I was born in 1980, which technically makes me a part of Generation X; there is at least one data point, though, that makes me a millennial. In 2021 Fast Company conducted a survey about what constituted middle age; millennials defined it as 35 to 50, while Generation X said 45 to 55 (Baby Boomers said 45 to 60).
我出生於 1980 年，從技術上來說我是 X 世代的一部分；然而，至少有一個數據點表明我是千禧一代。2021 年，《Fast Company》進行了一項關於中年定義的調查；千禧一代將其定義為 35 至 50 歲，而 X 世代則認為是 45 至 55 歲（嬰兒潮一代認為是 45 至 60 歲）。
For my part, I wrote that Apple was in its middle age in 2018, when the company was 42 years old, a solidly millennial definition. My argument then was that Apple was increasingly — and rightly — behaving like an incumbent in a market that was no longer growing. That meant that future iPhone growth would come from (1) more expensive iPhones, (2) selling more devices to existing iPhone users (AirPods, Watches, etc.), and (3) accelerating the revenue it derived from services for iPhone users.
對我來說，我在 2018 年寫道蘋果公司已經進入中年，當時公司已經 42 歲，這是一個堅實的千禧一代定義。當時我的觀點是蘋果越來越像一個市場上不再增長的現有企業，這是正確的。這意味著未來 iPhone 的增長將來自於（1）更昂貴的 iPhone，（2）向現有 iPhone 用戶銷售更多設備（AirPods，手錶等），以及（3）加速從為 iPhone 用戶提供服務中獲得的收入。
That is exactly what the company did over the ensuing few years, but 2022 brought a bit of a surprise: Apple, in the face of the worst inflation in a generation, declined to raise the price of the iPhone, which in real terms meant an iPhone Pro, nominally priced at $999, was $116 cheaper than it had been two years prior.
這正是公司在接下來的幾年裡所做的事情，但 2022 年帶來了一點驚喜：蘋果在面對一代人中最嚴重的通脹時，拒絕提高 iPhone 的價格，這實際上意味著一部名義上定價為 999 美元的 iPhone Pro 比兩年前便宜了 116 美元。
I thought this was a big deal at the time; I wrote in The Services iPhone:
當時我認為這是一件大事；我在《服務 iPhone》中寫道：
This doesn’t make much sense for the product company Apple has always been thought to be, and doesn’t fully align with the approach I laid out in Apple’s Middle Age. It does, though, make all kinds of sense for a services company, which is focused first-and-foremost on increasing its install base. Indeed, this is the missing piece from that Update I wrote about Apple’s changing metrics. To measure its business based on users, not products, was to measure like a services company; to lower the prices of the products that lead to services revenue is to price like one.
這對於一直被認為是產品公司的蘋果公司來說並沒有太多意義，也並不完全符合我在蘋果公司中期所制定的方法。然而，對於一家專注於增加其安裝基數的服務公司來說，這確實是有各種意義的。事實上，這是我關於蘋果變化指標的那篇更新中缺少的一塊。根據用戶而不是產品來衡量其業務，就像一家服務公司一樣；降低導致服務收入的產品價格，就像定價一樣。
Here’s another aspect of getting old: it’s hard to let go of the preconceptions of your youth. In yesterday’s Update I wrote that I believed that Apple would surely raise prices this year; that $999 iPhone Pro is now $177 cheaper than in 2020 in real terms, and given the fact that Apple was increasing the bill of materials on the lower end phones in particular (bumping them to 8GB RAM, and onto the latest TSMC process), surely they wouldn’t accept the hit on margins on top of the loss in value of their longstanding iPhone pricing.
這是變老的另一個方面：很難放下年輕時的先入為主。在昨天的更新中，我寫道，我相信蘋果今年肯定會提高價格；那款 999 美元的 iPhone Pro 現在比 2020 年實際上便宜了 177 美元，考慮到蘋果尤其在低端手機上增加了材料成本（將它們提升到 8GB RAM，並採用最新的 TSMC 工藝），他們肯定不會接受那種邊際損失以及他們長期 iPhone 價格的貶值。
| 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 year old iPhone 2 歲的 iPhone |
$499 | $477 | $441 | $422 | $411 |
| 1 year old iPhone 1 歲的 iPhone |
$599 | $572 | $530 | $507 | $493 |
| New iPhone 新 iPhone | $799 | $763 | $707 | $676 | $657 |
| iPhone Pro | $999 | $954 | $883 | $846 | $822 |
| iPhone Pro Max | $1,099 | $1,050 | $972 | $1,015 | $904 |
In fact, though, I had it right in 2022: Apple held the line on prices once again; I should have realized the company — like myself! — really is in a different stage.
