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Emissions trading in China: New political economy dynamics

Zexiang Wang | Jouni Paavola
王澤翔 | Jouni Paavola

School of International Relations, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangdong, China
School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

Correspondence 通信

Zexiang Wang, School of International Relations, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangdong, China.
Email: wangzexiang88@gmail.com; mlzw@
電子郵件:wangzexiang88@gmail.com; mlzw@

Funding information 資金資訊

Economic and Social Research Council, Grant/Award Number: ES/K006576/1; Climate Research Bursary Fund; Priestley International Centre for Climate in Leeds

Abstract 摘要

China has pledged to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and to become carbon neutral by 2060 . Achieving the targets would need great improvement of its emissions trading scheme (ETS) that covers half of the country's emissions. Lessons from the European Union have shown that the ETS is not only a product of the changing circumstances, but its implementation and revisions are also continuously affected by the evolving context. Using a political economy perspective, we examine whether the changing environment is also affecting China's ETS. Our analysis centres on two recent contextual dynamics with relevance to the ETS: (1) the change in the ETS authority in 2018; and (2) the impacts of the deteriorating economic environment on the climate-energy policy complex. We find that China's ETS and its broad climate ambitions are still constrained by the tensions between the long-term socioeconomic benefits of low-carbon policies and the short-term economic interests behind the government's policy motives, which led to conflicting interests and priorities among regulatory agencies and local governments. The analysis contributes to the political economy debates on emissions trading and China's environmental governance. It also provides practical insights to the policymakers with an in-depth inquiry into the structural barriers to China's net-zero targets.
中國已承諾在 2030 年實現碳排放峰值,並在 2060 年實現碳中和。要實現這些目標,需要大幅改進覆蓋該國一半排放量的排放交易計劃(ETS)。歐盟的經驗表明,ETS 不僅是環境變化的產物,其實施和修訂也不斷受到不斷變化的背景影響。從政治經濟學的角度出發,我們檢視了環境變化是否也在影響中國的 ETS。我們的分析集中在兩個與 ETS 相關的最近情境動態上:(1)2018 年 ETS 權威的變化;以及(2)經濟環境惡化對氣候能源政策複雜性的影響。我們發現,中國的 ETS 及其廣泛的氣候抱負仍受制於長期低碳政策的社會經濟利益與政府政策動機背後的短期經濟利益之間的張力,這導致監管機構和地方政府之間存在利益和優先順序的衝突。 這份分析對排放交易和中國環境治理的政治經濟辯論做出了貢獻。它還通過深入研究中國實現淨零目標的結構性障礙,為政策制定者提供了實用的見解。


China, conflicting interests and priorities, economic slowdown, emissions trading scheme, ministerial reform, political economy


China has pledged to peak its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions before 2030 and to become carbon neutral by 2060. Achieving the targets would require great improvement of its emissions trading scheme (ETS, or interchangeably carbon market) that covers half of the country's emissions. However, China's ETS may be haunted by barriers arising from its unique institutional features of economic prioritisation and authoritarian environmentalism (Gilley, 2012; Han et al., 2012; Lo, 2016), which have become even more pressing due to the ongoing global recession and geopolitical conflicts. The government is used to prioritise economic growth over environmental protection and to pursue environmental policy goals with coercive and mandatory measures. These features have led to high implementation costs and conflicts between economic and environmental interests.
中國已承諾在 2030 年之前將溫室氣體(GHG)排放達到峰值,並在 2060 年實現碳中和。實現這些目標需要大幅改善其涵蓋該國一半排放量的排放交易計劃(ETS,或可互換稱為碳市場)。然而,中國的 ETS 可能會受到由經濟優先和威權環保主義的獨特制度特徵引起的障礙的困擾(Gilley, 2012; Han et al., 2012; Lo, 2016),這些問題由於全球經濟衰退和地緣政治衝突的持續而變得更加迫切。政府習慣於將經濟增長置於環境保護之上,並通過強制性措施來實現環境政策目標。這些特徵導致了高昂的實施成本和經濟與環境利益之間的衝突。
The ETS offers China a new governance approach that can reduce emissions with lower policy costs, improve governance efficiency and create new opportunities for investment and economic growth (Han et al., 2012; Lo, 2015). However, the assumed benefits are constrained by the political economy context which has changed significantly since the government first revealed the ETS plan in 2011. China has reformed its environmental governance by establishing a new powerful environmental ministry and increasing its control over local environmental officials (Shen & Jiang, 2021). The economy has
雖然政治經濟背景自 2011 年政府首次公佈排放交易制度(ETS)計劃以來已經發生了重大變化,但 ETS 向中國提供了一種降低排放成本、提高管治效率、並為投資和經濟增長創造新機遇的新治理方法(韓等,2012;盧,2015)。中國通過成立一個強有力的新環境部並增加對地方環保官員的控制,改革了其環境治理(沈和姜,2021)。經濟趨于

also experienced a painful slowdown due to a combination of factors. Our analysis starts from the political economy perspective that the ETS is essentially political, reflecting the broad relations of political and economic power within which it evolves (Ervine, 2017; Lane & Newell, 2016). Political economy considerations permeate the whole ETS process from the outset as to why it is chosen over other policies, to the consideration of design options and its performance and adaptation (Aldy, 2017; Lane & Newell, 2016; Paterson, 2012). While much research has examined China's ETS, little is known about how China's unique yet dynamic political economy shapes it.
Such examination is important. The experience from the European Union (EU) has demonstrated that the ETS is continuously affected by political-economic dynamics, mirroring the broad relations of political, economic and environmental interests. Hence, we examine how the recent changes in China's political economy affect its ETS, probing the structural barriers to China's future emission reduction efforts. We focus on two recent changes in China's ETS political economy: (1) the change of the ETS authority in 2018; and (2) the ongoing economic slowdown and its implications for the climateenergy policy complex. Drawing from empirical evidence, we argue that China's ETS is still stranded by the government's dilemma of balancing short-term economic interests and long-term socioenvironmental imperatives. The government needs to prioritise climate change agenda and build trust in the long-term socioeconomic benefits of the ETS. The national targets of achieving carbon peak and carbon neutrality (tandafeng and tanzhonghe, 碳达峰碳中和) may provide momentum for this, but its efforts could still be overshadowed by the fragmented authority framework and ongoing economic challenges. Our analysis resonates with two strands of earlier research published in Environmental Policy and Governance: one on the political economy of emissions trading (Deters, 2019; Skjærseth, 2010; Stevens, 2019; Thomas et al., 2011) and the other on the integration and interactions of environmental governance at different levels of the Chinese government (Schreurs, 2017; Tsang & Kolk, 2010; Zhang et al., 2020).
這樣的檢驗是重要的。歐盟的經驗表明,排放交易系統(ETS)不斷受到政治經濟動態的影響,反映了政治、經濟和環境利益的廣泛關係。因此,我們研究中國政治經濟最近的變化如何影響其排放交易系統,探討中國未來減排努力的結構障礙。我們專注於中國排放交易系統政治經濟的兩個最近變化:(1)2018 年排放交易系統權威的變化;以及(2)持續的經濟放緩及其對氣候能源政策複雜性的影響。根據實證證據,我們認為中國的排放交易系統仍受到政府在平衡短期經濟利益和長期社會環境要求之間的困境所困。政府需要優先考慮氣候變化議程,並建立對排放交易系統的長期社經利益的信任。實現碳達峰和碳中和的國家目標可能為此提供動力,但其努力仍可能被分散的權威框架和持續的經濟挑戰所掩蓋。 我們的分析 resonates with two strands of earlier research published in Environmental Policy and Governance: one on the political economy of emissions trading (Deters, 2019; Skjærseth, 2010; Stevens, 2019; Thomas et al., 2011) and the other on the integration and interactions of environmental governance at different levels of the Chinese government (Schreurs, 2017; Tsang & Kolk, 2010; Zhang et al., 2020).
The next section elaborates our conceptual approach to the ETS political economy and its relevance to the analysis of China's ETS. We then outline our material collection and analytical solutions. We next present the empirical analysis of the two changes in China's ETS political economy. The findings will be discussed in the penultimate section, followed by a conclusion.

