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机械思维

人类的思想如何代表外部世界？什么是思想，它能被科学地研究吗？把心灵看作一种机器有帮助吗？

蒂姆·克兰（Tim Crane ）着手以生动直接的方式回答此类问题，假设他没有哲学或相关知识的先验知识学科。自 1995 年首次出版以来，The Mechanical Mind已经向成千上万的人介绍了当代心灵哲学。蒂姆·克兰（Tim Crane）解释了跨越心灵哲学、人工智能和认知科学的一些基本概念：什么是身心问题;什么是计算机及其工作原理;什么是思想以及计算机和心灵可能具有他们。他研究了从二元论到消除论的不同心智模型，并质疑是否可以没有语言就有思想，以及心灵是否受制于与自然现象相同的因果法则。其结果是对围绕思想和表征概念的理论和论点的迷人探索。

此版本已经过全面修订和更新，包括关于意识的新章节和关于模块化和进化心理学的新章节。书中还有进一步阅读的指南、年表和新的术语表，如 Mentalese、con- con- con- nrelationism 和 intentionality。普通读者和学生以及任何对我们的思维机制感兴趣的人都可以阅读《机械思维》。

蒂姆·克兰（Tim Crane）是伦敦大学学院（University College London）哲学教授，也是伦敦大学高级研究学院（School of Advanced Study， London）哲学项目主任。他是 Elements of Mind 的作者和 The Contents of Experience 的编辑。

但是，灵魂是怎么理解的，又是用什么艺术来读到物质的这种变化或中风 ...... 表示这样的对象？我们在胚胎状态下学会了这样的字母表吗？为什么我们不知道任何这种先天性的担忧呢？ . . . . 通过运动的多样性，我们应该拼出数字、距离、大小、颜色、与它们不同的事物，我们归因于一些秘密的推论。

荣

机械思维
机械思维

对心智、机器和心理表征
对心智、机器和心理表征的哲学介绍的哲学介绍

第二版
第二版

蒂姆·克兰
蒂姆·克兰

1995 年由 Penguin Books
1995 年由PenguinBooks 首次出版首次出版 ...

第二版由Routledge于2003年出版

11 New Fetter Lane，伦敦 EC4P 4EE
11NewFetterLane，伦敦EC4P4EE

由 Routledge
由Routledge 在美国和加拿大同时出版在美国和加拿大同时出版

29 West 35th Street，纽约， NY 10001
29West35thStreet，纽约，NY10001

Routledge 是 Taylor n Francis Group
Routledge是TaylornFrancisGroup 的印记的印记

此版本在泰勒和弗朗西斯电子图书馆出版，2003年。
此版本在泰勒和弗朗西斯电子图书馆出版，2003年。

大英图书馆出版物数据
大英图书馆出版物数据编目编目

本书的目录记录可从大英图书馆
本书的目录记录可从大英图书馆获得获得

美国国会图书馆出版物数据编目已
美国国会图书馆出版物数据编目已请求本书的目录记录请求本书的目录记录

ISBN 0-203-42631-2 主电子书 ISBN
ISBN 0-203-42631-2 主电子书 ISBN

ISBN 0-203-43982-1 （Adobe eReader 格式）
ISBN 0-203-43982-1 （Adobe eReader 格式）

国际标准书号：0-415-29030-9 （hbk）
书号：ISBN0-415-29030-9（hbk）

ISBN 0-415-29031-7 （pbk）
国际标准书号0-415-29031-7（pbk）

图表图表列表列表第一版序言第二版第一版序言第二版序言序言	八九习八九习
简介：机械思维简介：机械心智	1
	2
心灵心灵	5
1 表征 1表征之谜之谜	8
表示表示的概念的概念	11
图片和相似之处图片和相似之处	13
Linguistic representation 语言表示	20
Mental representation 心理表征	22
Thought and consciousness 思想和意识	26
意向	30
Brentano’s thesis 布伦塔诺的论文	36
Conclusion: from representation to the mind 结论：从再现到心灵	40
Further reading 延伸阅读	41
2 Understanding thinkers and their thoughts 2了解思想家和他们的想法	42
The mind–body problem 身心问题	43
Understanding other minds 理解他人的思想	47
The causal picture of thoughts 思想的因果图	54
Common-sense psychology 常识心理学	62
The science of thought: elimination or vindication? 思想的科学：消除还是平反？	70
Theory versus simulation 理论与模拟	77
Conclusion: from representation to computation ...	80
Further reading ...	81

Computers and thought 83 ...

Asking the right questions 83 ...

Computation, functions and algorithms 85 ...

Turing machines 92 ...

Coding and symbols 99 ...

Instantiating a function and computing a function 102 ...

Automatic algorithms 104 ...

Thinking computers? 109 ...

Artificial intelligence 114 ...

Can thinking be captured by rules and representations? 118 ...

The Chinese room 123 ...

Conclusion: can a computer think? 128 ...

Further reading
延伸阅读

Chapter 1 of Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett 1976) is an important discussion of pictorial representation. Ian Hacking’s Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975) is a very readable semi-historical ac- count of the relation between ideas and linguistic representation. A good introduction to the philosophy of language is Alex Miller’s Philosophy of Language (London: UCL Press 1997). More advanced is Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal, Knowledge of Meaning: an Introduction to Semantic Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995) which integrates ideas from recent philosophy of language and linguistics. An excellent collection of essential readings in this area of the philosophy of language is A.W. Moore (ed.) Meaning and Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993). For more on the idea of intentionality, see Chapter 1 of my Elements of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001). An important discussion is Robert Stalnaker’s Inquiry (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1984), Chapters 1 and 2. John Searle’s Intentionality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983) is an accessible book on the phenomena of intentionality. A useful collection of essays, many of them quite technical, on the idea of a ‘propositional attitude’ is Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames (eds.), Propositions and Attitudes (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1988). The best one-volume collection of readings in the philosophy of mind in general is still David Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990). For further reading on consciousness, see Chapter 6 below (pp. 231–232).
纳尔逊·古德曼（Nelson Goodman）的《艺术语言》（Indianapolis，Ind.： Hackett1976）的第一章是对图像表现的重要讨论。伊恩·哈金（Ian Hacking）的《为什么语言对哲学很重要？（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1975 年）是一本非常可读的半历史著作，记录了思想和语言表征之间的关系。亚历克斯·米勒（Alex Miller）的《语言哲学》（伦敦：伦敦大学学院出版社 1997 年）是语言哲学的一个很好的介绍。更高级的是理查德·拉森（Richard Larson）和加布里埃尔·西格尔（Gabriel Segal）的《意义知识：语义理论导论》（Knowledge ofMeaning：an Introduction toSemanticTheory）（剑桥，马萨诸塞州：麻省理工学院出版社，1995年），它整合了近代语言哲学和语言学的思想。 A.W. 是语言哲学这一领域优秀的基本读物集。 Moore （ed.） Meaning and Reference （Oxford： Oxford University Press， 1993）.有关意向性概念的更多信息，请参阅我的 Elements of Mind（牛津：牛津大学出版社，2001 年）的第一章。一个重要的讨论是罗伯特·斯塔尔纳克（Robert Stalnaker）的《探究》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：麻省理工学院出版社，1984 年），第 1 章和第 2 章。约翰·塞尔（John Searle）的《意向性》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1983 年）是一本关于意向性现象的通俗易懂的书。关于 “命题态度” 概念的有用论文集，其中许多是相当技术性的，是 Nathan Salmon 和 Scott Soames（编辑），《命题和态度》（牛津：牛津大学）Press1988）。一般来说，最好的单卷本心灵哲学读物集仍然是大卫·罗森塔尔（David Rosenthal）（编辑）的《心灵的本质》（The Nature of Mind）（牛津：牛津大学出版社） 1990 年）。有关意识的进一步阅读，请参阅下面的第 6 章（第 231-232 页）。

了解思想家及其思想

I
已经说过，要理解表征，我们必须理解思想。但是，我们对思想真正了解多少呢？或者，就此而言，我们对一般的心智了解多少？

你可能会想，这是一个只有大脑科学才能真正回答的问题。但是，如果这是真的，那么大多数人对思想和思想的了解就很少了。毕竟，大多数人都没有研究过大脑，即使对专家来说，大脑的某些方面仍然非常神秘。因此，如果我们必须了解大脑功能的细节才能理解心智，那么我们中很少有人会了解心智。

但是，在某种意义上，我们确实对心智有大量的了解。事实上，头脑对我们来说是如此熟悉，以至于这个事实一开始可以逃避注意。我的意思是，我们知道我们有思想、经历、记忆、梦、感觉和情绪，我们知道其他人也有它们。我们非常清楚各种心理状态之间的细微差别 – 例如，希望和期望之间，或者遗憾和懊悔之间。这种关于心智的知识被用于理解他人。我们日常生活的大部分时间都取决于我们对他人想法的了解，而我们通常非常擅长了解这是什么。我们通过观察他们、倾听他们、与他们交谈和了解他们的性格来了解其他人在想什么。这种对人的了解往往使我们能够预测他们将做什么——通常其准确性会让气象局感到羞愧。

这里要考虑的是非常普通的 “预测” 情况。例如，假设您打电话给一位朋友并安排明天与她共进午餐。我猜想（取决于朋友是谁）我们中的许多人对朋友会出现的信心比我们对天气预报的信心更大。然而，在制作这个

“预测”我们依赖于我们对她思想的了解——她理解对她说的话，她知道餐厅在哪里，她想和你一起吃午饭，等等。

所以，至少从这个意义上说，我们都是心智专家。但请注意，这本身并不意味着心智与大脑不同。因为我们认为这些心理状态（如欲望、理解等）与我们了解很多的事实是完全一致的。最终只是大脑的生化状态。如果是这样的话，那么我们对心智的知识也将是关于大脑的知识 – 尽管对我们来说可能不是这样。

幸运的是，我们不必为了弄清楚我们对心智的了解而解决心智是否是大脑的问题。要解释为什么不，需要谈谈臭名昭著的 “身心问题”。

身心问题

身心问题是身心如何相互连接的问题。我们知道它们当然是相互关联的：我们知道，当人们的大脑受损时，他们的思考能力就会发生变化。我们都知道，当人们服用麻醉药或饮酒过多时，这些身体活动会影响大脑，进而影响他们的思想。我们的思想和构成我们身体的物质显然是相关的——但如何呢？

One reason this is a problem is because, on the one hand, it seems obvious that we must just be entirely made up of matter and, on the other hand, it seems obvious that we cannot just be made up of mat- ter; we must be something more. We think we must just be matter, for example, because we believe that human beings have evolved from lower forms of life, which themselves were made entirely from matter – when minds first evolved, the raw material out of which they evolved was just complex matter. And it is plausible to believe that we are entirely made up of matter – for example, if all my mat- ter were taken away, bit by bit, there would be nothing of me left.
这是一个问题的一个原因是，一方面，我们似乎很明显必须完全由物质组成，另一方面，这似乎很明显我们不能仅仅由物质组成;我们必须成为更多的东西。例如，我们认为我们一定是物质，因为我们相信人类是从低级生命形式进化而来的，而低级生命本身完全由物质构成——当思想第一次进化时，他们从中进化出来的原材料只是复杂的物质。而且，相信我们完全由物质组成是合理的——例如，如果我的所有物质都被一点一点地拿走，我就什么都没有留下了。

But it seems so hard to believe that we are, underneath it all, just matter – just a few dollars’ worth of carbon, water and some miner- als. It is easy for anyone who has experienced the slightest damage to their body to get the sense that it is just incredible that this fragile, messy matter constitutes their nature as thinking, conscious agents. Likewise, although people sometimes talk of the ‘chemistry’ that occurs between people who are in love, the usage is obviously metaphorical – the idea that love itself is literally ‘nothing but a complex chemical reaction’ seems just absurd.
但似乎很难相信，在这一切的背后，我们只是物质——只是价值几美元的碳、水和一些矿工。任何经历过身体最轻微伤害的人都很容易感觉到，这种脆弱、凌乱的物质构成了他们作为思考、有意识的代理人的本质，这真是不可思议。同样，尽管人们有时会谈论恋爱中的人之间发生的“化学反应”，但其用法显然是隐喻性的——爱本身实际上“ 只不过是一种复杂的化学反应”的想法似乎很荒谬。

I once heard a (probably apocryphal) story that illustrates this feeling.1 According to the story, some medical researchers in the 1940s discovered that female cats who were deprived of magnesium in their diet stopped caring for their offspring. This was reported in a newspaper under the headline, ‘Motherlove is magnesium’. Whether the story is true doesn’t matter – what matters is why we find it funny. Thinking of our conscious mental lives as ‘really’ being com- plex physical interactions between chemicals seems to be as absurd as thinking of motherlove as ‘really’ being magnesium.
曾经听过一个（可能是杜撰的）故事来说明这种感觉。根据这个故事，1940 年代的一些医学研究人员发现，饮食中被剥夺了镁的母猫不再照顾它们的后代。一家报纸的标题为“母爱是镁”，对此进行了报道。这个故事是否真实并不重要——重要的是我们为什么觉得它有趣。将我们有意识的精神生活视为“真正”是化学物质之间的复杂物理相互作用，这似乎与将母爱视为“真正”是镁一样荒谬。

