Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry
柏拉图论修辞学和诗歌
首次发布于 2003 年 12 月 22 日星期一;实质性修订 2024 年 2 月 20 日星期二
Plato’s discussions of rhetoric and poetry are both extensive
and influential. As in so many other cases, he sets the agenda for the
subsequent tradition. And yet understanding his remarks about each of
these topics—rhetoric and poetry—presents us with
significant philosophical and interpretive challenges. Further, it is
not initially clear why he links the two topics together so closely
(he suggests that poetry is a kind of rhetoric). Plato certainly
thought that matters of the greatest importance hang in the balance,
as is clear from the famous statement that “there is an old
quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (Republic,
607b5–6). In his dialogues, both this quarrel and the related
quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric amount to clashes between
comprehensive world-views—those of philosophy on the one hand,
and of poetry or rhetoric on the other. What are these quarrels about?
What does Plato mean by “poetry” and
“rhetoric”? The purpose of this article is to analyze his
discussions of rhetoric and poetry as they are presented in four
dialogues: the Ion, the Republic, the
Gorgias, and the Phaedrus. Plato is (perhaps
paradoxically) known for the poetic and rhetorical qualities of his
own writings, a fact which will also be discussed in what follows.
柏拉图对修辞学和诗歌的讨论既广泛又具有影响力。与许多其他情况一样,他为随后的传统制定了议程。然而,理解他对这些主题(修辞和诗歌)的评论给我们带来了重大的哲学和解释挑战。此外,最初并不清楚为什么他将这两个主题如此紧密地联系在一起(他认为诗歌是一种修辞学)。柏拉图当然认为最重要的事情悬而未决,正如著名的陈述“哲学与诗歌之间存在着一场古老的争论”( 《理想国》 ,607b5-6)所清楚表明的那样。在他的对话中,这种争论以及与之相关的哲学与修辞学之间的争论都构成了综合世界观之间的冲突——一方面是哲学的世界观,另一方面是诗歌或修辞学的世界观。这些争吵是为了什么呢?柏拉图所说的“诗歌”和“修辞学”是什么意思?本文的目的是分析他在《伊翁》、《理想国》 、《高尔吉亚》和《斐德罗》这四个对话中对修辞学和诗歌的讨论。柏拉图因其作品的诗意和修辞品质而闻名(也许有些矛盾),这一事实也将在下文中讨论。
- 1. Introduction 一、简介
- 2. Ion 2.离子
- 3. Republic, Books II, III, X
3. 《共和国》 ,第二册,第三册,第十册 - 4. Gorgias 4.高尔吉亚
- 5. Phaedrus
5.斐德若 - 6. Plato’s Dialogues as Rhetoric and Poetry
6. 柏拉图的对话作为修辞学和诗歌 - Bibliography 参考书目
- Academic Tools 学术工具
- Other Internet Resources 其他互联网资源
- Related Entries 相关条目
1. Introduction 一、简介
A good poem helps to change the shape and significance of the universe, helps to extend everyone’s knowledge of himself and the world around him
一首好诗有助于改变诗的形式和意义 宇宙,有助于扩展每个人对自己和 他周围的世界—Dylan Thomas[1]
——迪伦·托马斯[ 1 ]
When we think of a philosophical analysis of poetry, something like a
treatise on aesthetics comes to mind. At a minimum, we would expect a
rigorous examination of the following: the characteristics that define
poetry; the differences between kinds of poetry (epic, tragic, lyric,
comic, and so forth); and the senses in which poetry is and is not
bound to representation, imitation, expression (which are possible
meanings of the classical Greek word “mimesis”) and
fiction.[2]
These complicated terms themselves require careful definition.
Equally rigorous and systematic remarks about the differences between
poetry and other art forms, such as music and painting, would be in
order, as would reflection on the relation between orally delivered
poetry (indeed, if we are to include performance, poetry that is in
one way or another enacted) and poetry communicated through the
written word. Aristotle’s Poetics is an early, and now
classic, philosophical exploration of poetry along these sorts of
lines.
当我们想到对诗歌的哲学分析时,我们会想到类似美学论文的东西。至少,我们期望对以下内容进行严格的审查:定义诗歌的特征;各种诗歌之间的差异(史诗、悲剧、抒情、喜剧等);以及诗歌与再现、模仿、表达(这些是古希腊词“模仿”的可能含义)和虚构的联系和无关的含义。 [ 2 ]这些复杂的术语本身需要仔细的定义。对诗歌与其他艺术形式(例如音乐和绘画)之间的差异进行同样严格和系统的评论,就像对口头诗歌之间关系的反思一样(事实上,如果我们要包括表演,诗歌是在以某种方式制定),诗歌通过书面文字进行交流。亚里士多德的《诗学》是对诗歌的早期、如今经典的哲学探索。
Plato’s extensive discussions of poetry frustrate these
expectations. He did not write a treatise on the subject—indeed,
he wrote no treatises, and confined his thought to
“dramatic” dialogues that are themselves shaped
poetically—and the remarks he offers us both meander
unsystematically, even within a single dialogue, and branch off in
what seem like strange directions, such as into discussions about the
corruption of self to which poetry allegedly exposes its audience. And
yet Plato clearly thought that something of enormous importance hangs
on his assessment of poetry, something that goes significantly beyond
getting the details of the subject pinned down in a philosophically
respectable fashion. One of the most famous lines in the culminating
sections of one of his most famous dialogues announces that
“there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry”
(Rep. 607b5–6), in support of which Plato quotes bits
of several obscure but furious polemics—presumably directed by
poets against philosophers—such as the accusation that the
opponent is a “yelping bitch shrieking at her master” and
“great in the empty eloquence of fools”.
[3]
Indeed, much of the final book of the Republic is an attack
on poetry, and there is no question but that a quarrel between
philosophy and poetry is a continuing theme throughout Plato’s
corpus.
柏拉图对诗歌的广泛讨论使这些期望落空。他没有写一篇关于这个主题的论文——事实上,他没有写任何论文,他的思想仅限于本身就充满诗意的“戏剧性”对话——他为我们提供的评论都是不系统的,甚至在一个对话中也是如此,而且是分支。朝着看似奇怪的方向发展,比如讨论诗歌据称让观众面临的自我腐败。然而柏拉图显然认为,他对诗歌的评价具有极其重要的意义,这远远超出了以哲学上令人尊敬的方式确定主题细节的范围。在他最著名的对话之一的最后部分中,最著名的诗句之一宣布“哲学和诗歌之间存在着一场古老的争论”( Rep . 607b5-6),柏拉图引用了一些晦涩但激烈的片段来支持这一观点。争论——大概是诗人针对哲学家的——比如指责对手是“对她的主人尖叫的尖叫母狗”和“愚蠢的空洞口才”。 [ 3 ]事实上,《理想国》最后一本书的大部分内容都是对诗歌的攻击,毫无疑问,哲学与诗歌之间的争论是贯穿柏拉图全集的一个持续主题。
The scope of the quarrel, especially in the Republic, also
indicates that for Plato what is at stake is a clash between what we
might call comprehensive world-views; it seems that matters of grave
importance in ethics, politics, metaphysics, theology, and
epistemology are at stake. He leads up to the famous line about the
quarrel by identifying the addressees of his critique as the
“praisers of Homer who say that this poet educated Greece, and
that in the management and education of human affairs it is worthwhile
to take him up for study and for living, by arranging one’s
whole life according to this poet” (606e1–5). The praisers
of Homer treat him as the font of wisdom. Plato agrees that Homer is
indeed the educator of Greece, and immediately adds that Homer is
“the most poetic and first of the tragic poets.” Plato is
setting himself against what he takes to be the entire
outlook—in contemporary but not Plato’s parlance, the
entire “philosophy of life”—he believes Homer and
his followers have successfully propagated. And since Homer shaped the
popular culture of the times, Plato is setting himself against popular
culture as he knew it. Not just that: the quarrel is not simply
between philosophy and Homer, but philosophy and poetry. Plato has in
his sights all of “poetry,” contending that its influence
is pervasive and often harmful, and that its premises about nature and
the divine are mistaken. He is addressing not just fans of Homer but
fans of the sort of thing that Homer does and conveys. The critique is
presented as a trans-historical one. It seems that Plato was the first
to articulate the quarrel in so sweeping a
fashion.[4]
It is noteworthy that in the Apology (23e), Socrates’
accusers are said to include the poets, whose cause Meletus
represents.
争论的范围,特别是在《理想国》中,也表明对柏拉图来说,面临的问题是我们所谓的全面世界观之间的冲突;伦理学、政治学、形而上学、神学和认识论中的重大问题似乎都处于危险之中。他引出了关于这场争吵的著名台词,他指出他的批评对象是“荷马的赞美者,他们说这位诗人教育了希腊,在人类事务的管理和教育方面值得接受他的研究”。为了生活,按照这位诗人的安排来安排自己的一生”(606e1-5)。荷马的赞美者把他视为智慧的源泉。柏拉图同意荷马确实是希腊的教育家,并立即补充说荷马是“最有诗意和第一位悲剧诗人”。柏拉图正在反对他所认为的整个观点——用当代但不是柏拉图的说法,即整个“生命哲学”——他相信荷马和他的追随者已经成功地传播了这一观点。由于荷马塑造了那个时代的流行文化,柏拉图正在反对他所知道的流行文化。不仅如此:争论不仅发生在哲学和荷马之间,而且发生在哲学和诗歌之间。柏拉图将“诗歌”视为他的全部,他认为诗歌的影响是普遍的,而且往往是有害的,而且它关于自然和神性的前提是错误的。他不仅向荷马的粉丝们讲话,而且向荷马所做和传达的事物的粉丝们讲话。这种批评是一种跨历史的批评。柏拉图似乎是第一个以如此全面的方式阐明这场争论的人。[ 4 ]值得注意的是,在《申辩》 (23e)中,据说苏格拉底的控告者包括诗人,而梅勒图斯代表了诗人的事业。
It is not easy to understand what Plato means by poetry, why it is an
opponent, whether it is dangerous because of its form or content or
both, and whether there is much of ongoing interest or relevance in
his account. Would his critique apply to, say, Shakespeare’s
tragedies? To E. E. Cummings’ or T. S. Eliot’s poetry?
These questions are complicated by the fact that Plato was not (or,
not primarily) thinking of poetry as a written text read in silence;
he had in mind recitations or performances, often experienced in the
context of theater. Still further, when Socrates and Plato conducted
their inquiries, poetry was far more influential than what Plato calls
“philosophy.” Given the resounding success of
Plato’s advocacy of “philosophy,” it is very easy to
forget that at the time he was advocating a (historically) new project
in a context swirling with controversy about the relative value of
such projects (and indeed about what “philosophy” means).
By contrast, poetry seems relatively marginal in today’s large
commercial and liberal societies, in spite of the energetic efforts of
figures such as the recent American national Poet Laureate Robert
Pinsky, whereas media of which Plato knew nothing—such as
television, videos, and the cinema, literary forms such as the novel,
and information systems such as the World Wide Web—exercise
tremendous influence. Television and movie actors enjoy a degree of
status and wealth in modern society that transcends anything known in
the ancient world. Is Plato’s critique marginalized along with
poetry?
理解柏拉图对诗歌的含义、为什么它是对手、它是否因其形式或内容或两者兼而有之而危险,以及他的叙述中是否有很多持续的兴趣或相关性,并不容易。他的批评是否适用于莎士比亚的悲剧?听 EE 卡明斯或 TS 艾略特的诗歌?这些问题因柏拉图并未(或者主要不是)将诗歌视为默读的书面文本这一事实而变得复杂。他想到的是经常在戏剧背景下进行的朗诵或表演。更进一步,当苏格拉底和柏拉图进行探究时,诗歌的影响力远远超过柏拉图所说的“哲学”。鉴于柏拉图倡导的“哲学”取得了巨大成功,人们很容易忘记,当时他正在倡导一个(历史上的)新项目,背景是关于此类项目的相对价值(实际上是关于什么是“哲学”)的争议。哲学”的意思)。相比之下,尽管最近的美国国家诗人桂冠获得者罗伯特·平斯基等人物做出了积极的努力,但在当今大型商业和自由社会中,诗歌似乎相对边缘化,而柏拉图对媒体一无所知——例如电视、视频和媒体。电影、小说等文学形式以及万维网等信息系统都具有巨大的影响力。电视和电影演员在现代社会中享有的地位和财富超越了古代世界。柏拉图的批评是否与诗歌一样被边缘化?
In spite of the harshness, and in some ways the bluntness of
Plato’s critique of poetry, he not only put his finger on deep
issues of ongoing interest, but also leavened his polemic in a number
of intriguing and subtle ways—most obviously, by writing
philosophy in a way that can, with proper qualifications, itself be
called poetic. The “quarrel between philosophy and poetry”
is justly famed and pondered: what is it about?
尽管柏拉图对诗歌的批评很严厉,在某些方面甚至很直率,但他不仅把矛头指向了人们持续感兴趣的深刻问题,而且还以一些有趣而微妙的方式丰富了他的论战——最明显的是,通过写作哲学的方式,在适当的条件下,本身就可以被称为诗意的。 “哲学与诗歌之争”理所当然地被人们所熟知和思考:它是关于什么的?
When we turn to the second theme under consideration, viz., rhetoric,
we find ourselves even more puzzled initially. What do philosophers
have to say about rhetoric? Generally speaking, very little
qua philosophers. Like all reflective people, philosophers
dislike rhetoric as it is commonly practiced, bemoan the decline of
public speech into mere persuasion and demagoguery, and generally
think of themselves as avoiding rhetoric in favor of careful analysis
and argument. “Rhetoric” tends to have a very negative
connotation, and for the most part means “mere rhetoric.”
As an object of academic study, the subject of rhetoric seems best
left to English professors who specialize in the long history of
manuals on techniques of persuasion and such. Consequently,
philosophers, especially in modernity, have had little to say about
rhetoric. By contrast, Aristotle devoted a book to the topic. And
Plato struggles with rhetoric—or sophistry as it is sometimes
also called, although the two are not necessarily
identical—repeatedly. We recall that Socrates was put to death
in part because he was suspected of being a sophist, a clever
rhetorician who twists words and makes the weaker argument into the
stronger and teaches others to do the
same.[5]
Plato’s polemic against the sophists was so persuasive that, in
conjunction with a well established and ongoing popular hostility
towards sophistry (a hostility of which Socrates was, ironically, also
the object), we have come to use “sophist” as a term of
opprobrium meaning something like “mere rhetorician.” In
Plato’s dialogues there is unquestionably an ongoing quarrel
between philosophy on the one hand and rhetoric and sophistry on the
other, and it too is justly famed and pondered. What is it about?
当我们转向所考虑的第二个主题,即修辞学时,我们发现自己最初更加困惑。哲学家对修辞学有什么看法?一般来说,很少有哲学家。像所有善于反思的人一样,哲学家不喜欢常见的修辞,他们哀叹公共言论沦为单纯的说服和煽动,并且普遍认为自己避免修辞而支持仔细的分析和论证。 “修辞”往往具有非常负面的含义,并且在大多数情况下意味着“纯粹的修辞”。作为学术研究的一个对象,修辞学的主题似乎最好留给专门研究说服技巧等手册悠久历史的英语教授。因此,哲学家,尤其是现代哲学家,对修辞学几乎没有什么可说的。相比之下,亚里士多德专门写了一本书来讨论这个主题。柏拉图不断地与修辞学——有时也被称为诡辩术,尽管两者不一定相同——进行斗争。我们记得,苏格拉底被处死的部分原因是他被怀疑是一个诡辩家,一个聪明的修辞学家,他曲解词语,使较弱的论点变得更强,并教导其他人也这样做。 [ 5 ]柏拉图针对诡辩家的论战是如此有说服力,以至于加上人们对诡辩术的根深蒂固且持续的敌意(讽刺的是,苏格拉底也是这种敌意的对象),我们开始使用“诡辩家”作为“opprobrium”一词的意思类似于“纯粹的修辞学家”。在柏拉图的对话录中,毫无疑问,一方面是哲学,另一方面是修辞和诡辩之间持续不断的争论,这也是理所当然地著名和深思的。 这是关于什么的?
Once again, the question is surprisingly difficult. It is not easy to
understand why the topic is so important to Plato, what the essential
issues in the quarrel are, and whether rhetoric is always a bad thing.
We do recognize commendable examples of rhetoric—say,
Pericles’ Funeral Oration, Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address,
or Churchill’s rousing speeches during World War II. These were
rhetorical, but were they merely rhetorical, let alone sophistical?
Still further, Plato’s Socrates is not above speaking to his
interlocutors rhetorically at times, even sophistically (some of his
arguments against Thrasymachus in book I of the Republic have
been suspected of falling into the latter category, and
Socrates’ interlocutors are occasionally reported as feeling
that he has played some kind of verbal trick on them). And are not
Plato’s dialogues themselves rhetorical in significant senses of
the term?
