of Chan, Huayan, or the Shanwai, attempts to incorporate irony directly into the immediate subsumption of events by mind via the notion that mind is itself Empty, that is, devoid of any positive identity of its own: this coherence of all things is a non-coherence, has no intelligible characteristics. This subsumption-this dominance, this possession-is for this reason seen as a non-subsumption, non-dominance, non-possession, revealing instead the free unconditionality of all events, all characteristics. At the final Huayan stage, there are supposedly only events interpervading unobstructedly. Explicit reference to Li disappears: this cosmos of interpenetrating events is itself the beatific vision that ends suffering. But precisely as such, this vision is itself Li , one that locks in as a definite point of view that excludes other points of view, all the more entrenched for being invisibly embedded in the framing of what defines events, that is to say, what serves as the standard by which to determine what is “real” and what merely “appearance.” The mind is a shi, but manifests the nonobstruction of event and event directly: this nonobstruction of events is itself the only Li, the only real coherence, and it is supposed to contain a built-in guarantee against becoming a non-ironic coherence due to its intrinsic emptiness of identity. A non-ironic coherence, in the ironic traditions of which we speak, is of course a form of dominance, a definite rule, a coercion, a lack of unconditionality. The mind is supposed to be unbiased, unconditional, because, seen and experienced correctly, it is perfectly empty, it is emptiness itself, a mirrorlike pure awareness that manifests anything precisely because it holds to no identity of its own. Zhili’s Tiantai position, in contrast, is that this is a sham. That is, the phenomenal mind is a shi, and as such is necessarily conditional, and as such is necessarily biased and delusional. Its emptiness is never separable from its biased conditional particularity, and any claim it may make to be viewing or subsuming things from a positionless position is just a subterfuge: the claim to be free from bias is itself always biased. Rather, the self-undermining of non-ironic coherence to achieve the real, ironic, coherence, Li , must be achieved through this very bias. The very bias is accomplished only through the de facto overlapping copresence of sameness and difference in ordinary deluded perception, its ceaseless subsumption of whatever it encounters, the very thing that made it feel, erroneously, that it was in control of whatever it encounters. It is this copresence of self and other, of sameness and difference, in any perception which reveals the multilocality and multi-identity of any local coherence, its ambiguity, its
将讨论带回到反讽与非反讽的连贯性问题上,我们可以说,清心立场,无论是禅宗、华严宗还是山外宗,都试图通过“反讽”这一概念,将反讽直接纳入心灵对事件的直接包容之中。心本身是空的,也就是说,它本身没有任何确定的同一性:一切事物的这种连贯性是一种非连贯性,没有可理解的特征。这种包容——这种支配、这种占有——因此被视为一种非包容、非支配、非占有,而是揭示了所有事件、所有特征的自由无条件性。到了华严末期,据说只有事件的畅通无阻。对李的明确提及消失了:这个相互渗透的事件的宇宙本身就是结束痛苦的幸福愿景。但正是如此,这种愿景本身就是李,一种锁定为排除其他观点的明确观点的观点,由于无形地嵌入到定义事件的框架中而更加根深蒂固,也就是说,是判断什么是“真实”、什么仅仅是“表象”的标准。心是“势”,但直接显现出事件和事件的无碍:这种事件的无碍本身就是唯一的理,唯一真正的连贯性,并且它应该包含一个内在的保证,不会成为由于非讽刺性的连贯性。其内在的身份空虚。在我们所说的反讽传统中,非反讽的连贯性当然是一种统治形式、一种明确的规则、一种强制、一种缺乏无条件性。 心被认为是无偏见、无条件的,因为,如果正确地观察和体验,它是完全空的,它本身就是空,是一面镜子般的纯粹意识,它精确地显现出任何东西,因为它没有自己的身份。相比之下,直隶的天台立场是,这是一个骗局。也就是说,现象心是“势”,因此必然是有缘的,因此必然是偏执和迷惑的。它的空性永远与其有偏见的条件特殊性分不开,任何从无立场的立场看待或包容事物的主张都只是一种借口:没有偏见的主张本身总是有偏见的。相反,非讽刺连贯性的自我破坏必须通过这种偏见来实现,以实现真实的、讽刺性的、连贯性Li。这种偏见只能通过普通迷惑知觉中的相同性和差异事实上的重叠共存来实现,它不断地包容它所遇到的一切,正是它让它错误地感觉到它控制着它所遇到的一切。正是这种自我与他人、相同与差异的共存,在任何感知中都揭示了任何局部连贯性的多地点性和多重身份、其模糊性、其不确定性。

unconditional omnipresence. This in turn reveals the unilateral subsumption of things by mind to necessarily entail an intersubsumption of the mind itself by things. The very act of disambiguation, the deluded mind itself, is the mechanism for revealing the failure of disambiguation, and the upayic necessity of this failure to its own self-overcoming. The result is the intersubsumption of all possible coherences, always manifesting upayically also as their own opposites, and thus revealed as all equally unconditional, all equally the locus of absolute value, all equally the ironic unity of all things that ends suffering by remaining inextricably copresent in suffering: each and every possible characteristic appearing anywhere is, not “in reality” or “in essence” the one Li, but is, rather, itself, precisely as this specific appearance, a particular Li. Zhiyi had said it already, but now we are in a position to understand it: 一色一香無非中道(yise yixiang wufei zhongdao) “Each sight or smell is itself the Middle Way.” 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}
无条件的无所不在。这反过来揭示了心灵对事物的单方面包容必然导致心灵本身与事物的相互包容。消除歧义的行为本身,也就是被迷惑的心本身,就是揭示消除歧义的失败的机制,以及这种失败对其自我克服的巨大必要性。结果是所有可能的连贯性的相互包容,总是以它们自己的对立面的形式显现出来,因此揭示为所有事物都同样无条件,都同样是绝对价值的轨迹,都同样是所有事物的讽刺性统一,通过保持不可分割的共存来结束痛苦在痛苦中:任何地方出现的每一种可能的特征,都不是“现实中”或“本质上”的一理,而是它本身,正如这种特定的显现一样,是一种特定的理。知一已经说过了,但现在我们可以理解了:一色一香无非中道(yise yiyang wufei zhongdao)“一色一香无非中道”“一色一香无非中道”。 65 65 ^(65){ }^{65}

CONCLUSION 结论

The Vertex of the Vortex
漩涡的顶点

In Ironies of Oneness and Difference, and again in the introduction to this book, I raised the several issues as a way of framing the problem of Li . We were looking for how the Chinese traditions handled the questions of repeatability, set membership, apodictic knowledge, part and whole relations, omnipresence, contextualization, determinateness, conditionality, ironic and non-ironic coherence, pragmatism, value, nominalism/realism, and normativity. At the heart of all these issues was a question about sameness and difference: What happens to all these conceptions if neither sameness nor difference, neither oneness nor manyness, can be an ultimate ontological fact about anything? How can we think about how early Chinese thinkers might have thought about entities that were neither same nor different, or that were both same and different? We attempted to make some headway on this issue by considering early Chinese notions of coherence, both ironic and non-ironic, as ways of conceiving a neither/nor/both/and mode of understanding for what we would otherwise call sameness and difference; and in this volume, we have looked at the term Li as an increasingly important marker of a kind of second-order relation between certain kinds of coherences, which cohere again so as to end up being again neither definitively the same coherence nor definitively different coherences. The term Li , we said, would play a crucial role in configuring these issues, which are approached in quite different ways in the various strands of occidental philosophy. Li, I suggested, means a harmonious coherence, which, when a human being becomes harmoniously coherent with it, leads to further harmonious coherence. We have come to see how all these meanings are combined in the Tiantai conception of Li as Centrality. We are now in a position to see how “centrality” and “coherence” converge into the meaning of Li , and how this sort of notion developed through various partial prefigurements in Confucian and Daoist thought. Let us review these findings briefly.
在《统一与差异的讽刺》中,以及在本书的引言中,我再次提出了几个问题,作为构建李问题的一种方式。我们正在寻找中国传统如何处理重复性、集合成员、绝对知识、部分与整体关系、无所不在、情境化、确定性、条件性、讽刺与非讽刺连贯性、实用主义、价值、唯名论/实在论和规范性等问题。 。所有这些问题的核心都是关于相同性和差异性的问题:如果相同性和差异性、单一性和多样性都不能成为任何事物的终极本体论事实,那么所有这些概念会发生什么?我们如何思考早期的中国思想家如何思考既不相同也不不同,或者既相同又不同的实体?我们试图在这个问题上取得一些进展,通过考虑中国早期的连贯概念,无论是反讽的还是非反讽的,作为构想一种非/非/两者/和模式的方式来理解我们否则称为相同和差异的东西;在本书中,我们将术语“Li”视为某些连贯性之间的一种二阶关系的日益重要的标记,这些连贯性再次连贯,最终既不是绝对相同的连贯性,也不是绝对不同的连贯性。 。我们说过,“理”一词在解决这些问题时将发挥至关重要的作用,而西方哲学的各个流派以截然不同的方式处理这些问题。我认为,“理”意味着一种和谐的连贯性,当一个人与它和谐地连贯时,就会导致进一步的和谐连贯。 我们来看看所有这些含义是如何在天台以理为中心的概念中结合起来的。我们现在可以看到“中心性”和“连贯性”如何汇聚到“理”的含义中,以及这种概念如何通过儒家和道家思想中的各种局部预兆而发展起来。让我们简要回顾一下这些发现。
In the Analects, we found that Confucius was said to have no “constant teacher,” and yet to find his teacher everywhere. He himself was the
在《论语》中,我们发现孔子说“无常师”,但又到处都可以找到他的老师。他本人就是

“center,” which here meant the determinant of the coherence, the “pattern,” the “principle,” the sustainable intelligible unity with the past and the future, the value. But he was depicted as neither subjectively creating this value ex nihilo nor acting as a mere passive mirror of an objectively existing truth. The value he creates is a coherence, a readable converging, of aspects available everywhere, combined by the selective filter of Confucius’s own responses and evaluations. His discernment is a selective frame which creates/discerns coherence, the value-endowed style of culture, which is omniavailable, present in more than one place, not strictly reiterable except in the special sense of being continuable. We have here already the sprout of a model of a multiple instantiation that is neither nominalist nor realist, manifesting in a cognition that is neither objective nor subjective.
“中心”在这里意味着连贯性、“模式”、“原则”、与过去和未来的可持续的可理解的统一、价值的决定因素。但他被描述为既没有主观地无中生有地创造了这种价值,也没有仅仅充当客观存在真理的被动镜子。他创造的价值是一种连贯性,一种可读的融合,无处不在的各个方面,并通过孔子自己的反应和评价的选择性过滤结合起来。他的洞察力是一种选择性框架,它创造/辨别连贯性,即文化的价值赋予风格,它是无所不在的,存在于多个地方,除了在可延续的特殊意义上之外,不能严格重复。我们在这里已经萌芽了一种既不是唯名论也不是实在论的多重实例化模型,表现为一种既不客观也不主观的认知。
In the Mencius, we had the selective definition of which of the inborn capabilities of the human animal are to be properly named “the Nature” (性 xing) with a more explicit set of criteria: precisely those spontaneous human tendencies that allow for coherence, that is, those that are appealing (valued) and discernible to other humans, and that create cohesion among humans, are to be called the Nature. These were the desires that can be satisfied independently of external material conditions, that allow for the other (for example, material) desires to also be nurtured and developed, the enjoyment of which is increased rather than decreased when shared, and so on. The material desires were to be called “the Decree,” because they are not conducive to coherence in this sense: they isolate, they create strife because their satisfaction depends on external material resources, which may be in short supply, their enjoyment is decreased when shared, and so on. The class name Human Nature was there also neither objective nor subjective, neither nominalist nor realist; and there again we had a “center” embodied by a living human agent, the sage, whose manifestation of these virtues makes him the organizing hub, around which this style of being, humanity, converges. The human virtues manifested by the presence of this center, by drawing others to cohere with them and emulate them, literally actualized the coherence “humanity.” Once picked out, it is seen to have always been there, and always to have been operating as a genuine multiply instantiated coherence, really present as something with actual and identifiable causal effects in all the members it includes. But the act of picking it out, prioritizing, and naming it in this way is itself an example of it, decisively instantiating it and simultaneously revealing its instantiation elsewhere, even in the past.
在《孟子》中,我们对人类动物的哪些与生俱来的能力进行了选择性定义,并以一套更明确的标准来恰当地命名为“性”:正是那些允许连贯性的人类自发倾向,也就是说,那些对其他人类有吸引力(有价值)和可识别的,并且在人类之间产生凝聚力的,将被称为自然。这些欲望可以独立于外部物质条件而得到满足,允许其他(例如物质)欲望也得到培育和发展,当分享时,其享受会增加而不是减少,等等。物质欲望被称为“法令”,因为它们不利于这种意义上的一致性:它们孤立,它们制造冲突,因为它们的满足依赖于外部物质资源,而这些资源可能供应不足,当它们满足时,它们的享受就会减少。共享等。类名“人性”也在那里,既不客观也不主观,既不唯名论也不现实主义;在那里,我们再次有了一个由活生生的人类代理人——圣人——所体现的“中心”,他对这些美德的表现使他成为组织中心,这种存在风格——人性——围绕着这个中心汇聚起来。这个中心的存在所体现的人类美德,通过吸引其他人与他们一致并效仿他们,真正实现了“人性”的一致性。一旦被挑选出来,它就会被视为一直存在,并且始终以真正的多重实例化一致性的形式运作,真正呈现为在它所包含的所有成员中具有实际和可识别的因果效应的东西。 但以这种方式挑选它、排列优先顺序和命名它的行为本身就是它的一个例子,果断地将它实例化,同时在其他地方,甚至在过去,揭示它的实例化。
In the Xunzi, we had a seeming conflict between a nominalistic and a realist theory of naming, which was resolved once again by recourse to a human center, in this case the tradition of the sages and exemplary persons who literally give order to the cosmos through mandated ritual. But this
在《荀子》中,我们在唯名论和实在论的命名理论之间存在着表面上的冲突,这个冲突再次通过诉诸人类中心来解决,在这种情况下,圣贤和模范人物的传统通过字面上给宇宙赋予秩序。强制仪式。但这

too was neither creation ex nihilo nor passive reflection of coherence: Xunzi recognized an overabundance of real distinctions, groupings, coherences in the world, among which the sages serve as a selective filter, enforcing their standardized names in the same way that weights and measures are to be enforced in the marketplace. Omnipresence was found in the “Greatest Coherence” (大理 dali), the value present in all parts of the organized whole, which resulted from the noble man’s selective ritual regulations of which of the really occurring groupings of nature may be grouped into a valued whole, that is to say, a whole that maximizes the satisfaction of human desires. This Greatest Coherence, a second-order coherence relation between a certain subset of prior coherences both human and nonhuman, operated as a genuine whole inclusive even of the natural world, viewed as having a real determinative power to instantiate its characteristics of “order and value” fully in each of its component participants. These characteristics turned out, once they were established in any time and place, to be really there, really efficacious, really multiply instantiated, extending to all relevant times and places.
也不是从无到有的创造,也不是连贯性的被动反映:荀子认识到世界上存在过多的真正的区别、分组和连贯性,圣人在其中充当选择性过滤器,以与度量衡相同的方式强制执行他们的标准化名称。并在市场上强制执行。无所不在存在于“大理大理”中,即存在于组织整体的所有部分的价值,这是贵族选择性仪式规则的结果,其中真正发生的自然分组可以被分组为一个有价值的整体,也就是最大限度地满足人类欲望的整体。这种最大的一致性,是人类和非人类先验一致性的某个子集之间的二阶一致性关系,作为一个真正的整体运作,甚至包括自然世界,被视为具有真正的决定性力量来实例化其“秩序和价值”的特征” 充分体现在其每个组成部分参与者中。事实证明,这些特性一旦在任何时间和地点建立起来,就真实存在、真实有效、真实多重实例化,延伸到所有相关的时间和地点。
In the Laozi tradition, we have the advent of ironic coherence: a valued togetherness, which is necessarily also unintelligible, unreadable. When all is together, nothing is discernible, and this is the ultimate cohering, also the ultimate value, from which lesser (intelligible, non-ironic) values/ coherences emerge. The motif of the center is here transformed from the exemplary center of Confucianism, the model that inspires those around it to modify themselves because it is seen and valued, to the invisible center, which attracts, creating togetherness and value, precisely by not being seen, not being valued. To be valued is to inspire imitation, which is to inspire competition, which is to create strife, which is to undermine ultimate coherence. To be seen is to be cut out from a background that is unseen, which means again a loss of the greatest coherence. Coherence is “ironic” in that the true coherence (value, togetherness, the unhewn or devalued from which the valued grows, which is inseparable from the valued, which accounts for the cycle of reversal from value to anti-value, and which is omnipresent in both the valued and the devalued) is by definition incoherent (indiscernible, invisible).
在老子传统中,我们出现了讽刺性的连贯性:一种有价值的团结,这也必然是难以理解、难以解读的。当一切都在一起时,没有什么是可辨别的,这是最终的凝聚力,也是最终的价值,从中出现较小的(可理解的、非讽刺的)价值/连贯性。中心的主题在这里从儒家的模范中心(由于它被看到和重视而激励周围的人改变自己的模型)转变为无形的中心,正是通过不被看到而吸引、创造团结和价值,不被重视。受到重视就会激发模仿,从而激发竞争,从而制造冲突,从而破坏最终的一致性。被看见就是从看不见的背景中被剔除出来,这又意味着失去最大的连贯性。连贯性是“讽刺的”,因为真正的连贯性(价值、团结性、未经雕琢的或贬值的东西,有价值的东西从中成长,它与有价值的东西密不可分,它解释了从价值到反价值的逆转循环,它是无所不在的从定义上看,无论是有价值的还是贬值的,都是不连贯的(难以辨别的、不可见的)。
In the writings of Zhuang Zhou, we had an overabundance of perspectives, each positing its own standard of rightness (是 shi), which were filtered down moment by moment not according to tradition or sagacity, but by virtue of the mere fact that each perspective was in fact a perspective, a “this.” Being a “this,” it posits its “that,” which is also a “this,” and hence its own new perspective. Zhuang Zhou’s “wild card” perspective reflects and affirms the “rightness” presented by each new situation, but does not consider it in conflict with the opposite perspective, the opposed shi/fei 是非.
在庄周的著作中,我们有过多的观点,每种观点都有自己的正确标准,这些标准不是根据传统或智慧,而是根据每一种观点的事实而被时时过滤掉的。实际上是一个视角,一个“这个”。作为一个“这个”,它提出了它的“那个”,而“那个”也是一个“这个”,因此它也提出了它自己的新视角。庄周的“万能牌”视角反映并肯定了每种新情况所呈现的“正确性”,但并不认为它与相反的视角、对立的“是非”相冲突。
Shi is “this,” which is coherence, value, intelligibility; but in positing its own negation, which in turn negates “this,” every coherence is also necessarily an incoherence, which again affirms Laozi’s ironic coherence: value which is togetherness which is unintelligibility: “the radiance of drift and doubt” (滑疑之耀 guyi zhi yao). The “togetherness” here comes in not as an overriding convergence of all things in a single vision (as in Xunzi’s “Greatest Coherence”) but resides in a new application of the motif of the center, already prefigured in Mencius’s discussion of “not clinging to the center.” Zhuang Zhou introduces the idea of the pivot of Dao (道樞 daoshu), which is also the pivots of daos: the point where opposed shi/feis are not opposed, not mutually exclusive, precisely because of their mutual positing, and hence, in “responding but not storing” (應而不藏 ying er bu cang) like a mirror, they flow freely into one another. The center allows one to “travel two roads at once” (兩行 liangxing): this special kind of value bilocality is Zhuang Zhou’s distinctive contribution to the problematic of coherence, universality, and omnipresence in Chinese thought.
势是“此”,即连贯性、价值性、可理解性;但在提出自己的否定,进而否定“此”时,每一种连贯性也必然是一种不连贯性,这再次肯定了老子讽刺的连贯性:价值即是不可理解的整体性:“滑疑之光”(滑疑之)耀古一之耀)。这里的“和”并不是万物在一个视野中的压倒性的汇聚(如荀子的“大同”),而是在于对中心主题的新应用,这在孟子的“不执着”讨论中已经有所预示。到中心。”庄周提出了“道枢”的概念,这也是道的枢轴:对立的势/非不对立,不相互排斥,正是因为它们的相互定位,因此, “应而不藏而不藏”如明镜,自由流动。该中心允许人们“两行良行”:这种特殊的价值二方性是庄周对中国思想的连贯性、普遍性和普遍性问题的独特贡献。
In Liji texts such as the “Yueji,” “Daxue,” and “Zhongyong,” as also in the Yin-Yang systems of the commentaries to the Zhouyi and Yang Xiong’s Taixuanjing, we found a domestication of the ironic notion of the coherence and center-the unseen, the unmanifest, the unintelligible-as a creator of observable order and consistency. Overall coherence works through local pockets of invisibility or ironic coherence: the as-yet-unseen sprouts, the unmanifest but constant Inner Coherence (誠 cheng), which reveals itself in all individual affects and actions but never shows itself simpliciter, the Yin side of a Yin-Yang dyad, which however works toward and is subordinated to the manifestation and purposes of the Yang. The role of the unintelligible, the background, the unreadable togetherness in which value is rooted is here acknowledged and integrated into the system of Greatest Coherence.
在《礼记》、《大学》、《中庸》等《礼记》文本中,以及《周易》和扬雄《太玄经》的阴阳体系中,我们发现了对连贯性和反讽性概念的驯化。中心——看不见的、未显现的、不可理解的——作为可观察的秩序和一致性的创造者。整体连贯性是通过局部的隐形或讽刺连贯性发挥作用的:尚未见的萌芽,不明显但持续的内在连贯性(诚诚),它在所有个人的情感和行为中揭示自己,但从未表现出更简单的一面,阴阳二元,然而,它致力于并服从于阳的表现和目的。价值所植根的难以理解的、背景的、难以理解的团结的作用在这里得到承认,并融入到最大一致性的系统中。
Moving into the present volume, examining the later parts of the Zhuangzi, and the Hanfeizi commentary to the Laozi, we found an ironic appropriation of the non-ironic sense of coherence, where local forms of coherence-predictability, intelligibility, constancy-coexisted with the overriding incoherence of the whole, the ironic value/togetherness of the valueless, the unreadable whole. These horizontal forms of coherence were necessarily tentative, approximate, non-rigorous, and all structured basically as expansions of the Laozian point about reversal. What is knowable about things is their tendency to revert to the Dao, which is formulable in vague terms for general tendencies, but is not strictly predictive for individual events. The value of knowing these “principles” lies not in allowing us to control or understand all the events in the world, but in creating a state of mind that takes into account the centripetal action of the Dao, for living with minimal strife and worry. Knowing the Li of reversal and transforma-
进入本卷,考察《庄子》的后期部分以及韩非子对《老子》的注释,我们发现了对非讽刺连贯感的讽刺性挪用,其中连贯性的局部形式——可预测性、可理解性、恒定性——与整体的压倒性的不连贯性,无价值的讽刺价值/团结性,难以理解的整体。这些横向的连贯形式必然是试探性的、近似的、非严格的,并且所有结构基本上都是老子关于逆转观点的扩展。关于事物的可知性在于它们回归道的倾向,道可以用模糊的术语来表述一般趋势,但不能严格预测个别事件。了解这些“道理”的价值不在于让我们能够掌控或理解世界上的所有事件,而在于创造一种考虑到道的向心作用的心态,让生活中的冲突和忧虑最小化。认识逆转与变革之理

tion (“Community Words”), of perspectival relativism (“Autumn Floods”), or of yielding (Hanfeizi commentary) in a general way allows for an easier handling of things in general, without requiring specific knowledge about particular entities as such.
普遍的方式(“共同体词”)、透视相对主义(“秋水”)或屈服(韩非子评论)允许更容易地处理一般事物,而不需要关于特定实体本身的特定知识。
In Wang Bi , we see the introduction of another way of combining the ironic and non-ironic traditions, with the introduction of Li not as the determinate counterpart and opposite of the indeterminate Dao, the determinate parts of an indeterminate whole, as in the Hanfeizi commentary, but Li as mini-Daos, as the scarcest elements of a given situation, concretized indeterminacies that structure the determinate situation around them. The least evident aspects of the situation bear the same relation to that situation that the Dao bears to the universe as a whole; they are the empty space in that situation toward which the other elements converge. First-order harmony here is specifically the harmony between a desire and its object: the predominant elements desire what they lack, and are thereby ruled and organized by it. In observing the situation, we harmonize with this kind of harmony: to understand and master the situation is to harmonize with (com-prehend) its harmony (convergence of desires of its elements toward the mini-Dao, the Li , that rules and determines it, the quantitatively least-represented element). This is done in order to create another harmony: the harmony between what we, the knowers, may want, and the outcome of the situation. Here, we have an attempt at a more concrete kind of information about specific situations, determined in a broad variety of individual ways. Predictability and knowability are now direct expressions of the localized instances of unknowability.
在《王弼》中,我们看到了另一种结合反讽和非反讽传统的方式,其中“礼”的引入并不像《韩非子》中那样作为不确定道的确定对应物和对立面,即不确定整体的确定部分。评论,但理作为迷你道,作为特定情况下最稀缺的元素,具体化了构建其周围确定情况的不确定性。这种情况的最不明显的方面与道与整个宇宙的情况有着同样的关系。它们是那种情况下其他元素汇聚的空白空间。这里的一阶和谐特指欲望与其客体之间的和谐:占主导地位的元素渴望它们所缺乏的东西,从而受其统治和组织。在观察形势时,我们与这种和谐相协调:了解和掌握形势就是协调(理解)它的和谐(其元素的欲望趋向于统治和决定的小道,礼)。它,数量上最少的元素)。这样做是为了创造另一种和谐:我们(了解者)可能想要的东西与情况结果之间的和谐。在这里,我们试图获得有关特定情况的更具体的信息,这些信息以各种不同的个人方式确定。可预测性和可知性现在是局部不可知性实例的直接表达。
In Guo Xiang, the ironic sense of coherence is pushed to its extreme, such that all apparent principles are in reality only one Li: the self-so, the negation of all principles. It is a Li because it is still a harmony-i.e., a cohering of elements “vanishing into” the present situation, moment, or entity, where their harmony is guaranteed by the fact that no traces emerge; and it is a value-the one thing “worth noticing” in order to ensure maximum human effectiveness in responding to the situation. This is the second-order harmony, the harmony with human interests: not conscious teleological desires any more, but merely the form of living that is most in accord with the basic nature of the human event, most conducive to the full free function of the self-so and its self-forgetting. “No principle” still fits our definition of “Li.” But Guo also equates this self-forgetting, this Li of self-so, with the earliest concept of Li as a cutting, a limitation. The self-so is whatever an event may be prior to its interference from traces, from things lying outside its limits, defined as whatever requires knowing and willing to attain. The complete isolation, limitedness, separation of any event is its Li, its self-so, but this is at once the unintelligible, the unknowable, the
在《郭象》中,这种反讽的连贯性被推到了极致,所有表面的原则实际上都只有一个理:自我如此,对所有原则的否定。它是理,因为它仍然是一种和谐——即“消失”到当前情境、时刻或实体中的元素的凝聚,其中它们的和谐通过不出现任何痕迹的事实来保证;它是一种价值——为了确保人类在应对情况时发挥最大效力而“值得注意”的一件事。这是二阶和谐,与人类利益的和谐:不再是有意识的目的论欲望,而仅仅是最符合人类事件的基本性质、最有利于人类充分自由运作的生活方式。自我如此并且忘记自我。 “无原则”仍然符合我们对“礼”的定义。但郭也将这种忘我、这种自我之理与最早的“理”概念等同起来,即一种切割、一种限制。自性就是一个事件在其受到痕迹、来自其界限之外的事物的干扰之前可能是什么,被定义为任何需要知道并愿意达到的东西。任何事件的完全孤立、有限、分离就是它的理、它的自性,但这同时也是不可理解的、不可知的、

merging of all elements in the incoherent ironic coherence formerly reserved for the whole. Hence, Guo creates a singularity between the non-ironic Li as intelligible separation and ironic Li as unintelligible omnipresence.
所有元素融合在以前为整体保留的不连贯的讽刺连贯性中。因此,郭在作为可理解的分离的非讽刺性的李和作为难以理解的无所不在的讽刺性的李之间创造了一个奇点。
In Huayan Buddhism, we have what looks an expanded sense of one side of Guo’s Daoism: the one real principle is Emptiness, which is Li in all the senses delineated above: it is all-inclusive (cohering, harmonizing), it is universally applicable, it is what needs to be paid attention to in order to attain maximum value for human beings (second-order harmony, harmony with human needs). As in Guo, this involves a turnaround and negation of Li , a turning back to events, to individual instances outside the top-down control of any higher-order principles. But as in Guo also, this amounts to the redundant repetition of one and the same principle, namely, the principle of “no-principle.” That is all that Emptiness qua interpenetration means here, and it retains the full sense of a truth to be recognized, against which alternate perceptions can only be counted as illusions and errors.
在华严佛教中,我们看到了郭氏道教一方面的扩展意义:唯一的真实原则是空,即上述所有意义上的理:它是包罗万象的(凝聚、和谐),它是普遍适用的,这是人类实现最大价值所需要关注的(二阶和谐,与人类需求的和谐)。与郭的情况一样,这涉及对李的转变和否定,即回到事件,回到任何高阶原则自上而下控制之外的个体实例。但正如郭的情况一样,这相当于重复同一个原则,即“无原则”原则。这就是空性作为相互渗透的全部意义,它保留了有待认识的真理的全部意义,与之相反,替代的感知只能被视为幻象和错误。
In Tiantai, developing the other aspect of Guo’s work-coherence and incoherence converging to a point of being completely coextensive-this epistemological stance is altered: there are no errors, only upāyas. Moreover, the notion of Li is diversified: it is not just that there is one principle-of-no-principle, which then empties out into the interpenetration of events. Rather, there are infinite principles, infinite Lis, which interpenetrate infinite events. These Lis are neither simply given as facts in the objective world (realism) nor merely projected onto a blank canvas by subjective whim or convention (nominalism). Rather, they are “inherently entailed” in the sense delineated by the Three Truths: always identifiable, but always ambiguous, and thus readable into all locations and times, but equally readable out of the initial instance, the apparently “given” occurrence of this quiddity. Yet each of them is genuinely omnipresent and omnitemporal, playing a non-negligible part in every event occurring at any time or place, and demanding to be recognized as a nonnegotiable attribute instantiated in every event; neglect of this attribute in any event anywhere is an obstacle to the realization of the highest value, the only complete satisfaction of sentient desire, namely, the end of suffering in the state of Buddhahood as Tiantai conceives it. Each one is an omnipresence which must be recognized to attain the satisfaction of human aspiration: a second-order coherence, an omnipresence (coherence) which must be known (coherence between a mind and a cognitive object) in order to bring satisfaction (coherence between desire and object desired): in short, a Li. Li is “Centrality,” so that the claim that “all dharmas are Li” means that “all dharmas revert to and are reducible to each dharma; each dharma is the omnipresent unconditional center of the universe, subsuming all qualities in itself, and as itself; thus each is the Middle Way, the end of suffering.” Every content is also a
在《天台山》中,发展了郭氏作品的另一个方面——连贯性和非连贯性收敛到完全同延的程度——这种认识论立场被改变了:没有错误,只有upayas。而且,理的概念是多元化的:它不仅仅是有一个无理的原则,然后空洞到事件的相互渗透中。相反,有无限的原则、无限的理,它们相互渗透到无限的事件中。这些“理”既不是简单地作为客观世界中的事实(现实主义)给出的,也不是仅仅通过主观的突发奇想或惯例投射到空白画布上(唯名论)。相反,它们在三谛所描述的意义上是“内在必然的”:总是可识别的,但总是模棱两可的,因此可以在所有地点和时间中读取,但同样可以从最初的实例中读取,显然是“给定”的发生本质。然而,它们中的每一个都是真正无所不在、全时空的,在任何时间、任何地点发生的每一个事件中都发挥着不可忽视的作用,并要求被视为在每一个事件中实例化的不可协商的属性;在任何情况下、任何地方忽视这一属性都是实现最高价值的障碍,最高价值是有情欲望的唯一完全满足,即天台所设想的佛果境界中痛苦的终结。每一个都是一种无所不在的存在,必须被认识到才能满足人类的愿望:一种二阶连贯性,一种必须被认识的无所不在(连贯性)(心灵与认知对象之间的连贯性),以便带来满足(心灵与认知对象之间的连贯性)。欲望和想要的对象):简而言之,就是一个礼。 理是“中心”,所以说“诸法皆理”,意思是“诸法归于诸法,皆归于诸法;诸法归于诸法,诸法皆归于诸法;诸法归于诸法,诸法皆归于诸法。”每一种佛法都是宇宙无所不在、无条件的中心,将所有品质包含在其本身之中;因此,每一个都是中道,苦的终结。” 每个内容也是一个

category that subsumes all other contents; every category is also a content subsumed by every other category. It is in this sense that Li are valued coherent harmonies to be harmonized with: all things “cohere” in them, they are “readable” (coherent) and all things are readable in them, and this reading of all coherences in each coherence is a harmonizing that itself constitutes liberation from the existential condition of suffering, conceived as a function of conceiving the self (and correlatively, all entities) as finite, simply located in one time or place rather than any other, hence impermanent, sundered from one another, and hence constitutively saturated with suffering.
包含所有其他内容的类别;每个类别也是所有其他类别所包含的内容。正是在这个意义上,理被重视为和谐的连贯和谐:一切事物在其中“连贯”,它们是“可读的”(连贯的),并且所有事物在其中都是可读的,而这种对每个连贯性中所有连贯性的解读是一种和谐,其本身构成了从痛苦的存在条件中解放出来,被认为是一种将自我(以及相关的所有实体)视为有限的功能,仅仅位于一个时间或地点而不是任何其他时间或地点,因此是无常的,彼此分离的,因此本质上充满了痛苦。
Each thing, each imaginable characteristic, is in Tiantai a “Li.” These Li are neither subjective nor objective, imply neither realism nor nominalism. The desires of sentient beings are what underwrite the biased perspectives that disambiguate the observed world into specific, simply located entities. These desires are in one sense simply “given”-they have been going on since beginningless time-but the doctrine of “inherent evil” (性惡 xing’e), stipulating that all evils are ineradicably present in all times and places, even in Buddhahood, 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} implies that they themselves are also part of the valued coherence, what must be comprehended in order to be liberated, the Li. The use of the term Three Thousand for the totality, rather than simply all dharmas, brings with it also the “traditionalism” of the non-ironic tradition-i.e., these are the ten realms and ten suchnesses that are pointed out by the Buddha in the scriptures as being particularly relevant for human practice. The contemplation of “inherent entailment” (具 j u j u juj u ), then, means simply seeing each thing not only as a display of the capacity of my mind to produce this effect, but to see it as literally unconditioned, preexistent, like a universal category, incapable of causal arising from any particular set of conditions. Ironically, this is ensured precisely because it is nothing but conditional.
每一个事物,每一个可以想象的特征,在天台都是一个“理”。这些理既不是主观的,也不是客观的,既不是实在论,也不是唯名论。有情众生的欲望导致了偏见的观点,这些观点将观察到的世界消除为具体的、简单定位的实体。这些欲望在某种意义上只是“给定”——它们从无始以来就一直存在——但“性恶”的教义规定,一切邪恶都存在于一切时间和地点,无法根除。在成佛时, 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 意味着它们本身也是有价值的一致性的一部分,为了获得解放而必须理解的一致性,即理。使用“三千”一词来表示整体,而不是简单地表示一切法,也带来了非讽刺传统的“传统主义”,即佛陀在经文与人类实践特别相关。对“内在蕴涵”的思考 j u j u juj u ),那么,意味着不仅将每件事视为我心灵产生这种效果的能力的展示,而且将其视为字面意义上无条件的、预先存在的,就像一个普遍的类别,不能由任何特定条件组产生因果关系。讽刺的是,这之所以能得到保证,正是因为它只是有条件的。
In the preceded pages, we have experimented with many motifs and models in an attempt to maximize our appreciation for the nuances of many related but distinct ways of thinking about problems of sameness, difference, coherence, incoherence, and omnipresence, and found each of them to have their own distinctive ways of handling and organizing some of these key motifs that we have found to gather around the term Li. The Tiantai position just summarized may perhaps be considered the most intricate and extensive development of the tendency to make Li a marker of omnipresence, but at the same time to maintain its original sense of division and particularity, along with its focus on value and its performatively self-instantiating character. The attempt at a detailed exposition of the premises and nuances involved in that highly counterintuitive system provides, I hope, something interesting to think about, and allows us to think many new thoughts, which I would suggest, if pressed, is the sole and real point of intellectual
在前面的几页中,我们尝试了许多主题和模型,试图最大限度地理解许多相关但不同的思考相同、差异、连贯、不连贯和无所不在问题的方式的细微差别,并发现了它们中的每一个他们有自己独特的方式来处理和组织我们发现围绕“李”一词聚集的一些关键主题。刚才总结的天台立场也许可以被认为是“理”成为无所不在的标志的趋势中最复杂和最广泛的发展,但同时又保持了其原有的划分感和特殊性,以及对价值和表演性的关注。自我实例化的角色。我希望,对这个高度违反直觉的系统所涉及的前提和细微差别进行详细阐述的尝试提供了一些有趣的思考,并使我们能够思考许多新的想法,如果有压力的话,我建议这些想法是唯一和真实的。知识点

endeavors such as the one currently before the reader: to provide the power to think a greater number of more greatly differing thoughts. This has been the driving desideratum of this work, quite apart from questions of getting things either historically or philosophically “right,” although as I indicated in the introduction to the prequel, those labors are necessary to maximize the real goal, which is always the literal ability or power to think more thoughts. Truth is important, but it is important only because it makes things so much more interesting. I hope at least that the journey has been interesting for those who like the activity of thinking, take pleasure in the expansion of thinking into new powers and operations, and have some prior interest in thinking about these particular types of issues. I hope, in other words, that reading one’s way through the ins and outs of all these texts has given you some interesting new thoughts, whether right or wrong. (If not, your time has been wasted, and in that case, dear reader, you are certainly owed an apology.)
诸如当前摆在读者面前的努力:提供思考更多更截然不同的想法的能力。这一直是这部作品的迫切需要,除了让事情在历史上或哲学上“正确”的问题之外,尽管正如我在前传的介绍中指出的那样,这些劳动对于最大化真正的目标是必要的,而这始终是字面上的能力或思考更多想法的能力。真相很重要,但它之所以重要只是因为它让事情变得更加有趣。我希望至少对于那些喜欢思考活动、乐于将思维扩展到新的力量和操作、并且对思考这些特定类型的问题有兴趣的人来说,这段旅程是有趣的。换句话说,我希望通过阅读所有这些文本的来龙去脉,能够给你带来一些有趣的新想法,无论是对还是错。 (如果没有,你的时间就被浪费了,在这种情况下,亲爱的读者,你当然应该道歉。)
One who feels at home in goals and methods of this kind will naturally tend to read texts somewhat as an “insider” in each case, however diverse those cases might be: wallowing in each of them for the intrinsic rewards of doing so, opting for total immersion, motivated by love of the game itself, wanting to see what possibilities for alternate ways of seeing the world might open up from inside each orientation, implication after implication, and without much interest in gathering these moves and expansions into handy “results” to be harvested for ulterior uses. But taking a step back from this gallery of related philosophical positions in which we’ve tried to immerse ourselves, we might ask ourselves how these ideas that might look to someone in more of a hurry, what form they might assume in takeaway shorthand models, for application to other truth projects or goodness projects of whatever kind. In our discussion we’ve had to try on and fling off various models and analogies to explore individual points of oddness, without worrying too much about squaring them with one another. These models seem to lend themselves to incessant invention and modification and revision, precisely because in this term Li something interestingly strange is being denoted. But the “outsider” will justifiably want to compare and crystallize and refine these models for some kind of conclusion. We moderns, for example, may be tempted to compare the weird ubiquitous co-presence of intersubsumptive but conflicting Li in Tiantai doctrine to, say, the presence of radio waves pervading space. All the stations are playing in all locations at the same time, but only one comes forth, due to the way a particular radio receiver is tuned. Perhaps an even better metaphor would be that of various prisms and lenses. All the colors are present everywhere, copresent in each locus. But a particular prism or lens breaks this light up, making one or another color appear at a particular locus. All the colors are in fact present at each
一个对这种目标和方法感到熟悉的人自然会倾向于在每种情况下都以某种“内部人士”的身份来阅读文本,无论这些情况可能有多么不同:沉迷于每一种情况,以获得这样做的内在回报,选择完全沉浸,出于对游戏本身的热爱,想要看看从每个方向内部可能会出现什么看待世界的替代方式的可能性,暗示一个又一个暗示,并且没有太多兴趣将这些动作和扩展收集成方便的“结果”为别有用心而收获。但是,从我们试图沉浸其中的相关哲学立场画廊中退一步,我们可能会问自己,这些想法对于更匆忙的人来说可能是什么样子,它们在外卖速记模型中可能采取什么形式,适用于其他任何类型的真理项目或善良项目。在我们的讨论中,我们必须尝试并抛弃各种模型和类比来探索个别的奇怪点,而不必太担心将它们相互关联。这些模型似乎适合不断的发明、修改和修正,正是因为“李”这个词表示了一些有趣而奇怪的东西。但“局外人”有理由想要比较、结晶和完善这些模型以获得某种结论。例如,我们现代人可能会忍不住将天台教义中普遍存在的相互包容但相互冲突的理与遍布空间的无线电波的存在进行比较。所有电台都在所有地点同时播放,但由于特定无线电接收器的调谐方式,只有一个电台出现。 也许更好的比喻是各种棱镜和透镜。所有颜色无处不在,共存于每个位置。但特定的棱镜或透镜会分解这种光线,使一种或另一种颜色出现在特定的位置。所有颜色实际上都存在于每个

locus, but only one is manifest. A moment of experience is like the lens that selects out and manifests some of the Three Thousand at this locus rather than others, while in fact each is present everywhere. This metaphor must be modified by the further consideration that each of the particular colors subsumes all the others; it is not just white that is composed of all the other colors, but each particular color does likewise: it is as if red light could be broken up by a particular lens into all the other colors of the spectrum, plus white itself. This consideration is what is meant by “intersubsumption of Lis.” The unique role of white light in physical reality as we presently conceive it would be a case of “the exclusive Mean”: a fixed relationship exists between that which is the subsumed and that which is the subsumer. In the Tiantai case, each is the subsumer and each is the subsumed.
轨迹,但只有一个是明显的。片刻的体验就像镜头一样,在这个地点挑选并显现出三千人中的一些人,而不是其他人,而事实上,每一个人都存在于各处。这个比喻必须通过进一步考虑来修改,即每种特定颜色都包含所有其他颜色;不仅白色是由所有其他颜色组成的,而且每种特定颜色也是如此:就好像红光可以被特定的透镜分解成光谱中的所有其他颜色,加上白色本身。这种考虑就是“Lis的相互包容”的含义。正如我们目前所设想的,白光在物理现实中的独特作用将是“排他性平均”的情况:在被包容者和被包容者之间存在着固定的关系。在天台案中,每个人都是被包含者,每个人都是被包含者。
But there is still something profoundly wrong with these metaphors. They are too “Platonic.” That is, they suggest a two-tiered ontology: lenses are lenses, light is light. To correct this, we would have to make a mental adjustment that seems to make the metaphor quite unworkable. For to really correspond to the Tiantai position, we would need a situation where light was, as it were, made of not waves or particles, but of lenses. The light pervading all space would have to be just lenses and nothing more; perhaps tiny lenses, or waves that are themselves distortions of space, which function themselves as lenses. This would mean that light passes through light, as it were; that is, that the lens bending the light is itself made out of light. Perhaps we could imagine this by picturing light threaded through itself, so that we have a difference in scale, something like a knot; light loops around to form a construct through which other light may pass, and be filtered and distorted; or microlevel coherences of light passing through macrolevel coherences.
但这些比喻仍然存在严重错误。他们太“柏拉图式”了。也就是说,他们提出了一个两层本体论:镜片是镜片,光是光。为了纠正这个问题,我们必须进行心理调整,这似乎使这个比喻变得非常行不通。为了真正对应天台位置,我们需要这样一种情况:光可以说不是由波或粒子组成,而是由透镜组成。遍布整个空间的光只能是透镜,仅此而已;也许是微小的透镜,或者本身就是空间扭曲的波,它们本身就起到了透镜的作用。这意味着光可以穿过光;也就是说,弯曲光线的透镜本身就是由光制成的。也许我们可以通过想象光穿过自身来想象这一点,这样我们就有了尺度上的差异,就像一个结;光环绕形成一个结构,其他光可以通过该结构,并被过滤和扭曲;或光通过宏观相干性的微观相干性。
All this is very confusing, and perhaps it is not constructive to continue to modify our metaphor; it has, in effect, broken down. To make it work, we would have to speak of a certain inherent “nodalizing” capability inherent in the nature of a “ray.” That is, rays would have to also serve as nodes of other rays, rather than being evenly distributed universal presences with no built-in centers of gravity-or in the Tiantai case, the constant ability to serve as a nodal center of gravity for other rays. But the problem that arises here is indicative of the big issue we are confronting in this book. In a word, rather than a two-tiered ontology, we would suggest that we think here of a vortex with a center of gravity: a certain kind of center-periphery ontology, a kind of modified offshoot of Qian Mu’s pendulum or Hall and Ames’s focus/field model, which we might call the vortex-vertex model. Li are the vertices of vortices. Like essences, universals, or Platonic Forms, the Li have the character of (1) multilocal or omnipresent instantiation; (2) transcendence; (3) determining (content-providing); (4) inclusivity, and
这一切都非常令人困惑,也许继续修改我们的比喻并没有建设性;事实上,它已经崩溃了。为了使其发挥作用,我们必须谈论“射线”本质中固有的某种固有的“节点化”能力。也就是说,射线也必须充当其他射线的节点,而不是均匀分布的普遍存在,没有内置的重心,或者在天台的情况下,始终能够充当其他射线的节点重心。射线。但这里出现的问题表明了我们在本书中面临的大问题。总之,我们建议我们在这里考虑一个具有重心的漩涡,而不是一个两层本体论:某种中心-外围本体论,一种钱穆摆或霍尔和艾姆斯摆的改良分支。焦点/场模型,我们可以称之为涡顶点模型。 Li 是涡旋的顶点。与本质、共相或柏拉图形式一样,理具有以下特征:(1)多局部或无所不在的实例化; (2)超越性; (3)确定(提供内容); (4) 包容性,以及

(5) normativity. But each of these must be understood by means of this vortex whirling around its vertex, rather than the two-tiered light/lens model or the two-tiered universal/particular model or Form/Matter model. That is:
(5)规范性。但每一个都必须通过围绕其顶点旋转的漩涡来理解,而不是两层光/透镜模型或两层普遍/特殊模型或形式/物质模型。那是:
Multilocal or Omnipresent Instantiation: The Li must pervade a given span of particular instantiations not as light pervades a space, nor as a universal Form is repeated identically in its instantiations, but as the center of gravity, the vertex, is discernible everywhere in the vortex. Note that we do not say here that there is one entity, the vertex, and another entity, the vortex, and then a third entity, which we call the “influence” of the vertex on the vortex. For this way of speaking presupposes a strict simple-location ontology, which multiplies entities in order to bridge the gap of relation between these sundered entities, and in fact, as Whitehead pointed out, is correlative to an ontology of universals and particulars. Rather, wherever the influence of something is discernible, that something is itself present in that certain form. Since the identity of an entity is here a matter of continuity-coherence-rather than repeatability of a selfsame essence, we have the manifestation of the same coherence in different forms rather than the influence of one thing on another. Hence, to indicate a few of the models for this idea, the Way of Wen and Wu was “present” all around Confucius; the “influence” of the sage’s human nature is present as the humanness of the people influenced and grouped by him (Mencius); the Ritual is present in its various, apparently contrary expressions (Xunzi); the Dao is the source but also the stuff and the course of things, it is what they are made of and also what they come from and go to, and again what charts their motion (Laozi); the wild card is present as whatever perspective it is mirroring (Zhuangzi); the Inner Coherence (“sincerity,” 誠 cheng) “is” the various emotions that manifest in accordance with it (“Zhongyong”), and so on. This is the distinctive matrix of omnipresence in these traditions, as opposed to the derivation from the concept of universality in occidental traditions. The vertex is present in the vortex. As we saw in the Tiantai case, the ultimate issue of this way of thinking is that the vortex is present as the vertex.
多局部或无所不在的实例化:Li必须遍布特定实例化的给定范围,不像光遍布空间,也不像通用形式在其实例化中相同地重复,而是像重心、顶点一样,在漩涡中的任何地方都可以辨别。 。注意,我们在这里并不是说有一个实体,即顶点,还有另一个实体,即漩涡,然后是第三个实体,我们称之为顶点对漩涡的“影响”。因为这种说法预设了一个严格的简单位置本体论,它通过增加实体来弥合这些分离实体之间的关系差距,事实上,正如怀特海指出的那样,它与普遍性和特殊性的本体论相关。相反,只要某种事物的影响是可辨别的,那么该事物本身就以某种形式存在。由于一个实体的同一性在这里是一个连续性、连贯性的问题,而不是同一本质的可重复性,所以我们看到的是同一连贯性以不同形式的表现,而不是一件事对另一件事的影响。因此,为了表明这一思想的一些模型,文武之道“存在”在孔子周围;圣人的人性的“影响”表现为受他影响和聚集的人们的人性(孟子);礼以各种明显相反的表达形式出现(荀子);道是事物的源头,也是事物的物质和过程,它是事物的组成部分,也是事物的来处和去处,也是事物运动的规律(老子);通配符以其所反映的任何视角呈现(庄子); “诚”“是”依其表现的各种情感(“中用”),等等。 这是这些传统中无所不在的独特矩阵,而不是源自西方传统中的普遍性概念。顶点存在于漩涡中。正如我们在天台案中看到的,这种思维方式的最终问题是漩涡作为顶点而存在。

Transcendence: The Li must be beyond any particular determination not as white light is beyond any particular color, nor as a universal or Form is beyond any of its instantiations, but as a center of gravity is not any of the elements that are organized around it, nor the entirety of the vortex, but a virtual point that
超越性:理必须超越任何特定的规定,不像白光超越任何特定的颜色,也不像普遍性或形式超越其任何实例,而是作为重心而不是围绕它组织的任何元素,也不是整个漩涡,而是一个虚拟点

may be empty of contents. It is present as them, but it is not any of them simpliciter. To be a center that joins two extremes, it must not itself be either of the two extremes; it must exclude them, be beyond them. Transcendence here means simply negation (to “not” be X is to be entirely “beyond” X), but negation in this case turns out to imply inclusion: the center is not the two extremes precisely because it is the one place that is both of the two extremes, their only point of contact and copresence. More to the point, the center is the sole intelligibility of the whole, the totality of relations. Outside of the whole, there is nothing. Hence, there is nothing for that totality to be related to. Thus, precisely because everything is constituted by its relations and is nothing besides, each thing, qua center, is transcendent, is beyond all relations. Put another way: if all is relation (nontranscendent), then there are no relata, and if there are no relata, there are no relations. Each thing subsumes all beings as aspects of itself, each is nothing but the totality of all relations, each is the whole, outside of which there is nothing. Each thing stands alone beyond all otherness, dependent on no “other” being, transcendent to all other beings. Total immanence implies total transcendence.
可能内容为空。它与它们一样存在,但并不比它们更简单。要成为连接两个极端的中心,它本身就不能是两个极端中的任何一个;它必须排除他们,超越他们。这里的超越意味着简单的否定(“不”是X就是完全“超越”X),但在这种情况下的否定却意味着包容:中心并不是两个极端,因为它是一个既是两个极端又是两个极端的地方。两个极端之间,他们唯一的接触点和共存点。更重要的是,中心是整体、关系的整体的唯一可理解性。在整体之外,什么也没有。因此,与这个整体没有任何关系。因此,正因为一切事物都是由其关系构成的,除此之外什么也不是,所以作为中心的每一事物都是超越的,超越所有关系的。换句话说:如果一切都是关系(非超越的),那么就没有关系,如果没有关系,就没有关系。每一个事物都包含所有存在作为其自身的方面,每一个事物只不过是所有关系的总和,每一个事物都是整体,除此之外没有任何事物。每一个事物都独立存在,超越所有其他存在,不依赖于任何“其他”存在,超越所有其他存在。完全的内在性意味着完全的超越性。

Determination (content-providing): The Li must determine and provide the content of events not as light provides the content of the various colors, nor as a universal or Form provides the content of particulars, but as a vertex determines the position of the elements in a vortex, and the character of the vortex itself.
决定(提供内容):理必须决定并提供事件的内容,不是像光提供各种颜色的内容,也不是像普遍或形式提供细节的内容,而是像顶点决定元素的位置在漩涡中,以及漩涡本身的特征。

Inclusivity: The Li include all their exemplars not as light includes all colors, nor as a universal or Form includes the essence of all its instantiations, but as a center of gravity at the vertex is expressed by the behavior of all elements in the vortex, the point from which they are all derivable.
包容性:理包含了它们的所有范例,不是像光包含所有颜色,也不像通用或形式包含其所有实例的本质,而是作为顶点的重心由漩涡中所有元素的行为来表达,它们都是可导出的点。

Normativity: The Li are normative not as definitional forms but as the point of equilibrium to which an internal pull can be felt in all elements of a vortex, if these are viewed as elements in the whole vortex rather than separate events. But this normativity will only hold if human welfare, desire in the broad sense, is also one of the elements in the vortex. That is, we must presuppose that we are ourselves wind-sailors, who study these vortices with the specific interest of knowing how to maintain our equilibrium in sailing through them, utilizing them for sailing power, and so on. To know where the vertices or centers of gravity lie is the essential thing we need to know to make our
规范性:Li 是规范性的,不是作为定义形式,而是作为一个平衡点,如果将这些元素视为整个涡旋中的元素而不是单独的事件,则在涡旋的所有元素中都可以感受到内部拉力。但只有当人类福利(广义上的欲望)也是漩涡中的要素之一时,这种规范性才会成立。也就是说,我们必须预设我们自己是风水手,我们研究这些涡流的具体兴趣是了解如何在穿过它们时保持平衡,如何利用它们作为航行动力等等。知道顶点或重心在哪里是我们需要知道的重要事情,以便我们能够

way through the vortices and keep from capsizing. Not every vortex-around-a-vertex is a Li : only those that are “edible” to us, as it were, qualify.
穿过漩涡并防止倾覆。并非所有围绕顶点的漩涡都是李:只有那些对我们来说可以“食用”的漩涡才符合资格。
The earliest usage of the character Li was as a verb: to divide, as one divides plots of land for farming. This is a particular kind of cutting: the treatment of jade is also a process of cutting away, but one that creates a finished product that has a certain value to human beings. To divide in this way is also to group. It is to divide raw material into groups according to certain value requirements. As a noun, this comes to mean the contours of the natural material along which it can be so divided. It suggests the perforations that guide effective cutting, leaving the material grouped in a way that is coherent for human valuation.
“离”字最早的用法是作为动词:分,就像分田地一样。这是一种特殊的切割:玉石的处理也是一种切割的过程,但它创造出对人类有一定价值的成品。这样划分也是分组。是将原材料按照一定的价值要求进行分组。作为一个名词,它指的是天然材料的轮廓,可以沿着它来划分天然材料。它暗示了指导有效切割的穿孔,使材料以一种与人类评估一致的方式分组。
Thinking in terms of the vertex-vortex model, these perforations are the vertices which, when chosen as guides for our grouping divisions, form coherent vortices around themselves. A ready model from Chinese medicine would be the acupuncture meridians and their pressure points (穴道 xuedao). One cuts or presses into the body at certain places, and this divides and channels the energies of the body into coherent groupings, making the body a more harmonious totality. The division in the body thus further unifies the body. It is in this sense that dividing and uniting are combined in the conception of Li.
从顶点-涡流模型的角度思考,这些穿孔是顶点,当选择它们作为我们分组划分的指南时,它们会在它们周围形成连贯的涡流。中医的现成模型是针灸经络及其压力点(穴道血道)。在身体的某些部位进行切割或按压,这会将身体的能量划分和引导成连贯的分组,使身体成为一个更加和谐的整体。身体的分裂从而使身体进一步统一。正是在这个意义上,“理”的概念将分与合结合起来。
I will now repeat verbatim the chart given earlier, noting the three distinct levels of harmonious coherence are thus necessary for any item, X , to qualify as Li:
我现在将逐字重复之前给出的图表,并指出和谐连贯性的三个不同级别对于任何项目 X 来说都是必要的:
  1. The harmonious coherence (togetherness) of
    和谐的连贯性(团结性)

    a. the parts of X with one another, and
    一个。 X 的各个部分彼此相连,并且

    b. X as a whole with its environment.
    b. X 与其环境是一个整体。
  2. The harmonious coherence between X X XX and a desiring human perceiver:
    之间的和谐一致 X X XX 和一个充满渴望的人类感知者:

    a. The given desires of the human being must harmoniously cohere with X ; that is, X must satisfy some human desire.
    一个。人类的既定欲望必须与 X 和谐一致;也就是说,X必须满足人类的某些欲望。

    b. Human awareness harmoniously coheres with X ; that is, X is intelligible to human awareness.
    b.人类意识与X和谐一致;也就是说,X 是人类意识可以理解的。
  3. The harmonious coherences that result when 1 above harmoniously coheres with 2 above. These can be of any number of types:
    当上述 1 与上述 2 和谐一致时,就会产生和谐的连贯性。这些可以是任意数量的类型:

    a. Marketability or social utility of X ( X adheres with economic demand and market desires);
    一个。 X的市场性或社会效用(X符合经济需求和市场愿望);

    b. Harvest of crops (nutrition available to humans, which harmoniously cohere with their needs);
    b.农作物的收获(人类可获得的营养,与他们的需求和谐一致);

    c. Continuation of the species (harmonious coherence of past and present);
    c.物种的延续(过去和现在的和谐一致);

    d. Grouping together of the species (harmonious coherence of its members);
    d.物种的分组(其成员的和谐一致);

    e. Skill in human relations, or practical prowess or skill of any kind (coherence of ends and means);
    e.人际关系技巧,或任何形式的实际能力或技巧(目的和手段的一致性);

    f. Liberation from suffering (Nirvana), and enlightenment to further intelligible coherences (“wisdom”).
    f.从痛苦中解脱(涅槃),并获得进一步可理解的连贯性的启蒙(“智慧”)。
Li is any harmonious coherence of the type described in 1 that can harmoniously cohere with human beings in the sense of 2 , leading to further harmonious coherences of the type described in 3 . Li 3 . Li 3.Li3 . \mathrm{Li} is all about what goes where, not about what is and what is not, or a world of laws hidden either behind or inside existent things. Li refers to those vortices-around-vertices that are capable of serving as an element in the prior vortex-around-a-vertex, which is a human being, such that it either increases the harmony or expanse of that human vortex, or makes it an element in some larger vortex. It is hoped that running some such considerations through one’s mind will provide more than randomly probable assistance to anyone involved, for whatever reason, in thinking about coherence, incoherence, value, omnipresence, or the meaning of the term Li in classical Chinese philosophical texts.
理是1中描述的类型的任何和谐连贯性,它可以在2的意义上与人类和谐一致,导致进一步的1中描述的类型的和谐连贯性。 3 . Li 3 . Li 3.Li3 . \mathrm{Li} 一切都是关于什么去哪里,而不是关于什么是和不是什么,或者隐藏在现有事物背后或内部的法则世界。 Li指的是那些能够充当先前的围绕顶点的漩涡(人类)中的元素的那些围绕顶点的漩涡,这样它要么增加该人类漩涡的和谐或扩展,要么使得它是某个更大漩涡中的一个元素。我们希望,在一个人的头脑中进行一些这样的考虑,将为任何参与思考中国古典哲学文本中的连贯性、不连贯性、价值、无所不在或“理”一词的含义的人提供不仅仅是随机的可能的帮助,无论出于何种原因。

