Now revised and containing three new chapters, this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, a priori knowledge, naturalized epistemology, and the epistemic significance of testimony and disagreement. Intended primarily for students taking their first classes in epistemology, this lucid and well-written text will provide an excellent introduction to anyone interested in knowing more about this important area of philosophy.
本书经过修订，新增三章，清晰易懂地介绍了认识论或知识论。书中讨论了一些主要的理由理论，包括基础主义、连贯主义、可靠主义和美德认识论。其他主题包括格蒂埃问题、内部主义和外部主义、怀疑论、认识论循环问题、先验知识、归化认识论以及证词和分歧的认识论意义。这本书主要面向修读认识论第一堂课的学生，但对于任何有兴趣了解这一重要哲学领域的人来说，这本文字清晰、文笔优美的书都将是一本极好的入门读物。

Cover illustration: Image courtesy of John Lund/Stone/Getty Images. Series cover design: Sue Watson
封面插图：图片来源：John Lund/Stone/Getty Images。系列封面设计：苏-沃森
Noah Lemos is the Leslie and Naomi Legum Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The College of William & Mary. He is the author of Intrinsic Value (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and common Sense (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and is co-editor of The Journal of Ethics.
诺亚-莱莫斯是威廉玛丽学院莱斯利和纳奥米-莱格姆杰出哲学教授。他著有《内在价值》（剑桥大学出版社，1994 年）和《常识》（剑桥大学出版社，2004 年），还是《伦理学杂志》的联合编辑。
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS www.cambridge.org
剑桥大学出版社 www.cambridge.org

ISBN 978-1-108-49867-8

Now revised and containing three new chapters, this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, a priori knowledge, naturalized epistemology, and the epistemic significance of testimony and disagreement. Intended primarily for students taking their first classes in epistemology, this lucid and well-written text will provide an excellent introduction to anyone interested in knowing more about this important area of philosophy.
本书经过修订，新增三章，清晰易懂地介绍了认识论或知识论。书中讨论了一些主要的理由理论，包括基础主义、连贯主义、可靠主义和美德认识论。其他主题包括格蒂埃问题、内部主义和外部主义、怀疑论、认识论循环问题、先验知识、归化认识论以及证词和分歧的认识论意义。这本书主要面向修读认识论第一堂课的学生，但对于任何有兴趣了解这一重要哲学领域的人来说，这本文字清晰、文笔优美的书都将是一本极好的入门读物。

noAH lemos is the Leslie and Naomi Legum Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at The College of William & Mary. He is the author of Intrinsic Value (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Common Sense (Cambridge University Press, 2004), and is co-editor of The Journal of Ethics.
NoAH Lemos 是威廉玛丽学院 Leslie and Naomi Legum 特聘哲学教授。他著有《内在价值》（剑桥大学出版社，1994 年）和《常识》（剑桥大学出版社，2004 年），还是《伦理学杂志》的联合编辑。

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Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.
剑桥大学出版社是剑桥大学的一部分。

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
它通过传播知识来追求国际最高水平的教育、学习和研究，从而推进大学的使命。

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108498678
有关此标题的信息： www.cambridge.org/9781108498678

DOI:  DOI：

(c) Noah Lemos 2007, 2021

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
本出版物受版权保护。除法定例外情况和相关集体许可协议的规定外，未经剑桥大学出版社书面许可，不得复制本出版物的任何部分。

First published 2007 2007 年首次出版

10th printing 2016 2016 年第 10 次印刷

Second edition 2021 2021 年第二版

Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ Books Limited, Padstow Cornwall
英国帕德斯托康沃尔 TJ Books 有限公司印刷

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.
大英图书馆可提供该出版物的目录记录。

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
美国国会图书馆编目-出版数据

Names: Lemos, Noah Marcelino, 1956-author.
姓名莱莫斯、诺亚-马塞利诺，1956 年--作者。

Title: An introduction to the theory of knowledge / Noah Lemos.
标题：知识理论导论 / 诺亚-莱莫斯。

Description: Second edition. | Cambridge ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2021. I Includes bibliographical references and index.
内容简介第二版。| 剑桥；纽约：剑桥大学出版社，2021 年。I 包括参考书目和索引。

Identifiers: LCCN 2020021933 (print) | LCCN 2020021934 (ebook) | ISBN 9781108498678
标识符：LCCN 2020021933（印刷版） | LCCN 2020021934（电子书） | ISBN 9781108498678

(hardback) | ISBN 9781108724401 (paperback) | ISBN 9781108595162 (ebook)
(精装本） | ISBN 9781108724401（平装本） | ISBN 9781108595162（电子书）

Subjects: LCSH: Knowledge, Theory of.
科目：LCSH: Knowledge, Theory of.

Classification: LCC BD161 .L375 2021 (print) | LCC BD161 (ebook) | DDC 121-dc23
分类：LCC BD161 .L375 2021 (print) | LCC BD161 (ebook) | DDC 121-dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020021933
LC 记录见 https://lccn.loc.gov/2020021933

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020021934
LC 电子书记录可从 https://lccn.loc.gov/2020021934 获取

ISBN 978-1-108-49867-8 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-108-49867-8 精装本

ISBN 978-1-108-72440-1 Paperback
ISBN 978-1-108-72440-1 平装本

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
剑桥大学出版社对本出版物中提及的外部或第三方互联网网站 URL 的持续性或准确性不承担任何责任，也不保证此类网站上的任何内容现在或将来都是准确或适当的。

For Jill 吉尔

Preface to the Second Edition page ix
第二版前言第 ix 页
1 Knowledge, Truth, and Justification ..... 1
1 知识、真理与称义 .....1
2 The Traditional Analysis and the Gettier Problem ..... 22
2 传统分析和格蒂埃问题 .....22
3 Foundationalism ..... 46
3 基础主义 .....46
4 The Coherence Theory of Justification ..... 70
4 辩证的一致性理论 .....70
5 Reliabilism and Virtue Epistemology ..... 91
5 可靠论与美德认识论 .....91
6 Internalism and Externalism about Justification ..... 115
6 关于正义的内部主义和外部主义 .....115
7 Epistemic Circularity ..... 134
7 认识论的循环性 .....134
8 Skepticism ..... 151
8 怀疑论 .....151
9 The Problem of the Criterion ..... 177
9 标准问题 .....177
10 The A Priori ..... 198
10 先验论 .....198
11 Naturalized Epistemology ..... 219
11 自然化认识论 .....219
12 Testimony and Disagreement ..... 237
12 证词与分歧 .....237
Select Bibliography ..... 261
选择书目 .....261
Index ..... 273 索引 .....273

The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, is one of the main areas of philosophy. Some of the problems are as old as Plato, yet they remain alive and interesting today. This book is intended to introduce readers to some of the main problems in epistemology and to some proposed solutions. It is primarily intended for students taking their first course in the theory of knowledge, but it should also be useful to generally educated readers interested in learning something about epistemology. I do not assume that the reader has an extensive background in philosophy.
知识理论或认识论是哲学的主要领域之一。其中的一些问题与柏拉图一样古老，但它们在今天依然具有生命力和趣味性。本书旨在向读者介绍认识论中的一些主要问题以及一些建议的解决方案。本书主要面向学习知识论第一课的学生，但对于有兴趣了解认识论的受过高等教育的普通读者来说，它也应该是有用的。我并不假定读者具有广泛的哲学背景。

In writing an introductory text, one must balance many things. I have sought to strike a balance between impartial presentation and advocacy. In general, I have tried to be fair and neutral between competing positions, yet in some places I defend various views. I have also sought to hit the mean between breadth and depth of coverage. I have not tried to cover every important or recent position or to cover every recent development within the views I discuss. I have not, for example, included discussions of formal epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, or detailed discussions of the ethics of belief. Some of these, such as formal epistemology, are likely beyond the level of students taking a first course in epistemology. Instead, I have tried to focus with clarity on some main features of a few major positions, issues, and debates. I hope this approach will be helpful to readers seeking an introduction to epistemology, and I would urge anyone interested in more information to make good use of the notes provided in-text, as they provide helpful guidance for further reading. In balancing breadth and depth of coverage, I have tried to hit the mean, but, as Aristotle says, the mean rests with perception. I apologize for my blind spots.
在撰写介绍性文章时，必须兼顾许多方面。我力求在不偏不倚的介绍和宣传之间取得平衡。总的来说，我试图在相互竞争的立场之间保持公正和中立，但在某些地方我也为各种观点辩护。我还力求在报道的广度和深度之间取得平衡。我没有试图涵盖每一个重要或最新的立场，也没有试图涵盖我所讨论观点的每一个最新发展。例如，我没有包括对形式认识论、实用主义侵蚀的讨论，也没有包括对信仰伦理的详细讨论。其中有些内容，如形式认识论，可能超出了学习认识论第一课的学生的水平。相反，我试图把重点放在几个主要立场、问题和争论的一些主要特征上。我希望这种方法能对寻求认识论入门的读者有所帮助，同时我也建议对更多信息感兴趣的读者充分利用文中提供的注释，因为它们为进一步阅读提供了有益的指导。在兼顾覆盖面的广度和深度时，我尽量做到中规中矩，但正如亚里士多德所说，中庸在于知觉。对于我的盲点，我深表歉意。

This second edition contains new material reflecting some important developments since the publication of the first edition. The first edition contained, for example, a single chapter on externalism, internalism, and
第二版包含新材料，反映了自第一版出版以来的一些重要发展。例如，第一版只包含了关于外部论、内部论和外部论的一章。
the problem of epistemic circularity. This edition has a new chapter devoted solely to the debate on externalism and internalism about justification. This allows for a deeper examination of the issues than was offered in the first edition. This edition also includes a new chapter devoted to the problem of epistemic circularity that includes new material addressing that vexing issue. In addition, this new edition includes an entirely new chapter that deals with the epistemology of testimony and disagreement. There have been many important contributions to the growing field of social epistemology, and this new chapter focuses on some of the recent developments not covered in the first edition.
认识论的循环性问题。本版新增一章，专门讨论关于正当性的外部主义和内部主义之争。这使得对这些问题的探讨比第一版更为深入。本版还新增一章，专门讨论认识论循环问题，其中包括解决这一棘手问题的新材料。此外，新版还增加了全新的一章，论述证言和分歧的认识论。对于不断发展的社会认识论领域，已有许多重要贡献，而这一新篇章则侧重于第一版中未涉及的一些最新进展。

In addition to these new chapters, much new material has been added to the other chapters. For example, the chapter on foundationalism presents the problem of the speckled hen as a challenge to certain forms of foundationalism, and presents and examines Phenomenal Conservatism as a response to that challenge. Phenomenal Conservatism is an important version of foundationalism and deserves attention in our consideration of foundationalist views. The chapter on reliablilism and virtue epistemology has been re-written to include an entirely updated discussion of Sosa's recent work on virtue epistemology. It reflects his views on knowledge and justification as they have developed since the publication of the first edition. Finally, I would note that the chapter on the Gettier problem and subsequent attempts to analyze knowledge includes a brief discussion of Williamson's view that knowledge is a simple and unanalyzable concept. There are other changes and additions as well, but it would be tiresome to try to catalog them all.
除了这些新章节外，其他章节也增加了许多新材料。例如，关于基础主义的一章提出了斑点母鸡问题，作为对某些形式的基础主义的挑战，并提出和研究了现象保守主义，作为对这一挑战的回应。现象保守主义是基础主义的一个重要版本，值得我们在考虑基础主义观点时加以关注。关于可靠主义和美德认识论的章节已经重新撰写，对索萨最近在美德认识论方面的工作进行了全面更新的讨论。这一章反映了他自第一版出版以来对知识和正当性的看法。最后，我想指出的是，关于格蒂埃问题和随后对知识进行分析的尝试的章节，包含了对威廉姆森关于知识是一个简单且不可分析的概念的观点的简短讨论。本书还有其他一些改动和增补，但要一一列举会很累人。

In Chapter 1, I distinguish between some senses of "knows" and note that our primary focus will be on propositional knowledge. I introduce the traditional view that propositional knowledge is justified true belief, and discuss in a general way the concepts of belief, truth, and justification. In Chapter 2, we consider some problems for this traditional view, problems made prominent in a brief essay by Edmund Gettier. Much of Chapter 2 is devoted to considering some simple ways of analyzing or defining knowledge that avoid the problems to which Gettier calls our attention. Unfortunately, none of these are successful, but they represent some basic attempts upon which others have tried to improve. As noted above, I also discuss briefly Williamson's view that knowledge is a simple, unanalyzable mental state, and, that therefore, attempts to analyze the concept of knowledge rest on a
在第 1 章中，我区分了 "知道 "的几种含义，并指出我们将主要关注命题知识。我介绍了命题知识是有理由的真信念这一传统观点，并一般性地讨论了信念、真理和理由等概念。在第 2 章中，我们将考虑这一传统观点的一些问题，这些问题在埃德蒙-盖蒂埃（Edmund Gettier）的一篇短文中得到了突出的体现。第 2 章的大部分篇幅都用来考虑一些分析或定义知识的简单方法，以避免盖蒂埃提请我们注意的问题。遗憾的是，这些方法都不成功，但它们代表了一些基本尝试，其他人曾试图在此基础上加以改进。如上所述，我还简要讨论了威廉姆森的观点，他认为知识是一种简单的、不可分析的精神状态，因此，分析知识概念的尝试是建立在对知识进行分析的基础之上的。
mistake. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, we explore some views about what makes beliefs justified. In these chapters we will look at versions of foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. I have tried not to discuss every version or nuance of these views. Most likely, too much detail would overwhelm the readers and prevent them from understanding the main points of the theory. In Chapter 6, I distinguish between two main forms of internalism about justification before taking up the debate between internalism and externalism. Various arguments in support of internalism are considered critically. In Chapter 7 we turn to the problem of epistemic circularity. The problem of epistemic circularity arises when we consider how we can know that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. Can one use a way of forming beliefs to support the belief that that way of forming beliefs is reliable? Can one use memory, for example, to support the belief that memory is a reliable way of forming beliefs? Chapter 8 addresses the problem of skepticism. We consider several skeptical arguments and consider some main responses to them. These include the Moorean response, the relevant alternatives response, the contextualist response, and the inference to the best explanation response. In Chapter 9, we turn to the problem of the criterion. We focus on Roderick Chisholm's formulation of the problem and his favored position, "particularism." Throughout much of this book, we will appeal to particular examples of knowledge and justification in assessing criteria of knowledge and justification. Is this an epistemically unsatisfactory procedure? In Chapter 10, we will explore some views about a priori knowledge and justification, and consider whether our a priori knowledge and justification are confined to what is "analytic." Chapter 11 examines some central themes in naturalistic epistemology and considers some forms that naturalistic epistemology might take. Chapter 12 examines some main views in the epistemology of testimony and disagreement. We examine some views about the nature of testimony and the debate between "reductionism" and "non-reductionism" about testimony. We also explore some main views concerning the epistemology of disagreement. What, for example, is the reasonable stance for us to take when we find that our "epistemic peers" disagree with us about some proposition? Should we suspend judgment, stick to our guns, or modify our views in some other way?
错误。在第 3、4 和 5 章中，我们将探讨一些关于信念合理性的观点。在这几章中，我们将探讨基础主义、连贯主义、可靠主义和美德认识论的版本。我尽量不讨论这些观点的每一个版本或细微差别。很可能，过多的细节会让读者不知所措，无法理解理论的要点。在第 6 章中，在讨论内部主义与外部主义的争论之前，我区分了关于正当性的内部主义的两种主要形式。我对支持内部主义的各种论点进行了批判性的思考。在第 7 章中，我们将讨论认识论的循环性问题。当我们考虑如何才能知道我们形成信念的方式是可靠的时候，认识论的循环性问题就出现了。我们能否利用形成信念的方式来支持这种信念，即形成信念的方式是可靠的？例如，我们能否利用记忆来支持 "记忆是形成信念的可靠方式 "这一信念？第 8 章讨论了怀疑论的问题。我们考虑了几个怀疑论的论点，并思考了对这些论点的一些主要回应。这些回应包括摩尔回应、相关替代回应、情境主义回应和最佳解释推论回应。在第 9 章中，我们将讨论标准问题。我们将重点讨论罗德里克-奇肖姆对这一问题的表述及其所偏爱的立场--"特殊主义"。在本书的大部分内容中，我们在评估知识和理由的标准时，都会引用知识和理由的特殊例子。这在认识论上是否是一种令人不满的程序？在第10章中，我们将探讨一些关于先验知识和正当性的观点，并思考我们的先验知识和正当性是否仅限于 "分析性 "的东西。第11章探讨自然主义认识论的一些核心主题，并考虑自然主义认识论可能采取的一些形式。第12章探讨了证言和分歧认识论中的一些主要观点。我们探讨了关于证言性质的一些观点，以及关于证言的 "还原论 "和 "非还原论 "之争。我们还探讨了关于分歧认识论的一些主要观点。例如，当我们发现我们的 "认识论同行 "在某个命题上与我们意见相左时，我们应该采取什么合理的立场？我们应该暂缓判断、坚持己见，还是以其他方式修正我们的观点？

Again, I have tried to balance breadth with depth, and always with an eye to providing a clear and useful introduction to epistemology. I would recommend that anyone seriously interested in studying the subject read this book
同样，我试图在广度与深度之间取得平衡，并始终着眼于为认识论提供清晰而有用的介绍。我建议任何认真对待这一课题的人阅读本书
in conjunction with a good anthology of contemporary essays in the field. In that way a reader will be exposed to more sophisticated and detailed versions of the views considered here.
与该领域当代优秀论文选集一起阅读。这样，读者就能接触到更复杂、更详细的观点。

I wish to thank Hilary Gaskin of Cambridge University Press for her support and patience. I wish to thank several people who read and commented on parts of the manuscript: Nathaniel Anderson, Charles Cooper, and most especially Yuan Dong, who read carefully every chapter and provided many helpful comments and suggestions. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Jill, for her help and support in this project. Without her love and support, this new edition could not have been written.
我要感谢剑桥大学出版社的 Hilary Gaskin，感谢她的支持和耐心。我还要感谢几位阅读过手稿并对部分内容提出意见的人：纳撒尼尔-安德森（Nathaniel Anderson）、查尔斯-库珀（Charles Cooper），尤其是袁东，他仔细阅读了每一章，并提出了许多有益的意见和建议。最后，我要感谢我的妻子吉尔在这个项目中给予我的帮助和支持。没有她的爱和支持，就不可能写出这本新书。

Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is concerned with a variety of questions about knowledge and related topics. Certainly one of the most important questions is "What is the extent of our knowledge?" Some philosophers, especially those in the "common sense" tradition, would say that we know pretty much those things that we ordinarily think we know. They would tell us, for example, that we know that there are other people, that they think and feel, that we were alive yesterday, that there are cars and dogs, and so on. They would tell us that we know a lot about our immediate physical surroundings, other people, and the past. Others would add that we know various ethical and moral truths, and some would also say that they know various truths about God and God's attitude toward mankind. Still other philosophers, influenced by various forms of skepticism, would say that we know much less than any of this, and the most extreme skeptics would say that we really know nothing at all.
认识论或知识论关注的是有关知识和相关主题的各种问题。当然，最重要的问题之一是 "我们的知识范围有多大？一些哲学家，尤其是 "常识 "传统的哲学家会说，我们知道的东西差不多就是我们通常认为自己知道的东西。例如，他们会告诉我们，我们知道有其他人，知道他们的思想和感觉，知道我们昨天还活着，知道有汽车和狗，等等。他们会告诉我们，我们对我们周围的物质环境、其他人和过去知道很多。还有人会补充说，我们知道各种伦理道德真理，有些人还会说，他们知道关于上帝和上帝对人类态度的各种真理。还有一些哲学家受各种怀疑论的影响，会说我们知道的远比这些要少，而最极端的怀疑论者会说我们真的什么都不知道。

Evaluating these views is no easy matter, and when we reflect on them, and the reasons advanced in favor of them, we are soon led to other questions about knowledge. Such reflection might naturally lead us to ask one of the most important and oldest epistemological questions, "What is knowledge?" Over two millennia ago, Plato wrestled with it in his dialogue, Theaetetus. Plato sought a definition of knowledge but came to no clear answer, and the dialogue ended inconclusively.
评价这些观点并非易事，当我们对这些观点以及支持这些观点的理由进行反思时，我们很快就会被引向有关知识的其他问题。这种思考可能会自然而然地让我们提出一个最重要、最古老的认识论问题："知识是什么？两千多年前，柏拉图在他的对话《泰阿泰德篇》中就提出了这个问题。柏拉图试图给知识下一个定义，但没有找到明确的答案，对话也就无疾而终。

The primary aim of this chapter is to introduce the traditional account of propositional knowledge as epistemically justified true belief. In the first section, propositional knowledge will be distinguished from other sorts of knowledge. In the second section, the traditional account of knowledge will be introduced. Next, I shall make some general remarks about the main components of the traditional account, about belief, truth, and epistemic
本章的主要目的是介绍命题知识作为认识论上合理的真实信念的传统说法。在第一节中，我们将把命题知识与其他类型的知识区分开来。第二节将介绍知识的传统说法。接下来，我将对传统知识论的主要内容、信念、真理和认识论作一些概括性的论述。
justification. Finally, I will make some general comments about justification and evidence, and introduce the concept of evidential defeat.
最后，我将对理由和证据发表一些一般性评论，并介绍证据失效的概念。最后，我将对正当性和证据作一些一般性评论，并介绍证据失效的概念。

In ordinary language, when we say that someone knows something, we can mean different things by "knows." There are different senses of "knowledge" or, we may say, different kinds of knowledge. Among the three most significant are (1) propositional knowledge, (2) acquaintance knowledge, and (3) "how to" knowledge. Let's begin with propositional knowledge.
在普通语言中，当我们说某人知道某事时，"知道 "可以有不同的含义。知识 "有不同的含义，或者我们可以说，知识有不同的种类。其中最重要的三种是：(1) 命题知识；(2) 熟人知识；(3) "如何做 "知识。先说命题知识。

Propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts or true propositions. So, consider the following examples of propositional knowledge:
命题知识是关于事实或真命题的知识。因此，请看下面这些命题知识的例子：

(1) John knows that Caesar was assassinated.
(1) 约翰知道凯撒是被刺杀的。

(2) John knows that the sky is blue.
(2) 约翰知道天空是蓝色的。

In these examples, the objects of knowledge, or what is known, are, respectively, the true propositions that Caesar was assassinated and that the sky is blue.
在这些例子中，知识的对象或已知事物分别是 "凯撒被刺杀 "和 "天空是蓝色的 "这两个真命题。

It is important to distinguish between sentences and propositions. Consider two people, Paul and Pierre. Let's suppose that each believes that the sky is blue. Paul, however, speaks only English and Pierre speaks only French. In expressing his belief, Paul would say, "The sky is blue," and Pierre would say, "Le ciel est bleu." Though each expresses his belief by a different sentence, each believes the same proposition. Similarly, since each knows that the sky is blue, each knows the same proposition.
区分句子和命题非常重要。请看两个人，保罗和皮埃尔。假设这两个人都认为天空是蓝色的。然而，保罗只会说英语，皮埃尔只会说法语。在表达自己的信念时，保罗会说 "天空是蓝色的"，而皮埃尔会说 "Le ciel est bleu"。虽然每个人都用不同的句子表达自己的信念，但每个人都相信同一个命题。同样，因为每个人都知道天空是蓝色的，所以每个人都知道同一个命题。

We may think of belief as a relation between a subject and a proposition. If the proposition one believes is true, then one's belief is true and if the proposition one believes is false, then one's belief is false. We may also think of propositional knowledge as a relation between a subject and a proposition. More precisely, propositional knowledge is a relation between a subject and a true proposition.
我们可以把信念看作是主体与命题之间的关系。如果一个人所相信的命题是真的，那么他的信念就是真的；如果一个人所相信的命题是假的，那么他的信念就是假的。我们也可以把命题知识看作是主体与命题之间的关系。更确切地说，命题知识是主体与真命题之间的关系。

Propositional knowledge is not the only sort of knowledge. Suppose, for example, someone made the following claims:
命题知识并不是唯一的知识。例如，假设有人提出以下主张：

(3) John knows the president of the United States.
(3) 约翰认识美国总统。

(4) John knows the pope.
(4) 约翰认识教皇。

We might naturally take these claims to imply that John is acquainted with the president of the United States and that he is acquainted with the pope. We might naturally take (3) and (4) to imply that John has met them. If we do take (3) and (4) in this way, then we are attributing acquaintance knowledge to John. To say that John has acquaintance knowledge of someone is to imply that he is acquainted with him or that he has met him.
我们自然会认为这些说法意味着约翰认识美国总统和教皇。我们可能会很自然地认为（3）和（4）意味着约翰见过他们。如果我们这样理解(3)和(4)，那么我们就是把熟人知识归于约翰。说约翰认识某个人，就意味着他认识这个人或见过这个人。