2 ETS 政治經濟學和中國的獨特性

Political economy reasoning has it that carbon markets are not neutral and value-free, but are political and highly politicised (Ervine, 2017; Newell & Paterson, 2010; Stephan & Lane, 2015). The neoliberal account of emissions trading promises the most cost-effective and flexible abatement strategy because the price mechanism will find the most appropriate price for environmental externalities. However, this account assumes that the markets will automatically work and overlooks that the existing relations of political and economic power are interwoven into the very fabric of the ETS (Ervine, 2017). Despite the interest of many governments, emissions trading has not delivered cost-efficiency and carbon markets have often been in crisis without generating meaningful carbon prices. Lane and Newell (2016) coined the term 'zombie markets' to depict that carbon markets were effectively dead yet still politically unstopped. The zombie-like development and varying design features across jurisdictions have underlined the importance of political economy analysis of ETSs, which should not be restricted to the policymaking process, but also consider the broad relations of power within which the ETS has both evolved and continues to change (Aldy, 2017; Lane & Newell, 2016; Stephan & Paterson, 2012).
政治經濟學的推理認為,碳市場並非中立和無價值取向,而是政治化且高度政治化(Ervine,2017 年;Newell&Paterson,2010 年;Stephan&Lane,2015 年)。排放交易的新自由主義解釋承諾提供成本效益最高且靈活的減排策略,因為價格機制將找到最適合環境外部性的價格。然而,這種解釋假設市場將自動運作,卻忽略了現有的政治和經濟權力關係已經緊緊編織到排放交易體系的結構中(Ervine,2017 年)。儘管許多政府感興趣,排放交易並未實現成本效率,碳市場經常陷入危機,並未產生有意義的碳價格。Lane 和 Newell(2016 年)創造了“殭屍市場”這個術語,以描述碳市場實際上已經死亡,但在政治上仍未受到阻止。 各地區類似殭屍般的發展和不同的設計特徵凸顯了對排放交易體系的政治經濟分析的重要性,這種分析不應僅限於政策制定過程,還應考慮排放交易體系在其中演變並持續變化的廣泛權力關係(Aldy, 2017; Lane & Newell, 2016; Stephan & Paterson, 2012)。
The political economy analysis of ETSs is important for three reasons. First, it provides valuable accounts as to why emissions trading is preferred over other policy options. Some analysts argued that the rapid proliferation of ETSs was not just due to their proclaimed efficiency and flexibility, but also because they provide a politically feasible solution to address climate change while leaving entrenched economic and energy patterns of growth intact (Ervine, 2017; Newell, 2008). It suggests that emissions trading is an attempt by the power of global capitalism to ease the tension between accumulation and legitimation (Paterson, 2010). At the domestic level, carbon markets have enabled a new political coalition favouring decarbonisation by attracting the business sector with prospects of new profit opportunities (Paterson, 2012).
排放交易體系的政治經濟分析之重要性有三個原因。首先,它提供了有價值的說法,解釋為何排放交易被優先選擇而非其他政策選項。一些分析師認為,排放交易體系的快速擴散不僅是因為其所宣稱的效率和靈活性,還因為它們提供了一個在保留根深蒂固的經濟和能源增長模式的同時,解決氣候變化問題的政治可行解決方案(Ervine,2017 年;Newell,2008 年)。這表明,排放交易是全球資本主義力量緩解積累和合法性之間緊張關係的一種嘗試(Paterson,2010 年)。在國內層面,碳市場通過吸引商業部門提供新的利潤機會,促成了一個支持脫碳的新政治聯盟(Paterson,2012 年)。
Second, the ETS design choices mirror political economy considerations (Aldy, 2017; Shen & Wang, 2019). As the ETS alters existing economic and energy structures by creating a new array of winners and losers in affected sectors, the pre-existing policy landscape must influence the policy design. Third, the ETS shapes and is shaped by the broad political economy context. The changes in the political, economic and energy circumstances all affect the ETS. This has been evident with regard to the EU ETS, which experienced price volatility after the 2008 economic crisis, failed to include the international aviation sector, has retained free allowances for certain industries and countries, introduced a market reserve policy and has seen skyrocketing carbon prices recently. This highlights that carbon markets are not neutral, and instead deeply embedded in the continuously changing political economy landscape.
其次,排放交易制度的設計選擇反映了政治經濟考量(Aldy, 2017; Shen & Wang, 2019)。由於排放交易制度通過在受影響的行業中創造一組新的贏家和輸家,改變了現有的經濟和能源結構,因此現有的政策環境必然會影響政策設計。第三,排放交易制度塑造並受到廣泛政治經濟背景的影響。政治、經濟和能源環境的變化都會影響排放交易制度。這在歐盟排放交易制度中已經顯而易見,該制度在 2008 年經濟危機後出現價格波動,未能納入國際航空業,保留了某些行業和國家的免費配額,引入了市場儲備政策,最近碳價飆升。這凸顯了碳市場並非中立,而是深深植根於不斷變化的政治經濟環境中。
China's ETS political economy is rather different from that of EU ETS. China's economy has experienced unparalleled growth over the last decades, but this has also caused many environmental problems. Within the political system, the environmental agency had long been marginalised due to the government's prioritisation of the economy until when in 2018 it was transformed into the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE). At the local government level, enforcement of environmental policy has been plagued by the duality and overlap of the horizontal (tiao, 条) and vertical (kuai, 块) regulatory systems (Shen & Jiang, 2021; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). Environmentally authoritarian government relies heavily on command-and-control measures to achieve environmental goals, which has proved costly and inefficient (Gilley, 2012; Han et al., 2012). In 2010 for example, many provinces
中國的排放交易政治經濟與歐盟排放交易體系有著相當不同。過去幾十年來,中國經濟經歷了前所未有的增長,但這也導致了許多環境問題。在政治體系內,由於政府將經濟置於優先位置,環保機構長期以來一直處於邊緣化地位,直到 2018 年才轉變為生態環境部。在地方政府層面,環境政策的執行受到橫向(條)和縱向(塊)監管體系的雙重和重疊困擾。環境專制政府嚴重依賴命令與控制措施來實現環境目標,這被證明是昂貴且低效的。例如,在 2010 年,許多省份...

