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Free Will 自由意志

First published Mon Jan 7, 2002; substantive revision Thu Nov 3, 2022
首次发表于2002年1月7日星期一;实质性修订 2022 年 11 月 3 日星期四

The term “free will” has emerged over the past two millennia as the canonical designator for a significant kind of control over one’s actions. Questions concerning the nature and existence of this kind of control (e.g., does it require and do we have the freedom to do otherwise or the power of self-determination?), and what its true significance is (is it necessary for moral responsibility or human dignity?) have been taken up in every period of Western philosophy and by many of the most important philosophical figures, such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant. (We cannot undertake here a review of related discussions in other philosophical traditions. For a start, the reader may consult Marchal and Wenzel 2017 and Chakrabarti 2017 for overviews of thought on free will, broadly construed, in Chinese and Indian philosophical traditions, respectively.) In this way, it should be clear that disputes about free will ineluctably involve disputes about metaphysics and ethics. In ferreting out the kind of control at stake in free will, we are forced to consider questions about (among others) causation, laws of nature, time, substance, ontological reduction vs emergence, the relationship of causal and reasons-based explanations, the nature of motivation and more generally of human persons. In assessing the significance of free will, we are forced to consider questions about (among others) rightness and wrongness, good and evil, virtue and vice, blame and praise, reward and punishment, and desert. The topic of free will also gives rise to purely empirical questions that are beginning to be explored in the human sciences: do we have it, and to what degree?
在过去的两千年里,“自由意志”一词已经出现,作为对一个人行为的一种重要控制的规范标志。关于这种控制的本质和存在的问题(例如,它是否需要,我们是否有其他自由或自决的权力?),以及它的真正意义是什么(它是道德责任还是人类尊严的必要条件?)在西方哲学的每个时期和许多最重要的哲学人物中都得到了讨论。 如柏拉图、亚里士多德、奥古斯丁、阿奎那、笛卡尔、康德等。(我们不能在这里回顾其他哲学传统中的相关讨论。首先,读者可以参考Marchal and Wenzel 2017和Chakrabarti 2017,分别对中国和印度哲学传统中广义的自由意志思想进行概述。这样一来,关于自由意志的争论就不可避免地牵涉到关于形而上学和伦理学的争论。在论述自由意志的控制权时,我们不得不考虑(除其他外)因果关系、自然法则、时间、物质、本体论还原与涌现、因果关系和基于原因的解释的关系、动机的本质以及更普遍的人类问题。在评估自由意志的意义时,我们不得不考虑(除其他外)对与错、善与恶、美德与恶、责备与赞美、奖励与惩罚以及遗弃等问题。自由意志的话题也引发了人文科学中开始探索的纯粹经验问题:我们是否拥有自由意志,以及在多大程度上拥有自由意志?

Here is an overview of what follows. In Section 1, we acquaint the reader with some central historical contributions to our understanding of free will. (As nearly every major and minor figure had something to say about it, we cannot begin to cover them all.) As with contributions to many other foundational topics, these ideas are not of ‘merely historical interest’: present-day philosophers continue to find themselves drawn back to certain thinkers as they freshly engage their contemporaries. In Section 2, we map the complex architecture of the contemporary discussion of the nature of free will by dividing it into five subtopics: its relation to moral responsibility; the proper analysis of the freedom to do otherwise; a powerful, recent argument that the freedom to do otherwise (at least in one important sense) is not necessary for moral responsibility; ‘compatibilist’ accounts of sourcehood or self-determination; and ‘incompatibilist’ or ‘libertarian’ accounts of source and self-determination. In Section 3, we consider arguments from experience, a priori reflection, and various scientific findings and theories for and against the thesis that human beings have free will, along with the related question of whether it is reasonable to believe that we have it. Finally, in Section 4, we survey the long-debated questions involving free will that arise in classical theistic metaphysics.
以下是以下内容的概述。在第 1 节中,我们向读者介绍了一些对我们理解自由意志的核心历史贡献。(由于几乎每个主要人物和次要人物都有话要说,我们无法开始涵盖所有人物。与对许多其他基础主题的贡献一样,这些思想不仅仅是“历史兴趣”:当今的哲学家继续发现自己被某些思想家所吸引,因为他们刚刚与同时代人接触。在第2节中,我们通过将自由意志分为五个子主题来映射当代讨论自由意志本质的复杂架构:它与道德责任的关系;对做其他事情的自由进行适当分析;最近有力的论点,即做其他事情的自由(至少在一种重要意义上)不是道德责任的必要条件;关于来源或自决的“相容主义”叙述;以及“不相容主义”或“自由意志主义”对来源和自决的解释。在第 3 节中,我们考虑了来自经验的论点、先验反思以及支持和反对人类具有自由意志的论点的各种科学发现和理论,以及相信我们拥有自由意志是否合理的相关问题。最后,在第4节中,我们调查了古典有神论形而上学中出现的涉及自由意志的长期争论问题。

1. Major Historical Contributions

1.1 Ancient and Medieval Period
1.1 古代和中世纪时期

One finds scholarly debate on the ‘origin’ of the notion of free will in Western philosophy. (See, e.g., Dihle (1982) and, in response Frede (2011), with Dihle finding it in St. Augustine (354–430 CE) and Frede in the Stoic Epictetus (c. 55–c. 135 CE).) But this debate presupposes a fairly particular and highly conceptualized concept of free will, with Dihle’s later ‘origin’ reflecting his having a yet more particular concept in view than Frede. If, instead, we look more generally for philosophical reflection on choice-directed control over one’s own actions, then we find significant discussion in Plato and Aristotle (cf. Irwin 1992). Indeed, on this matter, as with so many other major philosophical issues, Plato and Aristotle give importantly different emphases that inform much subsequent thought.
人们发现,关于西方哲学中自由意志概念的“起源”的学术辩论。(例如,参见Dihle (1982)和Frede (2011)的回应,Dihle在圣奥古斯丁(公元354-430年)和弗雷德在斯多葛派的Epictetus(约公元55-约135年)中找到了它。但这场辩论以一个相当特殊和高度概念化的自由意志概念为前提,迪勒后来的“起源”反映了他比弗雷德更具体的概念。相反,如果我们更广泛地寻找关于选择导向的对自己行为的控制的哲学反思,那么我们就会在柏拉图和亚里士多德中找到重要的讨论(参见Irwin 1992)。事实上,在这个问题上,就像许多其他主要的哲学问题一样,柏拉图和亚里士多德给出了重要的不同重点,为后来的许多思考提供了信息。

In Book IV of The Republic, Plato posits rational, spirited, and appetitive aspects to the human soul. The wise person strives for inner ‘justice’, a condition in which each part of the soul plays its proper role—reason as the guide, the spirited nature as the ally of reason, exhorting oneself to do what reason deems proper, and the passions as subjugated to the determinations of reason. In the absence of justice, the individual is enslaved to the passions. Hence, freedom for Plato is a kind of self-mastery, attained by developing the virtues of wisdom, courage, and temperance, resulting in one’s liberation from the tyranny of base desires and acquisition of a more accurate understanding and resolute pursuit of the Good (Hecht 2014).
在《理想国》第四卷中,柏拉图为人类灵魂提出了理性、精神和食欲的方面。智者追求内在的“正义”,在这种状态下,灵魂的每个部分都发挥其应有的作用——理性作为向导,精神本性作为理性的盟友,劝诫自己去做理性认为合适的事情,而激情则屈服于理性的决定。在没有正义的情况下,个人被激情所奴役。因此,柏拉图的自由是一种自我控制,通过发展智慧、勇气和节制的美德来实现,从而使一个人从基本欲望的暴政中解放出来,获得更准确的理解和对善的坚定追求(Hecht 2014)。

While Aristotle shares with Plato a concern for cultivating virtues, he gives greater theoretical attention to the role of choice in initiating individual actions which, over time, result in habits, for good or ill. In Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that, unlike nonrational agents, we have the power to do or not to do, and much of what we do is voluntary, such that its origin is ‘in us’ and we are ‘aware of the particular circumstances of the action’. Furthermore, mature humans make choices after deliberating about different available means to our ends, drawing on rational principles of action. Choose consistently well (poorly), and a virtuous (vicious) character will form over time, and it is in our power to be either virtuous or vicious.

A question that Aristotle seems to recognize, while not satisfactorily answering, is whether the choice an individual makes on any given occasion is wholly determined by his internal state—perception of his circumstances and his relevant beliefs, desires, and general character dispositions (wherever on the continuum between virtue and vice he may be)—and external circumstances. He says that “the man is the father of his actions as of children”—that is, a person’s character shapes how she acts. One might worry that this seems to entail that the person could not have done otherwise—at the moment of choice, she has no control over what her present character is—and so she is not responsible for choosing as she does. Aristotle responds by contending that her present character is partly a result of previous choices she made. While this claim is plausible enough, it seems to ‘pass the buck’, since ‘the man is the father’ of those earlier choices and actions, too.

We note just a few contributions of the subsequent centuries of the Hellenistic era. (See Bobzien 1998.) This period was dominated by debates between Epicureans, Stoics, and the Academic Skeptics, and as it concerned freedom of the will, the debate centered on the place of determinism or of fate in governing human actions and lives. The Stoics and the Epicureans believed that all ordinary things, human souls included, are corporeal and governed by natural laws or principles. Stoics believed that all human choice and behavior was causally determined, but held that this was compatible with our actions being ‘up to us’. Chrysippus ably defended this position by contending that your actions are ‘up to you’ when they come about ‘through you’—when the determining factors of your action are not external circumstances compelling you to act as you do but are instead your own choices grounded in your perception of the options before you. Hence, for moral responsibility, the issue is not whether one’s choices are determined (they are) but in what manner they are determined. Epicurus and his followers had a more mechanistic conception of bodily action than the Stoics. They held that all things (human soul included) are constituted by atoms, whose law-governed behavior fixes the behavior of everything made of such atoms. But they rejected determinism by supposing that atoms, though law-governed, are susceptible to slight ‘swerves’ or departures from the usual paths. Epicurus has often been understood as seeking to ground the freedom of human willings in such indeterministic swerves, but this is a matter of controversy. If this understanding of his aim is correct, how he thought that this scheme might work in detail is not known. (What little we know about his views in this matter stem chiefly from the account given in his follower Lucretius’s six-book poem, On the Nature of Things. See Bobzien 2000 for discussion.)

A final notable figure of this period was Alexander of Aphrodisias, the most important Peripatetic commentator on Aristotle. In his On Fate, Alexander sharply criticizes the positions of the Stoics. He goes on to resolve the ambiguity in Aristotle on the question of the determining nature of character on individual choices by maintaining that, given all such shaping factors, it remains open to the person when she acts freely to do or not to do what she in fact does. Many scholars see Alexander as the first unambiguously ‘libertarian’ theorist of the will (for more information about such theories see section 2 below).

Augustine (354–430) is the central bridge between the ancient and medieval eras of philosophy. His mature thinking about the will was influenced by his early encounter with late classical Neoplatonist thought, which is then transformed by the theological views he embraces in his adult Christian conversion, famously recounted in his Confessions. In that work and in the earlier On the Free Choice of the Will, Augustine struggles to draw together into a coherent whole the doctrines that creaturely misuse of freedom, not God, is the source of evil in the world and that the human will has been corrupted through the ‘fall’ from grace of the earliest human beings, necessitating a salvation that is attained entirely through the actions of God, even as it requires, constitutively, an individual’s willed response of faith. The details of Augustine’s positive account remain a matter of controversy. He clearly affirms that the will is by its nature a self-determining power—no powers external to it determine its choice—and that this feature is the basis of its freedom. But he does not explicitly rule out the will’s being internally determined by psychological factors, as Chrysippus held, and Augustine had theological reasons that might favor (as well as others that would oppose) the thesis that all things are determined in some manner by God. Scholars divide on whether Augustine was a libertarian or instead a kind of compatibilist with respect to metaphysical freedom. (Macdonald 1999 and Stump 2006 argue the former, Baker 2003 and Couenhoven 2007 the latter.) It is clear, however, that Augustine thought that we are powerfully shaped by wrongly-ordered desires that can make it impossible for us to wholeheartedly will ends contrary to those desires, for a sustained period of time. This condition entails an absence of something more valuable, ‘true freedom’, in which our wills are aligned with the Good, a freedom that can be attained only by a transformative operation of divine grace. This latter, psychological conception of freedom of will clearly echoes Plato’s notion of the soul’s (possible) inner justice.

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) attempted to synthesize major strands of Aristotle’s systematic philosophy with Christian theology, and so Aquinas begins his complex discussion of human action and choice by agreeing with Aristotle that creatures such as ourselves who are endowed with both intellect and will are hardwired to will certain general ends ordered to the most general goal of goodness. Will is rational desire: we cannot move towards that which does not appear to us at the time to be good. Freedom enters the picture when we consider various means to these ends and move ourselves to activity in pursuit of certain of them. Our will is free in that it is not fixed by nature on any particular means, and they generally do not appear to us either as unqualifiedly good or as uniquely satisfying the end we wish to fulfill. Furthermore, what appears to us to be good can vary widely—even, over time, intra-personally. So much is consistent with saying that in a given total circumstance (including one’s present beliefs and desires), one is necessitated to will as one does. For this reason, some commentators have taken Aquinas to be a kind of compatibilist concerning freedom and causal or theological determinism. In his most extended defense of the thesis that the will is not ‘compelled’ (DM 6), Aquinas notes three ways that the will might reject an option it sees as attractive: (i) it finds another option more attractive, (ii) it comes to think of some circumstance rendering an alternative more favorable “by some chance circumstance, external or internal”, and (iii) the person is momentarily disposed to find an alternative attractive by virtue of a non-innate state that is subject to the will (e.g., being angry vs being at peace). The first consideration is clearly consistent with compatibilism. The second at best points to a kind of contingency that is not grounded in the activity of the will itself. And one wanting to read Aquinas as a libertarian might worry that his third consideration just passes the buck: even if we do sometimes have an ability to directly modify perception-coloring states such as moods, Aquinas’s account of will as rational desire seems to indicate that we will do so only if it seems to us on balance to be good to do so. Those who read Aquinas as a libertarian point to the following further remark in this text: “Will itself can interfere with the process [of some cause’s moving the will] either by refusing to consider what attracts it to will or by considering its opposite: namely, that there is a bad side to what is being proposed…” (Reply to 15; see also DV 24.2). For discussion, see MacDonald (1998), Stump (2003, ch. 9) and especially Hoffman & Michon (2017), which offers the most comprehensive analysis of relevant texts to date.

