LECTURE I  第一讲

WHAT I shall have to say here is neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I should like to claim for it is that of being true, at least in parts. The phenomenon to be discussed is very widespread and obvious, and it cannot fail to have been already noticed, at least here and there, by others. Yet I have not found attention paid to it specifically.
我在这里要说的既不困难，也不争论;我想声称的唯一优点是它是真实的，至少在部分上是这样。要讨论的现象非常普遍和明显，它不可能不被其他人注意到，至少在这里和那里。然而，我还没有发现它受到了特别的关注。

It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely. Grammarians, indeed, have regularly pointed out that not all ‘sentences’ are (used in making) statements: ${}^{\mathrm{I}}$${}^{\mathrm{I}}$^(I){ }^{\mathrm{I}} there are, traditionally, besides (grammarians’) statements, also questions and exclamations, and sentences expressing commands or wishes or concessions. And doubtless philosophers have not intended to deny this, despite some loose use of ‘sentence’ for ‘statement’. Doubtless, too, both grammarians and philosophers have been aware that it is by no means easy to distinguish even questions, commands, and so on from statements by means of the few and jejune grammatical marks available, such as word order, mood, and the like:
长期以来，哲学家们一直认为，“陈述”的任务只能是“描述”某种事态，或“陈述某种事实”，它必须真实或虚假地做到这一点。事实上，语法学家经常指出，并不是所有的 “句子” 都是（用于制作）陈述： ${}^{\mathrm{I}}$${}^{\mathrm{I}}$^(I){ }^{\mathrm{I}} 传统上，除了（语法学家的）陈述之外，还有疑问和感叹，以及表达命令、愿望或让步的句子。毫无疑问，哲学家们并不打算否认这一点，尽管有些人松散地使用“句子”来表示“陈述”。毫无疑问，语法学家和哲学家都已经意识到，通过为数不多的可用语法标记（如词序、语气等）将问题、命令等与陈述区分开来绝非易事：

though perhaps it has not been usual to dwell on the difficulties which this fact obviously raises. For how do we decide which is which? What are the limits and definitions of each?
虽然也许人们并不常常详述这一事实显然引起的困难。因为我们如何决定哪个是哪个？每个的限制和定义是什么？

But now in recent years, many things which would once have been accepted without question as ‘statements’ by both philosophers and grammarians have been scrutinized with new care. This scrutiny arose somewhat in-directly-at least in philosophy. First came the view, not always formulated without unfortunate dogmatism, that a statement (of fact) ought to be ‘verifiable’, and this led to the view that many ‘statements’ are only what may be called pseudo-statements. First and most obviously, many ‘statements’ were shown to be, as KANT perhaps first argued systematically, strictly nonsense, despite an unexceptionable grammatical form: and the continual discovery of fresh types of nonsense, unsystematic though their classification and mysterious though their explanation is too often allowed to remain, has done on the whole nothing but good. Yet we, that is, even philosophers, set some limits to the amount of nonsense that we are prepared to admit we talk: so that it was natural to go on to ask, as a second stage, whether many apparent pseudostatements really set out to be ‘statements’ at all. It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts: for example, ‘ethical propositions’ are perhaps intended, solely or partly, to evince
但现在，近年来，许多曾经被哲学家和语法学家毫无疑问地接受为“陈述”的东西，已经被重新审视了。这种审查在某种程度上是间接的——至少在哲学中是这样。首先是这样一种观点，即一个陈述（事实的）应该是“可验证的”，这导致了许多“陈述”只是可以被称为伪陈述的东西的观点。首先也是最明显的是，正如康德可能首先系统地论证的那样，许多“陈述”被证明是严格的胡说八道，尽管语法形式无可挑剔：而不断发现的新类型的胡说八道，尽管它们的分类是非系统的，尽管它们的解释往往被允许保留，但仍然神秘莫测，总的来说，除了好之外，什么都没有。然而，我们，甚至哲学家，对我们准备承认我们谈论的废话数量设定了一些限制：因此，作为第二阶段，很自然地继续询问许多明显的伪陈述是否真的是“陈述”。人们普遍认为，许多看起来像陈述的话语要么根本不打算，要么只是部分地记录或传递有关事实的直接信息：例如，“道德命题”可能全部或部分旨在证明
emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways. Here too Kant was among the pioneers. We very often also use utterances in ways beyond the scope at least of traditional grammar. It has come to be seen that many specially perplexing words embedded in apparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd additional feature in the reality reported, but to indicate (not to report) the circumstances in which the statement is made or reservations to which it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken and the like. To overlook these possibilities in the way once common is called the ‘descriptive’ fallacy; but perhaps this is not a good name, as ‘descriptive’ itself is special. Not all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I prefer to use the word ‘Constative’. Along these lines it has by now been shown piecemeal, or at least made to look likely, that many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different.
情感或规定行为或以特殊方式影响行为。在这方面，康德也是先驱之一。我们经常以超出传统语法范围的方式使用话语。我们已经看到，在显然是描述性的陈述中嵌入了许多特别令人困惑的词语，并不是为了表明所报道的现实中某些特别奇怪的额外特征，而是表明（不是报告）做出该陈述的情况或它所受的保留，或采取它的方式等等。以曾经常见的方式忽视这些可能性被称为“描述性”谬误;但也许这不是一个好名字，因为 “Descriptive” 本身就很特殊。并非所有正确或错误的陈述都是描述，因此我更喜欢使用“constative”这个词。沿着这些思路，现在已经零碎地表明，或者至少看起来可能，许多传统的哲学困惑是由于一个错误而产生的——这个错误是将事实话语的直接陈述视为事实的直接陈述，这些陈述要么（以有趣的非语法方式）荒谬，要么是完全不同的东西。

Whatever we may think of any particular one of these views and suggestions, and however much we may deplore the initial confusion into which philosophical doctrine and method have been plunged, it cannot be doubted that they are producing a revolution in philosophy. If anyone wishes to call it the greatest and most salutary in its history, this is not, if you come to think of it, a
无论我们如何看待这些观点和建议中的任何一个，无论我们多么遗憾哲学学说和方法最初陷入的混乱，毫无疑问，它们正在产生一场哲学革命。如果有人想称其为历史上最伟大、最有益的，那么，如果你仔细想想，这并不是一个
large claim. It is not surprising that beginnings have been piecemeal, with parti pris, and for extraneous aims; this is common with revolutions.
大索赔。毫不奇怪，开始是零碎的，有部分的，而且是为了无关紧要的目标;这在 Revolutions 中很常见。

