PRELIMINARY STATEMENT  初步声明

Plaintiffs' invocation of the Basic presumption to qualify for class treatment falters in the face of direct and indirect evidence that the Challenged Misstatements had no price impact. The Challenged Misstatements did not cause inflation in Alibaba's ADS price. Hubbard Rpt. § 133. The very information Plaintiffs claim was fraudulently concealed-that Alibaba was continuing to practice exclusivity—was widely reported during the putative Class Period. Id. Iף 85-90. Commentators explained, for example, that Alibaba "sign[ed] exclusive agreements with business partners to avoid competition," D-16, and expressed concern that proposed guidelines would "diminish[]" "Alibaba's capability to offer exclusive merchants." D-3. Indeed, Alibaba itself warned investors that its "current business practices" carried antitrust risk. 20-F at 39. Market knowledge is statistically proven by Alibaba's ADS price reaction to SAMR's announced Draft Guidelines taking aim at exclusivity practices. Hubbard Rpt. ๆ 82. And if this qualitative and quantitative evidence was not enough, when SAMR announced its investigation into Alibaba's exclusivity practices, commentators stated that they were "not surprised" by this purported corrective disclosure because the practices had "long been a source of friction." D-17, D-20. The evidence amply demonstrates why a presumption of class-wide reliance is not appropriate.
原告援引基本推定以符合集体诉讼条件的做法在直接和间接证据面前出现了问题，表明受质疑的错误陈述没有价格影响。受质疑的错误陈述并没有导致阿里巴巴的 ADS 价格通货膨胀。哈伯德报告第 133 节。原告声称被欺骗隐瞒的信息——即阿里巴巴继续实行排他性的信息——在所谓的类别期间被广泛报道。第 85-90 节。评论员解释，例如，阿里巴巴“与商业伙伴签署排他性协议以避免竞争”，D-16，并表示担忧，拟议的指导方针将“削弱”“阿里巴巴提供排他性商家的能力”。D-3。事实上，阿里巴巴本身警告投资者，其“当前的商业实践”存在反垄断风险。20-F 第 39 页。市场知识通过阿里巴巴 ADS 价格对国家市场监督管理总局宣布的旨在打击排他性实践的草案指导方针做出反应而得到统计证明。哈伯德报告第 82 节。 如果这些定性和定量证据还不足以证明，当 SAMR 宣布对阿里巴巴的独家经营做法展开调查时，评论员们表示，他们对这一所谓的纠正性披露“并不感到惊讶”，因为这些做法“长期以来一直是摩擦的源头”。D-17，D-20。证据充分证明了为什么不适合假定整个类别都依赖于此。

In reply, Plaintiffs accept nearly all of Defendants' expert's findings. Rather than mount an evidentiary defense, Plaintiffs abandon the Complaint's central theory of misrepresentation for a patchwork of disconnected, speculative theories. Plaintiffs have consistently argued-and the Court found plausible - that the Prior Practices Statement affirmatively misled the market to believe that Alibaba had stopped practicing exclusivity. Order at 18-19. Plaintiffs now suggest that Alibaba's statement did not change the status quo, but was instead "entirely consistent with what the market . . . expected," and somehow "maintained" an inflated price. Pls' Reply at 6,8 .
答辩中，原告几乎接受被告专家的所有发现。原告并未提出证据辩护，而是放弃了投诉书中关于误导的核心理论，转而提出一系列毫不相关、纯属推测的理论。原告一直主张 - 法院认为是合理的 - 先前的做法声明在市场上产生了误导，使人相信阿里巴巴已经停止实行排他性。第 18-19 页的命令。原告现在暗示阿里巴巴的声明并没有改变现状，而是“完全符合市场的预期”，并以某种方式“维持”了价格的膨胀。原告答辩书第 6,8 页。

Plaintiffs offer no evidence to support these newfound speculations and, tellingly,
原告没有提供任何证据来支持这些新发现的猜测，而且显而易见，

Plaintiffs' own expert does not opine that Alibaba's ADS was artificially inflated. Instead, Tabak acknowledges marketplace knowledge of Alibaba's continued exclusivity practices during the putative Class Period. His concession of "heterogeneous" investor beliefs dooms the application of Basic and proves individual issues predominate. Certification should be denied.
原告自己的专家并未表示阿里巴巴的 ADS 是人为膨胀的。相反，塔巴克承认阿里巴巴在所谓的类别期间继续实行排他性做法的市场知识。他对“异质”投资者信念的让步注定了 Basic 的应用失败，并证明个别问题占主导地位。认证应该被拒绝。