再次,这个问题出人意料地困难。为什么这个话题对柏拉图如此重要,争论的本质问题是什么,以及修辞是否总是坏事,这些都不容易理解。我们确实认识到值得称赞的修辞例子,例如伯里克利的葬礼演说、林肯的葛底斯堡演说或第二次世界大战期间丘吉尔的激动人心的演讲。这些都是修辞,但它们仅仅是修辞而已,更不用说诡辩了?更进一步,柏拉图笔下的苏格拉底有时会以修辞甚至诡辩的方式与他的对话者交谈(他在《理想国》第一卷中反对色拉叙马科斯的一些论点被怀疑属于后一类,而苏格拉底的对话者偶尔被报道为感觉他对他们玩了某种言语欺骗)。柏拉图的对话本身不就是具有修辞意义的吗?
These remarks prompt yet another question. However interesting the
topics of poetry and rhetoric may be, when we read Plato, why group
them together? Few people today would imagine that there is any
interesting relation between poetry and rhetoric. To think of great
poets as “rhetoricians” seems bizarre; and most (popular)
rhetoricians do not seem to know the first thing about poetry. Yet
Plato himself associates the two very closely: at Gorgias
502c he characterizes poetry as a kind of rhetoric. Thus Plato
provides our warrant for investigating the topics together. This
linkage between poetry and rhetoric is of course controversial, and
will be discussed below.
这些言论又引发了另一个问题。无论诗歌和修辞学的主题多么有趣,当我们阅读柏拉图时,为什么要把它们放在一起呢?今天很少有人会想到诗歌和修辞之间有什么有趣的关系。将伟大的诗人视为“修辞学家”似乎很奇怪。大多数(流行的)修辞学家似乎对诗歌一无所知。然而柏拉图本人将两者联系得非常紧密:在《高尔吉亚》 502c 中,他将诗歌描述为一种修辞学。因此,柏拉图为我们提供了共同研究这些主题的依据。诗歌和修辞之间的这种联系当然是有争议的,将在下面讨论。
Quite clearly, our themes are very large in scope, and indeed nearly
every one of Plato’s dialogues is relevant to one or more of
them. The present essay will confine itself to just four dialogues,
the Ion, Republic, Gorgias, and
Phaedrus. I will discuss them in that order, and in the final
section of the essay shall briefly examine the famous question of the
poetic and rhetorical dimension of Plato’s own writings.
很明显,我们的主题范围非常广泛,事实上,柏拉图的几乎每一篇对话都与其中的一个或多个相关。本文将仅限于四个对话:《伊恩》、 《理想国》 、 《高尔吉亚》和《斐德罗》 。我将按此顺序讨论它们,并在本文的最后部分简要探讨柏拉图自己著作的诗意和修辞维度这一著名问题。
I shall look for connections between our four dialogues, though I do
not believe that our chosen texts present a picture of poetry and
rhetoric that is altogether unified (indeed, this could not be claimed
even of the Republic taken by itself). I will put aside the
question about which dialogue Plato composed at which time, along with
assumptions about the possible “development” of
Plato’s views from “earlier” to “later”
dialogues. This is an example of an interpretive (or as it is
sometimes called, a “hermeneutical”) assumption; every
reader of Plato necessarily commits to interpretive assumptions. The
debate about which assumptions are best is an ongoing one, but not
germane to the present
discussion.[6]
It suffices here to state the relevant assumptions made in this
discussion.
我将寻找我们的四次对话之间的联系,尽管我不相信我们选择的文本呈现出完全统一的诗歌和修辞的图景(事实上,即使是共和国本身也不能声称这一点)。我将把关于柏拉图在何时创作的哪些对话的问题放在一边,以及关于柏拉图的观点从“早期”对话到“晚期”对话可能“发展”的假设。这是解释性(或有时称为“解释学”)假设的一个例子;柏拉图的每一位读者都必然致力于解释性假设。关于哪种假设最好的争论仍在继续,但与当前的讨论无关。 [ 6 ]这里只需陈述本次讨论中所做的相关假设即可。
The identity of “Socrates” is contested; we have no
writings by the historical figure, only writings by a number of
authors that in some sense or other—and the senses vary a great
deal—are either about him or creatively adapt his name and
aspects of his story. In referring to Socrates, I shall mean only the
figure as represented by Plato; nothing follows, for present purposes,
about the historical accuracy of Plato’s depiction. Further, it
is not the case that the views Plato puts into the mouth of his
Socrates are necessarily espoused by Plato himself; they may or may
not be those of Plato. Since Plato did not write a treatise in his own
voice, telling us what his views are, it is impossible to know with
certainty which views he espouses (at least on the basis of the works
he composed). In several cases, one of which will be examined in the
final section of this essay, it seems reasonably clear that Plato
cannot be espousing without qualification a view that his
Socrates is endorsing. With these principles firmly in mind, however,
I shall occasionally refer (as I already have) to Plato as presenting
this or that view. For as author of all the statements and
drama of the dialogues, he does indeed present the views in question;
and on occasion it is convenient and simpler to say he is advocating
this or that position (for example, the position that there is an
ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry).
“苏格拉底”的身份受到争议;我们没有历史人物的著作,只有许多作者的著作,这些作者在某种意义上——而且意义差异很大——要么是关于他的,要么创造性地改编了他的名字和故事的各个方面。在提到苏格拉底时,我仅指以柏拉图为代表的人物;就目前而言,柏拉图描述的历史准确性尚无定论。此外,柏拉图向他的苏格拉底口中提出的观点并不一定得到柏拉图本人的拥护;相反,柏拉图所说的观点也不一定是柏拉图本人所拥护的。他们可能是柏拉图的,也可能不是。由于柏拉图没有用自己的声音写一篇论文,告诉我们他的观点是什么,所以不可能确切地知道他支持哪些观点(至少根据他所写的作品)。在几种情况下,其中一个将在本文的最后部分进行探讨,似乎相当清楚的是,柏拉图不能毫无条件地拥护苏格拉底所赞同的观点。然而,牢记这些原则后,我偶尔会提到(正如我已经提到的那样)柏拉图提出了这样或那样的观点。因为作为对话中所有陈述和戏剧的作者,他确实提出了相关观点;有时,说他主张这个或那个立场是方便和简单的(例如,哲学和诗歌之间存在着古老的争论的立场)。
2. Ion 2.离子
Ion is a prize-winning professional reciter of poetry—a
“rhapsode”—and of Homer in
particular.[7]
Though he speaks his lines with the requisite conviction and emotion,
he does not “imitate” his subjects in the sense of act
their parts (of course, Homer did not write for the stage). He is a
performer but not a (stage) actor. Ion is depicted as superb at making
the Iliad and Odyssey come alive, at communicating
their drama to his audience and at involving them intimately. We might
say that he “represents” or “expresses” the
characters, action, and narrative of Homer’s epic poems, and
thus in some sense both identifies with his subject and leads his
audience to do the same. As he puts it in the dialogue that bears his
name: if he has done his job well, he will find himself weeping when
reciting sorrowful lines, and expects to see his audience weep along
with him (535b1–e6). Both are somehow transported, thanks to
Ion’s superb narrative capacity, into the original scene (as
Socrates says, Ion is “beside himself” and in the
enthusiasm of the moment thinks he is present at the scene he is
describing; 535b7–c3).
伊恩是一位屡获殊荣的专业诗歌朗诵者——“狂想曲”——尤其是荷马诗歌。 [ 7 ]尽管他以必要的信念和情感说出自己的台词,但他并没有“模仿”他的主题,即表演他们的角色(当然,荷马不是为舞台而写的)。他是一个表演者,但不是一个(舞台)演员。伊恩被描述为非常擅长让《伊利亚特》和《奥德赛》栩栩如生,能够将戏剧性地传达给观众,并让他们密切参与。我们可以说,他“代表”或“表达”了荷马史诗中的人物、动作和叙事,因此在某种意义上既认同他的主题,又引导他的观众也这样做。正如他在以他的名字命名的对话中所说的那样:如果他做得很好,他会发现自己在背诵悲伤台词时哭泣,并期望看到他的观众和他一起哭泣(535b1-e6)。由于 Ion 出色的叙事能力,两者都以某种方式转移到了原始场景中(正如苏格拉底所说,Ion “发疯了”,并在当时的热情中认为他出现在他所描述的场景中;535b7-c3)。
But Ion thinks himself capable of yet more, for he also claims to be
an expert in explaining what Homer means. He’s an exegete (see
531a7) or interpreter par excellence, and this claim especially
intrigues Socrates. He does not permit Ion to actually exhibit his
skills as a rhapsode, and instead insists that he engage in
give-and-take about the abilities Ion claims to possess. This is
typical of Socrates’ method; he forces his interlocutor to give
an account of his commitments and way of life. As both reciter and
exegete, the rhapsode has no exact analogue today. Nonetheless, the
implications of the Ion are broad; while Ion is not a poet
himself, he bears important traits in common with the poet.
但伊恩认为自己有能力做到更多,因为他还声称自己是解释荷马含义的专家。他是一位卓越的注释者(见 531a7)或解释者,这一说法特别引起了苏格拉底的兴趣。他不允许伊恩实际展示他作为狂想者的技能,而是坚持要求他就伊恩声称拥有的能力进行交换。这是典型的苏格拉底方法;他强迫对话者说明他的承诺和生活方式。作为朗诵者和解经者,狂想曲如今还没有确切的类似物。尽管如此,离子的影响是广泛的。虽然伊昂本人不是诗人,但他与诗人有着重要的共同特征。
The thrust of Socrates’ initial questioning is revealing.
Essentially, he attempts to show that Ion is committed to several
theses that are not compatible with one another, unless a rather
peculiar, saving assumption is introduced. Ion claims that he is a
first rate explicator of Homer; that he is a first rate explicator
only of Homer, and loses interest as well as competence if
another poet (such as Hesiod) is brought up (531a3–4,
532b8–c2; 533c4–8); and that Homer discusses his subjects
much better than do any other poets (531d4–11, 532a4–8).
Ion may justly be thought of as one of the “praisers” of
Homer referred to in Republic X (see above, and Ion
542b4). Notice that Socrates’s first order of business is to get
Ion to agree that a number of claims are being made by him;
while this may seem obvious, it is an essential condition for
Socrates’ inquiry, and is a distinctive characteristic of the
sort of thing Socrates does as a philosopher.
苏格拉底最初提问的主旨很能说明问题。从本质上讲,他试图表明离子致力于几个彼此不兼容的论点,除非引入一个相当奇特的、节省性的假设。伊恩声称他是荷马史诗的一流解释者。他只是荷马的一流解释者,如果提出另一位诗人(例如赫西奥德),他就会失去兴趣和能力(531a3-4,532b8-c2;533c4-8);荷马比任何其他诗人更好地讨论他的主题(531d4-11、532a4-8)。离子可能被公正地认为是第十共和国中提到的荷马的“赞美者”之一(见上文和离子542b4)。请注意,苏格拉底的首要任务是让伊恩同意他提出的许多主张;虽然这似乎是显而易见的,但它是苏格拉底探究的一个基本条件,也是苏格拉底作为哲学家所做的事情的一个显着特征。
If Ion is an exegete or explicator of Homer’s poems, he must
surely understand what the poet means, else he could not explain the
poet’s thoughts. This seemingly commonsensical point is asserted
by Socrates at the start (530c1–5), and happily accepted by Ion.
However, if Ion understands what the poet says about X, and
judges that the poet speaks best about X, he must be in a
position to assess other poets’ pronouncements about the subject
in question. For example, Homer talks a great deal about how war is
waged; as an expert on Homer who claims that Homer spoke beautifully
about that subject (in the sense of got it right), Ion must be in a
position to explain just how Homer got it right and how Hesiod, say,
got it wrong, as a series of simple analogies show. If you can
knowledgeably (531e10) pick out a good speaker on a subject,
you can also pick out the bad speaker on it, since the precondition of
doing the former is that you have knowledge of the relevant subject
matter. But this seems to contradict Ion’s assertion that he can
explain only Homer, not the other poets.
如果伊昂是荷马诗歌的注释者或解释者,他一定能理解诗人的意思,否则他无法解释诗人的思想。这个看似常识性的观点是苏格拉底在一开始就提出的(530c1-5),并被伊恩愉快地接受了。然而,如果 Ion 理解诗人对X 的看法,并判断诗人对X 的看法最好,那么他一定能够评估其他诗人关于相关主题的声明。例如,荷马大量谈论战争是如何发动的;作为荷马研究专家,他声称荷马对这个主题的论述非常精彩(从正确的意义上来说),伊恩必须能够解释荷马如何正确,以及赫西奥德如何错误。一系列简单的类比表明。如果你能明智地(531e10)在某个主题上挑选出一个好的演讲者,那么你也可以在这个主题上挑选出一个不好的演讲者,因为前者的前提是你对相关主题有了解。但这似乎与伊恩的主张相矛盾,即他只能解释荷马,而不能解释其他诗人。
Let us recapitulate, since the steps Socrates is taking are so
important for his critique of poetry (it is noteworthy that at several
junctures, Socrates generalizes his results from epic to dithyrambic,
encomiastic, iambic, and lyric poetry; 533e5–534a7,
534b7–c7). To interpret Homer well, we have to understand what
Homer said; to do that, and to support our judgment that he spoke
superlatively well, we have to understand the subject matter about
which Homer speaks (just as we would in, say, evaluating
someone’s pronouncements about health). Further, Homer himself
must have understood well that about which he speaks. As interpreters
or assessors, we are claiming to be experts judging a claim (in this
case Homer’s) to expertise, just as though we were members of a
medical examination board considering an application to the
profession. So as interpreters we are making claims about the truth of
Homer’s teachings about XYZ; and thus we are assuming
that Homer sought to state the truth about XYZ. Given that he
discusses the central topics of human and godly life (531c1–d2),
it would seem that Homer claims to be wise, and that as his devoted
encomiasts we too must be claiming to be wise (532d6–e1). But
claims to wisdom are subject to counter-claims (the poets disagree
with each other, as Socrates points out); and in order to adjudicate
between them, as well as support our assessment of their relative
merits, we must open ourselves to informed discussion both technical
and philosophical. Technical, because on subjects such as (say)
war-making, the general should be consulted about the accuracy of
Homer’s description thereof; philosophical because both the
method of assessing the whole (the “Socratic method”) and
the comprehensive claims about the truth made by interpreter and poet,
are properly philosophical preoccupations for Plato.
让我们重述一下,因为苏格拉底所采取的步骤对于他的诗歌批评非常重要(值得注意的是,苏格拉底在几个关键时刻将他的结果从史诗概括为颂歌诗、赞美诗、抑扬格诗和抒情诗;533e5-534a7,534b7- c7).为了更好地解读荷马,我们必须理解荷马所说的内容;要做到这一点,并支持我们对他讲话非常出色的判断,我们必须了解荷马讲话的主题(就像我们评估某人关于健康的言论一样)。此外,荷马本人一定很清楚他所说的内容。作为口译员或评估员,我们声称自己是专家,对专业知识的主张(在本例中是荷马的)进行判断,就像我们是考虑该职业申请的体检委员会成员一样。因此,作为解释者,我们正在断言荷马关于XYZ的教义的真实性;因此我们假设荷马试图陈述有关XYZ 的真相。鉴于他讨论了人类和敬虔生活的中心主题(531c1-d2),荷马似乎声称自己是明智的,而作为他虔诚的赞美者,我们也必须声称自己是明智的(532d6-e1)。但对智慧的主张会受到反主张的影响(正如苏格拉底指出的那样,诗人彼此意见不一);为了在它们之间做出裁决,并支持我们对其相对优点的评估,我们必须开放自己进行技术和哲学方面的知情讨论。 技术上,因为在诸如战争之类的主题上,应该向将军咨询荷马描述的准确性;哲学上的原因是,评估整体的方法(“苏格拉底方法”)以及解释者和诗人对真理的全面主张,都是柏拉图正确的哲学关注点。
It is but a step from there to the proposition that neither Ion nor
Homer can sustain their claims to knowledge, and therefore could not
sustain the claim that the poems are fine and beautiful works. In
passage after passage, Homer pronounces on subjects that are the
province of a specialized techne (art or skill), that is, a
specialized branch of knowledge. But neither the rhapsode nor Homer
possesses knowledge of all (or indeed perhaps any) of those
specialized branches (generalship, chariot making, medicine,
navigation, divination, agriculture, fishing, horsemanship, cow
herding, cithara playing, wool working, etc.). Ion attempts to resist
this by claiming that thanks to his study of Homer, he knows what a
general (for example) should say (540d5). Since he has accepted that
this would involve possessing the art of generalship (541e2,
techne kai episteme), his claim is patently indefensible, and
Socrates charges that he has failed to make good on his assertion to
be “wonderfully wise … about Homer” (542a1).