John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) was the stoutest defender in the medieval era of a strongly libertarian conception of the will, maintaining on introspective grounds that will by its very nature is such that “nothing other than the will is the total cause” of its activity (QAM). Indeed, he held the unusual view that not only up to but at the very instant that one is willing X, it is possible for one to will Y or at least not to will X. (He articulates this view through the puzzling claim that a single instant of time comprises two ‘instants of nature’, at the first but not the second of which alternative possibilities are preserved.) In opposition to Aquinas and other medieval Aristotelians, Scotus maintained that a precondition of our freedom is that there are two fundamentally distinct ways things can seem good to us: as practically advantageous to us or as according with justice. Contrary to some popular accounts, however, Scotus allowed that the scope of available alternatives for a person will be more or less constricted. He grants that we are not capable of willing something in which we see no good whatsoever, nor of positively repudiating something which appears to us as unqualifiedly good. However, in accordance with his uncompromising position that nothing can be the total cause of the will other than itself, he held that where something does appear to us as unqualifiedly good (perfectly suited both to our advantage and justice)—viz., in the ‘beatific vision’ of God in the afterlife—we still can refrain from willing it. For discussion, see John Duns Scotus, §5.2.
约翰·邓斯·司各都(John Duns Scotus,1265/66-1308)是中世纪强烈自由主义意志概念最坚定的捍卫者,他坚持认为,意志的本质是“意志以外的任何东西都是其活动的全部原因”(QAM)。事实上,他持有一种不同寻常的观点,即不仅在一个人愿意X的那一刻,而且在一个人愿意X的那一刻,一个人有可能将Y或至少不将X.(他通过一个令人费解的主张来阐明这一观点,即一个时间的瞬间包括两个“自然的瞬间”,在第一个而不是第二个时刻,保留了其他可能性。与阿奎那和其他中世纪的亚里士多德主义者相反,司各都坚持认为,我们自由的先决条件是,有两种根本不同的方式可以使事物在我们看来是好的:对我们实际有利或符合正义。然而,与一些流行的说法相反,斯科特斯允许一个人可用的替代方案的范围或多或少受到限制。他承认,我们没有能力愿意我们认为没有任何好处的东西,也没有能力积极地拒绝在我们看来无条件的好东西。然而,根据他毫不妥协的立场,即除了意志本身之外,没有什么可以成为意志的全部原因,他认为,如果某件事在我们看来确实是无条件的好(完全适合我们的利益和正义)——即在上帝来世的“真福异象”中——我们仍然可以避免愿意它。有关讨论,请参见 John Duns Scotus,§5.2。

1.2 Modern Period and Twentieth Century
1.2 近代与二十世纪

The problem of free will was an important topic in the modern period, with all the major figures wading into it (Descartes 1641 [1988], 1644 [1988]; Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 [1999]; Spinoza 1677 [1992]; Malebranche 1684 [1993]; Leibniz 1686 [1991]; Locke 1690 [1975]; Hume 1740 [1978], 1748 [1975]; Edwards 1754 [1957]; Kant 1781 [1998], 1785 [1998], 1788 [2015]; Reid 1788 [1969]). After less sustained attention in the 19th Century (most notable were Schopenhauer 1841 [1999] and Nietzsche 1886 [1966]), it was widely discussed again among early twentieth century philosophers (Moore 1912; Hobart 1934; Schlick 1939; Nowell-Smith 1948, 1954; Campbell 1951; Ayer 1954; Smart 1961). The centrality of the problem of free will to the various projects of early modern philosophers can be traced to two widely, though not universally, shared assumptions. The first is that without belief in free will, there would be little reason for us to act morally. More carefully, it was widely assumed that belief in an afterlife in which a just God rewards and punishes us according to our right or wrong use of free will was key to motivating us to be moral (Russell 2008, chs. 16–17). Life before death affords us many examples in which vice is better rewarded than virtue and so without knowledge of a final judgment in the afterlife, we would have little reason to pursue virtue and justice when they depart from self-interest. And without free will there can be no final judgement.
自由意志问题是现代的一个重要话题,所有主要人物都涉足其中(笛卡尔 1641 [1988]、1644 [1988];霍布斯 1654 [1999]、1656 [1999];斯宾诺莎 1677 [1992];Malebranche 1684 [1993];莱布尼茨 1686 [1991];洛克 1690 [1975];休谟 1740 [1978]、1748 [1975];爱德华兹 1754 [1957];康德 1781 [1998]、1785 [1998]、1788 [2015];里德 1788 [1969])。在19世纪受到较少的持续关注之后(最著名的是叔本华1841年[1999]和尼采1886年[1966年]),它在20世纪初的哲学家中再次被广泛讨论(摩尔1912年;霍巴特 1934 年;施利克 1939 年;诺威尔-史密斯 1948 年、1954 年;坎贝尔 1951;艾尔 1954;Smart 1961)。自由意志问题在早期现代哲学家的各种计划中的核心地位可以追溯到两个广泛但不普遍的共同假设。首先,如果不相信自由意志,我们就没有理由按照道德行事。更仔细地说,人们普遍认为,相信来世是公正的上帝根据我们对自由意志的正确或错误使用来奖励和惩罚我们是激励我们道德的关键(罗素 2008,第 16-17 章)。死前的生活为我们提供了许多例子,在这些例子中,罪恶比美德得到更好的回报,因此,如果不知道来世的最终审判,当美德和正义背离自身利益时,我们就没有理由去追求它们。没有自由意志,就没有最终的判断。

The second widely shared assumption is that free will seems difficult to reconcile with what we know about the world. While this assumption is shared by the majority of early modern philosophers, what specifically it is about the world that seems to conflict with freedom differs from philosopher to philosopher. For some, the worry is primarily theological. How can we make sense of contingency and freedom in a world determined by a God who must choose the best possible world to create? For some, the worry was primarily metaphysical. The principle of sufficient reason—roughly, the idea that every event must have a reason or cause—was a cornerstone of Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s metaphysics. How does contingency and freedom fit into such a world? For some, the worry was primarily scientific (Descartes). Given that a proper understanding of the physical world is one in which all physical objects are governed by deterministic laws of nature, how does contingency and freedom fit into such a world? Of course, for some, all three worries were in play in their work (this is true especially of Leibniz).

Despite many disagreements about how best to solve these worries, there were three claims that were widely, although not universally, agreed upon. The first was that free will has two aspects: the freedom to do otherwise and the power of self-determination. The second is that an adequate account of free will must entail that free agents are morally responsible agents and/or fit subjects for punishment. Ideas about moral responsibility were often a yard stick by which analyses of free will were measured, with critics objecting to an analysis of free will by arguing that agents who satisfied the analysis would not, intuitively, be morally responsible for their actions. The third is that compatibilism—the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism—is true. (Spinoza, Reid, and Kant are the clear exceptions to this, though some also see Descartes as an incompatibilist [Ragland 2006].)
尽管在如何最好地解决这些担忧方面存在许多分歧,但有三项主张得到了广泛同意,尽管不是普遍同意的。首先,自由意志有两个方面:做其他事情的自由和自决的权力。第二,对自由意志的充分解释必须意味着自由主体是道德上负责任的主体和/或适合惩罚的对象。关于道德责任的观念往往是衡量自由意志分析的标准,批评者反对对自由意志的分析,认为满足分析的主体在直觉上不会对他们的行为承担道德责任。第三,相容论——自由意志与决定论相容的论点——是正确的。(斯宾诺莎、里德和康德是明显的例外,尽管有些人也认为笛卡尔是一个不相容主义者[Ragland 2006]。

Since a detailed discussion of these philosophers’ accounts of free will would take us too far afield, we want instead to focus on isolating a two-step strategy for defending compatibilism that emerges in the early modern period and continued to exert considerable force into the early twentieth century (and perhaps is still at work today). Advocates of this two-step strategy have come to be known as “classical compatibilists”. The first step was to argue that the contrary of freedom is not determinism but external constraint on doing what one wants to do. For example, Hobbes contends that liberty is “the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent” (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 38; cf. Hume 1748 [1975] VIII.1; Edwards 1754 [1957]; Ayer 1954). This idea led many compatibilists, especially the more empiricist-inclined, to develop desire- or preference-based analyses of both the freedom to do otherwise and self-determination. An agent has the freedom to do otherwise than ϕ just in case if she preferred or willed to do otherwise, she would have done otherwise (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 16; Locke 1690 [1975]) II.xx.8; Hume 1748 [1975] VIII.1; Moore 1912; Ayer 1954). The freedom to do otherwise does not require that you are able to act contrary to your strongest motivation but simply that your action be dependent on your strongest motivation in the sense that had you desired something else more strongly, then you would have pursued that alternative end. (We will discuss this analysis in more detail below in section 2.2.) Similarly, an agent self-determines her ϕ-ing just in case ϕ is caused by her strongest desires or preferences at the time of action (Hobbes 1654 [1999]; Locke 1690 [1975]; Edwards 1754 [1957]). (We will discuss this analysis in more detail below in section 2.4.) Given these analyses, determinism seems innocuous to freedom.

The second step was to argue that any attempt to analyze free will in a way that putatively captures a deeper or more robust sense of freedom leads to intractable conundrums. The most important examples of this attempt to capture a deeper sense of freedom in the modern period are Immanuel Kant (1781 [1998], 1785 [1998], 1788 [2015]) and Thomas Reid (1788 [1969]) and in the early twentieth century C. A. Campbell (1951). These philosophers argued that the above compatibilist analyses of the freedom to do otherwise and self-determination are, at best, insufficient for free will, and, at worst, incompatible with it. With respect to the classical compatibilist analysis of the freedom to do otherwise, these critics argued that the freedom to do otherwise requires not just that an agent could have acted differently if he had willed differently, but also that he could have willed differently. Free will requires more than free action. With respect to classical compatibilists’ analysis of self-determination, they argued that self-determination requires that the agent—rather than his desires, preferences, or any other mental state—cause his free choices and actions. Reid explains:
第二步是论证,任何试图以一种假定能捕捉到更深刻或更强烈的自由感的方式分析自由意志的尝试都会导致棘手的难题。在现代时期,这种试图捕捉更深层次的自由感的最重要例子是伊曼纽尔·康德(Immanuel Kant,1781 [1998],1785 [1998],1788 [2015])和托马斯·里德(Thomas Reid,1788 [1969])以及二十世纪初的C.A.坎贝尔(C. A. Campbell,1951)。这些哲学家认为,上述关于做其他事情的自由和自决的相容主义分析,充其量是不足以实现自由意志,最坏的情况是与自由意志不相容。关于经典的相容主义对不做其他事情的自由的分析,这些批评者认为,做其他事情的自由不仅要求代理人如果意志不同,他可以采取不同的行动,而且还要求他可以采取不同的意愿。自由意志需要的不仅仅是自由行动。关于古典相容论者对自决的分析,他们认为,自决要求主体——而不是他的欲望、偏好或任何其他精神状态——导致他的自由选择和行动。Reid 解释道:

I consider the determination of the will as an effect. This effect must have a cause which had the power to produce it; and the cause must be either the person himself, whose will it is, or some other being…. If the person was the cause of that determination of his own will, he was free in that action, and it is justly imputed to him, whether it be good or bad. But, if another being was the cause of this determination, either producing it immediately, or by means and instruments under his direction, then the determination is the act and deed of that being, and is solely imputed to him. (1788 [1969] IV.i, 265)
我认为意志的确定是一种效果。这种结果必须有一个有能力产生它的原因;原因必须是这个人自己,他的意志,或者是其他的人。如果这个人是他自己意志决定的原因,那么他在那个行动中是自由的,无论它是好是坏,这都是公正的。但是,如果另一个存在是这个决定的原因,要么立即产生它,要么通过他指导的手段和工具产生它,那么这个决定就是那个存在的行为和行为,并且完全归咎于他。(1788 [1969] IV.i, 265)

Classical compatibilists argued that both claims are incoherent. While it is intelligible to ask whether a man willed to do what he did, it is incoherent to ask whether a man willed to will what he did:

For to ask whether a man is at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence, which he pleases, is to ask whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who make a question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on in infinitum. (Locke 1690 [1975] II.xx.25; cf. Hobbes 1656 [1999], 72)
因为问一个人是否可以自由地移动或休息,说话或沉默,他喜欢,就是问一个人是否可以随心所欲,或者对他所高兴的事情感到满意?我认为,这个问题不需要回答;提出问题的人必须假设一个意志决定另一个人的行为,另一个人决定另一个意志,以此类推,无穷无尽。(Locke 1690 [1975] II.xx.25;参见Hobbes 1656 [1999], 72)

In response to libertarians’ claim that self-determination requires that the agent, rather than his motives, cause his actions, it was objected that this removes the agent from the natural causal order, which is clearly unintelligible for human animals (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 38). It is important to recognize that an implication of the second step of the strategy is that free will is not only compatible with determinism but actually requires determinism (cf. Hume 1748 [1975] VIII). This was a widely shared assumption among compatibilists up through the mid-twentieth century.

Spinoza’s Ethics (1677 [1992]) is an important departure from the above dialectic. He endorses a strong form of necessitarianism in which everything is categorically necessary as opposed to the conditional necessity embraced by most compatibilists, and he contends that there is no room in such a world for divine or creaturely free will. Thus, Spinoza is a free will skeptic. Interestingly, Spinoza is also keen to deny that the nonexistence of free will has the dire implications often assumed. As noted above, many in the modern period saw belief in free will and an afterlife in which God rewards the just and punishes the wicked as necessary to motivate us to act morally. According to Spinoza, so far from this being necessary to motivate us to be moral, it actually distorts our pursuit of morality. True moral living, Spinoza thinks, sees virtue as its own reward (Part V, Prop. 42). Moreover, while free will is a chimera, humans are still capable of freedom or self-determination. Such self-determination, which admits of degrees on Spinoza’s view, arises when our emotions are determined by true ideas about the nature of reality. The emotional lives of the free persons are ones in which “we desire nothing but that which must be, nor, in an absolute sense, can we find contentment in anything but truth. And so in so far as we rightly understand these matters, the endeavor of the better part of us is in harmony with the order of the whole of Nature” (Part IV, Appendix). Spinoza is an important forerunner to the many free will skeptics in the twentieth century, a position that continues to attract strong support (see Strawson 1986; Double 1992; Smilansky 2000; Pereboom 2001, 2014; Levy 2011; Waller 2011; Caruso 2012; Vilhauer 2012. For further discussion see the entry skepticism about moral responsibility).

It is worth observing that in many of these disputes about the nature of free will there is an underlying dispute about the nature of moral responsibility. This is seen clearly in Hobbes (1654 [1999]) and early twentieth century philosophers’ defenses of compatibilism. Underlying the belief that free will is incompatible with determinism is the thought that no one would be morally responsible for any actions in a deterministic world in the sense that no one would deserve blame or punishment. Hobbes responded to this charge in part by endorsing broadly consequentialist justifications of blame and punishment: we are justified in blaming or punishing because these practices deter future harmful actions and/or contribute to reforming the offender (1654 [1999], 24–25; cf. Schlick 1939; Nowell-Smith 1948; Smart 1961). While many, perhaps even most, compatibilists have come to reject this consequentialist approach to moral responsibility in the wake of P. F. Strawson’s 1962 landmark essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (though see Vargas (2013) and McGeer (2014) for contemporary defenses of compatibilism that appeal to forward-looking considerations) there is still a general lesson to be learned: disputes about free will are often a function of underlying disputes about the nature and value of moral responsibility.
值得一提的是,在许多关于自由意志本质的争论中,存在着关于道德责任本质的潜在争论。这在霍布斯(1654 [1999])和二十世纪初哲学家对相容论的辩护中可以清楚地看到。自由意志与决定论不相容的信念背后是这样一种想法,即在决定论的世界中,没有人会对任何行为承担道德责任,因为没有人应该受到指责或惩罚。霍布斯在一定程度上回应了这一指控,他赞同责备和惩罚的广泛后果主义理由:我们有理由责备或惩罚,因为这些做法阻止了未来的有害行为和/或有助于改造罪犯(1654 [1999],24-25;参见Schlick 1939;诺威尔-史密斯 1948;Smart 1961)。尽管在P.F.斯特劳森(P. F. Strawson)1962年发表具有里程碑意义的论文《自由与怨恨》(Freedom and Resentment)之后,许多甚至大多数相容论者开始拒绝这种结果主义的道德责任方法(尽管参见Vargas (2013)和McGeer (2014)关于当代相容主义的辩护,这些辩护诉诸于前瞻性的考虑),但仍有一个普遍的教训需要吸取:关于自由意志的争论往往是关于道德责任的性质和价值的潜在争议的功能。

2. The Nature of Free Will
2. 自由意志的本质

2.1 Free Will and Moral Responsibility
2.1 自由意志和道德责任

As should be clear from this short discussion of the history of the idea of free will, free will has traditionally been conceived of as a kind of power to control one’s choices and actions. When an agent exercises free will over her choices and actions, her choices and actions are up to her. But up to her in what sense? As should be clear from our historical survey, two common (and compatible) answers are: (i) up to her in the sense that she is able to choose otherwise, or at minimum that she is able not to choose or act as she does, and (ii) up to her in the sense that she is the source of her action. However, there is widespread controversy both over whether each of these conditions is required for free will and if so, how to understand the kind or sense of freedom to do otherwise or sourcehood that is required. While some seek to resolve these controversies in part by careful articulation of our experiences of deliberation, choice, and action (Nozick 1981, ch. 4; van Inwagen 1983, ch. 1), many seek to resolve these controversies by appealing to the nature of moral responsibility. The idea is that the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness involved in free will is the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness relevant to moral responsibility (Double 1992, 12; Ekstrom 2000, 7–8; Smilansky 2000, 16; Widerker and McKenna 2003, 2; Vargas 2007, 128; Nelkin 2011, 151–52; Levy 2011, 1; Pereboom 2014, 1–2). Indeed, some go so far as to define ‘free will’ as ‘the strongest control condition—whatever that turns out to be—necessary for moral responsibility’ (Wolf 1990, 3–4; Fischer 1994, 3; Mele 2006, 17). Given this connection, we can determine whether the freedom to do otherwise and the power of self-determination are constitutive of free will and, if so, in what sense, by considering what it takes to be a morally responsible agent. On these latter characterizations of free will, understanding free will is inextricably linked to, and perhaps even derivative from, understanding moral responsibility. And even those who demur from this claim regarding conceptual priority typically see a close link between these two ideas. Consequently, to appreciate the current debates surrounding the nature of free will, we need to say something about the nature of moral responsibility.
从对自由意志概念历史的简短讨论中可以清楚地看出,自由意志传统上被认为是一种控制一个人的选择和行动的力量。当代理人对她的选择和行动行使自由意志时,她的选择和行动取决于她。但在什么意义上取决于她?从我们的历史调查中可以清楚地看出,两个常见(且兼容)的答案是:(i)在她能够选择其他方式的意义上取决于她,或者至少她能够不选择或像她那样行事,以及(ii)在她是她行动的来源的意义上取决于她。然而,对于这些条件是否是自由意志所必需的,以及如果是,如何理解自由意志的种类或自由感,或者是必需的来源,都存在广泛的争议。虽然有些人试图通过仔细阐述我们的审议、选择和行动的经验来解决这些争议(Nozick 1981,第4章;van Inwagen 1983,第1章),但许多人试图通过诉诸道德责任的本质来解决这些争议。这个想法是,自由意志中涉及的那种控制或自我意识是与道德责任相关的那种控制或自我意识(Double 1992,12;埃克斯特罗姆 2000, 7-8;斯米兰斯基 2000, 16;Widerker 和 McKenna 2003, 2;巴尔加斯 2007, 128;内尔金 2011, 151–52;征税 2011, 1;Pereboom 2014,1-2)。事实上,有些人甚至将“自由意志”定义为“道德责任所必需的最强控制条件——无论结果如何”(Wolf 1990,3-4;Fischer 1994, 3;Mele 2006, 17)。 鉴于这种联系,我们可以通过考虑成为一个道德上负责任的代理人需要什么来确定做其他事情的自由和自决权是否构成自由意志,如果是的话,在什么意义上。在自由意志的后一种特征中,对自由意志的理解与对道德责任的理解有着千丝万缕的联系,甚至可能是从道德责任中衍生出来的。即使是那些反对这种关于概念优先权的说法的人,通常也会看到这两种想法之间的密切联系。因此,为了理解当前围绕自由意志本质的辩论,我们需要对道德责任的本质说些什么。

It is now widely accepted that there are different species of moral responsibility. It is common (though not uncontroversial) to distinguish moral responsibility as answerability from moral responsibility as attributability from moral responsibility as accountability (Watson 1996; Fischer and Tognazzini 2011; Shoemaker 2011. See Smith (2012) for a critique of this taxonomy). These different species of moral responsibility differ along three dimensions: (i) the kind of responses licensed toward the responsible agent, (ii) the nature of the licensing relation, and (iii) the necessary and sufficient conditions for licensing the relevant kind of responses toward the agent. For example, some argue that when an agent is morally responsible in the attributability sense, certain judgments about the agent—such as judgments concerning the virtues and vices of the agent—are fitting, and that the fittingness of such judgments does not depend on whether the agent in question possessed the freedom to do otherwise (cf. Watson 1996).