EPILOGUE 结语

TOWARD LI IN NEO-CONFUCIANISM
新儒家的“礼”观

This is not the place to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the Neo-Confucian conceptions of Li. It would require another book, or possibly several, to exhaust the vast and sometimes contradictory utterances of even one of the main Neo-Confucian thinkers, let alone the various possible interpretations offered in the growing body of secondary literature. However, it might be worthwhile to take a quick and tentative glance at the direction such a work might take, on the basis of these considerations of the prehistory of Li . We have been groping for models with which to think about describing values and accounting for the identities and relations of existing entities without recourse to mutually exclusive notions of one and many, or of sameness and difference. Applying the takeaway models of center and periphery, of vertex and vortex, of second-order coherences between coherences, of intelligibility as cohesion, of negation (transcendence) as inclusion (immanence), and so on, to the formative moves in the development of Neo-Confucianism, attempting also a somewhat oversimplified account of the immensely complex and hotly contested question of Zhu Xi’s (朱喜, 1130 1200 1130 1200 1130-12001130-1200 ) understanding of the relation between Li and “material force” (氣 q i q i qiq i ), we can perhaps gain some insight into some of the peculiarities of this mode of thinking, some of which were mentioned in passing at the beginning of this work.
这里不是对新儒家礼观进行全面分析的地方。即使是一位主要新儒家思想家的大量且有时相互矛盾的言论,也需要另一本书,甚至可能是几本书来穷尽,更不用说在不断增长的二手文献中提供的各种可能的解释了。然而,基于对李史前史的这些考虑,快速、试探性地看一下这样一部作品可能采取的方向可能是值得的。我们一直在探索模型来思考描述价值并解释现有实体的身份和关系,而不求助于一与多、相同与差异的相互排斥的概念。将中心和外围、顶点和漩涡、相干性之间的二阶相干性、作为内聚性的可理解性、作为包含性(内在性)的否定(超越)等的外卖模型应用于新儒家也尝试对朱熹极其复杂且争议激烈的问题进行过于简单化的解释(朱喜, 1130 1200 1130 1200 1130-12001130-1200 ) 理解力与“气”之间的关系 q i q i qiq i ),我们也许可以深入了解这种思维模式的一些特殊性,其中一些在本文开头顺便提到过。
I choose to focus on Zhu Xi not only for the obvious reason of his historical and philosophical importance and influence, but also because Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism is often viewed as the place to look for a decisive rift in the tradition, where something much closer to European dualistic metaphysics somehow makes its appearance in China. Zhu Xi seems closer to the two-tiered model, with his ontology of Li and qi. Moreover, he sometimes says Li is static as opposed to the dynamism of q i q i qiq i, that it is eternal and unchangeable, and that it preexists q i q i qiq i, has determining influence on qi, provides values, and so on-all of which stinks of metaphysical
我选择关注朱熹,不仅是因为他在历史和哲学上的重要性和影响力,而且是因为成朱理学经常被视为寻找传统中决定性裂痕的地方,其中有很多东西更接近欧洲的二元形而上学以某种方式出现在中国。朱熹似乎更接近两层模型,他的理气本体论。此外,他有时会说李是静态的,而不是动态的。 q i q i qiq i ,它是永恒的、不可改变的,并且它是预先存在的 q i q i qiq i ,对气有决定性的影响,提供价值等等——所有这些都带有玄学的臭味。

dualism. But here too, we must make the adjustment to the vertex-vortex model. This helps clear up some of the confusions about oneness and manyness, or sameness and difference, among the Li.
二元论。但在这里,我们也必须对顶点涡模型进行调整。这有助于澄清黎族中关于单一性和多样性、相同性和差异性的一些困惑。
We may start by considering the very beginning of this shift in the conception of Li in the work of Cheng Hao 程顥 (Cheng Mingdao 程明道, 1032-1085). For it was Cheng who famously is said to have declared himself the initiator of a new understanding precisely of Li: “Though much in my learning was received from tradition, my understanding of the two characters 天理 tianli are derived from my own experience.” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} This seems to suggest that Cheng believed he had arrived at a radically new understanding about “Heavenly Li” at least, which becomes the guiding concept for the more comprehensive innovations and expansions of the Neo-Confucian concept of Li simpliciter, always a shorthand for tianli in this context, to follow in the thought of his younger brother Cheng Yi 程頣 (Cheng Yichuan 程伊川, 1033-1107) and of Zhu Xi. It is thus perhaps useful to look at Cheng Hao’s first deployments of the term. In my view, Cheng’s short essay “Shi ren pian” (識仁篇 “Essay on Recognizing Ren”) is extremely illuminating in this connection. That work opens with the following words:
我们可以从程明道(Cheng Mingdao 程明道,1032-1085)的著作中“理”观念转变的最开始开始。据说,程氏曾宣称自己是对“理”的新理解的发起者:“虽然我的学问大部分是从传统中获得的,但我对“天理天理”两个字的理解却来自于我自己的经验。” 1 1 ^(1){ }^{1} 这似乎表明,程相信他至少对“天理”有了全新的认识,这成为新儒家“理”概念更全面创新和扩展的指导概念。在此背景下,他追随其弟程伊川(1033-1107)和朱熹的思想。因此,看看程浩对该术语的首次运用也许是有用的。在我看来,程的短文《识仁篇》在这方面极具启发性。该作品以以下文字开头:
The first thing we must do is recognize what ren 仁is. Ren means to form a single undivided body with things. Rightness [義 yi], Ritual [禮 li], Wisdom [智 zhi], and Good Faith [信 xin] are all ren. Once you have recognized this L i L i LiL i [ci L i L i LiL i ], simply attend respectfully to it and preserve it with Sincerity [cheng]; there is no need for caution or control, for extensive searching. The only thing to guard against is laziness of mind. If the mind is not lazy, what need one guard against? Extensive searching is necessary only when the Li is not understood. But if it is preserved long enough it will become clear spontaneously; then what search is necessary? This Dao means not to stand over against things as their opposite [與物無對 yuwuwudui]; “vastness” is really inadequate to describe it. All the functions of the world are then my own function. Mencius said that for “all things to be complete in me” requires “finding the genuinely sincere in oneself upon self-examination,” and that this is the greatest joy. If in self-examination you find a lack of genuine sincerity, then you are still standing over against things as their opposite. To try to use such a self to then unite with things is impossible-what joy then can there be in it? 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
我们要做的第一件事就是认识什么是仁。仁的意思是与事物形成一体。义、礼、智、信,都是仁。一旦你认识到这一点 L i L i LiL i [ci L i L i LiL i ],只要恭敬地对待它,并以诚心来保存它;无需谨慎或控制,也无需进行广泛的搜索。唯一要提防的是思想上的懒惰。心若不懒惰,何须防备?只有当礼不被理解时,才需要进行广泛的搜索。但如果保存得足够久,它就会自然而然地变得清晰;那么还需要什么搜索呢?此道的意思是不与事物相对立。 “浩瀚”这个词实在不足以形容。世界上所有的功能都是我自己的功能。孟子说,“万物成于我”,就必须“自省而至至”,这是最大的快乐。如果你在自省中发现缺乏真诚,那么你还是站在事物的对立面。想要用这样的自我来与事物结合,那是不可能的,那还有什么快乐呢? 2 2 ^(2){ }^{2}
Cheng here does not speak of Li in general; instead he is speaking about a specific Li: the Li of ren, which he calls “this Li” (此理 cili). It seems that Li is, initially, a shorthand for ren itself. Ren in classical Confucian
程在此并非泛指李;相反,他谈论的是一个特定的理:仁的理,他称之为“此理”。最初,“礼”似乎是“仁”本身的简写。古典儒家的“仁”

texts is variously translated as “benevolence,” “humaneness,” “humanity,” “co-humanity,” “Goodness,” “authoritative humanity,” and so on. It is one of the four traditional Mencian virtues, Benevolence, Rightness, Ritual, and Wisdom (sometimes, as here, supplemented by the fifth, Good Faith, which fills out the fivefold parallelism with the Five Phases (五行 wuxing) and all the other correlative sets of five). But here we note that ren is defined specifically as coherence, in two specific ways. First, it is the unity with all things: coherence as togetherness, on an organistic model of “forming one body.” All things, including the self, are to be viewed as part of a single undivided living body. Cheng will famously compare ren to feeling, as opposed to numbness, of the parts of a body, and this is what he has in mind here: the ability to feel what other things feel, rather than standing over them as an opposite, externally to them. This may be regarded as a metaphysical expansion of the traditional Confucian association of ren with “reciprocity,” 恕 shu, putting oneself in the shoes of the other in any relationship. The use of t i t i tit i 體 here should remind us not only of Mencius’s use of the term in the older sense of “parts” with reference to the organs of a single human body, and with a similar interest in expansion of embodiment and concern (6A14-15), but also of the verbal use of the term in Wang Bi and thereafter, meaning “to embody” but in the specific sense of standing in the shoes of the other, as well as Guo Xiang’s occasional use of the metaphor of the spontaneous connection and mutual service of the various parts of the body, all unknowingly joining vanishingly into the accomplishment of any event. Secondly, ren is another kind of coherence: the unifier of the other, apparently different and even opposed Confucian virtues of Rightness, Ritual, Wisdom, and Good Faith. Ren is simultaneously one item in the list of virtues and the totality of the list. It is not simply one among them, it is what is expressed in all of them. It is both whole and part. It is both one and many. Zhu Xi will make much of this idea, as we shall see. For the moment, let us note simply that ren is what expresses itself even when not apparent, which is present even when seemingly replaced by its opposite (for example, “Rightness”), as its own apparent absence, and is at the same time thought to thereby be what gives real value to all the virtues and to bring them together into a living and embodied unity. To be ren is (1) to be unified with all things, feeling and functioning with and for and as them all, and (2) to be unified with all virtues, activating and functioning as them all. Cheng Yi will associate ren more directly with two further qualities: the endless production of life (生生不息 shengsheng buxi),as in the Zhouyi commentaries,associated now with ren as the germ within a seed, and 公 gong, impartiality, that is, what applies equally in all places, unbiased toward any one expression or position. We must, I think, understand both of these ideas specifically in terms of the initial idea of Li as ren first developed by Cheng Hao, although Cheng
文本被不同地翻译为“仁慈”、“仁慈”、“人性”、“共人性”、“善良”、“权威人性”等等。它是孟子传统四德之一:仁、义、礼、智(有时,如这里,辅以第五德“信”,它与五行(五行)和所有其他的五行并列)相关的五组)。但在这里我们注意到,仁以两种特定方式被明确定义为连贯性。首先,它是与万物的统一:作为团结的连贯性,基于“形成一体”的有机体模型。所有事物,包括自我,都应被视为一个不可分割的生命体的一部分。程将著名的“仁”与身体各部位的感觉(而不是麻木)进行了比较,这就是他在这里的意思:感受其他事物所感受的能力,而不是站在它们之上,从外部看他们。这可以被视为传统儒家“仁”与“互惠”(“恕恕”)联系的形而上学扩展,即在任何关系中设身处地为他人着想。使用 t i t i tit i 这里的“体”不仅应该提醒我们孟子在旧意义上的“部分”一词中使用这个术语,指的是单个人体的器官,并且对扩展体现和关注有着类似的兴趣(6A14-15),而且还有王弼及此后对该术语的口头使用,意思是“体现”,但具体含义是站在他人的立场上,以及郭象偶尔使用的自发联系和相互服务的隐喻身体的各个部分,所有的一切都在不知不觉中消失地加入到任何事件的完成中。 其次,仁是另一种连贯性:是其他明显不同甚至对立的儒家美德“义、礼、智、信”的统一体。仁既是美德清单中的一项,也是美德清单的全部。它不仅仅是其中之一,而是所有这些中所表达的。它既是整体又是部分。它既是一又是多。正如我们将会看到的,朱熹会非常重视这个想法。现在,让我们简单地注意到,“仁”是即使在不明显的情况下也能表达自己的东西,即使在看似被其对立面(例如“正确”)取代时,它仍然存在,因为它本身明显不存在,并且同时也是存在的。因此,它被认为赋予所有美德真正的价值,并将它们结合成一个生动的、具体的统一体。仁就是(1)与万物合一,与万物一起感受和运作,为万物而运作,(2)与一切美德合一,与万物一样激活和运作。成毅将仁更直接地与另外两个品质联系起来:生命的生生不息(生生不息),正如《周易》注释中所说,现在与仁作为种子中的胚芽联系在一起,以及公公,公正,即,同样适用于所有地方,不偏向任何一种表达或立场。我认为,我们必须根据程浩首先提出的“礼”作为“仁”的最初思想来具体理解这两个思想,尽管程浩
Yi and Zhu Xi will add some decisive twists to the implications of this move.
易和朱熹将为这一举动的含义添加一些决定性的转折。
It is also, as the title of the essay suggests, something that functions as an object of knowledge, coherence as intelligibility; indeed, Cheng Hao stresses that merely recognizing it and remaining aware of it, keeping it in view, continuing to feel it as such, is the heart of Confucian self-cultivation. Ren is the recognizable vertex of the virtues and of the accomplished sense of oneness with the total body of all things, giving them their value when they are recognized as the vortex around this vertex.
正如文章标题所暗示的,它也是一种充当知识对象、连贯性和可理解性的东西;事实上,程浩强调,仅仅认识它、保持觉察它、保持在视野中、持续地感受它,就是儒家修身的核心。仁是美德的可识别顶点,也是与万物整体合一的完成感的顶点,当它们被认为是围绕该顶点的漩涡时,它们就具有价值。
Li as ren is value, but it incorporates one dimension of the ironic conception of coherence as value: the inclusion of both good and evil. The need to overcome “oppositeness,” the true togetherness of all things, still trumps the need for a clear-cut value dualism, just as in the ironic tradition. To be one body with all things, without opposing any, involves accepting both good and evil things as parts of this totalistic body. Good and evil, as part of the one harmonious coherence of the body of ren, are also “not two opposed things produced within the original nature”-as embraced within the original nature of ren, they are not actually opposites at all. 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} This would be a sticking point for later Neo-Confucians in the Cheng-Zhu tradition, but we can perhaps understand it as part of the entailment of Li as coherence and the incorporation of the ironic elements that were now entrenched in the tradition (and we will see a similar idea reasserted by Wang Yangming). But Cheng Hao gives us a new example of the non-ironic incorporation of this ironic motif, which allows him to embrace this inclusion of good and evil in Li without undermining his commitment to the Good, conceived specifically as the coherence of ren as Li , as value. It is accomplished in this case by Cheng Hao’s conception of ren as Li as explicitly nonreversible. In spite of the importance of the notion of reciprocity in ren, close examination reveals that the affect of reciprocity is accomplished all from one side: unreciprocated reciprocity. The structure is quite similar to the Huayan approach. Cheng says, “For there to be both good and evil events is all the Li of Heaven. It is necessary that the things within the Li of Heaven include both good and evil. For it is the natural condition of things to be uneven. We should only understand this, but refrain from entering into evil ourselves, lest we devolve into a mere thing.” 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} The point here is that the active experience of the oneness of all things in the single body of ren as value is a specific prerogative and responsibility of human beings; humans are the unifier, all things are merely the unified. That which is unified must include both the good and the evil for it to qualify as the ultimate coherence of all things in one body, but since good is defined precisely by the ability to actively form one body with all things, to recognize and realize this oneness, this ironic form of value is incorporated into the non-ironic
作为仁的礼是一种价值,但它包含了具有讽刺意味的连贯性概念的一个维度:善与恶的包容。正如讽刺传统一样,克服“对立”、万物真正一体的需要仍然胜过对明确的价值二元论的需要。要与万物合而为一,不反对任何事物,就需要接受善恶事物作为这个整体的一部分。善与恶,作为仁体的和谐统一的一部分,也“不是本性中产生的二对立之物”——在仁的本性中,它们实际上根本不是对立的。 3 3 ^(3){ }^{3} 这对于后来的程朱传统中的新儒家来说是一个症结所在,但我们也许可以将其理解为礼作为连贯性的内涵的一部分,以及现在在传统中根深蒂固的反讽元素的结合(而我们将会看到王阳明重申了类似的想法)。但程浩为我们提供了一个新的例子,以非讽刺的方式融入这一讽刺主题,这使他能够接受礼中善与恶的包容性,同时又不损害他对善的承诺,特别是仁与礼的连贯性,作为价值。在这种情况下,这是通过程浩将“仁”视为“理”的概念来实现的,因为“仁”是明确不可逆转的。尽管仁中互惠的概念很重要,但仔细研究就会发现,互惠的影响完全是从一个方面实现的:无回报的互惠。其结构与华严法非常相似。成曰:“善恶皆有,是天理也。天理之内的事物必然有善有恶。 因为事物的自然状态是不平衡的。我们只要明白这一点,自己就不要去作恶,免得沦为凡物。” 4 4 ^(4){ }^{4} 这里的要点是,积极体验万物一体的仁作为价值,是人类的特殊特权和责任;人是统一体,万物只是统一体。统一的东西必须包括善与恶,这样它才有资格成为所有事物在一个整体中的最终一致性,但由于善的精确定义是能够与所有事物积极地形成一个整体,因此要认识并实现这一点统一性,这种讽刺性的价值形式被纳入非讽刺性的价值形式中。

value of the Ren person. To be evil would be to devolve into a mere thing: that is, something that “stands over against its opposite,” isolated, incoherent, sealed up in its own borders and thus unable to be unbiased, failing to form one body with all other things (although still part of the one body of all things formed by the ren sage). The unifier is good, the unified includes both good and evil. Failing to unify all would undermine the goodness of the unifier. This sort of appropriation of an ironic motif into a non-ironic framework should be familiar to us by now.
仁人的价值。邪恶就意味着沦为纯粹的事物:也就是说,某种“与它的对立面相对立”的事物,孤立的、不连贯的、封闭在自己的边界内,因此无法公正,无法与所有其他事物形成一个整体。物(尽管仍然是仁圣所形成的万物一体的一部分)。统一者是善,统一者既包括善,也包括恶。不能统一一切将会损害统一者的善良。这种将讽刺主题融入非讽刺框架的做法现在我们应该很熟悉了。
But something quite decisively new does happen with Cheng Yi’s appropriation of his brother’s ideas, as Graham and others have suggested. This is where the idea of the Li as both one and many really comes to the fore, with a new emphasis on the specific Lis of individual things. The germ of this idea is already present in Cheng Hao in the notion of ren’s relation to the other virtues, and by extension in its copresence in all members of the one body of all things. But Li still remains for Cheng Hao, when all is said and done, a single Li: the Li, the second-order coherence, that is ren. Cheng Hao has suggested a structure by which it can remain itself and yet “manifest” as diverse specific virtues, but in the final analysis it seems that he thinks of Li everywhere primarily as the same Li with the specific characteristics, unchanged, of being ren: empathetically forming one body with things, feeling with them, as expressed in all the virtues. It seems that the notion of specific individual Lis as providing some explanation of “why they are so” and “how they should be” is the contribution of Cheng Yi, who stresses the many more than the one, albeit with his brother’s overriding single Li perhaps lurking the background.
但正如格雷厄姆和其他人所暗示的那样,成毅挪用了他哥哥的想法,确实发生了一些相当新的事情。这就是“理”既是“一”又是“多”的理念真正脱颖而出的地方,并重新强调了个体事物的具体“理”。这一思想的萌芽已经存在于程浩的仁与其他美德关系的概念中,并延伸到仁与万物一体的所有成员的共存中。但对于程浩来说,归根结底,礼仍然是一个礼:礼,二阶连贯性,即仁。程浩提出了一种结构,通过这种结构,它可以保持自身,但又“显现”为不同的具体美德,但归根结底,他似乎认为处处的“礼”主要是同一个“礼”,其具体特征没有改变,即“仁”。 :同理心与事物形成一体,与事物一起感受,正如所有美德所表达的那样。似乎特定个体李的概念为“他们为什么如此”和“他们应该如何”提供了一些解释,这是成毅的贡献,尽管他哥哥的单曲《李》压倒一切,但他更强调多而不是一。也许潜伏在背景中。
Cheng Y’s notion of Li brings with it a stronger sense of the “conditions for the possibility” of the existence, and the value, of a particular thing. We have seen that Li has already taken on the sense of a potentiality, something unrealized, a fact to be recognized but as yet not explicitly recognized, the preexistent perforations along which cuts might be made for maximal value. Playing on the ordinary usage of Li as “possibility,” I would suggest that Cheng Yi’s Li might be well translated with Leibniz’s term, “Compossibility.” It is a precondition for the appearance of anything in reality: if there is no specific Li for a thing, that thing cannot exist. When something is impossible, Cheng says, “There is no such Li,” or, “How could there be such a Li?” When admitting something to be marginally possible, though unconfirmed, he will say that there is this Li. That means that, given what else exists, it has no place to fit in. It cannot be. But the key to understanding the one-many implications of this notion comes in the prefix: Li is not just possibility, it is compossibility: it is the possibility of coexistence. This “co-” is where our notion of coherence comes into the picture. Li is, as we remarked in the Conclusion, a question of what goes where, how a thing
程Y的“理”观念带来了对特定事物存在的“可能性的条件”和价值的更强烈的认识。我们已经看到,李已经呈现出一种潜力的感觉,某种尚未实现的东西,一种待认识但尚未明确认识的事实,一种预先存在的穿孔,沿着这些穿孔可以进行切割以实现最大价值。利用“理”作为“可能性”的普通用法,我建议成毅的“理”可以很好地用莱布尼茨的术语“可可能性”来翻译。它是现实中任何事物出现的前提:如果一个事物没有特定的理,那么该事物就不可能存在。当某件事不可能时,程说:“没有这样的李”,或者“怎么可能有这样的李?”当承认某事有一点可能时,尽管未经证实,他会说有这个李。这意味着,考虑到其他存在的东西,它没有地方可以容纳。它不可能。但理解这一概念的一对多含义的关键在于前缀:Li不仅仅是可能性,它是共存性:它是共存的可能性。这个“co-”就是我们的连贯性概念出现的地方。正如我们在结论中所说,Li 是一个关于什么去哪里、如何发生的问题。

functions within the whole, of properly playing of its roles in the overall web of coherence. Li is not just the “logical” possibility of a thing’s existence, it is the possibility, given the existence of everything else that exists, of this thing also existing. “Existence” here would also imply value, as in all the cases we’ve examined: it must exist sustainably, in interaction with things around it in a way that provides enough value for them to motivate their continued interchange with it, its sustenance and propagation. We might think here of Cheng Chung-ying’s suggestion of “well-placedness” as a translation of Li 5 5 Li 5 5 Li^(5)^(5)\mathrm{Li}^{5}{ }^{5} So when Cheng talks about, say, some poems by Du Fu as a Li that exists, he means that these poems are proved by the fact that they were written to be possible in the context of all that exists, to have a place there, to not impinge on other existence to the extent of excluding them, so that it is not impossible for someone to suddenly perceive them in a delirium, in spite of never having read them. Compossibility, however, is thus also ren, is also gong (impartiality), is also sheng (generativity). The compossibility of X to exist in the whole is also the compossibility of X and Y in the whole itself, and the compossibility of Y. The compossibility of any given thing is by definition also the compossibility of other things; one compossibility is simultaneously many compossibilities. It is the same, impartial (gong) compossibility everywhere, and yet for this particular item it is this particular item’s (com)possibility. It is the forming of one body with all things in mutual reciprocity, manifesting also as its own other: it is ren. And it is the sustainable continuation of this life into another life, the production of life: the future (com)possibility of the existence of Y as it is present in the existence of X . It is the compossibility of the two diverse things X and Y that allows X to be what contributes to the production of Y, which would otherwise be in exclusionary opposition to it.
在整体中发挥作用,在整个连贯网络中正确发挥其作用。理不仅仅是一个事物存在的“逻辑”可能性,它是在所有其他事物都存在的情况下,这个事物也存在的可能性。这里的“存在”也意味着价值,就像我们研究过的所有案例一样:它必须可持续地存在,与周围的事物相互作用,为它们提供足够的价值,以激励他们继续与它交换,它的维持和发展传播。这里我们可能会想到郑中英提出的“well-placedness”的翻译 Li 5 5 Li 5 5 Li^(5)^(5)\mathrm{Li}^{5}{ }^{5} 因此,当程谈到杜甫作为李的一些存在的诗时,他的意思是,这些诗被这样的事实证明:它们被写成在所有存在的背景下是可能的,在那里有一席之地,不影响其他存在而将它们排除在外,因此,尽管从未读过它们,但某人在谵妄中突然感知到它们并非不可能。然而,共生也是仁,也是公,也是生。 X 在整体中​​存在的共存性也是 X 和 Y 在整体本身中的共存性,以及 Y 的共存性。根据定义,任何给定事物的共存性也是其他事物的共存性;一种可能性同时也是多种可能性。到处都是一样的、公正的可共性,但对于这个特定的项目来说,它是这个特定项目的(共)可能。它是与万物相辅相成的一体,又显现出它自己的另一体:这就是仁。 它是这个生命到另一个生命的可持续延续,生命的产生:Y 存在的未来(共)可能性,因为它存在于 X 的存在中。正是两种不同事物 X 和 Y 的共存性,使得 X 能够促成 Y 的产生,否则 Y 就会与它排他性地对立。
Zhu Xi follows this trend. Zhu’s remarks on the relation of ren to the other virtues, picking up on Cheng Hao’s definition above, provides our best model of how to understand the oneness and manyness of Li. Zhu Xi says:
朱熹也顺应了这一趋势。朱对仁与其他美德关系的评论,继承了程浩的上述定义,为我们提供了如何理解礼的单一性和多样性的最佳模型。朱熹说:
The word ren cannot be understood until you see that it includes rightness, ritual and wisdom. “Benevolence” per se refers to the original substance of benevolence. Ritual is the patterned regulations of benevolence. Rightness is the decisive cuttings and limitations of benevolence. Wisdom is the differentiations of benevolence. For example, although the four seasons differ, they all emerge from the spring. Spring is the generativity of the impulse of generation, summer is the growth of the impulse of generation, autumn is the completion of the impulse of generation, and winter is the storing up of the impulse of generation. The four can be reduced to two, the two to one, so their unity has a ruling source and their
仁这个词只有在你看到它包含了正义、礼和智慧之后才能被理解。 “仁”本身就是仁的本源。礼是仁义的规范。义是仁的决断和限制。智慧是仁的分别。例如,四时虽有不同,但都是从春天产生的。春为生冲动的生成,夏为生冲动的生长,秋为生冲动的完成,冬为生冲动的储存。四可以化为二,二可以化为一,故其合一有主源,其合一也。

togetherness an origin. . . . Benevolence is the head/beginning of the four fonts, while wisdom is what allows them to start and to finish. It is like the four virtues of the Zhouyi, “origin” is the elder of the four, but it starts not in itself but in “firmness.” For the transformations of heaven and earth cannot expand and go forth unless they have first gathered and congealed. The transition from wisdom to benevolence is the seed and axle of all transformations. 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
团结是一个起源。 。 。 。仁为四字之首,智为四字之始也。就像《周易》的四德一样,“本”为四德之长,但它的起始不在于它本身,而在于“坚定”。因为天地之变,若不先聚凝,就不能发散。从智到仁的转变,是一切变化的种子和轴。 6 6 ^(6){ }^{6}
And again: 再说一遍:
Spring is benevolence, which has the sense of an impulse of generation to it. In the summer, a sense of penetration and unobstructedness is seen in it. In autumn, a sense of realness and fruition is seen in it. In winter, a sense of firmness is seen in it. How can it be said that the impulse of generation has ceased for one moment in the times of summer, autumn and winter? Even when the roots are barren, the impulse of generation exists in them. For generally speaking, there is only one Li between heaven and earth, which divides off into many different names depending on where it arrives. 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
春天是仁,有一种产生的冲动感。夏天,在其中看到一种通透、通畅的感觉。秋天,给人一种踏实、丰收的感觉。冬天的时候,里面会看到一种坚挺的感觉。夏、秋、冬时节,怎能说一代的冲动有片刻的停息呢?即使根部贫瘠,其内仍存在着生成的冲动。一般来说,天地之间只有一里,根据到达的地方有许多不同的名称。 7 7 ^(7){ }^{7}
And, bringing out the way in which the “one” principle expresses itself not only as different, but even as opposite characteristics:
并且,提出了“一”原则不仅以不同的、甚至相反的特征来表达自己的方式:
Q: Benevolence, I think, means the impulse for ceaseless generation. It is only because people are stopped by selfish intentions that this impulse of generation cannot flow freely. If one overcomes his selfishness, the entirety of the substance produces the great function, and it is constantly flowing. A: This is the common theory of the mass of people, which misses the essential point. What is needed here is to understand the meaning of the word benevolence, which can only become clear when you look at the four virtues of benevolence, rightness, ritual, and wisdom together. When you understand what each of these means you will understand the meaning of the word benevolence. If you just look at benevolence by itself, it will become increasingly unclear the more you examine it. . . . In general the virtue-nature of human beings has four aspects: benevolence, which is a warm, harmonious impulse; rightness, which is a severe, fierce, hard, and decisive impulse; ritual, which is an expressing and disclosing impulse; and wisdom, which is an impulse of collecting and turning inward which leaves no traces. These four exist within the nature, but the sagely teaching stresses seeking the meaning of benevolence as the most urgent
问:我认为仁就是生生不息的冲动。只是因为人们被自私的意图所阻止,这种生成的冲动才无法自由流动。如果一个人克服了他的自私,那么整个本体就会产生伟大的作用,并且它会不断地流动。答:这是大众的普遍看法,没有抓住要点。这里需要理解“仁”字的含义,只有将仁、义、礼、智四德放在一起来看,才能明白。当你明白了每一个的含义时,你就会明白仁慈这个词的含义。如果只看仁本身,越看越不清楚。 。 。 。一般来说,人类的德性有四个方面:仁,是一种温暖、和谐的冲动;仁,是一种温暖、和谐的冲动;正,是一种严厉、猛烈、刚硬、果断的冲动;仪式,是一种表达和披露的冲动;智慧,是一种不留痕迹的收集和转向内心的冲动。此四者存在于自然之中,而圣教却以求仁义为当务之急。

matter, because benevolence is the first of the four. If you can constantly preserve this warm and kind impulse here, you will naturally be able to express and disclose when the times comes for expressing and disclosing; when it’s time to be hard and decisive, you will naturally be able to do so; when it’s time to gather and turn inward, you will be able to do so naturally. 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
之所以如此,是因为仁是四者之首。如果你能一直把这份温暖、善良的冲动保存在这里,到了该表达、该表露的时候,你自然就能表达、表露;该坚决果断的时候,自然就能做到;该坚决果断的时候,你自然就能做到。当该聚集并向内转的时候,你就能自然地做到这一点。 8 8 ^(8){ }^{8}
Summing up the relation to the Li of human beings, Zhu says:
朱总结了与人之礼的关系:

Love is a feeling of empathy, and empathy is a feeling, but its Li is called ren. . . . The reason human beings are human beings is that their Li is the Li of heaven and earth, and their qi is the qi of heaven and earth. Li has no traces and cannot be seen, so it must be viewed in qi. If you want to know the meaning of ren, it is an undivided qi of warmth and harmony; its qi is the Yang qi of heaven and earth in spring, and its Li is heaven and earth’s heart/ mind of generating living things. 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
爱是一种同理心的感觉,同理心是一种感觉,但它的礼叫做仁。 。 。 。人之所以为人,是因为他的理是天地之理,他的气是天地之气。理无踪迹,不可见,故须以气观之。如果你想知道“仁”的含义,那就是“仁”是一种温润和谐之气。其气,是天地春阳之气;其理,是天地生化之心。 9 9 ^(9){ }^{9}
Ren is generativity, the origin, the spring of all things. But ren is also the collective name for all four of the Mencian virtues: ren itself ( = = == benevolence), rightness, ritual, and wisdom. Each of these is “benevolence,” the generativity, appearing in a different way in a different context, just as we might say that “summer” is the further development or expression of what was started as “spring,” autumn its harvesting, winter its fallow period of self-restoration, storage of energy, consolidation of gains, turning inward for replenishment.
仁是万物的生成、本源、源泉。但仁也是孟子所有四种美德的统称:仁本身( = = == 仁)、义、礼、智。每一个都是“仁”,是生成性,在不同的背景下以不同的方式出现,就像我们可以说“夏”是“春”的进一步发展或表达,秋是收获,冬是“春”的进一步发展或表达。自我恢复、储存能量、巩固成果、向内补给的休整期。
We can see here a development of the “compossibility” of Cheng Yi’s notion of Li. The “co-” is still very much to the fore here. But Zhu Xi’s more detailed explications sometimes seem to bring out the more active determinative sense of Cheng Yi’s “possibility.” Zhu’s more robust sense of preexistence and priority of Li perhaps tips the implication one step further, to what we might call a kind of “co-potentiality.” We may ponder this in considering the following exchange:
在这里我们可以看到程颐的礼观念的“共存性”的发展。 “合作”在这里仍然非常引人注目。但朱熹更为细致的阐释有时似乎带出了程颐的“可能”更为积极的决定性意义。朱对李的先在性和优先性的更强烈的认识可能进一步将这一含义推向了一种我们可以称之为“共同潜力”的含义。我们可以在考虑以下交换时思考这一点:
Q: How is it that a dry and withered thing also has the Nature? A: It has always had this Li , which is why we say that there is nothing in the world outside the Nature. (When they went walking in the street, he said) A brick has the Li of a brick. (When they sat, he said) A bamboo chair has the Li of a bamboo chair. A dry and withered thing can be said to lack the impulse of life, but it cannot be said to lack the Li of life. For example, a rotten piece of wood may be useless, so that it can only be put in the furnace.
问:枯萎之物何以有性?答:自古以来就有这个理,所以说天地间无物外于自然。 (走在街上时,他说)砖有砖之理。 (坐时说)竹椅有竹椅的礼。一个枯萎的东西可以说缺乏生命的冲动,但不能说缺乏生命的理。例如,一块腐烂的木头可能没有用处,因此只能将其放入炉中。
This is what it means to lack the impulse of life. But when you burn a specific kind of wood, a specific Qi-force is produced, each one different. This is because the Li of each is thus. 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
这就是缺乏生活冲动的意思。但是,当你燃烧特定种类的木材时,会产生特定的气力,每一种都不同。这是因为各理如此。 10 10 ^(10){ }^{10}
Li is still ultimately rooted in ren, generativity (sheng) and unity (“one body” as inter-feeling) as such, and its unbiased omnipresence in various apparently non-ren manifestations. But “generation” means “co-generation,” and the sort of “life” generated here includes any function, any distinctive way of functioning within the whole, any way of affecting other things that is of potential value to those things in their own continued coherence with one another. The “co-potentiality of life” is just a “co-potentiality of mutually useful activity.” It is a kind of co-activity. The dried and withered thing has the potential to act in concert with other things, to perform a role in the totality: it can produce energy. That is its co-potential for value. The Li of each thing is specific to that thing as that thing’s function within the whole, in relation to other things and to its potential values. This value means specifically value to the human, or at least to the sage among humans who sees all things as his own undivided body, who, as possessor of the most balanced and unobstructed qi, manifests the totality of ren, of Li. When asked about the Li of specific inanimate things, Zhu Xi cites the potential functions of things: “A boat can only move on water, a cart can only move on land.” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} Contrast the case of the cart to the case of the rotten wood. The latter has no other function than the potential energy it will produced when burned. If it were still a decent piece of wood, it might function as part of a cart or a boat, and then would manifest the coherence of that part of that vehicle. Being rotten, it reverts to its minimal function for human beings. Zhu does not say that “to burn and produce heat” is part of the Li of the cart, although it can be burned for fire. That is not the Li of cart qua cart, but the Li of the wood. We may think here of Fazang’s distinction between the complete building and the “broken building.” The point is that Li is the possibility of functioning (“it can only move . . .”) in the context of how it coheres both with other things (land, water) and also, crucially, with human beings, themselves conduits of the unbiased and unceasing generative fullness of ren.
礼最终仍然植根于仁、生生和统一(“一体”作为相互的感觉)本身,以及它在各种明显非仁的表现中的公正无所不在。但“一代”的意思是“共同发电”,这里产生的那种“生命”包括任何功能、任何在整体中独特的运作方式、任何影响其他事物的方式,而这些方式对这些事物本身具有潜在价值。彼此之间继续保持一致。 “生命的共同潜力”只是“互利活动的共同潜力”。这是一种共同活动。干燥和枯萎的东西有潜力与其他东西协同作用,在整体中发挥作用:它可以产生能量。这就是它的价值共同潜力。每个事物的理都是特定于该事物的,因为该事物在整体中的功能,与其他事物及其潜在价值的关系。这种价值对于人类,或者至少对于人类中的圣人来说,意味着特殊的价值,圣人将万物视为自己不可分割的整体,作为最平衡、最通畅的气的拥有者,体现了仁、理的整体。当被问及具体无生命事物的理时,朱熹列举了事物的潜在功能:“船只能在水上行驶,车只能在陆地上行驶。” 11 11 ^(11){ }^{11} 将手推车的情况与腐烂的木头的情况进行对比。后者除了燃烧时产生的势能之外没有其他功能。如果它仍然是一块像样的木头,它可能会起到车或船的一部分的作用,然后就会体现出该车辆的该部分的连贯性。腐烂后,它又恢复到对人类最起码的作用。 朱并没有说“燃烧生热”是车礼的一部分,尽管它可以燃烧生火。那不是车之礼,而是木之礼。这里我们可能会想到法藏对完整建筑和“残破建筑”的区分。关键在于,理是在它如何与其他事物(土地、水)以及最重要的是与人类结合的背景下发挥作用的可能性(“它只能移动……”)。仁的公正和不断的生成圆满。
Discerning Li is for Zhu Xi a matter of finding the parts that fit together, the co-potentials:
对于朱熹来说,辨别李就是找到相互配合的部分,即共势:
For Heavenly Li is never in all the ages extinguished in any human being; no matter how it is covered over or confined, Heavenly Li is always constantly there just as ever, emerging from within selfish desire at every moment without cease-it is just that human beings are not aware of it. It is exactly like [fragments of] bright pearl or
因为天理在任何一个时代里都不会在任何人身上消失。无论怎样遮盖、限制,天理始终如一地存在着,每时每刻都从私欲中涌现出来,只是人类没有意识到而已。它就像明亮的珍珠[碎片]或

of a large shell mixed in together with sand and gravel, successively flashing forth here and there. Just recognize and gather these scattered pieces of the Way and its coherences [daoli] right where they appear, joining the fragments until they gradually become an integral whole. After your own good intentions grow and increase by the day and the month, Heavenly Li will naturally become pure and firm in you. What you formerly called selfish desires will naturally retreat and scatter, until finally they no longer sprout up at all. 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
一个巨大的贝壳与沙子和碎石混合在一起,不断地闪现出来。只要在它们出现的地方认出并聚集这些分散的道及其连贯性,将这些碎片连接起来,直到它们逐渐成为一个整体。当你自己的善心日渐增长、月月增多之后,你的天理自然就会变得纯洁而坚定。以前所谓的私欲,自然会退去、散去,直到最后根本不再发芽。 12 12 ^(12){ }^{12}
The parts that don’t fit into this overall network of coherence, that do not cohere, are ipso facto "selfish (i.e., biased, non-ren) desires. The parts that do are always flashing forth, and need only be retained and put in tandem with one another to spring into a fully coherent Gestalt.
那些不适合这个整体连贯网络、不连贯的部分,本身就是“自私(即偏见、不仁)的欲望。符合的部分总是闪现出来,只需要保留和保留即可。”彼此串联起来,形成一个完全连贯的格式塔。
Zhu’s description of Li as a kind of network of roads has led to the translation of the term as “pattern,” associated with the array of veins in a piece of jade. This is a useful consideration. In Zhu’s recorded conversations we do indeed find some provocative materials on this point:
朱将理描述为一种道路网络,导致该术语被翻译为“图案”,与一块玉石中的纹理阵列相关。这是一个有用的考虑因素。在朱的谈话录音中,我们确实发现了一些关于这一点的挑衅性材料:
Q: What is the difference between Dao and Li? A: Dao is a road, and Li is its pattern and coherence. Q : Like the pattern in wood? A: Yes. Q: So it is just like that? A: Dao is a vastly inclusive term, while Li is the coherent veins in this Dao. (He also said) Dao is vast, Li is dense. 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
问:道和理有什么区别?答:道是道路,礼是其格局和连贯性。问:喜欢木头的图案吗?答:是的。问:所以就是这样吗?答:道是一个包容性很大的词,而理是道中连贯的脉络。 (又说)道广大,理密。 13 13 ^(13){ }^{13}
Q: What is the difference between ren and Dao? A: Dao is a collective name, while benevolence specifies it as one particular thing. It is a like a road, with many paths and subdivisions, but which are all a single road. 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
问:仁和道有什么区别?答:道是一个集体名称,而仁则是具体的一个事物。它就像一条路,有许多路径和细分,但都是一条路。 14 14 ^(14){ }^{14}
Note that ren is still the general synonym for Li as such here. The Dao/ Li relation here still bears the traces of the Hanfeizi conception: Dao as the all-inclusive term, Li as the term for the individual divisions. But the oneness-manyness relation has been modified: one road also connects to the totality of roads, and Dao is no longer the material outside the roads, what’s left out of the coherent divisions and groupings created by the cutting, but rather the totality of cuts in their interfusion. But that is not the whole story: what is crucial is that a Li per se is a center, a sustainable vertex of contrasting but converging forces. The Cheng-Zhu way of thinking about Li seems to shift the focus from the vortex-around-a-vertex to the vertex itself, the vertex as such. I would suggest that if we must picture this network of roads analogy that we do so not as flat mapping of a “pattern,” but rather as a system of ravines or valleys. They are intrinsically centers
请注意,这里的“仁”仍然是“李”的一般同义词。这里的道理关系仍然带有韩非子观念的痕迹:“道”为包罗万象的术语,“理”为个别部分的术语。但一与多的关系被修改了:一条路也连接着道路的整体,而道不再是道路之外的物质,不再是在切割所产生的连贯的划分和分组中所遗漏的东西,而是道路的整体。减少他们的融合。但这还不是故事的全部:重要的是,李本身就是一个中心,一个对比但汇聚的力量的可持续顶点。成朱对李的思考方式似乎将焦点从围绕顶点的漩涡转移到顶点本身,即顶点本身。我建议,如果我们必须将这种道路网络进行类比,那么我们不要将其视为“模式”的平面映射,而是将其视为峡谷或山谷系统。它们本质上是中心

of gravitational pull, vertices of possible movements. With this emendation, Graham’s description, cited earlier, of the Li as channels along which qi moves is quite helpful. Zhu’s conception of Li is very explicitly that of a Center, like the Tiantai notion. It is the Taiji (太極 “Great Ultimate”) that forms the pivot and interface between Yin and Yang, determining their movement, forming the template on the macrolevel of the each microlevel vortex: like slicing a magnet, every portion separated off ends up having the same positive-negative polarity as the original whole. Thus, it is also explicitly linked to “the Mean,” or Center (中 zhong), expressed as the “warmth and harmony” (溫和 wenhe), which is the characteristic of ren. The further linkage of ren and the Center is crucial here, for the idea of centrality helps explain the oneness-manyness problem, and also the peculiar form of omnipresence characteristic of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism. Wherever there is a thing-a vortex of qi-there is a vertex, a center, which makes it what it is and provides the norm to which it tends to, and should, adhere in order to remain itself, that is, to sustain the coherence among its own parts and between itself and its characteristic functions in its interactions with the things in its environment. Centrality itself is precisely a kind of co-potentiality: it enables the continued function of the two extremes in their relation to one another. This maintenance of balance is what allows it to take its place in the larger context of its external relationships, to be an identifiable member of a larger whole. This principle of centrality is present in every thing, but although the specific centers may be differently determinable, they are all Li because they are centers, because of their function as the vertex of the vortex. They produce coherence both internally and externally. But this does not separate off into a set of definitively distinct centers in that to be is to be centered, to cohere around a center, to have a center of gravity that provides equilibrium and intelligibility as this or that (coherence). The Center is precisely sustainable intelligibility, as in Qian Mu’s pendulum: without the coherence provided by the center, the vertex would not be anything, would be random movement in all directions never collected back into a finite range, incoherent, unintelligible, inaccessible to cognition. But it must be identifiably and coherently “something” in order to function as a part-one extreme-of another pendulum swing. The same applies for the role of this large whole as one extreme of another swing, another vortex. Here again, there is a constant reference to the human being-“embodying Li in its completeness”-who is himself metaphysicalized and made an intrinsic standard of value within the cosmos. Those centers that are digestible to the centering processes of humans-the most excellent qi in the cosmos, which allows Li to function unobstructedly within it, where Li can manifest in its most balanced and comprehensive way-count as Li . The center is a value: it is the value of life, “continual generation”
引力,可能运动的顶点。通过这一修正,前面引用的格雷厄姆关于“理”作为气运行通道的描述是非常有帮助的。朱的理的概念非常明确,是一个中心的概念,就像天台的概念一样。正是太极形成了阴阳之间的枢纽和界面,决定了阴阳的运动,形成了各个微观漩涡的宏观模板:就像切割一块磁铁一样,每分离出来的部分都会有与原整体正负极性相同。因此,它也明确地与“中”或“中”联系在一起,表现为“温和”,这是“仁”的特征。仁与中心的进一步联系在这里至关重要,因为中心性的思想有助于解释一多问题,也有助于解释成朱理学的无所不在特征的独特形式。凡是有一个东西——气的漩涡——就有一个顶点,一个中心,它使它成为它的样子,并提供它趋向于并且应该遵守的规范,以便保持它自己,即维持它。在与环境中的事物相互作用时,其自身各部分之间以及自身与其特征功能之间的连贯性。中心性本身恰恰是一种共势:它使两个极端在相互关系中能够持续发挥作用。这种平衡的维持使其能够在更大的外部关系背景中占有一席之地,成为更大整体中可识别的成员。 这种中心性原则存在于一切事物中,但虽然具体的中心可能有不同的确定方式,但它们都是“理”,因为它们是中心,因为它们作为漩涡的顶点。它们在内部和外部产生一致性。但这并没有分成一组明确不同的中心,因为存在就是以中心为中心,围绕一个中心凝聚在一起,有一个重心,提供平衡和可理解性,如这个或那个(连贯性)。中心恰恰是可持续的可理解性,就像钱穆的钟摆一样:没有中心提供的连贯性,顶点就什么都不是,将是各个方向的随机运动,永远不会收回到有限的范围内,不连贯,不可理解,无法认知。但它必须是可识别且连贯的“某物”,才能充当另一个钟摆摆动的一部分(一个极端)。这同样适用于这个大整体作为另一种摆动、另一种漩涡的一个极端的作用。这里再次不断提到人类——“体现了完整的理”——人类本身被形而上化,并在宇宙中成为了内在的价值标准。那些能被人的中枢过程所消化的中枢,宇宙中最优秀的气,让理在其中畅通无阻,使理能够最平衡、最全面地体现出来,这就是理。中心是一种价值:是生命的价值,“生生不息”

(生生不息 shengshengbuxi), which Zhu Xi also characterizes as ren, the subsuming virtue of “harmony and warmth.”
(生生不息),朱熹也将其描述为“仁”,即“和和暖”的美德。
It should be noted that Zhu’s one-many structure here follows what might be called a Huayan rather than a Tiantai structure: there is one specific privileged center of centers, called Benevolence, which is identical to the other virtues and underwrites their mutual identity. The issue is again whether there is a single selfsame Li serving as the coherence of all and each, or if there many distinct and specific Lis each providing its own kind of coherence, and how to understand the relation between this one and this many. If Cheng Hao tended toward a clearly “Huayan” notion of a single selfsame Li , ren, which served as the coherence of all and each, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi add a real diversification into the specific Li , which are nonetheless also all the one Li expressed in various ways, which might seem to tilt more toward the Tiantai vision of Three Thousand intersubsumptive but specific Lis. But this is still here, as in Huayan, a consequence of the specific qualities of that one all-inclusive Li: in the Huayan case, because Li was Emptiness, a “principle of no-principle,” it necessarily involved both self-emptying openness to otherness and indivisibility, the pure undivided reflectivity or interactivity per se. Li is just the single idea “interpervasion,” and its apparent multiplicity as the immanent principle of each thing follows from this characteristic, which remains foundational and unchanged; as in Guo Xiang, the seeming diversity of principles ends up meaning only that the same principle-of-no-principle is repeated everywhere. Ren as a foundational principle has some of the same features, namely, a built-in mandate to extend into otherness, to overcoming dividedness, to generate and sustain life. It is just the same thing, the one and only fact of co-potentiality, which applies to the whole as a whole and to each individual existent thing: the Li of the whole is Co-poteniality, and the specific Li of a cart is the same Co-potentiality of the cart qua cart; the Li of the boat is the same Co-potentiality of the boat qua boat. It is the same Li that is all these different Lis, not, as in Tiantai, genuinely different Lis that are intersubsumptively all the “same” L i L i LiL i, a different “same” in each case (i.e., the Li that is the valued coherence of all things is the specific Li of boatishness per se, but also and alternatively it is the specific Li of cartishness per se that is the Li of all things). As such, any manifestation of life, integration, centrality, coherence may be viewed as a further flowering of the single principle or ren. This is further complexified by the explicit use of the Yin-Yang model to comprehend balance, which allows for apparently diametrically opposed functions to be seen as parts of a single process, playing out a single purpose and exemplifying a single overall character, as in the case of spring and autumn, which “are” both spring, or ren and y i y i yiy i, which
应该指出的是,朱的一对多结构在这里遵循的是华严而不是天台的结构:有一个特定的特权中心,称为仁,它与其他美德相同,并保证了它们的相互同一性。问题又是,是否有一个单一的理作为所有和每个的连贯性,或者是否有许多不同的和具体的理,每个理都提供自己的一种连贯性,以及如何理解这个“一”和“多”之间的关系。如果说程浩倾向于一种明显的“华严”观念,即单一的同一礼、仁,作为所有和每一者的连贯性,那么程颐和朱熹则为具体的礼添加了真正的多样化,尽管如此,它们也是全一的。李的表达方式多种多样,似乎更倾向于三千相互包容而又具体的李的天台愿景。但这仍然在这里,就像在华严一样,是那种包罗万象的理的特殊性质的结果:在华严的例子中,因为理是空性,是一种“无理之理”,所以它必然涉及到自我空虚。对他者的开放性和不可分割性,纯粹的不可分割的反射性或交互性本身。理只是“渗透”这个单一的观念,而它表面上的多重性作为每一个事物的内在原理都源于这一特征,而这一特征仍然是基础性的、不变的。就像郭象一样,表面上原则的多样性最终意味着同样的无原则的原则到处重复。作为基本原则的仁具有一些相同的特征,即延伸到他者、克服分裂、创造和维持生命的内在使命。 这只是同一件事,唯一的共势事实,它适用于作为整体的整体和每个单独的存在事物:整体的Li是共势,而一辆小车的特定Li是车与车具有相同的共势;船的力与船的共势相同。所有这些不同的理都是同一个理,而不是像《天台山》中那样,真正不同的理在相互包容性上都是“相同”的 L i L i LiL i ,在每种情况下都有不同的“相同”(即,作为所有事物的有价值的一致性的“理”是船性本身的特定理,但也可以是,它是狂欢本身的特定理,这是所有事物的理事物)。因此,生命、整合、中心性、连贯性的任何表现都可以被视为单一原则或仁的进一步开花。通过明确使用阴阳模型来理解平衡,这一点进一步复杂化,它允许将明显相反的功能视为单个过程的一部分,发挥单个目的并例证单个整体特征,如以春和秋为例,它们“都是”春,或者是“仁”和“仁” y i y i yiy i , 哪个

are opposites but are both still “really” ren. The ultimacy of the one of the pair remains unshaken. The one Li that is one and present everywhere is the Li of “becoming one with all things and being present everywhere.” The Tiantai structure would require that he say not only, “Rightness, Ritual and Wisdom are all alternate expressions of Benevolence, which is their real essence and to which they are all reducible,” but also, to begin with, “Benevolence, Rightness and Wisdom are all alternate expression for Ritual, which is their real essence and to which they are all reducible.” Further, we would need an emendation of Cheng Hao’s one-way concept of inclusion in the one body of all things, his stricture against becoming a “mere thing”: thinghood as such, the very separation into self-enclosure, would have to be seen as a mode of being one with all other things, and to be a specific Li in its own right, pervading and grounding all other things, including the expansive benevolent mind of the sage. Reversibility is again the issue here: full and exceptionless intersubsumption. Occasionally, we do find Zhu making a move in this direction, as for example in the following passage:
是对立的,但仍然是“真正的”仁。两人中的一个的终极地位仍然没有动摇。一理无处不在,就是“与万物合一,无处不在”的理。天台结构要求他不仅说:“义、礼、智,都是仁的替代表现,仁才是它们的本质,它们都可以还原为仁”,而且首先要说“仁、义、智”。智慧都是礼的替代表达,礼是它们的真正本质,它们都可以还原为礼。”此外,我们还需要修正程浩关于包容万物一体的单向概念,以及他反对成为“纯粹事物”的严格观念:事物本身,即与自我封闭的分离,必须是被视为一种与所有其他事物合一的模式,并且本身就是一种特定的礼,渗透并扎根于所有其他事物,包括圣人博大的仁慈之心。可逆性再次成为这里的问题:完全且无例外的相互包容。有时,我们确实会发现朱朝这个方向迈出一步,例如下面的段落:
Benevolence (ren) and rightness are like Yin and Yang, a single Qi. Yang is the Qi in the process of growth, and Yin is the Qi when it has just begun retreating. Benevolence is rightness which is just in the process of being generating, while rightness is benevolence which is turning back and collecting itself. . . . If you can [truly] see Yang, you can see Yin; if you can [truly] see Yin, you can see Yang. If you know one, you know the other. 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
仁与义,犹如阴阳,一气。阳为生盛之气,阴为刚退之气。仁是正在生成的义,义是正在回归、自我收集的仁。 。 。 。能见阳,就能见阴;能见阳,就能见阴;能见阳,就能见阴;能见阳,就能见阴。能见阴,就能见阳。如果你知道其中一个,你就知道另一个。 15 15 ^(15){ }^{15}
In the sentence I have italicized here, Zhu allows for a reversibility between substance and function: rightness is a function of benevolence, but that fact can also be expressed by saying that benevolence is a function of rightness. This is the Tiantai structure of relation between various Lis. Some of the consequences of his willingness to apply this structure can be seen in similar passages, for example:
在我这里用斜体表示的那句话中,朱氏允许实质与作用之间的可逆性:义是仁的作用,但这一事实也可以通过说仁是义的作用来表达。这就是诸理关系的天台结构。他愿意应用这种结构的一些后果可以在类似的段落中看到,例如:
Q: What is the difference between the substance and function concerning benevolence, rightness, ritual and wisdom? A: From the point of view of Yin and Yang, benevolence and ritual are Yang, while rightness and wisdom are Yin. The first two are function, the latter two are substance. Spring and summer are Yang, autumn and winter are Yin. In terms of benevolence and rightness alone, things begin in spring and grow in summer, which is benevolence. They are harvested in autumn and stored in winter, which is rightness. In terms of all four virtues, spring is benevolence, summer is ritual,
问:仁、义、礼、智的实质和作用有什么区别?答:从阴阳的角度来说,仁、礼是阳,义、智是阴。前两者是功能,后两者是实质。春夏属阳,秋冬季属阴。单就仁义而言,万物始于春,而长于夏,这就是仁。秋季采收,冬季储藏,这是正理。就四德而言,春为仁,夏为礼,