Or is it? Scientists are finding more and more detailed correla- tions between psychological disorders and specific chemicals in the brain.2 Is there a limit to what they can find out about these correlations? It seems a desperate last resort to insist, from a posi- tion of almost total ignorance, that there must be a limit. For we just don’t know. Perhaps the truth isn’t as simple as ‘motherlove is magnesium’ – but may it not be too far away from that?
或者是这样吗？科学家们发现心理障碍与大脑中的特定化学物质之间存在越来越详细的联系。他们能找到的关于这些相关性的信息有限制吗？从几乎完全无知的姿态出发，坚持必须有一个限度，这似乎是绝望的最后手段。因为我们就是不知道。也许真相并不像 “母爱是镁 ”那么简单——但与此相去不远吗？

所以我们先被拖向一个方向，然后是另一个方向。当然，我们对自己说，我们只是物质，以复杂的方式组织起来; 但是，仔细想想，我们似乎不可能只是物质，对我们来说必须有更多的东西。简而言之，这是表达身心问题的一种方式。事实证明，这是哲学中最棘手的问题之一——以至于一些哲学家认为这是不可能解决的。17世纪英国哲学家约瑟夫·格兰维尔（Joseph Glanvill，1636-1680）尖锐地表达了这个想法：“更纯洁的精神如何与这块土块结合在一起，对于堕落的人类来说，这是一个难以解开的结。

其他人则更为乐观，并为此提供了解决方案

问题。一些——唯物主义者或物理主义者——认为，尽管我们的感受恰恰相反，但有可能证明心智只是复杂的物质：心智只是以某种复杂的方式组织的大脑问题。其他人认为心不可能只是物质，而必须是其他东西，某种其他种类的东西。例如，那些相信我们有“非物质”灵魂的人，这些灵魂在我们的身体死亡后幸存下来，他们必须否认我们的思想和我们的身体是同一回事。因为，如果我们的思想和我们的身体是一样的，那么它们怎么能在这些身体的毁灭中幸存下来呢？这些哲学家是二元论者，因为他们认为有两种主要的东西 – 物质和心理。（现在一个不太常见的解决方案是声称一切都归根结底是心理的：这是理想主义。

Materialism, in one of its many varieties, tends to be the ortho- dox approach to the mind–body problem these days. Dualism is less common, but still defended vigorously by its proponents.3 In Chapter 6 (‘Consciousness and physicalism’), I will return to this problem, and will attempt to make it more precise and to outline what is at issue between dualism and materialism. But, for the time being, we can put the mind–body problem to one side when investigating the problem of mental representation. Let me explain.
唯物主义是其众多变体之一，往往是当今解决身心问题的正统方法。二元论不太常见，但仍然受到其支持者的大力捍卫。在第六章（“意识和物理主义”）中，我将回到这个问题，并试图使其更精确，并概述二元论和唯物主义之间的问题。但是，就目前而言，在研究心理表征问题时，我们可以把身心问题放在一边。让我解释一下。

The problem about mental representation can be expressed very simply: how can the mind represent anything at all? Suppose for the moment that materialism is true: the mind is nothing but the brain. How does this help with the problem of mental representa- tion? Can’t we just rephrase the question and ask: how can the brain represent anything at all? This seems just as hard to understand as the question about the mind. For all its complexity, the brain is just a piece of matter, and how a piece of matter can represent anything else seems just as puzzling as how a mind can represent something – whether that mind is a piece of matter or not.
关于心理表征的问题可以非常简单地表达出来：心理怎么能代表任何事物呢？假设唯物主义是真实的：思想只不过是大脑。这对解决心理表征问题有什么帮助呢？我们难道不能改写这个问题并问：大脑怎么能代表任何东西吗？这似乎和关于心的问题一样难以理解。尽管它很复杂，但大脑只是一块物质，一块物质如何代表其他任何东西似乎与头脑如何代表某物一样令人费解——无论那个思想是否是一块物质。

Suppose for a moment that materialism is true, and think about what is inside your head. There are about 100 billion brain cells. These form a substance of a grey and white watery consistency resembling yoghurt. About a kilogram of this stuff constitutes your brain. If materialism is true, then this yoghurty substance alone
假设唯物主义是真实的，然后想想你脑子里是什么。大约有 1000 亿个脑细胞。这些形成一种类似于酸奶的灰白色水状稠度物质。大约一公斤这种东西构成了你的大脑。如果唯物主义是真的，那么只有这种酸奶物质

enables you to think – about yourself, your life and the world. It enables you to reason about what to do. It enables you to have expe- riences, memories, emotions and sensations. But how? How can this watery yoghurty substance – this ‘clod’ – constitute your thoughts?
让您思考 – 关于您自己、您的生活和世界。它使你能够推理该做什么。它使你能够拥有经验、记忆、情感和感觉。但是怎么做呢？这种水状的酸奶物质——这个“土块”——是如何构成你的想法的？

On the other hand, let’s suppose dualism is true: the mind is not the brain but is something else, distinct from the brain, like an ‘immaterial soul’. Then it seems that we can pose the same question about the immaterial soul: how can an immaterial soul represent anything at all? Descartes believed that mind and body were distinct things: the mind was, for Descartes, an immaterial soul. He also thought that the essence of this soul is to think. But to say that the essence of the soul is to think does not answer the question ‘How does the soul manage to think?’. In general, it’s not very satisfactory to respond to the question ‘How does this do that?’ with the answer ‘Well, it’s because it’s in the essence (or nature) of this to do that’. To think that that’s all there is to it would be to be like the famous doctor in Molière’s play, Le Malade imaginaire, who answered the question of how opium sends you to sleep by saying that it has a virtus dormitiva or a ‘dormitive virtue’, i.e. it is in the essence or nature of opium to send one to sleep. ...

Both materialism and dualism, then, need a solution to the prob- lem of representation. The upshot is that answering the mind–body problem with materialism or dualism does not by itself solve the problem of representation. For the latter problem will remain even when we have settled on materialism or dualism as an answer to the former problem. If materialism is true, and everything is matter, we still need to know what is the difference between thinking matter and non-thinking matter. And if dualism is true, then we still need to know what it is about this non-material mind that enables it to think. ...

(On the other hand, if idealism is true, then there is a sense in which everything is thought, anyway, so the problem does not arise. However, idealism of this kind is much harder to believe – to put it mildly – than many philosophical views, so it looks as if we would be trading one mystery for another.) ...

This means that we can discuss the main issues of this book with- ...

必须决定唯物主义还是二元论是身心问题的正确解决方案。唯物主义/二元论的争论与我们的问题没有直接关系。就本章而言，这是一件好事。因为，虽然我们不知道心智和大脑之间的关系是什么，但这里感兴趣的是我们对一般心智，特别是思想的了解。这就是本章其余部分的主题。我们将在第 6 章回到身心问题。

理解他人的思想

那么，我们对心灵了解多少呢？解决这个问题的一种方法是问：“我们如何发现心智？当然，这些不是同一个问题。（比较问题，“什么我们了解水吗？以及'我们如何了解水？但是，正如我们将看到的，就心智而言，询问我们如何知道将对我们所知道的产生相当大的启示。

One thing that seems obvious is that we know about the minds of others in a very different way from the way we know our own minds. We know about our own minds partly by introspecting. If I am trying to figure out what I think about a certain question, I can concentrate on the contents of my conscious mind until I work it out. But I can’t concentrate in the same way on the contents of your mind in figuring out what you think. Sometimes, of course, I cannot tell what I really think, and I have to consult others – a friend or a therapist, perhaps – about the significance of my thoughts and actions, and what they reveal about my mind. But the point is that learning about one’s own mind is not always like this, whereas learning about the minds of others always is.
有一点似乎很明显，那就是我们了解他人心智的方式与我们了解自己心智的方式截然不同。我们部分是通过内省来了解自己的思想。如果我试图弄清楚我对某个问题的看法，我可以专注于我意识的内容，直到我弄清楚它。但是不能以同样的方式专注于你心中的内容，以弄清楚你的想法。当然，有时无法说出真实的想法，不得不咨询其他人——也许是朋友或治疗师——关于我的想法和行为的重要性，以及它们揭示了我的思想。但关键是，了解自己的心并不总是这样，而了解他人的心总是这样。

The way we know about the states of mind of others is not, so to speak, symmetrical to the way we know our own states of mind. This ‘asymmetry’ is related to another important asymmetry: the differ- ent ways we use to know about the position of our own bodies and the bodies of others. In order to know whether your legs are crossed, I have to look, or use some other form of observation or inspection (I could ask you). But I don’t need any sort of observation to tell
可以说，我们了解他人心理状态的方式与我们了解自己心理状态的方式并不对称。这种“不对称”与另一个重要的不对称性有关：我们用来了解自己身体和他人身体位置的不同方式。为了知道你的双腿是否交叉，我必须观察，或使用其他形式的观察或检查（我可以问你）。但不需要任何形式的观察来判断

me whether my legs are crossed. Normally, I know this immediately, without observation. Likewise, I can typically tell what I think with- out having to observe my words and watch my actions. Yet I can’t tell what you think without observing your words and actions.
我是否双腿交叉。通常，我不用观察就能立即知道这一点。同样，我通常可以说出我的想法——而不必观察我的言语和行动。然而，如果不观察你的言行，就无法判断你的想法。

Where the minds of others are concerned, it seems obvious that all we have to go on is what people say and do: their observable behaviour. So how can we get from knowledge of people’s observ- able behaviour to knowledge of what they think?
在关心他人的思想方面，很明显，我们所要做的就是人们的言行：他们可观察到的行为。那么，我们如何才能从对人们可观察行为的了解到对他们的想法的了解呢？

A certain sort of philosophical scepticism says that we can’t. This is ‘scepticism about other minds’, and the problem it raises is known as ‘the problem of other minds’. This will need a brief digression. According to this sceptical view, all that we really know about other people are facts about their observable behaviour. But it seems possible that people could behave as they do without having minds at all. For example, all the people you see around you could be robots programmed by some mad scientist to behave as if they were conscious, thinking people: you might be the only real mind around. This is a crazy hypothesis, of course: but it does seem to be compatible with the evidence we have about other minds.
某种哲学怀疑主义说我们不能。这就是“对他人思想的怀疑”，它引发的问题被称为 “他人思想的问题”。这需要简短的题外话。根据这种怀疑论观点，我们对他人的真正了解都是关于他们可观察行为的事实。但似乎人们可以在根本没有思想的情况下做出他们的行为。例如，你周围看到的所有人都可能是某个疯狂科学家编程的机器人，让他们的行为就像是有意识、有思想的人一样：你可能是周围唯一真实的头脑。当然，这是一个疯狂的假设：但它似乎确实与我们所拥有的关于其他思想的证据是相容的。

Compare scepticism about other minds with scepticism about the existence of the ‘external world’ (that is, the world outside our minds). This kind of scepticism says that, in forming your beliefs about objects in the world, all you really have to go on is the evidence of your senses: your beliefs formed on the basis of experi- ences. But these experiences and beliefs could be just as they are, yet the ‘external’ world be very different from the way you think it is. For example, your brain could be kept in a vat of nutrients, its input and output nerves being stimulated by a mad scientist to make it appear that you are experiencing the world of everyday objects. This too is a crazy hypothesis: but it also seems to be compatible with your experience. ...4

These versions of scepticism are not meant to be philosophically tenable positions: there have been few philosophers in history who have seriously held that other people do not have minds. What scep- ticism does is force us to uncover what we really know, and force us to justify how we know it. To answer scepticism, we need to give an ...

account of what it is to know something, and therefore account for what we ‘really’ know. So the arguments for and against scepticism belong properly to the theory of knowledge (called epistemology) and lie outside the scope of this book. For this reason, I’m going to put scepticism to one side. My concern in this book is what we believe to be true about our minds. In fact, we all believe that we know a lot about the minds of others, and I think we are undoubt- edly right in this belief. So let us leave it to the epistemologists to tell us what knowledge is – but whatever it is, it had better allow the obvious fact that we know a lot about the minds of others. ...

Our question, then, is about how we come to know about other minds – not about whether we know. That is, given that we know a lot of things about the minds of others, how do we know these things? One aspect of the sceptical argument that seems hard to deny is this: all we have to go on when understanding other people is their observable behaviour. How could it be otherwise? Surely we do not perceive other people’s thoughts or experiences – we perceive their observable words and their actions.5 So the question is: how do we get from the observable behaviour to knowledge of their minds? One answer that was once seriously proposed is that the observable behaviour is, in some sense, all there is to having a mind: for ex- ample, all there really is to being in pain is ‘pain-behaviour’ (crying, moaning complaining, etc.). This view is known as behaviourism, and it is worth starting our examination of our knowledge of minds with an examination of behaviourism. ...

Though it seems very implausible, behaviourism was, for a short time in the twentieth century, popular in both psychology and the philosophy of mind.6 It gives a straightforward answer to the question of how we know the minds of others. But it makes the question of how we know our own minds very problematic, because, as I noted above, we can know our own minds without observing our behaviour. (Hence the popular philosophical joke, repeated ad nauseam to generations of students: two behaviourists meet in the street; one says to the other, ‘You’re feeling pretty well today, how am I feeling?’.) This aspect of behaviourism goes hand in hand with its deliberate disregard (or even its outright denial) of subjective, ...

conscious experience – what it’s like, from the inside, to have a mind. ...