The type of utterance we are to consider here is not, of course, in general a type of nonsense; though misuse of it can, as we shall see, engender rather special varieties of ‘nonsense’. Rather, it is one of our second class-the masqueraders. But it does not by any means necessarily masquerade as a statement of fact, descriptive or constative. Yet it does quite commonly do so, and that, oddly enough, when it assumes its most explicit form. Grammarians have not, I believe, seen through this ‘disguise’, and philosophers only at best incidentally. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} It will be convenient, therefore, to study it first in this misleading form, in order to bring out its characteristics by contrasting them with those of the statement of fact which it apes.
当然，我们在这里要考虑的话语类型通常不是一种胡说八道;尽管正如我们将看到的，滥用它可能会产生相当特殊的“胡说八道”。相反，它是我们的第二类之一——化装舞会。但它绝不一定要伪装成事实陈述、描述性或解释性。然而，它确实经常这样做，而且奇怪的是，当它呈现出最明确的形式时。我相信，语法学家没有看穿这种 “伪装”，哲学家充其量只是偶然的。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 因此，首先以这种误导性的形式研究它是很方便的，以便通过将它们与它所模仿的事实陈述的特征进行对比来突出它的特征。

We shall take, then, for our first examples some utterances which can fall into no hitherto recognized grammatical category save that of ‘statement’, which are not nonsense, and which contain none of those verbal dangersignals which philosophers have by now detected or think
那么，我们将以一些话语作为我们的第一个例子，这些话语除了“陈述”之外，不能属于迄今为止公认的语法类别，它们不是胡说八道，而且不包含哲学家现在已经检测到或思考的那些语言危险信号

they have detected (curious words like ‘good’ or ‘all’, suspect auxiliaries like ‘ought’ or ‘can’, and dubious constructions like the hypothetical): all will have, as it happens, humdrum verbs in the first person singular present indicative active. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Utterances can be found, satisfying these conditions, yet such that
他们已经检测到（像 'good' 或 'all' 这样的奇怪词，像 'should' 或 'can' 这样的可疑助词，以及像 hypothetical 这样的可疑结构）：碰巧，所有都会有单调的动词，第一人称单数现在时，主动。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 可以找到满足这些条件的话语，但
A. they do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or false’; and
A. 他们根本不“描述”或“报告”或陈述任何内容，不是“真或假”;和
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying something.
B. 说出这句话是或是做某事的一部分，这通常不会被描述为说某事。
This is far from being as paradoxical as it may sound or as I have meanly been trying to make it sound: indeed, the examples now to be given will be disappointing.
这远非听起来那么自相矛盾，也远非我一直刻薄地试图让它听起来那么自相矛盾：事实上，现在要给出的例子将是令人失望的。

Examples: 例子：
(E. a) ‘I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)’-as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
（E. a）“我愿意（娶这个女人做我的合法妻子）”——正如在结婚仪式过程中所说的那样。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
(E. b) ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’-as uttered when smashing the bottle against the stem.
（E. b）“我把这艘船命名为伊丽莎白女王”——这是在用瓶子砸向酒杆时说的。
(E. c) ‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’ -as occurring in a will.
（E. c）“我将我的手表赠予并遗赠给我的兄弟”——就像在遗嘱中一样。
(E. d) ‘I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.’
（东 d）“我打赌你六便士，明天会下雨。”

In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. It needs argument no more than that ‘damn’ is not true or false: it may be that the utterance ‘serves to inform you’-but that is quite different. To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words ‘I name, &c.’. When I say, before the registrar or altar, &c., ‘I do’, I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it.
在这些例子中，很明显，说出这句话（当然，在适当的情况下）不是描述我做了我应该说的事，或者说我正在做 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} ：就是去做。所引用的话语都不是真是假：我断言这是显而易见的，并不争论。只需要论证 “damn” 不是真是假：可能是这句话 “用于通知你”——但这是完全不同的。为船命名就是说（在适当的情况下）“I name， &c.”这句话。当我在登记官或祭坛前说，“我愿意”时，我不是在报道婚姻：我是沉迷于婚姻。

What are we to call a sentence or an utterance of this type?2 I propose to call it a performative sentence or a performative utterance, or, for short, ‘a performative’. The term ‘performative’ will be used in a variety of cognate ways and constructions, much as the term ‘imperative’ is. ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} The name is derived, of course, from ‘perform’, the usual verb with the noun ‘action’: it indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action
我们该如何称呼这种类型的句子或话语？2 我建议将其称为表演性句子或表演性话语，或者简称为“表演性”。“performative”一词将以各种同源方式和结构使用，就像“imperative”一词一样。 ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 当然，这个名字来源于“perform”，这是一个带有名词“action”的常用动词：它表示话语的发出就是执行一个动作

-it is not normally thought of as just saying something.
- 通常不认为它只是说了什么。

A number of other terms may suggest themselves, each of which would suitably cover this or that wider or narrower class of performatives: for example, many performatives are contractual (‘I bet’) or declaratory (‘I declare war’) utterances. But no term in current use that I know of is nearly wide enough to cover them all. One technical term that comes nearest to what we need is perhaps ‘operative’, as it is used strictly by lawyers in referring to that part, i.e. those clauses, of an instrument which serves to effect the transaction (conveyance or what not) which is its main object, whereas the rest of the document merely ‘recites’ the circumstances in which the transaction is to be effected. ${}^{\text{I}}$${}^{\text{I }}$^("I "){ }^{\text {I }} But ‘operative’ has other meanings, and indeed is often used nowadays to mean little more than ‘important’. I have preferred a new word, to which, though its etymology is not irrelevant, we shall perhaps not be so ready to attach some preconceived meaning.
许多其他术语可能会暗示自己，每个术语都可以适当地涵盖这个或那个更广泛或更狭义的表演性类别：例如，许多表演性是合同性的（'I bet'）或宣告性的（'我宣战'）的话语。但是我所知道的目前使用的术语中没有一个术语足够广泛地涵盖它们。最接近我们需要的一个技术术语可能是“operative”，因为律师严格使用它来指代用于实现交易（转让或其他什么）的文书的那部分，即那些条款，这是其主要目的，而文件的其余部分只是“叙述”进行交易的情况。 ${}^{\text{I}}$${}^{\text{I }}$^("I "){ }^{\text {I }} 但 “operative” 还有其他含义，事实上，现在经常被用来表示 “important” 以外的意思。我更喜欢一个新词，尽管它的词源并非无关紧要，但我们也许不会那么准备好附加一些先入为主的含义。

Are we then to say things like this:
那么我们应该说这样的话吗：
‘To marry is to say a few words’, or
“结婚就是说几句话”，或者
‘Betting is simply saying something’?
“投注只是在说什么”？
Such a doctrine sounds odd or even flippant at first, but with sufficient safeguards it may become not odd at all.
这样的学说乍一听很奇怪，甚至很轻率，但只要有足够的保障措施，它可能就变得一点也不奇怪。

