Section Two: Heterogeneity Analysis
In addition to the main effect analysis, we studied the average intervention effects of three experimental groups on political aspirations at different values of moderating variables. Combining domestic and foreign studies, we analyzed the heterogeneity of twelve moderating variables and classified them into three categories: psychological cognitive category (gender, extraversion personality, anger emotion, social dominance orientation, life satisfaction), external environment category (parents' party membership, cadre experience, academic pressure, perception of economic environment), and political ideology category (party identification, political efficacy, "official-oriented"). The detailed heterogeneity effect regression coefficients for each variable are shown in Appendix (Six).
1. Gender
图 2
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for different experimental groups under the condition of controlling for student gender. In the Y1 direction, interventions for female students in all three experimental groups were not significant, and the intervention effects were weaker for male students. This may be because female participation in competition and their overall evaluation of their qualifications for running for public office are lower than those of males.
(Lawless and Fox, 2010) found that female political aspirations and ambitions are generally lower than those of males (Adam M. Dynes, 2021). However, interventions in experimental groups 3 and 4 had a significant positive effect on male students. In other words, males are more likely than females to be driven by public spirit to choose to serve as student leaders. We speculate that this may be related to the societal roles assigned to males, as males are expected to take on more responsibilities in public life. The differences in interventions for males and females may be related to the differences between males and females in pursuing self-worth realization, with males more willing to demonstrate their self-worth through taking on public responsibilities and participating in public life. Additionally, the differences in motivations for male and female participation in student work may be related to males being more concerned with personal development and networking, having a stronger sense of competition, while females are more focused on enriching extracurricular activities, developing their abilities, and relatively lacking a competitive spirit or disliking competition (Liu Daoning, 2013; Schneider et al., 2016). Both male and female groups did not show a significant response to personal interest incentives, which may indicate that for undergraduate students at Peking University, there are many channels available for personal development and opportunities to expand their network, and becoming a student leader may not be the best choice among them. In the
However, overall, the absolute difference in the impact of the three experimental interventions on male and female students is not significant. In other words, the influence of gender on political aspirations of Peking University students is not as huge as traditionally believed in academia. This is different from the emphasis by foreign scholars on the existence of "gender psychology" as a hindering factor for women's participation in public life (for example, Lawless and Fox, 2005, 2011, 2014; Melody Crowder-meyer, 2020), which may be related to the fact that the selection and appointment of student cadres in the university environment is not closely related to gender itself and the values of gender equality among university students.
2. Extraverted Personality
图 3
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for the three experimental groups under the condition of controlling for extraversion personality trait
In the Y1 direction, the intervention of Group 4 on individuals with stronger extraversion (values greater than 6) is significantly positive, meaning that more energetic and proactive individuals are more likely to choose to become student cadres under the stimulus of self-fulfillment. In the Y2 direction, there seems to be different trends in the moderation of extraversion among the three experimental groups, but since the results are not significant, no conclusion can be drawn. In the
3. Social Dominance Orientation
图 4
The figure shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for the three experimental groups under the condition of controlling the social dominance orientation (SDO) of the subjects. From
4. Anger Emotion
图 5
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for the three experimental groups under the condition of controlling the degree of student anger (hereinafter referred to as "anger"). Overall, anger strengthens the average intervention effect of experimental group 4, which means that angrier individuals are more likely to "get into politics" under the stimulus of self-satisfaction, and this result is significant.
In the Y1 direction, anger consistently modulated the interventions of the three experimental groups, and the interventions of experimental groups 3 and 4 on individuals with high anger were significant. This means that angrier individuals are often influenced by public spirit and self-satisfaction stimuli to choose to become student cadres. They may feel dissatisfied with the status quo, yet harbor the idea of working for the collective, while also wanting to change things by their own efforts to demonstrate their self-worth. In the Y2 direction, we found differences between experimental groups 3 and 2, 4, indicating that angry individuals often find it difficult to choose to work within the system under the stimulus of public spirit. Perhaps the grand ideal of "serving the public" at this point can no longer offset their existing anger, and they are no longer willing to be confined to the "cage" of the system. In the Y3 direction, the gap between experimental groups 4 and 2 further widened, with the positive intervention effect of experimental group 4 significantly higher than the negative intervention effect of experimental group 2. This means that when facing the decision of "whether to become a political figure," anger significantly inhibits the stimulus of public spirit and significantly reinforces the stimulus of self-satisfaction. In other words, for those students who are already "burning with anger," the motivation to inspire them to become political figures is more likely to come from their intrinsic self-achievement motivation. In the
Existing research has confirmed the political effects of emotions, emotions are a well-documented prelude to action, and certain important emotions (such as excitement, anger) can be seen as predictors of action. Anger emotions significantly influence students' political actions (Huddy et al., 2015). Anger makes partisans less influenced by external information, more likely to take action, and more likely to take greater risks, thereby driving politics towards polarization (Huddy et al., 2007). It can be seen that anger emotions often play an important role in political actions and political participation, acting as a catalyst, playing an intensifying role. Our findings can be seen as a development of emotional political theory.
