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Egon G. Guba and Yvonna S. Lincoln
埃貢·古巴(Egon G. Guba)和伊沃娜·林肯(Yvonna S.Lincoln)

Io. 2 Hi. 艾歐。2 嗨。

Abstract 抽象

n our chapter for the first edition of the Handbook of Qualitative Research, we focused on the contention among various research paradigms for legitimacy and intellectual and paradigmatic hegemony (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The postmodern paradigms that discussed (postmodernist critical theory and constructivism) were in contention with the received positivist and postpositivist paradigms for legitimacy, and with one another for intëllectual legitimacy. In the more than' 10 years that have elapsed since that chapter was published, subsstantial changes have occurred in the landscape of social scientific inquiry.
在《定性研究手冊》第一版的章節中,我們重點討論了各種研究範式之間關於合法性、知識和範式霸權的爭論(Guba & Lincoln,1994)。所討論的後現代範式(後現代主義批判理論和建構主義) 與公認的實證主義和後實證主義範式爭奪合法性,以及相互爭奪內在合法性。自該章出版以來的10多年裡,社會科學探究的格局發生了重大變化。

On the matter of legitimacy, we observe that readers familiar with the literature on methods and paradigms reflect a high interest in ontologies and epistemologies that differ sharply from those undergirding conventional social science. Second, even those established professionals trained in quantitative social science (including the two of us) want to learn more about qualitative approaches, because new young professionals being mentored in graduate schools are asking serious questions about and looking for guidance in qualitatively

oriented studies and dissertations. Third, the number of qualitative texts, research papers, workshops, and training materials has exploded. Indeed, it would be difficult to miss the distinct turn of the social sciences toward more interpretive, postmodern, and criticalist practices and theorizing (Bloland, 1989, 1995). This nonpositivist orientation has created a context (surround) in which virtually no study can go unchallenged by proponents of contending paradigms. Further, it is obvious that the number of practitioners of newparadigm inquiry is growing daily. There can be no question that the legitimacy of postmodern paradigms is well established and at least equal to the legitimacy of received and conventional paradigms (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).
On the matter of hegemony, or supremacy, among postmodern paradigms, it is clear that Geertz's prophecy about the "blurring of genres" is rapidly being fulfilled. Inquiry methodology can no longer be treated as a set of universally applicable rules or abstractions. Methodology is inevitably interwoven with and emerges from the nature of particular disciplines
關於後現代範式中的霸權或霸權問題,很明顯,格爾茨關於“流派模糊” 的預言正在迅速實現。探究方法不能再被視為一套普遍適用的規則或抽象。方法論不可避免地與特定學科的性質交織在一起,並從特定學科的性質中產生

(such as sociology and psychology) and particular perspectives (such as Marxism, feminist theory, and queer theory). So, for instance, we can read feminist critical theorists such as Olesen (2000) or queer theorists such as Gamson (2000), or we can follow arguments about teachers as researchers (Kincheloe, 1991) while we understand the secondary text to be teacher empowerment and democratization of schooling practices. Indeed, the various paradigms are beginning to "interbreed" such that two theorists previously thought to be in irreconcilable conflict may now appear, under a different theoretical rubric, to be informing one another's arguments. A personal example is our own work, which has been heavily influenced by action research practitioners and postmodern critical theorists. Consequently, to argue that it is paradigms that are in contention is probably less useful than to probe where and how paradigms exhibit confluence and where and how they exhibit differences, controversies, and contradictions.

回 MajoR Issubs ConRRonting All Paradigms

In our chapter in the first edition of this Handbook, we presented two tables that summarized our positions, first; on the axiomatic nature of paradigms (the paradigms we considered at that time were positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism; Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109, Table 6.1); and second, on the issues we believed were most fundamental to differentiating the four paradigms (p.112, Table 6.2). These tables are reproduced here as a way of reminding our readers of our previous statements. The axioms defined the ontological, epistemological, and methodological bases for both established and emergent paradigms; these are shown here in Table 8.1. The issues most often in contention that we examined were inquiry aim, nature of knowledge, the way knowledge is accumulated, goodness (rigor and validity) or quality criteria, values, ethics, voice, training, accommodation, and hegemony; these are shown in Table 8.2. An examination of these two tables will reacquaint the reader with our original Handbook treatment; more detailed information is, of course, available in our original chapter.
在本手冊第一版的章節中,我們提出了兩個表格來總結我們的立場:第一;關於范式的公理性質(我們當時考慮的範式是實證主義、後實證主義、批判理論和建構主義;Guba & Lincoln,1994 年,第 109 頁,表 6.1);其次,關於我們認為對區分四種範式最基本的問題(第112頁,表6.2)。現將這些表格轉載於此,以提醒讀者注意我們先前的發言。公理定義了既定範式和新興範式的本體論、認識論和方法論基礎;這些如表 8.1 所示。我們研究的最常爭論的問題是探究目標、知識的性質、知識積累的方式、善良(嚴謹性和有效性)或品質標準、價值觀、道德、聲音、培訓、住宿和霸權;這些如表 8.2 所示。對這兩個表格的檢查將使讀者重新熟悉我們原始的手錶格冊處理方式;當然,更詳細的資訊可以在我們的原始章節中找到。
Since publication of that chapter, at least one set of authors, John Heron and Peter Reason, have elaborated on our tables to include the participatory/cooperative paradigm (Heron, 1996; Heron & Reason, 1997, pp. 289-290). Thus, in addition to the paradigms of positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism, we add the participatory paradigm in the present chapter (this is an excellent example, we might add, of the hermeneutic elaboration so embedded in our own view, constructivism).
自該章出版以來,至少有一組作者,John Heron和Peter Reason,詳細闡述了我們的表格,包括參與/合作範式(Heron,1996;Heron & Reason,1997 年,第 289-290 頁)。因此,除了實證主義、後實證主義、批判理論和建構主義的範式之外,我們還在本章中增加了參與式範式(我們可以補充一點,這是一個很好的例子,說明我們自己的觀點——建構主義)中嵌入的解釋學闡述)。
Our aim here is to extend the analysis further by building on Heron and Reason's additions and by rearranging the issues to reflect current thought. The issues we have chosen include our original formulations and the additions, revisions, and amplifications made by Heron and Reason (1997), and we have also chosen what we believe to be the issues most important today. We should note that important means several things to us. An important topic may be one that is widely debated (or even hotly contested)-validity is one such issue. An important issue may be one that bespeaks a new awareness (an issue such as recognition of the role of values). An important issue may be one that illustrates the influence of one paradigm on another (such as the influence of feminist, action research, critical theory, and participatory models on researcher conceptions of action within and with the community in which research is carried out). Or issues may be important because new or extended theoretical and/or field-oriented treatments for them are newly available-voice and reflexivity are two such issues.
我們在這裡的目的是通過建立在蒼鷺和理性的補充基礎上,並通過重新排列問題來反映當前的思想,從而進一步擴展分析。我們選擇的議題包括我們的原始表述以及Heron and Reason(1997)所做的增討、修訂和擴大,我們也選擇了我們認為是當今最重要的議題。我們應該注意到,重要對我們來說意味著幾件事。一個重要的話題可能是一個被廣泛爭論(甚至激烈爭論)的話題——有效性就是這樣一個問題。一個重要的問題可能是表達一種新的意識(例如承認價值觀的作用等問題)。一個重要的問題可能是說明一種範式對另一種範式的影響(例如女權主義、行動研究、批判理論和參與式模型對研究人員在進行研究的社區內和與進行研究的社區一起行動概念的影響)。或者問題可能很重要,因為新的或擴展的理論和/或面向領域的治療方法是新近可用的——語音和反身性是兩個這樣的問題。
Table 8.3 reprises the original Table 6.1 but adds the axioms of the participatory paradigm proposed by Heron and Reason (1997). Table 8.4 deals with seven issues and represents an update of selected issues first presented in the old Table 6.2. "Voice" in the 1994 version of, Table 6.2 has been renamed "inquirer posture," and we have inserted a redefined "voice" in the current
表8.3重複了原來的表6.1,但增加了Heron和Reason(1997)提出的參與範式的公理。表8.4涉及7個問題,是對原表6.2中首次提出的選定問題的更新。1994 年版中的「語音」,表 6.2 已更名為“詢問者姿勢”,我們在當前
Table 8.1. Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms
表 8.1.替代探究範式的基本信念(形而上學)
Item 專案 Positivism 實證主義 Postpositivism 後實證主義 Critical Theory et al.
Constructivism 建構主義
Ontology 本體

Naïve realism-"real"
reality but apprehendible

Critical realism-"real" reality but
only imperfectly and
probabilistically apprehendible

Historical realism-virtual reality
shaped by social, political, cultural,
economic, ethnic, and gender values;
crystallized over time

Relativism-local and specific
constructed and
co-constructed realities
Epistemology 認識論

Dualist/objectivist; findings

Modified dualist/objectivist; critical
tradition/community; findings
probably true

Transactional/subjectivist; value-
mediated findings

created findings
Methodology 方法論

manipulative; verification
of hypotheses; chiefly
quantitative methods

Modified experimental/
manipulative; critical multiplism;
falsification of hypotheses; may
include qualitative methods
Dialogic/dialectical 對話/辯證 Hermeneutical/dialectical
T. Table 8.2. Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical Issues
T. 表 8.2.關於選定實際問題的範式立場
Item 專案 Positivism 實證主義 Postpositivism 後實證主義 Critical Theory et al.
Constructivism 建構主義
Inquiry aim 探究目的 Explanation: prediction and control

Critique and transformation;
restitution and emancipation

Nature of

Verified hypotheses
established as facts.
or laws

Nonfalsified hypotheses that
are probable facts or laws
Structural/historical insights

Individual or collective
reconstructions coalescing
around consensus

Accretion-"building blocks" adding to "edifice of knowledge";
generalizations and cause-effect linkages

Historical revisionism; generalization
by similarity

More informed and
sophisticated reconstructions;
vicarious experience

Goodness or
quality criteria

Conventional benchmarks of "rigor": internal and external
validity, reliability, and objectivity

Historical situatedness; erosion of
ignorance and misapprehension;
action stimulus

Trustworthiness and
authenticity, including catalyst
for action
Values  Excluded-influence denied
Included-formative 包括形成 Included-formative 包括形成
Ethics 倫理學 Extrinsic: tilt toward deception
Intrinsic: moral tilt toward revelation

Intrinsic: process tilt toward
revelation; special problems
Voice 聲音

"Disinterested scientist" as informer of decision makers, policy
makers, and change agents

"Transformative intellectual" as
advocate and activist

"Passionate participant" as
facilitator of multivoice
Training 訓練

Technical and
substantive theories

Technical; quantitative and
qualitative; substantive theories

Resocialization; qualitative and quantitative; history; values of altruism,
empowerment, and liberation
Accommodation 膳宿 Commensurable 可比性 Incommensurable with previous two
Hegemony 霸權 In control of publication, funding, promotion, and tenure

Seeking recognition and input; offering challenges to predecessor
paradigms, aligned with postcolonial aspirations
Table 8.3. Basic Beliefs of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms-Updated
表 8.3.替代探究範式的基本信念-更新
Issue  問題 Positivism 實證主義 Postpositivism 後實證主義 Critical Theory et al.
Constructivism 建構主義 Participatory  參與
Ontology 本體

Naïve realism-
areal" reality but

批判現實主義——真實的現實,但只有不完美和概率可理解的 2 aोing ang
Critical realism-"real" reality
but only imperfectly and
probabilistically apprehendible

Historical realism-
virtual reality
shaped by social,
political, cultural,
economic, ethnic,
and gender values;
crystallized over

local and

Participative reality-
reality, cocreated by
mind and given cosmos
Epistemology 認識論

findings true

Modified dualist/objectivist;
critical tradition/community;
findings probably true

subjectivist; value-
mediated findings


Critical subjectivity in
participatory transaction
with cosmos; extended
epistemology of
propositional, and
practical knowing;
cocreated findings
Methodology 方法論

verification of
hypotheses; chiefly

Modified experimental/
manipulative; critical
multiplism; falsification of
hypotheses; may include
qualitative methods
Dialogic/dialectical 對話/辯證