ordered temporary shutdowns of power plants and factories to meet the energy-efficiency targets of the 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP), highlighting the inadequacy of regulatory measures. China initially did not perceive climate change as an environmental issue, but rather a scientific and economic one to be addressed by energy-saving measures (Lo, 2015). The authority of climate governance was held by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) until 2018 it was moved to the MEE.
下令暫時關閉發電廠和工廠,以滿足第十一個五年計劃(FYP)的能源效率目標,突顯監管措施的不足。中國最初並未將氣候變化視為環境問題,而是視為一個需要透過節能措施來解決的科學和經濟問題(Lo,2015 年)。氣候治理的權威一直由國家發展和改革委員會(NDRC)掌握,直到 2018 年才轉移到生態環境部(MEE)。
Unlike the ETSs of Western economies, China did not need to form a pro-climate political coalition underpinning its emission reduction policy given the government's dominance in the business and financial sectors. Its decision to adopt an ETS was due to its own political economy considerations. Since the 2000s, environmental problems have drawn extensive public attention, and the government sought to reconcile the interests of economic growth and environmental protection (Tang et al., 2015). Meanwhile, China's experience from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) had proved marketbased instruments a more cost-effective and economically beneficial alternative (Ba et al., 2018; Lo, 2015).
與西方經濟體的排放交易系統(ETS)不同,中國不需要在支持其減排政策的政治聯盟基礎上形成一個親氣候的政治聯盟,因為政府在商業和金融領域中占主導地位。中國採取 ETS 的決定是出於其自身的政治經濟考慮。自 2000 年代以來,環境問題引起了廣泛的公眾關注,政府試圖調和經濟增長和環境保護的利益(唐等,2015 年)。與此同時,中國從清潔發展機制(CDM)中獲得的經驗證明,市場為基礎的工具是一種更具成本效益和經濟效益的替代方案(巴等,2018 年;Lo,2015 年)。
After China surpassed the United States as the world's largest GHG emitter in the late 2000s, it has faced increasing pressure to combat climate change. The ETS offers to balance national economic, energy and climate interests. An ETS is more cost-efficient for abating GHG emissions and meeting energy intensity goals than regulation (Han et al., 2012). This resonated with the Communist Party's 'Comprehensively Deepening the Reform' strategy at the time, which sought to reform the economic system by minimising the role of government and promoting the role of markets to enhance efficiency and maximise socio-economic benefits (Chinese Communist Party, 2013).
中國在 2000 年代後期超越美國成為全球最大的溫室氣體排放國後,面臨越來越大的壓力來對抗氣候變化。排放交易系統提供了平衡國家經濟、能源和氣候利益的機會。排放交易系統比規定更具成本效益,可以更有效地減少溫室氣體排放並實現能源強度目標(Han 等,2012 年)。這與當時共產黨的“全面深化改革”戰略相呼應,該戰略旨在通過減少政府的作用,促進市場的作用,提高效率並最大程度地實現社會經濟效益(中國共產黨,2013 年)。
China followed its philosophy of 'crossing the river by feeling the stones' by first experimenting with the ETS at the regional level. The government established eight regional pilots with varying economic and geographic conditions in 2013-2016, and used the experience to launch a national market in 2017 (Shen & Wang, 2019). Research has shown that China's ETS has been designed with features aligning to its unique political-economic conditions. China has not committed to an absolute emission reduction target and thus designed its ETS based on intensity targets. Allowances are distributed for free and are subject to within-period ex-post adjustments, so that the caps can be corrected to the actual energy consumption levels (Wang, Jotzo, & Qi, 2018). As electricity prices are controlled by the central government, the ETS includes both upstream and downstream sectors (Shen & Wang, 2019; Zeng et al., 2018). Only domestic offsets approved by the NDRC on the basis of the CDM methodology are accepted (Ba et al., 2018). Price management mechanisms have been introduced to avoid price fluctuations drawing lessons from the EU ETS (Munnings et al., 2016).
中國遵循了其“摸著石頭過河”的哲學,首先在區域層面進行碳排放交易體系(ETS)的實驗。政府於 2013 年至 2016 年建立了八個具有不同經濟和地理條件的區域試點項目,並利用這些經驗於 2017 年推出了全國性市場(沈與王,2019 年)。研究表明,中國的 ETS 設計具備符合其獨特政治經濟條件的特點。中國尚未承諾絕對的減排目標,因此設計了基於強度目標的 ETS。允許免費分配配額並根據週期內事後調整進行調整,以便將上限校正為實際能源消耗水平(王、Jotzo 與齊,2018 年)。由於電價受中央政府控制,ETS 包括上游和下游部門(沈與王,2019 年;曾等,2018 年)。僅接受國家發展和改革委員會批準的基於 CDM 方法的國內抵消(巴等,2018 年)。引入了價格管理機制以避免價格波動,並從歐盟 ETS 中吸取教訓(Munnings 等,2016 年)。
Although the ETS has shown economic and environmental potentials, it is also manifesting deficiencies and barriers which call for further reforms. First, while the intensity-based cap ensures cohesion between economic growth and energy intensity targets, it creates uncertainty for industries' abatement strategies and constrains market trading (Munnings et al., 2016). Second, the inclusion of both upstream and downstream sectors creates a problem of doublecounting, calling for reforms in the electricity market (Zeng et al., 2018). Third, state intervention has been extensive. In some pilots, the government arranged transactions and postponed deadlines to ensure compliance (Munnings et al., 2016). Last, public engagement has remained low, and a comprehensive and strong legal framework for the ETS is still lacking (Goron & Cassisa, 2017; Liu & Fan, 2018; Lo et al., 2018; Shen, 2015).
儘管排放交易體系顯示出經濟和環境潛力,但也表現出缺陷和障礙,需要進一步改革。首先,基於強度的上限確保了經濟增長和能源強度目標之間的一致性,但也為行業的減排策略帶來了不確定性,並限制了市場交易(Munnings 等,2016 年)。其次,上游和下游部門的納入造成了重復計算的問題,需要對電力市場進行改革(Zeng 等,2018 年)。第三,國家干預已經相當廣泛。在一些試點中,政府安排交易並延遲截止日期以確保遵守(Munnings 等,2016 年)。最後,公眾參與仍然不足,對排放交易體系缺乏全面和強有力的法律框架(Goron&Cassisa,2017 年;Liu&Fan,2018 年;Lo 等,2018 年;Shen,2015 年)。
Heggelund et al. contended that China's ETS development has been a process of testing and learning, which improves ETS policy by drawing lessons from the past and regional pilots. The development of China's ETS has indeed involved many adaptive innovations derived from the complex and unique state-business and local-central government relations. While some innovations have adapted the ETS in a more efficient way across varying economic and industrial contexts, some have exposed existing institutional barriers in, for example, business engagement, industrial awareness and parochialism, which require further policy improvement (Lo & Chen, 2020; Schröder, 2012; Shen & Wang, 2019; Shen & Xie, 2018; Zhang et al., 2020).
Heggelund 等人( )主張,中國碳排放交易體系的發展是一個不斷試驗和學習的過程,通過從過去和地區性試點中吸取教訓來改進碳排放交易政策。中國碳排放交易體系的發展確實涉及許多適應性創新,這些創新源於複雜而獨特的政企和地方中央政府關係。雖然一些創新已經使碳排放交易體系在不同經濟和工業背景下更有效地適應,但有些暴露了現有的機構障礙,例如企業參與、工業意識和地方主義,這需要進一步改進政策(Lo&Chen,2020; Schröder,2012; Shen&Wang,2019; Shen&Xie,2018; Zhang et al.,2020)。
However, it has rarely been noted that the ETS also needs to constantly adjust to the new information in its political economy environment. It is more than 10 years since China first revealed the ETS plan in 2011, and the political economy landscape of the ETS has changed significantly. Just like with the EU ETS, the evolving context will alter China's ETS considerations and practices. For China, emissions trading is not just a climate policy, but a novel attempt at governance transformation of political and economic relevance. Politically, the ETS signals the government's reform of its regulatory approach by exploiting markets to enhance efficiency. Economically, its co-benefits in green investment and technology innovation play a crucial part of China's transition towards a low-carbon, sustainable economy. Achieving these benefits would require not only a well-designed ETS but also coordinated reforms and efforts in other relevant policy areas, which are all constrained by the broad political economy environment. This highlights the need to examine the implications of China's rapidly changing political economy on the ETS. In so doing, we will focus on two recent important changes in the political economy landscape of China's ETS. The first is the change of the ETS authority in 2018. The second is the economic slowdown and its implications for the climateenergy policy complex and in particular for the country's mostly important fuel, coal. The two cases will highlight to what extent the changing political economy affects the ETS, and what are the underlying barriers for the government's net-zero targets.
然而,很少有人注意到排放交易系統(ETS)也需要不斷適應其政治經濟環境中的新信息。自 2011 年中國首次公布 ETS 計劃以來已經超過 10 年,ETS 的政治經濟格局發生了重大變化。就像歐盟 ETS 一樣,不斷變化的背景將改變中國的 ETS 考慮和實踐。對中國而言,排放交易不僅是一項氣候政策,而且是政治和經濟轉型的一次新嘗試。在政治上,ETS 表明政府通過利用市場來提高效率來改革其監管方法。在經濟上,其在綠色投資和技術創新方面的附加效益對中國向低碳、可持續經濟的轉型起著至關重要的作用。實現這些好處不僅需要一個設計良好的 ETS,還需要在其他相關政策領域進行協調的改革和努力,這些都受制於廣泛的政治經濟環境。這突顯了有必要研究中國快速變化的政治經濟對 ETS 的影響。 通過這樣做,我們將專注於中國碳排放交易體系政治經濟格局中兩個最近重要的變化。第一個是 2018 年碳排放交易體系權威的變化。第二個是經濟放緩及其對氣候能源政策複雜性的影響,特別是對該國最重要的燃料煤炭的影響。這兩個案例將突顯政治經濟變化對碳排放交易體系的影響程度,以及政府實現淨零目標所面臨的潛在障礙是什麼。
In order to understand the political economy of China's ETS, this research uses qualitative research strategies drawing from semistructured expert interviews and documentary materials such as formal government records, media reports and academic literature. We conducted 16 semi-structured interviews with representatives of the government, researchers, environmental nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and ETS-related enterprises (an overview of the interviews is in the Appendix (Table A1)). The participants were selected based on prior research and through referral sampling methods until
為了了解中國碳排放交易體系的政治經濟,本研究採用質性研究策略,從半結構化專家訪談和文件資料中獲取資料,如正式政府記錄、媒體報導和學術文獻。我們與政府代表、研究人員、環境非政府組織(NGO)和與碳排放交易體系相關的企業進行了 16 次半結構化訪談(訪談概況見附錄(表 A1))。參與者是根據先前的研究和轉介抽樣方法選擇的。

an even coverage of different stakeholder groups was achieved. All participants were either directly involved in ETS activities or have experience from research on the Chinese ETS. Ethical clearance for the research was obtained from the authors' research institute. All interviews were conducted with the promise of confidentiality in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong between September 2018 and December 2019. Interviews were triangulated using comprehensive document research and analysed with a combination of narrative and critical discourse analysis.
實現了對不同利益相關者群體的均衡覆蓋。所有參與者要麼直接參與碳排放交易體系(ETS)的活動,要麼在中國碳排放交易體系的研究上具有經驗。本研究獲得了作者所屬研究機構的倫理審批。所有訪談均在 2018 年 9 月至 2019 年 12 月期間,在北京、上海、深圳和香港進行,並承諾保密。訪談根據包括全面文件研究在內的三角驗證進行分析,運用敘事和批判性話語分析的結合方法。