While keeping this controversy about the nature of moral responsibility firmly in mind (see the entry on moral responsibility for a more detailed discussion of these issues), we think it is fair to say that the most commonly assumed understanding of moral responsibility in the historical and contemporary discussion of the problem of free will is moral responsibility as accountability in something like the following sense:

An agent S is morally accountable for performing an action ϕ =df. S deserves praise if ϕ goes beyond what can be reasonably expected of S and S deserves blame if ϕ is morally wrong.
代理人 S 在道德上对执行的行为 ϕ =df. S 负有责任,如果 ϕ 超出了合理的预期,则值得称赞 SS 如果 ϕ 道德上是错误的,则应受到指责。

The central notions in this definition are praise, blame, and desert. The majority of contemporary philosophers have followed Strawson (1962) in contending that praising and blaming an agent consist in experiencing (or at least being disposed to experience (cf. Wallace 1994, 70–71)) reactive attitudes or emotions directed toward the agent, such as gratitude, approbation, and pride in the case of praise, and resentment, indignation, and guilt in the case of blame. (See Sher (2006) and Scanlon (2008) for important dissents from this trend. See the entry on blame for a more detailed discussion.) These emotions, in turn, dispose us to act in a variety of ways. For example, blame disposes us to respond with some kind of hostility toward the blameworthy agent, such as verbal rebuke or partial withdrawal of good will. But while these kinds of dispositions are essential to our blaming someone, their manifestation is not: it is possible to blame someone with very little change in attitudes or actions toward the agent. Blaming someone might be immediately followed by forgiveness as an end of the matter.
这个定义的核心概念是赞美、责备和沙漠。大多数当代哲学家都遵循斯特劳森(Strawson,1962)的观点,认为赞美和责备行为者包括体验(或至少倾向于体验(参见Wallace 1994,70-71))针对行为者的反应性态度或情绪,例如赞美时的感激、赞许和自豪,以及责备时的怨恨、愤慨和内疚。(参见Sher (2006)和Scanlon (2008)对这一趋势的重要异议。有关更详细的讨论,请参阅有关责备的条目。反过来,这些情绪促使我们以各种方式行事。例如,责备使我们对应责备的代理人产生某种敌意,例如口头责备或部分撤回善意。但是,虽然这些性格对于我们责备某人是必不可少的,但它们的表现却不是:有可能责备某人,而对代理人的态度或行为几乎没有变化。责备某人可能会立即得到宽恕,作为事情的结束。

By ‘desert’, we have in mind what Derk Pereboom has called basic desert:
通过“沙漠”,我们想到了 Derk Pereboom 所说的基本沙漠:

The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations. (2014, 2)
这里所讨论的沙漠是基本的,因为行为者应该受到指责或赞扬,仅仅因为她实施了行动,了解了行为的道德地位,而不是仅仅由于结果主义或契约主义的考虑。(2014, 2)

As we understand desert, if an agent deserves blame, then we have a strong pro tanto reason to blame him simply in virtue of his being accountable for doing wrong. Importantly, these reasons can be outweighed by other considerations. While an agent may deserve blame, it might, all things considered, be best to forgive him unconditionally instead.

When an agent is morally responsible for doing something wrong, he is blameworthy: he deserves hard treatment marked by resentment and indignation and the actions these emotions dispose us toward, such as censure, rebuke, and ostracism. However, it would seem unfair to treat agents in these ways unless their actions were up to them. Thus, we arrive at the core connection between free will and moral responsibility: agents deserve praise or blame only if their actions are up to them—only if they have free will. Consequently, we can assess analyses of free will by their implications for judgments of moral responsibility. We note that some might reject the claim that free will is necessary for moral responsibility (e.g., Frankfurt 1971; Stump 1988), but even for these theorists an adequate analysis of free will must specify a sufficient condition for the kind of control at play in moral responsibility.

In what follows, we focus our attention on the two most commonly cited features of free will: the freedom to do otherwise and sourcehood. While some seem to think that free will consists exclusively in either the freedom to do otherwise (van Inwagen 2008) or in sourcehood (Zagzebski 2000), many philosophers hold that free will involves both conditions—though philosophers often emphasize one condition over the other depending on their dialectical situation or argumentative purposes (cf. Watson 1987). In what follows, we will describe the most common characterizations of these two conditions.

2.2 The Freedom to Do Otherwise

For most newcomers to the problem of free will, it will seem obvious that an action is up to an agent only if she had the freedom to do otherwise. But what does this freedom come to? The freedom to do otherwise is clearly a modal property of agents, but it is controversial just what species of modality is at stake. It must be more than mere possibility: to have the freedom to do otherwise consists in more than the mere possibility of something else’s happening. A more plausible and widely endorsed understanding claims the relevant modality is ability or power (Locke 1690 [1975], II.xx; Reid 1788 [1969], II.i–ii; D. Locke 1973; Clarke 2009; Vihvelin 2013). But abilities themselves seem to come in different varieties (Lewis 1976; Horgan 1979; van Inwagen 1983, ch. 1; Mele 2003; Clarke 2009; Vihvelin 2013, ch. 1; Franklin 2015; Cyr and Swenson 2019; Hofmann 2022; Whittle 2022), so a claim that an agent has ‘the ability to do otherwise’ is potentially ambiguous or indeterminate; in philosophical discussion, the sense of ability appealed to needs to be spelled out. A satisfactory account of the freedom to do otherwise owes us both an account of the kind of ability in terms of which the freedom to do otherwise is analyzed, and an argument for why this kind of ability (as opposed to some other species) is the one constitutive of the freedom to do otherwise. As we will see, philosophers sometimes leave this second debt unpaid.
对于大多数自由意志问题的新手来说,很明显,只有当代理人有其他行为的自由时,行动才取决于代理人。但这种自由是怎么来的呢?做其他事情的自由显然是代理人的模态属性,但究竟哪种模态受到威胁是有争议的。它必须不仅仅是可能性:拥有做其他事情的自由不仅仅是其他事情发生的可能性。一种更合理和被广泛认可的理解声称相关模式是能力或权力(Locke 1690 [1975], II.xx;里德 1788 [1969],II.i-ii;D. Locke 1973 年;克拉克 2009;Vihvelin 2013 年)。但能力本身似乎有不同的种类(Lewis 1976;霍根 1979;van Inwagen 1983年,第1章;梅勒 2003;克拉克 2009;Vihvelin 2013,第 1 章;富兰克林 2015;Cyr 和 Swenson 2019;霍夫曼 2022;Whittle 2022),因此,代理人具有“做其他事情的能力”的说法可能是模棱两可或不确定的;在哲学讨论中,需要阐明所诉诸的能力感。要想对做其他事情的自由作出令人满意的解释,我们既要说明分析做其他事情的自由所依据的那种能力,也要论证为什么这种能力(相对于其他一些物种)是做其他事情的自由的组成部分。正如我们将要看到的,哲学家有时会不偿还这第二笔债务。

The contemporary literature takes its cue from classical compatibilism’s recognized failure to deliver a satisfactory analysis of the freedom to do otherwise. As we saw above, classical compatibilists (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 [1999]; Locke 1690 [1975]; Hume 1740 [1978], 1748 [1975]; Edwards 1754 [1957]; Moore 1912; Schlick 1939; Ayer 1954) sought to analyze the freedom to do otherwise in terms of a simple conditional analysis of ability:
当代文学从古典相容主义(Contemporary Compatibilism)的公认失败中汲取了灵感,该理论未能对不这样做的自由进行令人满意的分析。正如我们上面所看到的,经典相容论者(Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 [1999];洛克 1690 [1975];休谟 1740 [1978]、1748 [1975];爱德华兹 1754 [1957];摩尔 1912;施利克 1939 年;Ayer 1954)试图从简单的能力条件分析的角度来分析做其他事情的自由:

Simple Conditional Analysis: An agent S has the ability to do otherwise if and only if, were S to choose to do otherwise, then S would do otherwise.
简单条件分析:当且仅当 S 选择不这样做,然后 S 才会做其他事情时,代理 S 才有能力做其他事情。

Part of the attraction of this analysis is that it obviously reconciles the freedom to do otherwise with determinism. While the truth of determinism entails that one’s action is inevitable given the past and laws of nature, there is nothing about determinism that implies that if one had chosen otherwise, then one would not do otherwise.

There are two problems with the Simple Conditional Analysis. The first is that it is, at best, an analysis of free action, not free will (cf. Reid 1788 [1969]; Chisholm 1966; 1976, ch. 2; Lehrer 1968, 1976). It only tells us when an agent has the ability to do otherwise, not when an agent has the ability to choose to do otherwise. One might be tempted to think that there is an easy fix along the following lines:
简单条件分析存在两个问题。首先,它充其量是对自由行动的分析,而不是对自由意志的分析(参见Reid 1788 [1969];奇泽姆 1966;1976年,第2章;Lehrer 1968, 1976)。它只告诉我们代理何时有能力做其他事情,而不是当代理有能力选择做其他事情时。人们可能会认为,按照以下思路有一个简单的解决方法:

Simple Conditional Analysis*: An agent S has the ability to choose otherwise if and only if, were S to desire or prefer to choose otherwise, then S would choose otherwise.

The problem is that we often fail to choose to do things we want to choose, even when it appears that we had the ability to choose otherwise (one might think the same problem attends the original analysis). Suppose that, in deciding how to spend my evening, I have a desire to choose to read and a desire to choose to watch a movie. Suppose that I choose to read. By all appearances, I had the ability to choose to watch a movie. And yet, according to the Simple Conditional Analysis*, I lack this freedom, since the conditional ‘if I were to desire to choose to watch a movie, then I would choose to watch a movie’ is false. I do desire to choose to watch a movie and yet I do not choose to watch a movie. It is unclear how to remedy this problem. On the one hand, we might refine the antecedent by replacing ‘desire’ with ‘strongest desire’ (cf. Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 [1999]; Edwards 1754 [1957]). The problem is that this assumes, implausibly, that we always choose what we most strongly desire (for criticisms of this view see Reid 1788 [1969]; Campbell 1951; Wallace 1999; Holton 2009). On the other hand, we might refine the consequent by replacing ‘would choose to do otherwise’ with either ‘would probably choose to do otherwise’ or ‘might choose to do otherwise’. But each of these proposals is also problematic. If ‘probably’ means ‘more likely than not’, then this revised conditional still seems too strong: it seems possible to have the ability to choose otherwise even when one’s so choosing is unlikely. If we opt for ‘might’, then the relevant sense of modality needs to be spelled out.

Even if there are fixes to these problems, there is a yet deeper problem with these analyses. There are some agents who clearly lack the freedom to do otherwise and yet satisfy the conditional at the heart of these analyses. That is, although these agents lack the freedom to do otherwise, it is, for example, true of them that if they chose otherwise, they would do otherwise. Picking up on an argument developed by Keith Lehrer (1968; cf. Campbell 1951; Broad 1952; Chisholm 1966), consider an agoraphobic, Luke, who, when faced with the prospect of entering an open space, is subject not merely to an irresistible desire to refrain from intentionally going outside, but an irresistible desire to refrain from even choosing to go outside. Given Luke’s psychology, there is no possible world in which he suffers from his agoraphobia and chooses to go outside. It may well nevertheless be true that if Luke chose to go outside, then he would have gone outside. After all, any possible world in which he chooses to go outside will be a world in which he no longer suffers (to the same degree) from his agoraphobia, and thus we have no reason to doubt that in those worlds he would go outside as a result of his choosing to go outside. The same kind of counterexample applies with equal force to the conditional ‘if S desired to choose otherwise, then S would choose otherwise’.
即使这些问题得到了解决,这些分析也存在更深层次的问题。有些智能体显然缺乏做其他事情的自由,但满足了这些分析的核心条件。也就是说,尽管这些代理人缺乏做其他事情的自由,但例如,如果他们选择其他方式,他们就会这样做。采用Keith Lehrer(1968;cf. Campbell 1951;布罗德 1952;Chisholm 1966),考虑一个广场恐惧症患者卢克,当他面对进入开放空间的前景时,他不仅受到一种不可抗拒的欲望的影响,即避免故意外出,而且有一种不可抗拒的欲望,甚至不选择外出。鉴于卢克的心理,他不可能患有广场恐惧症并选择外出。然而,如果路加选择出门,那么他就会出门。毕竟,他选择走出去的任何可能世界都将是一个他不再(在相同程度上)遭受广场恐惧症折磨的世界,因此我们没有理由怀疑在这些世界中,他会因为他选择走出去而走出去。同样的反例同样适用于条件“如果 S 希望选择其他方式,那么 S 会选择其他方式”。

While simple conditional analyses admirably make clear the species of ability to which they appeal, they fail to show that this species of ability is constitutive of the freedom to do otherwise. Agents need a stronger ability to do otherwise than characterized by such simple conditionals. Some argue that the fundamental source of the above problems is the conditional nature of these analyses (Campbell 1951; Austin 1961; Chisholm 1966; Lehrer 1976; van Inwagen 1983, ch. 4). The sense of ability relevant to the freedom to do otherwise is the ‘all-in sense’—that is, holding everything fixed up to the time of the decision or action—and this sense, so it is argued, can only be captured by a categorical analysis of the ability to do otherwise:
雖然簡單的條件分析令人钦佩地清楚地顯示了它們所訴求的能力類型,但它們未能表明這種能力是做其他事情的自由的構成。智能体需要更强的能力来做其他事情,而不是以这种简单的条件为特征。一些人认为,上述问题的根本根源是这些分析的条件性质(Campbell 1951;奥斯汀 1961;奇泽姆 1966;莱勒 1976;van Inwagen 1983年,第4章)。与做其他事情的自由相关的能力感是“全包感”——也就是说,在做出决定或采取行动之前,一切都是固定的——因此,这种感觉只能通过对做其他事情的能力进行分类分析来捕捉:

Categorical Analysis: An agent S has the ability to choose or do otherwise than ϕ at time t if and only if it was possible, holding fixed everything up to t, that S choose or do otherwise than ϕ at t.
分类分析:当且仅当可能时,智能体 S 才有能力选择或执行非 ϕ 在时间 t 以外的操作,将所有内容固定到 t ,即 S 选择或执行非 ϕ 在 的 t 操作。

This analysis gets the right verdict in Luke’s case. He lacks the ability to do otherwise than refrain from choosing to go outside, according to this analysis, because there is no possible world in which he suffers from his agoraphobia and yet chooses to go outside. Unlike the above conditional analyses, the Categorical Analysis requires that we hold fixed Luke’s agoraphobia when considering alternative possibilities.