距离此仅一步之遥,即离子和荷马都无法支持他们对知识的主张,因此也无法支持这些诗歌是精美而美丽的作品的主张。在一篇又一篇的文章中,荷马对属于专业技术(艺术或技能)范围的主题发表了看法,即知识的专门分支。但是,狂想曲和荷马都不具备所有(或者实际上可能是任何)这些专业领域的知识(将军术、战车制造、医学、航海、占卜、农业、渔业、马术、牧牛、西塔拉演奏、羊毛加工等)。 。伊恩试图抵制这一点,声称由于他对荷马的研究,他知道将军(例如)应该说什么(540d5)。由于他承认这将涉及掌握将军的艺术(541e2, techne kai episteme ),他的主张显然是站不住脚的,苏格拉底指责他未能兑现他的主张“关于荷马的……非常明智”( 542a1)。
So Ion, and by extension Homer, are faced with a series of unpalatable
alternatives:
因此,伊恩(Ion)以及荷马(Homer)面临着一系列令人不快的选择:
- They could continue to defend the claim that they really do know
the subjects about which they discourse—in the sense of possess
the techne kai episteme of them, i.e., a mastery of the
subject matter. Yet if they do defend that claim they will be liable
to examination by relevant experts.
他们可以继续捍卫这样的主张:他们确实了解他们所讨论的主题,即拥有他们的技术知识,即对主题的掌握。然而,如果他们确实捍卫这一主张,他们将接受相关专家的审查。 - They could admit that they do not know what they are talking
about. This admission could be understood in several ways:
他们可以承认他们不知道自己在说什么 关于。这种承认可以从几个方面来理解:(b.1) one would amount to saying that while lacking in technical knowledge (knowledge of this or that craft or skill), they do have knowledge of human affairs—something like knowledge of human nature, of how human life tends to go, of the relation between (say) virtue and happiness, as well as of the natures of both virtue and happiness. To this might be added the claim that the poets and their exponents know the nature of the cosmos and of the divine. In the Republic Socrates in effect allows them comprehensive claims to knowledge along those lines, and then attacks across the board, seeking to show that the poets have got it wrong on all important counts.
(b.1) 人们相当于说,虽然缺乏技术知识(这种或那种工艺或技能的知识),但他们确实拥有人类事务的知识——比如关于人性的知识,关于人类生活趋向如何发展的知识, (比如说)美德和幸福之间的关系,以及美德和幸福的本质。除此之外,还可以声称诗人及其倡导者了解宇宙和神圣的本质。在《理想国》中,苏格拉底实际上允许他们按照这些思路对知识进行全面的主张,然后全面攻击,试图表明诗人在所有重要的问题上都错了。(b.2) alternatively, they could admit that they do not have either technical or non-technical knowledge of any of the topics about which they sing; rather, they possess the skill (techne) of creating beautiful, persuasive, and moving images of the subjects in question. So when Ion claims that Homer speaks beautifully about X, he just means that Homer speaks beautifully in a rhetorical sense even though he (Homer) does not necessarily know what he is talking about. By extension, poets would (on this interpretation) make the same claim about themselves. That would seem to reduce them to rhetoricians, which in effect is what Socrates argues in the Gorgias, with the further proviso that rhetoric as popularly practiced is not even a techne. Poetry-as-mere-rhetoric is not a promising credential for authority either to educate all of Greece or to better one’s audience; (b.2) is not a position that poets or their rhapsodes would, presumably, be eager to adopt.
(b.2) 或者,他们可以承认他们对所演唱的任何主题都不具备技术或非技术知识;相反,他们拥有为所讨论的主题创造美丽、有说服力和动人的图像的技能(技术)。因此,当 Ion 声称荷马关于 X 的说法很优美时,他只是指荷马在修辞意义上说得很优美,尽管他(荷马)不一定知道他在说什么。推而广之,诗人(根据这种解释)会对自己做出同样的主张。这似乎将他们降格为修辞学家,这实际上就是苏格拉底在《高尔吉亚篇》中所主张的,进一步的条件是,普遍实践的修辞甚至不是一种技术。诗歌作为纯粹的修辞学并不是一个有前途的权威凭证,既不能教育整个希腊,也不能改善听众; (b.2) 大概不是诗人或他们的吟游诗人会急于采取的立场。(b.3) Ion could admit that he knows nothing about the topics Homer addresses, withdrawing his claim to be a knowledgeable exegete, but maintain that Homer himself knows what he’s talking about. Ion would be liable to the question as to how he knows all that, however; and in any case would at best shift Socrates’ attack to the real target, viz. Homer.
(b.3) 伊恩可以承认他对荷马所讨论的主题一无所知,撤回了他作为知识渊博的注释家的说法,但坚持认为荷马本人知道他在说什么。然而,伊恩很容易被问到他是如何知道这一切的;无论如何,最多只能将苏格拉底的攻击转移到真正的目标上,即。荷马。(b.4) Socrates provides a seemingly more palatable alternative in the Ion, one that is echoed in the Phaedrus (245a); this is the “peculiar, saving assumption” mentioned above. It consists in the thesis that Ion recites (and Homer composes) not from knowledge but from divine inspiration. Neither knows what he is saying, but is nonetheless capable of speaking or composing beautifully thanks to the divine. They are like the worshippers of Bacchus, out of their right minds (534b4–6). This creative madness, as we might call it, they share with other Muse-inspired artists as well as prophets and diviners (534b7–d1). This is supposed to explain why Ion can recite only Homer beautifully; he’s been divinely inspired only in that area, and that is all he means when he says that Homer is better than his rival poets. Ion has no argument to support what looks like a comparative assessment; it is just a report to the effect that he is “possessed” by Homer’s magic thanks to the work of a god. A poet, further, is not a knower, but a kind of transmitter of a divine spark; he or she is “an airy thing, winged and holy” (534b3–4). The spark is generated by the god, and is passed down through the poet to the rhapsode and then to the audience. In Socrates’ unforgettable simile, the relationship of the god to poet to rhapsode to audience is like a magnetized sequence of rings, each of which sticks to the next thanks to the power of the divine magnet at the start (535e7–536b4), as though they were links in a chain (as we might put it).
(b.4) 苏格拉底在《离子》中提供了一种看似更令人愉快的替代方案,这在《斐德罗篇》 (245a)中得到了呼应;这就是上面提到的“特殊的节约假设”。它的论点是,伊昂的背诵(以及荷马的写作)不是来自知识,而是来自神圣的灵感。两人都不知道自己在说什么,但由于神的帮助,他们仍然能够优美地说话或作曲。他们就像巴克斯的崇拜者一样,失去了正确的思想(534b4-6)。我们可以称之为这种创造性的疯狂,他们与其他受缪斯启发的艺术家以及先知和占卜师一样(534b7-d1)。这应该可以解释为什么伊恩只能优美地背诵荷马史诗;他只在这方面受到了神圣的启发,当他说荷马比他的竞争对手诗人更好时,这就是他的意思。 Ion 没有任何论据来支持看似比较的评估;这只是一份报告,大意是由于神的工作,他被荷马的魔法“附身”了。此外,诗人不是知识者,而是神圣火花的传递者。他或她是“一个空中的东西,有翅膀并且神圣”(534b3-4)。火花由神产生,并通过诗人传递给狂想者,然后传递给观众。在苏格拉底令人难忘的比喻中,神与诗人、狂想曲与观众的关系就像一个磁化的环序列,由于一开始就有神圣磁铁的力量(535e7-536b4),每个环都粘在下一个环上,就像尽管它们是链条中的一环(正如我们所说的)。
This simile helps to answer an important question: why should we care
whether or not the poets know what they are talking about, if we enjoy
their compositions? Socrates’ answer is that as the last link on
this chain of inspiration, we are capable of being deeply affected by
poetry. We “spectators” at the recital too lose our minds,
to some degree, weeping or laughing as we enter into the narrated
scene, seemingly forgetting our real selves and lives
(535b2–d9). In the Ion he doesn’t offer a further
explanation of how this effect is supposed to happen—for that,
we will turn to the Republic—but the important point is
that it does happen. It would seem that the audience is transformed by
the experience in a way that momentarily takes them out of themselves.
Perhaps it does not leave them as they were, for their understanding
of what properly elicits their grief or their laughter would seem to
be shaped by this powerful experience, an experience they presumably
repeat many times throughout childhood and beyond. Perhaps they too
start to believe—as Ion and possibly the poet do—that they
“know” something thanks to their contact with the divine,
such as how war is to be conducted and for what ends, what fidelity in
love means, or the character of the gods. None of this would matter
much if superb poetry left us unmoved, or in any case as we were.
Plato’s critique depends on the assumption that poetry can and
does shape the soul.
这个比喻有助于回答一个重要的问题:如果我们喜欢诗人的作品,为什么我们要关心他们是否知道他们在说什么?苏格拉底的回答是,作为灵感链条上的最后一环,我们能够深受诗歌的影响。我们这些演奏会的“观众”在某种程度上也失去了理智,当我们进入叙述的场景时哭泣或大笑,似乎忘记了真实的自我和生活(535b2-d9)。在《离子》中,他没有进一步解释这种效应如何发生——为此,我们将转向《共和国》——但重要的一点是它确实发生了。观众似乎被这种体验所改变,从而暂时脱离了自我。也许这并没有让他们保持原来的样子,因为他们对什么正确引发他们的悲伤或笑声的理解似乎是由这种强烈的经历塑造的,他们可能在整个童年及以后多次重复这种经历。也许他们也开始相信——就像伊恩和诗人所做的那样——他们通过与神圣的接触而“知道”一些东西,比如战争如何进行以及其目的是什么,对爱情的忠诚意味着什么,或者众神的性格。如果精湛的诗歌让我们无动于衷,或者无论如何我们都无动于衷,那么这一切都无关紧要。柏拉图的批评基于这样的假设:诗歌能够而且确实塑造灵魂。
The “divine inspiration” thesis resolves some problems for
Ion (and implicitly for Homer) while postponing others. One problem is
indicated by the last few lines of the dialogue, where Socrates offers
Ion a choice: either be human, and take responsibility for unfairly
avoiding his questions about the nature of his (Ion’s) wisdom;
or accept the label “divine” and subscribe to the
inspiration thesis. Ion chooses the latter on grounds that it is
“lovelier.” It is an invitation to hybris, of course. How
easy it would be to confuse divine and human madness (to borrow a
distinction from the Phaedrus 244a5–245c4)! And not all
of the contenders for the prize Ion has won could be equally worthy of
promotion to divine status. By contrast, Socrates characterizes
himself in the Apology as not thinking he knows what he does
not know, as possessing human rather than divine
“wisdom.”[8]
Finally, since the poets and their rhapsodes both present views about
how things are and ought to be, and seek to persuade their auditors of
the same, they cannot escape responsibility for the implicit claim to
wisdom and authority they make. For Plato, this means that they must
be held accountable. It is philosophy’s mission to force them to
give an account of themselves, and to examine its soundness. This
would mean that they are required to engage philosophy on its turf,
just as Ion has somewhat reluctantly done. The legitimacy of that
requirement is itself a point of contention, it is one aspect of the
quarrel between philosophy and
poetry.[9]
“神圣灵感”论文解决了伊恩(也隐含地为荷马)的一些问题,同时推迟了其他问题。对话的最后几行表明了一个问题,苏格拉底向伊昂提供了一个选择:要么成为人类,并为不公平地回避他关于他(伊昂)智慧本质的问题承担责任;要么成为人类,并承担不公平的责任。或者接受“神圣”的标签并订阅灵感论文。 Ion 选择后者,因为它“更可爱”。当然,这是对 hybris 的邀请。混淆神圣的疯狂和人类的疯狂是多么容易(借用《斐德罗篇》 244a5-245c4 中的区别)!并不是所有艾恩所赢得的奖项的竞争者都同样值得晋升为神圣地位。相比之下,苏格拉底在《申辩》中将自己描述为不认为自己知道自己不知道的事情,拥有人类而非神圣的“智慧”。 [ 8 ]最后,由于诗人和他们的吟游诗人都提出了关于事物是如何和应该如何的观点,并试图说服他们的听众也相信同样的观点,所以他们无法逃避对他们所提出的智慧和权威的隐含主张的责任。对于柏拉图来说,这意味着他们必须承担责任。哲学的使命是迫使人们对自己做出解释,并检验其合理性。这意味着他们需要在哲学的地盘上从事哲学工作,就像伊恩有些不情愿地做的那样。这一要求的合法性本身就是一个争论点,它是哲学与诗歌之间争论的一个方面。 [ 9 ]
3. Republic, Books II, III, X
3. 《共和国》 ,第二册,第三册,第十册
3.1 Republic II
3.1共和国二世
In order to respond to the famous challenge put to Socrates by Glaucon
and Adeimantus, it is necessary to define justice. Socrates suggests
that the task would be easier if justice were first sought in a polis,
where it is “writ large.” That strategy accepted, the
polis must be created in speech. It turns out that philosophic
guardians are to rule the polis, and the next question concerns their
education (376e2). The critique of poetry in the Republic
grows out of a consideration of the proper education (from their
childhood on) of the philosopher-guardians in the “city in
speech.” The context for the critique is therefore that of the
specific project of the Republic, and this raises a question
as to whether the critique is meant to hold whether or not the
“city in speech” is possible or desirable.
为了回应格劳孔和阿德曼图斯对苏格拉底提出的著名挑战,有必要对正义进行定义。苏格拉底认为,如果首先在城邦中寻求正义,那么这项任务就会更容易,因为城邦的正义“显而易见”。如果接受这一策略,城邦就必须通过言语来创建。事实证明,哲学守护者将统治城邦,下一个问题涉及他们的教育(376e2)。 《理想国》中对诗歌的批判源于对“言语之城”中哲学家守护者的适当教育(从童年开始)的考虑。因此,批判的背景是共和国的具体计划,这就提出了一个问题,即批判是否意味着“言语中的城市”是否可能或可取。
The concern in book II is very much with the proper education of a
citizen, as befits the project of creating a model city. The
“myth makers” (377b11; Bloom translates “makers of
tales”) who supply the governing stories of the day are like
painters (377e2) who make pictures of heroes and gods, and indeed of
the relations both among and between the two. From the outset,
Socrates treats the poems (those by Hesiod and Homer are singled out,
but the critique isn’t meant to be confined to them) as though
they contained not just falsehoods, but falsehoods held up as models
of good behavior. The poems are taken as educational and thus broadly
political texts; persuasion (see 378c7) of a class of the young is
very much at stake. The young cannot judge well what is true and
false; since a view of things taken on at early age is very hard to
eradicate or change, it is necessary to ensure that they hear only
myths that encourage true virtue (378d7–e3). The pedagogic
motivation in question certainly extends beyond the specific
“city in speech” the Republic creates. Thus while
the critique of poetry in book II and beyond is in this sense shaped
by the contextual concerns, it is not limited to them.
第二本书非常关注对公民的适当教育,这与创建模范城市的项目相适应。提供当今主导故事的“神话制造者”(377b11;布鲁姆翻译为“故事制造者”)就像画家(377e2)一样,描绘英雄和神灵,甚至描绘两者之间的关系。从一开始,苏格拉底就认为这些诗歌(赫西奥德和荷马的诗是被挑选出来的,但批评并不局限于它们),就好像它们不仅包含谎言,而且还包含被视为良好行为典范的谎言。这些诗被视为教育文本,因此也被视为广泛的政治文本。对一类年轻人的说服(见378c7)至关重要。年轻人不能很好地判断真假;由于幼年时对事物的看法很难根除或改变,因此有必要确保他们只听到鼓励真正美德的神话(378d7-e3)。所讨论的教学动机当然超出了共和国所创造的特定“言论之城”。因此,虽然第二卷及之后的诗歌批评在这个意义上是由语境关注所塑造的,但它并不限于它们。
Further, Socrates takes aim at the content of several
particularly influential poems, and his arguments against that content
do not depend, here, on the project of creating the “best
city.” One of his first targets is what he calls their
“theology” (379a5–6). Whether in epics, lyrics or
tragedies, whether in meter or not (379a8–9, 380c1–2), god
must be described accurately, and that turns out to be as unchanging;
as good and the cause of only good; as incapable of violence; and as
“altogether simple and true in deed and speech,” for god
“doesn’t himself change or deceive others by illusions,
speeches, or the sending of signs either in waking or dreaming”
(382e8–11). For “there is no lying poet in a god”
(382d9). In short, the gods accurately conceived are remarkably
similar to what Socrates will subsequently call, in Republic
V-VII, the “Ideas.” Quite obviously, the dominant
“theological” foundation of the world-view prevalent in
fourth and fifth century Greece—and also any theological view
that does not meet the strictures Socrates specifies—must be
abandoned. The scope of the critique is breathtaking.