Political participation in
collaborative action
inquiry; primacy of the
practical; use of
language grounded in
shared experiential
a. Entries in this column are based on Heron and Reason (1997).
一個。本專欄中的條目基於Heron and Reason (1997)。
Issue 問題 Positivism 實證主義 Postpositivism 後實證主義 Critical Theories 批判理論 Constructivism 建構主義 Participatory" 參與式”
Nature of

Verified hypotheses
as facts or laws

hypotheses that are
probable facts or laws

Structural/ historical

Individual and collective
reconstructions sometimes
coalescing around consensus

Extended epistemology: primacy of practical
knowing; critical subjectivity; living

Accretion-"building blocks" adding to
"edifice of knowledge"; generalizations
and cause-effect linkages

Historical revisionism;
generalization by

More informed and
reconstructions; vicarious

In communities of inquiry embedded in
communities of practice

Goodness or
quality criteria

Conventional benchmarks of “rigor":
internal and external validity, reliability,
and objectivity

Historical situatedness;
erosion of ignorance
and misapprehensions;
action stimulus

Trustworthiness and
authenticity including
catalyst for action

Congruence of experiential, presentational,
propositional, and practical knowing; leads
to action to transform the world in the
service of human flourishing
Values  Excluded-influence denied
Included-formative 包括形成

Intrinsic-moral tilt
toward revelation
Intrinsic-process tilt toward revelation
Ethics 倫理學 Extrinsic-tilt toward deception

intellectual" as
advocate and

"Passionate participant" as
facilitator of multivoice

Primary voice manifest through aware
self-reflective action; secondary voices in
illuminating theory, narrative, movement,
song, dance, and other presentational forms
Inquirer posture 詢問者姿勢

"Disinterested scientis" as informer of
decision makers, policy makers, and
change agents

Resocialization; qualitative and quantitative; history;
values of altruism, empowerment and liberation

Coresearchers are initiated into the
inquiry process by faciltator/researcher
and learn through active engagement in
the process; facilitator/researcher requires
emotional competence, democratic
personality and skills
a. Entries in this column are based on Heron and Reason (1997), except for "ethics" and "values."
一個。本專欄中的條目基於Heron and Reason(1997),但“倫理”和“價值觀”除外。
Table 8.5. In all cases except "inquirer posture," the entries for the participatory paradigm are those proposed by Heron and Reason; in the one case not covered by them, we have added a notation that we believe captures their intention.
表 8.5.在所有情況下,除了「詢問者姿態」之外,參與式範式的條目都是蒼鷺和理性提出的;在他們未涵蓋的一種情況下,我們添加了一個我們認為可以捕捉到他們意圖的符號。
We make no attempt here to reprise the material well discussed in our earlier Handbook chapter. Instead, we focus solely on the issues in Table 8.5: axiology; accommodation and commensurability; action; control; foundations of truth and knowledge; validity; and voice, reflexivity, and postmodern textual representation. We believe these seven issues to be the most important at this time.
While we believe these issues to be the most contentious, we also believe they create the intellectual, theoretical, and practical space for dialogue, consensus, and confluence to occur. There is great potential for interweaving of viewpoints, for the incorporation of multiple perspectives, and for borrowing, or bricolage, where borrowing seems useful, richness enhancing, or theoretically heuristic. For instance, even though we are ourselves social constructivists/constructionists, our call to action embedded in the authenticity criteria we elaborated in Fourth Generation Evaluation (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) reflects strongly the bent to action embodied in critical theorists' perspectives. And although Heron and Reason have elaborated a model they call the cooperative paradigm, careful reading of their proposal reveals a form of inquiry that is post-postpositive, postmodern, and criticalist in orientation. As a result, the reader familiar with several theoretical and paradigmatic strands of research will find that echoes of many streams of thought come together in the extended table. What this means is that the categories, as Laurel Richardson (personal communication, September 12,1998 ) has pointed out, "are fluid, indeed what should be a category keeps altering, enlarging." She notes that "even as [we] write, the boundaries between the paradigms are shifting." This is the paradigmatic equivalent of the Geertzian "blurring of genres" to which we referred earlier.
雖然我們認為這些問題最具爭議性,但我們也認為它們為對話、共識和匯合創造了知識、理論和實踐空間。觀點交織、多種觀點的融合以及借用或拼湊的巨大潛力,借用似乎有用,豐富性增強,或理論啟發式。例如,儘管我們自己是社會建構主義者/建構主義者,但我們在《第四代評估》(Guba & Lincoln,1989)中闡述的真實性標準中嵌入的行動呼籲強烈地反映了批判理論家觀點所體現的行動傾向。儘管蒼鷺和理性已經闡述了一種他們稱之為合作範式的模型,但仔細閱讀他們的建議會發現一種後後積極、後現代和批判主義的探究形式。因此,熟悉幾種理論和範式研究的讀者會發現,許多思想流的回聲彙集在擴展表中。這意味著,正如勞雷爾·理查森(Laurel Richardson,1998年9月12日)所指出的那樣,這些類別“是流動的,實際上,本應是一個類別的東西在不斷變化,不斷擴大。她指出,“即使在(我們)寫作的時候,範式之間的界限也在發生變化。這就是我們前面提到的格爾茨式的「流派模糊」的範式等價物。
Our own position is that of the constructionist camp, loosely defined. We do not believe that criteria for judging either "reality" or validity are absolutist (Bradley & Schaefer, 1998); rather, they are derived from community consensus regarding what is "real," what is useful, and what has meaning (especially meaning for action and further steps). We believe that a goodly portion of social phenomena consists of the meaning-making activities of groups and individuals around those phenomena. The meaning-making activities themselves are of central interest to social constructionists/constructivists, simply because it is the meaning-making/sense-making/attributional activities that shape action (or inaction). The meaning-making activities themselves can be changed when they are found to be incomplete, faulty (e.g., discriminatory, oppressive, or nonliberatory), or malformed (created from data that can be shown to be false).
我們自己的立場是建構主義陣營的立場,定義鬆散。我們不認為判斷「現實」或有效性的標準是絕對主義的(Bradley & Schaefer,1998);相反,它們來自社區關於什麼是“真實”的、什麼是有用的、什麼是有意義的(尤其是對行動和進一步步驟的意義)的共識。我們認為,社會現象的很大一部分是由群體和個人圍繞這些現象的意義創造活動組成的。意義建構活動本身是社會建構主義者/建構主義者的核心興趣,僅僅是因為正是意義建構/意義建構/歸因活動塑造了行動(或不作為)。當發現意義建構活動本身不完整、有缺陷(例如,歧視性、壓迫性或非解放性)或畸形(根據可證明是虛假的數據創建)時,可以改變它們本身。
We have tried, however, to incorporate perspectives from other major nonpositivist paradigms. This is not a complete summation; space constraints prevent that. What we hope to do in this chapter is to acquaint readers with the larger currents, arguments, dialogues, and provocative writings and theorizing, the better to see perhaps what we ourselves do not even yet see: where and when confluence is possible, where constructive rapprochement might be negotiated, where voices are beginning to achieve some harmony.


Earlier, we placed values on the table as an "issue" on which positivists or phenomenologists might have a "posture" (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Fortunately, we reserved for ourselves the right to either get smarter or just change our minds. We did both. Now, we suspect (although Table 8.5 does not yet reflect it) that "axiology" should be grouped with "basic beliefs." In Naturalistic Inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), we covered some of the ways in which values feed into the inquiry process: choice of the problem, choice of paradigm to guide the problem, choice of theoretical framework, choice of major datagathering and data-analytic methods, choice of context, treatment of values already resident
早些時候,我們把價值觀作為一個「問題」擺在桌面上,實證主義者或現象學家可能會有「姿態」(Guba & Lincoln,1989,1994;Lincoln & Guba,1985)。幸運的是,我們為自己保留了變得更聰明或改變主意的權利。我們兩者都做到了。現在,我們懷疑(儘管表8.5尚未反映這一點)“價值論”應該與“基本信念”歸為一類。在《自然主義探究》(Lincoln & Guba, 1985)一書中,我們介紹了價值觀融入探究過程的一些方式:問題的選擇,指導問題的範式的選擇,理論框架的選擇,主要數據收集和數據分析方法的選擇,背景的選擇,對已經存在的價值觀的處理
Table 8.5. Critical Issues of the Time
表 8.5.時代的關鍵問題
Issue 問題 Positivism 實證主義 Postpositivism 後實證主義 Critical Theory et al.
Constructivism 建構主義 Participatory 參與
Axiology 價值論

Propositional knowing about the world is
an end in itself, is intrinsically valuable.

Propositional, transactionalknowing is instrumentally
valuable as ameans to social emancipation, which is
an end in itself, is intrinsically valuable.

Practical knowing about how to flourish
with a balance of autonomy, cooperation,
and hierarchy in a culture is an end in
itself, is intrinsically valuable.


for all positivist

Incommensurable with positivist forms; some commensurability with constructivist, criticalist, and
participatory approaches, especially as they merge in liberationist approaches outside the West
Action 行動

Not the responsibility of the researcher;
viewed as "advocacy" or subjectivity, and
therefore a threat to validity and objectivity

Found especially in the
form of empowerment;
anticipated and hoped
for; social
particularly toward
more equity and
justice, is end goal

Intertwined with validity; inquiry often incomplete without action on
the part of participants; constructivist formulation mandates training in
political action if participants do not understand political systems
Control 控制 Resides solely in researcher

Often resides in
intellectual"; in new
constructions, control
returns to community

Shared between inquirer and
Shared to varying degrees

Relationship to
foundations of
truth and
Foundational 基礎 Foundational 基礎

Foundational within
social critique
Antifoundational 反基礎 Nonfoundational 非基礎
Issue 問題 Positivism 實證主義 Postpositivism 後實證主義 Critical Theory et al.
Constructivism 建構主義 Participatory 參與

of validity

傳統有效性;RI 有效性,re
validity; ri
validity, re

t Nal 效度的構造,外部射速 4
t constructions of
nal validity, external

有效性的擴展結構:(a)晶體有效性(Richardson);(b)真實性標準(Guba & Lincoln);(c) 催化、根莖、性感有效性(泡沫);(d)以關係和道德為中心的標準(林肯);(e) 以社區為中心的有效性確定
Extended constructions of
validity: (a) crystalline
validity (Richardson);
(b) authenticity criteria (Guba
& Lincoln); (c) catalytic,
rhizomatic, voluptuous
validities (Lather); (d)
relational and ethics-centered
criteria (Lincoln); (e)
determinations of validity
See "action" above 請參閱上面的“操作”

Voice, reflexivity,

Voice of th
in objectiv

她,主要是;擱置一個問題 al 表示有點公式化
her, principally;
onsidered a problem
al representation
somewhat formulaic

研究人員和參與者之間的混合聲音 2
Voices mixed between
researcher and

Voices mixed, with
participants' voices
sometimes dominant;
reflexivity serious and
problematic; textual
representation an extended

Voices mixed; textual representation rarely
discussed but problematic; reflexivity relies
on critical subjectivity and self-awareness