Defendants' expert has undertaken a comprehensive review of market commentary, conducted statistical analysis of Alibaba's ADS price reaction to key statements and regulatory events, and opines that the market understood, during the putative Class Period, that Alibaba was practicing exclusivity. Hubbard Rpt. बศ 80-90. In response, Tabak concedes that some investors were aware of the very thing Plaintiffs allege the market was misled about - that Alibaba continued to deploy exclusivity practices during the putative Class Period. Tabak states:
被告方的专家已对市场评论进行了全面审查，对阿里巴巴 ADS 价格对关键声明和监管事件的反应进行了统计分析，并认为市场在所谓的类别期间理解到阿里巴巴正在实行排他性。哈伯德报告。80-90 页。作为回应，塔巴克承认一些投资者意识到原告所指控的市场被误导的事实 - 即阿里巴巴在所谓的类别期间继续实施排他性做法。塔巴克表示：

I do not deny that some market participants viewed the exclusivity portion of the November Draft Guidelines to be potentially negative to Alibaba. But, [] this does not mean that all relevant market participants believed that Alibaba was engaging in exclusivity . ... It is more plausible that some market participants did not believe or were uncertain if Alibaba was practicing exclusivity. . .
我并不否认，一些市场参与者认为《十一月草案指南》中的独家经营部分可能对阿里巴巴产生负面影响。但是，这并不意味着所有相关市场参与者都认为阿里巴巴在从事独家经营。更有可能的是，一些市场参与者并不相信或者对阿里巴巴是否在从事独家经营持怀疑态度。

Tabak Reply 58. This finding goes to the very foundations of the Basic presumption upon which Plaintiffs rely for class certification. Because "a section 10(b) claimant must allege and prove that the claimant traded in ignorance of the fact that the price was affected by the alleged manipulation," Plaintiffs cannot proceed on a class basis where "[t]he claim that lack of knowledge is common to the class is thoroughly undermined." See In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Carpenters Health Fund v. Rali Series 2006-QO1 Tr., 477 F. App'x 809, 813 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of class certification in a Section 11 case where evidence "indicated that individual knowledge inquiries might be necessary").
Tabak 回复 58。这一发现涉及原告依赖于类别认证的基本假设。因为“根据第 10（b）条款，索赔人必须声称并证明索赔人在不知道价格受到所谓操纵影响的情况下进行了交易”，原告无法在类别基础上继续进行，“缺乏知识的主张对类别普遍存在的事实受到了严重削弱。”参见 In re IPO Sec. Litig.，471 F.3d 24, 43（第二巡回法院 2006 年）；另请参见 Carpenters Health Fund v. Rali Series 2006-QO1 Tr.，477 F. App'x 809, 813（第二巡回法院 2012 年）（确认在第 11 条款案件中拒绝类别认证，因为证据“表明可能需要进行个别知识调查”）。

It defies common sense for Plaintiffs to invoke a presumption of reliance when they
原告在他们提起依赖推定时违背了常识
simultaneously concede that a portion of their putative class did not actually "trade[] in ignorance of the fact" that Alibaba was engaging in exclusivity practices. Not only have Defendants presented evidence of widespread awareness of the allegedly concealed fact, Plaintiffs' own expert "thoroughly undermine[s]" the issue of lack of knowledge. Tabak's opinion proves individualized issues of reliance predominate, and thus the class cannot be certified.
同时承认，他们所谓的类别中的一部分实际上并没有“在不知情的情况下交易”，即阿里巴巴正在进行排他性做法。被告不仅提出了有关所谓隐瞒事实的广泛认识的证据，原告自己的专家“彻底削弱了”缺乏知识的问题。塔巴克的意见证明依赖的个别问题占主导地位，因此无法认证该类别。

Hubbard demonstrates that there is no direct evidence to support price impact because none of the Challenged Misstatements are associated with a statistically significant increase in Alibaba's ADS price. Hubbard Rpt. Tণ 57, 59-60, 65, 67. In response, Plaintiffs do not rebut-and thereby concede-a lack of direct front-end evidence of price impact. Pls' Reply at 6-8.
哈伯德证明没有直接证据支持价格影响，因为挑战的错误陈述中没有一个与阿里巴巴的 ADS 价格的统计显著增加相关联。哈伯德报告 57、59-60、65、67 页。作为回应，原告没有反驳，从而承认了缺乏价格影响的直接前端证据。原告答辩书第 6-8 页。

