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Figure 2.1 Frontispiece of the Encyclopédie, or Reasoned Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts and Trades
圖 2.1 《科學、藝術和貿易百科全書》或推理詞典的卷首插畫
Source: Engraved by B.L. Prevost, from a 1764 drawing by Charles-Nicolas Cochin.
資料來源:由 B.L. Prevost 雕刻,摘自 Charles-Nicolas Cochin 1764 年的一幅畫。
Note: For the essay entitled 'Encyclopédie', Diderot wrote: 'our Encyclopédie could only have been the endeavour of a philosophical century; that age has dawned'. The frontisplece depicts Reason and Philosophy pulling the veil away from Truth, radiating light from the centre and dispersing the clouds. Imagination (left) offers Truth a garland on behalf of all the Arts and Sciences.

in finding out what can be beneficial to us and what can be detrimental to us in Nature. The communication of ideas is the principle and support of this union, and necessarily requires the invention of signs - such is the source of the formation of societies, with which must have come the birth of languages.
('Preliminary Discourse' to the Encyclopédie)


Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), one of the greatest and most influential philosophers of the Enlightenment, was born into a relatively poor family in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad) in East Prussia, the son of a saddler. His parents were devout reformist (pietist) Lutherans, with a strong sense of conscience and duty, and his schooling was strictly religious. In person, Kant was short and remarkably thin; however, he placed great emphasis on his health and appearance and had a reputation for dressing elegantly. A student from the age of sixteen, and later tutor and Professor of Logic and Metaphysics (1770) at the University of Königsberg, he evidently never travelled more than about forty miles from his birthplace throughout his life. Even so, his interest in the politics of the age is apparent in his sympathy with both the American and French revolutionaries, and in works such as Zum Ewigen Frieden (On Perpetual Peace, 1795) in which he tried to show how independent nations, like moral persons, could and should form an international community committed to live in harmony and peace: 'The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere'. He was influenced by Newton, d'Alembert, Rousseau (who, in 1764, he called the Newton of the moral world') and, in particular, Hume. It was Hume's account of causality, that, according to Kant, 'first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave me a completely different direction to my enquiries in the field of speculative philosophy'. This led to a trilogy of major works, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781), Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason, 1788), and Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgement, 1790), which established his international reputation.
伊曼紐爾·康得(1724-1804)是啟蒙運動中最偉大和最有影響力的哲學家之一,出生於東普魯士柯尼斯堡(今加里寧格勒)一個相對貧窮的家庭,是一個馬鞍匠的兒子。他的父母是虔誠的改革派(虔誠派)路德教徒,具有強烈的良心和責任感,他的學校教育是嚴格的宗教教育。就個人而言,康得身材矮小,非常瘦弱;然而,他非常重視自己的健康和外表,並以穿著優雅而聞名。他從十六歲起就成為學生,後來成為柯尼斯堡大學的導師和邏輯與形而上學教授(1770年),顯然他一生中從未離開出生地超過四十英里。即便如此,他對時代政治的興趣體現在他對美國和法國革命者的同情中,以及在Zum Ewigen Frieden(《論永久和平》,1795年)等作品中,他試圖展示獨立國家如何像道德人一樣,能夠而且應該組成一個致力於和諧與和平生活的國際社會: “因此,地球上的人民在不同程度上進入了一個普遍的社區,它已經發展到在世界某個地方到處都能感受到權利受到侵犯的地步”。他受到牛頓、達朗貝爾、盧梭(1764年他稱之為道德世界的牛頓)的影響,特別是休謨的影響。根據康德的說法,正是休謨對因果關係的描述“首先打斷了我教條主義的沉睡,併為我在思辨哲學領域的探究提供了完全不同的方向”。 這導致了主要著作的三部曲,Kritik der Reinen Vernunft(《純粹理性批判》,1781 年)、Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft(《實踐理性批判》,1788 年)和 Kritik der Urteilskraft(《判斷力批判》,1790 年),奠定了他的國際聲譽。
The first Critique, though described by Kant himself as 'dry, obscure and contrary to all ordinary ideas', is generally regarded as a landmark in modern philosophy. In this work, Kant asks what can be known by pure (i.e. a priori) reasoning. While he agreed with empiricists such as Locke and Hume that there were no innate ideas, he did not accept that all knowledge could be derived solely from experience. In order to understand our experiences we have to have some concepts or tools ('categories' such as quantity and causation) that are not learnt from experience, but that enable us to make sense of the natural world through our experiences. The order and coherence of the natural world, the laws of nature, are not then inherent in nature but constructs imposed upon it by our minds: 'the order and regularity in objects, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. The understanding is itself the lawgiver of nature.'