5. Life satisfaction
图 6
The figure above shows the situation in which the happiness of students' lives is controlled (hereinafter referred to as "happiness"), the average marginal effect of different experimental groups in predicting direction.
Overall, the happiness of students will weaken the ATE of the experimental group, and the trend of regulating Y1 to Y is basically consistent. This indicates that students with stronger happiness are less likely to be stimulated by our experiments. On the contrary, the more unhappy they feel, the stronger the stimulating effect of the experiment.
The more unhappy they feel, the stronger the stimulating effect of the experiment.
Specifically, in the Y1 direction, when the sense of happiness is very unhappy or not very happy, the marginal effects of the three experimental groups on the willingness to serve as student cadres are significantly positive; when feeling very happy, the average impact of experimental groups 3 and 4 on the willingness to serve as student cadres is not statistically significant, and the impact of experimental group 2 is significantly negative. This indicates that among students who feel very happy, there is a negative relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable in experimental group 2. This may be because very happy students have a strong sense of responsibility and public spirit, and they disdain the behavior of those who take on the role of student cadres for self-interest, thus receiving negative interference from self-interest. In the Y2 direction, experimental groups 2 and 4 have a significant positive impact on students who feel unhappy (very unhappy or not very happy). This may be because, on the one hand, in China, self-satisfaction is strongly positively correlated with happiness (M. Verkuyten, G. A. Kwa, 2012), and students with lower levels of happiness want to achieve more self-satisfaction, thus receiving stronger interference from self-satisfaction. On the other hand, working within the system may be positively correlated with personal benefits, and participants know that once they enter the party and government institutions, they may obtain some political conveniences, thus receiving a significant stimulus from personal benefits. In the Y3 direction, the average marginal effects of the three experimental groups are not significant. In the
(2) Moderation analysis of external environmental factors
6. Parent's membership in the Communist Party
图 7
The figure shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for different experimental groups under the condition of controlling parental party membership. From
In the intervention of the three experimental groups, there was no significant difference. It is generally believed that in China, the likelihood of cadres being members of the Communist Party of China is relatively high, that is, there is a strong correlation between cadres and party members. In theory, the impact of parents' party membership on whether their children serve as student cadres or enter the system should be similar (Li Fengliang, 2006). However, the empirical test results of Y1 and Y2 do not support this, indicating that university students have certain differences in their pursuit of social work (such as serving as student cadres) and political pursuits. This also reflects that the influence of parental background on the two is not the same. At the same time, Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as the actual or potential set of resources that individuals can obtain through institutionalized social relationships. The social capital passed down from parents to children can provide children with more and better opportunities. According to the previous analysis, when both parents are party members, it may mean that the family can provide more social capital, so children's choices are more comprehensive, and there is no strong preference for working within the system. In the direction of
7. Cadre Experience
图 8
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for the three experimental groups under the condition of having pre-university student cadres experience (hereinafter referred to as "cadre experience"). Obviously, cadre experience will weaken the average intervention effect of the experimental groups, with a consistent trend of moderation from
It is easy to see that in the Y1 direction, experimental groups 3 and 4 have a significant positive intervention effect on individuals without cadre experience, meaning that students who have not previously served as cadres are more likely to become student cadres under the impetus of public spirit and self-satisfaction. This may be because they lack this experience, their understanding of student cadres mainly revolves around the public image of "serving classmates," and the psychological satisfaction of receiving attention and recognition. Therefore, they are curious and eager to become student cadres under the stimuli of experimental groups 3 and 4. In the Y2 direction, experimental group 3 has a significant intervention effect on students who have not served as cadres, indicating that students without cadre experience are more likely to choose to work within the system for the public interest in the future, reflecting a simple understanding of working within the system. In the Y3 direction, we did not find a significant moderating effect of cadre experience on the three experimental groups.
