Memo to: Oaktree Clients 備忘錄Oaktree 客戶
From: Howard Marks 來自Howard Marks
Re: On Bubble Watch 關於泡沫觀察
Exactly 25 years ago today, I published the first memo that brought a response from readers (after having written for almost ten years without receiving any). The memo was called bubble.com, and the subject was the irrational behavior I thought was taking place with respect to tech, internet, and e-commerce stocks. The memo had two things going for it: it was right, and it was right fast. One of the first great investment adages I learned in the early 1970s is that “being too far ahead of your time is indistinguishable from being wrong.” In this case, however, I wasn’t too far ahead. 整整 25 年前的今天，我發表了第一份引起讀者回應的備忘錄（之前我寫了近十年的文章都沒有收到任何回應）。這份備忘錄的名字叫做 bubble.com，主題是我認為科技、網路和電子商務股正在發生的非理性行為。這份備忘錄有兩項優點：它是對的，而且對得很快。我在 20 世紀 70 年代初學到的第一句投資格言是：「太過超前與錯誤是沒有區別的。然而，在這個案例中，我並沒有太過超前。
This milestone anniversary gives me an occasion to write again about bubbles, a subject that’s very much of interest today. Some of what I write here will be familiar to anyone who read my December memo about the macro picture. But that memo only went to Oaktree clients, so I’m going to recycle here the part of its content that relates to the subject of bubbles. 這個里程碑式的週年紀念讓我有機會再次寫下有關泡沫的文章，這個話題在今天非常受關注。閱讀過我 12 月份關於宏觀形勢的備忘錄的人，對我在此所寫的部分內容應該不會陌生。但那份備忘錄只寄給了 Oaktree 的客戶，所以我在此重溫其中與泡沫主題相關的部分內容。
Since I’m a credit investor, having stopped analyzing stocks nearly five decades ago, and since I’ve never ventured far into the world of technology, I’m certainly not going to say much about today’s hot companies and their stocks. All of my observations will be generalities, but I’m hopeful they’ll be relevant nonetheless. 由於我是一個信用投資者，幾乎在五十年前就不再分析股票，也因為我從未涉足科技世界，所以我當然不會對當今的熱門公司及其股票發表太多意見。我所有的觀察都是概括性的，但我希望這些觀察仍會是相關的。
The seven top stocks in the S&P 500 - the so-called “Magnificent Seven” - are Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet (Google’s parent), Amazon.com, Nvidia, Meta (owner of Facebook, WhatsApp, and Instagram), and Tesla. I’m sure I don’t have to go into detail regarding the performance of these stocks; everyone’s aware of the phenomenon. Suffice it to say that a small number of stocks have dominated the S&P 500 in recent years and have been responsible for a highly disproportionate share of its gains. A chart from Michael Cembalest, chief strategist at J.P. Morgan Asset Management, shows that: 標準普爾 500 指數中排名前七位的股票，也就是所謂的「豪門七巨頭」，分別是蘋果 (Apple)、微軟 (Microsoft)、Alphabet (Google母公司)、亞馬遜 (Amazon.com)、Nvidia、Meta (Facebook、WhatsApp 和 Instagram 的擁有者) 和特斯拉 (Tesla)。關於這些股票的表現，我相信我不必多說，大家都知道這個現象。我只想說，近幾年來有少數股票主導了標準普爾 500 指數，並在其漲幅中佔有極大比例。摩根資產管理公司 (J.P. Morgan Asset Management) 的首席策略師 Michael Cembalest 所繪製的圖表顯示了這一現象：
the market capitalization of the seven largest components of the S&P 500 represented 32-33%32-33 \% of the index’s total capitalization at the end of October; 標準普爾 500 指數最大的七個成份股的市值在 10 月底佔該指數總市值的 32-33%32-33 \% ；
that percentage is roughly double the leaders’ share five years ago; and 該百分比約為五年前領導者所佔比例的兩倍；以及
prior to the emergence of the “Magnificent Seven,” the highest share for the top seven stocks in the last 28 years was roughly 22%22 \% in 2000, at the height of the TMT bubble. 在「七大奇蹟」出現之前，過去 28 年前七大股票的最高佔有率約為 2000 年的 22%22 \% ，當時正值 TMT 泡沫的高峰期。
It’s also important to note that at the end of November, U.S. stocks represented over 70%70 \% of the MSCI World Index, the highest percentage since 1970 according to another Cembalest chart. Thus, it’s clear that (a) U.S. companies are worth a lot compared to the companies in other regions and (b) the top seven U.S. stocks are worth a heightened amount relative to the rest of U.S. stocks. But is it a bubble? 同樣重要的是，根據 Cembalest 的另一張圖表，截至 11 月底，美股在 MSCI 全球指數中所佔的比例超過 70%70 \% ，創下 1970 年以來的新高。由此可見，(a) 與其他地區的公司相比，美國公司的價值很高，(b) 與其他美股相比，排名前七位的美股價值更高。但這是泡沫嗎？
What Is a Bubble? 什麼是泡沫？