Having tackled our understanding of nature and scientific knowledge in the first Critique, in the second and in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, 1785) Kant examined action and ethics (see p. 220). He did not believe that Hume was right in attributing moral action to feelings. Rather, he argued, every person has a free will that enables them to decide what action to take. However, an action is only moral if it is undertaken for the sake of duty. The third Critique contained an important essay on aesthetics, discussing judgements of taste and beauty.
In 1784 Kant entered a competition held by the Enlightenment journal Berlinische Monatsschrift (Berlin Monthly) to answer the question 'Was ist Aufklärung?' ('What is Enlightenment?') In reflecting on the previous century, he argued that Enlightenment was a complex and on-going process, and summed up his view of the central aspiration of the philosophes in what would become the most commonly recited formulation (derived from the Roman poet Horace) of the Enlightenment: 'Dare to know! Have courage to use your own reason!'
1784年,康德參加了啟蒙運動雜誌《柏林月刊》(Berlinische Monatsschrift)舉辦的比賽,以回答“Is ist Aufklärung?(「什麼是啟蒙?在反思上個世紀時,他認為啟蒙運動是一個複雜而持續的過程,並總結了他對哲學中心願望的看法,後來成為啟蒙運動最常被引用的表述(源自羅馬詩人賀拉斯):“敢於知道!要有勇氣用自己的理智!

'What is Enlightenment?' (1784)

Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Selfincurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! [Dare to know!] 'Have courage to use your own reason!' - that is the motto of enlightenment.
啟蒙是人從自我的監護中解脫出來。監護是人無法在沒有他人指導的情況下利用自己的理解。這種監護是自我招致的,因為它的原因不是缺乏理性,而是缺乏決心和勇氣在沒有他人指導的情況下使用它。Sapere aude![敢於知道!“要有勇氣運用自己的理性!”——這是啟蒙的座右銘。
Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why so great a portion of mankind, after nature has long since discharged them from external direction (naturaliter maiorennes [those who have come of age by course of nature]), never theless remains under lifelong tutelage, and why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so easy not to be of age. If I have a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, and so forth, I need not trouble myself. I need not think, if I can only pay - others will readily undertake the irksome work for me.
懶惰和怯懦是為什麼在自然早已將他們從外部方向上釋放出來之後,人類中有很大一部分人(naturaliter maiorennes[那些通過自然過程而成年的人])仍然處於終生的監護之下,以及為什麼其他人如此容易地將自己設定為他們的監護人。不成年太容易了。如果我有一本能理解我的書,有一位有良心的牧師,有一位決定我飲食的醫生,等等,我就不必為難自己了。我不需要思考,如果我只能付錢——別人會很樂意為我承擔令人討厭的工作。
That the step to competence is held to be very dangerous by the far greater portion of mankind (and by the entire fair sex) - quite apart from its being arduous - is seen to by those guardians who have so kindly assumed superintendence over them. After the guardians have first made their domestic cattle dumb and have made sure that these placid creatures will not dare take a single step without the harness of the cart to which they are confined, the guardians then show them the danger which threatens if they try to go alone. Actually, however, this danger is not so great, for by falling a few times they would finally learn to walk alone. But an example of this failure makes them timid and ordinarily frightens them away from all further trials.
For any single individual to work himself out of the life under tutelage which has become almost his nature is very difficult. He has come to be fond of this state, and he

is for the present really incapable of making use of his reason, for no one has ever let him try it out. Statutes and formulas, those mechanical tools of the rational employment or rather misemployment of his natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting tutelage. Whoever throws them off makes only an uncertain leap over the narrowest ditch because he is not accustomed to that kind of free motion. Therefore, there are only few who have succeeded by their own exercise of mind both in freeing themselves from incompetence and in achieving a steady pace.