In the
Early research has confirmed that past political participation experiences can increase people's interest in politics and serve as a better predictor of people's political participation (Verba et al., 1995). Fox and Lawless (2005) also found that individuals who participated in student elections in high school or college may have stronger political ambitions compared to the general public. Lundin et al. (2016) studied whether winning a public position in high school would affect future formal political candidacy. The above studies can be seen as evidence of political socialization theory, which is defined as "the developmental process by which adolescents acquire cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral orientations toward politics in their environment" (Atkin and Gantz, 1978). Our findings can be seen as an extension of these studies, as we examined how past leadership experiences significantly moderated the effects of public spirit and self-fulfillment on students' political ambitions.
8. Academic Pressure
图 9
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for different experimental groups under the condition of controlling students' learning pressure (hereinafter referred to as "learning pressure"). Obviously, overall, learning pressure reinforces the average intervention effects of the three experimental groups.
The trend of moderation from
In the Y1 direction, when the learning pressure value is greater than 4, the interventions of the three experimental groups are significantly positive. This means that the intervention effects of the three experimental groups on individuals with higher learning pressure are stronger. This may be because individuals who perceive high learning pressure set higher demands for themselves, and high academic pressure also implies intense competition, making them more inclined to gain additional competitive advantages by serving as student cadres. In the Y2 direction, when the learning pressure value is greater than 4, the intervention of experimental group 2 is significantly positive, indicating that individuals with higher learning pressure are more likely to choose to work within the system under the stimulation of personal interests. We speculate that this is related to the fiercely competitive social environment in China today. Rational behavior of job seekers is the process of choosing a future job position with lower future work intensity but higher returns under established acquisition costs, depending on variables such as position income level, stability, self-development space, probability of acquisition, post-acquisition work intensity, etc. (Yuan Kuangji, 2010). Students with high learning pressure usually have high self-demands, and pressure is the "cost" they have already paid. Therefore, to offset this high cost, they are usually more utilitarian, tending to choose occupations that can bring them greater benefits. Working within the system is relatively stable and offers security, which is more attractive to this group of people. When students face intensified competition, entering the system becomes a choice of maximizing utility. In the
9. Perception of Economic Environment
Figure 10
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction under the condition of controlling students' perception of the past economic situation (hereinafter referred to as "economic situation") for different experimental groups. In the
A pessimistic perception of the economic situation will increase the average intervention effect of the experimental group. This may also be because when students believe that the economic situation is worsening, they will feel a stronger sense of social responsibility compared to no change, thus the intervention of public spirit is more intense.
However, the situations in the Y2, Y3, and
(3) Moderation analysis of political ideological factors
10. Party Identification
Figure 11
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for different experimental groups when controlling for participants' party identification. From
11. Political Efficacy
Figure 12
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for different experimental groups when controlling for participants' external political efficacy. From
At
12. Official-centric
Figure 13
The figure above shows the average marginal effects in the predicted direction for different experimental groups under the control of the "official-oriented concept". In the Y1 direction, the intervention of Experiment Group 3 on students with weaker official-oriented concepts is significantly positive, which means that students who deny official-oriented thinking are more likely to take on student cadres under the drive of public spirit, showing that they may view student work as a channel for pursuing equal values. Some scholars view student work as a way to express the status of students, emphasizing that student power is an important component of university power structures. Universities should pay attention to students' rights to information, decision-making, participation, and expression (Li Fuhua, 2003). Therefore, when students do not agree
with the official-oriented concept, they may view student work as a way to resist overwhelming power from the school. Under the drive of public spirit, they are more willing to choose student cadre work that aligns with their values. It is worth noting that when students strongly disagree with the concept of "learning for official positions," the intervention of personal interests in the willingness to take on student cadres is also significantly positive. This may be because, in the subjects' original cognition, entering politics is no longer the primary choice for seeking benefits for themselves, and "entering official positions" is no longer the top choice for elites. When they are stimulated by personal interests and realize that entering politics can still bring personal benefits, their willingness to take on student cadres is affected. In the
Some scholars believe that the prominent "official-oriented" consciousness in China's historical and cultural traditions has many official-oriented phenomena and concepts in university administration and teaching (Zhong Binglin, 2010), which may have a certain impact on the behavioral choices of university students. We speculate that this "official-oriented" tradition has produced influences in different directions. Some students acknowledge and admire the "official-oriented" tradition, actively adapt to this tradition, and choose to "enter politics" under the stimulus of personal interests, public spirit, and self-satisfaction. Another group of students strongly oppose the "official-oriented" concept, considering it as dross, and aspire to change this tradition through the efforts of their generation. Therefore, they may become student cadres, enter the system, or even become a politician out of the motivation to change the status quo. This may explain the multi-directionality and diversity of the moderating effects of "official-oriented" on the three experimental groups.