Acquaintance knowledge needs to be distinguished from propositional knowledge. Obviously, one can have a great deal of propositional knowledge about someone without having acquaintance knowledge of him. I might have, for example, a great deal of propositional knowledge about the president. I might know that he was born on such-and-such a date and that he attended such-and-such a university. I might know a great many similar true propositions about him. But though I might have a great deal of propositional knowledge about the president, it would not follow that I have acquaintance knowledge of him, since I am not acquainted with him and have not met him.
熟人知识需要与命题知识区分开来。显然，一个人可以对某个人拥有大量的命题知识，却不会对他拥有熟人知识。例如，我可能拥有关于总统的大量命题知识。我可能知道他出生于某年某月某日，上过某某大学。我可能知道很多关于他的类似真命题。不过，尽管我可能拥有关于总统的大量命题知识，但这并不意味着我拥有关于他的熟人知识，因为我并不认识他，也没有见过他。

In ordinary language, when we say "A knows B," we are sometimes using "know" in the propositional sense and sometimes in the acquaintance sense. Suppose, for example, a detective says grimly, "I know this killer. He'll strike again - and soon." Our detective need not be taken to mean that he has actually met the killer or that he is acquainted with him. He might mean simply that he knows that the killer is the sort who will soon strike again. He has a certain sort of propositional knowledge about the killer. Similarly, if I am impressed with John's vast knowledge about Caesar, I might say, "John really knows Caesar." Clearly, I am implying that John has a lot of propositional knowledge about Caesar and not that John has met him.
在普通语言中，当我们说 "A 认识 B "时，我们有时使用命题意义上的 "认识"，有时使用熟人意义上的 "认识"。例如，假设一名侦探面无表情地说："我认识这个杀手。他会再次作案，而且很快。我们的侦探不一定是指他真的见过凶手，也不一定是指他认识凶手。他可能只是说，他知道凶手是那种很快就会再次作案的人。他对凶手有某种命题式的了解。同样，如果我对约翰关于凯撒的渊博知识印象深刻，我可能会说："约翰真的了解凯撒"。显然，我是在暗示约翰对凯撒有很多命题知识，而不是约翰见过他。

One can have acquaintance knowledge of things other than people. One can have, for example, acquaintance knowledge of Paris, or the taste of a mango. If one has such knowledge of Paris, then one has been there, and if one has such knowledge of the taste of a mango, then one has tasted a mango. Again, we need to distinguish knowledge of this sort from propositional knowledge. One might have much in the way of propositional knowledge about Paris, knowing what the main boulevards are, when the city was founded, knowing where various landmarks are, without having the sort of acquaintance knowledge that implies actually having been there.
除了人之外，人们还可以对其他事物有所了解。例如，一个人可以熟知巴黎，也可以熟知芒果的味道。如果一个人对巴黎有这种知识，那么他就去过巴黎；如果一个人对芒果的味道有这种知识，那么他就尝过芒果。同样，我们需要将这类知识与命题知识区分开来。一个人可能拥有很多关于巴黎的命题知识，知道主要的林荫大道是什么，知道这座城市是什么时候建立的，知道各种地标在哪里，但却没有那种意味着真正去过那里的熟人知识。

In addition to propositional knowledge and acquaintance knowledge, let's consider "how to" knowledge. Sometimes when we say, "A knows how to X," we mean or imply that A has the ability to X. In other cases, however, when we say that "A knows how to " we do not mean or imply that A has the ability to . There is, then, one sense of "knowing how to " which implies that one has the ability to and another sense that doesn't. According to the first sense of "knowing how,"
除了命题知识和熟人知识之外，让我们来看看 "如何 "知识。有时，当我们说 "A 知道如何 X "时，我们的意思是或暗示 A 有能力 X。然而，在其他情况下，当我们说 "A 知道如何 "时，我们的意思不是或暗示 A 有能力 。因此，有一种意义上的 "知道如何 "意味着一个人有能力 ，而另一种意义上的 "知道如何 "则不意味着有能力 。根据 "知道如何 "的第一种含义，

(5) John knows how to play a piano sonata, implies
(5) 约翰知道如何演奏钢琴奏鸣曲，这意味着

(6) John has the ability to play a piano sonata.
(6) 约翰有能力弹奏钢琴奏鸣曲。

But, again, there is another sense of knowing how to that does not imply that one has the ability to . To appreciate this second sense, suppose that John is a talented violinist who reads music well, but can't play the piano at all. Imagine that he has a lot of knowledge about how to play a particular piano sonata. He might know, for example, that the right index finger should play this note and the right thumb should play that note, and so forth. Indeed, John might be able to describe precisely how to play the piece, even though he cannot play it himself. In this case, we may say that John knows how to play the sonata, even though he does not have the ability to play. In this sense of "knowing how," (5) does not imply (6). There is, then, a sense of "knowing how" to do something which is simply a matter of having propositional knowledge about how to do it. John the violinist, for example, has a great deal of propositional knowledge about how to play a piano sonata. But in another sense of "knowing how," he does not know how to play a piano sonata because he lacks the ability to do so.
但是，还有另一种意义上的懂得 ，它并不意味着一个人有能力 。为了理解第二种意义，假设约翰是一位才华横溢的小提琴家，他读谱很好，但完全不会弹钢琴。想象一下，他对如何演奏一首特定的钢琴奏鸣曲有很多了解。例如，他可能知道右手食指应该弹这个音，右手拇指应该弹那个音，等等。事实上，约翰可能能够准确描述如何弹奏这首曲子，尽管他自己不会弹奏。在这种情况下，我们可以说约翰知道如何弹奏这首奏鸣曲，尽管他没有弹奏的能力。在这种 "知道如何 "的意义上，（5）并不意味着（6）。因此，有一种 "知道如何 "做某事的意义仅仅是拥有关于如何做某事的命题知识。例如，小提琴家约翰拥有大量关于如何演奏钢琴奏鸣曲的命题知识。但在 "知道如何做 "的另一种意义上，他并不知道如何演奏钢琴奏鸣曲，因为他缺乏这样做的能力。

As the previous case illustrates, one can have a lot of propositional knowledge about how to do something without having the ability to do it. Conversely, one can have the ability to do something without having much propositional knowledge about it. To see this, imagine a physiologist who has a lot of propositional knowledge about how to walk. He has studied how one needs to transfer weight from one foot to another, how the knees should bend, how the foot should bend, what muscles are involved, etc. Our expert might have a great deal of propositional knowledge about walking. But now consider young Mary. Mary is 10 months old and has just learned to walk. She knows how to walk, but we can easily imagine that she lacks the
正如前面的例子所说明的，一个人可以拥有很多关于如何做某事的命题知识，却没有做这件事的能力。反过来说，一个人有能力做某件事情，却没有很多关于它的命题知识。要理解这一点，可以想象一位生理学家，他拥有很多关于如何走路的命题知识。他研究了一个人需要如何把重量从一只脚转移到另一只脚，膝盖应该如何弯曲，脚应该如何弯曲，涉及哪些肌肉等等。我们的专家可能拥有大量关于走路的命题知识。但现在考虑一下小玛丽。玛丽 10 个月大，刚刚学会走路。她知道如何走路，但我们很容易想象出她缺乏
propositional knowledge about how to walk enjoyed by the expert. Mary's propositional knowledge about how to walk is probably quite meager, if, indeed, she has any at all.
专家所享有的关于如何走路的命题知识。玛丽关于如何走路的命题知识可能非常少，如果她真的有的话。

We have distinguished propositional knowledge from both acquaintance knowledge and knowing how to do something. Traditionally, philosophers have been most concerned with propositional knowledge. One reason for this is that philosophers are typically concerned with what is true. They want to know what is true, and they want to evaluate and assess their own claims, and those of others, to know the truth. When philosophers ask, for example, about the extent of our knowledge, they are typically concerned with the extent of our propositional knowledge, with the extent of the truths that we know. When one philosopher says he knows that there are external objects and another philosopher denies this, they are disagreeing about whether there is propositional knowledge of a certain sort. They are disagreeing about whether truths of a certain kind are known. Acquaintance knowledge and "how to" knowledge are not in the same way "truth focused." So let's consider the concept of propositional knowledge more closely.
我们将命题知识与熟知知识和知道如何做某事区分开来。传统上，哲学家最关注的是命题知识。其中一个原因是，哲学家通常关注的是什么是真的。他们想知道什么是真的，他们想评价和评估自己和他人的主张，以了解真相。例如，当哲学家问及我们知识的范围时，他们通常关注的是我们命题知识的范围，即我们所知道的真理的范围。当一位哲学家说他知道存在外部对象，而另一位哲学家否认这一点时，他们的分歧在于是否存在某种命题知识。他们争论的是某类真理是否为人所知。熟知的知识和 "如何做 "的知识与 "以真理为中心 "的知识是不同的。因此，让我们更仔细地考虑一下命题知识的概念。

We noted at the beginning of this chapter that the question "What is knowledge?" is an ancient one. Since our focus is on propositional knowledge, we might ask, "What is it for someone to have propositional knowledge?" Alternatively, we might ask, "What is it for a subject, , to know that (where is some proposition)?"
我们在本章开头指出，"什么是知识？"是一个古老的问题。既然我们的重点是命题知识，那么我们可以问："对于一个人来说，拥有命题知识是什么？或者，我们可以问："对于一个主体 来说，知道 （其中 是某个命题）是什么？"

According to one traditional view, to have propositional knowledge that is to have epistemically justified true belief that . Before we consider this traditional view, let's begin by considering the following clearly mistaken view:
根据一种传统观点，拥有 的命题知识就是拥有 的认识论上合理的真实信念。在讨论这一传统观点之前，我们先来看看下面这个明显错误的观点：

D1 knows that . believes that .
D1 知道 。 认为 。

According to D1, believing something is sufficient for knowing it. If D1 were true, then someone who believed a false proposition would know it. If a child, for example, believed that , then, according to D1, the child would know that . But the child does not know that. So, D1 is false.
根据 D1，相信某事就足以知道它。如果 D1 为真，那么相信假命题的人就会知道它。例如，如果一个孩子相信 ，那么根据 D1，这个孩子就会知道 。但孩子并不知道。因此，D1 是假的。

Now, admittedly, people do sometimes say that they know things that are false. For example, a football fan might be utterly convinced that his team will win the championship. After his team loses, he might say, "I just knew they would win. Too bad they didn't." But our fan did not know that his team would win. He was simply confident or convinced that they would. His claim to know is perhaps best understood as a bit of hyperbole, as when one says, "I am just dying of hunger" or "I'd just kill for a cigarette." Such claims are, usually, not to be taken literally. Strictly speaking, what our fan says is false.
诚然，人们有时确实会说他们知道一些虚假的事情。例如，一个足球迷可能完全相信他的球队会赢得冠军。球队输球后，他可能会说："我就知道他们会赢。可惜他们没赢"。但我们的球迷并不知道他的球队会赢。他只是自信或坚信他们会赢。他所说的 "知道 "也许最好理解为一种夸张的说法，就像一个人说 "我快饿死了 "或 "我真想抽根烟 "一样。这种说法通常不能从字面上理解。严格来说，我们的粉丝说的是假话。

Mere belief, then, is not sufficient for knowledge. Knowledge requires that one's belief be true. So, let's consider the following view:
因此，仅仅有信念还不足以构成知识。知识要求一个人的信念是真实的。那么，让我们考虑一下下面的观点：

D2

D2 tells us that one knows that if and only if one has a true belief that . D2 says that having a true belief that is sufficient for one's knowing that . But this, too, is clearly mistaken. One might have a true belief that is not knowledge. True beliefs that are mere lucky guesses or mere hunches or based on wild superstitions are not instances of knowledge. Suppose, for example, Bonnie reads her horoscope in the newspaper. It says that she will soon come into money. Bonnie has no evidence to believe that this is true; still she believes what her horoscope says. Later that day, she finds in the pocket of her old coat. Bonnie's belief that she would come into money was true, but it was not knowledge. It was a true belief based on no evidence. Consider also Malcomb, an extreme pessimist. Every morning he forms the belief that something really bad will happen to him today. Every morning he forms this belief, though he has no reasons or evidence for it and the belief is almost always false. One afternoon he is hit by a bus and killed. On that morning, Malcomb's belief that something really bad would happen to him turned out to be true. But it is false that Malcomb knew that something really bad was going to happen to him. His belief, though true, was not an instance of knowledge. Since D2 takes mere true belief to be sufficient for knowledge, it implies incorrectly that Bonnie and Malcomb have knowledge.
D2 告诉我们，一个人知道 ，当且仅当他真正相信 。D2 说，一个人只要真正相信 ，就足以知道 。但这显然也是错误的。一个人可能有一个不是知识的真实信念。仅仅是幸运的猜测、仅仅是直觉或基于疯狂迷信的真实信念都不是知识的实例。例如，假设邦妮在报纸上看到了她的星座运势。上面说她很快就会有钱。邦妮没有证据相信这是真的，但她仍然相信她的星座运势。那天晚些时候，她在旧大衣的口袋里发现了 。邦妮相信自己会发财是真的，但这不是知识。这是一个没有证据的真实信念。再看马尔科姆，一个极端的悲观主义者。每天早上，他都会相信今天会有非常糟糕的事情发生在自己身上。每天早上，他都会形成这样的信念，尽管他没有任何理由或证据，而且这个信念几乎总是错误的。一天下午，他被一辆公共汽车撞死了。那天早上，马尔科姆认为自己会遭遇不幸的信念变成了现实。但是，马尔科姆知道自己会遭遇不幸的说法是错误的。他的信念虽然是真的，但并不是知识的实例。由于 D2 认为仅仅真实的信念就足以构成知识，因此它错误地暗示邦妮和马尔科姆拥有知识。

If mere true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, then what else is needed? One traditional answer is that knows that only if is epistemically justified for or is reasonable for to believe. We may formulate this traditional account this way:
如果仅仅是真实的信念还不足以构成知识，那么还需要什么呢？一个传统的答案是，只有当 对 来说在认识论上是合理的，或者 对 来说是合理的， 才知道 。我们可以这样来表述这种传统的说法：
epistemically justified for .
的认识论合理性。

According to D3, knowledge requires epistemically justified true belief (JTB). So, let's say that D3 represents a JTB account of knowledge.
根据 D3，知识需要认识论上合理的真信念（JTB）。因此，我们可以说 D3 代表了关于知识的 "真实信念"（JTB）。

As we have seen, D2 implies incorrectly that Bonnie knows that she will come into money and Malcomb knows that something really bad will happen to him today. But D3 need not be taken to have that flaw. To see why, consider Bonnie again. She believes that she will come into money. She believes this because she read it in the newspaper's horoscope and she has no other evidence for believing it. Under these circumstances, the proposition that she will come into money is not one that is justified or reasonable for her. Bonnie's belief does not meet the justification condition in D3. So, D3 does not imply that Bonnie knows. Similar considerations apply to Malcomb's case. The proposition that something really bad will happen to him today is not justified or reasonable for him. He simply accepts it on the basis of an exaggerated pessimism. So, D3 does not imply that Malcomb knows. D3 seems in this respect to be an advance over D2.
正如我们所看到的，D2 错误地暗示邦妮知道她会有钱，而马尔科姆知道他今天会遇到非常糟糕的事情。但 D3 不一定有这种缺陷。要知道为什么，请再考虑一下邦妮。她相信自己会有钱。她相信这一点是因为她在报纸的星座运势上看到的，而且她也没有其他证据来证明她会相信这一点。在这种情况下，"她会发财 "这个命题对她来说既不正当也不合理。邦妮的信念不符合 D3 中的合理性条件。因此，D3 并不意味着邦妮知道。类似的考虑也适用于马尔科姆的案例。对他来说，"今天会有一件非常糟糕的事情发生在他身上 "这个命题既不正当也不合理。他只是在夸大悲观情绪的基础上接受了这一命题。因此，D3 并不意味着马尔科姆知道。在这方面，D3 似乎比 D2 有所进步。

D3 seems to be on the right track. In the next chapter, however, we shall consider some serious objections to D3 and the need to add yet further conditions. Still, while almost all philosophers agree that D3 is not adequate as it stands, many agree that knowledge does require epistemically justified true belief. For the moment, then, let's turn to consider briefly these components of propositional knowledge. I shall make some general comments about each in the hope that we might get a better understanding of the traditional view about knowledge.
D3 似乎走上了正确的道路。然而，在下一章中，我们将考虑对 D3 的一些严重反对意见，以及是否有必要增加更多条件。不过，尽管几乎所有哲学家都认为 D3 并不充分，但许多哲学家都同意，知识确实需要认识论上合理的真信念。现在，让我们来简要地考虑一下命题知识的这些组成部分。我将对每一个部分发表一些一般性评论，希望我们能更好地理解关于知识的传统观点。

Whenever we consider a proposition, there are three different attitudes we can take toward it. First, we can believe it or accept it as true. Second, we can disbelieve it, i.e., believe that it is false or believe its negation. Third, we can withhold belief in it or suspend judgment. We may illustrate these attitudes by reflecting on the attitudes of the theist, the atheist, and the agnostic toward the proposition that God exists. The theist accepts the proposition, the atheist disbelieves it, and the agnostic withholds belief in it.
每当我们考虑一个命题时，我们可以对它采取三种不同的态度。首先，我们可以相信它或接受它为真。第二，我们可以不相信它，即相信它是假的或相信它的否定。第三，我们可以不相信它或暂缓判断。我们可以通过思考有神论者、无神论者和不可知论者对 "上帝存在 "这一命题的态度来说明这些态度。有神论者接受这个命题，无神论者不相信这个命题，不可知论者不相信这个命题。

As we noted earlier, we may think of belief as a propositional attitude, as a relation between a subject and a proposition. There are, of course, many propositional attitudes in addition to belief. Hope, fear, doubt, and desire are just some ways in which one may be related to a proposition. Consider the proposition that it will rain. In addition to believing that it will rain, one can hope, fear, doubt, or desire that it will rain.
如前所述，我们可以把 "信念 "看作一种命题态度，看作主体与命题之间的关系。当然，除了信念，还有许多命题态度。希望、恐惧、怀疑和渴望只是命题态度与命题关系的一些方式。请看 "会下雨 "这个命题。除了相信 "会下雨 "之外，人们还可以希望、恐惧、怀疑或渴望 "会下雨"。

Believing a proposition needs to be distinguished from other propositional attitudes such as entertaining and considering a proposition. To entertain a proposition is merely to "hold it before the mind." To consider a proposition is to entertain it and to study or examine it. One can entertain or consider a proposition without believing it. I can now, for example, entertain and consider the proposition that the earth is a cube without believing it. One can also believe something without entertaining or considering it. This morning, for example, I believed that the earth was round, but I did not entertain or consider that proposition.
需要将 "相信命题 "与 "接受命题 "和 "考虑命题 "等其他命题态度区分开来。接受一个命题只是 "把它放在心里"。考虑一个命题是娱乐它、研究它或审视它。一个人可以在不相信一个命题的情况下接受或考虑它。例如，我现在可以接受并思考 "地球是一个立方体 "这一命题，但并不相信它。一个人也可以相信一些东西，而不去娱乐或考虑它。例如，今天早上，我相信地球是圆的，但我并没有接受或考虑这个命题。

We all believe a great many things that we are not entertaining or considering. These beliefs are said to be dispositional beliefs. My belief this morning that the earth is round was a dispositional belief. When we believe some proposition that we are entertaining, then our belief is said to be an occurrent belief. Since I am now entertaining the proposition that the earth is round, my belief that the earth is round is an occurrent belief.
我们每个人都相信很多自己不以为然或不以为然的事情。这些信念被称为处置信念。今天早上我相信地球是圆的就是一种处置性信念。当我们相信一些我们正在考虑的命题时，我们的信念就被称为发生信念。由于我现在正在考虑 "地球是圆的 "这个命题，所以我的 "地球是圆的 "信念就是一个发生信念。

Having a dispositional belief needs to be distinguished from a disposition to believe something. There are many propositions that we do not now believe, but are such that we would believe them if we considered them. Someone might never have considered the proposition that no elephant is a neurosurgeon and might not believe that proposition. Still, he might be such that he would believe that proposition if he considered it. He would have a disposition to believe that proposition, even if he did not have a dispositional belief in it.
有倾向性的信念需要与倾向于相信某事区分开来。有许多命题我们现在并不相信，但如果我们考虑过这些命题，我们就会相信它们。有人可能从来没有考虑过 "没有大象是神经外科医生 "这个命题，因此他可能不会相信这个命题。但是，如果他考虑过这个命题，他可能会相信这个命题。即使他不具有相信该命题的倾向性，他也会具有相信该命题的倾向性。

Let's conclude this brief discussion by making two points. First, according to the traditional JTB account of knowledge, knowledge that requires that one believe that . We may say that knowledge requires either occurrent or dispositional belief. Thus, we can say I knew this morning that the earth was round even though my belief in that proposition was dispositional. Second,
最后，让我们提出两点来结束这一简短的讨论。首先，根据传统的 JTB 知识论， 的知识要求人们相信 。我们可以说，知识既需要发生性信念，也需要处置性信念。因此，我们可以说我今天早上知道地球是圆的，即使我对这个命题的信念是处置性的。第二、
belief ranges in intensity or strength from complete and firm conviction to tentative and cautious acceptance. Thus, one might be firmly and strongly convinced that God exists or one might accept it with some weaker degree of conviction. Now, if knowledge requires belief and belief comes in varying degrees of intensity, is there some degree of intensity of belief that is required for knowledge? According to the traditional view, knowledge simply requires justified true belief. As long as one believes that and the other conditions are met, then one knows that whatever the intensity of one's belief.
信仰的强度或力度有大有小，既有完全和坚定的信念，也有暂时和谨慎的接受。因此，一个人可能会坚定不移地相信上帝存在，也可能会以较弱的信念接受上帝的存在。现在，如果知识需要信念，而信念又有不同程度的强度，那么知识是否需要某种程度的信念强度呢？根据传统观点，知识只需要有正当理由的真实信念。只要一个人相信 ，并且满足其他条件，那么无论他的信念强度如何，他都知道 。

There are many theories about the nature of truth and about what makes a proposition or a belief true or false. One of the oldest and perhaps most widely held is the correspondence theory of truth. The correspondence theory makes two main claims. First, a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to the facts. Second, a proposition is false if and only if it fails to correspond to the facts. Advocates of the correspondence theory often add a third claim, that the truth of a proposition or belief is dependent on the facts or upon the way the world is. Such a view is suggested by Aristotle, who wrote, "It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale; but because you are pale we who say this have the truth." The proposition that you are pale is true because you are pale. The proposition that you are pale is true because of, or in virtue of, the fact that you are pale.
关于真理的本质以及命题或信念的真假，有许多理论。其中最古老、或许也是最广为流传的一种理论是真理的对应理论。对应理论有两个主要主张。首先，当且仅当一个命题与事实相对应时，它才是真的。其次，只有当一个命题不符合事实时，它才是假的。对应理论的拥护者通常会加上第三个主张，即命题或信念的真假取决于事实或世界的存在方式。亚里士多德提出了这样一种观点，他写道："不是因为我们真的认为你是苍白的，你才是苍白的；而是因为你是苍白的，我们说这话的人才是真理"。 "你是苍白的 "这个命题是真的，因为你是苍白的。你是苍白的 "这个命题之所以为真，是因为或凭借你是苍白的这个事实。

According to the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is not true because of what we believe about it. The truth of the proposition that someone is pale, for example, does not depend on our believing it or on what we believe about it. The proposition is true if and only if someone is pale. It is true, as Aristotle notes, because of the fact that someone is pale.
根据真理的对应理论，一个命题不是因为我们相信它什么而为真。例如，"某人面色苍白 "命题的真假并不取决于我们是否相信它，也不取决于我们相信什么。这个命题是真的，如果且只有当某人是苍白的。正如亚里士多德所指出的，它之所以为真，是因为某人脸色苍白这一事实。

Moreover, according to the correspondence theory, one and the same proposition cannot be both true and false. The proposition that you are pale cannot be both true and false. Neither can the proposition be "true for you and false for me." The truth is not "relative" in this way. Of course, you might believe some proposition that I reject. We might thus disagree about the truth of some proposition. Still, the truth of the proposition is determined by the facts and not by whether you or I believe it. Again, suppose that some ancient culture believed that the earth was a disk floating in an endless sea. Should we say that this proposition was true "for them"? According to the correspondence theory, the answer is no. They accepted the proposition. They believed it was true. But the proposition they believed was false. It did not correspond to the facts.
此外，根据对应理论，同一个命题不可能既是真命题又是假命题。你是苍白的 "这个命题不可能既是真命题又是假命题。这个命题也不可能 "对你是真，对我是假"。真理不是这样 "相对 "的。当然，你可能会相信一些我拒绝接受的命题。因此，我们可能会对某个命题的真伪产生分歧。不过，命题的真伪是由事实决定的，而不是由你或我是否相信它决定的。同样，假设某个古代文化认为地球是一个漂浮在无尽海洋中的圆盘。我们应该说这个命题 "对他们来说 "是真的吗？根据对应理论，答案是否定的。他们接受了这个命题。他们相信这个命题是真的。但他们相信的命题是假的。它与事实不符。