A sound initial objection to them may be this; and it is not without some importance. In very many cases it is possible to perform an act of exactly the same kind not by uttering words, whether written or spoken, but in some other way. For example, I may in some places effect marriage by cohabiting, or I may bet with a totalisator machine by putting a coin in a slot. We should then, perhaps, convert the propositions above, and put it that ‘to say a few certain words is to marry’ or ‘to marry is, in some cases, simply to say a few words’ or ‘simply to say a certain something is to bet’.
对他们的一个合理的最初反对可能是这样的;而且它并非没有重要性。在很多情况下，可以不是通过说出文字，无论是书面的还是口头的，而是通过其他方式来执行完全相同的行为。例如，在某些地方，我可能会通过同居来实现婚姻，或者我可能会通过将硬币放入插槽中来与累加器下注。然后，我们也许应该转换上面的命题，说“说几个确定的词就是结婚”或“在某些情况下，结婚只是说几个词”或“只是说某件事就是打赌”。

But probably the real reason why such remarks sound dangerous lies in another obvious fact, to which we shall have to revert in detail later, which is this. The uttering of the words is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading incident in the performance of the act (of betting or what not), the performance of which is also the object of the utterance, but it is far from being usually, even if it is ever, the sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed to have been performed. Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words. Thus, for naming the ship, it is essential that I should be the person appointed to name her, for (Christian) marrying, it is essential that I should not be already married with a wife
但这种言论听起来很危险的真正原因可能在于另一个明显的事实，我们稍后将不得不详细地回到这个事实，那就是这个。事实上，这些话的说出通常是行为（下注或其他什么）的执行中的一个，甚至是主要事件，其执行也是该行为的对象，但它远非通常，即使它曾经是，如果该行为要被视为已经执行，它就不是唯一必要的事情。一般来说，说出这些话的情况总是必要的，或者说出这些话时，应该以某种方式或方式是适当的，而且说话者本人或其他人也应该进行某些其他行为，无论是“身体”或“精神”行为，甚至是说出更多话语的行为，这是非常常见的。因此，要给这艘船命名，我必须是指定给她命名的人，因为（基督徒）结婚时，我不应该已经结婚了
living, sane and undivorced, and so on: for a bet to have been made, it is generally necessary for the offer of the bet to have been accepted by a taker (who must have done something, such as to say ‘Done’), and it is hardly a gift if I say ‘I give it you’ but never hand it over.
在世、理智、未离婚，等等：要下注，通常必须接受下注的提议（他必须做过某事，例如说“完成”），如果我说“我给你”但从未交出，这几乎不算是礼物。

So far, well and good. The action may be performed in ways other than by a performative utterance, and in any case the circumstances, including other actions, must be appropriate. But we may, in objecting, have something totally different, and this time quite mistaken, in mind, especially when we think of some of the more aweinspiring performatives such as ‘I promise to . . .’. Surely the words must be spoken ‘seriously’ and so as to be taken ‘seriously’? This is, though vague, true enough in general-it is an important commonplace in discussing the purport of any utterance whatsoever. I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem. But we are apt to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign, for convenience or other record or for information, of an inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for many purposes the outward utterance is a description, true or false, of the occurrence of the inward performance. The classic expression of this idea is to be found in the Hippolytus (1. 6I2), where Hippolytus says
到目前为止，一切都很好。该操作可以通过表演性话语以外的方式执行，并且在任何情况下，包括其他操作在内的情况都必须适当。但是，在反对时，我们可能有完全不同的东西，这一次，考虑到这一点，特别是当我们想到一些更令人敬畏的表演时，比如“我承诺......这些话肯定必须“认真”地说出来，才能被“认真”地对待吗？这虽然含糊不清，但总的来说是正确的——在讨论任何话语的意图时，这是一个重要的常态。例如，我不能开玩笑，也不能写诗。但是我们很容易有一种感觉，即它们的严肃在于它们被说成是（仅仅）外在的和可见的标志，为了方便或其他记录或信息，一种内在的和精神的行为：从这个开始，继续相信或假设只是一小步，而没有意识到，就许多目的来说，外在的话语是一种描述。 true 或 false，内在表现的发生。这个想法的经典表达可以在希波吕托斯 （1. 6I2） 中找到，希波吕托斯说
i.e. 'my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other
即 '我的舌头发誓，但我的心（或思想或其他

backstage artiste) did not’. ${}^{\text{I}}$${}^{\text{I }}$^("I "){ }^{\text {I }} Thus 'I promise to . . ‘’ obliges me-puts on record my spiritual assumption of a spiritual shackle.
Backstage Artiste）没有”。 ${}^{\text{I}}$${}^{\text{I }}$^("I "){ }^{\text {I }} 因此，“我承诺.......“我强迫我——把我对精神枷锁的精神假设记录下来。
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves the way for immodality. For one who says ‘promising is not merely a matter of uttering words! It is an inward and spiritual act!’ is apt to appear as a solid moralist standing out against a generation of superficial theorizers: we see him as he sees himself, surveying the invisible depths of ethical space, with all the distinction of a specialist in the sui generis. Yet he provides Hippolytus with a let-out, the bigamist with an excuse for his ‘I do’ and the welsher with a defence for his ‘I bet’. Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our word is our bond.
令人欣慰的是，在这个例子中，我们观察到过度的深刻，或者更确切地说是庄严，是如何立即为无形铺平道路的。因为有人说'承诺不仅仅是说说而已！这是一种内在的、精神的行为！“很容易表现为一个坚实的道德家，在一代肤浅的理论家面前脱颖而出：我们以他看待自己的方式看待他，审视着道德空间的无形深处，具有特殊专家的所有独特之处。然而，他为希波吕托斯提供了一个发泄的机会，重婚者为他的“我愿意”提供了借口，而威尔士则为他的“我打赌”提供了辩护。准确性和道德都站在直截了当的一边，即我们的话语就是我们的纽带。

If we exclude such fictitious inward acts as this, can we suppose that any of the other things which certainly are normally required to accompany an utterance such as ’ $I$$I$II promise that . . . or ‘I do (take this woman . . .)’ are in fact described by it, and consequently do by their presence make it true or by their absence make it false? Well, taking the latter first, we shall next consider what we actually do say about the utterance concerned when one or another of its normal concomitants is absent. In no case do we say that the utterance was false but rather
如果我们排除了这种虚构的内在行为，我们能否假设通常肯定需要伴随诸如 ' $I$$I$II 这样的话语的任何其他事物承诺......或者'我愿意（带走这个女人......）'实际上是由它来描述的，因此是因为他们的存在使它成为真的，还是因为他们的缺席使它成为假的？好吧，首先选择后者，我们接下来将考虑当一个或另一个正常伴随词不存在时，我们对相关话语的实际说法。在任何情况下，我们都没有说这句话是假的，而是说