autumn is rightness, winter is wisdom. Benevolence and ritual are putting forth and spreading out, while rightness is severe, killing, decisive and judgmental, and wisdom is a collecting and storing up. 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
秋为正,冬为智。仁和礼是发扬和传播,义是严酷、杀戮、决断和判断,智慧是收集和储存。 16 16 ^(16){ }^{16}
Again: 再次:
Benevolence and rightness are the substance and function of one another, the motion and stillness of one another. The substance of benevolence is still, but its function flows without end. The function of rightness is originally moving, but its substance is that each thing finds rest in its proper place. 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
仁与义,互为本质与作用,互为动静。仁的本质是静止的,而其作用却永不停歇。正的作用本是动,其实质是万物各安其位。 17 17 ^(17){ }^{17}
And again: 再说一遍:
Someone asked about the saying that Benevolence is yielding while Rightness is firm. He answered: “Benevolence is yielding in its substance but firm in its function, while Rightness is firm in its substance and yielding in its function.” . . . [On another occasion, though, he said], “The substance of benevolence is firm but its function is yielding; the substance of rightness is yielding but its function is firm.” Guang asked, “Is it that speaking from the point of view of the motion of the Great Ultimate, benevolence is firm and rightness is yielding, but from the Yin and Yang within a single object, the function of benevolence is yielding while the function of rightness is firm?” He said, "That’s right too. Benevolence is an impulse of flowing, moving, emerging and transcending, but its function is kind and yielding. Rightness is a sense of measuring and weighing to follow what is proper, but its function is decisive and disjunctive. 118 118 ^(118){ }^{118}
有人问“仁者让,义者坚”。他回答说:“仁,其本质是屈服而其作用是坚定的;义是其本质是坚定而其作用是屈服的。” 。 。 。 [但他又在另一个场合说]:“仁的本质是坚固的,而其作用是屈服的;仁的本质是坚固的,而其作用是屈服的;义的实质是屈服,而其作用是牢固的。”光问:“是不是从太极的运行来看,仁是坚,义是让,但从一物的阴阳来看,仁的作用是让,义的作用是让。”正义坚定吗?他说:“也对。仁,是一种流动、动动、涌现、超越的冲动,其作用是仁慈、屈服;义,是衡量、权衡以遵循正当的感觉,其作用是决断、分离的。” 。 118 118 ^(118){ }^{118}
The flexibility of the categories of t i t i tit i and yong, and the reversibility of subject and predicate it allows, is deployed to good effect here. 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} Of course, this interpenetration only applies to the predetermined human values, the virtues: it does not extend, as in Tiantai, to apparent evils, nor to the entirety of the phenomenal world. But this is because of a differing conception of human welfare. In both cases, a Li must be “edible” to humans to count as a Li, must be useful for specifically human ends. Tiantai, working within the framework of infinite rebirths and infinitely multifarious bodhisattva work, regards all possible vortices as materials that will prove useful to this project. Zhu Xi, with a more modest conception of human spiritual digestion, sees only the Confucian virtues as edible, that is, transformable into the energy and activities of human social, political, and emotional life. Zhu
类别的灵活性 t i t i tit i yong,以及它所允许的主语和谓语的可逆性,在这里得到了良好的效果。 19 19 ^(19){ }^{19} 当然,这种相互渗透只适用于人类预先确定的价值,即美德:它并不像天台山那样延伸到明显的邪恶,也不延伸到整个现象世界。但这是因为对人类福利的不同看法。在这两种情况下,黎必须对人类“可食用”才能算作黎,必须对特定的人类目的有用。天台在无限轮回和无限繁杂菩萨工作的框架内工作,将所有可能的漩涡视为对该项目有用的材料。朱熹对人的精神消化的看法比较温和,他只把儒家的美德视为可以食用的,即可以转化为人类社会、政治、情感生活的能量和活动。朱
Xi’s conception is oligocentric, not omnicentric: there are a limited number of reversible centers-benevolence, rightness, etc.—which are capable of subsuming all events; but reversibility only pertains to these centers, not to all possible elements of the periphery, as in Tiantai.
习近平的理念是寡中心的,而不是全中心的:可逆的中心——仁、义等——数量有限,能够包容所有事件;但可逆性仅适用于这些中心,而不适用于天台那样的外围所有可能的元素。
The reversibility of subject and predicate can be found also in Wang Yangming 王陽明 (Wang Shouren 王守仁, 1472-1529), who quite frequently and self-consciously deployed the subject-predicate reversibility motif, and at the most comprehensible level, asserting, for example, Li is the orderliness of q i q i qiq i, and q i q i qiq i is the function of Li : " Li is the orderliness of q i q i qiq i, qi is the function of Li . Without this orderliness, the function would be impossible, and without the function, there would be no means by which to see the orderliness. 220 220 ^(220){ }^{220} Note that these are presented here in definitional form: Li is the orderliness of qi, qi is the functioning of Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} is just something about qi, but qi is also just something about Li. The “center” can be wherever one likes, wherever one chooses to start. Neither is in this sense more foundational than the other. Indeed, we seem to have here the structure of the Tiantai “Non-Exclusive Center” (不但中 budanzhong): rather than saying both “order” and “function” are two alternate ways of describing a tertium quid that enables both but is exclusively identifiable with neither (“The Exclusive Center” 但中 danzhong), Wang directly uses each of the two extremes as the name for the substantial Center of which the other is an attribute, eliminating the neutral “middle” man entirely. This appears to be a “Tiantai” move. Note, however, the next line, which echoes exactly the typical Huayan nengyi/suoyi 能依/所依 distinction, where apparent interdependence reveals itself to be an asymmetrical unilateral dependence: q i q i qiq i depends on Li ontologically, it cannot function at all without it, while Li depends on qi only epistemologically, which is to say, doesn’t really depend on it to exist, but only to be seen or manifested. Wang also shows a tendency toward privileging a particular determination or anti-determination, “of which” everything else is made the expression: the Innate Knowledge (良知 liangzhi), the substance of mind. But Wang also provides a loophole, in his claim that “the mind has no substance of its own: it takes the feeling and response of the rights and wrongs of all things as its substance” (心無體,以萬物之是非感應為體 xinwuti,yiwanwuzhi shifeiganying wei ti). 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} Here, “all things” becomes, for once, the real substance of which mind is instead the function: the usual substance of which all things are the expression-the mind-has instead become the predicate, the expression, of all things. This is also clear in Wang’s extended polemic against the Cheng-Zhu conception of Li , which he claims is mistaken in seeking a particular “fixed Li” (定理 dingli) in each particular thing. Instead, he says, the mind itself is Li: not a fixed Li, but the “Li-ing” of whatever it encounters, precisely the “feeling and response of the rights and wrongs of all things.” These cannot
主语和谓语的可逆性也可以在王守仁(1472-1529)那里找到,他经常自觉地运用主谓可逆性母题,并在最容易理解的层面上断言,例如,Li 是有序性 q i q i qiq i , 和 q i q i qiq i 是 Li 的函数:“Li 是 q i q i qiq i ,气是理的函数。没有这个秩序,功能就不可能,没有功能,就没有办法看到秩序。 220 220 ^(220){ }^{220} 请注意,这些是以定义形式呈现的:理是气的有序性,气是气的功能。 Li . Li Li . Li Li.Li\mathrm{Li} . \mathrm{Li} 是气的东西,气也是力的东西。 “中心”可以是人们喜欢的任何地方,也可以是人们选择开始的地方。从这个意义上说,两者都不比另一个更基础。事实上,我们在这里似乎看到了天台“非独中”的结构:与其说“秩序”和“功能”都是描述“三者”的两种替代方式,后者既能实现两者,又能独占。由于两者都无法识别(“独家中心”但中单中),王直接使用两个极端中的每一个作为实体中心的名称,而另一个是实体中心的属性,完全消除了中立的“中间”人。这似乎是“天台”之举。然而,请注意下一行,它完全呼应了典型的华严能依/所依区别,其中明显的相互依存揭示了自己是一种不对称的单边依存: q i q i qiq i 理在本体论上依赖于理,没有它就根本无法发挥作用,而理仅在认识论上依赖于气,也就是说,它并不真正依赖于它而存在,而只是被看到或表现出来。 王还表现出一种优先考虑特定决定或反决定的倾向,其他一切都是“由其”表达的:良知(良知),心灵的实质。但王也提供了一个漏洞,他声称“心无实体,以万物是非的感觉和反应为实体”(心无体,以万物之是非感应为)体心五体,一万五指是非感性的体)。 21 21 ^(21){ }^{21} 在这里,“一切事物”第一次成为了真正的实体,而心智却是其功能:一切事物都是其表达的通常实体——心智——却变成了一切事物的谓词、表达。这一点在王对程朱礼观的长期争论中也很明显,他声称这种礼观在每个特定事物中寻求特定的“定理”是错误的。相反,他说,心本身就是理:不是一个固定的理,而是它所遇到的任何事物的“理”,准确地说是“对万物是非的感觉和反应”。” 这些不能

be known in advance and cannot be exhaustively catalogued or systematized even after the fact. Here we have the inclusion of “coherence with human cognition and desires,” which has always been implicit in the notion of Li as coherence, made explicit again. “The mind is Li” means that the mind is the decisive vertex creating a unique vortex around itself whenever it wills, defining thereby a set of determinate “things” that are the components from which its endeavor is to be compounded, which it endeavors to form into a coherent vortex. Thus it is that all things are mind, and mind is the Li of all things, but there is nonetheless no “fixed” Li which is the mind: for the mind is both what constitutes things as things, and is itself nothing but the process of centering and cohering of those things.
事先就知道,即使事后也无法对其进行详尽的分类或系统化。这里,我们将“与人类认知和欲望的一致性”纳入其中,这一点一直隐含在理作为一致性的概念中,再次明确起来。 “心即理”意味着,心是决定性的顶点,只要它愿意,它就会在自身周围产生独特的漩涡,从而定义一组确定的“物”,这些“物”是其努力所要复合的组成部分,它努力将其组合起来。形成连贯的漩涡。因此,一切事物都是心,心是万物之理,但仍然没有“固定”的理即心:因为心既是构成事物的事物,又是事物本身的过程。这些东西的中心和凝聚力。
But this full reversibility is the exception rather than the rule in both Zhu and Wang. For Zhu, the ultimate center of centers is The Great Ultimate, which is the Non-Ultimate, which is generativity, which is Benevolence, which is warmth and harmony-the vertex of the vortex, which brings it together as this particular vortex, holds it together as such, and makes it function. For Wang, the ultimate center of centers is the mind, which includes all things as its substance, standing as their equilibrium, their mutual adjustment, the feeling and response of liking and disliking, right and wrong, between them, and yet is also beyond it (“the substance of mind has no good or evil”)—the vertex-vortex of all things and of each thing it encounters.
但这种完全可逆性对于朱和王来说只是例外,而不是规则。对朱来说,中心的终极中心是大终极,这是非终极,这是生成,这是仁慈,这是温暖与和谐——漩涡的顶点,它把它聚集在一起,因为这个特殊的漩涡持有它本身就在一起,并使其发挥作用。对于王来说,中心的最终中心是心,它包括万物作为其本体,作为它们之间的平衡、它们的相互调节、好恶、对错的感觉和反应,但又是超越的。它(“心的本质没有善恶”)——万物及其所遇到的每件事的顶点漩涡。
Zhu’s doctrine of the relation between Li and qi reflects this structure. Asked whether there is a priority between Li and qi, Zhu says:
朱氏的理气关系学说反映了这种结构。当被问及理和气是否有优先顺序时,朱说:
Originally there is no prior and posterior between them. But if you insist on searching out the origin, you must say that the Li is first. But Li is also not some separate thing; it exists here within this qi. Without this qi, the Li has no other place that can carry it. Qi refers to metal, wood, water and fire, while Li means benevolence, rightness, ritual and wisdom. 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
他们之间本来就没有先后。但若硬要追根溯源,则必说礼为先。但礼也不是某种单独的东西;它是一种独立的东西。它存在于这气之中。如果没有这个气,黎就没有其他地方可以承载它。气指的是金、木、水、火,礼指的是仁、义、礼、智。 22 22 ^(22){ }^{22}
Again: 再次:
Someone asked about the theory that Li precedes qi. [Zhuxi] said, “One cannot say that. Can we know that, as things appear at present, Li precedes qi, or qi precedes Li? Neither can be found out. But if we speculate on it, it seems that this qi always moves in dependence on this Li , and wherever this qi gathers, Li is also present. Now qi can congeal and create things, while Li has no sentiment or intention, no plan, no calculation, no creation. But wherever qi congeals, Li is within it. It is perhaps like the plants
有人问礼先气之说。朱熹说:不能这样说。能否知道从目前的情况看,是理先于气,还是气先于理呢?两者都查不出来。但如果我们推测一下,似乎这个气总是依附于这个理而运行的,而这个气所聚集的地方,理也在那里。现在气可以凝结万物,而离则无情无意,无计划,无算计,无创造。但气凝结处,理就在其中。或许就像植物一样

and animals and people in the world; none is born without a root; and it is certain that nothing grows in unplanted land from no seed. All of this is qi. As for Li , it is just a pure, unobstructed realm, without form or trace. It cannot create, while qi can ferment and congeal to generate things. But wherever this q i q i qiq i is, Li is within it.” 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
以及世界上的动物和人;没有一个人是无根而生的;可以肯定的是,在没有播种的土地上,任何东西都不会生长。这一切都是气。至于离,只是一个清净无碍的境界,无相无迹。它不能创造,而气可以发酵、凝结而生成事物。但无论这个 q i q i qiq i 是,李就在其中。” 23 23 ^(23){ }^{23}
Here, Li and qi are determined in a relation of root and branch, although Zhu goes on to qualify this with his assertion-rejected by many later Neo-Confucians-that Li per se cannot create, and to this degree is unlike a seed or root. Li is the vertex determining the vortex, not the coherence of the vortex-around-a-vertex; it does not create the vortex, and there remains a kind of rogue element, not strictly determined, in the behavior of the vortex, although it cannot exist as such without its orientation around the vertex. Qi has some degree of autonomy, a “mind of its own,” which allows for Zhu’s “theodicy,” as it were. He specifies that Heaven has no intention to create sages, and that Li’s governance is not an exact arrangement, but more like the pouring out of water on the ground, which more or less follows certain predictable patterns. We may think here of iron filings flung over a magnetic pattern: they will more or less cling to the shape of the pattern, making it discernible, but there will always be a few scattered bits out of place.
在这里,理和气是由根和枝的关系决定的,尽管朱继续用他的断言(被许多后来的新儒家拒绝)来限定这一点,即理本身不能创造,在某种程度上不像种子或种子。根。 Li是决定涡旋的顶点,而不是顶点周围涡旋的相干性;它不会产生漩涡,并且在漩涡的行为中仍然存在一种未严格确定的流氓元素,尽管如果没有围绕顶点的方向,它就不能存在。齐有一定程度的自主权,有“自己的思想”,这允许朱的“神正论”。他指出,天无意造圣人,李的治理也不是一种精确的安排,而更像是水倒在地上,或多或少遵循着某种可预测的模式。我们在这里可能会想到铁屑扔在磁性图案上:它们或多或少会粘附在图案的形状上,使其易于辨别,但总会有一些分散的碎片不合适。
Where does the qi, the obstructing element that is flung, which arranges itself so as to give more or less complete reflections of Li , come from? Zhu sometimes asserts that this “flinging” is itself a function of Li -it is a Li that there be qi at all. This is as far as his “theodicy” goes, and while it cannot provide a final explanation of evil—which for Zhu means simply the one-sidedness and obstruction in the expression of Li -in the world, none is really necessary. We may here again make a fruitful comparison to the Tiantai case. The parallel terms in Tiantai would be Li as inherent entailment-all-pervasiveness in time and space-and “dependent co-arising,” that is, shi, the temporal functions of arising and ceasing in particular times and places, simple location and temporal process. Zhili says, "When events are generated, there is no separate generation: it is all from inherent entailment in Li. Inherent entailment is no separate inherent entailment: is it all just dependent co-arising. 224 224 ^(224){ }^{224} Here we see the full mutually reversibility of the two realms, Möbius-like, where each is entirely reducible to the other: there is no arising-and-perishing other than inherent entailment itself, and no inherent entailment other than arising-and-perishing itself. Arising-and-perishing is another word for ineradicable presence (in the modified form of readability-into); ineradicable presence is another name for arising-and-perishing. They are related like equilaterality and equiangularity of a triangle. This is a consequence of the Three Truths doctrine:
气,即被抛出的阻碍元素,其自身排列以便或多或少地完整反映“理”,它从哪里来?朱有时断言,这种“甩动”本身就是理的功能——有气就是理。这就是他的“神正论”,虽然它不能提供对恶的最终解释——对朱而言之,恶只是意味着理在世界上表达的片面性和阻碍性——但没有一个是真正必要的。我们在这里可以再次与天台案进行富有成效的比较。天台中的平行术语是“理”,即内在蕴涵——时间和空间中的普遍性——以及“缘起”,即“时”,在特定时间和地点中生灭的时间功能,简单的位置和时间。过程。直隶说:“事件发生时,没有单独的生成,都是从理的固有蕴涵中产生的。固有蕴涵不是单独的固有蕴涵:都是因缘共生吗? 224 224 ^(224){ }^{224} 在这里,我们看到两个领域完全相互可逆,就像莫比乌斯一样,其中每个领域都可以完全还原为另一个领域:除了固有蕴涵本身之外,没有生与灭,除了生与灭之外,没有固有蕴涵。本身。生灭是不可根除的存在的另一个词(以readability-into的修改形式);不灭的存在是生灭的另一个名称。它们之间的关系就像三角形的等边性和等角性一样。这是三谛教义的结果:

conditionality itself is unconditionality, local coherence is global incoherence is intersubsumption. Needless to say, Zhu Xi neither wants nor needs anything quite so radical for his purposes. It is enough simply to assert that it is a part of Li -the vertex or center of gravity that allows man, the best vortex around the most fully expressed vertex, to flourish, to generate ceaselessly-that there be such a thing as qi continually generated. It might also be a good thing if qi more obediently reflected Li -although sometimes Zhu suggests that it would not be-but that is not relevant to the question. The question is just whether the process of edible-to-man centerings includes the fact of ceaseless production of malleable overgrowing flung qi, the medium through which it is, in fact, expressed. The answer is yes. Li does not have to mean “the best possible order,” but only “what among existing configurations is most nourishing to mankind in his own pattern of ceaseless generation, benevolence, balance.” It would be possible to say that even the disorder is an expression of Li , pantheistically, inasmuch as the random flinging, the constant production, of qi is also an aspect of Li. But this misconceives the concept of Li as we have disclosed it here: it misses the unalterable connection to human welfare that is built into the concept of Li. At most, it allows Zhu to say, characteristically, that “in a sense” the existence of disorder and evil is also Li , in that this “flinging” is a necessary part of the ordering process which is genuinely beneficial to human welfare-benevolence, rightness, generativity, etc.-but in another sense-i.e., as disorder considered as such-it is not Li . In one sense everything is Li Li Li-\mathrm{Li}- hence good-and in another there is both good and evil, something needing to be corrected. We may recall here the passage from Zhu’s commentary to the Zhouyi, quoted in our discussion of that text; in one sense, yin and yang are to be balanced, but in another sense, yang is to be promoted and yin suppressed. Only to the extent that these disordered elements are seen as subsumed into the prescribed centers are they Li ; as ends in themselves they are obstructions to Li . This seeming prevarication is found very often in Zhu’s pronouncements on this topic, and make perfect sense if we keep this basic definition of Li in mind. Hence:
条件性本身就是无条件性,局部一致性就是全局性,不一致性就是相互包容。不用说,朱熹既不想也不需要如此激进的东西来达到他的目的。简单地断言它是“理”的一部分就足够了——“理”的顶点或重心使人,围绕最充分表达的顶点的最佳漩涡蓬勃发展,不断生成——存在着“气”这样的东西,不断地存在着。生成的。如果“气”更顺从地反映“理”,这也可能是一件好事——尽管有时朱表示不会如此——但这与问题无关。问题只是,以人为中心的食用过程是否包括不断产生可塑性过度生长的飞散之气的事实,事实上,这是表达它的媒介。答案是肯定的。理不一定意味着“最好的可能秩序”,而只是“在现有的配置中,以他自己的不断生成、仁慈、平衡的模式,对人类最有滋养的东西”。甚至可以说,从泛神论的角度来看,即使是紊乱也是理的一种表现,因为气的随意挥动、不断产生也是理的一个方面。但这误解了我们在此披露的“礼”概念:它忽略了“礼”概念中与人类福利不可改变的联系。至多,它允许朱有特色地说,“在某种意义上”,无序和邪恶的存在也是理,因为这种“甩”是秩序过程中的必要组成部分,真正有益于人类的福祉——仁爱。 、正确性、生成性等等——但在另一种意义上——即,作为无序被认为如此——它不是“理”。 从某种意义上说,一切都是 Li Li Li-\mathrm{Li}- 因此,善——而在另一个人中,既有善也有恶,需要纠正一些东西。我们可以在这里回忆一下我们在讨论《周易》时引用的朱注释的一段话;一方面是阴阳平衡,另一方面是扬阳抑阴。只有当这些无序元素被视为包含在规定的中心中时,它们才是“Li”;作为目的本身,它们对李来说是障碍。这种看似搪塞的说法在朱的关于这个话题的言论中很常见,如果我们牢记李的这个基本定义,那就完全有道理了。因此:
Q: Each thing possesses the entire Great Ultimate-thus the Li is complete in all of them, yes? A: You can say it is complete, but you can also say it’s one-sided. From the point of view of Li itself, it is complete in all, but from the point of view of qi, it is impossible for them not to be one-sided in some way. 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
问:一切事物都有完整的大终极,所以理在所有事物中都是完整的,是吗?答:你可以说它是完整的,但也可以说它是片面的。从理本身来看,一切都是完整的,但从气的角度来看,他们不可能不出现一边倒的情况。 25 25 ^(25){ }^{25}
Again: 再次:
If we are discussing the single origin of all things, we can say that they are the same in terms of Li , but differ in terms of qi. But exam-
如果说万物同源,可以说它们在理上是相同的,在气上却是不同的。但考试——

ining the different bodies of all things, we see that the qi is similar but the Li absolutely different. As for the saying that all things are the same in terms of Li , but differ as to qi, this is directed at the beginning of all things, when the heavenly mandate is flowing, and it is all of one type, so we say the Li is the same. Because there are pure and impurity, unmixed and mixed combinations of the qi of the Yin-Yang and the five processes [wood, fire, earth, metal, water], we say the qi are different. But the contrary claim is made with reference to all things as already existing, for then, although they differ as to purity and impurity, they all are made of the qi of Yin-Yang and the five processes, so we say they are similar in their q i q i qiq i; but because the differences between their levels of turbidity and brightness, openness and cloggedness differ greatly, we say the Li is absolutely different. . . . The similarity of q i q i qiq i is seen in the fact that all creatures understand cold and warmth, hunger and satiety, love life and hate death, approach benefit and avoid harm-this is the same in humans and in other creatures. They differ in Li ; for example, the lord and servant relation among bees and ants just means they have a little spark of illumination of the [principle of] rightness. The father and son relationship among tigers and wolves just means they have a little spark of illumination of the [principle of] benevolence. But they are unable to push it farther to the rest of [principle]. It is just like a mirror which is dark all over except from one or two little points in the middle. 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
观察万物之体,气相似而理不同。所谓万物同理异气,是指万物之初,天命所流,皆为一类,所以说李亦同。因为阴阳之气和五理(木、火、土、金、水)有纯与杂、纯与混的组合,所以说气不同。反之,则以万物既存而论,则虽清浊不同,皆由阴阳之气及五程所成,故曰相似。他们的 q i q i qiq i ;但由于其浊度、明度、通浊程度差别很大,故称“离异”。 。 。 。相似度为 q i q i qiq i 可见众生皆知冷暖、饥饱、好生恶死、趋利避害,人类如此,其他生物也如此。其不同之处在于礼;比如蜜蜂和蚂蚁之间的主仆关系,就说明它们有一点点正理的光照。虎与狼的父子关系,只是说明他们有一点仁爱的火花。但他们无法将其进一步推向[原则]的其余部分。就像一面镜子,除了中间的一两个小点之外,全身都是黑的。 26 26 ^(26){ }^{26}
Zhu Xi makes very free use of this “in one sense same, in one sense different” structure, and the reversibility it entails, in designating the precise relation between Li and qi. But this reversibility itself is not Li , as it is for Tiantai. Li is for Zhu Xi the vertices of the coherences that aid human coherence when cohered with. Human coherence revolves around the vertex of equilibrium expressed most directly as benevolence, the warm and harmonious process of constant generation, which necessarily also expresses itself through the proper measure of harshness, coldness, inward turning, and death. In this, Zhu’s conception of Li , although having its own distinctive contents in accordance with his conception of the desiderata constitutive to its criterion, nevertheless accords closely with the way the term Li is used in other contexts throughout the Chinese intellectual tradition. As with the acupuncture points, and pace Dai Zhen’s critique, there is still a conception of division in Zhu’s conception of unity. It is the vertices of centrality, the centers of gravity, that divide and group the energies of heaven and earth in such a way as to make them coherent entities (that is, to generate beings), which, when taken as a guide for our own acts of grouping, allow us to maximize the equilibrium and generativity (value) of these beings.
朱熹非常自由地运用了这种“一同一异”的结构及其所带来的可逆性,来指明理与气之间的精确关系。但这种可逆性本身并不是理,而是天台。对于朱熹而言,“理”是连贯性的顶点,当连贯时,它有助于人类的连贯性。人类的连贯性围绕着最直接表现为仁慈的平衡顶点,即不断生成的温暖和谐的过程,它也必然通过适当的严厉、冷酷、内向和死亡来表达自己。就这一点而言,朱的“理”概念虽然根据其标准的必要条件概念而具有自己独特的内容,但与整个中国思想传统中“理”一词在其他语境中的使用方式密切一致。正如戴震对穴位的批评一样,朱氏的统一观中仍然存在着分裂的观念。正是中心性的顶点,重心,将天地的能量分开并组合在一起,使它们成为连贯的实体(即产生存在),当将其作为我们的指南时自己的分组行为,使我们能够最大化这些生物的平衡和繁殖力(价值)。
Looking back to the wide range of usages of the term Li in both philosophical and ordinary discourse, we can perhaps now discern what is behind it. Both Neo-Confucian philosophers and ordinary modern Chinese speakers can say, “There is no such Li ,” to mean something that could be translated as either, “That’s not the right thing to do,” or, “There is no such thing as that.” More exactly, though, it means in both cases something like, “There is no compossibility for that,” which, expanded, means something like, “There is no acupuncture point right there, so by cutting there you fail to create any coherent groupings.” Coherent groupings means here groupings that are both discernible as some particular things to a human being-hence coherence coherent with some specific human cognition-and also integrable into human purposes without obstructing the coherence with more fundamental and comprehensive human purposes. The perception and the valuation are inseparable, a point made more explicitly in Wang Yangming’s thought than perhaps anywhere else, where an “object” is constituted as such only by being the orienting target of a volition. It is important to remember here the notion of “being” as synonymous with “a coherent grouping.” The yes/no Parmenidean relation between being and nonbeing has never been palatable to Chinese thinkers, and after the many centuries it took to finally even frame it, it was decisively overcome by Guo Xiang in his very adoption of it. Rather, to say something “exists” is to say that it is coherently, discernibly, usefully grouped, integrated intelligibly into some whole. A goofy but effective way of grasping this idea is to consider the modern Chinese usage of the word ling 零 for “zero,” and its relation to terms such as lingian 零件, meaning “spare parts.” Spare parts, as of an automobile, are fragments not currently integrated into some larger whole, particularly the whole that is of some use to human purposes, such as the automobile. To be “zero,” nothing, is to be like a spare part, unintegrated, incoherent. At best, these spare parts might “exist” as integrated into some other whole-e.g., the mechanic’s workshop-but the criterion for existence is still going to be some human purpose or other. The idea of absolute existence contrasted to absolute nonexistence is lacking here. So, “There is no such Li” means simply, “There is no such coherence-it does not exist, and/or in its current unintegrated state it is useless: it is not compossible with the other things we are doing, have done, and want to do.”
回顾“理”一词在哲学和日常话语中的广泛用法,我们现在也许可以看出其背后的含义。新儒家哲学家和普通的现代中国人都可以说“没有这样的礼”,意思是可以翻译为“那不是正确的事情”,或者“没有这样的礼”。那。”但更准确地说,在这两种情况下,它都意味着“没有这样的可能性”,扩展后,意味着“那里没有穴位,所以通过切入那里,你无法创建任何连贯的分组” ”。连贯的分组在这里意味着分组既可以被人类识别为某些特定的事物,因此与某些特定的人类认知相一致,也可以融入人类的目的,而不妨碍与更基本和更全面的人类目的的一致性。感知和评价是不可分割的,这一点在王阳明的思想中也许比其他任何地方都表达得更加明确,即“物体”只有作为意志的定向目标才被构成。重要的是要记住这里“存在”的概念是“一个连贯的群体”的同义词。巴门尼德式的存在与非存在之间的是/否关系从来都不为中国思想家所接受,经过几个世纪才最终形成它,郭象在采用它时果断地克服了这种关系。相反,说某物“存在”是指它是连贯的、可辨别的、有用的组合、可理解地整合成某个整体。 理解这个想法的一个愚蠢但有效的方法是考虑现代汉语中“零”一词的用法,即“零”,以及它与“零”等术语的关系,意为“备件”。备件,例如汽车,是目前尚未整合成某个较大整体的碎片,特别是对人类有一定用途的整体,例如汽车。 “零”,什么都不是,就像一个备件,不完整、不连贯。充其量,这些备件可能会“存在”为集成到其他整体(例如机械师车间)中,但存在的标准仍然是人类的某种目的或其他目的。这里缺乏相对于绝对不存在的绝对存在的观念。因此,“不存在这样的李”简单地说,“不存在这样的一致性——它不存在,和/或在当前未整合的状态下它是无用的:它与我们正在做的、已经做过的其他事情是不可能共存的” ,并且想做。”
The same basic sense is operative when someone says he has gotten a hold of a Li to mean that he has understood a point that is made, or an idea. It means, “I see where the vertices are that make the vortices coherent; I have a sense of where the acupuncture points lie; I can now group these materials in a way that is coherent with my ultimate needs.” The “I see” here is a further coherence between human cognition and the array of vertices. When someone is asked to “talk Li” in the sense of “be reason-
当有人说他已经掌握了李时,这意味着他已经理解了所提出的观点或想法,同样的基本含义也适用。它的意思是,“我看到了使漩涡连贯的顶点在哪里;我知道穴位在哪里;我现在可以按照与我的最终需求相一致的方式对这些材料进行分组。”这里的“我看到”是人类认知与顶点数组之间的进一步一致性。当有人被要求以“讲道理”的方式“讲李”时

able,” it means, “The words you are using now are pressing on points that are not acupuncture points, further disorganizing the body of material; they impede other possibilities; they fail to cohere with the other coherences that exist; they are incompossible. Divide along the acupuncture points instead.” When someone is money managing (licai) or cutting hair (lifa), he is grouping the money or the hair in such a way as to form vertices that make useful vortices, imposing divisions along the acupuncture points of the money or hair, so that it coheres with the human desire for increased wealth or beauty. When someone is told, “Don’t Li him,” in the sense of “pay no attention to him,” it means, “Don’t try to integrate him into your practice of grouping the world along its acupuncture points, for it will not yield any coherent-to-human-value-and-cognition groupings to do so: no useful vortices can form for you which take him as a vertex.” A similar analysis can be made for all of the examples given earlier in this book.
能”的意思是:“你现在用的这个词,压在了不是穴位的穴位上,进一步破坏了物质的组织;它们阻碍了其他可能性;它们无法与现有的其他一致性相一致;他们是不可能的。而是沿着穴位来划分。”当某人管理金钱(licai)或剪发(lifa)时,他将金钱或头发分组,形成顶点,形成有用的漩涡,沿着金钱或头发的穴位进行划分,以便它与人类对增加财富或美丽的渴望相一致。当某人被告知“不要理他”时,意思是“别理他”,意思是“不要试图将他融入到你按照穴位对世界进行分组的实践中,因为不会产生任何与人类价值和认知相一致的分组:不会为你形成以他为顶点的有用漩涡。”可以对本书前面给出的所有示例进行类似的分析。
Things get more complicated when the ironic usage of the term is involved, but the same basic structure still applies. When Li in the ironic sense is invoked, it means, “Pay attention to the fact of illegibility: this will bring all elements of your existence into harmony.” The “division” here is purely on the cognitive side: don’t pay attention to all those particular readable characteristics of things, but rather to the background, the outline, the self-contradictoriness, the ambiguity, or the overarching raw material into which they resolve and from which they begin. Making this divide in your cognition is the application of the needle to the acupuncture point, which brings the cognition and the rest of the human person into a harmony with itself and with its highest possible values. All things are brought into the vortex of this vertex. When Buddhist intellectuals speak of “realizing the Li of Emptiness,” it means, “Of all the various aspects of a thing you might concentrate on, concentrate on this sense in which it is Empty of self-being, and keep concentrating on this same aspect of whatever thing you encounter: for activation of that acupuncture point groups your cognitions in the form most useful to you: the way that eliminates desire and suffering.” When Huayan Buddhists say, “Li and events are unobstructed,” they mean, “The aspect of things which it is most liberating to concentrate on is their ultimate lack of any characteristics of their own. It is equally findable-in its entirety-in any perceived event. This indeterminateness is what is most reliably present in any event. Since indeterminateness cannot be cognized as such, it is this interpenetration of each event with all other events to which attention is to be paid. That concentrating on this one fact will divide consciousness in such a way as to unify it, and unify the person with the highest values, forming a vertex which makes all things its vortex.” When Tiantai Buddhists speak of the Three Thousand Li, they mean: “Any of the Three Thousand determinate events, when concentrated
当涉及该术语的讽刺用法时,事情会变得更加复杂,但相同的基本结构仍然适用。当讽刺意义上的“理”被引用时,它的意思是“注意难以辨认的事实:这将使你存在的所有元素变得和谐。”这里的“划分”纯粹是认知方面的:不要关注事物所有那些特定的可读特征,而是关注事物的背景、轮廓、自相矛盾、歧义或总体原材料。他们决心并从那里开始。在你的认知中形成这种鸿沟是通过将针应用到穴位上,从而使认知和人类的其他部分达到自身及其最高可能价值的和谐。万物都被带入这个顶点的漩涡之中。佛教知识分子所说的“证悟空性”,意思是:“在你所关注的事物的各个方面中,关注它是空性的感觉,并继续关注这一点。”无论你遇到什么事情的一个方面:激活该穴位都会以对你最有用的形式组合你的认知:消除欲望和痛苦的方式。”当华严佛教徒说“理与事无碍”时,他们的意思是:“事物最解脱的一面是它们最终没有任何自己的特征。在任何感知到的事件中,它都同样可以被发现——整体而言。在任何情况下,这种不确定性都是最可靠的存在。由于不确定性不能被如此认知,因此我们应该关注每个事件与所有其他事件的相互渗透。 专注于这一事实将使意识以一种统一的方式分裂意识,并将人与最高价值观统一起来,形成一个顶点,使所有事物都成为漩涡。” 天台宗佛教徒讲三千里时,意思是:“三千定事中的任何一个,当集中时,

upon and fully realized, divides the world like an acupuncture point; it can serve as the vertex of a vortex which unifies all the parts of the individual, all possible theories and practices, and all events, such that all of these are, in vortexing around this vertex, thereby vortexing around the highest value. This event is both the vertex and the vortex, and all the elements in its vortex are thus also vertices in their own right. Every point is an acupuncture point-as long as it is pressed hard enough. Each event is Li, if its defining division is made sharply enough, if the event is made explicit and articulated enough.”
完全证悟之后,像穴位一样分割世界;它可以作为一个漩涡的顶点,将个体的所有部分、所有可能的理论和实践、所有事件统一起来,使所有这些都围绕这个顶点漩涡,从而围绕最高价值漩涡。该事件既是顶点又是漩涡,因此其漩涡中的所有元素本身也是顶点。每一个穴位都是一个穴位——只要按得够用力。每个事件都是礼,如果它的定义划分足够明确,如果事件足够明确和清晰。”
It is hoped that these investigations into the implications of the term Li can help us grasp how it is that the Chinese tradition was able to get along without any notions of an intelligible realm, or a two-tiered metaphysic consisting of eternal supersensory laws, universals, Ideas, or forms on the one hand and temporal sensory events, particulars, instantiations on the other-indeed, without any idea of mutually exclusive sameness and difference, oneness and manyness, as ultimate ontological facts. Instead, what holds individual events and generalizable multilocal facts together is a coherence or a metacoherence between coherences, always involving the irreducible co-presence of unity and diversity at even the most primitive level. This does not solve the problem of induction, because this problem is stated in terms of the presupposition of the existence of genuinely distinct particulars and universals and, as stated, is unsolvable. But these reflections can perhaps help us see why the problem need not be so posed. There is, as I’ve indicated, a Tiantai solution to the problem of induction, but it is not useful for fulfilling the purposes that normally bring this problem into focus. The Tiantai solution is that all possible inductions are performatively true. If, having seen X here, I infer that X is also equally present somewhere else, I am correct; the act of seeing it so is what makes it equally so in all other places and times (including all pasts and futures), hence makes it true that it always has and always will be so. But the opposite will also be correct. Whatever I was reading into the “here” can also be, equally correctly, read into the “somewhere else,” and in neither case will it be a mere subjective projection; it is “inherently entailed,” and it is this doctrine alone among traditional Chinese philosophies that can, strictly speaking, solve the problem of induction. As a criterion for which inductions are legitimate, however, this is quite useless. In the context of the Tiantai epistemology, it is more than adequate; whatever one-sided induction I am making, it is an upāya that can be used to lead beyond itself, finally to the emptying-out of the original X , the realization of its local-coherence-sive-global-incoherence-sive-intersubsumption, its status as a Center, a Li , and this will attain the practical goal of cognition as conceived in Tiantai: liberation, Buddhahood. But in terms of specific inductions about the future, what will or will
希望对“理”一词含义的这些研究能够帮助我们理解中国传统如何能够在没有任何可理解领域或由永恒的超感官法则、普遍性组成的两层形而上学的概念的情况下相处。一方面是观念或形式,另一方面是时间感觉事件、细节、实例——事实上,没有任何相互排斥的相同性和差异性、单一性和多样性的观念,作为最终的本体论事实。相反,将个体事件和可概括的多地域事实结合在一起的是连贯性或连贯性之间的元连贯性,即使在最原始的层面上,也始终涉及统一性和多样性的不可简化的共存。这并没有解决归纳问题,因为这个问题是根据存在真正不同的特殊性和普遍性的前提来陈述的,并且如上所述,是无法解决的。但这些反思也许可以帮助我们明白为什么这个问题不需要如此提出。正如我已经指出的,对于归纳问题有一个天台解决方案,但它对于实现通常使这个问题成为焦点的目的没有用处。天台解是所有可能的归纳都是表演真。如果在这里看到 X,我推断 X 也同样存在于其他地方,那么我是对的;看到它如此的行为使得它在所有其他地方和时间(包括所有过去和未来)也同样如此,因此使它成为真实的,它总是如此并且永远如此。但反之亦然。 无论我在“这里”解读什么,也同样可以正确地解读“在其他地方”,而且在任何一种情况下,它都不会仅仅是主观的投射;它是一种主观的投射。严格来说,中国传统哲学中只有这一学说能够解决归纳问题。然而,作为归纳法是否合法的标准,这是毫无用处的。就天台认识论而言,是绰绰有余的;无论我做出什么片面的归纳,它都是一种可以用来超越自身的upaya,最终导致原始X的清空,实现其局部连贯性全局不连贯性相互包容,它作为一个中心、一个理的地位,这将达到天台所构想的认知的实际目标:解脱、成佛。但就对未来的具体归纳而言,将会或将要发生什么?

not be so in real time in a singly ordered world, none of the conceptions of Li in the tradition can be of any use. It is simply not possible to know exactly what will be eternally so, in all cases, based on what is happening here and now. However, it is also not necessary. One need only know that existence is vortices around vertices, which can be, at certain times, places where dividing pressure needs to be applied so as to order all the surrounding vortices around it more coherently. This is the only needed a priori assumption. A good doctor knows, however, that all bodies are different; with experience, and reference to precedent, he can make an educated guess about where the acupuncture points may lie. But in the end, some trial and error is necessary; each body must be treated on a case by case basis. There may be general categories of bodies into which individuals are grouped, but they are not to be considered hard and fast rules or laws.
在一个单一秩序的世界中,实时情况并非如此,传统中的“理”概念没有任何用处。在所有情况下,根据此时此地发生的事情,根本不可能准确地知道什么会永远如此。然而,这也不是必要的。我们只需要知道,存在是围绕顶点的漩涡,在某些时候,顶点可能是需要施加分压的地方,以便使周围的所有漩涡更加连贯地排列。这是唯一需要的先验假设。然而,一位好医生知道,每个人的身体都是不同的。凭借经验并参考先例,他可以对穴位可能所在的位置做出有根据的猜测。但最终,一些尝试和错误是必要的;每个尸体都必须根据具体情况进行治疗。可能存在将个人分组的一般类别,但它们不应被视为硬性规定或法律。
Similarly, the fact/value problem cannot be solved as usually stated, as Hume showed. The ultimate values in terms of which coherence is defined in Chinese traditions-human virtuosity, freedom from suffering, or the enabling harmony and equilibrium supporting generative power of human beings, or of coherent beings in general-is never defended on objective grounds, and never could be. Even the most “objectivist” school of Neo-Confucianism, as represented here by Zhu Xi , justifies its claims for what constitutes Li as value by means of its assertion that human beings, and ultimate human aspirations, have a special representative place in the cosmos. This claim itself is not, and cannot be, justified objectively. This may seem to pose another version of the problem of induction: even if we grant that human aspirations have a special status, which human inclinations count as the truly human, which are highest or ultimate, what forms of coherence represent the truly human such that their perpetuation is a criterion for what counts as Li? Of all the possible types of humanity, what kind of flourishing is defined as truly “human” flourishing? But the only answer that can be given to these questions is a version of Zhuangzi’s answer, as reinterpreted through the non-ironic conception of sociality and tradition. “Our” aspirations are the truly human aspirations, and it is the continued equilibrium and flourishing of “us” that constitutes value-we Neo-Confucians, for example, or anyone who can read and understand what we’re saying. This vague “us” is as far back as we can go: it is indistinctly bordered, but not unintelligible. And to join this community requires, not the repetition of a pattern or the application of a rule, but the coherence with the tradition of this community in the past, continuing it in some new way. Perhaps the easiest way to formulize this is to consider the distinction between law and ritual made in early Confucianism, discussed in the prequel, and the continued influence of this conception throughout the tradition in its many permutations. We noted there the peculiar combination
同样,正如休谟所表明的那样,事实/价值问题不能像通常所说的那样得到解决。中国传统中用来定义一致性的终极价值观——人类的高尚、免于痛苦、或者支持人类或一般连贯存在的生成能力的和谐与平衡——从来没有以客观理由得到捍卫,也从来没有被捍卫过。可能是。即使是以朱熹为代表的最“客观主义”的新儒家学派,也通过断言人类和人类的终极愿望在宇宙中具有特殊的代表性地位来证明其对“礼”价值的主张。 。这种说法本身没有、也不可能被客观地证明是合理的。这似乎提出了归纳问题的另一个版本:即使我们承认人类的愿望具有特殊的地位,人类的哪些倾向被视为真正的人类,是最高或最终的,什么形式的连贯性代表了真正的人类,使得他们的永存是衡量什么是“礼”的标准?在所有可能的人类类型中,什么样的繁荣被定义为真正的“人类”繁荣?但对这些问题唯一的答案是庄子的答案,通过社会性和传统的非讽刺概念重新解释。 “我们”的愿望才是真正的人类愿望,正是“我们”的持续平衡和繁荣构成了价值——例如我们理学家,或者任何能够阅读和理解我们所说内容的人。这个模糊的“我们”是我们所能追溯的最久远的:它的边界模糊,但并非难以理解。 加入这个共同体需要的不是重复某种模式或应用某种规则,而是与这个共同体过去的传统保持一致,并以某种新的方式延续它。也许阐述这一点的最简单方法是考虑前传中讨论的早期儒家思想中法律和仪式之间的区别,以及这一概念在整个传统中的许多排列的持续影响。我们在那里注意到了奇特的组合

of normativity and allowance for exceptions that marked this conception of ritual, reducible to neither the nominalist nor realist notion of universality, which we have traced elsewhere in Chinese thought. We might then say simply that what all these conceptions of Li share is this overall assumption: there are no laws of nature. There are, instead, only rituals of nature. There are no universals as such. There are only local traditions of coherence. Each such tradition of coherence, however, is not something to which preexistent members are merely added, fully constituted members that join a fully constituted coherence from outside. Rather, it actually makes these members what they are by so adding them, and they make it what it is by being so joined. It is something that, though never the same, remains fully present in each of its differing places of instantiation, and has the real causal power of binding its members to one another to form a totality, thereby actually determining what they are, namely, actual instantiations of this very totality, which however is constituted by these instantiations. Each is a vertex to the vortex of members that constitutes it as a vertex, and yet the intelligibility of those members as any specifically discernible entities at all is provided only by the ever-shifting vertex itself. They are present as intelligible entities only to the extent that they are members of this vortex, constituting and yet constituted by this vertex, which is the sole content of their intelligibility, which is all they really “are.” The world we are asked to contemplate here would be one that has no single ruling order, and yet is also not unruly, neither controlled by an omnipresent law nor anarchic, neither pervaded by organizing universals nor devoid of real unities and harmonies, neither centered nor centerless. What harmonies there are in Li always in one way or another fold in the ironic dimensions long integrated into Chinese thinking about coherence, the cosmos being a “Great Harmony” (太和 taihe) only in the sense described by Zhang Zai 張載 (1020-1077), in one of the foundational and defining declarations standing at the beginning of the new Neo-Confucian metaphysics: it qualifies as “harmonious” if and only if it is an unstable mass of confusion, like “an agitated cloud of dust raised by a stampede of wild horses”(不知野馬絪䓝,不足謂之太和 buru yema yinyun,bu zu wei zhi taihe). Li, as a second-order coherence, points toward the always unsteady form of “harmony” and “peace” that Zhuangzi had described as the “Turbulent Tranquility” (攖寧 yingning), which is always both destroying and forming coherences, both making and dissolving harmonies-indeed, not only as two distinct acts, but explicitly as forming them only by disturbing them, formation accomplished only through disturbance itself (攖而後成者也 ying er hou chengzhe ye). What is omnipresent is the process of cohering itself: a centerless cosmos where centerings and decentering for further recenterings are going on everywhere.
规范性和对例外的允许,标志着这种仪式的概念,既不能还原为唯名论的普遍性概念,也不能还原为现实主义的普遍性概念,而我们在中国思想的其他地方已经追溯过这种概念。那么我们可以简单地说,李的所有这些概念都有一个总体假设:不存在自然法则。相反,只有自然的仪式。不存在这样的普遍性。只有当地的一致性传统。然而,每一个这样的一致性传统都不是仅仅添加先前存在的成员的东西,而是从外部加入完全构成的一致性的完全构成的成员。相反,它实际上通过添加这些成员而使他们成为现在的样子,并且通过如此加入而使他们成为现在的样子。它是某种东西,虽然永远不会相同,但仍然完全存在于其实例化的每个不同位置,并且具有将其成员彼此绑定以形成整体的真正因果力量,从而实际上决定它们是什么,即,实际的这个整体的实例化,然而整体性是由这些实例化构成的。每个都是将其构成为顶点的成员漩涡的一个顶点,但这些成员作为任何具体可辨别实体的可理解性仅由不断移动的顶点本身提供。它们作为可理解的实体而存在,仅在它们是这个漩涡的成员、构成这个顶点并由这个顶点构成的范围内,这是它们的可理解性的唯一内容,这就是它们真正的“所是”。“我们在这里思考的世界将是一个没有单一统治秩序的世界,但也不难以驾驭,既不受无所不在的法律控制,也不是无政府主义,既不充满组织共性,也不缺乏真正的统一与和谐,也不集中亦非无心。李总是以一种或另一种方式体现出讽刺性的维度,这种和谐长期融入中国人关于​​连贯性的思维中,宇宙只是在张载张载(1020)所描述的意义上是“太和”(太和) -1077),在新理学形而上学之初的一项基础性和定义性声明中:当且仅当它是一团不稳定的混乱,就像“一团激起的尘埃云”时,它才算是“和谐”。野马奔袭”(不知野马絪䓝,不足谓之太和布鲁野马印云,不祖伟之太和)。 “理”作为二阶连贯性,指向庄子所描述的“和”与“和”的始终不稳定的形式,即“撄宁宁宁”,它总是既破坏又形成连贯性,两者都使连贯性变得不稳定。和解和声——事实上,不仅是两种不同的行为,而且明确地是只有通过干扰它们才能形成它们,只有通过干扰本身才能形成(撄而后成者也)。无所不在的是凝聚自身的过程:一个无中心的宇宙,其中到处都在发生着中心化和偏心化,以进一步重新中心化。

NOTES 笔记

INTRODUCTION 介绍

  1. Throughout this book whenever I leave “Li” capitalized and unitalicized, I mean this term: 理.
    在本书中,每当我将“Li”大写并统一化时,我指的是这个词:理。
  2. Think not only of all the obvious Daoist examples—無為 wu wei and the like-and the ceaseless iterations of things such as True Emptiness as Wondrous Being (真空妙有 zhenkong miaoyou), Non-Attribute (無相 wuxiang), Non-Dwelling (無住 wuzhu), No-Mind (無心 wuxin), No-Thought (無念 wunian) and such in Chinese Buddhism, but also the inevitability with which each line even of Confucian thought always seems to end up with something like Zhou Dunyi’s 無極而太極 wuji er taiji (“the limitless/standardless and yet the ultimate limit/standard!”) or Wang Yangming’s 無善無惡是心之體 wushanwu e shixinzhiti (“the absence of both good and evil—that is the substance of mind”) considered as a synonym for the “ultimate good” 至善 zhishan.
    不仅要想到所有明显的道家例子——无为无为之类——以及诸如真空妙有真空妙游、无相无相、无住之类的不断迭代的事物。中国佛教中的“无住无住”、“无心无心”、“无念无念”等,而且不可避免地,即使是儒家思想的每一行,也总是以周敦颐的无极而太极结束。 “无极二太极”(“无极限/无标准,但最终极限/标准!”)或王阳明的“无善无恶是心之体” )被视为“至善”的同义词。
  3. Qian Mu, Hushang xiansi lu (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1988), 42-44.
    钱穆,湖商贤思录(台北:东大图书公司,1988),42-44。
  4. Qian’s own way of thinking here clearly reflects the influence of Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, along with its interpretation of the version of coherence that takes shape in the Yin-Yang theory rooted in the Zhouyi. As such, it is most closely fitted to what we will be calling the non-ironic sense of coherence, along with the systems we are calling “non-ironic incorporations of the ironic.”
    钱氏自己的思维方式在这里清楚地反映了程朱理学的影响,以及它对植根于《周易》的阴阳理论中形成的连贯性版本的解释。因此,它最适合我们所说的非讽刺连贯感,以及我们所说的“讽刺的非讽刺结合”的系统。
  5. The other argument used by Aristotle and his followers is even less satisfying. The Law of Non-Contradiction is admitted to be undemonstrable, because circular: any attempt to demonstrate it assumes it in advance. But then, lo and behold, this circularity, which in all other cases is used as an argument against the validity of a claim, is used as an argument for its absolute certainty. First there is some name calling and threats against those who deny it: they are uneducated, they are fools, they are not worth our time. Then there is the suggestion that it is an axiom that must be accepted on faith, like the axioms of mathematics-you can’t prove everything, gosh! For it is claimed that the law of non-contradiction is assumed in argument, and that no discussion can proceed without assuming it. This may be true. But it amounts to no more than saying that when certain North American contractors buy and sell lumber by the foot, they are also assuming twelve inches to the foot, and otherwise no business could be done. Other people talk differently at other times-poets, madmen, non-logicians-and their talk proceeds and has effects
    亚里士多德及其追随者使用的另一个论点甚至更不令人满意。不矛盾律被认为是不可证明的,因为循环:任何证明它的尝试都预先假设了它。但是,你瞧,这种循环性在所有其他情况下都被用作反对主张有效性的论据,却被用作其绝对确定性的论据。首先,对那些否认这一点的人进行辱骂和威胁:他们没有受过教育,他们是傻瓜,他们不值得我们花时间。然后有人建议,这是一条必须凭信仰接受的公理,就像数学公理一样——你无法证明一切,天哪!因为有人声称,在论证中假定了不矛盾律,并且如果不假定它,任何讨论都不能进行。这可能是真的。但这无非是说,当某些北美承包商按英尺买卖木材时,他们也假设每英尺为 12 英寸,否则无法做生意。其他人在其他时候的谈话方式不同——诗人、疯子、非逻辑学家——他们的谈话会继续进行并产生影响

    in the world just as much as do the discussions of those who, temporarily and in some contexts, decide to adhere to the law of non-contradiction.
    正如那些在某些情况下暂时决定遵守不矛盾律的人的讨论一样。
Sometimes it is argued that for someone to argue for a position at all, and therefore to be involved in the conversation, presupposes that he believes there is a difference between his opponent accepting his view and not accepting it.
有时有人认为,对于一个人来说,为某种立场辩护并因此参与对话,就预设了他相信对手接受他的观点与不接受他的观点之间存在差异。
Sometimes it is claimed that the behavior of people proves that they do accept the law of non-contradiction. The care I take when I cross the street seems to mean that I accept that there is a real difference between being hit by a car and not being hit by a car. But this is not denied by the denier of the law of non-contradiction. All that is denied is that this cannot coexist with a simultaneous belief that there is no relevant difference between the two. If I want X X XX and also don’t want X X XX, my behavior may sometimes, under some conditions (random or non-random) display my desire for X . The claim is simply that this is not the whole story about what I desire. It is far from implausible to say, for example, that I both desire to die and desire to avoid death. This is where the metaphysical version of the LNC comes in: its defender will say “I desire to die in one respect-or at some times-and I desire not to die in other respects, or at other times.” So again, the psychological version of the LNC depends on the ontological version, and its feasibility depends entirely on what is defined as a “respect” and as a “time.” I claim that these are defined with reference to contradiction itself, and so the entire principle collapses into meaningless gerrymandering. This of course rests on the claim that any other attempt to specify what constitutes a “time” and a “respect” in isolation of an explicit appeal to non-contradictoriness will, when closely examined, reveal that it presupposes a prior acceptance of non-contradiction in the definitions of each proposed criterion-something I can only assert but not exhaustively demonstrate in the limited space allotted here.
有时有人声称人们的行为证明他们确实接受不矛盾律。我过马路时的小心似乎意味着我承认被车撞和不被车撞之间存在着真正的区别。但这并不被不矛盾律的否定者所否认。唯一被否认的是,这不能与同时相信两者之间不存在相关差异的信念共存。如果我愿意 X X XX 并且也不想要 X X XX ,我的行为有时可能在某些条件下(随机或非随机)表现出我对 X 的渴望。我的主张很简单,这并不是我想要的全部。例如,说我既渴望死亡又渴望避免死亡,这绝非难以置信。这就是 LNC 的形而上学版本的用武之地:它的捍卫者会说“我渴望在某一方面或某些时候死去,而我渴望在其他方面或其他时候不死。”所以,LNC的心理版本依赖于本体版本,其可行性完全取决于“尊重”和“时间”的定义。我声称这些是根据矛盾本身来定义的,因此整个原则崩溃为毫无意义的选区划分。当然,这基于以下主张:任何其他试图在不明确诉诸不矛盾性的情况下具体说明什么构成“时间”和“尊重”的行为,经过仔细审查,都会发现它的前提是事先接受非矛盾性。每个提议标准的定义都存在矛盾——我只能断言,但在有限的空间内无法详尽地证明这一点。

6. See David L. Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 76; and David L. Hall, Eros and Irony (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 113-148.
6. 参见David L. Hall和Roger Ames,《汉族思考:中西文化中的自我、真理和超越》(奥尔巴尼:纽约州立大学出版社,1998年),76;和 David L. Hall,《爱欲与讽刺》(奥尔巴尼:纽约州立大学出版社,1983 年),113-148。

7. As is noted in the Zhuangzi, “To forget the feet indicates the fitness (or comfort, 適 shi) of the shoes; to forget the waist indicates the fitness of the belt; when consciousness forgets right and wrong it indicates the fitness of the mind. . . . He who begins in fitness/comfort and is never unfit/uncomfortable has the comfort of forgetting even comfort.” 50/19/62-64.
7、《庄子》云:“忘足,鞋适适;忘足,鞋适适;鞋适,适适”。忘记腰,说明腰带的合身;当意识忘记是非时,表明心的健康。 。 。 。一个人从健康/舒适开始,并且永远不会不健康/不舒服,他会拥有忘记舒适的舒适。” 50/19/62-64。

8. My translations-cum-interpretations here of course require some explanation. See in particular the discussion of “The Five Meanings of the Unhewn: Omnipresence and Ironic Coherence in the Laozi,” in Ironies of Oneness and Difference, 146 62 146 62 146-62146-62.
8. 我在这里的翻译和解释当然需要一些解释。特别参见《统一与差异的讽刺》中对“未凿之五义:老子中的无所不在和讽刺连贯性”的讨论, 146 62 146 62 146-62146-62

CHAPTER ONE. LI 理 AS A FUNDAMENTAL CATEGORY IN CHINESE THOUGHT
第一章。理作为中国思想的基本范畴

  1. Fung Yulan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), vol. 2, 537.
    冯玉兰,《中国哲学史》,译。 Derk Bodde(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,1953 年),卷。 2、537。
  2. I owe this crucial point to A. C. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers (LaSalle: Open Court, 1992), 16, quoting Chengshi yishu, 49, 1-6.
    我把这一关键点归功于AC Graham,《两位中国哲学家》(拉萨尔:公开法庭,1992),16,引用《程氏艺术》,49,1-6。
  3. This useful phrase is derived from Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 2001).
    这个有用的短语源自 Donald J. Munro,《早期中国的人的概念》(安娜堡:密歇根大学中国研究中心,2001 年)。
  4. Graham, op. cit., 18. 格雷厄姆,同上。引用,18。
  5. I am paraphrasing here from the translation of Leibniz’s text by Rosemont and Cook, in Leibniz, Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (Monographs of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, no. 4), trans. Henry Rosemont Jr. and Daniel J. Cook (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977), 60-67.
    我在此转述罗斯蒙特和库克翻译的莱布尼茨文本,载于莱布尼茨《中国自然神学论述》(亚洲与比较哲学学会专着,第4期),译。 Henry Rosemont Jr. 和 Daniel J. Cook(檀香山:夏威夷大学出版社,1977 年),60-67。
  6. Ibid., 71. 同上,71。
  7. I will list a few here, with translations of the meaning of the whole phrase and literal renderings of the character or characters yoked to Li in each phrase. However, the term L i L i LiL i will be left untranslated, here as throughout most of this book:
    我在这里列出一些,并附上整个短语的意思的翻译以及每个短语中与“李”相关的一个或多个字符的字面翻译。然而,该术语 L i L i LiL i 将不翻译,就像本书的大部分内容一样:
Lixing (理性 “inborn characteristic of Li”): reason, rationality
理性(“理的天生特征”):理性、合理性

Lun2li (倫理 “human relationships Li”): ethics
Lun2li(伦理“人际关系礼”):伦理学

Lun4li (論理 “discourse Li”): logic
Lun4li(论理“话语理”):逻辑

Daoli (道理 “Li of [and?] the Way”): principle, idea, a valid point made or understood
道理(“理”):原则、观念、提出或理解的有效观点

Guanli (管理 “to control and Li”): manage, management
管理(管理“控制和礼”):管理、管理

Chuli (處理 “to position oneself in and Li [something]”): to deal with, handle (a situation)
Chuli(处理“将自己置于和Li [某事]”):处理,处理(情况)

Jiangli (講理 “to speak Li”): to talk or listen to reason
讲理(讲理“讲理”):讲或听道理

Dili (地理 “terrain Li”): geography
帝力(地理“李地形”):地理

Wenli(文理 “patterned ornament and Li , or the Li of patterned ornament”): pattern
Wenli(文理“纹饰与礼,或纹饰之礼”):图案

Wuli (物理 “Li of things or matter”): physics
Wuli(物理“事物或物质的Li”):物理学

Lijie (理解 “to Li and untangle”): to understand
Lijie (理解“理解”): 理解

Likui (理虧 “Li lacking”): to be in the wrong
理亏“理亏”:做错了事

Heli (合理 “coming together with Li”): reasonable
合理(合理“与李在一起”):合理

Zhenli (真理 “genuine Li”): truth
真理(真理“真理”):真理

Licai2 (理財 “to Li wealth”): money management
Licai2(理财“致富”):资金管理

Lifa (理髮 “to Li hair”): get a haircut, or cut hair
Lifa(理发“理发”):理发或剪头发

Licai3 (理睬 “to Li and see?”): to notice. Li can be used by itself as a verb in this sense: “Don’t ‘li’ it” means something like, “Don’t pay any attention to it,” i.e., don’t bother to try to integrate it into your awareness, judge it, make any adjustments of it or the rest of the world to make them fit together in some desirable way.
Licai3(理睬“到李而见?”):注意到。在这个意义上,“Li”可以单独用作动词:“Don't 'li' it”的意思是“不要注意它”,即,不要费心去尝试将它融入到你的生活中。意识,判断它,对其或世界其他地方做出任何调整,使它们以某种理想的方式结合在一起。