If the Categorical Analysis is correct, then free will is incompatible with determinism. According to the thesis of determinism, all deterministic possible worlds with the same pasts and laws of nature have the same futures (Lewis 1979; van Inwagen 1983, 3). Suppose John is in deterministic world W and refrains from raising his hand at time t. Since W is deterministic, it follows that any possible world W that has the same past and laws up to t must have the same future, including John’s refraining from raising his hand at t. Therefore, John lacked the ability, and thus freedom, to raise his hand.
如果分类分析是正确的,那么自由意志与决定论是不相容的。根据决定论的论点,所有具有相同过去和自然法则的确定性可能世界都具有相同的未来(Lewis 1979; van Inwagen 1983,3)。假设约翰在确定性世界中 W ,并且没有在时间 t 举手。既然 W 是确定论的,那么任何具有相同过去和法律的可能世界 W t 都必须具有相同的未来,包括约翰没有举手。 t 因此,约翰没有能力,因此也没有自由举手。

This argument, carefully articulated in the late 1960s and early 1970s by Carl Ginet (1966, 1990) and Peter van Inwagen (1975, 1983) and refined in important ways by John Martin Fischer (1994), has come to be known as the Consequence Argument. van Inwagen offers the following informal statement of the argument:

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born [i.e., we do not have the ability to change the past], and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are [i.e., we do not have the ability to break the laws of nature]. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (van Inwagen 1983, 16; cf. Fischer 1994, ch. 1)

Like the Simple Conditional Analysis, a virtue of the Categorical Analysis is that it spells out clearly the kind of ability appealed to in its analysis of the freedom to do otherwise, but like the Simple Conditional Analysis, critics have argued that the sense of ability it captures is not the sense at the heart of free will. The objection here, though, is not that the analysis is too permissive or weak, but rather that it is too restrictive or strong.

While there have been numerous different replies along these lines (e.g., Lehrer 1980; Slote 1982; Watson 1986. See the entry on arguments for incompatibilism for a more extensive discussion of and bibliography for the Consequence Argument), the most influential of these objections is due to David Lewis (1981). Lewis contended that van Inwagen’s argument equivocated on ‘is able to break a law of nature’. We can distinguish two senses of ‘is able to break a law of nature’:

(Weak Thesis) I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law of nature would be broken.

(Strong Thesis) I am able to do something such that, if I did it, it would constitute a law of nature’s being broken or would cause a law of nature to be broken.

If we are committed to the Categorical Analysis, then those desiring to defend compatibilism seem to be committed to the sense of ability in ‘is able to break a law of nature’ along the lines of the strong thesis. Lewis agrees with van Inwagen that it is “incredible” to think humans have such an ability (Lewis 1981, 113), but maintains that compatibilists need only appeal to the ability to break a law of nature in the weak sense. While it is absurd to think that humans are able to do something that is a violation of a law of nature or causes a law of nature to be broken, there is nothing incredible, so Lewis claimed, in thinking that humans are able to do something such that if they did it, a law of nature would be broken. In essence, Lewis is arguing that incompatibilists like van Inwagen have failed to adequately motivate the restrictiveness of the Categorical Analysis.
如果我们致力于分类分析,那么那些希望捍卫相容论的人似乎致力于“能够打破自然法则”的能力感,沿着强论点的路线。刘易斯同意van Inwagen的观点,认为人类具有这种能力是“不可思议的”(Lewis 1981,113),但坚持认为相容论者只需要诉诸于在弱意义上打破自然法则的能力。虽然认为人类能够做一些违反自然法则或导致自然法则被打破的事情是荒谬的,但没有什么不可思议的,所以刘易斯声称,认为人类能够做这样的事情,如果他们这样做,自然法则就会被打破。从本质上讲,刘易斯认为,像范·英瓦根这样的不相容论者未能充分激发分类分析的限制性。

Some incompatibilists have responded to Lewis by contending that even the weak ability is incredible (van Inwagen 2004). But there is a different and often overlooked problem for Lewis: the weak ability seems to be too weak. Returning to the case of John’s refraining from raising his hand, Lewis maintains that the following three propositions are consistent:
一些不相容论者对刘易斯的回应是,即使是弱的能力也是不可思议的(van Inwagen 2004)。但对于刘易斯来说,还有一个不同的、经常被忽视的问题:能力弱似乎太弱了。回到约翰不举手的案例,刘易斯坚持认为以下三个命题是一致的:

John is able to raise his hand.
(ii) (二)
A necessary condition for John’s raising his hand fails to obtain (i.e., that the laws of nature or past are different than they actually are).
(iii) (三)
John is not able to do anything that would constitute this necessary condition’s obtaining or cause this necessary condition to obtain (i.e., he is unable to do anything that would constitute or cause a law of nature to be broken or the past to be different).

One might think that (ii) and (iii) are incompatible with (i). Consider again Luke, our agoraphobic. Suppose that his agoraphobia affects him in such a way that he will only intentionally go outside if he chooses to go outside, and yet his agoraphobia makes it impossible for him to make this choice. In this case, a necessary condition for Luke’s intentionally going outside is his choosing to go outside. Moreover, Luke is not able to choose or cause himself to choose to go outside. Intuitively, this would seem to imply that Luke lacks the freedom to go outside. But this implication does not follow for Lewis. From the fact that Luke is able to go outside only if he chooses to go outside and the fact that Luke is not able to choose to go outside, it does not follow, on Lewis’s account, that Luke lacks the ability to go outside. Consequently, Lewis’s account fails to explain why Luke lacks the ability to go outside (cf. Speak 2011). (For other important criticisms of Lewis, see Ginet [1990, ch. 5] and Fischer [1994, ch. 4].)
有人可能会认为(ii)和(iii)与(i)不相容。再想想路加,我们的广场恐惧症。假设他的广场恐惧症以这样一种方式影响他,如果他选择外出,他只会故意外出,但他的广场恐惧症使他无法做出这种选择。在这种情况下,路加有意外出的必要条件是他选择外出。此外,路加无法选择或促使自己选择外出。从直觉上看,这似乎意味着路加缺乏外出的自由。但刘易斯并没有因此而产生这种影响。从卢克只有选择外出才能外出,以及卢克不能选择外出这一事实来看,根据刘易斯的说法,这并不意味着卢克缺乏外出的能力。因此,刘易斯的叙述无法解释为什么路加缺乏外出的能力(参见Speak 2011)。(有关对刘易斯的其他重要批评,请参阅Ginet [1990,第5章]和Fischer [1994,第4章]。

While Lewis may be right that the Categorical Analysis is too restrictive, his argument, all by itself, doesn’t seem to establish this. His argument is successful only if (a) he can provide an alternative analysis of ability that entails that Luke’s agoraphobia robs him of the ability to go outside and (b) does not entail that determinism robs John of the ability to raise his hand (cf. Pendergraft 2010). Lewis must point out a principled difference between these two cases. As should be clear from the above, the Simple Conditional Analysis is of no help. However, some recent work by Michael Smith (2003), Kadri Vihvelin (2004; 2013), and Michael Fara (2008) have attempted to fill this gap. What unites these theorists—whom Clarke (2009) has called the ‘new dispositionalists’—is their attempt to appeal to recent advances in the metaphysics of dispositions to arrive at a revised conditional analysis of the freedom to do otherwise. The most perspicuous of these accounts is offered by Vihvelin (2004), who argues that an agent’s having the ability to do otherwise is solely a function of the agent’s intrinsic properties. (It is important to note that Vihvelin [2013] has come to reject the view that free will consists exclusively in the kind of ability analyzed below.) Building on Lewis’s work on the metaphysics of dispositions, she arrives at the following analysis of ability:

Revised Conditional Analysis of Ability: S has the ability at time t to do X iff, for some intrinsic property or set of properties B that S has at t, for some time t after t, if S chose (decided, intended, or tried) at t to do X, and S were to retain B until t, S’s choosing (deciding, intending, or trying) to do X and S’s having B would jointly be an S-complete cause of S’s doing X. (Vihvelin 2004, 438)

Lewis defines an ‘S-complete cause’ as “a cause complete insofar as havings of properties intrinsic to [S] are concerned, though perhaps omitting some events extrinsic to [S]” (cf. Lewis 1997, 156). In other words, an S-complete cause of S’s doing ϕ requires that S possess all the intrinsic properties relevant to S’s causing S’s doing ϕ. This analysis appears to afford Vihvelin the basis for a principled difference between agoraphobics and merely determined agents. We must hold fixed an agent’s phobias since they are intrinsic properties of agents, but we need not hold fixed the laws of nature because these are not intrinsic properties of agents. (It should be noted that the assumption that intrinsic properties are wholly separable from the laws of nature is disputed by ‘dispositional essentialists.’ See the entry on metaphysics of causation.) Vihvelin’s analysis appears to be restrictive enough to exclude phobics from having the freedom to do otherwise, but permissive enough to allow that some agents in deterministic worlds have the freedom to do otherwise.
刘易斯将“ S 完全原因”定义为“就具有[ S ]固有的属性而言,一个完整的原因,尽管可能省略了[ S ]的一些外在事件”(参见Lewis 1997,156)。换言之, S S 一个完整的“做 ϕ ”的原因要求它 S 具备 S 与“导致 S ”做 ϕ “相关的所有内在属性。这种分析似乎为Vihvelin提供了广场恐惧症和仅仅确定的代理人之间原则性差异的基础。我们必须固定一个主体的恐惧症,因为它们是主体的内在属性,但我们不需要固定自然法则,因为这些不是主体的内在属性。(应该指出的是,内在属性与自然法则完全分离的假设受到“性格本质主义者”的质疑。参见因果关系的形而上学条目。Vihvelin的分析似乎具有足够的限制性,将恐惧症患者排除在外,但又足够宽容,允许确定性世界中的一些主体有做其他事情的自由。

But appearances can be deceiving. The new dispositionalist claims have received some serious criticism, with the majority of the criticisms maintaining that these analyses are still too permissive (Clarke 2009; Whittle 2010; Franklin 2011b). For example, Randolph Clarke argues that Vihvelin’s analysis fails to overcome the original problem with the Simple Conditional Analysis. He writes, “A phobic agent might, on some occasion, be unable to choose to A and unable to A without so choosing, while retaining all that she would need to implement such a choice, should she make it. Despite lacking the ability to choose to A, the agent might have some set of intrinsic properties B such that, if she chose to A and retained B, then her choosing to A and her having B would jointly be an agent-complete cause of her A-ing” (Clarke 2009, p. 329).
但外表可能具有欺骗性。新的性格主义主张受到了一些严重的批评,大多数批评认为这些分析仍然过于宽松(Clarke 2009;惠特尔 2010;富兰克林 2011b)。例如,伦道夫·克拉克(Randolph Clarke)认为,维维林的分析未能克服简单条件分析的原始问题。他写道,“在某些情况下,一个恐惧症患者可能无法选择A,也无法选择A,同时保留她实施这种选择所需的一切,如果她做出选择的话。尽管缺乏选择A的能力,但代理人可能具有一些内在属性B,因此,如果她选择A并保留B,那么她选择A和她拥有B将共同成为她A-ing的代理人完全原因“(Clarke 2009,第329页)。

The Categorical Analysis, and thus incompatibilism about free will and determinism, remains an attractive option for many philosophers precisely because it seems that compatibilists have yet to furnish an analysis of the freedom to do otherwise that implies that phobics clearly lack the ability to choose or do otherwise that is relevant to moral responsibility and yet some merely determined agents have this ability.

2.3 Freedom to Do Otherwise vs. Sourcehood Accounts
2.3 做其他事情的自由与来源账户

Some have tried to avoid these lingering problems for compatibilists by arguing that the freedom to do otherwise is not required for free will or moral responsibility. What matters for an agent’s freedom and responsibility, so it is argued, is the source of her action—how her action was brought about. The most prominent strategy for defending this move appeals to ‘Frankfurt-style cases’. In a ground-breaking article, Harry Frankfurt (1969) presented a series of thought experiments intended to show that it is possible that agents are morally responsible for their actions and yet they lack the ability to do otherwise. While Frankfurt (1971) took this to show that moral responsibility and free will come apart—free will requires the ability to do otherwise but moral responsibility does not—if we define ‘free will’ as ‘the strongest control condition required for moral responsibility’ (cf. Wolf 1990, 3–4; Fischer 1994, 3; Mele 2006, 17), then if Frankfurt-style cases show that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, then they also show that free will does not require the ability to do otherwise. Let us consider this challenge in more detail.
一些人试图避免相容论者面临的这些挥之不去的问题,他们认为自由意志或道德责任不需要这样做的自由。因此,有人认为,对代理人的自由和责任来说,重要的是她行动的来源——她的行动是如何产生的。为这一举动辩护的最突出策略是“法兰克福式案件”。在一篇开创性的文章中,Harry Frankfurt(1969)提出了一系列思想实验,旨在表明代理人可能对自己的行为负有道德责任,但他们缺乏这样做的能力。虽然Frankfurt(1971)以此表明道德责任和自由意志是分开的——自由意志需要做其他事情的能力,但道德责任不需要——如果我们将“自由意志”定义为“道德责任所需的最强控制条件”(参见Wolf 1990,3-4;Fischer 1994, 3;Mele 2006, 17),那么,如果法兰克福式的案例表明,道德责任不需要做其他事情的能力,那么它们也表明,自由意志不需要做其他事情的能力。让我们更详细地考虑这一挑战。

Here is a representative Frankfurt-style case:

Imagine, if you will, that Black is a quite nifty (and even generally nice) neurosurgeon. But in performing an operation on Jones to remove a brain tumor, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones’s brain which enables Black to monitor and control Jones’s activities. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Black exercises this control through a sophisticated computer which he has programmed so that, among other things, it monitors Jones’s voting behavior. If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for Bush, then the computer, through the mechanism in Jones’s brain, intervenes to ensure that he actually decides to vote for Clinton and does so vote. But if Jones decides on his own to vote for Clinton, the computer does nothing but continue to monitor—without affecting—the goings-on in Jones’s head. (Fischer 2006, 38)

Fischer goes on to suppose that Jones “decides to vote for Clinton on his own”, without any interference from Black, and maintains that in such a case Jones is morally responsible for his decision. Fischer draws two interrelated conclusions from this case. The first, negative conclusion, is that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. Jones is unable to refrain from deciding to vote for Clinton, and yet, so long as Jones decides to vote for Clinton on his own, his decision is free and one for which he is morally responsible. The second, positive conclusion, is that freedom and responsibility are functions of the actual sequence. What matters for an agent’s freedom and moral responsibility is not what might have happened, but how his action was actually brought about. What matters is not whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise, but whether he was the source of his actions.