此外,苏格拉底瞄准了几首特别有影响力的诗歌的内容,而他反对这些内容的论点在这里并不取决于创建“最好的城市”的计划。他的首要目标之一就是他所谓的“神学”(379a5-6)。无论是史诗、抒情诗还是悲剧,无论是否用韵律(379a8-9、380c1-2),上帝都必须被准确地描述,而事实证明这是不变的;同样是善,也是善的原因;没有暴力能力;并且“在行为和言语上都是简单而真实的”,因为上帝“自己不会通过幻觉、言语或在清醒或梦中发送信号来改变或欺骗他人”(382e8-11)。因为“神中没有说谎的诗人”(382d9)。简而言之,准确构想的诸神与苏格拉底随后在第五至第七共和国中所说的“理念”非常相似。很明显,四、五世纪希腊盛行的世界观的主导“神学”基础——以及任何不符合苏格拉底规定的限制的神学观点——都必须被放弃。批评的范围是惊人的。
Along the way Socrates makes yet another point of great importance,
namely that the poets ought not be permitted to say that those
punished for misdeeds are wretched; rather, they must say that in
paying a (just) penalty, bad men are benefited by the god
(380b2–6). Socrates is starting to push against the theses that
bad people will flourish or that good people can be harmed. The cosmos
is structured in such a way as to support virtue. Socrates is
attempting to undermine what one might call a “tragic”
world view (note that in book X, he characterizes Homer as the
“leader” of tragedy; 598d8).
在此过程中,苏格拉底提出了另一点非常重要的观点,即诗人不应该被允许说那些因犯罪而受到惩罚的人是可怜的;相反,他们必须说,在支付(公正)惩罚时,坏人会得到上帝的好处(380b2-6)。苏格拉底开始反对坏人会兴盛或好人会受到伤害的论点。宇宙的结构是为了支持美德。苏格拉底试图破坏人们所谓的“悲剧”世界观(请注意,在第十卷中,他将荷马描述为悲剧的“领导者”;598d8)。
3.2 Republic III
3.2共和国三
In book III Socrates expands the argument considerably. The concern
now is squarely with poetry that encourages virtue in the souls of the
young. Courage and moderation are the first two virtues considered
here; the psychological and ethical effects of poetry are now
scrutinized. The entire portrait of Hades must go, since it is neither
true nor beneficial for auditors who must become fearless in the face
of death. Death is not the worst thing there is, and all depictions of
famous or (allegedly) good men wailing and lamenting their misfortunes
must go (or at least, be confined to unimportant women and to bad men;
387e9–388a3). The poets must not imitate (see 388c3 for the
term) gods or men suffering any extremes of emotion, including
hilarity, for the strong souls are not overpowered by any emotion, let
along any bodily desire. Nor do they suffer from spiritual conflict
(391c). The rejection of the “tragic” world view becomes
explicit: neither poets nor prose writers should be allowed to say
that “many happy men are unjust, and many wretched ones just,
and that doing injustice is profitable if one gets away with it, but
justice is someone else’s good and one’s own loss.”
Anybody pronouncing on any of these topics—poetically or
not—must say the opposite (392a13–b6). In expanding the
scope of the relevant discourse so broadly, Socrates in effect lays
down requirements for all persuasive discourse—for what he
elsewhere calls “rhetoric”—and makes poetry a
subsection thereof.
在第三卷中,苏格拉底大大扩展了这个论证。现在我们关心的是鼓励年轻人心灵美德的诗歌。勇气和节制是这里首先考虑的两种美德。现在人们正在仔细审视诗歌的心理和伦理影响。哈迪斯的整个肖像必须消失,因为它既不真实,对于必须在死亡面前无所畏惧的审计师来说也没有什么好处。死亡并不是最糟糕的事情,所有对著名或(据称)好人哭泣和哀叹他们的不幸的描述都必须消失(或者至少仅限于不重要的女人和坏男人;387e9-388a3)。诗人不得模仿(参见388c3的术语)遭受任何极端情感(包括欢闹)的神或人,因为坚强的灵魂不会被任何情感所压倒,更不用说任何身体欲望了。他们也没有遭受精神冲突(391c)。对“悲剧”世界观的拒绝变得明确:诗人和散文作家都不应说“许多幸福的人是不公正的,许多不幸的人是正义的,如果一个人逃脱惩罚,做不公正的事是有利可图的,但是正义是别人的好处和自己的损失。”任何人在谈论这些话题时,无论诗意与否,都必须说相反的话(392a13-b6)。在如此广泛地扩展相关话语的范围的过程中,苏格拉底实际上为所有说服性话语(他在其他地方所说的“修辞学”)提出了要求,并使诗歌成为其中的一个组成部分。
Having covered the issue of content, Socrates turns to the
“style” (“lexis,” 392c6), or as we might say,
of the “form” of myth tellers or poets (Socrates again
runs these two together). He does so in a way that marks a new
direction in the conversation. The issue turns out to be of deep
ethical import, because it concerns the way in which poetry
affects the soul. Up until now, the mechanism, so to speak, has been
vague; now it becomes a little bit clearer. Poetic myth tellers convey
their thought through a narrative (diegesis) that is either
“simple” (haplos) or imitative (that is,
accomplished through “mimesis”). The notion of
mimesis, missing from the Ion, now takes center
stage. When the poet speaks in his own voice, the narrative is
“simple”; when he speaks through a character, as it were
concealing himself behind the mask of one of his literary creations,
the narrative is imitative or mimetic. For then the poet is likening
himself to this character, and trying to make the audience believe
that it’s the character speaking. Some poetry (comedy and
tragedy are mentioned) proceeds wholly by imitation, another wholly by
simple narration (dithyrambs are mentioned), and epic poetry combines
the two forms of narrative.
讨论完内容问题后,苏格拉底转向神话讲述者或诗人的“风格”(“词汇”,392c6),或者我们可能会说的“形式”(苏格拉底再次将这两者放在一起)。他这样做的方式标志着谈话的新方向。事实证明,这个问题具有深刻的伦理意义,因为它涉及诗歌影响灵魂的方式。到目前为止,这个机制可以说还很模糊。现在它变得有点清楚了。诗意的神话讲述者通过“简单”( haplos )或模仿(即通过“模仿”完成)的叙述( diegesis )来传达他们的思想。 Ion中缺少的模仿概念现在占据了中心舞台。当诗人用自己的声音说话时,叙述是“简单的”;当诗人用自己的声音说话时,叙述是“简单的”;当他通过一个人物说话时,就像他将自己隐藏在他的文学创作的面具后面一样,叙述是模仿或拟态的。因为此时诗人将自己比作这个角色,并试图让观众相信这是角色在说话。有些诗歌(提到了喜剧和悲剧)完全是通过模仿来进行的,另一些则完全是通过简单的叙述(提到了酒神颂歌)来进行的,而史诗则结合了这两种叙事形式。
What follows this classificatory scheme is a polemic against
imitation. The initial thesis is that every person can do a fine job
in just one activity only. Consequently, nobody can do a fine job of
imitating more than one thing (for example, an actor cannot be a
rhapsode, a comic poet cannot be a tragic poet, if any of these is
finely done). Imitation is itself something one does, and so one
cannot both imitate X (say, generalship) well and also do the activity
X in question (394e-395b). It has to be said that this thesis is set
out with little real argument. In any case, the best souls (the
guardians, in this case, in the city in speech) ought not imitate
anything.
遵循这种分类方案的是一场反对模仿的争论。最初的论点是每个人都可以只在一项活动中做得很好。因此,没有人能很好地模仿不止一件事(例如,演员不可能成为狂想曲家,喜剧诗人不可能成为悲剧诗人,如果其中任何一个做得很好的话)。模仿本身就是一个人所做的事情,因此一个人不能既很好地模仿X(例如,将军才能),又做所讨论的X活动(394e-395b)。不得不说,这篇论文的提出并没有什么真正的论据。无论如何,最好的灵魂(在这种情况下,是城市中的守护者的言语)不应该模仿任何东西。
And were they to imitate anything, every care must be taken that they
are ennobled rather than degraded as a result. Why? If imitations
“are practiced continually from youth onwards,” they
“become established as habits and nature, in body and sounds and
in thought” (395d1–3). Unlike simple narrative, mimesis
poses a particular psychic danger, because as the speaker of the
narrative one may take on the character of literary persona in
question. It is as though the fictionality of the persona is
forgotten; in acting out a part one acts the part, and then one begins
to act (in “real life”) as the character would act. One
does not actually take oneself to be the fictional character;
rather, the “model” or pattern of response or sentiment or
thought one has acted out when “imitating” the character
becomes enacted. There is no airtight barrier between throwing
yourself (especially habitually) into a certain part, body and soul,
and being molded by the part; no firm boundary, in that sense, between
what happens on and off the stage. By contrast, Socrates argues, a
simple narration preserves distance between narrator and narrated.
如果他们要模仿任何东西,就必须小心翼翼地使他们变得高贵,而不是因此而被贬低。为什么?如果模仿“从年轻时就不断练习”,它们“就会在身体、声音和思想中成为习惯和本性”(395d1-3)。与简单的叙事不同,模仿造成了一种特殊的心理危险,因为作为叙事的说话者,一个人可能会呈现出相关文学人物的性格。就好像角色的虚构性被遗忘了;在表演一个角色时,一个人扮演这个角色,然后一个人开始(在“现实生活”中)按照角色的方式行事。人们实际上并不认为自己是虚构的人物;而是认为自己是虚构的人物。相反,当“模仿”角色时,一个人所表现出的反应、情感或思想的“模型”或模式。将自己投入(尤其是习惯性地)身体和灵魂的某个部分,与被该部分塑造之间,并没有密不可分的障碍;从这个意义上说,舞台上和舞台下发生的事情之间没有明确的界限。苏格拉底认为,相比之下,简单的叙述可以保持叙述者和被叙述者之间的距离。
Before passing onto critiques of music and gymnastic, Socrates
concludes this section of his critique of poetry with the stipulation
that a poet who imitates all things (both good and bad) in all styles
cannot be admitted into the good
polis.[10]
However, a more “austere” poet and myth teller is
admissible, for he confines himself to imitating decent people (when
he imitates at all, presumably as infrequently as possible), thus
speaking pretty much in the same tone and rhythm, and who accurately
represents the nature of the gods, heroes, virtue, and other issues
discussed in books II and III
(398a1–b4).[11]
在继续对音乐和体操的批评之前,苏格拉底在他对诗歌的批评的这一部分中总结道,一个以各种风格模仿一切事物(无论好坏)的诗人不能被接纳进入好城邦。 [ 10 ]然而,一个更“严肃”的诗人和神话讲述者是可以接受的,因为他仅限于模仿正派的人(当他模仿的时候,大概尽可能少模仿),因此几乎以相同的语气和节奏说话,他准确地代表了诸神的本质、英雄、美德以及第二卷和第三卷(398a1-b4)中讨论的其他问题。 [ 11 ]
This critique of mimetic poetry has struck not a few readers as a bit
strange and obtuse, even putting aside the question of the legitimacy
of censorship of the arts. It seems not to distinguish between the
poet, the reciter of the poem, and the audience; no spectatorial
distance is allowed to the audience; and the author is allowed little
distance from the characters he is representing. All become the
speakers or performers of the poem when they say or think the lines;
and speaking the poem, taking it on as it were, is alleged to have
real effects on one’s dispositions.
即使不考虑艺术审查的合法性问题,这种对模仿诗歌的批评也让不少读者觉得有点奇怪和迟钝。似乎并没有区分诗人、朗诵者和观众;不允许与观众保持观看距离;作者与他所代表的人物之间的距离很小。当他们说出或思考诗句时,所有人都成为这首诗的讲述者或表演者;据说,朗诵这首诗,接受它的本来面目,会对一个人的性情产生真正的影响。
3.3 Republic X
3.3共和国X
In book II the critique of poetry focused on mimesis understood as
representation; the fundamental point was that poets misrepresent the
nature of the subjects about which they write (e.g., the gods). They
do not produce a true likeness of their topics. In book III, the focus
shifts to mimesis understood as what one commentator has called
“impersonation”; participating in the
“imitation” by taking on the characters imitated was
viewed as corrupting in all but a few cases of poetic
mimesis.[12]
Surprisingly, in book X Socrates turns back to the critique of
poetry; even more surprisingly, he not only mischaracterizes the
results of the earlier discussion (at 595a5 he claims that all of
poetry that was imitative was banished, whereas only part of it was
banished; 398a1–b4), but recasts the critique in very different
terms. This is due in part to the fact that the intervening discussion
has seen the introduction of the “theory of Forms,” a more
elaborate analysis of the nature of the soul, and a detailed
description of the nature of philosophy. The renewed criticism leads
up to the famous statement that there exists an ancient quarrel
between poetry and philosophy.
在第二卷中,对诗歌的批评集中在被理解为再现的模仿上。基本点是诗人歪曲了他们所写主题(例如众神)的本质。他们并没有产生与其主题真正相似的内容。在第三本书中,焦点转移到了模仿,即一位评论家所说的“模仿”;除了少数诗意模仿之外,通过扮演被模仿的角色来参与“模仿”被认为是一种腐败。 [ 12 ]令人惊讶的是,在第十卷中,苏格拉底又回到了诗歌批评;更令人惊讶的是,他不仅错误地描述了早期讨论的结果(在 595a5 中,他声称所有模仿的诗歌都被驱逐了,而只有一部分被驱逐了;398a1-b4),而且用非常不同的术语重新诠释了批评。部分原因在于,介入的讨论引入了“形式论”,对灵魂本质进行了更详尽的分析,并对哲学本质进行了详细描述。新的批评导致了一个著名的说法,即诗歌与哲学之间存在着古老的争论。
Book X starts us off with a reaffirmation of a main deficiency of
poets: their products “maim the thought of those who hear
them.” And by means of the following schema, this is now
connected to a development of the allegation (repeated at
602b6–8) that poets do not know what they are talking about.
Socrates posits that there are Forms (or Ideas) of beds and tables,
the maker of which is a god; there are imitations thereof, namely beds
and tables, produced by craftsmen (such as carpenters) who behold the
Forms (as though they were looking at blueprints); thirdly, there are
imitators of the products of the craftsmen, who, like painters, create
a kind of image of these objects in the world of becoming. The
tripartite schema presents the interpreter with many
problems.[13]
Certainly, Socrates does not literally mean that poets paint verbal
pictures of beds and tables. Subsequently, the scheme is elaborated so
as to replace the craftsmen with those who produce opinion in the city
(legislators, educators, military commanders, among others), and the
painters with “the first teacher and leader of all these fine
tragic things” (595b10–c2), that is, Homer. The poets are
therefore “at the third generation from nature” or
“third from a king and the truth” (597e3–4,
6–7).
第十卷一开始就重申了诗人的一个主要缺陷:他们的作品“损害了听者的思想”。通过以下模式,这现在与诗人不知道他们在谈论什么的指控(在 602b6-8 中重复)的发展有关。苏格拉底假定床和桌子有形式(或理念),其制造者是神;有一些仿制品,即床和桌子,是由工匠(例如木匠)看着形状(就好像他们在看蓝图)制作的;第三,有工匠产品的模仿者,他们像画家一样,在生成的世界中创造出这些物体的一种图像。三方模式给解释器带来了许多问题。 [ 13 ]当然,苏格拉底的字面意思并不是诗人用语言描绘床和桌子。随后,该计划被精心设计,以在城市中产生意见的人(立法者、教育家、军事指挥官等)取代工匠,并以“所有这些美好悲剧事物的第一任老师和领导者”取代画家。 595b10–c2),即荷马。因此,诗人是“自然的第三代”或“国王和真理的第三代”(597e3-4, 6-7)。
Let us focus on one of the implications of this schema, about which
Socrates is quite specific. The poets don’t know the originals
of (i.e., the truth about) the topics about which they discourse; they
appear to be ignorant of that fact; and even worse, just as a
trompe-l’oeil painting can deceive the naïve
onlooker into believing that the imitation is the original,
so too those who take in poetry believe they are being given truth.
Imitation now starts to take on the sense of
“counterfeit.”[14]
Unequipped to put claims to knowledge to the test, the audience buys
into the comprehensive picture of “all arts and all things human
that have to do with virtue and vice, and the divine things too”
that the poet so persuasively articulates (598b-599a). The fundamental
point is by now familiar to us: “For it is necessary that the
good poet, if he is going to make fair poems about the things his
poetry concerns, be in possession of knowledge when he makes his
poems” (598e3–5). Even putting aside all of the matters
relating to arts and crafts (technai such as medicine), and
focusing on the greatest and most important things—above all,
the governance of societies and the education of a human
being—Homer simply does not stand up to examination (599c-600e).