Still, let's consider the following objection. "Suppose that Jim is in London talking to his brother, Tom, in New York. Jim looks out his window, sees the rain falling and says, 'It is raining.' Tom looks out his window, sees the sun shining and says, 'It is not raining.' Couldn't they both be right? Isn't this a case where a proposition is both true and false?" Of course, they could both be right. In fact, given our description of the case, each of them is right. But this does not show that one and the same proposition is both true and false. We should say that the proposition that Jim accepts is that it is raining in London, and the proposition that Tom accepts is that it is not raining in New York. Each of them accepts a true proposition. But they do not accept the same proposition.
不过，我们还是要考虑一下下面的反对意见。"假设吉姆在伦敦与他在纽约的兄弟汤姆通话。吉姆望向窗外，看到雨在下，就说：'下雨了。汤姆望向窗外，看到阳光明媚，说：'没下雨。难道他们不可能都是对的吗？这难道不是一个命题既真又假的情况吗？当然，他们可能都是对的。事实上，根据我们对这种情况的描述，他们每个人都是对的。但这并不能说明同一个命题既是真命题又是假命题。我们应该说，吉姆接受的命题是伦敦正在下雨，而汤姆接受的命题是纽约没有下雨。他们每个人都接受了一个真命题。但他们接受的命题并不相同。

The correspondence theory of truth is old and widely held. There are, however, objections to this theory. Some object that unless we have some explanation of what it is for a proposition to correspond with the facts, the theory is not very informative. Others object that the theory is uninformative because the notion of a fact is obscure. Yet others would say that one cannot explain what a fact is without making use of the concepts of truth and falsity, and, therefore, the correspondence theory is circular and ultimately unenlightening.
真理的对应理论由来已久并广为流传。然而，也有人反对这一理论。一些人反对说，除非我们对命题与事实的对应关系有所解释，否则这一理论的信息量并不大。还有人反对说，由于事实的概念晦涩难懂，所以该理论信息量不大。还有人说，如果不使用真假概念，我们就无法解释事实是什么，因此，对应理论是循环论证，最终不会给我们带来启迪。

These are important criticisms. Unfortunately, to assess these objections adequately would simply take us too far afield. Still, the basic intuition that the truth of a proposition depends upon the facts has proved stubbornly resistant to criticism. I shall be assuming throughout this book that some version of the correspondence theory of truth is correct. It is worth noting, though, that there are other theories of truth. Let's consider briefly two of them.
这些都是重要的批评意见。遗憾的是，要充分评估这些反对意见，只会让我们走得太远。尽管如此，命题的真伪取决于事实这一基本直觉还是顽强地抵制了批评。在本书中，我将始终假定某种版本的真理对应理论是正确的。但值得注意的是，还有其他的真理理论。让我们简要地讨论其中的两种。

One alternative to the correspondence theory is the pragmatic theory of truth. A central insight of the pragmatic theory is that true beliefs are generally useful and false beliefs are not. If a doctor wants to cure a patient, it is useful for the doctor to have true beliefs about what will cure the
对应理论的另一种选择是实用真理理论。实用主义理论的一个核心观点是，真实的信念通常是有用的，而虚假的信念则是无用的。如果一个医生想治好一个病人，那么对于医生来说，拥有关于什么能治好病人的真信念是有用的。
patient. If a man wants to go to Boston, true beliefs about which road to take are generally more useful than false beliefs. Noting this connection, the pragmatic theory tells us that a proposition is true if and only if believing it or acting on it is, or would be, useful (in the long run). Roughly, a belief is true if and only if it is useful or expedient. William James, the great American pragmatist, wrote, "The true is only the expedient in the way of our behaving, expedient in almost any fashion, and expedient in the long run and on the whole course."
病人。如果一个人想去波士顿，关于走哪条路的真信念通常比假信念更有用。注意到这种联系，实用主义理论告诉我们，一个命题是真的，当且仅当相信它或按它行事是有用的，或（从长远来看）是有用的。粗略地说，当且仅当一个信念有用或有利时，它才是真的。美国伟大的实用主义者威廉-詹姆斯写道："真实只是我们行为方式中的权宜之计，几乎在任何方式中都是权宜之计，而且从长远和整个过程来看都是权宜之计"。

Suppose that true beliefs generally provide a good basis for action, that they are generally useful, and that false beliefs are generally a bad basis for action. Critics of the pragmatic theory note that even if this is so, it would not follow that we should identify true belief with useful belief. Sometimes a true belief might have very bad consequences and a false belief might have very good ones. Suppose, for example, the following proposition is true:
假设真实的信念一般都能为行动提供良好的基础，一般都是有用的，而虚假的信念一般都是不好的行动基础。实用主义理论的批评者指出，即便如此，我们也不能因此就认定真信念就是有用的信念。有时，真实的信念可能会带来非常糟糕的后果，而错误的信念可能会带来非常好的后果。例如，假设以下命题为真：

(7) Tom will die in old age from a long and painful illness.
(7) 汤姆将在年老时死于一场漫长而痛苦的疾病。

Suppose further that if Tom were to believe this, he would be quite distraught. The joy that he now finds in life would be greatly diminished. He would be haunted by the specter of his painful death. Let's suppose that it is not useful for Tom to believe (7). Still, since (7) is true, it seems we should reject the view that a proposition is true if and only if believing it or acting on it would be useful. Similarly, there could be false propositions that are useful to believe or act on. Imagine, for example, that when Tom is old and suffering from his painful and fatal illness, he consoles himself with the belief that:
再假设，如果汤姆相信这一点，他将会非常痛苦。他现在在生活中找到的快乐会大打折扣。他将被痛苦死亡的阴影所笼罩。让我们假设汤姆相信（7）是没有用的。尽管如此，既然(7)是真的，我们似乎应该拒绝这样的观点，即一个命题是真的，如果并且只有当相信它或按照它行事才是有用的。同样，也可能存在假命题，但相信它或按它行事是有用的。例如，试想一下，当汤姆年老时饱受致命疾病的折磨，他安慰自己相信：

(8) Others in the hospital are suffering more than I am and doing so with courage.
(8) 医院里的其他人比我承受更多的痛苦，他们却勇敢地承受着。

Believing (8) helps Tom face his own suffering calmly and with courage. He thinks that since others are courageously facing suffering greater than his, then at least he can do the same. Believing (8) is very useful for Tom. But suppose (8) is false. Suppose no one in the hospital is suffering worse than Tom. Again, it seems that what is useful to believe is not always true, and what is true is not always useful to believe.
信念（8）帮助汤姆冷静、勇敢地面对自己的苦难。他认为，既然别人能勇敢地面对比他更大的痛苦，那么至少他也能做到这一点。相信（8）对汤姆来说非常有用。但假设（8）是假的。假设医院里没有人比汤姆更痛苦。看来，有用的信念不一定是真的，而真的信念也不一定有用。

Another theory of truth is the coherence theory of truth. Not surprisingly, the concept of coherence is central to the theory. We shall say more about coherence in Chapter 4. For the moment, let's consider the following example that we may take to illustrate the concept. Suppose that I believe the following propositions: (i) I have the sense experience of something white in my hand, (ii) I have the experience of something round in my hand, (iii) I have the experience of something cold in my hand. The proposition, (iv) there is a snowball in my hand, coheres with (i)-(iii). It would seem that (iv) better coheres with (i)-(iii) than some other propositions, e.g. that I have a hot lump of coal in my hand.
另一种真理理论是真理的一致性理论。一致性概念是该理论的核心，这一点不足为奇。我们将在第 4 章中详细介绍一致性。现在，我们不妨举以下例子来说明这一概念。假设我相信以下命题：(i) 我的感官体验是手中拿着白色的东西；(ii) 我的体验是手中拿着圆形的东西；(iii) 我的体验是手中拿着冰冷的东西。命题(iv) "我手里有一个雪球 "与(i)-(iii)是一致的。似乎(iv)与(i)-(iii)的一致性要好于其他一些命题，如我手中有一块热煤块。

Some philosophers take the fact that a proposition coheres or "hangs together" with other propositions one believes to be indicative of its truth or a good reason to believe it's true. In other words, they treat coherence as a source of justification. So, for example, if one believes (i)-(iii), then, other things being equal, it is more reasonable to believe (iv) than that one has a hot lump of coal in one's hand because of (iv)'s greater coherence with (i)-(iii). Proponents of the coherence theory of truth, however, treat coherence not merely as a source of justification: they take coherence to be a condition of truth. They hold that for a proposition to be true is nothing more than a matter of its coherence with other propositions. Brand Blanshard, a defender of the coherence theory of truth, wrote, "Assume coherence as the test [of truth], and you will be driven by the incoherence of your alternatives to the conclusion that it is also the nature of truth."
有些哲学家认为，一个命题与人们所相信的其他命题相一致或 "挂在一起"，就表明了它的真实性，或者说是相信它是真的一个很好的理由。换句话说，他们将一致性视为合理性的来源。因此，举例来说，如果一个人相信(i)-(iii)，那么在其他条件相同的情况下，相信(iv)比相信自己手里有一块热煤块更合理，因为(iv)与(i)-(iii)更一致。然而，真理一致性理论的支持者们不仅把一致性视为合理性的来源：他们还把一致性视为真理的条件。他们认为，一个命题是否为真，无非是它与其他命题的一致性问题。真理一致性理论的捍卫者布兰德-布兰沙德写道："假定一致性是[真理]的检验标准，你就会被你的替代品的不一致性所驱使，得出一致性也是真理的本质的结论"。

Critics of the coherence theory of truth raise a variety of objections. First, they note that the concept of "coherence" is murky. Indeed, some critics claim that the concept of coherence is at least as much in need of explanation as those of "correspondence" and "fact." They would say that the coherence theory has no real advantage in clarity over the correspondence theory. Second, they note that we cannot say simply that a proposition is true if and only if it belongs to a coherent set of propositions. A very realistic piece of fiction might be a coherent set of false propositions. Moreover, the fact that (iv) above coheres with other propositions that I believe such as (i)-(iii) does not guarantee that (iv) is true. I might believe (i)-(iv) and be merely having an hallucination of a snowball or merely dreaming that I am holding a snowball. Indeed, Descartes raised the possibility of massive deception by an evil demon, deception so massive that most of our sensory experience of the world is illusory. In such a scenario, our beliefs about the world around us would be almost entirely false. Still, they might be quite coherent. In fact, our beliefs might enjoy as much coherence in such a scenario as they do right now. But again, they would be false. Finally, critics argue that we should not confuse a criterion of justification with a condition of truth and we should not assume that because we have a criterion of justification we have ipso facto a condition of truth. Even if coherence turns out to be a source of justification, it does not follow that it is what makes a proposition true.
真理一致性理论的批评者提出了各种反对意见。首先，他们指出 "一致性 "的概念模糊不清。事实上，一些批评者声称，连贯性概念至少与 "对应 "和 "事实 "概念一样需要解释。他们会说，相干性理论与对应性理论相比，在清晰度上并没有真正的优势。其次，他们指出，我们不能简单地说，一个命题是真的，如果并且只有当它属于一个连贯的命题集合时才是真的。一个非常现实的虚构可能是一组连贯的假命题。此外，上述(iv)与我所相信的其他命题（如(i)-(iii)）相一致的事实并不能保证(iv)是真的。我可能相信(i)-(iv)，但却只是对雪球产生了幻觉，或者只是梦见自己拿着一个雪球。事实上，笛卡尔提出了恶鬼大肆欺骗的可能性，这种欺骗如此之大，以至于我们对世界的大部分感官体验都是虚幻的。在这种情况下，我们对周围世界的信念几乎完全是虚假的。尽管如此，它们可能还是相当连贯的。事实上，在这种情况下，我们的信念可能和现在一样具有连贯性。但同样，它们也会是错误的。最后，批评者认为，我们不应该把合理性标准与真理条件混为一谈，也不应该因为我们有了合理性标准，就当然有了真理条件。即使一致性被证明是合理性的来源，也并不意味着它是命题成真的原因。

According to the traditional JTB account, knowledge that requires that one be epistemically justified in believing that . Much of this book will be concerned with the topic of epistemic justification. Indeed, much of recent epistemology has focused on this topic. For the moment, we may make the following general points.
根据传统的JTB论述， 的知识要求人们在认识论上有理由相信 。本书的大部分内容都与认识论上的合理性有关。事实上，近代认识论的大部分内容都集中在这一主题上。目前，我们可以提出以下一般性观点。

First, the kind of justification knowledge requires is epistemic justification. We must note that there are kinds of justification that are not epistemic. For example, the batter who steps up to the plate might be more likely to get a hit if he believes that he will. Of course, he will probably not get a hit. Even for the best batters, the odds of doing so are poor. Still, believing that he will succeed and having a positive attitude will help him. So, we may grant that he has a practical justification for his belief even if he has no epistemic justification for it. Again, consider someone facing a life-threatening illness, one from which most people do not recover. Even though the evidence is against his recovery, a belief that one will recover might improve one's chances. In such a case, one might have a moral or prudential justification for believing that one will recover even if one has no epistemic justification for it. Unlike prudential or moral justification, epistemic justification seems to be tied in an important way to truth, though it is hard to say in exactly what way it is connected with truth. Perhaps we might say that epistemic justification aims at truth in a way that prudential and moral justification do not. Perhaps we might say that if one is epistemically justified in believing a proposition, then one's belief is likely to be true. As we shall see, philosophers differ about the connection between truth and epistemic justification.
首先，知识所需要的理由是认识论上的理由。我们必须注意到，有些理由并不是认识论上的理由。例如，站上打击区的击球手如果相信自己会击出安打，那么他就更有可能击出安打。当然，他很可能不会击出安打。即使是最优秀的击球手，这样做的几率也很低。不过，相信自己会成功，态度积极，对他还是有帮助的。因此，即使他没有认识论上的理由，我们也可以承认他的信念有其实践上的理由。再看一个人，他面临的是一种危及生命的疾病，大多数人都无法痊愈。即使有证据表明他无法康复，但相信自己会康复的信念可能会增加他的机会。在这种情况下，一个人即使没有认识论上的理由，也可能有道德或审慎的理由相信自己会康复。与审慎或道德上的理由不同，认识论上的理由似乎以一种重要的方式与真理联系在一起，尽管很难说它究竟是以何种方式与真理联系在一起的。也许我们可以说，认识论的正当性以真理为目标，而审慎的和道德的正当性则不是。也许我们可以说，如果一个人在认识论上有理由相信一个命题，那么他的信念就有可能是真的。正如我们将要看到的，哲学家们对真理与认识论合理性之间的联系有着不同的看法。

In any case, our focus will be on epistemic justification, so henceforth when I refer to justification, I shall be referring to epistemic justification.
无论如何，我们的重点是认识论上的合理性，所以从今往后，当我提到合理性时，我指的是认识论上的合理性。

Second, a proposition can be true and not justified. Consider the propositions: (i) the number of stars is even, and (ii) the number of stars is not even. Either (i) or (ii) is true. But clearly neither (i) nor (ii) is justified for us. We have no evidence for either. So, a proposition can be true without being justified for us. Again, the proposition that there is life on Mars might be true, but as of now, given the state of our evidence, it is not something we are justified in believing. With respect to these propositions we might say that one is not justified in believing them. Instead, one is justified in withholding belief in them.
其次，命题可以为真，也可以不成立。请看以下命题：(i) 恒星的数量是偶数，(ii) 恒星的数量不是偶数。(i)或(ii)都是真的。但很明显，(i) 或 (ii) 对我们来说都不成立。我们没有证据证明这两者。因此，一个命题可以是真命题，但对我们来说是不成立的。同样，"火星上有生命 "这个命题可能是真的，但从目前的证据来看，我们没有理由相信它。对于这些命题，我们可以说，我们没有理由相信它们。相反，我们有理由不相信它们。

Third, a proposition can be justified and not true. One can be justified in believing a proposition that is false. Suppose, for example, you are justified in believing that it is noon. You are justified because you have just looked at your watch around midday and it says that it is noon. But suppose that, unbeknownst to you, your watch stopped working at noon and it is now 12:30. Given your evidence, your belief is justified but false. Again, I might be justified in believing that the person I see going into the library is Lisa. I am justified because the person I see looks, dresses, and behaves just like Lisa. But suppose that, unbeknownst to me, Lisa has an identical twin and the person I see is not Lisa, but her twin. My belief that the person I saw was Lisa is false, but justified.
第三，一个命题可以是合理的，也可以不是真的。一个人可以有理由相信一个假命题。例如，假设你有理由相信现在是中午。你之所以有理由相信，是因为你刚刚在正午时分看了一下手表，上面显示现在是中午。但是，假设你不知道，你的表在中午停止了工作，现在是 12:30。鉴于你的证据，你的信念是合理的，但却是错误的。同样，我可能有理由相信我看到的那个走进图书馆的人是丽莎。我之所以有理由相信，是因为我看到的这个人的长相、穿着和行为举止都很像丽莎。但是，假设我不知道丽莎有一个同卵双胞胎，我看到的人不是丽莎，而是她的双胞胎。我认为我看到的人是丽莎的想法是错误的，但却是合理的。

Fourth, we need to distinguish a proposition's being justified for a person from justifying it. Justifying a proposition is an activity that one engages in, often when one's belief has been challenged. Typically, when justifying a proposition one attempts to adduce reasons in its support. In contrast, a proposition's being justified for a person is a state that one is in. Knowledge that requires that one be justified in believing that , but it does not require that one justify one's belief that . There are a great many things that each of us knows that we have never attempted to justify.
第四，我们需要将一个命题对一个人来说是合理的与为它辩护区分开来。为命题辩护是一个人经常在自己的信念受到质疑时进行的活动。通常情况下，在为一个命题辩护时，人们会试图举出支持它的理由。相比之下，对一个人来说，命题被证明是一种状态。要知道 ，一个人就必须有理由相信 ，但这并不要求他证明自己相信 是合理的。我们每个人都知道很多事情，但我们从未试图去证明它们的合理性。

Fifth, unlike truth, justification is relative in the sense that a proposition can be justified for one person, but not for another. This can happen if one person has evidence that another person lacks. Suppose, for example, that Smith is a thief. The proposition that Smith is a thief might be justified for Smith, but not for anyone else. Smith could have a lot of evidence that he is a thief, though no one else has any. Indeed, many of Smith's friends, we may suppose, are justified in believing that he is not a thief. (Here again we would
第五，与真理不同，合理性是相对的，即一个命题对一个人来说是合理的，但对另一个人来说就不是。如果一个人拥有另一个人缺乏的证据，就会出现这种情况。例如，假设史密斯是个小偷。对史密斯来说，"史密斯是小偷 "这个命题可能是合理的，但对其他人来说却不是。史密斯可能有很多证据证明他是小偷，但其他人却没有任何证据。事实上，我们可以假设，史密斯的许多朋友都有理由相信他不是小偷。(在这里，我们还是要
have an example of a belief that is justified yet false.) Furthermore, a proposition can be justified for a person at one time, but not at another time. After Smith is caught, tried, and convicted, his friends who have followed the trial closely are highly justified in believing that he is a thief. They now have evidence that they did not have before. Justification, then, can vary from person to person and it can vary for one person from time to time depending upon the evidence he has.
有一个例子说明一个信念是合理的，但却是错误的）。此外，一个命题可能在某一时刻对某人来说是合理的，但在另一时刻却不是。史密斯被抓获、审判并定罪后，他的朋友们密切关注了审判过程，他们非常有理由相信史密斯是个小偷。他们现在有了以前没有的证据。因此，理由可以因人而异，一个人的理由也可以根据他所掌握的证据而随时变化。

Sixth, epistemic justification comes in degrees. It ranges from propositions that are certain or maximally justified for us to propositions that are just barely justified, that are just barely reasonable to accept. The propositions that , that I think, that I exist, are certain for me. In contrast, the proposition that I will be alive in three months is one that it is not certain or maximally justified for me. It is not maximally justified because the proposition that I am alive now is more justified for me than it is. Still, I am justified in believing that I will be alive in three months. I am more justified in believing that proposition than I am in believing that there is life on Mars or that the number of stars is even.
第六，认识论的合理性是有程度之分的。它的范围从对我们来说确定无疑或最大限度合理的命题，到勉强合理、勉强可以接受的命题。对我来说，" "、"我认为"、"我存在 "这些命题是确定的。相比之下，"三个月后我还活着 "这个命题对我来说既不确定，也没有最大限度的合理性。它不是最大合理的，因为 "我现在还活着 "这个命题对我来说比它更合理。尽管如此，我还是有理由相信三个月后我还活着。我相信这个命题比相信火星上有生命或恒星的数量是偶数更有道理。

If knowledge requires justification, then we might ask, "What degree of justification does knowledge require?" Strictly speaking, D3 does not tell us. It seems reasonable to believe that not just any level of justification will do. The proposition that I will be alive in ten years has some degree of justification for me, but it is not high enough for me to know it. Similarly, if I know that 60 out of 100 marbles in an urn are black, then the proposition that I will draw a black marble has some positive justification for me, but I am not sufficiently justified to know that I will. So, some levels of justification are too low for knowledge. Should we say, then, that knowledge that requires that one be certain that ? That knowledge requires maximal justification? I think most philosophers who have defended a JTB account would say that knowledge does not require certainty. They would hold, reasonably, that we do know, for example, that Washington was the first president of the United States, that Caesar was assassinated, and many similar things. But these propositions are not certain for us, they are not as justified for us as or that I exist. I think it is fair to say that most defenders of the JTB account would say that while knowledge does not require certainty, it does require a high degree of justification.
如果知识需要理由，那么我们可能会问："知识需要多大程度的理由？严格地说，D3 并没有告诉我们。我们似乎有理由相信，并非任何程度的合理性都可以。对我来说，"十年后我还活着 "这个命题有一定程度的合理性，但这个程度还不足以让我知道它。同样，如果我知道瓮中的 100 个弹珠中有 60 个是黑色的，那么 "我会抽到一个黑色弹珠 "这个命题对我来说有一定的积极合理性，但我没有足够的合理性知道我会抽到一个黑色弹珠。因此，对于知识来说，某些程度的合理性太低了。那么，我们是否应该说， 的知识要求人们确信 ？知识需要最大限度的正当性？我认为，大多数为JTB观点辩护的哲学家都会说，知识并不需要确定性。他们会合理地认为，例如，我们确实知道华盛顿是美国的第一任总统，凯撒是被刺杀的，以及许多类似的事情。但这些命题对我们来说并不确定，它们对我们来说不像 或 "我存在 "那样合理。我认为，可以公平地说，大多数JTB观点的捍卫者都会说，虽然知识并不需要确定性，但它确实需要高度的合理性。

Finally, a proposition can be epistemically justified for a person even if he does not believe it. Consider the confident batter who steps into the batter's
最后，对一个人来说，即使他不相信一个命题，这个命题在认识论上也是合理的。考虑一下自信满满的击球手，他走上击球台
box. Again, more often than not, even the best batters fail to get a hit. The proposition that he won't get a hit is epistemically justified for him. But though the proposition is justified for him, he does not believe it. Indeed, he believes its negation. Similarly, the proposition that nothing terrible will happen to him today is justified for pessimistic Malcomb, but he fails to believe it.
盒子同样，即使是最优秀的击球手，也经常无法击出安打。对他来说，"他不会击出安打 "这个命题在认识论上是合理的。尽管这个命题对他来说是合理的，但他并不相信。事实上，他相信的是它的否定。同样，对于悲观的马尔科姆来说，"今天不会有什么可怕的事情发生在他身上 "这个命题是合理的，但他不相信这个命题。

Some philosophers draw a distinction between a proposition's being justified for a person and a proposition's being "well-founded" for a person. To say that a proposition, , is well-founded for a person, , is to say that (i) is justified for , and (ii) believes that on the basis of his evidence for . If a proposition is well-founded for a person, then he believes it and he believes it on the basis of evidence that supports it. If a proposition, , is well-founded for a person, then he not only has good reasons for believing it, he also believes it on the basis of good reasons. In such a case, we may also say that his belief that is well-founded or that he justifiably believes that .
一些哲学家区分了一个命题对一个人而言是否有理与一个命题对一个人而言是否 "有理"。 说一个命题（ ）对一个人（ ）来说是有根据的，就是说：(i) 对 来说是有根据的，(ii) 根据他对 的证据相信 。如果一个命题对一个人来说是有根据的，那么他就相信这个命题，而且是根据支持这个命题的证据而相信的。如果一个命题， ，对一个人来说是有充分根据的，那么他不仅有充分的理由相信这个命题，而且还根据充分的理由相信这个命题。在这种情况下，我们也可以说他相信 是有充分根据的，或者说他有理由相信 。