3.1 The change of the ETS authority
3.1 ETS 權威的變化

Climate change has always been closely related to China's economic, energy and technology policy agendas (Lo, 2015; Wang, Jotzo, & Qi, 2018; Wang, Liu, & Wu, 2018). Before 2018, the NDRC was the climate policy regulator. As an economic regulation agency, it has advantages in enforcing the ETS over the environmental ministry given its substantial power over macroeconomic management and planning, through which it can specify climate targets, integrate them into the economic plans and align them with sectoral policies (Chang & Wang, 2010). It has also extensive power in energy governance, including setting out guidance for energy prices, approving power plant construction and promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency policies.
氣候變化一直與中國的經濟、能源和技術政策議程密切相關(Lo, 2015; Wang, Jotzo, & Qi, 2018; Wang, Liu, & Wu, 2018)。在 2018 年之前,國家發展和改革委員會(NDRC)是氣候政策監管機構。作為經濟監管機構,它在執行排放交易制度方面具有優勢,相較於環保部門,因為它在宏觀經濟管理和規劃方面擁有實質權力,通過這些權力可以明確制定氣候目標,將其納入經濟計劃並與各部門政策相協調(Chang & Wang, 2010)。它在能源治理方面也具有廣泛權力,包括制定能源價格指導、批准發電廠建設以及推動可再生能源和能源效率政策。
China's climate change governance changed significantly in 2018 when the government upgraded the MEP into the MEE. The MEE inherited the MEP's competence and the NDRC's climate authority. The department of climate change in the NDRC and its local affiliates were moved to the MEE. In June 2018, the MEE was further promoted to be the co-implementing agency of the country's leading body on climate change, the State Council Leading Group on Climate Change (SCLGCC).
2018 年,中國的氣候變化治理在政府將環保部升級為生態環境部後發生了重大變化。生態環境部繼承了環保部的職能和國家發展和改革委員會的氣候權威。國家發展和改革委員會的氣候變化部門及其地方分支機構被轉移到了生態環境部。2018 年 6 月,生態環境部進一步晉升為國家氣候變化領導小組的協同執行機構。
A key objective of the reform was to strengthen the environmental ministry's power by bringing together the environmental competence formerly scatted across many ministries. The MEE is expected to fix China's environmental governance problems by improving administrative efficiency and lowering coordination costs. However, the reform may have mixed effects on climate policy as climate change is not just an environmental but also economic, energy and diplomatic concern. While the NDRC has broad power and leverage in those areas, the MEE may lack such power to make and implement policies by itself (Tsang & Kolk, 2010; Wang, Jotzo, & Qi, 2018; Wang, Liu, & Wu, 2018).
For years, China's environmental governance has been paralysed by weak implementation at the local level. This was largely due to China's decentralised administrative structure in which local governments are incentivised to enforce growth-oriented policies while shirking environmental protection responsibilities (Kostka & Nahm, 2017; Ran, 2013; Zhang et al., 2020). Local environmental officials face a conflict between horizontal and vertical regulatory systems (Chang & Wang, 2010). Although local environmental departments are responsible for enforcing the policies of the central government, they are financially and institutionally subordinate to local governments. Enforcement of environmental policies is thus often undermined due to economic considerations (Schreurs, 2017). While the central government has recently sought to tackle this problem by establishing the MEE and using more inspection and disciplinary measures (Shen & Jiang, 2021), the institutional settings of local environmental departments have not been reformed and local governments are facing rising pressure of delivering imminent economic results given the current impacts of COVID-19 outbreaks and economic slowdown:
多年來,中國的環境治理一直受到地方層面執行力薄弱的困擾。這主要是由於中國分權的行政結構,地方政府被激勵實施以促進經濟增長為導向的政策,同時推卸環境保護責任。地方環境官員面臨著水平和垂直監管體系之間的衝突。儘管地方環境部門負責執行中央政府的政策,但在財政和制度上卻處於地方政府的下級地位。由於經濟考量,環境政策的執行往往受到破壞。雖然中央政府最近試圖通過建立生態環境部並採取更多檢查和紀律措施來解決這個問題,但地方環境部門的制度設置尚未得到改革,地方政府面臨著交付即時經濟成果的壓力不斷上升,尤其是考慮到當前 COVID-19 疫情爆發和經濟放緩的影響。
The MEE has a positive effect in integrating environmental governance. For example, now carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are regulated by the same agency, while before they were regulated by the NDRC and the MEP respectively. However, the problem of weak enforcement may still exist, as local environmental bureaus are still subordinate to, and heavily influenced by the local governments. -Interview with an environmental journalist
In China's political system, the responsible agency's power and hierarchical ranking are crucial for policy enforcement, as this will affect how the local governments and businesses weigh the importance of the policy with relevant interests. In previous sulphur dioxide trading experiments, local environmental departments struggled with policy enforcement due to their weak authority within the administrative hierarchy and the local governments' economic interests (Tao & Mah, 2009). In contrast, the NDRC has more leverage to ensure ETS compliance (Goron & Cassisa, 2017):
To firms, the orders from the NDRC and from the environmental agency are different. Obviously, they will pay more attention to the former. -Interview with an academic scholar in environmental politics
The rapid ETS development has been largely motivated by the government. The government dominates the ETS, and has a great influence on the price. So the authority change could affect policy enforcement. -Interview with an academic scholar in environmental economics
The transfer of authority has changed the way how climate, economic and energy policies are coordinated. Before 2018, the coordination could be achieved within the NDRC through its extensive power over the three policy areas. Now coordination has to happen through interministerial communication and collaboration between the NDRC and the MEE. It is uncertain whether the MEE has sufficient leverage on the NDRC, if the latter prioritises economic and energy interests over climate change:
權力的轉移改變了氣候、經濟和能源政策協調的方式。在 2018 年之前,這種協調可以在國家發展和改革委員會內部實現,因為該委員會對這三個政策領域有著廣泛的權力。現在協調必須通過部委間的溝通和國家發展和改革委員會與生態環境部之間的合作來實現。目前尚不清楚生態環境部對國家發展和改革委員會是否有足夠的影響力,如果後者將經濟和能源利益置於氣候變化之上。
TABLE 1 Key authorities relevant for carbon finance regulation in China
表 1 中國碳金融監管相關的主要權威
Ministry of Ecology and
Environment (MEE) 證券監管
Securities Regulatory
Commission (SRC) 委員會(SRC)
People's Bank of China (PBC)
Responsible for the design,
implementation and supervision of the
ETS, setting up the market infrastructure
for carbon finance. 用於碳金融。
- Supervising the spot trading of carbon
- 監督碳交易的現場交易
- Formulating the policies, regulations
- 制訂有關碳交易的政策、法規
and standards concerning the
securitisation of carbon assets and
the futures contracts of carbon
- Overseeing issuing, trading, custody
- 監督發行、交易、保管
and settlement of equity shares,
bonds, and investment funds
concerning carbon assets.
- Overseeing the listing, trading and
- 監督碳期貨上市、交易和結算
settlement of carbon futures
- 碳期貨合約的交易所
contracts, carbon futures exchange
- 碳期貨交易所
and relevant firms. 相關公司。
- The leading authority of China's
- 中國綠色金融發展的領先權威。
green finance development.
- Formulating the policies, regulations
- 制定有關碳的融資和投資政策、法規和標準
and standards of financing and
investment concerning the carbon
finance market. 金融市場。
Source: Authors' own creation based on each agency's competence and goals in relevant documents.
The MEE lacks the ability to influence the NDRC when the NDRC decides to de-prioritise climate policy. -Interview with an academic scholar in environmental politics
MEE 在國家發展和改革委員會決定降低氣候政策優先級時缺乏影響力。-環境政治學者的訪談
A recent example echoing this concern is the NDRC's 14th FYP for a Modern Energy System (NDRC & NEA, 2022), which specifies plans for the country's energy sector up to 2025 . Unlike previous FYP energy plans, it sets no limits on coal consumption or the share of coal in primary energy sources. Instead, it emphasises the importance of coal for the country's energy security, drawing lessons from the previous year's coal and electricity shortages. In 2021, the coordination of climate policies was further complicated as the NDRC took the responsibility for coordinating the policies to achieve the national targets of carbon peak and carbon neutrality. It will compile a national roadmap for emission reduction, including plans for cleaning up carbon-intensive sectors and promoting low-carbon technologies. It is also the implementing agency for the newly established leading group on the dual-carbon targets which consists of high-profile officials from several ministries and is headed by the Vice Premier. While the MEE remains the regulator of the country's climate policy, emission reduction now falls into the competence of both the NDRC and the MEE.
最近一個例子是國家發展和改革委員會關於現代能源體系的第十四個五年規劃(NDRC & NEA, 2022),該規劃明確了該國能源部門直至 2025 年的計劃。與以往的五年規劃能源計劃不同,該規劃沒有設定煤炭消耗限制或煤炭在一次能源來源中的份額。相反,它強調了煤炭對該國能源安全的重要性,從前一年的煤炭和電力短缺中吸取教訓。2021 年,隨著國家發展和改革委員會負責協調政策以實現碳峰和碳中和的國家目標,氣候政策的協調變得更加複雜。它將編制一份國家減排路線圖,包括清理碳密集型行業和促進低碳技術的計劃。它還是新成立的雙碳目標領導小組的實施機構,該小組由來自幾個部委的高級官員組成,由副總理領導。監管該國氣候政策的仍然是生態環境部,但減排現在是國家發展和改革委員會和生態環境部的職責範圍。
Concerns of interest coordination also arise with regard to carbon finance, which involves financial regulators such as the Securities Regulatory Commission (SRC) and the People's Bank of China (PBC) with different policy priorities (see Table 1). Signs of such conflicting priorities were seen before the MEE took over the ETS authority. In 2016, the NDRC drafted an ETS proposal to the State Council for legislation in order to upgrade the ETS legal status. The proposal included carbon futures as one of the commodities in the system. The SRC as the financial market regulator opposed the plan due to concerns for incomplete market infrastructure and potential instability, but its objection was overruled by the NDRC. However, in the same year when rectifying the financial market orders, the SRC affirmed that the ETS is disallowed from the securitisation and trading of futures contacts (SRC, 2016). Then in 2017, the NDRC changed its attitude and started to emphasise the importance of financial stability in the ETS and only allowed spot trading in the upcoming national market (NDRC, 2017). In 2020, the MEE as the new authority issued its first ETS regulation including no financial instruments related to carbon.
關於碳金融的利益協調問題也涉及到金融監管機構,如證券監督管理委員會(SRC)和中國人民銀行(PBC),它們有不同的政策優先順序(見表 1)。在生態環境部接管排放交易體系權限之前,就已經出現了這些政策優先順序的矛盾跡象。2016 年,國家發展和改革委員會向國務院起草了一份排放交易體系法律地位升級的提案。該提案將碳期貨列為體系中的商品之一。作為金融市場監管機構的 SRC 反對了這一計劃,擔心市場基礎設施不完善和潛在的不穩定性,但其反對被國家發展和改革委員會否決。然而,同年在整頓金融市場秩序時,SRC 確認排放交易體系不得進行期貨合約的證券化和交易。然後在 2017 年,國家發展和改革委員會改變了態度,開始強調排放交易體系中金融穩定的重要性,並只允許即期交易在即將到來的全國市場中進行。 2020 年,新成立的環境部作為主管機構,發布了首項包括與碳有關的金融工具的 ETS 規定。
The hedging on the financial aspects of the ETS underlines a predicament in which the government seeks to develop green finance for its economic benefits but also fears the associated financial risks due to incomplete market infrastructure. Since 2016, China has launched several initiatives to develop green finance to underpin its strategies of economic transition and ecological civilisation. In 2016, the PBC released the Guidance on the Establishment of Green Finance Framework to initiate an experiment on green finance (PBC, 2016). In 2017, it further instructed the NDRC to launch the national ETS by 2017 to build market infrastructures for carbon finance (PBC, 2017). An annual report on green finance has also been released since 2017. In 2018, the PBC was included as a member to the country's top leading body on climate change, the SCLGCC. The same year, the PBC and the SRC established the Committee on Green Bonds Standard, and the MEE also established the Committee on Climate Investment and Financing. In 2019, the State Council issued a plan to establish a futures exchange in Guangzhou that will include carbon futures as the first commodity. However, despite the green finance initiatives, China's ventures have been limited due to the concerns for financial risk and inadequate market infrastructure (Lo et al., 2020):
對於碳交易體系的財務方面進行避險凸顯了政府在發展綠色金融以獲取經濟利益的同時,也擔憂由於市場基礎設施不完善而帶來的財務風險。自 2016 年以來,中國已推出多項倡議,以發展綠色金融支持其經濟轉型和生態文明戰略。2016 年,中國人民銀行發布了《綠色金融框架建設指引》,啟動了綠色金融實驗。2017 年,進一步指示國家發展和改革委員會在 2017 年啟動全國碳交易體系,為碳金融建立市場基礎設施。自 2017 年以來,每年都發布一份綠色金融年度報告。2018 年,中國人民銀行成為國家最高領導機構氣候變化領導小組的成員。同年,中國人民銀行和證監會成立了綠色債券標準委員會,生態環境部也成立了氣候投資與融資委員會。2019 年,國務院發布了在廣州設立期貨交易所的計劃,首批商品將包括碳期貨。 然而,儘管有綠色金融倡議,中國的投資受到金融風險和市場基礎設施不足的擔憂所限制(羅等人。, 2020):
Carbon finance and the financialisation of the carbon market are different. The government likes the idea of carbon finance because it can attract investment. But

