There has been a veritable discursive explosion in recent years around the concept of ‘identity’, at the same moment as it has been subjected to a searching critique. How is this paradoxical development to be explained? And where does it leave us with respect to the concept? The deconstruction has been conducted within a variety of disciplinary areas, all of them, in one way or another critical of the notion of an integral, originary and unified identity. The critique of the self-sustaining subject at the centre of post-Cartesian western metaphysics has been comprehensively advanced in philosophy. The question of subjectivity and its unconscious processes of formation has been developed within the discourse of a psychoanalytically influenced feminism and cultural criticism. The endlessly performative self has been advanced in celebratory variants of postmodernism. Within the anti-essentialist critique of ethnic, racial and national conceptions of cultural identity and the ‘politics of location’ some adventurous theoretical conceptions have been sketched in their most grounded forms. What, then, is the need for a further debate about ‘identity’? Who needs it? 近年来，围绕 "身份认同 "这一概念，出现了名副其实的话语爆炸，与此同时，这一概念也受到了深刻的批判。如何解释这种自相矛盾的发展？我们又该如何看待这一概念？解构是在不同的学科领域进行的，它们都以这样或那样的方式对整体、起源和统一的 "身份 "概念进行了批判。对作为后笛卡尔西方形而上学核心的自在主体的批判在哲学中得到了全面推进。主体性及其无意识形成过程的问题在受精神分析影响的女性主义和文化批评的话语中得到了发展。无休止的表演性自我在后现代主义的颂扬变体中得到了推进。在对民族、种族和国家的文化身份概念以及 "位置政治 "的反本质主义批判中，一些具有冒险精神的理论概念以其最基础的形式被勾勒出来。那么，进一步讨论 "身份认同 "的必要性何在？谁需要？
There are two ways of responding to the question. The first is to observe something distinctive about the deconstructive critique to which many of these essentialist concepts have been subjected. Unlike those forms of critique which aim to supplant inadequate concepts with ‘truer’ ones, or which aspire to the production of positive knowledge, the deconstructive approach puts key concepts ‘under erasure’. This indicates that they are no longer serviceable - ‘good to think with’ - in their originary and unreconstructed form. But since they have not been superseded dialectically, and there are no other, entirely different concepts with which to replace them, there is nothing to do but to continue to think with them - albeit now in their detotalized or deconstructed forms, and no longer operating within the paradigm in which they were originally generated (cf. Hall, 1995). The line which cancels them, paradoxically, permits them to go on being read. Derrida has described this approach as thinking at the limit, as thinking in the interval, a sort of double writing. ‘By means of this double, and precisely stratified, dislodged and dislodging writing, we must also mark the 回答这个问题有两种方法。第一种是观察许多本质主义概念所受到的解构主义批判的独特之处。与那些旨在用 "更真实 "的概念取代不恰当的概念或渴望产生积极知识的批判形式不同，解构主义方法将关键概念 "置于抹杀之下"。这表明，这些概念在其原始和未解构的形式下已不再适用--"不再适合思考"。但是，既然它们没有被辩证地取代，也没有其他完全不同的概念可以替代它们，那么就只能继续用它们来思考--尽管现在是以它们的解otalized 或解构的形式，而且不再是在它们最初产生的范式中运作（参见 Hall, 1995）。矛盾的是，取消它们的线条允许它们继续被阅读。德里达将这种方法描述为极限思维、间歇思维，一种双重写作。通过这种双重的、精确分层的、位移的和位移的书写，我们还必须标明：'......'。
interval between inversion, which brings low what was high, and the irruptive emergence of a new ‘concept’, a concept that can no longer be and never could be, included in the previous regime’ (Derrida, 1981). Identity is such a concept - operating ‘under erasure’ in the interval between reversal and emergence; an idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key questions cannot be thought at all. 反转（将原来高高在上的东西降到低处）与新'概念'的颠覆性出现之间的间隔，而新'概念'是一个再也不可能、也永远不可能包含在先前制度中的概念"（德里达，1981 年）。身份 "就是这样一个概念--在颠倒与出现之间的 "消解 "状态下运作；一个无法以旧有方式思考的概念，但没有它，某些关键问题根本无法思考。
A second kind of answer requires us to note where, in relation to what set of problems, does the irreducibility of the concept, identity, emerge? I think the answer here lies in its centrality to the question of agency and politics. By politics, I mean both the significance in modern forms of political movement of the signifier ‘identity’, its pivotal relationship to a politics of location - but also the manifest difficulties and instabilities which have characteristically affected all contemporary forms of ‘identity politics’. By ‘agency’ I express no desire whatsoever to return to an unmediated and transparent notion of the subject or identity as the centred author of social practice, or to restore an approach which ‘places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity - which, in short, leads to a transcendental consciousness’ (Foucault, 1970, p. xiv). I agree with Foucault that what we require here is ‘not a theory of the knowing subject, but rather a theory of discursive practice’. However, I believe that what this decentring requires - as the evolution of Foucault’s work clearly shows - is not an abandonment or abolition of ‘the subject’ but a reconceptualization - thinking it in its new, displaced or decentred position within the paradigm. It seems to be in the attempt to rearticulate the relationship between subjects and. discursive practices that the question of identity recurs - or rather, if one prefers to stress the process of subjectification to discursive practices, and the politics of exclusion which all such subjectification appears to entail, the question of idenififcation. 第二种答案要求我们注意到，身份这一概念的不可还原性出现在哪里，与哪一系列问题有关？我认为这里的答案在于它在机构和政治问题中的核心地位。我所说的政治，既指 "身份 "这一符号在现代政治运动中的重要意义，也指它与位置政治之间的关键关系--同时还指明显的困难和不稳定性，而这些困难和不稳定性正是影响所有当代形式的 "身份政治 "的特征。我所说的 "机构 "并不希望回到主体或身份作为社会实践的中心作者的非中介和透明的概念，也不希望恢复一种 "将自己的观点置于所有历史性的源头--简言之，这导致了一种超验的意识"（福柯，1970 年，第 xiv 页）的方法。我同意福柯的观点，即我们在此需要的 "不是关于认识主体的理论，而是关于话语实践的理论"。然而，我认为，正如福柯著作的演变所清楚表明的那样，这种去中心化所需要的不是放弃或废除 "主体"，而是重新概念化--在范式中将其置于新的、被取代的或体面的位置上进行思考。似乎正是在试图重新阐明主体与话语实践之间的关系时，身份问题再次出现--或者更确切地说，如果我们更愿意强调话语实践的主体化过程，以及所有这些主体化似乎都会带来的排斥政治，那么身份问题就是如此。
Identification turns out to be one of the least well-understood concepts - almost as tricky as, though preferable to, ‘identity’ itself; and certainly no guarantee against the conceptual difficulties which have beset the latter. It is drawing meanings from both the discursive and the psychoanalytic repertoire, without being limited to either. This semantic field is too complex to unravel here, but it is useful at least to establish its relevance to the task in hand indicatively. In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. In contrast with the ‘naturalism’ of this definition, the discursive approach sees identification as a construction, a process never completed-always ‘in process’. It is not determined in the sense that it can always be ‘won’ or ‘lost’, sustained or abandoned. Though not without its determinate conditions of existence, including the material and symbolic resources required to sustain it, identification is in the end 认同 "是最不容易理解的概念之一--几乎与 "身份 "本身一样棘手，尽管比 "身份 "更可取；当然也不能保证不出现困扰后者的概念难题。它从话语和精神分析两方面汲取意义，但又不局限于其中任何一方面。这一语义领域过于复杂，无法在此展开，但至少可以通过指示性的方式确定其与当前任务的相关性。在常识语言中，认同是建立在对另一个人或另一个群体或某一理想的某种共同起源或共同特征的认识之上，并在此基础上建立起团结和忠诚的自然闭合。与这一定义的 "自然主义 "不同，辨证法认为认同是一种建构，是一个从未完成的过程--始终 "处于过程之中"。它并不是决定性的，因为它总是可以 "赢得 "或 "失去"、维持或放弃。尽管认同并非没有确定的存在条件，包括维持认同所需的物质和符号资源，但它最终是
conditional, lodged in contingency. Once secured, it does not obliterate difference. The total merging it suggests is, in fact, a fantasy of incorporation. (Freud always spoke of it in relation to ‘consuming the other’ as we shall see in a moment.) Identification is, then, a process of articulation, a suturing, an over-determination not a subsumption. There is always ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ - an over-determination or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality. Like all signifying practices, it is subject to the ‘play’, of differance. It obeys the logic of more-than-one. And since as a process it operates across difference, it entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries, the production of ‘frontiereffects’. It requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process. 它是有条件的，存在于偶然性之中。一旦得到保证，它就不会抹杀差异。事实上，它所暗示的完全融合是一种幻想的融入。(弗洛伊德总是把它与 "吞噬他人 "联系起来谈论，我们稍后就会看到）。因此，认同是一个衔接的过程，是一个缝合的过程，是一个过度决定的过程，而不是一个归并的过程。总是有 "太多 "或 "太少"--过度确定或缺乏，但从来没有一个适当的契合点，一个整体。与所有的符号实践一样，它受制于差异的 "游戏"。它遵循 "多于一 "的逻辑。由于它是一个跨越差异的过程，因此它需要话语工作、符号边界的约束和标记、"前沿效应 "的产生。它需要留在外部的东西，即其构成性外部，来巩固这一过程。