I
不想关注行为主义的这些缺点，这些缺点在许多其他关于心灵哲学的书籍中都有详细讨论。我想集中讨论的是行为主义的内在不足：事实上，即使用它自己的术语来说，它也不能纯粹地从行为的角度来解释关于心灵的事实。7

对行为主义的一个明显的最初反对是，我们有很多想法根本没有在行为中表现出来。例如，我相信里加是拉脱维亚的首都，尽管我从未在任何行为中表达过这种信念。那么，行为主义会否认有这种信念吗？不。行为主义会说，信念不需要实际的行为，而需要行为的倾向。它会将信念比作一种性情，比如一块糖的溶解度。一块糖即使从未放入水中也可以溶解;块的溶解性在于它在放入水中时会溶解。类似地，相信里加是拉脱维亚的首都就是被倾向以某种方式行事。

This seems more plausible until we ask what this ‘certain way’ is. What is the behaviour that relates to the belief that Riga is the capital of Latvia as the dissolving of the sugar relates to its solubil- ity? One possibility is that the behaviour is verbal: saying ‘Riga is the capital of Latvia’ when asked the question ‘What is the capital of Latvia?’. (So asking the question would be analogous to putting the sugar in water.)
这似乎更合理，直到我们问这个 “确定的方式 ”是什么。认为里加是拉脱维亚的首都，因为糖的溶解与它的溶解性有关，这种行为是什么？一种可能性是行为是口头的：当被问到“拉脱维亚的首都是什么”时，他说“里加是拉脱维亚的首都”。（所以问这个问题就像把糖放在水里。

Simple as it is, this suggestion cannot be right. For I will only answer ‘Riga is the capital of Latvia’ to the question ‘What is the capital of Latvia?’ if, among other things, I understand English. But understanding English is not a precondition for believing that Riga is the capital of Latvia: plenty of monoglot Latvians have true beliefs about their capital. So understanding English must be a dis- tinct mental state from believing that Riga is the capital of Latvia, and this too must be explained in behavioural terms. Let’s bypass the question of whether understanding English can be explained in purely behaviourist terms – to which the answer is without doubt ‘No’8 – and pursue this example for a moment.
尽管很简单，但这个建议不可能是正确的。因为我只会回答“里加是拉脱维亚的首都”这个问题，以及“拉脱维亚的首都是什么”这个问题。如果我能听懂英语。但懂英语并不是相信里加是拉脱维亚首都的先决条件：许多单一语言的拉脱维亚人对他们的首都有真实的信仰。因此，理解英语必须与相信里加是拉脱维亚的首都截然不同的心理状态，这也必须用行为术语来解释。让我们绕过理解英语是否可以用纯粹的行为主义术语来解释的问题—— 答案无疑是“不”——并追究这个例子。

Suppose that the behaviourist explanation of my understanding of the sentence ‘Riga is the capital of Latvia’ is in terms of my disposition to utter the sentence. This disposition cannot, obviously, just be the disposition to make the sounds ‘Riga is the capital of Latvia’: a parrot could have this disposition without understanding the sentence. What we need (at least) is the idea that the sounds are uttered with understanding, i.e. certain utterances of the sentence, and certain ways of responding to the utterance, are appropriate and others are not. When is it appropriate to utter the sentence? When I believe that Riga is the capital of Latvia? Not necessarily, as I can utter the sentence with understanding without believing it. Perhaps I utter the sentence because I want my audience to believe that Riga is the capital of Latvia, though I myself (mistakenly) believe that Vilnius is.
假设我对“里加是拉脱维亚的首都”这句话的理解的行为主义解释是我说出这句话的倾向。显然，这种性格不能只是发出“里加是拉脱维亚的首都”的声音：一只鹦鹉可以在不理解句子的情况下有这种性格。我们（至少）需要的是这样一个想法，即声音是在理解的情况下说出的，即句子的某些话语和对话语的某些回应方式是合适的，而其他的则不合适。什么时候说出这句话是合适的？当我相信里加是拉脱维亚的首都时？不一定，因为我可以在不相信的情况下理解地说出这句话。也许我说出这句话是因为我想让我的听众相信里加是拉脱维亚的首都，尽管我自己（错误地）相信维尔纽斯是。

But, in any case, the behaviourist cannot appeal to the belief that Riga is the capital of Latvia in explaining when it is right to utter the sentence, as uttering the sentence was supposed to explain what it is to have the belief. So this explanation would go round in circles. The general lesson here is that thoughts cannot be fully defined in terms of behaviour: other thoughts need to be mentioned too. Each time we try to associate one thought with one piece of behaviour, we discover that this association won’t hold unless other mental states are in place. And trying to associate each of these other mental states with other pieces of behaviour leads to the same problems. Your individual thought may be associated with many different pieces of behaviour depending on which other thoughts you have
但是，无论如何，行为主义者不能诉诸里加是拉脱维亚首都的信念来解释何时说出这句话是正确的，因为说出这句话应该解释拥有这种信仰是什么。所以这个解释会兜圈子。这里的一般教训是，思想不能完全用行为来定义：其他思想也需要被提及。每次我们试图将一个想法与一种行为联系起来时，我们发现除非其他心理状态到位，否则这种关联不会成立。试图将这些其他心理状态与其他行为联系起来会导致同样的问题。您的个人想法可能与许多不同的行为相关联，具体取决于您的其他想法.

A simpler example will sharpen the point. A man looks out of a window, goes to a closet and takes an umbrella before leaving his house. What is he thinking? The obvious answer is that he thought that it was raining. But notice that, even if this is true, this thought would not lead him to take his umbrella unless he also wants to stay dry and he believes that taking his umbrella will help him stay dry and he believes that this object is his umbrella. This might seem so obvious that it hardly needs saying. But, on reflection, it is obvious that if he didn’t have these (doubtless unconscious) thoughts, it would be quite mysterious why he should take his umbrella when ...

he thought it was raining. Where this point should lead is, I think, clear: we learn about the thoughts of others by making reasoned conjectures about what makes sense of their behaviour. ...

However, as our little examples show, there are many ways of making sense of a piece of behaviour, by attributing to the thinker very different patterns of thought. How, then, do we choose between all the possible competing versions of what someone’s thoughts are? The answer, I believe, is that we do this by employing, or presup- posing, various general hypotheses about what it is to be a thinker. Take the example of the man and his umbrella. We could frame the following conjectures about what his state of mind is: ...

He thought it was raining, and wanted to stay dry (and, we hardly need to add, he thought his umbrella would help him stay dry and he thought this was his umbrella, etc.). ...

He thought it was sunny, and he wanted the umbrella to protect him from the heat of the sun (and he thought his umbrella would protect him from the sun and he thought this was his umbrella, etc.). ...

He had no opinion about the weather, but he believed that his umbrella had magical powers and he wanted to take it to ward off evil spirits (and he thought this was his umbrella, etc.). ...

He was planning to kill an enemy and believed that his umbrella con- tained a weapon (and he thought this was his umbrella, etc.). ...

All of these are possible explanations for why he did what he did, and we could think up many more. But, given that it actually is raining, and we know this, the first explanation is by far the most likely. Why? Well, it is partly because we believe that he can see what we see (that it’s raining) and partly because we think that it is a generally undesirable thing to get wet when fully clothed, and that people where possible avoid undesirable things when it doesn’t cost them too much effort . . . and so on. In short, we make certain as- sumptions about his view of his surroundings, his mental faculties, and his degree of rationality, and we attribute to him the thoughts it is reasonable for him to have, given those faculties. ...

许多心灵哲学家（以及一些心理学家）习惯于将我们在理解其他心灵时所采用的假设和假设描述为一种理论其他思想的。他们称这种理论为“常识心理学”或“民间心理学”。这个想法是，正如我们对物理世界的常识性知识建立在对物理对象特征行为的一些一般原则（“民间物理学”）的知识之上一样，我们对其他思想建立在关于人们特征行为的一些一般原则（“民俗心理学”）的知识之上。

I agree with the idea that our common-sense knowledge of other thinkers is a kind of theory. But I prefer the label ‘common-sense psychology’ to ‘folk psychology’ as a name for this theory. These are only labels, of course, and in one sense it doesn’t matter too much which you use. But, to my ear, the term ‘folk psychology’ carries the connotation that the principles involved are mere ‘folk wisdom’, homespun folksy truisms of the ‘many hands make light work’ variety. So, in so far as the label ‘folk psychology’ can sug- gest that the knowledge involved is unsophisticated and banal, the label embodies an invidious attitude to the theory. As we shall see, quite a lot turns on one’s attitude to the theory, so it is better not to prejudice things too strongly at the outset.
同意我们对其他思想家的常识性知识是一种理论的观点。但我更喜欢用“常识心理学”而不是“民间心理学”这个标签来作为这个理论的名称。当然，这些只是标签，从某种意义上说，您使用哪个标签并不重要。但是，在我看来，“民间心理学”一词的含义是，所涉及的原则只是“民间智慧”，是“多只手使轻松工作”的朴素的民俗老生常谈。因此，只要“民间心理学”这个标签可以表明所涉及的知识是简单和平庸的，那么这个标签就体现了对该理论的令人反感的态度。正如我们将看到的，相当多的人对这个理论的态度取决于他，所以最好不要在一开始就把事情看得太过强烈。9

Since understanding why other thinkers do what they do is (more often than not) derived from knowledge of their observable behaviour, the understanding given by common-sense psychology is often called ‘the explanation of behaviour’. Thus, philosophers often say that the point or purpose or function of common-sense psychology is the explanation of behaviour. In a sense this is true – we are explaining behaviour in that we are making sense of the behaviour by attributing mental states. But, in another way, the expression ‘the explanation of behaviour’ is misleading, as it makes it look as if our main concern is always with what people are do- ing, rather than what they are thinking. Obviously, we often want to know what people are thinking in order to find out what they will do, or to make sense of what they have done – but sometimes it is pure curiosity that makes us want to find out what they are
由于理解其他思考者为什么做他们所做的事情（通常）来自对他们可观察行为的了解，因此常识心理学给出的理解通常被称为“行为的解释”。因此，哲学家经常说，常识心理学的重点、目的或功能是对行为的解释。从某种意义上说，这是真的 – 我们在解释行为，因为我们通过归因心理状态来理解行为。但是，从另一个角度来看，“行为的解释”这个表达具有误导性，因为它使人看起来好像我们主要关心的总是人们在做什么，而不是他们在想什么。显然，我们经常想知道人们在想什么，以便找出他们将做什么，或者弄清楚他们已经做了什么——但有时是纯粹的好奇心让我们想知道是什么他们是

thinking. Here our interest is not in their behaviour as such, but in the psychological facts that organise and ‘lie behind’ the behaviour – those facts that makes sense of the behaviour.
思维。在这里，我们的兴趣不在于他们的行为本身，而在于组织和“隐藏”行为背后的心理事实——那些使行为有意义的事实。

Behaviourists, of course, would deny that there is anything psychological lying behind behaviour. They could accept, just as a basic fact, that certain interpretations of behaviour are more natural to us than others. So, in our umbrella example, the behaviourist can accept that the reason that the man takes his umbrella is because he thought it was going to rain, and so on. This is the natural thing to say, and the behaviourist could agree. But since, according to behaviourism, there is no real substance to the idea that something might be producing the behaviour or bringing it about, we should not take the description of how the man’s thoughts lead to his be- haviour as literally true. We are ‘at home’ with certain explanations rather than others; but that doesn’t mean that they are true. They are just more natural for us.
当然，行为主义者会否认行为背后有任何心理因素。他们可以接受，就像一个基本事实一样，对行为的某些解释对我们来说比其他解释更自然。所以，在我们的雨伞例子中，行为主义者可以接受这个人拿伞的原因是因为他认为要下雨了，等等。这是很自然的说法，行为主义者可能会同意。但是，根据行为主义，某物可能产生或导致行为的想法没有真正的实质内容，我们不应该把这个人的思想如何导致他的行为的描述看作是真实的。我们“在家里”有某些解释而不是其他解释;但这并不意味着它们是真的。它们对我们来说更自然。

This view is very unsatisfactory. Surely, in understanding others, we want to know what is true of them, and not just which explana- tions we find it more natural to give. And this requires, it seems to me, that we are interested in what makes these explanations true – and therefore in what makes us justified in finding one explana- tion more natural than others. That is, we are interested in what it is that producing the behaviour or bringing it about. So to understand more deeply what is wrong with this behaviourist view, we need to look more closely at the idea of thoughts lying behind behaviour.
这个观点很不令人满意。当然，在理解他人时，我们想知道他们的真实情况，而不仅仅是我们发现给出哪些解释更自然。在我看来，这要求我们对是什么使这些解释成立感兴趣——因此，我们又对什么使我们有理由找到一个比其他解释更自然的解释感兴趣。也就是说，我们对产生行为或带来行为的是什么感兴趣。因此，为了更深入地理解这种行为主义观点的问题所在，我们需要更仔细地研究行为背后的思想观念。

The causal picture of thoughts
思想的因果图

One aspect of this idea is just the ordinary view, mentioned earlier, that we cannot directly perceive other people’s thoughts. It’s worth saying here that this fact by itself doesn’t make other people’s minds peculiar or mysterious. There are many things which we cannot per- ceive directly, which are not for that reason mysterious. Microbes, for example, are too small to be directly perceived; black holes are too dense even to allow light to escape from them, so we cannot directly perceive them. But our inability to directly perceive these ...

things does not in itself make them peculiar or mysterious. Black holes may be mysterious, but not just because we can’t see them. ...