To illustrate the distinction between a proposition's being justified and its being well-founded, suppose that Jones is suffering from a serious illness. Though the illness is quite serious, he has excellent evidence that he will fully recover. His doctor, an expert in the field, tells him there are highly effective treatments for his condition and that the recovery rate is over 99 percent. Jones also reads the same information about the effectiveness of treatments in a well-respected medical journal. Under these circumstances we may assume that the proposition that he will recover is justified for Jones. Suppose, however, that Jones does not believe that he will recover on the basis of this evidence. Instead, he believes that he will recover on the basis of some very bad reason. Suppose he believes that he will recover because his tea-leaf reader said he would, or he believes he will recover simply on the basis of wishful thinking. The point is that even though Jones has excellent reasons for believing that he will recover, his belief is not based on those reasons. Jones's belief that he will recover is not well-founded.
为了说明命题有理与有据之间的区别，假设琼斯身患重病。虽然病情相当严重，但他有充分的证据证明自己会完全康复。他的医生是该领域的专家，他的医生告诉他，对他的病有非常有效的治疗方法，康复率超过 99%。琼斯还在一份备受推崇的医学期刊上读到了同样的治疗效果信息。在这种情况下，我们可以假定琼斯认为自己会康复的主张是合理的。然而，假设琼斯不相信自己会根据这些证据康复。相反，他认为自己会康复的理由非常糟糕。假设他相信自己会康复是因为他的茶叶阅读器说他会康复，或者他相信自己会康复仅仅是因为一厢情愿。问题是，即使琼斯有很好的理由相信自己会康复，但他的信念并不是基于这些理由。琼斯认为自己会康复的信念并没有充分的依据。

If Jones's belief that he will recover is not based on the evidence that he has for that proposition, but is based instead on wishful thinking or the testimony of his tea-leaf reader, then it seems plausible to think that Jones's belief is not an instance of knowledge. We might think that knowledge requires not simply that one have evidence for one's belief, but that one's belief be based on one's evidence. Given the concept of a proposition's being well-founded for a person, we might modify the account of knowledge to take account of the distinction. We might say:
如果琼斯认为自己会康复的信念不是基于他所掌握的证据，而是基于一厢情愿的想法或他的茶叶读者的证词，那么我们似乎可以认为琼斯的信念不是知识的实例。我们可能会认为，知识不仅要求一个人的信念有证据，还要求一个人的信念建立在他的证据之上。鉴于一个命题对一个人来说是有充分根据的这一概念，我们可以修改对知识的解释，以考虑到这一区别。我们可以这样说

D3' knows that Df. (1) believes that , (2) is true, and (3) 's belief that is well-founded.
D3' 知道 Df.(1) 相信 ，(2) 是真的，(3) '相信 是有根据的。

In this view, 's knowing that requires not simply that be justified for . It also requires that believe that on the basis of evidence that supports . Such a view seems plausible.
这种观点认为， "知道 "不仅要求 对 有正当理由。它还要求 在支持 的证据基础上相信 。这种观点似乎是可信的。

Whether a belief is justified and the degree to which it is justified is often, if not always, a function of the evidence one has for it. One might think of a person's evidence at a certain time as consisting in all the information or data she has at that time. It is widely and commonly held that sense perception, memory, introspection, and reason are "sources" of evidence. We might think of these sources as providing information or data that serve as evidence for our beliefs. We might think that they provide evidence through such things as memory experiences, sense experiences, introspective experiences, and rational intuitions. Such experiences along with our justified beliefs may be thought to constitute our evidence. Thus, my evidence that there is a cup of coffee on the desk would include my sensory experiences that I see the coffee and that I smell it, that I remember making the coffee and putting the cup there on the desk, and my justified belief that I almost always have a cup of coffee on the desk at this time of day.
一个信念是否合理，以及合理的程度，即使不一定总是合理的，也往往是一个人所拥有的证据的函数。我们可以把一个人在某一时刻的证据看作是她当时所拥有的所有信息或数据。人们普遍认为，感官知觉、记忆、内省和理性都是证据的 "来源"。我们可以认为这些来源提供的信息或数据是我们信念的证据。我们可以认为，它们通过记忆经验、感官经验、内省经验和理性直觉等提供证据。我们可以认为，这些经验与我们合理的信念一起构成了我们的证据。因此，我认为桌子上有一杯咖啡的证据包括我的感官经验，即我看到了咖啡，闻到了咖啡的香味，我记得我煮了咖啡并把杯子放在桌子上，以及我的合理信念，即我几乎总是在一天的这个时候在桌子上放一杯咖啡。

We may distinguish between two types of evidence, conclusive and nonconclusive. Conclusive evidence guarantees the truth of the proposition it supports. If is conclusive evidence for a proposition, , then it is impossible for to be false, given . Perhaps we might illustrate the concept of conclusive evidence by considering the proposition that I think. I am introspectively aware that I think. The introspective awareness that I think is evidence for the proposition that I think. It is also conclusive evidence. It is impossible for the proposition that I think to be false given my introspective awareness that I am thinking. Similarly, my introspective awareness that I think is conclusive evidence for the proposition that I exist. It is impossible for the proposition that I exist to be false, given my introspective awareness that I think.
我们可以区分两类证据，即确凿证据和非确凿证据。确凿证据保证了它所支持的命题的真实性。如果 是一个命题 的确凿证据，那么在 的前提下， 就不可能是假的。也许我们可以通过 "我认为 "这个命题来说明确凿证据的概念。我内省地意识到我在思考。我思考 "的内省意识就是 "我思考 "这一命题的证据。它也是确凿的证据。鉴于我的内省意识到我在思考，"我思考 "这个命题不可能是假的。同样，我的内省意识 "我在思考 "也是 "我存在 "这一命题的确凿证据。鉴于我的内省意识是我在思考，"我存在 "这个命题不可能是假的。

Often, however, our evidence for a proposition is nonconclusive. It is nonconclusive in the sense that it does not guarantee the truth of the proposition that it supports. Suppose that I know that there are 100 marbles in an urn and that 95 of them are black. My evidence supports the proposition that I will draw a black marble, but it does not guarantee it. My evidence is nonconclusive. Suppose, to recall an earlier example, I have the following evidence: I see that my watch says it is noon, I am justified in believing that it is around midday and that my watch has been highly reliable in the past. But, again, suppose that, unbeknownst to me, my watch quit working at noon and that is now 12:30. In this case, my evidence that it is noon is nonconclusive. My evidence supports the proposition that it is noon, but it does not guarantee it.
然而，我们对一个命题的证据往往是非结论性的。所谓非决定性，是指它并不能保证所支持的命题的真实性。假设我知道一个瓮里有 100 个弹珠，其中 95 个是黑色的。我的证据支持 "我会抽到一个黑色弹珠 "的命题，但它并不能保证这一点。我的证据是非结论性的。再举一个例子，假设我有以下证据：我看到我的手表显示现在是中午，我有理由相信现在大约是中午，而且我的手表在过去一直非常可靠。但是，再假设一下，我不知道我的表在中午时就不工作了，现在是 12:30。在这种情况下，我认为现在是中午的证据是非结论性的。我的证据支持现在是中午这一命题，但并不能保证现在是中午。

The evidence for the existence of material objects provided by our sensory experience is nonconclusive evidence. As Descartes famously pointed out, it is possible that my sensory experience is produced, not by material objects, but by a powerful evil demon intent on deceiving me. Thus, even if I am having the sensory experience of a snowball in my hand, that evidence does not guarantee that there is a snowball in my hand. It is logically possible that I have that experience and there be no snowball in my hand.
我们的感官经验为物质对象的存在提供的证据是非结论性证据。正如笛卡尔的名言所指出的，我的感官体验有可能不是由物质对象产生的，而是由一个意图欺骗我的强大恶魔产生的。因此，即使我有雪球在手的感官体验，这一证据也不能保证雪球就在我手里。从逻辑上讲，我有这种体验，但手中并没有雪球也是有可能的。

The term "nonconclusive evidence" can be misleading. To say that is nonconclusive evidence for is not to say that does not make it reasonable for us to conclude that . If, for example, I know that 95 of the 100 marbles are black, then it is reasonable for me to conclude, to believe or accept, that I will draw a black one. To say that evidence is nonconclusive is not, therefore, to imply that it does not support a particular conclusion: it is rather to note that it does not guarantee that conclusion. Furthermore, as Matthias Steup notes, we should not confuse nonconclusive evidence with "inconclusive" evidence. To say that a body of evidence, , is nonconclusive with respect to a proposition, , is to say that supports but does not guarantee it. In contrast, to say that a body of evidence, , is inconclusive with respect to is to say that does not support believing . In our previous examples, my evidence does support my beliefs that it is noon and that I will draw a black marble. My evidence for those propositions is not, therefore, inconclusive.
非确凿证据 "一词可能具有误导性。说 是 的非确凿证据，并不是说 不能让我们合理地得出 的结论。例如，如果我知道 100 个弹珠中有 95 个是黑色的，那么我得出结论、相信或接受我会抽到一个黑色的弹珠就是合理的。因此，说证据是非结论性的，并不意味着它不支持某个特定的结论：而是指出它并不能保证这个结论。此外，正如马蒂亚斯-斯图普（Matthias Steup）所指出的，我们不应将非结论性证据与 "不确定 "证据混为一谈。 说一组证据（ ）对一个命题（ ）而言是非结论性的，是说 支持 ，但并不保证它。相反，如果说一组证据（ ）对 而言是不确定的，那就是 不支持相信 。在我们前面的例子中，我的证据确实支持我相信现在是中午和我会画出黑色弹珠。因此，我对这些命题的证据并不是不确定的。

Given that there is some connection between evidence and justified belief, can we say simply that if someone has evidence for a proposition, then he is justified in believing it? No. Suppose that someone has evidence for believing and equally good evidence for believing that not-p. If this is all the evidence one has, then one is epistemically justified in withholding belief that . Whether one is justified in believing that depends on one's total evidence. A more plausible view, then, is that if one's total evidence on balance supports , then one is justified in believing that .
既然证据与合理信念之间存在着某种联系，那么我们是否可以简单地说，如果某人有证据相信某个命题，那么他就有理由相信这个命题呢？不能。假设某人有证据相信 ，也有同样好的证据相信非 p。如果这就是一个人所拥有的全部证据，那么他在认识论上就有理由不相信 。一个人是否有理由相信 取决于他的全部证据。因此，一个更可信的观点是，如果一个人的全部证据总的来说支持 ，那么他就有理由相信 。

As we noted above, our justification for believing various propositions can change over time as we acquires additional information. Sometimes our evidence for a proposition can be "defeated" or "overridden." We can lose our justification for believing a proposition when our evidence for it is defeated or overridden. Let's define the concept of "evidential defeat" as follows:
如上所述，我们相信各种命题的理由会随着时间的推移而改变，因为我们会获得更多的信息。有时，我们对某个命题的证据会被 "击败 "或 "推翻"。当我们相信某个命题的证据失效或被推翻时，我们就会失去相信该命题的理由。让我们来定义一下 "证据失效 "的概念：

defeats as evidence for Df. is evidence for believing that , but and is not evidence for believing that .
是相信 的证据，但 和 不是相信 的证据。

Let's consider two examples that illustrate the concept of defeat. Suppose that a certain table looks red to you. Let's call this bit of evidence, . Now consider the proposition that the table is red. Let's call this proposition, . We may say that is evidence for . We may say that the fact that the table looks red to you offers some support for the proposition that the table is red. Now, suppose that you get some additional information. Suppose that you learn that there is a red light shining on the table. Let's call this additional bit of information, . Note that and is not evidence for . In this case, defeats or overrides as evidence for . Speaking somewhat loosely, if your only information about the color of the table were and , then you would no longer be justified in believing . Again, we cannot say simply that if one has some evidence for a proposition, then one is justified in believing it. The evidence that one has might be defeated by one's other information.
让我们举两个例子来说明 "失败 "的概念。假设某张桌子在你看来是红色的。我们把这个证据称为 。现在考虑一下 "桌子是红色的 "这个命题。我们把这个命题称为 。我们可以说 是 的证据。我们可以说，在你看来桌子是红色的这一事实为 "桌子是红色的 "这一命题提供了一些支持。现在，假设你得到了一些额外的信息。假设你知道桌子上有一束红光。我们把这个额外的信息称为 。请注意， 和 并不是 的证据。在这种情况下，作为 的证据， 否定或取代了 。从广义上讲，如果你关于桌子颜色的唯一信息是 和 ，那么你就没有理由再相信 了。同样，我们不能简单地说，如果一个人掌握了某个命题的某些证据，那么他就有理由相信这个命题。一个人所拥有的证据可能会被他的其他信息所击败。

Let's consider a second example of defeat. Suppose you go to a party and you learn that (h): Most of the people in the room are Democrats and John is in the room. We may say that is evidence for (i) John is a Democrat. But now suppose you learn that (j): Most of the people on the right side of the room are not Democrats and John is on the right side of the room. Even though is evidence for and is not evidence for . defeats as evidence for .
让我们来看第二个失败的例子。 假设你参加了一个聚会，并了解到 (h)：房间里的大多数人都是民主党人，而约翰就在房间里。我们可以说 是（i）约翰是民主党人的证据。但现在假设你知道了 (j)：房间右边的大多数人都不是民主党人，而约翰在房间的右边。尽管 是 的证据，而 不是 的证据。 击败 成为 的证据。

It is worth noting that defeaters can themselves be defeated. Again, consider the previous example. Suppose that, along with your previous evidence, and , you also come to learn ( ) forty-nine of the fifty people in the room who voted for the trade bill are Democrats and John voted for the trade bill. Even though and is not evidence for believing and and is evidence for believing . So, along with the concept of evidential defeat, we may add:
值得注意的是，打败者本身也可以被打败。再看前面的例子。假设除了之前的证据 和 之外，你还得知 ( ) 在座的 50 个投票支持贸易法案的人中有 49 个是民主党人，而约翰投票支持贸易法案。尽管 和 不是相信 和 的证据， 也不是相信 的证据。因此，除了 "证据失效 "这一概念之外，我们还可以补充以下内容：

D5

defeats as a defeater of evidence for Df. (i) is evidence for believing that , (ii) and is not evidence for believing that , and (iii) and and is evidence for believing that .
的证据 的证据 Df.(i) 是相信 的证据，(ii) 和 不是相信 的证据，(iii) 和 以及 是相信 的证据。

Again, since one can have some evidence for believing a proposition that is defeated by one's other information, it is important to bear in mind that whether one is justified in believing some proposition depends on one's total evidence. A more promising view would be that, if you have evidence for a proposition, , and nothing in your total evidence defeats your evidence for , then is justified for you.
同样，由于一个人相信一个命题的某些证据可能会被他的其他信息所击败，因此重要的是要记住，一个人是否有理由相信某个命题取决于他的全部证据。一个更有希望的观点是，如果你有证据相信一个命题， ，而你的全部证据中没有任何东西能击败你相信 的证据，那么 对你来说就是合理的。

The fact that evidence can be defeated or overridden has an analogy in ethics. Sometimes one feature of a situation ethically requires that one perform an act and certain other features of the situation require that one not perform that act. For example, suppose that Jones has promised to meet his friend Smith for lunch at noon. The fact that Jones promised to meet Smith at noon requires that he meet Smith at noon. Suppose we let Jones's promising to meet Smith at noon and let Jones's meeting Smith at noon. We may then say that requires q. Suppose, however, that on his way to meet Smith, Jones comes across Brown, who has been severely injured in an automobile accident. Jones is the only person present who can help the severely injured Brown. Relative to these wider, more inclusive, circumstances, Jones is not ethically required to meet Smith at noon. Suppose we let Jones's being the only one who can help the severely injured Brown. We might then say that while requires and does not require . The ethical requirement for imposed by has been overridden or defeated by
证据可以被否定或推翻，这在伦理学中也有类似的道理。有时，某种情况的某一特征在伦理上要求一个人做出某种行为，而该情况的某些其他特征则要求一个人不做出该行为。例如，假设琼斯答应了他的朋友史密斯中午一起吃午饭。琼斯答应在中午与史密斯见面，这就要求他在中午与史密斯见面。假设我们让 琼斯答应中午与史密斯见面，让 琼斯中午与史密斯见面。我们可以说 要求 q。然而，假设琼斯在去见史密斯的路上遇到了布朗，布朗在一次车祸中受了重伤。琼斯是在场唯一能帮助重伤的布朗的人。相对于这些更广泛、更包容的情况，琼斯在道德上没有必要在中午去见史密斯。假设我们让 琼斯是唯一能够帮助重伤的布朗的人。那么我们可以说，虽然 要求 ，而 并不要求 。 强加给 的道德要求被以下因素推翻或击败了

Of course, it might be that yet further circumstances restore the requirement that Jones meet Smith at noon. Suppose, for example, that Brown's injuries, though severe, are not life-threatening, and that Jones has promised to meet Smith at noon in order to pay a ransom that will save the lives of several hostages. Thus, if defeats the requirement for imposed by , there might be further features that defeat as a defeater for the requirement for .
当然，也可能有其他情况使琼斯中午与史密斯见面的要求得以恢复。例如，假设布朗的伤势虽然严重，但并不危及生命，而且琼斯答应在中午与史密斯见面，以便支付赎金，挽救几名人质的生命。因此，如果 挫败了 对 的要求，那么可能还有其他特征使 作为 要求的挫败因素。

In the epistemological case, what one is justified in believing depends on one's total evidence. So too, it would seem that in the ethical case, the right action depends on one's total circumstances. Just as one's reasons for performing certain actions can be defeated by further considerations, so too one's reasons for believing various things can be defeated by further evidence.
在认识论方面，一个人有理由相信什么取决于他的全部证据。同样，在伦理学中，正确的行动似乎也取决于一个人的总体情况。正如一个人采取某些行动的理由可能会被更多的考虑所击败一样，一个人相信各种事情的理由也可能会被更多的证据所击败。

In this chapter, we have distinguished propositional knowledge from acquaintance knowledge and "how to" knowledge. We also introduced the view that propositional knowledge is justified true belief and looked very briefly at some views about belief, truth, and epistemic justification. In later chapters, we shall examine in more detail some important views about the nature of justification. In the next chapter, however, we will look at some objections to the view that knowledge is justified true belief. These objections are important, for they show that the simple view of knowledge introduced here is not quite right. In considering these objections, and the responses to them, we shall be pursuing an answer to the ancient question, "What is knowledge?"
在本章中，我们将命题知识与熟知知识和 "如何做 "知识区分开来。我们还介绍了命题知识是有正当理由的真信念这一观点，并简要探讨了关于信念、真理和认识论正当性的一些看法。在以后的章节中，我们将更详细地探讨关于正当性本质的一些重要观点。然而，在下一章中，我们将探讨对 "知识是有理由的真实信念 "这一观点的一些反对意见。这些反对意见非常重要，因为它们表明这里介绍的简单知识观并不完全正确。在考虑这些反对意见以及对它们的回应时，我们将寻求对 "知识是什么 "这个古老问题的答案。

In the last chapter, we considered the view that knowledge is epistemically justified true belief. In this chapter, we shall consider some counterexamples to the justified true belief (JTB) account and consider some attempts to repair the definition of knowledge in light of these examples. The objection we shall first consider was made prominent by Edmund Gettier in his brief, yet famous, 1963 essay "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". The difficulty for the traditional account to which he calls our attention has become known as "the Gettier problem." Since 1963, it has received a great deal of attention in epistemological circles, and there have been a great many attempts to solve it. It would be fair to say, however, that there remains no widely accepted solution. Many of the attempted solutions are quite ingenious, and many are quite complicated and difficult to evaluate. In this chapter we shall have to content ourselves with considering some very simple proposals. The solutions we shall consider are fairly early attempts to solve the problem, solutions that appeared within ten years of Gettier's original essay. None of them are adequate, but the ways in which they fail are instructive, and many of the more promising attempted solutions involve refinements and developments of these simple proposals. The three approaches we shall consider are (1) the No False Grounds approach, (2) the Defeasibility approach, and (3) the Causal approach. We shall conclude by considering briefly the view that knowledge is an unanalyzable mental state.
在上一章中，我们探讨了知识就是认识论上的正当真实信念这一观点。在本章中，我们将考虑有理由的真实信念（JTB）观点的一些反例，并考虑根据这些反例修复知识定义的一些尝试。我们首先要考虑的反例是埃德蒙-盖蒂埃（Edmund Gettier）在 1963 年发表的简短而著名的文章《有理由的真实信念是知识吗？他提请我们注意的传统观点所面临的困难被称为 "盖蒂埃问题"。自 1963 年以来，这个问题在认识论界受到了广泛关注，也有很多人试图解决这个问题。然而，可以公平地说，至今仍没有一个被广泛接受的解决方案。许多尝试的解决方案都相当巧妙，但也有许多相当复杂，难以评估。在本章中，我们将不得不满足于考虑一些非常简单的建议。我们将考虑的解决方案都是相当早期的尝试，是在盖蒂埃最初的文章发表后十年内出现的。它们中没有一个是适当的，但它们失败的方式是有启发性的，许多更有希望的尝试性解决方案都是对这些简单建议的完善和发展。我们将考虑的三种方法是：(1) 无虚假根据方法；(2) 可否性方法；(3) 因果关系方法。最后，我们将简要讨论知识是一种不可分析的心理状态这一观点。

According to the traditional account of knowledge examined in the last chapter, propositional knowledge is epistemically justified true belief. Recall that in the last chapter, we introduced the following definition:
根据上一章对知识的传统解释，命题知识是认识论上合理的真实信念。回顾上一章，我们引入了如下定义：
epistemically justified for .
的认识论合理性。

In his brief two-and-a-half-page essay, Edmund Gettier presents two counterexamples to the traditional definition. Gettier shows that some cases of justified true belief aren't instances of knowledge. If some instances of justified true belief aren't instances of knowledge, then traditional JTB accounts, such as D3, are mistaken. Let's consider Gettier's counterexamples.
埃德蒙-盖蒂埃（Edmund Gettier）在其长达两页半的短文中提出了两个反例来反驳传统定义。盖蒂尔指出，某些有理由的真实信念并不是知识的实例。如果有理由的真实信念的某些实例不是知识的实例，那么传统的 JTB 论述，如 D3，就是错误的。让我们来看看盖蒂埃的反例。

Case 1. Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:
案例 1.史密斯和琼斯申请了某份工作。史密斯有强有力的证据证明以下命题：

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
(d) 琼斯将得到这份工作，而琼斯的口袋里有 10 个硬币。

Let's suppose that Smith's evidence for (d) is that the company president has assured Smith that Jones will get the job, and let's suppose that Smith has only minutes ago counted the coins in Jones's pocket. Let's suppose that from (d), Smith deduces:
假设史密斯对（d）的证据是公司总裁向史密斯保证琼斯会得到这份工作，假设史密斯几分钟前才数过琼斯口袋里的硬币。假设史密斯从（d）推导出：

(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
(e) 能得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币。

So, Smith is justified in believing (d) and deduces (e) from (d). Smith is therefore justified in believing that (e) is true. But now imagine that unbeknownst to Smith, he, not Jones, will get the job, and also, unbeknownst to Smith, he has ten coins in his pocket. So, (e) is true. In this example, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But clearly Smith does not know that (e) is true. It is a matter of luck or sheer coincidence that Smith is right about (e).
因此，史密斯有理由相信(d)，并从(d)推导出(e)。因此，史密斯有理由相信（e）为真。但现在设想一下，史密斯并不知道是他而不是琼斯得到了这份工作，而且史密斯也不知道他口袋里有 10 个硬币。因此，（e）为真。在这个例子中，以下所有条件都成立：(i) (e) 为真；(ii) 史密斯相信 (e) 为真；(iii) 史密斯有理由相信 (e) 为真。但史密斯显然不知道（e）为真。史密斯对(e)的判断是正确的，这只是运气或纯粹的巧合。

Case 2. Suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:
案例 2.假设史密斯掌握了以下命题的有力证据：

(f) Jones owns a Ford.
(f) 琼斯拥有一辆福特汽车。

Let's imagine that Smith's evidence includes that, for as long as Smith can remember, Jones has owned a car, and always a Ford, and has just offered Smith a ride in a Ford. Let's assume that Smith is justified in believing that (f). Now, suppose that Smith has another friend, Brown, whose whereabouts are unknown to Smith. Smith selects some place names at random and deduces from (f) the following:
让我们设想一下，史密斯的证据包括，从史密斯记事起，琼斯就有一辆车，而且一直是福特车，并且刚刚让史密斯坐福特车兜风。我们假设史密斯有理由相信（f）。现在，假设史密斯还有一个朋友布朗，史密斯不知道他的下落。史密斯随机选择了一些地名，并从(f)推断出以下结论：

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston.
(g) 要么琼斯拥有一辆福特车，要么布朗在波士顿。