that the utterance-or rather the $act,{}^1$$act,{}^1$act,^(1)a c t,{ }^{1} e.g. the promisewas void, or given in bad faith, or not implemented, or the like. In the particular case of promising, as with many other performatives, it is appropriate that the person uttering the promise should have a certain intention, viz. here to keep his word: and perhaps of all concomitants this looks the most suitable to be that which ‘I promise’ does describe or record. Do we not actually, when such intention is absent, speak of a ‘false’ promise? Yet so to speak is not to say that the utterance ‘I promise that . . .’ is false, in the sense that though he states that he does, he doesn’t, or that though he describes he misdescribesmisreports. For he does promise: the promise here is not even void, though it is given in bad faith. His utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless wrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatement. At most we might make out a case for saying that it implies or insinuates a falsehood or a misstatement (to the effect that he does intend to do something): but that is a very different matter. Moreover, we do not speak of a false bet or a false christening; and that we do speak of a false promise need commit us no more than the fact that we speak of a false move. ‘False’ is not necessarily used of statements only.
该话语——或者更确切地说， $act,{}^1$$act,{}^1$act,^(1)a c t,{ }^{1} 例如承诺是无效的，或恶意给出的，或未实施，或类似的。在承诺的特殊情况下，就像许多其他表演一样，说出承诺的人应该有一定的意图是合适的，即在这里信守诺言：也许在所有伴随者中，这看起来最适合成为“我承诺”所描述或记录的。当这种意图不存在时，我们实际上不是在谈论一个 “虚假 ”的承诺吗？然而，可以这么说并不是说'我保证......是错误的，因为虽然他说他这样做了，但他没有，或者虽然他描述了，但他却错误地描述了错误报告。因为他确实应许了：这里的应许甚至不是无效的，尽管它是恶意的。他的话也许具有误导性，可能是欺骗性的，无疑是错误的，但这不是谎言或错误陈述。我们最多只能说它暗示或暗示了谎言或错误陈述（大意是他确实打算做某事）：但那是另一回事。此外，我们不谈到虚假的赌注或虚假的洗礼;我们确实谈到了一个虚假的承诺，只需要我们说一个虚假的行动这一事实。'False' 不一定仅用于语句。

IN embarking on a programme of finding a list of explicit performative verbs, it seemed that we were going to find it not always easy to distinguish performative utterances from constative, and it therefore seemed expedient to go farther back for a while to funda-mentals-to consider from the ground up how many senses there are in which to say something is to do something, or in saying something we do something, and even $by$$by$byb y saying something we do something. And we began by distinguishing a whole group of senses of ‘doing something’ which are all included together when we say, what is obvious, that to say something is in the full normal sense to do something-which includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain ‘meaning’ in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference.
在着手寻找一系列明确的表演性动词的程序时，我们似乎会发现区分表演性话语和定性话语并不总是那么容易，因此，似乎有必要再往前追溯一段时间，从根本上考虑一下说某事就是做某事有多少种意义。 或者说某事我们做某事，甚至 $by$$by$byb y 说某事我们做某事。我们首先区分了一整套“做某事”的含义，当我们说，显而易见的，说某事在完全正常的意义上是做某事时，它们都包括在一起——这包括某些噪音的发声，某些词语以某种结构的语气说出，以及它们在该词最喜欢的哲学意义上具有某种“意义”的说出。 即具有一定的意义和一定的指涉。

The act of ‘saying something’ in this full normal sense I call, i.e. dub, the performance of a locutionary act, and the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of locutions, or of the full units of speech. Our interest in the locutionary act is, of course, principally to make quite plain what it is, in order to distinguish it from other acts with which we are going to be primarily
我称之为完全正常意义上的“说某事”的行为，即 dub，语言行为的表演，以及迄今为止对话语的研究，在这些方面是对语言或完整语言单位的研究。当然，我们对 locutionary 行为的兴趣主要在于清楚地说明它是什么，以便将其与我们主要参与的其他行为区分开来
concerned. Let me add merely that, of course, a great many further refinements would be possible and necessary if we were to discuss it for its own sake-refinements of very great importance not merely to philosophers but to, say, grammarians and phoneticians.
关心。我只想补充一点，当然，如果我们为了它本身而讨论它，那么许多进一步的改进将是可能的和必要的——这些改进不仅对哲学家，而且对语法学家和语音学家都非常重要。

We had made three rough distinctions between the phonetic act, the phatic act, and the rhetic act. The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference. Thus ’ He said “The cat is on the mat”’, reports a phatic act, whereas "He said that the cat was on the mat’ reports a rhetic act. A similar contrast is illustrated by the pairs:
我们在语音行为、阶段行为和修辞行为之间做了三个粗略的区分。语音行为只是发出某些声音的行为。阶段行为是说出某些词汇或单词，即某种类型的噪音，属于并属于某种词汇，符合和符合某种语法。修辞行为是使用这些具有某种或多或少确定的意义和指称的元音的行为。因此，“他说”猫在垫子上“，报告了一个阶段性行为，而”他说猫在垫子上“报告了一个修辞行为。这对值说明了类似的对比：
‘He said “I shall be there”’, ‘He said he would be there’;
'他说'我会在那里'，'他说他会在那里';
'He said “Get out” ', ‘He told me to get out’;
“他说'滚出去'，'他叫我出去';
‘He said “Is it in Oxford or Cambridge ?”’ ’ ‘He asked whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge’.
“他说：'是在牛津还是在剑桥？'''他问是在牛津还是在剑桥'。

To pursue this for its own sake beyond our immediate requirements, I shall mention some general points worth remembering:
为了超越我们的直接要求而追求这一点，我将提到一些值得记住的一般要点：
(I) Obviously, to perform a phatic I must perform a phonetic act, or, if you like, in performing one I am performing the other (not, however, that phatic acts are
（I） 显然，要执行 phatic 我必须执行语音行为，或者，如果你愿意，在执行一个 phatic 行为时，我正在执行另一个 （然而，并不是说 phatic 行为是
a sub-class of phonetic acts-as belonging to): but the converse is not true, for if a monkey makes a noise indistinguishable from ‘go’ it is still not a phatic act.
语音行为的一个子类-as 属于）：但反之则不然，因为如果一只猴子发出的声音与“go”无法区分，它仍然不是一个 phatic 行为。
(2) Obviously in the definition of the phatic act two things were lumped together: vocabulary and grammar. So we have not assigned a special name to the person who utters, for example, ‘cat thoroughly the if’ or ‘the slithy toves did gyre’. Yet a further point arising is the intonation as well as grammar and vocabulary.
（2） 显然，在 phatic 行为的定义中，有两样东西被混为一谈：词汇和语法。因此，我们没有给说出“cat completely the if”或“the slithy toves did gyre”的人分配一个特殊的名字。然而，另一个问题是语调以及语法和词汇。
(3) The phatic act, however, like the phonetic, is essentially mimicable, reproducible (including intonation, winks, gestures, &c.). One can mimic not merely the statement in quotation marks ‘She has lovely hair’, but also the more complex fact that he said it like this:‘She has lovely hair’ (shrugs).
（3） 然而，与语音一样，相位行为本质上是可模仿的、可再现的（包括语调、眨眼、手势等）。我们不仅可以模仿引号中的陈述“她有一头可爱的头发”，还可以模仿更复杂的事实，即他是这样说的：“她有一头可爱的头发”（耸耸肩）。

