'Distributed Lethality' “分布式杀伤力”

Force Shift 力移

A shift is now under way within the surface force. It is not subtle, and it is not accidental. The surface force is taking the offensive, to give the operational commander options to employ naval combat power in any anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment. The surface fleet will always defend the high-value and mission-essential units; that is in our core doctrine. However, the emergence of sophisticated sea-denial strategies has driven a need to shift to an offensive imperative to control the seas. Increasing surface-force lethality—particularly in our offensive weapons and the concept of operations for surface action groups (SAGs)—will provide more strike options to joint-force commanders, provide another method to seize the initiative, and add battlespace complexity to an adversary’s calculus.
地面部队内部正在发生转变。这并不微妙，也不是偶然的。水面部队正在采取攻势，为作战指挥官提供在任何反介入/区域拒止（A2/AD）环境中使用海军作战力量的选择。水面舰队将始终保卫高价值和关键任务单位；这是我们的核心原则。然而，复杂的海上拒止战略的出现促使需要转向进攻性控制海洋。提高水面部队杀伤力——特别是我们的进攻性武器和水面行动群（SAG）的作战概念——将为联合部队指挥官提供更多的打击选择，提供另一种夺取主动权的方法，并增加对手作战空间的复杂性。结石。

The objective is to cause the adversary to shift his own defenses to counter our thrusts. He will be forced to allocate critical and limited resources across a larger set of defended targets, thereby improving our operational advantage to exploit adversary forces. This shift is required for several reasons. First, when the Cold War ended, our Navy emerged unchallenged and dominant. No power could match us at sea, and that dominance allowed the Navy to focus on projecting power ashore. The balance between sea control and power projection tipped strongly in favor of the latter, and the surface force evolved accordingly. Our proficiency in land-attack and maritime-security operations reached new heights, while foundational skills in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW) slowly began to erode. During this period, the mindset of our surface warriors slowly transformed from offensive to defensive. The surface force began to shift its expertise to launching Tomahawk missiles from uncontested sanctuaries at sea. If U.S. naval power is to reclaim maritime battlespace dominance in contemporary and future anti-A2/AD environments, the surface Navy must counter rapidly evolving missile, air, submarine, and surface threats that will challenge our ability to sail where we want, when we want.
目的是让对手改变自己的防御来对抗我们的攻击。他将被迫将关键和有限的资源分配给更多的防御目标，从而提高我们利用敌方力量的作战优势。需要这种转变有几个原因。首先，冷战结束后，我们的海军毫无挑战地占据主导地位。在海上没有任何力量可以与我们匹敌，这种主导地位使海军能够专注于向岸上投射力量。制海权与力量投送之间的平衡强烈倾向于后者，水面力量也随之演变。我们对陆地攻击和海上安全行动的熟练程度达到了新的高度，而反潜战（ASW）和反水面战（ASUW）的基础技能则开始慢慢削弱。在这期间，我们地表战士的心态慢慢地从进攻转向了防守。水面部队开始将其专业知识转向从海上无争议的庇护所发射战斧导弹。如果美国海军力量想要在当代和未来的反介入/区域拒止环境中夺回海上战场的主导地位，水面海军就必须应对快速发展的导弹、空中、潜艇和水面威胁，这些威胁将挑战我们在我们想要的地方航行的能力。想。

Second, the shift to the offensive responds to the development of increasingly capable A2/AD weapons and sensors designed specifically to deny U.S. naval forces the freedom of maneuver necessary to project power. This subject has been covered in this journal before, but it is important to remember that as our interests lay thousands of miles from our own coastlines, sea-based power projection is both our main competitive advantage and an absolute necessity to retain influence and to exercise global leadership. Adversaries who counter this advantage diminish the deterrent value of forward-deployed forces and negatively impact the assurances we provide to friends and allies. A shift to the offensive is necessary to “spread the playing field,” providing a more complex targeting problem while creating more favorable conditions to project power where required.
其次，向进攻的转变是对能力日益增强的反介入/区域拒止武器和传感器的发展的回应，这些武器和传感器专门设计用于剥夺美国海军投射力量所需的机动自由。本杂志以前曾讨论过这个主题，但重要的是要记住，由于我们的利益距离我们自己的海岸线有数千英里，海基力量投送既是我们的主要竞争优势，也是保持影响力和发挥作用的绝对必要性。全球领导力。对抗这一优势的对手会削弱前沿部署部队的威慑价值，并对我们向朋友和盟友提供的保证产生负面影响。为了“扩大竞争环境”，有必要转向进攻，提供更复杂的目标定位问题，同时为在需要时投射力量创造更有利的条件。