The success of Frankfurt-style cases is hotly contested. An early and far-reaching criticism is due to David Widerker (1995), Carl Ginet (1996), and Robert Kane (1996, 142–43). According to this criticism, proponents of Frankfurt-style cases face a dilemma: either these cases assume that the connection between the indicator (in our case, the absence of Jones’s showing any inclination to decide to vote for Bush) and the agent’s decision (here, Jones’s deciding to vote for Clinton) is deterministic or not. If the connection is deterministic, then Frankfurt-style cases cannot be expected to convince incompatibilists that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility and/or free will, since Jones’s action will be deterministically brought about by factors beyond his control, leading incompatibilists to conclude that Jones is not morally responsible for his decision. But if the connection is nondeterministic, then it is possible even in the absence of showing any inclination to decide to vote for Bush, that Jones decides to vote for Bush, and so he retains the ability to do otherwise. Either way Frankfurt-style cases fail to show that Jones is both morally responsible for his decision and yet is unable to do otherwise.
法兰克福式案例的成功与否备受争议。David Widerker (1995)、Carl Ginet (1996) 和 Robert Kane (1996, 142–43) 提出了早期影响深远的批评。根据这种批评,法兰克福式案例的支持者面临着一个两难境地:要么这些案例假设指标(在我们的案例中,琼斯没有表现出任何决定投票给布什的倾向)和代理人的决定(这里是琼斯决定投票给克林顿)之间的联系是确定性的。如果这种联系是确定性的,那么法兰克福式的案例就不能指望不相容论者相信,不相容论者不具备做其他事情的能力对于道德责任和/或自由意志不是必需的,因为琼斯的行为将决定性地由他无法控制的因素引起,导致不相容论者得出结论,琼斯对他的决定没有道德责任。但是,如果这种联系是不确定的,那么即使没有表现出任何决定投票给布什的倾向,琼斯也有可能决定投票给布什,因此他保留了这样做的能力。无论哪种方式,法兰克福式的案例都无法证明琼斯对他的决定负有道德责任,但又不能做其他事情。

While some have argued that even Frankfurt-style cases that assume determinism are effective (see, e.g., Fischer 1999, 2010, 2013 and Haji and McKenna 2004 and for criticisms of this approach, see Goetz 2005, Palmer 2005, 2014, Widerker and Goetz 2013, and Cohen 2017), the majority of proponents of Frankfurt-style cases have attempted to revise these cases so that they are explicitly nondeterministic and yet still show that the agent was morally responsible even though he lacked the ability to do otherwise—or, at least that he lacked any ability to do otherwise that could be relevant to grounding the agent’s moral responsibility (see, e.g., Mele and Robb 1998, 2003, Pereboom 2001, 2014, McKenna 2003, Hunt 2005, and for criticisms of these cases see Ginet 2002, Timpe 2006, Widerker 2006, Franklin 2011c, Moya 2011, Palmer 2011, 2013, Robinson 2014, Capes 2016, Capes and Swenson 2017, and Elzein 2017).
虽然有些人认为,即使是假设决定论的法兰克福式案例也是有效的(参见,例如,Fischer 1999、2010、2013 和 Haji and McKenna 2004,对于这种方法的批评,参见 Goetz 2005、Palmer 2005、2014、Widerker and Goetz 2013 和 Cohen 2017),但法兰克福式案例的大多数支持者都试图修改这些案例,使它们明确地具有非确定性,但仍然表明代理人在道德上负有责任,即使他缺乏做其他事情的能力——或者,至少他缺乏任何可能与代理人的道德责任相关的其他事情的能力(参见,例如,Mele and Robb 1998, 2003, Pereboom 2001, 2014, McKenna 2003, Hunt 2005,对于这些案例的批评,参见Ginet 2002, Timpe 2006, Widerker 2006, Franklin 2011c, Moya 2011、Palmer 2011、2013、Robinson 2014、Capes 2016、Capes and Swenson 2017 和 Elzein 2017)。

Supposing that Frankfurt-style cases are successful, what exactly do they show? In our view, they show neither that free will and moral responsibility do not require an ability to do otherwise in any sense nor that compatibilism is true. Frankfurt-style cases are of clear help to the compatibilists’ position (though see Speak 2007 for a dissenting opinion). The Consequence Argument raises a powerful challenge to the cogency of compatibilism. But if Frankfurt-style cases are successful, agents can act freely in the sense relevant to moral responsibility while lacking the ability to do otherwise in the all-in sense. This allows compatibilists to concede that the all-in ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism, and yet insist that it is irrelevant to the question of the compatibility of determinism with moral responsibility (and perhaps even free will, depending on how we define this) (cf. Fischer 1987, 1994. For a challenge to the move from not strictly necessary to irrelevant, see O’Connor [2000, 20–22] and in reply, Fischer [2006, 152–56].). But, of course, showing that an argument for the falsity of compatibilism is irrelevant does not show that compatibilism is true. Indeed, many incompatibilists maintain that Frankfurt-style cases are successful and defend incompatibilism not via the Consequence Argument, but by way of arguments that attempt to show that agents in deterministic worlds cannot be the ‘source’ of their actions in the way that moral responsibility requires (Stump 1999; Zagzebski 2000; Pereboom 2001, 2014). Thus, if successful, Frankfurt-style cases would be at best the first step in defending compatibilism. The second step must offer an analysis of the kind of sourcehood constitutive of free will that entails that free will is compatible with determinism (cf. Fischer 1982).

Furthermore, while proponents of Frankfurt-style cases often maintain that these cases show that no ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility (“I have employed the Frankfurt-type example to argue that this sense of control [i.e. the one required for moral responsibility] need not involve any alternative possibilities” [Fischer 2006, p. 40; emphasis ours]), we believe that this conclusion overreaches. At best, Frankfurt-style cases show that the ability to do otherwise in the all-in sense—in the sense defined by the Categorical Analysis—is not necessary for free will or moral responsibility (cf. Franklin 2015). To appreciate this, let us assume that in the above Frankfurt-style case Jones lacks the ability to do otherwise in the all-in sense: there is no possible world in which we hold fixed the past and laws and yet Jones does otherwise, since all such worlds include Black and his preparations for preventing Jones from doing otherwise should Jones show any inclination. Even if this is all true, it should take only a little reflection to recognize that in this case Jones is able to do otherwise in certain weaker senses we might attach to that phrase, and compatibilists in fact still think that the ability to do otherwise in some such senses is necessary for free will and moral responsibility. Consequently, even though Frankfurt-style cases have, as a matter of fact, moved many compatibilists away from emphasizing ability to do otherwise to emphasizing sourcehood, we suggest that this move is best seen as a weakening of the ability-to-do-otherwise condition on moral responsibility (but see Cyr 2017 and Kittle 2019 for criticisms of this claim). (A potentially important exception to this claim is Sartorio [2016], who appealing to some controversial ideas in the metaphysics of causation appears to argue that no sense of the ability to do otherwise is necessary for control in the sense at stake for moral responsibility, but instead what matters is whether the agent is the cause of the action. We simply note that Sartorio’s account of causation is a modal one [see especially Sartorio (2016, 94–95, 132–37)] and thus it is far from clear that her account of freedom and responsibility is really an exception.)
此外,虽然法兰克福式案例的支持者经常坚持认为,这些案例表明,道德责任不需要任何能力(“我用法兰克福式的例子来论证这种控制感[即道德责任所需的控制感]不需要涉及任何替代可能性”[Fischer 2006,第40页;强调我们的]),但我们认为这一结论过分了。充其量,法兰克福式的案例表明,在整体意义上(在分类分析定义的意义上)做其他事情的能力对于自由意志或道德责任来说不是必需的(参见富兰克林 2015)。为了理解这一点,让我们假设,在上述法兰克福式的案例中,琼斯缺乏在全部意义上做其他事情的能力:不存在一个可能的世界,在这个世界中,我们固定了过去和法律,但琼斯却不这样做,因为所有这些世界都包括布莱克,以及他为阻止琼斯做其他事情的准备,如果琼斯表现出任何倾向。即使这一切都是真的,只需要一点点思考就可以认识到,在这种情况下,琼斯能够在某些较弱的意义上做其他事情,我们可能附加到这句话上,而相容论者实际上仍然认为,在某些这样的意义上做其他事情的能力对于自由意志和道德责任是必要的。因此,尽管法兰克福式的案例实际上已经使许多相容论者从强调做其他事情的能力转向强调来源性,但我们认为,这一举动最好被视为削弱道德责任的“做其他事情的能力”条件(但有关对这一主张的批评,请参阅Cyr 2017和Kittle 2019)。 (Sartorio [2016]是这一主张的一个潜在重要例外,他诉诸因果关系形而上学中一些有争议的观点,似乎认为在道德责任的意义上,控制不需要任何能力,但重要的是代理人是否是行动的原因。我们只是注意到,萨托里奥对因果关系的解释是一种模态的解释[特别是参见Sartorio(2016,94-95,132-37)],因此,她对自由和责任的解释是否真的是一个例外还远不清楚。)

2.4 Compatibilist Accounts of Sourcehood
2.4 来源的兼容性账户

In this section, we will assume that Frankfurt-style cases are successful in order to consider two prominent compatibilist attempts to construct analyses of the sourcehood condition (though see the entry on compatibilism for a more systematic survey of compatibilist theories of free will). The first, and perhaps most popular, compatibilist model is a reasons-responsiveness model. According to this model, an agent’s action ϕ is free just in case the agent or manner in which the action is brought about is responsive to the reasons available to the agent at the time of action. While compatibilists develop this kind of account in different ways, the most detailed proposal is due to John Martin Fischer (1994, 2006, 2010, 2012; Fischer and Ravizza 1998. For similar compatibilist treatments of reasons-responsiveness, see Wolf 1990, Wallace 1994, Haji 1998, Nelkin 2011, McKenna 2013, Vargas 2013, Sartorio 2016). Fischer and Ravizza argue that an agent’s action is free and one for which he is morally responsible only if the mechanism that issued in the action is moderately reasons-responsive (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, ch. 3). By ‘mechanism’, Fischer and Ravizza simply mean “the way the action was brought about” (38). One mechanism they often discuss is practical deliberation. For example, in the case of Jones discussed above, his decision to vote for Clinton on his own was brought about by the process of practical deliberation. What must be true of this process, this mechanism, for it to be moderately reasons-responsive? Fischer and Ravizza maintain that moderate reasons-responsiveness consists in two conditions: reasons-receptivity and reasons-reactivity. A mechanism’s reasons-receptivity depends on the agent’s cognitive capacities, such as being capable of understanding moral reasons and the implications of their actions (69–73). The second condition is more important for us in the present context. A mechanism’s reasons-reactivity depends on how the mechanism would react given different reasons for action. Fischer and Ravizza argue that the kind of reasons-reactivity at stake is weak reasons-reactivity, where this merely requires that there is some possible world in which the laws of nature remain the same, the same mechanism operates, there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, and the mechanism brings about the alternative action in response to this sufficient reason (73–76). On this analysis, while Jones, due to the activity of Black, lacks the ‘all-in’ sense of the ability to do otherwise, he is nevertheless morally responsible for deciding to vote for Clinton because his action finds its source in Jones’s practical deliberation that is moderately reasons-responsive.
在本节中,我们将假设法兰克福式的案例是成功的,以便考虑两个突出的相容主义尝试,以构建对源性条件的分析(尽管有关对自由意志的相容主义理论的更系统的调查,请参阅关于相容主义的条目)。第一种,也许也是最流行的兼容模型是原因响应模型。根据该模型,如果代理人或提起诉讼的方式对代理人在采取行动时可用的理由作出反应,则代理人的行动 ϕ 是自由的。虽然相容论者以不同的方式发展了这种说法,但最详细的建议归功于John Martin Fischer(1994,2006,2010,2012;Fischer和Ravizza 1998。对于原因响应性的类似相容性处理,请参阅Wolf 1990,Wallace 1994,Haji 1998,Nelkin 2011,McKenna 2013,Vargas 2013,Sartorio 2016)。Fischer和Ravizza认为,代理人的行动是自由的,只有当行动中发出的机制是适度的原因响应时,他才对行为负有道德责任(Fischer和Ravizza 1998,第3章)。Fischer和Ravizza所说的“机制”只是指“行动发生的方式”(38)。他们经常讨论的一个机制是实际审议。例如,在上面讨论的琼斯的案例中,他自己投票给克林顿的决定是由实际审议过程产生的。这个过程,这个机制必须是什么,才能适度地响应原因?Fischer和Ravizza坚持认为,适度的原因反应包括两个条件:原因-接受性和原因-反应性。 机制的原因-接受能力取决于主体的认知能力,例如能够理解道德原因及其行为的含义(69-73)。在目前的情况下,第二个条件对我们来说更为重要。一个机制的原因-反应性取决于该机制在不同的行动理由下会如何反应。Fischer和Ravizza认为,这种原因-反应性是弱原因-反应性,这仅仅要求存在一些可能的世界,其中自然法则保持不变,相同的机制在运作,有充分的理由做其他事情,并且该机制带来了替代行动来回应这个充分的理由(73-76)。根据这一分析,虽然琼斯由于布莱克的活动而缺乏“全力以赴”的能力,但他在决定投票给克林顿方面负有道德责任,因为他的行动在琼斯的实际考虑中找到了根源,这种考虑是适度的理性反应。

Fischer and Ravizza’s theory of freedom and responsibility has shifted the focus of much recent debate to questions of sourcehood. Moreover, one might argue that this theory is a clear improvement over classical compatibilism with respect to handling cases of phobia. By focusing on mechanisms, Fischer and Ravizza can argue that our agoraphobic Luke is not morally responsible for deciding to refrain from going outside because the mechanism that issues in this action—namely his agoraphobia—is not moderately reasons-responsive. There is no world with the same laws of nature as our own, this mechanism operates, and yet it reacts to a sufficient reason to go outside. No matter what reasons there are for Luke to go outside, when acting on this mechanism, he will always refrain from going outside (cf. Fischer 1987, 74).

Before turning to our second compatibilist model, it is worth noting that it would be a mistake to think that Fischer and Ravizza’s account is a sourcehood account to the exclusion of the ability to do otherwise in any sense. As we have just seen, Fischer and Ravizza place clear modal requirements on mechanisms that issue in actions with respect to which agents are free and morally responsible. Indeed, this should be clear from the very idea of reasons-responsiveness. Whether one is responsive depends not merely on how one does respond, but also on how one would respond. Thus, any account that makes reasons-responsiveness an essential condition of free will is an account that makes the ability to do otherwise, in some sense, necessary for free will (Fischer [2018] concedes this point, though, as noted above, the reader should consider Sartorio [2016] as a potential counterexample to this claim).

The second main compatibilist model of sourcehood is an identification model. Accounts of sourcehood of this kind lay stress on self-determination or autonomy: to be the source of her action the agent must self-determine her action. Like the contemporary discussion of the ability to do otherwise, the contemporary discussion of the power of self-determination begins with the failure of classical compatibilism to produce an acceptable definition. According to classical compatibilists, self-determination simply consists in the agent’s action being determined by her strongest motive. On the assumption that some compulsive agents’ compulsions operate by generating irresistible desires to act in certain ways, the classical compatibilist analysis of self-determination implies that these compulsive actions are self-determined. While Hobbes seems willing to accept this implication (1656 [1999], 78), most contemporary compatibilists concede that this result is unacceptable.

Beginning with the work of Harry Frankfurt (1971) and Gary Watson (1975), many compatibilists have developed identification accounts of self-determination that attempt to draw a distinction between an agent’s desires or motives that are internal to the agent and those that are external. The idea is that while agents are not (or at least may not be) identical to any motivations (or bundle of motivations), they are identified with a subset of their motivations, rendering these motivations internal to the agent in such a way that any actions brought about by these motivations are self-determined. The identification relation is not an identity relation, but something weaker (cf. Bratman 2000, 39n12). What the precise nature of the identification relation is and to which attitudes an agent stands in this relation is hotly disputed. Lippert-Rasmussen (2003) helpfully divides identification accounts into two main types. The first are “authority” accounts, according to which agents are identified with attitudes that are authorized to speak for them (368). The second are authenticity accounts, according to which agents are identified with attitudes that reveal who they truly are (368). (But see Shoemaker 2015 for an ecumenical account of identification that blends these two accounts.) Proposed attitudes to which agents are said to stand in the identification relation include higher-order desires (Frankfurt 1971), cares or loves (Frankfurt 1993, 1994; Shoemaker 2003; Jaworska 2007; Sripada 2016), self-governing policies (Bratman 2000), the desire to make sense of oneself (Velleman 1992, 2009), and perceptions (or judgments) of the good (or best) (Watson 1975; Stump 1988; Ekstrom 1993; Mitchell-Yellin 2015).

The distinction between internal and external motivations allows identification theorists to enrich classical compatibilists’ understanding of constraint, while remaining compatibilists about free will and determinism. According to classical compatibilists, the only kind of constraint is external (e.g., broken cars and broken legs), but addictions and phobias seem just as threatening to free will. Identification theorists have the resources to concede that some constraints are internal. For example, they can argue that our agoraphobic Luke is not free in refraining from going outside even though this decision was caused by his strongest desires because he is not identified with his strongest desires. On compatibilist identification accounts, what matters for self-determination is not whether our actions are determined or undetermined, but whether they are brought about by motives with which the agent is identified: exercises of the power of self-determination consists in an agent’s actions being brought about, in part, by an agent’s motives with which she is identified. (It is important to note that while we have distinguished reasons-responsive accounts from identification accounts, there is nothing preventing one from combing both elements in a complete analysis of free will.)