Investment lingo comes and goes. My young Oaktree colleagues use a lot of terms these days for which I have to request translation. But “bubble” and “crash” have been in the financial lexicon for as long as I’ve been in the investment business, and I imagine they’ll remain there for generations to come. Today, the mainstream media uses them broadly, and people seem to consider them to be subject to objective definition. But for me, a bubble or crash is more a state of mind than a quantitative calculation. 投資術語來來去去。我年輕的 Oaktree 同事最近用了很多詞，我必須要求翻譯。但是，「泡沫 」和 「崩盤 」這兩個詞在金融詞彙中的存在時間和我從事投資業務的時間一樣長，而且我想這兩個詞在未來幾代人中都會繼續存在。今天，主流媒體廣泛地使用這兩個詞，而且人們似乎認為它們有客觀的定義。但對我來說，泡沫或崩盤更像是一種心態，而非量化計算。
In my view, a bubble not only reflects a rapid rise in stock prices, but it is a temporary mania characterized by - or, perhaps better, resulting from - the following: 在我看來，泡沫不僅反映了股票價格的快速上升，而且它是一種暫時性的狂熱，其特點是 - 或者，更好的說，是由以下幾點造成的：
highly irrational exuberance (to borrow a term from former Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan), 高度非理性的亢奮（借用聯儲局前主席格林斯潘的術語）、
outright adoration of the subject companies or assets, and a belief that they can’t miss, 對目標公司或資產的徹底崇拜，並相信他們不會失手、
massive fear of being left behind if one fails to participate (“FOMO”), and 大量的恐懼，害怕自己無法參與（"FOMO"）而被遺棄，以及
resulting conviction that, for these stocks, “there’s no price too high.” 因此他們深信，對於這些股票來說，「沒有太高的價格」。
“No price too high” stands out to me in particular. When you can’t imagine any flaws in the argument and are terrified that your officemate/golf partner/brother-in-law/competitor will own the asset in question and you won’t, it’s hard to conclude there’s a price at which you shouldn’t buy. (As Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber observed in the fifth edition of Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, “there is nothing so disturbing to one’s well-being and judgment as to see a friend get rich.”) 「價格不能太高 」對我來說尤其突出。當您無法想像這個論點有任何瑕疵，而且害怕您的同事/高爾夫球夥伴/妹夫/競爭對手將擁有該資產而您卻沒有時，您很難得出不該買的價格的結論。(正如 Charles Kindleberger 和 Robert Aliber 在第五版《Manias, Panics, and Crashes：A History of Financial Crises》(《金融危機史》)第五版中指出，「沒有什麼比看到朋友發財更能擾亂一個人的福祉和判斷力。
So, to discern a bubble, you can look at valuation parameters, but I’ve long believed a psychological diagnosis is more effective. Whenever I hear “there’s no price too high” or one of its variants - a more disciplined investor might say, “of course there’s a price that’s too high, but we’re not there yet” - I consider it a sure sign that a bubble is brewing. 因此，要分辨泡沫，您可以參考估值參數，但我一直認為心理診斷更為有效。每當我聽到「沒有太高的價格」或其變體之一 - 一個更有紀律的投資人可能會說：「當然有太高的價格，但我們還沒到那一步」 - 我認為這肯定是泡沫正在醞釀的跡象。
Roughly fifty years ago, an elder gave me the gift of one of my favorite maxims. I’ve written about it several times in my memos, but in my opinion, I can’t do so often enough. It’s “the three stages of the bull market”: 大約五十年前，一位長輩送了我一句我最喜歡的格言。我在備忘錄中寫過好幾次，但在我看來，這樣做的次數還是不夠多。它就是「牛市的三個階段」：
The first stage usually comes on the heels of a market decline or crash that has left most investors licking their wounds and highly dispirited. At this point, only a few unusually insightful people are capable of imagining that there could be improvement ahead. 第一階段通常發生在市場下跌或崩盤之後，這讓大多數投資者舔舐傷口、極度沮喪。在這時候，只有少數具有非凡洞察力的人能夠想像未來可能會有所改善。
In the second stage, the economy, companies, and markets are doing well, and most people accept that improvement is actually taking place. 在第二階段，經濟、公司和市場都表現良好，而且大多數人都接受改善正在實際發生。
In the third stage, after a period in which the economic news has been great, companies have reported soaring earnings, and stocks have appreciated wildly, everyone concludes that things can only get better forever. 在第三階段，經過一段經濟消息大好、公司報告獲利飆升、股票瘋狂升值的時期後，每個人都會得出結論：事情只會永遠變好。