After failing to challenge Defendants' direct evidence, Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of "ignor[ing]" the price maintenance theory. Pls' Reply at 2. Not so. Although a price maintenance theory is, in the words of the Second Circuit, "at most backward-looking, indirect evidence" of price impact, Defendants dedicated the bulk of their opposition brief to explaining why there is no indirect evidence supporting a price maintenance theory. See Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 77 F.4th 74, 93 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Goldman 2023") (citations omitted); see also Defs' Opp. at 12-22; Hubbard Rpt. Iף 69-115.
在未能挑战被告的直接证据之后，原告指控被告“忽视”价格维持理论。原告答辩书第 2 页。并非如此。尽管价格维持理论在第二巡回法院的话语中被描述为“最多是向后看的间接证据”价格影响，被告在反对意见书的大部分内容中致力于解释为什么没有间接证据支持价格维持理论。参见阿肯色州教师退休系统诉高盛集团，77 F.4th 74, 93（第二巡回法院 2023 年）（“高盛 2023”）（省略引文）；另见被告反对意见书第 12-22 页；哈伯德报告 I 第 69-115 段。

It is Defendants' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Challenged Misstatements did not impact the price of Alibaba's ADS. Defendants have done so, systematically proving the inapplicability of a price maintenance theory: First, by showing there is no evidence that the market interpreted the Prior Practices Statement to mean that Alibaba had ceased practicing exclusivity. Hubbard Rpt. 50, 54-55, 78. Second, by showing-through statistical analysis and an exhaustive review of thousands of analyst reports and news articleswidespread market awareness that Alibaba practiced exclusivity during the putative Class Period. Id. 80-90. Courts in this Circuit have found such evidence shows lack of price impact in price maintenance cases. See In re Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2024 WL 1342800, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024) ("[e]vidence from contemporaneous analyst reports [] supports the absence of price impact[;] . . . no analysts referenced or discussed [the alleged misstatements]" and "multiple analysts reported on" the allegedly concealed facts); Sjunde Ap-Fonden v. Goldman Sachs Grp., 2024 WL 1497110, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2024) (recommending no price impact as to certain alleged misstatements, noting "the market was well aware" of the allegedly concealed facts). Defendants have shown that, more likely than not, the Challenged Misstatements did not have price impact and, as discussed below, Plaintiffs identify no countervailing indirect evidence.
被告有责任通过证据的优势证明，挑战的错误陈述并未影响阿里巴巴的 ADS 价格。被告已经这样做了，系统地证明了价格维持理论的不适用性：首先，通过证明市场并未将先前的做法声明解释为阿里巴巴已停止实行排他性做法而没有证据。哈伯德报告。 50, 54-55, 78。其次，通过统计分析和对成千上万的分析师报告和新闻文章进行详尽审查，证明市场普遍意识到阿里巴巴在所谓的类别期间实行排他性做法。Id. 80-90。本巡回法院的法院已经发现，这类证据显示了价格维持案件中缺乏价格影响。参见 In re Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd. Sec. Litig.，2024 WL 1342800，第*9 页（S.D.N.Y. 2024 年 3 月 29 日）（“[来自同时期分析师报告的证据]支持了价格影响的缺席[;]...没有分析师提到或讨论[所谓的错误陈述]”和“多个分析师报告了”所谓的隐瞒事实）；Sjunde Ap-Fonden v. Goldman Sachs Grp.，2024 WL 1497110，第*16 页（S.D.N.Y. Apr. 被告已经证明，挑战性的错误陈述更有可能没有价格影响，并且如下所述，原告没有提供任何相反的间接证据。 （建议对某些被指称的错误陈述不产生价格影响，指出“市场已经充分了解”被指称的隐瞒事实）。

The parties and their experts all agree that the price maintenance theory requires that alleged misrepresentations "maintain" the status quo. Pls' Reply at 5-6; Tabak Reply at 4 n. 10. Hubbard found Plaintiffs' legal theories to be incompatible with price maintenance because Plaintiffs allege that the Prior Practices Statement changed-rather than maintained-status quo market expectations. Hubbard Rpt. ף 40. Plaintiffs reply by abandoning their own allegations.
各方及其专家都一致认为，价格维持理论要求所谓的虚假陈述“维持”现状。请答复书第 5-6 页；塔巴克答复书第 4 页注 10。哈伯德发现原告的法律理论与价格维持不相容，因为原告声称先前的做法声明改变了市场预期的现状，而不是维持。哈伯德报告第 40 段。原告通过放弃自己的指控作出回应。

At motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs argued-and the Court found plausible-that the market was aware that Alibaba practiced exclusivity before the putative Class Period, but "Alibaba's description of its 'prior' exclusivity practices" in July of 2020 "affirmatively created an impression" that "Alibaba was no longer requiring exclusivity from merchants at all." Order at 18-19 (emphases added). Now, in a complete reversal, Plaintiffs claim that the Prior Practices Statement was "entirely consistent with what the market would have expected at that time." Pls' Reply at 8. Plaintiffs' retreat only reinforces Hubbard's finding of no price impact.
在驳回动议中，原告辩称——法院认为是合理的——市场已经意识到阿里巴巴在所谓的类别期间之前实行排他性，但是 2020 年 7 月的“阿里巴巴对其‘先前’排他性做法的描述”“肯定地产生了一种印象”，即“阿里巴巴不再要求商家完全排他性”。裁定书第 18-19 页（强调添加）。现在，原告完全改变立场，声称先前做法声明“完全符合当时市场的预期”。原告答辩书第 8 页。原告的撤退只会加强哈伯德对价格影响的判断。

Compounding their failure, Plaintiffs offer the Court no evidence, just a patchwork of alternative, mutually inconsistent theories-and commit to none. First, Plaintiffs suggest that after "SAMR's stark instructions at [a] November 5, 2019 meeting that exclusivity was illegal, investors would expect Alibaba to comply," possibly causing the market's status quo expectation about Alibaba's practices to shift at that time. Id. (emphasis omitted). Next, Plaintiffs posit that statements made as early as 2015 could have caused the "market to believe . . . that [Alibaba] did not use exclusivity practices." . at 5-6, 8 n.6, B-1. Plaintiffs also theorize that perhaps Alibaba's Prior Practices Statement on November 13, 2019 did change the market's expectations, but confounding news disguised the effect. Id. at 10. Finally, Plaintiffs take the novel position that misinformation-and presumably price inflation-may have entered Alibaba's ADS price through statements that became public during the putative Class Period but which are not the Challenged Misstatements. Pls' Reply at 1, 12-13; P-22, P-33, P-35.
原告们加剧了他们的失败，向法院提供了没有证据支持的一系列相互矛盾的替代理论，并且没有承诺支持任何一种理论。首先，原告们暗示在 2019 年 11 月 5 日的一次会议上，“SAMR 明确指示排他性是非法的后，投资者会期望阿里巴巴遵守”，可能导致市场对阿里巴巴的做法的现状预期在那个时候发生变化。Id.（强调省略）。接下来，原告们提出，早在 2015 年就发表的言论可能导致“市场相信……[阿里巴巴]没有使用排他性做法”。 。在 5-6、8 n.6、B-1 处。原告们还推测，也许阿里巴巴在 2019 年 11 月 13 日发布的“先前做法声明”确实改变了市场的预期，但令人困惑的消息掩盖了这种影响。Id.在 10 处。最后，原告们提出了一种新颖的观点，即错误信息——并且可能是价格通胀——可能通过在所谓的类别期间公开的但不是受质疑的错误陈述的声明进入了阿里巴巴的 ADS 价格。原告答辩书第 1、12-13 页；P-22、P-33、P-35。

Plaintiffs offer no evidentiary support for their shifting theories. In fact, Plaintiffs' own expert does not affirmatively opine that the Challenged Misstatements had price impact and does not adopt any of their new theories. See Tabak Rpt.; Tabak Reply. This contrasts sharply with cases on which Plaintiffs rely. See, e.g., In re NIO, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2023 WL 5048615, at *15
原告对其不断变化的理论没有提供证据支持。事实上，原告自己的专家并未明确表示挑战性陈述对价格产生影响，并且也没有采纳他们的任何新理论。请参阅塔巴克报告；塔巴克回复。这与原告所依赖的案例形成鲜明对比。请参见，例如，In re NIO, Inc. Sec. Litig.，2023 WL 5048615，第 15 页。

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2023) ("[p]laintiffs submit expert reports from [two experts], each of whom opines that the misrepresentations had a price impact."); Pirnik v. Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, N.V., 327 F.R.D. 38, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (discussing "price impact[] identified by" plaintiffs' expert). Plaintiffs' theories are not only unsupported, they are directly contradicted by Plaintiffs' own pleadings and Hubbard's findings. First, the Complaint highlights, and Hubbard corroborates, ample market evidence showing that—in November 2019 or earlier-the market was aware that Alibaba was practicing exclusivity. Second, a change in the status quo understanding of Alibaba's practices on November 5, 2019 would trigger analyst commentary and likely would cause a statistically significant price movement. See Tabak Tr. 96:10-23. Hubbard confirms that there is no such evidence. Hubbard Dec. 9 10. Finally, Hubbard found no confounding effect on November 13, 2019. Id . at 9ף 6-9. Plaintiffs' theories fail to show price impact.
（E.D.N.Y. 2023 年 8 月 8 日）（“[原告]提交了[两位专家]的专家报告，他们各自认为虚假陈述对价格产生了影响。”）；Pirnik 诉 Fiat Chrysler Automobiles，N.V.，327 F.R.D. 38，46（S.D.N.Y. 2018）（讨论原告专家指出的“价格影响”）。原告的理论不仅没有得到支持，而且直接与原告自己的诉状和哈伯德的发现相矛盾。首先，诉状突出显示，并且哈伯德证实，有大量市场证据表明，在 2019 年 11 月或更早时，市场已经意识到阿里巴巴正在实行排他性。第二，2019 年 11 月 5 日对阿里巴巴实践的现状理解的改变将引发分析师评论，并可能导致统计上显著的价格波动。参见 Tabak Tr. 96:10-23。哈伯德证实没有这样的证据。哈伯德于 12 月 9 日发现，2019 年 11 月 13 日没有混淆效应。最后，哈伯德发现 2019 年 11 月 13 日没有混淆效应。原告的理论未能显示价格影响。