All those “skilled in making” (tous poietikous),
along with this educator of Greece and leader of the tragic poets, are
painted as “imitators of phantoms of virtue and of the other
subjects of their making” (600e4–6).
让我们关注这个图式的含义之一,苏格拉底对此非常具体。诗人不知道他们所谈论的主题的起源(即真相);他们似乎不知道这一事实;更糟糕的是,正如一幅错视画可以欺骗天真的旁观者,让他们相信仿制品是原创的,那些接受诗歌的人也相信他们被赋予了真理。模仿现在开始带有“赝品”的含义。 [ 14 ]由于没有能力对知识进行检验,观众接受了诗人如此有说服力地阐述的“与美德和罪恶有关的所有艺术和所有人类事物,以及神圣事物”的全面图景( 598b-599a)。现在我们已经熟悉了基本点:“因为优秀的诗人如果要就他的诗歌所涉及的事物创作出公正的诗歌,那么他在创作诗歌时就必须拥有知识”(598e3-5) )。即使抛开所有与艺术和手工艺有关的问题(技术,如医学),专注于最伟大和最重要的事情——首先是社会的治理和人类的教育——荷马根本站不住脚进行检查(599c-600e)。所有那些“善于创造”( tous poietikous )的人,以及这位希腊教育家和悲剧诗人的领袖,都被描绘成“美德幻影及其创造的其他主题的模仿者”(600e4-6)。
And what, apart from their own ignorance of the truth, governs their
very partial perspective on the world of becoming? Socrates implies
that they pander to their audience, to the hoi polloi
(602b3–4). This links them to the rhetoricians as Socrates
describes them in the Gorgias. At the same time, they take
advantage of that part in us the hoi polloi are governed by;
here Socrates attempts to bring his discussion of psychology,
presented since book III, to bear. The ensuing discussion is
remarkable in the way in which it elaborates on these theses.
除了他们自己对真理的无知之外,是什么决定了他们对生成世界的片面看法?苏格拉底暗示他们迎合观众,迎合大众(602b3-4)。这将他们与苏格拉底在《高尔吉亚篇》中所描述的修辞学家联系起来。与此同时,他们利用了我们受民众管辖的那部分;在这里,苏格拉底试图运用他自第三卷以来对心理学的讨论。接下来的讨论对这些论点的阐述方式非常引人注目。
The example which introduces the last stage of Socrates’
critique of poetry prior to the famous announcement of the
“quarrel” is that of deep human suffering; specifically, a
parent’s loss of a child (603e3–5). How would a decent
person respond to such a calamity? He would fight the pain, hold out
against it as much as possible, not let himself be seen when in pain,
would be ashamed to make a scene, and would “keep as quiet as
possible” knowing that none of “the human things” is
“worthy of great seriousness.” Being in pain impedes the
rule of reason, which dictates that when we are dealt misfortunes, we
must be as unaffected by them as possible, preserving the harmony of
our souls (603e-604e). Socrates sketches the character of the decent
and good person this way: “the prudent and quiet character,
which is always nearly equal to itself, is neither easily imitated
nor, when imitated, easily understood, especially by a festive
assembly where all sorts of human beings are gathered in a theater.
For imitation is of a condition that is surely alien to them”
(604e). This may be a sketch of Socrates himself, whose imitation
Plato has
produced.[15]
在著名的“争吵”宣布之前,介绍苏格拉底诗歌批评的最后阶段的例子是对人类深重苦难的批评。具体来说,父母失去孩子 (603e3-5)。一个正直的人会如何应对这样的灾难呢?他会与痛苦作斗争,尽可能地抵抗它,在痛苦时不让别人看到自己,会羞于大吵大闹,并且会“尽可能保持安静”,因为他知道没有任何“人类的事情” “值得高度重视”。处于痛苦之中会阻碍理性的统治,这意味着当我们遇到不幸时,我们必须尽可能不受影响,以保持我们灵魂的和谐(603e-604e)。苏格拉底这样描绘了正派善良的人的性格:“审慎而安静的性格总是几乎等于它自己,它既不容易被模仿,也不容易被模仿,尤其是在节日集会中,各种人类都聚集在一起。众生聚集在剧院里。因为模仿对于他们来说肯定是陌生的”(604e)。这可能是苏格拉底本人的素描,柏拉图模仿了他的作品。 [ 15 ]
By contrast, the tragic imitators excel at portraying the psychic
conflicts of people who are suffering and who do not even attempt to
respond philosophically. Since their audience consists of people whose
own selves are in that sort of condition too, imitators and audience
are locked into a sort of mutually reinforcing picture of the human
condition. Both are captured by that part of themselves given to the
non-rational or irrational; both are most interested in the condition
of internal conflict. The poet “awakens this part of the soul
and nourishes it,” producing a disordered psychic regime or
constitution (politeia, 605b7–8; compare this language
to that of the passages at the end of book IX of the
Republic). The “childish” part of the soul that
revels in the poet’s pictures cannot distinguish truth from
reality; it uncritically grants the poet’s authority to tell it
like it is. Onlookers become emotively involved in the poet’s
drama.
相比之下,悲剧模仿者擅长描绘那些正在受苦、甚至不试图从哲学上做出回应的人们的心理冲突。由于他们的观众中也有同样处于这种状况的人,模仿者和观众就被锁定在一种相互强化的人类状况图景中。两者都被自己赋予非理性或非理性的那部分所俘获;两人都对内部冲突的状况最感兴趣。诗人“唤醒了灵魂的这一部分并滋养了它”,产生了一种混乱的精神制度或宪法( politeia ,605b7-8;将这种语言与《共和国》第九卷末尾的段落进行比较)。陶醉在诗人的图画中的灵魂的“幼稚”部分无法区分真实与现实;它不加批判地赋予诗人如实讲述的权力。旁观者纷纷投入诗人的戏剧之中。
Another remarkable passage follows: “Listen and consider. When
even the best of us hear Homer or any other of the tragic poets
imitating one of the heroes in mourning and making quite an extended
speech with lamentation, or, if you like, singing and beating his
breast, you know that we enjoy it and that we give ourselves over to
following the imitation; suffering along [‘sympaschontes’,
a word related to another Greek word, ‘sympatheia’] with
the hero in all seriousness, we praise as a good poet the man who most
puts us in this state” (605c10–d5). So the danger posed by
poetry is great, for it appeals to something to which even the
best—the most philosophical—are liable, and induces a
dream-like, uncritical state in which we lose ourselves in the
emotions in question (above all, in sorrow, grief, anger,
resentment).
接下来是另一段值得注意的段落:“倾听并思考。即使是我们中最优秀的人,当听到荷马或任何其他悲剧诗人模仿一位英雄的哀悼并发表长篇哀悼的演讲,或者,如果你愿意的话,唱歌并捶打他的胸膛时,你知道我们喜欢它,并且我们屈服于模仿;严肃地与英雄一起遭受[“sympaschontes”,一个与另一个希腊词“sympatheia”相关的词,我们称赞最让我们处于这种状态的人是一位好诗人”(605c10-d5)。因此,诗歌带来的危险是巨大的,因为它所诉诸的东西,即使是最优秀的——最有哲理的——也可能会受到影响,并引发一种梦幻般的、不加批判的状态,在这种状态中,我们迷失在所讨论的情感中(最重要的是,悲伤、悲伤、愤怒、怨恨)。
As one commentator aptly puts it, “on the one hand, poetry
promotes intrapsychic conflict; on the other, it keeps us unconscious
of that conflict, for the irrational part of our psyche cannot hear
reason’s corrections. That is why poetry, with its throbbing
rhythms and beating of breasts, appeals equally to the nondescript mob
in the theater and to the best among us. But if poetry goes straight
to the lower part of the psyche, that is where it must come
from.”[16]
Further, the picture of the gods that the Greek poets painted was a
projection of the tumultuous and conflictual lower parts of the soul,
one which in turn gave sustenance and power to those very same parts
of the soul.
正如一位评论家恰当地指出的那样,“一方面,诗歌促进了内心的冲突;另一方面,诗歌促进了内心的冲突。”另一方面,它让我们无意识地意识到这种冲突,因为我们心灵中的非理性部分听不到理性的纠正。这就是为什么诗歌,以其跳动的节奏和跳动的胸膛,对剧院里不起眼的暴民和我们当中最优秀的人同样有吸引力。但如果诗歌直达心灵的深处,那它一定来自那里。” [ 16 ]此外,希腊诗人所描绘的众神的形象是灵魂的混乱和冲突的较低部分的投射,而这反过来又为灵魂的这些部分提供了养分和力量。
The worry, then, is that in experiencing the emotions
vicariously—by identifying, so to speak, with the drama—we
release emotions better regulated by reason, and become captive to
them in “real” life. In a psychological sense, drama
supplies what today we would call “role models.”
Socrates’ point is not that we think the drama is itself real,
as though we cannot distinguish between what takes place on and off
the stage; but that “the enjoyment of other people’s
sufferings has a necessary effect on one’s own.” Why?
“For the pitying part [of the soul], fed strong on these
examples, is not easily held down in one’s own sufferings”
(606b).[17]
And this applies to comedy as well; we get used to hearing shameful
things in comic imitation, stop feeling ashamed at them, and indeed
begin to enjoy them
(606c).[18]
Socrates quite explicitly is denying that aesthetic
“pleasure” (606b4) can be insulated from the ethical
effects of poetry. To put the point with a slight risk of anachronism
(since Plato does not have a term corresponding to our
“aesthetics”), he does not think that aesthetics is
separable from ethics. He does not separate knowledge of beauty and
knowledge of good. It is as though the pleasure we take in the
representation of sorrow on the stage will—because it is
pleasure in that which the representation represents (and not just a
representation on the stage or in a poem)—transmute
into pleasure in the expression of sorrow in life. And that is not
only an ethical effect, but a bad one, for Plato. These are
ingredients of his disagreements on the subject with Aristotle, as
well as with myriad thinkers since
then.[19]
He is asserting, though without filling out the psychological
mechanisms in the detail for which one would wish, that from childhood
up, mimesis shapes our images and our fantasies, our unconscious or
semi-conscious pictures and feelings, and thereby shapes our
characters, especially that part of our nature prone to what he thinks
of as irrational or non-rational.
那么,令人担忧的是,在间接体验情绪时——可以说,通过认同戏剧——我们释放了由理性更好地调节的情绪,并在“现实”生活中成为它们的俘虏。从心理学的角度来看,戏剧提供了我们今天所说的“榜样”。苏格拉底的观点并不是说我们认为戏剧本身是真实的,就好像我们无法区分舞台上和舞台下发生的事情一样;相反,我们认为戏剧本身是真实的。但“享受别人的痛苦对自己的痛苦也有必然的影响”。为什么? “因为[灵魂]的怜悯部分,在这些例子中得到了强烈的滋养,不容易被自己的痛苦所抑制”(606b)。 [ 17 ]这也适用于喜剧;我们习惯于在喜剧模仿中听到可耻的事情,不再为它们感到羞耻,反而开始享受它们(606c)。 [ 18 ]苏格拉底相当明确地否认审美“愉悦”(606b4)可以与诗歌的伦理影响隔离。带着一点不合时宜的风险(因为柏拉图没有一个与我们的“美学”相对应的术语),他并不认为美学与伦理学是分开的。他没有将美的知识和善的知识分开。就好像我们在舞台上表现悲伤时所获得的快乐——因为它是表现所代表的快乐(而不仅仅是舞台上或一首诗中的表现)——转化为表达悲伤的快乐。生活中的悲伤。对于柏拉图来说,这不仅是一种道德影响,而且是一种糟糕的影响。这些是他与亚里士多德以及此后无数思想家在这个问题上存在分歧的因素。[ 19 ]他断言,尽管没有详细说明人们所希望的心理机制,但从童年起,模仿塑造了我们的形象和幻想,我们无意识或半意识的画面和感觉,从而塑造了我们的行为。人物,尤其是我们天性中容易出现他认为的非理性或非理性的部分。
The poets help enslave even the best of us to the lower parts of our
soul; and just insofar as they do so, they must be kept out of any
community that wishes to be free and virtuous. Famously, or
notoriously, Plato refuses to countenance a firm separation between
the private and the public, between the virtue of the one and the
regulation of the other. What goes on in the theater, in your home, in
your fantasy life, are connected. Poetry unregulated by philosophy is
a danger to soul and
community.[20]
诗人甚至帮助我们中最优秀的人奴役我们灵魂的低层部分。只要他们这样做,就必须将他们排除在任何希望自由和有道德的社区之外。众所周知,或臭名昭著的是,柏拉图拒绝支持私人与公共、一方的美德与另一方的监管之间的严格分离。剧院里、家里、幻想生活中发生的事情都是相互关联的。不受哲学规范的诗歌对灵魂和社会是一种危险。 [ 20 ]
3.4 Concluding Observations about the Republic’s “quarrel”
3.4 关于共和国“争吵”的结论性观察
The argument in book X cuts across all forms of “poetry,”
whether tragic, comic, lyric, in meter or not; indeed, the earlier
distinction between imitative and narrative poetry too seems
irrelevant here. The conclusion is the same: “We are, at all
events, aware that such poetry mustn’t be taken seriously as a
serious thing laying hold of truth, but that the man who hears it must
be careful, fearing for the regime in himself, and must hold what we
have said about poetry” (608a6–b2). So sweeping a
conclusion makes many assumptions, of course, one of which is that
there is such as thing as “truth” out there, and the
theory of Forms or Ideas is part of the metaphysical foundation of
that view. The poets have been characterized as making claims to
truth, to telling it like it is, that are in fact—contrary to
appearances—little more than the poet’s unargued
imaginative projections whose tenability is established by their
ability to command the applause of the audience. That is, the poets
are rhetoricians who are, as it were, selling their products to as
large a market as possible, in the hope of gaining repute and
influence.
第十本书中的论点跨越了所有形式的“诗歌”,无论是悲剧、喜剧、抒情、韵律或非韵律;事实上,早期模仿诗和叙事诗之间的区别在这里似乎也无关紧要。结论是相同的:“无论如何,我们都意识到,这样的诗歌不应该被认真对待,被视为掌握真理的严肃事物,但听到它的人必须小心,担心自己的政权。 ,并且必须持有我们所说的关于诗歌的内容”(608a6-b2)。因此,笼统的结论当然会做出许多假设,其中之一是存在诸如“真理”之类的东西,而形式或理念的理论是该观点的形而上学基础的一部分。诗人的特点是声称真理,如实讲述事实,事实上,与表面上相反,只不过是诗人无可争议的想象力投射,其可行性是通过他们获得观众掌声的能力而建立的。也就是说,诗人是修辞学家,他们将自己的产品推销给尽可能大的市场,以期获得声誉和影响力。
The tripartite schema of Idea, artifact, and imitator is as much about
making as it is about imitation. Making is a continual thread
through all three levels of the schema. The Ideas too are said to be
made, even though that is entirely inconsistent with the
doctrine of Ideas as eternal expressed earlier in the
Republic itself (and in all the other Platonic dialogues).
The suggestion is arguably that the poets are makers (see also
599a2–3, where we are told that poets “produce
appearances,” as one might translate), that they move in a world
permeated by making. The word “poetry” in Platonic Greek
comes from the word “to make” (poiein), a fact
upon which Socrates remarks in the
Symposium.[21]
Making takes place in and contributes to the world of becoming.
Philosophers, by contrast, are presented as committed to the pursuit
of truth that is already “out there,” independently of the
mind and the world of becoming. Their effort has to do with discovery
rather than making. Thus stated the contrast is crude, since poets
also reflect what they take their audience to (want to) feel or
believe—they “imitate” in the sense of represent as
well as express—and philosophers make speeches and (as Socrates
himself says) they too
imitate.[22]
Nonetheless, the distinction suggests an interesting possibility,
viz. that the quarrel between poetry and philosophy is finally, in
Plato’s eyes, about the relative priority of making and
discovery. The making/discovery distinction chimes with a number of
the dichotomies upon which we have touched: imagination vs. reason,
emotion vs. principle, becoming vs. being, artifacts vs. Forms, images
vs. originals.