The important inferences aren’t with regard to economic or corporate events. They involve investor psychology. It’s not a matter of what’s happening in the macro world; it’s how people view the developments. When few people think there can be improvement, security prices by definition don’t incorporate much optimism. But when everyone believes things can only get better forever, it can be hard to find anything that’s reasonably priced. 重要的推論與經濟或公司事件無關。它們涉及投資者心理。這不是宏觀世界發生了什麼的問題，而是人們如何看待這些發展。當很少人認為情況會有所改善時，根據定義，證券價格就不會太樂觀。但是當所有人都相信事情只會永遠變好時，就很難找到價格合理的東西了。
Bubbles are marked by bubble thinking. Perhaps for working purposes we should say that bubbles and crashes are times when extreme events cause people to lose their objectivity and view the world through highly skewed psychology - either too positive or too negative. Here’s how Kindleberger put it in the first edition of Manias, Panics, and Crashes: 泡沫的特徵是泡沫思維。或許為了工作的目的，我們應該說，泡沫和崩盤是極端事件導致人們失去客觀性，並透過高度扭曲的心理來看待世界的時候 - 不是太積極就是太消極。以下是 Kindleberger 在《Manias, Panics, and Crashes》第一版中的說法：
… As firms or households see others making profits from speculative purchases and resales, they tend to follow. When the number of firms and households indulging in these practices grows larger, bringing in segments of the population that are normally aloof from such ventures, speculation for profit leads away from normal, rational behavior to what have been described as “manias” or “bubbles.” The word “mania” emphasizes the irrationality; “bubble” foreshadows the bursting. (Emphasis added) ......當公司或家庭看到其他人從投機性購買和轉售中獲利時，他們往往會跟隨。當沉溺於這些行為的公司和家庭數量越來越多，同時也帶入了通常對這種投資不屑一顧的人口群體時，為了獲利而進行的投機活動就會偏離正常、理性的行為，變成被稱為 「狂熱 」或 「泡沫 」的行為。躁狂」一詞強調非理性；「泡沫」則預示爆破。(重點為後加)
For me, it’s psychological extremeness that marks a bubble. Often, as Kindleberger indicates, it can be inferred from widespread participation in the investment fad of the moment, especially among nonfinancial types. Legend has it that J.P. Morgan knew there was a problem when the person shining his shoes started giving him stock tips. My partner John Frank says he saw it in 2000, when he heard the dads at his son’s soccer game bragging about the tech stocks they owned, and again in 2006, when a Las Vegas cab driver told him about the three condos he’d purchased. When Mark Twain purportedly said, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes,” it’s this kind of thing he was talking about. 對我來說，心理上的極端才是泡沫的標誌。通常，就像 Kindleberger 所說的，它可以從普遍參與當下的投資熱潮中推斷出來，尤其是在非金融類型的人當中。傳說中，當摩根大通（J.P. Morgan）擦鞋的人開始給他股票提示時，他就知道出問題了。我的合夥人約翰‧法蘭克（John Frank）說，他在 2000 年就發現了這個問題，當時他在兒子的足球比賽中聽到爸爸們吹噓他們擁有的科技股，2006 年又聽到拉斯維加斯的計程車司機告訴他自己購買了三套公寓。馬克‧吐溫 (Mark Twain) 聲稱「歷史不會重複，但經常會押韻」，他說的就是這種事。
The New, New Thing 新新事物
If bubble thinking is irrational, what is it that permits investors to get away from rational thinking, like the thrust of a rocket ship that breaks free of the limits imposed by gravity and attains escape velocity? There’s a simple answer: newness. This phenomenon relies on another time-honored investment phrase, “this time is different.” 如果泡沫思維是非理性的，那麼是什麼允許投資者擺脫理性思維，就像火箭船的推力擺脫地心引力的限制，達到逃逸速度？答案很簡單：新鮮感。這種現象依賴於另一個歷史悠久的投資箴言：「這次不一樣」。
Bubbles are invariably associated with new developments. There were bubbles in the Nifty Fifty stocks in the 1960s (more on them just below), disc drive companies in the 1980s, TMT/internet stocks in the late 1990s, and sub-prime mortgage-backed securities in 2004-06. These relatively recent manias followed in the tradition of ones like (a) the 1630s craze in Holland over recently introduced tulips and (b) the South Sea Bubble in 1720 England concerning the riches that were sure to ensue from a trading monopoly that the Crown had awarded to the South Sea Company. 泡沫總是與新的發展相關聯。1960 年代的 Nifty Fifty 股票出現泡沫 (下文將詳細介紹)、1980 年代的光碟驅動器公司、1990 年代末的 TMT/網際網路股票，以及 2004-06 年的次級房貸擔保證券。這些相對較新的狂熱沿襲了以下的傳統：(a) 1630 年代荷蘭對新近引進的鬱金香的狂熱；(b) 1720 年英國的南海泡沫，當時王室將貿易壟斷權授予南海公司（South Sea Company），認為這肯定會帶來巨大財富。