about the financialisation of the carbon market, drawing lessons from the past stock market catastrophe, the government is concerned about the potential financial risk. - Interview with an academic scholar in environmental politics
關於碳市場的金融化,從過去的股市災難中吸取教訓,政府關注潛在的金融風險。- 環境政治學者訪談
The ETS should mainly serve as a policy to reduce emissions. So it should avoid over-financialisation. -Interview with a provincial NDRC officer
ETS 主要應作為減排政策。因此,應避免過度金融化。- 省級發改委官員訪談
Carbon finance also faces challenges due to immature market infrastructure. Market liquidity is low, which does not support trading on financial goods. In the absence of an absolute and quantified emission reduction target and due to the global energy crisis, the carbon price in China still faces many policy uncertainties:
The market infrastructure is not sufficient to support the trading of carbon futures now. The biggest concern is financial risk. The low market liquidity cannot attract financial institutions, and also has the risk of market manipulation. -Interview with an academic scholar in environmental economics
Regarding carbon finance, preventing financial risk is always the primary concern of policymakers. The lack of market infrastructure is not realistic to financialise the ETS at the beginning. -Interview with a provinciallevel environmental officer
Spot trading and futures trading are regulated by different agencies with different policy stances. While the MEE as the spot trading regulator focuses on emission reduction, the SRC as the financial regulator focuses on price discovery and hedging:
There are still disputes among different regulators. The attitude of the government on carbon finance remains uncertain until further regulation is released. -Interview with an asset management fund manager in financial sector
The above observations highlight the fragmentation of ETS governance. The authority change in 2018 has broken up the economic, energy and climate dimensions of ETS governance, which now requires more inter-ministerial coordination between the NDRC and the MEE than before. The authority change was partly reversed when the responsibility for achieving dual-carbon targets was assigned to the NDRC while the MEE remains responsible of climate governance. In China, carbon finance is administered and supervised by the PBC and the SRC whereas the MEE lacks both experience and competence. Carbon finance policies are not determined by the MEE solely and it faces competition from the country's financial regulators with varying policy priorities and interests.
上述觀察突顯了排放交易體系治理的分散性。2018 年的權威變更打破了排放交易體系治理的經濟、能源和氣候維度,現在需要更多的國家發展和改革委員會與生態環境部之間的跨部門協調。當雙碳目標的責任歸於國家發展和改革委員會,而生態環境部仍負責氣候治理時,部分權威變更被部分撤銷。在中國,碳金融由人民銀行和證監會管理和監督,而生態環境部缺乏經驗和能力。碳金融政策並非僅由生態環境部決定,它面臨來自國內金融監管機構的競爭,這些監管機構擁有不同的政策優先順序和利益。

3.2 The climate-energy policy complex amid economic slowdown
3.2 經濟放緩中的氣候能源政策複雜性

In China's energy mix, coal accounts for nearly of total energy consumption and for about of China's GHG emissions. Excessive coal consumption has contributed to severe air pollution, triggering public dissatisfaction and threatening social stability (Flatø, 2022). The ETS offers to balance the aims of environmental protection, energy security and economic growth. By providing a strong price signal, it can incentivise industries to switch to cleaner energies and invest in low-carbon technologies. Industries are allowed flexibility to decide their abating strategies so that emission reduction can be achieved at the lowest cost. Moreover, it echoes the government's reform of its economic and environmental governance, exploiting markets to enhance efficiency.
在中國的能源結構中,煤炭佔總能源消耗的近 ,佔中國溫室氣體排放的約 過度的煤炭消耗導致嚴重的空氣污染,引發公眾不滿,威脅社會穩定(Flatø, 2022)。排放交易體系(ETS)旨在平衡環境保護、能源安全和經濟增長的目標。通過提供強有力的價格信號,它可以激勵行業轉向更清潔的能源並投資於低碳技術。行業被允許靈活決定其減排策略,以實現以最低成本達到減排目標。此外,它呼應了政府對經濟和環境治理的改革,利用市場提高效率。
Yet, the materialisation of those benefits are constrained by China's energy political economy. Many features of its energy sector are inhospitable for emissions trading, such as the highly regulated electricity market, explicit and implicit subsidies on fossil fuels and the government's regulatory and planning approach in energy governance (Ren et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2021; Yuan et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2018). Reforms in these policy areas are thus needed for the ETS to achieve flexibility and cost-efficiency in GHG abatement. For China, the tensions between the long-term socio-economic imperatives and the short-term economic interests are key in determining climate policy pathways (Purdon, 2015). Studies have found that even as the long-term benefits of low-carbon energy transition are widely accepted in China, concerns over its short-term economic impacts still trigger resistance of local governments and entrenched interest groups (Shen & Xie, 2018; Tan et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2020). Ensuring economic growth and energy security, at least in the short run, is still a defining factor for China's climate policy.
The ETS is an artificial market: the carbon price is determined by the political economy of market design which reflects the broad configuration of interests in relation to climate change (Ervine, 2017). The government's short-term economic prioritisation may thus constrain the ETS function, entrenching the incumbent energy political economy dominated by fossil fuel industry. The influence of economic prioritisation could be more pressing now as China has been dealing with economic slowdown, the COVID-19 Pandemic and the ensuing global recession. We examine next how the slowing economy affects the ETS by focusing on the recent dynamics of China's coal political economy. Coal is closely related to China's short-term economic interests and the ETS as it dominates the power sector and key industries with strong carbon lock-in and path dependence in energy transition. Reducing coal consumption has become a cornerstone for China's emission reduction efforts (Heggelund et al., 2022). The government's stance over imminent economic boost and coal phase-out will thus reflect its considerations of climate change mitigation and institutional reforms which affect carbon price and market confidence.
ETS 是一個人工市場:碳價格由市場設計的政治經濟所決定,反映了與氣候變化相關的廣泛利益配置(Ervine,2017)。政府的短期經濟優先可能會限制 ETS 的功能,打壓由化石燃料行業主導的現有能源政治經濟體系。隨著中國在應對經濟減速、COVID-19 大流行和隨之而來的全球經濟衰退,經濟優先的影響可能更加迫切。接下來,我們將通過關注中國煤炭政治經濟的最新動態,來檢視經濟減速如何影響 ETS。煤炭與中國的短期經濟利益和 ETS 密切相關,因為它主導著能源部門和具有在能源轉型中碳鎖定和路徑依賴性的關鍵產業。減少煤炭消耗已成為中國減排努力的基石(Heggelund 等,2022)。 政府對即將到來的經濟增長和煤炭淘汰的立場將反映其對氣候變化減緩和制度改革的考量,這些因素影響碳價和市場信心。
To date, the prices and market liquidity of China's ETS have had limited impact on the energy sector. As of 2020, eight regional
迄今為止,中國碳排放交易體系的價格和市場流動性對能源部門的影響有限。截至 2020 年,八個地區