Likely recognizing the weakness of their evidentiary position, Plaintiffs argue that they need not present the Court with a coherent price maintenance theory in response to Defendants' evidence-based challenge. Pls' Reply at 7. The Supreme Court disagrees, explaining that:
原告可能意识到他们证据立场的薄弱，辩称他们无需向法庭提出一套连贯的价格维持理论来回应被告基于证据的挑战。原告回复书第 7 页。最高法院不同意，解释道：

In most securities-fraud class actions, . . the plaintiffs and defendants submit competing expert evidence on price impact. . . . The district court's task is simply to assess all the evidence of price impact - direct and indirect - and determine whether it is more likely than not that the alleged misrepresentations had a price impact. The defendant's burden of persuasion will have bite only when the court finds the evidence in equipoise-a situation that should rarely arise.
在大多数证券欺诈集体诉讼中，原告和被告提交相互竞争的专家证据，以证明价格影响。地方法院的任务只是评估所有价格影响的证据 - 直接和间接的 - 并确定所谓的虚假陈述是否更有可能对价格产生影响。只有当法院发现证据平衡时，被告的说服责任才会产生影响 - 这种情况应该很少发生。

Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1951, 1963 (2021) (“Goldman
高盛集团诉阿肯色州教师退休系统案，141 S. Ct. 1951, 1963 (2021) (“高盛

2021 "). Such an assessment of the evidence compels a finding of no price impact.
2021 年"）。对证据的这种评估迫使得出没有价格影响的结论。

Hubbard identified clear quantitative and qualitative evidence that the Challenged Misstatements did not have price impact because the market was aware during the putative Class Period that Alibaba was engaged in exclusivity practices. Hubbard Rpt. 9ף 82, 85-89. Most pointedly, when SAMR released Draft Guidelines related to exclusivity on November 10, 2020, Alibaba's ADS price experienced a sharp decline and market commentators expressed concern that, due to its ongoing exclusivity practices, Alibaba would be targeted by SAMR. Id.
哈伯德确定了明确的定量和定性证据，表明受挑战的错误陈述没有价格影响，因为市场在所谓的类别期间知道阿里巴巴从事排他性做法。哈伯德报告第 9 页 82、85-89。 最尖锐的是，当国家市场监管总局于 2020 年 11 月 10 日发布有关排他性的草案指导意见时，阿里巴巴的 ADS 价格出现急剧下跌，市场评论员表示担忧，因为由于其持续的排他性做法，阿里巴巴可能成为国家市场监管总局的目标。Id.

In response, Plaintiffs again run away from their own allegations. Plaintiffs previously alleged in no uncertain terms that "on November 10, 2020, the SAMR published new rules under China's AML further targeting 'choose one' practices." MTD Opp. at 10; id at 1 ("Alibaba was the target of new rules governing restrictive trading ..."); AC ৭ף 128-29, 373 (quoting commentary indicating exclusivity-related concerns caused Alibaba's ADS price decline). Yet Plaintiffs now claim that the price movement was in response to generalized "regulatory tightening" and a "laundry list" of other practices in the Draft Guidelines. Pls' Reply at 3, 10-11.
作为回应，原告再次逃避自己的指控。原告先前明确指称“2020 年 11 月 10 日，SAMR 根据中国反垄断法发布了新规定，进一步针对‘选择一个’的做法。” MTD Opp. at 10; id at 1（“阿里巴巴成为了受限制交易新规定的目标...”）；AC ৭ף 128-29, 373（援引表明排他性相关担忧导致阿里巴巴 ADS 价格下跌的评论）。然而，原告现在声称价格波动是对一般性“监管收紧”和“草案指南”中的“一长串”其他做法的回应。Pls' Reply at 3, 10-11.