In normal circumstances, if an industry’s or a country’s securities are attracting unusually high valuations, investment historians are able to point out that, in the past, those stocks had never sold at more than an x%\mathrm{x} \% premium over the average, or some similar metric. In this way, attention to history can serve as a tether, keeping a favored group grounded on terra firma. 在正常情況下，如果某個行業或國家的證券估值異常高，投資歷史學家能夠指出，在過去，這些股票的銷售價格從未高於平均水平的 x%\mathrm{x} \% 溢價，或一些類似的指標。如此一來，對歷史的關注就像一根繩子，讓受青睞的族群屹立不倒。
But if something’s new, meaning there is no history, then there’s nothing to temper enthusiasm. 但如果是新的東西，也就是說沒有歷史，那麼就沒有什麼可以抑制熱情。
After all, it’s owned by the brightest people - the ones who are showing up in the headlines and on TV and they’ve made a fortune. Who’s willing to throw a wet blanket over that party or sit out that dance? 畢竟，它的主人是最聰明的人 - 那些出現在頭條新聞和電視上的人，他們已經發大財了。誰會願意為那場派對鋪上濕毯，或坐視那場舞會呢？
The explanation often lies in Hans Christian Andersen’s story The Emperor’s New Clothes. Con men sell the emperor an allegedly gorgeous suit of clothes that only intelligent people can see. But in actuality there is no suit. When the emperor parades around town naked, the citizens are afraid to say they don’t see a suit, since that would mark them as unintelligent. This goes on unchecked until a young boy steps out of the crowd and - in his naivete - points out that the emperor has no clothes. Most people would rather go along with a shared delusion that’s making investors buckets of money than say something to the contrary and appear to be dummies. When a whole market or a group of securities is blasting off and a specious idea is making its adherents rich, few people will risk calling it out. 安徒生的故事《皇帝的新衣》中經常會有這樣的解釋。騙子向皇帝兜售一套據說只有聰明人才能看見的華麗衣服。但事實上，根本就沒有這套衣服。當皇帝光著身子在城裡遊行時，市民們都不敢說他們沒看到衣服，因為那會讓他們覺得自己不聰明。這種情況一直持續下去，直到一個小男孩從人群中走出來，以他的天真指出皇帝沒有穿衣服。大多數人寧願跟隨一個讓投資人賺得盆滿缽滿的共同錯覺，也不願意說出相反的話，讓自己顯得像個傻瓜。當整個市場或一組證券爆發時，當一個似是而非的想法讓它的追隨者發大財的時候，很少有人會冒險指出來。
My Baptism Under Fire 我在炮火中接受洗禮
They say experience is what you got when you didn’t get what you wanted, and I got my most formative experience at the very beginning of my career. As many of my memo readers know, I joined the equity research department at First National City Bank (now Citi) in September 1969. As was the case with most of the so-called “money-center banks,” Citi invested mainly in the “Nifty Fifty”- the stocks of the best and fastest-growing companies in America. These companies were considered to be so good that (a) nothing bad could ever happen and (b) there was no price too high for their stocks . . . literally. 有人說，經驗就是在你沒有得到你想要的東西時所得到的東西，而我在我職業生涯的最初期就得到了我最成長的經驗。我的許多備忘錄讀者都知道，我在 1969 年 9 月加入第一國家城市銀行（現為花旗銀行）的股票研究部門。就像大多數所謂的「資金中心銀行」一樣，花旗主要投資於「Nifty Fifty」--美國最好、成長最快的公司股票。這些公司被認為非常優秀，(a) 不會發生任何壞事，(b) 他們的股票沒有太高的價格......。
Three factors contributed to investors’ fascination with these stocks. First, the U.S. economy grew strongly in the post-World War II period. Second, these companies benefitted from their involvement with areas of innovation such as computers, drugs, and consumer products. And third, they represented the first wave of “growth stocks,” a new investment style that separately became a fad in itself. The Nifty Fifty were the object of the first big bubble in roughly 40 years, and since there hadn’t been one for so long, investors had forgotten what a bubble looks like. As a result of the popularity that was conferred on them, if you bought these stocks on the day I started work and held them tenaciously for five years, you lost well over 90%90 \% of your money . . in the best companies in America. What happened? 有三個因素促使投資人對這些股票著迷。首先，美國經濟在二次大戰後強勁成長。第二，這些公司因涉足電腦、藥物和消費品等創新領域而受益。第三，它們代表了第一波「成長型股票」，這種新的投資風格本身也成為了一種時尚。Nifty Fifty 是大約 40 年來第一次大泡沫的對象，由於長期沒有泡沫，投資人已經忘了泡沫是什麼樣子。由於這些股票大受歡迎，如果你在我開始工作的那天買了這些股票，並堅持持有五年，你的損失遠遠超過 90%90 \% 你的錢......在美國最好的公司。發生了什麼事？