Third, the shift to offense is pivotal for the surface Navy to reinforce closer integration with the Marine Corps. A more fully integrated Marine Corps–surface force combat team will provide persistent presence that can influence and control events at sea and in the littorals, applying the right capability to the right target for the joint-force commander. Supported by other elements of the joint force, this integrated Navy–Marine Corps striking force will be increasingly called upon to tend to the nation’s security needs around the world.
第三，转向进攻对于水面海军加强与海军陆战队更紧密的融合至关重要。更加全面一体化的海军陆战队-水面部队作战小组将提供持续存在，能够影响和控制海上和沿海地区的事件，为联合部队指挥官将正确的能力应用于正确的目标。在联合部队其他部队的支持下，这支海军-海军陆战队一体化打击部队将越来越多地被要求满足国家在世界各地的安全需求。

Finally, the shift to offense makes the most efficient and effective use of significant investments made in surface-force lethality over the past two decades. These visionary investments were made by planners who recognized that our dominant position was not a birthright, and that challenges to our ability to control the seas were emerging. These investments in enhanced surface-ship lethality create the conditions for a renaissance in surface-force employment and a return to the core competencies of sea control when applied with bold new offensive methods.
最后，转向进攻可以最有效地利用过去二十年来在水面部队杀伤力方面所做的重大投资。这些富有远见的投资是由规划者做出的，他们认识到我们的主导地位并不是与生俱来的权利，而且我们控制海洋的能力正在面临挑战。这些对增强水面舰艇杀伤力的投资为水面部队使用的复兴以及在采用大胆的新进攻方法时恢复制海核心能力创造了条件。

Control ‘Can No Longer Be Assumed’
控制“不能再被假设”

A new emphasis on sea control derives from the simple truth that navies cannot persistently project power from water space they do not control. Nor can navies guarantee the free movement of goods in the face of a power-seeking adversary whose objective is to limit the freedom of the maritime commons within their sphere of influence. Sea control is the necessary precondition for virtually everything else the Navy does, and its provision can no longer be assumed. Threats ranging from low-end piracy to the navies of high-end nation-states pose challenges that we must be prepared to counter—and ultimately defeat.
对海洋控制的新重视源自一个简单的事实：海军无法持续从他们无法控制的水域投射力量。面对追求权力的对手，海军也无法保证货物的自由流动，而对手的目标是限制其势力范围内海洋公地的自由。制海权是海军几乎所有其他工作的必要先决条件，而其提供已不再是假设的。从低端海盗到高端民族国家海军的威胁构成了我们必须做好应对并最终战胜的挑战。

Sea control does not mean command of all the seas, all the time. Rather, it is the capability and capacity to impose localized sea control when and where it is required to enable other objectives to be met, holding it as long as is necessary to accomplish those objectives. We must begin to treat expanses of ocean the way we viewed islands during World War II—as areas to be seized for conducting follow-on power-projection operations. Additionally, we should recognize that the enemy gets a vote, and that all of the elements of the Navy’s Fleet architecture are unlikely to be available when the shooting starts. The day-to-day persistence of the surface force means that it must be prepared to immediately go on the offensive in order to create conditions for the success of follow-on forces.
制海权并不意味着始终控制所有海域。相反，它是在需要的时间和地点实施局部海上控制以实现其他目标的能力和能力，并在实现这些目标所需的时间内保持这种控制。我们必须开始像二战期间对待岛屿那样对待广阔的海洋——将其视为进行后续力量投射行动的夺取地区。此外，我们应该认识到，敌人获得了投票权，并且海军舰队架构的所有要素在射击开始时不太可能可用。水面部队的日常坚持意味着必须做好立即发起进攻的准备，为后续部队的成功创造条件。