From its psychoanalytic usage, the concept of identification inherits a rich semantic legacy. Freud calls it ‘the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person’ (Freud, 1921/1991) In the context of the Oedipus complex, however, it takes the parental figures as both love-objects and objects of rivalry, thereby inserting ambivalence into the very centre of the process. ‘Identification is, in fact, ambivalent from the very start’ (1921/1991: 134). In ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, it is not that which binds one to an object that exists, but that which binds one to an abandoned object-choice. It is, in the first instance, a ‘moulding after the other’ which compensates for the loss of the libidinal pleasures of primal narcissism. It is grounded in fantasy, in projection and idealization. Its object is as likely to be the one that is hated as the one that is adored; and as often taken back into the unconscious self as ‘taking one out of oneself’. It is in relation to identification that Freud elaborated the critical distinction between ‘being’ and ‘having’ the other. It behaves like a derivative of the first, oral phase of organization of the libido, in which the object that we long for is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such (1921/1991:135). Identifications viewed as a whole’, Laplanche and Pontalis (1985) note ‘are in no way a coherent relational system. Demands coexist within an agency like the super-ego, for instance, which are diverse, conflicting and disorderly. Similarly, the ego-ideal is composed of identifications with cultural ideals that are not necessarily harmonious’ (p. 208). 从精神分析的用法来看，认同的概念继承了丰富的语义遗产。弗洛伊德称其为 "与他人情感纽带的最早表达"（弗洛伊德，1921/1991），但在俄狄浦斯情结的语境中，它将父母的形象同时视为爱的对象和竞争的对象，从而将矛盾插入了这一过程的核心。事实上，认同从一开始就是矛盾的"（1921/1991: 134）。在《哀悼与忧郁》中，不是将人与存在的对象联系在一起，而是将人与被放弃的对象选择联系在一起。首先，它是一种 "仿效他人的塑造"，用以补偿原始自恋所丧失的性欲快感。它以幻想、投射和理想化为基础。它的对象既有可能是被憎恨的，也有可能是被崇拜的；既有可能被带回到无意识的自我中，也有可能 "带出自我"。弗洛伊德正是在认同方面阐述了 "存在 "与 "拥有 "他人之间的关键区别。它的行为就像性欲组织的第一个口腔阶段的衍生物，在这一阶段，我们渴望的对象被饮食同化，并以这种方式被消灭（1921/1991:135）。Laplanche 和 Pontalis（1985 年）指出，"从整体上看，认同并不是一个连贯的关系系统。例如，在超我这样的机构中，各种需求并存，它们是多样的、相互冲突的和无序的。同样，自我理想是由对文化理想的认同组成的，而这些文化理想并不一定和谐"（第 208 页）。
I am not suggesting that all these connotations should be imported wholesale and without translation into our thinking around ‘identity’, but they are cited to indicate the novel repertoires of meaning with which the term is now being inflected. The concept of identity deployed here is therefore not an essentialist, but a strategic and positional one. That is to say, directly contrary to what appears to be its settled semantic career, this concept of identity does not signal that stable core of the self, unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change; the bit of the self which remains always-already ‘the same’, identical to itself across time. Nor - if we translate this essentializing conception to the stage of cultural identity - is it that ‘collective or true 我并不是说所有这些内涵都应该不加翻译地全盘引入我们对 "身份 "的思考中，但引用这些内涵是为了说明这个词现在所具有的新的含义。因此，这里使用的 "身份 "概念不是一个本质主义的概念，而是一个战略和定位的概念。这就是说，与它看似固定的语义生涯直接相反，这一身份概念并不意味着自我的稳定核心，它从始至终经历了所有的历史沧桑而不曾改变；自我的那一点始终保持 "相同"，在时间的长河中与自身相同。如果我们将这一本质化概念转换到文化认同的阶段，它也不是 "集体或真正的 "自我。
self hiding inside the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed “selves” which a people with a shared history and ancestry hold in common’ (Hall, 1990) and which can stabilize, fix or guarantee an unchanging ‘oneness’ or cultural belongingness underlying all the other superficial differences. It accepts that identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation. We need to situate the debates about identity within all those historically specific developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively ‘settled’ character of many populations and cultures, above all in relation to the processes of globalization, which I would argue are coterminous with modernity (Hall, 1996) and the processes of forced and ‘free’ migration which have become a global phenomenon of the so-called ‘post-colonial’ world. Though they seem to invoke an origin in a historical past with which they continue to correspond, actually identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came from’, so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves. Identities are therefore constituted within, not outside representation, They relate to the invention of tradition as much as to tradition itself, which they oblige us to read not as an endless reiteration but as the changing same’ (Gilroy, 1994): not the so-called return to roots but a coming-to-terms-with our ‘routes’. They arise from the narrativization of the self, but the necessarily fictional nature of this process in no way undermines its discursive, material or political effectivity, even if the belongingness, the ‘suturing into the story’ through which identities arise is, partly, in the imaginary (as well as the symbolic) and therefore, always, partly constructed in fantasy, or at least within a fantasmatic field. 隐藏在许多其他更肤浅或人为强加的'自我'之中，而这些'自我'是拥有共同历史 和祖先的民族所共有的"（Hall，1990 年），它可以稳定、固定或保证所有其他肤浅 差异背后不变的'同一性'或文化归属感。它承认，身份认同从来都不是统一的，在现代社会后期，身份认同越来越支离破碎；从来都不是单一的，而是在不同的、往往是交叉的和对立的话语、实践和立场中多重建构的。它们被彻底历史化，并不断处于变化和转型的过程中。我们需要将有关身份认同的辩论置于所有这些历史上特定的发展和实践之中，这些发展和实践扰乱了许多人口和文化相对 "定居 "的特性，尤其是与全球化进程有关的发展和实践，我认为全球化进程与现代性（Hall，1996 年）以及被迫和 "自由 "移民的进程密切相关，这些进程已成为所谓 "后殖民 "世界的一种全球现象。尽管身份认同似乎源于历史的过去，并与之继续保持一致，但实际上，身份认同涉及的是在成为而非存在的过程中利用历史、语言和文化资源的问题：不是 "我们是谁 "或 "我们从哪里来"，而是我们可能成为什么样的人，我们如何被代表，以及这如何影响我们如何代表自己。 因此，身份是在表象之内而非之外构成的，它们既与传统的发明有关，也与传统本身有关，它们迫使我们不是将传统解读为无休止的重复，而是将其解读为不断变化的同一"（吉尔罗伊，1994 年）：不是所谓的回归根源，而是与我们的 "路线 "达成协议。它们产生于自我的叙事化，但这一过程必然具有的虚构性丝毫不会削弱其话语、物质或政治效果，即使身份产生的归属感、"与故事的缝合 "部分是在想象中（以及象征中），因此，总是部分地建构在幻想中，或至少是在幻想的领域中。
Precisely because identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies. Moreover, they emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity - an ‘identity’ in its traditional meaning (that is, an all-inclusive sameness, seamless, without internal differentiation). 正因为身份是在话语内部而非外部构建的，我们需要将其理解为在特定的历史和制度环境中，在特定的话语形式和实践中，通过特定的阐释策略产生的。此外，身份是在特定权力模式的作用下产生的，因此，与其说身份是一个相同的、自然构成的统一体--传统意义上的 "身份"（即包罗万象、天衣无缝、没有内部差异的同一性）--的标志，不如说是标记差异和排斥的产物。
Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term - and thus its ‘identity’ - can be 最重要的是，身份是通过差异而不是在差异之外建构起来的，这与人们不断援引身份的形式直接相反。这就要求我们从根本上认识到，只有通过与他者的关系，与它所不是的东西的关系，与它所缺乏的东西的关系，与被称为其构成性外部的东西的关系，任何术语的 "正面 "意义--因而也是它的 "身份"--才能被建构起来。
constructed (Derrida, 1981; Laclau, 1990; Butler, 1993). Throughout their careers, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render ‘outside’, abjected. Every identity has at its ‘margin’, an excess, something more. The unity, the internal homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its necessary, even if silenced and unspoken other, that which it ‘lacks’. Laclau (1990) argues powerfully and persuasively that ‘the constitution of a social identity is an act of power’ since, 德里达，1981 年；拉克劳，1990 年；巴特勒，1993 年）。在其整个职业生涯中，身份之所以能够作为认同和依附的点，只是因为它们具有排斥、遗漏、使人 "置身事外 "和被排斥的能力。每种身份都有其 "边缘"，都有多余的部分，都有更多的东西。身份一词所视为基础的统一性、内部同一性并不是一种自然的，而是一种建构的封闭形式，每一种身份都将其 "缺乏 "的东西命名为其必要的、即使是沉默的、不为人知的他者。拉克劳（1990 年）有力而有说服力地指出，"社会身份的构成是一种权力行为"、
If . . . an objectivity manages to partially affirm itselfit is only by repressing that which threatens it. Derrida has shown how an identity’s constitution is always based on excluding something and establishing a violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles - man/woman, etc. What is peculiar to the second term is thus reduced to the function of an accident as opposed to the essentiality of the first. It is the same with the black-white relationship, in which white, of course, is equivalent to ‘human being’. ‘Woman’ and ‘black’ are thus ‘marks’ (i.e. marked terms) in contrast to the unmarked terms of ‘man’ and ‘white’. (Laclau, 1990:33) 如果......客观性能够部分地肯定自己，那也只是通过压制威胁它的东西。德里达展示了身份的构成是如何总是基于排除某些东西，并在由此产生的两极--男人/女人等--之间建立起暴力的等级制度。因此，相对于第一个术语的本质而言，第二个术语所特有的东西被简化为一种意外的功能。黑白关系也是如此，其中 "白 "当然等同于 "人"。因此，"女人 "和 "黑 "是 "标记"（即有标记的术语），与 "人 "和 "白 "这些无标记的术语形成对比。(拉克劳，1990:33）
So the ‘unities’ which identities proclaim are, in fact, constructed within the play of power and exclusion, and are the result, not of a natural and inevitable or primordial totality but of the naturalized, overdetermined process of ‘closure’ (Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1993). 因此，身份所宣称的 "统一性 "实际上是在权力与排斥的博弈中构建的，不是自然的、不可避免的或原始的整体性的结果，而是自然化的、过度决定的 "封闭 "过程的结果（Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1993）。
If ‘identities’ can only be read against the grain - that is to say, specifically not as that which fixes the play of difference in a point of origin and stability, but as that which is constructed in or through differance and is constantly destabilized by what it leaves out, then how can we understand its meaning and how can we theorize its emergence? Avtar Brah (1992;143), in her important article on ‘Difference, diversity and differentiation’, raises an important series of questions which these new ways of conceptualizing identity have posed: 如果 "身份 "只能被逆向解读--也就是说，具体地说，不是作为将差异游戏固定在一个原点和稳定点上的身份，而是作为在差异中或通过差异建构起来的身份，并不断因其所遗漏的东西而不稳定，那么我们如何理解其意义，如何将其出现理论化？阿夫塔尔-布拉（Avtar Brah，1992; 143）在其关于 "差异、多样性和分化 "的重要文章中提出了一系列重要问题，这些新的身份概念化方式提出了这些问题：