The Nifty Fifty had been put on a pedestal, and investors get hurt when something falls from it. The stock market as a whole declined by about half in 1973-74. And it turned out these stocks had been selling at prices that actually were too high; in many cases, their price/earnings ratios fell from the range of 60 to 90 to the range of 6 to 9 (that’s the easy way to lose 90%90 \% ). Further, bad things actually did happen to several of the companies in fundamental terms. Nifty Fifty 已被推上神壇，當有東西從神壇跌落時，投資人就會受到傷害。1973-74 年，股市整體下跌了約一半。而事實證明，這些股票的售價實在太高了；在許多情況下，它們的市盈率從 60 到 90 的範圍跌到了 6 到 9 的範圍（這是很容易虧損的方法 90%90 \% ）。此外，就基本面而言，幾家公司確實發生了不好的事情。
My early brush with a genuine bubble caused me to formulate some guiding principles that carried me through the next 50 -odd years: 早年與真正的泡沫擦身而過，讓我制定了一些指導原則，這些原則陪伴我度過了接下來的 50 多年：
It’s not what you buy, it’s what you pay that counts. 重要的不是您買了什麼，而是您付出了什麼。
Good investing doesn’t come from buying good things, but from buying things well. 良好的投資並非來自於買到好東西，而是買到好東西。
There’s no asset so good that it can’t become overpriced and thus dangerous, and there are few assets so bad that they can’t get cheap enough to be a bargain. 沒有什麼資產會好到不會因為價格過高而變得危險，也很少有什麼資產會壞到不會因為價格便宜而變得便宜。
Things Can Only Get Better 事情只會越來越好
The bubbles I’ve lived through have all involved innovations, as I noted above, and many of those were either overestimated or not fully understood. The attractions of a new product or way of doing business are usually obvious, but the potholes and pitfalls are often hidden and only discovered in trying times. A new company may completely outclass its predecessors, but investors who by definition lack experience in 如上所述，我所經歷的泡沫都涉及到創新，其中許多都被高估或未被完全理解。新產品或新經營方式的吸引力通常是顯而易見的，但坑洞和陷阱往往是隱藏的，只有在困難時期才會被發現。一家新公司可能完全超越其前輩，但投資人因為缺乏在以下領域的經驗
this new field often fail to grasp that even a bright newcomer can be supplanted. The disrupters can be disrupted, whether by skillful competitors or even newer technologies. 在這個新領域中，即使是聰明的新人也有可能被取代。無論是技術高超的競爭對手，甚至是更新的技術，都有可能瓦解破壞者的地位。
In my early decades in business, technology seemed to evolve gradually. Computers, drugs, and other innovative products improved a little at a time. But in the 1990s, innovation came in a big rush. When Oaktree was founded in 1995, I insisted that I could get by with just WordPerfect for word processing and Lotus 1-2-3 for spreadsheets. But when we moved to our current office in 1998, I threw in the towel and let our IT team install e-mail and the internet (and, of course, WordPerfect gave way to Word, and Lotus 1-2-3 to Excel). At the time, investors were sure “the internet will change the world.” It certainly looked that way, and that assumption prompted tremendous demand for everything internet-related. E-commerce stocks went public at seemingly high prices and then tripled the first day. There was a real goldrush. 在我從商的最初幾十年，科技似乎是逐漸演進的。電腦、藥物和其他創新產品每次都有少許進步。但到了 1990 年代，創新卻來得非常匆忙。1995 年 Oaktree 成立之初，我堅持只用 WordPerfect 來處理文字，用 Lotus 1-2-3 來處理試算表就可以了。但當我們在 1998 年搬到現在的辦公室時，我放棄了這個想法，讓我們的 IT 團隊安裝了電子郵件和網際網路 (當然，WordPerfect 讓位給 Word，Lotus 1-2-3 讓位給 Excel)。當時，投資人確信「網際網路將會改變世界」。看起來確實如此，而這種假設也催生了對一切與網路相關的產品的龐大需求。電子商務股票以看似很高的價格上市，第一天就翻了三倍。當時真是淘金熱。
There’s usually a grain of truth that underlies every mania and bubble. It just gets taken too far. It’s clear that the internet absolutely did change the world - in fact, we can’t imagine a world without it. But the vast majority of internet and e-commerce companies that soared in the late ’ 90 s bubble ended up worthless. When a bubble burst in my early investing days, The Wall Street Journal would run a box on the front page listing stocks that were down by 90%90 \%. In the aftermath of the TMT Bubble, they’d lost 99%99 \%. 每種狂熱和泡沫背後都隱含著真理。它只是走得太遠了。很明顯，網際網路確實改變了世界 - 事實上，我們無法想像沒有網際網路的世界。但絕大多數在 90 年代末泡沫中飛漲的網路和電子商務公司最終都一文不值。在我早期的投資時期，每當泡沫爆破，《華爾街日報》都會在頭版刊登一個方塊，列出下跌 90%90 \% 的股票。在 TMT 泡沫爆破之後，他們損失了 99%99 \% 。