The enablers for this shift to the offensive are an array of existing platforms and capabilities, planned capabilities in various stages of acquisition, and future capabilities resident in today’s promising research-and-development programs. Employing the concept of “distributed lethality,” the surface force—through innovation, emerging command-and-control concepts, and an increased ability to operate within an acceptable margin of risk—will flexibly adapt to future maritime operations, exploiting seized areas of localized sea control to generate larger combat effects.
这种向进攻性转变的推动因素是一系列现有平台和能力、不同采购阶段的计划能力以及当今有前途的研发计划中存在的未来能力。采用“分布式杀伤力”的概念，水面部队通过创新、新兴的指挥控制概念以及在可接受的风险范围内提高作战能力，将灵活地适应未来的海上作战，利用占领的局部地区制海权产生更大的战斗效果。

Distributed lethality is the condition gained by increasing the offensive power of individual components of the surface force (cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships [LCSs], amphibious ships, and logistics ships) and then employing them in dispersed offensive formations known as “hunter-killer SAGs.” It is the motive force behind offensive sea control. Both parts of the definition are critical; raising the lethality of the force but operating it the same way sub-optimizes the investment. Operating hunter-killer SAGs without a resulting increase in offensive power creates unacceptable risk.
分布式杀伤力是通过增加水面部队各个组成部分（巡洋舰、驱逐舰、濒海战斗舰[LCS]、两栖舰和后勤舰）的攻击力，然后将它们部署在被称为“猎手”的分散进攻编队中而获得的条件。杀手 SAG。”它是进攻性制海权背后的动力。定义的两部分都很重要；提高部队的杀伤力，但以同样的方式操作它，次优化了投资。在不增加攻击力的情况下使用猎杀型 SAG 会带来不可接受的风险。

Hunter-killer SAGs seize maritime-operations areas for subsequent activities (including power projection), perform screening operations for larger formations, and hold adversary land targets at risk. Additionally, by distributing power across a larger number of more geographically spaced units, adversary targeting is complicated and attack density is diluted. Hunter-killer SAGS are capable of defending themselves against air and missile attack, and extend that protection to expeditionary forces conducting offensive operations of their own. These hunter-killer SAGs will be networked and integrated to support complex operations even when not supported by the carrier air wing and land-based patrol aircraft.
猎杀型作战部队夺取海上作战区域以进行后续活动（包括力量投送），对较大编队进行掩护行动，并将敌方陆地目标置于危险之中。此外，通过将力量分配给大量地理上分布较远的单位，对手的目标变得复杂，攻击密度也被稀释。猎杀型 SAGS 能够防御空中和导弹攻击，并将这种保护扩展到自己进行进攻行动的远征部队。这些猎杀型 SAG 将进行联网和集成，以支持复杂的行动，即使没有舰载机联队和陆基巡逻机的支持。

A Hunter-Killer Hypothetical
猎人-杀手的假设

As an example, let us move ahead to the late 2020s and consider a scenario that emphasizes close Navy–Marine Corps integration: A hunter-killer SAG consisting of an LCS (ASW module), a Flight III Arleigh Burke–class destroyer, and a Zumwalt-class destroyer are ordered to deploy to the vicinity of a small, abandoned island with an airfield that the joint force’s maritime-component commander plans to seize and use as a temporary expeditionary-operations base for six Marine Corps F-35Bs.
举个例子，让我们展望 2020 年代末，考虑一个强调海军与海军陆战队紧密整合的场景：由一艘濒海战斗舰（反潜战模块）、一艘 Flight III 阿利伯克级驱逐舰和一艘组成的猎杀型 SAG。朱姆沃尔特级驱逐舰奉命部署到一个废弃小岛附近，该岛有一个机场，联合部队海上部队指挥官计划占领该岛并将其用作六架海军陆战队 F-35B 的临时远征作战基地。