But that the public should enlighten itself is more possible; indeed if only freedom is granted, enlightenment is almost sure to follow. For there will always be some independent thinkers, even among the established guardians of the great masses, who, after throwing off the yoke of tutelage from their own shoulders, will disseminate the spirit of the rational appreciation of both their own worth and every man's vocation for thinking for himself. But be it noted that the public, which has first been brought under this yoke by their guardians, forces the guardians themselves to remain bound when it is incited to do so by some of the guardians who are themselves capable of some enlightenment - so harmful is it to implant prejudices, for they later take vengeance on their cultivators or on their descendants. Thus the public can only slowly attain enlightenment. Perhaps a fall of personal despotism or of avaricious or tyrannical oppression may be accomplished by revolution, but never a true reform in ways of thinking. Rather, new prejudices will serve as well as old ones to harness the great unthinking masses.
For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the most harmless among all the things to which this term can properly be applied. It is the freedom to make public use of one's reason at every point. But I hear on all sides, 'Do not argue!' The officer says: 'Do not argue but drill!' The tax collector: 'Do not argue but pay!'The cleric: 'Do not argue but believe!' Only one prince [Frederick the Great] in the world says, 'Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, but obey!' Everywhere there is restriction on freedom.
Which restriction is an obstacle to enlightenment, and which is not an obstacle but a promoter of it? I answer: The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men. The private use of reason, on the other hand, may often be very narrowly restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. By the public use of one's reason I understand the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public. Private use I call that which one may make of it in a particular civil post or office which is intrusted to him. Many affairs which are conducted in the interest of the community require a certain mechanism through which some members of the community must passively conduct themselves with an artificial unanimity, so that the government may direct them to public ends, or at least prevent them from destroying those ends. Here argument is certainly not allowed - one must obey. But so far as a part of the mechanism regards himself at the same time as a member of the whole community or of a society of world citizens, and thus in the role of a scholar who addresses the public (in the proper sense of the word) through his writings, he certainly can argue without hurting the affairs for which he is in part responsible as a passive member. Thus it would be ruinous for an officer in service to debate about the suitability or utility of a command given to him by his superior; he must obey. But the right to make remarks on errors in the military service and

to lay them before the public for judgment cannot equitably be refused him as a scholar. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes imposed on him; indeed, an impudent complaint at those levied on him can be punished as a scandal (as it could occasion general refractoriness). But the same person nevertheless does not act contrary to his duty as a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts on the inappropriateness or even the injustice of these levies. Similarly a clergyman is obligated to make his sermon to his pupils in catechism and his congregation conform to the symbol of the church which he serves, for he has been accepted on this condition. But as a scholar he has complete freedom, even the calling, to communicate to the public all his carefully tested and well-meaning thoughts on that which is erroneous in the symbol and to make suggestions for the better organization of the religious body and church. In doing this, there is nothing that could be laid as a burden on his conscience. For what he teaches as a consequence of his office as a representative of the church, this he considers something about which he has no freedom to teach according to his own lights; it is something which he is appointed to propound at the dictation of and in the name of another. He will say, 'Our church teaches this or that; those are the proofs which it adduces.' He thus extracts all practical uses for his congregation from statutes to which he himself would not subscribe with full conviction but to the enunciation of which he can very well pledge himself because it is not impossible that truth lies hidden in them, and, in any case, there is at least nothing in them contradictory to inner religion. For if he believed he had found such in them, he could not conscientiously discharge the duties of his office; he would have to give it up. The use, therefore, which an appointed teacher makes of his reason before his congregation is merely private, because this congregation is only a domestic one (even if it be a large gathering); with respect to it, as a priest, he is not free, nor can he be free, because he carries out the orders of another. But as a scholar, whose writings speak to his public, the world, the clergyman in the public use of his reason enjoys an unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own person. That the guardians of the people (in spiritual things) should themselves be incompetent is an absurdity which amounts to the eternalization of absurdities.