Fanon notwithstanding, much work is yet to be undertaken on the subject of how the racialized ‘other’ is constituted in the psychic domain. How is post-colonial gendered and racialized subjectivity to be analyzed? Does the privileging of ‘sexual difference’ and early childhood in psychoanalysis limit its explanatory value in helping us to understand the psychic dimensions of social phenomena such as racism? How do the ‘symbolic order’ and the social order articulate in the formation of the subject? In other words, how is the link between social and psychic reality to be theorized?’ (1992:142.) 尽管有法农的观点，但关于种族化的 "他者 "如何在心理领域构成这一主题，还有许多工作要做。如何分析后殖民时代的性别和种族主体性？精神分析对 "性差异 "和幼儿期的偏爱是否限制了其在帮助我们理解种族主义等社会现象的心理层面方面的解释价值？在主体的形成过程中，"符号秩序 "和社会秩序是如何衔接的？换句话说，如何将社会现实与心理现实之间的联系理论化？
What follows is an attempt to begin to respond to this critical but troubling set of questions. 下文试图开始回答这一系列关键而又令人不安的问题。
In some recent work on this topic, I have made an appropriation of the term identity which is certainly not widely shared and may not be well understood. I use ‘identity’ to refer to the meeting point, the point of suture, between on the one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to ‘interpellate’, speak to us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on the other hand, the processes 在最近关于这一主题的一些工作中，我对身份一词进行了挪用，这个词肯定没有得到广泛的认同，也可能没有得到很好的理解。我用 "身份 "来指代两个方面之间的交汇点、缝合点，一方面是那些试图 "interellate"（插话）、与我们对话或将我们塑造成特定话语的社会主体的话语和实践，另一方面是那些试图 "interellate"（插话）、与我们对话或将我们塑造成特定话语的社会主体的过程。
which produce subjectivities, which construct us as subjects which can be ‘spoken’. Identities are thus points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us (see Hall, 1995). They are the result of a successful articulation or ‘chaining’ of the subject into the flow of the discourse, what Stephen Heath, in his pathbreaking essay on ‘Suture’ called ‘an intersection’ (1981: 106). ‘A theory of ideology must begin not from the subject but as an account of suturing effects, the effecting of the join of the subject in structures of meaning.’ Identities are, as it were, the positions which the subject is obliged to take up while always ‘knowing’ (the language of consciousness here betrays us) that they are representations, that representation is always constructed across a ‘lack’, across a division, from the place of the Other, and thus can never be adequate - identical - to the subject processes which are invested in them. The notion that an effective suturing of the subject to a subject-position requires, not only that the subject is ‘hailed’, but that the subject invests in the position, means that suturing has to be thought of as an articulation, rather than a one-sided process, and that in turn places identification, if not identities, firmly on the theoretical agenda. 它产生了主体性，将我们构建为可以 "言说 "的主体。因此，身份是话语实践为我们构建的主体地位的临时依附点（见霍尔，1995 年）。身份是主体与话语流成功衔接或 "连锁 "的结果，也就是斯蒂芬-希思（Stephen Heath）在其开创性的 "缝合"（Suture）一文中所说的 "交叉点"（1981: 106）。'意识形态理论必须不是从主体出发，而是作为对缝合效果的描述，即主体在意义结构中的连接效果'。可以说，身份是主体不得不采取的立场，而主体总是'知道'（这里的意识语言背叛了我们）它们是表征，表征总是跨越'缺失'、跨越分裂、从他者的位置建构起来的，因此永远不可能与投入其中的主体过程充分--完全--相同。主体与主体位置的有效缝合不仅要求主体被 "呼唤"，还要求主体投入到位置中，这一概念意味着缝合必须被视为一种衔接，而不是一个片面的过程，这反过来又将认同（如果不是身份认同的话）牢牢地提上了理论议程。
The references to the term which describes the hailing of the subject by discourse - interpellation - remind us that this debate has a significant and uncompleted pre-history in the arguments sparked off by Althusser’s ‘Ideological state apparatuses’ essay (1971). This essay introduced the notion of interpellation, and the speculary structure of ideology in an attempt to circumvent the economism and reductionism of the classical Marxist theory of ideology, and to bring together within one explanatory framework both the materialist function of ideology in reproducing the social relations of production (Marxism) and (through its borrowings from Lacan) the symbolic function of ideology in the constitution of subjects. Michele Barrett, in her recent discussion of this debate, has gone a considerable way to demonstrating ‘the profoundly divided and contradictory nature of the argument Althusser was beginning to make’ (Barrett, 1991:96; see also Hall, 1985: 102: ‘The two sides of the difficult problem of ideology were fractured in that essay and, ever since, have been assigned to different poles’). Nevertheless, the ISAs essay, as it came to be known, has turned out to be a highly significant, even if not successful, moment in the debate. Jacqueline Rose, for example, has argued in Sexuality in the Field of Vision (1986), that the question of identity - how it is constituted and maintained - is therefore the central issue through which psychoanalysis enters the political field’. 对描述话语对主体的呼唤的术语--"互斥"--的引用提醒我们，这场辩论在阿尔都塞的《意识形态国家机器》一文（1971 年）所引发的争论中有着重要的、尚未完成的前史。这篇文章引入了 "互称"（interpellation）概念和意识形态的具体结构，试图规避经典马克思主义意识形态理论中的经济主义和还原论，将意识形态在再生产社会生产关系中的唯物主义功能（马克思主义）和（通过对拉康的借鉴）意识形态在主体构成中的象征性功能整合到一个解释框架中。米歇尔-巴雷特（Michele Barrett）在她最近对这一争论的讨论中，在很大程度上证明了 "阿尔都塞开始提出的论点的深刻分裂和矛盾性质"（Barrett, 1991:96；另见霍尔，1985:102："意识形态这一棘手问题的两面在那篇文章中支离破碎，自那以后，一直被归于不同的两极"）。尽管如此，《国际社会科学评论》一文在这场争论中即使没有取得成功，也是一个非常重要的时刻。例如，杰奎琳-罗斯（Jacqueline Rose）在《视野中的性行为》（Sexuality in the Field of Vision，1986 年）一书中指出："因此，身份认同问题--它是如何构成和维持的--是精神分析进入政治领域的核心问题"。
This is one reason why Lacanian psychoanalysis came into English intellectual life, via Althusser’s concept of ideology, through the two paths of feminism and the analysis of film (a fact often used to discredit all three). Feminism because the issue of how individuals recognize themselves as male or female, the demand that they do so, seems to stand in such fundamental relation to 这就是为什么拉康精神分析学派通过阿尔都塞的意识形态概念，通过女性主义和电影分析这两条道路（这一事实经常被用来诋毁这三者）进入英国知识界的原因之一。女权主义是因为个人如何承认自己是男性或女性的问题，以及他们这样做的要求，似乎与以下问题有着根本的关系
the forms of inequality and subordination which it is feminism’s objective to change. Film because its power as an ideological apparatus rests on the mechanisms of identification and sexual fantasy which we all seem to participate in, but which - outside the cinema - are for the most part only ever admitted on the couch. If ideology is effective, it is because it works at the most rudimentary levels of psychic identity and the drives. (Rose, 1986:5) 女权主义的目标是改变不平等和从属地位的形式。电影作为一种意识形态工具，其力量依赖于我们似乎都参与其中的身份认同和性幻想机制，但在电影之外，这些机制大多只能在沙发上被承认。如果说意识形态是有效的，那是因为它作用于心理认同和驱动力的最基本层面。(罗斯，1986:5）
However, if we are not to fall directly from an economistic reductionism into a psychoanalytic one, we need to add that, if ideology is effective, it is because it works at both ’ the rudimentary levels of psychic identity and the drives’ and at the level of the discursive formation and practices which constitute the social field; and that it is in the articulation of these mutually constitutive but not identical fields that the real conceptual problems lie. The term identity - which arises precisely at the point of intersection between them - is thus the site of the difficulty. It is worth adding that we are unlikely ever to be able to square up these two constituents as equivalents - the unconscious itself acting as the bar or cut between them which makes it ‘the site of a perpetual postponement or deferral of equivalence’ (Hall, 1995) but which cannot, for that reason, be given up. 然而，如果我们不想直接从经济学的还原论陷入精神分析的还原论，我们就需要补充一点，如果意识形态是有效的，那是因为它既在 "心理认同和驱动力的初级层面 "起作用，也在构成社会领域的话语形成和实践层面起作用；而真正的概念问题就在于这些相互构成但又不完全相同的领域之间的衔接。因此，"身份 "一词--恰恰产生于它们之间的交汇点--是难题所在。值得补充的是，我们不可能将这两种成分等同起来--无意识本身就是它们之间的障碍或切口，使其成为 "等同性永久推迟或延迟的场所"（霍尔，1995 年），但也正因为如此，我们不能放弃它。
Heath’s essay (1981) reminds us that it was Michael Pêcheux who tried to develop an account of discourse within the Althusserian perspective, and who in effect, registered the unbridgeable gap between the first and the second halves of Althusser’s essay in terms of 'the heavy absence of a conceptual articulation elaborated between ideology and the unconscious, (quoted in Heath, 1981:106). Pêcheux tried 'to describe with reference to the mechanisms of the setting in position of its subjects* (Heath, 1981:101-2), using the Foucauldian notion of discursive formation as that which ‘determines what can and must be said’. As Heath put Pécheux’s argument: 希斯的文章（1981）提醒我们，正是迈克尔-佩休（Michael Pêcheux）试图从阿尔都塞的视角来阐释话语，他实际上将阿尔都塞文章前半部分与后半部分之间无法弥合的鸿沟归结为 "意识形态与无意识之间严重缺乏概念衔接"（引自希斯，1981:106）。Pêcheux试图 "参照主体位置设置的机制来描述*（Heath, 1981:101-2），并使用福柯的话语形成概念，即'决定什么可以说，什么必须说'。正如希斯对佩休论点的阐述：