While no troops are defending the island, the adversary is expected to use a multilayered area-denial strategy with a three-ship antisurface-warfare SAG and several fast patrol vessels conducting operations approximately 80 miles north. Additionally, an enemy diesel submarine was located 24 hours ago, 120 miles north. The U.S. hunter-killer SAG’s mission is to place itself between the adversary and the island and conduct reconnaissance of the island, while also locating, targeting, and neutralizing adversary surface and subsurface forces in the area; and destroy any enemy attempt to garrison the airfield before the arrival of the Marine F-35Bs. Once those aircraft begin operations, the SAG will be required to provide for their defense from the sea.
虽然没有军队保卫该岛，但预计对手将采用多层区域拒止战略，由三艘反水面战 SAG 和几艘快速巡逻舰在以北约 80 英里处执行任务。此外，24 小时前，一艘敌方柴油潜艇位于北边 120 英里处。美国猎杀型SAG的任务是部署在敌方和岛屿之间并对岛屿进行侦察，同时定位、瞄准并压制该地区的敌方水面和地下部队；并在海军陆战队 F-35B 抵达之前摧毁任何试图驻守机场的敌人。一旦这些飞机开始运行，美国空军司令部将需要为其提供海上防御。

To provide integrated air and missile defense, the Burke destroyer, employing her AMDR (air- and missile-defense radar), will conduct traditional area antiair-warfare missions against advanced manned and unmanned threats, while simultaneously providing ballistic-missile-defense support.
为了提供综合防空和导弹防御，伯克级驱逐舰将采用AMDR（防空和导弹防御雷达），针对先进的有人和无人威胁执行传统的区域防空任务，同时提供弹道导弹防御支持。

Quick-reaction strikes ashore in the event of adversary special-operations-forces insertion (or other forward elements of an adversary garrisoning operation) will come from the advanced gun system on the Zumwalt destroyer. Overhead sensing from organic unmanned aerial-surveillance (UAS) platforms will be crucial for maintaining situational awareness and providing island surveillance, and for over-the-horizon targeting of the adversary SAG. Additionally, the UAS can provide precise targeting to the Zumwalt destroyer to eradicate or neutralize enemy targets across the breadth of the 25-by-12-mile island.
如果敌方特种作战部队介入（或敌方驻防行动的其他前沿部队），朱姆沃尔特号驱逐舰上的先进火炮系统将进行快速反应的岸上打击。建制无人机监视 (UAS) 平台的头顶传感对于维持态势感知、提供岛屿监视以及对敌方 SAG 进行超视距瞄准至关重要。此外，无人机系统还可以为朱姆沃尔特驱逐舰提供精确瞄准，以消灭或消灭整个 25 x 12 英里岛屿上的敌方目标。

Each of the ships in the hunter-killer SAG will employ long-range offensive ASUW missiles against the enemy SAG and fast patrol vessels, an operational necessity in dispersed operations often far from air-wing support. These missiles will represent a dramatic improvement in range, lethality, and survivability over existing Fleet assets, and they will be more broadly employed across the force.
猎杀型 SAG 中的每艘舰艇都将使用远程进攻型反潜导弹攻击敌方 SAG 和快速巡逻舰，这是在通常远离空军联队支援的分散作战中的必要条件。这些导弹将比现有的舰队资产在射程、杀伤力和生存能力方面得到显着提高，并且将在整个部队中得到更广泛的使用。

All three ships have considerable ASW capability, with the Zumwalt’s SQQ 90 system optimized for above-the-layer active sonar operations, the LCS’a ASW mission module packing considerable capability below-the-layer, and the Burke’s sonar suite adept throughout the water column. All three combatants are capable of carrying ASW aircraft such as the MH-60R Seahwawk helicopter, and unmanned airborne systems such as the MQ-8 Fire Scout for surveillance.
所有三艘船都具有相当大的反潜能力，其中朱姆沃尔特号的SQQ 90系统针对层上主动声纳操作进行了优化，濒海战斗舰的反潜任务模块具有相当大的层下能力，而伯克号的声纳套件擅长在整个水域柱子。所有三架战斗机都能够携带 MH-60R Seahwawk 直升机等反潜飞机，以及用于监视的 MQ-8 Fire Scout 等无人机系统。