However, when I say that thoughts ‘lie behind’ behaviour I don’t just mean that thoughts are not directly perceptible. I also mean that behaviour is the result of thought, that thoughts produce behaviour. This is how we know about thoughts: we know about them through their effects. That is, thoughts are among the causes of behaviour: the relation between thought and behaviour is a causal relation. ...

What does it mean to say that thoughts are the causes of behav- iour? The notions of cause and effect are among the basic notions we use to understand our world. Think how often we use the notions in everyday life: we think the government’s economic policy causes inflation or high unemployment, smoking causes cancer, the HIV virus causes AIDS, excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere causes global warming, which will in turn cause the rising of the sea level, and so on. Causation is, in the words of David Hume (1711–1776), the ‘cement of the universe’.10 To say that thoughts are the causes of behaviour is partly to say that this ‘cement’ (whatever it is) is what binds thoughts to the behaviour they lie behind. If my desire for a drink caused me to go to the fridge, then the relation between my desire and my action is in some sense fundamentally the same as the relation between someone’s smoking and their getting cancer: the relation of cause and effect. That is, in some sense my thoughts make me move. I will call the assumption that thoughts and other mental states are the causes of behaviour the ‘causal picture of thought’. ...

Now, although we talk about causes and effects constantly, there is massive dispute among philosophers about what causation actually is, or even if there is any such thing as causation.11 So, to understand fully what it means to say that thoughts are the causes of behaviour, we need to know a little about causation. Here I shall restrict myself to some uncontroversial features of causation, and show how these features can apply to the relation between thought and behaviour. ...

First, when we say that A caused B, we normally commit our- selves to the idea that if A had not occurred, B would not have
首先，当我们说 A 导致了 B 时，我们通常会相信，如果A没有发生，B就不会发生

occurred. When we say, for example, that someone’s smoking caused their cancer, we normally believe that if they hadn’t smoked then they would not have got cancer. Philosophers put this by say- ing that causation involves counterfactuals: truths about matters ‘contrary to fact’. So we could say that, if we believe that A caused B, we commit ourselves to the truth of the counterfactual claim: ‘If A had not occurred, B would not have occurred’.
发生。例如，当我们说某人吸烟导致他们患上癌症时，我们通常会相信，如果他们没有吸烟，那么他们就不会患上癌症。哲学家们说，因果关系涉及反事实：关于“与事实相反”的事物的真理。所以我们可以说，如果我们相信A导致了 B，我们就承诺反事实主张的真实性：“如果 A 没有发生，B 就不会发生”。

Applied to the relation between thoughts and behaviour, this claim about the relation between counterfactuals and causation says this: if a certain thought – say, a desire for a drink – has a certain action – drinking – as a result, then if that thought hadn’t been there the action wouldn’t have been there either. If I hadn’t had the desire, then I wouldn’t have had the drink.
应用于思想和行为之间的关系，这个关于反事实和因果关系的主张是这样的：如果某个思想——比如说，对饮料的渴望——具有某种行为——饮酒——结果，那么如果如果没有这个想法，行动也不会在那里。如果没有这个愿望，我就不会喝到那杯酒。

What we learned in the discussion of behaviourism was that thoughts give rise to behaviour only in the presence of other thoughts. So my desire for a drink will cause me to get a drink only if I also believe that I am actually capable of getting myself a drink, and so on. This is exactly the same as in non-mental cases of causation: for example, we may say that a certain kind of bacterium caused an epidemic, but only in the presence of other factors such as inadequate vaccination, the absence of emergency medical care and decent sanitation and so on. We can sum this up by saying that in the circumstances, if the bacteria hadn’t been there, then there wouldn’t have been an epidemic. Likewise with desire: in the cir- cumstances, if my desire had not been there, I wouldn’t have had the drink. That is part of what makes the desire a cause of the action.
我们在行为主义的讨论中学到的是，思想只有在其他思想存在的情况下才会产生行为。因此，我对饮料的渴望只有在我也相信我真的有能力给自己喝一杯的情况下才会让我喝一杯，依此类推。这与非精神因果关系的情况完全相同：例如，我们可以说某种细菌引起了流行病，但前提是存在其他因素，例如疫苗接种不足、缺乏紧急医疗护理和体面的卫生设施等。我们可以总结一下，在这种情况下，如果细菌不存在，就不会有流行病。欲望也是如此：在各个领域，如果我的欲望不存在，我就不会喝酒。这就是使欲望成为行动原因的部分原因。

The second feature of causation I shall mention is the relation be- tween causation and the idea of explanation. To explain something is to answer a ‘Why?’-question about it. To ask ‘Why did the First World War occur?’ and ‘Explain the origins of the First World War’ is to ask pretty much the same sort of thing. One way in which ‘Why?’ questions can be answered is by citing the cause of what you want explained. So, for example, an answer to the question ‘Why did he get cancer?’ could be ‘Because he smoked’; an answer to ‘Why was there a fire?’ could be ‘Because there was a short-circuit’.
应提及的因果关系的第二个特征是因果关系和解释概念之间的关系。解释某事就是回答“为什么？- 关于它的问题。问'为什么会发生第一次世界大战？而“解释第一次世界大战的起源”则要求几乎相同的事情。回答 “为什么 ”问题的一种方法是引用你想要解释的原因。因此，例如，“他为什么会患上癌症”这个问题的答案可以是“因为他抽烟”;“Whywas there a fire？”的答案可以是“Because there was a short-circuit”。

It’s easy to see how this applies to the relation between thoughts
很容易看出这如何适用于思想之间的关系

and behaviour, since we have been employing it in our examples so far. When we ask ‘Why did the man take his umbrella?’ and answer ‘Because he thought it was raining etc.’, we are (according to the causal picture) explaining the action by citing its cause, the thoughts that lie behind it.
和行为，因为到目前为止我们一直在我们的示例中使用它。当我们问“那个人为什么拿走他的伞？并回答“因为他认为正在下雨等”，我们（根据因果关系）通过引用其原因、其背后的想法来解释该行为。

The final feature of causation I shall mention is the link between causation and regularities in the world. Like much in the contem- porary theory of causation, the idea that cause and regularity are linked derives from Hume. Hume said that a cause is an ‘object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second’.12 So if, for example, this short-circuit caused this fire, then all events similar to this short-circuit will cause events similar to this fire. Maybe no two events are ever exactly similar; but all the claim requires is that two events similar in some specific respect will cause events similar in some specific respect. ...

We certainly expect the world to be regular. When we throw a ball into the air, we expect it to fall to the ground, usually because we are used to things like that happening. And if we were to throw a ball into the air and it didn’t come down to the ground, we would normally conclude that something else intervened – that is, some other cause stopped the ball from falling to the ground. We expect similar causes to have similar effects. Causation seems to involve an element of regularity. ...

However, some regularities seem to be more regular than others. There is a regularity in my pizza eating: I have never eaten a pizza more than 20 inches in diameter. It is also a regularity that unsup- ported objects (apart from balloons etc.) fall to the ground. But these two regularities seem to be very different. For only modesty stops me from eating a pizza larger than 20 inches, but it is nature that stops unsupported objects from flying off into space. For this rea- son, philosophers distinguish between mere accidental regularities, like the first, and laws of nature, like the second. ...

So if there is an element of regularity in causation then there must be regularity in the relation between thought and behaviour – if this really is a causal relation. I’ll discuss the idea that there are such regularities, and what they may be like, in the next section. ...

Let’s draw these various lines of thought about causation and thought together. To say that thoughts cause behaviour is to say at least the following things: ...

The relation between thought and behaviour involves the truth of a counterfactual to the effect that, given the circumstances, if the thought had not been there, then the behaviour would not have been there. ...

To cite a thought, or bunch of thoughts, as the cause of a piece of behaviour is to explain the behaviour, since citing causes is one way of explaining effects. ...

Causes typically involve regularities or laws, so, if there is a causal relationship between thought and behaviour, then we might expect there to be regularities in the connection between thought and behaviour. ...

At no point have I said that causation has to be a physical rela- tion. Causation may be mental or physical, depending on whether what it relates (its ‘relata’) are mental or physical. So the causal picture of the mind does not entail physicalism or materialism. Nonetheless, the causal picture of thought is a key element in what I am calling the ‘mechanical’ view of the mind. According to this view, the mind is a causal mechanism: a part of the causal order of nature, just as the liver and the heart are part of the causal order of nature. And we find out about the minds of others in just the same way that we find out about the rest of nature: by their effects. The mind is a mechanism that has its effects in behaviour. ...

But why should we believe that mental states are causes of behaviour at all? After all, it is one thing to deny behaviourism but quite another to accept that mental states are causes of behaviour. This is not a trivial hypothesis, something that anyone would accept who understood the concept of a mental state. In fact, many philos- ophers deny it. For example, the view that mental states are causes of behaviour is denied by Wittgenstein and some of his followers. In their view, to describe the mind in terms of causes and mechanisms is to make the mistake of imposing a model of explanation which ...

is only really appropriate for non-mental things and events. ‘The mistake’, writes G.E.M. Anscombe, a student of Wittgenstein’s, ‘is to think that the relation of being done in execution of a certain intention, or being done intentionally, is a causal relation between act and intention’.13 ...

Why might someone think this? How might it be argued that mental states are not the causes of behaviour? Well, consider the example of the mental phenomenon of humour. We can distinguish between the mental state (or, more precisely, event) of being amused and the observable manifestations of that state: laughing, smiling and so on. We need to make this distinction, of course, because someone can be silently amused, and someone can pretend to be amused and convince others that they are genuinely amused. But does this distinction mean that we have to think of the inner state of being amused as causing the outward manifestations? The opponents of the causal view of the mind say not. We should, rather, think of the laughing (in a genuine case of amusement) as the expression of amusement. Expressing amusement in this case should not be thought of as an effect of an inner state, but rather as partially constituting what it is to be amused. To think of the inner state as causing the external expression would be as misleading as thinking of some hidden facts that a picture (or a piece of music) expresses. As Wittgenstein puts it, ‘speech with and without thought is to be compared with the playing of a piece of music with or without thought’.14 ...

This may help give some idea of why some philosophers reject the causal picture of thought. Given this opposition, we need rea- sons for believing in the causal picture of thought. What reasons can be given? Here I shall mention two reasons that support the causal picture. The first argument derives from ideas of Donald Davidson’s.15 The second is a more general and ‘ideological’ argu- ment – it depends on accepting a certain picture of the world, rather than accepting that a certain conclusion decisively follows from a certain set of indisputable premises. ...

The first argument is best introduced with an example. Consider someone, let’s call him Boleslav, who wants to kill his brother. Let’s
第一个参数最好通过一个例子来介绍。考虑一个人，让我们叫他Boleslav，他想杀死他的兄弟。让我们

suppose he is jealous of his brother, and feels that his brother is frustrating his own progress in life. We could say that Boleslav has a reason for killing his brother – we might not think it is a very good reason, or a very moral reason, but it is still a reason. A reason (in this sense) is just a collection of thoughts that make sense of a certain plan of action. Now, suppose that Boleslav is involved in a bar-room brawl one night, for reasons completely unconnected to his murderous plot, and accidentally kills a man who, unknown to him, is his brother (perhaps his brother is in disguise). So Boleslav has a reason to kill his brother, and kills his brother, but does not kill his brother for that reason
假设他嫉妒他的兄弟，觉得他的兄弟阻碍了他自己的人生进步。我们可以说博莱斯拉夫杀死他的兄弟是有原因的——我们可能认为这不是一个很好的理由，或者是一个非常道德的理由，但它仍然是一个理由。原因（在这个意义上）只是理解某个行动计划的想法的集合。现在，假设博莱斯拉夫在一天晚上卷入了一场酒吧斗殴，原因与他的谋杀阴谋完全无关，并意外杀死了一个他不知道的男人，这个人是他的兄弟（也许他的兄弟是伪装的）。所以博列斯拉夫有理由杀死他的兄弟，并杀死了他的兄弟，但没有因为这个原因杀死他的兄弟.