Plaintiffs' disingenuous position is unsupported, as Hubbard's analysis confirms. Hubbard found Alibaba's ADS price reaction on November 10, 2020 was statistically significant, and therefore could not be a reaction to a "general risk of increased regulation" affecting the entire
原告的不诚实立场得不到支持，因为哈伯德的分析证实了这一点。哈伯德发现，2020 年 11 月 10 日阿里巴巴的 ADS 价格反应在统计上是显著的，因此不能是对影响整个市场的“一般性增加监管风险”的反应。

price inflation theory. In Pirnik, the court found plaintiffs did explain how inflation entered the stock price. 327 F.R.D. at 45. And the price impact "assumptions underlying the 7th Circuit's opinions in" Glickenhaus & Co.v. Household Intern., Inc., 787 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2015) have been criticized in this Circuit. See In re Bear Stearns Companies, Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., 2016 WL 4098385, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016).
价格通货膨胀理论。在 Pirnik 案中，法院发现原告确实解释了通货膨胀如何影响股价。327 F.R.D. at 45。而且价格影响“7th Circuit 在 Glickenhaus & Co.v. Household Intern., Inc.案中的观点假设”已经在本巡回法院受到批评。参见 In re Bear Stearns Companies, Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., 2016 WL 4098385, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016)。

Plaintiffs claim some of the putative Class Period market evidence Defendants highlight should be disregarded because it "allude[s] to pre-Class Period events" or because Defendants overstate its significance. Pls' Reply at 1314. But Plaintiffs' selective quotes omit direct discussion of ongoing practices. See, e.g., D-16 at 2 (the "proposed regulations will prevent companies from signing exclusive agreements . . ., a move that Alibaba has adopted. . . ." Post-ban, "some major brands may open up official flagship online stores with JD and Pinduoduo"); D-3 at 2 (noting that "[a]fter the antitrust rules, Alibaba's capability to offer exclusive merchants on its platforms would be diminished"); D-12 at 2 ("Many merchants would be interested in having a presence on multiple platforms if their traffic on the main platform is not affected."). Furthermore, putative Class Period references to allegations and complaints, even those pre-dating the putative Class Period, demonstrate the market's ongoing awareness and concern.
原告声称，被告强调的一些被认为属于类别期间市场证据应该被忽视，因为它“暗示了类别期间之前的事件”，或者因为被告夸大了其重要性。原告回复书第 1314 页。但原告选择性引用省略了对正在进行的做法的直接讨论。例如，见 D-16 页 2（“拟议的规定将阻止公司签署独家协议……，这是阿里巴巴已经采纳的做法……”禁令后，“一些主要品牌可能会与京东和拼多多开设官方旗舰在线商店”）；D-3 页 2（指出“在反垄断规则之后，阿里巴巴在其平台上提供独家商家的能力将会减弱”）；D-12 页 2（“如果在主要平台上的流量没有受到影响，许多商家会有兴趣在多个平台上设立业务”）。此外，被认为属于类别期间的指控和投诉的参考，即使是那些在类别期间之前的，也表明市场对此事的持续关注和担忧。
industry. Hubbard Dec. § 18. Hubbard also found that Alibaba and Meituan-two companies consistently in the news for "choose one of two"-suffered the largest negative reactions on that date, reinforcing the link, already evident from market commentary, between Alibaba's ADS price drop and market knowledge of and concern over Alibaba's exclusivity practices. Id. 19-21.
行业。Hubbard Dec. § 18. Hubbard 还发现，阿里巴巴和美团这两家公司一直是新闻中的焦点，因为它们在“二选一”方面遭受了最大的负面反应，这进一步加强了市场评论中已经明显的阿里巴巴 ADS 股价下跌与市场对阿里巴巴独家经营做法的了解和关注之间的联系。Id. 19-21.

Plaintiffs and their expert next identify four analyst reports that, they claim, show "some market participants did not believe or were uncertain if Alibaba was practicing exclusivity" during the putative Class Period. Pls' Reply at 12. In fact, these reports provide further evidence of market awareness of Alibaba's ongoing exclusivity practices. For example, a November 25, 2020 J.P. Morgan article Plaintiffs cite explains that "offering exclusive products is not only Alibaba's issue but the entire industry's issue." P-36 (emphases added). A KeyBanc report, also cited by Plaintiffs, explains that "despite potential impact on their business if [Alibaba and others] fully comply with the guidelines, we don't expect significant changes in [their] core business." P-31 (dated Nov. 11, 2020) (emphases added). KeyBanc cites interviews where merchants state they hope the guidelines will put a stop to "pressure from Alibaba." Id.
原告及其专家接着指出了四份分析师报告，他们声称这些报告显示“一些市场参与者并不相信或者对阿里巴巴是否在虚拟类期间实行排他性做法感到不确定”。原告答辩书第 12 页。事实上，这些报告进一步证明了市场对阿里巴巴正在进行的排他性做法的认识。例如，原告引用的 2020 年 11 月 25 日摩根大通的一篇文章解释说，“提供独家产品不仅仅是阿里巴巴的问题，而是整个行业的问题。”P-36（强调部分）。原告还引用了一份凯銀报告，该报告解释说，“尽管[阿里巴巴和其他公司]如果完全遵守指导方针可能会对他们的业务产生影响，但我们不认为[他们的]核心业务会发生重大变化。”P-31（日期为 2020 年 11 月 11 日）（强调部分）。凯銀引用了商家的访谈，商家表示希望这些指导方针能制止“来自阿里巴巴的压力”。Id.