The hunter-killer SAG just described is capable of the following: targeting and destroying the enemy SAG and fast patrol vessels; identifying and destroying fleeting land targets ashore; identifying and destroying air and missile threats to the expeditionary air operation; providing wide-area air surveillance; and locating and destroying enemy submarine threats. It could do this while supported by either carrier- or land-based aircraft, but it would not require this support to accomplish its mission. Every capability described is either in the force or in a budgeted acquisition program. This combination of increasingly lethal surface forces with the F-35B-configured amphibious force creates a significant threat to adversary forward-operating bases and creates additional planning and targeting problems for the adversary.
刚才描述的猎杀型SAG具有以下能力：瞄准并摧毁敌方SAG和快速巡逻舰；识别并摧毁岸上短暂的陆地目标；识别并摧毁对远征空中行动的空中和导弹威胁；提供广域空中监视；定位并摧毁敌方潜艇威胁。它可以在舰载机或陆基飞机的支持下做到这一点，但它不需要这种支持来完成其任务。所描述的每项能力要么在部队中，要么在预算采购计划中。日益致命的水面部队与 F-35B 配置的两栖部队的结合对敌方前沿作战基地构成了重大威胁，并给敌方带来了额外的规划和瞄准问题。

In addition to adding offensive punch to traditional cruiser/destroyer platforms, consideration should be given to applying the principles of distributed lethality and sea control to the amphibious force as well. There is a strong argument to add offensive capability to the amphibious fleet, creating within it yet another planning nightmare for an adversary, who would face expeditionary forces packing organic offensive surface-to-surface missiles and land-attack capabilities. Adding offensive firepower to the amphibious force does not relieve the surface force from its role of protection, nor does it mean that the primary mission of those ships—projecting Marine Corps power ashore—must be compromised. It does mean, however, that we should think differently about these ships and consider the power of adding additional capability to them.
除了在传统巡洋舰/驱逐舰平台上增加进攻性打击外，还应考虑将分布式杀伤和制海原则应用于两栖部队。有充分的理由认为，要增加两栖舰队的进攻能力，这会给对手带来另一个规划噩梦，因为对手将面临拥有进攻性地对地导弹和陆地攻击能力的远征军。为两栖部队增加进攻性火力并不能解除水面部队的保护作用，也不意味着这些舰艇的主要任务——向岸上投射海军陆战队力量——必须受到损害。然而，这确实意味着我们应该以不同的方式思考这些船只，并考虑为其增加额外功能的力量。

Value-Adds to the Lethality Mix
杀伤力组合的增值

The fact that the platforms and capabilities in the previous vignette are already considered does not preclude the need for additional capability. (Only three Zumwalts, for example, are slated to be constructed.) Several enablers of distributed lethality are worthwhile and should be closely analyzed and/or accelerated. These include:
事实上，前面的小插图中的平台和功能已经被考虑，但这并不排除对额外功能的需求。 （例如，仅计划建造三架朱姆沃尔特。）分布式杀伤力的几个推动因素是值得的，应该仔细分析和/或加速。这些包括：

Offensive surface-to-surface missile. We are working closely with naval aviation on a common approach for long-range surface-to-surface missiles for the surface fleet. We have tested a proof-of-concept for a medium-range surface-to-surface missile for employment from virtually any vessel via a “bolt-on” launcher or one that is fully integrated into the ship’s existing combat system. It is becoming increasingly obvious that we should accelerate this capability insertion.
进攻性地对地导弹。我们正在与海军航空兵密切合作，为水面舰队制定远程地对地导弹的共同方案。我们已经测试了一种中程地对地导弹的概念验证，该导弹可以通过“螺栓固定”发射器或完全集成到舰艇现有战斗系统中的发射器在几乎任何船只上使用。越来越明显的是，我们应该加快这种能力的插入。

Low-cost medium-range strike weapon. Considering the Zumwalt and her ability to strike targets ashore, we are left with an option that extends to the vicinity of 60 nautical miles (the advanced gun system) or an option that extends to nearly 1,000 nm (the Tomahawk and its eventual replacement). We must be able to rapidly engage targets ashore with a medium-range, economical strike weapon that can be employed from existing launchers and be backfit throughout the Fleet, especially into the amphibious force.
低成本中程打击武器。考虑到朱姆沃尔特号及其打击岸上目标的能力，我们可以选择延伸到 60 海里附近（先进的火炮系统）或延伸到近 1,000 海里（战斧及其最终替代品）的选择。我们必须能够使用中程、经济的打击武器快速打击岸上目标，这种武器可以从现有的发射器上使用，并可以在整个舰队中安装，特别是安装到两栖部队中。