Compare this alternative story: Boleslav wants to kill his brother, for the same reason. He goes into the bar, recognises his brother and shoots him dead. In this case, Boleslav has a reason for killing his brother, and kills his brother for that reason.
比较这个替代故事：Boleslav想杀死他的兄弟，原因相同。他走进酒吧，认出了他的兄弟并开枪打死了他。在这种情况下，博列斯拉夫杀死他的兄弟是有原因的，并且正是因为这个原因杀死了他的兄弟。

What is the difference between the two cases? Or, to put it an- other way, what is involved in performing an action for a reason? The causal picture of thoughts gives an answer: someone performs an action for a reason when their reason is a cause of their action. So, in the first case, Boleslav’s fratricidal plan did not cause him to kill his brother, even though he did have a reason for doing so, and he did perform the act. But, in the second case, Boleslav’s fratricidal plan was the cause of his action. It is the difference in the causation of Boleslav’s behaviour that distinguishes the two cases.
这两种情况有什么区别？或者，换句话说，出于某种原因执行操作涉及什么？思想的因果图画给出了一个答案：当某人的理性是他们行为的原因时，他们出于某种原因执行一个动作。因此，在第一种情况下，博列斯拉夫的自相残杀计划并没有导致他杀死他的兄弟，即使他这样做是有原因的，而且他确实实施了这一行为。正是 Boleslav 行为的因果关系的差异区分了这两种情况。

How plausible is it to say that Boleslav’s reason (his murder- ous bunch of thoughts) was the cause of the murder in the second case but not in the first? Well, remember the features of causation mentioned above; let’s apply two of them to this case. (I shall ignore the connection between mental causation and laws – this will be discussed in the next section.)
说博列斯拉夫的理由（他那一堆杀人的想法）是第二起案件中谋杀的原因，而不是第一起案件中谋杀的原因，这有多大道理呢？好吧，记住上面提到的因果关系的特征;让我们将其中两个应用于这种情况。（我将忽略心理因果关系和定律之间的联系——这将在下一节中讨论。

First, the counterfactual feature: it seems right to say that, in the first case, other things being equal (i.e. keeping all the other circumstances the same as far as possible), if Boleslav had not had the fratricidal thoughts, then he would still have killed his brother. Killing his brother in the brawl is independent of his fratricidal thoughts. But in the second case this is not so.
首先，反事实特征：似乎可以说，在第一种情况下，其他条件相同（即尽可能保持所有其他情况相同），如果博莱斯拉夫没有自相残杀的想法，那么他仍然会杀死他的兄弟。在斗殴中杀死他的兄弟与他的自相残杀的想法无关。但在第二种情况下，情况并非如此。

Second, the explanatory feature of causation. When we ask ‘Why did Boleslav kill his brother?’ in the first case, it is not a good answer to say ‘Because he was jealous of his brother’. His jealousy of his brother does not explain why he killed his brother in this case; he did not kill his brother because of the fratricidal desires that he had. In the second case, however, killing his brother is explained by the fratricidal thoughts: we should treat them as the cause.
第二，因果关系的解释性特征。当我们问“为什么博莱斯拉夫杀了他的兄弟？在第一种情况下，说 '因为他嫉妒他的兄弟' 不是一个好的答案。他对兄弟的嫉妒并不能解释为什么他在这种情况下杀死了他的兄弟;他没有因为他的自相残杀的欲望而杀死他的兄弟。然而，在第二种情况下，杀死他的兄弟可以用自相残杀的想法来解释：我们应该把他们当作原因。

What the argument claims is that we need to distinguish between these two sorts of case, and that we can distinguish between them by thinking of the relation between reason and action as a causal relation. And this gives us an answer to the question: what is it to do something for a reason, or what is it to act on a reason? The answer is: to act on a reason is to have that reason as a cause of one’s action.
该论证声称，我们需要区分这两种情况，并且我们可以通过将理性和行动之间的关系视为因果关系来区分它们。这为我们提供了以下问题的答案：出于某种原因做某事是什么，或者根据某种原因采取行动是什么？答案是：根据一个理由采取行动就是将这个理由作为一个人行动的原因。

I think this argument is persuasive. But it is not absolutely compelling. For the argument itself does not rule out an alternative account of what it is to act on a reason. The structure of the argu- ment is as follows: here are two situations that obviously differ; we need to explain the difference between them; appealing to causation explains the difference between them. This may be right – but notice that it does not rule out the possibility that there is some other even better account of what it is to act on a reason. It is open, therefore, to the opponent of the causal picture of thought to respond to the argument by offering an alternative account. So the first argument will not persuade this opponent.
我认为这个论点很有说服力。但这并不是绝对令人信服的。因为论证本身并不排除对根据理性采取行动的另一种解释。论证的结构如下：这是两种明显不同的情况;我们需要解释它们之间的区别;诉诸因果关系解释了它们之间的区别。这可能是对的——但请注意，它并不排除这样一种可能性，即还有其他更好的解释来说明根据一个原因采取行动是什么。因此，思想因果图景的反对者可以通过提供另一种解释来回应这一论点。所以第一个论点不会说服这个对手。

However, it is useful to see this argument of Davidson’s in its historical context. The argument is one of a number of arguments which arose in opposition to the view above that I attributed to Wittgenstein and his followers: the view that it is a mistake to think of the mind in causal terms at all. These other arguments aimed to show that there is an essential causal component in many mental concepts. For example, perception was analysed as involving a causal relation between perceiver and the object perceived; memory was analysed as involving a causal relation between the memory and the fact remembered; knowledge and the relation between language and reality was thought of as fundamentally based on ...

causal relations.16 Davidson’s argument is part of a movement which analysed many mental concepts in terms of causation. Against this background, I can introduce my second argument for the causal picture of thought. ...

The second argument is what I call the ideological argument. I call it this because it depends upon accepting a certain picture of the world, the mechanical/causal world picture. This picture sees the whole of nature as obeying certain general causal laws – the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. – and it holds that psychology too has its laws, and that the mind fits into the causal order of nature. Throughout nature we find causation, the regular succession of events and the determination of one event by another. Why should the mind be exempt from this sort of determination? ...

After all, we do all believe that mental states can be affected by causes in the physical world: the colours you see, the things you smell, the food you taste, the things you hear – all of these experi- ences are the result of certain purely mechanistic physical processes outside your mind. We all know how our minds can be affected by chemicals – stimulants, antidepressants, narcotics, alcohol – and in all these cases we expect a regular, law-like connection between the taking of the chemical drug and the nature of the thought. So if mental states can be effects, what are supposed to be the reasons for thinking that they cannot also be causes? ...

I admit that this falls a long way short of being a conclusive argument. But it’s hard to see how you could have a conclusive philosophical argument for such a general, all-embracing view. What I am going to assume here, in any case, is that, given this overall view of the non-mental world, we need some pretty strong positive reasons to believe that the mental world does not work in the same sort of way. ...

Common-sense psychology ...

So much, for the time being, for the idea that mental states are the causes of behaviour. Let’s now return to the idea of common-sense psychology: the idea that when we understand the minds of others, ...

we employ (in some sense) a sort of ‘theory’ which characterises or describes mental states. Adam Morton has called this idea the ‘Theory Theory’ of common-sense psychology – i.e. the theory that common-sense psychology is a theory – and I’ll borrow the label from him.17 To understand this Theory Theory, we need to know what a theory is, and how the common-sense psychology theory applies to mental states. Then we need to ask about how this theory is supposed to be employed by thinkers. ...

在大多数一般意义上，我们可以将理论视为一种原则或原则的集合，旨在解释某些现象。因此，要有一个心理状态理论，就需要有一组解释心理现象的原则。就常识心理学而言，这些原则可能就像老生常谈一样简单，例如，人们通常会试图实现他们欲望的对象（其他事物相等）或者如果一个人以良好的光线看着他/她面前的物体，那么他/她通常会相信该物体在他/她面前（其他条件相同）（这些真理的明显琐碎将在下面讨论。

However, in the way it is normally understood, the claim that common-sense psychology is a theory is not just the claim that there are principles which describe the behaviour of mental states. What is meant in addition to this is that mental states are what philosophers call ‘theoretical entities’.18 That is, it is not just that mental states are describable by a theory, but also that the (true, complete) theory of mental states tells us everything there is to know about them. Compare the theory of the atom. If we knew a collection of general principles that described the structure and behaviour of the atom, these would tell us everything we needed to know about atoms in general – for everything there is to know about atoms is contained within the true complete theory of the atom. (Contrast colours: it’s arguably false that everything we know about colours is contained within the physical theory of colours. We also know what colours look like, which is not something that can be given by having knowledge of the theory of colours.19) Atoms are theoretical entities, not just in the sense that they are posits of a theory, but also
然而，按照通常的理解方式，声称常识心理学是一种理论，而不仅仅是声称有描述心理状态行为的原则。除此之外，心理状态是哲学家所说的“理论实体”。 18 也就是说，不仅心理状态可以用理论来描述，而且（真正的、完整的）心理状态理论也告诉我们了解他们比较原子的理论。如果我们知道一组描述原子结构和行为的一般原则，这些原则就会告诉我们我们需要了解的关于原子的一切——因为关于原子的一切知识都包含在原子的真正完整理论中。（对比颜色：可以说，我们关于颜色的一切都包含在颜色的物理理论中是错误的。我们也知道颜色是什么样子的，这不是通过了解颜色理论来提供的东西。19）原子是理论实体，不仅在它们是理论假设的意义上，而且

because their nature is exhausted by the description of them given by the theory. Likewise, according to the Theory Theory, all there is to know about, say, belief is contained within the true complete theory of belief.
因为他们的本质被理论对他们的描述所耗尽。同样，根据理论理论，所有关于信仰的知识都包含在真正完整的信仰理论中。

An analogy may help to make the point clear.20 Think of the theory as being rather like a story. Consider a story which goes like this: ‘Once upon a time there was an man called King Lear, who had three daughters, called Goneril, Regan and Cordelia. One day he said to them . . . ’ and so on. Now, if you ask, ‘Who was King Lear?’, a perfectly correct answer would be to paraphrase some part of the story: ‘King Lear is the man who divided his kingdom, disinherited his favourite daughter, went mad, and ended up on a heath’ and so on. But if you ask, ‘Did King Lear have a son? What happened to him?’ or ‘What sort of hairstyle did King Lear have?’, the story gives no answer. But it’s not that there is some fact about Lear’s son or his hairstyle which the story fails to mention; it’s rather that everything there is to know about Lear is contained within the story. To think there might be more is to misunderstand the story. Likewise, to think that there is more to atoms than is contained within the true complete theory of atoms is (on this view of theories) to fail to ap- preciate that atoms are theoretical entities.
一个类比可能有助于阐明这一点。20把这个理论看作是一个故事。考虑一个故事是这样的：“从前有一个人，名叫李尔王，他有三个女儿，分别是戈纳里尔、里根和科黛莉亚。有一天，他对他们说......' 等。现在，如果你问“李尔王是谁”，一个完全正确的答案是转述故事的某个部分：“李尔王是那个分裂王国的人，他剥夺了他最喜欢的女儿的继承权，发疯了，最终走上了荒地”和等等。但是，如果你问，'李尔王有儿子吗？他怎么了？“或”李尔王有什么样的发型“，这个故事没有给出答案。但这并不是说故事中没有提到一些关于李尔的儿子或他的发型的事实;相反，关于李尔的一切都包含在故事中。认为可能还有更多是误解了这个故事。同样，认为原子的内容超过了真正的完整原子理论所包含的内容（根据这种理论观点），就不能认定原子是理论实体。

The analogy with common-sense psychology is this. The theory of belief, for example, might say something like: ‘There are these states, beliefs, which causally interact with desires to cause actions
与常识心理学的类比是这样的。例如，信念理论可能会说这样的话：“ 有这些状态，信念，它们与引起行动的欲望因果相互作用

. . . ’ and so on, listing all the familiar facts about beliefs and their relations to other mental states. Once all these familiar facts have been listed, the list gives a ‘theoretical definition’ of the term ‘be- lief’. The nature of beliefs will be, on this view, entirely exhausted by these truisms about beliefs. There is no more to beliefs than is contained within the theory of belief; and likewise with other kinds of thought.21
. . . .“等等，列出了所有关于信念及其与其他心理状态关系的熟悉事实。一旦列出了所有这些熟悉的事实，该列表就给出了“be-believef”一词的“理论定义”。根据这种观点，信仰的本质将完全被这些关于信仰的老生常谈所耗尽。信仰没有比信仰理论所包含的更多的东西;其他种类的思想也是如此。21

It is important to distinguish, in principle, the idea that common- sense psychology is a theory from the causal picture of thoughts as such. One could accept the causal picture of thoughts – which, re- member, is simply the claim that thoughts have effects in behaviour – without accepting the idea that common-sense psychology is a
原则上，将常识心理学是一种理论的观点与思想本身的因果图景区分开来是很重要的。人们可以接受思想的因果图景——回想一下，这只是声称思想对行为有影响——而不接受常识心理学是

theory (see ‘Theory versus simulation’, p. 77). It would also be pos- sible to deny the causal theory of thoughts – to deny that thoughts have effects – while accepting the conception of common-sense psychology as a theory. This view could be held by someone who is sceptical about the existence of causation, for example – though this would be quite an unusual view.
理论（参见“理论与模拟”，第 77 页）。否认思想的因果理论——否认思想有效果——同时接受常识心理学的概念作为一种理论，也是可能的。例如，对因果关系的存在持怀疑态度的人可能持有这种观点——尽管这将是一个相当不寻常的观点。