Xiuli (修理 “to cultivate and Li”): to fix, as a car or a person (by humiliating and cutting him down to size)
修理(修理“修和理”):修理汽车或人(通过羞辱和削减他的尺寸)

Huli (護理 “to protect and Li”): medical nurse, or nursing
Huli(护理“保护和丽”):医疗护士或护理

Liizhi (理智 “Li wisdom”): reason, rationality
Liizhi(理性“理智慧”):理性、合理性

Linian (理念 “Li thought”): an idea, sometimes in the Platonic sense
Linian(理念“Li思想”):一个想法,有时是柏拉图意义上的

Lixing2 (理型 “Li form”): a Platonic idea or form
Lixing2(理型“Li form”):柏拉图式的理念或形式

Lixiang (理想 “Li thinking”): an ideal
理想(理想“Li想”):理想
Shengli (生理 “life Li”): physiology, physiological
生力(生理“life Li”):生理学,生理学

Gongli (公理 “everywhere-available or unbiased Li”): an axiom
公理(公理“无处不在或公正的礼”):一条公理

Dingli (定理 “fixed Li”): a theorem
Dingli(定理“固定的Li”):一个定理

Tiaoli (條理 “stripelike Li”): order
条理(条理“条纹状的李”):顺序

Zhi4li3 (治理 “to govern and Li”): to govern
zhi4li3(治理“治理和礼”):治理

Lilun (理論 “Li discourse”): a theory
理论(理论“理话语”):一种理论

Lihui (理會 “to Li and meet”) to pay attention to (synonymous with Licai3) or to understand
理会(“理会”)关注(与 Licai3 同义)或理解

Tongli (同理 “same Li”): “by the same token. . . .”
同理(同理):“同理。 。 。 ”。

Changli (常理 “constant or usual li”): common sense, general principle
Changli(“常理”):常识、一般原则

Jingli (經理 “to go through comprehensively and to Li”): to manage, a manager
经理(经理“全面而至”):管理,经理

Liyou (理由 “Li come-from”): a reason (for doing something)
Liyou(理由“Li come-from”):理由(做某事)

Liao4li3 (料理 “raw materials Li-ed”): to manage or deal with; also, cuisine, cooking, e.g., Italian cuisine, Japanese cuisine, etc. (originally Japanese, current in Taiwan)
Liao4li3(料理“原料Li-ed”):管理或处理;还有,美食、烹饪,例如意大利菜、日本菜等(原本是日本菜,现在在台湾)

Yuanli: (原理 “origin Li”): principle
Yuanli: (原理“原力”):原理

Gongli: (共理 “shared Li”): a Universal; sometimes 共相 gongxiang, shared characteristic, is also used for a Universal in the philosophical sense
共理:(共理“共享之理”):一个普遍性;有时,“共相”也被用来表示哲学意义上的“普遍”

Qingli (清理 “to purify and Li”): to clean up
清理(​​清理“净化和厉”):清理

Tuili (推理 “to push Li”): to infer or deduce, to reason, as in solving a puzzle or a murder mystery
Tuili(推理“推动Li”):推断或演绎,推理,如解决谜题或谋杀之谜

Zhaoli (照理 “to reflect or shine on Li , or to accord with Li”): by rights, it would be reasonable to expect that. . . .
照理(照理“反映或照耀李,或符合李”):按理说,这是合理的期望。 。 。 。

Jianbuduan, Lihuanluan (剪不斷,理還亂 “cut, they do not break; Li’ed, they return to chaos”): unmanageable and persistent, as of unruly emotions (from a Li Houzhu poem)
剪不断,理还乱:剪不断,理还乱:难以驾驭,执着,如难以驾驭的情绪(出自李后主诗)

Lichu touxu (理出頭緒 “to Li-out the end of the thread”): to find a way to make sense of
Lichu touxu(理出头绪“到Li-out the end of the thread”):找到一种方式来理解

Li suo dang ran (理所當然 “what should be so by virtue of Li, what matches that which belongs to Li”): to be taken for granted as what should be so, requiring no further argument
理所当然“理所当然”,理所当然:理所当然,理所当然,无需进一步争论。

Qi you ci li (豈有此理 “How could there exist such a Li?”): how unreasonable, how absurd, how outrageous
岂有此理(“岂有此理”,怎么会有这样的理?):多么不合理,多么荒谬,多么令人发指。

Shunlichengzhang (順理成章 “to follow Li and form a coherent insignia”): reasonable behavior according to de facto precedent
顺理成章:根据事实先例的合理行为

Lizhiqizhuang (理直氣壯 “Li straight qi [life-force] strong”): to be fearless because one is in the right
理直气壮:因为正确而无所畏惧

8. Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: Daolunpian (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1986), 21-89.
8. 唐君毅,中国哲学原理:导论篇(台北:台湾学生书局,1986),21-89。

9. Ibid., 212; italics in the original.
9.同上,212;原文中斜体。

10. Tang Junyi, op. cit., 31.
10. 唐君毅,同前。引文,31。

11. I translate this term in accordance with the suggestion of Scott Cook, in his unpublished paper, “The Term Li in Chinese Treatises on Literature and the Arts.”
11. 我根据斯科特·库克(Scott Cook)未发表的论文《中国文学艺术论中的“李”一词》中的建议翻译了这个术语。

12. Duan Yucai, Shuwenjiezizhu (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1982), 32.
12. 段玉才,《书文解字注》(上海:上海古籍出版社,1982),32。

13. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Taipei: Caves Books, 1985), Vol. 2, 302.
13.李约瑟,《中国的科学与文明》(台北:洞穴书店,1985),卷。 2、302。

14. David Hall and Roger Ames, Anticipating China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 269.
14. David Hall 和 Roger Ames,《预测中国》(奥尔巴尼:纽约州立大学出版社,1995 年),269。

15. Ibid., 213. 15.同上,213。
16. See Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), 30-54.
16. 参见 Chad Hansen,《古代中国的语言和逻辑》(安娜堡:密歇根大学出版社,1983 年),30-54。

17. Ibid., 112 . 17.同上,112。
18. A. C. Graham, “Relating Categories to Question Forms in Pre-Han Chinese Thought,” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), 382-83. The case of the Mohist is obviously quite relevant to the question at hand. For here we have the closest case in the tradition of an attempt to give an abstract and comprehensive “logical” treatment to the question of how predicates attach to multiple instances, the equivalent of the problem of universals. I have nothing to add to Graham’s analysis of the Mohist’s, except to note the relevance of his analysis in the present context.
18. AC Graham,“汉前中国思想中的范畴与问题形式”,《中国哲学与哲学文献研究》(新加坡:东亚哲学研究所,1986),382-83。墨家的案例显然与当前的问题非常相关。因为这里我们有传统上最接近的例子,试图对谓词如何附加到多个实例的问题进行抽象和全面的“逻辑”处理,相当于共相问题。对于格雷厄姆对墨家的分析,我没有什么要补充的,除了指出他的分析在当前背景下的相关性。

19. Graham, 343 44 343 44 343-44343-44. 19.格雷厄姆, 343 44 343 44 343-44343-44
20. For example, a sentence such as, 不內相教而外相謗者,是謂不足親也 bunei xiangiao er wai xiangbangzhe, shi wei bu zu qin ye (“To slander a person in public without first instructing him in private is to be unworthy of associating with”), from the “Guidelines of Governing” chapter of Liu Xiang’s 劉向 Shuoyuan 說苑,政理。 Note that in this chapter title I translate X Li as “guidelines of X,” i.e., lines to be followed in treating X so as to make it desirably coherent (i.e., a coherence that is coherent with our desires). With that understanding of the intended meaning, I would have no objection to translating this sort of usage of Li directly as “principles,” as the content of the chapter really is concerned with those types of coherences which in English we would call principles, i.e., precepts to guide behavior.
20. 例如,不内相教而外相诽谤者,是谓不足亲也bunei yangiao er wai bangzhe, shi wei bu zu qin ye是不值得交往”),出自刘向说苑,政理的“Guidelines of Governing”一章。注意,在本章标题中,我将 X Li 翻译为“Guidelines of X”,即行对待X时应遵循的原则,使其具有理想的连贯性(即与我们的愿望一致的连贯性)。有了对原意的理解,我不反对将“理”的这种用法直接翻译为“原则”,因为本章的内容实际上涉及那些在英语中我们称之为原则的连贯性,即,以戒律来指导行为。

21. For example, in Kumārajīva’s rendering of the Saddharmapundarikasutra (Miaofalianhuajing), we often find structures like the following: 不復為貪欲所惱,亦復不為巔靑愚癡所惱,亦復不為憍慢嫉妒諸垢所惱 (T33.954c.): “He will no longer be afflicted with greed, not will he be afflicted by anger and delustion, nor will be be afflicted by other defilements such as arrogance and envy.” To passively “be afflicted by X” rather than actively "to afflict X " is here indicated with a wei X suo afflict construction: to “be” that which X afflicts.
21. 例如,在鸠摩罗什翻译的《妙法莲华经》中,我们经常会看到这样的结构:不复为贪欲所恼,亦复不为山顶靑愚痴所恼,亦复不为憍慢嫉妒诸垢所。烦恼(T33.954c.):“他将不再被贪婪所困扰,不再被愤怒和痴迷所困扰,也不会被其他烦恼(例如傲慢和嫉妒)所困扰。”被动地“被X折磨”而不是主动地“折磨X”在这里用“为X所折磨”结构表示:“成为”X折磨的东西。

22. Graham, “The Cheng-Chu Theory of Human Nature,” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy, 421.
22.格雷厄姆,“程朱人性论”,载于《中国哲学研究》,421。

23. Ibid. 23.同上。
24. Ibid., 422 . 24.同上,422。
25. Ibid., 423 24 423 24 423-24423-24. 25.同上, 423 24 423 24 423-24423-24
26. Ibid., 426 27 426 27 426-27426-27. 26.同上, 426 27 426 27 426-27426-27
27. Ibid., 431. 27.同上,431。
28. Willard Peterson, “Another Look at Li,” Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies 18 (1986): 14 .
28.威拉德·彼得森,“再看李”,《宋元研究通报》18(1986):14。

29. Ibid., 15 . 29.同上,15。
30. Ibid., 17 18 17 18 17-1817-18. 30.同上, 17 18 17 18 17-1817-18
31. Ibid., 18 . 31.同上,18。
32. Ibid., 19 . 32.同上,19。
33. Ibid., 20 . 33.同上,20。
34. Ibid., 21. 34.同上,21。
35. Ibid., 23 . 35.同上,23。
36. Ibid. 36. 同上。
37. Ibid., 27 . 37.同上,27。
38. These points allow Peterson to provide solutions to the six “problem areas” concerning Neo-Confucian Li raised by Wittenborn (Allen Wittenborn, “Li Revisited and Other Explorations,” The Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies 17 [1981]: 32-48):
38. 这些观点使彼得森能够为维滕伯恩提出的关于新儒家李的六个“问题领域”提供解决方案(艾伦·维滕伯恩,“李重访和其他探索”,《宋元研究通报》17 [1981]:32- 48):
  1. “How do we, or can we know li?” The problem here is that there is no independent standard of what a thing’s l i l i l_(i)l_{i} is outside of its actual behavior; so if I think the li of this cart is “to travel on land,” and this is discomfirmed by the fact that it later does something not specified by this characterization, such as be used as a boat to float on water, how can I ever know if I have correctly ascertained any thing’s li? Peterson answers that both the floating and land-travel are part of a single coherence, which includes, again, both a thing’s actual and potential connections, without thereby fading immediately into all possible connections and thus meaninglessness.
    “我们如何,或者我们能够知道‘理’吗?”这里的问题是,对于事物的本质并没有独立的标准。 l i l i l_(i)l_{i} 超出其实际行为;所以如果我认为这辆车的理是“在陆地上行驶”,而事实证明它后来做了一些不属于这个特征的事情,比如用作船漂浮在水上,我怎么能你知道我是否正确地确定了任何事情的意义吗?彼得森回答说,漂浮和陆地旅行都是单一连贯性的一部分,其中再次包括事物的实际联系和潜在联系,但不会立即消失为所有可能的联系,从而变得毫无意义。
  2. “Is li prior to ch’I, and, if so, what does this mean?”
    “礼先于气,如果是的话,这意味着什么?”
  3. Is li subjective or objective?"
    理是主观的还是客观的?”
  4. “Is li a form of what things are or a standard of what they should be?”
    “礼是事物本质的一种形式,还是事物应有的标准?”
  5. “What accounts for the differentiation of things?” Peterson grants that li gives no answer to the question of what causes things to be differentiated; they are so of themselves, if this question is meant to be answered in terms of efficient causality.
    “事物的差异是由什么造成的?”彼得森承认,李没有回答是什么导致事物有区别的问题;如果这个问题是要根据有效因果关系来回答的话,他们本身就是如此。
  6. “What is the scope of li?” This question is concerned with the li of purely mental concepts, such as dreams, memories, numbers, beliefs, actions, and emptiness. Peterson answers that coherence applies to the “sticking together” also of particular sets of electrical characters in a particular part of our brain and events in the world.
    “礼的范围是什么?”这个问题涉及纯粹心理概念的“理”,例如梦、记忆、数字、信念、行为和空性。彼得森回答说,连贯性也适用于我们大脑的特定部分中的特定电特征组和世界上的事件的“粘在一起”。
  7. Ibid., 29. 同上,29。
  8. Hall and Ames, Anticipating China, 303, note 65.
    霍尔和艾姆斯,《展望中国》,303,注 65。
  9. Ibid., 136 . 同上,136。
  10. Ibid., 140 . 同上,140。
  11. Ibid., 213. 同上,213。
  12. Ibid., 214 15 214 15 214-15214-15. 同上, 214 15 214 15 214-15214-15
  13. Ibid., 215. 同上,215。
  14. Indeed, we could almost translate Li simply as "“guideline” or “useful information,” as long as we gloss this by saying that “useful” presupposes a given set
    事实上,我们几乎可以将 Li 简单地翻译为““指南”或“有用的信息”,只要我们通过说“有用”预设了给定的集合来掩盖这一点。

    of human goals and desires, the coherence with which makes something useful, and that “information” means an intelligible fitting between a symbol, a cognitive apparatus, a background set of linguistic or symbolic usages, and a context, in such a way as to be transferable between contexts. With this translation, “useful information” becomes equivalent to our previous definition of Li , i.e., a harmonious coherence that, if cohered with, leads to further such coherences.
    人类目标和欲望的一致性,使某些东西变得有用,并且“信息”意味着符号,认知装置,语言或符号用法的背景集以及上下文之间的可理解的配合,以这样的方式可以在上下文之间转移。通过这种翻译,“有用的信息”就等同于我们之前对“理”的定义,即一种和谐的连贯性,如果与之连贯,就会导致进一步的这种连贯性。

CHAPTER TWO. THE ADVENT OF LI, IRONIC AND NON-IRONIC
第二章。 LI 的出现,讽刺与非讽刺

  1. Ironies of Oneness and Difference, 201.
    同一性与差异的讽刺,201。
  2. See Xunzi, 21/102/5-21/107/17.
    参见荀子,21/102/5-21/107/17。
  3. 7 / 3 / 17 7 / 3 / 17 7//3//177 / 3 / 17. Cf. the almost identical usage at 18/7/21.
    7 / 3 / 17 7 / 3 / 17 7//3//177 / 3 / 17 。比照。 21 年 7 月 18 日的用法几乎相同。
  4. 14 / 5 / 36 14 / 5 / 36 14//5//3614 / 5 / 36.
  5. 51 / 13 / 42 51 / 13 / 42 51//13//4251 / 13 / 42.
  6. 64 / 17 / 47 , 82 / 20 / 80 64 / 17 / 47 , 82 / 20 / 80 64//17//47,82//20//8064 / 17 / 47,82 / 20 / 80.
  7. 56 / 15 / 67 68 56 / 15 / 67 68 56//15//67-6856 / 15 / 67-68.
  8. 94 / 26 / 3 94 / 26 / 3 94//26//394 / 26 / 3.
  9. See Ironies, 199-220, particularly the discussion of the taxonomy of whales and fish on p. 209.
    参见 Ironies, 199-220,特别是第 14 页对鲸鱼和鱼类分类学的讨论。 209.
  10. Thanks are due here to Paul Goldin’s sublimely hostile review of the first volume of this series, which nicely illustrates both the attractions and the dangers of isolating Xunzi from his own context and immediately assimilating him into ours. Looking at this single example in isolation, outside of its place in the development of relevant positions earlier and later in our particular way of narratizing Chinese thought here, it might indeed be convenient to look at Xunzi’s position, and some of the others in early Confucian and Daoist thinking, as founded on a straightforward assumption of a kind of “underdetermination,” in the modern sense of that term, which seems to make the human action of adding explanatory theoretical concepts or linguistic systems the disambiguating factor that provides the determinations, hence resulting in a kind of nominalism, as he suggests. But such a move, though convenient, arouses some worry about too quickly integrating the Confucian and Daoist problematic into an existing conversation, with its own set of concerns and assumptions, which obscures some of the relevant connections to some of the distinctive trajectories and concerns animating the prior and subsequent Chinese traditions, as sketched out in our discussion. The key point is again the question of sameness and difference, both of which I contend must be regarded as ontologically real and genuinely mutually exclusive, on some level or other of abstraction or concreteness, for any nominalism or realism to be true in the strict sense. My claim is that for Xunzi, in contrast, the pre-theorized facts must be such that the theoretical explanation pertaining to their essence, however conceived, cannot be either entirely extraneous to them, making them genuinely different from this imputed essence or explanation and leaving them unchanged by its application, nor a denotation of some genuinely shared and unchangeably iterable fact about them. Their shared name denotes the inherence of a whole in which they cohere. But they cohere in a way that is not limitable to only one such whole. Indeed, it seems that clarity might be
    这里要感谢保罗·戈尔丁对本系列第一卷的高度敌意的评论,它很好地说明了将荀子从他自己的背景中孤立出来并立即将他同化到我们的背景中的吸引力和危险。孤立地看待这个单一的例子,除了它在我们在这里叙述中国思想的特定方式中早先和后来的相关立场的发展中的地位之外,看看荀子的立场以及早期儒家中的其他一些立场可能确实很方便。道家思想建立在一种现代意义上的“不确定性”的直接假设之上,这似乎使人类添加解释性理论概念或语言系统的行为成为提供确定性的消歧因素,因此正如他所暗示的,这导致了一种唯名论。但是,这样的举动虽然方便,但却引起了一些人的担忧,担心太快地将儒家和道家的问题纳入现有的对话中,并带有自己的一系列关注点和假设,这掩盖了与一些独特的轨迹和关注点的相关联系。正如我们在讨论中概述的那样,之前和之后的中国传统。关键点又是相同性和差异性的问题,我认为,为了使任何唯名论或实在论在严格意义上都是真实的,我认为这两者必须在抽象或具体的某种层面上被视为本体论上的真实和真正相互排斥的。 。 我的主张是,相比之下,对于荀子来说,预先理论化的事实必须是这样的,即关于其本质的理论解释,无论如何设想,都不能与它们完全无关,使它们真正不同于这种推定的本质或解释,并留下它们的应用没有改变它们,也不是关于它们的一些真正共享的、不可改变的可重复事实的表示。他们共同的名字表示他们凝聚在一起的整体的内在性。但它们以一种不限于单一整体的方式结合在一起。事实上,看起来清晰度可能是

    better served here by inventing an alternate term which reverses the emphases so as to avoid any implication that there is a neutral substratum of fact about the real state of the natural world, prior to human theorizing, that is ultimately to be thought of as devoid of the determinations subsequently foisted upon it. The nature of the smallest units of fact to be theorized here are after all themselves functions of the alternate theories, and all these incompatible facts, generated by alternate holisms of meaning, are really to be found as always having been available, ineradicably, both before and after these alternate groupings pick them out and synthesize them in one particular way. A term such as, say, overperforation would perhaps do a better job of stressing this overabundance of asynordinate determinations and their ineradicable availability than the accepted term underdetermination, which prima facie seems to put stress instead on the paucity of theoretical determinations and the contrastive presupposition of their ultimate absence from the facts to be discovered. Admittedly, though, this is mainly a matter of emphasis; the choice of one term over another depends on pragmatic rhetorical considerations. “Overperforation” is recommended for the express purpose of facilitating linkages to other positions in our exposition, rather than participating in an ongoing conversation within the philosophy of science, however worthy that purpose might be.
    这里最好通过发明一个替代术语来颠倒重点,以避免任何暗示,即在人类理论化之前,自然世界的真实状态存在一个中立的事实基础,最终被认为缺乏随后强加给它的决定。这里要理论化的最小事实单位的本质毕竟是替代理论的功能,而所有这些不相容的事实,由意义的替代整体论产生,确实被发现始终是可用的,不可根除的,无论是在在这些交替分组之后,将它们挑选出来并以一种特定的方式综合它们。诸如过度穿孔之类的术语也许比公认的术语“不充分决定”更能强调这种过多的不同步决定及其不可根除的可用性,从表面上看,“不充分决定”似乎强调理论决定的缺乏和对比预设。他们最终缺席了待发现的事实。不过,不可否认,这主要是一个强调的问题。选择一个术语而不是另一个术语取决于务实的修辞考虑。建议使用“过度穿孔”的明确目的是促进与我们阐述中其他立场的联系,而不是参与科学哲学中正在进行的对话,无论这个目的多么有价值。
  11. 78 / 21 / 1 78 / 21 / 1 78//21//178 / 21 / 1.
  12. 82 / 21 / 78 83 82 / 21 / 78 83 82//21//78-8382 / 21 / 78-83.
  13. 28 / 9 / 63 28 / 9 / 63 28//9//6328 / 9 / 63.
  14. 77 / 20 / 33 34 77 / 20 / 33 34 77//20//33-3477 / 20 / 33-34.
  15. 7 / 3 / 28 7 / 3 / 28 7//3//287 / 3 / 28.
  16. 21 / 8 / 31 32 21 / 8 / 31 32 21//8//31-3221 / 8 / 31-32.
  17. 7 / 3 / 6 7 7 / 3 / 6 7 7//3//6-77 / 3 / 6-7.
  18. I am interpreting the notorious "qiong ren y u y u yuy u " (窮人慾) in a controversial manner here, flying in the face of thousands of years of commentary; Neo-Confucians take the qiong to mean “to extend to the limit,” thereby reading a strong contrast between “Heavenly coherence” and “human desires” into the passage. I think this is clearly incorrect. The “proper Way of man” and “the desires of their nature” are all positively valued here, and seem to refer not to the excessive but to the proper desires of man, those which are in accord with the “stillness” of human nature when it has not yet been “transformed” by things. Note also that the word qiong is consistently used to mean “exhaust,” not “extend to the limit,” in this text. As we note in our discussion of the Zhuangzi, qiong is generally the opposite of 達 da, meaning failure as opposed to success, blockage as opposed to reaching the goal. I take the meaning here to be “makes human desires fail (to reach satisfaction).”
    我正在诠释臭名昭著的“琼人” y u y u yuy u ”(穷人欲)在这里以一种颇具争议的方式,与数千年的评论相悖;新儒家将“穷”视为“延伸到极限”,从而解读“天通”与“天通”之间的强烈对比。我认为这显然是不正确的,这里的“人之正道”和“性欲”似乎都不是指过度的,而是指正当的欲望。人,符合人性尚未被事物“转化”时的“静止”,还要注意,“穷”一词始终表示“耗尽”,而不是“延伸到极限”。正如我们在讨论《庄子》时所注意到的,“穷”通常是“达”的反义词,意思是“失败”而不是“成功”,“阻碍”而不是“达到目标”,我在这里的意思是“使人的欲望失败”。 (达到满意的程度)。”
  19. Translation adapted from Scott Cook, “The Term Li in Chinese Treatises on Literature and the Arts,” (unpublished paper), 33.
    译文改编自斯科特·库克(Scott Cook)的《中国文学艺术论中的术语》(未发表论文),33。
  20. It is also worth noting that this conception can be boiled down into an immanent axiology, i.e., that an attempt is made to derive value simply from existence as such, without applying a heteronomous valuation from without which would in principle designate some portion of being as good and another portion as bad. This is equal to saying also that it is tautological, or that it leads to an infinite regress. It rests on the base assumption that being (or rather, continuous creation) is good as such.
    还值得注意的是,这一概念可以归结为一种内在价值论,即试图简单地从存在本身中获取价值,而不应用他律评价,原则上将存在的某些部分指定为好的部分和坏的部分。这也等于说它是同义反复,或者它导致无限倒退。它基于这样一个基本假设:存在(或者更确切地说,持续创造)本身就是好的。
  21. There are many instances of such a situation in the hexagrams themselves. For example, Hexagram #24, Return (復 Fu), is one of the most auspicious overall hexagrams in the system, and is traditionally regarded as the reassertion of the power of Yang. It consists of one Yang line, on the bottom, and five Yin lines. The “ruling line” of the hexagram, the fifth from the bottom, which should “ideally” be occupied by a Yang line, is here occupied by a Yin line, which moreover does not have the virtue of “responding” with the second line, since the latter is also Yin. Structurally, this hexagram doesn’t have much going for it, according to the general rules applied to hexagram interpretation. And yet it is highly auspicious and moreover emblematic of a Yang situation because the single Yang line comes “at the beginning,” is perfectly playing its pure role of initiation, a turning point (associated with the winter solstice) where a small bubbling up of Yang force is enough to ensure subsequent “responses” and “finishes” from the Yin elements present (structurally, this response would come especially from the fourth line), and thereby to serve the process of continuance. Another example is the final hexagram, #64, Before Completion (未濟 Wei Ji). Here every line is in the wrong place. But this too is one of the most auspicious of hexagrams, since its disequilibrium implies of state of incompletion that will function, holistically, as an initiation for later completion. The total hexagram is thus Yangish, although it is quantitatively equally Yin and Yang and structurally perfectly wrong, with a Yin ruler. Here we see a non-ironic incorporation of the ironic implications of coherence: it is still value, it is still intelligibility, it is still a kind of sticking together or harmony of elements, but now value and intelligibility reside in the harmony between valued intelligibility and non-valued unintelligibility.
    这种情况在卦象本身中有很多例子。例如,第24卦“复符”是系统中最吉祥的整体卦之一,传统上被认为是阳的力量的重申。它由底部的一根阳线和五根阴线组成。卦象的“界线”,即下数第五条,本应“理想地”被阳线占据,但在这里却被阴线占据,而且阴线不具备与下线“呼应”的美德,因为后者也是阴。从结构上来说,根据卦象解释的一般规则,这个卦象没有太多的意义。然而,它是非常吉祥的,而且还象征着阳的情况,因为单阳线出现在“开始”,完美地发挥了它纯粹的启动作用,一个转折点(与冬至相关),其中有一小部分冒泡。阳力足以保证随后的阴元素的“反应”和“完成”(从结构上来说,这种反应尤其来自第四行),从而服务于延续的过程。另一个例子是最后一个卦,#64,未济未吉。这里每一行都在错误的位置。但这也是最吉祥的卦象之一,因为它的不平衡意味着不完整的状态,从整体上来说,它将作为以后完成的开始。因此,整个卦象是阳卦,尽管它在数量上阴阳相等,而且在结构上完全错误,有阴尺。 在这里,我们看到了连贯性的讽刺含义的非讽刺性结合:它仍然是价值,它仍然是可理解性,它仍然是一种元素的粘在一起或和谐,但现在价值和可理解性存在于有价值的可理解性之间的和谐之中。和非有价值的不可理解性。
  22. Legge’s amusingly outraged comments on the “silliness” of this “drivel” are still well worth consulting.
    莱格对这种“胡言乱语”的“愚蠢”的有趣而愤怒的评论仍然非常值得参考。

CHAPTER THREE. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LI IN IRONIC TEXTS
第三章。反讽文本中“离”的发展

  1. 41 / 16 / 1 3 41 / 16 / 1 3 41//16//1-341 / 16 / 1-3.
  2. 44/17/50-52. 天在內,人在外,德在乎天。知天人之行,本乎天,位乎得。。。。曰何謂天?何謂人?北海若曰:牛馬四足,是謂天;落馬首,穿牛鼻,是謂人.
    44/17/50-52。 天允,人在外,德在乎天。知天人之行,本乎天,位乎得。。。。曰何谓天?何谓人? 北海若曰:牛马四足,是谓天;落马首,穿牛鼻,是指人。
  3. 15/6/3-4. 庸詎知吾所謂天之非人乎、所謂人之非天乎.
    15/6/3-4。 庸讵知吾所谓天之非人乎、所谓人之非人乎。
  4. 6/2/66. 庸詎知吾所謂知之非不知邪、庸詎知吾所謂不知之非知邪.
    66 年 6 月 2 日。 庸讵知吾谓知之非不知邪、庸讵知吾谓不知之非知邪。
  5. 16 / 6 / 20 16 / 6 / 20 16//6//2016 / 6 / 20.
  6. 42 / 17 / 6 7 42 / 17 / 6 7 42//17//6-742 / 17 / 6-7.
  7. 43 / 17 / 37 39 43 / 17 / 37 39 43//17//37-3943 / 17 / 37-39.
  8. 44 / 17 / 45 46 44 / 17 / 45 46 44//17//45-4644 / 17 / 45-46.
  9. 44 / 17 / 48 50 44 / 17 / 48 50 44//17//48-5044 / 17 / 48-50.
  10. 22 / 8 / 33 22 / 8 / 33 22//8//3322 / 8 / 33. 上不敢為仁義之操,而下不敢為淫僻之行也。.
    22 / 8 / 33 22 / 8 / 33 22//8//3322 / 8 / 33 。 上为不敢仁义之操,下不敢为淫乱之行也。
  11. 30 / 12 / 37 41 30 / 12 / 37 41 30//12//37-4130 / 12 / 37-41.
  12. 58/22/16-20.
  13. 59/22/36-39.
  14. 25-26/11/8-9.
  15. 40/15/10-12.
  16. 72 73 / 25 / 59 82 72 73 / 25 / 59 82 72-73//25//59-8272-73 / 25 / 59-82.
  17. Reading 小 xiao for 水 shui, in accordance with Yu Yue’s amendation, preserving the parallelism with the previous line.
    读“小晓”为“水水”,按照余岳的修改,保留与上行的对句。
  18. Thus at least do I understand the import of Graham’s remark that this passage argues that “infinity is more than the sum of finite quantities” (Graham, Disputers, 209).
    因此,至少我理解了格雷厄姆评论的重要性,即这段话认为“无穷大大于有限数量的总和”(格雷厄姆,争议者,209)。
  19. I take the parallelism to break up at this line, with 合并 hebing as two parallel verbs, rather than a verb and object as in the previous two lines, which seems to me an impossible reading for this line. I take the omitted object to be simply “things.”
    我在这一行把排比分解为两个并列动词,而不是像前两行那样一个动词和宾语,这对我来说是一个不可能的阅读。我将省略的对象简单地视为“事物”。
  20. Reading 私 si for 賜 si throughout this passage, in accordance with the suggestion of Chen Guying, quoting Ma Xulun (Chen Guying, Zhuangzi jinzhu jinshi, vol. 2 [Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1989], 755). I justify this not only by the greater coherence it gives the passage, and the alternating use of the si for partial in two of the four examples given, but also by the last use of the si for bequeath, which is followed by an explicit claim about “completeness,” which seems to me to be posed in clear contrast to partiality. The senses various illustrious commentators have wrenched out of the passage reading the character as it stands, meaning to bequeath, ingenious as they sometimes are, do not seem to me compelling.
    根据陈谷英的建议,将这段经文读作“赐斯”,并引用了马须伦的建议(陈谷英,《庄子金珠进士》,第2卷[台北:台湾商务印书馆,1989],755)。我不仅通过它赋予段落更大的连贯性以及在给出的四个示例中的两个中交替使用 si 表示部分来证明这一点,而且还通过最后使用 si 表示遗赠,其后有一个明确的主张来证明这一点关于“完整性”,在我看来,这与偏颇形成鲜明对比。各种杰出的评论家从阅读这个人物的原意(即遗赠)的段落中获得的感觉,尽管有时很巧妙,但在我看来并不令人信服。
  21. Supplying 殊材 shu cai, in accordance with the suggestion of Xuan Ying (see Wang Shuming, Zhuangzi jiaoquan [Taipei: Academia Sinica, Academy of History and Linguistics, 1988], 1033-34).
    根据玄英的建议,提供特殊材蜀材(见王树明,庄子教权[台北:中央研究院历史语言研究院,1988],1033-34)。
  22. Glossing 度 d u d u dud u as 居 j u j u juj u, as suggested by Lu Wenchao, cited in ZZJS, 912.
    光泽度 d u d u dud u 作为居 j u j u juj u ,如陆文超建议,引自ZZJS,912。
  23. Before discussing the implications these lines have for our overall interpretation, we should note that they could also be read in other ways. For example, we could take these lines to mean: “Whenever one thing is thwarted, another is suited. . . . When one thing is just right, another is deficient,” as most commentators and translators do. Indeed, there is much to recommend this reading, and it is not to be ruled out, especially if we take the overall context to be a description of the totality of Dao’s operation. Moreover, following this reading, the line about individual things going in their own directions seems to lead naturally into the statement that some are right and some deficient at any time, echoing the flow of disaster and prosperity alluded to above. But I have adopted the above reading because it better emphasizes the peculiar relation of part to whole being suggested here, on which the entire argument rests. This part/whole paradigm makes it very appropriate that this paradoxicality or unity of opposites be true not only of the totality, but of every part within it, which will have a number of contrary points of view available to it, an extension of the value of relativism put forward elsewhere in the text.
    在讨论这些线条对我们整体解释的影响之前,我们应该注意到它们也可以用其他方式来解读。例如,我们可以将这些台词理解为:“每当一件事受到阻碍时,另一件事就会迎刃而解。 。 。 。当一件事恰到好处时,另一件事就会有缺陷”,正如大多数评论家和翻译家所做的那样。事实上,有很多值得推荐阅读的内容,并且不能排除它,特别是如果我们将整体上下文视为对 Dao 操作整体的描述。而且,这样一读,个别事物各行其是的台词,似乎随时都会自然而然地引出“有对有缺”的说法,呼应了上面提到的祸与福的流动。但我之所以采用上述解读,是因为它更好地强调了这里所建议的部分与整体的特殊关系,整个论证都以此为基础。这种部分/整体范式使得这种悖论或对立统一不仅适用于整体,也适用于其中的每个部分,这些部分将有许多相反的观点可供使用,这是价值的延伸。文本其他地方提出的相对主义。
Another possibility, adopted by Watson, is to take this section as referring to the individual’s (wrong) attitude: “Bad and good fortune, tripping and tumbling, come now with what repels you, now with what you welcome. Set in your own opinion, at odds with others, now you judge things to be upright, now you judge them to be warped. But if you could only be like the great swamp . . .” Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 291. This too is possible, although somewhat less persuasive than the other alternative, since it demands certain additions which have no basis in the text (for example,
沃森采用的另一种可能性是,将此部分视为个人的(错误)态度:“坏运和好运,绊倒和翻滚,现在带着你排斥的东西来,现在带着你欢迎的东西来。自以为是,与人不合,时而论其正,时而论其歪。但如果你只能像大沼泽一样就好了。 。 ”。 Burton Watson,《庄子全集》(纽约:哥伦比亚大学出版社,1968 年),291。这也是可能的,尽管比其他选择更有说服力,因为它需要某些在文本中没有基础的补充(例如例子,

there is no explicit reference to the partiality of the individual’s view anywhere in the passage; on the contrary, the only individual explicitly referred to is the Great Man, who joins things into impartiality), and seems to violate the general force of the larger context, in whatever way we may interpret it.
文章中没有明确提及个人观点的偏见;相反,唯一明确提及的个人是伟人,他将事物结合成公正),并且似乎违反了更大背景的普遍力量,无论我们以何种方式解释它。
Nonetheless, I do not wish to completely dismiss these readings, as it seems to me that, in spite of the larger interpretative difference behind them, they complement each other and my own reading well, each adding a dimension to the sense of the passage, albeit from different perspectives. I am compelled to the reading adopted in my own translation not only by concerns for thematic consistency, but also by grammatical considerations: the 者 zhe in the middle of each of these phrases seems to militate against reading them to mean simply, “There are some who are thwarted, some who are suited,” for which meaning we would expect either no zhe or a zhe following both verbs. The single zhe in each phrase seems to me to suggest at the very least a conditional, and more likely a full nominalization, a subject-predicate sentence: “One who possesses what thwarts him (also) possesses what suits him,” and so on. However, it is to be noted that the 而 er in the first line breaks up the parallelism, hence interfering with this subject-predicate reading, which works better in the second line. It is likely that the text is corrupt here, and there should either be an er in both lines or in neither. If it appeared in both, I would change my reading; if in neither, my reading would be supported.
尽管如此,我并不希望完全驳回这些阅读,因为在我看来,尽管它们背后存在较大的解释差异,但它们与我自己的阅读相得益彰,各自为文章的意义增添了一个维度,尽管从不同的角度来看。我被迫在自己的翻译中采用这样的解读,不仅是出于对主题一致性的考虑,而且也是出于语法方面的考虑:这些短语中间的“者者”似乎不利于将它们简单地理解为“有一些哪些人受到阻碍,一些人适合”,对于这个意思,我们期望这两个动词后面要么没有“zhe”,要么有“zhe”。在我看来,每个短语中的单个“着”至少暗示了一个条件,更可能是一个完整的名词化,一个主谓句:“拥有阻碍他的东西的人(也)拥有适合他的东西,”等等。然而,需要注意的是,第一行中的“而er”破坏了平行关系,因此干扰了主谓式阅读,而第二行中的这种阅读效果更好。这里的文本很可能已损坏,并且两行中都应该有错误,或者两行都没有错误。如果两者都出现,我就会改变我的阅读方式;如果两者都不符合,我的阅读就会得到支持。

24. My translation here is potentially controversial, so I shall say a few words to justify it. The first impulse may be to translate this phrase to mean, “Dao is their unity, or impartiality,” taking the 為 wei as a copula. Grammatically, however, we would normally expect a possessive 其 q i q i qiq i rather than a 之zhi in that case. Another possibility is to read the wei in the fourth tone, and the zhi as a pronoun referring to the previously adduced items, i.e., Heaven, Earth, Yin and Yang, yielding, “Dao serves as their impartiality,” or something of the sort. But this too is not as convincing as taking the phrase as strictly parallel to the preceding two phrases, which forces us to take the 為 wei as a nominalized verb, meaning, “all activity, all deeming, all purpose.” As Heaven and earth were the vast among forms, and Yin and Yang the vast among forces, Dao is the gong among weis.
24. 我在这里的翻译可能会引起争议,所以我要说几句话来证明它的合理性。第一个冲动可能是将这句话翻译为“道是他们的统一,或公正”,将“为为”作为系词。然而,从语法上来说,我们通常会期望所有格 其 q i q i qiq i 在这种情况下,而不是“之”。另一种可能是用第四声读“未”,将“之”读作代词,指代先前引述的项目,即天、地、阴、阳,产生“道作为其公正”之类的内容。 。但这也不像将这个短语与前两个短语严格平行那样令人信服,这迫使我们将“为为”视为一个名词化动词,意思是“所有活动,所有认为,所有目的”。天地为形之广大,阴阳为力之广大,道为微之功。

25. Some of the choices in this translation are perhaps a bit controversial, so I will try to justify them. I take both gong and Dao to be the provisional names that are permitted provisionally but not accepted as adequate; gong, as we noted before, is the quintessential “community word,” and the description of what words do: they universalize. The name Dao indicates the ultimate universality that is not partial to heaven or earth, to Yin or Yang, to forms or forces, nor to any one principle or meaning. Words and Dao (which also has the meaning “to speak”) share this feature. I take 比 bi to mean both compare and contrast, i.e., both to group similar members together into a class and to contrast this class to another class; as we noted above, this is precisely what happens in the use of particular words, which simultaneously name a universal class (“dog” for example groups all individual dogs together) and distinguish this class from every other category (the universal “dog” gets its meaning through its contrast to the universal “horse” et al.). To have meaning, it must indicate more than one thing and less than all things.
25. 这个翻译中的一些选择可能有点有争议,所以我会尽力证明它们的合理性。我认为“功”和“道”都是暂时被允许但不被接受的临时名称;正如我们之前提到的,“功”是典型的“社区词”,也是对词的作用的描述:它们具有普遍性。 “道”这个名字表明了终极的普遍性,不偏天地、不偏阴阳、不偏形势、不偏任何理义。言和道(也有“说话”的意思)都有这个特点。我把“比bi”理解为“比较”和“对比”,即既把相似的成员归为一个类,又把这个类与另一个类进行对比。正如我们上面指出的,这正是使用特定单词时发生的情况,这些单词同时命名一个通用类(例如“狗”将所有单独的狗组合在一起)并将该类与其他所有类别区分开来(通用“狗”得到它的含义是通过与普遍的“马”等的对比来体现的)。为了有意义,它必须表示多于一件事且少于所有事物。

26. Taking 以 yi as equivalent to 相 xiang, as suggested by Xuan Ying.
26. 按照玄英的建议,以“以一”等同于“相相”。

27. Strangely, the image of the bridge, so vividly depicting this state of dependence on the joining of opposites, has been read as a mistaken character by most commentators, in spite of its reappearance later in the passage and the very good sense it makes as is.
27. 奇怪的是,桥的形象如此生动地描绘了这种依赖于对立面结合的状态,却被大多数评论家解读为一个错误的角色,尽管它在文章的后面再次出现,而且它的意义非常好照原样。

28. According to Zhuangzi, ch. 17, these were stock propositions among the debaters of the time.
28. 根据《庄子》,第 1 章。 17、这些是当时辩手们的常见命题。

29. This whole section could perhaps be taken as a critique of the “Daoism” ascribed to Shen Dao, Tian Pian, and Peng Meng in the “Tianxia” chapter, which held that “Dao can include but cannot differentiate,” and advocated “Universality with no favoritism” (公而不黨 gong er bu dang). This would be a commitment to the total universality of namelessness and nonaction, which ignores the concrete particularity of individual occurrences.
29. 这整节或许可以看作是对《天下》篇中神道、田骈、蓬蒙的“道教”的批判,认为“道可包容而不能分别”,主张“公而无党”。这将是对无名和无为的总体普遍性的承诺,而忽略了个体事件的具体特殊性。

30. Reading 之 zhi as 其 qi throughout, as suggested by Ma Xulun, quoted in Wang Shuming, 1041.
30. 通篇读之为其气,马须伦建议,引自王叔明,1041。

CHAPTER FOUR. THE ADVENT OF LI AS A
TECHNICAL PHILOSOPHICAL TERM
第四章。 LI AS A 的出现 技术哲学术语

  1. Ironies of Oneness and Difference, 131-38.
    同一性与差异的讽刺,131-38。
  2. Guo Moruo 郭沫若 seems to have been the first to advance this theory, considering all four chapters to be derived from Song Xing 宋釬 and Yi Wen 尹文 at the Jixia Academy in the state of Qi, and his conclusion is supported by the work of such scholars as Liu Jie 劉節, Pan Fu’en 潘富恩, and Shi Changdong 施昌東. Others, such as Zhu Bokun 朱伯崑 and Qiu Xigui 裁錫圭, suggest Shen Dao 慎到 or Tian Peng 田駢, or members of their school, as the author, while others, such as Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, Ren Jiyu 任繼愈, Li Jinquan 李錦全, and Wu Guang 吳光 endorse the notion of these works as coming from “Daoist” writers associated with the Jixia Academy of Qi but without venturing to name a specific author. See Wu Menghong 巫夢虹, “Guanzi sipian sixiangyanjiu” (“Research on the Thought of the ‘Four Chapters’ of the Guanzi”《管子》四篇思想研究, Master’s Thesis, Taiwan National Central University 國立中央大學,2004,for a good overview of the scholarship on this issue and a valiant attempt to give a comprehensive outline of the doctrines of these four chapters read as a single integrated whole.
    郭沫若似乎是第一个提出这一理论的人,考虑到所有四章均源自齐国稷下书院的宋行和尹文,他的结论得到了刘节、潘富恩、施昌东等学者。其他人,如朱伯昆和裁锡圭,建议慎到或田骈或他们的学派成员为作者,而其他人,如冯友兰、任继愈、李金泉李锦全和吴光认可这些作品的概念,认为它们出自与齐稷下书院有关的“道家”作家,但没有冒险指出具体作者的名字。参见吴梦虹,《管子四篇思想研究》(《管子》四篇思想研究,硕士论文,国立中央大学,2004年)概述了关于这个问题的学术成果,并勇敢地尝试对这四章的理论进行全面的概述,将其作为一个整体来阅读。
  3. Reading chu for ai, as suggested by Wang Niansun, and adopted by Chen Guying. See Chen, 95 .
    读楚为艾,由王念孙建议,陈谷英采纳。参见陈,95 岁。
  4. ZZJC, vol. 5, 269. ZZJC,卷。 5、269。
  5. Ibid., 219 . 同上,219。
  6. 人皆欲智,而莫索其所以智乎。智乎智乎,投之海外無自奪,求之者不得處之者,夫正人無求之也,故能虛無,虛無無形謂之道。化育萬物謂之德。君臣父子人間之事謂之義。登降揖讓,貴賤有等,親疏之體,謂之禮。簡物小未一道, 殺僇禁誅謂之法.
    智乎智乎,投之海外无自夺,求之者不得处之者,夫正人无求之也,故能虚无,虚无无形谓之道。化育万物谓之德。君臣父子人间之事谓之义。登降揖让,贵贱有等,亲疏之体,谓之礼。简物小未若,杀戮诛禁谓之法。
  7. ZZJC, vol. 5, 270. This phrase is a “false cousin” to the more modern usage, which would interpret this last phrase as “this is the principle of attaining oneness,” which is suggested by the form “xx 之理 zhi li.” I think this is a later grammatical form depending on a more fully developed concept of Li. Here we should translate literally as I have attempted. The case is similar to that in the first
    ZZJC,卷。 5, 270. 这个短语对于更现代的用法来说是一个“假表亲”,现代用法会将最后一个短语解释为“这是获得统一的原则”,这由“xx之理之理”的形式表示。我认为这是一种后来的语法形式,取决于更充分发展的“礼”概念。这里我们应该按照我的尝试逐字翻译。此案与第一案类似

    line of the received Laozi: feichang should be read literally, character by character, not in its later and modern sense of “extraordinary.”
    《老子》中的一句话:“非常”应该逐字逐字地读,而不是后来和现代意义上的“非凡”。
  8. Ibid., 272. My reading follows Chen Guying’s interpretation. See Chen, 118.
    同上,272。我的阅读遵循陈谷英的解释。参见陈,118。
  9. The later “Baixin” echoes this idea, spelling out the idea of continuance more explicitly: “With harmony, one can long persist.” (和則能久 he ze neng jiu) ZZJC, vol. 5, 224.
    后来的《百信》也呼应了这一点,将延续的思想阐述得更加明确:“和则可以长久”。 (和则能久he ze neng jiu) ZZJC, vol. 5、224。
  10. Ibid., 272. 同上,272。
  11. ZZJC, vol. 4. 219. See also Chen, 147. I follow his emendation of 執 zhi to 勢 shi, but not his replacement of 不 b u b u bub u with 而 er.
    ZZJC,卷。 4. 219. 另见陈,147。我遵循他对“执之”的修改为“势势”,但不同意他对“不”的替代。 b u b u bub u 与 呃。
  12. See Ironies, 139-99. 参见反讽,139-99。
  13. Following the interpretation of Wang Yinzhi. See Chen, 141.
    以下为王引智的解读。参见陈,141。
  14. Reading 識 shi for 職 zhi.
    读知识是为了职志。
  15. Bamboo, measure, fullness and emptiness, straightness, strength, etc.
    竹、尺度、虚实、挺直、刚强等。
  16. 道在天地之間也,其大無外,其小無內,故曰不遠而難極也。虛之與人也無間。唯聖人得虛道,故曰並處而難得。。。。天之道,虛其無形。虛則不屈,無形則無所位 ulcorner\ulcorner ,無所位 ulcorner\ulcorner ,故遍流萬物而不變。德者道之舍,物得以生。生知得以職道之精。故德者得也,得也者,其謂所得以然也,以無為之謂道,舍之之謂德。故道之與德無間。故言之者不別也。間之理者,謂其所以舍也。義者,謂各處其宜也。禮者,因人之情,緣義之理,而為之節文者也。故禮者謂有理也,理也者,明分以諭義之意也。故禮出乎義,義出乎理,理因乎宜者也。法者所以同出,不得不然者也。故殺僇禁誅以一之也,故事督乎法,法出乎權,權出乎道。ZZJC,vol. 5,220-21. Wang Yinzhi suggests that this phrase should be rearranged to read, “禮出乎理,理出乎義,義因乎宜 li chu hu li, li chu h u y i , y i h u y i , y i huyi,yih u y i, y i yin hu yi,” (ritual derives from Li, Li derives from rightness, rightness follows along with what is appropriate) which follows the exposition more directly. I prefer to follow the more garbled and intricate version given in the received text. See Chen, 141.
    道在天地之间也,其大无外,其小无内,故曰不远而难极也。虚之与人也无间。唯圣人得虚道,故曰并处而难得。。。。天之道,虚其无形。虚则不屈,无形则无所位 ulcorner\ulcorner ,无所不在 ulcorner\ulcorner ,故遍流万物而不变。德者道之舍,物乃生。生知即可职道之精。故德者得也,得也者,其谓所得以然也,以无为谓道,舍之之谓德。故道之与德无间。故言之者不别也。间之理者,谓其所以舍也。义者,谓遍其宜也。礼者,因人之情,缘义之理,而为之节文者也。故礼者谓有理也,理也者,明分以谕义之意也。故礼出乎义,义出乎理,理因乎宜者也。法者故同出,不得不然者也。故杀戮禁诛以一之也,故事督乎法,法出乎权,权出乎道。 5,220-21。王引之建议将这句话重新排列为:“礼出乎理,理出乎义,义因乎宜 li chu hu li, li chu h u y i , y i h u y i , y i huyi,yih u y i, y i 殷胡义”(礼出于礼,礼出于礼,礼从宜),它更直接地跟在阐述之后。我更喜欢遵循收到的文本中给出的更乱码和更复杂的版本。参见陈,141。
  17. This line of thought appears to have been common in “HuangLao” thought: the categorical claim that “Dao produces laws” (道生法 dao sheng fa) is found in the texts discovered at Mawangdui, which many scholars, somewhat questionably, take as representative of HuangLao thought, the “Four Canons of the Yellow Emperor” 黃帝四經.
    这种思路似乎在“黄老”思想中很常见:在马王堆出土的文献中可以找到“道生法”的明确主张,许多学者有些怀疑地认为这是代表性的。黄老思想中的“黄帝四经”。
  18. This is signaled by the expression 人之情 ren zhi qing, which at this point means “what is real in people” as opposed to potentially deceptive appearances, with qing meaning the real state of something, as for example, the true facts in a legal case. The emphasis is on what is so prior to any specific, one-sided, deliberate manipulation. Hence, I translate as “unpremeditated human responses” and the like. The phrase ren qing later comes to mean simply “human emotions,” and is a common antonym of Li in both Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism, which is one further reason we should pay special attention to this connection here.
    这可以用“人之情人之情”这个表达来表示,它的意思是“人的真实情况”,而不是潜在的欺骗性外表,“情”意味着事物的真实状态,例如,事物中的真实事实。法律案件。重点在于任何具体的、片面的、蓄意的操纵之前的情况。因此,我翻译为“无预谋的人类反应”之类的。 “仁情”一词后来简单地表示“人类情感”,并且是佛教和新儒家中“理”的常见反义词,这也是我们在这里应该特别注意这种联系的另一个原因。
  19. See Kwong-loi Shun, “Mencius and Human Nature,” Philosophy East and West 47 (January 1997), for a good summary of early usages of this term. Shun agrees with Graham’s analysis of the term, as “what a thing is genuinely like,” but takes exception to Graham’s further equation of the term with “essence” in the Aristotelian sense. As Shun points out, the term can mean simply refer to “certain
    请参阅 Kwong-loi Shun,“Mencius and Human Nature”,Philosophy East and West 47(1997 年 1 月),了解该术语早期用法的详细总结。舜同意格雷厄姆对该术语的分析,即“事物真正的样子”,但对格雷厄姆对该术语与亚里士多德意义上的“本质”的进一步等同表示异议。正如 Shun 指出的,这个词可以简单地指“某些

    characteristic features . . . that are particularly conspicuous, pervasive, and difficult to alter, without necessarily having the connotation of what is essential as opposed to accidental.” I agree with Shun, and add that the stress is on “genuine” in the sense of “what it is like prior to deliberate manipulation for some special purpose,” rather than “genuine” in the sense of objective as opposed to a subjective illusion.
    特色特征。 。 。它们特别引人注目、普遍且难以改变,但不一定具有本质而非偶然的内涵。”我同意 Shun 的观点,并补充说,重点是“真实”,即“出于某种特殊目的而故意操纵之前的情况”,而不是客观意义上的“真实”,而不是主观幻觉。 。
  20. ZZJC, vol. 5, 222. ZZJC,卷。 5、222。
  21. 原始計實。本其所生。知其象,則索其形,緣其理,則知其情。索其端,則知其名。ZZJC, vol. 5, 224.
    原始计实。本其所生。知其象,则索其形,缘其理,则知其情。索其端,则知其名。ZZJC,卷。 5、224。
  22. John Makeham, “Names, Actualities, and The Emergence of Essentialist Theories of Naming in Classical Chinese Thought,” Philosophy East E E E\mathcal{E} West 41, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 347. Makeham claims here that “Relative to the concepts each is paired with, ‘form,’ ‘distinguishing marks,’ and ‘starting point’ are all manifest and apparent.” But this makes havoc of the parallelism of the passage, which lines up not “form” but “image” with distinguishing marks and starting point. Just the opposite is the case: these three (象, 理, 端 xiang, li, duan) are precisely the non-manifest beginnings of the terms they are paired with. The “image” is the not-fully-actualized beginning of the palpable form (not, as Makeham alleges, its mental representation). The “Li” are the limited particular channels of fitting together that can later become manifest as the genuine condition of a thing. The “starting points” are the unmanifest sprouts that eventually can blossom into a named-renowned, eminent, valued, definite presence. Makeham has to add the “If you want to . . .” clause to the beginning of each phrase to make his meaning come out, but this gives a very forced meaning to the connective ze.
    约翰·马克汉姆,“名称、现实以及中国古典思想中命名的本质主义理论的出现”,哲学东方 E E E\mathcal{E} 西41号,没有。 3(1991 年 7 月),第 17 页。 347. Makeham在此声称“相对于每个与之配对的概念,‘形式’、‘区别标记’和‘起点’都是显而易见的。”但这严重破坏了段落的平行性,它不是将“形式”而是“图像”与区别标记和起点排列起来。情况恰恰相反:这三个(象、理、端向、礼、端)正是它们所配对的术语的非显性开头。 “图像”是可感知形式的未完全实现的开始(而不是像马克汉姆所说的那样,它的心理表征)。 “礼”是有限的特定的组合渠道,后来可以显现为事物的真实状态。 “起点”是尚未显现的萌芽,最终可以开花结果,成为知名的、杰出的、有价值的、明确的存在。马克汉姆必须添加“如果你想……”。 。 ”。在每个短语的开头加一个从句,以表达其含义,但这给连接词“ze”带来了非常强迫的含义。
  23. Shun has gathered useful examples from early sources: “II]t is the ch’ing of the senses to desire their ideal objects (LSCC 5/9b.6-10a.1) and the ch’ing of human beings to desire life and honor and have an aversion to death and disgrace (LSCC 5/10a.7-8, 8/4b.2-5). Sometimes the ch’ing of x’s can be certain characteristic features of x’s as a class, without such features obtaining of each individual x. For example, that the common people have different abilities is described as the ch’ing of the common people (ST, 250, no. 33), and the distinction between genders is described as the ch’ing of human beings ( M T 6 / 35 M T 6 / 35 MT6//35M T 6 / 35 ). But, often, the ch’ing of x’s includes characteristic features that obtain of x’s as a class in virtue of their obtaining of each individual x , as when ‘ch’ing’ is used to refer to the tendency of the senses to seek their ideal objects, or to refer to the desires and aversions that human beings have” (Kwong-loi Shun, op. cit.).
    舜从早期资料中收集了有用的例子:“II]这是感官渴望理想对象的渴望(LSCC 5/9b.6-10a.1),也是人类渴望生命和生命的渴望。”尊重并厌恶死亡和耻辱(LSCC 5/10a.7-8、8/4b.2-5)。有时,x的变化可能是x作为一个类的某些特征,而不是每个单独的x都获得这样的特征。例如,将百姓能力不同称为“百姓之情”(《ST》250第33号),将性别的区别称为“人之情”(《古文》250第33号)。 M T 6 / 35 M T 6 / 35 MT6//35M T 6 / 35 )。但是,通常,x 的 ch'ing 包括 x 的特征,这些特征是由于它们获得每个单独的 x 而作为一个类而获得的,就像当“ch'ing”用来指感官寻求它们的倾向时一样。理想的对象,或指人类所拥有的欲望和厌恶”(Kwong-loi Shun,同上)。
  24. Scholars disagree about the authorship of this commentary, whether it comes from the same author as the rest of the Hanfeizi text, and whether the thought expressed therein is compatible with the Legalism of the rest of the Hanfeizi. It has been suggested that it is a work of Hanfei’s early years, or that it comes from another brush entirely. The facts of the matter, if we had them, would certainly be helpful in interpreting the text; given the distinctive Legalist reading-some would say twisting-of other Laozian themes (e.g., the idea of the unknown ruler, taken by Hanfeizi as a recommendation that the ruler not let his preferences be known by his ministers, the better to test and surveille them), we might indeed wonder whether the interpretation of Dao and its relation to Li in this text can really be
    对于这篇评论的作者是谁,它是否与《韩非子》其他文本出自同一作者,以及其中所表达的思想是否与《韩非子》其他文本的法家思想相一致,学者们意见不一。有人认为这是韩非早年的作品,或者完全出自另一笔。事情的事实,如果我们有的话,肯定会有助于解释文本。鉴于法家独特的解读——有些人会说是对老子其他主题的扭曲(例如,韩非子认为未知统治者的想法是建议统治者不要让他的大臣知道他的喜好,以便更好地测试和监视)他们),我们可能确实想知道本文中对“道”及其与“理”的关系的解释是否真的可以

    taken as representative of the ironic tradition. In fact, Hanfeizi’s Legalism in general can perhaps be considered a non-ironic appropriation of ironic motifs. But the passage under discussion here provides a valuable window into the way the terms Dao and Li are to be related, in a way that seems to develop the line of thinking we’ve seen in the above ironic appropriations of non-ironic motifs. The general attitude toward this relation seems to be shared by the “HuangLao” Daoism represented by the unearthed “Four Canons of the Yellow Emperor” 黃帝四經 as well; the "Sidu"四度, for example, tells us, “Success and failure share the same Dao but are different Lis” (逆順同道而異理 nishun tongdao er yili). Sameness pertains to Dao, which participates in both positive and negative events, while differentiation pertains to Li.
    被视为讽刺传统的代表。事实上,韩非子的法家思想总体上或许可以被认为是对讽刺主题的非讽刺挪用。但这里讨论的段落提供了一个宝贵的窗口,让我们了解术语“道”和“理”的关联方式,这种方式似乎发展了我们在上述非讽刺主题的讽刺挪用中看到的思路。以出土的《黄帝四经》为代表的“黄老”道教似乎也持这种态度。例如,《四度》告诉我们:“成败同道而异理”。 “同”属于“道”,参与正反事件;“异”属于“礼”。
  25. The term j i j i jij i is sometimes glossed as meaning “coming together” (cohering) and sometimes as “examining” (making intelligible). I include both meanings here, in line with the internal connection we have discerned between intelligibility and coherence in the tradition so far.
    期限 j i j i jij i 有时被解释为“聚集”(凝聚),有时被解释为“检查”(使可理解)。我在这里包含了这两种含义,这与我们迄今为止在传统中的可理解性和连贯性之间所认识到的内在联系是一致的。
  26. 道者,萬物之所然也,萬理之所稽也。理者,成物之文也;道者,萬物之所以成也。故曰:「道,理之者也。」物有理不可以相薄,物有理不可以相薄故理之為物之制。萬物各異理,萬物各異理而道盡。稽萬物之理,故不得不化;不得不化,故無常操;無常操,是以死生氣稟焉,萬智卙酌焉,萬事廢興焉。。。。道與堯、舜俱智,與接輿俱狂,與桀、紂俱滅,與湯、武俱昌。。凡道之情,不制不形,柔弱隨時,與理相應。萬物得之以死,得之以生;萬事得之以敗,得之以成。道譬諸若水,溺者多飲之即死,渴者適飲之即生。。。故得之以死,得之以生,得之以敗,得之以成。
    道者,万物之所然也,万理之所稽也。理者,成物之文也;道者,万物当时成也。故曰:「道,理之所然也。」物有理不可以相薄,物有理不可以相薄故理之为物之制。 万物各异理,万物异理而道尽。稽万物之理,故不得不化;不得不化,故无常操;无常操,完成死事业的制度完善,万智卙斟酌完善,万事废兴完善。。。。道与尧、舜俱智,与接舆狂俱,与桀、纣俱灭,与汤、武俱昌。凡道之情,不制不形,柔弱随时,与理相应。万物得之以死,得之以生;万事得之以败,得之以成。道喻诸若水,溺者多饮之即死,渴者适饮之即生。。。故得之以死,得之以生,得之以败,得之以成。
。。。。凡理者,方圓、短長、魔靡、堅脆之分也。故理定而後可得道也。故定理有存亡,有死生,有盛衰。夫物之一存一亡,乍死乍生,初盛而後衰者,不可謂常。唯夫與天地之剖判也具生,至天地之消散也不死不衰者謂常。而常者,無做易,無定理,無定理非在於常所,是以不可道也。。。。。短長、大小、方圓、堅脆、輕重、白黑之謂理。理定而物易割也。Hanfeizi, “Jielaopian,” Zhuzijicheng, vol. 5, 107-108.
。。。。凡理者,方圆、短长、魔靡、坚脆之分也。故理定而后可得道也。故定理有存亡,有死生,有盛衰。夫物之一存一亡,乍死乍生,初盛而后衰者,不降临常。唯夫与天地之剖判也具生,至天地之消散也不死不衰者谓常。而常者,无做易,无定理,无定理非位于常所,达到不可道也。。。。。短长、大小、方圆、坚脆、轻重、白黑之谓理。理定而物易割也。韩非子《解老篇》朱子积成卷。 5、107-108。