Textual representation practices may be problematic-i.e., "fiction formulas" or unexamined
-regimes of truth"
within the context, and choice of format(s) for presenting findings. We believed those were strong enough reasons to argue for the inclusion of values as a major point of departure between positivist, conventional modes of inquiry and interpretive forms of inquiry.
A second "reading" of the burgeoning literature and subsequent rethinking of our own rationale have led us to conclude that the issue is much larger than we first conceived. If we had it to do all over again, we would make values or, more correctly, axiology (the branch of philosophy dealing with ethics, aesthetics, and religion) a part of the basic foundational philosophical dimensions of paradigm proposal. Doing so would, in our opinion, begin to help us see the embeddedness of ethics within, not external to, paradigms (see, for instance, Christians, 2000 ) and would contribute to the consideration of and dialogue about the role of spirituality in human inquiry. Arguably, axiology has been "defined out of" scientific inquiry for no larger a reason than that it also concerns "religion." But defining "religion" broadly to encompass spirituality would move constructivists closer to participative inquirers and would move critical theorists closer to both (owing to their concern with liberation from oppression and freeing of the human spirit, both profoundly spiritual concerns). The expansion of basic issues to include axiology, then, is one way of achieving greater confluence among the various interpretivist inquiry models. This is the place, for example, where Peter Reason's profound concerns with "sacred science" and human functioning find legitimacy; it is a place where Laurel Richardson's "sacred spaces" become authoritative sites for human inquiry; it is a place-or the place-where the spiritual meets social inquiry, as Reason (1993), and later Lincoln and Denzin (1994), proposed some years earlier.
對新興文獻的第二次“閱讀”以及隨後對我們自己的理由的重新思考使我們得出結論,這個問題比我們最初設想的要大得多。如果我們重新來過,我們會把價值觀,或者更準確地說,價值論(處理倫理學、美學和宗教的哲學分支)作為範式建議的基本基礎哲學維度的一部分。在我們看來,這樣做將開始幫助我們看到倫理學在範式內部而不是外部的嵌入性(例如,參見Christians,2000),並將有助於考慮和對話靈性在人類探究中的作用。可以說,價值論被“定義”在科學探究之外,其原因無非是它也涉及“宗教”。但是,將“宗教”廣義地定義為包括靈性,將使建構主義者更接近參與式探究者,並使批判理論家更接近兩者(因為他們關注從壓迫中解放出來和解放人類精神,這兩者都是深刻的精神關注)。因此,將基本問題擴展到包括價值論,是實現各種解釋主義探究模型之間更大融合的一種方式。例如,彼得·理性(Peter Reason)對「神聖科學」和人類功能的深刻關注在這裡找到了合法性;在這裡,勞雷爾·理查森(Laurel Richardson)的「神聖空間」成為人類探究的權威場所;它是精神與社會探究相遇的地方,正如理性(1993)以及後來的林肯和丹津(1994)在幾年前提出的那樣。

回 AcCOMMODATION AND CommensurabilitY
回 Acmodation AND CommensurabilitY

Positivists and postpositivists alike still occasionally argue that paradigms are, in some ways, commensurable; that is, they can be retrofitted to each other in ways that make the simultaneous practice of both possible. We have argued that at the paradigmatic, or philosophical, level, commensurability between positivist and postpositivist worldviews is not possible, but that within each paradigm, mixed methodologies (strategies) may make perfectly good sense (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1982, 1989, 1994; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). So, for instance, in Effective Evaluation we argued:
實證主義者和後實證主義者仍然偶爾爭辯說,范式在某些方面是可比的;也就是說,它們可以相互改造,使兩者同時實踐成為可能。我們認為,在范式或哲學層面上,實證主義和後實證主義世界觀之間的可比性是不可能的,但在每種範式中,混合方法論(策略)可能非常有意義(Guba & Lincoln,1981,1982,1989,1994;Lincoln & Guba,1985)。因此,例如,在《有效評估》中,我們認為:
The guiding inquiry paradigm most appropriate to responsive evaluation is ... the naturalistic, phenomenological, or ethnographic paradigm. It will be seen that qualitative techniques are typically most appropriate to support this approach. There are times, however, when the issues and concerns voiced by audiences require information that is best generated by more conventional methods, especially quantitative methods.... In such cases, the responsive conventional evaluator will not shrink from the appropriate application. (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, p. 36)
最適合回應式評估的指導性探究範式是......自然主義、現象學或民族志範式。可以看出,定性技術通常最適合支援這種方法。然而,有時,受眾表達的問題和擔憂需要最好通過更傳統的方法,尤其是定量方法產生的資訊。在這種情況下,回應式常規評估器不會從適當的應用中退縮。(Guba & Lincoln,1981 年,第 36 頁)
As we tried to make clear, the "argument" arising in the social sciences was not about method, although many critics of the new naturalistic, ethnographic, phenomenological, and/or case study approaches assumed it was. As late as 1998, Weiss could be found to claim that "some evaluation theorists, notably Guba and Lincoln (1989), hold that it is impossible to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches responsibly within an evaluation" (p. 268), even though we stated early on in Fourth Generation Evaluation (1989) that
正如我們試圖澄清的那樣,社會科學中出現的“爭論”與方法無關,儘管許多對新自然主義、民族志、現象學和/或案例研究方法的批評者認為它是。 直到1998年,Weiss聲稱「一些評估理論家,特別是Guba和Lincoln(1989)認為,在評估中負責任地將定性和定量方法結合起來是不可能的」(第268頁),儘管我們在《第四代評估》(1989)中很早就說過
those claims, concerns, and issues that have not been resolved become the advance organizers for information collection by the evaluator. . . The information may be quantitative or qualitative. Responsive evaluation does not rule out quantitative modes, as is mistakenly believed by many, but deals with whatever information is responsive to the unresolved claim, concern, or issue. (p. 43)
We had also strongly asserted earlier, in Naturalistic Inquiry (1985), that
qualitative methods are stressed within the naturalistic paradigm not because the paradigm is antiquantitative but because qualitative methods

come more easily to the human-as-instrument. The reader should particularly note the absence of an antiquantitative stance, precisely because the naturalistic and conventional paradigms are so oftenmistakenly-equated with the qualitative and quantitative paradigms, respectively. Indeed, there are many opportunities for the naturalistic investigator to utilize quantitative data -probably more than are appreciated. (pp. 198-199; emphasis added)
Having demonstrated that we were not then (and are not now) talking about an antiquantitative posture or the exclusivity of methods, but rather about the philosophies of which paradigms are constructed, we can ask the question again regarding commensurability:Are paradigms commensurable? Is it possible to blend elements of one paradigm into another, so that one is engaging in research that represents the best of both worldviews? The answer, from our perspective, has to be a cautious yes. This is especially so if the models (paradigms) share axiomatic elements that are similar, or that resonate strongly between them. So, for instance, positivism and postpositivism are clearly commensurable. In the same vein, elements of interpretivist/postmodern critical theory, constructivist and participative inquiry, fit comfortably together. Commensurability is an issue only when researchers want to "pick and choose" among the axioms of positivist and interpretivist models, because the axioms are contradictory and mutually exclusive.

圂 The CaLL to Action
圂 CaLL行動

One of the clearest ways in which the paradigmatic controversies can be demonstrated is to compare the positivist and postpositivist adherents, who view action as a form of contamination of research results and processes, and the interpretivists, who see action on research results as a meaningful and important outcome of inquiry processes. Positivist adherents believe action to be either a form of advocacy or a form of subjectivity, either or both of which undermine the aim of objectivity. Critical theorists, on the other hand, have always advocated varying degrees of social action, from the overturning of specific unjust practices to radical transformation of entire societies. The call for action-whether in terms of internal transformation, such as ridding oneself of false consciousness, or of external social transformation-differentiates between positivist and postmodern criticalist theorists (including feminist and queer theorists). The sharpest shift, however, has been in the constructivist and participatory phenomenological models, where a step beyond interpretation and Verstehen, or understanding, toward social action is probably one of the most conceptually interesting of the shifts (Lincoln, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). For some theorists, the shift toward action came in response to widespread nonutilization of evaluation findings and the desire to create forms of evaluation that would attract champions who might follow through on recommendations with meaningful action plans (Guba & Lincoln, 1981, 1989). For others, embracing action came as both a political and an ethical commitment (see, for instance, Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Christians, 2000; Greenwood & Levin, 2000; Schratz & Walker, 1995; Tierney, 2000).
證明范式爭議的最清晰方式之一是比較實證主義和後實證主義的追隨者,前者將行動視為對研究結果和過程的一種污染形式,後者將對研究結果的行動視為探究過程的有意義和重要的結果。實證主義的追隨者認為,行動要麼是一種宣導形式,要麼是一種主觀性形式,其中任何一種或兩者都破壞了客觀性的目的。另一方面,批判理論家一直主張不同程度的社會行動,從推翻特定的不公正做法到徹底改變整個社會。行動的呼籲——無論是在內部轉型方面,例如擺脫虛假意識,還是在外部社會轉型方面——區分了實證主義和後現代批判主義理論家(包括女權主義和酷兒理論家)。然而,最急劇的轉變是在建構主義和參與式現象學模型中,其中超越解釋和Verstehen或理解的一步,走向社會行動可能是概念上最有趣的轉變之一(Lincoln,1997,1998a,1998b)。對於一些理論家來說,向行動的轉變是為了應對評估結果的普遍不利用,以及希望創建評估形式,以吸引那些可能通過有意義的行動計劃來貫徹建議的擁護者(Guba & Lincoln,1981,1989)。對於其他人來說,擁抱行動既是一種政治承諾,也是一種道德承諾(例如,參見Carr&Kemmis,1986;基督徒,2000年;Greenwood & Levin,2000 年;Schratz & Walker,1995 年;蒂爾尼,2000年)。
Whatever the source of the problem to which inquirers were responding, the shift toward connecting research, policy analysis, evaluation, and/or social deconstruction (e.g, deconstruction of thespatriarchal forms of oppression in social structures, which is the project informing much feminist theorizing, or deconstruction of the homophobia embedded in public policies) with action hàs come to characterize much new-paradigm inguiry work, both at the theoretical and at the practice and praxis-oriented levels. Action has become a major controversy that limns the ongoing debates among practitioners of the various paradigms. The mandate for social action, especially action designed and created by and for research participants with the aid and cooperation of researchers, can be most sharply delineated between positivist/postpositivist and new-paradigm inquirers. Many positivist and postpositivist inquirers still consider "action" the domain of communities other than researchers and research participants: those of policy
無論詢問者所回答的問題的根源是什麼,將研究、政策分析、評估和/或社會解構(例如,解構社會結構中的父權制壓迫形式,這是為許多女權主義理論提供資訊的專案,或解構嵌入在公共政策中的同性戀恐懼症)與行動的轉變,已成為許多新範式啟發工作的特徵, 無論是在理論層面,還是在實踐和實踐層面。行動已成為一個主要爭議,它阻礙了各種範式的實踐者之間正在進行的辯論。社會行動的任務,特別是由研究參與者在研究人員的説明和合作下為研究參與者設計和創造的行動,可以在實證主義/後實證主義和新範式探究者之間最清晰地劃分。許多實證主義和後實證主義的探究者仍然認為“行動”是研究人員和研究參與者以外的社區領域:政策領域

personnel, legislators, and civic and political officials. Hard-line foundationalists presume that the taint of action will interfere with, or even negate, the objectivity that is a (presumed) characteristic of rigorous scientific method inquiry.