markets had traded a total of 425 million allowances worth 1.56 billion dollars. The average prices ranged from to per ton (Slater et al., 2020). The national market had its first compliance year by 2022 covering only the power sector. The market traded 194 million allowances with an average price of per ton. Compared with the EU ETS prices which have reached around , it is clear that the prices in China's ETS have been rather low.
市場已經交易了價值 15.6 億美元的 4.25 億個津貼。平均價格從 美元每噸不等(Slater 等人,2020)。到 2022 年,全國市場將迎來首個遵從年度,僅涵蓋電力部門。市場交易了 1.94 億個津貼,平均價格為每噸 美元。與已達到約 美元的歐盟 ETS 價格相比,中國 ETS 的價格明顯偏低。
The market liquidity and prices now are not sufficient to reflect the economic dynamics. Sometimes firms do not even see the price signal in their abatement strategy. -Interview with an academic scholar in environmental politics
Covered companies also suggest that they do not attach much importance to the ETS (Deng et al., 2018; Liu & Fan, 2018; Shen, 2015):
覆蓋的公司也表示他們並不太重視碳排放交易體系(鄧等,2018 年;劉&范,2018 年;沈,2015 年):
Because of the slow progress of the national carbon market and little attention from the central government, leaders of the company have not paid too much attention to the ETS. -Interview with a state-owned enterprise in iron and steel sector
We don't have employees to work exclusively on the carbon assets and trading, the work is usually shared by some departments before the compliance deadline. -Interview with a state-owned enterprise in power sector
As China's economy is slowing down, pessimism has emerged on ETS stringency:
The pressure of the economic downturn can impact China's climate policy as the government may relax its climate policy stringency. -Interview with an academic scholar in climate economics
Over the past decade, China's coal political economy has experienced significant changes. After 2008, as the government sought to stimulate growth via a massive infrastructure projects, China's coal consumption skyrocketed, reaching its highest ever level in 2013. The infrastructure building stimulus also contributed to severe air pollution and high GHG emissions and led to pressure from both domestic and international communities to address the energy use. The government faced the imperative to reduce its reliance on coal in the early .
在過去十年中,中國的煤炭政治經濟經歷了重大變化。 2008 年後,政府試圖通過大規模基礎設施項目刺激經濟增長,中國的煤炭消耗急劇增加,2013 年達到歷史最高水平。 基礎設施建設刺激也導致嚴重的空氣污染和高溫室氣體排放,並導致國內外社會對能源使用施加壓力。 政府面臨著在 年代早期減少對煤炭的依賴的迫切需要。
Addressing air pollution was obviously the primary motivation of the government to reduce coal consumption then. But reducing coal consumption could also benefit climate change mitigation. -Interview with an environmental NGO
解決空氣污染顯然是政府當時減少煤炭消耗的主要動機。 但減少煤炭消耗也有助於氣候變化的緩解。 -與環保非政府組織的訪談

At the time, the government also needed to reduce overcapacity in the energy sector, because the massive scale of coal-fired power plant construction had surpassed the country's need and many plants were not in full operation (China Electricity Council, 2013).
同時,政府還需要減少能源行業的產能過剩,因為大規模的燃煤發電廠建設已經超出了國家的需求,許多發電廠並未全面運營(中國電力協會,2013 年)。
As a result of more and more coal plants, many existing plants only operate part-time. This is a waste of investment and capacity. -Interview with an environmental NGO
由於越來越多的煤電廠,許多現有的電廠只是部分運作。這是對投資和產能的浪費。- 環保非政府組織的訪談
Central government used to have the authority to approve new coal power projects. To reduce overcapacity, China decentralised the authority to local governments in 2014 so that approval decisions could be made in light of their circumstances. The authority of approving environmental impact assessments of new coal plants was also decentralised to provincial environmental bureaus in 2015 (Shearer et al., 2018). The decentralisation turned out to be counterproductive. Provincial governments raced to permit new plants for economic and security considerations (Tan et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2018), further aggravating overcapacity.
中央政府曾經有權批准新的煤電項目。為了減少產能過剩,中國於 2014 年將權力下放給地方政府,以便根據當地情況做出批准決定。2015 年,批准新煤電廠環境影響評估的權力也下放給省級環保局(Shearer 等人,2018 年)。這種分權結果是事與願違。省級政府為了經濟和安全考慮而競相批准新的電廠(Tan 等人,2021 年;Wang 等人,2021 年;Zhang 等人,2018 年),進一步加劇了產能過剩。
Building coal plants was beneficial to local economies, as it could boost investment and production in many sectors. - Interview with an environmental NGO
建設煤電廠對當地經濟有益,因為它可以促進許多行業的投資和生產。- 環保非政府組織的訪談
In 2016, the NDRC and the NEA stepped in by suspending or cancelling the construction of coal plants in most provinces (NDRC & NEA, 2016). The government also set an 1100 Gigawatt (GW) capacity cap on coal power in the 13th FYP. As a result, China's coal consumption decreased to 3.8 billion tons in 2016 :
2016 年,國家發展和改革委員會以及國家能源局通過暫停或取消大多數省份的燃煤電廠建設來介入(NDRC&NEA,2016 年)。政府還在第十三個五年計劃中對燃煤發電設置了 1100 吉瓦(GW)的容量上限。因此,中國的煤炭消耗量在 2016 年降至 38 億噸:
A capacity of cap in the 13th FYP is undoubtedly the most powerful policy to limit the construction of coal plants, and local governments have to cease many ongoing projects to control their capacity under the cap. -Interview with a provincial-level NDRC officer
在第十三個五年計劃中設置的 容量上限無疑是限制燃煤電廠建設最有力的政策,地方政府必須停止許多正在進行的項目,以控制其容量在上限之下。-與省級國家發展和改革委員會官員的訪談
However, due to the deteriorating economic environment, China's coal consumption has rebounded since 2017 as the government has stimulated growth with infrastructure investment. The production of iron and steel, cement and other building materials has increased, which has increased coal consumption and GHG emissions (IEA, 2019):
然而,由於經濟環境惡化,自 2017 年以來,中國的煤炭消耗量已經反彈,政府通過基礎設施投資刺激經濟增長。鐵鋼、水泥和其他建築材料的生產增加,這增加了煤炭消耗和溫室氣體排放(IEA,2019 年):
The government used to boost the economy via infrastructure investment and construction. However, given the substantial debts of local governments, the central government may be more cautious this time. But it may still put aside the stringency of fossil fuels to reduce the burdens of industries. -Interview with an academic scholar in environmental economics
The power sector has also been revitalised. In 2017 and 2018, its coal consumption increased by and respectively (Xinhua, 2019). Local governments started to invest again in new coal power projects to promote growth. New coal power capacity skyrocketed in 2019 and 2020 as local governments rushed to use the last chance to build new capacity in the 13th FYP (Greenpeace, 2021). The coal reliance threatens economic and energy security. In late 2021, several provinces experienced power cuts and blackouts, as power plants faced soaring energy prices and mandatory limits on their coal consumption. The U-turn of coal consumption highlights the dilemma between climate change mitigation and short-term economic growth, given the significance of coal to the economy, especially to the local governments:
電力部門也得到了振興。2017 年和 2018 年,其煤炭消耗分別增加了 (新華社,2019 年)。地方政府開始再次投資於新的燃煤發電項目以促進增長。2019 年和 2020 年,新的燃煤發電容量急劇增加,因為地方政府趕著利用第 13 個五年計劃的最後機會來建設新的容量(綠色和平組織,2021 年)。煤炭依賴威脅著經濟和能源安全。2021 年底,幾個省份出現了停電和停電,因為發電廠面臨著能源價格飆升和對其煤炭消耗的強制限制。煤炭消耗的逆轉凸顯了在氣候變化減緩和短期經濟增長之間的困境,考慮到煤炭對經濟的重要性,特別是對地方政府來說:
From a long-term perspective, certainly the economy will phase out coal eventually. But a short-term rebound is still possible, if coal consumption proves cheaper......Moreover, it should be noticed that the coal industry is still influential, especially in some regions. -Interview with a provincial NDRC officer
Local governments do not want to shut down coal plants, because this will waste the investment before and cause unemployment. -Interview with an academic scholar in climate economics
Due to the highly regulated electricity prices, rallying coal prices and increasing costs of complying with environmental regulations, coal power business is no longer attractive for state-owned enterprises (Tan et al., 2021). However, local governments still have economic and security stakes. Some governments, especially those in coal rich regions, rely on revenue and employment from coal-related industries (Mori, 2018). Some also pursue self-reliance due to the concerns of potential disruption of inter-provincial electricity transmission (Wang et al., 2021).
由於電價高度受到監管、煤炭價格上漲以及遵守環境法規成本增加,國有企業對煤電業務不再感到吸引(Tan 等人,2021 年)。然而,地方政府仍然具有經濟和安全利益。一些政府,特別是那些煤炭豐富地區的政府,依賴於與煤炭相關產業的收入和就業(Mori,2018 年)。一些政府也出於對省際電力傳輸潛在中斷的擔憂,追求自給自足(Wang 等人,2021 年)。
The central government's stance has also wavered. In the 26th United Nations climate change conference in Glasgow, China supported India in changing the language on coal from 'phase-out' to 'phase-down'. In addition to removing limits on total coal consumption and the share of coal in primary energy mix in the 14th FYP (NDRC & NEA, 2022), it also plans to increase coal production capacity and provide more financial support for coal industry (Xinhua, 2022a, 2022b).
中央政府的立場也出現了變化。在格拉斯哥舉行的第 26 屆聯合國氣候變化大會上,中國支持印度將煤炭的用語從「淘汰」改為「逐步減少」。除了在第十四個五年計劃中取消對煤炭總消耗量和煤炭在一次能源組合中的佔比的限制外,還計劃增加煤炭生產能力並為煤炭行業提供更多財政支持。
Given the strong lock-in effect of coal on China's energy transition, the government has invested heavily in energy efficiency and clean coal technologies to reduce the environmental impacts. It has upgraded most of the existing coal power plants to meet efficiency standards (Chinese Government, 2019). But investment in energy efficiency can also affect the ETS by reducing compliance costs of coal power plants and prolonging their life-spans (Wang, Jotzo, & Qi, 2018; Wang, Liu, & Wu, 2018; Yuan et al., 2019). Also, the investment has mostly targeted air pollutants instead of GHC emissions:

Compared with the emissions and greenhouse effects, the government is more concerned about the impact of air pollution from coal. -Interview with an environmental journalist
Although supporting clean coal technologies is pragmatic in a coaldominant energy economy, it is misleading to label clean coal as green. In 2017, China identified clean coal as one of its strategic fields for technology investment (Xinhua, 2019). In 2019, clean coal was included in the government's Guiding List for Green Industries, which offers preferential policies and financial support to clean coal technologies and investment (NDRC, 2019). The scope of the Guiding List was adopted by the MEE in 2020 to guide investments and financing regarding climate change (MEE, 2020).
雖然支持清潔煤技術在以煤為主導的能源經濟中是務實的,但將清潔煤標籤為綠色是具有誤導性的。2017 年,中國將清潔煤確定為技術投資的戰略領域之一(新華社,2019 年)。2019 年,清潔煤被納入政府的綠色產業引導目錄,為清潔煤技術和投資提供優惠政策和財政支持(國家發展改革委員會,2019 年)。2020 年,環境部採納了引導目錄的範圍,以指導有關氣候變化的投資和融資(環境部,2020 年)。
China's coal phase-out is challenged by short-term economic interests. The ETS is still immature and has limited effect on energy transition. Local governments still rely on revenue and employment from coal industry, which is a structural barrier for coal phase-out. While the central government has shown determination on coal phase-out, its stance has recently wavered due to economic and security concerns. The swing could slow the reforms in relevant policy fields, further constraining the ETS functions.


China's environmental governance has been characterised for long by economic prioritisation and authoritarian environmentalism. However, the pursuit of growth proved unsustainable in the late 2000 s due to environmental degradation and mounting GHG emissions (Tang et al., 2015). The command-and-control approach also needed reform to enhance efficiency (Han et al., 2012). The ETS emerged to help amalgamate economic, energy and climate interests in the early 2010 s. (Lo, 2015). The market-based policy resonated with the government's 'Comprehensively Deepening the Reform' ideology, which sought to reform its mandatory governance approach and enhance efficiency by utilising markets (Chinese Communist Party, 2013).
中國的環境治理長期以來以經濟優先和威權環保主義為特徵。然而,由於環境惡化和溫室氣體排放增加,2000 年代後期追求增長變得不可持續(唐等,2015 年)。命令與控制的方法也需要改革以提高效率(韓等,2012 年)。在 2010 年代初期,碳排放交易體系出現,以幫助整合經濟、能源和氣候利益(羅,2015 年)。市場導向的政策與政府的“全面深化改革”思想相呼應,該思想旨在通過利用市場改革其強制性治理方法並提高效率(中國共產黨,2013 年)。
However, the realisation of those benefits are constrained by the particularities of China's political economy. The political economy landscape of the ETS has changed significantly after China firstly brought up the policy in 2011. We have examined two major changes that are of great importance for the ETS functioning: (1) the change of the ETS authority and (2) the economic slowdown and its implications for the climate-energy policy complex. Our starting point was that the contextual political economy is fundamental to the ETS functioning, as it affects the policy design, the reforms in relevant fields and the policy effects in both prices and institutional practices. The validity of this starting point has been established in the context of the EU, where the ETS has been demonstrably shaped by the changing political economy.
然而,這些好處的實現受到中國政治經濟的特殊性所限制。自 2011 年中國首次提出該政策以來,排放交易體系的政治經濟格局已發生了重大變化。我們已經檢視了兩個對排放交易體系運作至關重要的重大變化:(1)排放交易體系權威的變化和(2)經濟放緩及其對氣候能源政策複雜性的影響。我們的出發點是,背景政治經濟對排放交易體系的運作至關重要,因為它影響政策設計、相關領域的改革以及價格和制度實踐方面的政策效果。這一出發點的有效性已在歐盟的背景下得到證實,歐盟的排放交易體系明顯受到不斷變化的政治經濟的影響。
We first focused on the change of the ETS authority from the NDRC to the MEE in 2018. Although the MEE has been upgraded to
我們首先專注於 2018 年從國家發展和改革委員會轉移到生態環境部的排放交易體系(ETS)權限變化。雖然生態環境部已經升級至

consolidate China's environmental competence and strengthen the enforcement of environmental policies, the authority change also likely increases the costs of coordinating climate change, economic, energy and financial policies. The NDRC had advantages in ETS governance as it could incorporate the ETS targets into economic and energy policies (Chang & Wang, 2010), and had more leverage to ensure compliance (Goron & Cassisa, 2017). The authority change split the economic-energy and climate dimensions of the ETS into two agencies. After the NDRC has regained the responsibility for emission reduction to attain the dual-carbon targets, the coordination of the ETS with the country's economic and energy strategies has been further complicated.
Carbon finance is another example of tensions among competing authorities. Carbon finance falls into the MEE's competence but it also involves the supervision and authority of the PBC, the SRC and the NDRC since it falls under the broad policy framework of green finance. Priorities and interests of competing agencies are thus a defining feature of carbon finance policy. The MEE as the environmental regulator is primarily motivated to promote investment and financing policies to achieve climate targets. In contrast, financial regulators such as the PBC and the SRC focus on market stability due to the past catastrophes in China's stock market and the spillover effects of the financial markets (Cao et al., 2022; Lo et al., 2020). Concerns about carbon financial market instability stem from the immature legal and market infrastructures. The dominance of a handful of stateowned enterprises could also result in market manipulation and speculation. The MEE lacks expertise and competence in financial regulation, and needs to rely on other authorities to design and implement policies. Therefore, prudence and stability have become central to China's carbon financial market, allowing only spot trading and a scattering of financial experiments by far.
碳金融是競爭當局之間緊張關係的另一個例子。碳金融屬於生態環境部的職權範圍,但也涉及中國人民銀行、證監會和國家發展和改革委員會的監督和權威,因為它屬於綠色金融的廣泛政策框架。競爭機構的優先事項和利益因此成為碳金融政策的一個決定性特徵。作為環境監管機構,生態環境部主要是為了促進投資和融資政策以實現氣候目標。相比之下,中國人民銀行和證監會等金融監管機構則專注於市場穩定,這是由於中國股市過去的災難和金融市場的波及效應所致。對於碳金融市場不穩定的擔憂源於法律和市場基礎設施的不成熟。少數國有企業的主導地位也可能導致市場操縱和投機。生態環境部在金融監管方面缺乏專業知識和能力,需要依賴其他當局來設計和實施政策。 因此,謹慎和穩定已成為中國碳金融市場的核心,到目前為止僅允許現貨交易和少量金融實驗。
Next, we reviewed the recent dynamics in China's climate-energy political economy, assessing the implications of the recent economic slowdown to the ETS institutional environment. Climate policy involves the tensions between short- and long-term interests (Purdon, 2015). In China, this is reflected in the government's hedging on its most important fuel: coal. Despite the broad agreement on the long-term socio-economic imperatives of coal phaseout, the economy still heavily relies on coal for short-term growth and energy security. Short-term interests are especially important for local governments that are incentivised to deliver strong economic performance, whereas the benefits of environmental regulations are longer-term and more difficult to quantify (Tan et al., 2021). The ETS has only had limited impact on the energy sector to date due to low carbon prices and market liquidity, and it faces many structural barriers such as the subsidies on fossil fuels, the highly regulated electricity market and impediments to renewable energy development. The government is accustomed to curb coal consumption with command-and-control policies. A functional ETS thus requires reforms in interconnected policy areas, which are constrained by the government's stances over the long-term interests and short-term impacts associated with climate policies. Although the government has ratcheted up efforts to reduce coal reliance since the early 2010 s, we found that its stance has wavered recently due to economic slowdown and the associated shift towards short-term priorities. Stringency of coal phase-out policies has waned at both the central and local government levels, and the country's coal consumption has rebounded as a result.
接下來,我們回顧了中國氣候能源政治經濟的最新動態,評估了最近經濟放緩對排放交易體系機構環境的影響。氣候政策涉及短期和長期利益之間的緊張關係(Purdon, 2015)。在中國,這在政府對其最重要燃料煤炭的態度上得到體現。儘管對煤炭淘汰的長期社經必要性存在廣泛共識,但經濟仍然在短期增長和能源安全方面嚴重依賴煤炭。短期利益對於被激勵提供強勁經濟表現的地方政府尤為重要,而環境法規的好處是長期的,更難量化(Tan et al., 2021)。到目前為止,排放交易體系對能源部門的影響有限,原因在於碳價低和市場流動性不足,並且面臨著許多結構性障礙,如對化石燃料的補貼、高度管制的電力市場和可再生能源發展的障礙。政府習慣於通過命令和控制政策來限制煤炭消耗。 因此,一個功能性的排放交易體系需要在相互關聯的政策領域進行改革,這些改革受到政府在氣候政策的長期利益和短期影響之間立場的限制。儘管政府自 2010 年初以來加大了減少對煤炭依賴的努力,但我們發現,由於經濟放緩和相應轉向短期優先事項,政府的立場最近出現了動搖。中央和地方政府的煤炭淘汰政策的嚴格性已經減弱,因此該國的煤炭消耗量也隨之反彈。
The two cases highlight a key challenge for China's climate policy: climate change remains less important than other priorities in the political agenda. In both cases, the interests and priorities of central authorities and local governments overrode climate policies, disturbing the ETS political economy. But the recent national dual-carbon targets may provide new momentum. By prioritising emission reduction in the country's political and economic agendas, they can create new incentives for bureaucratic agencies and local governments to implement climate policy. However, the impact of the deteriorating economic environment should not be underestimated. China's climate policy is still overshadowed by short-term economic interests, as the government clings to achieve its growth targets despite the mounting costs of doing so.
Our research makes several theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretically, we complement the ongoing political economy debates of emissions trading, adding that not only the ETS itself is a product of evolving political-economic circumstances, but also its implementation and performance are continuously shaped by the changing context. This has particular relevance to the current research on global climate policies. The drastic changes in global economic and geopolitical circumstances, along with the varying domestic factors and priorities, have informed distinctive political economy considerations across jurisdictions in regard to combating climate change. Tailored political economy research perspectives are thus of more importance in understanding the complexity of climate politics across countries and regions. Empirically, we have inquired about the impacts of the recent political reform and the evolving economic-energy circumstances on China's ETS, exploring the potential barriers to the implementation of the policy and generating new empirical insights. We argue that the tensions between the long-term socio-economic necessities and the shortterm economic interests are defining factors for the ETS functioning, and such tensions could be further magnified by the current politicaleconomic upheavals.
我們的研究在理論和實證上做出了幾項貢獻。從理論上講,我們補充了有關排放交易的政治經濟辯論,指出排放交易體系本身不僅是不斷演變的政治經濟環境的產物,而且其實施和表現也不斷受到不斷變化的背景塑造。這對當前全球氣候政策的研究具有特殊意義。全球經濟和地緣政治環境的急劇變化,以及不同國內因素和優先事項的變化,已經影響了各個司法管轄區在應對氣候變化方面的政治經濟考量。因此,量身定制的政治經濟研究觀點在理解各國和地區氣候政治的複雜性方面更加重要。在實證方面,我們探討了最近政治改革和不斷演變的經濟能源環境對中國排放交易體系的影響,探索了政策實施可能面臨的障礙,並產生了新的實證見解。 我們認為,長期社會經濟需求與短期經濟利益之間的緊張關係是確定碳排放交易體系運作的因素,這些緊張關係可能會被當前政治經濟動盪進一步放大。