Individuals are constituted as subjects through the discursive formation, a process of subjection in which [drawing on Althusser’s loan from Lacan concerning the speculary character of the constitution of subjectivityl the individual is identified as subject to the discursive formation in a structure of misrecognition (the subject thus presented as the source of the meanings of which it is an effect). Interpellation names the mechanism of this structure of misrecognition, effectively the term of the subject in the discursive and the ideological, the point of their correspondence (1981: 101-2). 个人通过话语形成而成为主体，在这个过程中，[借用阿尔都塞从拉康那里借来的关于主体性构成的具体特征的说法，]个人被识别为话语形成的主体，在一个误认的结构中（主体因此被视为其所产生的意义的来源）。"互称"（Interpellation）命名了这种误认结构的机制，实际上是主体在话语和意识形态中的术语，是它们的对应点（1981：101-2）。
Such ‘correspondence’, however, remained troublingly unresolved. Interpellation, though it continues to be used as a general way of describing the ‘summoning into place’ of the subject, was subjected to Hirst’s famous critique. It depended, Hirst argued, on a recognition which, in effect, the subject would have been required to have the capacity to perform before it had been constituted, within discourse, as a subject. ‘This something which is not a subject must already have the faculties necessary to support the recognition that will constitute it as a subject’ (Hirst, 1979:65). This argument has proved very persuasive to 然而，这种 "对应关系 "仍未得到解决，令人不安。尽管 "称谓"（interpellation）仍被用作描述主体 "就位 "的一般方式，但它受到了赫斯特著名的批判。赫斯特认为，它依赖于一种承认，实际上，主体在话语中被构成为主体之前，就必须有能力进行这种承认。这个不是主体的东西必须已经具有必要的能力来支持将其构成主体的承认"（赫斯特，1979:65）。事实证明，这一论点非常具有说服力。
many of Althusser’s subsequent readers, in effect bringing the whole field of investigation to an untimely halt. 阿尔都塞后来的许多读者，实际上使整个研究领域夭折。
The critique was certainly a formidable one, but the halting of all further inquiry at this point may turn out to have been premature. Hirst’s critique was effective in showing that all the mechanisms which constituted the subject in discourse as an interpellation, (through the speculary structure of misrecognition modelled on the Lacanian mirror phase), were in danger of presupposing an already constituted subject. However, since no one proposed to renounce the idea of the subject as constituted in discourse as an effect, it still remained to be shown by what mechanism which was not vulnerable to the charge of presupposition this constitution could be achieved. The problem was postponed, not resolved. Some of the difficuties, at least, seemed to arise from accepting too much at face value, and without qualification, Lacan’s somewhat sensationalist proposition that everything constitutive of the subject not only happens through this mechanism of the resolution of the Oedipal crisis, but happens in the same moment. The ‘resolution’ of the Oedipal crisis, in the over-condensed language of the Lacanian hot-gospellers, was identical with, and occurred through the equivalent mechanism as, the submission to the Law of the Father, the consolidation of sexual difference, the entry into language, the formation of the unconscious as well - after Althusseras the recruitment into the patriarchal ideologies of late capitalist western societies! The more complex notion of a subject-in-process is lost in these polemical condensations and hypothetically aligned equivalences. (Is the subject racialized, nationalized and constituted as a late-liberal entrepreneurial subject in this moment too?) 赫斯特的批判无疑是有力的，但在这一点上停止所有进一步的探索可能为时过早。赫斯特的批判有效地表明，所有在话语中构成主体的机制（通过以拉康镜像阶段为模型的错误认知的推测结构），都有预设一个已经构成的主体的危险。然而，由于没有人提议放弃主体在话语中作为一种效果而被构成的观点，因此仍有待说明的是，这种构成可以通过什么机制来实现，而这种机制又不容易受到预设的指控。问题被推迟了，而不是解决了。拉康提出了一个有点耸人听闻的命题，即构成主体的一切不仅是通过俄狄浦斯危机的解决机制发生的，而且是在同一时刻发生的。俄狄浦斯危机的 "解决"，用拉康热衷的福音派过度浓缩的语言来说，与服从父法、巩固性差异、进入语言、无意识的形成--在阿尔都塞之后，即被西方晚期资本主义社会的父权意识形态所招募--是相同的，并通过同等的机制发生！在这些争论性的浓缩和假设性的对等中，主体过程这一更为复杂的概念被遗忘了。(在这一时刻，主体是否也被种族化、民族化并被构成为晚期自由主义企业家主体？）
Hirst, too, seems to have assumed what Michele Barrett calls ‘Althusser’s Lacan’. However, as he puts it, ‘the complex and hazardous process of formation of a human adult from “a small animal” does not necessarily correspond to Althusser’s mechanism of ideology . . . unless the Child remains in Lacan’s mirror phase, or unless we fill the child’s cradle with anthropological assumptions’ (Hirst, 1979). His response to this is somewhat perfunctory. ‘I have no quarrel with Children, and I do not wish to pronounce them blind, deaf or dumb, merely to deny that they posses the capacities of philosophical subjects, that they have the attributes of “knowing” subjects independent of their formation and training as social beings.’ What is at issue here is the capacity for self-recognition. But it is an unwarrantable assumption to make, that ‘recognition’ is a purely cognitive let alone ‘philosophical’ attribute, and unlikely that it should appear in the child at one fell swoop, in a before/after fashion. The stakes here seem, unaccountably, to have been pitched very high indeed. It hardly requires us to endow the individual ‘small animal’ with the full philosophical apparatus to account for why it may have the capacity to ‘misrecognize’ itself in the look from the place of the other which is all we require to set the passage between the Imaginary and the Symbolic in motion in Lacan’s terms. After all, following Freud, the basic cathexing of 赫斯特似乎也假定了米歇尔-巴雷特所说的 "阿尔都塞的拉康"。然而，正如他所说，"从'小动物'成长为成人的复杂而危险的过程并不一定符合阿尔都塞的意识形态机制。......除非儿童仍然处于拉康的镜像阶段，或者除非我们用人类学的假设来填充儿童的摇篮"（Hirst，1979）。他对此的回应有些敷衍。我与儿童并无争执，我也不想宣布他们是盲、聋或哑，只是否认他们拥有哲学主体的能力，否认他们拥有 "知性 "主体的属性，而不依赖于他们作为社会人的形成和训练。这里的问题是自我认知的能力。但是，认为 "认识 "是一种纯粹的认知属性，更不用说 "哲学 "属性了，这是一个毫无根据的假设。令人不解的是，这里的赌注似乎被定得很高。我们几乎不需要为个体的 "小动物 "配备完整的哲学装置，就能解释为什么它有能力从他人的视角 "误认 "自己。毕竟，按照弗洛伊德的说法，"想象 "与 "象征 "之间的基本联系是
the zones of bodily activity and the apparatus of sensation, pleasure and pain must be already ‘in play’ in however embryonic a form in order for any relation of any kind to be established with the external world. There is already a relation to a source of pleasure - the relation to the Mother in the Imaginary - so there must be already something which is capable of ‘recognizing’ what pleasure is. Lacan himself noted in his essay on ‘The Mirror Stage’ that ‘The child, at an age when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize his own image in a mirror.’ What is more, the critique seems to be pitched in a rather binary, before/after, either/or logical form. The mirror stage is not the beginning of something, but the interruption - the loss, the lack, the division - which initiates the process that ‘founds’ the sexually differentiated subject (and the unconscious) and this depends not alone on the instantaneous formation of some internal cognitive capacity, but on the dislocating rupture of the look from the place of the Other. For Lacan, however, this is already a fantasy - the very image which places the child divides its identity into two. Furthermore, that moment only has meaning in relation to the supporting presence and the look of the mother who guarantees its reality for the child. Peter Osborne notes (1995) that in The Field Of The Other Lacan (1977) describes the ‘parent holding him up before the mirror’, with the child looking towards the Mother for confirmation, the child seeing her as a ‘reference point . . . not his ego ideal but his ideal ego’ (p.257). This argument, Osborne suggests, ‘exploits the indeterminacy inherent in the discrepancy between the temporality of Lacan’s description of the child’s encounter with its bodily image in the mirror as a “stage” and the punctuality of his depiction of it as a scene, the dramatic point of which is restricted to the relations between two “characters” alone: the child and its bodily image’. However, as Osbome says, either it represents a critical addition to the ‘mirror stage’ argument - in which case, why is it not developed? Or it introduces a different logic whose implications remain unaddressed in Lacan’s subsequent work. 为了与外部世界建立任何形式的关系，身体活动的区域和感觉、快乐和痛苦的装置必须已经以任何雏形的形式 "发挥作用"。我们已经有了一种与快乐源泉的关系--在想象中与母亲的关系--因此必须已经有了某种能够 "识别 "快乐是什么的东西。拉康本人在《镜像阶段》一文中指出，"儿童在工具性智慧方面一度被黑猩猩超越，不管时间有多短，但他已经可以在镜子中认出自己的形象。更重要的是，这种批判似乎采用了一种二元对立、前/后、非此即彼的逻辑形式。镜像阶段并不是某件事情的开始，而是中断--损失、缺乏、分裂--它启动了 "建立 "性分化主体（和无意识）的过程，而这并不仅仅取决于某种内在认知能力的瞬间形成，而是取决于从他者的位置上看的错位断裂。然而，对于拉康来说，这已经是一种幻想--放置儿童的图像将其身份一分为二。此外，这一时刻只有在母亲的支持下才有意义，母亲的神情保证了儿童的现实性。彼得-奥斯本（1995 年）指出，拉康（1977 年）在《他者的领域》中描述了 "父母在镜子前举着他"，孩子向母亲寻求确认，孩子将母亲视为 "参照点......不是他的自我理想，而是他的理想自我"（第 257 页）。 奥斯本认为，这一论点 "利用了拉康将儿童与镜中身体形象的相遇描述为'舞台'的时间性与将其描绘为场景的时间性之间的差异所固有的不确定性，场景的戏剧性仅限于两个'角色'之间的关系：儿童与其身体形象"。然而，正如奥斯博姆所说，这要么是对'镜像舞台'论点的批判性补充--既然如此，为何不加以阐释？或者，它引入了一种不同的逻辑，而这种逻辑的含义在拉康的后续著作中仍未涉及。