囯 CONTROL 囯 控制

Another controversy that has tended to become problematic centers on control of the study: Who initiates? Who determines salient questions? Who determines what constitutes findings? Who determines how data will be collected? Who determines in what forms the findings will be made public, if at all? Who determines what representations will be made of participants in the research? Let us be very clear: The issue of control is deeply embedded in the questions of voice, reflexivity, and issues of postmodern textual representation, which we shall take up later, but only for new-paradigm inquirers. For more conventional inquirers, the issue of control is effectively walled off from voice, reflexivity, and issues of textual representation, because each of those issues in some way threatens claims to rigor (particularly objectivity and validity). For new-paradigm inquirers who have seen the preeminent paradigm issues of ontology and epistemology effectively folded into one another, and who have watched as methodology and axiology logically folded into one another (Lincoln, 1995, 1997), control of an inquiry seems far less problematic, except insofar as inquirers seek to obtain participants' genuine participation (see, for instance, Guba &Lincoln, 1981, on contracting and attempts to get some stakeholding groups to do more than stand by while an evaluation is in progress).
另一個趨向於成為問題的爭議集中在對研究的控制上:誰發起?誰來決定突出問題?誰來決定什麼構成調查結果?誰決定如何收集數據?如果有的話,誰來決定調查結果將以何種形式公開?誰來決定研究參與者的哪些代表?讓我們明確一點:控制問題深深植根於聲音、反身性和後現代文本表徵問題中,我們稍後將討論這些問題,但僅限於新範式探究者。對於更傳統的探究者來說,控制問題實際上與聲音、反身性和文本表示問題隔離開來,因為這些問題中的每一個都以某種方式威脅到對嚴謹性(特別是客觀性和有效性)的主張。對於新範式探究者來說,他們已經看到本體論和認識論的卓越範式問題有效地相互摺疊,並且已經看到方法論和價值論在邏輯上相互摺疊(Lincoln,1995,1997),對探究的控制似乎沒有那麼成問題,除非探究者尋求獲得參與者的真正參與(例如,參見 Guba &Lincoln,1981 年,關於合同和試圖讓一些利益相關者團體在評估過程中做更多的事情,而不是袖手旁觀)。
Critical theorists, especially those who work in community organizing programs, are painfully aware of the necessity for members of the community, or research participants, to take control of their futures. Constructivists desire participants to take an increasingly active role in nominating questions of interest for any inquiry and in designing outlets for findings to be shared more widely within and outside the community. Participatory inquirers understand action controlled by the local context members to be the aim of inquiry within a community. For none of these paradigmatic adherents is control an issue of advocacy, a somewhat deceptive term usually used as a code within a larger metanarrative to attack an inquiry's rigor, objectivity, or fairness. Rather, for new-paradigm researchers control is a means of fostering emancipation, democracy, and community empowerment, and of redressing power imbalances such that those who were previously marginalized now achieve voice (Mertens, 1998) or "human flourishing" (Heron & Reason, 1997). Control as a controversy is an excellent place to observe the phenomenon that we have always termed "Catholic questions directed to a Methodist audience." We use this description-given to us by a workshop participant in the early 1980s-to refer to the ongoing problem of illegitimate questions: questions that have no meaning because the frames of reference are those for which they were never intended. (We could as well call these "Hindu questions to a Muslim,", to give another sense of how paradigms, or overarching philosophies-or theologies-are incommensurable, and how questions in one framework make little, if any, sense in another.) Paradigmatic formulations interact such that control becomes inextricably intertwined with mandates for objectivity. Objectivity derives from the Enlightenment prescription for knowledge of the physical world, which is postulated to be separate and distinct from those who would know (Polkinghorne, 1989). But if knowledge of the social (as opposed to the physical) world resides in meaning-making mechanisms of the social, mental, and linguistic worlds that individuals inhabit, then knowledge cannot be separate from the knower, but rather is rooted in his or her mental or linguistic designations of that world (Polkinghorne, 1989; Salner, 1989).
批判理論家,尤其是那些在社區組織專案中工作的理論家,痛苦地意識到社區成員或研究參與者必須控制自己的未來。建構主義者希望參與者在為任何調查提名感興趣的問題方面發揮越來越積極的作用,並設計在社區內外更廣泛地分享調查結果的管道。參與式探究者將當地環境成員控制的行動理解為社區內探究的目的。因為這些範式追隨者中沒有一個是控制倡導問題,這是一個有點欺騙性的術語,通常被用作更大的元敘事中的代碼,以攻擊調查的嚴謹性、客觀性或公平性。相反,對於新範式研究者來說,控制是促進解放、民主和社區賦權的一種手段,也是糾正權力失衡的一種手段,使那些以前被邊緣化的人現在獲得了發言權(Mertens,1998)或“人類繁榮”(Heron & Reason,1997)。作為爭議的控制是觀察我們一直稱之為「針對衛理公會聽眾的天主教問題」現象的極好地方。我們用1980年代初一位講習班參與者給我們的這種描述來指代持續存在的非法問題:這些問題沒有意義,因為參考框架是它們從未打算解決的問題。(我們不妨稱這些為“穆斯林的印度教問題”,以另一種方式說明範式或總體哲學或神學是如何不可比擬的,以及一個框架中的問題在另一個框架中幾乎沒有意義。範式表述相互作用,使控制與客觀性任務密不可分。客觀性源於啟蒙運動對物理世界知識的處方,它被假定為與那些知道的人是分開的和不同的(Polkinghorne,1989)。但是,如果社會(而不是物理)世界的知識存在於個人所居住的社會、心理和語言世界的意義創造機制中,那麼知識就不能與知識者分開,而是植根於他或她對那個世界的心理或語言指定(Polkinghorne,1989;Salner,1989年)。

囯 Foundations of Truth and Knowledge in ParadigmS
囯 ParadigmS 中的真理和知識基礎

Whether or not the world has a "real" existence outside of human experience of that world is an open question. For modernist (i.e., Enlightenment,

scientific method, conventional, positivist) researchers, most assuredly there is a "real" reality "out there," apart from the flawed human apprehension of it. Further, that reality can be approached (approximated) only through the utilization of methods that prevent human contamination of its apprehension or comprehension. For foundationalists in the empiricist tradition, the foundations of scientific truth and knowledge about reality reside in rigorous application of testing phenomena against a template as much devoid of human bias, misperception, and other "idols" (Francis Bacon, cited in Polkinghorne, 1989) as instrumentally possible. As Polkinghorne (1989) makes clear:
The idea that the objective realm is independent of the knower's subjective experiences of it can be found in Descartes's dual substance theory, with its distinction between the objective and subjective realms. . . In the splitting of reality into subject and object realms, what can be known "objectively" is only the objective realm. True knowledge is limited to the objects and the relationships between them that exist in the realm of time and space. Human consciousness, which is subjective, is not Uaccessible to 'science, and thus not truly knowable. 0. (p.23)
Now, témplates of trith and knowledge can be defined in a variety of ways-as the end product of rational processes, as the result of expefiential sensing, as the result of empirical observation, and others. In all cases, however, the referent is the physical or empirical world: rational engagement with it, experience of it, empirical observation of it. Realists, who work on the assumption that there is a "real" world "out there," may in individual cases also be foundationalists, taking the view that all of these ways of defining are rooted in phenomena existing outside the human mind. Although we can think about them, experience them, or observe them, they are nevertheless transcendent, referred to but beyondrdirect apprehension. Realism is an ontological question, whereas foundationalism is̀ a criterial question. Some foundationalists argue that real phenomena necessarily imply certain final, ultimate criteria for testing them as truthful (although we may have great difficulty in determining what those criteria are); nonfoundationalists tend to argue that there are no such ultimate criteria, only those that we can agree upon at a certain time and under certain conditions. Foundational criteria are discovered; nonfoundational criteria are negotiated. It is the case, however, that most realists are also foundationalists, and many nonfoundationalists or antifoundationalists are relativists.
An ontological formulation that connects realism and foundationalism within the same "collapse" of categories that characterizes the ontological-epistemological collapse is one that exhibits good fit with the other assumptions of constructivism. That state of affairs suits newparadigm inquirers well. Critical theorists, constructivists, and participatory/cooperative inquirers take their primary field of interest to be precisely that subjective and intersubjective social knowledge and the active construction and cocreation of such knowledge by human agents that is produced by human consciousness. Further, newparadigm inquirers take to the social knowledge field with zest, informed by a variety of social, intellectual, and theoretical explorations. These theoretical excursions include Saussurian linguistic theory; which views all relationships between words and what those words signify as the function of an initernal relationship within some linguistic system; literary theory's deconstructive contributions, which seek tó disconnect texts from any essentialist or transcendental meaning and resituate them within both author and reader historical and social contexts (Hutcheon, 1989; Leitch, 1996); feminist (Addelson, 1993; Alpern, Antler, Perry, & Scobie, 1992; Babbitt, 1993; Harding, 1993), race and ethnic (Kondo, 1990, 1997; Trinh, 1991), and queer theorizing (Gamson, 2000), which seeks to uncover and explore varieties of oppression and historical colonizing between dominant and subaltern genders, identities, races, and social worlds; the postmodern historical moment (Michael, 1996), which problematizes truth as partial, identity as fluid, language as an unclear referent system, and method and criteria as potentially coercive (Ellis & Bochner, 1996); and
將現實主義和基礎主義聯繫在一起的本體論表述,是本體論-認識論崩潰的特徵,它與建構主義的其他假設非常吻合。這種狀況非常適合新范式的探究者。批判理論家、建構主義者和參與式/合作式探究者認為他們的主要興趣領域恰恰是主觀和主體間的社會知識,以及人類意識產生的人類主體對這種知識的積極建構和共同創造。此外,新範式探究者以各種社會、知識和理論探索為依據,熱情地進入社會知識領域。這些理論遊覽包括索緒爾語言學理論;它把詞語之間的所有關係以及這些詞語所表示的東西看作是某種語言系統中一種永恆關係的功能;文學理論的解構貢獻,試圖將文本與任何本質主義或先驗意義脫節,並將它們重新置於作者和讀者的歷史和社會語境中(Hutcheon,1989;Leitch,1996年);女權主義者(Addelson,1993;Alpern,Antler,Perry和Scobie,1992;巴比特,1993年;Harding, 1993)、種族和民族(Kondo, 1990, 1997;Trinh,1991)和酷兒理論(Gamson,2000),旨在揭示和探索主導性別和次級性別、身份、種族和社會世界之間的各種壓迫和歷史殖民;後現代歷史時刻(Michael,1996),它把真理看作是片面的,身份是流動的,語言是一個不明確的指涉系統,方法和標準是潛在的強制性的(Ellis&Bochner,1996);和