Bearing this in mind, we need to say more about how the Theory Theory is supposed to work, and what the theory says that thoughts are. Let’s take another simple everyday example. Suppose we see someone running along an empty pavement, carrying a number of bags, while a bus overtakes her, approaching a bus stop. What is she doing? The obvious answer is: she is running for the bus. The reflections earlier in this chapter should make us aware that there are alternatives to the obvious answer: perhaps she thinks she is being chased by someone, or perhaps she just wants to exercise. But, given the fact that the pavement is otherwise empty, and the fact that people don’t normally exercise while carrying large bags, we draw the obvious conclusion.
牢记这一点，我们需要更多地说明理论理论应该如何运作，以及理论是怎么说思想的。让我们再举一个简单的日常例子。假设我们看到有人在空荡荡的人行道上奔跑，背着一些包，而一辆公共汽车超过了她，接近一个公共汽车站。她在做什么？显而易见的答案是：她正在奔向公交车。本章前面的思考应该让我们意识到，除了显而易见的答案之外，还有其他选择：也许她认为她正在被某人追赶，或者她只是想要锻炼。但是，考虑到人行道上空无一人的事实，以及人们通常不会在背着大包时锻炼的事实，我们得出了明显的结论。

As with our earlier example, we rule out the more unusual in- terpretations because they don’t strike us as reasonable or rational things for the person to do. In making this interpretation of her behaviour, we assume a certain degree of rationality in the woman’s mind: we assume that she is pursuing her immediate goal (catching the bus), doubtless in order to reach some long-term goal (getting home). We assume this because these are, in our view, reasonable things to do, and she is using reasonable ways to try and do them (as opposed to, say, lying down in the middle of the road in front of the bus and hoping that the bus driver will pick her up).
与我们前面的例子一样，我们排除了更不寻常的解释，因为它们不会让我们觉得这是人应该做的合理或理性的事情。在对她的行为进行这种解释时，我们假设女性的心目中有一定程度的理性：我们假设她正在追求她的直接目标（赶公共汽车），无疑是为了达到一些长期目标（回家）。我们之所以假设，是因为我们认为这些是合理的事情，而且她正在使用合理的方法来尝试去做这些事情（而不是，比如说，躺在公共汽车前面的马路中间，希望公共汽车司机这样做把她捡起来）。

To say this is not to deny the existence of irrational and crazy be- haviour. Of course not. But if all behaviour was irrational and crazy, we would not be able to make these hypotheses about what is going on in people’s minds. We would not know how to choose between one wild hypothesis and another. In order for the interpretation of other thinkers to be possible in general, then, we have to assume that there is a certain regularity in the connection between thought and behaviour. And if the relation between people’s thoughts and ...

their behaviour is to be regular enough to allow interpretation, then it is natural to expect that common-sense psychology will contain generalisations which detail these regularities. In fact, if common- sense psychology really is a theory, this is what we should expect anyway – for a theory is (at the very least) a collection of general principles or laws. ...

So the next question is: are there any psychological gener- alisations? Scepticism about such generalisations can come from a number of sources. One common kind of scepticism is based on the idea that, if there were psychological generalisations, then surely we (as ‘common-sense psychologists’) should know them. But, in fact, we are very bad at bringing any plausible generalisations to mind. As Adam Morton says, ‘principles like “anyone who thinks there is a tiger in this room will leave it” are . . . almost always false’.22 And when we do actually succeed in bringing to mind some true gener- alisations, they can turn out to be rather disappointing – consider our earlier example: ‘People generally try to achieve the object of their desires (other things being equal)’. We are inclined to say: ‘Of course! Tell me something I didn’t know!’. Here is Morton again: ...

The most striking thing about common-sense psychology . . . is the combination of a powerful and versatile explanatory power with a great absence of powerful or daring hypotheses. When one tries to come up with principles of psychological explanation generally used in everyday life one only finds dull truisms, and yet in particular cases, interesting brave and acute hypotheses are produced about why one person . . . acts in some particular way.23 ...

There is obviously something right about this point; but perhaps it is a little exaggerated. After all, if the Theory Theory is right about common-sense psychology, we are employing this theory all the time when we interpret one another. So it will be hardly surprising if we find the generalisations that we use ‘truistic’. They will be truistic because they are so familiar – but this does not mean that they are not powerful. Compare our everyday theory of physical ob- jects – ‘folk physics’. We know that solid objects resist pressure and ...

被其他物体穿透。从某种意义上说，这是不言而喻的，但它的不言而喻影响着我们与物体世界的所有交往。

Another way in which the defender of the Theory Theory can respond is by saying that it is only the assumption that we have some knowledge of a psychological theory of other minds that can satisfactorily explain how we manage to interpret other people so successfully. However, this knowledge need not be explicitly known by us – that is, we need not be able to bring this knowledge to our conscious minds. But this unconscious knowledge – like the mathematical knowledge of Meno’s slave which was discussed in Chapter 1 (see ‘Thought and consciousness’, p. 26) – is nonetheless there. And it explains how we understand each other, just as (say) unconscious or ‘tacit’ knowledge of linguistic rules explains how we understand language. (We will return to this idea in Chapter 4.)
理论理论的捍卫者可以回应的另一种方式是说，只有假设我们对其他思想的心理学理论有一些了解，才能令人满意地解释我们设法如此成功地诠释了其他人。然而，这些知识不需要我们明确地知道——也就是说，我们不需要能够将这些知识带到我们的意识中。但这种无意识的知识——就像第一章中讨论的美诺奴隶的数学知识一样（见“思想与意识”，第26页）——是尽管如此，还是在那里。它解释了我们如何理解彼此，就像（比如）无意识或“隐性”的语言规则知识解释了我们如何理解语言一样。（我们将在第 4 章中回到这个想法。

So far, then, I have claimed that common-sense psychology oper- ates by assuming that people are largely rational, and by assuming the truth of certain generalisations. We might not be able to state all these generalisations. But given that we know some of them – even the ‘dull truisms’ – we can now ask: what do the generalisations of common-sense psychology say that thoughts themselves are?
因此，到目前为止，人们声称常识心理学的运作方式是假设人们在很大程度上是理性的，并假设某些概括的真理。我们可能无法陈述所有这些概括。但是，鉴于我们知道其中的一些——甚至是“枯燥的真理”——我们现在可以问：常识心理学的概括是怎么说思想本身的？

Let’s return to the example of the woman running for the bus. If someone were to ask why we interpret her as running for the bus, one thing we might say is: ‘Well, it’s obvious: the bus is coming’. But, when you think about it, this isn’t quite right. For it’s not the fact that the bus is coming which makes her do what she does, it’s the fact that she thinks that the bus is coming. If the bus were coming and she didn’t realise it, then she wouldn’t be running for the bus. Likewise, if she thought the bus was coming when in fact it wasn’t (perhaps she mistakes the sound of a truck for the sound of the bus), she would still run.
让我们回到那个女人跑公交车的例子。如果有人问我们为什么把她解释为跑公交车，我们可能会说：'嗯，很明显：公交车来了'。但是，仔细想想，这并不完全正确。因为不是公共汽车要来的事实让她做她所做的事情，而是她认为公共汽车要来的事实。如果公共汽车要来了，而她没有意识到，那么她就不会跑向公共汽车。同样，如果她认为公共汽车要来，但实际上并没有（也许她把卡车的声音误认为是公共汽车的声音），她仍然会跑。

In more general terms, what people do is determined by how they take the world to be, and how a thinker takes the world to be is not always how the world is (we all make mistakes). But to say that a thinker ‘takes’ the world to be a certain way is just another way of saying that the thinker represents the world as being a certain way. So what thinkers do is determined by how they represent the world
更一般地说，人们做什么取决于他们如何看待世界，而思想家如何看待世界并不总是这样的（我们都会犯错）。但是，说一个思想家 “采取 ”世界是某种方式，只是另一种说法，即思想者把世界表现为某种方式。因此，思想家做什么取决于他们如何代表世界

to be. That is, according to common-sense psychology, the thoughts which determine behaviour are representational
成为。也就是说，根据常识心理学，决定行为的思想是表征的.

Notice that it is how things are represented in thought that matters to common-sense psychology, not just what objects are represented. Someone who thinks the bus is coming must represent the bus as a bus, and not (for example) just as a motorised vehicle of some kind – for why should anyone run after a motorised vehicle of some kind? Or consider Boleslav: although he killed his brother in the first scenario, and represented his brother to himself in some way, he did not represent his brother as his brother, and this is why his desire to kill his brother is not the cause of the murder. (Recall the example of Orwell in Chapter 1: ‘Intentionality’.)
请注意，对于常识心理学来说，重要的是事物在思想中的表现方式，而不仅仅是表现了什么对象。认为公共汽车要来的人必须将公共汽车表示为公共汽车，而不是（例如）只是某种机动车辆——因为为什么有人要追赶一辆机动车辆某种？或者考虑一下波列斯拉夫：虽然他在第一种情况下杀死了他的兄弟，并以某种方式代表了他的兄弟，但他并没有将他的兄弟代表为他的兄弟，这就是为什么他杀死他兄弟的愿望不是导致谋杀。（回想一下奥威尔在第一章“意向性”中的例子。

The other central part of the common-sense conception, at least according to the causal picture of thoughts, is that thoughts are the causes of behaviour. The common-sense conception says that, when we give an explanation of someone’s behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires, the explanation cites the causes of the behaviour. When we say that the woman is running for the bus because she believes that the bus is coming and wants to go home on the bus, this because expresses causation, just as the because in ‘He got cancer because he smoked’ expresses causation.
常识性概念的另一个核心部分，至少根据思想的因果图景，是思想是行为的原因。常识性概念说，当我们从信仰和欲望的角度来解释某人的行为时，解释会引用行为的原因。当我们说这个女人跑去坐公交车，因为她相信公交车要来了，想坐公交车回家，这因为表达了因果关系，就像'他得到了cancer because he smoked' 表示因果关系。

Combining the causal picture of thought with the Theory Theory, we get the following: common-sense psychology contains generalisations which describe the effects and potential effects of having certain thoughts. For instance: the simple examples we have discussed are examples in which what someone does depends on what he or she believes and what he or she wants or desires. So the causal picture-plus-Theory Theory would say that common-sense psychology contains a generalisation or bunch of generalisations about how beliefs and desires interact to cause actions. A rough attempt at formulating a generalisation might be:
将思想的因果图景与理论理论相结合，我们得到以下内容：常识心理学包含描述拥有某些想法的效果和潜在影响的概括。例如：我们讨论的简单例子是某人做什么取决于他或她的信仰以及他或她想要或渴望什么的例子。因此，因果图观加理论会说，常识心理学包含关于信念和欲望如何相互作用以引起行动的概括或一堆概括。粗略地尝试构建一个概括可能是：

Beliefs combine with desires to cause actions which aim at the satis- faction or fulfilment of those desires.24
信念与欲望相结合，导致旨在满足或满足这些欲望的行动。24

So, for example, if I desire a glass of wine, and I believe that there is some wine in the fridge, and I believe that the fridge is in the
所以，例如，如果我想喝一杯葡萄酒，我相信冰箱里有一些葡萄酒，并且相信冰箱里有

kitchen, and I believe the kitchen is over there, these will cause me to act in a way that aims at the satisfaction of the desire: for example, I might move over there towards the fridge. (For more on this, see Chapter 5: ‘Representation and success in action’.) ...

Of course, I might not – even if I had all these beliefs and this desire. If I had another, stronger, desire to keep a clear head, or if I believed that the wine belonged to someone else and thought I shouldn’t take it, then I may not act on my desire for a glass of wine. But this doesn’t undermine the generalisation, since the generalisa- tion is compatible with any number of desires interacting to bring about my action. If my desire to keep a clear head is stronger than my desire to have a drink, then it will be the cause of a different action (avoiding the fridge, going for a bracing walk in the country, or some such). All the generalisation says is that one will act in a way that aims to satisfy one’s desires, whatever they are. ...

It’s worth stressing again that trains of thought like these are not supposed to run through one’s conscious mind. Someone who wants a drink will hardly ever consciously think, ‘I want a drink; the drink is in the fridge; the fridge is over there; therefore I should go over there’ and so on. (If this is what he or she is consciously thinking, then it is probably unwise to have another drink.) The idea is rather that there are unconscious thoughts, with these representational contents, which cause a thinker’s behaviour. These thoughts are the causal ‘springs’ of thinkers’ actions, not necessarily the occupants of their conscious minds. ...

Or that’s what the causal version of the Theory Theory says; it’s now time to assess the Theory Theory. In assessing it, we need to address two central questions. First, does the Theory Theory give a correct account of our everyday psychological understanding of each other? That is, is it right to talk about common-sense psychol- ogy as a kind of theory at all, or should it be understood in some other way? (Bear in mind that to reject the Theory Theory on these grounds is not ipso facto to reject the causal picture of thoughts.) ...

The second question is, even if our everyday psychological understanding of each other is a theory, is it a good theory? That is, suppose the collection of principles and platitudes about beliefs and ...

desires causing actions (and so on), which I am calling common- sense psychology, is indeed a theory of human minds; are there any reasons for thinking that it is a true theory of human minds? This might seem like an odd question but, as we shall see, one’s attitude to it can affect one’s whole attitude to the mind. ...

It will be simplest if I take these questions in reverse order. ...