把它們擺在公眾面前接受審判,不能公平地拒絕他作為一個學者。公民不能拒絕繳納強加給他的稅款;事實上,對那些強加給他的人的無禮投訴可能會被視為醜聞而受到懲罰(因為它可能會導致普遍的頑固性)。但是,當同一個人作為學者公開表達他對這些徵稅的不適當甚至不公正的看法時,他的行為並沒有違背他作為公民的義務。同樣,神職人員有義務在教理問答中向他的學生講道,他的會眾符合他所服務的教會的象徵,因為他是在這個條件下被接受的。但是,作為一名學者,他有完全的自由,甚至是呼召,可以向公眾傳達他對符號中錯誤的所有經過仔細測試和善意的想法,併為更好地組織宗教團體和教會提出建議。在這樣做的時候,沒有什麼可以作為他良心的負擔。對於他作為教會代表的職位所教導的東西,他認為這是他沒有根據自己的自由來教導的東西;這是他被任命為在另一個人的口授下並以他人的名義提出的東西。他會說,『我們教會教導這個或那個;這些都是它所舉證的證據。因此,他從他自己不會完全相信的法規中提取出對他的會眾的所有實際用途,但他可以很好地保證自己可以保證自己所闡明的法規,因為真理隱藏在其中並非不可能,而且無論如何,其中至少沒有任何與內在宗教相矛盾的東西。 因為如果他相信他在他們身上發現了這樣的東西,他就不能認真地履行他的職責;他將不得不放棄它。因此,一個被任命的教師在他的會眾面前使用他的理性只是私人的,因為這個會眾只是一個家庭的會眾(即使它是一個大型聚會);就此而言,作為祭司,他不自由,也不可能是自由的,因為他執行他人的命令。但是,作為一個學者,他的著作是向他的公眾、世界說話的,神職人員在公開使用他的理性時,享有無限的自由,可以使用他自己的理性,並以他自己的身份說話。人民的守護者(在屬靈的事物上)本身是無能的,這是一種荒謬,相當於荒謬的永恆化。
But would not a society of clergymen, perhaps a church conference or a venerable classis (as they call themselves among the Dutch), be justified in obligating itself by oath to a certain unchangeable symbol in order to enjoy an unceasing guardianship over each of its members and thereby over the people as a whole, and even to make it eternal? I answer that this is altogether impossible. Such a contract, made to shut off all further enlightenment from the human race, is absolutely null and void even if confirmed by the supreme power, by parliaments, and by the most ceremonious of peace treaties. An age cannot bind itself and ordain to put the succeeding one into such a condition that it cannot extend its (at best very occasional) knowledge, purify itself of errors, and progress in general enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature, the proper destination of which lies precisely in this progress; and the descendants would be fully justified in rejecting those decrees as having been made in an unwarranted and malicious manner.
The touchstone of everything that can be concluded as a law for a people lies in the question whether the people could have imposed such a law on itself. Now such a religious compact might be possible for a short and definitely limited time, as it were, in

expectation of a better. One might let every citizen, and especially the clergyman, in the role of scholar, make his comments freely and publicly, i.e., through writing, on the erroneous aspects of the present institution. The newly introduced order might last until insight into the nature of these things had become so general and widely approved that through uniting their voices (even if not unanimously) they could bring a proposal to the throne to take those congregations under protection which had united into a changed religious organization according to their better ideas, without, however, hindering others who wish to remain in the order. But to unite in a permanent religious institution which is not to be subject to doubt before the public even in the lifetime of one man, and thereby to make a period of time fruitless in the progress of mankind toward improvement, thus working to the disadvantage of posterity - that is absolutely forbidden. For himself (and only for a short time) a man can postpone enlightenment in what he ought to know, but to renounce it for himself, and even more to renounce it for posterity, is to injure and trample on the rights of mankind.
期待更好的。人們可以讓每個公民,特別是神職人員,以學者的身份,自由和公開地,即通過書面形式,對現行制度的錯誤方面發表意見。新引入的命令可能會持續下去,直到對這些事情的本質的洞察力變得如此普遍和廣泛認可,以至於通過團結他們的聲音(即使不是一致的),他們可以向王位提出一項建議,以保護那些根據他們更好的想法聯合成一個改變的宗教組織的會眾, 但是,不會妨礙其他希望留在教團中的人。但是,團結在一個永久的宗教機構中,即使在一個人的一生中,也不會在公眾面前受到懷疑,從而使人類進步的一段時間徒勞無功,從而對後代不利——這是絕對禁止的。為了他自己(而且只是在很短的時間內),一個人可以推遲他應該知道的啟蒙,但為自己放棄它,甚至為後代放棄它,就是傷害和踐踏人類的權利。
And what a people may not decree for itself can even less be decreed for them by a monarch, for his lawgiving authority rests on his uniting the general public will in his own. If he only sees to it that all true or alleged improvement stands together with civil order, he can leave it to his subjects to do what they find necessary for their spiritual welfare. This is not his concern, though it is incumbent on him to prevent one of them from violently hindering another in determining and promoting this welfare to the best of his ability. To meddle in these matters lowers his own majesty, since by the writings in which his subjects seek to present their views he may evaluate his own governance. He can do this when, with deepest understanding, he lays upon himself the reproach: Caesar non est supra grammaticos [Caesar is not above the grammarians (i.e. the rules of grammar)]. Far more does he injure his own majesty when he degrades his supreme power by supporting the ecclesiastical despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects.