27. Shi 勢, as in the Wang Bi text; but the Mawangdui text B has 器 “qi,” utensils or palpable objects, which also works here.
27. 势,见王弼文;但马王堆文本B有“器”,即器具或可触摸的物体,在这里也适用。

28. I am following the Mawangdui texts here, both of which lack the character de in this line, so that Dao remains the subject for the verb “to husband,” in contrast to the first line of the chapter, where Dao is what generates while Virtuosity is what husbands. The other two agents listed in the first line- “things” and “tendencies”-drop out here in all versions of the text, which might be taken as support for the Mawangdui reading, but in either case the point is the same; although the verbs “to form” and “to complete” are not used, which are what was done by “things” and “tendencies” respectively, their function seems to be covered by the following six verbs: to grow, to nourish, to house, to mature, to feed, to shelter. These are simply another way of describing the process of being “formed” and “completed,” but when looked at not as the actions of things and tendencies, but of Dao and/or Virtuosity, the latter in any case being the presence of the formlessness of Dao in the formed thing. What matters is the double vision of agency: on the one hand things and tendencies make things what they are, but on the other precisely in so doing it is Dao (and/or Virtue) that, by not doing so, is making things what they are.
28. 我在这里遵循马王堆文本,这两行文本都缺少“德”字,因此“道”仍然是动词“丈夫”的主语,这与本章的第一行形成鲜明对比,其中“道”是产生“丈夫”的东西。而贤良就是丈夫。第一行列出的另外两个因素——“事物”和“趋势”——在所有版本的文本中都被删除了,这可能被视为对马王堆阅读的支持,但无论哪种情况,要点都是一样的;虽然没有使用动词“形成”和“完成”,而这分别是“事物”和“趋势”所做的,但它们的功能似乎被以下六个动词所涵盖:生长、滋养、房子,成熟,喂养,住所。这些只是描述“形成”和“完成”过程的另一种方式,但不是将其视为事物和倾向的行为,而是将其视为道和/或精湛技艺,后者无论如何都是事物的存在。道无形于有形之物。重要的是能动性的双重视角:一方面,事物和倾向使事物成为其本来面目,但另一方面,正是在这样做的过程中,道(和/或美德)不这样做,就使事物成为了现在的样子。他们是。

29. 故任一人之能,不足以治三畝之宅也。修道理之數,因天地之自然,則六合不足均也。
29. 故任一人之能,只能治三田之宅也。修道理之数,因天地之自然,则六合不足均也。

30. 3 / 2 / 9 3 / 2 / 9 3//2//93 / 2 / 9.
31. See Harold D. Roth, The Textual History of the Huai-nan Tzu (Ann Arbor: Association of Asian Studies Monograph, 1992), 9-26.
31. 参见 Harold D. Roth,《淮南子文本史》(安娜堡:亚洲研究协会专着,1992 年),9-26。

32. 故任一人之能,不足以治三畝之宅也。修道理之數,因天地之自然,則六合不足均也。
32.故任一人之能,只能治三田之宅也。修道理之数,因天地之自然,则六合不足均也。

33. Roth et al., Huainanzi, 55.
33. Roth 等,《淮南子》,55。

34. Ibid., 53, n. 17.
34.同上,53,n。 17.

35. 所謂後者, 非謂其底滯而不發, 凝結而不流, 貴其周於數而合于時也。夫執道理以耦變,先亦制後,後亦制先。是何則?不失其所以制人,人不能制也。
35. 称谓,非谓其底滞而不发,凝结流,贵其周于数而合于时也。夫执道理而不以耦合变,先亦制后,后亦制先。是何则?不失其故制人,人不能制也。

36. 所謂無形者,一之謂也。所謂一者,無匹合於天下者也。卓然獨立,塊然獨處,上通九天,下貫九野。員不中規,方不中矩。大渾而為一,棄累而無根。懷囊天地,為道開門。穆莣隱閔,純德獨存,佈施而不既,用之而不勤。是故視之不見其形,聽之聞其聲,循之不得其身;無形而有形生焉,無聲而五音鳴焉,無味而五味形焉,無色而五色成焉。是故有生於無,實出於虛,天下為之圈,則名實同居。音之數不過五,而五音之變,不可勝聽也;味之和不過五,而五味之化,不可勝嘗也;色之數不過五,而五色之變,不可勝觀也。故音者,宮立而五音形矣;味者,甘立而五味亭矣;色者,白立而五色成矣;道者,一立而萬物生矣。是故一之理,施四海;一之解,際天地。其全也,純兮若樸;其散也,混兮若濁。濁而徐清,沖而徐盈。
36. 所谓无形者,一之谓也。称一者,无匹合于天下者也。卓然独立,块然独处,上通九天,下贯九野。员不中规,方不中矩。大浑而为一,弃累而无根。怀囊天地,为道开门。穆莣隐闵,纯德独存,布施而不既,用之而不勤。是故视之不见其形,听之闻其声,循之不得其身;无形而有形生焉,无声而五音鸣焉,无味而五味形焉,无色而五色成焉。是故有生于无,实出于虚,天下为之圈,则名实同居。音之数不过五,而五音之变,不可胜听也;味之和不过五,而五味之化,不可胜尝也;色之数不过五,而五色之变,不可胜观也。故音者,宫立而五音形矣;味者,甘立而五味亭矣;色者,白立而五色成矣;道者,一立而万物生矣。是故一之理,施四海;一之解,际天地。其全也,纯兮若朴;其散也,混兮若浊。浊而徐清,冲而徐盈。

CHAPTER FIVE. LI AS THE CONVERGENCE OF COHERENCE AND INCOHERENCE IN WANG BI AND GUO XIANG
第五章。理是王弼与郭象的连贯与非连贯的汇合

  1. See Mizoguchi Yûzô, “Liqilun de xingcheng,” trans. Li Changli, in Zhongguo guannian shi, ed. Yuan Shuya (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 2005), 147 .
    参见沟口佑三,《力气论的行城》,译。李长礼,《中国冠年史》主编。袁书亚(郑州:中州古籍出版社,2005),147。
  2. Ibid. 同上。
  3. 夫彖者,何也?統論一卦之體,明其所由之主者也。夫眾不能治眾,治眾者,至寡者也。夫動不能制動,制天下之動者,貞夫一者也。故眾之所以得咸存者,主必致一也;動之所以得咸運者,原必(無)二也。 物(無)安然,必由其理。統之有宗,會之有元,故繁而不亂,眾而不惑. 故六爻相錯,可舉一以明也;剛柔相乘,可立主以定也。… 夫少者,多之所貴也;㟯者,眾之所宗也。一卦五陽而一陰,則一陰為之主矣;五陰而一陽,則一陽為之主矣!夫陰之所求者陽也,陽之所求者陰也, Wang Bi, Zhouyilueli, “Mingduan.”
    夫彖者,何也?统论一卦之体,明其所由之主者也。夫众不能治众,治众者,至寡者也。夫动不能制动,制天下之动者,贞夫一者也。故众相继得咸存者,主必致一也;动得咸运者,原必(无)二也。物(无)安然,必由其理。统之有宗,会之有元,故繁而不乱,众而不惑。 故六爻相错,可举一以明也;刚柔相乘,可立主以定也。…夫少者,多之所贵也;㟯者,众之所宗也。一卦五阳而一阴,则一阴为之主矣;五阴而一阳,则一阳为之主矣!夫阴之所求者阳也,阳之所求者阴也,王弼,周易略力,《明端》。
  4. Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: yuandaopian, volume 3 (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1986), 336.
    唐君毅,《中国哲学元论:元道篇》第3卷(台北:学生书局,1986),336。
  5. Ibid., 350-53. 同上,350-53。
  6. Ibid., 370 . 同上,370。
  7. Zhouyi zhu, Qiangua, Wenyan.
    《周易注》、《千卦》、《文言》。
  8. Tang Junyi, “Wang Bi zhi you Yixue yi tong Laoxue zhi dao,” in Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: Yuandao pian, Volume 2 (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1986), 355-58.
    唐君毅,《王必之有一学一通老学之道》,载于《中国哲学原理:原理篇》第二卷(台北:学生书局,1986),355-58。
  9. Alan K. L. Chan, Two Visions of the Way: A Study of the Wang Pi and the Ho-shang Kung Commentaries on the Lao-tzu (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 66.
    陈艾伦 (Alan KL Chan),《道的两种愿景:《王丕》与《何商孔老子评》的研究》(奥尔巴尼:纽约州立大学出版社,1991 年),66。
  10. For example, in such usages as li yi yi zhangyou yue de 禮以體長幼曰德 (“Using ritual propriety to give form to [“embody”] the [distinction between] elder and younger is called Virtue.” (Liji, “Xiangyinjiuyi”).
    例如,“礼以体长幼曰德”(“以礼以形,长幼之分,谓之德。”)相饮九仪》)。
  11. We see this sense of “completeness,” ironically, even in the earliest usages of t i t i tit i as a noun, the literal meaning of which is “part,” as in a limb or other portion of the body, rather than the entire body. See, for example, Shijing, Daya, “Xingwei”: niuyang wu jianlu fangbao fangti 牛羊勿踐履,方苞方體(“Let not the cows and sheep trample [on the rushes], which have just now grown and fully formed”). Ti here seems to mean, literally, to be endowed with [all its proper] parts. See also Shijing, Gufeng, “Xiang Shu,”: xiang shu you ti, ren er wu li . . . 相鼠有體,人而無理。。。“See the mouse, with [all this] limbs-and yet here is a man lacking ritual propriety . . .” The connection with ritual is often picked up in later writings, implying also this sense of completion, for example, Liji, “Liqi,” liyezhe youtiye. Ti bubei junzi weizhi buchengren 禮也者猶體也。體不備,君子謂之不成人 (“Ritual is like body parts. If one lacks the complete array of [all] the body parts, the gentleman calls one an incomplete person”).
    讽刺的是,即使在最早的用法中,我们也看到了这种“完整性”的感觉。 t i t i tit i 作为名词,其字面意思是“部分”,如肢体或身体的其他部分,而不是整个身体。参见《大雅诗经》《行尾》:牛羊勿践履,方苞方体(“牛羊勿践履,方苞方体”)形成”)。 Ti在这里的字面意思似乎是被赋予[所有适当的]部分。又见《诗经》、《古风》《象数》:象数有体,人而五里。 。 。 相鼠有体,人而无理。。。“你看老鼠,有四肢,而人却没有礼节。 。 ”。后来的著作中经常提到与仪式的联系,也暗示着这种完成感,例如《礼记》、《礼器》、《礼者有体也》。礼也者犹体也。体不备,君子谓之不成人。 )。
  12. This has an ethical sense of “empathizing,” “being considerate,” i.e., seeing things from the position of the other-the famous Confucian virtue of “reciprocity.” For example, in such usages as gongzu zhi zui, suiqin buyifan, yousizhengshuye, suoyi ti baixing 公族之罪,雖親不以犯、有司正術也,所以體百姓也(“When any of the ruler’s clan are guilty of an offense, although they are close kin, he does not for this reason allow them their offense, for there are proper procedures of the authorities in charge. This is how he puts himself in the place oflforms one body with the common people” (Liji, “Wenwan shizi”). Ti here means to take the common people as part of his own body, but not in the sense of regarding them as organs to be used for his own self-centered purposes, like one’s limbs, but rather in the ethical sense of “consideration of their position,” “seeing things as they do, from their point of view.” A similar sense is found in modern Chinese usages such as titie 體貼 (“considerate”), tiliang 體諒 (“forgive,” in the sense of “understanding” the offender’s predicament), and also in the sense of bodily going through an actual experience in compounds such as tiyan 體驗 (“to experience”) and tihui 體會 (“experiential understanding”). We may think here of Mengzi’s remark that the sages “did not practice Benevolence and Righteousness; rather, they proceeded from Benevolence and Righteousness.” buxing renyi, you renyixing 不行仁義,由仁義行。For a comprehensive and insightful analysis of the implications of some of these points for the broader overview of Chinese metaphysics and onto-cosmology, see Chung-ying Cheng, “On the Metaphysical Significance of Ti (Body-Embodiment) in Chinese Philosophy: Benti (Origin-Substance) and Ti-Yong,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29, no. 2 (June 2002): 145-61.
    这具有“共情”、“体贴”的伦理意义,即站在对方的立场上看问题——即著名的儒家美德“互惠”。例如,“公族之罪,随亲不凡,有私正数也,所为公族之罪,虽亲不以犯、有司正术也,所以体百姓也”尽管他们是近亲,但他不允许他们犯罪,因为主管当局有适当的程序。这就是他把自己置于与百姓一体的位置”(《礼记》《文玩世子》)。这里的“体”是指将百姓视为自己身体的一部分,但不是指将其视为肢体等为自己的自我中心目的所使用的器官,而是指“顾及他人”的伦理意义。他们的立场”,“从他们的角度看待事情”。现代汉语的用法中也有类似的含义,例如“体贴”(“体贴”)、“体谅”(“原谅”,意思是“理解”冒犯者的困境),以及身体经历实际经历的意思在 tiyan 体验(“体验”)和 tihui 体验(“体验式理解”)等复合词中。这里我们可以想到孟子所说的圣人“不行仁义,不行仁义”的说法。而是从仁义出发。”对于其中一些观点对中国形而上学和本体宇宙学更广泛的概述的影响的全面而富有洞察力的分析,请参阅郑中英,“论《中国哲学中的体:本体与体用》,《中国哲学杂志》29期,第1期。 2(2002 年 6 月):145-61。
  13. Shishuo xinyu, Chapter 4, Item 8: 王輔嗣弱冠詣裴徽,徽問曰:「夫無者,誠萬物之所資,聖人莫肯致言,而老子申之無已,何邪?」弼曰:「聖人體無,無又不可以訓,故言必及有;老、莊未免於有,恒訓其所不足. See Yu Jiaxi, ed., Shishuo xinyu jianshu (Taipei: Huazheng shuju, 2002), 199.
    《世说新语》第四章第八项:王辅嗣弱冠冕裴徽,徽问曰:“夫无者,圣万物之所资,人莫肯致言,而老子申之无已,何邪?”弼曰:「圣人体无,无又不可训,故言必及有;老、庄未免于有,恒训其所不足。」参见余家熙主编,《世说新语简书》(台北:华证书局,2002),199。
  14. Tang Junyi, Zhongguo zhexue yuanlun: Yuandao pian, Volume 2, 373-74.
    唐君毅,中国哲学元论:元道篇,卷二,373-74。
  15. Wang Bi, Laozizhu, Ch. 5. The same sentiment, stressing the ironic sense of ordering as non-ordering, or the true overall coherence as simply the reciprocal ordering, limiting, making coherent of individual things, is found in Wang’s comments to Chapters 36 and 38.
    王弼,老子主,CH. 5. 在王对第 36 章和第 38 章的评论中也发现了同样的观点,即强调有序作为非有序的讽刺意义,或者真正的整体连贯性只是个体事物的相互有序、限制和连贯。
  16. Ibid., Ch. 47. 同上,第 1 章。 47.
  17. ZZJS, 251 . ZZJS,251。
  18. Ibid., 111 . 同上,111。
  19. Ibid., 662 . 同上,662。
  20. Ibid., 200. 同上,200。
  21. Ibid., 50 . 同上,50。
  22. Huran. This term, which normally means simply “suddenly,” has a rather extended meaning in Guo Xiang. The h u h u huh u here also implies to not pay attention, to neglect, unconsciousness. Moreover, the ran has a sense of both being-so and affirming, embodying a particular point of view.
    胡兰。这个词通常的意思是“突然”,但在郭象那里却有着相当广泛的含义。这 h u h u huh u 这里也暗示不注意、忽视、无意识。此外,“跑”既有“如此”的感觉,也有一种肯定的感觉,体现了一种特定的观点。
  23. ZZJS, 754 . 第 754 章
  24. Mizoguchi, op. cit., 154 .
    沟口,同前。前述,154。
  25. Zhuangzi jishi, ed. Guo Qingfan (Taipei: Muduo Press, 1983), 74. Henceforth cited as ZZJS.
    庄子纪实,主编。郭清帆(台北:木多出版社,1983),74。以下简称ZZJS。
  26. Ibid., 277. 同上,277。
  27. Ibid., 245 . 同上,245。
  28. Ibid., 583 . 同上,583。
  29. Ibid., 585 . 同上,585。
  30. Ibid., 570 . 同上,570。
  31. Ibid., 58 59 58 59 58-5958-59. 同上, 58 59 58 59 58-5958-59
  32. This is why Guo does sometimes sound as though he considers the determinacy of things to be fixed, for example when he says, “This passage means to say that the determinacies of things have their different allotments and roles [fen]; thus the intelligent await their end holding on to their intelligence, while the stupid await death embracing their stupidity; how could they change their innate determinacy in the middle?” (Guo 1983, 59). But in the light of his entire system, his emphasis on change and transformation, his admission of unfixity of worldly conditions that alone express determinate differences, we may rather interpret such assertions to mean that at any given moment one is just what one is and cannot be otherwise, that one’s determinacy in that moment is self-so and absolute, not that one must literally be the same in every subsequent moment. For Guo makes it abundantly clear elsewhere that xing does not mean something eternally fixed: “Benevolence and Righteousness are the determinate nature [性 xing] of man; but man’s determinate nature changes [人性有變 ren xing you bian], it is different in the past and in the present” (Guo 1983, 519). Whatever changes happen to occur to one’s determinacy are also self-so, and hence are also one’s “nature.” “To follow one’s present determinacy and move directly forward [直往 zhiwang] is self-so. To so move and harm that determinacy, and the fact that the determinacy [性 xing] once hurt can change, are also self-so” (Guo 1983, 281). Here we see clearly that xing is something that can and does change; in fact, in light of Guo’s general view of the uninterrupted all-pervasiveness of change, it must change.
    这就是为什么郭有时听起来好像认为事物的决定性是固定的,例如他说:“这段话的意思是说,事物的决定性有其不同的分配和作用。”因此,聪明人抱着他们的聪明等待死亡,而愚蠢的人抱着他们的愚蠢等待死亡。他们怎么可能在中间改变他们与生俱来的决定性呢?” (郭1983,59)。但鉴于他的整个体系,他对变化和转变的强调,他承认世俗条件的不固定性,而这些条件本身就表达了决定性的差异,我们宁愿将这样的断言解释为意味着在任何特定时刻,一个人就是一个人,也不能是一个人。否则,一个人在那一刻的决定性是自我的和绝对的,而不是一个人在随后的每个时刻都必须是相同的。因为郭在其他地方非常清楚地指出,“性”并不意味着永远固定的东西:“仁义,是人的本质[性兴];仁义,是人的本质。但人性有变,古今不同”(郭1983,519)。一个人的决心发生任何变化,也是自我的,因此也是一个人的“本性”。 “顺着当下的决心,直接向前走,是自以为是的。如此动而伤害其定性,而定性一旦受到伤害就会改变,也是自如此”(郭1983:281)。在这里我们清楚地看到,性是可以改变的,也确实是改变的。事实上,根据郭对变化不间断、无处不在的总体看法,它必须改变。
  33. ZZJS, 588 . 第 588 章
  34. Ibid., 225. 同上,225。
  35. Guo’s thought bears a striking resemblance also to the more radical variety of Chan Buddhism as represented to works associated with the Linji school. They share the idea of total merging with each moment of experience, relinquishment of all clinging to particular identity, and an anti-explanatory tendency. What distin-
    郭的思想与以临济宗相关著作为代表的更为激进的禅宗思想也有着惊人的相似之处。他们的想法是完全融入每一刻的经历,放弃所有对特定身份的执着,以及反解释倾向。有什么区别-

    guishes them are two crucial points. First, Guo’s epistemology is based on his “traces” idea, whereas the Buddhist epistemology follows the Two Truths structure of Indian Mahayana. The traces are an inadvertent by-product of the self-so, and are usually, although not always, considered harmful by Guo Xiang; they are a mistake made by deluded people who cling to bygone traces and make ideals of them, thereby distorting their own self-so of each moment. The Buddhist picture attributes a positive salvific meaning to the misapprehensions of the Buddha’s activities and teachings, which he also underwrites with his own compassion. Although the nonintentionality of the Buddha’s work comes to be stressed more and more in Chinese Buddhism, in accordance with Guo’s thinking, the basic Two Truths structure continues to alter the structure. Second, Guo has no theory of karma, even in a conventional truth sense. For him, what one encounters and what one does are exactly equal, and treated in exactly the same way. For Chan, what one encounters is the result of one’s past karma, and is, initially, sharply distinguished from the Buddha-nature’s constant relinquishment. One is still counseled to accept each encounter wholeheartedly and without resistance, as in Guo Xiang, but a different reason is given. It is still “done by oneself,” but in a quite different sense. Chan moves closer to Guo’s position when it claims that this karmic determinacy can be completely overcome by means of one’s present attitude in accepting it; for Guo, the very idea that what one is encountering is some particular event, identifiable as this rather than that, is a result of trace-thinking, and a similar idea comes to play a part in Chan. But again, the original structure of the karmic idea prevents a full convergence of the two positions.
    认为它们是两个关键点。首先,郭氏的认识论是基于他的“道”思想,而佛教的认识论则遵循印度大乘的二谛结构。这些痕迹是自我无意中产生的副产品,郭象通常(尽管并非总是)认为是有害的。它们是那些被迷惑的人所犯的错误,他们紧紧抓住过去的痕迹,并以此为理想,从而扭曲了自己每时每刻的自我。佛教图画对佛陀的活动和教义的误解赋予了积极的救赎意义,而佛陀也以自己的慈悲来支持这一点。尽管中国佛教越来越强调佛陀著作的无意性,但按照郭的思想,基本的二谛结构仍在不断改变。其次,郭没有业力理论,即使是传统真理意义上的业力理论。对他来说,遇到的事和所做的事是完全平等的,也是一视同仁的。对于禅宗来说,一个人所遭遇的一切都是过去业力的结果,最初与佛性的不断舍弃是截然不同的。仍然建议人们全心全意地接受每一次遭遇,不要抗拒,就像郭象那样,但给出了不同的理由。它仍然是“自己做的”,但意义却截然不同。陈更接近郭的立场,他声称这种业力决定性可以通过一个人目前接受它的态度来完全克服。对于郭来说,“一个人所遇到的是某种特定事件,可以识别为这个而不是那个”这一想法是追踪思维的结果,类似的想法在禅宗中也发挥了作用。 但同样,业力观念的原始结构阻碍了两种立场的完全融合。
  36. ZZJS, 225. ZZJS,225。
  37. Ibid., 257. 同上,257。
  38. Ibid., 280. 同上,280。
  39. Ibid., 206. See also 156 .
    同上,206。另见 156。
  40. Ibid., 213. 同上,213。
  41. Ibid., 323 24 323 24 323-24323-24. 同上, 323 24 323 24 323-24323-24
  42. Ibid., 5 . 同上,5。
  43. Ibid., 406. 同上,406。
  44. Ibid., 4 . 同上,4。
  45. See my The Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).
    参见我的《半影无界:郭象的新道家哲学》(奥尔巴尼:纽约州立大学出版社,2003)。
  46. ZZJS, 213. ZZJS,213。
  47. Ibid., 471. 同上,471。
  48. Ibid., 549 . 同上,549。
  49. Ibid., 273 . 同上,273。
  50. Ibid., 638 . 同上,638。
  51. Ibid., 855 . 同上,855。
  52. Cf., among many other examples: “At the point where principle reaches its ultimate, outside and inside [the realm of social rules] vanish (into) one another; there has never been one who roams outside [i.e., in the self-so] who does not at the same time vanish (into) the inside [i.e., morality]. Thus the sage constantly roams outside the realm to vanish (into) what is inside it, following along with existence with no deliberate mind, and hence although his body is waving about all day long, his spirit and breath remain unchanged, looking above and below along with ten thousand different circumstances, and yet calmly constant and self-like” (ZZJS, 99).
    参见许多其他例子:“当原则达到终极时,外部和内部[社会规则领域]彼此消失;从来没有一个在外游荡的人(即在自我中)不会同时消失(进入)内部(即道德)。故圣人常游于域外,而消失于域内,随有而无刻意,故其身虽终日摇动,而神气不变,上观下。纵有万种境遇,却又淡定自如”(ZZJS,99)。
Or again, “Although the sequence of precedence and following is the work of man, it comes from within the perfect principle [of the self-so], and is not the doing of the sage” (ZZJS, 470).
又或“前后之序虽为人之所为,而出于圆理之中,非圣人之所为”(《ZZZJS》,470)。

53. Ibid., 72 . 53.同上,72。
54. A mutation of duhua.
54. 毒花的变异。

55. ZZJS, 99 . 55.ZZJS,99。
56. Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 317.
56. 陈永捷,《中国哲学资料集》(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,1973),317。

CHAPTER SIX. BEYOND ONE AND MANY
第六章。超越一和多

  1. Yinwenzi; Guanyinzi 尹文子,關尹子(Taipei:Taiwan Zhonghuashuju, 1979), Guanyinzi, 1.
    银文子;观音子尹文子,关尹子(台北:台湾中华书局,1979),观音子,1。
  2. Aramaki Noritoshi 荒牧典俊," Zhongguo fojiao de jieshou Li de yida bianhua,""中國對佛教的接受—“理"的一大變化,” in Shijiezongiiaoyanjiu 世界宗教研究. 1988.01.01: 37-43.
    荒牧典俊荒牧典俊,《中国佛教的戒守力的一大变话》,《中国对佛教的接受——“理”的一大变化》,载于《世界宗教研究》。 1988年1月1日:37-43。
  3. Kan’no Hiroshi, 菅野博史, 道生撰『妙法蓮花経疏』における「理」の 概念について (“On the Concept of Li” in Daosheng’s Commentary to the Lotus Sutra"), in 創価大学人文論集 3 (March 1991): 119-43.
    菅野博史、道生撰『妙法莲花経疏』における「理」の概念について(道生《法华经注》中“礼之概念”),创価大学人文论集第3期(1991年3月) ):119-43。
  4. Taishōshinshūdaizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經(“The Chinese Buddhist Canon as Compiled in the Taishō Reign,” ed. and compiled Takakusu Junjirō, Watanabe Kaigyoku et al. [Tokyo: Taishō Issaikyō Kankō Kai, 1924-1934]), vol. 45, 19, top fascicle. Henceforth this collection will be cited as “T,” followed by volume number, page number, and top, middle, and bottom fascicle of the page indicated as “a, b, c,” respectively. Hence, this citation would be: T45.19a.
    《大正新修大藏经》并编有高楠淳二郎、渡边海极等。 [东京:大正一生观光会,1924-1934]),卷。 45、19,顶部分册。此后,该合集将被引用为“T”,后跟卷号、页码以及页面的顶部、中部和底部分册,分别表示为“a、b、c”。因此,该引用将是:T45.19a。
  5. See James Behuniak Jr., “Li in East Asian Buddhism: One Approach from Plato’s Parmenides,” Asian Philosophy 19, no. 1 (March 2009): 31-49.
    参见 James Behuniak Jr.,“东亚佛教中的理:来自柏拉图巴门尼德的一种方法”,亚洲哲学 19,第 1 期。 1(2009 年 3 月):31-49。
  6. It should be noted as well that the endeavor to end suffering is itself something one may choose to embark upon or not; Buddhism is good and true only to the extent that the liberation from suffering is one’s goal. It may be that all goals can be (not “must be”) reduced to this goal-all human activity can be seen (not “must be seen”) as various attempts to reduce suffering in one way or another. But this is different from asserting that something that is useful for this goal is true or good outside of the context of having adopted this goal explicitly.
    还应该指出的是,结束痛苦的努力本身就是人们可以选择是否开始的事情。只有当一个人的目标是从痛苦中解脱出来时,佛教才是善的、真实的。可能所有目标都可以(不是“必须”)简化为这个目标——所有人类活动都可以被视为(不是“必须被视为”)以某种方式减少痛苦的各种尝试。但这不同于在明确采用该目标的背景之外断言对该目标有用的东西是真实的或好的。
  7. See T25.59b17-61b18. The four siddhantas (literally, “tenets” or “doctrines” with an implication of something firmly established or held to; roughly, “established authorized teachings”) are (1) the Worldly Siddhanta, which corresponds directly to the category of “Conventional Truth” on a non-Upayicized understanding of that doctrine: it is the Buddha’s teaching in terms generally accepted by the world; (2) the Individually Adapted Siddhanta, which means that the Buddha may preach things that conform to the preconceptions of a particular sentient being, no matter how misguided, but that conform neither to the first Siddhanta (ordinary Conventional Truth) nor to Ultimate Truth; (3) the Counteractive Siddhanta, which takes the particular beliefs of either the world in general or of some individual subset of sentient beings, even if only a single one, and rather than speaking in terms of these preconceptions, instead speaks in a way designed specifically to undermine and refute them; (4) the Supreme Meaning Siddhanta, which corresponds to the
    参见 T25.59b17-61b18。四悉丹塔(字面意思是“信条”或“教义”,暗示着某种牢固确立或坚持的事物;粗略地说,“既定的权威教义”)是(1)世俗悉丹塔,它直接对应于“世俗真理”的范畴。 ” 对这一教义的非 Upayicized 理解:这是佛陀的教义,以被世界普遍接受的术语; (2) 因材施教,即佛陀所宣扬的说法,可能符合特定众生的先入之见,无论多么误导,但既不符合第一悉丹塔(普通世俗真理),也不符合胜义谛; (3)反作用悉丹塔(Counteractive Siddhanta),它采用一般世界或有情众生的某些个别子集的特定信念,即使只有一个,并且不是用这些先入之见来说话,而是以一种设计的方式来说话专门用来破坏和反驳它们; (4) 最高义悉丹塔 (Siddhanta),对应于

    preaching of Ultimate Truth on a Two Truths scheme: the preaching of non-self, emptiness, and so on.
    宣讲二真谛的终极真理:宣讲无我、空性等等。
  8. 性欲無量故,說法無量;說法無量,義亦無量。無量義者,從一法生;其一法者,即無相也。如是無相,無相不相,不相無相,名為實相。T9.385c-386a.
    性欲无量故,说法无量;说法无量,义无量。无量义者,从一法生;其一法者,即无相也。如是无相,无相不相,不相无相,名实相。 385c-386a。
  9. Ibid. 同上。
  10. It will be noted here that the Tiantai writers thus do not recognize a difference between what Westerhoff has called “essence-svabhava” and “substance-svabhava”-which is perhaps not surprising, given the lack of a substance ontology in pre-Buddhist China against which to argue. See Jan Westerhoff, Nägärjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). On the Tiantai view, the rejection of substance-svabhava entails the rejection of essence-svabhava, as we shall see.
    这里需要指出的是,天台山的作者因此并没有认识到韦斯特霍夫所说的“本质性”和“实质性”之间的区别——考虑到佛教之前的中国缺乏实质本体论,这也许并不奇怪。反对哪个争论。参见 Jan Westerhoff,Nägärjuna 的中观:哲学导论(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2009 年)。根据天台宗的观点,对物质性的拒绝就意味着对本质性的拒绝,正如我们将要看到的。
  11. In this story, Sā̄riputra compares himself, and the other śrāvakas, to a son who, while still a youth, has been separated from his father, gone off on his own, become lost. The father searches all over for him, but finally gives up in despair; he can find him nowhere. Instead, he settles in a certain town and becomes very rich. Meanwhile, the son has to fend for himself, and lives hand to mouth in extreme poverty, taking whatever odd jobs come his way. In his wanderings, quite by chance, he eventually comes to the gate of his father’s opulent mansion. He is greatly intimidated by the splendor of this palatial estate, seeing nothing there that seems remotely relatable to his own condition; this is someone as different from himself as imaginable, someone with whom he has nothing at all in common. Indeed, he fears this must be a king of some sort, a person of great authority and might who will force him into military service or corvee labor if he doesn’t flee as quickly as possible. The father, instantly recognizing this broken impoverished man at the gate as his own long lost son, is overjoyed. He sends his servants to apprehend him-but the son is terrified, and falls into a faint. Realizing that his son has forgotten his own identity and is in no condition to take in the news, he devises a “skillful means”: the son is allowed to return to the poor part of town, and two ragged looking messengers are sent, pretending to be looking randomly for cheap day laborers, paid at the minimum wage. This the son can accept; it accords with his own concept of himself and his worth. He takes the job, and works shoveling out manure for twenty years. For Zhiyi’s interpretation, see Fahuawenju, especially T34.279c, and passim.
    在这个故事中,舍利弗将自己和其他声闻比作一个儿子,他在年轻时就与父亲分离,独自离开,迷失了方向。父亲四处寻找,最终绝望放弃;他无处可寻。相反,他在某个城镇定居并变得非常富有。与此同时,儿子必须自力更生,过着赤贫的生活,无论什么零工都打。在他的流浪中,机缘巧合,他最终来到了父亲豪华宅邸的门口。他对这座富丽堂皇的庄园感到非常害怕,因为在那里看不到任何与他自己的状况有任何关系的东西;这是一个与他自己完全不同的人,与他毫无共同之处。事实上,他担心这一定是某种国王,一个拥有巨大权力和力量的人,如果他不尽快逃跑,他就会强迫他服兵役或服苦役。父亲立刻认出门口这个破碎的贫困男子就是他失散多年的儿子,欣喜若狂。他派仆人去逮捕他,但儿子吓坏了,晕倒了。意识到儿子忘记了自己的身份,没有条件接受消息,他想出了一个“巧妙的手段”:让儿子回到城里的贫困地区,并派了两个衣衫褴褛的使者,假装随机寻找廉价的日工,支付最低工资。这是儿子可以接受的;这符合他自己的自我概念和价值。他接受了这份工作,铲粪工作了二十年。至一的解释参见《法华文具》,尤其是T34.279c和passim。
  12. This is of course a very abbreviated summary of Zhiyi’s favorite method of meditative inquiry. This method, described in greatest detail in the Mohezhiguan, T46.63b-66c, argues as follows: "Whenever a single moment of experience arises, all three types of Provisional Positing (elements, succession, conceptual contrasts) are present. . . . One should ask of this one moment of experience, Is this mental event created by itself? Does the facing object produce this mental event? Do the organ and object combine to form this mental event? Is this mental event born in separation from organ and object? If the mental event creates itself, we are taking the previous mental event as the organ and the subsequent mental event as the consciousness born from this organ. Is the mental event born from the organ or from the consciousness? If the organ can produce the consciousness, does the organ have consciousness existing antecedently within it, or no consciousness within it?
    这当然是智一最喜欢的冥想探究方法的非常简短的总结。这种方法在《漠河之观》T46.63b-66c 中有最详细的描述,其论证如下:“每当体验的一个时刻出现时,所有三种类型的临时定位(元素、连续、概念对比)都会出现......我们应该问,这一刹那的体验是由所面对的对象产生的吗?是器官与对象结合而形成的吗?如果心理事件是自身产生的,那么我们就将前一个心理事件视为器官,而将随后的心理事件视为从该器官生出的意识。意识,这个器官内部是否有意识,或者没有意识?
If there is consciousness already within the organ, organ and consciousness coexist, and there is no relation of the generator and the generated between them (as claimed). If there is no consciousness within the organ, and yet it can generate consciousness, why does this organ produce consciousness when all other objects, also equally lacking consciousness within them, cannot? Or is it that although there is no actual consciousness within the organ, it can generate consciousness because it has within it the “potential for consciousness”? But is this “potential for consciousness” existent or nonexistent? If it is existent, it is already consciousness coexisting with the organ-in what sense is it to be called merely a potential? If it is nonexistent, on the other hand, it can do no generating of consciousness. Moreover, is this potential for consciousness the same as consciousness or something other than consciousness? If they are the same, the potential is the consciousness, then there is no possible relation of generator and generated between them. If they are different, then we have here another case of generation from an other, not from itself. If we reason in this way, we find that the mental event is not generated from mind itself.
如果器官内已经存在意识,则器官和意识共存,并且它们之间不存在生成者和被生成者的关系(如所声称的)。如果器官内没有意识,但它能产生意识,为什么这个器官能产生意识,而其他同样缺乏意识的物体却不能产生意识呢?还是说器官内部虽然没有实际的意识,但因为内部有“意识潜力”,所以能够产生意识?但这种“意识的潜力”到底存在还是不存在?如果它是存在的,那么它就已经是与器官共存的意识——在什么意义上它才可以被称为仅仅是一种潜能呢?另一方面,如果它不存在,它就不能产生意识。而且,这种意识的潜力与意识相同,还是意识以外的东西?如果它们是相同的,势就是意识,那么它们之间就不可能有生成者和被生成者的关系。如果它们不同,那么我们这里就有了另一种从他者而不是从自身生成的情况。如果我们这样推理,就会发现心理事件并不是从心本身产生的。

"[A similar argument can be made to refute the contention that the mental event is generated by the object]: is this object mental, and thus capable of generating the mental, or non-mental, and thus capable of generating the mental? If it is mental, it is not an object, and not outside, and the refutation goes the same as the refutation of generation from self. Moreover, in this case the organ and object would be two coexistent mentals, and no generator/generated relationship would exist between them. If the object is non-mental, we refute as above. If you say that there is the potential for generation of consciousness within the object, again we ask if this potential is existent or nonexistent. If it is existent, it coexists with the object, and there is no generator/generated relationship. If it is nonexistent, it can do no generating. From this we conclude that the mental event is not produced by the object.
“[可以提出类似的论点来反驳精神事件是由物体产生的论点]:这个物体是精神的,因此能够产生精神的,还是非精神的,因此能够产生精神的?如果它是精神的,它不是一个物体,也不是外在的,而且这个反驳与反驳从自我产生的一样,而且,在这种情况下,器官和物体将是两个共存的精神,并且不会有生成者/被生成的关系。如果物体是非心智的,我们就如上面反驳,如果你说物体内部有产生意识的潜力,我们再问这个潜力是否存在。与对象共存,并且不存在生成器/被生成关系。如果不存在,则它不能生成。由此我们得出结论,心理事件不是由对象生成的。

"If the claim is made that the mental event is generated by the combining of the organ and object, we ask if this is because they both are mental, or both are non-mental? If both are mental, we have the coexistence of two mentals when they come together, and the case is refuted as before. If they are both non-mental, in their coming together they remain devoid of the mental. For example, when a mirror confronts a face, is it because both have this visage that the image appears, or because both lack this visage? If they both have this visage, there should be two visages when they come together. If neither has this visage, they cannot produce one just by being juxtaposed. If you say that it is in uniting the mirror and the image into a unity that the image is produced, we note that in reality they do not form a unity, and if they did there would be no image [i.e., we would be back to the case of self-production, already refuted] . . . [Thus generation from a finite combination is refuted].
“如果声称精神事件是由器官和物体结合产生的,我们会问,这是因为它们都是精神的,还是都是非精神的?如果两者都是精神的,那么我们就有了两种共存。二者相合时,有心,如前反驳;若二者皆无心,则相合时,无心。是因为两者都没有这个相貌吗?如果他们都有这个相貌,那么当他们在一起时,应该有两个相貌。如果两个人都没有这个相貌,那么他们不能仅仅通过并列来产生一个。在将镜子和图像统一为图像产生的统一体时,我们注意到,实际上它们并不形成统一体,如果它们确实形成统一体,就不会有图像[即,我们将回到自我的情况]产生式,已被驳斥] 。

“If it is claimed that the mental event is generated in separation from both organ and object, with no cause at all, we ask: is this “separation” something that exists or does not exist? If it exists, then we still have a particular cause here; in what sense is it free of conditions? If it does not exist, it can do no producing. Or if it is claimed that this detachment from organ and object has the potential for consciousness, is this potential existent or nonexistent? . . Thus we see that this mental event is not generated by detachment from organ and object.”
如果说心理事件是在与器官和物体分离而没有任何原因的情况下产生的,那么我们要问:这种“分离”是存在的还是不存在的?如果它存在,那么我们这里仍然有一个特定的原因;在什么意义上它是无条件的?如果不存在,则不能进行生产。或者说,这种与器官和物体的分离具有意识的潜力,那么这种潜力是存在还是不存在? 。 。因此,我们看到这种心理事件并不是由脱离器官和物体而产生的。”
This is the refutation of the first type of Provisional Positing. Next, Zhiyi takes on succession, focusing on the four states of not-yet-arisen, about-to-arise, arisen, and gone, for any mental event. This angle is expounded most commonly and at most length in Zhiyi’s works, and seems to be of particular use in meditative practice. But the argument is the same for each type of Provisional Positing. In each case, attention is drawn to the interface between the “this” and the “not-this,” either spatially, temporally or conceptually, and the impossibility of construing this boundary coherently is made apparent. The “this” arises necessarily with some “non-this,” but the generation of the one by the other cannot be understood if cause and effect are assumed to be simply located entities.
这是对第一种临时定位的反驳。接下来,至一论相续,针对任何心理事件,专注于未生、将生、生起、灭去四种状态。这个角度在智一的著作中阐述得最普遍、最详尽,似乎在冥想练习中特别有用。但每种类型的临时定位的论点都是相同的。在每种情况下,人们的注意力都集中在“这个”和“非这个”之间的界面上,无论是在空间上、时间上还是概念上,并且清楚地表明了连贯地解释这个边界的不可能性。 “此”必然与某些“非此”一起出现,但如果因果被假设为简单定位的实体,则无法理解一个由另一个产生的过程。

13. T46.29c. 13.T46.29c。
14. T46.10b. 14.T46.10b。
15. T8.332a-333c. For a paradigmatic instance of Zhiyi’s deployment of this motif in the discussion of the Three Truths, Miaofalianhuajing xuan yi, in T33.702c, and passim.
15.T8.332a-333c。对于智一在讨论三圣谛时运用这一主题的典型例子,《妙法莲华经玄义》,T33.702c 和《passim》。

16. T46.13c. 16.T46.13c。
17. T33.691b. 17.T33.691b。
18. T46.60c. 18.T46.60c。
19. T9.11c. 19.T9.11c。
20. T33.p0763c. 既以大乘果為大理。何不用小乘果為小理。彼救云。小果非真。故不以其果為理。若爾權教及權行人。何嘗是實。既立權教行人。何不立權理。又權若無理。俗不應稱諦。
20.T33.p0763c。 既以大乘果为大理。不用何小乘果为小理。彼救云。小果非真。故不习果为理。若尔权教及权行人。何尝是实。既立权教行人。何不立权理。又权若无理。俗不宜称义。

21. T14.547c. 21.T14.547c。
22. T34.37c. 22.T34.37c。
23. Indeed, it is no accident that later Tiantai writers, such as Boting Shanyue 柏庭善月 (1149-1241) in his brilliant Taizong shilei yinge lun, make a point of restating the Li /shi relationship in strictly bilateral terms. In explaining Zhanran’s comment that “It is only because of inherent entailment in Li that there can be function as event [shi],” he states. “Without shi, Li has nothing to depend on; without Li, shi has nothing to be rooted in [理無事無依, 事無理無本 liwushiwuyi, shiwuli wuben]. For Li absorbs shi, and shi subsumes Li.” Shanyue, 台宗十類因革論 Taizong shilei yinge lun, juan 2, XZJ 95.907b. Li here depends on shi; it is not merely “manifested by” shi. Li is the root (本 ben) of shi, while shi is the thing depended on ( y i y i yiy i ) by Li. These are basically equivalent terms, implying that the two are strictly mutually dependent, allowing no one-way dependence relationship between them. This is to be recalled when we consider the split between shi as 能依 nengyi (that which depends) and Li as 所依 suoyi in Huayan, below. This restatement of the relation in Tiantai is not mere latter-day gerrymandering; it shows a grasp of the real meaning of Zhiyi’s way of setting up the problem, in spite of the superficial similarity to the later Huayan way of speaking.
23. 事实上,后来的天台山作家,例如柏庭善月(1149-1241)在其出色的《太宗石类音歌论》中,强调以严格的双边术语来重述礼/石关系,这并非偶然。在解释湛然的评论时,他说:“只是因为理的内在蕴涵,才可以有作为事件[shi]的功能”。 “没有势,礼就无依无靠;没有理,势就没有任何根基。因为理吸纳势,势包容理。”山岳,台宗十类因革论,太宗石类因革论,卷2,XZJ 95.907b。这里的“礼”取决于“势”;它不仅仅是“势”的“体现”。理是“势”的本源,“势”是所依附的东西( y i y i yiy i )李.这些基本上是等价的术语,意味着两者严格相互依赖,不允许它们之间存在单向依赖关系。当我们考虑下面《华严经》中的“能依能”(“能依”)和“理”(所依所依)之间的划分时,需要记住这一点。 《天台山》中对这种关系的重述不仅仅是近代的选区划分;尽管表面上与后来华严的说话方式有相似之处,但它显示了对智仪提出问题的方式的真正含义的把握。

24. T33.764b. 24.T33.764b。
25. T46.784c 25.T46.784c
26. For a full account, see Robert Gimello, Chih-Yen and the Foundations of Hua-Yen Buddhism, PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1976.
26. 如需完整说明,请参阅 Robert Gimello,《智严与华严佛教的基础》,博士论文,哥伦比亚大学,1976 年。

27. Peter N, Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 157-65.
27. Peter N,Gregory,Tsung-mi 和佛教的中国化(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,1991),157-65。

28. The text of this work appears at T45.672-683, with Chengguan’s commentary.
28. 这部作品的正文见T45.672-683,附有城关的评论。

29. T45.594a. 29.T45.594a。
30. See Tao Jiang, “The Problematic of Whole-Part and the Horizon of the Enlightened in Huayan Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 28, no. 4 (December 2001): 457 75 , 467 457 75 , 467 457-75,467457-75,467.
30. 参见陶江,《华严宗的整体问题与觉悟境界》,《中国哲学杂志》28年第1期。 4(2001 年 12 月): 457 75 , 467 457 75 , 467 457-75,467457-75,467

31. T45.499a-b. 31.T45.499a-b。
32. T 45.499 b c T 45.499 b c T45.499b-c\mathrm{T} 45.499 \mathrm{~b}-\mathrm{c}.
33. T45.600b-c. 33.T45.600b-c。
34. T46.451c. 34.T46.451c。
35. Compare Kant’s remarks in the Transcendental Aesthetic regarding space: “We present space as an infinite given magnitude. Now it is true that every concept must be thought as a presentation that is contained in an infinite multitude of possible presentations (as their common characteristic) and hence the concept contains these presentations under itself. But no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite multitude of presentations within itself. Yet that is how we think space (for all parts of space, ad infinitum, are simultaneous). Therefore the original presentation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Unified edition (with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions), trans. Wener S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 79. The same point is made concerning time: “Time is not a discursive or, as it is called, universal concept; rather, it is a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time; and the kind of presentation that can be given only through a single object is intuition” (86).
35. 比较康德在《先验美学》中关于空间的评论:“我们将空间呈现为无限的给定大小。现在确实,每个概念都必须被视为包含在无限多种可能的表示(作为它们的共同特征)中的表示,因此该概念在其自身下包含这些表示。但没有一个概念本身可以被认为包含无限多的表现形式。然而,这就是我们思考空间的方式(空间的所有部分,无穷无尽,都是同时发生的)。因此,空间最初的呈现是一种先验的直觉,而不是一个概念。”康德,《纯粹理性批判》,统一版(包含 1781 年和 1787 年版本的所有变体),译。 Wener S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 79. 关于时间也提出了同样的观点:相反,它是一种纯粹的感性直觉。不同的时间只是同一个时间的一部分;而那种只能通过单一物体给出的呈现就是直觉”(86)。

36. T45.503b. 36.T45.503b。
37. T46.707a-b. 37.T46.707a-b。
38. T46.55b. The order is rearranged for clarity.
38.T46.55b。为清楚起见,顺序已重新排列。

39. Liumiaofamen, T46.551c.
39.六庙法门,T46.551c。

40. T45.511b. 40.T45.511b。
41. T45.511c. 41.T45.511c。
42. T35.119a. 42.T35.119a。
43. T45.598c. 43.T45.598c。
44. T45.595b. 44.T45.595b。
45. T46.703c. 45.T46.703c。
46. T34.58a. 46.T34.58a。
47. A. C. Graham, “‘Being’ in Western Philosophy Compared with Shih/fei and y u / w u y u / w u yu//wuy u / w u in Chinese Philosophy,” in Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), 348.
47. AC Graham,“西方哲学中的‘存在’与实/非和 y u / w u y u / w u yu//wuy u / w u 中国哲学博士”,载于《中国哲学与哲学文献研究》(新加坡:东亚哲学研究所,1986),348。

48. T34.247a-b. 48.T34.247a-b。
49. T46.716b-c. 49.T46.716b-c。
50. T46.716c. 50.T46.716c。
51. Fazang used the metaphor in precisely this way, for example, at T45.638bc: “The function is the waves, roiling and jumping, but the entire true substance is what is moving and changing. The substance is mirror-pure clear water, all of it following conditions and gathering it all into quiescence.” Sometimes Fazang, in elaborating the Huayan metaphor of the “Ocean Seal Samadhi,” compares the substance to the water when the waves are gone, and the function to the images that appear on the still surface of the water. See T45.647b. Zhanran, on the other
51. 法藏正是这样使用这个比喻的,例如,在T45.638bc中:“功能是波浪、翻滚和跳跃,但整个真实实体是运动和变化的。其质如镜净水,皆随缘而聚而寂静。”有时,法藏在阐释华严喻“海印三昧”时,将物质比作波浪消散后的水,将其作用比作平静水面上出现的图像。参见 T45.647b。另一边是湛然

hand, states rather emphatically, “There is no water without waves, and no wave that is not wet.”
手,相当强调,“没有没有波浪的水,也没有不湿的波浪。”

52. Chengguan, Dafang guangfo Huayanjing shechao xuantan, ch. 15.
52. 城关,大方广佛华严经社超玄谈,第一章。 15.

53. See Dong Ping, Tiantai zong yanjiu (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 173-75.
53. 参见董平,《天台宗研究》(上海:上海古籍出版社,2002),173-75。

CHAPTER SEVEN. MIND, OMNIPRESENCE, AND COHERENCE IN TIANTAI AND HUAYAN
第七章。天台华严的心性、无所不在和连贯性