Chapter Six, Summary and Discussion
Through in-depth interviews and text analysis techniques, we listened to the voices of political aspirations deep within college students, capturing more subtle and diverse underlying motivations at the individual level. In conversations with the interviewees, our three hypotheses were confirmed. The introduction of this method provided qualitative support for our experimental section and added richer details, enabling our theory to have both qualitative and quantitative explanatory power.
We focus our attention on college students and introduce the theory of "political ambition" to study the motivation of student cadres. By selecting "whether to become a student cadre" as a preliminary measure of college students' political ambitions, we identified three stimuli that enhance students' political ambitions: personal interests, public spirit, and self-satisfaction, and the three have different intervention effects in the three dimensions of serving as student cadres, entering the system, and becoming political figures. Overall, our experimental intervention has been proven to be effective and successful. We observed significant changes in students' political ambitions before and after the intervention, as well as compared to the control group. Through a survey experiment, we demonstrated that for students at Peking University, improving public life and realizing self-worth are more likely to motivate them to make decisions when facing the choice of becoming a student cadre. However, students' behavioral motivations may be diverse, and when considering entering the system or even becoming a political figure in the future, their motivations change: personal interests take precedence. This finding made us realize that students' motivations for political ambitions vary significantly across different dimensions.
In addition, by including several covariates in heterogeneous analysis, we revealed the differences in the intervention effects of the above three motivations on different groups and derived a series of interesting and important new findings: (1) Men are more likely than women to be stimulated by public spirit and self-satisfaction to become student cadres, but they are also more likely to choose to become political figures under the stimulus of personal interests; (2) People under high academic pressure are more likely to enhance their political ambitions under the stimulus of personal interests; (3) Angry individuals are more likely to strengthen their political ambitions under the drive of self-satisfaction; (4) People with a stronger social dominance orientation are more sensitive to the stimulus of personal interests and are more likely to enter politics for personal gain; (5) People who perceive the economic environment pessimistically are more likely to respond to the stimulus of public spirit to enter politics, while those who perceive optimistically are more likely to enter politics for personal interests; (6) The concept of "official-oriented" has complexity in regulating students' political ambitions, and whether to support or oppose "official-oriented" has different motivational directions for becoming student cadres or political figures, and so on. The revelation of these results helps us to understand more deeply how the three main motivations act on different individuals and how these differences may have important implications for students' political ambitions.
或成为政治人物的动机刺激方向不同; 等等。这些结果的揭示有助于我们更深入地理解三种主要动机是如何作用于不同个体的, 以及这种差异可能对学生的政治抱负带来哪些重要的影响。
(2) Discussion
The findings of this study help us better understand the student cadres in China, who are essentially altruistic and self-fulfilling, carrying the ideal of serving the collective and realizing personal values, actively participating in student work. As a response to the "refined selfishness" among Chinese university students, our research indicates that at least in the context of "becoming student cadres," self-interest motivation is not as effective as altruistic actions and self-satisfaction motivations, which seems to refute the accusations against elite university students in recent years. Furthermore, our conclusions also suggest that students' motivations for entering politics in the future are still utilitarian, in other words, satisfying and developing personal interests are key factors motivating them to enter the system and become political figures. This implies that as students develop higher political aspirations, they often pursue personal interests, gradually eroding the drive for public spirit and self-satisfaction. They climb the "political ladder," increasingly becoming self-centered. Perhaps we can outline a systematic trajectory of changes in the driving force of political aspirations: gradually shifting from altruistic incentives and a sense of achievement to selfish stimuli. However, why do public spirit and self-satisfaction gradually disappear as students enter the real political world? Will people tend to become secular and self-centered once they enter the "officialdom"? The differences in the driving factors of students' political aspirations on different dimensions are interesting, as they seem to reflect the evolution of Chinese "bureaucrats." If this is true, then this study predicts that the future Chinese political arena is likely to be filled with a group of "self-serving bureaucrats," which is undoubtedly detrimental to the country's long-term development and prone to abuse of power and corruption. Understanding this issue is important, but exploring this change is beyond the scope of this study, yet it may be an important and unavoidable issue for our future research.
In addition, based on our heterogeneity test results, we have developed existing theories. In the moderation effect of gender, we found differences in motivational factors when faced with different choices between males and females. Compared to females, males seem to have stronger political aspirations, but also show more significant changes in different dimensions of political aspirations. Despite being universities where there is little difference in knowledge levels between men and women, and where everyone has elite consciousness, there are still gender differences in attitudes towards politics, which still conform to traditional Chinese societal perceptions of gender roles—males seem more likely to be "political animals," regardless of their motivations for entering politics. This finding also enriches previous research on gender political attitudes, revealing which aspects of male political aspirations are stronger.