criticalist theories of social change (Carspecken, 1996; Schratz & Walker, 1995). The realization of the richness of the mental, social, psychological, and linguistic worlds that individuals and social groups create and constantly re-create and cocreate gives rise, in the minds of new-paradigm postmodern and poststructural inquirers, to endlessly fertile fields of inquiry rigidly walled off from conventional inquirers. Unfettered from the pursuit of transcendental scientific truth, inquirers are now free to resituate themselves within texts, to reconstruct their relationships with research participants in less constricted fashions, and to create re-presentations (Tierney & Lincoln, 1997) that grapple openly with problems of inscription, reinscription, metanarratives, and other rhetorical devices that obscure the extent to which human action is locally and temporally shaped. The processes of uncovering forms of inscription and the rhetoric of metanarratives are genealogical-"expos[ing] the origins of the view that have become sedimented and accepted as truths" (Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 42; emphasis added)-or archaeological (Foucault, 1971; Scheurich, 1997).
社會變革的批判主義理論(Carspecken,1996;Schratz&Walker,1995)。個人和社會群體創造並不斷再創造和共同創造的心理、社會、心理和語言世界的豐富性,在新範式的後現代和後結構探究者的心目中,產生了無窮無盡的沃土探究領域,與傳統的探究者嚴格隔絕。不受對先驗科學真理的追求的束縛,探究者現在可以自由地將自己重新置放在文本中,以不那麼受限制的方式重建他們與研究參與者的關係,並創造重新呈現(Tierney & Lincoln,1997),公開解決銘文,重新銘文,元敘事和其他修辭手段的問題,這些問題掩蓋了人類行為在多大程度上被局部和時間塑造。揭示銘文形式和元敘事修辭的過程是譜系學的——“揭示了已經沉澱並被接受為真理的觀點的起源”(Polkinghorne,1989年,第42頁;強調是後加的)——或考古學的(Foucault,1971年;Scheurich,1997年)。
New-paradigm inquirers engage the foundational controversy in quite different ways. Critical theorists, particularly critical theorists more positivist in orientation, who lean toward Marxian interpretations, tend toward foundational perspectives, with an important difference. Rather than locating foundational truth and knowledge in some external reality "out there," such critical theorists tend to locate the foundations of truth in specific historical, economic, racial, and social infrastructures of oppression, injustice, and marginalization. Knowers are not portrayed as separate from some objective reality, but may be cast as unaware actors in such historical realities ("false consciousness") or as aware of historical forms of oppression, but unable or unwilling, because of conflicts, to act on those historical forms to alter specific conditions in this historical moment ("divided consciousness"). Thus the "foundation" for critical theorists is a duality: social critique tied in turn to raised consciousness of the possibility of positive and liberating social change. Social critique may exist apart from social change, but both are necessary for criticalist perspectives.
Constructivists, on the other hand, tend toward the antifoundational (Lincoln, 1995, 1998b; Schwandt, 1996). Antifoundational is the term used to denote a refusal to adopt any permanent, unvarying (or "foundational") standards by which truth can be universally known. As one of us has argued, truth-and any agreement regarding what is valid knowledge-arises from the relationship between members of some stakeholding community (Lincoln, 1995). Agreements about truth may be the subject of community negotiations regarding what will be accepted as truth (although there are difficulties with that formulation as well; Guba & Lincoln, 1989). Or agreements may eventuate as the result of a dialogue that moves arguments about truth claims or validity past the warring camps of objectivity and relativity toward "a communal test of validity through the argumentation of the participants in a discourse" (Bernstein, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1989; Schwandt, 1996). This "communicative and pragmatic concept" of validity (Rorty, 1979) is never fixed or unvarying. Rather, it is created by means of a community narrative, itself subject to the temporal and historical conditions that gave rise to the community. Schwandt (1989) has also argued that these discourses, or community narratives, can and should be bounded by moral considerations, a premise grounded in the emancipatory narratives of the critical theorists, the philosophical pragmatism of Rorty, the democratic focus of constructivist inquiry, and the "human flourishing" goals of participatory and cooperative inquiry.
The controversies around foundationalism (and, to a lesser extent, essentialism) are not likely to be resolved through dialogue between paradigm adherents. The likelier event is that the "postmodern turn" (Best & Kellner, 1997), with its emphasis on the social construction of social reality, fluid as opposed to fixed identities of the self, and the partiality of all truths, will simply overtake modernist assumptions of an objective reality, as indeed, to some extent, it has already
圍繞基礎主義(以及較小程度上的本質主義)的爭議不太可能通過范式擁護者之間的對話來解決。更有可能的事件是,「後現代轉向」(Best & Kellner,1997),強調社會現實的社會建構,與自我的固定身份相對,以及所有真理的片面性,將簡單地超越現代主義對客觀現實的假設,事實上,在某種程度上,它已經

done in the physical sciences. We might predict that, if not in our lifetimes, at some later time the dualist idea of an objective reality suborned by limited human subjective realities will seem as quaint as flat-earth theories do to us today.


Nowhere can the conversation about paradigm differences be more fertile than in the extended controversy about validity (Howe & Eisenhart, 1990; Kvale, 1989, 1994; Ryan, Greene, Lincoln, Mathison, & Mertens, 1998; Scheurich, 1994, 1996). Validity is not like objectivity. There are fairly strong theoretical, philosophical, and pragmatic rationales for examining the concept of objectivity and finding it wanting. Even within positivist frameworks it is viewed as conceptually flawed. But validity is a more irritating construct, one neither easily dismissed nor readily configured by new-paradigm practitioners (Enerstvedt, 1989; Tschudi, 1989). Validity cannot be dismissed simply because it points to a question that has to be answered in one way or another: Are these findings sufficiently authentic (isomorphic to some reality others construct their social worlds) that I may trust myself in acting on their impligations? More to the point, would I feel sufficiëntly secure about these findings to construct social policy or legislation based on them? At the same time, radical reconfigurations of validity leave researchers with multiple, sometimes conflicting, mandates for what constitutes rigorous research.
關於範式差異的對話沒有比關於有效性的廣泛爭論更豐富的了(Howe & Eisenhart, 1990;Kvale,1989年,1994年;Ryan,Greene,Lincoln,Mathison和Mertens,1998;Scheurich,1994年,1996年)。有效性與客觀性不同。有相當強大的理論、哲學和實用主義理由來檢驗客觀性的概念並發現它是缺乏的。即使在實證主義的框架內,它也被認為在概念上有缺陷。但有效性是一種更令人惱火的結構,它既不容易被新範式實踐者忽視,也不容易被配置(Enerstvedt,1989;Tschudi,1989年)。不能僅僅因為它指出了一個必須以某種方式回答的問題,就否定了有效性:這些發現是否足夠真實(與某些現實 同構,其他人構建了他們的社會世界),以至於我可以相信自己會按照它們的暗示行事?更重要的是,我是否對這些發現感到足夠安全,以根據它們構建社會政策或立法?與此同時,有效性的徹底重新配置使研究人員對嚴謹研究的構成具有多重,有時甚至是相互衝突的任務。
One of the issues around validity is the conflation between method and interpretation. The postmodern turn suggests that no method can deliver on ultimate truth, and in fact "suspects all methods," the more so the larger their claims to delivering on truth (Richardson, 1994). Thus, although one might argue that some methods are more suited than others for conducting research on human construction of social realities (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), no one would argue that a single method -or collection of methods-is the royal road to ultimate knowledge. In new-paradigm inquiry, however, it is not merely method that promises to deliver on some set of local or contextgrounded truths, it is also the processes of interpretation. Thus we have two arguments proceeding simultaneously. The first, borrowed from positivism, argues for a kind of rigor in the application of method, whereas the second argues for both a community consent and a form of rigordefensible reasoning, plausible alongside some other reality that is known to author and readerin ascribing salience to one interpretation over another and for framing and bounding an interpretive study itself. Prior to our understanding that there were, indeed, two forms of rigor, we assembled a set of methodological criteria, largely borrowed from an earlier generation of thoughtful anthropological and sociological methodological theorists. Those methodological criteria are still useful for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that they ensure that such issues as prolonged engagement and persistent observation are attended to with some seriousness.
圍繞有效性的問題之一是方法和解釋之間的混淆。後現代的轉向表明,沒有一種方法可以提供終極真理,事實上,“懷疑所有方法”,他們越是聲稱要提供真理(Richardson,1994)。因此,儘管有人可能會爭辯說,某些方法比其他方法更適合對人類對社會現實的建構進行研究(Lincoln & Guba,1985),但沒有人會爭辯說,單一的方法或方法的集合是通往終極知識的王道。然而,在新範式探究中,承諾提供某種局部或基於語境的真理的不僅僅是方法,它也是解釋的過程。因此,我們有兩個論點同時進行。第一種是從實證主義借來的,主張在方法的應用上有一種嚴謹性,而第二種主張既有社區的同意,又有嚴格的推理形式,與作者和讀者已知的其他一些現實一起合理,將一種解釋歸因於另一種解釋的顯著性,並構建和限制解釋研究本身。在我們理解確實有兩種形式的嚴謹之前,我們收集了一套方法論標準,這些標準主要借鑒了上一代深思熟慮的人類學和社會學方法論理論家。由於各種原因,這些方法標準仍然有用,其中最重要的是,它們確保長期接觸和持續觀察等問題得到某種認真的處理。
It is the second kind of rigor, however, that has received the most attention in recent writings: Are we interpretively rigorous? Can our cocreated constructions be trusted to provide some purchase on some important human phenomenon?
Human phenomena are themselves the subject of controversy. Classical social scientists would like to see "human phenomena" limited to those social experiences from which (scientific) generalizations may be drawn, New-paradigm inquirers, however, are increasingly concerned with the single experience, the individual crisis, the epiphany or moment of discovery; with that most powerful of all threats to conventional objectivity, feeling and emotion. Social scientists concerned with the expansion of what count as social data rely increasingly on the experiential, the embodied, the emotive qualities of human experience that contribute the narrative quality to a life. Sociologists such as Ellis and Bochner (2000) and Richardson (2000) and psychologists such as Michelle Fine (see Fine, Weis, Weseen, Wong, 2000) concern themselves with various forms of autoethnography and personal experience methods, both to overcome the abstractions of a social
人類現象本身就是爭議的主題。古典社會科學家希望看到「人類現象」僅限於那些可以從中得出(科學)概括的社會經驗,然而,新範式探究者越來越關注單一經驗、個人危機、頓悟或發現時刻;這是對傳統客觀性、感覺和情感的最強大威脅。關注社會數據擴展的社會科學家越來越依賴人類經驗的經驗、體現和情感品質,這些品質為生活提供了敘事品質。Ellis 和 Bochner (2000) 和 Richardson (2000) 等社會學家以及 Michelle Fine 等心理學家(參見 Fine, Weis, Weseen, Wong, 2000) 關注各種形式的自傳民族志和個人體驗方法,兩者都是為了克服社會的抽象

science far gone with quantitative descriptions of human life and to capture those elements that make life conflictual, moving, problematic.
For purposes of this discussion, we believe the adoption of the most radical definitions of social science is appropriate, because the paradigmatic controversies are often taking place at the edges of those conversations. Those edges are where the border work is occurring, and, accordingly, they are the places that show the most promise for projecting where qualitative methods will be in the near and far future.

Whither and Whether Criteria

At those edges, several conversations are occurring around validity. The first-and most radical-is a conversation opened by Schwandt (1996), who suggests that we say "farewell to criteriology," or the "regulative norms for removing doubt and settling disputes about what is correct or incorrect, true or false" (p.59), which have created a virtual cult around criteria. Schwandt does not, however, himself say farewell to criteria forever; rather, he resituates social inquiry, with other contemporary philosophical pragmatists, within a framework that transforms professional social inquiry into a form of practical philosophy, characterized by "aesthetic, prudential and moral considerations as well as more conventionally scientific ones" (p.68). When social inquiry becomes the practice of a form of practical philosophy-a deep questioning about how we shall get on in the world and what we conceive to be the potentials and limits of human knowledge and functioning-then we have some preliminary understanding of what entirely different criteria might be for judging social inquiry.
Schwandt (1996) proposes three such criteria. First, he argues, we should search for a social inquiry that "generate[s] knowledge that complements or supplements rather than displac[ing] lay probing of social problems," a form of knowledge for which we do not yet have the content, but from which we might seek to understand the aims of practice from a variety of perspectives, or with different lenses. Second, he proposes a "social inquiry as practical philosophy" that has as its aim "enhancing or cultivating critical intelligence in parties to the research encounter," critical intelligence being defined as "the capacity to engage in moral critique." And finally, he proposes a third way in which we might judge social inquiry as practical philosophy:We might make judgments about the social inquirer-as-practical-philosopher. He or she might be "evaluated on the success to which his or her reports of the inquiry enable the training or calibration of human judgment" (p.69) or "the capacity for practical wisdom" (p. 70).
Schwandt(1996)提出了三個這樣的標準。首先,他認為,我們應該尋找一種社會探究,這種探究“產生的知識補充或補充而不是取代對社會問題的探索”,這種知識形式我們還沒有內容,但我們可以從中尋求從各種角度理解實踐的目的。 或使用不同的鏡頭。其次,他提出了一種「作為實踐哲學的社會探究」,其目的是「增強或培養研究各方的批判性智力」,批判性智力被定義為「從事道德批判的能力」。。最後,他提出了第三種方式,我們可以將社會探究判斷為實踐哲學:我們可以對作為實踐哲學家的社會探究者做出判斷。他或她可能會被「根據他或她的調查報告是否成功地訓練或校準人類的判斷力」(第69頁)或“實踐智慧的能力”(第70頁)進行評估。
Schwandt is not alone, however, in wishing to say "farewell to criteriology," at least as it has been previously conceived. Scheurich (1997) makes a similar plea, and in the same vein, Smith (1993) also argues that validity, if it is to survive at all, must be radically reformulated if it is ever to serve phenomenological research well (see also Smith & Deemer, 2000).
然而,施萬特並不是唯一一個希望「告別批判學」的人,至少正如之前所設想的那樣。Scheurich(1997)也提出了類似的請求,同樣,Smith(1993)也認為,如果有效性要生存下去,就必須從根本上重新表述,如果它要很好地服務於現象學研究(另見Smith & Deemer,2000)。
At issue here is not whether we shall have criteria, or whose criteria we as a scientific community might adopt, but rather what the nature of social inquiry ought to be, whether it ought to undergo a transformation, and what might be the basis for criteria within a projected transformation. Schwandt (1989; also personal communication, August 21, 1998) is quite clear that both the transformation and the criteria are rooted in dialogic efforts. These dialogiclefforts are quite clearly themselves forms of "moral discourse." Through the specific connections of the dialogic, the idea of practical wisdom, and moral discourses, much of Schwandt's work can be seen to be related to, and reflective of, critical theorist and participatory paradigms, as well as constructivism, although Schwandt specifically denies the relativity of truth. (For a more sophisticated explication and critique of forms of constructivism, hermeneutics, and interpretivism, see Schwandt, 2000. In that chapter, Schwandt spells out distinctions between realists and nonrealists, and between foundationalists and nonfoundationalists, far more clearly than it is possible for us to do in this chapter.)
To return to the central question embedded in validity: How do we know when we have specific

social inquiries that are faithful enough to some human construction that we may feel safe in acting on them, or, more important, that members of the community in which the research is conducted may act on them? To that question, there is no final answer. There are, however, several discussions of what we might use to make both professional and lay judgments regarding any piece of work. It is to those versions of validity that we now turn.