事實上，2022 年我是對的：蘋果再次堅守價格不變；我應該意識到這家公司——就像我自己一樣！——真的處於不同的階段。
The iPhone Event iPhone 發布會
The lack of a price increase for the iPhone 16 Pro made more sense when I watched Apple’s presentation; I found the updates over the iPhone 15 Pro to be pretty underwhelming. The A18 Pro chip is on TSMC’s newest 3nm process, there is a new Camera Control button, and the screen is a bit bigger with bezels that are a bit smaller; that’s really about it from a hardware perspective, although as always, Apple continues to push the envelope with computational photography. And, frankly, that’s fine: last year’s iPhone Pro 15, the first with titanium and USB-C, was for me the iPhone I had been waiting for (and most customers don’t upgrade every year, so these and other previous updates will be new features for them).
iPhone 16 Pro 的價格沒有上漲，當我觀看蘋果的演示時，這更合理；我覺得相較於 iPhone 15 Pro，iPhone 16 Pro 的更新相當令人失望。A18 Pro 芯片採用 TSMC 最新的 3nm 製程，新增了一個新的相機控制按鈕，螢幕稍微變大，邊框也變小了一點；從硬體角度來看，這就是全部了，儘管蘋果一如既往地在計算攝影方面不斷突破。老實說，這樣也挺好：去年的 iPhone Pro 15 是首款搭載鈦和 USB-C 的 iPhone，對我來說是一直以來期待的 iPhone（大多數客戶並不每年都升級，因此這些以及之前的更新對他們來說都是新功能）。
What I find much more compelling — and arguably the best deal in iPhone history — is the $799 iPhone 16 (non-Pro). The A18 chip appears to be a binned version of the A18 Pro (there is one less GPU and smaller caches), while the aforementioned bump to 8GB of RAM — necessary to run Apple Intelligence — matches the iPhone 16 Pro. There is one fewer camera, but the two-camera system that remains has been reconfigured to a much more aesthetically pleasing pill shape that has the added bonus of making it possible to record spatial video when held horizontally. The screen isn’t quite as good, and the bezels are a bit larger, but the colors are more fun. It’s a great phone, and the closest the regular iPhone has been to the Pro since the line separated in 2017.
我發現更具吸引力的是，也可以說是 iPhone 歷史上最划算的交易，就是售價為 799 美元的 iPhone 16（非 Pro 版）。A18 芯片似乎是 A18 Pro 的一個經篩選版本（少了一個 GPU 和較小的快取），同時前述的 8GB RAM 升級 — 這是運行蘋果智慧的必要條件 — 與 iPhone 16 Pro 相匹配。相機減少了一個，但剩下的雙攝系統已經重新配置成更具美感的藥丸形狀，這不僅使橫向拍攝時能夠記錄空間視頻，還增加了額外的好處。螢幕不如 Pro 版好，邊框稍微寬一些，但色彩更加有趣。這是一款很棒的手機，也是自 2017 年分開以來，普通 iPhone 與 Pro 版之間最接近的一款。
It’s also the more important phone when it comes to Apple’s long-term addressable market. The non-pro iPhones are the ones that stay on sale for years (the iPhone 14 just received its expected price drop to $599); one potential consideration for Apple in terms of price is that it wants to move the 8GB RAM iPhone 16 down the line sooner rather than later; a price raise, if it meant keeping a 6GB RAM iPhone for sale one year longer, could be bad for Apple Intelligence.