5 | CONCLUSION 5 | 結論

China's climate policy has been constrained by the tensions between long-term socio-environmental necessities and short-term economic interests. Although the ETS provides a solution with economic cobenefits, its implementation and effects are still determined by the broader political-economic environment. We in this paper have explored the evolving context of China's ETS by focusing on the implications of two recent dynamics: (1) the change of the ETS authority and (2) the economic slow-down and its implications for the climateenergy policy complex. We find that the ETS in China is still overshadowed by the imminent economic interests and priorities of central authorities and local governments, which suggests that climate change has remained a topic with lower priority. The recent national targets

of achieving carbon peak and carbon neutrality may offer a fix by prioritising emission reduction in the political and economic agendas. Yet, as the economy is faltering due to the COVID-19 outbreaks and other geopolitical upheavals, imperatives of economic growth could again dominate the agenda and undermine climate policy ambitions. Future research is therefore needed on the implications of the deteriorating economic circumstances and the dual-carbon targets on China's climate ambitions.
實現碳峰和碳中和的途徑可能通過將減排置於政治和經濟議程的優先位置來提供解決方案。然而,由於 COVID-19 爆發和其他地緣政治動盪導致經濟陷入困境,經濟增長的必要性可能再次主導議程,並削弱氣候政策的雄心。因此,未來研究需要關注經濟環境惡化和中國氣候雄心的雙碳目標帶來的影響。


The authors would like to thank participants in the research project that forms the basis of this paper. This paper was supported financially by the Climate Research Bursary Fund from the Priestley International Centre for Climate in Leeds. Jouni Paavola was supported by funding from the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) to the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy (CCCEP) (ESRC grant number ES/K006576/1).
作者感謝參與形成本文基礎的研究項目的參與者。本文得到了利茲氣候國際中心的氣候研究獎學金的財務支持。Jouni Paavola 得到了英國經濟和社會研究委員會(ESRC)為氣候變化經濟與政策中心(CCCEP)提供的資助(ESRC 資助編號 ES/K006576/1)。


Zexiang Wang (1) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3686-7055 Jouni Paavola (1) https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5720-466X
王澤翔 (1) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3686-7055 朱尼·帕沃拉 (1) https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5720-466X


While some argued that in recent years China's environmental governance has experienced a process of politicisation with strong party disciplines (Shen & Jiang, 2021), in parallel, the market has still been repeatedly stressed as a crucial mechanism in resources allocation to promote governance efficiency on various occasions by the government and the Communist Party.
雖然有人認為近年來中國的環境治理已經經歷了一個政治化的過程,並受到強烈的黨紀黨風約束(沈&江,2021 年),但與此同時,政府和共產黨仍然一再強調市場作為資源配置的關鍵機制,以促進治理效率。
The NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission, 国家发展和改革委员会), formerly State Planning Commission and State Development Planning Commission, is a macroeconomic management agency with broad administrative and planning control over the economy. It has a higher administrative rank than most of the ministries in the government with the reputation of the 'mini-state council'. During 1998-2018, it was the competent authority of China's climate governance given the issue's economic, energy and diplomatic relevance. It also administrates the National Energy Administration (NEA, 国家能源局) responsible for formulating and implementing China's energy policies.
國家發展和改革委員會(NDRC,National Development and Reform Commission),前身為國家計劃委員會和國家發展計劃委員會,是一個具有廣泛經濟管理和規劃控制權的宏觀經濟管理機構。它在政府中具有比大多數部委更高的行政級別,被譽為“小國務院”。在 1998 年至 2018 年期間,它是中國氣候治理的主管機關,因為這個問題在經濟、能源和外交上具有重要意義。它還管理著負責制定和實施中國能源政策的國家能源局(NEA,National Energy Administration)。
Before 2018, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP, 环境保护部) did not have the authority of climate governance and was plagued by the problem of weak local enforcement of environmental regulations. In 2018, the MEP was upgraded into the MEE (Ministry of Ecology and Environment, 生态环境部) that has absorbed the climate change authority from the NDRC.
在 2018 年之前,环境保护部(MEP,环境保护部)沒有氣候治理的權限,並且受到地方執法環境法規的弱點困擾。2018 年,MEP 升級為 MEE(生態環境部),吸收了氣候變化權力從國家發展和改革委員會。
Carbon finance (tanjinrong, 碳金融) refers to financial instruments and investments applied in the ETS, such as futures, bonds, loans, equities and other forms of contracts concerning the trading of carbon allowances.
In 2014, the NDRC issued the first ETS regulation to guide domestic ETS activities (NDRC, 2014). As a departmental regulation, it had the lowest binding force in the legal system. The NDRC thus attempted to strengthen the ETS legal status in 2016, but due to the workload of the State Council, the proposal was shelved.
2014 年,國家發展和改革委員會發布了第一個排放交易體系法規來指導國內的排放交易活動(NDRC,2014)。作為一項部門法規,它在法律體系中具有最低的約束力。因此,NDRC 試圖在 2016 年加強排放交易體系的法律地位,但由於國務院的工作量,該提案被擱置。
Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China and Statista.
數據來自中國國家統計局和 Statista。
7 Data from Shanghai Environment Energy Exchange.
7 數據來自上海環境能源交易所。


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How to cite this article: Wang, Z., & Paavola, J. (2023). Emissions trading in China: New political economy dynamics. Environmental Policy and Governance, 33(5), 504-516. https:// doi.org/10.1002/eet. 2046


TABLE A1 Interview list
表 A1 訪談清單
No. Date Interviewee
1 09.2018 Academic scholar in environmental politics
2 10.2018 Academic scholar in climate economics
3 10.2018 Environmental NGO representative
4 11.2018 State-own enterprise in iron and steel sector
5 11.2018 Academic scholar in environmental politics
6 11.2018 Provincial-level NDRC officer
7 11.2018 Environmental NGO representative
8 12.2018 Academic scholar in environmental politics
9 12.2018 State-own enterprise in power sector
10 12.2018 Provincial-level environmental officer
11 04.2019 Provincial-level NDRC officer
12 04.2019 Environmental NGO representative
13 07.2019 Environmental journalist
14 09.2019 Environmental journalist
15 10.2019 Academic scholar in environmental economics
16 12.2019 Asset management fund in financial sector