This is the ‘inverted commas’ use of ‘said’ as we get it in novels: every utterance can be just reproduced in inverted commas, or in inverted commas with ‘said he’ or, more often, ‘said she’, &c., after it.
这就是我们在小说中对“said”的“倒逗号”用法：每个话语都可以用倒逗号再现，或者用倒逗号和“said he”，或者更常见的是，“said she”，&c.，后面跟着它。

But the rhetic act is the one we report, in the case of assertions, by saying ‘He said that the cat was on the mat’, ‘He said he would go’, ‘He said I was to go’ (his words were ‘You are to go’). This is the so-called ‘indirect speech’. If the sense or reference is not being taken as clear, then the whole or part is to be in quotation marks. Thus I might say: ‘He said I was to go to the “minister”, but he did not say which minister’ or ‘I said that he was behaving badly and he replied that “the higher you get the fewer”’. We cannot, however, always use ‘said that’
但是，在断言的情况下，我们报告的修辞行为是说“他说猫在垫子上”，“他说他会走”，“他说我要走”（他的话是“你要走”）。这就是所谓的“间接引语”。如果意思或引用不被认为是明确的，那么整个或部分应该用引号引起来。因此，我可以说：'他说我要去找'部长'，但他没有说是哪位部长'或'我说他行为不端，他回答说'你升得越高越少'。但是，我们不能总是使用“说那个”
easily: we would say ‘told to’, ‘advise to’, &c., if he used the imperative mood, or such equivalent phrases as ‘said I was to’, ‘said I should’, &c. Compare such phrases as ‘bade me welcome’ and ‘extended his apologies’.
简单：如果他使用祈使语气，我们会说 'told to'， 'advise to'， &c.，或者等价的短语，如 'said I was to'， 'said I should'， &c.比较一下 'bade me welcome' 和 'extended his apoologies' 等短语。

I add one further point about the rhetic act: of course sense and reference (naming and referring) themselves are here ancillary acts performed in performing the rhetic act. Thus we may say ‘I meant by “bank” . .’ and we say 'by “he” I was referring to . . ’ Can we perform a rhetic act without referring or without naming? In general it would seem that the answer is that we cannot, but there are puzzling cases. What is the reference in ‘all triangles have three sides’? Correspondingly, it is clear that we can perform a phatic act which is not a rhetic act, though not conversely. Thus we may repeat someone else’s remark or mumble over some sentence, or we may read a Latin sentence without knowing the meaning of the words.
关于修辞行为，我还要补充一点：当然，意义和指称（命名和指称）本身在这里是执行修辞行为的辅助行为。因此，我们可以说 '我指的是 '银行' 。.' 我们说 '他' 我指的是 ..' 我们可以在没有指称或不命名的情况下进行修辞行为吗？一般来说，答案似乎是我们不能，但也有令人费解的情况。'所有三角形都有三个边'中的引用是什么？相应地，很明显我们可以执行一个不是修辞行为的 phatic 行为，尽管不是相反的。因此，我们可能会重复别人的评论或对某个句子喃喃自语，或者我们可能在不知道单词含义的情况下阅读拉丁语句子。

The question when one pheme or one rheme is the same as another, whether in the ‘type’ or ‘token’ sense, and the question what is one single pheme or rheme, do not so much matter here. But, of course, it is important to remember that the same pheme (token of the same type) may be used on different occasions of utterance with a different sense or reference, and so be a different rheme. When different phemes are used with the same sense and reference, we might speak of rhetically equivalent acts (‘the same statement’ in one sense) but not of the same rheme or rhetic acts (which are the same
当一个 pheme 或一个 rheme 与另一个相同时的问题，无论是在 “类型” 还是 “标记” 的意义上，以及什么是一个单一的 pheme 或 rheme 的问题，在这里都无关紧要。但是，当然，重要的是要记住，相同的 pheme（相同类型的标记）可能用于不同的话语场合，具有不同的意义或指称，因此是不同的 rheme。当不同的 phemes 以相同的意义和指称使用时，我们可能会谈论修辞学上等价的行为（在某种意义上是“相同的陈述”），但不会谈论相同的 rheme 或修辞行为（它们是相同的
statement in another sense which involves using the same words).
另一种意义上的陈述，涉及使用相同的词）。

The pheme is a unit of language: its typical fault is to be nonsense-meaningless. But the rheme is a unit of speech; its typical fault is to be vague or void or obscure, &c.
pheme 是一个语言单位：它的典型错误是无意义。但 rheme 是一个语言单位;它的典型错误是模糊的、无效的或模糊的，&c.

But though these matters are of much interest, they do not so far throw any light at all on our problem of the constative as opposed to the performative utterance. For example, it might be perfectly possible, with regard to an utterance, say ‘It is going to charge’, to make entirely plain ‘what we were saying’ in issuing the utterance, in all the senses so far distinguished, and yet not at all to have cleared up whether or not in issuing the utterance I was performing the act of marning or not. It may be perfectly clear what I mean by ‘It is going to charge’ or ‘Shut the door’, but not clear whether it is meant as a statement or warning, &c.
但是，尽管这些问题非常有趣，但到目前为止，它们根本没有阐明我们关于构成性话语而不是表演性话语的问题。例如，对于一个话语，说“它将要充电”，完全有可能在发出该话语时完全清楚地表明“我们在说什么”，在迄今为止区分的所有意义上，但根本没有澄清我在发出话语时是否在进行破坏行为。我所说的“它要充电”或“关上门”的意思可能很清楚，但不清楚它是作为声明还是警告，&c。

To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act, as I propose to call it. To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using the locution:
一般来说，我们可以说，执行 locutionary 行为也是 eo ipso 来执行 illocutionary 行为，正如我建议的那样。要确定是这样执行的 illocutionary 行为，我们必须确定我们以何种方式使用 locution：
asking or answering a question,
提出或回答问题，
giving some information or an assurance or a warning,
提供一些信息、保证或警告，
announcing a verdict or an intention,
宣布判决或意图，
pronouncing sentence, 发音句子，
making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism,
预约、上诉或批评，
making an identification or giving a description,
进行识别或提供描述，
and the numerous like. (I am not suggesting that this is a clearly defined class by any means.) There is nothing mysterious about our eo ipso here. The trouble rather is the number of different senses of so vague an expression as ‘in what way are we using it’-this may refer even to a locutionary act, and further to perlocutionary acts to which we shall come in a minute. When we perform a locutionary act, we use speech: but in what way precisely are we using it on this occasion? For there are very numerous functions of or ways in which we use speech, and it makes a great difference to our act in some sensesense (B) ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}-in which way and which sense we were on this occasion ‘using’ it. It makes a great difference whether we were advising, or merely suggesting, or actually ordering, whether we were strictly promising or only announcing a vague intention, and so forth. These issues penetrate a little but not without confusion into grammar (see above), but we constantly do debate them, in such terms as whether certain words (a certain locution) had the force of a question, or ought to have been taken as an estimate and so on.
以及无数类似的。（我并不是说这是一个明确定义的类。我们的 eo ipso 在这里并没有什么神秘之处。相反，问题在于“我们以何种方式使用它”这样模糊的表达方式有多少种不同的含义——这甚至可能指一种言语行为，进一步指我们稍后将要讨论的言语行为。当我们进行语言表演时，我们使用了语言：但是我们在这个场合究竟以何种方式使用它呢？因为我们使用语言的功能或方式非常多，它在某种意义上对我们的行为有很大的不同 （B） ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} - 我们此时以何种方式和方式“使用”它。无论我们是建议，还是仅仅建议，还是实际命令，我们是严格承诺还是只宣布一个模糊的意图，等等，都有很大的不同。这些问题对语法有一点渗透，但并非没有混淆（见上文），但我们确实经常争论它们，比如某些词（某种语气）是否具有疑问的效力，或者应该被视为估计值等等。