The notion that nothing of the subject is there until the Oedipal drama is an exaggerated reading of Lacan. The assertion that subjectivity is not fully constituted until the Oedipal crisis has been ‘resolved’ does not require a blank screen, tabula rasa, or a beforelafter conception of the subject, initiated by a sort of coup de thêâtre, even if - as Hirst rightly noted - it leaves unsettled the problematic relationship between ‘the individual’ and the subject. (What is the individual ‘small animal’ that is not yet a subject?). 在恋母情结发生之前，主体什么都不存在的说法是对拉康的夸大解读。在 "解决 "了恋母情结危机之前，主体性并没有完全形成，这一论断并不要求一个空白的屏幕、白板或由某种 "政变 "启动的主体的前后概念，即使--正如赫斯特正确指出的--它使 "个体 "与主体之间的问题关系悬而未决。(什么是尚未成为主体的个体 "小动物"？）
One could add that Lacan’s is only one of the many accounts of the formation of subjectivity which takes account of unconscious psychic processes and the relation to the other, and the debate may look different now that the ‘Lacanian deluge’ is somewhat receding and in the absence of the early powerful impulsion in that direction which we were given by Althusser’s text. In his thoughtful recent discussion of the Hegelian 我们还可以补充说，拉康的论述只是关于主体性形成的众多论述中的一种，这些论述考虑到了无意识的心理过程以及与他人的关系。现在，"拉康洪流 "已经有所退去，阿尔都塞的文章也没有像早期那样对我们产生强大的推动力，在这种情况下，辩论可能会有所不同。在他最近对黑格尔的深思熟虑的讨论中
origins of this concept of ‘recognition’ referred to above, Peter Osbome has criticized Lacan for ‘the way in which the child’s relation to the image is absolutized by being abstracted from the context of its relations to others (particularly, the mother)’, while being made ontologically constitutive of ‘the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form . . .’ and considers several other variants (Kristeva, Jessica Benjamin, Laplanche) which are not so confined within the alienated misrecognition of the Lacanian scenario. These are useful pointers beyond the impasse in which this discussion, in the wake of ‘Althusser’s Lacan’, has left us, with the threads of the psychic and the discursive spinning loose in our hands. 关于上述 "承认 "概念的起源，彼得-奥斯波姆（Peter Osbome）批评拉康 "将儿童与图像的关系从儿童与他人（尤其是母亲）的关系中抽象出来，从而将儿童与图像的关系绝对化"，同时在本体论上构成了 "我以原始形式沉淀于其中的符号矩阵......"。......"，并考虑了其他几种变体（克里斯蒂娃、杰西卡-本雅明、拉普兰奇），这些变体并不局限于拉康情景中的异化误认。在 "阿尔都塞的拉康 "之后，这场讨论陷入了僵局，精神和话语的线索在我们手中松散地打转。
Foucault, I would argue, also approaches the impasse with which Hirst’s critique of Althusser leaves us, but so to speak from the opposite direction. Ruthlessly attacking ‘the great myth of interiority’, and driven both by his critque of humanism and the philosophy of consciousness, and by his negative reading of psychoanalysis, Foucault also undertakes a radical historicization of the category of the subject. The subject is produced ‘as an effect’ through and within discourse, within specific discursive formations, and has no existence, and certainly no transcendental continuity or identity from one subject position to another. In his ‘archaeological’ work (Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, The Archaeology of Knowledge), discourses construct subject positions through their rules of formation and ‘modalities of enunciation’. Powerfully compelling and original as these works are, the criticism levelled against them in this respect at least seems justified. They offer a formal account of the construction of subject positions within discourse while revealing little about why it is that certain individuals occupy some subject positions rather than others. By neglecting to analyse how the social positions of individuals interact with the construction of certain ‘empty’ discursive subject positions, Foucault reinscribes an antinomy between subject positions and the individuals who occupy them. Thus his archaeology provides a critical, but one-dimensional, formal account of the subject of discourse. Discursive subject positions become a priori categories which individuals seem to occupy in an unproblematic fashion. (McNay, 1994:76-7). McNay cites Brown and Cousins’s key observation that Foucault tends here to elide ‘subject positions of a statement with individual capacities to fill them’ (Brown and Cousins, 1980:272)-thus coming up against the very difficulty which Althusser failed to resolve, by a different route. 我认为，福柯也陷入了赫斯特对阿尔都塞的批判所留下的僵局，但可以说是从相反的方向。福柯对 "内在性的伟大神话 "进行了无情的抨击，在他对人文主义和意识哲学的批判以及对精神分析的负面解读的推动下，福柯还对主体的范畴进行了彻底的历史化。主体是 "作为一种效应 "通过话语、在话语中、在特定的话语形式中产生的，它并不存在，当然也不具有从一个主体位置到另一个主体位置的超越性连续性或同一性。在他的 "考古学 "著作（《疯狂与文明》、《诊所的诞生》、《事物的秩序》、《知识考古学》）中，话语通过其形成规则和 "表述方式 "构建了主体地位。尽管这些著作具有很强的说服力和原创性，但对它们在这方面的批评至少看起来是有道理的。这些著作对话语中主体地位的建构进行了形式上的阐述，但对某些人为何占据某些主体地位而非其他主体地位却知之甚少。福柯忽略了分析个人的社会地位如何与某些 "空洞的 "话语主体地位的建构相互作用，从而在主体地位与占据主体地位的个人之间重新建立了对立。因此，他的考古学为话语主体提供了一种批判性的、但单一维度的形式描述。话语主体地位成为先验的范畴，个人似乎可以毫无问题地占据这些范畴。(McNay, 1994:76-7）。 McNay 引用了 Brown 和 Cousins 的重要观点，即福柯在此倾向于将 "陈述的主体位置与填补这些位置的个人能力"（Brown and Cousins, 1980:272）相混淆--从而以不同的方式遇到了阿尔都塞未能解决的难题。
The critical shift in Foucault’s work from an archaeological to a genealogical method does many things to render more concrete the somewhat ‘empty formalism’ of the earlier work, especially in the powerful ways in which power, which was missing from the more formal account of discourse, is now centrally reintroduced and the exciting possibilities opened up by Foucault’s discussion of the double-sided character of subjection/subjectification (assujettisement). Moreover, the 福柯的工作从考古学方法到谱系学方法的批判性转变，在许多方面使早期工作中略显 "空洞的形式主义 "变得更加具体，特别是以强有力的方式重新引入了权力，而权力在更为正式的话语论述中是缺失的，福柯对臣服/主体化（assujettisement）的双面特征的讨论开辟了令人兴奋的可能性。此外
centring of questions of power, and the notion that discourse itself is a regulative and regulated formation, entry into which is 'determined by and constitutive of the power relations that permeate the social realm ^(3){ }^{3} (McNay, 1994:87), brings Foucault’s conception of the discursive formation closer to some of the classical questions which Althusser tried to address through the concept of ‘ideology’ - shom, of course, of its class reductionism, economistic and truth-claiming overtones. 福柯以权力问题为中心，认为话语本身是一种调节和被调节的形式，进入这种形式是 "由渗透于社会领域的权力关系所决定和构成的" ^(3){ }^{3} （McNay, 1994:87），这使得福柯的话语形式概念更接近阿尔都塞试图通过 "意识形态 "概念来解决的一些经典问题--当然，这并不包括其阶级还原论、经济学和真理论的色彩。
In the area of the theorization of the subject and identity, however, certain problems remain. One implication of the new conceptions of power elaborated in this body of work is the radical ‘deconstruction’ of the body, the last residue or hiding place of ‘Man’, and its ‘reconstruction’ in terms of its historical, genealogical and discursive formations. The body is constructed by, shaped and reshaped by the intersection of a series of disciplinary discursive practices. Genealogy’s task, Foucault proclaims, ‘is to expose the body totally imprinted by history and the processes of history’s destruction of the body’ (1984:63). While we can accept this, with its radically ‘constructivist’ implications (the body becomes infinitely malleable and contingent) I am not sure we can or ought to go as far as his proposition that ‘Nothing in man - not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as a basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men.’ This is not because the body is such a stable and true referent for self-understanding, but because, though this may be a ‘misrecognition’, it is precisely how the body has served to function as the signifier of the condensation of subjectivities in the individual and this function cannot simply be dismissed because, as Foucault effectively shows, it is not true. 然而，在主体和身份的理论化领域，某些问题依然存在。这套著作中阐述的新权力概念的含义之一，是对 "人 "的最后残余或藏身之处--身体的彻底 "解构"，以及从其历史、谱系和话语形式的角度对其进行 "重建"。身体是由一系列学科话语实践交叉构建、塑造和重塑的。福柯宣称，"谱系学的任务是揭露完全被历史和历史对身体的破坏过程所烙印的身体"（1984:63）。虽然我们可以接受这一点，并接受其根本性的'建构主义'含义（身体变得无限可塑性和偶然性），但我不确定我们能否或是否应该像他的命题那样，'人的任何东西--甚至他的身体--都不够稳定，无法作为自我认知或理解他人的基础'。这并不是因为身体是自我理解的稳定而真实的参照物，而是因为，尽管这可能是一种'错误的认识'，但它恰恰是身体作为凝聚个人主体性的符号的功能，而这种功能不能被简单地否定，因为正如福柯有效地表明的那样，它并不真实。
Further, my own feeling is that, despite Foucault’s disclaimers, his invocation of the body as the point of application of a variety of disciplinary practices tends to lend this theory of disciplinary regulation a sort of ‘displaced or misplaced concreteness’ - a residual materiality - and in this way operates discursively to ‘resolve’ or appear to resolve the unspecified relationship between the subject, the individual and the body. To put it crudely, it pins back together or ‘sutures’ those things which the theory of the discursive production of subjects, if taken to its limits, would irretrievably fracture and disperse. I think ‘the body’ has acquired a totemic value in post-Foucauldian work precisely because of this talismanic status. It is almost the only trace we have left in Foucault’s work of a ‘transcendental signifier’. 此外，我自己的感觉是，尽管福柯声明了自己的观点，但他援引身体作为各种学科实践的应用点，倾向于赋予这一学科规制理论一种 "被移置或错位的具体性"--一种残余的物质性--并以这种方式在话语上运作，以 "解决 "或似乎解决主体、个人与身体之间的不明确关系。粗略地说，它把主体的话语生产理论如果发挥到极限，就会无可挽回地断裂和分散的那些东西重新钉在一起或 "缝合 "起来。我认为 "身体 "在后福柯尔德主义作品中获得了图腾般的价值，正是因为这种护身符般的地位。它几乎是我们在福柯作品中留下的 "超验符号 "的唯一痕迹。