The science of thought: elimination or vindication? ...

Let’s suppose, then, that common-sense psychology is a theory: the theory of belief, desire, imagination, hope, fear, love and the other psychological states which we attribute to one another. In calling this theory common-sense psychology, philosophers implicitly contrast it with the scientific discipline of psychology. Common- sense psychology is a theory whose mastery requires only a fairly mature mind, a bit of imagination and some familiarity with other people. In this sense, we are all psychologists. Scientific psychology, however, uses many technical concepts and quantitative methods which only a small proportion of ‘common-sense psychologists’ understand. But both theories claim, on the face of it, to be theories of the same thing – the mind. So how are they related? ...

It won’t do simply to assume that in fact scientific psychology and common-sense psychology are theories of different things – sci- entific psychology is the theory of the brain, while common-sense psychology is the theory of the mind or the person. There are at least three reasons why this won’t work. First, for all that we have said about these theories so far, the mind could just be the brain. As I said in Chapter 1, this is a question we can leave to one side in discussing thought and mental representation. But, whatever conclusion we reach on this, we certainly should not assume that just because we have two theories, we have two things. (Compare: common-sense says that the table is solid wood; particle physics says that the table is mostly empty space. It is a bad inference to conclude that there are two tables just because there are two theories.25) ...

Second, scientific psychology talks about a lot of the same kinds of mental states as we talk about in common-sense psychology. ...

Scientific psychologists attempt to answer questions such as: How does memory work? How do we see objects? Why do we dream? What are mental images? All these mental states and events – memory, vision, dreaming and mental imagery – are familiar to common-sense psychology. You do not have to have any scientific qualifications to be able to apply the concepts of memory or vision. Both scientific and common-sense psychology have things to say about these phenomena; there is no reason to assume at the outset that the phenomenon of vision for a scientific psychologist is a dif- ferent phenomenon of vision for a common-sense ‘psychologist’. ...

Finally, a lot of actual scientific psychology is carried out without reference to the actual workings of the brain. This is not normally because the psychologists involved are Cartesian dualists, but rather because it often makes more sense to look at how the mind works in large-scale, macroscopic terms – in terms of ordinary behaviour – before looking at the details of its neural implementation. So the idea that scientific psychology is concerned only with the brain is not true even to the actual practice of psychology. ...

Given that scientific psychology and common-sense psychology are concerned with the same thing – the mind – the question of the relationship between them becomes urgent. There are many approaches one can take to this relationship, but in the end they boil down to two: vindication or elimination. Let’s look at these two approaches. ...

According to the vindication approach, we already know (or have good reason to believe) that the generalisations of common-sense psychology are largely true. So one of the things we can expect from scientific psychology is an explanation of how or why they are true. We know, for example, that if normal perceivers look at an object in good light, with nothing in the way, they will come to believe that the object is in front of them. So one of the aims of a scientific psychology of vision and cognition is to explain why this humble truth is in fact true: what is it about us, about our brains and our eyes, and about light that makes it possible for us to see objects, and to form beliefs about them on the basis of seeing them. The vindication approach might use an analogy with common-sense ...

physics. Before Newton, people already knew that if an object is thrown into the air, it eventually returns to the ground. But it took Newton’s physics to explain why this truth is, in fact, true. And this is how things will be with common-sense psychology.26 ...

By contrast, the elimination approach says that there are many reasons for doubting whether common-sense psychology is true. And if it is not true then we should allow the science of the mind or the brain to develop without having to employ the categories of common-sense psychology. Scientific psychology has no obligation to explain why the common-sense generalisations are true, because there are good reasons for thinking they aren’t true! So we should expect scientific psychology eventually to eliminate common- sense, rather than to vindicate it. This approach uses an analogy with discredited theories such as alchemy. Alchemists thought that there was a ‘philosopher’s stone’ which could turn lead into gold. But science did not show why this was true – it wasn’t true, and alchemy was eventually eliminated. And this is how things will be with common-sense psychology.27 ...

Since proponents of the elimination approach are always materi- alists, the approach is known as eliminative materialism. According to one of its leading defenders, Paul Churchland: ...

[E]liminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense concep- tion of psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of the theory will eventually be displaced . . . by completed neuroscience. ...

By ‘the ontology of the theory’, Churchland means those things which the theory claims to exist: beliefs, desires, intentions and so on. (‘Ontology’ is the study of being, or what exists.) So to say that the ontology of common-sense psychology is defective is to say that common-sense psychology is wrong about what is in the mind. In fact, eliminative materialists normally claim that none of the mental states that common-sense psychology postulates exists. That is, there are no beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, hopes, fears and so on. ...

This might strike you as an incredible view. How could any reasonable person think that there are no thoughts? Isn’t that as self-refuting as saying that there are no words? But, before assessing the view, notice how smoothly it seems to flow from the conception of common-sense psychology as a theory, and of mental states as theoretical entities, mentioned in the previous section. Remember that, on this conception, the entire nature of thoughts is described by the theory. The answer to the question ‘What are thoughts?’ is: ‘Thoughts are what the theory of thoughts says they are’. So, if the theory of thoughts turns out to be false, then there is nothing for thoughts to be. That is, either the theory is largely true, or there are no thoughts at all. (Compare: atoms are what the theory of atoms says they are. There is nothing more to being an atom than what the theory says; so if the theory is false, there are no atoms.) ...

Eliminative materialists adopt the view that common-sense psychology is a theory, and then argue that the theory is false.28 But why do they think the theory is false? One reason they give is that (contrary to the vindication approach) common-sense psychology does not in fact explain very much: ...

[T]he nature and dynamics of mental illness, the faculty of creative imagination . . . the nature and psychological function of sleep . . . the rich variety of perceptual illusions . . . the miracle of memory . . . the nature of the learning process itself . . . 29 ...

– all of these phenomena, according to Churchland, are ‘wholly mysterious’ to common-sense psychology, and will probably remain so. A second reason for rejecting common-sense psychology is that it is ‘stagnant’ – it has shown little sign of development throughout its long history (whose length Churchland rather arbitrarily gives as twenty-five centuries30). A third reason is that there seems little chance that the categories of common-sense psychology (belief, desire and so on) will ‘reduce’ to physical categories, i.e. it seems very unlikely that scientists will be able to say in a detailed and systematic way which physical phenomena underpin beliefs and desires. (Remember the absurdity of ‘mother love is magnesium’.) ...

If this cannot be done, Churchland argues, there is little chance of making common-sense psychology scientifically respectable.
丘奇兰认为，如果这做不到，那么使常识心理学在科学上受人尊敬的机会就很小。

Before assessing these reasons, we must return to the question that is probably still worrying you: how can anyone really believe this theory? How can anyone believe that there are no beliefs? Indeed, how can anyone even assert the theory? For to assert something is to express a belief in it; but, if eliminative materialism is right, then there are no beliefs, so no-one can express them. So aren’t eliminative materialists, by their own lights, just sounding off, vibrating the airwaves with meaningless sounds? Doesn’t their theory refute itself?
在评估这些原因之前，我们必须回到可能仍然困扰你的问题：怎么会有人真的相信这个理论呢？怎么会有人相信没有信仰呢？事实上，怎么会有人断言这个理论呢？因为断言某事就是表达对它的信念;但是，如果消除唯物主义是对的，那么就没有信仰，所以没有人可以表达它们。那么，消除唯物主义者不正是借着他们自己的灯光，发出无意义的声音来震动电波吗？他们的理论不是在反驳自己吗？

Churchland has responded to this argument by drawing an analogy with the nineteenth-century belief in vitalism – the thesis that it is not possible to explain the difference between living and non-living things in wholly physicochemical terms, but only by ap- pealing to the presence of a vital spirit or ‘entelechy’ which explains the presence of life. He imagines someone arguing that the denial of vitalism (antivitalism) is self-refuting:
丘奇兰通过类比 19 世纪的生命力论信仰来回应这一论点——该论点认为不可能完全用物理化学术语来解释生物和非生物之间的区别，而只能通过应用生命精神的存在或“entelechy”这解释了生命的存在。他想象有人争论说，对生命力论（antivitalism）的否认是自我反驳的：

My learned friend has stated that there is no such things as vital spirit. But this statement is incoherent. For if it is true, then my friend does not have vital spirit, and therefore must be dead. But if he is dead, then his statement is just a string of noises, devoid of meaning or truth. Evidently, the assumption that antivitalism is true entails that it cannot be true! QED31
我博学的朋友说过，没有生命力的精神这样的东西。但这种说法是不连贯的。因为如果这是真的，那么我的朋友就没有生命力，因此一定是死了。但如果他死了，那么他的陈述就只是一连串的声音，没有意义或真理。显然，反生命论是真的假设它不可能是真的！QED31

The argument being parodied is this: the vitalists held that it was in the nature of being alive that one’s body contained vital entelechy, so anyone who denies the existence of vital entelechies claims in effect that nothing is alive (including they themselves). This is a bad argument. Churchland claims that the self-refutation charge against eliminative materialism involves an equally bad argument: what it is to assert something, according to common-sense psychology, is to express a belief in it; so anyone who denies the existence of beliefs in effect claims that no-one asserts anything (including the eliminative materialists).
被模仿的论点是这样的：生命论者认为，在活着的本质中，一个人的身体包含着生命的 entelechy，所以任何否认生命 entelechis 存在的人实际上都声称什么都没有alive（包括他们自己）。这是一个糟糕的论点。丘奇兰声称，对消除唯物主义的自我反驳指控涉及一个同样糟糕的论点：根据常识心理学，断言某物是什么，是表达对它的信仰;因此，任何实际上否认信念存在的人都声称没有人断言任何东西（包括排除唯物主义者）。

Certainly, the argument in favour of vitalism is a bad one. But
当然，支持活力主义的论点是糟糕的。但

the analogy is not very persuasive. For, whereas we can easily make sense of the idea that life might not involve vital entelechy, it’s very hard to make sense of the analogous idea that assertion might not involve the expression of belief. Assertion itself is a notion from common-sense psychology: to assert something is to claim that it is true. In this sense, assertion is close to the idea of belief: to believe something is to hold it as true. So if common-sense psychology is eliminated, assertion as well as belief must go.32
这个类比不是很有说服力。因为，虽然我们很容易理解生命可能不涉及生命的意义，但很难理解断言可能不涉及信仰表达的类似想法。断言本身是来自常识心理学的一个概念：断言某事就是声称它是真实的。从这个意义上说，断言接近于信念的概念：相信某事就是认为它是真实的。因此，如果常识性心理学被消除，断言和信念就必须消失。32

Churchland may respond that we should not let the future devel- opment of science be dictated by what we can or cannot imagine or make sense of. If in the nineteenth century there were people who could not make sense of the idea that life did not consist of vital ‘entelechy’, these people were victims of the limitations of their own imaginations. But, of course, though it is a good idea to be aware of our own cognitive limits, such caution by itself does not get us anywhere near the eliminative position. ...

But we do not need to settle this issue about self-refutation in order to assess eliminative materialism. For, when examined, the positive arguments in support of the view are not very persuasive anyway. I shall briefly review them. ...

First, take the idea that common-sense psychology hasn’t explained much. On the face of it, the fact that the theory which explains behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires does not also explain why we sleep (and the other things mentioned above) is not in itself a reason for rejecting beliefs and desires. For why should the theory of beliefs and desires have to explain sleep? This response seems to demand too much of the vindication view. ...

Second, let’s consider the charge that common-sense psychology is ‘stagnant’. This is highly questionable. One striking example of how the common-sense theory of mind seems to have changed is in the place it assigns to consciousness (see Chapter 1). It is widely accepted that, since Freud, many people in the West accept that it makes sense to suppose that some mental states (for example, desires) are not conscious. This is a change in the view of the mind that can plausibly be regarded as part of common-sense. ...

In any case, even if common-sense psychology had not changed ...

very much over the centuries, this would not in itself establish much. The fact that a theory has not changed for many years could be a sign either of the theory’s stagnation or of the fact that it is extremely well established. Which of these is the case depends on how good the theory is in explaining the phenomena, not on the absence of change as such. (Compare: the common-sense physical belief that unsupported bodies fall to the ground has not changed for many centuries. Should we conclude that this common-sense belief is stagnant?) ...

Third, there is the issue of whether the folk psychological catego- ries can be reduced to physical (or neurophysiological) categories. The assumption here is that, in order for a theory to be scientifically respectable, it has to be reducible to physics. This is a very extreme assumption, and, as I suggested in the introduction, it does not have to be accepted in order to accept the idea that the mind can be explained by science. If this is right, the vindication approach can reject reductionism without rejecting the scientific explanation of the mind.33 ...

So, even if they are not ultimately self-refuting, the arguments for eliminative materialism are not very convincing. The specific reasons eliminative materialists offer in defence of the theory are very controversial. Nonetheless, many philosophers of mind are disturbed by the mere possibility of eliminative materialism. The reason is that this possibility (however remote) is one which is implicit in the Theory Theory. For if common-sense psychology really is an empirical theory – that is, a theory which claims to be true of the ordinary world of experience – then, like any empirical theory, its proponents must accept the possibility that it may one day be falsified. No matter how much we believe in the theories of evolution or relativity, we must accept (at least) the possibility that one day they may be shown to be false. ...