這也是蘋果長期可開發市場中更重要的手機。非 Pro 版 iPhone 會長時間銷售（iPhone 14 剛剛降價至 599 美元）；蘋果在價格方面的一個潛在考慮是，它希望盡早將 8GB RAM 的 iPhone 16 推出市場；如果提高價格意味著將 6GB RAM 的 iPhone 銷售時間延長一年，這對蘋果智能來說可能是不利的。
Apple Intelligence, meanwhile, is the great hope when it comes to driving new iPhone sales: Apple shareholders are hoping for an AI-driven “supercycle”, when consumers, eager for Apple Intelligence features, update their iPhones to one of the latest models with sufficient RAM to run Apple’s new tentpole offering.
蘋果智能，與此同時，是推動新 iPhone 銷售的重要希望：蘋果股東希望透過人工智能驅動的“超級週期”，當消費者渴望蘋果智能功能時，將他們的 iPhone 更新為具有足夠 RAM 運行蘋果新的支柱產品之一的最新型號。
Apple’s Crossing Lines 蘋果的跨界
Notice, though, that this hope itself speaks to how Apple is at a different stage in life: the big hardware changes this year are at the low end; one of the takeaways from AI is that we are well and truly into the age of software-driven differentiation. This is hardly a surprise; I wrote in 2016’s Everything as a Service:
請注意，這種希望本身表明蘋果處於生命的不同階段：今年的重大硬體變化出現在低端；從人工智慧中得出的一個結論是，我們確實進入了軟體驅動差異化時代。這幾乎不足為奇；我在 2016 年的《一切皆服務》中寫道：
Apple has arguably perfected the manufacturing model: most of the company’s corporate employees are employed in California in the design and marketing of iconic devices that are created in Chinese factories built and run to Apple’s exacting standards (including a substantial number of employees on site), and then transported all over the world to consumers eager for best-in-class smartphones, tablets, computers, and smartwatches.
蘋果可以說已經完善了製造模式：公司的大多數企業員工在加利福尼亞州從事設計和營銷具有標誌性的設備，這些設備是在中國的工廠中按照蘋果嚴格的標準建造和運營的（包括現場的大量員工），然後運送到世界各地，供渴望擁有最佳智能手機、平板電腦、電腦和智能手錶的消費者使用。What makes this model so effective — and so profitable — is that Apple has differentiated its otherwise commoditizable hardware with software. Software is a completely new type of good in that it is both infinitely differentiable yet infinitely copyable; this means that any piece of software is both completely unique yet has unlimited supply, leading to a theoretical price of $0. However, by combining the differentiable qualities of software with hardware that requires real assets and commodities to manufacture, Apple is able to charge an incredible premium for its products.
這款模型如此有效且如此有利可圖的原因在於蘋果通過軟體將其本來可以通用化的硬體產品區隔開來。軟體是一種全新的商品，因為它既具有無限的差異性又可以無限複製；這意味著任何一款軟體都是獨一無二的，但供應量卻是無限的，導致理論價格為 0 美元。然而，蘋果將軟體的可區分特性與需要實際資產和商品製造的硬體結合在一起，因此能夠為其產品收取令人難以置信的高價。The results speak for themselves: this past “down” quarter saw Apple rake in $50.6 billion in revenue and $10.5 billion in profit. Over the last nine years the iPhone alone has generated $600 billion in revenue and nearly $250 billion in gross profit. It is probably the most valuable — the “best”, at least from a business perspective — manufactured product of all time.
結果不言自明：過去這個“低潮”季度，蘋果公司獲得了 506 億美元的收入和 105 億美元的利潤。僅在過去九年中，iPhone 就帶來了 6000 億美元的收入和近 2500 億美元的毛利潤。從商業角度來看，這可能是有史以來價值最高的製造產品。
In the eight years since then the iPhone has driven another $1.4 trillion in revenue and something around $625 billion in profit;
從那時起的八年裡，iPhone 帶動了另外 1.4 兆美元的收入和大約 6250 億美元的利潤；
它在公司兩者方面仍然名列前茅。然而，就收入而言，不依賴底層硬體有多好的軟體服務，則排名第二：
The comparison is even more striking when you look at profit (again, with the assumption that iPhones have a 45% gross profit margin):
比較更加引人注目的是當您查看利潤時（再次假設 iPhone 的毛利率為 45％）：
Jason Snell already noted the impending convergence of the overall product and services profit lines at Six Colors:
Jason Snell 已經注意到 Six Colors 整體產品和服務利潤線的即將匯聚
But what about the bottom line? While Apple’s Services gross margin was 74% last quarter, products was only a measly 35%. (I’m kidding—35% margin on hardware is actually a really great number. It just can’t compare to Services, because hardware has some fundamental costs that services just don’t.)