The more well-established critique, however, has to do with the problem which Foucault encounters with theorizing resistance within the theory of power he deploys in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality; the entirely self-policing conception of the subject which emerges from the disciplinary, confessional and pastoral modalities of power discussed there, and the absence of any attention to what might in any way interrupt, prevent or disturb the smooth insertion of individuals into the subject positions constructed by these discourses. The submission of the body through ‘the soul’ to the normalizing regimes of truth 然而，福柯在《规训与惩罚》和《性史》中所运用的权力理论中，将抵抗理论化时遇到了一个问题，那就是他的批判更为成熟；在《规训与惩罚》和《性史》中所讨论的规训、忏悔和牧师权力模式中，出现了一种完全自我控制的主体概念，而福柯对可能以任何方式干扰、阻止或扰乱个人顺利进入这些话语所构建的主体地位的因素却没有给予任何关注。身体通过 "灵魂 "服从于正常化的真理制度
constitutes a powerful way of rethinking the body’s so-called ‘materiality’ (which has been productively taken up by Nikolas Rose, and the ‘governmentality’ school, as well as, in a different mode, by Judith Butler in Bodies That Matter, 1993). But it is hard not to take Foucault’s own formulation seriously, with all the difficulties it brings in its train: namely, that the subjects which are constructed in this way are ‘docile bodies’. There is no theorized account of how or why bodies should not always-for-ever turn up, in place, at the right time (exactly the point from which the classical Marxist theory of ideology started to unravel, and the very difficulty which Althusser reinscribed when he normatively defined the function of ideology as ‘to reproduce the social relations of production’). Furthermore, there is no theorization of the psychic mechanism or interior processes by which these automatic ‘interpellations’ might be produced, or - more significantly - fail or be resisted or negotiated. Powerful and productive as this work undoubtedly is, then, it remains the case that here Foucault steps too easily from describing disciplinary power as a tendency within modern forms of social control, to positing disciplinary power as a fully installed monolithic force which saturates all social relations. This leads to an overestimation of the efficacy of disciplinary power and to an impoverished understanding of the individual which cannot account for experiences that fall outside the realm of the “docile” body’ (McNay, 1994: 104.) 这构成了重新思考身体的所谓 "物质性 "的有力方式（尼古拉斯-罗斯和 "政府性 "学派，以及朱迪斯-巴特勒在《重要的身体》（Bodies That Matter）一书中以不同的方式对此进行了卓有成效的探讨）。但是，我们很难不认真对待福柯自己的表述，因为它带来了种种困难：即以这种方式建构起来的主体是 "温顺的身体"。福柯并没有理论化地解释身体如何或为何不总是在正确的时间、正确的地点出现（这正是经典马克思主义意识形态理论开始瓦解的起点，也是阿尔都塞将意识形态的功能规范性地定义为 "再生产社会生产关系 "时重新提出的难题）。此外，这部著作也没有对这些自动 "互译 "产生的心理机制或内部过程进行理论化，或者--更重要的是--对其失败、抵制或协商进行理论化。福柯的这一著作无疑是强大而富有成效的，但在这里，福柯过于轻易地将纪律权力描述为现代社会控制形式中的一种趋势，进而将纪律权力假定为一种完全固定的、覆盖所有社会关系的整体力量。这导致高估了纪律权力的效力，也导致对个人的理解贫乏，无法解释 "温顺 "身体领域之外的经验"（McNay, 1994: 104）。
That this became obvious to Foucault, even if it is still refused as a critique by many of his followers, is apparent from the further and distinctive shift in his work marked by the later (and incomplete) volumes of his so-called ‘History of Sexuality’ (The Use of Pleasure, 1987; The Care of the Self, 1988, and as far as we can gather, the unpublished - and from the point of view of the critique just passed, the critical - volume on ‘The Perversions’). For here, without moving very far from his insightful work on the productive character of normative regulation (no subjects outside the Law, as Judith Butler puts it), he tacitly recognizes that it is not enough for the Law to summon, discipline, produce and regulate, but there must also be the corresponding production of a response (and thus the capacity and apparatus of subjectivity) from the side of the subject. In the critical Introduction to The Use of Pleasure Foucault lists what by now we would expect of his work - the correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity and forms of subjectivity in particular cultures’ - but now critically adds 尽管福柯的许多追随者仍然拒绝将其作为一种批判，但这一点对福柯来说是显而易见的，这一点从福柯所谓的 "性史"（《快感的使用》，1987 年；《自我的关怀》，1988 年，以及据我们所知尚未出版的--从刚刚通过的批判的角度来看，是批判性的--关于 "变态 "的一卷）的后期（和不完整的）作品中的进一步和独特的转变就可以看出。因为在这里，他并没有远离他对规范性规制的生产性特征（如朱迪思-巴特勒所说，法律之外无主体）的洞察力，而是默认了仅有法律的召唤、约束、生产和规制是不够的，还必须有相应的来自主体方面的回应的生产（从而主体性的能力和装置）。在《快感的使用》的批判性导言中，福柯列举了我们现在对其作品的预期--特定文化中知识领域、规范性类型和主体性形式之间的关联--但现在又批判性地补充道
the practices by which individuals were led to focus attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize and acknowledge themselves as subjects of desire, bring. ing into play between themselves and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being, be it natural or fallen. In short, with this genealogy, the idea was to investigate how individuals were led to practice, on themselves and on others, a hermeneutics of desire. (1987:5) 通过这些实践，个人被引导关注自身，解读、认识并承认自己是欲望的主体，在自身与自身之间建立起某种关系，使他们能够在欲望中发现自己存在的真相，无论是自然的还是堕落的。简而言之，通过这一谱系，我们的想法是研究个人如何在自己和他人身上实践欲望诠释学。(1987:5)
Foucault describes this - correctly, in our view - as ‘a third shift, in order to analyze what is termed “the subject”. It seemed appropriate to 福柯将其描述为 "为了分析所谓的'主体'而进行的第三次转变"--我们认为这是正确的。似乎应该
look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject.’ Foucault, of course, would not commit anything so vulgar as actually to deploy the term ‘identity’, but I think, with ‘the relation to self’ and the constitution and recognition of ‘himself’ (sic) qua subject we are approaching something of the territory which, in the terms established earlier, belongs to the problematic of ‘identity’. 寻找个人构成和承认自己作为主体的自我关系的形式和模式"。当然，福柯不会使用'身份'这个庸俗的词，但我认为，'与自我的关系'以及'他自己'（原文如此）作为主体的构成和认可，是我们正在接近的领域，用前面的话说，属于'身份'的问题。
This is not the place to trace through the many productive insights which flow from Foucault’s analysis of the truth-games, the elaboration of ethical work, of the regimes of self-regulation and self-fashioning, of the ‘technologies of the self’ involved in the constitution of the desiring subject. There is certainly no single switch to ‘agency’, to intention and volition, here (though there are, very centrally, the practices of freedom which prevent this subject from ever being simply a docile sexualized body). 福柯对真相游戏的分析、对伦理工作的阐述、对自我调节和自我塑造制度的分析，以及对欲望主体的构成所涉及的 "自我技术 "的分析，产生了许多富有成效的洞见，但这里并不是追溯这些洞见的地方。在这里，"能动性"、意向和意志的转换肯定不是一蹴而就的（不过，非常核心的是，自由的实践使这一主体永远不会仅仅是一个温顺的性化躯体）。
But there is the production of self as an object in the world, the practices of self-constitution, recognition and reflection, the relation to the rule, alongside the scrupulous attention to normative regulation, and the constraints of the rules without which no ‘subjectification’ is produced. This is a significant advance, since it addresses for the first time in Foucault’s major work the existence of some interior landscape of the subject, some interior mechanisms of assent to the rule, as well as its objectively disciplining force, which saves the account from the "behaviourism’ and objectivism which threatens certain parts of Discipline and Punish. Often, in this work, the ethics and practices of the self are most fully described by Foucault as an ‘aesthetics of existence’, a deliberate stylization of daily life; and its technologies are most effectively demonstrated in the practices of self-production, in specific modes of conduct, in what we have come from later work to recognize as a kind of performativity. 但是，作为世界客体的 "自我 "的产生，"自我构成"、"承认 "和 "反思 "的实践，与 "规则 "的关系，以及对 "规范性规制 "的严格关注，还有 "规则 "的约束，没有这些，就不会产生 "主体化"。这是一个重大的进步，因为它在福柯的主要著作中首次论述了主体的一些内部景观、对规则的一些内部认同机制以及规则的客观约束力量的存在，这使福柯的论述免于 "行为主义 "和客观主义，而 "行为主义 "和客观主义对《规训与惩罚》的某些部分构成了威胁。通常，在这部著作中，自我的伦理和实践被福柯最充分地描述为一种 "存在美学"，一种日常生活的刻意风格化；其技术在自我生产实践中、在特定的行为模式中、在我们从后来的著作中认识到的一种表演性中得到了最有效的展示。
What I think we can see here, then, is Foucault being pushed, by the scrupulous rigour of his own thinking, through a series of conceptual shifts at different stages in his work, towards a recognition that, since the decentring of the subject is not the destruction of the subject, and since the ‘centring’ of discursive practice cannot work without the constitution of subjects, the theoretical work cannot be fully accomplished without complementing the account of discursive and disciplinary regulation with an account of the practices of subjective self-constitution. It has never been enough - in Marx, in Althusser, in Foucault - to elaborate a theory of how individuals are summoned into place in the discursive structures. It has always, also, required an account of how subjects are constituted; and in this work, Foucault has gone a considerable way in showing this, in reference to historically-specific discursive practices, normative self-regulation and technologies of the self. The question which remains is whether we also require to, as it were, close the gap between the two: that is to say, a theory of what the mechanisms are by 因此，我认为我们在这里看到的是，福柯在其工作的不同阶段，在其自身严谨思维的推动下，经历了一系列概念上的转变，最终认识到，既然主体的去中心化并不是主体的毁灭，既然话语实践的 "中心化 "离不开主体的构成，那么，如果不对主体自我构成的实践进行说明，以补充对话语和学科规制的说明，理论工作就不可能完全完成。在马克思、阿尔都塞和福柯那里，仅仅阐述个人如何在话语结构中被召唤到位的理论是远远不够的。在这部著作中，福柯通过对特定历史时期的话语实践、规范性自我调节和自我技术的论述，大大地说明了这一点。剩下的问题是，我们是否还需要缩小这两者之间的差距：也就是说，我们是否还需要一种理论，来说明 "自我 "的机制是什么？