One way to avoid this unhappy situation is to reject the Theory Theory altogether as an account of our ordinary understanding of other minds. This approach would give a negative answer to the first question posed at the end of the last section – ’Does the Theory Theory give an adequate account of common-sense psychology?’. Let’s take a brief look at this approach. ...

Theory versus simulation ...

So there are many philosophers who think that the Theory Theory utterly misrepresents what we do when we apply psychological concepts to understand each others’ minds. Their alternative is rather that understanding others’ minds involves a kind of imagina- tive projection into their minds. This projection they call variously ‘replication’ or ‘simulation’. ...

The essence of the idea is easy to grasp. When we try and figure out what someone else is doing, we often put ourselves ‘in their shoes’, trying to see things from their perspective. That is, we im- aginatively ‘simulate’ or ‘replicate’ the thoughts that might explain their behaviour. In reflecting on the actions of another, according to Jane Heal: ...

[W]hat I endeavour to do it to replicate or recreate his thinking. I place myself in what I take to be his initial state by imagining the world as it would appear from his point of view and then deliberate, reason and reflect to see what decision emerges.34 ...

A similar view was expressed over forty years ago by W.V. Quine: ...

[P]ropositional attitudes . . . can be thoughts of as involving something like quotation of one’s imagined verbal response to an imagined situ- ation. Casting our real selves thus in unreal roles, we do not generally know how much reality to hold constant. Quandaries arise. But despite them we find ourselves attributing beliefs, wishes and strivings even to creatures lacking the power of speech, such is our dramatic virtuosity. We project ourselves even into what from his behaviour we imagine a mouse’s state of mind to have been, and dramatize it as a belief, wish or striving, verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us in the state thus feigned.35 ...

Recent thinkers have begun to take Quine’s observation very seriously, and there are a number of options emerging on how to fill out the details. But common to them all is the idea that figuring out what someone thinks is not looking at their behaviour and applying a theory to it. Rather, it is something more like a skill we have: the ...

skill to imagine ourselves into the minds of others, and to predict and explain their behaviour as a result.
将自己想象成他人的思想，并预测和解释他们行为的技能。

It is easy to see how this ‘simulation theory’ of common-sense psychology can avoid the issue of the elimination of the mind. The eliminative materialist argument in the last section started with the assumptions that common-sense psychology was a theory, that the things it talks about are fully defined by the theory, and that it is competing with scientific psychology. The argument then said that common-sense psychology is not a very good theory – and concluded that there are no good reasons for thinking that mental states exist. But if common-sense psychology is not a theory at all then it is not even in competition with science, and the argument doesn’t get off the ground.
很容易看出这种常识性心理学的“模拟理论”如何避免消除心灵的问题。上一节中的排除唯物主义论证始于这样一个假设，即常识心理学是一种理论，它所谈论的事物完全由理论定义，并且它与科学心理学竞争。然后，该论点说常识性心理学不是一个很好的理论——并得出结论，认为精神状态存在没有充分的理由。但是，如果常识心理学根本不是一种理论，那么它甚至不与科学竞争，而且这个论点也没有开始。

Although adopting the simulation theory would be a way of denying a premise – the Theory Theory – in one of the arguments for eliminative materialism, this is not a very good reason in itself for believing in the simulation theory. For, looked at in another way, the simulation theory could be quite congenial to eliminative materialists: it could be argued that, if common-sense psychology does not even present itself as a science, or as a ‘proto-science’, then we do not need to think of it as true at all. So one could embrace the simulation theory without believing that minds really exist. (The assumption here, of course, is that the only claims that tell us what there is in the world are the claims made by scientific theories.)
尽管采用模拟理论是一种否认消除唯物主义论点之一的前提——理论理论——的方式，但这本身并不是相信模拟理论的一个很好的理由。因为，从另一个角度来看，模拟理论可能相当适合消元论者：可以说，如果常识心理学甚至不把自己表现为一门科学，或者说是一门“原始科学”，那么我们根本不需要认为它是真的。因此，人们可以接受模拟理论，而不相信思想真的存在。（当然，这里的假设是，唯一告诉我们世界上有什么的主张是科学理论的主张。

This combination of simulation theory and eliminative material- ism is actually held by Quine. Contrast the remark quoted earlier with the following:
这种模拟理论和消除唯物主义的结合实际上是奎因所持有的。将前面引用的评论与以下内容进行对比：

The issue is . . . whether in an ideal last accounting of everything . . . it is efficacious so to frame our conceptual scheme as to mark out a range of entities or units of a so-called mental kind in addition to the physical ones. My hypothesis, put forward in the spirit of a hypothesis of natural science, is that it is not efficacious.36
问题是。无论在理想情况下，对一切事物的最后解释，构建我们的概念图式，以便在物理实体之外，标出一系列所谓的心理类型的实体或单位是有效的。我的假设是，本着自然科学假说的精神提出的，是它没有效果。36 元

Since eliminative materialism and the simulation theory are compat- ible in this way, avoiding eliminative materialism would be a very bad motivation on its own for believing in the simulation theory.
既然消除唯物主义和模拟理论以这种方式是兼容的，那么避免消除唯物主义本身就是相信模拟理论的一个非常糟糕的动机。

And, of course, simulation theorists have a number of independent reasons for believing in their theory. One reason has already been mentioned in this chapter (in the section ‘Common-sense psychol- ogy’): no-one has been able to come up with very many powerful or interesting common-sense psychological generalisations. Remember Adam Morton’s remark that most of the generalisations of folk psychology are ‘dull truisms’. This is not intended as a knock-down argument, but (simulation theorists say) it should encourage us to look for an alternative to the Theory Theory. ...

So what should we make of the simulation theory? Certainly, many of us will recognise that this is often how things seem to us when we understand one another. ‘Seeing things from someone else’s point of view’ can even be practically synonymous with understanding them, and failure to see things from others’ points of view is clearly failure in one’s ability as a common-sense psycholo- gist. But if simulation is such an obvious part of our waking lives, why should anyone deny that it takes place? And if no-one (even a Theory Theorist) should deny that it takes place, how is the simula- tion theory supposed to be in confiict with the Theory Theory? Why couldn’t a Theory Theorist respond by saying: ‘I agree: that’s how understanding other minds seems to us; but you couldn’t simulate unless you had knowledge of some underlying theory whose truth made the simulation possible. This underlying theory need not be applied consciously; but as we all know, this doesn’t mean it isn’t there’.
那么我们应该如何看待模拟理论呢？当然，我们中的许多人会认识到，当我们相互理解时，事情往往就是我们看起来的样子。“从别人的角度看事物 ” 甚至可以等同于理解事物，而不能从别人的角度看事物显然是一个人能力的失败作为一个常识性的心理学家。但是，如果模拟是我们清醒生活中如此明显的一部分，为什么有人要否认它的存在呢？如果没有人（即使是理论理论家）否认它发生了，那么模拟理论又该如何与理论理论相吻合呢？为什么理论理论家不能回答说：'我同意：这就是我们理解他人思想的方式 ;但是除非你了解一些基本理论，否则你无法模拟，这些理论的真理使模拟成为可能。这个基本理论不需要有意识地应用;但众所周知，这并不意味着它不存在。

The answer depends on what we mean by saying that common- sense psychology is a theory that is ‘applied’ to thinkers. In the section on ‘Common-sense psychology’ above, I pointed out that the Theory Theory could say that common-sense psychological gener- alisations were unconsciously known by thinkers (an idea we will return to in Chapter 4). But, on the face of it, it looks as if this view is not directly threatened by the simulation theory. Since simulation relates to what we are explicitly aware of in acts of interpretation, the fact that we simulate others does not show that we do not have tacit knowledge of common-sense psychological generalisations. Simulation theorists therefore need to provide independent argu- ments against this view.
答案取决于我们所说的常识心理学是一种 “应用”到思想家的理论是什么意思。在上面的“常识心理学”一节中，指出理论理论可以说常识性心理学泛型是思想家无意识地知道的（我们将在本章中返回这一想法）4）.但是，从表面上看，这种观点似乎并没有受到模拟理论的直接威胁。由于模拟与我们在解释行为中明确意识到的东西有关，因此我们模拟他人的事实并不表明我们对常识性的心理学概括没有隐性知识。因此，模拟理论家需要提供独立的论据来反对这种观点。

It is important not to rush to any hasty conclusions. It is still relatively early days for the simulation theory, and many of the details have not been worked out yet. However, it does seem that the Theory Theory can defend itself if it is allowed to appeal to the idea of tacit knowledge; and the Theory Theory can, it seems, accept the main insight of the simulation theory, that we often interpret others by thinking of things from their point of view etc. In this way, it might be possible to hold the best elements of both approaches to understanding other minds. Maybe there is no real dispute here, only a difference of emphasis.
重要的是不要急于得出任何草率的结论。模拟理论仍处于相对早期的阶段，许多细节尚未确定。然而，如果允许理论理论诉诸隐性知识的概念，它似乎确实可以为自己辩护; 而理论理论似乎可以接受模拟理论的主要见解，即我们经常通过从他人的角度思考事物来解释他人，等等。通过这种方式，有可能持有两种方法的最佳元素来理解其他思想。也许这里没有真正的争议，只是重点的不同。

Conclusion: from representation to computation
结论：从表示到计算

So how do we know about the mind? I’ve considered and endorsed an answer: by applying conjectures about people’s minds – or ap- plying a theory of the mind – to explain their behaviour. Examining the theory then helps us then to answer the other question – what do we know about the mind? This question can be answered by finding out what the theory says about minds. As I interpret common-sense psychology, it says (at least) that thoughts are states of mind which represent the world and which have effects in the world. That’s how we get from an answer to the ‘How?’ question to an answer to the ‘What?’ question.
那么我们如何了解心呢？我考虑并赞同一个答案：通过应用关于人们思想的猜想——或应用一种心理理论——来解释他们的行为。然后，检查理论有助于我们回答另一个问题——我们对心灵了解多少？这个问题可以通过找出该理论对心智的看法来回答。作为常识心理学的解释，它说（至少）思想是代表世界并对世界产生影响的心理状态。这就是我们如何从“如何”问题的答案变成“什么”问题的答案。

There are various ways in which an enquiry could go from here. The idea of a state which represents the world, and causes its posses- sor to behave in a certain way, is not an idea that is applicable only to human beings. Since our knowledge of thoughts is derived from behaviour – and not necessarily verbal behaviour – it is possible to apply the basic elements of common-sense psychology to other animals too. ...

How far down the evolutionary scale does this sort of explana- tion go? To what sorts of animals can we apply this explanation? Consider this striking passage from C.R. Gallistel: ...

On the featureless Tunisian desert, a long-legged, fast-moving ant leaves the protection of the humid nest on a foraging expedition. It ...

moves across the desert in tortuous loops, running first this way, then that, but gradually progressing ever farther away from the life-sustain- ing humidity of the nest. Finally it finds the carcass of a scorpion, uses its strong pincers to gouge out a chunk nearly its own size, then turns to orient within one or two degrees of the straight line between itself and the nest entrance, a 1-millimetre-wide hole, 40 metres distant. It runs a straight line for 43 metres, holding its course by maintaining its angle to the sun. Three metres past the point at which it should have located the entrance, the ant abruptly breaks into a search pattern by which it eventually locates it. A witness to this homeward journey finds it hard to resist the inference that the ant on its search for food possessed at each moment a representation of its position relative to the entrance of the nest, a spatial representation that enabled it to compute the solar angle and the distance of the homeward journey from wherever it happened to encounter food.37 ...

Here the ant’s behaviour is explained in terms of representations of locations in its environment. Something else is added, however: Gallistel talks about the ant ‘computing’ the solar angle and the distance of the return journey. How can we make sense of an ant ‘computing’ representations? Why is this conclusion ‘hard to resist’? For that matter, what does it mean to compute representations at all? It turns out, of course, that what Gallistel thinks is true of the ant, many people think is true of our minds – that as we move around and think about the world, we compute representations. This is the topic of the next chapter.
在这里，蚂蚁的行为是根据其环境中位置的表示来解释的。然而，还添加了其他内容：Gallistel 谈到了蚂蚁“计算” 太阳角度和回程的距离。我们如何理解 ant 的 'computing' 表示？为什么这个结论是“难以抗拒的”？就此而言，计算表示到底意味着什么？当然，事实证明，Gallistel 认为蚂蚁是正确的，许多人认为我们的思想也是正确的—— 当我们四处移动并思考世界时，我们会计算表征。这是下一章的主题。

(i) 0 0 ...	0	1	1	0	0	0	. . . ...
(ii) . . ...	0	0	1	1	0	0	0 . . . ...
(iii) . . ...	0	0	0	1	1	0	0 0 . . . ...
(iv) . . ...	.	0	0	0	1	1	0 0 0 . . . ...
(v) . . ...	.	.	0	0	0	1	1 0 0 0 . . . ...
(vi) 0 ...					0	0	1	1	0	0	0 . . . ...
(vii) 0 ...					0	1	1	1	0	0	0 . . . ...

1 =	1
2 =	10
3 =	11
4 =	100
5 =	101
6 =	110
7 =	111