理念、人工制品和模仿者的三重模式既与创造有关,也与模仿有关。制作是贯穿该模式所有三个层次的连续线索。理念也被认为是被创造出来的,尽管这与《理想国》本身(以及所有其他柏拉图对话)早期表达的永恒理念学说完全不一致。这个建议可以说是诗人是制造者(另见599a2-3,其中我们被告知诗人“产生外观”,正如人们可能会翻译的那样),他们在一个充满制造的世界中移动。柏拉图希腊语中的“诗歌”一词源自“创造”( poiein )一词,苏格拉底在《会饮》中评论了这一事实。 [ 21 ]创造发生在生成的世界中,并为生成的世界做出贡献。相比之下,哲学家被描述为致力于追求已经“存在”的真理,独立于思想和生成的世界。他们的努力与发现有关,而不是与制造有关。因此,这种对比是粗略的,因为诗人也反映了他们让观众(想要)感受到或相信的东西——他们在代表和表达的意义上“模仿”——而哲学家则发表演讲并且(正如苏格拉底本人所说)他们也模仿。 [ 22 ]尽管如此,这种区别表明了一种有趣的可能性,即。在柏拉图看来,诗歌与哲学之间的争论最终在于创造与发现的相对优先性。创造/发现的区别与我们所触及的许多二分法相一致:想象与理性、情感与原则、生成与存在、人工制品与形式、图像与原创。
Nowhere in the Republic does Socrates mention the
poet’s claim to inspiration. Indeed, that claim is pointedly
omitted in the passage in which Socrates talks about the beginnings of
the Iliad (392e2–393a5; see Bloom’s note ad
loc). Socrates implicitly denies the soundness of that claim
here. Given his conception of the divine as Idea, such a claim could
not be true, since the Ideas do not speak, let alone speak the things
which Homer, Hesiod, and their followers recount. The result is that
the poets are fabricators even of the appearance of knowing what they
are talking about; this is not inconsistent with the
Ion’s characterization of poetry as inspired
ignorance.
在《理想国》中,苏格拉底没有提到诗人声称自己有灵感。事实上,这一说法在苏格拉底谈论《伊利亚特》开头的段落中被有意地省略了(392e2-393a5;参见布卢姆的注释)。苏格拉底在这里含蓄地否认了这一主张的合理性。鉴于他将神圣视为理念,这样的主张不可能是真的,因为理念不会说话,更不用说说出荷马、赫西奥德及其追随者所叙述的事情了。结果是,诗人甚至是捏造出来的,他们表面上知道自己在谈论什么。这与离子将诗歌描述为受启发的无知并不矛盾。
Does the critique of poetry in the Republic extend beyond the
project of founding the just city in speech? I have already suggested
an affirmative answer when discussing book II. The concerns about
poetry expressed in books III and X would also extend beyond the
immediate project of the dialogue, if they carry any water at all,
even though the targets Plato names are of course taken from his own
times. It has been argued that the authority to speak truth that poets
claim is shared by many widely esteemed poets since
then.[23]
It has also been argued that the debate about the effects on the
audience of poetry continues, except that today it is not so much
poets strictly speaking, but the makers of others sorts of images in
the “mass media,” who are the culprits. Controversies
about, say, the effects of graphic depictions of violence, of the
degradation of women, and of sex, echo the Platonic worries about the
ethical and social effects of art. At least in cases such as these, we
retain Plato’s skepticism about the notion of “aesthetic
distance.”[24]
《民国》对诗歌的批判是否超出了建立言论正义之城的范围?我在讨论第二本书时已经提出了肯定的答案。第三卷和第十卷中表达的对诗歌的担忧也将超出对话的直接计划,如果它们有任何意义的话,即使目标柏拉图的名字当然取自他自己的时代。有人认为,自那时以来,许多广受尊敬的诗人都拥有诗人所声称的说出真相的权威。 [ 23 ]也有人认为,关于诗歌对受众的影响的争论仍在继续,只不过今天严格意义上来说,影响的对象不再是诗人,而是“大众媒体”中其他类型形象的创造者。罪魁祸首。例如,关于暴力、妇女堕落和性的图形描绘的影响的争议,呼应了柏拉图式对艺术的伦理和社会影响的担忧。至少在这些例子中,我们保留了柏拉图对“审美距离”概念的怀疑态度。 [ 24 ]
4. Gorgias 4.高尔吉亚
The Gorgias is one of Plato’s most bitter dialogues in
that the exchanges are at times full of anger, of uncompromising
disagreement, plenty of misunderstanding, and cutting rhetoric. In
these respects it goes beyond even the Protagoras, a dialogue
that depicts a hostile confrontation between Socrates and the renowned
sophist by the same
name.[25]
The quarrel between philosophy and rhetoric shows itself as an ugly
fight in the Gorgias.
《高尔吉亚篇》是柏拉图最痛苦的对话之一,其中的交流有时充满了愤怒、不妥协的分歧、大量的误解和尖锐的言辞。在这些方面,它甚至超越了《普罗泰戈拉》 ,这部对话描绘了苏格拉底和同名的著名诡辩家之间的敌对对抗。 [ 25 ]哲学与修辞之间的争论在《高尔吉亚》中表现为一场丑陋的斗争。
What is the fight about? Socrates asks Gorgias to define what it is
that he does, that is, to define rhetoric. And he asks him to do it in
a way that helps to distinguish rhetorical from philosophical
discourse: the former produces speeches of praise and blame, the
latter answers questions through the give and take of discussion
(dialegesthai, 448d10) in an effort to arrive at a concise
definition, and more broadly, with the intent to understand the
subject. The philosopher is happy to be refuted if that leads to
better understanding; wisdom, and not just striving to
“win” the argument, is the goal (457e-458a).
战斗是为了什么呢?苏格拉底要求高尔吉亚定义他所做的是什么,即定义修辞学。他要求他以一种有助于区分修辞和哲学话语的方式来做这件事:前者产生赞扬和责备的言论,后者通过讨论的给予和接受来回答问题( dialegesthai ,448d10),以努力达成一个简洁的定义,更广泛地,旨在理解该主题。哲学家很乐意被反驳,如果这能带来更好的理解;智慧,而不仅仅是努力“赢得”争论,才是目标(457e-458a)。
Gorgias is forced by successive challenges to move from the view that
rhetoric is concerned with words (speeches) to the view that its
activity and effectiveness happen only in and through words (unlike
the manual arts) to the view that its object is the greatest of human
concerns, namely freedom. Rhetoric is “the source of freedom for
humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source
of rule over others in one’s own city” (452d6–8).
This freedom is a kind of power produced by the ability to persuade
others to do one’s bidding; “rhetoric is a producer of
persuasion. Its whole business comes to that, and that’s the
long and short of it” (453a2–3). But persuasion about what
exactly? Gorgias’ answer is: about matters concerning justice
and injustice (454b7). But surely there are two kinds of persuasion,
one that instills beliefs merely, and another that produces knowledge;
it is the former only with which rhetoric is concerned. The analogy of
this argument to the critique of poetry is already clear; in both
cases, Socrates wants to argue that the speaker is not a truth
speaker, and does not convey knowledge to his audience. As already
noted, Socrates classifies poetry (dithyrambic and tragic poetry are
named) as a species of rhetoric. Its goal is to gratify and please the
spectator, or differently put, it is just a kind of flattery. Strip
away the rhythm and meter, and you have plain prose directed at the
mob. It’s a kind of public speaking, that’s all
(502a6–c12).
高尔吉亚在接二连三的挑战中被迫从“修辞学与文字(言语)有关”的观点转变为“修辞学的活动和有效性只能在文字中并通过文字发生(与手工艺术不同)”,再到“修辞学的对象是最伟大的”这一观点。人类关心的问题,即自由。修辞是“人类本身自由的源泉,同时它也是每个人在自己的城市中统治他人的源泉”(452d6-8)。这种自由是一种由说服他人听从自己命令的能力所产生的力量; “修辞是说服力的产生者。整个事情就是这样,这就是它的长处和短处”(453a2-3)。但说服到底是什么?高尔吉亚的回答是:关于正义与非正义的问题(454b7)。但肯定有两种说服,一种仅仅灌输信念,另一种产生知识。修辞学只关心前者。这个论证与诗歌批评的类比已经很清楚了。在这两种情况下,苏格拉底都想论证说话者不是真理的说话者,并且没有向听众传达知识。正如已经指出的,苏格拉底将诗歌(被称为酒神诗和悲剧诗)归类为修辞学的一种。其目的是为了让观众满意、取悦,或者换句话说,这只是一种阿谀奉承。去掉节奏和韵律,你就会得到针对暴民的平淡的散文。这是一种公开演讲,仅此而已(502a6-c12)。
The rhetorician is a maker of beliefs in the souls of his auditors
(455a3–4). And without that skill—here Gorgias begins to
wax at length and eloquently—other arts (such as medicine)
cannot do their work effectively (456b ff.). Rhetoric is a
comprehensive art. But Gorgias offers a crucial qualification that
turns out to contribute to his downfall: rhetoric should not be used
against any and everybody, any more than skill in boxing should be.
Although the rhetorician teaches others to use the skill justly, it is
always possible for the student to misuse it. This is followed by
another damaging admission: the rhetorician knows what justice,
injustice, and other moral qualities are, and teaches them to the
student if the student is ignorant of them (460a). It would follow
that, in Socrates’ language, the true rhetorician is a
philosopher; and in fact that is a position Socrates takes in the
Phaedrus. But Gorgias is not a philosopher and does not in
fact know—cannot give an account of—the moral qualities in
question. So his art is all about appearing, in the eyes of the
ignorant, to know about these topics, and then persuading them as is
expedient (cf. 459d-e). But this is not something Gorgias wishes to
admit; indeed, he allows himself to agree that since the rhetorician
knows what justice is, he must be a just man and therefore acts justly
(460b-c). He is caught in a contradiction: he claimed that a student
who had acquired the art of rhetoric could use it unjustly, but now
claims that the rhetorician could not commit injustice.
修辞学家是听众灵魂信仰的创造者(455a3-4)。如果没有这种技能——高尔吉亚在这里开始详细而雄辩地阐述——其他艺术(例如医学)就无法有效地发挥作用(456b ff.)。修辞学是一门综合性的艺术。但高尔吉亚提出了一个至关重要的条件,结果却导致了他的垮台:修辞不应该用来对付任何人和所有人,就像拳击技巧不应该一样。尽管修辞学家教导别人正确地使用这项技能,但学生总是有可能误用它。接下来是另一个具有破坏性的承认:修辞学家知道什么是正义、不正义和其他道德品质,如果学生不了解它们,就会将它们教给学生(460a)。由此可见,用苏格拉底的话来说,真正的修辞学家是哲学家。事实上,这就是苏格拉底在《斐德罗篇》中所采取的立场。但高尔吉亚不是哲学家,事实上他并不知道——也无法解释——所讨论的道德品质。因此,他的艺术就是在无知者的眼中出现,了解这些主题,然后以权宜之计说服他们(参见459d-e)。但这并不是高尔吉亚愿意承认的事情。事实上,他允许自己同意,既然修辞学家知道什么是正义,那么他一定是一个正义的人,因此也会正义地行事(460b-c)。他陷入了一个矛盾之中:他声称获得修辞艺术的学生可以不公正地使用它,但现在又声称修辞学家不能做出不公正的事情。
All this is just too much for Gorgias’ student Polus, whose
angry intervention marks the second and much more bitter stage of the
dialogue (461b3). A new point emerges that is consistent with the
claim that rhetoricians do not know or convey knowledge, viz. that it
is not an art or craft (techne) but a mere knack
(empeiria, or experience). Socrates adds that its object is
to produce gratification. To develop the point, Socrates produces a
striking schema distinguishing between care of the body and care of
the soul. Medicine and gymnastics truly care for the body, cookery and
cosmetics pretend to but do not. Politics is the art that cares for
the soul; justice and legislation are its branches, and the imitations
of each are rhetoric and sophistry. As medicine stands to cookery, so
justice to rhetoric; as gymnastics to cosmetics, so legislation to
sophistry. The true forms of caring are arts (technai) aiming
at the good; the false, knacks aiming at pleasure (464b-465d). Let us
note that sophistry and rhetoric are very closely allied here;
Socrates notes that they are distinct but closely related and
therefore often confused by people (465c). What exactly their
distinction consists in is not clear, either in Plato’s
discussions of the matter, or historically. Socrates’s polemic
here is intended to apply to them both, as both are (alleged) to
amount to a knack for persuasion of the ignorant by the ignorant with
a view to producing pleasure in the audience and the pleasures of
power for the speaker.
所有这些对于高尔吉亚的学生波卢斯来说实在是难以承受,他愤怒的干预标志着对话的第二个也是更加痛苦的阶段(461b3)。出现了一个新观点,它与修辞学家不知道或传达知识的主张是一致的,即。它不是一种艺术或工艺( techne ),而仅仅是一种技巧( empeiria ,或经验)。苏格拉底补充说,其目标是产生满足感。为了阐述这一点,苏格拉底提出了一个引人注目的图式,区分了对身体的关怀和对灵魂的关怀。医学和体操真正保健身体,烹饪和化妆品假装但没有。政治是关怀灵魂的艺术;司法和立法是它的分支,各自的模仿都是言辞和诡辩。正如医学之于烹饪,正义之于修辞;正如体操之于化妆品,立法之于诡辩。关怀的真正形式是旨在向善的艺术( technai );虚假的、旨在享乐的技巧(464b-465d)。让我们注意到,诡辩和修辞在这里密切相关。苏格拉底指出,它们是不同的,但密切相关,因此经常被人们混淆(465c)。无论是在柏拉图对这个问题的讨论中,还是在历史上,它们的区别到底是什么并不清楚。苏格拉底在这里的论战旨在适用于他们两者,因为两者(据称)都是无知者说服无知者的技巧,目的是为听众带来快乐,并为演讲者带来权力的快乐。
Socrates’ ensuing argument with Polus is complicated and long.
The nub of the matter concerns the relation between power and justice.
For Polus, the person who has power and wields it successfully is
happy. For Socrates, a person is happy only if he or she is (morally)
good, and an unjust or evil person is wretched—all the more so,
indeed, if they escape punishment for their misdeeds. Polus finds this
position “absurd” (473a1), and challenges Socrates to take
a poll of all present to confirm the point. In sum: Plato’s
suggestion is that rhetoric and sophistry are tied to substantive
theses about the irrelevance of moral truth to the happy life; about
the conventionality or relativity of morals; and about the irrelevance
of the sort of inquiry into the truth of the matter (as distinguished
from opinions or the results of polls) upon which Socrates keeps
insisting. Socrates argues for some of his most famous theses along
the way, such as the view that “the one who does what’s
unjust is always more miserable than the one who suffers it, and the
one who avoids paying what’s due always more miserable than the
one who does pay it” (479e4–6). And if these hold, what
use is there in rhetoric? For someone who wishes to avoid doing
himself and others harm, Socrates concludes, rhetoric is altogether
useless. Tied into logical knots, Polus succumbs.
苏格拉底随后与波卢斯的争论复杂而漫长。问题的核心在于权力与正义的关系。对于波卢斯来说,拥有权力并成功运用权力的人是幸福的。对于苏格拉底来说,一个人只有在(道德上)善良时才是幸福的,而一个不公正或邪恶的人则是不幸的——事实上,如果他们逃脱了对其罪行的惩罚,那就更是如此。波卢斯认为这个立场“荒谬”(473a1),并挑战苏格拉底对在场所有人进行民意调查以证实这一点。总之:柏拉图的建议是,修辞和诡辩与道德真理与幸福生活无关的实质性论点联系在一起;关于道德的约定性或相对性;以及苏格拉底一直坚持的对事情真相的那种调查(与意见或民意调查结果不同)的无关紧要。苏格拉底一路上论证了他最著名的一些论点,例如“做不义之事的人总是比受苦的人更痛苦,而逃避偿还应得之事的人总是比受苦的人更痛苦”。谁付钱”(479e4-6)。如果这些成立,那么修辞还有什么用呢?苏格拉底的结论是,对于那些希望避免伤害自己和他人的人来说,修辞是完全没有用的。由于陷入逻辑困境,波卢斯屈服了。
All this is just too much for yet another interlocutor in the
dialogue, Callicles. The rhetoric of the Gorgias reaches its
most bitter stage. Callicles presents himself as a no-holds-barred,
bare-knuckled, clear-headed advocate of Realpolitik, as we
would now call it. Telling it like it is, he draws a famous
distinction between nature and convention, and advances a thesis
familiar to readers of Republic books I and II: “But I
believe that nature itself reveals that it’s a just thing for
the better man and the more capable man to have a greater share than
the worse man and the less capable man. Nature shows that this is so
in many places; both among the other animals and in whole cities and
races of men, it shows that this is what justice has been decided to
be: that the superior rule the inferior and have a greater share than
they” (483c8–d6). This is the “law of nature”
(483e3; perhaps the first occurrence in Western philosophy of this
famous phrase). Conventional talk of justice, fairness, not taking
more than is your share, not pursuing your individual best
interest—these are simply ways by which the weak seek to enslave
the strong. The art of rhetoric is all about empowering those who are
strong by nature to master the weak by nature.