It provides a possibility for further discussion on gender issues for women.
In addition, our research has also yielded new findings. In exploring the regulatory effect of academic stress, we investigated how academic stress affects students' political ambitions, reflecting the intensified "internal competition" in Chinese universities today and how students' political psychology is influenced by stress. Pressure makes students tend towards utilitarianism, often entering politics with self-interested motives, a phenomenon that should be taken seriously and vigilantly, as none of us want to see a future political elite in China filled with "self-serving bureaucrats." Therefore, reflecting on this phenomenon requires the state and universities to pay more attention to the mental health of young people, create a more relaxed and lively atmosphere, and nurture their public spirit. Another point worth mentioning is that the perception of the economic environment significantly regulates the political ambitions of young people. Peking University students do not seem to be rushing into the system seeking stability due to the economic downturn. Their decision reflects a public spirit of changing the status quo. That is to say, when they realize that the national economy is in trouble, their entry into politics is more motivated by the public interest of "wanting to change something," which is encouraging and heartening, demonstrating the responsibility of elite university students towards the country. Understanding this motivation helps us better understand the deeper implications of the recent "recruitment fever." The last interesting finding is that the concept of "official-oriented" does not consistently regulate students' political ambitions; on the contrary, its role is complex. We can understand that there are two types of people in the student group: some are loyal adherents of the "official-oriented" concept, who identify with this concept and are willing to become student cadres and enter politics under its guidance; however, there are also opponents of the "official-oriented" concept, or rebels, who choose to become student cadres and enter politics out of a motivation to change this bad tradition. Therefore, the regulatory effect of "official-oriented" on political ambitions is complex, reflecting the internal differentiation of elite universities and embodying the unique thinking of the new generation of young people on power and politics.
Overall, our research findings will help understand and comprehend Chinese university students, especially the elites of top universities, in their mindset before "entering politics." It is foreseeable that many of them will enter the political arena in the near future, participate in the game of power, and a detailed study of this group will outline a portrait of China's "future politicians" for us. The emergence of new political ambitions provides us with a direction and possibility. Although how many of the "budding bureaucrats" will eventually become true bureaucrats or even "political figures" in the future is still unknown, we believe that this research will provide insights for the academic community to understand the emergence and growth of future Chinese political elites.
Of course, it must be acknowledged that our research also has shortcomings. First, due to the limited sample size of this study, and the relatively high proportion of humanities and social science students in the composition, although we have adopted strict experimental methods to ensure the effect of causal identification, it is difficult to make more extensive and reliable inferences. In addition, since our research is limited to Peking University, a comprehensive university, and does not involve other types of universities (such as normal universities, professional universities, military universities, etc.), the conclusions should be very cautious in their general application. Moreover, there may be debates about whether the willingness to become a student cadre can reflect political ambitions, as student cadres may not be able to perfectly measure the political ambitions of students in the early stages. Those who want to become student cadres may have other motives, such as experiencing university life, seeking social groups, etc. Finally, our article may not delve into the issue of dynamic changes in political ambitions (dynamic ambition, Fox and Lawless, 2011) because this study only used cross-sectional data for analysis, which may not reveal the patterns of changes in students' political ambitions over time. As time passes, external environments and internal psychology change, personal experiences increase, and individuals' political efficacy also changes, all of which may cause potential candidates to gain or lose interest in politics, undoubtedly leading to changes in political ambition levels after a period of time. However, since our data includes highly homogenized samples of different age groups from freshman to senior year, we may also interpret the differences in political ambitions brought about by grade growth as time effects. Of course, our qualitative interviews also provide the possibility of revealing changes in individual political ambitions. The discussion of the above shortcomings provides us with issues worthy of further exploration in the future, and will also be the direction of our next efforts.
{{0}} Extraversion means being energetic in social and material worlds, including characteristics such as sociability, activity, confidence, and positive emotions.
外倾性 (extraversion) 意味着对社会和物质世界充满活力的方式, 包括社交、活动、自信和积极情绪等特征。
selected a statement from the Social Dominance Orientation scale: To what extent do you agree with "Some groups should have more power than others."
"It should be noted that the question in our survey about 'anger towards events in the country' is taken from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and is intended to measure the level of anger among respondents, not the specific cause of anger. Therefore, 'events in the country' is more like a general background summary.