(h) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
(h) 要么琼斯拥有一辆福特车，要么布朗在巴塞罗那。

(i) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
(i) 要么琼斯拥有一辆福特汽车，要么布朗在布列斯特-利托夫斯克。

Since Smith is justified in believing (f) and sees that (f) entails (g)-(i), he is justified in believing each of them. But suppose that (f) is false: Jones does not own a Ford, but has been recently driving a rented car. Moreover, suppose that by sheer coincidence and utterly unbeknownst to Smith, Brown is in Barcelona. In other words, (h) is true. So, again, the following conditions are met: (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true. But Smith does not know (h). It is only by sheer coincidence or mere luck that Smith is right about (h).
由于史密斯有理由相信(f)，并且看到(f)蕴含(g)-(i)，所以他有理由相信其中的每一个。但假设（f）是假的：琼斯并不拥有一辆福特汽车，但他最近开的是一辆租来的汽车。此外，假设布朗完全是巧合，史密斯也完全不知道他在巴塞罗那。换句话说，（h）为真。因此，以下条件再次得到满足：(i)(h)为真；(ii)史密斯相信(h)为真；(iii)史密斯有理由相信(h)为真。但史密斯并不知道（h）。史密斯对（h）的判断是正确的，这完全是巧合或运气使然。

In Cases 1 and 2, Smith has evidence for, and is justified in believing, some false proposition. From this falsehood he deduces a true proposition. On the basis of this inference he acquires a justified true belief, but not knowledge. What these cases show is that one can satisfy the requirements of the JTB account of knowledge, that one can meet the requirements laid out in D3, and yet fail to have knowledge.
在案例 1 和 2 中，史密斯有证据证明并有理由相信某个假命题。他从这个假命题推导出一个真命题。在这个推论的基础上，他获得了一个合理的真信念，但不是知识。这些案例表明，一个人可以满足 JTB 知识论的要求，一个人可以满足 D3 中提出的要求，但却不能拥有知识。

Gettier notes that the counterexamples he presents presuppose two things about epistemic justification. First, they presuppose that one can be justified in believing a false proposition. In Case 1, Smith is justified in believing the falsehood, (d), Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. In Case 2, Smith is justified in believing the falsehood, (f), Jones owns a Ford. As we noted in Chapter 1, it is commonly assumed that one can be justified in believing a false proposition. To be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of nonconclusive evidence is to have evidence that does not guarantee the truth of what is believed. As long as we accept that a proposition can be justified for us on the basis of nonconclusive evidence or reasons, we must accept that we can be justified in believing some false propositions.
Gettier 指出，他提出的反例预先假定了认识论上的两件事。首先，它们预设了一个人有理由相信一个假命题。在案例 1 中，史密斯有理由相信假命题 (d)，琼斯是那个会得到这份工作的人，而且琼斯口袋里有 10 个硬币。在案例 2 中，史密斯有理由相信假命题 (f)，即琼斯拥有一辆福特汽车。正如我们在第 1 章中所指出的，人们通常认为相信一个假命题是合理的。在非确凿证据的基础上有理由相信一个命题，是指证据并不能保证所相信的命题的真实性。只要我们承认一个命题可以在非结论性证据或理由的基础上被证明是合理的，我们就必须承认我们可以有理由相信一些假命题。

Second, the examples presuppose the following Principle of Deductive Closure (PDC):
其次，这些例子预设了以下演绎封闭原则（PDC）：

If is justified in believing that and entails and deduces from and accepts as a result of this deduction, then is justified in believing .
如果 有理由相信 ，而 又蕴含 ， 从 推导出 ，并接受 这一推导结果，那么 就有理由相信 。

The PDC tells us, roughly, that justification is transmitted through deduction from propositions one is justified in believing. In Case 1, Smith is justified in believing (e) because he deduces it from (d). In Case 2, Smith is justified in believing ( ) because he deduces it from ( ). In these cases, Smith gains justification for believing a true proposition by deducing it from a false proposition that he is justified in believing.
PDC 粗略地告诉我们，正当性是通过从一个人有理由相信的命题中演绎出来的。在案例 1 中，史密斯有理由相信(e)，因为他是从(d)推导出来的。在情况 2 中，史密斯有理由相信 ( ) ，因为他是从 ( ) 推导出来的。在这些情况下，斯密通过从一个假命题推导出一个真命题，从而获得了相信这个假命题的理由。

In responding to Gettier's counterexamples, it is tempting to defend the traditional JTB account by calling into question one or both of these presuppositions. One might, for example, deny the PDC. One might hold that in Case 1, Smith is justified in believing (d) and correctly deduces (e) from (d), but deny that Smith is justified in believing that (e). If justification is not transmitted through deduction in Smith's case, then we need not hold that Smith is justified in believing (e) and we need not hold that he has a justified true belief in (e).
在回应盖蒂埃的反例时，我们很容易通过质疑其中一个或两个预设来为传统的 JTB 说法辩护。例如，我们可以否认PDC。我们可以认为，在案例1中，史密斯有理由相信(d)，并从(d)正确地推导出(e)，但否认史密斯有理由相信(e)。如果在史密斯的案例中，正当性不是通过演绎传递的，那么我们就不必认为史密斯有理由相信（e），也不必认为他对（e）有正当的真实信念。

Whether the PDC is true is controversial. Some philosophers hold that in some cases justification is not transferred through deduction. But even if that is true in some cases, it is not clear why it would be true in either of these cases. Why would Jones not be justified in believing (e) on the basis of (d)? Why would Smith not be justified in believing (h) on the basis of (f)? In each case, it seems intuitively plausible that he is justified in believing the one proposition by deducing it from the other. Moreover, as a general strategy for dealing with Gettier cases, denying the PDC seems inadequate. This is because there seem to be some Gettier-type cases that do not involve deducing one proposition from another. Suppose, for example, you are visiting your friend in the physics department. As you walk down the hall, you look in the doorway and seem to see a man in the room. You form the perceptual belief "There's a man in that room." Your perceptual belief is not formed on the basis of an inference. You simply look in the room and form the belief. Now suppose that what you saw was in fact an extremely realistic holographic image of a man. Still, given the realistic holographic image, it seems that your perceptual belief is justified. But now let's suppose that your belief is also true - there is a man in the room. He's simply not visible to you from the doorway. In this case, your belief that
PDC是否成立尚存争议。一些哲学家认为，在某些情况下，正当性并不是通过演绎转移的。但是，即使在某些情况下这是真的，也不清楚为什么在这两种情况下它都是真的。为什么琼斯在(d)的基础上没有理由相信(e)呢？为什么史密斯在(f)的基础上没有理由相信(h)呢？在每种情况下，直觉上似乎都可以认为，他通过从另一个命题推导出一个命题，从而有理由相信这个命题。此外，作为处理 Gettier 案例的一般策略，否认 PDC 似乎是不够的。这是因为似乎有一些格蒂埃类型的情况并不涉及从一个命题推导出另一个命题。举例来说，假设你去拜访物理系的朋友。当你走到大厅时，你向门口望去，似乎看到房间里有一个人。你形成了 "房间里有个男人 "的感知信念。你的感知信念并不是在推理的基础上形成的。你只是看了看房间，然后形成了这个信念。现在假设你看到的其实是一个极其逼真的全息图像。尽管如此，考虑到全息图像的逼真性，你的感知信念似乎还是合理的。但现在假设你的信念也是真的--房间里确实有一个男人。只是你从门口看不到他。在这种情况下，你的信念
there is a man in the room is true and justified, but it is not an instance of knowledge.
房间里有一个人 "是真实的、合理的，但它并不是知识的实例。

This seems to be another case in which we have a justified true belief that is not knowledge. But note that in this case your justified true belief is not formed by inferring it from some other justified belief. Consequently, it is not clear how denying the PDC would help with this case.
这似乎是另一种情况，我们有一个并非知识的合理的真实信念。但要注意的是，在这种情况下，你的有理由的真实信念并不是通过从其他有理由的信念中推论出来的。因此，我们并不清楚否认 PDC 对这种情况有什么帮助。

Alternatively, one might respond to the Gettier problem by denying that it is possible for someone to be justified in believing a false proposition. Suppose that one cannot be justified in believing a false proposition. Why would this matter for Gettier's counter-examples? Gettier claims that (e) and (h) are instances of justified true belief that are not instances of knowledge. Smith gets his justification for (e) and (h) by deducing them from (d) and (f), falsehoods that he is supposedly justified in believing. But if one can't be justified in believing a falsehood, then Smith isn't justified in believing (d) and ( ), and, consequently, he isn't justified in believing (e) and (h). In short, if one can't be justified in believing a falsehood, then Smith doesn't have a justified true belief in either (e) or ( ), and Gettier doesn't have an objection to D3.
另外，我们也可以通过否认某人有可能有理由相信一个假命题来回应格蒂埃问题。假设一个人不可能有理由相信一个假命题。为什么这对盖蒂埃的反例有影响呢？盖蒂埃认为（e）和（h）是有理由相信真命题的例子，而不是知识的例子。斯密是从（d）和（f）这两个他认为有理由相信的假话中推导出（e）和（h）的，从而得到（e）和（h）的理由。但是，如果一个人没有理由相信一个谬误，那么史密斯就没有理由相信(d)和( )，因此，他也没有理由相信(e)和(h)。简言之，如果一个人不能有理由相信一个虚假的事实，那么史密斯就没有理由相信(e)或( )是真实的，格蒂埃也就没有理由反对D3。

Unfortunately, this line of response does not seem promising. Again, as we noted in Chapter 1, a common assumption about justification is that one can be justified in believing a false proposition. Such an assumption seems quite plausible. I am justified in believing that Lisa went into the library if unbeknownst to me Lisa has an identical twin and the woman I saw enter the library was the twin. Again, suppose I incorrectly predict that the next marble drawn from an urn will be red. Wouldn't such a false belief be reasonable or justified for me if I knew only that the urn contained 1,000 marbles and 998 of them were red? Consider again Smith's position with respect to (f). Suppose that Smith knows that Jones has always owned a car in the past and always a Ford, that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Suppose we add to Gettier's original description that Jones shows Smith a cleverly forged title to the car stating that the Ford is Jones's and Jones tells Smith, "This is my Ford. I own it." It seems quite plausible to assume that Smith is justified in believing Jones owns a Ford.
遗憾的是，这种回答似乎并不乐观。同样，正如我们在第一章中指出的，关于正当性的一个常见假设是，一个人有理由相信一个假命题。这种假设似乎很有道理。如果我不知道丽莎有一个同卵双胞胎，而我看到进入图书馆的女人就是那个双胞胎，那么我就有理由相信丽莎进了图书馆。同样，假设我错误地预测下一个从瓮中抽出的弹珠是红色的。如果我只知道瓮里有 1000 颗弹珠，其中 998 颗是红色的，这样的错误信念对我来说难道不是合理或正当的吗？再考虑一下史密斯对（f）项的立场。假设史密斯知道琼斯过去一直拥有一辆车，而且总是一辆福特车，琼斯刚刚在驾驶福特车时邀请史密斯搭车。假设我们在 Gettier 的原始描述之外，再加上琼斯向史密斯出示了一份巧妙伪造的汽车所有权证，上面写明这辆福特车是琼斯的，而且琼斯告诉史密斯："这是我的福特车。我拥有它"。假设史密斯有理由相信琼斯拥有一辆福特车，这似乎很有道理。

Defending the traditional JTB account of knowledge by rejecting one or both of Gettier's presuppositions about justification does not appear to be a promising approach. The philosophical literature is rich, however, with other sorts of approaches. Some philosophers have focused on the
通过拒绝盖蒂埃关于正当性的一个或两个预设来捍卫传统的 JTB 知识论似乎并不是一种有前途的方法。不过，哲学文献中还有很多其他类型的方法。一些哲学家专注于
justification requirement for knowledge. They hold that knowledge requires epistemic justification, but, they suggest, it also requires that one's justification be of "the right sort." According to this idea, a Gettier case involves justified true belief, but the subject's justification is in some way "defective" or not the right sort to yield knowledge. Those who take this view hold that knowledge that requires that one's justification for believing meet some further condition, e.g. that one's justification does rest on any false grounds. Other philosophers have focused on the idea that knowledge requires that one not be right "by accident." Knowledge requires true belief where one's true belief is not the result of accident or coincidence. This view has led some philosophers to hold that knowledge requires some causal connection between the fact that and one's belief that .
知识的理由要求。他们认为，知识需要认识论上的正当理由，但他们认为，知识还需要一个人的正当理由是 "正确的"。根据这一观点，盖蒂埃案例涉及有正当理由的真实信念，但主体的正当理由在某种程度上是 "有缺陷的"，或者说不是产生知识的正确类型。持这种观点的人认为， 的知识要求一个人相信 的正当理由满足某些进一步的条件，例如，一个人的正当理由不基于任何虚假的理由。另一些哲学家则关注知识要求人们不能 "偶然 "正确的观点。知识要求一个人的真实信念不是偶然或巧合的结果。这种观点使一些哲学家认为，知识要求 这一事实与 这一信念之间存在某种因果联系。

As we have noted, there are many attempts to solve the Gettier problem. While there is no possibility of surveying them here, let's consider a few fairly straightforward, simple, and suggestive approaches. As we noted earlier, the three approaches we shall consider are (1) the No False Grounds approach, (2) the Defeasibility approach, and (3) the Causal approach. Of these three approaches, the first two tend to focus on the role of epistemic justification and develop the idea that one's justification must be of the right sort. The third is an early attempt to use the notion of causal connection to make sense of the idea that knowledge is true belief that is not the result of accident or coincidence.
正如我们所指出的，有许多人试图解决格蒂埃问题。虽然我们不可能在这里对它们一一详述，但还是让我们来考虑几种相当直接、简单和具有启发性的方法。 如前所述，我们要考虑的三种方法是：(1) 无虚假理由方法；(2) 解除可行性方法；(3) 因果关系方法。在这三种方法中，前两种方法倾向于关注认识论理由的作用，并提出一个观点，即一个人的理由必须是正确的。第三种方法较早地尝试使用因果联系的概念来解释 "知识是真实的信念，不是偶然或巧合的结果 "这一观点。

One approach to solving the Gettier problem begins by noting that in Gettier's examples, Smith deduces a true proposition from a falsehood. His justification for believing the true proposition depends upon his being justified in believing a false proposition. Proponents of the No False Grounds approach claim that Smith's justification for believing the true proposition is defective, at least from the standpoint of knowledge, insofar as his grounds for believing the true proposition include one or more falsehoods. This suggests a fairly simple solution, namely, that we modify D3 as follows:
解决盖蒂埃问题的一种方法是，首先注意到在盖蒂埃的例子中，史密斯从一个假命题推导出一个真命题。他相信真命题的理由取决于他相信假命题的理由。无假根据 "方法的支持者声称，至少从知识的角度来看，斯密相信真命题的理由是有缺陷的，因为他相信真命题的理由包括一个或多个假命题。这就提出了一个相当简单的解决方案，即我们可以对 D3 做如下修改：

D6

knows that Df. (1) believes that , (2) is true, (3) is epistemically justified for , and (4) 's grounds for believing that do not include any false propositions.
知道 Df。(1) 相信 ，(2) 是真的，(3) 在认识论上有理由相信 ，(4) 相信 的理由不包括任何假命题。

How is D6 supposed to help with the Gettier problem? Consider Case 1. Smith's grounds for believing (e), the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, include the false proposition (d), Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith has a justified true belief in (e). According to D6, then, Smith does not know (e), since his grounds for believing (e) include the false proposition (d). Smith's belief in (e) does not meet our added fourth condition. Similar considerations would apply to Case 2. In that case, Smith's grounds for believing ( ), Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, include the falsehood, (f), Jones owns a Ford. So, Smith's belief in ( ) fails to meet the added fourth condition and, thus, we get the right result that Smith does not know (h). When applied to Cases 1 and 2, D6 gives us the right result.
D6 如何帮助解决 Gettier 问题？请看案例 1。史密斯相信(e)的理由，即会得到这份工作的人口袋里有 10 个硬币，包括假命题(d)，即琼斯是会得到这份工作的人，琼斯口袋里有 10 个硬币。史密斯有理由相信(e)为真。根据 D6，史密斯不知道(e)，因为他相信(e)的理由包括假命题(d)。史密斯对（e）的信念不符合我们添加的第四个条件。类似的考虑也适用于情况 2。在这种情况下，史密斯相信 ( )，琼斯拥有一辆福特车或布朗在巴塞罗那的理由包括假命题(f)，琼斯拥有一辆福特车。因此，史密斯相信 ( ) 不符合附加的第四个条件，所以我们得到了正确的结果，即史密斯不知道 (h)。当应用到案例 1 和 2 时，D6 给出了正确的结果。

Unfortunately, D6 is not satisfactory. There are two problems with D6. First, it is too weak to rule out some Gettier cases. Second, it is too strong, insofar as it rules out some plausible instances of knowledge. Let's consider first the objection that D6 is too weak. Let's consider the following case.
遗憾的是，D6 并不令人满意。D6 有两个问题。首先，它太弱了，无法排除一些格蒂埃情况。第二，它太强了，因为它排除了一些似是而非的知识实例。让我们先来看看关于D6太弱的反对意见。 让我们考虑下面的情况。

Case 3. Suppose that Smith knows, and is thus justified in believing, the following:
案例 3。假设斯密知道并因此有理由相信以下内容：

(j) Jones, who works in my office, and has always driven a Ford in the past, has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says that he owns a Ford.
(j) 在我办公室工作的琼斯过去一直开福特车，刚才他让我坐福特车，并说他拥有一辆福特车。

From (j), Smith deduces:
根据 (j)，史密斯推导出

(k) There is someone, who works in my office, who has always driven a Ford in the past, has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says that he owns a Ford.
(k) 有个人在我的办公室工作，过去一直开福特车，刚才他让我坐福特车，还说他有一辆福特车。

On the basis of ( , Smith believes:
根据 ( ，史密斯认为：

(1) Someone in my office owns a Ford.
(1) 我办公室里有人拥有一辆福特汽车。

Given that Smith is justified in believing both (j) and (k), Smith is justified in believing (1). So, Smith has a justified belief in (1). Now, let's suppose that, as in Gettier's original case, Jones does not own a Ford. Jones has recently been pretending to own a Ford. But let's also suppose that, completely unbeknownst to Smith, someone else in Smith's office, Brown, does own a Ford. So, (1) is true. Thus, the following conditions are met: (i) (1) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (1) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (1) is true. Still, Smith does not know (1). It is only by sheer coincidence or luck that Smith turns out to be right about (1).
既然史密斯有理由相信(j)和(k)，那么史密斯也有理由相信(1)。因此，史密斯有理由相信（1）。现在，让我们假设，与盖蒂埃最初的案例一样，琼斯并不拥有一辆福特汽车。琼斯最近假装拥有一辆福特车。但我们又假设，史密斯完全不知道，史密斯办公室里的另一个人布朗确实拥有一辆福特车。因此，（1）为真。因此，满足以下条件：(i) (1) 为真；(ii) 史密斯相信 (1) 为真；(iii) 史密斯有理由相信 (1) 为真。然而，史密斯并不知道（1）。史密斯对（1）的判断是正确的，这完全是巧合或运气使然。

In Case 3, as in Gettier's original cases, we have an instance of justified true belief that isn't knowledge. But our amended definition, D6, appears too weak to rule out Smith's belief in (1) as an instance of knowledge. Why? The reason is that D6 requires that one's grounds for believing that do not include any false propositions. But in Case 3 Smith's grounds for believing (1) are the propositions (j) and (k), and they are both true. Since Smith's grounds for believing (1) are true, his belief in (1) meets the requirements for knowledge laid out in D6. Therefore, D6 is too weak to rule out Smith's belief in (1) as an instance of knowledge. D6 gives us the wrong result in Case 3.
在案例 3 中，与盖蒂埃最初的案例一样，我们有一个不是知识的有理真实信念的实例。但我们修正后的定义（D6）似乎太弱，无法排除史密斯对（1）的信念是知识的实例。为什么呢？原因在于 D6 要求一个人相信 的理由不包括任何假命题。但在案例 3 中，史密斯相信(1)的理由是命题(j)和(k)，而且这两个命题都是真的。由于史密斯相信(1)的理由是真的，所以他对(1)的信念符合 D6 中对知识的要求。因此，D6 太弱，不能排除史密斯对 (1) 的信念是知识的实例。在案例 3 中，D6 给出了错误的结果。

D6 also seems too strong, insofar as it rules out some beliefs that are clearly instances of knowledge. Suppose, for example, that you have a lot of evidence for believing some proposition. Most of your grounds consists of truths that you know. But suppose that your grounds include some false propositions. In some cases, it seems reasonable to think that you would still have knowledge even if your grounds included some false propositions. Suppose, for example, that Smith wants to know who won last night's basketball game. He sees a group of his friends and asks them who won. Each friend says that he watched the game and that the home team won. It seems reasonable to believe that Smith knows on the basis of their testimony that the home team won. But suppose that one of his friends, Jones, caught up in an uncharacteristic yet pathetic urge to fit in, lies about watching the game. Jones says, "I watched the game. It was great. The home team won." As a result, Smith's grounds for believing that the home team won includes the falsehood that Jones watched the game and said the home team won.
D6 似乎也太强了，因为它排除了一些明显属于知识的信念。举例来说，假设你有很多证据相信某个命题。你的大部分理由都是你知道的真理。但假设你的理由包括一些假命题。在某些情况下，即使你的理由中包含了一些假命题，你仍然拥有知识，这似乎是合理的。例如，假设史密斯想知道昨晚的篮球比赛谁赢了。他找到一群朋友，问他们谁赢了。每个朋友都说他看了比赛，主队赢了。根据他们的证词，史密斯知道主队赢了，这似乎是合理的。但是，假设他的一个朋友琼斯（Jones）出于一种不寻常却又可悲的合群冲动，谎称自己看了比赛。琼斯说："我看了比赛。很精彩。主队赢了"。因此，史密斯认为主队获胜的理由包括琼斯看了比赛并说主队获胜的谎言。

Still, this fact would not seem to prevent Smith from knowing that the home team won.
不过，这一事实似乎并不妨碍史密斯知道主队获胜。

As it stands, D6 is not satisfactory, though, perhaps, some modification of it will be acceptable. Let's consider a different approach, but one that, like D6, also focuses on the role of falsehoods. Let's consider:
就目前的情况而言，D6 是不能令人满意的，不过，也许对它进行一些修改是可以接受的。让我们考虑一种不同的方法，但这种方法与 D6 一样，也侧重于谬误的作用。让我们考虑一下

D7

knows that . (1) believes that , (2) is true, (3) is epistemically justified for , and (4) 's grounds for believing that do not justify any false proposition for .
(1) 相信 ，(2) 是真的，(3) 在认识论上证明 是合理的，(4) 相信 的理由不证明 的任何假命题是合理的。

According to D6, knowledge requires that none of one's grounds are false. In contrast, D7 requires that one's grounds do not justify any false proposition. How would D7 handle Gettier's original examples? Consider Case 1. Smith's grounds for believing (e), the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, also justified Smith in believing the false proposition (d) Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Since Smith's grounds for believing (e) also justify a false proposition for him, D7 gives us the right result that Smith does not know (e). Something similar is true in Case 2. In that case, Smith's grounds for believing (h), Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, also justified for Smith the false proposition ( ), Jones owns a Ford.
根据 D6，知识要求一个人的理由都不是假的。相反，D7 则要求一个人的理由不能证明任何假命题。D7 如何处理盖蒂埃最初的例子呢？请看案例 1。史密斯相信(e) "会得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币 "的理由也证明史密斯相信假命题(d) "琼斯是会得到这份工作的人，琼斯口袋里有十个硬币 "是正确的。由于斯密相信(e)的理由也证明他的命题是假的，因此 D7 给出了正确的结果，即斯密不知道(e)。情况 2 中也有类似的情况。在这种情况下，史密斯相信(h) "琼斯拥有一辆福特车或布朗在巴塞罗那 "的理由也证明( ) "琼斯拥有一辆福特车 "这个假命题是正确的。

As we have seen, D6 failed to give us the right results in Case 3. Does D7 fare any better? In Case 3, we assumed that Smith had no false grounds for believing (1), someone in my office owns a Ford. However, among Smith's grounds for believing (1) was (j), Jones, who works in my office, has always driven a Ford in the past, has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says he owns a Ford. We assumed that Smith did in fact know (j). But note that (j) does justify Smith in believing the falsehood (f), Jones owns a Ford. Since Smith's grounds for believing (1) justify him in believing a false proposition, D7 implies that Smith does not know (1). D7 seems to yield the right result in Case 3.
正如我们所看到的，D6 在案例 3 中未能给出正确的结果。D7 的结果会更好吗？在案例 3 中，我们假设史密斯没有错误的理由相信（1），即我办公室里有人拥有一辆福特汽车。然而，史密斯相信（1）的理由包括（j），在我办公室工作的琼斯过去一直开福特车，他刚刚让我坐福特车，并说他拥有一辆福特车。我们假定史密斯事实上知道（j）。但请注意，(j)确实证明史密斯有理由相信(f)的假话，即琼斯拥有一辆福特车。由于斯密相信(1)的理由使他有理由相信一个假命题，所以D7意味着斯密不知道(1)。在案例 3 中，D7 似乎得出了正确的结果。