对于对话中的另一位对话者卡里克勒斯来说,这一切实在是难以承受。 《高尔吉亚》的修辞达到了最苦涩的阶段。卡里克勒斯将自己描绘成一位无拘无束、赤裸裸、头脑清醒的现实政治(我们现在称之为现实政治)的拥护者。实事求是地讲,他在自然与习俗之间做出了著名的区分,并提出了《共和国》第一卷和第二卷的读者所熟悉的论点:“但我相信,自然本身表明,对于更好的人和更多的人来说,这是一件公正的事情。有能力的人比能力差和能力差的人拥有更多的份额。大自然表明,在许多地方都是如此。无论是在其他动物中,还是在整个城市和人类种族中,它都表明正义已被决定:上级统治下级,并比他们拥有更多的份额”(483c8-d6)。这就是“自然法则”(483e3;这句著名短语也许是西方哲学中第一次出现)。传统意义上的正义、公平、不夺取过多、不追求个人最大利益,这些都是弱者奴役强者的手段。修辞的艺术就是让本性强的人征服本性弱的人。
Callicles’ famous diatribe includes an indictment of philosophy
as a childish occupation that, if pursued past youth, interferes with
the manly pursuit of power, fosters contemptible ignorance of how the
real political world works, and renders its possessor effeminate and
defenseless. His example is none other than Socrates; philosophy will
(he says prophetically) render Socrates helpless should he be
indicted. Helplessness in the face of the stupidity of the hoi
polloi is disgraceful and pathetic (486a-c). By contrast, what
would it mean to have power? Callicles is quite explicit: power is the
ability to fulfill whatever desire you have. Power is freedom, freedom
is license (492a-c). The capacity to do what one wants is fulfillment
in the sense of the realization of pleasure. Rhetoric is a means to
that end.
卡里克勒斯著名的谩骂包括对哲学的控诉,认为哲学是一种幼稚的职业,如果在年轻时就追求这种职业,就会干扰男子气概对权力的追求,助长对现实政治世界如何运作的可鄙无知,并使其拥有者变得女性化和毫无防备。他的榜样就是苏格拉底。如果苏格拉底受到起诉,哲学将(他预言性地)使他变得无助。面对民众的愚蠢而无助是可耻和可悲的(486a-c)。相比之下,拥有权力意味着什么?卡里克勒斯说得非常明确:权力就是满足你任何愿望的能力。权力就是自由,自由就是许可(492a-c)。做自己想做的事情的能力就是实现快乐意义上的满足。修辞是达到这一目的的手段。
The quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy, thus understood,
ultimately addresses a range of fundamental issues.
“Rhetoric” is taken here to constitute an entire world
view. Its quarrel with philosophy is comprehensive, and bears on the
nature of nature; the existence of objective moral norms; the
connection (if any) between happiness and virtue; the nature and
limits of reason; the value of reason (understood as the rational
pursuit of objective purpose) in a human life; the nature of the soul
or self; and the question as to whether there is a difference between
true and false pleasure, i.e., whether pleasure is the good. It is
striking that while Socrates wants to contrast
“rhetorical” speech-making with his own approach of
philosophical dialogue, in practice the differences blur. Socrates too
starts to speak at length, sounds rhetorical at times, and ends the
discussion with a myth. Callicles advances a substantive position
(grounded in a version of the distinction between nature and
convention) and defends it. These transgressions of rhetorical genres
to one side, from Socrates’ standpoint the ultimate
philosophical question at stake concerns how one should live
one’s life (500c). Is the life of “politics,”
understood as the pursuit of power and glory, superior to the life of
philosophy?
由此理解,修辞与哲学之间的争论最终解决了一系列基本问题。这里的“修辞”是指构成整个世界观。它与哲学的争论是全面的,涉及自然的本质;客观道德规范的存在;幸福与美德之间的联系(如果有的话);理性的本质和局限性;人类生活中理性的价值(理解为对客观目的的理性追求);灵魂或自我的本质;以及关于真快乐和假快乐是否有区别的问题,即快乐是否是善。令人惊讶的是,虽然苏格拉底想要将“修辞性”演讲与他自己的哲学对话方法进行对比,但实际上差异却很模糊。苏格拉底也开始长篇大论,有时听起来很修辞,并以神话结束讨论。卡里克勒斯提出了一个实质性立场(基于自然与惯例之间的区别)并为其辩护。从苏格拉底的立场来看,这些修辞流派的越界,最终的哲学问题涉及一个人应该如何过自己的生活(500c)。被理解为追求权力和荣耀的“政治”生活是否优于哲学生活?
Readers of the dialogue will differ as to whether or not the arguments
there offered decide the matter. The nub of the debate is as current
today, both in academic and non-academic contexts, as it was in
Plato’s
day.[26]
Even though poetry is here cast as a species of rhetoric, a good deal
of work would have to be done to show that the substantive theses to
which poetry is committed, according to the Republic, are the
same as the substantive theses to which rhetoric is committed,
according to the Gorgias.
对话的读者对于其中提供的论点是否决定了问题会有不同看法。这场争论的核心在今天无论是在学术界还是非学术界都依然存在,就像柏拉图时代一样。 [ 26 ]尽管诗歌在此被视为一种修辞学,但根据《理想国》,仍需做大量的工作来表明诗歌所致力于的实质论点与所要表达的实质论点是相同的。根据高尔吉亚的说法,这是犯了哪些修辞。
Is all of rhetoric bad? Are we to avoid—indeed, can we
avoid—rhetoric altogether? Even in the Gorgias, as we
have seen, there is a distinction between rhetoric that instills
belief, and rhetoric that instills knowledge, and later in the
dialogue a form of noble rhetoric is mentioned, though no examples of
its practitioners can be found (503a-b). The Phaedrus offers
a more detailed explanation of this distinction.
所有的修辞都是不好的吗?我们是否要避免——事实上,我们可以完全避免——言辞吗?即使在《高尔吉亚》中,正如我们所看到的,灌输信仰的修辞和灌输知识的修辞之间也有区别,后来在对话中提到了一种高贵修辞的形式,尽管找不到它的实践者的例子(503a) -b)。 《斐德罗篇》对这种区别提供了更详细的解释。
5. Phaedrus
5.斐德若
Readers of the Phaedrus have often wondered how the dialogue
hangs together. The first “half” seems to be about love,
and the second about rhetoric. A slightly closer look reveals that any
such simple characterization is misleading, because the first half is
also about rhetoric, in several different ways. To begin with, the
first half of the dialogue contains explicit reflections on rhetoric;
for example, Socrates draws the distinction between what we would call
the “form” and the “content” of a discourse
(235a). Still further, it consists in part in three speeches, at least
the first of which (“Lysias’ speech”) is a
rhetorical set-piece. The other two are rhetorical as well, and
presented as efforts to persuade a young beloved. All three are justly
viewed as rhetorical masterstrokes by Plato, but for different
reasons. The first is a brilliantly executed parody of the style of
Lysias (an orator and speech writer of significant repute). The second
speech simultaneously preserves aspects of its fictional frame (the
first was a paradoxical sounding address by a “non-lover”
to a “beloved”), develops that frame (the non-lover is
transformed into a concealed lover), and deepens the themes in an
impressive and philosophically enlightening way. The third (referred
to as the “palinode” or recantation speech) contains some
of the most beautiful and powerful images in all of Greek literature.
It is mostly an allegory cast in the form of a myth, and tells the
story of true love and of the soul’s journeys in the cosmos
human and divine. That is, the rhetoric of the great palinode is
markedly “poetic.” Especially noteworthy for present
purposes is the fact that the theme of inspiration is repeatedly
invoked in the first half of the dialogue; poetic inspiration is
explicitly
discussed.[27]
《斐德罗篇》的读者经常想知道对话是如何联系在一起的。前“一半”似乎是关于爱情,第二个“一半”是关于修辞。稍微仔细观察就会发现,任何这样简单的描述都会产生误导,因为前半部分也以几种不同的方式与修辞有关。首先,对话的前半部分包含了对修辞的明确反思;例如,苏格拉底区分了我们所说的话语的“形式”和“内容”(235a)。此外,它部分由三个演讲组成,至少其中第一个(“莉西亚斯的演讲”)是一个修辞布景。另外两则也是修辞性的,表现为说服年轻恋人的努力。这三者都被柏拉图公正地视为修辞大师,但出于不同的原因。第一个是对吕西亚斯(Lysias)(一位享有盛誉的演说家和演讲作家)风格的出色模仿。第二个演讲同时保留了其虚构框架的各个方面(第一个演讲是“非情人”对“所爱的人”的听起来自相矛盾的讲话),发展了该框架(非情人转变为隐藏的情人),并加深了以令人印象深刻且具有哲学启发性的方式表达主题。第三部分(称为“palinode”或放弃信仰的演讲)包含了所有希腊文学中一些最美丽和最有力的形象。它主要是一个神话形式的寓言,讲述了真爱的故事以及灵魂在人类和神圣宇宙中的旅程。也就是说,伟大的帕利诺德的修辞明显是“诗意的”。就目前的目的而言,特别值得注意的是,对话的前半部分反复引用了灵感的主题;明确讨论了诗意灵感。[ 27 ]
The themes of poetry and rhetoric, then, are intertwined in the
Phaedrus. It looks initially as though both rhetoric and
poetry have gained significant stature, at least relative to their
status in the Ion, Republic, and Gorgias. I
will begin by focusing primarily on rhetoric, and then turn to the
question of poetry, even though the two themes are closely connected
in this dialogue.
因此,诗歌和修辞的主题在《斐德罗篇》中交织在一起。乍一看,修辞学和诗歌似乎都获得了显着的地位,至少相对于它们在《伊恩》、 《共和国》和《高尔吉亚》中的地位而言是这样。我将首先主要关注修辞学,然后转向诗歌问题,尽管这两个主题在这次对话中紧密相连。
5.1 Rhetoric in the Phaedrus
5.1 《斐德罗篇》中的修辞
The second “half” of the dialogue does not discuss the
nature of love thematically, at any length, but it does in effect
propose that discourse prompted by the love of
wisdom—philosophy—is true rhetoric. As the conversation
between one “lover of speeches” (228c1–2) and
another evolves, the three rhetorical speeches of the first part of
the dialogue are examined from the perspective of their rhetorical
artlessness or artfulness. Poetry is once again cast as a kind of
speech making (258b3) and, very importantly, Socrates declares that
“It’s not speaking or writing well that’s shameful;
what’s really shameful is to engage in either of them shamefully
or badly”
(258d4–5).[28]
The proffering of discourses is not in and of itself shameful; what
then constitutes honorable speech making?
对话的后“半部分”并没有在主题上以任何长度讨论爱的本质,但它实际上提出,由对智慧(哲学)的爱所引发的话语是真正的修辞。随着一个“演讲爱好者”(228c1-2)与另一个“演讲爱好者”之间对话的发展,对话第一部分的三个修辞演讲从其修辞的纯朴或巧妙的角度进行审视。诗歌再次被视为一种演讲(258b3),而且非常重要的是,苏格拉底宣称“可耻的不是说或写得好;而是说得好或写得不好才是可耻的”。真正可耻的是可耻地或糟糕地从事其中任何一个”(258d4-5)。 [ 28 ]开示本身并不可耻;那么什么才算是尊贵的演讲呢?
The answer to this crucial question constitutes one of the most famous
contributions to the topic. In essence, Socrates argues that someone
who is going to speak well and nobly must know the truth about the
subject he is going to discuss. The sort of theory Polus and Callicles
maintained in the Gorgias is false (see Phaedrus
259e4–260a4). In order to make good on this sweeping claim,
Socrates argues that rhetoric is an “art” (techne), and
not just artless practice (the equivalent of the
“empeiria” for which rhetoric was condemned in the
Gorgias). How to show that it is an art after all? Quite a
number of claimants to rhetoric are named and reviewed, and readers
who have an interest in the history of Greek rhetoric rightly find
these passages invaluable. We are told here that the extant manuals of
rhetoric offer the “preliminaries” to the true art of
rhetoric, not the thing itself (269b7–8).
这个关键问题的答案构成了该主题最著名的贡献之一。从本质上讲,苏格拉底认为,一个想要讲得好、高尚的人必须知道他将要讨论的主题的真相。波卢斯和卡里克勒斯在《高尔吉亚篇》中所坚持的那种理论是错误的(见《斐德罗》 259e4-260a4)。为了兑现这一全面的主张,苏格拉底认为修辞是一门“艺术”(techne),而不仅仅是朴素的实践(相当于《高尔吉亚篇》中修辞被谴责的“empeiria”)。如何证明它毕竟是一门艺术?相当多的修辞学主张者都被点名和评论,对希腊修辞学历史感兴趣的读者理所当然地发现这些段落非常有价值。这里告诉我们,现存的修辞手册为真正的修辞艺术提供了“预备”,而不是修辞本身(269b7-8)。
Many rhetoricians have artfully and effectively misled their
audiences, and Socrates argues—somewhat implausibly
perhaps—that in order to mislead one cannot oneself be
misled.[29]
An artful speech exhibits its artfulness in its structure, one
that—since in the best case it embodies the truth—retraces
or mirrors the natural divisions of the subject matter itself. It will
not only be coherent, but structured in a way that mirrors the way the
subject itself is naturally organized. In one of Socrates’ most
famous images, a good composition should exhibit the organic unity of
a living creature, “with a body of its own; it must be neither
without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and
extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole
work” (264c1–5). This will not be truly accomplished if it
only looks that way; to be that way, a
discourse’s unity should reflect the unity of its subject.
许多修辞学家巧妙而有效地误导了他们的听众,苏格拉底认为——也许有些难以置信——为了误导一个人,自己不能被误导。 [ 29 ]一场巧妙的演讲在其结构中展现了其巧妙性,因为在最好的情况下它体现了真理,所以它回溯或反映了主题本身的自然划分。它不仅是连贯的,而且其结构方式也反映了主题本身的自然组织方式。在苏格拉底最著名的形象之一中,一个好的构图应该展现生物的有机统一,“有自己的身体;它必须既不是没有头,也不是没有腿;它必须有一个中部和四肢,既相互配合又与整个作品配合”(264c1-5)。如果只是看起来那样,那是不可能真正实现的。为此,话语的统一性应该反映其主体的统一性。
At this point we might want to ask about the audience; after
all, the rhetorician is trying to persuade someone of something. Might
not the speaker know the truth of the matter, and know how to embody
it artfully in a composition, but fail to persuade anyone of it? Would
not a failure to persuade indicate that the speaker lacks the complete
art of rhetoric? Socrates in effect responds to this question by
postulating that the successful speaker must also know the nature of
the human soul, else his skill is just “empeiria” (the
term from the Gorgias again) rather than “techne”
(270b6). Just as an expert physician must understand both the human
body and the body of medical knowledge—these being
inseparable—so too the expert speaker must understand both the
human soul and what is known about the soul. The reader will
immediately recall that the great speech (the palinode) in the first
half of the Phaedrus was about the soul in its cosmic
context—the soul’s nature, its journeys divine and human,
its longings, the objects of its longings, its failures and their
consequences, were all part of the same story. Thus it is not
surprising that when defining the art of rhetoric Socrates suggests
that we cannot “reach a serious understanding of the nature of
the soul without understanding the nature of the world as a
whole” (270c1–2). The consequence of this approach to
rhetoric has now become clear: to possess that art, one must be a
philosopher. True rhetoric is philosophical discourse.
此时我们可能想询问一下观众;毕竟,修辞学家正在试图说服某人相信某件事。也许说话者不知道事情的真相,并且知道如何巧妙地将其体现在文章中,但无法说服任何人?无法说服,岂不是说明说话者缺乏完整的修辞艺术吗?苏格拉底实际上是通过假设成功的演讲者还必须了解人类灵魂的本质来回答这个问题,否则他的技能只是“empeiria”(再次来自高尔吉亚的术语)而不是“techne”(270b6)。正如专家医生必须了解人体和医学知识体系(它们是不可分割的)一样,专家演讲者也必须了解人类灵魂和对灵魂的了解。读者会立即回想起《斐德罗篇》前半部分的伟大演讲(古节)是关于宇宙背景下的灵魂的——灵魂的本质、它的神圣和人类之旅、它的渴望、它渴望的对象、它的失败及其后果,都是同一个故事的一部分。因此,苏格拉底在定义修辞艺术时指出,我们“如果不了解整个世界的本质,就无法对灵魂的本质进行认真的理解”(270c1-2),这并不奇怪。这种修辞方法的后果现在已经很清楚了:要拥有这种艺术,一个人必须是一名哲学家。真正的修辞是哲学话语。
But what happened to the question about the audience? “The
soul” is not the addressee of a rhetorical discourse. Socrates
responds that the artful rhetorician must also know what the types of
soul are, what sorts of speeches “work” on each type, and
be able to identify which type is being addressed on the given
occasion. This last demand is a matter of practice and of the ability
to size up the audience on the spot, as it were. The requirements of
the true art of rhetoric, which Socrates also calls the “art of
dialectic” (276e5–6), are very high indeed. (The reader
will find them summarized at 277b5–c6).