Even if these reasons-responsive and identification compatibilist accounts of sourcehood might successfully side-step the Consequence Argument, they must come to grips with a second incompatibilist argument: the Manipulation Argument. The general problem raised by this line of argument is that whatever proposed compatibilist conditions for an agent S’s being free with respect to, and morally responsible for, some action ϕ, it will seem that agents can be manipulated into satisfying these conditions with respect to ϕ and, yet, precisely because they are manipulated into satisfying these conditions, their freedom and responsibility seem undermined. The two most influential forms of the Manipulation Argument are Pereboom’s Four-case Argument (2001, ch. 4; 2014, ch. 4) and Mele’s Zygote Argument (2006, ch. 7. See Todd 2010, 2012 for developments of Mele’s argument). As the structure of Mele’s version is simpler, we will focus on it.
即使这些原因响应和识别相容的来源论述可能成功地回避了后果论证,他们也必须掌握第二个不相容论证:操纵论证。这种论点所提出的普遍问题是,无论提出什么相容的条件,使代理人 S 在某种行动方面是自由的,并且对某些行为 ϕ 负有道德责任,似乎代理人可以纵来满足这些条件 ϕ ,然而,正是因为他们纵来满足这些条件, 他们的自由和责任似乎受到了破坏。操纵论证的两种最有影响力的形式是Pereboom的四例论证(2001年,第4章;2014年,第4章)和Mele的受精卵论证(2006年,第7章)。参见Todd 2010,2012,了解Mele论点的发展)。由于 Mele 版本的结构更简单,我们将重点介绍它。

Imagine a goddess Diana who creates a zygote Z in Mary in some deterministic world. Suppose that Diana creates Z as she does because she wants Jones to be murdered thirty years later. From her knowledge of the laws of nature in her world and her knowledge of the state of the world just prior to her creating Z, she knows that a zygote with precisely Z’s constitution located in Mary will develop into an agent Ernie who, thirty years later, will murder Jones as a result of his moderately reasons-responsive mechanism and on the basis of motivations with which he is identified (whatever those might be). Suppose Diana succeeds in her plan and Ernie murders Jones as a result of her manipulation.
想象一下,戴安娜女神在某个确定性世界中 Z 在玛丽身上创造了一个受精卵。假设戴安娜之所以像她那样创作 Z ,是因为她希望琼斯在三十年后被谋杀。根据她对她所处世界的自然法则的了解以及她在创造 Z 之前对世界状况的了解,她知道一个位于玛丽体内的具有精确 Z 体质的受精卵将发展成一个特工厄尼,三十年后,他将谋杀琼斯,因为他适度的理性反应机制和他被识别的动机(无论这些动机是什么)。假设戴安娜的计划成功了,厄尼因为她的操纵而谋杀了琼斯。

Many judge that Ernie is not morally responsible for murdering Jones even though he satisfies both the reasons-responsive and identification criteria. There are two possible lines of reply open to compatibilists. On the soft-line reply, compatibilists attempt to show that there is a relevant difference between manipulated agents such as Ernie and agents who satisfy their account (McKenna 2008, 470). For example, Fischer and Ravizza propose a second condition on sourcehood: in addition to a mechanism’s being moderately reasons-responsive, an agent is morally responsible for the output of such a mechanism only if the agent has come to take responsibility for the mechanism, where an agent has taken responsibility for a mechanism M just in case (i) she believes that she is an agent when acting from M, (ii) she believes that she is an apt target for blame and praise for acting from M, and (iii) her beliefs specified in (i) and (ii) are “based, in an appropriate way, on [her] evidence” (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 238). The problem with this reply is that we can easily imagine Diana creating Ernie so that his murdering Jones is a result not only of a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, but also a mechanism for which he has taken responsibility. On the hard-line reply, compatibilists concede that, despite initial appearances, the manipulated agent is free and morally responsible and attempt to ameliorate the seeming counterintuitiveness of this concession (McKenna 2008, 470–71). Here compatibilists might point out that the idea of being manipulated is worrisome only so long as the manipulators are interfering with an agent’s development. But if the manipulators simply create a person, and then allow that person’s life to unfold without any further inference, the manipulators’ activity is no threat to freedom (McKenna 2008; Fischer 2011; Sartorio 2016, ch. 5). (For other responses to the Manipulation Argument, see Kearns 2012; Sripada 2012; McKenna 2014.)
许多人认为厄尼对谋杀琼斯没有道德责任,即使他同时满足原因回应和识别标准。兼容论者有两种可能的回答方式。在软线回复中,相容主义者试图表明,纵的代理人(如厄尼)与满足其账户的代理人之间存在相关差异(McKenna 2008,470)。例如,Fischer和Ravizza提出了关于来源的第二个条件:除了机制具有适度的原因响应之外,只有当代理人开始对机制负责时,代理人才对这种机制的输出负有道德责任,其中代理人已经对机制 M 负责,以防万一(i)她认为自己是代理人 M ,(ii)她认为自己是一个容易受到指责和赞扬的目标 M ,以及(iii)她在(i)和(ii)中指定的信念是“以适当的方式基于[她的]证据”(Fischer和Ravizza 1998,238)。这个回答的问题在于,我们可以很容易地想象戴安娜创造了厄尼,这样他谋杀琼斯不仅是一个适度的原因反应机制的结果,而且是一个他承担责任的机制。在强硬的回答中,相容主义者承认,尽管最初出现,但纵的代理人是自由的,在道德上是负责任的,并试图改善这种让步的看似违反直觉(McKenna 2008,470-71)。在这里,相容论者可能会指出,只有当操纵者干扰代理的发展时,纵的想法才令人担忧。 但是,如果操纵者只是简单地创造了一个人,然后允许这个人的生活展开而没有任何进一步的推断,那么操纵者的活动就不会对自由构成威胁(McKenna 2008;菲舍尔 2011;Sartorio 2016,第 5 章)。(有关对操纵论点的其他回应,请参阅Kearns 2012;斯里帕达 2012;麦肯纳 2014 年。)

2.5 Libertarian Accounts of Sourcehood

Despite these compatibilist replies, to some the idea that the entirety of a free agent’s life can be determined, and in this way controlled, by another agent will seem incredible. Some take the lesson of the Manipulation Argument to be that no compatibilist account of sourcehood or self-determination is satisfactory. True sourcehood—the kind of sourcehood that can actually ground an agent’s freedom and responsibility—requires, so it is argued, that one’s action not be causally determined by factors beyond one’s control.

Libertarians, while united in endorsing this negative condition on sourcehood, are deeply divided concerning which further positive conditions may be required. It is important to note that while libertarians are united in insisting that compatibilist accounts of sourcehood are insufficient, they are not committed to thinking that the conditions of freedom spelled out in terms either of reasons-responsiveness or of identification are not necessary. For example, Stump (1988, 1996, 2010) builds a sophisticated libertarian model of free will out of resources originally developed within Frankfurt’s identification model (see also Ekstrom 1993, 2000; Franklin 2014) and nearly all libertarians agree that exercises of free will require agents to be reasons-responsive (e.g., Kane 1996; Clarke 2003, chs. 8–9; Franklin 2018, ch. 2). Moreover, while this section focuses on libertarian accounts of sourcehood, we remind readers that most (if not all) libertarians think that the freedom to do otherwise is also necessary for free will and moral responsibility.

There are three main libertarian options for understanding sourcehood or self-determination: non-causal libertarianism (Ginet 1990, 2008; McCann 1998; Lowe 2008; Goetz 2009; Pink 2017; Palmer 2021), event-causal libertarianism (Wiggins 1973; Kane 1996, 1999, 2011, 2016; Mele 1995, chs. 11–12; 2006, chs. 4–5; 2017; Ekstrom 2000, 2019; Clarke 2003, chs. 2–6; Franklin 2018), and agent-causal libertarianism (Reid 1788 [1969]; Chisholm 1966, 1976; Taylor 1966; O’Connor 2000; Clarke 1993; 1996; 2003, chs. 8–10; Griffith 2010; Steward 2012). Non-causal libertarians contend that exercises of the power of self-determination need not (or perhaps even cannot) be caused or causally structured. According to this view, we control our volition or choice simply in virtue of its being ours—its occurring in us. We do not exert a special kind of causality in bringing it about; instead, it is an intrinsically active event, intrinsically something we do. While there may be causal influences upon our choice, there need not be, and any such causal influence is wholly irrelevant to understanding why it occurs. Reasons provide an autonomous, non-causal form of explanation. Provided our choice is not wholly determined by prior factors, it is free and under our control simply in virtue of being ours. Non-causal views have failed to garner wide support among libertarians since, for many, self-determination seems to be an essentially causal notion (cf. Mele 2000 and Clarke 2003, ch. 2). This dispute hinges on the necessary conditions on the concept of causal power, and relatedly on whether power simpliciter admits causal and non-causal variants. For discussion, see O’Connor (2021).
理解源头或自决有三种主要的自由意志主义选择:非因果自由意志主义(Ginet 1990,2008;麦肯 1998;Lowe,2008 年;Goetz 2009 年;粉红色 2017;Palmer 2021)、事件因果自由意志主义(Wiggins 1973;凯恩 1996、1999、2011、2016;Mele 1995,第 11-12 章;2006年,第4-5章;2017;埃克斯特罗姆 2000 年、2019 年;克拉克 2003 年,第 2-6 章;富兰克林 2018 年)和代理因果自由意志主义(Reid 1788 [1969];奇泽姆 1966, 1976;泰勒 1966;奥康纳 2000;克拉克 1993;1996;2003年,第8-10章;格里菲斯 2010;管家 2012 年)。非因果自由意志主义者认为,自决权的行使不需要(甚至可能不能)是因果关系或因果结构的。根据这种观点,我们控制我们的意志或选择,仅仅是因为它是我们的——它发生在我们身上。我们没有发挥一种特殊的因果关系来实现它;相反,它本质上是一个活跃的事件,本质上是我们做的事情。虽然我们的选择可能有因果影响,但不一定有,任何这样的因果影响都与理解它发生的原因完全无关。原因提供了一种自主的、非因果的解释形式。只要我们的选择不完全由先验因素决定,那么它是自由的,并且在我们的控制之下,只是因为我们的选择是我们的。非因果观点未能在自由意志主义者中获得广泛支持,因为对许多人来说,自决似乎本质上是一个因果概念(参见 Mele 2000 和 Clarke 2003,第 2 章)。这种争论取决于因果力量概念的必要条件,以及与之相关的权力简化者是否承认因果和非因果变体。有关讨论,请参阅O'Connor (2021) 。

Most libertarians endorse an event-causal or agent-causal account of sourcehood. Both these accounts maintain that exercises of the power of self-determination consist partly in the agent’s bringing about her choice or action, but they disagree on how to analyze an agent’s bringing about her choice. While event-causal libertarianism admits of different species, at the heart of this view is the idea that self-determining an action requires, at minimum, that the agent cause the action and that an agent’s causing his action is wholly reducible to mental states and other events involving the agent nondeviantly causing his action. Consider an agent’s raising his hand. According to the event-causal model at its most basic level, an agent’s raising his hand consists in the agent’s causing his hand to rise and his causing his hand to rise consists in apt mental states and events involving the agent—such as the agent’s desire to ask a question and his belief that he can ask a question by raising his hand—nondeviantly causing his hand to rise. (The nondeviance clause is required since it seems possible that an event be brought about by one’s desires and beliefs and yet not be self-determined, or even an action for that matter, due to the unusual causal path leading from the desires and beliefs to action. Imagine a would-be accomplice of an assassin believes that his dropping his cigarette is the signal for the assassin to shoot his intended victim and he desires to drop his cigarette and yet this belief and desire so unnerve him that he accidentally drops his cigarette. While the event of dropping the cigarette is caused by a relevant desire and belief it does not seem to be self-determined and perhaps is not even an action [cf. Davidson 1973].) To fully spell out this account, event-causal libertarians must specify which mental states and events are apt (cf. Brand 1979)—which mental states and events are the springs of self-determined actions—and what nondeviance consists in (cf. Bishop 1989). (We note that this has proven very difficult, enough so that some take the problem to spell doom for event-causal theories of action. Such philosophers [e.g., Taylor 1966 and Sehon 2005] take agential power to be conceptually and/or ontologically primitive and understand reasons explanations of action in irreducibly teleological terms. See Stout 2010 for a brisk survey of discussions of this topic.) For ease, in what follows we will assume that apt mental states are an agent’s reasons that favor the action.
大多数自由意志主义者都赞同对源头的事件因果关系或主体因果关系的解释。这两种说法都认为,自决权的行使部分在于代理人促成她的选择或行动,但他们在如何分析行动者促成她的选择方面存在分歧。虽然事件-因果自由意志主义承认不同的物种,但这种观点的核心是这样一种观点,即自我决定一个行为至少需要行为主体引起该行为,并且一个行为主体导致他的行为完全可以归结为精神状态和其他事件,涉及主体非偏差地引起他的行为。考虑一个代理人举手。根据最基本层面的事件因果模型,代理人举手包括代理人使他的手举起,而他使他的手举起包括适当的心理状态和涉及代理人的事件——例如代理人提出问题的愿望和他相信他可以通过举手提出问题——非偏差地导致他的手举起。(不越轨条款是必需的,因为似乎有可能由一个人的欲望和信念引起事件,但不是自我决定的,甚至不是就此而言的行动,因为从欲望和信念到行动的不寻常的因果路径。 想象一下,一个潜在的刺客同谋认为他掉下香烟是刺客射杀他预定受害者的信号,他想放下他的香烟,然而这种信念和欲望使他如此不安,以至于他不小心掉了烟。虽然掉落香烟的事件是由相关的欲望和信念引起的,但它似乎不是自我决定的,甚至可能不是一种行为[参见戴维森,1973]。为了充分阐明这一说法,事件因果自由意志主义者必须具体说明哪些心理状态和事件是恰当的(参见布兰德1979)——哪些心理状态和事件是自我决定行动的源泉——以及不偏差包括什么(参见毕晓普1989)。(我们注意到,这已被证明是非常困难的,以至于一些人认为这个问题为事件因果行动理论带来了厄运。这些哲学家[例如,Taylor 1966和Sehon 2005]认为代理权力在概念上和/或本体论上是原始的,并以不可简化的目的论术语来理解原因对行动的解释。参见 Stout 2010,了解有关此主题的讨论的快速调查。为了方便起见,在下文中,我们将假设适当的心理状态是代理人有利于该行动的原因。

Event-causal libertarians, of course, contend that self-determination requires more than nondeviant causation by agents’ reasons: for it is possible that agents’ actions in deterministic worlds are nondeviantly caused by apt mental states and events. Self-determination requires nondeterministic causation, in a nondeviant way, by an agent’s reasons. While historically many have thought that nondeterministic causation is impossible (Hobbes 1654 [1999], 1656 [1999]; Hume 1740 [1978], 1748 [1975]), with the advent of quantum physics and, from a very different direction, an influential essay by G.E.M. Anscombe (1971), it is now widely assumed that nondeterministic (or probabilistic) causation is possible. There are two importantly different ways to understand nondeterministic causation: as the causation of probability or as the probability of causation. Under the causation of probability model, a nondeterministic cause C causes (or causally contributes to) the objective probability of the outcome’s occurring rather than the outcome itself. On this account, S’s reasons do not cause his decision but there being a certain antecedent objective probability of its occurring, and the decision itself is uncaused. On the competing probability of causation model, a nondeterministic cause C causes the outcome of a nondeterministic process. Given that C is a nondeterministic cause of the outcome, it was possible given the exact same past and laws of nature that C not cause the outcome (perhaps because it was possible that some other event cause some other outcome)—the probability of this causal transaction’s occurring was less than 1. Given that event-causal libertarians maintain that self-determined actions, and thus free actions, must be caused, they are committed to the probability of causation model of nondeterministic causation (cf. Franklin 2018, 25–26). (We note that Balaguer [2010] is skeptical of the above distinction, and it is thus unclear whether he should best be classified as a non-causal or event-causal libertarian, though see Balaguer [2014] for evidence that it is best to treat him as a non-causalist.) Consequently, according to event-causal libertarians, when an agent S self-determines his choice ϕ, then S’s reasons r1 nondeterministically cause (in a nondeviant way) ϕ, and it was possible, given the past and laws, that r1 not have caused ϕ, but rather some of S’s other reasons r2 nondeterministically caused (in a nondeviant way) a different action ψ.

Agent-causal libertarians contend that the event-causal picture fails to capture self-determination, for it fails to accord the agent with a power to settle what she does. Pereboom offers a forceful statement of this worry:

On an event-causal libertarian picture, the relevant causal conditions antecedent to the decision, i.e., the occurrence of certain agent-involving events, do not settle whether the decision will occur, but only render the occurrence of the decision about 50% probable. In fact, because no occurrence of antecedent events settles whether the decision will occur, and only antecedent events are causally relevant, nothing settles whether the decision will occur. (Pereboom 2014, 32; cf. Watson 1987, 1996; Clarke 2003 [ch. 8], 2011; Griffith 2010; Shabo 2011, 2013; Steward 2012 [ch. 3]; and Schlosser 2014); and for critical assessment, see Clarke 2019.

On the event-causal picture, the agent’s causal contribution to her actions is exhausted by the causal contribution of her reasons, and yet her reasons leave open which decisions she will make, and this seems insufficient for self-determination.