Unfortunately, D7 is also too strong. Consider again Case 3. We assume that Smith knows,
遗憾的是，D7 也太强了。再看案例 3。我们假设史密斯知道

(j) Jones, who works in my office, has always driven a Ford in the past, has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says he owns a Ford.
(j) 在我办公室工作的琼斯过去一直开福特车，刚才他让我坐福特车，并说他拥有一辆福特车。

From (j) Smith deduces,
根据 (j) 史密斯推导出

(k) There is someone who works in my office, who has always driven a Ford in the past, who has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says he owns a Ford.
(k) 有个人在我的办公室工作，他过去一直开福特车，刚才他让我坐福特车，还说他拥有一辆福特车。

Surely Smith knows (k). But here's the problem with D7. Smith's grounds for (k) include (j) and (j) justifies Smith in believing the falsehood (f), Jones owns a Ford. Since Smith's grounds for believing justify a false proposition for Smith, D7 implies incorrectly that Smith does not know (k). As with D6, it might be that some modification of D7 will prove acceptable.
史密斯肯定知道 (k)。但 D7 的问题就在这里。史密斯相信(k)的理由包括(j)，而(j)证明史密斯相信假言(f) "琼斯拥有一辆福特 "是正确的。由于史密斯相信 的理由证明史密斯的命题是假的，所以 D7 错误地暗示史密斯不知道（k）。与 D6 一样，D7 的某些修改可能会被证明是可以接受的。

Another approach to solving the Gettier problem begins with the observation that, in Gettier's original cases, there is some true proposition which is such that if one were justified in believing it, then one would no longer be justified in believing the spurious instance of knowledge. To illustrate this point, consider again Case 3. Smith knows (j) and (k), and these propositions are evidence for (1), someone in my office owns a Ford. But now consider the true proposition, Jones is just pretending to own a Ford, (m). If Smith were justified in believing (m), or if (m) were added to his evidence, then he would not be justified in believing (1). We may say that (m) defeats (j) and ( ) as evidence for (1).
解决格蒂埃问题的另一种方法是从这样一种观察开始的：在格蒂埃的原始案例中，存在着某种真命题，如果人们有理由相信它，那么人们就不再有理由相信虚假的知识实例。为了说明这一点，请再看案例 3。史密斯知道（j）和（k），这些命题是（1）"我办公室里有人拥有一辆福特汽车 "的证据。但现在考虑一下真命题（m），即琼斯只是假装拥有一辆福特车。如果史密斯有理由相信（m），或者如果（m）被添加到他的证据中，那么他就没有理由相信（1）了。我们可以说，(m)击败了作为(1)证据的(j)和( )。

According to one version of the defeasibility approach, one's justification for believing is defective, at least from the standpoint of knowledge, if one's evidence for believing could be defeated by the addition of some true proposition to one's body of evidence. The basic idea here is that if one's justification for believing would be defeated by the addition of some true proposition, then one's justification for believing is not the right sort for knowing that . Given this assumption, perhaps we could say that one knows that only if there is no true proposition that could be added to one's evidence for and defeats one's justification for believing . We might say, roughly, that one knows that only if there is no true proposition which would defeat one's justification for believing that . This is an intriguing idea. Let's consider this view more closely.
根据 "可击败性 "方法的一个版本，如果一个人相信 的证据可能会因为在他的证据体系中增加了某个真命题而被击败，那么他相信 的理由至少从知识的角度来看是有缺陷的。这里的基本思路是，如果一个人相信 的理由会因为增加了某个真命题而失效，那么他相信 的理由就不是正确的，因为他不知道 。考虑到这一假设，我们或许可以说，只有在没有任何真命题可以添加到我们对 的证据中，并使我们相信 的理由失效的情况下，我们才知道 。我们可以粗略地说，只有当没有任何真命题会削弱人们相信 的理由时，人们才知道 。这是一个耐人寻味的观点。让我们更仔细地考虑一下这个观点。

One way to develop this idea is as follows:
提出这一想法的一种方法如下：

D8

knows that Df. (1) is true, (2) believes that , (3) is epistemically justified for , and (4) there is no true proposition, , such that if were justified in believing , then would not be justified in believing that
知道 Df。(1) 为真；(2) 相信 ；(3) 在认识论上有理由相信 ；(4) 不存在真命题 ，如果 有理由相信 ，那么 就没有理由相信

How would D8 help us with the Gettier cases? Consider Case 1. Smith's belief in (e), the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, does not meet condition (4) in D8. This is because there is a true proposition which is such that if Smith believed it, then he would not be justified in believing (e). If Smith were justified in believing the true proposition that Jones will not get the job, then he would not be justified in believing the false proposition (d), Jones is the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket, and, consequently, he would not be justified in believing (e). Since Smith's belief in (e) does not meet condition (4) in D8, D8 implies that Smith does not know (e). This is the right result.
D8 如何帮助我们处理 Gettier 案例？请看案例 1。史密斯相信（e），即会得到这份工作的人口袋里有十个硬币，不符合 D8 中的条件（4）。这是因为存在一个真命题，如果斯密相信这个真命题，那么他就没有理由相信（e）。如果史密斯有理由相信琼斯不会得到这份工作的真命题，那么他就没有理由相信假命题（d），即琼斯是会得到这份工作的人，而且琼斯口袋里有 10 个硬币，因此，他就没有理由相信（e）。由于史密斯对(e)的信念不符合 D8 中的条件(4)，D8 意味着史密斯不知道(e)。这是正确的结果。

Similar considerations apply to Case 2. Smith's belief in (h), either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, does not meet condition (4) in D8. Again, this is because there is a true proposition which is such that if Smith believed it, then he would not be justified in believing (h). If Smith were justified in believing the true proposition, that Jones is merely pretending to own a Ford, then he would not be justified in believing the false proposition (f), Jones owns a Ford, and, consequently, he would not be justified in believing (h). Since Smith's belief in (h) does not meet condition (4) in D8, D8 implies that Smith does not know (h). Again, this is the right result.
类似的考虑也适用于案例 2。史密斯相信（h），即琼斯拥有一辆福特车或布朗在巴塞罗那，不符合 D8 中的条件（4）。这还是因为存在一个真命题，如果史密斯相信这个真命题，那么他就没有理由相信（h）。如果史密斯有理由相信真命题 "琼斯只是假装拥有一辆福特车"，那么他就没有理由相信假命题（f）"琼斯拥有一辆福特车"，因此，他也没有理由相信（h）。由于史密斯相信（h）不符合 D8 中的条件（4），D8 意味着史密斯不知道（h）。这同样是正确的结果。

It is important to note that D8 makes use of a subjunctive conditional. A subjunctive conditional is a statement that tells us that if one thing were true, then something else would be. The statement "If I were to hit my thumb very hard with a hammer, then it would hurt" expresses a subjunctive conditional. People often use such statements, and, in many cases, we have no difficulty in assessing whether they are true or false. But sometimes subjunctive conditionals are tricky and they often invite difficulties in definitions. That seems to be the case in D8.
值得注意的是，D8 使用了从句条件。从句条件语句告诉我们，如果一件事是真的，那么另一件事也会是真的。如果我用锤子使劲敲我的大拇指，那么它就会疼 "这句话表达的就是从句条件。人们经常使用这样的语句，在很多情况下，我们不难判断它们的真假。但有时，从句条件式很棘手，往往会给定义带来困难。D8 似乎就是这种情况。

To appreciate the difficulty with D8, let's consider the following example. Stan's wife notices that he is awfully quiet and seems troubled about something. She asks if he is upset or angry with Tom, a co-worker. Suppose that Stan knows that he is not angry with Tom. Stan introspectively reflects and finds that he is not. So, Stan knows and is justified in believing,
为了理解 D8 的难点，让我们来看看下面的例子。斯坦的妻子注意到他异常安静，似乎在为某事烦恼。她问他是不是对同事汤姆不满或生气了。假设斯坦知道他没有生汤姆的气。斯坦自省后发现自己并没有生气。因此，斯坦知道并有理由相信、

(n) I am not angry with Tom.
(n) 我不生汤姆的气。

But suppose that earlier in the day, unbeknownst to Stan, Tom had gotten into a rather nasty squabble with Stan's mother. Suppose that the following proposition is true:
但是，假设今天早些时候，在斯坦不知道的情况下，汤姆与斯坦的母亲发生了一场相当恶劣的争吵。假设以下命题为真：

(o) Tom grossly insulted Stan's mother.
(o) 汤姆严重侮辱了斯坦的母亲。

If Stan were justified in believing (o), then he would not be justified in believing (n). For if Stan were justified in believing (o), then he would be very angry with Tom. And, if Stan were very angry with Tom, then Stan would know it and he would not be justified in believing (n). Stan's belief in (n) does not meet condition (iv) of D8. According to D8, then, Stan does not know (n). But that is the wrong result.
如果斯坦有理由相信（o），那么他就没有理由相信（n）。因为如果斯坦有理由相信（o），那么他就会对汤姆非常生气。而且，如果斯坦对汤姆非常生气，那么斯坦就会知道，他就没有理由相信（n）。斯坦相信（n）不符合 D8 的条件（iv）。因此，根据 D8，斯坦不知道（n）。但这是错误的结果。

Let's consider a second example suggested by Richard Feldman. Suppose that Smith is sitting in his study with the radio off. Smith knows that the radio is off. But a radio station, Classic Hits 101, is playing Neil Diamond's "Girl, You'll Be a Woman Soon." If Smith had the radio on and tuned to that station, he would hear the song and know that the radio is on. Now, in this case, Smith knows,
我们再来看看理查德-费尔德曼提出的第二个例子。假设史密斯坐在书房里，收音机关着。史密斯知道收音机是关着的。但是，一个名为 Classic Hits 101 的电台正在播放尼尔-戴蒙德的 "女孩，你很快就会成为女人"。如果史密斯打开收音机并调到那个电台，他就会听到这首歌，并知道收音机是开着的。现在，在这种情况下，史密斯知道了、

(r) The radio is off.
(r) 无线电已关闭。

Still, there is a true proposition such that if Smith were justified in believing it, then he would not be justified in believing (r). Such a proposition is:
不过，还是有一个真命题，如果史密斯有理由相信它，那么他就没有理由相信（r）。这个命题就是

(s) Classic Hits 101 is now playing "Girl, You'll be a Woman Soon."
(s) Classic Hits 101 正在播放 "Girl, You'll be a Woman Soon."

If Smith were justified in believing (s), it would probably be because he had the radio on and was listening to the song. So, according to D8, Smith does not know (r). Again, that is the wrong result.
如果史密斯有理由相信（s），那很可能是因为他开着收音机在听这首歌。因此，根据 D8，史密斯不知道（r）。这同样是错误的结果。

Feldman nicely sums up the basic difficulty with D8. He writes, "one can know some facts and there can be other facts such that if one knew the other facts, then one would not know the original facts. This is because, if one were in a position to know the latter facts, then one would not be in a position to
费尔德曼很好地总结了 D8 的基本难点。他写道："人们可以知道一些事实，也可以有其他事实，如果人们知道了其他事实，就不会知道原来的事实。这是因为，如果一个人能够知道后一个事实，那么他就不能
know the former facts. And, in some cases, if one knew the latter facts, the former facts would not even be true."
知道前一个事实。而且，在某些情况下，如果知道了后一事实，前一事实甚至就不是事实了"。

There are, however, versions of a defeasibility approach that do not make use of subjunctive conditionals. Let's consider one simple version of such a view. To appreciate this view, let's recall our definition of evidential defeat:
不过，也有一些不使用从句条件的失败论方法。让我们来看看这种观点的一个简单版本。为了理解这种观点，让我们回顾一下我们对证据失效的定义：

D4

defeats as evidence for Df. is evidence for believing that , but and is not evidence for believing that .
是相信 的证据，但 和 不是相信 的证据。

Following Matthias Steup, let's introduce the concepts of "justificational defeat" and "factual defeat":
继 Matthias Steup 之后， ，让我们来介绍一下 "合理性失败 "和 "事实性失败 "这两个概念：

D9

d justificationally defeats 's evidence for believing that Df.
'相信 Df 的证据。

(i) has evidence for believing that ; (ii) has also evidence ' for a proposition that defeats as evidence for .
(i) 有 的证据，可以相信 ； (ii) 也有 ' 的证据，可以相信命题 ，该命题击败了作为 证据的 。

D10

factually defeats 's evidence for believing that Df. (i) has evidence for believing that ; (ii) there is a proposition such that is true, does not have evidence for , and defeats as evidence for .
事实上， 的证据不能证明 Df.(i) 有证据证明 相信 ；(ii) 有一个命题 ，使得 为真， 没有证据证明 ，而 击溃了 作为 的证据。

There are some significant differences between justificational and factual defeat. First, in order for a proposition to be a factual defeater, it must be true. Justificational defeaters, however, can be either true or false. So, for example, if Jones, who is honest and usually quite reliable, misinforms me that Brown has been convicted three times for embezzlement, then the proposition that Brown is a thrice-convicted embezzler is a justificational defeater for my evidence that Brown is honest. But that proposition cannot be a factual defeater because it is not true.
合理性失效与事实性失效之间有一些显著的区别。首先，一个命题要想成为事实败笔，它必须是真的。然而，合理性失效命题可以是真命题，也可以是假命题。因此，举例来说，如果诚实且通常相当可靠的琼斯误告我布朗曾三次因挪用公款而被定罪，那么布朗是三次被定罪的挪用公款者这一命题就会使我关于布朗诚实的证据在理由上失效。但是，这个命题不能成为事实上的反驳理由，因为它不是真的。

Second, justificational defeat involves propositions for which one has evidence. In order for a proposition to justificationally defeat 's evidence for believing that , one must have evidence for both and . In contrast, if a proposition factually defeats 's justification for believing that , then has no evidence for . Factual defeaters are, in this respect, "hidden" defeaters. They are defeaters for which one has no evidence.
其次，合理性失效涉及到有证据支持的命题。为了使一个命题 从道理上击败 相信 的证据，人们必须同时拥有 和 的证据。相反，如果一个命题 从事实上否定了 相信 的合理性，那么 对 就没有证据。在这方面，事实破缺是 "隐藏的 "破缺。它们是没有证据证明的破缺。

Third, justificational defeat matters to one's justification in a way that factual defeat does not. If one's evidence for believing some proposition is justificationally defeated, then one loses one's justification for believing that proposition (assuming that the justificational defeater is not itself defeated). But again, one has no evidence for factual defeaters. Factual defeaters are hidden. If one's evidence for believing some proposition is factually defeated, this does not affect one's justification for believing that proposition. A proposition can factually defeat one's evidence for believing a proposition without affecting one's justification for believing it.
第三，合理性失效对一个人的合理性的影响是事实性失效所没有的。如果一个人相信某个命题的证据在理由上失效了，那么他就失去了相信这个命题的理由（假设理由上的失效本身并没有失效）。但同样，人们也没有证据证明事实性败笔。事实性落空是隐藏的。如果一个人相信某个命题的证据被事实打败了，这并不影响他相信该命题的正当性。一个命题可以在事实上击败一个人相信一个命题的证据，而不影响他相信这个命题的理由。

Given the concept of factual defeat, let's consider the following defeasibility account.
鉴于事实败诉的概念，让我们来考虑下面的败诉理由。

D11 knows that Df. (1) is true, (2) believes that , (3) is epistemically justified for , and (4) there is no proposition that factually defeats s evidence for believing that .
D11 知道 Df。(1) 为真；(2) 相信 ；(3) 在认识论上有理由相信 ；(4) 没有任何命题 在事实上削弱了 相信 的证据。

According to D11, knowledge that requires that there be no factual defeaters for one's evidence for . Roughly, it requires that there be no hidden truths that defeat one's evidence for believing that .
根据 D11， 的知识要求一个人相信 的证据不被事实所否定。粗略地说，它要求没有隐藏的事实来削弱一个人相信 的证据。

What does D11 imply about our Gettier cases? Consider Case 3. Smith has a justified true belief (1), someone who works in my office owns a Ford. Smith's evidence for this is,
D11 对我们的 Gettier 案例有何启示？请看案例 3。史密斯有一个合理的真实信念（1）：在我办公室工作的人拥有一辆福特汽车。史密斯的证据是

(j) Jones, who works in my office, has always driven a Ford in the past, has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says he owns a Ford, and
(j) 在我办公室工作的琼斯过去一直开福特车，刚才他让我坐福特车，并说他拥有一辆福特车，而且

(k) There is someone who works in my office who has always driven a Ford in the past, who has just offered me a ride in a Ford, and says he owns a Ford. Is there some true proposition that factually defeats Smith's evidence for believing (1)? Let's suppose that the following proposition is true and is one for which Smith has no evidence,
(k) 有个人在我的办公室工作，他过去一直开福特车，刚才他让我坐福特车，并说他拥有一辆福特车。是否有某个真命题能从事实上否定史密斯相信（1）的证据呢？让我们假设下面的命题是真的，而且是史密斯没有证据的命题、

(t) Jones has been pretending to own a Ford.
(t) 琼斯一直假装拥有一辆福特汽车。

It seems clear that (t) defeats ( ) and ( ) as evidence for (1). In other words, it seems clear that and and are not evidence for believing (1). So, (t) is a factual defeater for Smith's evidence for believing (1). Given D11, then, Smith does not know (1). So, D11 seems to give us the right answer in Case 3. It seems likely that D11 will also give us the right answer in Cases 1 and 2.
看来，(t)显然打败了( ) 和 ( ) 作为(1)的证据。换句话说， 、 和 显然不是相信（1）的证据。因此，(t)是史密斯相信(1)的证据的事实败笔。那么，鉴于 D11，史密斯不知道（1）。因此，D11 似乎给了我们案例 3 中的正确答案。在案例 1 和 2 中，D11 似乎也能给出正确答案。

There is, however, a serious problem for D11. To understand the problem, let's consider the following case. Suppose that Smith sees his acquaintance Tom Grabit remove a book from the library shelf, stick it under his coat, and walk out of the library with it. Smith sees Tom steal the book. Let's assume that Smith knows that Tom stole the book. But now imagine that, completely unbeknownst to Smith, Tom's mother, when informed of the charges against her son, swears that it wasn't Tom. She swears that Tom was a thousand miles away at the time and that it was his identical twin, John, who stole the book. Sadly, however, Tom's mother is insane and a pathological liar. Tom has no identical twin and John is a figment of the mother's deluded mind.
然而，D11 存在一个严重的问题。为了理解这个问题，让我们考虑下面的情况。假设史密斯看到他的熟人汤姆-格拉比特（Tom Grabit）从图书馆的书架上取下一本书，塞进自己的外套里，然后拿着书走出图书馆。史密斯看到汤姆偷了那本书。我们假设史密斯知道汤姆偷了书。但现在设想一下，史密斯完全不知道，汤姆的母亲在得知对她儿子的指控后，发誓说那不是汤姆干的。她发誓汤姆当时远在千里之外，偷书的是他的同卵双胞胎约翰。然而不幸的是，汤姆的母亲是个疯子，而且是个病态的骗子。汤姆并没有同卵双胞胎，约翰只是汤姆母亲妄想出来的。

It seems plausible to many that Smith knows that Tom stole the book. However, it seems that D11 implies Smith does not know that Tom stole the book. It seems that D11 gives us the wrong answer in this case. Consider the following true proposition,
在许多人看来，史密斯知道汤姆偷了书似乎是可信的。然而，D11 似乎暗示史密斯不知道汤姆偷了书。在这种情况下，D11 给出的答案似乎是错误的。请看下面的真命题、

(u) Tom's mother swears that Tom was miles away and Tom's twin stole the book.
(u) 汤姆的母亲发誓说，汤姆在数英里之外，汤姆的双胞胎偷了那本书。

The problem is that (u) seems to be a factual defeater for Smith's evidence that Tom stole the book. Smith has no evidence for (u), (u) is true, and the conjunction of (u) with the other propositions for which Smith has evidence are not evidence for believing that Tom stole the book. If (u) is a factual defeater, then D11 implies that Smith does not know that Tom stole the book.
问题在于，(u)似乎是史密斯关于汤姆偷了书的证据的事实败笔。史密斯没有证据证明(u)，(u)为真，而(u)与史密斯有证据证明的其他命题的联立并不是相信汤姆偷了书的证据。如果(u)是事实败项，那么D11意味着史密斯不知道汤姆偷了书。

D11 implies that one does not know that whenever there is a factual defeater for one's evidence that . The Tom Grabit case is intended to show that this is not so and that D11 is too strong, that it rules out some genuine instances of knowledge. One problem for D11, then, is that factual defeaters, or hidden truths, sometimes take away our knowledge and sometime they don't. Proponents of defeasibility accounts need to explain when they do and when they don't.
D11 意味着，只要一个人的证据证明 ，他就不知道 。汤姆-格拉比特的案例旨在说明事实并非如此，D11过于强势，它排除了一些真正的知识实例。因此，D11 的一个问题是，事实败笔或隐藏的真理有时会夺走我们的知识，有时却不会。可证实性论证的支持者需要解释什么时候会，什么时候不会。

The final approach we shall consider is the causal approach. A causal theory holds that knowledge that requires that there be some causal connection
我们要考虑的最后一种方法是因果方法。因果理论认为， 的知识需要有某种因果联系
between one's belief that and the fact that makes true. Such a view seems quite plausible when we reflect on some simple cases of perceptual knowledge. For example, I now know that there is a coffee cup on the desk. I know this because I see the cup. My belief that the cup is on the desk is causally connected through the various causal processes involved in perception to the fact that the cup is on the desk. Similarly, my belief that there was a cup here yesterday is causally connected to the fact that there was one here yesterday. Yesterday I formed that belief on the basis of perception and the belief was retained in my memory. What I now believe is causally connected through perception and memory to the fact that the cup was here then. It seems plausible to think that in many cases of perceptual and memory knowledge, there is some causal connection between one's belief that and the fact that .
的信念与使 成真的事实之间的联系。当我们思考一些简单的知觉知识时，这种观点似乎很有道理。例如，我现在知道桌子上有一个咖啡杯。我知道这一点是因为我看到了杯子。我之所以相信杯子在桌子上，是通过知觉中的各种因果过程与杯子在桌子上这一事实发生了因果联系。同样，我相信昨天这里有一个杯子，也与昨天这里有一个杯子这一事实有因果关系。昨天，我在感知的基础上形成了这个信念，并且这个信念保留在了我的记忆中。通过感知和记忆，我现在所相信的与杯子当时在这里这一事实有着因果关系。我们似乎可以认为，在许多感知和记忆知识的案例中，一个人相信 与 这一事实之间存在着某种因果联系。

Suppose, then, one were to say that knows that if and only if the fact that is causally connected to 's belief that . Unfortunately, such a simple and straightforward view won't do. Suppose, for example, that Smith has a brain tumor that causes him to believe many strange things. He believes, for example, that aliens are in his basement, that cats and dogs are joined in a conspiracy against him. Suppose further that as a result of his brain tumor he forms the belief that he has a brain tumor. The fact that he has a brain tumor is causally connected to his belief that he has a brain tumor, but surely Smith's belief isn't an instance of knowledge. Other examples illustrate the same point. Suppose that, unbeknownst to him, someone has slipped a drug into Jones's coffee. The drug causes Jones to form some paranoid beliefs. He starts to believe that people are watching him, that they are trying to read his thoughts, and that someone has put a drug in his coffee. The fact that someone has slipped a drug into his coffee is causally connected with his belief that he has been drugged, but again his belief does not seem to be an instance of knowledge.
那么，假设说 知道 ，当且仅当 这一事实与 相信 有因果关系。不幸的是，这种简单明了的观点是行不通的。例如，假设史密斯得了脑瘤，导致他相信许多奇怪的事情。例如，他相信外星人就在他家的地下室里，猫和狗联合起来密谋对付他。再假设由于脑瘤，他形成了自己患有脑瘤的信念。他得脑瘤的事实与他相信自己得了脑瘤有因果关系，但史密斯的信念肯定不是知识的实例。其他例子也能说明同样的问题。假设在琼斯不知道的情况下，有人在他的咖啡里下了药。这种药物使琼斯产生了一些偏执的信念。他开始相信有人在监视他，有人试图读懂他的想法，有人在他的咖啡里下了药。有人在他的咖啡里下药这一事实与他认为自己被下药这一信念有因果关系，但他的信念似乎又不是一种知识。

Recognizing these difficulties, Alvin Goldman proposed the following definition of knowledge in his 1967 essay "A Causal Theory of Knowing":
认识到这些困难后，阿尔文-戈德曼在 1967 年发表的论文《知识的因果理论》中提出了以下知识定义：

D12 knows that . The fact that is causally connected in an "appropriate" way with 's believing that .
D12 知道 。 与 的因果关系是 "适当 "的，因为 相信 .