When something is on the pedestal of popularity, the risk of a decline is high. When people assume and price in - an expectation that things can only get better, the damage done by negative surprises is profound. When something is new, the competitors and disruptive technologies have yet to arrive. The merit may be there, but if it’s overestimated it can be overpriced, only to evaporate when reality sets in. In the real world, trees don’t grow to the sky. 當某種事物受到歡迎時，衰退的風險就會很高。當人們假設事情只會越來越好，並以此為價格時，負面意外所造成的損害是深遠的。當新事物出現時，競爭對手和破壞性技術尚未出現。它的優點可能存在，但如果高估了它的價值，它的價格就可能過高，而當現實來臨時，它的價值就會煙消雲散。在現實世界中，樹是不會長到天上去的。
The foregoing discussion centered on the risk of overestimating fundamental strength. But optimism surrounding the power and potential of the new thing often causes the error to be compounded through the assignment of too high a stock price. 前文討論的重點在於高估基本面優勢的風險。但對新事物的力量和潛力抱持樂觀的態度，往往會因為指定過高的股價而使錯誤更加嚴重。
As mentioned above, for something new, there by definition is no historical indicator of what an appropriate valuation might be. 如上文所述，對於新事物而言，根據定義，沒有歷史指標可顯示適當的估值。
Further, the companies’potential hasn’t yet been turned into steady-state profits, meaning the thing that’s being valued is conjectural. In the TMT Bubble, the companies didn’t have earnings, so p/e ratios were out. And as startups, they often didn’t have revenues to value. As a result, new metrics were invented, and trusting investors ended up paying a multiple of “clicks” or “eyeballs,” regardless of whether these measurables could be turned into revenues and profits. 此外，公司的潛力尚未轉化為穩定的利潤，這意味著估值的東西是猜測。在 TMT 泡沫中，這些公司沒有盈利，所以市盈率是不存在的。作為新創公司，它們通常沒有收入可供估值。因此，新的衡量標準被發明出來，而信任的投資人最終支付的是 「點擊率 」或 「眼球 」的倍數，而不考慮這些衡量標準是否能轉化為收入和利潤。
Since bubble participants can’t imagine there being any downside, they tend to award valuations that assume success. 由於泡沫參與者無法想像會有任何不利因素，因此他們傾向於給予假設成功的估值。
In fact, it’s not infrequent for investors to treat all contenders in a new field as likely to succeed, whereas in reality only a few may thrive, or perhaps even survive. 事實上，投資人經常將新領域中的所有競爭者都視為有可能成功，但事實上只有少數競爭者可能茁壯成長，甚至可能存活下來。
Ultimately, with a really hot new thing, investors can adopt what I call “a lottery ticket mentality.” If a successful startup in a hot field can return 200x, it’s mathematically worth investing in even if it’s only 1%1 \% likely to succeed. And what doesn’t have a 1%1 \% likelihood of success? When investors think this way, there are few limits on what they’ll support or the prices they’ll pay. 最終，對於真正炙手可熱的新事物，投資人可以採取我所謂的「彩票心態」。如果一家在熱門領域成功的新創公司能獲得 200 倍的回報，那麼即使它只有 1%1 \% 的成功可能性，在數學上也是值得投資的。又有什麼東西沒有 1%1 \% 的成功可能性呢？當投資者以這種方式思考時，他們支持的項目或支付的價格幾乎沒有限制。
Obviously, investors can get caught up in the race to buy the new, new thing. That’s where the bubble comes in. 很明顯，投資人可能會陷入購買新事物的競賽中。這就是泡沫出現的原因。
What's the Appropriate Price to Pay for a Bright Future? 為了光明的未來，該付出什麼適當的代價？
If there’s a company for sale that will make $1\$ 1 million next year and then shut down, how much would you pay for it? The right answer is a little less than $1\$ 1 million, so that you’ll have a positive return on your money. 如果有一家公司要出售，它明年會賺 $1\$ 1 百萬，然後就會關閉，你會花多少錢買下？正確的答案是略低於 $1\$ 1 百萬，這樣您的資金就會有正面的回報。
But stocks are priced at “p/e multiples” - that is, multiples of next year’s earnings. Why? Because presumably they won’t earn profits for just one year; they’ll go on making money for many more. When you buy a stock, you buy a share of the company’s earnings every year into the future. The price of the S&P 500 has averaged roughly 16 times earnings in the post-World War II period. This is typically described as meaning “you’re paying for 16 years of earnings.” It’s actually more than that, though, because the process of discounting makes $1\$ 1 of profit in the future worth less than $1\$ 1 today. The current value of a company is the discounted present value of its future earnings, so a p/e ratio of 16 means you’re paying for more than 20 years of earnings (depending on the interest rate at which future earnings are discounted). 但股票的定價是「市盈率倍數」，也就是明年盈利的倍數。為什麼呢？因為假定它們不會只賺一年的利潤；它們還會賺更多的錢。當您購買股票時，您買的是公司未來每年的盈利。第二次世界大戰後，標準普爾 500 指數的價格平均約為盈利的 16 倍。這通常被描述為「您支付的是 16 年的收益」。但實際上比這還要多，因為折現過程使得未來的 $1\$ 1 利潤價值低於當前的 $1\$ 1 。公司目前的價值就是其未來獲利的貼現現值，因此市盈率為 16 表示您要支付超過 20 年的獲利（取決於未來獲利的貼現利率）。