但底線呢？蘋果上季服務的毛利率為 74%，產品則只有微不足道的 35%。（開玩笑的，硬體 35%的毛利率實際上是一個非常好的數字。只是無法與服務相比，因為硬體有一些基本成本，服務則沒有。）Let’s look at total profits:
讓我們來看總利潤：
Last quarter, Apple made about $22 billion in profit from products and $18 billion from Services. It’s the closest those two lines have ever come to each other.
上一季，蘋果從產品獲利約 220 億美元，從服務獲利約 180 億美元。這是這兩條線迄今為止最接近的一次。This is what was buzzing in the back of my head as I was going over all the numbers on Thursday. We’re not quite there yet, but it’s hard to imagine that there won’t be a quarter in the next year or so in which Apple reports more total profit on Services than on products.
這就是我在星期四查看所有數字時腦海中盤旋的想法。我們還沒有完全達到那個水平，但很難想像在未來一年左右的某個季度，蘋果報告的服務總利潤會超過產品利潤。When that happens, is Apple still a products company? Or has it crossed some invisible line?
當這種情況發生時，蘋果還是一家產品公司嗎？還是已經跨越了某條看不見的界線？
Snell concludes his piece by imploring Apple to “remember where you came from”; hardware is what makes the whole thing work. I’m sympathetic to Snell’s case, because Apple the integrated hardware company is both an entity I admire and one that — as evidenced by my mistaken prediction yesterday — still looms large in my mind. Moreover, you can can (and should) make the case that Services revenue and profit is just an accounting distinction for what is just more hardware revenue and profit, because it is the latter that unlocks the former.
Snell 在文章中以懇求蘋果“記得自己的根源”作結。硬體是整個系統運作的關鍵。我對 Snell 的觀點表示同情，因為作為一家我敬佩的整合硬體公司，蘋果仍然在我的腦海中占據著重要位置，正如昨天我錯誤的預測所證明的那樣。此外，你可以（也應該）提出這樣的觀點，即服務收入和利潤只是硬體收入和利潤的會計區別，因為後者才是前者的關鍵。
That, though, is why I broke out the iPhone specifically: I think the invisible line Snell talks about has already been crossed. Yes, next quarter’s iPhone numbers will jump back up thanks to seasonality, but this is now three straight years of Apple either favoring its more reliably growing Services business (by increasing the iPhone’s addressable market by lowering real prices) or admitting that it doesn’t have the pricing power that drove up product revenue in their middle age.
不過，這就是為什麼我特別提到了 iPhone：我認為 Snell 所談到的隱形界線已經被突破。是的，由於季節性因素，下一季的 iPhone 銷售數字將會反彈，但蘋果已經連續三年要麼偏好其增長可靠的服務業務（通過降低實際價格擴大 iPhone 的潛在市場），要麼承認在中年時期推高產品收入的定價能力已經不復存在。
Boomer Apple 博默蘋果
This is not, to be clear, an “Apple is Doomed” post; Apple hardware is still very good, and in lots of small ways that go beyond new buttons. I’ve been exploring the Android market over the past few weeks and there is a level of “it just works” that still differentiates the iPhone, particularly in terms of overall system integration (relative to the Pixel, which has a poor modem and problematic battery life) and worldwide reliability (relative to Samsung devices that are endlessly segmented in weird ways across markets, a hangup for me in particular).
這並不是一篇“蘋果命運堪憂”的文章；蘋果的硬體仍然非常出色，而且在許多小地方都超越了新按鈕。過去幾個星期我一直在探索 Android 市場，iPhone 仍然在“只要用就行”的程度上有所區別，特別是在整體系統整合方面（相對於 Pixel，後者具有較差的調製解調器和問題多多的電池壽命）以及全球可靠性方面（相對於三星設備，在各個市場以奇怪的方式無休止地分割，這對我來說是一個障礙）。
Moreover, it’s hardly a condemnation for hardware to become “good enough”, and to decrease in price over time; that has been the path of basically all consumer electronics.