Long-range ASW weapon. Our hunter-killer SAGs must be equipped with a weapon that can help mitigate the advantage a cruise missile–equipped submarine could have against our forces. While air-dropped torpedoes from organic LAMPS helicopters are the high-probability-of-kill weapon in the SAG, a weapon that can put the submarine on the defensive from ranges of approximately 50 nm or greater would be crucial to SAG survivability during helicopter’s transit to datum (or when organic air isn’t available). Therefore, we are looking at alternative ways to fire a torpedo from a launcher similar to legacy ASROC Mk-116 or using current MK-41 launchers.
远程反潜武器。我们的猎杀型 SAG 必须配备能够帮助削弱配备巡航导弹的潜艇对抗我们部队的优势的武器。虽然从建制 LAMPS 直升机空投鱼雷是 SAG 中的高概率杀伤武器，但能够在约 50 海里或更远的范围内使潜艇处于防御状态的武器对于 SAG 在直升机过境期间的生存能力至关重要至基准（或当有机空气不可用时）。因此，我们正在寻找从类似于传统 ASROC Mk-116 的发射器或使用当前 MK-41 发射器发射鱼雷的替代方法。

Railgun. The 78 megawatts of power created in the Zumwalt plant create the perfect home for the railgun, a capability that will not only increase lethality against shore targets but will also present a game-changing, cost-effective ballistic- and cruise-missile defense weapon. Operating in tandem with a Flight III Burke, a railgun-equipped Zumwalt could hurl fragmenting rounds into the path of incoming missiles, creating a “wall of flak” into which the missile would fly, destroying or disabling it. Such a fragmenting round would be considerably less expensive than large guided missiles that currently comprise our kinetic response to missile attacks.
轨道炮。朱姆沃尔特工厂产生的 78 兆瓦电力为轨道炮创造了完美的家园，这种能力不仅可以提高对海岸目标的杀伤力，而且还可以提供一种改变游戏规则、具有成本效益的弹道导弹和巡航导弹防御武器。配备轨道炮的朱姆沃尔特与Flight III Burke配合使用，可以将破片弹投掷到来袭导弹的路径上，形成一道“高射墙”，导弹飞入其中，将其摧毁或瘫痪。这种破片弹将比目前构成我们对导弹攻击的动能反应的大型制导导弹便宜得多。

Persistent organic airborne intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance and data relay. An important aspect of distributed lethality is the ability to confidently conduct dispersed operations apart from centralized command-and-control networks. Local combat-information networks are essential to achieving localized battlespace awareness. Those networks need to be more capable than those existing today and must be persistent in a satellite-denied or jamming-intensive environment. Whether current vertical-takeoff unmanned aerial systems have the persistence necessary to support dispersed offensive operations remains to be seen, but the potential for them to augment networking and information-sharing should be examined. The ability of hunter-killer SAGs to launch and recover fixed-wing or partially fixed-wing UAVs will be pivotal to employing UAVs in this role.
持续有机机载情报/监视/侦察和数据中继。分布式杀伤力的一个重要方面是能够在集中式指挥和控制网络之外自信地进行分散行动。局部作战信息网络对于实现局部战场空间感知至关重要。这些网络需要比当今现有的网络更强大，并且必须能够在卫星无法接收或干扰密集的环境中持续存在。目前的垂直起飞无人机系统是否具有支持分散进攻行动所需的持久性还有待观察，但应研究它们增强网络和信息共享的潜力。猎杀型 SAG 发射和回收固定翼或部分固定翼无人机的能力对于使用无人机执行此任务至关重要。

Command and control. Our hunter-killer SAGs must be equipped with detect-to-engage sensors, electronic-emission systems, and communications and networked systems that assure the passage of critical friendly force, battlespace shipping, and combat orders as part of the larger role of building battlespace awareness and achieving the effects of distributed lethality. We anticipate the electromagnetic spectrum to be challenged as a part of an adversary’s A2/AD tactics. Where we do not have equipment to counter and continue networking in such an environment, we must field such as part of the development of our next generation of ships and backfit that capability to existing ships. In a similar vein, of course, is the cyber realm, emerging as the newest and, in many ways most dynamic and daunting, levels of the battlespace—one that the surface Navy, not to mention the U.S. military at large—must get out in front of, as our potential adversaries are most certainly trying to do.
命令与控制。我们的猎杀型 SAG 必须配备探测交战传感器、电子发射系统以及通信和网络系统，以确保关键友军的通行、战场运输和作战命令，作为构建战场的更大作用的一部分意识并实现分布式杀伤力的效果。我们预计电磁频谱将作为对手反介入/区域拒止策略的一部分而受到挑战。如果我们没有设备来应对这种环境并继续联网，我们必须将其作为下一代船舶开发的一部分，并将这种能力重新安装到现有船舶上。当然，与此类似的是网络领域，它作为最新的、在许多方面最具活力和令人畏惧的战场空间层次而出现——水面海军，更不用说整个美国军队，必须摆脱这个层次。正如我们的潜在对手肯定正在尝试做的那样。