In bubbles, hot stocks sell for considerably more than 16 times earnings. Remember the 60 to 90 times for the Nifty Fifty! Investors in 1969 were paying for companies’ earnings - even after giving them credit for significant earnings growth - many decades into the future. Did they do so consciously and analytically? Not that I recall. Investors thought of a p/e ratio as just a number . . . if they thought about it at all. 在泡沫中，熱門股票的市盈率遠遠高於 16 倍。還記得 Nifty Fifty 的 60 到 90 倍！1969 年的投資人為公司的獲利付出代價，即使是在公司獲利大幅成長的情況下，投資人也要為未來數十年的獲利付出代價。他們是有意識、有分析地這樣做嗎？我不記得。投資人認為市盈率只是一個數字......如果他們有想過的話。
Today’s S&P-leading companies are, in many ways, much better than the best companies of the past. They enjoy massive technological advantages. They have vast scale, dominant market shares, and thus above average profit margins. And since their products are based on ideas more than metal, the marginal cost of producing an additional unit is low, meaning their marginal profitability is unusually high. 今天的標準普爾領先公司在很多方面都比過去最好的公司優勝得多。它們擁有巨大的技術優勢。它們規模龐大、市場佔有率高，因此利潤率高於平均水平。而且，由於它們的產品是基於理念而非金屬，因此生產多一個單位的邊際成本很低，這意味著它們的邊際利潤率異常高。
The further good news is that today’s leaders don’t trade at the p//e\mathrm{p} / \mathrm{e} ratios investors applied to the Nifty Fifty. Perhaps the sexiest of the seven is Nvidia, the leading designer of chips for artificial intelligence. It’s current multiple of future earnings is in the low 30s, depending on which earnings estimate you believe. While double the average post-war p/e on the S&P 500, that’s cheap compared to the Nifty Fifty. But what does a multiple in the 30s imply? First, that investors think Nvidia will be in business for decades to come. Second, that its profits will grow throughout those decades. And third, that it won’t be supplanted by competitors. In other words, investors are assuming Nvidia will demonstrate persistence. 更進一步的好消息是，今日的領漲股並不像投資人對 Nifty Fifty 所採用的 p//e\mathrm{p} / \mathrm{e} 比率。這七家公司中最性感的也許是 Nvidia，它是人工智慧晶片的領導設計商。該公司目前的未來獲利倍數約為 30 多倍，這取決於您相信哪一種獲利預測。雖然這是標準普爾 500 指數戰後平均市盈率的兩倍，但相較於 Nifty Fifty 指數，這已經算便宜了。但 30 多倍的市盈率代表什麼呢？首先，投資人認為 Nvidia 在未來數十年內仍會持續營運。第二，它的利潤在這數十年間都會成長。第三，它不會被競爭對手取代。換句話說，投資人假設 Nvidia 將展現持久性。
But persistence isn’t easily achieved, especially in high-tech fields where new technologies can arise and new competitors can leapfrog incumbents. It’s worth noting, for example, that only about half the Nifty Fifty (as enumerated by Wikipedia - there is no agreed-on list) are in the S&P 500 today (that figure undoubtedly looks worse than the reality, since mergers and acquisitions caused some of the old names to disappear, not failures). Leading lights of 1969 that are missing from the S&P 500 today include Xerox, Kodak, Polaroid, Avon, Burroughs, Digital Equipment, and my favorite, Simplicity Pattern (how many people make their own clothing these days?). 但是堅持並不容易做到，尤其是在高科技領域，新技術可能會出現，新競爭者可能會超越現有的競爭者。舉例來說，值得注意的是，今天的標準普爾 500 指數中，只有約一半的 Nifty Fifty (由維基百科列出，並沒有一致同意的名單)（這個數字無疑看起來比實際情況更糟，因為併購導致一些舊公司消失，而不是倒閉）。今天的標準普爾 500 指數中，1969 年的龍頭企業包括施樂 (Xerox)、柯達 (Kodak)、寶麗來 (Polaroid)、雅芳 (Avon)、伯勒斯 (Burroughs)、數位設備 (Digital Equipment)，以及我最喜歡的簡約布料 (Simplicity Pattern)（現在有多少人自己製作衣服？
Another indication of how hard it is to persist can be seen in the names of the top twenty S&P 500 companies. At the beginning of 2000, according to finhacker.cz, these twenty companies were the most heavily represented in the index: 從 S&P 500 前二十大公司的名稱可以看出，要堅持下去有多困難。在 2000 年初，根據 finhacker.cz 的資料，這二十家公司在該指數中的佔有率最高：
Microsoft 微軟General Electric 通用電氣Cisco Systems 思科系統Walmart 沃爾瑪
Exxon Mobil Johnson & Johnson
Intel Qualcomm
Citigroup Bristol-Myers Squibb
IBM Pfizer
Oracle AT&T
Home Depot Verizon| Exxon Mobil | Johnson & Johnson |