  1. On this point see Ōtake Susumu 大竹 晋.「理理相即」と「理理円融」:『花厳止観』論攻 (“Riri sousoku to riri enyuu: kegon shikan ronkou”) (“A Study on the Li-Li concepts in Hua-Yan Buddhism”). Tsukube: 筑波大学哲学 *\cdot思想学会,哲学 *\cdot思想論叢 17 (January 31, 1999): 23-34, for a fascinating overview of later medieval Japanese and Korean recountings of Huayan (Kegon) thought which, doubtless under Japanese Tendai influence, attempt to find some concept of interidentity and interpervasion of multiple Lis in Huayan thought, and the futility of the search for any trace of a doctrine of multiple Lis in Chinese Huayan sources.
    关于这一点,参见大竹晋。「理理相即」と「理理円融」:『花厳止観』论攻(“Riri sousoku to riri enyuu: kegon shikan ronkou”)华严佛教中的礼观念”)。筑部:筑波哲学大学 *\cdot 思想学会,哲学 *\cdot 思想论丛 17(1999 年 1 月 31 日):23-34,对中世纪后期日本和韩国华严思想的叙述进行了精彩的概述,毫无疑问,在日本天台的影响下,试图找到某种相互认同和多重渗透的概念。华严思想中的理,在中国华严源头中寻找多重理的踪迹是徒劳的。
  2. T45.518b-c. T45.518b-c。
  3. Yang Weizhong, Xinxing yu Foxing: Zhongguo Fojiao xinxinglun ji qi xiangguan wenti yanjiu. PhD Dissertation, Nanjing University, Department of Philosophy, 1998, published as Volume 12 of Zhongguo Fojiao xueshu lundian (Gaoxiong: Foguangshan, 2001), 368-69.
    杨伟忠、新兴与佛兴:中国佛教新兴论及其相关问题研究。博士论文,南京大学哲学系,1998,出版《中国佛教学论典》第十二卷(高雄:佛光山,2001),368-69。
  4. Ibid., 370 . 同上,370。
  5. See T32.576a. 参见 T32.576a。
  6. T35.440c. T35.440c。
  7. T44.240c. T44.240c。
  8. T45.627b. T45.627b。
  9. T45.507a. T45.507a。
  10. T45.637b. T45.637b。
  11. T45.485b. T45.485b。
  12. T45.637b. T45.637b。
  13. Tanxuanji, T35.347. 谈玄机,T35.347。
  14. T35.658c. T35.658c。
  15. T35.612b-c. T35.612b-c。
  16. See Peter Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), esp. 162-72 and 224-52.
    参见 Peter Gregory,《宗弥与佛教的中国化》(普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社,1991 年),特别是 1991 年。 162-72 和 224-52。
  17. T46.708c. T46.708c。
  18. T46.710a. T46.710a。
  19. Literally, “with respect to the mind-and-matter “of” mind,” i.e., the mind-and-matter that are this moment of mind.
    从字面上看,“关于心的名色”,即当下心的名色。
  20. Zhanran, Shibuermen (originally excerpted from his Fahuaxuanyi shiqian), T46.703a.
    湛然,十不二门(原摘自其《法华玄义时迁》),T46.703a。
  21. For a good overview of the scope of usages in the broader tradition, see Yang Weizhong, Xinxing yu foxing: Zhongguo fojiao xinxinglun jiqi xiangguan wenti yanjiu (Gaoxiong, Taiwan: Foguangshan wenjiao jijinhui, 2001).
    有关更广泛传统中的用法范围的详细概述,请参阅杨伟中,新兴与发展:中国佛教新兴论及其相关研究研究(台湾高雄:佛光山文教基金会,2001)。
  22. For example, in the discussion of Mind-observation in the 六妙法門 Liumiaofamen, Zhiyi says, “When observing the mind, the practitioner should understand that the xinxing is forever quiescent, and thus all dharmas are also quiescent” (T46.554a). This means “the innermost nature of the mind is quiescent, and so, since all dharmas are nothing but this mind, they are also quiescent.” Note that this is stating not that all dharmas are mind, but that whatever is so of mind is so of all dharmas; that all dharmas are mind had been established in the preceding two steps of the discussion, without reference to the Nature. In fact, the point here is that the mind is non-mind (as stated in the next phrase: “since it is quiescent, there is no thought,” not that dharmas are non-dharmas (i.e., that dharmas are mind).
    例如,《六妙法门六妙法门》论观心时,智一说:“观心者,当知心性常寂,故诸法亦寂”(T46.554a) 。这就是说:“心性本性寂静,故诸法无非是心,故亦寂静”。注意,这里并不是说一切法都是心,而是说心如此,一切法亦是如此。一切诸法皆心,已于前二次讨论中成立,不涉及性。其实,这里的重点是心是无心(如下一句所说:“既然寂静则无念”,而不是说法是非法(即法是心)。
  23. It is noteworthy that this expression seems to be consistently used, rather than the synonymous xingzao, which I have never seen in any Tiantai work. The stylistic or rhetorical reasons for this would be well worth investigating; but it is not difficult to demonstrate that l i l i lil i and xing are doctrinally synonymous in this context, even if it can be shown that each term is consistently used in certain particular contexts and not others.
    值得注意的是,这个表达方式似乎一直被使用,而不是同义的“兴灶”,我在任何天台作品中从未见过。其中的文体或修辞原因非常值得研究。但不难证明 l i l i lil i 和 xing 在这种情况下在理论上是同义的,即使可以证明每个术语在某些特定上下文中一致使用,而不是在其他上下文中使用。
  24. Shanyue (1149-1241), a seventh-generation dharma-descendant of Zhili’s, explains the relations between identity and entailment very effectively: “Any discussion of ‘identity’ [ji] or “entailment” [ju] coming from our [Tiantai] school must illuminate both of them simultaneously before it can be considered to have correctly grasped the meaning. What does this mean? For example, the Mohezhiguan explains that each single moment of experience entails the Three Thousand, but also that the Three Thousand are identical to each single moment of experience and vice versa, so that neither is prior or posterior. This is the greatest example of both identity and entailment. It still must be understood that “identity” must not lack “entailment,” and “entailment” must not lack “identity.” Identity without entailment is not the Integrated identity; entailment without identity is not the Sudden entailment. The Sudden entailment means identity to all dharmas without exception. The Integrated identity means entailment of all dharmas without exception. Even if both entailment and identity are each explained separately, but without showing how they complete one another and make one another possible, this is still something the one-sided teachings are capable of speaking about. Only when entailment and identity are both explained at the same time can it be considered the Integrated explanation. . . . Hence we speak of identity in such a way that identity is always identical to entailment; we speak of entailment in such a way that entailment is always said in reference to identity. It is only because we speak of identity in such a way that identity is always identical to entailment that our claims about the Three Thousand as unchangeable meritorious qualities of the Nature (xingde sanqian) mean not only the inherent entailment of their Natures, but even of the marks arising within temporal events. It is only because we speak of entailment in such a way that entailment is always said in reference to identity that our claims that the Three Thousand as events within temporal practice (xiuzhong sanqian) are identical to the Principle-Nature do not obstruct the fact that all marks remain just as they are . . .” (Shanyue, Taizong shilei yingelun, juan 2, XZJ95.908a-b.) The same reasoning applies to the question of “creation,” which Zhili explains at length in section four of his Shiyishu, entitled, “Refutation of the Shanwai’s failure to distinguish between the
    直隶第七代法裔山岳(1149-1241)非常有效地解释了同一性和蕴涵之间的关系:学校必须同时阐释两者,才算正确掌握了其含义。这意味着什么?例如,《鞑靼之观》解释说,每一刹那的经验都包含着三千,但三千与每一刹那的经验是相同的,反之亦然,因此既不是先验的,也不是后验的。这是身份和蕴含的最好例子。还须明白,“同一性”不能缺少“蕴涵”,“蕴涵”不能缺少“同一性”。没有蕴涵的身份不是综合身份;没有同一性的蕴涵不是突然蕴含。顿蕴即是一切法无一例外的同一性。一体性意味着一切法的包容,无一例外。即使蕴涵和同一性都被分别解释,但没有表明它们如何相互补充和使彼此成为可能,这仍然是片面的教义可以谈论的事情。只有当蕴涵和同一性同时被解释时,才能被认为是综合解释。 。 。 。因此,我们以这样的方式谈论同一性:同一性总是与蕴涵相同。我们以这样的方式谈论蕴涵,即蕴涵总是针对同一性而被提及。 正是因为我们以这样一种方式来谈论同一性,即同一性总是与蕴涵相同,所以我们所说的三千是不变的性德三千功德,不仅意味着其本质的固有蕴涵,而且还意味着其本质的内在蕴涵。时间事件中出现的标记。只是因为我们以这样的方式谈论蕴涵,即蕴涵总是就同一性而言,我们声称三千作为时间实践中的事件(修中三千)与理性相同,并不妨碍以下事实:所有标记均保持原样。 。 ”。 (山岳,太宗石垒英格伦,卷2,XZJ95.908a-b。)同样的推理也适用于“创造”的问题,直隶在他的《拾遗书》第四节中对此进行了详细的解释,题为“驳山外不分

    creation in terms of event and creation in terms of principle [bubian shili erzao].” There, he states: “In terms of creation in the as a function of temporal events, we select out the aggregate of ignorant consciousness as the creator and the ten realms, both sentient beings and their environments, as the created. In terms of creation as a function of principle, creation is identical to inherent entailment. Since each dharma, created or creating, is identical to principle, each one, just as it is, inherently entails all the Three Thousand as meritorious properties of the Nature” (T46.841a).
    按事件创造,按理创造。”他在那里说:“就作为时间事件的功能的创造而言,我们选择无明意识的聚合作为创造者,并选择十界,包括有情众生及其环境作为被创造者。就创造作为原则的功能而言,创造与内在蕴含是相同的。由于每一种法,无论创造或创造,都与原理相同,所以每一法,如其本来面目,本质上都包含了所有三千作为性质的功德”(T46.841a)。
  25. Simingshiyishu, T46.832b.
    四命十易术,T46.832b。
  26. “Q: The Five Aggregates are all the objects of contemplation; is the subject doing the contemplating then something outside of mind and body? A: In the Inconceivable Object and Wisdom, precisely the contemplated aggregates are themselves the subject doing the contemplating. But a distinction can also be made. The non-good and neutral aggregates are the object, while the good five aggregates are the subject doing the contemplating. When this contemplation reaches purity and maturity, there are seen to be no non-good or neutral aggregates (outside the contemplating ‘good’ aggregates); there are only the good aggregates. The good aggregates become the upayic aggregates, which become the flawless [no-outflows] aggregates, which become the Dharma-nature aggregates, which are called the unequalled unsurpassed aggregates. In this sense, can it not also be said that there is thus a contemplator outside the [original, ordinary] aggregates?” (T46.51b). Here we have a nutshell version, in Zhiyi’s plainer style, of what Zhili argues for so insistently. Initially, there is a distinction between the relatively good aggregates-i.e., Buddhist practices and cognitions, the deliberate endeavor of the contemplation and its concomitant doctrines-which view the deluded mind and body as its objects. Ultimately, both of these are deluded, but in relative terms, the viewer is “good” and the viewed is the “not-good.” The object viewed is the aggregates running their natural deluded karmic course, uninformed by Buddhist practices. The contemplation succeeds when these deluded aggregates are seen to be empty, provisionally posited, and central; that is to say, as ambiguous, locally coherent, and expressible as all other entities. Since the contemplating “good aggregates” have seen these deluded aggregates as lacking any definitive and separable self, the former see the latter also to be expressing itself as the former themselves, as the “good” aggregates, so that “there is no longer any non-good or neutral aggregate”-not because these contents have been eliminated, but because these selfsame elements, unchanged, have been absorbed into aspects of the contemplating “good” mind. Both viewer and viewed are seen to be the whole, and both are thereby sublated. When this occurs, there is a qualitative change, such that ultimately this subject that is also object, or object which is also subject, can no longer be simply identified with the pre-contemplation aggregates, which by definition were either exclusively subject or exclusively object. This is what Zhili means by “manifesting the Three Thousand Natures within the aggregate mind.”
    问:五蕴皆是观处;主体是否在进行冥想,是在心灵和身体之外的事物吗?答:在不可思议的目标与般若中,所观照的五蕴本身就是进行观照的主体。但也可以做出区分。不善与中性五蕴是所观的对象,而善五蕴则是修习的主体。当这种观照达到清净和成熟时,就看不到不善或中性的五蕴(在观照的“善”五蕴之外);只有好的聚合。善五蕴成为无漏五蕴,成为无瑕五蕴,成为法性五蕴,称为无等无上五蕴。从这个意义上来说,是不是也可以说,在五蕴之外还有一个思惟者呢?” (T46.51b)。在这里,我们有一个简明的版本,以志毅更朴素的风格,表达了志立如此坚持的主张。最初,相对好的五蕴(即佛教的修行和认知、思惟的刻意努力及其伴随的教义)之间是有区别的,它们将迷惑的身心视为其对象。归根结底,这两者都是迷惑的,但相对而言,观者是“善”,被观者是“恶”。所观察的对象是五蕴,它们运行着自然的迷惑业力过程,不了解佛教的修行。当这些迷惑五蕴被视为空性、暂时性和中心性时,思惟就成功了。也就是说,与所有其他实体一样模糊、局部一致且可表达。 由于观照“善五蕴”的人看到这些迷惑五蕴缺乏任何明确的、可分的自我,因此前者看到后者也表达为前者本身,即“善”五蕴,因此“不再有任何五蕴”。不善或中性蕴”——不是因为这些内容已被消除,而是因为这些相同的元素没有改变,已被吸收到思惟“善”心的各个方面。观看者和被观看者都被视为整体,因此两者都被扬弃了。当这种情况发生时,就会发生质的变化,最终,这个主体既是客体,又是客体,不能再简单地与前思惟五蕴等同起来,而根据定义,前五蕴要么是排他性的主体,要么排他性的客体。 。这就是智理所说的“蕴藏三千性”。”
  27. Shibuermenzhiyaochao, T46.709c.
    十不二门之要朝,T46.709c。
  28. The first of these is well known, but the second is less commonly noticed as a further aspect of distinctively Tiantai meditation, and for good reason; it is certainly not named as a separate category of practice in Zhiyi’s writings. But that in contrast these two procedures are conceived as distinct by Zhanran, and that this
    其中第一个是众所周知的,但第二个作为独特的天台禅修的另一个方面却很少被注意到,并且有充分的理由;在志毅的著作中,它当然没有被命名为一个单独的实践类别。但相比之下,展然认为这两个程序是截然不同的,而且这

    distinction is considered of great importance, is demonstrated quite clearly in a passage of his Zhiguanfuxingzhuanhongiue: " Q : Since one [moment of] mind inherently entails [all dharmas], one need only observe the mind [觀心 guanxin]. What need is there to observe inherence [觀具 guanju]? A: The method of meditation adopted in our [Tiantai] school is forever different from that of all other theories. Its covering and integration of all the ten direction and the three times, of ordinary and the sagely, of all causes and all effects is truly only because of inherence-observation [guanju]. Inherence is precisely Provisional Positing, and Provisional Positing is precisely Emptiness and Centrality. Although the Nature of Principle inherently entails all, if one does not observe it but speaks only of observing mind, this will fail to fully accord with the principle. Do not even the Hinayanists observe the mind? It is just that they confusedly fail to realize that this one mind inherently entails all dharmas" (T46.289c). Inherence-observation is thus clearly, for Zhanran, a further step beyond mere mind-observation, and Zhili exploits this point, not unconvincingly, to support his claim that we must read xin xing as suggesting two separate referents.
    其区别被认为是非常重要的,在他的《知观符行传弘法》中的一段话中就清楚地表明了这一点:“问:既然一心本来就包含着一切法,那么只需观察心即可。何须?答:我们天台宗的禅修方法,与一切法门的禅修方法,始终不同,它涵盖十方三时、凡夫俗世的一切法门。诸因诸果之圣,实是因观而性,即是暂置,暂置即是空性,虽理性自具一切,若不观察。只言观心,不完全符合理,难道连小乘也不能观心吗?只是迷惑不解,一心本具一切法而已。”(T46.289c) 。因此,对于湛然来说,固有观察显然比单纯的心观察更进一步,而直隶利用这一点,并非没有说服力地支持他的主张,即我们必须将心性解读为暗示两个单独的指涉对象。
  29. T9.465c-466a. The “new translation” of the same passage, in the 80 juan version of the sutra, on which Fazang himself worked, reads as follows: “It is like a skilled painter, spreading out various colors, and then deludedly taking them to be different objects [in the painting]. The elements [of which the colors are composed] have no differences. The elements have no colors in them, nor do the colors have elements in them, but neither are there any colors obtainable apart from the elements. The mind has no colors or paintings in it, nor do the colors and paintings have the mind in them, but neither are there any colors or paintings obtainable apart from the mind. That mind is eternally non-dwelling, infinite in measure, difficult to understand. It manifests all colors, none of which are aware of one another. Just as the skilled painter is unable to know his own mind and yet paints because of his mind, so it is with the nature of all dharmas. The mind is a skilled painter, able to paint various worlds. All the five aggregates are generated from it. There is no dharma it does not create. As it is with the mind, so it is with the Buddha. As it is with the Buddha, so it is with all sentient beings. You should know that the Substance and Nature of the Buddha and the Mind are all infinite. If a man knows the activities of the mind, and how it creates all worlds, this man sees the Buddha, comprehends the true nature of the Buddha.” The italicized passage reflects the Huayan understand later expressed by Chengguan. The specification that it is “the Substance and Nature” that is infinite, and the exclusion of “sentient beings” (which would include delusion) are to be noted here, as they accord precisely with Chengguan’s later remarks.
    T9.465c-466a。法藏自己撰写的八十卷经本中,同一段经文的“新译”如下:“如巧匠,涂诸诸色,妄以为不同。” [画中]的物体。 [组成颜色的]元素没有区别。元素中没有颜色,颜色中也没有元素,但除了元素之外,也没有任何颜色可以获得。心里面没有颜色或绘画,颜色和绘画也没有心在里面,但是除了心之外,也没有任何颜色或绘画可以得到。那心是永远无住的、无限的、难以理解的。它显现出所有的颜色,而其中的任何一种颜色都彼此不认识。正如善巧的画家,不能了知自己的心,而因心而作画,一切法的本质也是如此。心灵是一位熟练的画家,能够描绘出不同的世界。所有五蕴皆由它生起。没有什么法不是它所创造的。心如此,佛亦如此。佛如此,一切众生亦如此。当知佛心体性皆无量无边。如果一个人知道心的活动,以及它如何创造一切世界,这个人就见到佛,了解佛的真实本质。”斜体字反映了城管后来所表达的华严理解。这里要注意的是,“体性”是无边的,而排除“众生”(包括无明),这与城观后来的言论正好相符。
  30. T9.19b-c. T9.19b-c。
  31. “The Bodhisattva, when he practices, [moves from] not-yet-raising his foot to being about-to-raise his foot, from not-yet-generating a thought to being about-to-generate a thought. He first contemplates this mind, which has not yet had a thought and which is about to have a thought. When a thought has not yet arisen, there are no mental conceptions, no mind, no concomitants of mind. This is called the mind-nature. This mind-nature is neither generated nor destroyed, is neither illuminated nor benighted, neither empty nor provisionally posited, neither cut-off nor eternal. It has no marks or appearance, nothing which can be attained,
    菩萨修行时,从未起脚到将起脚,从未起念到将起念。他先观此心,尚未有念头,即将有念头。当念头尚未生起时,没有名法、没有心、没有心的伴随。这称为心性。此心性,不生不灭,不明不暗,不空不时,不断不常。它无相、无相、无所得,

    and so it is called the mind-nature. It is also called the pure mind of the self-nature.” Suiziyi sanmei, XZJ98.689a.
    故名心性。亦名自性清净心。”随子一三妹,XZJ98.689a。
  32. T9.392c-393a. T9.392c-393a。
  33. Zhanran makes this point eminently clear: “Q: Of the four phases of the [experience of any of the] Ten Realms [not-yet-arisen, about-to-arise, arisen, already-gone], the arisen has marks that are easy to know. But how can the not-yet-arisen and the already-gone be contemplated? A: Although the already-gone and the not-yet-arisen do not refer exclusively and precisely to one single mental state, they necessarily take shape within the arisen state of mind. Thus, one comes to know which realm the arisen state of mind belongs to; looking to what preceded it from within this perspective, we have what in this context takes the role of the already-gone, and looking ahead, we have the not-yet-arisen. Thus the already-gone and the not-yet-arisen can be contemplated from within the perspective of the about-to-arise and the arisen” (T45.452b-c).
    湛然将这一点说得非常清楚:“问:十界的四种阶段中,已生者有相:很容易知道。但如何思惟未生和已灭呢?答:虽然已去和未生并不专指单一的心境,但它们必然是在生起的心境中形成的。这样,我们就知道生起的心属于哪一境界;从这个角度来看之前发生的事情,我们看到的是在这种情况下扮演已经消失的角色的东西,而展望未来,我们看到的是尚未出现的东西。因此,可以从即将生起和已生起的角度来思考已去和未生”(T45.452b-c)。
  34. T46.54a. T46.54a。
  35. T46.55a. T46.55a。
  36. T33.685c, 741 b . T33.685c、741b。
  37. T46.715b. T46.715b。
  38. T46.452a. T46.452a。
  39. Ibid. 同上。
  40. T17.908a. T17.908a。
  41. T46.836a. T46.836a。
  42. T33.696b-697c. T33.696b-697c。
  43. T46.836a. Note that “the Three Thousand” means not only a single univocal set of facts, but all views and opinions, all “misconceptions,” all perspectives on the world. See the explanation of the “three worlds” 三世間 from the Dazhidulun that go into this equation: we have both “sentient beings” and “the five aggregates,” counted twice: once as “real” (實) and once as provisional (假): both the “true” mereological reductionist view of sentient beings as the five aggregates and the “false” conventional view of them as sentient beings are counted among the Three Thousand that must be inherently entailed in each moment of experience.
    T46.836a。请注意,“三千”不仅意味着一组明确的事实,还意味着所有观点和意见,所有“误解”,所有对世界的看法。参见《大智独论》中对“三世间”的解释,进入这个等式:我们既有“众生”,也有“五蕴”,算两次:一次是“实”,一次是暂(暂)。假):将众生视为五蕴的“真实”分体还原论观点和将众生视为五蕴的“错误”传统观点都被算作三千,而这必须内在地蕴含在每个体验时刻中。
  44. Zhanran, Zhiguan dayi, T46.460b.
    展然,直观大义,T46.460b。
  45. Zhili, Sibuermenzhiyaochao, T46.713a.
    织里,四布尔门之要朝,T46.713a。
  46. T46.710a. T46.710a。
  47. T46.293a. T46.293a。
  48. T46.835b. T46.835b。
  49. T46.710b
  50. For a more detailed analysis of the conception of mind-creation here, see my “Mind and its ‘Creation’ of all Phenomena in Tiantai Buddhism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37. no. 2 (June 2010): 156-80.
    对于这里的心造概念的更详细的分析,请参阅我的“天台佛教中所有现象的心及其‘创造’”,中国哲学杂志第37期。 2(2010 年 6 月):156-80。
  51. T46.452c. T46.452c。
  52. T46.712c. T46.712c。
  53. Siming Zhili, Sibuermen zhiyaochao, T46.708b.
    四明治历,四布尔门治药潮,T46.708b。
  54. Ibid., T46.708b-c. 同上,T46.708b-c。
  55. In Tiantai, the Buddha-nature is described as threefold, corresponding to the Three Truths. The Buddha-nature as conditioning cause of Buddhahood is
    天台宗把佛性描述为三重,对应三谛。佛性是成佛的因缘

    the practices and conditions that make possible the mental state of wisdom and realization (including meditation, morality, etc., and all the other conditions which make these possible). The Buddha-nature as illuminating cause is this mental state of wisdom which realizes the truth. The Buddha-nature as cause Proper is this truth itself which is realized, the truth about all things which is thus present in them from the beginning, and hence can be construed as a “mere potential” waiting to be realized. It is the Buddha-nature as conditions and illuminating that do the realizing, and the Buddha-nature as cause proper which is realized. A further twist is that, since these three are related as the Three Truths are related to each other, the content of the cause proper is nothing but the interchangeability of the first two, i.e., the fact that the illuminating is precisely the conditioning cause, that practices and conditions on the one hand and the awareness that results from them are identical-as-contrasted. In this passage from Zhanran, the threefold Buddha-nature is seen both in terms of principle and in terms of phenomena, and in both cases all three are seen to be operative.
    使智慧和证悟的精神状态成为可能的修行和条件(包括冥想、道德等,以及使这些成为可能的所有其他条件)。佛性明因,就是证悟真理的智慧心境。佛性作为真正的因,就是这个被证悟的真理本身,所有事物的真理从一开始就存在于它们之中,因此可以被解释为等待被证悟的“纯粹潜力”。是佛性为因、佛性为因、佛性为因而证悟。进一步的转折是,由于这三者之间的关系正如三圣谛彼此之间的关系一样,因此,因本身的内容只不过是前两者的互换性,即“照”恰恰是“缘”因,一方面,实践和条件以及由此产生的意识是相同的对比。在湛然的这段经文中,三重佛性既从原理上又从现象上被看到,而且在这两种情况下,三者都被看到是起作用的。
  56. Ibid., T46.709c-710a. 同上,T46.709c-710a。
  57. But this same dharma-as-principle has a determinate relationship to this particular dharma-as-Li, which is simply a way of restating the interchangeability of determinacy and indeterminacy entailed by the Three Truths.
    但同样的法理与特定的法理有着确定的关系,这只是重申三谛所蕴含的决定性与非决定性可互换性的一种方式。
  58. T46.575a. T46.575a。
  59. T46.783b. T46.783b。
  60. "問:「既以迷中實相為一性,對三千為別,正當以理為總,何苦破他?」 答:「以三千法同一性故,隨緣為萬法時,趣舉一法總攝一切也。眾生無始全體在迷,若唯論真性為總,何能事事具攝諸法?而專舉一念者,別從近要立觀慧之境也。若示一念總攝諸法,則顯諸法同一真性。故《釋籤》云,俗即百界千如,真則同居一念。須知同一性故,方能同居一念,故以同居一念用顯同一真性,非謂便將一念名為真諦,豈同居一塵非真諦邪?今文以一性為總,前後文以一念為總,蓋理事相顯也。此之二句,正出攝別入總之所以也,由一性無性立理事三千故,故兩重三千同居一念也,豈同他釋直以一念名真性邪? T46.710a-b.
    问:「既以迷中实相为一性,对三千为别,正当以理为总,何苦破他?」答:「三以千法同一性故,随缘为万法时,趣举一法总摄一切也。众生无始全体着迷,若唯论真性为总,何能事事具摄诸法?而专举一念者,别从近要立观慧之境也。若示一念总摄诸法,则显诸法同一真性。故《释签》云,俗即百界千如,真则同居一念。须知同性故,方能同居一念,故同居一念与显同一真性,非谓则将一念名真谛,岂同居一尘非真谛邪?今文以一性为总,颠倒文以一念为总,盖掌相显也。此二句,正出摄别入总同期也,由一性无性立领袖三千故,故两重三千同居一念也,岂同他释直以一念名真性邪T46.710a-b。
  61. This is why the reversibility of subject and object is so crucial to the Tiantai conception of Li, and why object must also understood to observe subject. Zhanran in his Zhiguanyili makes this point as quite emphatically: “Q: [Zhiyi’s] Fahuaxuanyi says that the object is able to contemplate the subject. Although many scriptures are quoted to prove it, this Li is hard to understand. A : If we follow the merely upayic teachings, this Li is incomprehensible. But from the point of view of the ultimate teaching, the principle/coherence is quite easy to integrate. We take mind itself as the object, while mind is also the subject that is doing the contemplating. Thus subject and object are both mind, and the essence of mind pervades everywhere. Each state of mind reflects on another state of mind-the Li is here is quite clear. Thus at the beginning of the section on the Inconceivable Object it says, ‘The inconceivable object is itself precisely the subject doing the contemplating.’ From this we can derive four different but equally accurate descriptions: the object is aware of [lit. illuminates, shines on] the object, the object is aware of the subject, the subject is aware of the object, the subject is aware of the subject. . . . Thus it is different from what people of the world normally think of, namely, an inert object
    这就是为什么主体和客体的可逆性对于理的天台观如此重要,并且为什么也必须理解客体才能观察主体。湛然在《知观意理》中十分强调这一点:“问:(知一)法华玄义说客体能观主体。虽然引用许多经文来证明这一点,但这个李却很难理解。答:如果我们仅仅遵循付费教义,这个理是不可理解的。但从最终教学的角度来看,原则/连贯性是很容易整合的。我们以心本身为对象,而心也是进行观照的主体。因此,主体和客体都是心,心的本质遍及各处。每一种心境都反映着另一种心境——李在这里是很清楚的。因此,在关于不可思议的对象的章节的开头,它说:“不可思议的对象本身正是进行沉思的主体。”由此我们可以得出四种不同但同样准确的描述:物体意识到[lit。照亮、照耀]客体,客体意识到主体,主体意识到客体,主体意识到主体。 。 。 。因此它与世人通常认为的惰性物体不同。

    as that which we are aware of, and also differs from the idea of a partial, small mind as the subject that contemplates. Nor is it the same as the idea of artificially setting up Suchness as the object of contemplation. These differences applying to the object also apply to the subject-let there be no confusion on this” (T46.452b). Zhili gives a more expansive account of the implications of this idea: “Thus we can say that all the sentient beings and all the Buddhas of the past, present and future, throughout the ten directions of space, and also their constituent environments, are the object being contemplating, and also that all the sentient beings and all the Buddhas of the past, present and future, throughout the ten directions of space, and also their corresponding environments, are the viewing wisdom as subject doing the contemplating [neng guan zhi]. The object and the viewing wisdom are two names for the same entity. Thus subject and object are two and not two . . . [So we can say equally that] the object perceives the object, or that the object perceives the viewing wisdom, or that the wisdom perceives the wisdom, or that the wisdom perceives the object.” 是故得云三世十方生佛依正為所觀境。三世一方生佛依正為能觀智。境智名別其體不殊。是故能所二而不二。境照於境。境照於智。智照於智。智照於境(T39.145c). This is also the key insight underlying Zhanran’s claim that “insentient beings also have the Buddha-nature” (無情有性 wuqing youxing) as expounded in the Jingangpi 金剛錍.
    正如我们所意识到的那样,也不同于作为沉思主体的片面的、狭隘的心灵的观念。它也不同于人为地将真如设置为冥想对象的想法。这些适用于客体的差异也适用于主体——这一点不要混淆”(T46.452b)。智力对这个概念的含义作了更广泛的解释:“因此我们可以说,过去、现在、未来的一切众生和诸佛,遍及十方虚空及其所构成的环境,都是亦彼虚空十方及其相应环境,一切众生、过去、现在、未来一切诸佛,皆为观智为观智。 。所缘和观智是同一实体的两个名称。因此,主体和客体是两个而不是两个。 。 。 [所以我们可以说]物体感知物体,或者物体感知观察智慧,或者智慧感知智慧,或者智慧感知物体。” 是故得云三世十方生佛依正为所观境。三世一方生佛依正为能观智。境智名别其体不殊。是故能所所二而非二。境照于境。境照于智。智照于智。智照于境(T39.145c)。这也是《金刚錍》中所阐述的湛然“无情有性”的关键见解。
  62. T46.710a-b, 712 c . T46.710a-b、712c。
  63. T46.868b. T46.868b。
  64. Hence Zhili says, “The Real-attribute is the Li of the Middle Way [i.e., the Center]. The entirety of this Li of the Middle and the Real is the active wisdom that is doing the contemplating, the contemplating wisdom, and this is what is called the Wisdom of the Real-attribute. The Real-attribute itself is the wisdom; it is not that there is some other wisdom that is given this name because of the object that it reflects upon.” 實相者。中道理也。全中實理為能觀慧。名實相慧。實相即慧也。非別有慧。從其所照得實相名. T39.125a.
    故直隶曰:“实属性者,中道之理也。”这个中实在理的整体,就是观照的能动智慧,观照的智慧,这就是所谓的实属性智慧。真实属性本身就是智慧;并不是因为有其他智慧所反映的对象而被赋予这个名称。” 实相者。中道理也。全中实理为能观慧。名实相慧。实相即慧也。非别有慧。从其所照得实相名。 T39.125a。
  65. T46.1c. T46.1c。

CONCLUSION 结论

  1. For a comprehensive discussion of this doctrine in Tiantai, see my Evil and/or/as the Good: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
    有关天台宗这一教义的全面讨论,请参阅我的《天台佛教思想中的邪恶和/或/作为善:天台佛教思想中的全中心主义、主体间性和价值悖论》(剑桥:哈佛大学出版社,2000)。

EPILOGUE 结语

  1. Wang Xiaoyu, ed., Erchengji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju), 424.
    王晓雨主编,《二成记》(北京:中华书局),424。
  2. 學者須先識仁。仁者,,渾然與物同體,義、禮、智、信皆仁也。識得此理,以誠敬存之而已,不須防檢,不須窮索。若心懈,則有防;心苟不解,何防之有!理有未得,故須窮索;存久自明,安待窮索!此道與物無對,「大」不足以明之。天地之用,皆我之用。孟子言「萬物皆備于我」,須「反身而誠」,乃為大樂。若反身未誠,則猶是二物有對,以己合彼,終未有之,又安得樂!。。。See Wang Xiaoyu, ed., Er Cheng ji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991), 16-17.
    学者须先识仁。仁者,,浑然与物同体,义、礼、智、信皆仁也。识得此理,以诚敬存之而已,不须防检,不须穷索。若心苍白,则有防;心苟不解,何防之有!理有未得,故须穷索;存久自明,安待穷索!此道与物无对,「大」礼仪明之。天地之用孟子言「万物皆备于我」,须「反身而诚」,乃为大乐。若反身未诚,则犹是二物有对,以己合彼,终未有之,又安得乐!。。。参见王晓雨主编,《二程集》(北京:中华书局,1991),16-17。
  3. Wang Xiaoyu, ed., Er Cheng ji (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1991), 10.
    王晓雨主编,《二程集》(北京:中华书局,1991),10。
  4. 事有善有恶皆天理也。天理中物須有善惡。蓋物之不齊,物之情也。但當察之,不可自入于惡,流于一物。 Ibid., 17 .
    事有善有恶皆天理也。天理中物须有善恶。盖物之不齐,物之情也。但当察之,不可自入于恶,流于一物。同上,十七。
  5. Chung-ying Cheng, “Categories of Creativity in Whitehead and Neo-Confucianism,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6 (1979): 262.
    程中英,“怀特海与理学的创造力范畴”,《中国哲学杂志》6(1979):262。
  6. Zhuzi yulei, compiled by Li Jingde, in Eight Volumes (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, third edition, 1973), Vol. 1, 175-76.
    《竹子育类》,李敬德编,八卷(台北:正中书局,第三版,1973年),卷11。 1、175-76。
  7. Ibid., 168 . 同上,168。
  8. Ibid., 177 78 177 78 177-78177-78. 同上, 177 78 177 78 177-78177-78
  9. Ibid., 90 (ibid., 179). In another place, Zhu expands on this thought as follows: “Man’s ability to speak and move and think and act is all qi, but Li exists within it. When these develop into filiality, brotherliness, loyalty, good-faith, benevolence (ren), rightness, ritual and wisdom, this is all Li. . . . Human beings obtain a qi which is balanced and unobstructed, while other things obtain a qi which is one-sided and clogged. Because only man has balanced [qi], this Li penetrates it without being clogged. Because other things have one-sided [qi], this Li is obstructed and they have no knowledge [of it]” (ibid., 105-106). Compare also ibid., 90: “In the case of human nature, we speak of darkness and brightness; in the case of the natures of other creatures, there is only one-sidedness and obstruction. Darkness can be made bright, but what is already one-sidedly obstructed cannot be made open and unobstructed.”
    同上,90(同上,179)。在另一处,朱对此思想进行了如下扩展:“人的说话、行动、思考和行动的能力都是气,而理存在于其中。发展到孝、悌、忠、信、仁、义、礼、智,这就是礼。 。 。 。人所得到的气是平衡、通畅的,而其他事物所得到的气是片面、堵塞的。因为只有人才能平衡气,所以这个理可以渗透进去而不被堵塞。因诸物有片面,此礼有碍而无知”(同上,105-106)。也比较同上,90:“就人性而言,我们谈论黑暗和光明;就人性而言,我们谈论黑暗和光明;就人性而言,我们谈论黑暗和光明。”对于其他生物的本性来说,只有片面性和障碍性。黑暗可以变得光明,但已经单方面阻碍的东西就无法变得畅通无阻了。”
  10. Ibid., 98. 梏槁之物,亦有性,,是如何?曰:"是他合下有此理,故云天下無性外之物。"因行街,云:"階磚便有磚之理。"因坐,云:“竹椅便有竹椅之理。枯槁之物,謂之無生意,則可;謂之無生理,則不可。如朽木無所用,止可付之覺灶,是無生意矣。然燒甚麼木,則是甚麼氣,亦各不同,這是理元如此。”「問:理是人物同得於天者。如物之無情者,
    同上,98.梏槁之物,亦有性,,是如何?曰:“是他合下有此理,故云天下无性外之物。”因行街,云:“阶砖便有砖之理。”因坐,云:“竹椅便有竹椅之理。枯槁之物,谓之无业务,则可;谓之无生理,则不可。如朽木无所用,止可付之觉灶,是无生意矣。然烧什么木,则是什么气,亦各不同,这是理元如此。” 「问:理是人物同得于天者。如物之无情者,
  11. Ibid. 「問:理是人物同得於天者。如物之無情者,亦有理否?曰:固是有理,如舟只可行之於水,車只可行之於陸。」。朱子語類》卷第四,性理一》(台北:文津,1986 年12月),頁61.
    同上。 「问:理是同得于天者。如物之无情者,亦有理否?曰:固是有理,如舟只适用于水,车只适用于陆。」。朱子语类》卷第四,性理一》(台北:文津,1986年12月),页61.
  12. Ibid., Vol. 8, 4476-77. 蓋天理在人,恆萬古而不泯;任其如何蔽錮,而天理常自若,無時不自私意中發出,但人不自覺。正如明珠大貝,混雜沙㸴中,零零星星逐時出來。但只於這箇道理發見處,當下認取,簇合零星,漸成片段。到得自家好底意思日長月益,則天理自然純固;向之所謂私欲者,自然消靡退散,久之不復萌動矣(朱子語類卷第一百一十七)。
    同上,卷。 8、4476-77。 盖天理在人,恒万古而不杂泯;任其如何染困,而天理常自若,无时不自私意中发出出来,但人不自觉。 正如明珠大贝,混沙㸴中,零零星逐时。但只于这箇道理发见处,当下认取,簇合零星,渐成碎片。到自家好底意日长月益,则天理自然纯固;向之所谓私欲者,消自然靡退散,久之不复萌动矣(朱子语类卷第一百十七)。
  13. Ibid., Vol. 1, 159. 同上,卷。 1、159。
  14. Ibid., 161. 同上,161。
  15. Ibid., 195. 同上,195。
  16. Ibid., 169 70 169 70 169-70169-70. 同上, 169 70 169 70 169-70169-70
  17. Ibid., 194 . 同上,194。
  18. Ibid., 195. 同上,195。
  19. See Antonio Cua, “On the Ethical Significance of the Ti-Yong Distinction,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29, no. 2 (June 2002): 163-70) for some useful reflections on the functions of this kind of t i t i tit i and yong flexibility and context-dependence in Neo-Confucian moral reflection. See also Charles Muller, “Essence-Function and Interpenetration: Early Chinese Origins and Manifestations,” Toyogakuen
    参见Antonio Cua,“论体用区别的伦理意义”,《中国哲学杂志》29,第11期。 2(2002 年 6 月):163-70)对此类功能的一些有用的思考 t i t i tit i 新儒家道德反思的灵活性和情境依赖性。另见查尔斯·穆勒 (Charles Muller),《本质功能与相互渗透:早期中国起源与表现》,Toyogakuen
XXX, no. 7 (1999), and “Tiyong and Interpenetration in the Analects of Confucius: The Sacred as Secular,” Toyogakuen XXX, no. 8 (2000).
XXX,没有。 7 (1999),以及《论语的体用与渗透:圣俗》,丰学园 XXX,第 7 期。 8(2000)。

20. 理者氣之條理,氣者理之運用。無條理則不能運用,無運用則亦無以見其所謂條理者矣. Wang Yangming, Chuanxilu (Taipei: Junshi shicuishe, 1985), juan 2, 81-82.
20. 理者气之条理,气者理之运用。无条理则不能运用,无运用则亦无以见其所谓条理者矣。王阳明,《川溪录》(台北:军师食萃社,1985),卷2,81-82。

21. Ibid., juan 3, 137.
21. 同上,137 年 1 月 3 日。

22. Zhuzi yulei, op. cit., Volume 1, 4.
22. 朱子玉垒,同前。引文,第 1 卷、第 4 卷。

23. Ibid., 4 5 4 5 4-54-5. 23.同上, 4 5 4 5 4-54-5
24. T46.868b. 24.T46.868b。
25. Ibid., 91 92 91 92 91-9291-92. 25.同上, 91 92 91 92 91-9291-92
26. Ibid. 26.同上。

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INDEX 指数

Absolute, 13 绝对,13
absoluteness, 232, 233 绝对性, 232, 233
activity vs. passivity, 25
主动与被动,25

acupuncture meridians, model of, 45 , 318 , 339 43 318 , 339 43 318,339-43318,339-43
针灸经络模型, 45 , 318 , 339 43 318 , 339 43 318,339-43318,339-43

aesthetic vs. logical order, 15
审美与逻辑顺序,15

ambiguity, 232, 233. See also ontological ambiguity
歧义, 232, 233.另见本体论歧义

Ames, Roger 艾姆斯,罗杰
focus/field and, 40-44, 315
焦点/场和, 40-44, 315

Li and, 27, 40 李和, 27, 40
nominalism and, 27 唯名论,27
on organism, 31 关于有机体,31
antitranscendentalism, 31, 236
反超验主义, 31, 236

appearance vs. reality, 135 , 144 , 304 135 , 144 , 304 135,144,304135,144,304
外表与现实, 135 , 144 , 304 135 , 144 , 304 135,144,304135,144,304

in Huayan and Tiantai, 189, 220-30, 281, 304
华严、天台、189、220-30、281、304

Li and, 304, 305 李和, 304, 305
arising-and-perishing, 337
生灭,337

Aristotle, 11-12, 143 亚里士多德,11-12, 143
arrived/arrival. See perfection
到达/到达。看到完美

Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana, 221, 222, 236, 237, 254, 265, 278
大乘信心的觉醒 221, 222, 236, 237, 254, 265, 278

Awareness. See zhi 意识。见芝
“bad,” 8 “不好”8
“Baixin,” 108, 118, 122 《百信》108、118、122
balance, 15-17, 62-63, 116, 132. See
平衡,15-17、62-63、116、132。参见

also coherence; shu 还有连贯性;蜀
centrality and, 86, 116, 211, 331. See also centrality
中心性和, 86, 116, 211, 331。另见中心性

Li and, 117, 122, 155
李和, 117, 122, 155

Yin-Yang model and, 332 阴阳模型和,332
balances, shifting, 76 平衡、转移、76
Behuniak, James, Jr., 188, 223
小詹姆斯·贝胡尼亚克,188, 223

being, 34-36. See also Non-Being
是,34-36。另见非存在

benevolence. See also ren
仁。另见任

coherence and, 339 第339章
Dao and, 64, 67, 330
道和, 64, 67, 330

Guo Xiang on, 175-76 郭翔上,175-76
Li, 52, 59, 336, 338, 339
李, 52, 59, 336, 338, 339

meanings and nature of, 326,327
的含义和性质,326,327

music and, 63 音乐和,63
rightness and, 67, 175-76, 326, 333 35 333 35 333-35333-35
正确性和, 67, 175-76, 326, 333 35 333 35 333-35333-35

virtues and, 327, 332 美德和, 327, 332
virtuosity and, 73 精湛技艺,73
and the way, 65 和方式,65
wisdom and, 65 , 327 , 333 65 , 327 , 333 65,327,33365,327,333 智慧和, 65 , 327 , 333 65 , 327 , 333 65,327,33365,327,333
Xunzi on, 52, 59 荀子论, 52, 59
Yin-Yang and, 333 阴阳和,333
Zhu Xi and, 326-28, 330, 332-36, 338, 339
朱熹和, 326-28, 330, 332-36, 338, 339

benevolent man, 52 仁慈的人,52
bias, 281, 304. See also gong; impartiality; partiality; unbiased
偏见,281, 304。另见锣;公正性;偏袒;不带偏见的

bilocality, 5, 310. See also multilocality
双域性, 5, 310。另请参见多域性

Bodhisattvas, 194-95 菩萨,194-95
Buddha, 205, 215, 220, 269, 275, 286, 362n35, 372n29
佛, 205, 215, 220, 269, 275, 286, 362n35, 372n29

self and non-self preached by, 195, 198
195、198 宣扬自我与非自我

truths preached by, 196, 198, 364n7
196、198、364n7 宣讲的真理

Buddha-eye, 228, 229 佛眼, 228, 229
Buddha-nature, 186, 296, 297, 299, 373 n 55 373 n 55 373 n 55373 n 55
佛性 186、296、297、299、 373 n 55 373 n 55 373 n 55373 n 55

Buddha-realms, 205 佛界,205
Buddhahood, 208, 245, 256-57, 313.
成佛,208、245、256-57、313。

See also Buddhas 亦见诸佛
and (not) trying to become a Buddha, 207-8, 215
以及(不)试图成佛,207-8, 215

all persons achieving, 207, 227
所有人实现, 207, 227

Bodhisattvas and, 194-95, 206, 215, 216
菩萨及, 194-95, 206, 215, 216

Buddha-nature and, 373n55
佛性与,373n55

deluded mind and, 195, 219, 275-76, 284, 299
迷惑心和, 195, 219, 275-76, 284, 299
Buddhahood (continued) 成佛(续)
end of suffering in the state of, 312
第312章 312

karma and, 299 业力和,299
Li and, 186, 217, 219, 342
李和, 186, 217, 219, 342

Lotus Sutra doctrine of universal, 303
法华经教义普世,303

pure mind after attainment of, 250, 267, 274, 275
达到 250、267、274、275 后的清净心

supreme function of realized, 296
实现的最高功能,296

Tiantai and, 312, 342 天台和, 312, 342
Buddhas, 205, 207-8, 215-19, 267-68, 275. See also Buddhahood
诸佛,205、207-8、215-19、267-68、275。另见佛性
Bodhisattvas and, 204, 206, 215, 216
菩萨及204、206、215、216

deluded mind and, 275-76, 284
迷惑之心,275-76, 284

dharmas and, 247 佛法和,247
Li and, 217, 219, 249, 296
李和, 217, 219, 249, 296

Mahayana Buddhism and, 207
大乘佛教和,207

truths and, 217, 218 第217章 218
Zhili on, 375 n 61
直隶安, 375 n 61

Buddhist rhetoric, 197 佛教修辞,197
Buddhists, 21 佛教徒, 21
categories, 83 类别, 83
center, 6, 211, 344. See also centrality
中心、6、211、344。另请参见中心性

coherence and, 3, 5, 9, 44, 68, 154, 203, 219, 258
连贯性和, 3, 5, 9, 44, 68, 154, 203, 219, 258

Conficianism and, 4, 7, 309
儒家思想和, 4, 7, 309

Conficius and, 2, 3, 307-8
孔子和, 2, 3, 307-8

convergence and, 44, 143, 145, 154, 211, 213, 290
收敛和, 44, 143, 145, 154, 211, 213, 290

as convertibility of determinate and indeterminate, 210-20
作为确定和不确定的可转换性,210-20

Dong Zhongshu on, 68-69 董仲舒论,68-69
Exclusive Center and Non-Exclusive Center, 200, 335
专属中心和非专属中心,200、335

and the Good, 7 8 7 8 7-87-8 和善, 7 8 7 8 7-87-8
of gravity, 45, 145, 315-18, 330-31, 338, 339
重力, 45, 145, 315-18, 330-31, 338, 339

human nature and, 3,7 人性,3,7
intelligibility and, 13, 14, 317, 331
可懂度和, 13, 14, 317, 331

Li and, 7, 14, 44, 69, 211-13, 216, 287, 288, 298, 330-31, 335, 338
李和、7、14、44、69、211-13、216、287、288、298、330-31、335、338

Mencius and, 3, 5, 310
孟子与,3,5,310

mind and, 233, 336 介意和, 233, 336
motif of the, 4 , 5 , 309 , 310 4 , 5 , 309 , 310 4,5,309,3104,5,309,310 nature of, 7 , 9 , 13 , 44 , 68 69 , 157 7 , 9 , 13 , 44 , 68 69 , 157 7,9,13,44,68-69,1577,9,13,44,68-69,157, 200, 202-3, 209-11, 233, 310, 317 , 331 32 , 335 317 , 331 32 , 335 317,331-32,335317,331-32,335
的主题, 4 , 5 , 309 , 310 4 , 5 , 309 , 310 4,5,309,3104,5,309,310 的性质, 7 , 9 , 13 , 44 , 68 69 , 157 7 , 9 , 13 , 44 , 68 69 , 157 7,9,13,44,68-69,1577,9,13,44,68-69,157 、 200、 202-3、 209-11、 233、 310、 317 , 331 32 , 335 317 , 331 32 , 335 317,331-32,335317,331-32,335

between opposites/extremes, 9 , 12 15 , 25 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 86 , 116 12 15 , 25 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 86 , 116 12-15,25,44,45,51,86,11612-15,25,44,45,51,86,116, 132, 133
在对立/极端之间,9, 12 15 , 25 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 86 , 116 12 15 , 25 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 86 , 116 12-15,25,44,45,51,86,11612-15,25,44,45,51,86,116 , 132, 133

of pendulum swing, 7 , 9 , 10 , 12 15 7 , 9 , 10 , 12 15 7,9,10,12-157,9,10,12-15, 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 , 133 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 , 133 44,45,51,62,63,86,132,13344,45,51,62,63,86,132,133, 211, 315, 331
钟摆的摆动, 7 , 9 , 10 , 12 15 7 , 9 , 10 , 12 15 7,9,10,12-157,9,10,12-15 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 , 133 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 , 133 44,45,51,62,63,86,132,13344,45,51,62,63,86,132,133 、 211、 315、 331

provisional positing, emptiness, and, 195, 197, 199, 200, 206, 212, 213, 221, 228, 232, 248. See also Three Truths
暂定、空性、195、197、199、200、206、212、213、221、228、232、248。亦见三谛

qi and, 7, 331 齐和, 7, 331
Qian Mu on, 7, 13
钱穆安, 7, 13

ren and, 331 任和,331
seeing the, 211 看到了,211
terms for, 7 条款,7
Three Truths and, 199-200, 211, 228, 232
三谛,199-200, 211, 228, 232

t i t i tit i and, 154-55  t i t i tit i 以及,154-55
transcendence and, 203, 317
超越和, 203, 317

as value, 331 32 331 32 331-32331-32 作为价值, 331 32 331 32 331-32331-32
virtual, 9 10 , 13 , 14 9 10 , 13 , 14 9-10,13,149-10,13,14 虚拟的, 9 10 , 13 , 14 9 10 , 13 , 14 9-10,13,149-10,13,14
Wang Bi on, 157 王碧安,157
Zhuangzi and, 5 庄子和, 5
centerings, 338,346 中心, 338,346
centers 中心
reversibility, 335 可逆性,335
ultimate center of. See Great Ultimate/Supreme Ultimate
的最终中心。查看伟大终极/至尊终极

centrality, 9, 199-201, 211, 331. See also center
中心性, 9, 199-201, 211, 331。另见中心

“all things are central,” 210, 211
“一切事物都是中心,”210, 211

balance and, 86, 116, 211, 331
余额和, 86, 116, 211, 331

coherence and, 2 , 9 , 307 2 , 9 , 307 2,9,3072,9,307 连贯性,并且, 2 , 9 , 307 2 , 9 , 307 2,9,3072,9,307
defined, 9 定义, 9
intelligibility and, 14 可懂度,14
Li and, 2, 44, 45, 210, 211, 213, 307, 312
李和、2、44、45、210、211、213、307、312

nature of, 14,331 性质, 14,331
omnipresence and, 199, 203, 210, 331, 344
无所不在,199、203、210、331、344

unconditionality and, 209-10, 214, 220, 228, 287, 294, 312
无条件性以及, 209-10, 214, 220, 228, 287, 294, 312

as value, 14,44 作为值,14,44
vertex-vortex model and, 210, 331, 338
顶点-涡流模型和,210, 331, 338

Zhiyi on, 44, 210, 213, 216, 232
执一、44、210、213、216、232

Chan, Alan, 151 陈艾伦,151
Chan, Wing-tsit, 182, 183
陈永捷, 182, 183

change, constant, 76, 165, 166, 252, 362 n 32
变化、常数、76、165、166、252、362 n 32

Cheng, Chung-ying, 326 郑仲英, 326
Cheng Hao, 23, 333 程浩, 23, 333
Li and, 24, 25, 322-25, 332, 333
李和, 24, 25, 322-25, 332, 333

on ren, 322-26, 332 论任, 322-26, 332
Cheng Yi, 23 程毅,23岁
Li and, 24 , 25 , 322 , 325 , 328 , 332 24 , 25 , 322 , 325 , 328 , 332 24,25,322,325,328,33224,25,322,325,328,332 李和, 24 , 25 , 322 , 325 , 328 , 332 24 , 25 , 322 , 325 , 328 , 332 24,25,322,325,328,33224,25,322,325,328,332
on ren, 323-24 关于任,323-24
Cheng-Zhu conception and use of Li , 21 , 22 , 36 , 39 , 330 , 335 21 , 22 , 36 , 39 , 330 , 335 21,22,36,39,330,33521,22,36,39,330,335
程朱礼的构思与运用, 21 , 22 , 36 , 39 , 330 , 335 21 , 22 , 36 , 39 , 330 , 335 21,22,36,39,330,33521,22,36,39,330,335

Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucianism, 22, 25, 36, 40, 78, 321, 331, 345n4
程朱理学, 22, 25, 36, 40, 78, 321, 331, 345n4

Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucians, 21-24, 36, 324
程朱理学,21-24, 36, 324

Chengguan, Qingliang, 221, 257, 263, 267, 274-76, 295
城关、清凉、221、257、263、267、274-76、295

Ch’ien Mu. See Qian Mu
钱穆.见钱穆

classes, 32, 83 班级,32、83
clinging, 193, 225 紧贴, 193, 225
clinging mind, 291 执着心,291
co-potentiality, 328-32 共同潜力,328-32
coherence, 2. See also specific topics
连贯性,2. 另请参阅特定主题

criteria for, 16 20 16 20 16-2016-20 标准, 16 20 16 20 16-2016-20
defined, 38 39 , 125 38 39 , 125 38-39,12538-39,125 定义, 38 39 , 125 38 39 , 125 38-39,12538-39,125
implicit tension in the notion of, 16
概念中隐含的张力,16

intersubsumption of incoherence
不连贯性的相互包容

and, 203, 243, 338, 342
以及, 203, 243, 338, 342

irony of, 5 讽刺的是,5
in Tiantai and Huayan classifications of teachings, 256-59
天台和华严教法分类,256-59

meanings and nature of, 15-16, 19
15-16、19 的含义和性质

perfect, 39 完美, 39
potential vs. actual, 39-40
潜力与实际,39-40

second-order, 44 二阶,44
unintelligible, vanishing and merging into things, 168 70 168 70 168-70168-70
难以理解,消失并融入事物, 168 70 168 70 168-70168-70

ways of considering, 262 colors, 144, 314-17
思考方式, 262 种颜色, 144, 314-17

Fazang on, 372n29 法藏上,372n29
Five Colors, 133-34 五种颜色,133-34
and the four elements, 275, 372n29
和四个元素 275, 372n29

Li and, 229, 315, 317
李和, 229, 315, 317

and the mind, 372 n 29
和心灵,372 n 29

in painting, 274-75, 372n29
绘画中, 274-75, 372n29

Zhanran on, 274-75, 284 展然上, 274-75, 284
communities, 83, 84. See also community word(s)
社区, 83, 84。另请参见社区词

community word(s), 54, 84, 85, 90
社区词、54、84、85、90

Dao and, 92-97, 102, 103, 105
道和, 92-97, 102, 103, 105

function, 86 函数, 86
gong as quintessential, 86, 87, 355 n 25
功为精髓, 86, 87, 355 n 25

Great Man and, 85-92 伟人和,85-92
and the joining of opposites, 97-98
以及对立面的结合,97-98

things and, 105 事情和,105
“Community Words” passage in Zhuangzi, 83, 102, 122, 126, 138
《庄子》中的“社词”段落,83、102、122、126、138

complementarity, 66. See also opposites
互补性,66。另见对立面

compossibility, 25, 325-26, 328, 340, 341
共存性, 25, 325-26, 328, 340, 341

comprehensiveness vs. one-sidedness, 100
全面性与片面性,100

conditionality, 251. See also Nirvana; unconditionality
条件性,251。另见涅槃;无条件性

dependent co-arising and, 254, 255
第254章 255

emptiness and, 209 空虚和,209
suffering and, 190, 210, 211, 215, 220, 298
痛苦和, 190, 210, 211, 215, 220, 298

transcendence of, 298 超越, 298
conditioned/unconditioned problem, 193, 288-89. See also unconditioned
条件/非条件问题,193, 288-89。另请参阅无条件

Confucian self-cultivation, 324
儒家修身,324

Confucian virtues, 112, 323, 334. See also virtues
儒家美德,112, 323, 334。另见美德

Confucianism 
axiocentric omniavailability of nonironic, 127
非讽刺的轴中心全方位可用性,127

centrality and, 4, 7, 309
中心性和, 4, 7, 309

law vs. ritual in, 343
法律与仪式,343

Li and, 28, 322-23 李和, 28, 322-23
qi and, 127 齐和,127
ren and, 322-23 任和,322-23
Confucians 儒家
Lu-Wang, 21 路王, 21
Qing, 21-22, 26 清, 21-22, 26
Confucius, 2, 21-22, 50, 307-8, 316
孔子, 2, 21-22, 50, 307-8, 316

coherence and omniavailability of value in, 2-3
价值的连贯性和全方位可用性,2-3

“embodied Non-Being,” 152
“体现的非存在”,152

Laozi and, 80, 152 老子和, 80, 152
Mencius and, 3-4 孟子和,3-4
timeliness of, 50 及时性, 50
Wang Bi and, 152 王碧和,152
consciousness, 365 n 12 意识,365 n 12
potential for, 366 n 12
潜力,366 n 12

consciousness-only contemplation, 282-83
仅意识沉思,282-83

constancy, 8, 171, 248-50, 254, 310
恒定性, 8, 171, 248-50, 254, 310

of Dao, 129, 156, 182
道, 129, 156, 182

and the Good, 7-8 和好人,7-8
Guo and, 167, 168 郭和, 167, 168
Li and, 7 李和,7
meaning of, 168 的含义, 168
nature of, 129 性质, 129
qi and, 7 气和, 7
constant, the, 7, 126, 128
常数, 7, 126, 128

constant change, 76 , 165 , 166 , 252 76 , 165 , 166 , 252 76,165,166,25276,165,166,252
不断的变化, 76 , 165 , 166 , 252 76 , 165 , 166 , 252 76,165,166,25276,165,166,252

contemplation, 244 沉思,244
consciousness-only vs. RealAttribute, 282-83. See also RealAttribute
仅意识与 RealAttribute,282-83。另请参见 RealAttribute

Fazang on, 239 法藏上,239
Five Aggregates as objects of, 371 n 26
五蕴作为对象,371 n 26

Li and, 214, 223, 228, 239, 282, 298
李和、214、223、228、239、282、298

Tiantai and, 279, 281-82, 284
天台和, 279, 281-82, 284

wisdom and, 371n26, 374n61, 375 n64
智慧和, 371n26, 374n61, 375 n64

Wondrous Contemplation, 293, 302
奇妙的沉思,293、302

Zhanran and, 228, 291, 299, 373n33
展然和, 228, 291, 299, 373n33

Zhili and, 290, 293, 297, 302, 371 n26
直隶和, 290, 293, 297, 302, 371 n26

Zhiyi and, 234-35, 374n61
执一和, 234-35, 374n61

controlling vs. being controlled, 113
控制与被控制,113

conventional truth, 196-98
传统真理,196-98

coherence and, 228 连贯性,并且,228
dharmas and, 218 佛法和,218
emptiness and, 193, 199, 228
空虚和, 193, 199, 228

Li and, 186, 216, 217
李和, 186, 216, 217

Nāgārjuna and, 192 龙树和,192
provisionally positing and, 285
第285章

self, non-self, and, 195, 198
自我、非自我以及, 195, 198

shi and, 186, 217 石和, 186, 217
ultimate truth and, 186, 195-200, 208, 218, 228, 364n7
究竟真理和, 186, 195-200, 208, 218, 228, 364n7

upāyas and, 196 第196章 196
Zhanran on, 228 展然上,228
convergence, 2, 142, 147, 183. See also vanishing convergence; specific topics
收敛,2, 142, 147, 183。另见消失收敛;具体主题

center and, 44, 143, 145, 154, 211, 213, 290
中心和, 44, 143, 145, 154, 211, 213, 290

of coherence and incoherence in Guo Xiang, 157-68
郭象的连贯与不连贯,157-68

Dao and, 184 道和,184
of dharmas, 213, 290 佛法, 213, 290
Guo Xiang and, 157-68, 183
郭祥和, 157-68, 183

of ironic and non-ironic, 106, 146, 147
讽刺和非讽刺,106, 146, 147

Li and, 106, 141, 147, 149, 155-68, 183, 200, 211, 307
李和、106、141、147、149、155-68、183、200、211、307

of multiple events, 141 多个事件,141
of opposites, 85-86, 97-98, 101, 146 , 354 n 23 146 , 354 n 23 146,354 n 23146,354 n 23. See also opposites; pendulum model
对立面, 85-86, 97-98, 101, 146 , 354 n 23 146 , 354 n 23 146,354 n 23146,354 n 23 。另见对立面;摆模型

Tang Junyi and, 183 唐君毅和,183
Cook Ding, 60 丁厨师,60 岁
correlative groupings, 40
相关分组,40

correlative thinking, 41 关联思维,41
creation, 370 n 24 创作,370 n 24
customs (fengsu 風俗), 83-89, 91-92, 94 , 96 , 102 94 , 96 , 102 94,96,10294,96,102
风俗, 83-89, 91-92, 94 , 96 , 102 94 , 96 , 102 94,96,10294,96,102

dali 大理, 53, 75, 216. See also Greatest Coherence
dali 大理, 53, 75, 216. 参见 Greatest Coherence

Dao, 19, 64, 94, 95, 105, 120. See also specific topics
Dao、19、64、94、95、105、120。另请参阅特定主题

benevolence and, 64, 67, 330
仁和、64、67、330

coherence and, 48, 95, 98, 125, 145 46 145 46 145-46145-46
连贯性和, 48, 95, 98, 125, 145 46 145 46 145-46145-46

community words and, 92-97, 102, 103, 105
社区词 and, 92-97, 102, 103, 105

determinacy vs. indeterminacy of, 127 29 , 144 45 127 29 , 144 45 127-29,144-45127-29,144-45
确定性与不确定性, 127 29 , 144 45 127 29 , 144 45 127-29,144-45127-29,144-45

emptiness and, 111, 118, 119, 121, 124,312
空虚和, 111, 118, 119, 121, 124,312

hallmark of the ironic notion of, 118 heaven and earth and, 88, 90, 91, 95 , 96 , 100 , 115 , 119 , 133 95 , 96 , 100 , 115 , 119 , 133 95,96,100,115,119,13395,96,100,115,119,133
具有讽刺意义的标志,118 天地和 88、90、91、 95 , 96 , 100 , 115 , 119 , 133 95 , 96 , 100 , 115 , 119 , 133 95,96,100,115,119,13395,96,100,115,119,133

hexagrams and, 143, 155, 156, 183
卦和、143、155、156、183

impartiality and, 90, 93-95, 103, 355 n 24
公正性以及, 90, 93-95, 103, 355 n 24

Laozi and, 72, 143, 149, 157-58
老子与, 72, 143, 149, 157-58

law and, 124-25, 358n24 法和,124-25,358n24
Li and, 99, 109-10, 112, 115-20, 330. See also daoli cosmological Dao and the Li in the Huainanzi, 131-36
理和, 99, 109-10, 112, 115-20, 330。另见道里宇宙道和《淮南子》里的理, 131-36