Validity as Authenticity

Perhaps the first nonfoundational criteria were those we developed in response to a challenge by John K. Smith (see Smith & Deemer, 2000). In those criteria, we attempted to locate criteria for judging the processes and outcomes of naturalistic or constructivist inquiries (rather than the application of methods; see Guba & Lincoln, 1989). We described five potential outcomes of a social constructionist inquiry (evaluation is one form of disciplined inquiry; see Guba & Lincoln, 1981), each grounded in concerns specific to the paradigm we had tried to describe and construct, and apart from any concerns carried over from the positivist legacy. The criteria were instead rooted in the axioms and assumptions of the constructivist paradigm, insofar as we could extrapolate and infer them.
也許第一個非基礎標準是我們為應對約翰·K·史密斯(John K. Smith)的挑戰而制定的標準(參見Smith & Deemer,2000)。在這些標準中,我們試圖找到判斷自然主義或建構主義探究的過程和結果的標準(而不是方法的應用;參見Guba & Lincoln,1989)。我們描述了社會建構主義探討的五種潛在結果(評估是規範探究的一種形式;參見Guba & Lincoln,1981),每個結果都基於我們試圖描述和建構的範式所特有的關注,並且與實證主義遺產所遺產的任何關注之外。相反,這些標準植根於建構主義範式的公理和假設,只要我們可以推斷和推斷它們。
G Those authenticity criteria-so called because we believed them to be hallmarks of authentic, trustworthy, rigorous, or "valid" constructivist or Phenomenological inquiry - were fairness, ontological authenticity, educative authenticity, catalytic authenticity, and tactical authenticity (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 245-25.1). Fairness was thought to be a quality of balance; that is, all stakeholder views, perspectives, claims, concerns, and voices should be apparent in the text. Omission of stakeholder or participant voices reflects, we believe, a form of bias. This bias, however, was and is not related directly to the concerns of objectivity that flow from positivist inquiry and that are reflective of inquirer blindness or subjectivity. Rather, this fairness was defined by deliberate attempts to prevent marginalization, to act affirmatively with respect to inclusion, and to act with energy to ensure that all voices in the inquiry effort had a chance to be represented in any texts and to have their stories treated fairly and with balance.
那些真實性標準——之所以這樣稱呼,是因為我們相信它們是真實的、可信的、嚴謹的或“有效的”建構主義或現象學探究的標誌——是公平性、本體論真實性、教育真實性、催化真實性和戰術真實性(Guba & Lincoln,1989,第245-25.1頁)。公平被認為是一種平衡的品質;也就是說,所有利益相關者的觀點、觀點、主張、關切和聲音都應該在文本中顯而易見。我們認為,遺漏利益相關者或參與者的聲音反映了一種偏見。然而,這種偏見過去和現在都與實證主義探究產生的客觀性問題沒有直接關係,這些關注反映了探究者的盲目性或主觀性。相反,這種公平性的定義是有意識地試圖防止邊緣化,在包容方面採取積極行動,並積極採取行動,確保調查工作中的所有聲音都有機會在任何文本中得到體現,並得到公平和平衡的對待。
Ontological and educative authenticity were designated as criteria for determining a raised level of awareness, in the first instance, by individual research participants and, in the second, by individuals about those who surround them or with whom they come into contact for some social or organizational purpose. Although we failed to see it at that particular historical moment (1989), there is no reason these criteria cannot be-at this point in time, with many miles under our theoretic and practice feet-reflective also of Schwandt's (1996) "critical intelligence," or capacity to engage in moral critique. In fact, the authenticity criteria we originally proposed had strong moral and ethical overtones, a point to which we later returned (see, for instance, Lincoln, 1995, 1998a, 1998b). It was a point to which our critics strongly objected before we were sufficiently selfaware to realize the implications of what we had proposed (see, for instance, Sechrest, 1993).
本體論和教育的真實性被指定為確定提高意識水平的標準,首先,由個人研究參與者,其次,由個人對他們周圍的人或他們出於某種社會或組織目的而接觸的人的認識。儘管我們在那個特定的歷史時刻(1989年)沒有看到它,但這些標準沒有理由不能——在這個時間點上,我們的理論和實踐還有很多英里——也反映了施萬特(1996)的“批判智慧”,或從事道德批判的能力。事實上,我們最初提出的真實性標準具有強烈的道德和倫理色彩,我們後來又回到了這一點(例如,參見Lincoln, 1995, 1998a, 1998b)。在我們有足夠的自我意識來意識到我們所提出的含義之前,我們的批評者強烈反對這一點(例如,參見Sechrest,1993)。
Catalytic and tactical authenticities refer to the ability of a given inquiry to prompt, first, action on the part of research participants and, second, the involvement of gthe researcher/evaluator in training participants in specific forms of social and political action if participants desire such training. If is here that constructivist inquiry practice begins to resemble forms of critical theorist action, action research, or participative or cooperative inquiry, each of which is predicated on creating the capacity in research participants for positive social change and forms of emancipatory community action. It is also at this specific point that practitioners of positivist and postpositivist social inquiry are the most critical, because any action on the part of the inquirer is thought to destabilize objectivity and introduce subjectivity, resulting in bias. The problem of subjectivity and bias has a long theoretical history, and this chapter is simply too brief for us to enter into the various formulations that either take account of subjectivity or posit it as a positive learning experience,

208 定性研究手冊-第8章

practical, embodied, gendered, and emotive. For purposes of this discussion, it is enough to say that we are persuaded that objectivity is a chimera: a mythological creature that never existed, save in the imaginations of those who believe that knowing can be separated from the knower.

Validity as Resistance, Validity as
Poststructural Transgression

Laurel Richardson (1994, 1997) has proposed another form of validity, a deliberately "transgressive" form, the crystalline. In writing experimental (i.e., nonauthoritative, nonpositivist) texts, particularly poems and plays, Richardson (1997) has sought to "problematize reliability, validity and truth" (p. 165) in an effort to create new relationships: to her research participants, to her work, to other women, to herself. She says that transgressive forms permit a social scientist to "conjure a different kind of social science... [which] means changing one's relationship to one's work, how one knows and tells about the sociological" (p.166). In order to see "how transgression looks and how it feels," it is necessary to "find and deploy methods that allow us to uncover the hidden assumptions and life-denying repressions of sociology; resee/refeel sociology. Reseeing and retelling are inseparable" (p.167).
Laurel Richardson(1994,1997)提出了另一種形式的有效性,一種故意“越界”的形式,即晶體。Richardson(1997)在撰寫實驗性(即非權威性、非實證主義)文本,特別是詩歌和戲劇時,試圖“將可靠性、有效性和真實性問題化”(第165頁),以努力創造新的關係:與她的研究參與者、她的工作、與其他女性、與她自己。她說,越界形式允許社會科學家「召喚出一種不同的社會科學......[這意味著]改變一個人與工作的關係,改變一個人如何認識和講述社會學“(第166頁)。為了瞭解「越界的樣子和感覺」,有必要「找到並部署方法,使我們能夠發現社會學中隱藏的假設和否定生命的壓抑;重新看到/重新感受社會學。重看和複述是不可分割的“(第167頁)。
The way to achieve such validity is by examining the properties of a crystal in a metaphoric sense. Here we present an extended quotation to give some flavor of how such validity might be described and deployed:
I propose that the central imaginary for "validity" for postmodernist texts is not the triangle-a rigid, fixed, two-dimensional object. Rather the central imaginary is the crystal, which combines symmetry and substance with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. Crystals grow, change, alter, but are not amorphous. Crystals are prisms that reflect externalities and refract within themselves, creating different colors, pattern, arrays, casting off in different directions. What we see depends upon our angle of repose. Not triangulation, crystallization. In postmodernist mixed-genre texts, we have moved from plane geometry to light theory, where light can be both waves and particles. Crystallization, without losing structure, deconstructs the traditional idea of "validity" (we feel how there is no single truth, we see how texts validate themselves); and crystallization provides us with a deepened, complex, thoroughly partial understanding of the topic. Paradoxically, we know more and doubt what we know. (Richardson, 1997, p. 92)
我提出,後現代主義文本的“有效性”的中心想像不是三角形——一個僵硬的、固定的、二維的物體。相反,中心想像是晶體,它將對稱性和物質與無限多樣的形狀、物質、嬗變、多維性和接近角度相結合。晶體生長、變化、改變,但不是無定形的。晶體是反射外部性並在自身內部折射的稜鏡,產生不同的顏色、圖案、陣列,向不同的方向投射。我們看到什麼取決於我們的休息角度。不是三角測量,結晶。在後現代主義的混合體裁文本中,我們已經從平面幾何轉向光理論,其中光既可以是波又是粒子。結晶,在不失去結構的情況下,解構了傳統的「有效性」觀念(我們感覺到沒有單一的真理,我們看到文本如何驗證自己);結晶為我們提供了對該主題的更深入、更複雜、更徹底的部分理解。矛盾的是,我們知道的更多,卻懷疑我們所知道的。(理查森,1997 年,第 92 頁)
The metaphoric "solid object" (crystal/text), which can be turned many ways, which reflects and refracts light (light/multiple layers of meaning), through which we can see both "wave" (light wave/human currents) and "particle" (light as "chunks" of energy/elements of truth, feeling, connection, processes of the research that "flow" together) is an attractive metaphor for validity. The properties of the crystal-as-metaphor help writers and readers alike see the interweaving of processes in the research: discovery, seeing, telling, storying, re-presentation.