But what more must be added? Agent-causal libertarians maintain that self-determination requires that the agent herself play a causal role over and above the causal role played by her reasons. Some agent-causal libertarians deny that an agent’s reasons play any direct causal role in bringing about an agent’s self-determined actions (Chisholm 1966; O’Connor 2000, ch. 5), whereas others allow or even require that self-determined actions be caused in part by the agent’s reasons (Clarke 2003, ch. 9; Steward 2012, ch. 3). But all agent-causal libertarians insist that exercises of the power of self-determination do not reduce to nondeterministic causation by apt mental states: agent-causation does not reduce to event-causation.

Agent-causal libertarianism seems to capture an aspect of self-determination that neither the above compatibilists accounts nor event-causal libertarian accounts capture. (Some compatibilists even accept this and try to incorporate agent-causation into a compatibilist understanding of free will. See Markosian 1999, 2012; Nelkin 2011.) These accounts reduce the causal role of the self to states and events to which the agent is not identical (even if he is identified with them). But how can self-determination of my actions wholly reduce to determination of my actions by things other than the self? Richard Taylor nicely expresses this intuition: “If I believe that something not identical to myself was the cause of my behavior—some event wholly external to myself, for instance, or even one internal to myself, such as a nerve impulse, volition, or whatnot—then I cannot regard the behavior as being an act of mine, unless I further believed that I was the cause of that external or internal event” (1974, 55; cf. Franklin 2016).

Despite its powerful intuitive pull for some, many have argued that agent-causal libertarianism is obscure or even incoherent. The stock objection used to be that the very idea of agent-causation—causation by agents that is not reducible to causation by mental states and events involving the agent—is incoherent, but this objection has become less common due to pioneering work by Chisholm (1966, 1976), Taylor (1974), O’Connor (2000, 2011), Clarke (2003), and Steward 2012, ch. 8). More common objections now concern, first, how to understand the relationship between agent-causation and an agent’s reasons (or motivations in general), and, second, the empirical adequacy of agent-causal libertarianism. With respect to the first worry, it is widely assumed that the only (or at least best) way to understand reasons-explanation and motivational influence is within a causal account of reasons, where reasons cause our actions (Davidson 1963; Mele 1992). If agent-causal libertarians accept that self-determined actions, in addition to being agent-caused, must also be caused by agents’ reasons that favored those actions, then agent-causal libertarians need to explain how to integrate these causes (for a detailed attempt to do just this, see Clarke 2003, ch. 8). Given that these two causes seem distinct, is it not possible that the agent cause his decision to ϕ and yet the agent’s reasons simultaneously cause an incompatible decision to ψ? If agent-causal libertarians side-step this difficult question by denying that reasons cause action, then they must explain how reasons can explain and motivate action without causing it; and this has turned out to be no easy task. (For more general attempts to understand reasons-explanation and motivation within a non-causal framework see Schueler 1995, 2003; Sehon 2005). For further discussion see the entry on incompatibilist (nondeterministic) theories of free will.
尽管对一些人来说,自由意志主义具有强大的直觉吸引力,但许多人认为,主体-因果的自由意志主义是晦涩难懂的,甚至是不连贯的。过去的反对意见是,代理人因果关系的概念——代理人的因果关系不能归结为涉及代理人的精神状态和事件的因果关系——是不连贯的,但由于Chisholm(1966,1976),Taylor(1974),O'Connor(2000,2011),Clarke(2003)和Steward 2012的开创性工作,这种反对意见已经变得不那么普遍了。 第 8 章)。现在更常见的反对意见首先涉及如何理解主体因果关系与主体原因(或一般动机)之间的关系,其次,主体因果自由意志主义的经验充分性。关于第一种担忧,人们普遍认为,理解原因解释和动机影响的唯一(或至少是最佳)方法是在原因的因果解释中,原因导致我们的行为(Davidson 1963;Mele 1992 年)。如果主体-因果自由意志主义者接受,自我决定的行为,除了是主体引起的之外,还必须由有利于这些行为的主体原因引起的,那么主体-因果自由意志主义者需要解释如何整合这些原因(有关这样做的详细尝试,请参阅Clarke 2003,第8章)。鉴于这两个原因似乎是不同的,难道代理人不可能使他的决定 ϕ 与代理人的原因同时导致一个不相容的决定 ψ 吗?如果主体-因果自由意志主义者通过否认原因导致行动来回避这个难题,那么他们必须解释原因如何解释和激励行动而不引起行动;事实证明,这并非易事。 (关于在非因果框架内理解原因解释和动机的更一般的尝试,见Schueler 1995,2003;Sehon 2005 年)。有关进一步的讨论,请参阅自由意志的不相容(非确定性)理论条目。

Finally, we note that some recent philosophers have questioned the presumed difference between event- and agent-causation by arguing that all causation is object or substance causation. They argue that the dominant tendency to understand ‘garden variety’ causal transactions in the world as relations between events is an unfortunate legacy of David Hume’s rejection of substance and causation as basic metaphysical categories. On the competing metaphysical picture of the world, the event or state of an object’s having some property such as mass is its having a causal power, which in suitable circumstances it exercises to bring about a characteristic effect. Applied to human agents in an account of free will, the account suggests a picture on which an agent’s having desires, beliefs, and intentions are rational powers to will particular courses of action, and where the agent’s willing is not determined in any one direction, she wills freely. An advantage for the agent-causalist who embraces this broader metaphysics is ‘ideological’ parsimony. For different developments and defenses of this approach, see Lowe (2008), Swinburne (2013), and O’Connor (2021); and for reason to doubt that a substance-causal metaphysics helps to allay skepticism concerning free will, see Clarke and Reed (2015).
最后,我们注意到,最近的一些哲学家通过认为所有因果关系都是客体或物质因果关系,对事件因果关系和主体因果关系之间的假定区别提出了质疑。他们认为,将世界上的“花园多样性”因果交易理解为事件之间关系的主导趋势是大卫·休谟拒绝将实体和因果关系作为基本的形而上学范畴的不幸遗产。在相互竞争的形而上学的世界图景中,一个物体具有某种属性(如质量)的事件或状态是它具有因果力量,在适当的情况下,它行使这种因果力量来产生特征效果。在对自由意志的解释中,这个描述适用于人类主体,它暗示了一幅图景,在这个图景上,主体的欲望、信念和意图是意志特定行动方案的理性力量,而主体的意愿不是在任何一个方向上决定的,她是自由意志的。对于接受这种更广泛的形而上学的主体因果论者来说,一个优势是“意识形态”的狭隘。有关这种方法的不同发展和辩护,请参阅Lowe (2008) , Swinburne (2013) 和O'Connor (2021) ;并且有理由怀疑物质因果形而上学有助于减轻对自由意志的怀疑,请参阅Clarke and Reed (2015) 。

3. Do We Have Free Will?

Most philosophers theorizing about free will take themselves to be attempting to analyze a near-universal power of mature human beings. But as we’ve noted above, there have been free will skeptics in both ancient and (especially) modern times. (Israel 2001 highlights a number of such skeptics in the early modern period.) In this section, we summarize the main lines of argument both for and against the reality of human freedom of will.

3.1 Arguments Against the Reality of Free Will

There are both a priori and empirical arguments against free will (See the entry on skepticism about moral responsibility). Several of these start with an argument that free will is incompatible with causal determinism, which we will not rehearse here. Instead, we focus on arguments that human beings lack free will, against the background assumption that freedom and causal determinism are incompatible.

The most radical a priori argument is that free will is not merely contingently absent but is impossible. Nietzsche 1886 [1966] argues to this effect, and more recently it has been argued by Galen Strawson (1986, ch. 2; 1994, 2002). Strawson associates free will with being ‘ultimately morally responsible’ for one’s actions. He argues that, because how one acts is a result of, or explained by, “how one is, mentally speaking” (M), for one to be responsible for that choice one must be responsible for M. To be responsible for M, one must have chosen to be M itself—and that not blindly, but deliberately, in accordance with some reasons r1. But for that choice to be a responsible one, one must have chosen to be such as to be moved by r1, requiring some further reasons r2 for such a choice. And so on, ad infinitum. Free choice requires an impossible infinite regress of choices to be the way one is in making choices.

There have been numerous replies to Strawson’s argument. Mele (1995, 221ff.) argues that Strawson misconstrues the locus of freedom and responsibility. Freedom is principally a feature of our actions, and only derivatively of our characters from which such actions spring. The task of the theorist is to show how one is in rational, reflective control of the choices one makes, consistent with there being no freedom-negating conditions. While this seems right, when considering those theories that make one’s free control to reside directly in the causal efficacy of one’s reasons (such as compatibilist reasons-responsive accounts or event-causal libertarianism), it is not beside the point to reflect on how one came to be that way in the first place and to worry that such reflection should lead one to conclude that true responsibility (and hence freedom) is undermined, since a complete distal source of any action may be found external to the agent. Clarke (2003, 170–76) argues that an effective reply may be made by indeterminists, and, in particular, by nondeterministic agent-causal theorists. Such theorists contend that (i) aspects of ‘how one is, mentally speaking’, fully explain an agent’s choice without causally determining it and (ii) the agent himself causes the choice that is made (so that the agent’s antecedent state, while grounding an explanation of the action, is not the complete causal source of it). Since the agent’s exercise of this power is causally undetermined, it is not true that there is a sufficient ‘ultimate’ source of it external to the agent. Finally, Mele (2006, 129–34, and 2017, 212–16) and O’Connor (2009b) suggest that freedom and moral responsibility come in degrees and grow over time, reflecting the fact that ‘how one is, mentally speaking’ is increasingly shaped by one’s own past choices. Furthermore, some choices for a given individual may reflect more freedom and responsibility than others, which may be the kernel of truth behind Strawson’s sweeping argument. (For discussion of the ways that nature, nurture, and contingent circumstances shape our behavior and raise deep issues concerning the extent of our freedom and responsibility, see Levy 2011 and Russell 2017, chs. 10–12.)

A second family of arguments against free will contend that, in one way or another, nondeterministic theories of freedom entail either that agents lack control over their choices or that the choices cannot be adequately explained. These arguments are variously called the ‘Mind’, ‘Rollback’, or ‘Luck’ argument, with the latter admitting of several versions. (For statements of such arguments, see van Inwagen 1983, ch. 4; 2000; Haji 2001; Mele 2006; Shabo 2011, 2013, 2020; Coffman 2015). We note that some philosophers advance such arguments not as parts of a general case against free will, but merely as showing the inadequacy of specific accounts of free will [see, e.g., Griffith 2010].) They each describe imagined cases—individual cases, or comparison of intra- or inter-world duplicate antecedent conditions followed by diverging outcomes—designed to elicit the judgment that the occurrence of a choice that had remained unsettled given all prior causal factors can only be a ‘matter of chance’, ‘random’, or ‘a matter of luck’. Such terms have been imported from other contexts and have come to function as quasi-technical, unanalyzed concepts in these debates, and it is perhaps more helpful to avoid such proxies and to conduct the debates directly in terms of the metaphysical notion of control and epistemic notion of explanation. Where the arguments question whether an undetermined agent can exercise appropriate control over the choice he makes, proponents of nondeterministic theories often reply that control is not exercised prior to, but at the time of the choice—in the very act of bringing it about (see, e.g., Clarke 2005 and O’Connor 2007). Where the arguments question whether undetermined choices can be adequately explained, the reply often consists in identifying a form of explanation other than the form demanded by the critic—a ‘noncontrastive’ explanation, perhaps, rather than a ‘contrastive’ explanation, or a species of contrastive explanation consistent with indeterminism (see, e.g., Kane 1999; Clarke, 2003, ch. 8; and Franklin 2011a; 2018, ch. 5).

We now consider empirical arguments against human freedom. Some of these stem from the physical sciences (while making assumptions concerning the way physical phenomena fix psychological phenomena) and others from neuroscience and psychology.

It used to be common for philosophers to argue that there is empirical reason to believe that the world in general is causally determined, and since human beings are parts of the world, they are too. Many took this to be strongly confirmed by the spectacular success of Isaac Newton’s framework for understanding the universe as governed everywhere by fairly simple, exceptionless laws of motion. But the quantum revolution of the early twentieth century has made that ‘clockwork universe’ image at least doubtful at the level of basic physics. While quantum mechanics has proven spectacularly successful as a framework for making precise and accurate predictions of certain observable phenomena, its implications for the causal structure of reality is still not well understood, and there are competing indeterministic and deterministic interpretations. See the entry on quantum mechanics for detailed discussion.) It is possible that indeterminacy on the small-scale, supposing it to be genuine, ‘cancels out’ at the macroscopic scale of birds and buildings and people, so that behavior at this scale is virtually deterministic. But this idea, once common, is now being challenged empirically, even at the level of basic biology. Furthermore, the social, biological, and medical sciences, too, are rife with merely statistical generalizations. Plainly, the jury is out on all these inter-theoretic questions. But that is just a way to say that current science does not decisively support the idea that everything we do is pre-determined by the past, and ultimately by the distant past, wholly out of our control. For discussion, see Balaguer (2009), Koch (2009), Roskies (2014), Ellis (2016).
哲学家们过去常常认为,有经验理由相信世界总体上是由因果决定的,既然人类是世界的一部分,他们也是。许多人认为,艾萨克·牛顿(Isaac Newton)的框架在理解宇宙的惊人成功方面取得了惊人的成功,宇宙在任何地方都受到相当简单,无例外的运动定律的支配。但是,二十世纪初的量子革命使得“发条宇宙”的形象至少在基础物理学层面上是值得怀疑的。虽然量子力学已被证明是对某些可观察现象进行精确预测的框架,但它对现实因果结构的影响仍然没有得到很好的理解,并且存在相互竞争的不确定和确定性解释。有关详细讨论,请参阅量子力学条目。假设小尺度上的不确定性是真实的,有可能在鸟类、建筑物和人的宏观尺度上“抵消”,因此这种尺度的行为实际上是确定性的。但是,这个想法曾经很普遍,现在甚至在基础生物学层面上也受到了经验上的挑战。此外,社会科学、生物科学和医学科学也充斥着纯粹的统计概括。显然,陪审团在所有这些理论间问题上都悬而未决。但这只是一种说法,即当前的科学并没有决定性地支持这样一种观点,即我们所做的一切都是由过去预先决定的,最终是由遥远的过去预先决定的,完全不受我们的控制。有关讨论,请参阅Balaguer (2009) , Koch (2009) , Roskies (2014) , Ellis (2016) 。

Maybe, then, we are subject to myriad causal influences, but the sum total of these influences doesn’t determine what we do, they only make it more or less likely that we’ll do this or that. Now some of the a priori no-free-will arguments above center on nondeterministic theories according to which there are objective antecedent probabilities associated with each possible choice outcome. Why objective probabilities of this kind might present special problems beyond those posed by the absence of determinism has been insufficiently explored to date. (For brief discussion, see Vicens 2016 and O’Connor 2016.) But one philosopher who argues that there is reason to hold that our actions, if undetermined, are governed by objective probabilities and that this fact calls into question whether we act freely is Derk Pereboom (2001, ch. 3; 2014, ch. 3). Pereboom notes that our best physical theories indicate that statistical laws govern isolated, small-scale physical events, and he infers from the thesis that human beings are wholly physically composed that such statistical laws will also govern all the physical components of human actions. Finally, Pereboom maintains that agent-causal libertarianism offers the correct analysis of free will. He then invites us to imagine that the antecedent probability of some physical component of an action occurring is 0.32. If the action is free while not violating the statistical law, then, in a scenario with a large enough number of instances, this action would have to be freely chosen close to 32 percent of the time. This leads to the problem of “wild coincidences”:
那么,也许我们受到无数因果影响的影响,但这些影响的总和并不能决定我们做什么,它们只会或多或少地使我们做这个或那个的可能性。现在,上面的一些先验无自由意志论证集中在非确定论理论上,根据这些理论,每个可能的选择结果都有客观的先验概率。为什么这种客观概率可能带来特殊的问题,而不是由于缺乏决定论而带来的问题,迄今为止还没有得到充分的探索。(有关简要讨论,请参阅 Vicens 2016 和 O'Connor 2016。但是,有一位哲学家认为,有理由认为,我们的行为,如果不确定,就会受到客观概率的支配,这一事实使我们质疑我们是否自由行动,他就是Derk Pereboom(2001年,第3章;2014年,第3章)。Pereboom指出,我们最好的物理理论表明,统计定律支配着孤立的、小规模的物理事件,他从人类完全由身体构成的论点中推断出,这种统计定律也将支配人类行为的所有物理组成部分。最后,佩雷布姆坚持认为,主体-因果自由意志主义提供了对自由意志的正确分析。然后,他邀请我们想象一个动作发生的某些物理分量的先验概率是 0.32 。如果该操作在不违反统计定律的情况下是自由的,那么,在具有足够多实例的场景中,该操作必须在接近 32 百分比的时间内自由选择。这导致了“疯狂巧合”的问题:

if the occurrence of these physical components were settled by the choices of agent-causes, then their actually being chosen close to 32 percent of the time would amount to a coincidence no less wild than the coincidence of possible actions whose physical components have an antecedent probability of about 0.99 being chosen, over large enough number of instances, close to 99 percent of the time. The proposal that agent-caused free choices do not diverge from what the statistical laws predict for the physical components of our actions would run so sharply counter to what we would expect as to make it incredible. (2014, 67)

Clarke (2010) questions the implicit assumption that free agent-causal choices should be expected not to conform to physical statistical laws, while O’Connor (2009a) challenges the more general assumption that freedom requires that agent-causal choices not be governed by statistical laws of any kind, as they plausibly would be if the relevant psychological states/powers are strongly emergent from physical states of the human brain. Finally, Runyan 2018 argues that Pereboom’s case rests on an implausible empirical assumption concerning the evolution of objective probabilities concerning types of behavior over time.