Li as division and the yielding Dao, 125 31 125 31 125-31125-31
礼为师而让道, 125 31 125 31 125-31125-31

as opposites, 130, 131, 144
作为对立面,130, 131, 144

Li as division and the yielding, 125 31 125 31 125-31125-31
礼为除而让, 125 31 125 31 125-31125-31

Li contrasted with, 127 李对比,127
meaning of, 125 的含义, 125
nature of, 84 , 98 , 101 , 109 10 , 170 84 , 98 , 101 , 109 10 , 170 84,98,101,109-10,17084,98,101,109-10,170. 的性质, 84 , 98 , 101 , 109 10 , 170 84 , 98 , 101 , 109 10 , 170 84,98,101,109-10,17084,98,101,109-10,170
See also Dao: Li and
另见道:理和

and the non-Dao, 134, 181-83
与非道, 134, 181-83

omnipresence and, 92, 96, 121, 134-35, 146, 155
无所不在以及, 92, 96, 121, 134-35, 146, 155

paradoxicality, 93-95, 97
悖论, 93-95, 97

pivot/axis of, 5, 157, 211, 310
5、157、211、310 的枢轴/轴

principles and, 155, 162, 182-84
原则和, 155, 162, 182-84

qi and, 95, 100, 109-12, 115-16, 120
齐和, 95, 100, 109-12, 115-16, 120

Tang Junyi and, 125, 148, 149, 185
唐君毅、125、148、149、185

transcendental, 148, 149, 161, 162
超验的, 148, 149, 161, 162

virtuosity and, 73 , 78 , 119 22 , 124 73 , 78 , 119 22 , 124 73,78,119-22,12473,78,119-22,124, 128 , 130 , 133 , 150 , 359 n 27 128 , 130 , 133 , 150 , 359 n 27 128,130,133,150,359 n 27128,130,133,150,359 n 27
技艺精湛,并且, 73 , 78 , 119 22 , 124 73 , 78 , 119 22 , 124 73,78,119-22,12473,78,119-22,124 , 128 , 130 , 133 , 150 , 359 n 27 128 , 130 , 133 , 150 , 359 n 27 128,130,133,150,359 n 27128,130,133,150,359 n 27

Zhuangzi and, 5, 80-81, 118, 129, 157-58, 211, 310
庄子及, 5, 80-81, 118, 129, 157-58, 211, 310

Dao of Kings Wen and Wu, 3
文武王之道3

Daoishness, 146, 164 道教, 146, 164
Daoli 道理, 41, 130-34, 330
道理道理, 41, 130-34, 330

daos, 5, 19, 120, 146, 310
道、5、19、120、146、310

Daosheng, Zhu, 186, 194 朱道生 186, 194
daoshu 道樞 (pivot/axis of Dao), 5, 157, 211, 310
道枢, 5, 157, 211, 310

de 德, 73, 78, 112, 119-21, 129, 149, 150. See also virtuosity
de 德, 73, 78, 112, 119-21, 129, 149, 150。另见精湛技艺

death, 127, 139 死亡, 127, 139
transcendence of, 204 超越, 204
Decree, 3, 7, 66, 308 deluded body, 240, 371n26
法令, 3, 7, 66, 308 迷身, 240, 371n26

deluded mind, 228-29, 288-90, 301, 303 5 , 371 ln 26 303 5 , 371 ln 26 303-5,371 ln 26303-5,371 \ln 26
迷惑心、228-29、288-90、301、 303 5 , 371 ln 26 303 5 , 371 ln 26 303-5,371 ln 26303-5,371 \ln 26

Buddhahood and, 195, 219, 275-76, 284, 299
成佛及, 195, 219, 275-76, 284, 299

Buddhas and, 275-76, 284 诸佛与, 275-76, 284
Chengguan and, 274-76 城关和,274-76
contemplation of, 274 沉思, 274
dharmas and, 240, 267, 273-75, 286
佛法及, 240, 267, 273-75, 286

Li and, 212, 214, 219-20, 225-28, 247, 249, 265, 269, 288, 289, 301, 303
李和、212、214、219-20、225-28、247、249、265、269、288、289、301、303

Nature and, 273, 288, 300
自然与, 273, 288, 300

and Pure Mind in Huayan thought, 261-68
与华严思想中的清心,261-68

Three Thousand and, 269, 274, 286, 289-90
三千和、269、274、286、289-90

Tiantai and, 273, 276, 279, 281, 284, 289, 303
天台、273、276、279、281、284、289、303

Zhili and, 274, 289, 297, 299, 303
直隶和、274、289、297、299、303

deluded sentient beings, Zhiyi on, 246, 247
迷惑众生,智一论,246、247

deluded subsumption, 294, 301
迷惑性归入, 294, 301

deluded thinking, 225-26, 266, 277-78, 283
妄想, 225-26, 266, 277-78, 283

delusion. See also deluded mind
妄想。又见迷惑心

clinging and, 193, 225 执着和, 193, 225
enlightenment and, 232, 242, 249, 267
启蒙和, 232, 242, 249, 267

karma and, 275, 277-78, 296, 299
业力和, 275, 277-78, 296, 299

meanings, 284, 294 含义, 284, 294
delusive disturbance (qing 情), 227-28, 239
情情, 227-28, 239

dependence, 222 依赖性, 222
dependent co-arising, 190, 239, 266, 267, 296, 302. See also pratītyasamutpāda
缘起、190、239、266、267、296、302。另见 pratītyasamutpāda

Buddhahood and, 186 成佛,186
conditionality and, 254, 255
第 254 章、第 255 章

Emptiness and, 184, 186 空虚和, 184, 186
entailment as, 302, 303, 337
蕴涵为, 302, 303, 337

Fazang on, 225, 227 法藏上, 225, 227
Li and, 186, 222, 227, 242, 249, 254, 302-3, 337
李和、186、222、227、242、249、254、302-3、337

mind and, 267, 291 第267章 291
motion and, 245 议案和,245
multiple conditions stipulation of, 291
多重条件规定,291

dependent co-arising (continued)
缘起共生(续)

Provisional Positing and, 201
临时定位和,201

Three Truths and, 201 三真理,201
dependent co-arising dharmas, 227, 240, 295, 302
缘起法、227、240、295、302

descriptive/normative problem, 37, 39, 43
描述性/规范性问题,37, 39, 43

determinacies, 132, 204-5
确定性, 132, 204-5

Dao and, 127-30, 132, 134, 144-45, 165
道和, 127-30, 132, 134, 144-45, 165

Guo and, 165, 167, 362n32
郭和, 165, 167, 362n32

Li and, 130, 132, 134, 165, 291, 302 3 302 3 302-3302-3
李和、130、132、134、165、291、 302 3 302 3 302-3302-3

Three Thousand and, 204 三千和,204
determinacy, 167. See also xing
确定性,167。另见 xing

vs. indeterminacy, 127-29, 144-45, 299, 372n57
与不确定性, 127-29, 144-45, 299, 372n57

determinate and indeterminate, center as convertibility of, 210-20
确定和不确定,中心作为可转换性,210-20

“determinate but unconditional” paradox, 36
“确定但无条件”悖论,36

determinateness, 232-33, 278, 299
确定性, 232-33, 278, 299

global coherence and, 201-2
全球一致性,201-2

local coherence and, 207, 210, 213, 247, 248, 253
局部一致性,207, 210, 213, 247, 248, 253

determination(s), 233-34, 317
决定, 233-34, 317

ways of considering, 262 考虑方式,262
Dharma-nature, 242-43, 281
法性, 242-43, 281

Dharmadhatus, Four, 262-63
法界四,262-63

dharma(s). See also specific topics
佛法。另请参阅特定主题

Buddhas and, 247 诸佛和,247
conventional truth and, 218
第218章

convergence of, 213, 290 213、290 的收敛
deluded mind and, 240, 267, 273-75, 286
迷惑心和, 240, 267, 273-75, 286

dependent co-arising, 227, 240, 295, 302
缘起共生、227、240、295、302

as emptiness, 215 作为空虚,215
inherent entailment and, 273, 281, 372 n 28 372 n 28 372 n 28372 n 28
第273章 281、 372 n 28 372 n 28 372 n 28372 n 28

interpenetration and, 240, 268
相互渗透,240、268

Li as, 232 李如,232
mind and, 370 n 22
头脑和,370 n 22

suffering and, 189 第189章 189
Three Thousand and, 286, 288, 296, 297, 313 ways of considering, 262
三千和、286、288、296、297、313种考虑方式、262

Zhanran and, 287-89, 291-92, 296, 297
展然和, 287-89, 291-92, 296, 297

Dharmas of Conversion, 256
皈依佛法,256

dharmatā, 186. See also Suchness
dharmata,186。亦见如性

difference 不同之处
essence and, 12 本质和,12
oneness and, 84,85 统一性和,84,85
sameness and, 10 , 12 13 , 85 , 252 10 , 12 13 , 85 , 252 10,12-13,85,25210,12-13,85,252, 285, 286, 290
相同性,并且, 10 , 12 13 , 85 , 252 10 , 12 13 , 85 , 252 10,12-13,85,25210,12-13,85,252 , 285, 286, 290

division, 172 师,172
Dao and, 330 道和,330
Li and, 330 李和,330
unity and, 339. See also unity
团结和,339。另见团结

Zhu Xi and, 339 朱熹和,339
“Doctrine of the Mean” (“Zhongyong”), 211
《中庸》,211

Dong Zhongshu, 137, 138 董仲舒, 137, 138
Li and centrality in, 68-69
李和中心地位,68-69

dualisms, 8 , 14 , 135 , 324 8 , 14 , 135 , 324 8,14,135,3248,14,135,324. See also nonduality; opposites; specific dualisms
二元论, 8 , 14 , 135 , 324 8 , 14 , 135 , 324 8,14,135,3248,14,135,324 。另见非二元性;对立面;特定的二元论

second-order, 253 二阶,253
Duan Yucai, 28-30 段玉才,28-30
earth. See heaven and earth
地球。见天地

elements, four, 275, 372n29
元素, 四, 275, 372n29

embodying. See t i t i tit i 體 (embody, substance) and yong 用 (function)
体现。看 t i t i tit i 体(体现、实质)和用(功能)

emptiness, 99, 111, 134, 188, 193, 224, 234
空, 99, 111, 134, 188, 193, 224, 234

attachment to, 193 附件, 193
coherence and, 184, 201, 207-9, 213, 228, 258, 277
连贯性和, 184, 201, 207-9, 213, 228, 258, 277

conditionality and, 209. See also unconditionality: emptiness and
有条件性和,209。另见无条件性:空虚和

Dao and, 111, 118, 119, 121, 124, 312
道和, 111, 118, 119, 121, 124, 312

dharmas as, 215 佛法,215
Dushun and, 221-22 都顺和,221-22
of essence, 192 本质上,192
existence and, 187, 230, 237
存在和, 187, 230, 237

form and, 191, 221-22 表格和, 191, 221-22
Guo on, 167, 312 郭安, 167, 312
Li and, 21, 121, 124, 213, 214, 216, 237, 238, 300, 304, 332, 341
李和、21、121、124、213、214、216、237、238、300、304、332、341

how emptiness became Li, 185-93
空如何变成理,185-93

meanings and nature of, 201, 209, 224
201、209、224 的含义和性质

Non-Being and, 154 非存在和,154
omnipresence and, 187, 189
无所不在,并且, 187, 189

Principle of Emptiness, 303
空性原理,303

shi and, 237 石和,237
Tang Junyi and, 147-48, 154
唐君毅和, 147-48, 154

Three Truths and, 195, 198-201, 207, 213, 221, 228, 232, 246, 247, 257. See also Three Truths ti and, 187
三谛和,195, 198-201, 207, 213, 221, 228, 232, 246, 247, 257。亦见三谛谛和,187

Tiantai and, 216, 222, 234, 258
天台和、216、222、234、258

ultimate truth and, 193, 199, 200, 208
究竟真理和, 193, 199, 200, 208

Wang Bi and, 147-48, 154, 187
王弼和, 147-48, 154, 187

Zhiyi on, 232, 233 智易上, 232, 233
empty mind and emptying the mind, 111-12, 119-21, 233, 278, 290-92, 294, 304
空心和空心, 111-12, 119-21, 233, 278, 290-92, 294, 304

“empty sky,” 292 “空旷的天空”292
empty space and empty hubs, 119, 121, 144 , 150 , 153 , 200 , 245 , 278 , 311 144 , 150 , 153 , 200 , 245 , 278 , 311 144,150,153,200,245,278,311144,150,153,200,245,278,311
空的空间和空的枢纽,119、121, 144 , 150 , 153 , 200 , 245 , 278 , 311 144 , 150 , 153 , 200 , 245 , 278 , 311 144,150,153,200,245,278,311144,150,153,200,245,278,311

ends-means relation, 183, 194. See also means-ends relation
目的-手段关系,183, 194。另见手段-目的关系

enlightenment. See also Buddhahood delusion and, 232, 242, 249, 267
启示。亦见佛果迷及, 232, 242, 249, 267

enlightenment experience of Zhiyi, 277-78
知一的启蒙经历,277-78

entailment (ju 具), 244, 302-3. See also omniavailability, inherent entailment as
蕴含 (ju 具), 244, 302-3.另请参见全可用性、固有蕴涵

as dependent co-arising, 302, 303, 337
作为缘起共生,302, 303, 337

identity and, 370n24 身份和,370n24
Li and, 302, 324 李和, 302, 324
Sudden, 370n24 突然,370n24
equilibrium, 15. See also coherence
均衡,15。另见一致性

essence, 10, 12, 32, 166, 271-72, 276, 291-92, 357n19
精华, 10, 12, 32, 166, 271-72, 276, 291-92, 357n19

difference and, 12 差和,12
vital, 109, 121. See also jing
重要, 109, 121. 参见 jing

essential qualities. See qing
基本素质。见清

events. See also under interpenetration
事件。另请参见相互渗透

convergence of multiple, 141
多重收敛,141

interpervasion of, 237, 266, 268, 294, 304
237、266、268、294、304 的相互渗透

Li and, 239-41 phenomenal, 140, 289, 290, 296
李和, 239-41 现象级, 140, 289, 290, 296

Three Thousand, 261, 269, 289, 293, 300-302, 341-42, 370n26
三千、261、269、289、293、300-302、341-42、370n26

evil, 8 邪恶, 8
good and, 244, 324-25 好,244、324-25
existence, 34 35 34 35 34-3534-35 存在, 34 35 34 35 34-3534-35
and nonexistence, 230, 279
和不存在, 230, 279

ways of viewing the totality of, 262-63
查看整体的方式,262-63

eye does not see itself, 152
眼睛看不到自己,152

fact/value problem, 343. See also value: fusion of fact and
事实/价值问题,343。另见价值:事实与价值的融合

Fahuaxuanyi, 271, 280, 285
法华玄义, 271, 280, 285

Fahuaxuanyishiqian, 242 法华玄一失千, 242
fang 方 and Li , 76 Li , 76 Li,76\mathrm{Li}, 76 方方和 Li , 76 Li , 76 Li,76\mathrm{Li}, 76
fatalism, 162-63 宿命论,162-63
Fate. See Decree 命运。参见法令
Fazang, Xianshou, 225-26, 231
法藏、闲手、225-26、231

on bodies, 239, 240, 255
在身体上,239、240、255

categories/classification of teachings, 256 58 256 58 256-58256-58
教学类别/分类, 256 58 256 58 256-58256-58

on complete building vs. “broken building,” 263
关于完整的建筑与“破损的建筑”,263

on dependent co-arising, 225, 227
225、227 缘起

Huayanjing wenda, 227, 238-39
华严经问达, 227, 238-39

Huayanjing zhigui, 222 华严经之归,222
on illusion, 258 关于幻觉,258
interpenetration and, 226, 241, 266
相互渗透和, 226, 241, 266

intersubjectivity and, 258
主体间性,258

Li and, 222, 228, 229, 231, 237-41, 255, 258, 263, 267
李和、222、228、229、231、237-41、255、258、263、267

metaperspectives and, 227, 231, 234
元视角和, 227, 231, 234

on mind, 263-67, 293, 372n29
铭记于心, 263-67, 293, 372n29

on mutual identity, 230-34
关于相互认同,230-34

nonduality and, 231 非二元性,并且,231
on shi, 222, 263 论时, 222, 263
on three natures, 224-25 关于三种本性,224-25
water/wave metaphor and, 238, 240, 265, 368n51
水/波浪隐喻和, 238, 240, 265, 368n51

finitude and infinite, 96, 248
有限与无限, 96, 248

Five Aggregates, 371n26 五蕴,371n26
Five Colors, 133-34 五种颜色,133-34
Five Teachings, 266 五法,266
focus/field model of Hall and Ames, 40 48 , 315 40 48 , 315 40-48,31540-48,315
霍尔和艾姆斯的焦点/场模型, 40 48 , 315 40 48 , 315 40-48,31540-48,315

force field, 44-45 力场,44-45
form, 109 表格,109
Form and Matter, 10 形式与物质,10
formlessness 无形
of Dao, 78, 110, 119-24, 131-34
道, 78, 110, 119-24, 131-34

Li and, 121, 122, 124, 131
李和, 121, 122, 124, 131

and the One, 78, 131-34
和一,78, 131-34

Forms, Plato’s theory of, 23
形式,柏拉图的理论,23

Li and, 22, 30 李和, 22, 30
Four Dharmadhatus, 262-63
四法界,262-63

Four Dharmas of Conversion, 256
四皈依法,256

Four Onenesses (siyi 四一), 214, 229, 252
四一四一, 214, 229, 252

Four Propositions, 280 四个命题,280
Four Samadhis, 274 四定,274
Four Siddhantas, Dazhidulun’s doctrine of, 196
四悉丹塔,大智都伦的教义,196

Four Teaching-Forms of Conversion, 256
四种转换教学形式,256

free will, 170 71 170 71 170-71170-71 自由意志, 170 71 170 71 170-71170-71
freedom, 163, 170-71, 276. See also suffering: liberation/freedom from
自由, 163, 170-71, 276。另见痛苦:解放/自由

fruition, 81 成果, 81
Fung Yulan, 22 冯玉兰,22岁
general terms, 83 一般条款,83
Gestalts, 15-16, 45 格式塔, 15-16, 45
global coherence 全球一致性
Dao and, 95, 145-46 道和, 95, 145-46
determinateness and, 201-2
确定性和,201-2

Emptiness and, 201, 207-9, 213, 228, 277
空与、201、207-9、213、228、277

Guo and, 173-74 郭和,173-74
local coherence and, 19, 188, 201-2, 205-7, 209-10, 213, 229, 243, 247, 277, 280, 296, 342
局部一致性,19, 188, 201-2, 205-7, 209-10, 213, 229, 243, 247, 277, 280, 296, 342

Three Truths and, 19, 213, 228, 243, 277, 296
三谛及, 19, 213, 228, 243, 277, 296

Tiantai and, 19, 188, 205-7, 253, 258, 277, 296
天台和, 19, 188, 205-7, 253, 258, 277, 296

truth and, 208 真相和,208
God, 25, 303 上帝, 25, 303
Goldin, Paul, 351n10 保罗·戈尔丁,351n10
gong, 83, 86-87, 323, 326, 355nn24-25
锣, 83, 86-87, 323, 326, 355nn24-25

Dao and, 90, 94-96, 101-3, 105
道和, 90, 94-96, 101-3, 105

as quintessential community word, 86, 87, 355n25
作为典型的社区词,86, 87, 355n25

Good, 7-8, 64 好, 7-8, 64
goodness 善良
evil and, 244, 324-25 邪恶和, 244, 324-25
harmony and, 65 和谐,65
Graham, A. C., 349n18 格雷厄姆,AC,349n18
and the absent copula and correlative thinking, 33-38
以及缺席的系词和关联思维,33-38

Chad Hansen and, 33-34, 36, 42
查德·汉森和, 33-34, 36, 42

Li and, 36-38, 40, 42-44, 325, 331
李和, 36-38, 40, 42-44, 325, 331

“perforation” idea, 42, 43
“穿孔”的想法,42, 43

on “rationalizing” and “irrationalizing” tendencies, 74, 79, 82
关于“合理化”和“非合理化”倾向,74,79,82

r u r u rur u and, 247  r u r u rur u 并且,247
whole-part relation and, 34,84
整体-部分关系和,34,84

Zhuangzi and, 72, 74, 77
庄子与, 72, 74, 77

grammar, 223-24, 355nn23-25. See also verbs
语法,223-24、355nn23-25。另见动词

Grand Universal Reconciliation, 85. See also Great Universal Reconciliation
大普世和解,85。另见大普世和解

gravity, center of, 45 , 145 , 315 18 45 , 145 , 315 18 45,145,315-1845,145,315-18, 330 31 , 338 , 339 330 31 , 338 , 339 330-31,338,339330-31,338,339
重心、中心、 45 , 145 , 315 18 45 , 145 , 315 18 45,145,315-1845,145,315-18 , 330 31 , 338 , 339 330 31 , 338 , 339 330-31,338,339330-31,338,339

Great Impartial Reconciliation, 97, 99
大公正和解,97、99

Great Man, 83, 85-92, 96
伟人, 83, 85-92, 96

community words and, 85-92
社区词汇和,85-92

Great Ultimate/Supreme Ultimate (taiji 太極), 22, 36, 38, 181, 331, 334, 336, 338. See also Li
太极/太极, 22, 36, 38, 181, 331, 334, 336, 338。另见李

Great Universal Reconciliation, 83. See also Grand Universal Reconciliation
大普世和解,83。另见大普世和解

Greatest Coherence (dali), 4
最大的一致性(大理),4

Greatest Coherence (dali 大理)
Greatest Coherence(大理)

coherence-incoherence and, 75
连贯-不连贯,并且,75

Dao and, 48 道和,48
Li and, 75-76, 100, 138, 156, 164
李和, 75-76, 100, 138, 156, 164

omnipresence and, 4, 48, 141, 309
无所不在以及, 4, 48, 141, 309

togetherness and, 310 团结和,310
Greatest Coherence (dali 大理), 4-6, 48, 51, 53, 55-57, 69, 86, 100, 138, 141, 309
大理, 4-6, 48, 51, 53, 55-57, 69, 86, 100, 138, 141, 309

Guanzi, 73, 76, 78, 81, 108, 124, 138. See also Li: defined
《管子》,73, 76, 78, 81, 108, 124, 138。另见李:定义

Li in the pre-ironic Daoism of the, 108 18 108 18 108-18108-18
李在前反讽道教中, 108 18 108 18 108-18108-18
Guo Xiang, 147, 340, 356n2
郭翔, 147, 340, 356n2

Chan Buddhism and, 362n35
禅宗和,362n35

commentary to Zhuangzi, 61, 114, 147
庄子注,61、114、147

contrast of Li to “knowing” and “doing,” 185, 186, 194, 195
“理”与“知”和“行”的对比,185, 186, 194, 195

convergence of coherence and incoherence in, 157-68
连贯性和不连贯性的融合,157-68

Daoism and, 185-86 道教和,185-86
on determinacy, 362 n 32
关于确定性,362 n 32

epistemology, 363n35 认识论,363n35
Huayan Buddhism and the Daoism of, 312
华严佛教与道教,312

ironic Li as non-ironic Li in, 168 84 , 311 12 168 84 , 311 12 168-84,311-12168-84,311-12
反讽李作为非反讽李, 168 84 , 311 12 168 84 , 311 12 168-84,311-12168-84,311-12

ironic sense of coherence in, 180, 183, 311
具有讽刺意味的连贯性,180、183、311

karma and, 363n35 业力和,363n35
one vs. many and, 182, 183
一对多和, 182, 183

principles and, 164-65, 171, 177-79, 182-84
原则和, 164-65, 171, 177-79, 182-84

renli and, 180 人力和,180
self-so and, 141, 161-63, 165-84
自以为是, 141, 161-63, 165-84

Tiantai and, 312 天台和,312
on vanishing (into) ming, 183
论消失(消失)明,183

Wang Bi and, 164, 168, 182-83
王弼和, 164, 168, 182-83

Zhuangzi and, 114, 147, 162-63, 179, 180
庄子与, 114, 147, 162-63, 179, 180

Guoluo 果蓏, 81 果蓏, 81
Hall, David L. 霍尔,大卫·L.
focus/field and, 40-44, 315
焦点/场和, 40-44, 315

Li and, 27, 40-44 李和, 27, 40-44
nominalism and, 27 唯名论,27
on organism, 31 关于有机体,31
Han dynasty, 38, 40, 68, 131, 137-39
汉代, 38, 40, 68, 131, 137-39

Hanfeizi, 358n24. See also under Laozi commentary(ies)
韩非子,358n24。另见老子注释

Hansen, Chad, 42 汉森,乍得,42
A. C. Graham and, 33-34, 36, 42
AC 格雷厄姆和, 33-34, 36, 42

coherence and, 53 连贯性,53
and the mass noun hypothesis, 31 33 31 33 31-3331-33
和质量名词假设, 31 33 31 33 31-3331-33

nominalism and, 32,42 唯名论和,32,42
harmonious coherence, levels of, 4647 harmony. See also specific topics coherence and, 9, 45-48, 58
和谐连贯,层次丰富,4647 和谐。另请参阅特定主题连贯性和、9、45-48、58

principle of, 179-80 原则,179-80
health and sickness, 8 , 13 , 14 8 , 13 , 14 8,13,148,13,14
健康和疾病, 8 , 13 , 14 8 , 13 , 14 8,13,148,13,14

heaven, 82 , 177 , 180 82 , 177 , 180 82,177,18082,177,180 天堂, 82 , 177 , 180 82 , 177 , 180 82,177,18082,177,180
Nature and, 182 自然和,182
Zhu Xi on, 337 朱熹论,337
heaven and earth, 63 , 64 , 78 , 355 63 , 64 , 78 , 355 63,64,78,35563,64,78,355
天地, 63 , 64 , 78 , 355 63 , 64 , 78 , 355 63,64,78,35563,64,78,355

beauty of, 79 美丽, 79
center and, 339 中心和,339
coherence and, 56-57, 75, 82, 126, 131
连贯性和, 56-57, 75, 82, 126, 131

coming together, 147 聚在一起,147
Dao and, 88, 90, 91, 95, 96, 100, 115 , 119 , 133 115 , 119 , 133 115,119,133115,119,133
道和, 88, 90, 91, 95, 96, 100, 115 , 119 , 133 115 , 119 , 133 115,119,133115,119,133

death and, 139 死亡和,139
“Following the Way of Heaven”
“遵循天道”

(Dong), 68-69 (董),68-69
formation of, 24 形成,24
Great Coherence of, 100. See also Greatest Coherence
伟大的连贯性,100。另请参见最大的连贯性

humans as the mind of, 331
人类作为心灵,331

as internal and external, 75
作为内部和外部,75

Li and, 7, 24, 36, 37, 56, 57, 62, 116 , 135 , 139 , 147 , 324 , 327 , 328 116 , 135 , 139 , 147 , 324 , 327 , 328 116,135,139,147,324,327,328116,135,139,147,324,327,328
李和, 7, 24, 36, 37, 56, 57, 62, 116 , 135 , 139 , 147 , 324 , 327 , 328 116 , 135 , 139 , 147 , 324 , 327 , 328 116,135,139,147,324,327,328116,135,139,147,324,327,328

merging and, 168 合并并且,168
mind and, 19, 327, 328, 331
介意和, 19, 327, 328, 331

noble men and, 56 贵族男子,56
One and, 133, 134 一和, 133, 134
qi and, 7, 115, 328
齐和, 7, 115, 328

self-so and, 131, 139, 155
自我和, 131, 139, 155

separation of, 126, 134, 135
126、134、135 的分离

transformations of, 327 第 327 章
Wang Bi on, 155 王碧安,155
Xunzi and, 56, 57 荀子和, 56, 57
Yin-Yang and, 63, 66, 67
阴阳和, 63, 66, 67

Zhuangzi on, 75 庄子论,75
heavenly, the, 74-75 天上的,74-75
heavenly coherences, 60,62
天堂般的一致性,60,62

Heavenly Li, 322, 329-30 天理, 322, 329-30
heavenly nature (tianxing 天性), 61, 167
天性, 61, 167

heavenly principle (tianli 天理) ironic and non-ironic in “inner chapters” of Zhuangzi and “The Record of Music,” 59-64
《庄子》“内章”和《乐记》中的讽刺与非讽刺,59-64
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 135
格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔,135

hexagram-situation, 6 卦象, 6
hexagram system, 67 卦象系统, 67
hexagrams 卦象
coherence and, 144 连贯性和,144
Dao and, 143, 155, 156, 183
道和, 143, 155, 156, 183

essence, 146 本质, 146
Guo on, 183 郭安,183
Li and, 143, 144, 147, 154-56
李和, 143, 144, 147, 154-56

structure, 141-43, 147-48, 154, 353 n 21 353 n 21 353 n 21353 n 21
结构, 141-43, 147-48, 154, 353 n 21 353 n 21 353 n 21353 n 21

Tang Junyi and, 146 唐君毅和,146
Tun, 147 敦, 147
Wang Bi on, 141-43, 147, 148, 154-57, 183
王碧安, 141-43, 147, 148, 154-57, 183

xian, 147, 148 西安, 147, 148
Yin-Yang and, 142, 157, 353n21
阴阳和, 142, 157, 353n21

of Zhouyi, 14, 66, 67, 141, 145, 148, 155,156
《周易》14、66、67、141、145、148、155,156

Hinayana, 194, 206, 215, 216, 256, 257
小乘, 194, 206, 215, 216, 256, 257

“Home Mountain” school. See Shanjia
“家乡山”学校。见善家

Huainanzi, 138 淮南子,138
cosmological Dao and the Li in the, 131 36 131 36 131-36131-36
宇宙道与理, 131 36 131 36 131-36131-36

HuangLao Daoism, 77, 124, 357n17
黄老道教, 77, 124, 357n17

Huayan Integrated Teachings. See Integrated Teachings
华严综合教法。参见综合教学

Huayan thought. See also Fazang, Xianshou; Tiantai thought: vs. Huayan thought
华严心想。又见法藏、先手;天台思想与华严思想

interpenetration and, 205, 234, 247, 263, 267
相互渗透和, 205, 234, 247, 263, 267

Pure Mind and Deluded Mind in, 261-68
清净心与迷惑心,261-68

wave and water in, 235-41
波浪和水,235-41

huiqu 會趣. See convergence
会趣。参见收敛

Huizi (Hui Shi), 96, 274, 277
惠子(惠施), 96, 274, 277

human nature, 3, 55, 64-66, 308. See also Nature; xing
人性,3, 55, 64-66, 308。另见《自然》;兴

Dao and, 64 道和,64
Li and, 7, 17, 19, 26, 50, 55
李和, 7, 17, 19, 26, 50, 55

Xunzi on, 50-51, 169 荀子论, 50-51, 169
“human principles,” 180-81
“人类原则”,180-81

humanity, 3 人性, 3
humor, 206-8 identity, 212, 370n24. See also mutual identity
幽默、206-8 身份、212、370n24。另请参阅相互身份

interpenetration as, 234 相互渗透,234
Three Truths and, 231 三真理,231
ignorance 无知
dharmas, Dharma-nature, and, 243
第243章

mind and, 280 第280章 280
“Illuminating the Judgments” passage, 141 42 , 146 141 42 , 146 141-42,146141-42,146
“阐明判断”段落, 141 42 , 146 141 42 , 146 141-42,146141-42,146

impartiality, 83, 88-91, 96, 99-100. See also center; gong; Great Impartial Reconciliation; unbiased
公正性,83、88-91、96、99-100。另见中心;锣;大公正和解;不带偏见的

Dao and, 90, 93-95, 103, 355n24
道和, 90, 93-95, 103, 355n24

impurity. See purity 杂质。查看纯度
inclusivity, 317 包容性,317
inherence-observation, 269, 274, 372n28
固有观察, 269, 274, 372n28

inherent entailment (xingju 性具), 285, 289, 292, 337. See also omniavailability: inherent entailment as
固有蕴涵 (xingju 性具), 285, 289, 292, 337。另请参见omniavailability:固有蕴含为

contemplation of, 313 沉思, 313
dharmas and, 273, 281, 372n28
法和, 273, 281, 372n28

doctrine of, 236-37, 342 学说, 236-37, 342
Li and, 287, 288, 300, 312, 337, 367 n 23
李和, 287, 288, 300, 312, 337, 367 n 23

mind and, 279-80, 372 n 28
头脑和, 279-80, 372 n 28

as non-dwelling, 287 作为非住宅,287
as omniavailability, 241 55 241 55 241-55241-55
作为全方位可用性, 241 55 241 55 241-55241-55

Three Thousand and, 280, 285, 370n24, 373n43
三千和、280、285、370n24、373n43

Inner Coherence (cheng 誠), 6, 310, 316. See also sincerity
内在连贯性 (heng 诚), 6, 310, 316。另见真诚

“Inner Training,” 108, 116, 127. See also “Neiye”
《内在训练》108、116、127。另见“内业”

Integrated Teachings, 214, 256-59, 266, 285
综合教学, 214, 256-59, 266, 285

intelligibility, 6 可懂度, 6
coherence and, 41,43 连贯性,41,43
defined, 9 定义, 9
sustainability, value, and, 9
可持续性、价值,以及,9

vs. unintelligibility, 6 与难以理解的情况相比,6
intention, deliberate, 161
意图,故意,161

interpenetration, 226-27, 233-34, 248, 253, 255, 334. See also water/wave metaphor
相互渗透, 226-27, 233-34, 248, 253, 255, 334。另见水/波隐喻

dharmas and, 240, 268 佛法和, 240, 268
Emptiness and, 312 空虚和,312
of events, 221, 223, 263, 267, 304, 312, 341
事件数, 221, 223, 263, 267, 304, 312, 341

Fazang and, 226, 241, 266
法藏和, 226, 241, 266

Huayan and, 205, 234, 247, 263, 267
华研、205、234、247、263、267

as identity, 234 作为身份,234
Li and, 228, 229, 234, 259, 267-70, 288, 304, 312
李和、228、229、234、259、267-70、288、304、312

between Li and events, 221, 241, 247, 263
李与事件之间, 221, 241, 247, 263

of Li and shi, 222, 229, 269
礼与时, 222, 229, 269

meaning and nature of, 224
的含义和性质,224

of oneness and manyness, 243
单一性和多样性,243

Pure Mind and, 266-68 纯净心灵和,266-68
Three Truths and, 228, 270
三谛,228、270

Tiantai on, 241 天台上,241
Zhanran and, 228, 255 展然和, 228, 255
Zhiyi on, 234 志毅上,234
interpervasion (hupian 互遍), 224
相互渗透 (hupian 互遍), 224

of events, 237, 266, 268, 294, 304
事件数, 237, 266, 268, 294, 304

Li and, 213, 231, 237, 294, 332
李和、213、231、237、294、332

Three Thousand and, 204, 205, 294
三千和、204、205、294

Three Truths and, 213 三真理,213
Tiantai and, 203, 204, 235
天台和、203、204、235

intersubjectivity, 197, 257-58
主体间性, 197, 257-58

intersubsumption, 210, 301, 305
相互包容, 210, 301, 305

of coherence and incoherence, 203, 243, 338, 342
连贯性和不连贯性, 203, 243, 338, 342

Li and, 291-94, 298, 301, 303, 314, 315, 332
李和、291-94、298、301、303、314、315、332

ironic and non-ironic. See also specific topics
讽刺和非讽刺。另请参阅特定主题

types of combinations of 的组合类型
first type: Li and Dao both nonironic, 72 73 72 73 72-7372-73
第一种:理和道都是非讽刺的, 72 73 72 73 72-7372-73

second type: Dao ironic, Li nonironic, 73-79
第二类:道反讽、理非反讽、73-79

third type: Dao and Li both ironic, 79 82 79 82 79-8279-82
第三种:道理皆反讽, 79 82 79 82 79-8279-82

integrating types two and three, 82-106
集成类型二和三,82-106

ironic move, 86 讽刺的举动,86
Ironies of Oneness and Difference
同一性与差异性的讽刺

(Ziporyn), 33, 40, 57, 59, 66, 134
(紫泊林), 33, 40, 57, 59, 66, 134

appropriations of the ironic into the non-ironic considered in, 71 coherence and, 1, 48, 53, 137
71 连贯性和 1, 48, 53, 137 中考虑的将讽刺性挪用为非讽刺性

dyadic a priori and, 35
二元先验和,35

“Great Commentary” to the Changes and, 64
对变化的“伟大评论”,64

Guanzi and, 108 管子和,108
Li and, 49-50, 56, 58, 61, 67, 307
李和, 49-50, 56, 58, 61, 67, 307

Liji texts and, 63, 71, 107, 123-24
《礼记》文本及, 63, 71, 107, 123-24

omnipresence and, 48 无所不在,48
order and, 50 订单,50
recap of, 1 20 1 20 1-201-20 回顾一下, 1 20 1 20 1-201-20
Xunzi and, 49-50, 53, 54, 56
荀子与, 49-50, 53, 54, 56

Yin and, 137 尹和,137
Zhouyi and, 64 周易和,64
Zhuangzi’s “Inner Chapters” and, 59, 71
庄子《内篇》59、71

“is,” 34-35 “是”34-35
and “ought,” fusion of, 23-24, 144
和“应该”的融合,23-24, 144

jade, 28, 29 玉, 28, 29
Li compared with, 28 李相比,28
Jesuits, 24, 25 耶稣会士, 24, 25
Jia 假, 285. See also provisional positing
贾假,285​​。另见临时定位

jing 精, 109, 111, 115
精精, 109, 111, 115

junzi 君子. See noble person
君子。见贵人

karma, 214, 217, 244, 277, 282, 363 n 35
业力, 214, 217, 244, 277, 282, 363 n 35

delusion and, 275, 277-78, 296, 299
妄想和, 275, 277-78, 296, 299

knowing, 14, 160, 220, 283. See also zhi
知道, 14, 160, 220, 283。另见 zhi

Bodhisattva path, Buddhahood, and, 194, 195
菩萨道、佛果、及 194、195

Dao and, 110 道和,110
doing and, 166, 168-71, 185
做并且, 166, 168-71, 185

Guo Xiang and, 160, 166, 168-71, 178, 185, 194, 195
郭翔和, 160, 166, 168-71, 178, 185, 194, 195

Li and, 38, 168, 169, 171, 185, 188, 194, 195
李和, 38, 168, 169, 171, 185, 188, 194, 195

new kind of, 145 新型,145
and not-knowing, 75, 110, 160, 161, 170, 171
和不知道, 75, 110, 160, 161, 170, 171

Zhuang Zhou on, 75 庄周,75 岁
knowledge, 42, 160, 161. See also zhi
知识, 42, 160, 161。另见 zhi

kong 空. See emptiness 空.见空性
kongli 空理, 26 孔利空理, 26
language, 91. See also words
语言,91。另见单词

Dao and, 91 道和,91
Laozi, 134 老子,134
Confucius and, 80, 152 孔子和, 80, 152
Wang Bi on, 152 王碧安,152
Laozi (Tao Te Ching), 4, 60, 97, 115
老子(道德经), 4, 60, 97, 115

Dao and, 72, 143, 149, 157-58
道和, 72, 143, 149, 157-58

“empty hub” in, 144, 150, 153, 200
144、150、153、200 中的“空集线器”

ironic coherence and, 4-6, 309, 310
讽刺连贯性和, 4-6, 309, 310

key terms in, 30 关键术语,30
Tang Junyi and, 148-50 唐君毅和,148-50
Zhouyi and, 137, 141 《周易》和, 137, 141
Zhuangzi and, 91, 125, 137-38
庄子与, 91, 125, 137-38

Laozi commentary(ies) 老子注释
Hanfeizi, 78, 99, 131-32, 138, 144, 145 , 310 , 330 145 , 310 , 330 145,310,330145,310,330
韩非子, 78, 99, 131-32, 138, 144, 145 , 310 , 330 145 , 310 , 330 145,310,330145,310,330

Li as division and the yielding Dao, 125 31 125 31 125-31125-31
礼为师而让道, 125 31 125 31 125-31125-31

Wang Bi’s, 141, 148-50, 152, 153 applications of multiplicity of Li in, 155-57. See also multiplicity
王弼的,141、148-50、152、153 李的多重性应用,155-57。另请参见多重性

law and Dao, 124-25, 358n24
法与道, 124-25, 358n24

law of non-contradiction (LNC), 10-12, 198, 345n5
非矛盾律 (LNC), 10-12, 198, 345n5

forms/versions of, 11 形式/版本,11
Legalism vs. Daoism, 124-25, 358n24
法家与道家, 124-25, 358n24

Lei 類, 52, 55, 57, 63
类, 52, 55, 57, 63

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 24, 25
莱布尼茨、戈特弗里德·威廉,24、25

leveling (qi 齊), 164-65. See also qi
调平(qi 齐),164-65。另见气

Li 理. See also specific topics
理。另请参阅特定主题

applications of the multiplicity of, 155 57 155 57 155-57155-57
多样性的应用, 155 57 155 57 155-57155-57

attempts to reinterpret and translate the term, 30 48 30 48 30-4830-48
尝试重新解释和翻译这个术语, 30 48 30 48 30-4830-48

“beyond,” 235-41 “超越”235-41
defined, 118 24 118 24 118-24118-24 定义, 118 24 118 24 118-24118-24
history of the term, 21 , 26 , 61 21 , 26 , 61 21,26,6121,26,61
该术语的历史, 21 , 26 , 61 21 , 26 , 61 21,26,6121,26,61

as “just the way it is,” as limit, and as vanishing convergence, 157-68
作为“本来就是这样”,作为极限,作为消失收敛,157-68

natural and cultural, 41, 42
自然和文化, 41, 42

paradoxical meanings, 28-29
矛盾的含义,28-29

philosophical categories and, 24
哲学类别和,24

single-value, 237 单值,237
Tang Junyi’s six senses of the term, 26
唐君毅词义六义,26

Three Thousand Lis and Three Thousand events, 293-305
三千里三千事,293-305

as verb, 27 , 28 , 47 , 50 , 51 , 98 , 110 27 , 28 , 47 , 50 , 51 , 98 , 110 27,28,47,50,51,98,11027,28,47,50,51,98,110, 122 , 155 , 222 , 223 , 318 , 347 n 7 122 , 155 , 222 , 223 , 318 , 347 n 7 122,155,222,223,318,347 n7122,155,222,223,318,347 n 7
作为动词, 27 , 28 , 47 , 50 , 51 , 98 , 110 27 , 28 , 47 , 50 , 51 , 98 , 110 27,28,47,50,51,98,11027,28,47,50,51,98,110 , 122 , 155 , 222 , 223 , 318 , 347 n 7 122 , 155 , 222 , 223 , 318 , 347 n 7 122,155,222,223,318,347 n7122,155,222,223,318,347 n 7

Western interpretations of, 24
西方的解释,24

li gu ziran 理固自然, 178,179
理固自然, 178,179

Li simpliciter, 322 李简单,322
life and death, transcendence of, 204
生与死,超越,204

Liji texts, 63, 71, 107, 123-24
《礼记》63、71、107、123-24

limitedness, 289-90 有限性,289-90
Liu An, 131 刘安,131
Liu Xiang, 139 刘翔,139
local coherence(s), 6, 201, 304, 310, 344. See also multilocality
局部一致性、6、201、304、310、344。另请参见多局部性
Dao and, 95, 98 道和, 95, 98
determinateness and, 207, 210, 213, 247, 248, 253
确定性和, 207, 210, 213, 247, 248, 253

Emptiness and, 201, 207-9, 213
空与, 201, 207-9, 213

global coherence and, 19, 188, 201-2, 205-7, 209-10, 213, 229, 243, 247, 277, 280, 296, 342
全球一致性,19、188、201-2、205-7、209-10、213、229、243、247、277、280、296、342

Huayan and, 188 华严和,188
intersubsumption and, 203, 210, 229, 243, 338
相互包容和, 203, 210, 229, 243, 338

mind and, 235 记住,235
provisional positing and, 213, 228, 277, 285
临时位置和, 213, 228, 277, 285

rationalizing and irrationalizing attitudes and, 82
合理化和非合理化态度,82

Three Truths and, 19, 201, 205-7, 243, 296
三谛及, 19, 201, 205-7, 243, 296

Tiantai and, 19, 188, 205-7, 247, 253, 258, 269, 285, 296, 342
天台和, 19, 188, 205-7, 247, 253, 258, 269, 285, 296, 342

truth and, 208, 228. See also under Three Truths
真理和, 208, 228。另见三真理

Zhanran on, 228, 248 展然上, 228, 248
logical vs. aesthetic order, 15
逻辑顺序与审美顺序,15

loneliness vs. non-loneliness, 298
孤独与不孤独,298

Lotus Sutra, 200, 206, 214-18, 220, 229, 256, 276. See also Ten Suchnesses; specific topics
《法华经》, 200, 206, 214-18, 220, 229, 256, 276。亦见十如是;具体主题

“Afterword,” 277 “后记”277
distinctive contribution of, 194
的独特贡献,194

doctrine of universal Buddhahood, 303
普世成佛的教义,303

epistemology of, 217 认识论,217
Li and, 214, 216-18 李和, 214, 216-18
“opening sutra” from, 196
《开经》出自,196

story of the lost son from, 198
198年失踪儿子的故事

Tiantai reading of, 207, 246
天台读经, 207, 246

truth and, 194-97, 211-12, 230. See also ultimate truth
真理和, 194-97, 211-12, 230。另见终极真理

upayic structure of, 211-12, 230
211-12、230 的 upayic 结构

Lu-Wang Confucians, 21 鲁王儒家,21
Lu-Wang Neo-Confucians, 21-22
陆王新儒家,21-22

Lu Xiangshan, 23 卢象山,23岁
Mahayana, 186, 190, 191, 194, 207, 237. See also Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana
大乘,186, 190, 191, 194, 207, 237。亦见大乘信心的觉醒

Li and, 216, 237 李和, 216, 237
many. See one-many relationship
许多。查看一对多关系

mass noun hypothesis, Chad Hansen and, 31 33 31 33 31-3331-33
质量名词假设,查德·汉森和, 31 33 31 33 31-3331-33

material/vessel relation, 145
材料/容器关系,145

Mean. See center 意思是。查看中心
means-ends relation, 29, 183, 194, 200, 205. See also ends-means relation
手段-目的关系、29、183、194、200、205。另请参见目的-手段关系

measure, 131, 132, 135. See also shu
措施、131、132、135。另见 shu

meditative inquiry, method of, 365 n 12
冥想探究,方法,365 n 12

Mencian virtues, 38, 323, 328
孟子的美德,38、323、328

Mencius, 3-5, 310, 322 孟子, 3-5, 310, 322
coherence and, 50 连贯性,50
ti and, 323 第323章
Mencius, 3, 50, 308 孟子, 3, 50, 308
mental process, four phases of, 278-79
心理过程,四个阶段,278-79

merging. See t i t i tit i 體 (embody, substance) and yong 用 (function)
合并。看 t i t i tit i 体(体现、实质)和用(功能)

meridians. See acupuncture meridians
经络。查看针灸经络

metaperspectives, 227, 231, 234
元视角, 227, 231, 234

middle. See also center 中间。另请参阅中心
excluded, 25 排除,25
mind, 111. See also deluded mind; empty mind and emptying the mind; specific topics
心,111。亦见迷惑心;心空,心放空;具体主题

as anti-value, 303 作为反价值,303
Dao and, 111 道和,111
heaven and earth and, 19, 327, 328, 331
天地和, 19, 327, 328, 331

history of the treatment of, 263 inherent entailment and, 279-80, 372 n 28 372 n 28 372 n 28372 n 28
第263章 固有后果的治疗史,以及,279-80, 372 n 28 372 n 28 372 n 28372 n 28

“is the gate of the following,” 235
“是下面的门,”235

Li and, 21, 235, 303, 336
李和, 21, 235, 303, 336

and the making of distinctions, 282
以及区分,282

nature and, 293, 296 自然和, 293, 296
nature of, 32, 293 性质, 32, 293
and “no mind,” 278 和“不介意”278
one’s own, 265, 282 自己的, 265, 282
role of, 110-11 的作用,110-11
Three Thousand and, 279, 280, 293, 296
三千和、279、280、293、296

in Tiantai (vs. Huayan), 263, 303. See also Huayan thought: Pure
《天台》(相对于华严),263, 303。另见华严思想:清净

Mind and Deluded Mind in
心与迷惑心

transcendent, 266, 267, 293
超越, 266, 267, 293

Zhili and, 263-64, 269, 270, 272-74, 276, 286, 296, 297, 303
直隶和, 263-64, 269, 270, 272-74, 276, 286, 296, 297, 303

Zhiyan on, 263-64 智言上,263-64
mind-contemplation, 281-83, 290, 299
心观, 281-83, 290, 299

Bodhisattvas and, 372 n 31
菩萨和,372 n 31

Five Aggregates and, 371n26
五蕴和,371n26

Huayan and, 263. See also Huayan thought: Pure Mind and Deluded Mind in
华严与,263。另见《华严思想:清净心与迷心》

Li and, 263, 269, 374n61
李和, 263, 269, 374n61

Tiantai and, 263, 277-79, 281, 284, 374 n 61 374 n 61 374 n 61374 n 61
天台和、263、277-79、281、284、 374 n 61 374 n 61 374 n 61374 n 61

Zhanran on, 282-83, 291, 374n61
展然上, 282-83, 291, 374n61

Zhili and, 274, 297, 371n26
直隶和, 274, 297, 371n26

Zhiyi on, 277-78 执一上,277-78
mind-nature, 372 n 31 心性,372 n 31
ming 命. See also Decree; vanishing
命。另见法令;消失

object of, 169 的对象,169
Ming Neo-Confucians, 7, 26
明理学, 7, 26

mini-Daos, 141, 143-44, 156, 183, 184, 200, 311. See also Li
mini-Daos, 141, 143-44, 156, 183, 184, 200, 311。另见 Li

Mizoguchi Yuzo, 139-40, 163-64
沟口雄三, 139-40, 163-64

mother/child relation, 153
母子关系,153

motion, 252. See also dependent co-arising
动议,252。另见因缘共生

moving, 250-54. See also water/wave metaphor
移动,250-54。另见水/波浪隐喻

mud/muddiness. See water/wave metaphor
泥泞/泥泞。参见水/波浪隐喻

multilocal instantiation, 315-16
多本地实例化,315-16

multilocality, 2-3, 33, 43-44, 304, 342.
多地点、2-3、33、43-44、304、342。

See also bilocality 另请参见双域性
multiperspectivism, 204, 227
多视角主义, 204, 227

multiplicity, 172 多重性, 172
Guo on, 164-65, 172 郭安, 164-65, 172
of Li, 22-24, 155-57, 164-65, 172, 212, 217, 259, 332
李, 22-24, 155-57, 164-65, 172, 212, 217, 259, 332

oneness and, 243, 269 统一性和, 243, 269
singularity and, 279 奇点,并且,279
vs. unity, 26 与团结,26
music. See also “Record of the Music”
音乐。另见“音乐唱片”

harmony and, 50, 58, 62-64
和谐和, 50, 58, 62-64

mutual entailment (huju 互具), 203, 273, 286, 302-3
互具, 203, 273, 286, 302-3

mutual identity 相互认同
Fazang on, 230-34 法藏上,230-34
of particulars, 230, 231, 240
详情, 230, 231, 240
Nāgārjuna, 195, 198, 280 龙树菩萨, 195, 198, 280
Emptiness and, 195, 285 空虚和, 195, 285
truth and, 191-93, 195, 197, 200, 280
真相和, 191-93, 195, 197, 200, 280

names, as unifying, 92 名称,作为统一,92
natural kinds, 31, 53, 57, 60, 83
自然种类, 31, 53, 57, 60, 83

“Natural Law,” 124 “自然法”,124
nature, 3, 7. See also xing
自然, 3, 7。另见 xing

deluded mind and, 273, 288, 300
迷惑心和, 273, 288, 300

Guo Xiang on, 169, 170
郭翔 上, 169, 170

meanings of, 169,170 169,170 的含义
rituals of, 344 仪式, 344
Three Thousand and, 271, 274, 292-93, 298, 300-302, 370n24
三千和、271、274、292-93、298、300-302、370n24

Zhanran on, 291, 292, 296
展然上, 291, 292, 296

Zhili on, 296 织里安,296
Nature, Law of, 30 自然法则,30
Needham, Joseph 李约瑟,约瑟夫
Li and, 31, 42 李和, 31, 42
and organic pattern, 30-31
和有机图案,30-31

negation, 4, 104, 151, 157. See also self-negation
否定, 4, 104, 151, 157。另见自我否定

vs. affirmation, 195, 200
与肯定, 195, 200

of all principles, 311 第 311 章
of coherence, 18,154 一致性,18,154
determination and, 203 决心和,203
Li and, 157, 182, 222, 301, 311, 312 maximization through, 157
李和、157、182、222、301、311、312最大化通、157

omnipresence and, 222 无所不在,222
shi/fei and, 5, 310 时/飞和, 5, 310
transcendence and, 317,321
超越和,317,321

negation problem, 1-2 否定问题,1-2
negative ontology, 152 否定本体论,152
“Neiye,” 108, 109, 111-13, 115, 127.
《内野》108、109、111-13、115、127。

See also “Inner Training”
另见“内在训练”

Neo-Confucianism, 154. See also
新儒家,154。另见

Peterson, Willard: coherence and
威拉德·彼得森:连贯性和

development, 321 发展, 321
Li and, 22, 23, 28, 31, 37, 38, 44, 80-81, 116, 154, 181, 182, 321, 322,343
李和, 22, 23, 28, 31, 37, 38, 44, 80-81, 116, 154, 181, 182, 321, 322,343

qi and, 154 齐和,154
Neo-Confucians, 343 新儒家,343
centrality and, 7 中心性,7
human nature and, 7,17 人性,7,17
Ming, 7, 26 明, 7, 26
qi and, 337 气和,337
Song, 7, 26 歌曲, 7, 26
toward Li in, 321-44 朝李进,321-44
Nirvana 涅槃
Centrality and, 199 中心性和,199
conditionality, unconditionality, and, 190, 191, 193, 215, 286
有条件、无条件以及, 190, 191, 193, 215, 286

extinction and, 194, 215-16
灭绝和, 194, 215-16

Mahayana sutras and, 191 大乘佛经,191
Nāgārjuna and, 192-94 龙树和,192-94
paradox of, 199, 203 悖论, 199, 203
samsarâ and, 186, 191, 193, 207, 264, 286, 299
轮回和, 186, 191, 193, 207, 264, 286, 299

suffering and, 47, 186, 190-94, 299, 319
痛苦和, 47, 186, 190-94, 299, 319

noble person (junzi), 51-52, 56-58, 113,122
君子, 51-52, 56-58, 113,122

nominalism, 351 唯名论,351
defined, 3 定义, 3
Li and, 45-46, 312, 313
李和, 45-46, 312, 313

realism and, 12 , 32 , 33 , 42 , 56 , 57 12 , 32 , 33 , 42 , 56 , 57 12,32,33,42,56,5712,32,33,42,56,57, 285, 312, 351
现实主义和, 12 , 32 , 33 , 42 , 56 , 57 12 , 32 , 33 , 42 , 56 , 57 12,32,33,42,56,5712,32,33,42,56,57 、 285、 312、 351

“weak,” 54 “弱”54
nominalistic vs. realist theory of naming, 4, 308
唯名论与实在论命名理论,4, 308

Non-Being, 153, 230, 258 非存在, 153, 230, 258
beings arising from, 78, 133
众生源自 78, 133
Dao as, 103, 149-52, 154
道如, 103, 149-52, 154

embodying, 152-54 体现,152-54
as function, 150, 151, 153
作为函数,150, 151, 153

gives all things their function, 150
赋予万物功能,150

Laozi and, 150 老子和,150
making use of, 150, 152-54
利用, 150, 152-54

original, 149 原创,149
division within the, 78 78 内部门
Tang Junyi on, 152, 154
唐君毅 上, 152, 154

t i t i tit i and, 151-52  t i t i tit i 以及,151-52
Wang Bi on, 149-53 王碧安,149-53
non-contradiction. See law of noncontradiction
不矛盾。参见不矛盾律

nonduality, 191, 231 非二元性, 191, 231
Emptiness and, 188, 191, 237
空和, 188, 191, 237

Fazang on, 230-31 法藏上,230-31
Huayan and, 230, 236, 237
华严和, 230, 236, 237

Li and, 188, 226, 231, 282
李和, 188, 226, 231, 282

of mind and material form, 281
心灵和物质形态,281

Zhanran on, 242, 297 展然上, 242, 297
noneness. See also nothingness
虚无。另见虚无

oneness and, 134, 135 统一性和, 134, 135
normativity, 317-18 规范性,317-18
norms, 132. See also shu
规范,132。另见 shu

“nothing does it,” 99, 103-5
“什么也做不了” 99, 103-5

nothingness, 36, 103, 144-46, 152, 170. See also noneness
虚无, 36, 103, 144-46, 152, 170。另见虚无

object and subject. See subject and object
客体和主体。查看主体和客体

Ocean Seal Samadhi, 266 海印三昧,266
Odes, 69 颂歌,69
“Off Mountain” school. See Shanwai omniavailability, 2, 4
“山外”学校。参见山外全可用性, 2, 4

inherent entailment as, 241-55
固有蕴涵为,241-55

omnipresence and, 4, 5, 48, 244
无所不在以及, 4, 5, 48, 244

of value, 5 价值,5
omnicentrism, 146, 221, 229
全中心主义, 146, 221, 229

omnipresence, 35,135 无所不在,35,135
Buddha-nature and, 299 佛性与,299
centrality and, 199, 203, 210, 331, 344
中心性和, 199, 203, 210, 331, 344

coherence and, 4, 48, 92, 104, 141, 191, 220, 268, 309, 312, 344
一致性和, 4, 48, 92, 104, 141, 191, 220, 268, 309, 312, 344

Dao and, 92, 96, 121, 134-35, 146, 155 emptiness and, 187, 189
道和、92、96、121、134-35、146、155 空和、187、189

Existence and, 187 存在和,187
Huayan and, 221 华严和,221
ironic idea of, 92 讽刺的想法,92
Li and, 22, 28-30, 80, 114, 121, 134-35, 155, 171, 186-89, 211, 216, 220, 222, 229, 242, 244, 245, 254, 255, 293-95, 297, 301, 312, 315-16, 329
李和、22、28-30、80、114、121、134-35、155、171、186-89、211、216、220、222、229、242、244、245、254、255、293-95 , 297, 301, 312, 315-16, 329

mind, awareness, and, 268
第268章

nature of, 191 性质, 191
negation and, 222 否定,并且,222
omniavailability and, 4, 5, 48, 244
全方位可用性和, 4, 5, 48, 244

paradox of Nirvana and, 199
涅槃悖论,199

Tiantai and, 221, 229, 237, 241, 242, 245, 246, 248-50, 253-55
天台和, 221, 229, 237, 241, 242, 245, 246, 248-50, 253-55

unconditionality and, 35, 191, 203, 210, 220, 229, 268, 287, 293, 294, 301, 305
无条件以及, 35, 191, 203, 210, 220, 229, 268, 287, 293, 294, 301, 305

undifferentiated, 28, 29 未分化, 28, 29
unity and, 114 团结和,114
universals and, 48, 141, 186, 187, 189, 238, 286
通用和, 48, 141, 186, 187, 189, 238, 286

value and, 189, 191 值和, 189, 191
Wang Bi and, 141, 155
王碧和, 141, 155

Zhuang Zhou and, 310 庄周和,310
Omnipresent, 48 无所不在,48
omnipresent instantiation, 315-16
无所不在的实例化,315-16