which individuals as subjects identify (or do not identify) with the ‘positions’ to which they are summoned; as well as how they fashion, stylize, produce and ‘perform’ these positions, and why they never do so completely, for once and all time, and some never do, or are in a constant, agonistic process of struggling with, resisting, negotiating and accommodating the normative or regulative rules with which they confront and regulate themselves. In short, what remains is the requirement to think this relation of subject to discursive formations as an artichlation (all articulations are properly relations of ‘no necessary correspondence’, i.e. founded on that contingency which ‘reactivates the historical’ cf. Laclau, 1990:35). 个人作为主体如何认同（或不认同）他们被召唤的 "立场"；以及他们如何塑造、风格化、生产和 "表演 "这些立场，为什么他们从来没有完全地、一劳永逸地做到这一点，有些人从来没有做到这一点，或者说他们处于一个不断的、激动人心的过程中，与他们所面对和规范自己的规范性或调节性规则进行斗争、抵制、谈判和适应。简而言之，剩下的就是要求将主体与话语形式的这种关系视为一种衔接（所有衔接都是 "无必然对应 "的恰当关系，即建立在 "重新激活历史 "的偶然性之上，参见拉克劳，1990:35）。
It is therefore all the more fascinating that, when finally Foucault does make the move in this direction (in work which was then tragically cut short), he was prevented, of course, from going to one of the principal sources of thinking about this neglected aspect - namely, psychoanalysis; prevented from moving in that direction by his own critique of it as simply another network of disciplinary power relations. What he produces instead is a discursive phenomenology of the subject (drawing perhaps on earlier sources and influences whose importance for him have been somewhat underplayed) and a genealogy of the technologies of the self. But it is a phenomenology which is in danger of being overwhelmed by an overemphasis on intentionality - precisely because it cannot engage with the unconscious. For good or ill, that door was already foreclosed. 因此，更吸引人的是，当福柯最终朝着这个方向迈进时（他的工作后来不幸中断了），他当然无法去思考这个被忽视的方面--即精神分析--的主要来源之一；他自己对精神分析的批判也阻止了他朝着这个方向迈进，因为他认为精神分析只不过是另一个学科权力关系网络。取而代之的是，他提出了一种主体的话语现象学（或许借鉴了对他的重要性有些轻描淡写的早期来源和影响），以及一种自我技术的谱系学。但这种现象学有可能被过分强调意向性所淹没--正是因为它无法涉及无意识。不管是好是坏，这扇门已经被关闭了。
Fortunately it has not remained so. In Gender Trouble (1990) and more especially in Bodies That Matter (1993), Judith Butler has taken up, through her concern with ‘the discursive limits of “sex”’ and with the politics of feminism, the complex transactions between the subject, the body and identity, through the drawing together in one analytic framework insights drawn from a Foucauldian and a psychoanalytic perspective. Adopting the position that the subject is discursively constructed and that there is no subject before or outside the Law, Butler develops a rigorously argued case that 幸运的是，情况并非如此。在《性别问题》（Gender Trouble，1990 年）一书中，尤其是在《重要的身体》（Bodies That Matter，1993 年）一书中，朱迪斯-巴特勒（Judith Butler）通过对"'性'的话语限制 "和女权主义政治的关注，将主体、身体和身份之间的复杂关系纳入一个分析框架，并从福柯尔德和精神分析的角度提出了自己的见解。巴特勒采取的立场是，主体是话语建构的，在法律之前或之外不存在主体。
sex is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault has called a ‘regulatory ideal’. In this sense, then, sex not only functions as a norm, but is part of a regulatory practice that produces (through the repetition or iteration of a norm which is without origin) the bodies it governs, that is, whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce - demarcate, circulate, differentiate - the bodies it controls…’ ‘sex’ is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time. (Butler, 1993:1) 性从一开始就是规范性的；它是福柯所说的 "规范理想"。从这个意义上说，性不仅是一种规范，而且是一种监管实践的一部分，这种监管实践（通过重复或迭代一种没有起源的规范）生产出它所监管的身体，也就是说，它的监管力量被明确为一种生产力量，一种生产它所控制的身体--划界、流通、区分--的力量......'性'是一种理想的建构，它通过时间被强行具体化。(巴特勒，1993:1）
Materialization here is rethought as an effect of power. The view that the subject is produced in the course of its materialization is strongly grounded in a performative theory of language and the subject, but performativity is shorn of its associations with volition, choice and intentionality and (against some of the misreadings of Gender Trouble) re-read ‘not as the act by which a subject brings into being what she/he names 在这里，物化被重新视为权力的效果。主体在物化过程中被生产出来的观点，深深植根于语言和主体的表演理论，但表演性被剥离了与意志、选择和意向性的联系，（与《性别困扰》中的一些误读相反）被重新解读为 "不是主体将她/他所命名的东西变成现实的行为"。
but rather as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler, 1993: 2). 而是话语产生其所规范和制约的现象的反复力量"（Butler, 1993: 2）。
The decisive shift, from the viewpoint of the argument being developed here, however, is ‘a linking of this process of “assuming” a sex with the question of identification, and with the discursive means by which the heterosexual imperative enables certain sexed identifications and forecloses and/or disavows other identifications’ (Butler, 1993:5). This centring of the question of identification, together with the problematic of the subject which ‘assumes a sex’, opens up a critical and reflexive dialogue in Butler’s work between Foucault and psychoanalysis which is enormously productive. It is true that Butler does not provide an elaborate theoretical meta-argument for the way the two perspectives, or the relation between the discursive and the psychic, are ‘thought’ together in her text beyond a suggestive indication: There may be a way to subject psychoanalysis to a Foucauldian redescription even as Foucault himself refused that possibility.’ At any rate 然而，从本文论证的角度来看，决定性的转变是 "将这种'假定'性别的过程与身份认同问题联系起来，并与异性恋要求促成某些性别认同、排除和/或否认其他认同的话语手段联系起来"（巴特勒，1993:5）。这种以身份认同为中心的问题，加上 "假定性别 "的主体问题，在巴特勒的作品中开启了福柯与精神分析之间的批判性和反思性对话，这种对话极富成效。诚然，巴特勒并没有提供详尽的理论元论证来说明这两种视角或话语与精神之间的关系是如何在她的文本中被 "思考 "在一起的，她只是暗示性地指出了这一点：或许有一种方法可以让精神分析接受福柯式的重新描述，即使福柯本人拒绝了这种可能性。无论如何
this text accepts as a point of departure Foucault’s notion that regulatory power produces the subjects it controls, that power is not only imposed externally but works as the regulatory and normative means by which subjects are formed. The return to psychoanalysis, then, is guided by the question of how certain regulatory norms form a ‘sexed’ subject in terms that establish the indistinguishability of psychic and bodily formation. (1993:23) 这篇文章的出发点是福柯的概念，即监管权力产生了它所控制的主体，权力不仅是外部强加的，而且是形成主体的监管和规范手段。因此，回归精神分析的出发点是，某些监管规范是如何形成 "性别化 "主体的，从而确立了心理和身体形成的不可分性。(1993:23)
However, Butler’s relevance to the argument is made all the more pertinent because it is developed in the context of the discussion of gender and sexuality, framed by feminism, and so is directly recurrent both to the questions of identity and identity politics, and to the questions which Avtar Brah’s work posed earlier about the paradigmatic function of sexual difference in relation to other axes of exclusion. Here Butler makes a powerful case that all identities operate through exclusion, through the discursive construction of a constitutive outside and the production of abjected and marginalized subjects, apparently outside the field of the symbolic, the representable - ‘the production of an “outside”, a domain of intelligible effects’ (1993:22) - which then returns to trouble and unsettle the foreclosures which we prematurely call ‘identities’. She deploys this argument with effect in relation to the sexualizing and the racializing of the subject - an argument which requires to be developed if the constitution of subjects in and through the normalizing regulatory effects of racial discourse is to acquire the theoretical development hitherto reserved for gender and sexuality (though, of course, her most well-worked example is in relation to the production of these forms of sexual abjection and lived unintelligibility usually ‘normalized’ as pathological or perverse). 然而，巴特勒的论证更加贴切，因为它是在以女权主义为框架的性别与性讨论背景下展开的，因此与身份和身份政治问题，以及阿夫塔-布拉赫（Avtar Brah）早先提出的关于性差异与其他排斥轴相关的范式功能的问题直接相关。在这里，巴特勒有力地证明了所有身份认同都是通过排斥来运作的，是通过对构成性外部的话语建构以及被排斥和边缘化主体的产生来运作的，这些主体显然处于象征性和可表征性领域之外--"一个'外部'的产生，一个可理解效果的领域"（1993:22）--然后，这些主体又会给我们过早地称之为 "身份认同 "的预设带来麻烦和不安。她将这一论点有效地运用于主体的性化和种族化--如果主体在种族话语的正常化规范效应中的构成以及通过种族话语的正常化规范效应的构成要获得迄今为止为性别和性保留的理论发展，那么这一论点就需要得到发展（当然，她最成功的例子是关于这些形式的性排斥和生活不可理解性的产生，通常被 "正常化 "为病态或反常）。
As James Souter (1995) has pointed out, ‘Butler’s internal critique of feminist identity politics and its foundationalist premises questions the adequacy of a representational politics whose basis is the presumed universality and unity of its subject - a seamless category of women.’ 正如詹姆斯-苏特（James Souter，1995 年）所指出的，"巴特勒对女性主义身份政治及其基础主义前提的内部批判，质疑了一种代表政治的适当性，这种政治的基础是其主体--一个无缝的女性类别--的假定普遍性和统一性。