Pereboom’s empirical basis for free will skepticism is very general. Others see support for free will skepticism from specific findings and theories in the human sciences. They point to evidence that we can be unconsciously influenced in the choices we make by a range of factors, including ones that are not motivationally relevant; that we can come to believe that we chose to initiate a behavior that in fact was artificially induced; that people subject to certain neurological disorders will sometimes engage in purposive behavior while sincerely believing that they are not directing them. Finally, a great deal of attention has been given to the work of neuroscientist Benjamin Libet (2002). Libet conducted some simple experiments that seemed to reveal the existence of ‘preparatory’ brain activity (the ‘readiness potential’) shortly before a subject engages in an ostensibly spontaneous action. (Libet interpreted this activity as the brain’s ‘deciding’ what to do before we are consciously settled on a course of action.) Wegner (2002) surveys all of these findings (some of which are due to his own work as a social psychologist) and argues on their basis that the experience of conscious willing is ‘an illusion’. For criticism of such arguments, see Mele (2009); Nahmias (2014); Mudrik et al. (2022); and several contributions to Maoz and Sinnott-Armstrong (2022). Libet’s interpretation of the readiness potential has come in for severe criticism. After extensive subsequent study, neuroscientists are uncertain what it signifies. For thorough review of the evidence, see Schurger et al. (2021).

While Pereboom and others point to these empirical considerations in defense of free will skepticism, other philosophers see them as reasons to favor a more modest free will agnosticism (Kearns 2015) or to promote revisionism about the ‘folk idea of free will’ (Vargas 2013; Nichols 2015).

3.2 Arguments for the Reality of Free Will

If one is a compatibilist, then a case for the reality of free will requires evidence for our being effective agents who for the most part are aware of what we do and why we are doing it. If one is an incompatibilist, then the case requires in addition evidence for causal indeterminism, occurring in the right locations in the process leading from deliberation to action. Many think that we already have third-personal ‘neutral’ scientific evidence for much of human behavior’s satisfying modest compatibilist requirements, such as Fischer and Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness account. However, given the immaturity of social science and the controversy over whether psychological states ‘reduce’ in some sense to underlying physical states (and what this might entail for the reality of mental causation), this claim is doubtful. A more promising case for our satisfying (at least) compatibilist requirements on freedom is that effective agency is presupposed by all scientific inquiry and so cannot rationally be doubted (which fact is overlooked by some of the more extreme ‘willusionists’ such as Wegner).

However, effective intervention in the world (in scientific practice and elsewhere) does not (obviously) require that our behavior be causally undetermined, so the ‘freedom is rationally presupposed’ argument cannot be launched for such an understanding of freedom. Instead, incompatibilists usually give one of the following two bases for rational belief in freedom (both of which can be given by compatibilists, too).

First, philosophers have long claimed that we have introspective evidence of freedom in our experience of action, or perhaps of consciously attended or deliberated action. Augustine and Scotus, discussed earlier, are two examples among many. In recent years, philosophers have been more carefully scrutinizing the experience of agency and a debate has emerged concerning its contents, and in particular whether it supports an indeterministic theory of human free action. For discussion, see Deery et al. (2013), Guillon (2014), Horgan (2015), and Bayne (2017).

Second, philosophers (e.g., Reid 1788 [1969], Swinburne 2013) sometimes claim that our belief in the reality of free will is epistemically basic, or reasonable without requiring independent evidential support. Most philosophers hold that some beliefs have that status, on pain of our having no justified beliefs whatever. It is controversial, however, just which beliefs do because it is controversial which criteria a belief must satisfy to qualify for that privileged status. It is perhaps necessary that a basic belief be ‘instinctive’ (unreflectively held) for all or most human beings; that it be embedded in regular experience; and that it be central to our understanding of an important aspect of the world. Our belief in free will seems to meet these criteria, but whether they are sufficient is debated. (O’Connor 2019 proposes that free will belief is epistemically basic but defeasible.) Other philosophers defend a variation on this stance, maintaining instead that belief in the reality of moral responsibility is epistemically basic, and that since moral responsibility entails free will, or so it is claimed, we may infer the reality of free will (see, e.g., van Inwagen 1983, 206–13).

4. Theological Wrinkles

4.1 Free Will and God’s Power, Knowledge, and Goodness

A large portion of Western philosophical work on free will has been written within an overarching theological framework, according to which God is the ultimate source, sustainer, and end of all else. Some of these thinkers draw the conclusion that God must be a sufficient, wholly determining cause for everything that happens; all of them suppose that every creaturely act necessarily depends on the explanatorily prior, cooperative activity of God. It is also commonly presumed by philosophical theists that human beings are free and responsible (on pain of attributing evil in the world to God alone, and so impugning His perfect goodness). Hence, those who believe that God is omni-determining typically are compatibilists with respect to freedom and (in this case) theological determinism. Edwards (1754 [1957]) is a good example. But those who suppose that God’s sustaining activity (and special activity of conferring grace) is only a necessary condition on the outcome of human free choices need to tell a more subtle story, on which omnipotent God’s cooperative activity can be (explanatorily) prior to a human choice and yet the outcome of that choice be settled only by the choice itself. For important medieval discussions—the apex of philosophical reflection on theological concerns—see the relevant portions of Al-Ghazali IP, Aquinas BW and Scotus QAM. Three positions (given in order of logical strength) on God’s activity vis-à-vis creaturely activity were variously defended by thinkers of this area: mere conservationism, concurrentism, and occasionalism. These positions turn on subtle distinctions, which have recently been explored by Freddoso (1988), Kvanvig and McCann (1991), Koons (2002), Grant (2016 and 2019), and Judisch (2016).
西方关于自由意志的哲学著作的很大一部分都是在一个总体的神学框架内写成的,根据这个框架,上帝是一切的最终来源、维持者和终点。这些思想家中的一些人得出的结论是,上帝必须是一切发生的充分的、完全决定性的原因;他们都认为,每一个受造物的行为都必然取决于上帝的解释性先验的合作活动。哲学有神论者也普遍认为,人类是自由和负责任的(将世界上的邪恶归咎于上帝,从而指责他完美的善良的痛苦)。因此,那些相信上帝是全能决定论的人,在自由和(在这种情况下)神学决定论方面通常是相容论者。爱德华兹(1754 [1957])就是一个很好的例子。但是,那些认为上帝的维持活动(以及赐予恩典的特殊活动)只是人类自由选择结果的必要条件的人,需要讲述一个更微妙的故事,在这个故事中,全能的上帝的合作活动可以(解释性地)先于人类选择,但这种选择的结果只能由选择本身决定。關於重要的中世紀討論——對神學問題的哲學反思的頂峰——請參閱Al-Ghazali IP、Aquinas BW和Scotus QAM的相關部分。关于上帝的活动与受造物活动的三种立场(按逻辑强度的顺序给出),这一领域的思想家们为之辩护:纯粹的保守主义、并发主义和偶然主义。这些立场开启了微妙的区别,最近由Freddoso(1988),Kvanvig和McCann(1991),Koons(2002),Grant(2016和2019)以及Judisch(2016)进行了探索。

Many suppose that there is a challenge to human freedom stemming not only from God’s perfect power but also from his perfect knowledge. A standard argument for the incompatibility of free will and causal determinism has a close theological analogue. Recall van Inwagen’s influential formulation of the ‘Consequence Argument’:
许多人认为,对人类自由的挑战不仅来自上帝完美的能力,也来自他完美的知识。关于自由意志和因果决定论不相容的标准论证有一个密切的神学类比。回想一下van Inwagen对“后果论证”的有影响力的表述:

If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (van Inwagen 1983, 16)
如果决定论是正确的,那么我们的行为就是自然法则和遥远过去事件的结果。但是,在我们出生之前发生了什么并不取决于我们,自然法则是什么也不取决于我们。因此,这些事情的后果(包括我们目前的行为)不取决于我们。(van Inwagen 1983,16)

And now consider an argument that turns on God’s comprehensive and infallible knowledge of the future:

If infallible divine foreknowledge is true, then our acts are the (logical) consequences of God’s beliefs in the remote past. (Since God cannot get things wrong, his believing that something will be so entails that it will be so.) But it is not up to us what beliefs God had before we were born, and neither is it up to us that God’s beliefs are necessarily true. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.

An excellent discussion of these arguments in tandem and attempts to point to relevant disanalogies between causal determinism and infallible foreknowledge may be found in the introduction to Fischer (1989). See also the entry on foreknowledge and free will.

Another issue concerns how knowledge of God, the ultimate Good, would impact human freedom. Many philosophical theologians, especially the medieval Aristotelians, were drawn to the idea that human beings cannot but will that which they take to be an unqualified good. (As noted above, Duns Scotus is an exception to this consensus, as were Ockham and Suarez subsequently, but their dissent is limited.) Hence, if there is an afterlife, in which humans ‘see God face to face,’ they will inevitably be drawn to Him. Following Pascal, Murray (1993, 2002) argues that a good God would choose to make His existence and character less than certain for human beings, for the sake of preserving their freedom. (He will do so, the argument goes, at least for a period of time in which human beings participate in their own character formation.) If it is a good for human beings that they freely choose to respond in love to God and to act in obedience to His will, then God must maintain an ‘epistemic distance’ from them lest they be overwhelmed by His goodness or power and respond out of necessity, rather than freedom. (See also the other essays in Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002.)

If it is true that God withholds our ability to be certain of his existence for the sake of our freedom, then it is natural to conclude that humans will lack freedom in heaven. And it is anyways common to traditional Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theologies to maintain that humans cannot sin in heaven. Even so, traditional Christian theology at least maintains that human persons in heaven are free. What sort of freedom is in view here, and how does it relate to mundane freedom? Two good recent discussions of these questions are Pawl and Timpe (2009) and Tamburro (2017).

4.2 God’s Freedom

Finally, there is the question of the freedom of God himself. Perfect goodness is an essential, not acquired, attribute of God. God cannot lie or be in any way immoral in His dealings with His creatures (appearances notwithstanding). Unless we take the minority position on which this is a trivial claim, since whatever God does definitionally counts as good, this appears to be a significant, inner constraint on God’s freedom. Did we not contemplate immediately above that human freedom would be curtailed by our having an unmistakable awareness of what is in fact the Good? And yet is it not passing strange to suppose that God should be less than perfectly free?

One suggested solution to this puzzle takes as its point of departure the distinction noted in section 2.3 between the ability to do otherwise and sourcehood, proposing that the core metaphysical feature of freedom is being the ultimate source, or originator, of one’s choices. For human beings or any created persons who owe their existence to factors outside themselves, the only way their acts of will could find their ultimate origin in themselves is for such acts not to be determined by their character and circumstances. For if all my willings were wholly determined, then if we were to trace my causal history back far enough, we would ultimately arrive at external factors that gave rise to me, with my particular genetic dispositions. My motives at the time would not be the ultimate source of my willings, only the most proximate ones. Only by there being less than deterministic connections between external influences and choices, then, is it be possible for me to be an ultimate source of my activity, concerning which I may truly say, “the buck stops here.”

As is generally the case, things are different on this point in the case of God. As Anselm observed, even if God’s character absolutely precludes His performing certain actions in certain contexts, this will not imply that some external factor is in any way a partial origin of His willings and refrainings from willing. Indeed, this would not be so even if he were determined by character to will everything which He wills. God’s nature owes its existence to nothing. Thus, God would be the sole and ultimate source of His will even if He couldn’t will otherwise.

Well, then, might God have willed otherwise in any respect? The majority view in the history of philosophical theology is that He indeed could have. He might have chosen not to create anything at all. And given that He did create, He might have created any number of alternatives to what we observe. But there have been noteworthy thinkers who argued the contrary position, along with others who clearly felt the pull of the contrary position even while resisting it. The most famous such thinker is Leibniz (1710 [1985]), who argued that God, being both perfectly good and perfectly powerful, cannot fail to will the best possible world. Leibniz insisted that this is consistent with saying that God is able to will otherwise, although his defense of this last claim is notoriously difficult to make out satisfactorily. Many read Leibniz, malgré lui, as one whose basic commitments imply that God could not have willed other than He does in any respect.

One might challenge Leibniz’s reasoning on this point by questioning the assumption that there is a uniquely best possible Creation (an option noted by Adams 1987, though he challenges instead Leibniz’s conclusion based on it). One way this could be is if there is no well-ordering of worlds: some pairs of worlds are sufficiently different in kind that they are incommensurate with each other (neither is better than the other, nor are they equal) and no world is better than either of them. Another way this could be is if there is no upper limit on goodness of worlds: for every possible world God might have created, there are others (infinitely many, in fact) which are better. If such is the case, one might argue, it is reasonable for God to arbitrarily choose which world to create from among those worlds exceeding some threshold value of overall goodness.

However, William Rowe (2004) has countered that the thesis that there is no upper limit on goodness of worlds has a very different consequence: it shows that there could not be a morally perfect Creator! For suppose our world has an on-balance moral value of n and that God chose to create it despite being aware of possibilities having values higher than n that He was able to create. It seems we can now imagine a morally better Creator: one having the same options who chooses to create a better world. For critical replies to Rowe, see Almeida (2008, ch. 1), Kray (2010), and Zimmerman (2018).
然而,William Rowe(2004)反驳说,世界善良没有上限的论点有一个非常不同的结果:它表明不可能有一个道德上完美的造物主!因为假设我们的世界有一个平衡的道德价值, n 并且上帝选择创造它,尽管他意识到具有比 n 他能够创造的价值更高的可能性。现在,我们似乎可以想象一个道德上更好的造物主:一个拥有相同选择的人,他选择创造一个更美好的世界。有关对Rowe的批评性回复,请参阅Almeida (2008, ch. 1), Kray (2010) 和Zimmerman (2018) 。

Finally, Norman Kretzmann (1997, 220–25) has argued in the context of Aquinas’s theological system that there is strong pressure to say that God must have created something or other, though it may well have been open to Him to create any of a number of contingent orders. The reason is that there is no plausible account of how an absolutely perfect God might have a resistible motivation—one consideration among other, competing considerations—for creating something rather than nothing. (It obviously cannot have to do with any sort of utility, for example.) The best general understanding of God’s being motivated to create at all—one which in places Aquinas himself comes very close to endorsing—is to see it as reflecting the fact that God’s very being, which is goodness, necessarily diffuses itself. Perfect goodness will naturally communicate itself outwardly; God who is perfect goodness will naturally create, generating a dependent reality that imperfectly reflects that goodness. Wainwright (1996) discusses a somewhat similar line of thought in the Puritan thinker Jonathan Edwards. Alexander Pruss (2016), however, raises substantial grounds for doubt concerning this line of thought; O’Connor (2022) offers a rejoinder.
最后,诺曼·克雷兹曼(Norman Kretzmann,1997,220-25)在阿奎那神学体系的背景下认为,存在着强大的压力,说上帝一定创造了某种东西或其他东西,尽管他很可能已经可以创造一些偶然秩序中的任何一个。原因在于,对于一个绝对完美的上帝如何有一个不可抗拒的动机——一个相互竞争的考虑因素——创造一个东西而不是什么都没有。(例如,它显然不能与任何类型的效用有关。对上帝创造的动机的最好一般理解——在阿奎那本人非常接近于赞同的地方——是把它看作是反映了这样一个事实,即上帝的存在,即良善,必然会扩散自己。完美的善良会自然而然地向外传达自己;完全良善的上帝会自然地创造,产生一个不完美地反映这种良善的依赖现实。Wainwright(1996)讨论了清教徒思想家乔纳森·爱德华兹(Jonathan Edwards)的类似思路。然而,Alexander Pruss (2016) 对这一思路提出了大量怀疑的理由;O'Connor (2022) 提出了反驳。

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