I explained the performance of an act in this new and second sense as the performance of an ‘illocutionary’ act, i.e. performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something; and I shall refer to the doctrine of the different types of function of language here in question as the doctrine of ‘illocutionary forces’.
我把这种新的第二种意义上的行为解释为“言语”行为的表演，即说某事的行为，而不是说某事的行为;我将把这里所讨论的语言的不同类型功能的学说称为“语言力”学说。

It may be said that for too long philosophers have neglected this study, treating all problems as problems of ‘locutionary usage’, and indeed that the ‘descriptive fallacy’ mentioned in Lecture I commonly arises through mistaking a problem of the former kind for a problem of the latter kind. True, we are now getting out of this; for some years we have been realizing more and more clearly that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some extent to be ‘explained’ by the ‘context’ in which they are designed to be or have actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange. Yet still perhaps we are too prone to give these explanations in terms of ‘the meanings of words’. Admittedly we can use ‘meaning’ also with reference to illocutionary force’He meant it as an order’, &c. But I want to distinguish force and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference within meaning.
可以说，哲学家们忽视了这项研究太久了，把所有问题都看作是“语言使用”的问题，事实上，第一讲中提到的“描述性谬误”通常是由于将前者的问题误认为是后一种问题而产生的。诚然，我们现在正在摆脱这种情况;多年来，我们越来越清楚地意识到，话语的场合非常重要，所使用的词语在某种程度上要通过它们在语言交流中被设计或实际说出的“语境”来“解释”。然而，也许我们仍然太倾向于用 “词的含义 ”来给出这些解释。诚然，我们也可以使用 'meaning' 来指代 illocutionary force'He mean it as an order'， &c.但我想区分力和意义，在意义上，意义等同于意义和指涉，就像在意义中区分意义和指涉已经变得至关重要一样。

Moreover, we have here an illustration of the different uses of the expression, ‘uses of language’, or ‘use of a sentence’, &c.-‘use’ is a hopelessly ambiguous or wide word, just as is the word ‘meaning’, which it has become customary to deride. But ‘use’, its supplanter, is not in much better case. We may entirely clear up the ‘use of a sentence’ on a particular occasion, in the sense of the locutionary act, without yet touching upon its use in the sense of an illocutionary act.
此外，我们在这里还举了一个例子，说明了“语言的使用”或“句子的使用”，&c.-“使用”是一个无可救药的模棱两可或宽泛的词，就像“意义”这个词一样，它已成为嘲笑的习惯。但是，它的替代者“使用”的情况也好不到哪里去。我们可以完全澄清在特定场合的“句子使用”，即 locutionary 行为的意义上的“句子使用”，而不必触及它在 locutionary 行为意义上的使用。

Before refining any further on this notion of the
在进一步完善
illocutionary act, let us contrast both the locutionary and the illocutionary act with yet a third kind of act.
illocutionary 行为，让我们将 locutionary 和 illocutionary 行为与第三种行为进行比较。

There is yet a further sense ( C ) in which to perform a locutionary act, and therein an illocutionary act, may also be to perform an act of another kind. Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them; and we may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker has performed an act in the nomenclature of which reference is made either (C. a), only obliquely, or even (C. b), not at all, to the performance of the locutionary or illocutionary act. We shall call the performance of an act of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary act or perlocution. Let us not yet define this idea any more carefully-of course it needs it-but simply give examples:
还有一种更深的意义 （ C ） 来执行 locutionary 行为，其中 illocutionary 行为也可能是执行另一种行为。说某事通常会，甚至通常会对听众、演讲者或其他人的感受、思想或行为产生某些后果性影响：这可能是出于产生这些影响的设计、意图或目的;然后，考虑到这一点，我们可以说，说话者已经表演了一个行为，这个行为的命名法要么是 （C. a），要么是隐晦的，要么是 （C. b），根本不是指 locutionary 或 illocutionary 行为的表演。我们将这种行为的实施称为实施 perlocution 行为或 perlocution 的行为。让我们先不仔细地定义这个想法——当然它需要它——而只是举个例子：
(E. I) （E.I)

Act (A) or Locution 第 （A） 幕或叙述
He said to me ‘Shoot her!’ meaning by ‘shoot’ shoot and referring by ‘her’ to her.
他对我说，'Shoot her！'，意思是'shoot'，shoot，用'her'来指她。

Act (B) or Illocution 第 （B） 幕或言语
He urged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her.
他催促（或建议、命令等）我向她开枪。
Act (C. a) or Perlocution
Act （C. a） 或 Perlocution
He persuaded me to shoot her.
他说服我向她开枪。

Act (C. b) 法案 （C. b）
He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her.
他让我（或让我，&c.）向她开枪。
(E. 2) （E. 2）

Act (A) or Locution 第 （A） 幕或叙述
He said to me, ‘You can’t do that’.
他对我说，'你不能那样做。
Act (B) or Illocution 第 （B） 幕或言语
He protested against my doing it.
他抗议我这样做。
Act (C. a) or Perlocution
Act （C. a） 或 Perlocution
He pulled me up, checked me.
他把我拉起来，检查我。

He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, &c.
他阻止了我，他让我清醒过来，&c。
He annoyed me. 他惹恼了我。
We can similarly distinguish the locutionary act ‘he said that . . .’ from the illocutionary act ‘he argued that . …’ and the perlocutionary act 'he convinced me that . . .
我们同样可以区分 locutionary 行为 'he said that . . .从《言语法》中，“他认为......…’以及 Perlocutionary Act '他使我确信......