Other "Transgressive" Validities

Laurel Richardson is not alone in calling for forms of validity that are "transgressive" and disruptive of the status quo. Patti Lather (1993) seeks "an incitement to discourse," the purpose of which is "to rupture validity as a regime of truth, to displace its historical inscription . . . via a dispersion, circulation and proliferation of counterpractices of authority that take the crisis of representation into account" (p. 674). In addition to catalytic validity (Lather, 1986), Lather (1993) poses validity as simulacralironic validity; Lyotardian paralogy/neopragmatic validity, a form of validity that "foster[s] heterogeneity, refusing disclosure" (p. 679); Derridean rigor/rhizomatic validity, a form of behaving " via relay, circuit, multiple openings" (p. 680); and voluptuous/situated validity, which "embodies a situated, partial tentativeness" and "brings ethics and epistemology together . . . via practices of engagement and selfreflexivity" (p.686). Together, these form a way of interrupting, disrupting, and transforming "pure" presence into a disturbing; fluid, partial, and
勞雷爾·理查森(Laurel Richardson)並不是唯一一個呼籲“越界”和破壞現狀的有效性形式的人。帕蒂·拉瑟(Patti Lather,1993)尋求「煽動話語」,其目的是「打破作為真理制度的有效性,取代其歷史銘文......通過考慮到代表危機的權威反做法的分散、流通和擴散“(第 674 頁)。除了催化效度(Lather,1986)之外,Lather(1993)將效度視為類比效度;利奧塔式的副詞/新語用效度,一種「促進異質性,拒絕披露」的效能形式(第 679 頁);德里達的嚴謹性/根莖有效性,一種「通過繼電器、電路、多個開口」的行為形式(第 680 頁);以及性感/定位的有效性,它「體現了一種定位的、部分的試探性」,並「將倫理學和認識論結合在一起......通過參與和自我反省的實踐“(第 686 頁)。這些共同構成了一種打斷、破壞和將「純粹」的存在轉化為令人不安的方式;流體、部分和

problematic presence-a poststructural and decidedly postmodern form of discourse theory, hence textual revelation.

Validity as an Ethical Relationship

As Lather (1993) points out, poststructural forms for validities "bring ethics and epistemology together" (p. 686); indeed, as Parker Palmer (1987) also notes, "every way of knowing contains its own moral trajectory" (p. 24). Peshkin reflects on Noddings's (1984) observation that "the search for justification often carries us farther and farther from the heart of morality" (p. 105; quoted in Peshkin, 1993, p. 24). The way in which we know is most assuredly tied up with both what we know and our relationships with our research participants. Accordingly, one of us worked on trying to understand the ways in which the ethical intersects both the interpersonal and the epistemological (as a form of authentic or valid knowing; Lincoln, 1995). The result was the first set of understandings about emerging criteria for quality that were also rooted in the epistemology/ethics nexus. Seven new standards were derived from that search: positionality, or standpoint, judgments; specific discourse communities and research sites as arbiters of quality; voice, or the extent to which a text has the quality of polyvocality; critical subjectivity (or what might be termed intense self-reflexivity); reciprocity, or the extent to which the research relationship becomes reciprocal rather than hierarchical; sacredness, or the profound regard for how science can (and does) contribute to human flourishing; and sharing the perquisites of privilege that accrue to our positions as academics with university positions. Each of these standards was extracted from a body of research, often from disciplines as disparate as management, philosophy, and women's studies (Lincoln, 1995).
正如Lather(1993)所指出的,有效性的後結構形式“將倫理學和認識論結合在一起”(第686頁);事實上,正如派克·帕爾默(Parker Palmer,1987)所指出的,“每一種認識方式都包含著自己的道德軌跡”(第24頁)。佩什金反思了諾丁斯(1984)的觀察,即“尋求正當性常常使我們離道德的核心越來越遠”(第105頁;引自佩什金,1993年,第24頁)。我們瞭解的方式肯定與我們所知道的以及我們與研究參與者的關係息息相關。因此,我們中的一個人致力於試圖理解倫理學與人際關係和認識論相交的方式(作為一種真實或有效的知識形式;林肯,1995年)。其結果是對新興質量標準的第一套理解,這些標準也植根於認識論/倫理學的關係。從這次搜索中得出了七個新標準:立場或立場判斷;作為品質仲裁者的特定話語社區和研究場所;聲音,或文本在多大程度上具有多聲部的品質;批判性主觀性(或所謂的強烈自我反省);互惠性,或研究關係在多大程度上變得互惠而不是等級;神聖性,或對科學如何能夠(並且確實)為人類繁榮做出貢獻的深刻尊重;並分享我們作為具有大學職位的學者職位所獲得的特權。這些標準中的每一個都是從一系列研究中提取出來的,這些研究通常來自管理學、哲學和婦女研究等不同的學科(Lincoln,1995)。

目 Voice, RefleXivitY, and Postmodern Textual Representation
目 Voice, RefleXivitY, and Postmodern Textual Representation

Texts have to do a lot more work these days than they used to. Even as they are charged by poststructuralists and postmodernists to reflect upon their representational practices, representational practices themselves become more problematic. Three of the most engaging, but painful, issues are the problem of voice, the status of reflexivity, and the problematics of postmodern/poststructural textual representation, especially as those problematics are displayed in the shift toward narrative and literary forms that directly and openly deal with human emotion.

Voice 聲音

Voice is a multilayered problem, simply because it has come to mean many things to different researchers. In former eras, the only appropriate "voice" was the "voice from nowhere"-the "pure presence" of representation, as Lather terms it. As researchers became more conscious of the abstracted realities their texts created, they became simultaneously more conscious of having readers "hear" their informants-permitting readers to hear the exact words (and, occasionally, the paralinguistic cues, the lapses, pauses, stops, starts, reformulations) of the informants. Today voice can mean, especially in more participatory forms of research, not only having a real researcher-and a researcher's voice-in the text, but also letting research participants speak for themselves, either in text form or through plays, forums, "town meetings," or other oral and performance-oriented media or communication forms designed by research participants themselves. Performance texts, in particular, give an emotional immediacy to the voices of researchers and research participants far beyond their own sites and locales (see McCall, 2000). Rosanna Hertz (1997) describes voice as
語音是一個多層次的問題,僅僅是因為它對不同的研究人員來說意味著很多事情。在以前的時代,唯一合適的“聲音”是“不知從何而來的聲音”——正如拉瑟所說的那樣,是表徵的“純粹存在”。隨著研究人員越來越意識到他們的文本所創造的抽象現實,他們同時也更加意識到讓讀者“聽到”他們的線人——允許讀者聽到線人的確切單詞(偶爾還有副語言提示、失誤、停頓、停止、開始、重新表述)。今天,聲音可以意味著,特別是在更具參與性的研究形式中,不僅在文本中擁有真正的研究人員和研究人員的聲音,而且還讓研究參與者以文本形式或通過戲劇、論壇、“城鎮會議”或其他由研究參與者自己設計的口頭和表演導向的媒體或交流形式為自己說話。特別是表演文本,為研究人員和研究參與者的聲音提供了情感上的即時性,遠遠超出了他們自己的地點和地點(見McCall,2000)。Rosanna Hertz (1997) 將聲音描述為
a struggle to figure out how to present the author's self while simultaneously writing the respondents accounts and representing their selves. Voice has multiple dimensions: First, there is the voice of the author. Second, there is the presentation of the voices of one's respondents within the text. A third dimension appears when the self is the subject of the inquiry. . . . Voice is how authors express themselves within an ethnography. (pp. xi-xii)
But knowing how to express ourselves goes far beyond the commonsense understanding of "expressing ourselves." Generations of ethnographers trained in the "cooled-out, stripped-down rhetoric" of positivist inquiry (Firestone, 1987) find it difficult, if not nearly impossible, to "locate" themselves deliberately and squarely within their texts (even though, as Geertz [1988] has demonstrated finally and without doubt, the authorial voice is rarely genuinely absent, or even hidden). Specific textual experimentation can help; that is, composing ethnographic work into various literary forms-the poetry and plays of Laurel Richardson are good examples-can help a researcher to overcome the tendency to write in the distanced and abstracted voice of the disembodied "I." But such writing exercises are hard work. This is also work that is embedded in the practices of reflexivity and narrativity, without which achieving a voice of (partial) truth is impossible.
但是,知道如何表達自己遠遠超出了對“表達自己”的常識性理解。一代又一代的民族志學家在實證主義探究的“冷靜、精簡的修辭”中受過訓練(Firestone,1987),他們發現很難,如果不是幾乎不可能,在他們的文本中刻意地、直截了當地“定位”自己(儘管,正如Geertz [1988]最終毫無疑問地證明的那樣,作者的聲音很少真正缺席,甚至隱藏)。 具體的文本實驗會有所説明;也就是說,將民族志作品創作成各種文學形式——勞雷爾·理查森(Laurel Richardson)的詩歌和戲劇就是很好的例子——可以説明研究人員克服以無形的“我”的遙遠和抽象的聲音寫作的傾向。但這樣的寫作練習是艱苦的工作。這也是嵌入在反身性和敘述性實踐中的工作,沒有這些工作,就不可能獲得(部分)真理的聲音。

Reflexivity 自反 性

Reflexivity is the process of reflecting critically on the self as researcher, the "human as instrument" (Guba & Lincoln, 1981). It is, we would assert, the critical subjectivity discussed early on in Reason' and Rowan's edited volume Human Inquiry (1981). It is a conscious experiencing of the self as both inquirer and respondent, as teacher and learner, as the one coming to know the self within the processes of research itself.
反身性是批判性地反思自我作為研究者的過程,“人類作為工具”(Guba & Lincoln,1981)。我們可以斷言,這是在《理性》和羅文編輯的《人類探究》(1981)一書中早期討論的批判性主觀性。這是一種有意識的自我體驗,既是詢問者又是被回應者,既是教師又是學習者,是在研究過程中認識自我的人。
Reflexivity forces us to come to terms not only with our choice of research problem and with those with whom we engage in the research process, but with our selves and with the multiple identities that represent the fluid self in the research setting (Alcoff & Potter, 1993). Shulamit Reinharz (1997), for example, argues that we not only"bring the self to the field, . . [we also] create the self in the field" (p. 3). She suggests that although we all have many selves we bring with us, those selves fall into three categories: researchbased selves, brought selves (the selves that historically, socially, and personally create our standpoints), and situationally created selves (p.5). Each of those selves comes into play in the research setting and consequently has a distinctive voice. Reflexivity-as well as the poststructural and postmodern sensibilities concerning quality in qualitative research-demands that we interrogate each of our selves regarding the ways in which research efforts are shaped and staged around the binaries, contradictions, and paradoxes that form our own lives. We must question our selves, too, regarding how those binaries and paradoxes shape not only the identities called forth in the field and later in the discovery processes of writing, but also our interactions with respondents, in who we become to them in the process of becoming to ourselves. Someone once characterized qualitative research as the twin processes of "writing up" (field notes) and "writing down" (the narrative). But Clandinin and Connelly (1994) have made clear that this bitextual reading of the processes of qualitative research is far too simplistic. In fact, many texts are created in the process of engaging in fieldwork. As Richardson (1994, 1997, 2000; see also Richardson & St. Pierre, Chapter 38, this volume) makes clear, writing is not merely the transcribing of some reality. Rather, writing-of all the texts, notes, presentations, and possibilities-is also a process of discovery: discovery of the subject (and sometimes of the problem itself) and discovery of the self.
反身性迫使我們不僅要接受我們對研究問題的選擇和與我們一起參與研究過程的人,還要接受我們的自我和代表研究環境中流動自我的多重身份(Alcoff&Potter,1993)。例如,Shulamit Reinharz(1997)認為,我們不僅“將自我帶到田野中,.......〔我們也〕在田野中創造自我“(第3頁)。她認為,儘管我們都有許多自我,但這些自我分為三類:基於研究的自我、帶來的自我(在歷史、社會和個人上創造我們立場的自我)和情境創造的自我(第 5 頁)。這些自我中的每一個都在研究環境中發揮作用,因此具有獨特的聲音。反身性——以及關於定性研究品質的後結構和後現代敏感性——要求我們拷問我們每個人,關於研究工作是如何圍繞構成我們自己生活的二元、矛盾和悖論來塑造和上演的。我們也必須質疑我們自己,這些二元對立和悖論如何不僅塑造了田野和後來寫作發現過程中所喚起的身份,還塑造了我們與受訪者的互動,以及我們在成為自己的過程中成為他們的人。有人曾經將定性研究描述為「寫下來」 (田野筆記) 和「 寫下來」 (敘述) 的雙重過程。但Clandinin和Connelly(1994)已經明確指出,這種對定性研究過程的雙文本解讀過於簡單化。事實上,許多文本都是在進行田野調查的過程中創作的。As Richardson (1994, 1997, 2000;另見Richardson & St. 皮埃爾,本卷第38章)清楚地表明,寫作不僅僅是對某些現實的抄錄。相反,寫作——所有的文本、筆記、演講和可能性——也是一個發現的過程:發現主題(有時是問題本身)和發現自我。
There is good news and bad news with the most contemporary of formulations. The good news is that the multiple selves-ourselves and our respondents-of postmodern inquiries may give rise to more dynamic, problematic, open-ended, and complex forms of writing and representation. The bad news is that the multiple selves we create and encounter give rise to more dynamic, problematic, open-ended, and complex forms of writing and representation.