此外，硬體變得“足夠好”並隨著時間降價並非一種譴責；這基本上是所有消費性電子產品的發展路徑。
It’s impressive that Apple was innovative enough to resist gravity for as long as it did.
蘋果能夠在如此長的時間內創新到足以抵抗重力，這令人印象深刻。
And, of course, there is the lock-in endemic to software: iMessage only works on iPhones,
當然，軟體固有的鎖定效應也是一個問題：iMessage 只能在 iPhone 上運作
這裡有您已經購買的所有應用程式，以及在特定生態系統中多年的肌肉記憶。有只能與 iPhone 配合或最佳運作的手錶和 AirPods，以及與 Mac 深度整合。蘋果的晶片仍然是最佳的，公司在隱私方面的投資可能在人們信任蘋果在設備和他們的新私有雲中利用他們的個人數據時得到回報。
That, though, is the rub: Craig Federighi, Apple’s software chief, usually doesn’t appear at the iPhone event; his domain is the Worldwide Developers Conference in June, and yet here he was in front of the camera for ten minutes.
然而，這就是問題所在：蘋果軟體主管克雷格·費德里吉通常不會出現在 iPhone 活動上；他的領域是每年六月的全球開發者大會，但這次他卻在鏡頭前出現了十分鐘。
Software, specifically AI, is what will drive differentiation going forward, and even in the best case scenario, where Apple’s AI efforts are good enough to keep people from switching to Google, the economics of software development push towards broad availability on every iPhone, not special features for people willing to pay a bit more. It’s as if the iPhone, which started out as one model for everyone before bifurcating into the Pro and regular (and SE) lines, is coming full circle to standardization; the difference, though, is its value is harvested through R&D intensive services that need to run everywhere, instead of unit profits driven by hardware differentiation.
軟體，特別是人工智慧，將是未來推動差異化的關鍵，即使在最理想的情況下，蘋果的人工智慧努力足夠好，可以阻止人們轉向谷歌，軟體開發的經濟學趨向於在每部 iPhone 上普遍提供，而不是為願意多付一點錢的人提供特殊功能。就像 iPhone 最初是為所有人設計的一款型號，然後分裂成 Pro 和常規（以及 SE）系列，現在又回到標準化；不同之處在於，其價值是通過需要在各處運行的研發密集型服務來實現，而不是通過硬體差異化帶來的單位利潤。
So what stage of life is this, where you are banking on your earlier investments for your moat, and having no choice but to strive for good enough on the hot new trends that don’t quite fit your model? Maybe it’s the age where you’re worried about things like irregular heart beats, sleep apnea, or hearing loss. I’m not meaning to make fun of the health features that are an ever larger focus of these events; these are incredible applications of technology that Apple is right to brag about. Indeed, these features make me want to wear an Apple Watch or use AirPods.
這是人生的哪個階段呢？你依賴早期的投資來保護自己，卻不得不努力追求熱門新趨勢，即使這些趨勢並不完全符合你的模式。也許這是你擔心心跳不規則、睡眠呼吸暫停或聽力喪失等問題的年齡。我並不是在取笑這些活動中越來越受關注的健康功能；這些都是蘋果科技的驕傲所在。事實上，這些功能讓我想戴著蘋果手錶或使用 AirPods。
But I’m old, and so enamored of the companies of my youth that I ignored my own (correct!) analysis of Apple’s shift in a desire to believe that this was still a product company that could wow me and charge me like it did in 2020. This is a services company now; the hardware is necessary, but insufficient for long-term growth. So it goes.
但我年紀大了，對我年輕時代的公司情有獨鍾，以至於忽略了我自己對蘋果轉變的（正確！）分析，希望相信這仍然是一家能讓我驚艷並像 2020 年那樣向我收費的產品公司。現在這是一家服務公司；硬體是必要的，但對於長期增長來說是不夠的。就這樣。
I am assuming 45% profit margins for the iPhone. Many iPhone models have reported gross profit margins of 50% or more, but those reports are based on the physical components of the phone, and do not include the attributed cost of software; therefore I am using 45% as a best guess to be conservative in terms of the following argument, but I would guess the true margin, including fully attributed R&D costs, is closer to 40% ↩
Although this can be worked around using services like AirMessage ↩