It will be seen that the consequential effects of perlocutions are really consequences, which do not include such conventional effects as, for example, the speaker’s being committed by his promise (which comes into the illocutionary act). Perhaps distinctions need drawing, as there is clearly a difference between what we feel to be the real production of real effects and what we regard as mere conventional consequences; we shall in any case return later to this.
我们将看到，perlocution 的后果效果实际上是后果，它不包括诸如例如，说话者被承诺的承诺（这属于 illocutionary 行为）之类的约定俗成的效果。也许需要区分，因为我们认为真实效果的真实产生和我们认为仅仅是约定俗成的结果之间显然存在差异;无论如何，我们稍后会回到这个问题上来。

We have here then roughly distinguished three kinds
我们在这里大致区分了三种
of acts-the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Let us make some general comments on these three classes, leaving them still fairly rough. The first three points will be about ‘the use of language’ again.
使徒行传——语言、言语和诗歌。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 让我们对这三个类做一些一般性的评论，让它们仍然相当粗略。前三点将再次关于 “语言的使用”。
® Our interest in these lectures is essentially to fasten on the second, illocutionary act and contrast it with the other two. There is a constant tendency in philosophy to elide this in favour of one or other of the other two. Yet it is distinct from both. We have already seen how the expressions ‘meaning’ and ‘use of sentence’ can blur the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. We now notice that to speak of the ‘use’ of language can likewise blur the distinction between the illocutionary and perlocutionary act-so we will distinguish them more carefully in a minute. Speaking of the ‘use of “language” for arguing or warning’ looks just like speaking of ‘the use of “language” for persuading, rousing, alarming’; yet the former may, for rough contrast, be said to be conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not. Thus we can say ‘I argue that’ or ‘I warn you that’ but we cannot say ‘I convince you that’ or ‘I alarm you that’. Further, we may entirely clear up whether someone was arguing or not without touching on the question whether he was convincing anyone or not.
® 我们对这些讲座的兴趣基本上是紧紧抓住第二种言语行为，并将其与其他两种行为进行对比。哲学中一直有一种趋势，即忽略这一点，而支持其他两者中的一个或另一个。然而，它与两者不同。我们已经看到了 'meaning' 和 'use of sentence' 这两个表达是如何模糊 locutionary 和 illocutionary 行为之间的区别的。我们现在注意到，谈论语言的 “使用” 同样会模糊 illocutionary 和 perlocutionary 行为之间的区别——因此我们稍后会更仔细地区分它们。说到“使用'语言'进行争论或警告”，就像说'使用'语言'进行说服、煽动、警告“一样;然而，为了粗略的对比，前者可以说是约定俗成的，因为至少它可以通过表演性公式来明确表示;但后者不能。因此，我们可以说 'I argue that' 或 'I warn you that'，但我们不能说 'I believesuit you that' 或 'I alarm you that'。此外，我们可以完全弄清楚某人是否在争论，而无需触及他是否在说服任何人的问题。

(2) To take this farther, let us be quite clear that the expression ‘use of language’ can cover other matters even more diverse than the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. For example, we may speak of the ‘use of language’ for something, e.g. for joking; and we may use ‘in’ in a way different from the illocutionary ‘in’, as when we say ‘in saying " p " I was joking’ or ‘acting a part’ or ‘writing poetry’; or again we may speak of ‘a poetical use of language’ as distinct from ‘the use of language in poetry’. These references to ‘use of language’ have nothing to do with the illocutionary act. For example, if I say ‘Go and catch a falling star’, it may be quite clear what both the meaning and the force of my utterance is, but still wholly unresolved which of these other kinds of things I may be doing. There are parasitic uses of language, which are ‘not serious’, not the ‘full normal use’. The normal conditions of reference may be suspended, or no attempt made at a standard perlocutionary act, no attempt to make you do anything, as Walt Whitman does not seriously incite the eagle of liberty to soar.
（2） 为了更进一步，让我们非常清楚地指出，“语言的使用”一词可以涵盖其他问题，甚至比 illocutionary 和 perlocutionary 行为更多样化。例如，我们可以谈论某事的 “语言使用”，例如开玩笑;我们可能以不同于言语 'in' 的方式使用 'in'，例如当我们说 'in 说 ' p ' 时，我在开玩笑' 或 '演戏' 或 '写诗';或者我们可以再说“语言的诗意使用”与“诗歌中的语言使用”不同。这些对 “使用语言 ”的引用与言语行为无关。例如，如果我说 “去捕捉一颗流星”，我的话的含义和力量可能很清楚，但仍然完全没有弄清楚我可能在做哪些其他类型的事情。语言的寄生性使用是 “不严肃的”，不是 “完全正常的使用”。正常的参考条件可以被暂停，或者不尝试标准的强制行为，不试图强迫你做任何事情，因为沃尔特·惠特曼并没有认真地煽动自由之鹰翱翔。
(3) Furthermore, there may be some things we ‘do’ in some connexion with saying something which do not seem to fall, intuitively at least, exactly into any of these roughly defined classes, or else seem to fall vaguely into more than one; but any way we do not at the outset feel so clear that they are as remote from our three acts as would be joking or writing poetry. For example, insinuating, as when we insinuate something in or by issuing some utterance, seems to involve some convention, as in
（3） 此外，可能有一些事情我们与说某事有某种联系，至少在直觉上似乎并不完全属于这些粗略定义的类别中的任何一类，或者似乎模糊地属于不止一类;但是，我们一开始就没有感觉到它们与我们的三幕相距甚远，就像开玩笑或写诗一样。例如，暗示，例如当我们在某项话语中暗示某事或通过发出某些话语时，似乎涉及某种约定，如
the illocutionary act; but we cannot say 'I insinuate . . $\therefore$$\therefore$:.\therefore ', and it seems like implying to be a clever effect rather than a mere act. A further example is evincing emotion. We may evince emotion in or by issuing an utterance, as when we swear; but once again we have no use here for performative formulas and the other devices of illocutionary acts. We might say that we use swearing ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} for relieving our feelings. We must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as conforming to a convention.
Illocutionary Act;但我们不能说 '我暗示 .. $\therefore$$\therefore$:.\therefore “，这似乎暗示着这是一种聪明的效果，而不仅仅是一种行为。另一个例子是表达情感。我们可以在言语中或通过发出话语来表达情感，就像我们发誓时一样;但是，我们在这里再次没有用处表演公式和其他言语行为的手段。我们可以说，我们用咒骂 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 来缓解我们的情绪。我们必须注意到，言语行为是一种约定俗成的行为：一种按照惯例做出的行为。
(4) Acts of all our three kinds necessitate, since they are the performing of actions, allowance being made for the ills that all action is heir to. We must systematically be prepared to distinguish between 'the act of doing $x$$x$xx ', i.e. achieving $x$$x$xx, and 'the act of attempting to do $x$$x$xx ': for example, we must distinguish between warning and attempting to warn. We must expect infelicities here.
（4） 我们所有三种行为都必须，因为它们是行为的执行，因此必须考虑到所有行为都继承的弊病。我们必须系统地准备区分“做 $x$$x$xx 事的行为”，即实现 $x$$x$xx 和“企图做 $x$$x$xx 的行为”：例如，我们必须区分警告和企图警告。我们必须预料到这里的不愉快。