When discussing all these various new platforms and distributed-lethality delivery systems, one rightly asks: What about the training that must arise concomitantly with the new hardware? The answer should be self-evident: With each add-on to the surface force’s distributed-lethality mix, manning and training issues will be a factor; without due diligence and requisite outlay in the training component, up front and at the outset, the most powerful innovations would be rendered moot.
在讨论所有这些不同的新平台和分布式杀伤力输送系统时，人们正确地问：与新硬件一起必须进行的培训怎么样？答案应该是不言而喻的：随着水面部队分布式杀伤力组合的每一个增加，人员配备和训练问题都将成为一个因素；如果从一开始就没有在培训部分进行尽职调查和必要的支出，最强大的创新就会变得毫无意义。

‘The Most Effective and Efficient Method’
“最有效、最高效的方法”

Distributed lethality combines more powerful ships with innovative methods of employing them. It capitalizes on the inherent advantages of surface forces (mobility and persistence) to provide meaningful deterrents to adversary aggression and immediately available warfighting options should deterrence fail. The more capable platforms the adversary has to account for, the more thinly distributed his surveillance assets will be and the more diluted will his attack densities become. The more distributed our combat power becomes, the more targets we hold at risk and the higher the costs of defense to the adversary.
分布式杀伤力将更强大的舰艇与创新的使用方法结合起来。它利用水面部队的固有优势（机动性和持久性）对对手的侵略提供有意义的威慑，并在威慑失败时立即提供作战选择。对手必须考虑的平台能力越强，他的监视资产分布就越稀疏，他的攻击密度就越薄弱。我们的战斗力越分散，我们面临的危险目标就越多，对手的防御成本就越高。

This is a relatively simple, yet powerful idea. By applying the principles of distributed lethality, the surface force can help sustain and extend America’s competitive advantage in power projection against a growing set of sea-denial capabilities. Distributed lethality is the most effective and efficient method of capitalizing on the Fleet we have today and the one planned for the immediate future. There are no leaps of technology required, no massive funding increases necessary, and no increase in the number of ships needed to implement it. We simply need to make better use of the ships we have today, and think differently about how we equip and employ them.
这是一个相对简单但功能强大的想法。通过应用分布式杀伤力原则，水面部队可以帮助维持和扩大美国在力量投送方面的竞争优势，以应对日益增长的海上拒止能力。分布式杀伤力是利用我们现有的舰队和近期计划的舰队的最有效和高效的方法。不需要技术的飞跃，不需要大量增加资金，也不需要增加实施它所需的船舶数量。我们只需要更好地利用我们今天拥有的船只，并以不同的方式思考我们如何装备和使用它们。

What is needed is will—the fortitude to recognize that we have to change the way we currently operate. We must display the courage necessary to move forward, to question established concepts and methods, to take risks, and to learn from our mistakes. We will have to experiment with and refine emerging concepts, and we will have to become more comfortable with autonomous operations across vast distances. The risks are worth it, however. A more widely postured and more uniformly lethal surface force will play a significant role in maintaining the United States’ position as the dominant naval power, something from which the world has benefited handsomely for more than seven decades.
我们需要的是意志——承认我们必须改变目前运作方式的毅力。我们必须表现出前进所必需的勇气，质疑既定的概念和方法，承担风险，并从错误中吸取教训。我们必须试验和完善新兴概念，并且必须更加适应远距离的自主操作。然而，这些风险是值得的。一支部署范围更广、杀伤力更强的水面部队将在维持美国海军主导地位方面发挥重要作用，七十多年来，世界已从中受益匪浅。