D12 requires not just any sort of causal connection between a fact and one's belief, it requires that there be an "appropriate" connection. Presumably, the sort of connection between one's belief that one has a brain tumor and the fact that one does in our previous example is not of the right sort. The same may be said of one's belief that one has been drugged.
D12 不仅要求事实与信念之间有任何因果联系，还要求有 "适当的 "联系。在我们前面的例子中，一个人认为自己得了脑瘤与这个事实之间的联系可能并不恰当。一个人相信自己被下了药也是同样的道理。

But what are the appropriate sorts of connections? Goldman says that the appropriate sorts of causal connections include perception and memory. In addition, one knows that if one properly reconstructs the causal chain from the fact that to one's belief that . A proper reconstruction would involve only true beliefs of the subject about the important causal links. The idea of a proper reconstruction may be illustrated by one's belief that there had been a campfire on the beach. Walking on the beach, one sees the pile of ashes and burned timbers. One believes that the ashes and the burned timbers were caused by a campfire. One thus properly reconstructs the causal chain from one's belief to the fact of the fire. Since one can properly reconstruct the causal connection between the fact of the campfire and one's belief that there was one, one's belief that there was one is in this case an instance of knowledge. Similarly, one can know that centuries ago a nearby mountain erupted by reconstructing the causal connection between the fact of the eruption, the surrounding lava fields which one now sees, and one's belief that the mountain did once erupt. By allowing such reconstructions, Goldman's theory allows that what we know transcends what we perceive and what we remember. That seems clearly a merit of the theory insofar as we do know things which go beyond perception and memory.
但什么是适当的联系呢？戈德曼说，适当的因果联系包括知觉和记忆。此外，如果一个人正确地重建了从 这一事实到他相信 这一因果链，他就会知道 。正确的重构只涉及主体对重要因果联系的真实信念。一个人认为海滩上有一堆篝火，这可以说明正确重构的概念。走在沙滩上，看到一堆灰烬和烧焦的木头。他认为这些灰烬和烧焦的木头是篝火造成的。因此，人们可以正确地重建从自己的信念到火灾事实的因果链。既然人们可以正确地重建篝火事实与 "有篝火 "这一信念之间的因果关系，那么 "有篝火 "这一信念就是知识的实例。同样，人们可以通过重建火山爆发的事实、现在看到的周围熔岩地和自己认为这座山曾经爆发过火山的信念之间的因果联系，知道附近的一座山几个世纪前爆发过火山。通过这种重建，戈德曼的理论允许我们的认知超越我们的感知和记忆。这显然是该理论的一个优点，因为我们确实知道一些超越感知和记忆的东西。

How would D12 deal with the Gettier problem? Consider Case 2 and Smith's belief in (h), Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. Goldman notes that what makes ( ) true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona. But that fact is not causally connected to Smith's belief in (h) in any appropriate way. Smith does not perceive or remember that Brown is in Barcelona, and he cannot properly reconstruct the causal chain from his belief in (h) to the fact that Brown is in Barcelona. So, given D12, Smith does not know (h). Something similar would be said about Case 1. Smith has a justified true belief in (e) the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. But what makes (e) true is the fact that he, Smith, is the man who will get the job and he has ten coins in his pocket. Yet this fact is not connected in any appropriate way to Smith's belief in (e). Therefore, according to D12, Smith does not know (e). Finally, in Case 3 what makes it true that (1), someone in my office owns a
D12 如何处理 Gettier 问题？考虑案例 2 和史密斯对（h）的信念，即琼斯拥有一辆福特车或布朗在巴塞罗那。戈德曼指出，使 ( ) 为真的是布朗在巴塞罗那这一事实。但这一事实与史密斯对（h）的信念并没有任何适当的因果联系。斯密并没有感知或记住布朗在巴塞罗那，他无法正确地重建从他相信（h）到布朗在巴塞罗那这一事实的因果链。因此，考虑到 D12，史密斯并不知道（h）。情况 1 也是如此。史密斯有一个合理的真实信念（e），即得到这份工作的人口袋里有 10 个硬币。但（e）之所以为真，是因为他，史密斯，就是那个会得到这份工作的人，而且他口袋里有十个硬币。然而，这一事实并没有以任何适当的方式与史密斯对(e)的信念联系起来。因此，根据 D12，史密斯不知道（e）。最后，在案例 3 中，是什么使得(1) "我办公室里有人拥有一辆汽车 "成为事实呢？

Ford, is the fact that Brown owns a Ford. But again the fact that Brown owns a Ford is not connected in any appropriate way with Smith's belief in (1). He cannot give a proper reconstruction from the fact that Brown owns a Ford to his belief in (1). D12 appears to yield the right results in Cases 1, 2, and 3 .
布朗拥有一辆福特车的事实。但是，布朗拥有一辆福特车的事实又与史密斯对（1）的信念没有任何适当的联系。他无法从布朗拥有一辆福特车的事实对他对（1）的信念进行适当的重构。在案例 1、2 和 3 中，D12 似乎得出了正确的结果。

In spite of its success in dealing with Gettier's original cases and some variations thereof, D12 faces some rather serious objections. First, D12 seems unable to accommodate our knowledge of various general propositions, such as all men are mortal. The fact that all men are mortal does not seem to cause anything. It does not seem to be causally connected to one's belief that all men are mortal and, thus, it is not appropriately connected. If D12 were true, then we would not know such a generalization. But since it seems clear that we do, D12 must be false.
尽管 D12 成功地处理了盖蒂埃的原始案例及其一些变体，但它也面临着一些相当严重的异议。首先，D12 似乎无法容纳我们对各种一般命题的知识，比如所有人都是必死的。所有的人都是必死的这一事实似乎并不导致任何事情。它似乎与 "所有的人都是必死的 "这一信念没有因果联系，因此，它没有适当的联系。如果 D12 是真的，那么我们就不会知道这样的概括。但既然我们显然知道，那么 D12 就一定是假的。

Second, consider those cases where knowledge involves a proper reconstruction of the causal chain. Goldman writes that if one is to know , one's reconstruction of the chain must contain no mistakes. "Though he need not reconstruct every detail of the causal chain, he must reconstruct all the important links. Goldman admits that it is hard to give criteria for what is an "important" detail, and he suggests that what is important will vary from case to case. Some philosophers find this requirement unacceptably vague. There is, however, a more serious problem. Consider the following case. Suppose that Omar falls down drunk in the street and passes out. An hour later he dies of a heart attack. Shortly after that, a mad fiend comes along, sees Omar, and cuts off his head. Still later, Smith comes along and sees poor Omar. Smith sees that Omar's head has been cut off, and Smith believes that Omar is dead because he was decapitated. In this case, Smith knows that Omar is dead. But Smith has not properly reconstructed the causal chain from the fact that Omar is dead to his belief that Omar is dead. Smith erroneously attributes Omar's death to the fact that he was decapitated. Since Smith has not properly reconstructed the causal chain, D12 implies incorrectly that Smith does not know that Omar is dead.
其次，考虑那些知识涉及正确重建因果链的情况。戈德曼写道，如果一个人要知道 ，他对因果链的重构就不能有任何错误。"虽然他不需要重建因果链的每一个细节，但他必须重建所有重要环节。 戈德曼承认，很难给出什么是 "重要 "细节的标准，他认为重要的细节会因人而异。一些哲学家认为这一要求含糊不清，令人难以接受。然而，还有一个更严重的问题。请看下面这个案例。 假设奥马尔醉倒在大街上，昏了过去。一小时后，他死于心脏病。不久之后，一个疯狂的恶魔走了过来，看到奥马尔，并砍下了他的头。过了一会儿，史密斯走了过来，看到了可怜的奥马尔。史密斯看到奥马尔的头被砍掉了，他认为奥马尔已经死了，因为他是被砍头的。在这种情况下，史密斯知道奥马尔已经死了。但是，史密斯没有正确地重建从奥马尔死了到他相信奥马尔死了的因果链。史密斯错误地将奥马尔的死亡归因于他被斩首的事实。由于史密斯没有正确地重建因果链，D12 错误地暗示史密斯不知道奥马尔已经死了。

A third difficulty for the causal theory was raised by Goldman himself several years after the publication of "A Causal Theory of Knowing." 12 Goldman asks us to imagine that Henry is driving through the countryside and sees a barn. He forms the belief "There's a barn." But unbeknownst to Henry, he is driving through a region where the natives have constructed many facsimiles of barns, facsimiles that are really just barn façades without back walls or interiors. The facsimiles are so cleverly constructed that tourists like Henry typically mistake them for barns. Under these circumstances, Henry's true belief that there's a barn seems to be right by luck. Goldman suggests that Henry does not know that there is a barn before him. But, as Goldman points out, D12 seems to give us the wrong answer in this case. Henry's belief is causally connected in an appropriate way, i.e. through perception, to the fact that there is a barn before him. So, D12 implies that Henry has knowledge. Goldman, however, thinks this is a mistake and that D12 should be rejected.
因果理论的第三个难题是在 "知识的因果理论 "发表几年后由戈尔曼本人提出的。12 戈德曼让我们想象一下，亨利开车穿过乡村，看到了一个谷仓。他形成了 "有一个谷仓 "的信念。但亨利并不知道，他正驾车经过一个当地人建造了许多谷仓摹本的地区，这些摹本实际上只是谷仓的外墙，没有后墙或内部结构。这些仿制品建造得非常巧妙，亨利这样的游客通常会误以为它们是谷仓。在这种情况下，亨利真正相信有一个谷仓似乎是靠运气。戈德曼认为，亨利并不知道眼前有一座谷仓。但是，正如戈德曼所指出的，在这种情况下，D12 似乎给了我们一个错误的答案。亨利的信念以适当的方式，即通过感知，与他面前有一个谷仓这一事实发生了因果关系。因此，D12 暗示亨利拥有知识。然而，戈德曼认为这是一个错误，应该否定 D12。

In our previous example, Henry does not know that he is in a region filled with barn facsimiles. But consider a slightly different version of the case in which he does know this. Imagine that Henry knows that he is in such a region. Suppose he has read all about the famous barn façades erected by the locals and that he has on occasion inspected such façades up close. Now, suppose that, in spite of all the evidence that he is in such a region, Henry just ignores it and forms the belief that there's a barn. Again, it seems that Henry would not have knowledge even though his belief is correct. But, again, his belief seems formed on the basis of perception, and therefore, according to D12, it is an instance of knowledge. But that seems mistaken.
在前面的例子中，亨利并不知道自己身处一个到处都是谷仓模型的区域。但是，我们可以考虑一个稍有不同的情况，即他确实知道这一点。假设亨利知道自己身处这样一个地区。假设他在书中读到过当地人建造的著名谷仓外墙，而且他偶尔也会近距离观察这些外墙。现在，假设尽管有所有证据表明他就在这样一个地区，亨利却置若罔闻，形成了 "有一个谷仓 "的信念。同样，即使亨利的信念是正确的，他似乎也不具备知识。但是，他的信念似乎又是在感知的基础上形成的，因此，根据 D12，它是知识的一个实例。但这似乎是错误的。

The causal accounts of knowing that we have considered have been no more successful than the No False Grounds and the Defeasibility accounts. At present, it is hard to see how a simple causal account can be successfully modified to solve the Gettier problem.
我们所考虑的关于 "知 "的因果说并不比 "无虚假根据说 "和 "不可行性说 "更成功。目前，我们还很难看出如何对简单的因果说进行成功的修改，以解决格蒂埃问题。

Gettier's counter-examples show us that a simple and straightforward account of knowledge as epistemically justified true belief is mistaken. We have considered three sorts of approaches to providing a definition of propositional knowledge. The specific proposals we have considered are fairly simple and represent some of the earliest attempts to deal with the Gettier problem. Unfortunately, none of the specific proposals we have considered are successful. Still, we have only skimmed the surface of a vast body of literature on the Gettier problem, and while it is true that there is no widely accepted solution, there has been a great deal of constructive work. Many of the more recent developments are refinements of the approaches considered here.
盖蒂埃的反例告诉我们，把知识简单明了地理解为认识论上合理的真实信念是错误的。我们考虑了三种为命题知识下定义的方法。我们所考虑的具体建议都相当简单，代表了解决格蒂埃问题的一些最早尝试。遗憾的是，我们所考虑的具体建议没有一个是成功的。尽管如此，我们只是略微浏览了有关格蒂埃问题的大量文献的表面，虽然确实没有被广泛接受的解决方案，但已经有了大量建设性的工作。许多最新的发展都是对本文所考虑的方法的完善。

While it is safe to say that there remains no generally accepted solution to the Gettier problem, some philosophers have argued that the attempt to find a satisfactory analysis of knowledge is misguided. Some philosophers defend the view that the concept of knowledge is unanalyzable or indefinable. In claiming that knowledge is unanalyzable or indefinable, they do not mean that it is just too hard or too difficult to define, but rather they mean that it. is a simple concept that cannot be meaningfully broken down into other concepts, e.g. the way we can analyze being a bachelor into being both unmarried and male. In Knowledge and Its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that we should reject a "conjunctive" account of knowledge, an account that sees knowledge as a conjunction of belief plus truth plus something else, i.e. something else to solve the Gettier problem. Indeed, Williamson suggests that the failure to develop a satisfactory conjunctive account is some reason to believe that knowledge is a simple concept.
尽管可以肯定地说，格蒂埃问题仍然没有公认的解决方案，但一些哲学家认为，试图找到一个令人满意的知识分析方法是错误的。一些哲学家认为，知识的概念是不可分析或不可定义的。他们声称知识是不可分析或不可定义的，并不是说它太难或太难定义，而是说它是一个简单的概念，无法有意义地分解为其他概念，例如，我们可以把单身汉分析为未婚和男性。蒂莫西-威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson）在《知识及其局限》（Knowledge and Its Limits）一书中指出，我们应该摒弃知识的 "联结 "说，即认为知识是信念加真理加其他东西的联结，即用其他东西来解决格蒂埃问题。事实上，威廉姆森认为，未能提出一个令人满意的联结说，正是我们认为知识是一个简单概念的理由。

But if a conjunctive account is mistaken, what then is knowledge? Williamson argues that knowing is a mental state like believing, hoping, desiring, perceiving, and remembering. Williamson thinks that mental states such as believing and desiring are unanalyzable. Such states are simple in the sense that we can't analyze them or define them in terms of other concepts. Knowing, he suggests, is similar. It cannot be analyzed or defined in terms of other concepts such as belief, truth, and justification.
但是，如果结合说是错误的，那么知识又是什么呢？威廉姆森认为，"知 "与 "信"、"望"、"欲"、"感知 "和 "记忆 "一样，是一种心理状态。威廉姆森认为，相信和渴望等心理状态是不可分析的。这种状态很简单，因为我们无法分析它们，也无法用其他概念来定义它们。他认为，"认知 "也是如此。它不能用信念、真理和正当性等其他概念来分析或定义。

Still, Williamson suggests that we may distinguish two types of mental states. Some mental states are factive and others are non-factive. Believing, desiring, and hoping are non-factive mental states. If one believes, desires, or hopes that , it does not follow that is true. In contrast, Williamson says perceiving and remembering are factive mental states. If one perceives or remembers that , then it follows that is true. Knowing, according to Williamson, is also a factive mental state. If one knows that , it follows that
尽管如此，威廉姆森还是建议我们可以区分两类心理状态。有些心理状态是事实性的，有些则是非事实性的。相信、渴望和希望都是非事实性的心理状态。如果一个人相信、渴望或希望 ，并不意味着 就是真的。与此相反，威廉姆森认为感知和记忆是有事实根据的心理状态。如果一个人感知到或记得 ，那么就可以认为 是真的。威廉姆森认为，"知道 "也是一种事实性心理状态。如果一个人知道 ，那么就可以推论出
is true. Indeed, Williamson says, knowing is the most general factive mental state, insofar as if one is in any other factive mental state toward , then one also knows that . So, for example, if one perceives or remembers that , then one knows that .
是真实的。事实上，威廉姆森说，"知道 "是最一般的事实心理状态，因为如果一个人处于对 的任何其他事实心理状态，那么他也知道 。因此，举例来说，如果一个人感知或记忆到 ，那么他就知道 。

On Williamson's view, knowledge is not mere true belief plus something else. It is a distinctive sui generis mental state. He says, "To know is not merely to believe while various other conditions are met; it is to be in a new kind of state, a factive one. What matters is...rejection of a conjunctive account of knowing."13 In addition to rejecting attempts to analyze knowledge in terms of other psychological and epistemic concepts, Williamson suggests that we should put "knowledge first." Instead of understanding knowledge in terms of evidence and justification, we should instead understand evidence and justification in terms of knowledge. According to Williamson, we should adopt a "knowledge first" epistemology.
威廉姆森认为，知识并不仅仅是真实的信念加上其他东西。它是一种独特的精神状态。他说："知识不仅仅是在满足其他各种条件的情况下相信；它是处于一种新的状态，一种事实状态。重要的是......拒绝对'知'的连接性解释。"13 除了拒绝从其他心理学和认识论概念的角度分析知识的尝试之外，威廉姆森还建议我们应该把 "知识放在首位"。与其从证据和理由的角度来理解知识，不如从知识的角度来理解证据和理由。威廉姆森认为，我们应该采用 "知识至上 "的认识论。

Even though Williamson rejects the view that knowledge is analyzable, he holds that there are interesting and important entailments between knowledge and other psychological states and epistemically important items. For example, he holds that it is necessarily the case that if one knows that , then one believes that . Also, he holds that it is necessarily true that if one knows that , then one is justified in believing that . And, necessarily, one knows that if and only if one's total evidence includes the proposition that .
尽管威廉姆森反对知识是可分析的这一观点，但他认为知识与其他心理状态和认识论上的重要项目之间存在着有趣而重要的必然联系。例如，他认为，如果一个人知道 ，那么他就会相信 。他还认为，如果一个人知道 ，那么他就有理由相信 ，这是必然的。而且，当且仅当一个人的全部证据包括 这一命题时，他就必然知道 。

Williamson's view is sophisticated, complex, and controversial, and there have been a variety to objections to it. Unfortunately, a full consideration of Williamson's view would be much too detailed to undertake here. But it is worth mentioning two points.
威廉姆森的观点是复杂的、有争议的，也有各种各样的反对意见。 遗憾的是，要在此全面探讨威廉姆森的观点，篇幅会过于详尽。但有两点值得一提。

First, many philosophers hold that mental states supervene upon or depend solely on states that are internal to the subject, e.g. on brain states. According to such mental state internalism, subjects who are internal duplicates of each other, e.g. who are in precisely the same brain states, are also in the same mental states. So, for example, if A is in precisely the same brain states as , then if believes that , then believes that , and if is having sensation of blue, then is having a sensation of blue. Of course, internalists about mental states might recognize "hybrid" states, states that contain a purely mental state plus some external fact. A true belief that there is a tree before me might be such a state, one that involves the mental state of believing that there is a tree before me, and the external fact of there being a tree before me. According to the internalist, many instances of knowledge may also be viewed as hybrid states, involving the mental state of belief, plus some external fact along with some condition to solve the Gettier problem.
首先，许多哲学家认为，精神状态优先于或完全取决于主体内部的状态，如大脑状态。根据这种心理状态内部论，彼此内部重复的主体，例如处于完全相同的大脑状态的主体，也处于相同的心理状态。因此，举例来说，如果 A 与 处于完全相同的大脑状态，那么如果 认为 ，那么 认为 ，如果 有 的蓝色感觉，那么 也有蓝色感觉。当然，心理状态的内在论者可能会承认 "混合 "状态，即包含纯粹心理状态和某些外部事实的状态。我面前有一棵树 "的真实信念可能就是这样一种状态，它包含 "我面前有一棵树 "的心理状态和 "我面前有一棵树 "的外部事实。根据内在论者的观点，许多知识的实例也可以被看作是混合状态，涉及到 "相信 "的心理状态，加上一些外部事实，以及一些解决格蒂埃问题的条件。

Now, such internalism about the mental seems incompatible with Williamson's view. To see why this is so, consider two subjects who are internal duplicates of one another. It seems possible, however, that one subject could have knowledge that the other lacked. This could have happen if one of them were deceived by Descartes' demon. But if knowledge is a mental state, as Williamson suggests, then even though they are internal duplicates, they do not share the same mental states. If internalism about the mental is true, then Williamson's view must be false, and vice versa. To put the point a slightly different way, if knowing is a factive mental state, then it depends on facts that are not solely internal to the subject. If mental states depend on what is solely internal to the subject, knowledge cannot be a mental state. It must be a hybrid state.
现在看来，这种关于精神的内部主义与威廉姆森的观点是不相容的。要知道为什么会这样，我们可以考虑两个主体，他们是彼此的内部复制品。然而，其中一个主体似乎有可能拥有另一个主体所缺乏的知识。如果其中一个人被笛卡尔的魔鬼欺骗了，就有可能发生这种情况。但是，如果知识是一种精神状态，正如威廉姆森所说的那样，那么即使他们是内部的复制品，他们也不具有相同的精神状态。如果关于精神的内部主义是真的，那么威廉姆森的观点就一定是假的，反之亦然。换一种说法，如果 "知道 "是一种事实性的心理状态，那么它所依赖的事实就不仅仅是主体内部的事实。如果精神状态依赖于纯粹主体内部的东西，那么知识就不可能是一种精神状态。它必须是一种混合状态。

How serious an objection does mental state internalism pose for Williamson's view? That is hard to say. Williamson rejects internalism, and internalism is itself a controversial view. Unfortunately, it would take us much too far afield to consider whether it is true and just how serious a challenge it poses to Williamson's view.
精神状态内部主义对威廉姆森的观点构成了多严重的反对？这很难说。威廉姆森反对内部主义，而内部主义本身就是一个有争议的观点。不幸的是，如果我们要考虑它是否是真的，以及它对威廉姆森的观点构成了多大的挑战，那就太遥远了。

Let's turn to a second objection. Consider, for example, the fact that if (i) one knows that , then (ii) one believes that , and (iii) one's belief that is true. It seems clear that (i) entails both (ii) and (iii). Williamson, as we have seen, also accepts these entailments. But suppose we ask why these entailments hold. If we follow Williamson and reject a conjunctive account, then what explains these entailments? Are these just brute unexplained
让我们来谈谈第二种反对意见。举例来说，如果(i)一个人知道 ，那么(ii)他相信 ，(iii)他相信 是真的。显然，(i)同时蕴含(ii)和(iii)。正如我们所看到的，威廉姆森也接受这些必然性。但假设我们要问为什么这些必然性成立。如果我们遵从威廉姆森的观点，拒绝接受连接解释，那么这些必然性又是如何解释的呢？难道这些只是未被解释的
necessities? Perhaps these are brute necessities akin to that which holds between is red and is colored. But we may wonder if this is the best way to view the connection between knowledge and such things as belief, justification, and truth. On a conjunctive account, such as the traditional JTB account, we have a ready explanation available for why these entailments hold. It is because to know that is to have, at least in part, a true belief that . One's having a true belief that is just part of knowing that , the way one's being unmarried is part of one's being a bachelor, of being an unmarried male. So, one might hold that on the conjunctive account we have a better explanation of why such entailments hold. On Williamson's view it is not clear why these entailments hold.
必要性？也许，这些是类似于 是红色和 是彩色之间的必然性。但我们可能会问，这是否是看待知识与诸如信念、理由和真理等事物之间联系的最佳方式。在结语式解释（如传统的 JTB 解释）中，我们有一个现成的解释来说明为什么这些蕴涵成立。这是因为，知道 ，至少在一定程度上就是真正相信 。一个人真正相信 只是知道 的一部分，就像一个人未婚是单身汉、未婚男性的一部分一样。因此，有人可能会认为，根据结合论的观点，我们可以更好地解释为什么这种蕴涵成立。根据威廉姆森的观点，我们并不清楚为什么这些必然性成立。

It is possible, I think, that some might exaggerate the significance of our failure to solve the Gettier problem and our not having a satisfactory definition of knowledge. Some might think that if we don't have a satisfactory definition of knowledge, then we can't pick out instances of it or make any headway in the theory of knowledge. "How," they might ask, "can we talk intelligently about knowledge, about its extent and scope, and about its other features without a definition of it?" Some might suggest that without a satisfactory definition, we can simply make no progress in epistemology.
我认为，有些人可能会夸大我们未能解决格蒂埃问题和我们没有令人满意的知识定义的重要性。有些人可能会认为，如果我们没有一个令人满意的知识定义，那么我们就无法找出知识的实例，也无法在知识理论方面取得任何进展。"他们可能会问，"没有知识的定义，我们怎么能明智地谈论知识、知识的程度和范围以及知识的其他特征呢？有些人可能会说，没有一个令人满意的定义，我们在认识论方面根本无法取得进展。