Postmodern Textual Representations

There are two dangers inherent in the conventional texts of scientific method: that they may lead us to believe the world is rather simpler than it is, and that they may reinscribe enduring forms

of historical oppression. Put another way, we are confronted with a crisis of authority (which tells us the world is "this way" when perhaps it is some other way, or many other ways) and a crisis of representation (which serves to silence those whose lives we appropriate for our social sciences, and which may also serve subtly to re-create this world, rather than some other, perhaps more complex, but just one). Catherine Stimpson (1988) has observed:
歷史壓迫。換句話說,我們面臨著權威的危機(它告訴我們世界是「這樣的」,而也許是其他方式,或許多其他方式)和表現性危機(它有助於讓那些我們的生活適合我們的社會科學的人保持沉默,這也可能巧妙地起到重新創造這個世界的作用, 而不是其他一些,也許更複雜,但只是一個)。Catherine Stimpson(1988)觀察到:
Like every great word, "representation/s" is a stew. A scrambled menu, it serves up several meanings at once. For a representation can be an imagevisual, verbal, or aural. . . A representation can also be a narrative, a sequence of images and ideas. ... Or, a representation can be the product of ideology, that vast scheme for showing forth the world and justifying its dealings. (p. 223)
One way to confront the dangerous illusions (and their underlying ideologies) that texts may foster is through the creation of new texts that break boundaries; that move from the center to the margins to comment on and decenter the center; that forgo closed, bounded worlds for those more open-ended and less conveniently encompassed; that transgress the boundaries of conventional social science; and that seek to create a social science about human life rather than on subjects.
Experiments with how to do this have produced "messy texts" (Marcus & Fischer, 1986). Messy texts are not typographic nightmares (although they may be typographically nonlinear); rather, they are texts that seek to break the binary between science and literature, to portray the contradiction and truth of human experience, to break the rules in the service of showing, even partially, how real human beings cope with both the eternal verities of human existence and the daily irritations and tragedies of living that existence. Postmodern representations search out and experiment with narratives that expand the range of understanding, voice, and storied variations in human experience. As much as they are social scientists, inquirers also become storytellers, poets, and playwrights, experimenting with personal narratives, first-person accounts, reflexive interrogations, and deconstruction of the forms of tyranny embedded in representational practices (see Richardson, 2000; Tierney & Lincoln, 1997).
關於如何做到這一點的實驗產生了“混亂的文本”(Marcus & Fischer,1986)。淩亂的文本不是排版的噩夢(儘管它們在排版上可能是非線性的);相反,它們是試圖打破科學與文學之間的二元對立的文本,描繪人類經驗的矛盾和真實,打破規則,以展示,甚至部分地展示真實的人類如何應對人類存在的永恆真理和生活在這種生活中的日常煩惱和悲劇。後現代表現形式尋找並嘗試敘事,以擴大人類經驗的理解、聲音和傳奇變化的範圍。儘管他們是社會科學家,但探究者也成為講故事的人、詩人和劇作家,嘗試個人敘述、第一人稱敘述、反思性審訊和解構嵌入在表徵實踐中的暴政形式(見理查森,2000 年;Tierney&Lincoln,1997)。
Representation may be arguably the most open-ended of the controversies surrounding phenomenological research today, for no other reasons than that the ideas of what constitutes legitimate inquiry are expanding and, at the same time, the forms of narrative, dramatic, and rhetorical structure are far from being either explored or exploited fully. Because, too, each inquiry, each inquirer, brings a unique perspective to our understanding, the possibilities for variation and exploration are limited only by the number of those engaged in inquiry and the realms of social and intrapersonal life that become interesting to researchers. The only thing that can be said for certain about postmodern representational practices is that they will proliferate as forms and they will seek, and demand much of, audiences, many of whom may be outside the scholarly and academic world. In fact, some forms of inquiry may never show up in the academic world, because their purpose will be use in the immediate context, for the consumption, reflection, and use of indigenous audiences. Those that are produced for scholarly audiences will, however, continue to be untidy, experimental, and driven by the need to communicate social worlds that have remained private and "nonscientific" until now.


The issues raised in this chapter are by no means the only ones under discussion for the near and far future. But they are some of the critical ones, and discussion, dialogue, and even controversies are bound to continue as practitioners of the various new and emergent paradigms continue either to look for common ground or to find ways in which to distinguish their forms of inquiry from others.
Some time ago, we expressed our hope that practitioners of both positivist and new-paradigm forms of inquiry might find some way of resolving

212 躗 定性研究手冊-第 8 章

their differences, such that all social scientists could work within a common discourse-and perhaps even several traditions-once again. In retrospect, such a resolution appears highly unlikely and would probably even be less than useful. This is not, however, because neither positivists nor phenomenologists will budge an inch (although that, too, is unlikely). Rather, it is because, in the postmodern moment, and in the wake of poststructuralism, the assumption that there is no single "truth"-that all truths are but partial truths; that the slippage between signifier and signified in linguistic and textual terms creates re-presentations that are only and always shadows of the actual people, events, and places; that identities are fluid rather than fixed-leads us ineluctably toward the insight that there will be no single "conventional" paradigm to which all social scientists might ascribe in some common terms and with mutual understanding. Rather, we stand at the threshold of a history marked by multivocality, contested meanings, paradigmatic controversies, and new textual forms. At some distance down this conjectural path, when its history is written, we will find that this has been the era of emancipation: emancipation from what Hannah Arendt calls "the coerciveness of Truth," emancipation from hearing only the voices of Western Europe, emancipation from generations of silence, and emancipation from seeing the world in one color.
他們的差異,以至於所有社會科學家都可以再次在一個共同的話語中工作,甚至可能在幾個傳統中工作。回想起來,這樣的決議似乎極不可能,甚至可能沒有太大用處。然而,這並不是因為實證主義者和現象學家都不會讓步(儘管這也不太可能)。相反,這是因為,在後現代時代,在後結構主義之後,假設沒有單一的“真理”——所有的真理都只是部分真理;在語言和文本術語中,能指和所指之間的滑移創造了重新呈現,這些再現只是而且永遠是實際人物、事件和地點的影子;身份是流動的,而不是固定的,這不可避免地使我們認識到,不會有單一的“傳統”範式,所有社會科學家都可以用一些共同的術語和相互理解來歸因於這種範式。相反,我們站在一個以多聲部、有爭議的意義、範式爭議和新的文本形式為標誌的歷史的門檻上。在這條推測的道路上,當它的歷史被書寫時,我們會發現這是一個解放的時代:從漢娜·阿倫特(Hannah Arendt)所說的“真理的強制性”中解放出來,從只聽到西歐的聲音中解放出來,從幾代人的沉默中解放出來,從以一種顏色看待世界中解放出來。
We may also be entering an age of greater spirituality within research efforts. The emphasis on inquiry that reflects ecological values, on inquiry that respects communal forms of living that are not Western, on inquiry involving intense reflexivity regarding how our inquiries are shaped by our own historical and gendered locations, and on inquiry into "human flourishing," as Heron and Reason (1997) call it, may yet reintegrate the sacred with the secular in ways that promote freedom and self-determination, Egon Brunswik, the organizational theorist, wrote of "tied" and "untied" variables-variables that are linked, or clearly not linked, with other variables-when studying human forms of organization. We may be in a period of exploring the ways in which our inquiries are both tied and untied, as a means of finding where our interests cross and where we can both be and promote others' being, as whole human beings.
我們也可能正在進入一個在研究工作中更加靈性的時代。強調反映生態價值的探究,尊重非西方的公共生活方式的探究,涉及關於我們的探究如何被我們自己的歷史和性別位置塑造的強烈反思性的探究,以及對“人類繁榮”的探究,正如蒼鷺和理性(1997)所說的那樣,可能會以促進自由和自決的方式將神聖與世俗重新整合在一起。 組織理論家埃貢·布倫斯維克(Egon Brunswik)在研究人類組織形式時寫道,“捆綁”和“不捆綁”變數——與其他變數相關或明顯沒有聯繫的變數。我們可能正處於一個探索我們的探究既有聯繫又沒有聯繫的方式的時期,作為一種手段,可以找到我們的利益交叉點,以及我們作為整個人類可以成為和促進他人存在的地方。


  1. There are several versions of critical theory, including classical critical theory, which is most closely related to neo-Marxist theory; postpositivist formulations, which divorce themselves from Marxist theory but are positivist in their insistence on conventional rigor criteria; and postmodernist, poststructuralist, or constructivist-oriented varieties. See, for instance, Fay (1987), Carr and Kemmis (1986), and Lather (1991). See also Kemmis and McTaggart (2000) and Kincheloe and McLaren (2000).
    批判理論有幾個版本,包括與新馬克思主義理論關係最密切的經典批判理論;後實證主義的表述,與馬克思主義理論脫節,但在堅持傳統的嚴格標準方面是實證主義的;以及後現代主義、後結構主義或建構主義導向的變體。例如,見Fay (1987)、Carr and Kemmis (1986)和Lather (1991)。另見Kemmis and McTaggart (2000)和Kincheloe and McLaren (2000)。
  2. For a clearer understanding of how methods came to stand in for paradigms, or how our initial (and, we thought, quite clear) positions came to be misconstrued, see Lancy (1993) or, even more currently, Weiss (1998, esp.p.268).
    為了更清楚地理解方法如何代表範式,或者我們最初(我們認為,非常清楚)的立場是如何被誤解的,參見Lancy (1993)或更現代的Weiss (1998,esp.268)。
  3. For example, compare this chapter with, say, the work of Richardson (2000) and Ellis and Bochner (2000), where the authorial voices are clear, personal, vocal, and interior, interacting subjectivities. Although some colleagues have surprised us by correctly identifying which chapters each of us has written in given books, nevertheless, the style of this chapter more closely approximates the more distanced forms of "realis" writing than it does the intimate, personal "feeling tone" (to borrow a phrase from Studs Terkel) of other chapters. Voices also arise as a function of the material being covered. The material we chose as most important for this chapter seemed to demand a less personal tone, probably because there appears to be much more "contention" than calm dialogue concerning these issues. The "cool" tone likely stems from our psychological response to trying to create a quieter space for discussion around controversial issues. What can we say?
    例如,將本章與Richardson(2000)和Ellis和Bochner(2000)的作品進行比較,其中作者的聲音是清晰的,個人的,聲音的和內在的,相互作用的主觀性。儘管有些同事正確地識別了我們每個人在給定的書中寫了哪些章節,這讓我們感到驚訝,但是,這一章的風格更接近於更遙遠的“現實”寫作形式,而不是其他章節的親密的、個人的“感覺語氣”(借用 Studs Terkel 的一句話)。聲音也因所涵蓋的材料而產生。我們選擇的本章最重要的材料似乎要求不那麼個人化的語氣,可能是因為關於這些問題的“爭論”似乎比平靜的對話要多得多。這種“冷靜”的語氣可能源於我們的心理反應,即試圖圍繞有爭議的問題創造一個更安靜的討論空間。我們能說什麼?


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