但是关于观众的问题怎么了? “灵魂”不是修辞话语的对象。苏格拉底回应说,巧妙的修辞学家还必须知道灵魂的类型是什么,什么样的演讲对每种类型“有效”,并且能够识别在特定场合所针对的是哪种类型。最后一个要求是一个练习问题,也是一个现场评估观众的能力的问题。真正的修辞艺术,苏格拉底也称之为“辩证法的艺术”(276e5-6),其要求确实非常高。 (读者会在 277b5-c6 中找到它们的总结)。
If the audience is philosophical, or includes philosophers, how would
the true, artful, philosophical dialectician address it? This question
is not faced head-on in the Phaedrus, but we are given a
number of clues. They are introduced by means of a myth—by a
kind of “poetry,” if you will—and they help us
understand the sort of discourse a philosopher will on the whole wish
to avoid, namely that which is written. According to
reflections inaugurated by the Theuth and Thamus myth, the written
word is not the most suitable vehicle for communicating truth, because
it cannot answer questions put to it; it simply repeats itself when
queried; it tends to substitute the authority of the author for the
reader’s open minded inquiry into the truth; and it circulates
everywhere indiscriminately, falling into the hands of people who
cannot understand it. Very importantly, it interferes with true
“recollection” (anamnesis, 249c2), that process
described at length and (for the most part) poetically in the
dialogue’s “palinode,” by which the knowledge latent
in the soul is brought out through question and answer (274d-275b).
Writing is a clumsy medium, and thus would not match the potential
effectiveness of philosophical give and take, the “Socratic
dialogue” which best leads the philosophical mind to truth. This
desirable rhetoric is “a discourse that is written down, with
knowledge, in the soul of the listener; it can defend itself, and it
knows for whom it should speak and for whom it should remain
silent” (276a5–7). Dialectical speech is accompanied by
knowledge, can defend itself when questioned, and is productive of
knowledge in its audience (276e4–277a4). Of course, all this
raises the question as to the status of Plato’s dialogues, since
they are themselves writings; we will return to it briefly below.
如果观众是哲学的,或者包括哲学家,那么真正的、巧妙的、哲学的辩证法家会如何解决这个问题? 《斐德罗篇》没有正面面对这个问题,但给了我们一些线索。它们是通过神话——通过一种“诗歌”,如果你愿意的话——引入的,它们帮助我们理解哲学家总体上希望避免的那种话语,即书面的话语。根据特乌斯和塔姆斯神话所引发的反思,书面文字并不是传达真理的最合适的工具,因为它无法回答向其提出的问题;当被查询时,它只是简单地重复;它倾向于用作者的权威来代替读者对真理的开放探究;它不分青红皂白地到处流通,落入无法理解的人们手中。非常重要的是,它干扰了真正的“回忆”(回忆,249c2),这个过程在对话的“古节”中被详细地和(大部分)诗意地描述,通过这个过程,潜藏在灵魂中的知识通过问题和答案(274d-275b)。写作是一种笨拙的媒介,因此无法与哲学给予和接受的潜在有效性相匹配,而“苏格拉底式对话”最能引导哲学思想走向真理。这种令人向往的修辞是“一种用知识写在听众灵魂中的话语;它可以保卫自己,并且知道应该为谁说话以及应该为谁保持沉默”(276a5-7)。辩证的言语伴随着知识,在受到质疑时可以为自己辩护,并且可以为听众提供知识(276e4-277a4)。 当然,所有这些都提出了柏拉图对话录的地位问题,因为它们本身就是著作。我们将在下面简要地回顾这一点。
Rhetoric is the art of “directing the soul by means of
speech” (261a8). Popular rhetoric is not an art, but a knack for
persuasion. Artful rhetoric requires philosophy; but does philosophy
require rhetoric? Why must philosophical discourse—say, as
exemplified in “Socratic dialogue”—have anything to
do with rhetoric? The Phaedrus points to the interesting
thought that all discourse is rhetorical, even when the
speaker is simply trying to communicate the truth—indeed, true
rhetoric is the art of communicating the truth (notice the broad sweep
of the discussion of discourse at 277e5–278b4). Rhetoric is
present wherever and whenever people speak (261d10–e4 and
context). Even when one is not sure what the truth is, and even when
one is thinking through something by oneself—carrying on an
inner dialogue, as it were—discourse and persuasion are
present.[30]
Of course, a philosopher will question assertions that he or she
ought to persuaded of X; but that questioning too, the
Phaedrus suggests, is part of a process aimed at warranted
persuasion, and inevitably involves a mix of the
“persuadability” of the philosopher on the one hand, and
the truth (or falsity) of the claims on the other. The bottom line is
that there is no escaping from persuasion, and so none from
rhetoric—including of course from the very problem of
distinguishing between warranted and unwarranted persuasion.
Self-deception is an ever-present possibility (as Socrates implies
here, and notes at Cratylus 428d). That is a problem about
which the philosopher above all worries about. It is always a question
of “directing the soul by means of speech,” even where
it’s a matter of the soul directing or leading itself (or to use
a phrase from earlier in the dialogue, moving itself
(245e)).[31]
修辞学是“通过言语引导灵魂”的艺术(261a8)。流行修辞不是一门艺术,而是一种说服的技巧。巧妙的修辞需要哲学;但哲学需要修辞吗?为什么哲学话语——比如“苏格拉底对话”中的例子——必须与修辞有关? 《斐德罗篇》指出了一个有趣的想法,即所有话语都是修辞性的,即使说话者只是想传达真理——事实上,真正的修辞是传达真理的艺术(注意 277e5-278b4 中话语讨论的广泛范围) )。无论何时何地,人们说话时都会出现修辞(261d10-e4 和上下文)。即使当一个人不确定真相是什么时,即使当一个人在自己思考某件事时——可以说是进行一场内心对话——话语和说服也是存在的。 [ 30 ]当然,哲学家会质疑他或她应该说服 X 的断言;但《斐德罗篇》认为,这种质疑也是旨在进行有根据的说服的过程的一部分,并且不可避免地涉及一方面哲学家的“说服力”与另一方面主张的真实性(或虚假性)的混合。 。底线是,说服是无法逃避的,因此修辞也无法逃避——当然也包括区分有根据的说服和无根据的说服的问题本身。自欺欺人是一种永远存在的可能性(正如苏格拉底在这里暗示的那样,并在Cratylus 428d 中指出)。这是哲学家最担心的问题。 这始终是一个“通过言语引导灵魂”的问题,即使这是灵魂引导或引导自身的问题(或者使用对话中前面的短语,移动自己(245e))。[ 31 ]
The Gorgias’ notion that the struggle between (popular)
rhetoric and philosophy—or as we might say, unphilosophical and
philosophical rhetoric—is one between comprehensive outlooks is
clear from the Phaedrus as well. The “great
speech” or palinode of the dialogue illustrates the character
and range of views upon which the project of philosophical rhetoric
(of philosophy, in short) is built. The speech is quite explicitly a
retraction of an outlook that does not espouse these views; ordinary
rhetoric moves in a very different moral, metaphysical, psychological,
and epistemic world. It is an interesting fact that Plato deploys
certain elements of poetry (such as myth, allegory, simile, image) in
drawing the contrast between these outlooks.
高尔吉亚认为(流行的)修辞与哲学之间的斗争(或者我们可以说,非哲学修辞与哲学修辞之间的斗争)是全面观点之间的斗争,这一点在《斐德罗篇》中也很清楚。对话中的“伟大演讲”或回文阐明了哲学修辞(简而言之,哲学)项目所建立的特征和观点范围。这篇演讲相当明确地收回了不支持这些观点的观点;普通修辞在一个非常不同的道德、形而上学、心理和认知世界中运作。有趣的是,柏拉图运用了诗歌的某些元素(例如神话、寓言、明喻、意象)来对比这些观点。
5.2 Rhapsodes, Inspiration, and Poetry in the Phaedrus
5.2 《斐德罗篇》中的狂想曲、灵感和诗歌
That poetry is itself a kind of persuasive discourse or rhetoric has
already been mentioned. It comes as no surprise to read that Socrates
indicts rhapsodes on the grounds that their speeches proceed
“without questioning and explanation” and “are given
only in order to produce conviction” (277e8–9). This
echoes the Ion’s charge that the rhapsodes do not know
what they are talking about. But what about the rationale that the
poets and rhapsodes are inspired?
前面已经提到,诗歌本身就是一种有说服力的话语或修辞。毫不奇怪,苏格拉底指控狂想曲的理由是他们的演讲“没有提问和解释”并且“只是为了产生信念”(277e8-9)。这呼应了离子的指控,即狂想者不知道他们在说什么。但诗人和吟游诗人受到启发的理由又是什么呢?
Inspiration comes up numerous times in the Phaedrus. It and
the related notions of Bacchic frenzy, madness, and possession are
invoked repeatedly almost from the start of the dialogue (228b), in
connection with Phaedrus’ allegedly inspiring recitation of
Lysias’ text (234d1–6), and as inspiring Socrates’s
two speeches (237a7–b1, 262d2–6, 263d1–3). These
references are uniformly playful, even at times joking. More serious
is the distinction between ordinary madness and divine madness, and
the defense of the superiority of divine madness, which
Socrates’ second speech sets out to defend. In particular, he
sets out to show that the madness of love or eros “is given us
by the gods to ensure our greatest good fortune”
(245b7–c1). The case is first made by noting that three species
of madness are already accepted: that of the prophets, that of certain
purifying or cathartic religious rites, and the third that inspiration
granted by the Muses that moves its possessor to poetry (244b-245a).
As noted, it begins to look as though a certain kind of poetry (the
inspired) is being rehabilitated.
《斐德罗篇》中多次出现灵感。它和酒神狂热、疯狂和占有的相关概念几乎从对话一开始就被反复引用(228b),与斐德罗据称鼓舞人心的对吕西亚斯文本的背诵(234d1-6)有关,并启发了苏格拉底的两个演讲(237a7-b1、262d2-6、263d1-3)。这些参考文献都非常有趣,甚至有时是开玩笑。更严重的是普通疯狂和神圣疯狂之间的区别,以及苏格拉底第二次演讲所要捍卫的神圣疯狂优越性的辩护。特别是,他着手表明爱或爱欲的疯狂“是众神赋予我们的,以确保我们最大的好运”(245b7-c1)。首先,我们注意到三种类型的疯狂已经被接受:先知的疯狂、某些净化或宣泄的宗教仪式的疯狂,以及第三种由缪斯赋予的灵感,将其拥有者感动为诗歌(244b-245a) 。如前所述,某种诗歌(受启发的诗歌)似乎开始得到复兴。
And yet when Socrates comes to classify kinds of lives a bit further
on, the poets (along with those who have anything to do with
mimesis) rank a low sixth out of nine, after the likes of
household managers, financiers, doctors, and prophets (248e1–2)!
The poet is just ahead of the manual laborer, sophist, and tyrant. The
philosopher comes in first, as the criterion for the ranking concerns
the level of knowledge of truth about the Ideas or Forms of which the
soul in question is capable. This hierarchy of lives could scarcely be
said to rehabilitate the poet. The Phaedrus quietly sustains
the critique of poetry, as well as (much less quietly) of
rhetoric.
然而,当苏格拉底进一步对生活类型进行分类时,诗人(以及那些与模仿有关的人)在九人中排名第六,排在家庭管理者、金融家、医生和先知之后(248e1-2)!诗人仅仅领先于体力劳动者、诡辩家和暴君。哲学家排在第一位,因为排名的标准涉及有关灵魂能够实现的理念或形式的真理知识水平。这种生活的等级制度很难说使诗人恢复了名誉。 《斐德罗篇》静静地支持着对诗歌以及(更不用说静静地)修辞的批评。
6. Plato’s Dialogues as Rhetoric and Poetry
6. 柏拉图的对话作为修辞学和诗歌
Plato’s critique of writing on the grounds that it is a poor
form of rhetoric is itself written. Of course, his Socrates does not
know that he is “speaking” in the context of a written
dialogue; but the reader immediately discerns the puzzle. Does the
critique apply to the dialogues themselves? If not, do the dialogues
escape the critique altogether, or meet it in part (being inferior to
“live” dialogue, but not liable to the full force of
Socrates’ criticisms)? Scholars dispute the answers to these
well-known
questions.[32]
柏拉图对写作的批评,理由是写作是一种糟糕的修辞形式,这本身就是写作的。当然,他的苏格拉底并不知道他是在书面对话的背景下“说话”;但读者立刻就看出了这个谜题。批评是否适用于对话本身?如果不是,那么这些对话是完全逃避了批评,还是部分地满足了批评(不如“现场”对话,但不受苏格拉底批评的全部影响)?学者们对这些众所周知的问题的答案存在争议。 [ 32 ]
There is general agreement that Plato perfected—perhaps even
invented—a new form of discourse. The Platonic dialogue is a
innovative type of rhetoric, and it is hard to believe that it does
not at all reflect—whether successfully or not is another
matter—Plato’s response to the criticisms of writing which
he puts into the mouth of his Socrates.
人们普遍认为柏拉图完善了——甚至发明了——一种新的话语形式。柏拉图对话是一种创新的修辞方式,很难相信它根本没有反映——成功与否是另一回事——柏拉图对他从苏格拉底口中提出的写作批评的回应。
Plato’s remarkable philosophical rhetoric incorporates elements
of poetry. Most obviously, his dialogues are dramas with several
formal features in common with much tragedy and comedy (for example,
the use of authorial irony, the importance of plot, setting, the role
of individual character and the interplay between dramatis
personae). No character called “Plato” ever says a
word in his texts. His works also narrate a number of myths, and
sparkle with imagery, simile, allegory, and snatches of meter and
rhyme. Indeed, as he sets out the city in speech in the
Republic, Socrates calls himself a myth teller
(376d9–10, 501e4–5). In a number of ways, the dialogues
may be said to be works of fiction; none of them took place exactly as
presented by Plato, several could not have taken place, some contain
characters who never existed. These are imaginary conversations,
imitations of certain kinds of philosophical conversations. As reader,
one is undoubtedly invited to see oneself reflected in various
characters, and to that extent identify with them, even while also
focusing on the arguments, exchanges, and speeches. Readers of Plato
often refer to the “literary” dimension of his writings,
or simply refer to them as a species of philosophical literature.
Exactly what to make of his appropriation of elements of poetry is
once again a matter of long discussion and
controversy.[33]
柏拉图非凡的哲学修辞融入了诗歌的元素。最明显的是,他的对话是戏剧,具有许多悲剧和喜剧共同的形式特征(例如,作者讽刺的使用,情节的重要性,背景,个人角色的作用以及戏剧人物之间的相互作用)。没有一个叫“柏拉图”的人物在他的文本中说过一句话。他的作品还讲述了许多神话,并闪烁着意象、明喻、寓言以及韵律和韵律的片段。事实上,当苏格拉底在《理想国》的演讲中阐述这座城市时,他称自己为神话讲述者(376d9-10、501e4-5)。从很多方面来说,这些对话都可以说是虚构的作品。其中没有一个完全按照柏拉图所描述的那样发生,有一些不可能发生,有些包含从未存在过的人物。这些是想象的对话,是对某些哲学对话的模仿。作为读者,毫无疑问,人们会被邀请看到自己在各种人物中的反映,并在某种程度上认同他们,即使同时也关注争论、交流和演讲。柏拉图的读者经常提到他的著作的“文学”维度,或者简单地将它们称为一种哲学文献。究竟如何理解他对诗歌元素的挪用,再次成为一个长期讨论和争议的问题。 [ 33 ]
Suffice it to say that Plato’s last word on the critique of
poetry and rhetoric is not spoken in his dialogues, but is embodied in
the dialogue form of writing he brought to perfection.
可以说,柏拉图关于诗歌和修辞学批判的最后一句话不是在他的对话中说出的,而是体现在他臻于完美的对话写作形式中。
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Acknowledgments 致谢
I am grateful to Nicola Moore for her help with the Bibliography, and
to Richard Kraut, Marina McCoy, and Stephen Scully for their excellent
comments on drafts of the text. I would also like to thank David
Roochnik for his help with various revisions along the way.
我感谢 Nicola Moore 在参考书目方面的帮助,感谢 Richard Kraut、Marina McCoy 和 Stephen Scully 对文本草稿的出色评论。我还要感谢 David Roochnik 在各种修改过程中提供的帮助。