I think that would be a mistake. One does not need a definition of knowledge in order to pick out instances of it. In general, it is not necessary for one to know the definition of in order to be able to pick out instances of . One can know that this is a man or that is a table without knowing a definition of man or table. It is no easy matter to define the concept of man or table, but we can all pick out instances of each. Young children, for example, can pick out men and tables without knowing a definition of either concept. By the same token, we can, I think, pick out instances of knowledge even without knowing a definition of knowledge. Each of us knows, for example, that we exist and that we think, and we know such things even without being able to define the concept of knowledge. Even without having a definition of knowledge or solving the Gettier problem, we know that there are other people who think and feel, who have lived for many years. So, again, it is hardly clear that one needs a definition of knowledge or a solution to the Gettier problem in order to pick out instances of knowledge.
我认为这是一个错误。我们不需要知识的定义就能找出知识的实例。一般来说，人们不需要知道 的定义，就能找出 的实例。不需要知道 "人 "或 "桌子 "的定义，也可以知道这是人或那是桌子。给 "人 "或 "桌子 "的概念下定义并非易事，但我们都能找出它们的实例。例如，幼儿在不知道人和桌子这两个概念的定义的情况下，就能找出它们。同样，我认为即使不知道知识的定义，我们也能找出知识的实例。例如，我们每个人都知道我们的存在和我们的思维，即使我们无法定义知识的概念，我们也知道这些事情。即使不知道知识的定义，也不解决盖蒂埃问题，我们也知道还有其他人在思考和感受，他们已经活了很多年。因此，要想找出知识的实例，还需要一个知识的定义或格蒂埃问题的解决方案，这一点并不清楚。

Moreover, as we have surveyed various attempts to define the concept of knowledge, we have assumed that we could pick out instances of knowledge. For example, we have sometimes rejected a definition because it implies that someone doesn't have knowledge in a particular case when it seems that he does, or it implies someone has knowledge when it seems clear he doesn't. In examining and assessing various definitions, we have assumed that we can pick out instances of knowledge.
此外，在我们对定义知识概念的各种尝试进行调查时，我们假定我们可以找出知识的实例。例如，我们有时会拒绝某个定义，因为它暗示某人在某一特定情况下不具备知识，而实际上他似乎具备知识；或者它暗示某人具备知识，而实际上他显然不具备知识。在研究和评估各种定义时，我们假定可以找出知识的实例。

Furthermore, it seems false that we can't talk intelligently about knowledge without having a definition of it. One can talk intelligently about human beings and cars and tables without having a definition of those things. So, why should it be any different for knowledge? Even if we have not solved the Gettier problem, it hardly follows that we know nothing about knowledge. We know, for example, that if someone knows that , then is true. We know that knowing that is not the same as having a mere true belief that or making a lucky guess that . We know that poor Smith in Gettier's examples lacks knowledge. Moreover, the idea that there can be no progress in epistemology without a solution to the Gettier problem or a definition of knowledge is mistaken. Consider our rejection of various proposed definitions. Rejecting mistaken views on the basis of sound reasons seems to be a kind of progress in epistemology. To discover that some seemingly plausible views about the nature of knowledge are mistaken is itself a kind of progress. These failures are instructive. To appreciate the difficulties with a defeasibility account that makes use of subjunctive conditionals or to see the problems with a simple causal account is in itself a kind of progress.
此外，如果没有知识的定义，我们就无法明智地谈论知识，这似乎是错误的。人们可以在没有定义的情况下智慧地谈论人类、汽车和桌子。那么，为什么知识就不一样呢？即使我们没有解决格蒂埃问题，也不能因此说我们对知识一无所知。例如，我们知道，如果有人知道 ，那么 就是真的。我们知道，知道 与仅仅真实地相信 或幸运地猜到 是不同的。我们知道，在盖蒂埃的例子中，可怜的史密斯缺乏知识。此外，那种认为没有格蒂埃问题的解决方案或知识的定义，认识论就不会有进步的想法是错误的。请看我们对各种拟议定义的否定。根据合理的理由拒绝接受错误的观点似乎是认识论的一种进步。发现关于知识本质的一些看似合理的观点是错误的，这本身就是一种进步。这些失败具有启发性。认识到使用从句条件的失败论的困难，或看到简单因果论的问题，本身就是一种进步。

If some might exaggerate the significance of our failure to solve the Gettier problem or to have a satisfactory definition of knowledge, some might ask why we should care. Indeed, if we don't need to solve the Gettier problem in order to pick out instances of knowledge, then why bother answering the ancient question "What is knowledge?" One response is simply that some people are motivated by a kind of philosophical or intellectual curiosity. They simply want to know in an especially precise and clear way what knowledge is. Such a curiosity is familiar to the readers of Plato, who asked about the definitions of piety, justice, and virtue. It is an ancient sort of curiosity about the nature of things, and curious minds want to know. For now, sadly, such curiosity must remain unsatisfied. We don't have a solution to the Gettier problem. Our brief attempt to answer the question "What is knowledge?" ends, as did Plato's, inconclusively.
有些人可能会夸大我们未能解决格蒂埃问题或未能给知识下一个令人满意的定义的重要性，有些人可能会问我们为什么要关心这个问题。的确，如果我们不需要解决格蒂埃问题就能找出知识的实例，那又何必费心回答 "什么是知识 "这个古老的问题呢？一种回答是，有些人只是出于一种哲学或知识上的好奇心。他们只是想特别准确、清楚地知道什么是知识。这种好奇心对于柏拉图的读者来说并不陌生，他曾问及虔诚、正义和美德的定义。这是对事物本质的一种古老的好奇心，好奇的人都想知道。遗憾的是，这种好奇心目前仍无法得到满足。我们没有解决盖蒂埃问题的办法。我们对 "知识是什么？"这个问题的简短回答，就像柏拉图的回答一样，没有结果。

In the last two chapters, we have focused mainly on the concept of knowledge. In the next few chapters we shall be concerned primarily with epistemic justification. There are at least two reasons for considering theories about epistemic justification. First, even if a satisfactory and widely accepted solution to the Gettier problem remains elusive, many philosophers hold that there is some important connection between knowledge and justification. Many hold that knowledge requires justification, that knows that only if is epistemically justified for . Similarly, many hold that if is justified in believing not-p, then does not know that . Since it is reasonable to think that there is some connection between knowledge and justification, a better understanding of the nature of justification will help us to understand better the nature of knowledge. Second, just as we are interested in the nature of knowledge, so too we may be interested in the nature of epistemic justification. We might simply be curious about what makes a belief justified or reasonable. Most of us believe that some beliefs are justified or reasonable and others aren't, but we may wonder what makes them so.
在前两章中，我们主要关注知识的概念。在接下来的几章中，我们将主要关注认识论的合理性。我们至少有两个理由来考虑认识论的正当性理论。首先，即使格蒂埃问题还没有一个令人满意且广为接受的解决方案，但许多哲学家都认为知识与理由之间存在着某种重要的联系。许多人认为，知识需要理由，只有当 对 具有认识论上的理由时， 才知道 。同样，许多人认为，如果 有理由相信 not-p，那么 就不知道 。既然我们有理由认为知识与理由之间存在某种联系，那么更好地理解理由的本质将有助于我们更好地理解知识的本质。其次，正如我们对知识的本质感兴趣一样，我们也可能对认识论理由的本质感兴趣。我们可能只是好奇，是什么让一个信念变得有理或合理。我们大多数人都相信，有些信念是正当或合理的，而有些则不是，但我们可能想知道是什么让它们如此。

In this chapter we shall focus on foundationalism. In the first section, we shall lay out some of the main claims of foundationalism and examine the concept of a justified basic belief. We shall also consider the regress argument for the existence of justified basic beliefs. In the second and third sections, we will examine two versions of foundationalism, classical and modest. In the final sections, we will ask, "What makes justified basic beliefs justified?" and consider critically some answers to this question. We shall explore the suggestion that basic beliefs can be justified by "nondoxastic" experiences.
在本章中，我们将重点讨论基础主义。在第一节中，我们将阐述基础主义的一些主要主张，并研究合理基本信念的概念。我们还将考虑存在合理基本信念的回归论证。在第二和第三部分中，我们将探讨基础主义的两种版本，即古典基础主义和温和基础主义。在最后几节，我们将提出 "是什么使合理的基本信念成为合理的？我们将探讨基本信念可以通过 "非恶性 "经验来证明的观点。

Some of our beliefs are justified on the basis of our other beliefs. In such cases, our belief is justified in virtue of, or because of, certain other things we
我们的某些信念是在其他信念的基础上形成的。在这种情况下，我们的信念是合理的，因为或由于我们的某些其他事情
believe. Examples of this are not hard to find. Suppose, for example, a detective is justified in believing that Smith is a thief. His belief is justified on the basis of certain other things he believes, e.g. that Smith's fingerprints were found at the crime scene, that witnesses saw Smith in the area at the time of the crime, that the stolen object was found in Smith's room. Many of these latter beliefs are themselves justified by yet further beliefs. Take the detective's belief that Smith's fingerprints were found at the crime scene. We may suppose that this belief derives its justification from other things he believes, e.g. that the police report states that Smith's fingerprints were found at the crime scene, that the report was written by a crime scene investigator competent in the collection of fingerprints. Oversimplifying somewhat, we might say that our detective is justified in one belief, , on the basis of other beliefs, and , and and are in turn justified on the basis of yet further beliefs. is thus supported by an evidential chain or series that includes and as well as all the beliefs that support and and all the beliefs that support those beliefs and so on.
相信。这方面的例子并不难找。例如，假设一名侦探有理由相信史密斯是小偷。他之所以相信，是因为他还相信其他一些事情，例如，在犯罪现场发现了史密斯的指纹，目击者看到史密斯在案发时出现在案发现场，在史密斯的房间里发现了被盗物品。后面这些信念中的许多信念本身又被更多的信念所证明。例如，侦探认为在犯罪现场发现了史密斯的指纹。我们可以假设，这个信念的合理性来自于他所相信的其他事情，例如，警方的报告指出史密斯的指纹是在犯罪现场发现的，报告是由一名有能力收集指纹的犯罪现场调查员撰写的。略微简化一下，我们可以说，我们的侦探基于其他信念（ 和 ）而证明了一个信念（ ）是正确的，而 和 又基于更多的信念而证明是正确的。因此， 得到了一个证据链或系列的支持，这个证据链或系列包括 和 以及支持 和 的所有信念，以及支持这些信念的所有信念，等等。

Does every justified belief derive its justification from some other belief? Some philosophers would say no. They hold that some beliefs are justified basic beliefs. Let's define the concept of a justified basic belief as follows:
是否每一个合理的信念都来自于其他信念？有些哲学家认为不是。他们认为，有些信念是合理的基本信念。让我们来定义一下合理基本信念的概念：

D13 B is a justified basic belief Df. B has some degree of justification that is not based on the justification, if any, it gets from other beliefs.
D13 B 是一个合理的基本信念 Df。B 具有某种程度的合理性，而这种合理性不是基于它从其他信念中获得的合理性（如果有的话）。

D13 does not rule out the possibility that a basic belief might have some support from other beliefs. Still, in order for something to be a justified basic belief it must have some degree of justification that is not dependent on the support it gets from other beliefs. It must have some degree of justification not derived from one's other beliefs. Justified basic beliefs are sometimes referred to as "immediately justified beliefs" or "noninferentially justified beliefs." Justified nonbasic beliefs do depend entirely for their justification on other beliefs. Justified nonbasic beliefs are sometimes referred to as "mediately justified beliefs" or "inferentially justified beliefs."
D13 并没有排除一个基本信念从其他信念中得到一些支持的可能性。尽管如此，要使某一信念成为一个合理的基本信念，它必须具有某种程度的合理性，而这种合理性并不依赖于它从其他信念中获得的支持。它必须具有某种程度的合理性，而不是来自于一个人的其他信念。合理的基本信念有时也被称为 "直接合理的信念 "或 "非推论合理的信念"。合理的非基本信念的合理性完全依赖于其他信念。合理的非基本信念有时也被称为 "中间合理信念 "或 "推论合理信念"。

What are examples of justified basic beliefs? Traditionally, examples of justified basic beliefs include two kinds: (1) beliefs about simple logical or mathematical truths; and (2) beliefs about our own mental states. Consider the propositions that all squares are squares or that if something is red and
有理基本信念的例子有哪些？传统上，合理的基本信念包括两种：(1) 关于简单逻辑或数学真理的信念；(2) 关于我们自己心理状态的信念。请看以下命题：所有的正方形都是正方形，或者如果某个东西是红色的并且
round, then it's round. One's justification for believing them does not seem to be based on one's believing some other proposition or on inferring them from some other propositions. We don't need an argument for these propositions in order to be justified in accepting them. Such propositions are immediately justified for us. One simply considers them and "sees" intellectually that they are true.
那么它就是圆的。一个人相信这些命题的理由似乎并不基于他相信其他命题或从其他命题推断出这些命题。我们不需要对这些命题进行论证，就能合理地接受它们。这些命题对我们来说立刻就是合理的。我们只需考虑这些命题，并在理智上 "看到 "它们是真的。

Along with such simple logical and mathematical truths, some beliefs about our own mental states would seem to be immediately justified or justified basic beliefs. Our beliefs that we doubt or believe some proposition are often immediately justified for us. Suppose, for example, that I believe that Paris is the capital of France. If I consider whether I have this belief, I need not infer that I do from my other beliefs. I simply consider whether I believe that Paris is the capital of France and I find that I do. I am immediately justified in believing that I have this belief. Similarly, suppose that I doubt that it will rain today. If I consider whether I do doubt this, I need not infer from some other propositions that I do. I simply consider whether I doubt it and find that I do. My belief that I doubt that it will rain today is immediately justified for me.
除了这些简单的逻辑和数学真理之外，一些关于我们自己心理状态的信念似乎也是立竿见影的或合理的基本信念。我们怀疑或相信某个命题的信念，往往对我们来说是立竿见影的。例如，假设我相信巴黎是法国的首都。如果我考虑我是否有这个信念，我不需要从我的其他信念中推断出我有这个信念。我只需考虑我是否相信巴黎是法国的首都，然后我发现我相信。我立刻就有理由相信我有这个信念。同样，假设我怀疑今天会下雨。如果我考虑我是否怀疑这一点，我不需要从其他命题中推断出我怀疑这一点。我只需考虑我是否怀疑它，并发现我确实怀疑它。我怀疑今天会下雨的信念对我来说立刻就是合理的。

Some beliefs about other mental attitudes would seem to be immediately justified. My beliefs about whether I am happy, sad, hopeful, or fearful are often immediately justified for me. For example, my belief that I hope it will rain soon is not based on an inference from other things I believe. It seems to be a justified basic belief. Similarly, my belief that I am sad that a colleague has moved away is not based on an inference. I am immediately justified in believing that I am sad that he moved away.
一些关于其他心理态度的信念似乎立刻就能证明是正确的。对我来说，我关于快乐、悲伤、希望或恐惧的信念往往是立即合理的。例如，我希望很快下雨的信念并不是基于我对其他事情的推断。它似乎是一个合理的基本信念。同样，我对同事搬走感到悲伤的信念也不是基于推理。我立刻就有理由相信我为他搬走而伤心。

Finally, some beliefs about my own sensations and perceptual experiences would seem to be justified basic beliefs. My beliefs that I am having a sensation of red or that I am in pain are plausibly thought to be immediately justified beliefs. My belief that I am in pain is not based on or inferred from some other belief of mine. It does not seem to depend upon some other beliefs for its justification. Similarly, beliefs about one's own perceptual experiences seem to be immediately justified. Consider the perceptual experiences of seeming to hear a bell or seeming to see a dog. Of course, one might have such experiences whether or not one is actually hearing a bell or seeing a dog. One might have such experiences even if one is merely having an auditory or visual hallucination. Still, the belief that one is having such experiences, whether or not they are veridical, is often taken to be a justified basic belief.
最后，一些关于我自己的感觉和知觉经验的信念似乎是合理的基本信念。我认为我有一种红色的感觉或我很痛苦，这些信念似乎是立即合理的信念。我痛苦的信念不是基于我的其他信念，也不是从其他信念推断出来的。它的合理性似乎并不依赖于其他信念。同样，关于自己感知经验的信念似乎也是立即合理的。考虑一下 "似乎听到了铃声 "或 "似乎看到了一只狗 "的知觉经验。当然，无论一个人是否真的听到铃声或看到狗，他都可能有这样的体验。即使只是听觉或视觉幻觉，也会有这种体验。尽管如此，认为自己有这种体验的信念，无论是否属实，通常都被认为是一种合理的基本信念。

Given the distinction between justified basic beliefs and justified nonbasic beliefs, we are in a position to state the two main theses of foundationalism. First, foundationalism holds that there are some justified basic beliefs. It holds that there are some immediately or noninferentially justified beliefs. Second, foundationalism holds that all justified nonbasic beliefs depend ultimately for their justification on justified basic beliefs. It holds that nonbasic justified beliefs derive their justification by being related in some appropriate way to our justified basic beliefs. According to foundationalism, then, our justified basic beliefs are a kind of "foundation" upon which the superstructure of nonbasic justified beliefs rests. There are different versions of foundationalism, but all versions of foundationalism accept these two general claims.
鉴于合理的基本信念与合理的非基本信念之间的区别，我们可以阐述基础主义的两个主要论点。首先，基础主义认为存在一些合理的基本信念。它认为有一些直接的或非推论的合理信念。其次，基础主义认为，所有合理的非基本信念的合理性最终取决于合理的基本信念。它认为，非基本的合理信念是通过以某种适当的方式与我们的合理基本信念相关联而获得其合理性的。因此，根据基础主义，我们有理的基本信念是一种 "基础"，非基本有理信念的上层建筑就建立在这种 "基础 "之上。基础主义有不同的版本，但所有版本的基础主义都接受这两个一般主张。

One historically important argument for the existence of justified basic beliefs is "the regress argument." The regress argument is quite old, and Aristotle seems to have given a version of it in his Posterior Analytics. In order to understand the argument, let's consider again nonbasic justified beliefs. Suppose we assume that if any belief, say , is justified on the basis of other beliefs, then there is an evidential or justificational chain or series that supports . The links in this chain are the beliefs that support . Often when a belief enjoys nonbasic justification, it will be supported by several beliefs, and each of these supporting beliefs will be in turn supported by several other beliefs. Our evidential chains will often consist of multiple widening branches. Still, when we consider evidential chains and trace out the lines of support for any particular belief, such as , there seem to be only four options: (i) the series terminates in a belief that is not justified; (ii) the series does not terminate, but contains an infinite number of supporting beliefs; (iii) the series is circular; or (iv) the justificational series terminates or ends in a justified basic belief. Given these four alternatives, we can state the regress argument as follows:
历史上关于存在合理基本信念的一个重要论证是 "回归论证"。回归论证的历史相当悠久，亚里士多德似乎在其《后分析》中给出了一个版本。 为了理解这个论证，让我们再考虑一下非基本的合理信念。假设我们假定，如果任何信念，比如 ，在其他信念的基础上是合理的，那么就存在一个支持 的证据或证明链或系列。这个链条上的环节就是支持 的信念。通常，当一个信念具有非基本的合理性时，它会得到几个信念的支持，而每一个支持信念又会得到其他几个信念的支持。我们的证据链往往由多个扩展分支组成。尽管如此，当我们考虑证据链并追溯任何特定信念（如 ）的支持线时，似乎只有四种选择：(i) 该系列终止于一个不成立的信念；(ii) 该系列没有终止，但包含无限多个支持信念；(iii) 该系列是循环的；或 (iv) 证明系列终止或结束于一个成立的基本信念。鉴于这四种选择，我们可以将回归论证表述如下：

The regress argument 回归论证

(1) Some beliefs have nonbasic justification. Some beliefs are justified on the basis of other beliefs.
(1) 有些信念是非基本的。有些信念是以其他信念为基础的。

(2) All beliefs that have nonbasic justification are supported by an evidential or justificational chain.
(2) 所有非基本理由的信念都有证据或理由链的支持。

(3) All justificational chains must either: (i) terminate in a belief that is not justified; (ii) be infinitely long; (iii) be circular; or (iv) terminate in a justified basic belief.
(3) 所有合理性链条都必须：(i) 终止于一个没有合理性的信念；(ii) 无限长；(iii) 是循环的；或 (iv) 终止于一个合理的基本信念。

(4) Options (i), (ii), and (iii) are impossible.
(4) 选项(i)、(ii)和(iii)都是不可能的。

(5) Therefore, option (iv) is true - some justificational chains terminate in justified basic beliefs.
(5) 因此，选项(iv)是正确的--一些合理性链条以合理的基本信念为终点。

The regress argument is an argument by elimination. It holds that there are only four conceivable ways in which evidential or justificational chains can be structured. But since three of the options are impossible, the fourth option, which implies that there are justified basic beliefs, must be correct.
倒退论证是一种排除论证。它认为，证据链或理由链的结构只有四种可以想象的方式。但由于其中三个选项是不可能的，第四个选项就意味着存在合理的基本信念，它一定是正确的。

Let's consider more closely premise 4 . Why should we think that options (i), (ii), and (iii) are impossible? Option (i) tells us that the evidential chain can terminate in a belief that is not justified. So, for example, option (i) allows that may be supported by an evidential chain of the following sort: , where is itself an unjustified belief. To many philosophers this option seems implausible. How can a belief which is not itself justified confer justification on other beliefs? How can an unjustified belief be a source of justification for other beliefs? Suppose, for example, that our police detective believed that Smith was a thief on the basis of the detective's beliefs that (a) Smith's fingerprints were found at the scene and (b) the stolen object was found in Smith's room. But suppose that the detective was not justified in believing (a) and (b). Suppose that he believed (a) and (b) on the basis of a mere hunch. In that case, it seems that he would not be justified in believing that Smith was a thief.
让我们仔细考虑一下前提 4。为什么我们要认为选项（i）、（ii）和（iii）是不可能的呢？选项(i)告诉我们，证据链的终点可以是一个不成立的信念。因此，举例来说，选项(i)允许以下证据链支持 ： ，其中 本身就是一个不成立的信念。对许多哲学家来说，这个选项似乎难以置信。一个本身并不正当的信念怎么能为其他信念提供正当性呢？一个不正当的信念怎么能成为其他信念的正当性来源呢？举例来说，假设我们的警探相信史密斯是小偷，因为他相信：(a) 现场发现了史密斯的指纹；(b) 在史密斯的房间里发现了被盗物品。但假设侦探没有理由相信（a）和（b）。假设他只是凭直觉相信（a）和（b）。在这种情况下，他似乎没有理由相信史密斯是小偷。

Option (ii) tells us that evidential chains can be infinitely long, and so they need not terminate. Option (ii) allows that can be supported by an evidential chain that has an infinite number of supporting links, such as and so on. Such an infinite chain would have no final or terminating link. One difficulty with this option is that it seems psychologically impossible for us to have an infinite number of beliefs. If it is psychologically impossible for us to have an infinite number of beliefs, then none of our beliefs can be supported by an infinite evidential chain.
选项（ii）告诉我们证据链可以无限长，因此它们不需要终止。选项(ii)允许 可以由证据链支持，证据链有无限多的支持环节，如 等。这种无限链没有最后或终止的链接。这个方案的一个难题是，从心理学角度看，我们似乎不可能拥有无限多的信念。如果我们在心理上不可能有无限多的信念，那么我们的任何信念都不可能得到无限证据链的支持。

Option (iii) holds that an evidential or justificational chain can be circular. It would permit justificational chains such as: . Proponents of the regress argument would say that it is impossible for a belief to confer justification on itself. But in order for to be supported by a circular
选项(iii)认为证据链或论证链可以是循环的。它允许这样的论证链：： .回归论证的支持者会说，一个信念不可能为自己赋予正当性。但是，为了使 得到循环的支持
evidential chain, it would have to confer justification on itself, if only through the other links of the chain, and this, say the supporters of the regress argument, is impossible. Suppose, for example, our police detective believes that (a) Brown is honest on the basis of his beliefs that (b) Jones is honest and (c) Jones swears that Brown is honest, and he believes that (b) Jones is honest on the basis of his beliefs that (d) Brown swears that Jones is honest and (a) Brown is honest. Given that our detective's justification for believing (a) is based, at least in part, on his belief that (a), it would seem that he is not justified in believing that (a).
退步论证的支持者说，这是不可能的。例如，假设我们的警探相信（a）布朗是诚实的，因为他相信（b）琼斯是诚实的，并且（c）琼斯发誓布朗是诚实的，而他相信（b）琼斯是诚实的，因为他相信（d）布朗发誓琼斯是诚实的，并且（a）布朗是诚实的。鉴于我们的侦探相信(a)的理由至少部分是基于他相信(a)，因此他相信(a)似乎是没有道理的。