Finally, Plaintiffs point out that on November 20, 2020 Morgan Stanley cited Alibaba as stating that it "does not operate business on exclusivity" and "[m]ost brands/merchants have multiplatform strategy," P-33, while Goldman Sachs reported Alibaba's comments in an investor meeting on November 23, 2020 that it was "compliant" and "no merchants are being restricted on [Alibaba's] platform." P-35, P-37. Contrary to Plaintiffs' broad claim, these two reports reflect only Alibaba's understanding that encouraging exclusivity through traffic resource allocation was in compliance with the Draft Guidelines. Moreover, these November 2020 reports in no way
最后，原告指出，2020 年 11 月 20 日，摩根士丹利引用阿里巴巴的话称，其“不以独家经营业务”，“大多数品牌/商家采取多平台战略”，P-33，而高盛则在 2020 年 11 月 23 日的投资者会议上报告了阿里巴巴的评论，称其“合规”，“没有商家在[阿里巴巴的]平台上受到限制”，P-35，P-37。与原告的广泛主张相反，这两份报告仅反映了阿里巴巴认为通过流量资源分配鼓励独家经营符合《草案指南》的理解。此外，这些 2020 年 11 月的报告并没有以任何方式。

There is no weight to Plaintiffs' claim that price impact exists unless the market knew the "full extent" of Alibaba's practices. Pls' Reply at 10,18. Plaintiffs' misrepresentation theory is that Alibaba misled the market about the fact that it "continued to use exclusive and restrictive trading practices" at all, Pls' Br. at 3, not that the market was misled about the "full extent" of Alibaba's practices.
原告声称价格影响存在，并不意味着市场了解了阿里巴巴的做法的“全部程度”。请答复书第 10,18 页。原告的虚假陈述理论是，阿里巴巴误导市场的事实是“继续使用独家和限制性交易做法”，请陈述书第 3 页，并非市场被误导关于阿里巴巴做法的“全部程度”。
support a finding that the Challenged Misstatements had price impact. Hubbard Dec. |T 13-15. The reports are dated four months after the Prior Practices Statement and make no reference to it or any other Challenged Misstatement. Id. Instead, the reports reference an entirely different source: statements made in late-November, attributed to Alibaba. Id. Prior to the purported mid-November statements, these same analysts indicated Alibaba was continuing to practice exclusivity. Id. Thus, as Hubbard explains, these two reports cannot support a finding that the Challenged Misstatements had price impact.
支持发现有挑战性的错误陈述具有价格影响。哈伯德声明。报告日期早于先前的做法声明四个月，但未提及该声明或任何其他有争议的错误陈述。相反，报告引用了一个完全不同的来源：11 月底阿里巴巴发表的声明。在所谓的 11 月中旬声明之前，这些分析师表示阿里巴巴仍在继续实行排他性。因此，正如哈伯德解释的那样，这两份报告无法支持有挑战性的错误陈述具有价格影响。

Defendants have presented strong post-putative Class Period evidence of no price impact: not a single analyst report suggests "surprise" at purported revelation of Alibaba practicing exclusivity. Hubbard Rpt. ף 106. In fact, analyst and news coverage show the opposite, with reports noting, for example, that "[i]f the political concerns around Alibaba are new, the complaints that Beijing's main market regulator raised on Thursday aren't," and the "'Choose One From Two' controversy between Alibaba and other e-commerce platforms has existed for years." Id. (citing news articles). Plaintiffs do not contest this showing, despite the fact that their own expert acknowledges its importance. See Tabak Tr. 74:19-76:8 (whether analysts "described" a disclosure as "surprising or unsurprising" is primary evidence of change in market's expectation).
被告提出了强有力的后推定类期证据，证明没有价格影响：没有一份分析师报告表明对阿里巴巴实行排他性的所谓揭示“惊讶”。Hubbard Rpt. ¶ 106。事实上，分析师和新闻报道显示相反的情况，有报道指出，例如，“如果围绕阿里巴巴的政治担忧是新的，那么周四北京主要市场监管机构提出的投诉并不新鲜”，以及阿里巴巴与其他电子商务平台之间的“二选一”争议已经存在多年。Id. （引用新闻文章）。原告没有反驳这一表现，尽管他们自己的专家承认其重要性。见 Tabak Tr. 74:19-76:8（分析师是否将披露描述为“令人惊讶或不足为奇”是市场预期变化的主要证据）。