The next three points that arise do so importantly because our acts are acts.
接下来出现的三点之所以重要，是因为我们的行为就是行为。
(5) Since our acts are acts, we must always remember the distinction between producing effects or consequences which are intended or unintended; and (i) when the speaker intends to produce an effect it may nevertheless not occur, and (ii) when he does not intend to produce it or intends not to produce it it may nevertheless occur. To cope with complication (i) we invoke as before the distinction between attempt and achievement; to cope
（5） 既然我们的行为就是行为，我们必须始终记住产生有意或无意的效果或后果之间的区别;以及 （i） 当说话者打算产生某种效果时，它可能不会发生，以及 （ii） 当他不打算产生或打算不产生它时，它可能仍然发生。为了应对复杂性 （i） 我们像以前一样援引尝试和成就之间的区别;应对

with complication (ii) we invoke the normal linguistic devices of disclaiming (adverbs like ‘unintentionally’ and ‘so on’) which we hold ready for personal use in all cases of doing actions.
通过复杂功能 （ii），我们调用了正常的否认语言手段（如“无意”和“等等”等副词），我们在做动作的所有情况下都准备好了供个人使用。
(6) Furthermore, we must, of course, allow that as acts they may be things that we do not exactly $do$$do$dod o, in the sense that we did them, say, under duress or in any other such way. Other ways besides in which we may not fully do the action are given in (2) above.
（6） 此外，我们当然必须允许它们作为行为，可能是我们并不完全 $do$$do$dod o 做的事情，比如说，在胁迫或任何其他类似方式下做了它们。除了我们可能无法完全执行操作的其他方法外，上述 （2） 中给出了其他方法。
(7) Finally we must meet the objection about our illocutionary and perlocutionary acts-namely that the notion of an act is unclear-by a general doctrine about action. We have the idea of an ‘act’ as a fixed physical thing that we do, as distinguished from conventions and as distinguished from consequences. But
（7） 最后，我们必须用一个关于行动的一般学说来回应关于我们的言语行为和言语行为的反对意见——即行为的概念是不明确的。我们把“行为”看作是我们所做的固定的物理事物，它与约定俗成不同，也不同于后果。但
(a) the illocutionary act and even the locutionary act too may involve conventions: consider the example of doing obeisance. It is obeisance only because it is conventional and it is done only because it is conventional. Compare the distinction between kicking a wall and kicking a goal;
（a） Illocutionary Act 甚至 Locutionary Act 也可能涉及惯例：考虑 do obeisance 的例子。它是崇拜，只是因为它是约定俗成的，而这样做只是因为它是约定俗成的。比较 kicking a wall 和 kicking a goal 之间的区别;
(b) the perlocutionary act may include what in a way are consequences, as when we say 'By doing $x$$x$xx I was doing $y$$y$yy ': we do bring in a greater or less stretch of ‘consequences’ always, some of which may be ‘unintentional’. There is no restriction to the minimum physical act at all. That we can import an indefinitely long stretch of what might also be called the ‘consequences’ of our act into the act itself is, or should be, a fundamental commonplace of
（b） 诉讼行为在某种程度上可能包括后果，例如当我们说“我 $x$$x$xx 所做的 $y$$y$yy 是”时：我们确实总是会带来或多或少的“后果”，其中一些可能是“无意的”。对最低限度的身体行为完全没有限制。我们可以将我们行为的“后果”无限期地导入到行为本身中，这是，或者应该是，一个基本的共同点
the theory of our language about all ‘action’ in general. Thus if asked ‘What did he do?’, we may reply either ‘He shot the donkey’ or ‘He fired a gun’ or ‘He pulled the trigger’ or ‘He moved his trigger finger’, and all may be correct. So, to shorten the nursery story of the endeavours of the old woman to drive her pig home in time to get her old man’s supper, we may in the last resort say that the cat drove or got the pig, or made the pig get, over the stile. If in such cases we mention both a B act (illocution) and a C act (perlocution) we shall say ‘by B -ing he C -ed’ rather than 'in B -ing . . $\therefore$$\therefore$:.\therefore This is the reason for calling $C$$C$CC a perlocutionary act as distinct from an illocutionary act.
我们语言中关于所有“行动”的一般理论。因此，如果问“他做了什么”，我们可能会回答“他射杀了驴子”或“他开了枪”或“他扣动了扳机”或“他动了扳机指”，所有答案都可能正确。所以，为了简化老妇人努力及时赶她的猪回家吃她老人家的晚餐的童话故事，我们可以在最后的手段中说，猫赶着或带走了猪，或使猪越过了栏杆。如果在这种情况下我们同时提到 B 行为 （illocution） 和 C 行为 （perlocution），我们应该说 'by B -ing he C -ed' 而不是 'in B -ing .. $\therefore$$\therefore$:.\therefore 这就是将 $C$$C$CC perlocutionary 行为与 illocutionary 行为区分开来的原因。

Next time we shall revert to the distinction between our three kinds of act, and to the expressions ‘in’ and 'by doing $x\mathrm{I}$$x\mathrm{I}$xIx \mathrm{I} am doing $y^{\prime }$$y^{\prime }$y^(')y^{\prime}, with a view to getting the three classes and their members and non-members somewhat clearer. We shall see that just as the locutionary act embraces doing many things at once to be complete, so may the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
下次我们将回到我们三种行为之间的区别，以及“in”和“by doing $x\mathrm{I}$$x\mathrm{I}$xIx \mathrm{I} am doing $y^{\prime }$$y^{\prime }$y^(')y^{\prime} ”这两个表达，以期使这三个等级及其成员和非成员更加清晰。我们将看到，正如 locutionary 行为包括同时做许多事情以完成一样，illocutionary 和 perlocutionary 行为也可以。

WHEN it was suggested that we embark on a programme of making a list of explicit performative verbs, we ran into some difficulties over the matter of determining whether some utterance was or was not performative, or anyway, purely performative. It seemed expedient, therefore, to go back to fundamentals and consider how many senses there may be in which to say something is to do something, or in saying something we do something, or even by saying something we do something.
当有人建议我们着手制定一个明确的表演动词清单时，我们在确定某些话语是否是表演性的，或者无论如何，纯粹是表演性的这个问题上遇到了一些困难。因此，回到基本原理，考虑一下说某事就是做某事，或者说某事就是做某事，或者说某事就是做某事，甚至通过说某事我们做了某事，这似乎是权宜之计。

We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we summed up by saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in the traditional sense. Second, we said that we also perform illocutionary acts such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, &c., i.e. utterances which have a certain (conventional) force. Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading. Here we have three, if not more, different senses or dimensions of the ‘use of a sentence’ or of 'the use of
我们首先区分了我们在说某事时所做的一组事情，我们一起总结为说我们执行了一个语言行为，这大致相当于说出具有某种意义和指涉的某个句子，这又大致等同于传统意义上的“意义”。其次，我们说我们还执行诸如通知、命令、警告、承诺等言语行为，即具有一定（约定俗成）力量的话语。第三，我们也可以进行 perlocutionive 行为：我们通过说某事带来或实现的事情，例如说服、说服、威慑，甚至说，令人惊讶或误导。在这里，我们有 'use of a sentence' 或 'the use of the use of