One, 133-34, 148 一、133-34、148
coherence of, 134 连贯性,134
Dao and, 134, 146 道和, 134, 146
division of, 134 134 的划分
formlessness and, 133, 134
无形体和, 133, 134

in Huainanzi, 133 位于淮南子,133
Li and, 134, 147 李和, 134, 147
nature of, 147, 148 性质, 147, 148
Plotinus and, 23 普罗提诺和,23
solitariness and inclusiveness of, 134
孤独与包容,134

Wang Bi and, 147 王碧和,147
Wang on, 183 王安,183
in Zhuangzi, 78 在庄子,78
one-many problem, 23, 38 一对多问题, 23, 38
one-many relationship, 23, 144, 182 84 , 243 , 330 , 332 182 84 , 243 , 330 , 332 182-84,243,330,332182-84,243,330,332
一对多关系, 23, 144, 182 84 , 243 , 330 , 332 182 84 , 243 , 330 , 332 182-84,243,330,332182-84,243,330,332

One nature, 290, 292, 300
一种性质、290、292、300

One Substance, 266-67 一种物质,266-67
“One True Mind” (Fazang), 264-66
“一心”(法藏),264-66

“One Yin and one Yang,” 64. See also Dao
“一阴一阳”,64。另见“道”

oneness, 133-35. See also t i t i tit i
一体性,133-35。参见 t i t i tit i

(embody, substance) and yong 用 (function)
(体现、实质)和用(功能)

alternative Onenesses, 290
另类一体性,290

Four Onenesses, 214, 229, 252
四个一体,214、229、252

noneness and, 134, 135 虚无和, 134, 135
Ones, multiple, 147 个,多个,147
ontological ambiguity, 192, 202, 208, 210. See also ambiguity
本体论歧义, 192, 202, 208, 210。另见歧义

ontology, 10-12 本体论,10-12
ironic, 157,160 讽刺, 157,160
Li and, 187, 222, 229, 321, 335
李和, 187, 222, 229, 321, 335

negative, 152 阴性,152
two-tiered/two-level, 32, 188-89, 229, 315-16
两层/两级、32、188-89、229、315-16

oppositeness. See also nonduality
对立性。另见非二元性

need to overcome, 324 需要克服,324
opposites, 8, 14, 29, 135. See also reciprocal limiting; unification
相反,8、14、29、135。另见相互限制;统一

Tiantai and, 286 天台和,286
transforming things into their, 85-86
将事物转化为他们的,85-86

union/convergence of, 85-86, 97-98, 101 , 146 , 354 n 23 101 , 146 , 354 n 23 101,146,354 n 23101,146,354 n 23
联合/收敛, 85-86, 97-98, 101 , 146 , 354 n 23 101 , 146 , 354 n 23 101,146,354 n 23101,146,354 n 23

order, 56,132 订单, 56,132
orderliness, 51-52 秩序,51-52
organic order, 31 有机订单,31
organic pattern, 38 有机图案,38
Joseph Needham and, 30-31
约瑟夫·李约瑟和,30-31

organism, 31, 42 有机体, 31, 42
organization, 31 组织, 31
oscillation. See dualisms; opposites; pendulum
振荡。参见二元论;对立面;摆

overperforation, 352n10 穿孔过度,352n10
pantheism, 127 泛神论,127
part/whole relations. See whole/part relations
部分/整体关系。查看整体/部分关系

partial expression, 155 部分表达,155
partial truths, 284 部分事实,284
partiality, 354n20, 355n23. See also
偏爱,354n20,355n23。参见

bias; impartiality 偏见;公正性
patterns, 35-37, 42 模式, 35-37, 42
peace and struggle, 8 pendulum model
和平与斗争,8摆模型

Qian Mu’s, 7-10, 13-15, 44, 45, 51, 62 , 63 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 62 , 63 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 62,63,86,155,211,315,33162,63,86,155,211,315,331
钱穆的, 7-10, 13-15, 44, 45, 51, 62 , 63 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 62 , 63 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 62,63,86,155,211,315,33162,63,86,155,211,315,331

“same” and “different” on, 12-13
“相同”和“不同”,12-13

pendulum range, 67 摆幅范围,67
pendulum swing, center of, 7 , 9 , 10 7 , 9 , 10 7,9,107,9,10, 12 15 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 12 15 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 12-15,44,45,51,62,63,86,13212-15,44,45,51,62,63,86,132, 133 , 211 , 315 , 331 133 , 211 , 315 , 331 133,211,315,331133,211,315,331
摆锤摆动,中心, 7 , 9 , 10 7 , 9 , 10 7,9,107,9,10 , 12 15 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 12 15 , 44 , 45 , 51 , 62 , 63 , 86 , 132 12-15,44,45,51,62,63,86,13212-15,44,45,51,62,63,86,132 , 133 , 211 , 315 , 331 133 , 211 , 315 , 331 133,211,315,331133,211,315,331

Peng Guoxiang, 124 彭国祥,124岁
Peng Meng, 124 彭萌,124
penumbra, 158 半影,158
perfect coherence, 39, 156
完美的连贯性, 39, 156

perfect division, 176-77 完全除法,176-77
Perfect Illumination (yuanming 圓明), 265-67
圆明,265-67

perfect Li , 181 82 Li , 181 82 Li,181-82\mathrm{Li}, 181-82. See also perfection: Li and
完美的 Li , 181 82 Li , 181 82 Li,181-82\mathrm{Li}, 181-82 。另见完美:李和

perfection, 17-18, 182, 267
完美, 17-18, 182, 267

Li and, 176-77, 181-82 李和, 176-77, 181-82
of virtue, 91 德行, 91
perfections, six, 215 完美, 六, 215
perforations, 42, 43 穿孔, 42, 43
perspectival relativism, 75, 311. See also relativistic perspectivism
透视相对主义, 75, 311。另见相对论透视主义

perspectives, 76-77, 309 观点, 76-77, 309
perspectivism, 76, 94 透视主义, 76, 94
subjective, in Wang Bi, 149-55
主观,见王弼,149-55

Zhanran and, 228 湛然和,228
Zhuangzi’s, 5, 60-61, 71-72, 74, 157, 231
庄子, 5, 60-61, 71-72, 74, 157, 231

Peterson, Willard 威拉德·彼得森
coherence and, 38-41, 43, 44, 53, 350n38
连贯性和, 38-41, 43, 44, 53, 350n38

Li and, 38-41, 43, 44, 350n38
李和, 38-41, 43, 44, 350n38

phenomenal appearances, 267, 284
惊人的外观, 267, 284

phenomenal events, 140, 289, 290, 296
现象事件, 140, 289, 290, 296

phenomenal experience, 295, 299-304
非凡的体验, 295, 299-304

phenomenal mind, 294, 296, 304
现象心智, 294, 296, 304

deluded. See deluded mind
迷惑了。见妄心

phenomenal objects, 208, 294
现象物体, 208, 294

phenomenal realm, 235-36 现象境界,235-36
pian 遍, 99, 100
Plato, 23 柏拉图,23 岁
Platonic forms. See Forms
柏拉图式的形式。查看表格

pleasure, coherence as, 16-18
快乐,连贯性,16-18

Plotinus, 23 普罗提诺,23
polarities. See opposites
极性。查看对立面

position (wei 位), 246-51, 253
位置 (wei 位), 246-51, 253

having a, 248, 250 具有, 248, 250
potential functions, 329 势函数,329
potential vs. actual coherence, 39-40
潜在一致性与实际一致性,39-40

potentiality and actuality, 39-40, 219
潜力与现实,39-40, 219

pratītyasamutpāda, 190, 209
普拉提亚萨穆帕达, 190, 209

principle(s), 143, 144, 171, 177, 310
原则, 143, 144, 171, 177, 310

Dao and, 155, 162, 182-84
道和, 155, 162, 182-84

Guo and, 164-65, 171, 177-79, 182 84 182 84 182-84182-84
郭和, 164-65, 171, 177-79, 182 84 182 84 182-84182-84

of human beings as such, 180-81
人类本身,180-81

Li and, 41, 58, 144, 164-65, 171, 172, 177-79, 182, 293, 311, 312, 349 n 20 349 n 20 349 n 20349 n 20
李和、41、58、144、164-65、171、172、177-79、182、293、311、312、 349 n 20 349 n 20 349 n 20349 n 20

mind and, 293 头脑和,293
multiplicity of, 172, 184, 259
重数, 172, 184, 259

negation of all, 311 否定一切,311
of no-principle, 177, 311, 312, 332
无原则的, 177, 311, 312, 332

perfect/ultimate/arrived, 181
完美/终极/到达,181

phenomena and, 289 现象和,289
Wang Bi on, 182, 183
王碧安, 182, 183

Xunzi and, 58-59 荀子与,58-59
productivity, 15. See also coherence
生产力,15。另见一致性

properties of things, 24 事物的属性,24
provisional posit, 232, 233, 246, 257, 277, 285
临时职位、232、233、246、257、277、285

provisional positing, 201, 209. See also under center
临时定位,201、209。另见中心下方

publicness, 83, 86 公共性, 83, 86
Pure Mind 清净心
after attainment of Buddhahood, 250, 267, 274, 275
成佛后250、267、274、275

and Deluded Mind in Huayan thought, 261-68
与华严思想中的迷心,261-68

interpenetration and, 266-68
相互渗透,266-68

of the self-nature, 373 n 31
自性,373 n 31

Pure Original Mind, doctrine of, 288
清净本心教义,288

purity (vs. impurity), 243
纯度(与杂质),243

and types of event (shi), 245
和事件类型(shi),245

Zhanran on, 242-43, 288 展然上, 242-43, 288
purposelessness, 114, 115, 154
无目的, 114, 115, 154

purpose(s), 113, 114, 117, 122, 152, 159
目的, 113, 114, 117, 122, 152, 159

deliberate, 100, 170 故意, 100, 170
human, 115, 126, 127, 211, 340
人类、115、126、127、211、340

ironic, 69 讽刺, 69
Li and, 27, 29, 48, 69, 112-16, 126, 127
李和、27、29、48、69、112-16、126、127

qi and, 112-16 气和,112-16
purposive action/activity, 29, 135, 150, 169
有目的的行动/活动, 29, 135, 150, 169

purposive desires and preferences, 112
有目的的欲望和偏好,112

purposive knowing, 166, 169
有目的的认识, 166, 169

purposive “thinking” (nian), 278
有目的的“思考”(年),278

q i q i qiq i 氣, 109,115  q i q i qiq i 气, 109,115
autonomy and, 337 第337章
Dao and, 95, 100, 109-12, 115-16, 120
道和, 95, 100, 109-12, 115-16, 120

heaven and earth and, 7 , 115 , 328 7 , 115 , 328 7,115,3287,115,328
天地,以及, 7 , 115 , 328 7 , 115 , 328 7,115,3287,115,328

Li and, 7, 21, 36, 37, 39, 43, 64, 100, 110, 112-16, 147, 154, 321, 328, 329, 331, 335-39, 376n9
李和、7、21、36、37、39、43、64、100、110、112-16、147、154、321、328、329、331、335-39、376n9

motion and, 7 运动和,7
nature of, 7 性质, 7
ren and, 328, 329 任和, 328, 329
spontaneity and, 110, 112, 115
自发性和, 110, 112, 115

vortex of, 331 漩涡, 331
Yin-Yang and, 95, 333, 339
阴阳和, 95, 333, 339

Zhu Xi and, 321-22, 328, 329, 333, 336-39, 376n9
朱熹和, 321-22, 328, 329, 333, 336-39, 376n9

Qian Mu (Ch’ien Mu), 7-8, 345n4
钱穆 (Chiien Mu), 7-8, 345n4

pendulum model, 7-8, 13-15, 44, 45 , 51 , 62 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 45 , 51 , 62 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 45,51,62,86,155,211,315,33145,51,62,86,155,211,315,331
摆模型, 7-8, 13-15, 44, 45 , 51 , 62 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 45 , 51 , 62 , 86 , 155 , 211 , 315 , 331 45,51,62,86,155,211,315,33145,51,62,86,155,211,315,331

“Qian Mu’s Pendulum,” 7-9, 12-15
《钱穆摆》7-9、12-15

qing 情. See also delusive disturbance
情情。另见妄想性干扰

Li and, 99-100, 122, 123
李和, 99-100, 122, 123

meaning, 99 , 100 , 122 , 123 , 357 n 18 99 , 100 , 122 , 123 , 357 n 18 99,100,122,123,357 n 1899,100,122,123,357 n 18 意义, 99 , 100 , 122 , 123 , 357 n 18 99 , 100 , 122 , 123 , 357 n 18 99,100,122,123,357 n 1899,100,122,123,357 n 18
Qing Confucians, 21-22, 26
清代儒家,21-22、26

Qiong 窮, 352 n 18
穷, 352 n 18

“Qiwulun,” 60, 129 《奇物论》60, 129
ran 然 (rightness), 60, 140, 160
然 (正确), 60, 140, 160

“rationalizing” and “irrationalizing” tendencies, 74 , 79 , 81 , 82 74 , 79 , 81 , 82 74,79,81,8274,79,81,82
“合理化”和“非理性化”倾向, 74 , 79 , 81 , 82 74 , 79 , 81 , 82 74,79,81,8274,79,81,82

Real-Attribute, 1, 196, 217-18, 282, 289, 298, 300
真实属性, 1, 196, 217-18, 282, 289, 298, 300

Wisdom of the Real-Attribute, 375n64
实属性智慧,375n64

realism, 53. See also nominalism: realism and
实在论,53。另见唯名论:实在论和

defined, 3 定义, 3
Li and, 312, 313 李和, 312, 313
reason, 24 , 30 , 135 24 , 30 , 135 24,30,13524,30,135 原因, 24 , 30 , 135 24 , 30 , 135 24,30,13524,30,135
reciprocal limiting, 98-100, 172
相互限制, 98-100, 172

reciprocal ordering, 155 , 156 , 172 155 , 156 , 172 155,156,172155,156,172
相互排序, 155 , 156 , 172 155 , 156 , 172 155,156,172155,156,172

reciprocity, 126 , 135 , 148 , 323 , 324 126 , 135 , 148 , 323 , 324 126,135,148,323,324126,135,148,323,324, 326, 361 n 12
互惠, 126 , 135 , 148 , 323 , 324 126 , 135 , 148 , 323 , 324 126,135,148,323,324126,135,148,323,324 , 326, 361 n 12

“Record of the Music, The” (“Yueji”), 61 64 , 131 61 64 , 131 61-64,13161-64,131
《乐记》(《乐记》), 61 64 , 131 61 64 , 131 61-64,13161-64,131

relativistic perspectivism, 74. See also perspectival relativism
相对论透视主义,74。另见透视相对主义

ren 仁, 328, 332. See also benevolence
ren 仁, 328, 332。另见仁慈

Center and, 331 中心和,331
Cheng Yi on, 322 成毅安, 322
coherence and, 323, 324 连贯性和, 323, 324
Dao and, 330 道和,330
Li and, 322-25, 328-30, 332
李和, 322-25, 328-30, 332

meanings and nature of, 322-24, 326, 328
322-24、326、328 的含义和性质

reciprocity and, 323,324 互惠,323,324
y i y i yiy i and, 322-23  y i y i yiy i 以及,322-23
Zhu Xi on, 323-24, 326, 332
朱熹论, 323-24, 326, 332

ren zhi qing 人之情, 119 , 357 n 18 119 , 357 n 18 119,357 n 18119,357 n 18
人之情, 119 , 357 n 18 119 , 357 n 18 119,357 n 18119,357 n 18

“respect,” 11, 12 “尊重”11、12
rightness, 50, 59. See also ran
正确性, 50, 59。另请参阅跑

benevolence and, 67, 175-76, 326, 333 35 333 35 333-35333-35
仁和, 67, 175-76, 326, 333 35 333 35 333-35333-35

coherence and, 50 连贯性,50
ritual 仪式
Li and, 58 李和,58
music and, 58, 61-63 音乐和, 58, 61-63
ritual coherence, 51 仪式连贯性,51
Roots and Traces, doctrine of, 216
根源与痕迹,学说,216

rules and ruling, 143 规则和裁决,143
sage-kings, 55 圣王,55
Samadhis, 266, 274 三摩地, 266, 274
sameness. See difference: sameness and
相同性。看到差异:相同和

samsarâ, 186, 187, 191, 193, 207, 264, 286, 299
轮回、186、187、191、193、207、264、286、299

seeing, 35 看见, 35
self, non-self, and ultimate truth, 195, 198
我、非我和胜义谛,195、198

self and other, existence of, 230
自我和他人,存在,230

self-interest, 140 自身利益,140
self-negation, 4, 152, 157, 222, 223, 285, 294, 301, 310 self-so (ziran 自然), 159-61, 173-74, 311 , 362 n 32 311 , 362 n 32 311,362n32311,362 \mathrm{n} 32
自我否定, 4, 152, 157, 222, 223, 285, 294, 301, 310 自然, 159-61, 173-74, 311 , 362 n 32 311 , 362 n 32 311,362n32311,362 \mathrm{n} 32

coherence(s) of, 172 172 的连贯性
Dao and, 159 道和,159
definitions, meanings, and nature of, 159 , 162 , 163 , 172 73 159 , 162 , 163 , 172 73 159,162,163,172-73159,162,163,172-73
的定义、含义和性质, 159 , 162 , 163 , 172 73 159 , 162 , 163 , 172 73 159,162,163,172-73159,162,163,172-73

Guo Xiang and, 141, 161-63, 165 84 165 84 165-84165-84
郭祥和, 141, 161-63, 165 84 165 84 165-84165-84

harmony and, 179-80 和谐和,179-80
heaven and earth and, 131, 139, 155,180
天地和, 131, 139, 155,180

Li and, 139-41, 156, 173-83
李和, 139-41, 156, 173-83

unintelligibility and, 172
难以理解,并且,172

Wang Bi on, 156 王碧安,156
self-transcendence, 219 自我超越,219
selfhood, 165 . See also self-so
自我,165。另见自我如此

selfsame entities, 10, 12, 53, 154
相同实体、10、12、53、154

selfsame Li, 332 同李,332
separation, 8 分离, 8
Li and, 28, 29 李和, 28, 29
Shanjia school, 22 单家学校,22
Shanwai, 22, 293 山外, 22, 293
shi 事, 5, 160 事事, 5, 160
Fazang on, 222, 263 法藏上, 222, 263
fei and, 5, 75, 309-10
费和, 5, 75, 309-10

Li and, 22, 139, 154, 164, 186, 187, 214, 216-23, 229, 237, 238, 258-59, 263, 266, 267, 269-70, 304, 337, 367 n 23
李和, 22, 139, 154, 164, 186, 187, 214, 216-23, 229, 237, 238, 258-59, 263, 266, 267, 269-70, 304, 337, 367 n 23

mind as, 304 心如,304
nature of, 5, 222, 237, 310
5、222、237、310 的性质

purity, impurity, and, 243, 245
第243章 245

Three Thousand, 259 三千,259
truth and, 186, 217 真相和, 186, 217
Zhiyi and, 216, 217, 220
智易和, 216, 217, 220

“Shi ren pian” (Cheng), 322
《世人篇》(程),322

shili 事理, 26 事理, 26
Shun, Kwong-loi, 357n19, 358n23
舜光来, 357n19, 358n23

Siming Zhili, 22 思明志立,22岁
simpliciter, 6, 10, 12, 247, 291, 310, 317,322
简化器, 6, 10, 12, 247, 291, 310, 317,322

simultaneity, 230-31, 233
同时性, 230-31, 233

sincere heart, 59 真诚的心59
sincerity, xvi, 122, 322. See also Inner Coherence
真诚, xvi, 122, 322。另见内在连贯性
Six Identities, Tiantai doctrine of, 212
六相,天台教义,212

social codes, 58 社会规范,58
Song Neo-Confucians, 7, 26
宋理学, 7, 26

soteriology, 186 救世论,186
spirit vs. matter, 25 精神与物质,25
spiritual attainment, levels of, 262-63
精神成就,级别,262-63

spontaneity, 37, 170-72 自发性, 37, 170-72
Dao and, 110, 115-16 道和, 110, 115-16
Joseph Needham and, 31 约瑟夫·李约瑟,31
Li and, 31, 37, 110, 112, 115-16, 171
李和, 31, 37, 110, 112, 115-16, 171

qi and, 110, 112, 115
气和, 110, 112, 115

second-order, 171 二阶,171
spontaneous coherence, 60
自发连贯性,60

spontaneous nature of humans, 77
人类的自发本性,77

spontaneous vs. deliberate, 74-75
自发与故意,74-75

Srāvakas, 194-95, 200, 204-6, 214-16, 365n11
声闻, 194-95, 200, 204-6, 214-16, 365n11

stillness, 112-19, 154, 162
静止, 112-19, 154, 162

subject and object, reversibility of, 374 n 61 374 n 61 374 n 61374 n 61
主体和客体,可逆性, 374 n 61 374 n 61 374 n 61374 n 61

subject-object dichotomy, 29
主客体二分法,29

subject-object split, 27-28
主客体分裂,27-28

subsumption. See also intersubsumption; specific topics
包容。另见相互包容;具体主题

deluded, 294, 301 迷惑, 294, 301
Suchness, 217, 246-51, 265-66. See also dharmatā
萨尼斯,217、246-51、265-66。另见法性

Ten Suchnesses, 204, 205, 271, 313
十如、204、205、271、313

suffering, 298. See also samsarâ
苦难,298。另见轮回

Buddhism and, 189, 216, 298, 299
佛教和, 189, 216, 298, 299

conditionality vs. unconditionality and, 190, 210, 211, 215, 220, 298
有条件与无条件以及, 190, 210, 211, 215, 220, 298

dharma and, 189 佛法和,189
emptiness and, 341 第341章
Li and, 217, 219, 297-98, 301, 303, 304
李和、217、219、297-98、301、303、304

liberation/freedom from, 47, 186, 187, 189, 191-93, 197, 198, 210, 214, 216, 217, 219, 298, 312-13, 319 , 341 , 343 , 364 n 6 319 , 341 , 343 , 364 n 6 319,341,343,364 n6319,341,343,364 n 6
解放/自由,47, 186, 187, 189, 191-93, 197, 198, 210, 214, 216, 217, 219, 298, 312-13, 319 , 341 , 343 , 364 n 6 319 , 341 , 343 , 364 n 6 319,341,343,364 n6319,341,343,364 n 6

mind and, 282 头脑和,282
Nirvana and, 47, 186, 190-94, 299, 319
涅槃和, 47, 186, 190-94, 299, 319

and nonsuffering, 190 pleasure and, 190
第190章 190

truth and, 197, 198 真相和, 197, 198
types of, 189-90, 277 类型, 189-90, 277
value and, 210,217 值,210,217
Supreme Ultimate. See Great Ultimate/
至尊终极。参见伟大的终极/

Supreme Ultimate 至尊终极
sustainability and value, 9
可持续性和价值,9

synthesis. See unification
合成。查看统一

Taixuan system, 138 太玄系统,138
Taixuanjing (Yang), 6, 310
太玄经(阳), 6, 310

Tang Junyi, 26-27 唐君毅,26-27
convergence and, 183 收敛并且,183
Dao and, 125, 148, 149, 185
道和, 125, 148, 149, 185

emptiness and, 147-48, 154
空虚和, 147-48, 154

Guo and, 183 郭和,183
Laozi and, 148-50 老子与,148-50
on Li, 26, 27, 29, 146-47
论李, 26, 27, 29, 146-47

Non-Being and, 152-54 非存在和,152-54
on subject/object dichotomy, 29
关于主体/客体二分法,29

on t i t i tit i vs. yong, 150 , 152 53 150 , 152 53 150,152-53150,152-53
t i t i tit i 与勇相比, 150 , 152 53 150 , 152 53 150,152-53150,152-53

on unity vs. multiplicity, 26, 29
关于统一性与多样性,26, 29

Wang Bi and, 146-50, 152-54, 183
王弼和, 146-50, 152-54, 183

“Yuan Li,” 26 “李媛”26
Zhouyi and, 148 《周易》和,148
Tao Te Ching. See Laozi
道德经.见老子

Ten Suchnesses, 204, 205, 271, 313
十如、204、205、271、313

“ten thousand things,” 79, 95, 96, 117
“万事” 79, 95, 96, 117

Ten Wondrous Gates, 266 十妙门,266
thoughts, 277-78. See also specific topics
想法,277-78。另请参阅特定主题

and non-thought, 277 和非思想,277
“not-yet-thinking,” 278-79
“尚未思考”278-79

space between, 277 之间的空间, 277
Three Thousand, 243-44, 255, 289-90, 315
三千、243-44、255、289-90、315

as dependent co-arising, 242
作为缘起共生,242

dharmas and, 286, 288, 296, 297, 313
佛法及, 286, 288, 296, 297, 313

inherent entailment and, 280, 285, 370 n 24 , 373 n 43 370 n 24 , 373 n 43 370 n 24,373 n 43370 n 24,373 n 43
第280章 285、 370 n 24 , 373 n 43 370 n 24 , 373 n 43 370 n 24,373 n 43370 n 24,373 n 43

interpervasion and, 204, 205, 294
204, 205, 294 相互渗透

meaning and significance of the number, 204, 205, 313, 370n26, 373n43
数字 204、205、313、370n26、373n43 的含义和意义

and the mind, 279, 280, 293, 296.
和心灵,279、280、293、296。

See also deluded mind: Three
又见迷惑心:三

Thousand and 千和
Three Thousand (continued)
三千人(续)

Mohezhiguan and, 370n24 漠河之关和, 370n24
nature and, 271, 274, 292-93, 298, 300-302, 370n24
自然和, 271, 274, 292-93, 298, 300-302, 370n24

as phenomena, 302 作为现象,302
Zhanran on, 289, 292 展然上, 289, 292
Zhili on, 250, 274, 276, 280, 285, 289, 292-94, 297, 298, 300-302, 370n24, 371n26
直隶, 250, 274, 276, 280, 285, 289, 292-94, 297, 298, 300-302, 370n24, 371n26

Zhiyi and, 205, 271, 293
智易和, 205, 271, 293

Three Thousand coherences, 294
三千连贯,294

Three Thousand events, 261, 269, 289, 293, 300-302, 341-42, 370n26
三千个事件、261、269、289、293、300-302、341-42、370n26

Three Thousand Lis, 244, 250, 259, 261, 269, 289, 291, 293, 294, 298, 300, 302, 332, 341-42
三千里、244、250、259、261、269、289、291、293​​、294、298、300、302、332、341-42

Three Thousand quiddities, 288, 292, 293, 296
三千元, 288, 292, 293, 296

Three Thousand shi, 259 三千石,259
Three Truths, 221, 228, 230, 252, 257, 284, 290. See also Emptiness; Provisional Positing
三谛,221, 228, 230, 252, 257, 284, 290。亦见空性;临时定位

Buddha-nature and, 373n55
佛性与,373n55

center and, 199-200, 211, 228, 232
中心和, 199-200, 211, 228, 232

coherence and, 19, 201, 205-7, 213, 228, 243, 277, 296, 337-38
连贯性和, 19, 201, 205-7, 213, 228, 243, 277, 296, 337-38

conditionality, unconditionality, and, 337 38 337 38 337-38337-38
有条件性、无条件性,以及, 337 38 337 38 337-38337-38

determinacy and, 219 确定性,以及,219
determination and, 197, 213-14
决定和, 197, 213-14

emptiness and, 195, 198-201, 207, 213, 221, 228, 232, 246, 247, 257
空和、195、198-201、207、213、221、228、232、246、247、257

identity and, 231 身份和,231
jia and, 285 贾和, 285
Li and, 212, 213, 219, 233, 255, 270, 291, 295, 312, 337
李和、212、213、219、233、255、270、291、295、312、337

Nāgārjuna and, 195, 280 龙树和, 195, 280
nature of, 19, 195, 201, 211-12, 224, 233, 253
性质, 19, 195, 201, 211-12, 224, 233, 253

vs. Two Truths, 223 与两个真理,223
yuanqi and, 201 元气和, 201
Zhanran and, 219, 228 展然和, 219, 228
Zhiyi on, 212-14, 232, 280
智易上、212-14、232、280

ti 體 (embody, substance) and yong 用 (function), 186-87, 242
ti 体(体现、实质)和 yong 用(功能), 186-87, 242

commonalities between, 154 comparison of, 154-55
154 之间的共性 154-55 的比较

distinction between, 152 之间的区别,152
Existence and, 187 存在和,187
flexibility of the categories of, 334
类别的灵活性,334

Li/qi and, 154 力/气和,154
value and, 187 价值和,187
Wang Bi and the advent of t i t i tit i and yong as ironic structure, 149-55. See also under Wang Bi
王弼的出现 t i t i tit i 和勇作为反讽结构,149-55。另见王弼

Tiantai thought, 22. See also specific topics
天台思想,22。另见专题

deluded mind and, 273, 276, 279, 281, 284, 289, 303
妄心、273、276、279、281、284、289、303

emptiness and, 216, 222, 234, 258
空虚和, 216, 222, 234, 258

global coherence and, 19, 188, 205-7, 253, 258, 277, 296
全球一致性,19, 188, 205-7, 253, 258, 277, 296

vs. Huayan thought, 256-59, 262-63
与华严思想对比,256-59、262-63

appearance and reality in, 220-29
表象与现实,220-29

existence and nonexistence in, 230-35
存在与不存在,230-35

irony of coherence in, 256-59
连贯性的讽刺,256-59

mind in, 263 记住,263
interpervasion and, 203, 204, 235
相互渗透和, 203, 204, 235

Li in early, 210-20 李早,210-20
local coherence and, 19, 188, 205-7, 247, 253, 258, 269, 285, 296, 342
局部一致性和, 19, 188, 205-7, 247, 253, 258, 269, 285, 296, 342

mind and the Nature in, 268-93
心灵与自然,268-93

omnipresence and, 221, 229, 237, 241, 242, 245, 246, 248-50, 253-55
无所不在,221、229、237、241、242、245、246、248-50、253-55

on truth, 194-210 关于真理,194-210
wave, water, and mud in, 241-55, 295, 369n51
波浪、水和泥浆,241-55, 295, 369n51

Zhanran and, 194, 227, 236, 241, 274, 292, 372n28
展然和, 194, 227, 236, 241, 274, 292, 372n28

Zhili and, 194, 261, 269, 270, 299, 302-4
直隶和, 194, 261, 269, 270, 299, 302-4

Zhiyi and, 194, 196, 217, 280
智易和, 194, 196, 217, 280

time, 11 时间, 11
togetherness, 4 团结, 4
value and, 44 值,44
tong, 52-53, 55 通, 52-53, 55
transcendence, 9-10, 25, 36, 204, 219, 316 17 316 17 316-17316-17
超越, 9-10, 25, 36, 204, 219, 316 17 316 17 316-17316-17

coherence and, 39 连贯性,39
of conditionality, 298 条件性,298
vs. dependence on the world, 25
与对世界的依赖,25
Huayan thought and, 189, 236
华严思想和, 189, 236

Li and, 22, 39, 43, 118, 241, 287, 315,316
李和, 22, 39, 43, 118, 241, 287, 315,316

negation and, 317, 321 否定和, 317, 321
transcendent Mind, 266, 267, 293
超越心灵,266, 267, 293

transcendental Dao or creator, 148, 149, 161, 162
超验的道或创造者,148, 149, 161, 162

transcendentalism, 40. See also antitranscendentalism
超验主义,40。另见反超验主义

triangle, equilaterality and equiangularity of a, 200, 286, 287, 289, 337
三角形、a、200、286、287、289、337 的等边性和等角性

truth(s). See also conventional truth;
真相。另见传统真理;

Nāgārjuna; Three Truths; ultimate truth
龙树;三真理;最终真理

apophatic real, 193 疏离真实,193
importance of, 314 的重要性, 314
Li and, 28, 100, 186
李和, 28, 100, 186

Lotus Sutra and, 194-97, 211-12, 230 partial, 284
《法华经》及,194-97,211-12,230部分,284

suffering and, 197, 198 痛苦和, 197, 198
Tiantai on, 194-210 天台上,194-210
unconditionality and, 193, 228, 284, 337 38 337 38 337-38337-38
无条件性以及, 193, 228, 284, 337 38 337 38 337-38337-38

Two Truth system, categories of, 197
两个真理系统,类别,197

Two Truths, 191-93, 195, 197, 200, 223
两个真理,191-93, 195, 197, 200, 223

types, 83 类型, 83
ultimate Li . See perfect Li
终极李。见完美李

ultimate truth, 300 最终真理,300
conventional truth and, 186, 195-200, 208, 218, 228, 364n7
传统真理和, 186, 195-200, 208, 218, 228, 364n7

emptiness and, 193, 199, 200, 208
空性和, 193, 199, 200, 208

as the end of suffering, 197
作为痛苦的终结,197

Li and, 186, 217, 218
李和, 186, 217, 218

Nāgārjuna and, 197, 200 龙树和, 197, 200
nature of, 192 性质, 192
provisional truth and, 194, 199, 205, 206, 208, 217
临时真相以及, 194, 199, 205, 206, 208, 217

self, non-self, and, 195, 198
自我、非自我以及, 195, 198

unbiased, 88-89, 92, 95-96, 98, 117, 304. See also gong; impartiality unconditional omnipresent, 229, 287, 292, 301, 304-5
公正、88-89、92、95-96、98、117、304。另见锣;公正无条件无所不在, 229, 287, 292, 301, 304-5

unconditionality, 36, 304. See also Nirvana centrality and, 209-10, 214, 220, 228, 287, 294, 312
无条件性, 36, 304。另见涅盘中心性和, 209-10, 214, 220, 228, 287, 294, 312

conditionality and, 191, 193, 199, 209-10, 248, 251, 286, 301, 337-38
条件和, 191, 193, 199, 209-10, 248, 251, 286, 301, 337-38

emptiness and, 209, 248, 292, 294
空虚和, 209, 248, 292, 294

Li and, 210, 216, 220, 270, 292, 294, 301, 303, 304
李和、210、216、220、270、292、294、301、303、304

omnipresence and, 35 , 191 , 203 35 , 191 , 203 35,191,20335,191,203, 210, 220, 229, 268, 287, 293, 294, 301, 305
无所不在并且, 35 , 191 , 203 35 , 191 , 203 35,191,20335,191,203 , 210, 220, 229, 268, 287, 293, 294, 301, 305

suffering and, 190, 210, 211, 215, 220, 298
痛苦和, 190, 210, 211, 215, 220, 298

truth and, 193, 228, 284, 337-38
真相和, 193, 228, 284, 337-38

value and, 190, 203, 210, 213, 305
值和、190、203、210、213、305

unconditioned, 191, 285-86, 288-89, 291-92
无条件、191、285-86、288-89、291-92

underdetermination, 351n10
欠定,351n10

unification, 85 . See also convergence and the ability to join things and create a new quality, 85
统一,85。另请参阅融合以及连接事物并创造新质量的能力,85

unity, 28, 113-14, 133-34. See also t i t i tit i 體 (embody) and yong 用 (function)
统一,28、113-14、133-34。参见 t i t i tit i 体(体现)和用(功能)

vs. division/differentiation, 29, 63, 113, 187-88
与分裂/分化, 29, 63, 113, 187-88

holding to, 113-14 坚持,113-14
vs. multiplicity, 26, 29 与多重性, 26, 29
Universal of Dao, 129 道之宇宙,129
universal universal, 189 通用 通用,189
Dao and, 96, 129 道和, 96, 129
Li and, 30, 80, 186-88, 229
李和, 30, 80, 186-88, 229

and the Omnipresent, 141, 186-89, 238
和无所不在,141, 186-89, 238

Wang Bi and, 141 王碧和,141
universality, 83, 86-89, 95-96, 98, 103, 186
普遍性, 83, 86-89, 95-96, 98, 103, 186

universalizaiton, 102 普遍化,102
universals, 31-32, 84, 95-96, 188-89, 344
通用、31-32、84、95-96、188-89、344

Dao and, 92 道和,92
Li and, 23, 302, 303, 315, 342
李和、23、302、303、315、342

nature of, 229 性质, 229
omnipresence and, 48, 141, 186, 187, 189, 238, 286
无所不在,48、141、186、187、189、238、286

words and, 83, 87, 101
字和, 83, 87, 101

value, 5 值,5
fusion of fact and, 23-24, 37
事实与融合, 23-24, 37

harmony and, 65 和谐,65
Li and, 27 李和,27岁
omnipresence and, 189, 191
无所不在,并且, 189, 191

suffering and, 210, 217 第210章 217
unconditionality and, 190, 203, 210, 213, 305
无条件性以及, 190, 203, 210, 213, 305

Xunzi on, 50 荀子上,50
vanishing, 170, 171, 173, 176, 178, 180, 182, 183
消失, 170, 171, 173, 176, 178, 180, 182, 183

vanishing convergence, 166,171
消失收敛,166,171

Li as, 157 68 157 68 157-68157-68 李如, 157 68 157 68 157-68157-68
vanishing merging, 168-70, 175
消失合并, 168-70, 175

verbs, 35, 223, 280. See also Li: as verb
动词,35, 223, 280。另见 Li:作为动词

vertex-vortex model, 14, 45, 315, 318, 339 , 341 42 , 344 339 , 341 42 , 344 339,341-42,344339,341-42,344
顶点-涡流模型, 14, 45, 315, 318, 339 , 341 42 , 344 339 , 341 42 , 344 339,341-42,344339,341-42,344

acupuncture meridians and, 45, 318, 341, 342
针灸经络、45、318、341、342

centrality and, 210, 331, 338
中心性和, 210, 331, 338

coherence and, 45 , 155 , 337 , 341 45 , 155 , 337 , 341 45,155,337,34145,155,337,341 连贯性,并且, 45 , 155 , 337 , 341 45 , 155 , 337 , 341 45,155,337,34145,155,337,341
determination and, 317 第317章
events and, 342 第342章
inclusivity and, 317 包容性,以及,317
intelligibility and, 344 第344章
Li and, 45, 155, 315-19, 321-22, 330 , 331 , 336 39 , 341 330 , 331 , 336 39 , 341 330,331,336-39,341330,331,336-39,341
李和, 45, 155, 315-19, 321-22, 330 , 331 , 336 39 , 341 330 , 331 , 336 39 , 341 330,331,336-39,341330,331,336-39,341

mind and, 336 第336章
multilocal/omnipresent instantiation and, 316
[第 316 章]

normativity and, 317-18 规范性和,317-18
ren and, 324 任和,324
transcendence and, 316-17
超越和,316-17

virtue, 23 美德, 23
does not see virtue, 151
没有看到德行,151

ironic, 19 讽刺, 19
non-virtue as the highest, 150, 151
无德为最高, 150, 151

perfection of, 91 完美, 91
virtues, 334 美德,334
benevolence and, 327, 332
仁和, 327, 332

center and, 308 中心和,308
Cheng Hao and, 325 程浩和,325
four virtues of Zhouyi, 323, 327-28, 333 34 333 34 333-34333-34
《周易》四德,323、327-28、 333 34 333 34 333-34333-34

Li and, 73, 129, 325
李和, 73, 129, 325

Mencian, 323, 328 孟子, 323, 328
ren and, 323-26 任和,323-26
of the seasons, 333-34 季节,333-34
of Zhouyi, 327 《周易》,327
Zhu Xi on, 326 朱熹论,326
virtuosity, 73, 78, 109-12. See also de; De
精湛技艺,73, 78, 109-12。另见 de;德

Dao and, 73, 78, 119-22, 124, 128, 130, 133, 150, 359n27
道和, 73, 78, 119-22, 124, 128, 130, 133, 150, 359n27

Unmanifest, 128 未显现,128
vortex-around-a-vertex, 318, 319, 330, 337. See also vertex-vortex model
顶点周围涡流、318、319、330、337。另请参见顶点涡流模型
Wang Bi, 155-57. See also Laozi commentary(ies): Wang Bi’s
王弼,155-57。另见老子注释:王弼

Dao/Li relation and, 155, 156, 164
道/理关系与, 155, 156, 164

determinacy, indeterminacy, and, 145
确定性、不确定性,以及,145

emptiness and, 147-48, 154, 187
空虚和, 147-48, 154, 187

Guo Xiang and, 164, 168, 182-83
郭祥和, 164, 168, 182-83

on hexagrams, 141-43, 147, 148, 154-57, 183
卦象、141-43、147、148、154-57、183

key insight and essence of the approach of, 141
141 方法的关键见解和本质

Li as convergence of coherence and incoherence in, 141-49, 164, 173, 182-84, 311
Li作为连贯性和非连贯性的融合,141-49, 164, 173, 182-84, 311

methodological mission statement for reading Zhouyi, 141-42, 146
阅读《周易》的方法论使命宣言,141-42, 146

Non-Being and, 149-54 非存在和,149-54
overview, 141 概述,141
principle and, 182 原则和,182
on relation between Dao and De, 149
论道与德的关系,149

on ren, 323 任上,323
subjective perspectivism in, 149-55
主观视角主义,149-55

Tang Junyi and, 146-50, 152-54, 183
唐君毅和, 146-50, 152-54, 183

“teleology” in the thought of, 143
思想中的“目的论”,143

on things, 166 关于事物,166
ti and, 150-52, 154, 157, 187, 323
钛和, 150-52, 154, 157, 187, 323

yong and, 150, 154 勇和, 150, 154
Wang Yangming, 21, 23, 166, 335-36, 340
王阳明, 21, 23, 166, 335-36, 340

water/wave metaphor, 287 水/波浪的隐喻,287
Fazang and, 238, 240, 265, 368n51
法藏和, 238, 240, 265, 368n51

in Huayan thought, 235-41
华严思想,235-41

mind and, 265 头脑和,265
water, wave, and mud in Tiantai, 241-55, 295, 369n51
天台的水、浪、泥,241-55、295、369n51

Watson, Burton, 354n23 沃森,伯顿,354n23
Way, the, 65 方式,65
wen 文, 52-53 文 , 52-53
wenli 文理, 26, 29, 41
wetness. See water/wave metaphor
潮湿。参见水/波浪隐喻

whole/part epistemology, 285
整体/部分认识论,285

whole/part relation(s), 84-85, 88, 89, 101, 112, 354n23
整体/部分关系, 84-85, 88, 89, 101, 112, 354n23

Dao and, 91, 92, 94, 101-3, 145
道和, 91, 92, 94, 101-3, 145

Li and, 91, 145, 229
李和, 91, 145, 229

list of, 92 列表, 92
unity of particulars into a whole, 102
将细节统一为一个整体,102

Zhili and, 293-96 直隶和,293-96
Zhili on, 293 织里安,293
wholeness, 188 完整性, 188
“wild card” perspective, 5, 309
“通配符”视角,5, 309

will, 27 意志, 27
“windstorm” story (Zhuangzi), 129
《暴风雨》故事(庄子),129

wisdom, 111 智慧, 111
benevolence and, 65 , 327 , 333 65 , 327 , 333 65,327,33365,327,333
仁慈和, 65 , 327 , 333 65 , 327 , 333 65,327,33365,327,333

contemplation and, 371 n 26 , 374 n 61 371 n 26 , 374 n 61 371n26,374n61371 \mathrm{n} 26,374 \mathrm{n} 61, 375 n 64 375 n 64 375 n 64375 n 64
沉思和, 371 n 26 , 374 n 61 371 n 26 , 374 n 61 371n26,374n61371 \mathrm{n} 26,374 \mathrm{n} 61 , 375 n 64 375 n 64 375 n 64375 n 64

Wittenborn, Allen, 350n38
艾伦·维滕伯恩,350n38

woli 我理, 179, 181
Wondrous Provisional Positing, 285
奇妙的临时定位,285

words, 86-87. See also grammar
字,86-87。另请参阅语法

compared with communities, 83 . See also community word(s)
与社区相比,83 .另请参阅社区词

Dao and, 96 道和,96
as unifying, 92 作为统一,92
work and rest, 8 工作与休息,8
wuli 物理, 26
xing 性 (unchanging nature)
性(不变的本性)

determinacy and, 162, 164, 362n32
确定性和, 162, 164, 362n32

Guo Xiang and, 164, 362n32
郭翔和, 164, 362n32

Li and, 55, 78, 162, 212, 270, 370n23
李和, 55, 78, 162, 212, 270, 370n23

Mencius and, 3, 17, 88, 308
孟子与,3,17,88,308

Tiantai conception of, 270 xin and, 272, 274, 285, 286. See also xinxing
天台构想,270 xin 和, 272, 274, 285, 286。另见 xinxing

Zhiyi on, 212 智易上,212
xingli 性理, 26 性理, 26
“Xinshu shang,” 108-11, 116-19, 122, 125,139
《新书商》108-11、116-19、122、125,139

“Xinshu xia,” 108, 109, 118
《新书侠》108、109、118

xinxing 心性, 270-74, 286, 288, 291, 370n22
心性, 270-74, 286, 288, 291, 370n22

xuanli 玄理, 26 玄理, 26
Xuanxue, 137, 157 玄雪, 137, 157
Xunzi, 6, 62, 72, 87, 351n10. See also Greatest Coherence
荀子, 6, 62, 72, 87, 351n10.另请参见最大一致性

on Benevolence and Rightness, 59
论仁义,59

on harmony and coherence, 58
关于和谐与连贯,58

on human nature, 50-51, 169
论人性,50-51, 169

Ironies of Oneness and Difference and, 49-50, 53, 54, 56
同一性与差异的讽刺,49-50, 53, 54, 56

nominalism vs. realism and, 56 . See also under Xunzi
唯名论与实在论,56。参见《荀子》

order, value, and, 50,51 顺序、值和 50,51
on the relation between Li and leitypes, 52
关于Li和leitypes之间的关系,52

ritual and, 58, 62, 63
仪式和, 58, 62, 63

“weak nominalism” embraced by, 54
54 所拥护的“弱唯名论”

Xunzi, 108 荀子,108
“Jiebi” chapter, 100 《解壁》篇,100
Li as the “Greatest Coherence” in the, 49-59
李作为“最大的一致性”,49-59

nominalistic vs. realist theory of naming in, 4, 308-9
唯名论与实在论的命名理论,4, 308-9

“Rectification of Names” chapter, 53
“正名”章节,53

Yang Weizhong, 264-66 杨伟忠,264-66
Yang Xiong, 6, 138, 310
杨雄, 6, 138, 310

Yin-Yang, 6, 65-69, 338 阴阳, 6, 65-69, 338
Hall and Ames on, 40
霍尔和艾姆斯,40

heaven and earth and, 63, 66, 67
天地和, 63, 66, 67

hexagrams and, 142, 157, 353n21
卦和, 142, 157, 353n21

qi and, 95, 333, 339
齐和, 95, 333, 339

Yinwenzi:, 124 银文子:,124
yong (function). See also t i t i tit i 體 (embody, substance) and yong 用 (function)
勇(功能)。参见 t i t i tit i 体(体现、实质)和用(功能)

emptiness and, 187 第187章
“Yuan Li” (Tang), 26 《原力》(唐),26
yuanqi 緣起. See dependent co-arising
缘起。参见缘起共生

Zhanran, Jingxi, 228, 255, 282, 284, 299, 368n51, 373n33
展然、京西、228、255、282、284、299、368n51、373n33

contemplation and, 228, 291, 299, 373 n33
沉思和, 228, 291, 299, 373 n33

on Dharma-nature, 242-43, 281
论法性, 242-43, 281

dharmas and, 287-89, 291-92, 296, 297
佛法及, 287-89, 291-92, 296, 297

discussion of “The Non-Duality of Taint and Purity,” 242
关于“污​​染与纯洁的非二元性”的讨论,242

Li and, 219, 220, 227-28, 242, 249, 250, 288, 296, 367n23
李和、219、220、227-28、242、249、250、288、296、367n23

on nature, 291, 292, 296
关于自然,291, 292, 296

on purity and impurity, 242-43, 288
关于纯度和杂质,242-43, 288

on “suchness,” 247-51 关于“如是”,247-51
Three Truths and, 219, 228
三谛,219、228

Tiantai and, 194, 227, 236, 241, 274, 292, 372 n 28
天台和, 194, 227, 236, 241, 274, 292, 372 n 28

on xinxing, 270-71, 291 新兴, 270-71, 291
Zhili and, 250, 274, 285-86, 288, 296, 297, 372n28
直隶和, 250, 274, 285-86, 288, 296, 297, 372n28

Zhiyi and, 247-48, 274, 372n28
执一和, 247-48, 274, 372n28

Zhili, Siming, 232, 243, 245, 250-52, 266, 273-74, 285-86, 371n26
直隶、思明、232、243、245、250-52、266、273-74、285-86、371n26

on Buddha-nature, 299 论佛性,299
on Buddhas, 375 n 61
论诸佛,375 n 61

contemplation and, 290, 293, 297, 302, 371n26
沉思和, 290, 293, 297, 302, 371n26

deluded mind and, 274, 289, 297, 299, 303
迷惑心、274、289、297、299、303

on difference, 290 差异,290
Huayan and, 269 华严和,269
on Li, 22, 216, 255, 261, 262, 269, 270, 288-90, 292-96, 298, 300-302, 337, 375n64
李, 22, 216, 255, 261, 262, 269, 270, 288-90, 292-96, 298, 300-302, 337, 375n64

mind and, 263-64, 269, 270, 272-74, 276, 286, 296, 297, 303
心和、263-64、269、270、272-74、276、286、296、297、303

on motion, 245, 251 议案中, 245, 251
nature and, 289, 292-93, 296-98
自然和, 289, 292-93, 296-98

on Three Thousand, 250, 274, 276, 280, 285, 289, 292-94, 297, 298, 300-302, 370n24, 371n26
三千、250、274、276、280、285、289、292-94、297、298、300-302、370n24、371n26

Tiantai and, 194, 261, 269, 270, 299, 302 4 302 4 302-4302-4 whole-part relation and, 293-96
天台和、194、261、269、270、299、 302 4 302 4 302-4302-4 整体-部分关系和,293-96

on xingqi, 293 论行气,293
Zhiyi, 204, 234-35, 277-80, 299, 305, 367 n 12
执一, 204, 234-35, 277-80, 299, 305, 367 n 12

on centrality, 44, 210, 213, 216, 232
关于中心性, 44, 210, 213, 216, 232

contemplation and, 234-35, 374n61
沉思和, 234-35, 374n61

on deluded sentient beings, 246, 247
论迷惑众生,246、247

on Dharma-nature, 281 论法性,281
on dharmas, 370n22 关于佛法,370n22
doctrine of “Four Onenesses,” 214.
“四个一体”教义,214。

See also Four Onenesses 另见四合一
on emptiness, 232, 233 论空虚, 232, 233
enlightenment experience, 277-78
启蒙经验,277-78

favorite method of meditative inquiry, 365 n 12
最喜欢的冥想探究方法,365 n 12

on interpenetration as identity, 234
关于作为身份的相互渗透,234

Li and, 44, 194, 210, 212-14, 216-18, 220, 245, 258
李和、44、194、210、212-14、216-18、220、245、258

on mind-observation, 370n 22
心观,370n 22

on non-dwelling, 216-18, 245
关于非住宅,216-18, 245

shi and, 216, 217, 220
石和, 216, 217, 220

on “Suchness,” 217, 246-48, 271
关于“如是”,217, 246-48, 271

teaching of “The Samadhi of Awareness of the Process of Attention,” 274
“注意力过程意识三摩地”的教学,274

Three Thousand and, 205, 271, 293
三千和、205、271、293

Three Truths and, 212-14, 232, 280
三谛,212-14, 232, 280

Tiantai and, 194, 196, 217, 280
天台和、194、196、217、280

on xinxing, 370 n 22
新兴路 370 经 22

Zhanran on, 247-48, 274, 281, 372 n 28
展然上, 247-48, 274, 281, 372 n 28

Zhili and, 293 直隶和,293
zhong 中. See Center; centrality
中.参见中心;中心性

zhongie 中節, 63 zhongie 中节, 63
Zhouyi 周易
four virtues of, 323, 327-28, 333-34
四种美德, 323, 327-28, 333-34

“Great Commentary” to, 17, 61, 63, 107, 145
“大注释”至, 17, 61, 63, 107, 145

hexagrams, 14, 66, 67, 141, 145, 148, 155, 156
卦象, 14, 66, 67, 141, 145, 148, 155, 156

Li in the “wings” to the, 64-67
李在“翅膀”来了,64-67

Zhu Daosheng, 186 朱道生,186
Zhu Xi, 21-23, 323-24 朱熹,21-23,323-24
A. C. Graham and, 37-38
AC 格雷厄姆和,37-38

allows for reversibility between substance and function:, 333
允许物质和功能之间的可逆性:,333

benevolence and, 326-28, 330, 332 36 , 338 , 339 332 36 , 338 , 339 332-36,338,339332-36,338,339
仁慈,326-28、330、 332 36 , 338 , 339 332 36 , 338 , 339 332-36,338,339332-36,338,339

coherence and, 40,339 连贯性,40,339
on Great Ultimate, 336 关于伟大的终极,336
Li and, 22, 37-38, 181, 194, 321-23, 326, 328-30, 332, 334-39, 343, 376n9
李和, 22, 37-38, 181, 194, 321-23, 326, 328-30, 332, 334-39, 343, 376n9

Neo-Confucianism and, 321, 343
新儒学和, 321, 343

qi and, 321-22, 328, 329, 333, 336-39, 376n9
气和, 321-22, 328, 329, 333, 336-39, 376n9

ren and, 323-24, 326, 332
仁和, 323-24, 326, 332

Willard Peterson on, 40 威拉德·彼得森 上,40
Zhuangzi, 108. See also Zhuangzi
庄子,108。另见庄子

“Autumn Floods” (“Qiushui”) chapter, 74, 79, 81
《秋水》章,74、79、81

“Community Words” passage, 83, 102, 122, 126, 138
“社区词汇”段落,83、102、122、126、138

Guo Xiang commentary to, 61, 114, 147
郭象评61、114、147

Laozi and, 91, 125, 137-38
老子与, 91, 125, 137-38

later/“inner”/“syncretic” chapters of, 71,129
后面/“内部”/“融合”章节,71,129

heavenly principle (tianli) ironic and non-ironic in, 59-64. See also ironic and non-ironic
天理(天理)讽刺和非讽刺,59-64。另请参见讽刺和非讽刺

Li and, 59, 107, 118, 138
李和, 59, 107, 118, 138

Li and non-ironic coherence in later parts of, 71-72
李和后面部分的非讽刺连贯性,71-72

“Qiushui” passage, 81 《秋水》段落,81
shi and, 160 “type two” appropriations in, 118-19
shi 和,118-19 中的 160 个“第二类”拨款

Xunzi and, 108 荀子和,108
Zhouyi and, 137 《周易》和,137
Zhuangzi (Zhuang Zhou), 3-4, 116. See also Zhuangzi
庄子 (庄周), 3-4, 116. 另见庄子

Dao and, 5, 80-81, 118, 129, 157-58, 211, 310
道和, 5, 80-81, 118, 129, 157-58, 211, 310

Guo Xiang and, 114, 147, 162-63, 179,180
郭翔和, 114, 147, 162-63, 179,180

on harmony and peace, 344
关于和谐与和平,344

on “heavenly” vs. “human,” 74-75
论“天”与“人”,74-75

on leveling, 164 练级时,164
perspectivism, 5, 60-61, 71-72, 74, 157, 231
透视主义, 5, 60-61, 71-72, 74, 157, 231

on preferences vs. desires, 116
关于偏好与欲望,116

on problematic of coherence, universality, and omnipresence, 5-6, 310
关于连贯性、普遍性和无所不在的问题,5-6, 310

“radical,” 97 “激进”97
relativism and, 74, 231 相对主义和, 74, 231
on “the torch of slippage and doubt,” 5, 60, 77, 217
关于“滑移和怀疑的火炬”,5, 60, 77, 217

on things, 166 关于事物,166
tianli and, 60 天利和,60
Wang Bi and, 157 王碧和,157
“wild card perspective,” 5, 309-10
“通配符视角”,5, 309-10

writings, 5 著作, 5
ziran 自然,140,164,169,170,175,
自然,140,164,169,170,175,

177. See also self-so 177.另见“自我”
ziran zhi li 自然之理, 139, 172, 173, 178
自然之理, 139, 172, 173, 178
Beyond Oneness and Difference considers the development of one of the key concepts of Chinese intellectual history, Li. A grasp of the strange history of this term and its seemingly conflicting implications-as oneness and differentiation, as the knowable and as what transeends knowledge, as the good and as the transeendence of good and bad, as order and as omnipresence-raises questions about the most basic building blocks of our thinking. This exploration began in the book’s companion volume, Irvies of Oneness and Difference, which detailed how formative Confucian and Daoist thinkers approached and demarcated concepts of coherence, order, and value, identifying both ironic and non-ironic trends in the elaboration of these core ideas. In the present volume, Brook Ziporyn goes on to examine the implications of Li as they develop in Neo-Daoist metaphysics and in Chinese Buddhism, ultimately becoming foundational to Song and Ming dynasty Neo-Confucianism, the orthodox ideology of late imperial China. Ziporyn’s interrogation goes beyond analysis to reveal the unsuspected range of human thinking on these most fundamental categories of ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.
《超越同异》思考了中国思想史的关键概念之一“礼”的发展。理解这个术语的奇怪历史及其看似相互矛盾的含义——作为统一性和差异性、作为可知性和超越知识的东西、作为善和作为善与恶的超越性、作为秩序和无所不在——提出了关于我们思维的最基本的组成部分。这一探索始于本书的姊妹篇《统一与差异》,该书详细介绍了儒家和道家思想家如何处理和界定连贯性、秩序和价值的概念,并在阐述这些核心思想时识别出讽刺和非讽刺的趋势。在本书中,布鲁克·兹波林继续探讨了“理”在新道家形而上学和中国佛教中的发展,最终成为宋明新儒学(帝制中国晚期的正统意识形态)的基础。齐波林的审问超越了分析,揭示了人类对本体论、形而上学、认识论和伦理学这些最基本范畴的思维范围。
BROOK ZIPORYN is Professor of Chinese Philosophy, Religion, and Comparative Thought at the University of Chicago Divinity School. He is the author of several books, including The Penumbra Unbound: The NeoTavist Philosoply of Guo Xiang and Ironies of Oncness and Difference: Colicrence in Early Chinese Thought; Prolggomena to the Study of Li, both also published by SUNY Press.
BROOK ZIPORYN 是芝加哥大学神学院中国哲学、宗教和比较思想教授。他是多本书的作者,包括《半影无界:郭象的新保守主义哲学》和《本体与差异的讽刺:早期中国思想中的共合》; 《李氏研究序言》,两者均由纽约州立大学出版社出版。
A volume in the SUNY series in Ciinese Philosophy and Culture Roger T. Ames, editor
纽约州立大学中国哲学与文化系列丛书 Roger T. Ames 主编
State University of New Yobk Phess www.sunypress.edu
纽约州立大学菲斯分校 www.sunypress.edu

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