Plaintiffs instead complain that Defendants' expert "fail[ed] to quantify that the entirety of the price drop was due to non-fraud-related factors." Pls' Reply at Again, Plaintiffs mischaracterize what Defendants show. Hubbard expressly opined that none of the price drop is attributable to fraud-related factors. Hubbard Rpt. |ศ 91, 93. His finding is supported by
原告反而抱怨被告的专家“未能量化价格下跌的全部原因是由于非欺诈相关因素。”原告答辩在 中，原告再次错误描述被告展示的内容。哈伯德明确表示，价格下跌中没有任何部分是由欺诈相关因素引起的。哈伯德报告 | 页 91, 93。他的发现得到支持。

Plaintiffs' final attack on Defendants' market evidence is to speculate that if Alibaba's practices were widely-known, SAMR would not have been "fooled" and would have investigated sooner. Pls' Reply at 4, 21. They offer no support for this theory. In contrast, Plaintiffs' pleadings make clear that SAMR's increased interest in exclusivity was the catalyst for the investigation. See, e.g., AC (detailing SAMR's "ever-increasing focus" on exclusivity).
原告对被告市场证据的最后攻击是猜测如果阿里巴巴的做法是众所周知的，国家市场监督管理总局就不会被“愚弄”，并且会更早进行调查。请参阅原告答辩书第 4 页，第 21 页。他们对这一理论没有提供支持。相比之下，原告的诉状明确表示，国家市场监督管理总局对排他性的兴趣增加是调查的催化剂。请参阅，例如，AC （详细说明国家市场监督管理总局对排他性的“日益关注”）。
statistical analysis and market commentary, as well as analysis of the content of the Challenged Misstatements and the SAMR Announcement. Id. Hubbard also illustrates for the Court how the events that occurred on December 23, 2020 would be expected to (and did) cause a non-fraudrelated drop in Alibaba's ADS price. Id. 94, 115. Therefore, Hubbard concluded that the price drop does not contradict his finding of no price impact. Id.; Hubbard Dec. .
统计分析和市场评论，以及对受挑战的错误陈述和 SAMR 公告内容的分析。哈伯德还为法庭说明了 2020 年 12 月 23 日发生的事件预计会（并且确实）导致阿里巴巴 ADS 价格下跌，而这与欺诈无关。因此，哈伯德得出结论，价格下跌并不否认他没有价格影响的发现。；哈伯德 Dec. 94, 115。

Defendants have shown that nearly all of Plaintiffs' Challenged Misstatements are too generic to support a finding of price impact under the Supreme Court and Second Circuit's recently-announced genericism test. Defs' Opp. at 21-23. In response, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants "ignore most of the specific [Growth and Revenue Statements],"9 and highlight the following statement as one of the most specific: "The marketplaces of our core commerce business attract and retain a large number of consumers and merchants. We primarily generate revenue from merchants." Pls' Reply at 22. But Plaintiffs fail to explain how this statement is more specific than, for example, the generic statements in Goldman 2023 such as "[w]e have extensive procedures and controls that are designed to identify and address conflicts of interest, including those designed to prevent the improper sharing of information." 77 F.4th at 82. The Court should not certify claims regarding these highly generic statements. See In re Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2024 WL 1342800, at *8; Defs' Opp. at App'x A.
被告已经表明，原告所质疑的几乎所有错误陈述都过于普遍，无法支持最高法院和第二巡回法院最近宣布的普遍性测试下的价格影响发现。被告反对意见书第 21-23 页。作为回应，原告声称被告“忽略了大部分具体的[增长和收入声明]”，并将以下声明突出为最具体之一：“我们核心商业市场吸引并保留了大量消费者和商家。我们主要从商家那里产生收入。”原告答辩书第 22 页。但原告未能解释这一声明如何比 Goldman 2023 中的普通声明更具体，比如“我们有广泛的程序和控制措施，旨在识别和解决利益冲突，包括旨在防止信息不当共享的措施。”77 F.4th 第 82 页。法院不应认定涉及这些高度普通声明的索赔。请参阅 In re Kirkland Lake Gold Ltd. Sec. Litig.，2024 WL 1342800，第*8 页；被告反对意见书附录 A。