Paradoxically, as in all other identities treated politically in a foundational manner, this identity ‘is based on excluding “different” women . . . and by normatively prioritizing heterosexual relations as the basis for feminist politics’. This ‘unity’, Souter argues, is a ‘fictive unity’, ‘produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought’. Significantly, however, as Souter also argues, this does not lead Butler to argue that all notions of identity should therefore be abandoned because they are theoretically flawed. Indeed, she takes the speculary structure of identification as a critical part of her argument. But she acknowledges that such an argument does suggest 'the necessary limits of identity politics: 自相矛盾的是，与所有其他以基础方式进行政治处理的身份一样，这种身份 "是建立在排斥'不同'女性......以及将异性关系作为女权政治基础的规范性优先地位的基础之上的"。苏特认为，这种 "统一性 "是一种 "虚构的统一性"，"是由权力结构产生和制约的，而解放正是通过权力结构来实现的"。然而，值得注意的是，正如索特也认为的那样，这并没有导致巴特勒认为所有的身份概念都应该放弃，因为它们在理论上是有缺陷的。事实上，她将身份认同的似是而非的结构作为其论证的关键部分。但她承认，这样的论证确实表明了 "身份政治的必要限制"：
In this sense, identifications belong to the imaginary; they are phantasmatic efforts of alignment, loyalty, ambiguous and cross-corporeal cohabitations, they unsettle the I; hey are the sedimentation of the ‘we’ in the constitution of any I, the structuring present of alterity in the very formulation of the I. Identifications are never fully and finally made; they are incessantly reconstituted, and, as such, are subject to the volatile logic of iterability. They are that which is constantly marshalled, consolidated, retrenched, contested and, on occasion, compelled to give way. (1993:105) 从这个意义上说，身份认同属于想象；它们是对齐、忠诚、暧昧和跨肉体同居的幻象努力，它们扰乱了 "我"；它们是 "我们 "在任何 "我 "的构成中的沉淀，是 "我 "的表述中改变性的结构性存在。身份认同永远不会完全和最终完成；它们不断重组，因此，受制于反复无常的逻辑。它们是不断被调集、巩固、重组、争论的，有时甚至是被迫让步的。(1993:105)
The effort, now, to think the question of the distinctiveness of the logic within which the racialized and ethnicized body is constituted discursively, through the regulatory normative ideal of a ‘compulsive Eurocentrism’ (for want of a different word), cannot be simply grafted on to the arguments briefly sketched above. But they have received an enormous and original impetus from this tangled and unconcluded argument, which demonstrates beyond the shadow of a doubt that the question, and the theorization, of identity is a matter of considerable political significance, and is only likely to be advanced when both the necessity and the ‘impossibility’ of identities, and the suturing of the psychic and the discursive in their constitution, are fully and unambiguously acknowledged. 现在，通过 "强制性欧洲中心主义"（为避免用另一个词）的规范性理想来思考种族化和民族化的身体在话语上构成的逻辑的独特性问题，这种努力不能简单地嫁接到上述简要概述的论点上。但这些论点却从这一纠缠不清、尚未终结的论证中获得了巨大的原创性推动力，毫无疑问地证明了身份问题和身份理论化是一个具有重大政治意义的问题，只有当身份的必要性和 "不可能性"，以及在其构成过程中心理和话语的缝合都得到充分和明确的承认时，身份问题和身份理论化才有可能得到推进。
References 参考资料
Althuser. L. (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and Oher Essuys, London: New Left Books Barrett, M (1991) The Poltics of Truh, Cambridge: Polity Althuser.L. (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and Oher Essuys, London：Barrett, M (1991) The Poltics of Truh, Cambridge：Polity
Bhabha, F. (1994) ‘The Other Question’, in The Location OI Culture, London: Routledge. Bhabha, F. (1994) 'The Other Question', in The Location OI Culture, London：Routledge.
Brah, A. (1992) Difference, diversity and alferentiation’, in J. Donald and A. Rattansi (eds) Rroe, Culturent Differte, London: Sage (126-45). Brah, A. (1992) Difference, diversity and alferentiation', in J. Donald and A. Rattansi (eds) Rroe, Culturent Differte, London: Sage (126-45).
Drown, B. and Cousins, M. (1980) The linguistic fault’, Economy and Socty, 9(3) Drown, B. and Cousins, M. (1980) The linguistic fault', Economy and Socty, 9(3)
Butler. I. (1990) Getder Trowhle, London: Routledge. Butler.I. (1990) Getder Trowhle, London：Routledge.
Buther. I. (1993) Beties Thui Mather, London: Routledge. Buther.I. (1993) Beties Thui Mather, London：Routledge.
Derrida, I. (1981) Postions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Derrida, I. (1981) Postions, Chicago：芝加哥大学出版社。
Foucault, M. (1970) The Order of Things, London: Tavistock Foucault, M. (1970) The Order of Things, London：塔维斯托克
Foucault, M. (1972) The Achatogy of Kwomedge, London: Tavistock. Foucault, M. (1972) The Achatogy of Kwomedge, London：Tavistock.
Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Pumil, Hamondsworth Penguin Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Pumil, Hamondsworth Penguin.
Foucault, M. (1981) The History of Sexulty Vime 1, Harmondsworth. Penguin. Foucault, M. (1981) The History of Sexulty Vime 1, Harmondsworth.企鹅出版社。
Foncalt, M. (1987) The Use of Pleasure, Harmondswoth. Penguin Foncalt, M. (1987) The Use of Pleasure, Harmondswoth.企鹅出版社
Foncault, M. (1988) The Care of he Self Hamondsworth: Penguin. Foncault, M. (1988) The Care of he Self Hamondsworth：企鹅出版社。
Foucault, M. (1984) ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucaull Reader, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Foucault, M. (1984) 'Nietzsche, genealogy, history', in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucaull Reader, Harmondsworth：企鹅出版社。
Freud, S (1921/1991) Group psychology and the antalysis of the ego, in Civilation, Soctely and Religion, Vol. 12 Seleted Works, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Freud, S (1921/1991) Group psychology and the antalysis of the ego, in Civilation, Soctely and Religion, Vol. 12 Seleted Works, Harmondsworth：企鹅出版社。
Giloy, P. (1994) The Black Allanic: Modemiy and Dowble Consciousuess, London: Verso. Hall, SS. (1985) ‘Signification, representation and ideology: Althusser and the poststructuralist debates’. Critical Shaties in Mass Commumotion, 2(2). Giloy, P. (1994) The Black Allanic：Modemiy and Dowble Consciousuess》，伦敦：Verso.Hall， SS .(1985) 'Signification, representation and ideology：Althusser and the poststructuralist debates'.Critical Shaties in Mass Commumotion, 2(2).
Hall, S. (1990) ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’, in 1. Rutherford (ed.), Identity, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Hall, S. (1990) 'Cultural identity and diaspora', in 1.Rutherford (ed.), Identity, London：Lawrence & Wishart.
Hall, S. (1993) ‘Cultural identity in question’, in S. Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew (eds), Modemityand its Fitures, Cambridge: Polity. Hall, S. (1993) 'Cultural identity in question', in S. Hall, D. Held and T. McGrew (eds), Modemityand its Fitures, Cambridge：Polity.
Hall, S. (1995) Fantasy, identity, politics, in E. Carter, J. Donald and J. Squites (eds), Culnul Remix: Theories of Politics and the Popular, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Hall, S. (1995) Fantasy, identity, politics, in E. Carter, J. Donald and J. Squites (eds), Culnul Remix：Theories of Politics and the Popular, London：Lawrence & Wishart.
Hall, S. (1996) ‘When was the post-colonial?’, in L. Curti and 1. Chambers (eds), The Post-Colontal in Question, London: Routledge Hall, S. (1996) 'When was the post-colonial?', in L. Curti and 1. Chambers (eds), The Post-Colontal in Question, London：Routledge
Heath, S. (1981) Questions of Cinenn, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Heath, S. (1981) Questions of Cinenn, Basingstoke：Macmillan.
Hirst, P. (1979) On Lawnd Ldeology, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Hirst, P. (1979) On Lawnd Ldeology, Basingstoke：Macmillan.
Laclau, E. (1990) New Reflections on the Rewhinton of Our Time, London: Verso. Laclau, E. (1990) New Reflections on the Rewhinton of Our Time, London：Verso.
Lacan, I. (1977) Fcrits, London: Tavistock. Lacan, I. (1977) Fcrits, London：Tavistock.
Lacan, I. (1977) The Four Findamental Concepts of Pychomalysis, London: Hogarth Press. Laplanche, I. and Pontalis, J.B. (1985) The Languge of Pychonalysis, London: Hogarth Press. Lacan, I. (1977) The Four Findamental Concepts of Pychomalysis, London: Hogarth Press.Laplanche, I. and Pontalis, J.B. (1985) The Languge of Pychonalysis, London: Hogarth Press.
McNay, L. (1994) Foucull: A Chital Intwaluction, Cambridge: Polity Press. McNay, L. (1994) Foucull：A Chital Intwaluction, Cambridge：Polity Press.
Osbome, P. (1995) The Politics of Time, London; Verso.
Rose, J. (1986) Sevulty in the Field of Vision, London: Verso. Rose, J. (1986) Sevulty in the Field of Vision, London：Verso.
Souter, I. (1995) From Gender Trouble to Bodies That Matier’, unpublished manuscript. Souter, I. (1995) From Gender Trouble to Bodies That Matier', unpublished manuscript.