一個民族不能為自己頒布的法令,更不能由君主為他們頒布法令,因為他的立法權取決於他將公眾的意志統一在他自己的意志中。如果他只確保所有真正的或所謂的改善都與社會秩序相輔相成,他就可以讓他的臣民去做他們認為對他們的精神福利必要的事情。這不是他所關心的,儘管他有責任防止其中一人暴力地阻礙另一人盡其所能決定和促進這種福利。插手這些事情會降低他自己的威嚴,因為他的臣民試圖通過表達自己觀點的著作來評估自己的治理。當他以最深刻的理解將責備歸咎於自己時,他可以做到這一點:Caesar non est supra grammaticos [Caesar not above the grammarians(即語法規則)]。當他通過支援他的國家中一些暴君對他的其他臣民的教會專制來貶低他的最高權力時,他更傷害了自己的威嚴。
If we are asked, 'Do we now live in an enlightened age?' the answer is, 'No,' but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As things now stand, much is lacking which prevents men from being, or easily becoming, capable of correctly using their own reason in religious matters with assurance and free from outside direction. But, on the other hand, we have clear indications that the field has now been opened wherein men may freely deal with these things and that the obstacles to general enlightenment or the release from selfimposed tutelage are gradually being reduced. In this respect, this is the age of enlightenment, or the century of Frederick [the Great].
A prince who does not find it unworthy of himself to say that he holds it to be his duty to prescribe nothing to men in religious matters but to give them complete freedom while renouncing the haughty name of tolerance, is himself enlightened and deserves to be esteemed by the grateful world and posterity as the first, at least from the side of government, who divested the human race of its tutelage and left each man free to make use of his reason in matters of conscience. Under him venerable ecclesiastics are allowed, in the role of scholars, and without infringing on their official duties, freely to submit for public testing their judgments and views which here and there diverge from the established symbol. And an even greater freedom is enjoyed by those who are restricted by no official duties. This spirit of freedom spreads beyond this land,
一個王子,如果不覺得自己不配說,他認為自己的職責是在宗教事務上不給人們任何規定,而是給予他們完全的自由,同時放棄寬容的傲慢之名,他自己是開明的,值得感恩的世界和後代尊敬為第一個, 至少從政府的角度來看,政府剝奪了人類的監護權,讓每個人都可以自由地在良心問題上使用他的理性。在他的領導下,受人尊敬的教會人士被允許以學者的身份,在不違反其公務的情況下,自由地將他們的判斷和觀點提交給公眾,以檢驗他們的判斷和觀點,這些判斷和觀點在這裡和那裡都與既定的象徵不同。那些不受公務限制的人享有更大的自由。這種自由的精神超越了這片土地,

even to those in which it must struggle with external obstacles erected by a government which misunderstands its own interest. For an example gives evidence to such a government that in freedom there is not the least cause for concern about public peace and the stability of the community. Men work themselves gradually out of barbarity if only intentional artifices are not made to hold them in it.
I have placed the main point of enlightenment - the escape of men from their selfincurred tutelage - chiefly in matters of religion because our rulers have no interest in playing the guardian with respect to the arts and sciences and also because religious incompetence is not only the most harmful but also the most degrading of all. But the manner of thinking of the head of a state who favours religious enlightenment goes further, and he sees that there is no danger to his lawgiving in allowing his subjects to make public use of their reason and to publish their thoughts on a better formulation of his legislation and even their open-minded criticisms of the laws already made. Of this we have a shining example wherein no monarch is superior to him whom we honour.
But only one who is himself enlightened, is not afraid of shadows and has a numerous and well-disciplined army to assure public peace can say: 'Argue as much as you will, and about what you will, only obey!' A republic could not dare say such a thing. Here is shown a strange and unexpected trend in human affairs in which almost everything, looked at in the large, is paradoxical. A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it; a lower degree of civil freedom, on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity. As nature has uncovered from under this hard shell the seed for which she most tenderly cares - the propensity and vocation to free thinking - this gradually works back upon the character of the people, who thereby gradually become capable of managing freedom; finally, it affects the principles of government, which finds it to its advantage to treat men, who are now more than machines, in accordance with their dignity.