| :--- | :--- |
| Intel | Qualcomm |
| Citigroup | Bristol-Myers Squibb |
| IBM | Pfizer |
| Oracle | AT&T |
| Home Depot | Verizon |
At the beginning of 2024, however, only six of them were still in the top twenty: 然而，在 2024 年初，只有六家仍在前二十名之列：
Microsoft 微軟
Johnson & Johnson 強生公司
Walmart 沃爾瑪
Procter & Gamble 寶潔公司
Exxon Mobil 埃克森美孚
Home Depot 家得寶
Microsoft Johnson & Johnson
Walmart Procter & Gamble
Exxon Mobil Home Depot| Microsoft | Johnson & Johnson |
| :--- | :--- |
| Walmart | Procter & Gamble |
| Exxon Mobil | Home Depot |
Importantly, of today’s Magnificent Seven, only Microsoft was in the top twenty 24 years ago. 重要的是，在今日的七巨頭中，只有微軟在 24 年前名列前二十名。
In bubbles, investors treat the leading companies - and pay for their stocks - as though the firms are sure to remain leaders for decades. Some do and some don’t, but change seems to be more the rule than persistence. 在泡沫中，投資人對待領導公司，並為其股票付費，彷彿這些公司肯定會持續領導數十年。有些會，有些不會，但改變似乎比堅持更為普遍。
Whole Markets 完整市場
The greatest bubbles usually originate in connection with innovations, mostly technological or financial, and they initially affect a small group of stocks. But sometimes they extend to whole markets, as the fervor for a bubble group spreads to everything. 最大的泡沫通常與創新有關，大多數是技術或金融創新，最初只影響一小部分股票。但有時它們會擴散到整個市場，因為對某個泡沫群體的狂熱會擴散到所有東西。
In the 1990s, the S&P 500 was borne aloft by (a) the continuing decline of interest rates from their inflation-fighting peak in the early 1980s and (b) the return of investor enthusiasm for stocks that had been lost in the traumatic '70s. Technological innovation and the rapid earnings growth of the high-tech companies added to the excitement. And an upswing in the popularity of stocks was reinforced by new academic research showing there had never been a long period in which the S&P 500 failed to outperform bonds, cash, and inflation. The combination of these positive factors caused the annual return on the index to average more than 20%20 \% for the decade. I’ve never seen another period like it. 在 1990 年代，標準普爾 500 指數因下列因素而高高在上：(a) 利率從 1980 年代初期對抗通脹的高峰持續下降；(b) 投資者對股票的熱情回復到 70 年代的創傷時期。科技創新和高科技公司盈利的快速成長，為這股熱潮加分不少。新的學術研究顯示，標準普爾 500 指數從未長時間跑輸過債券、現金和通貨膨脹。這些利好因素結合起來，使得該指數在這十年中的年平均回報率超過 20%20 \% 。我從未見過另一段類似的時期。
I always say the riskiest thing in the world is the belief that there’s no risk. In a similar vein, heated buying spurred by the observation that stocks had never performed poorly for a long period caused stock prices to rise to a point from which they were destined to do just that. In my view, that’s George Soros’s investment “reflexivity” at work. Stocks were tarred in the bursting of the TMT Bubble, and the S&P 500 declined in 2000, 2001, and 2002 for the first three-year decline since 1939, during the Great Depression. As a consequence of this poor performance, investors deserted stocks en masse, causing the S&P 500S \& P 500 to have a cumulative return of zero for the more than eleven years from the bubble peak in mid-2000 until December 2011. 我總是說，世界上最危險的事情就是相信沒有風險。與此類似的是，由於觀察到股票長期以來從未表現不佳而刺激的熱烈買盤，導致股價上升到一個注定會從此開始的點位。在我看來，這就是喬治-索羅斯的投資「反身性」在起作用。股票在 TMT 泡沫爆破中被塗上了瀝青，標準普爾 500 指數在 2000 年、2001 年和 2002 年連續三年下跌，這是自 1939 年大蕭條期間以來的首次下跌。由於表現不佳，投資人大舉拋棄股票，導致 S&P 500S \& P 500 從 2000 年中泡沫高峰到 2011 年 12 月的十一年多期間，累積回報率為零。
Lately, I’ve been repeating a quote I attribute to Warren Buffett: “When investors forget that corporate profits grow about 7%7 \% per year they tend to get into trouble.” What this means is that if corporate profits grow at 7%7 \% a year and stocks (which represent a share in corporate profits) appreciate at 20%20 \% a year for a while, eventually stocks will be so highly priced relative to their earnings that they’ll be risky. (I recently asked Warren for a source on the quote, and he told me he never said it. But I think it’s great, so I keep using it.) 最近，我一直在重複巴菲特（Warren Buffett）的一句話：「當投資者忘記企業利潤每年約有 7%7 \% 的成長時，他們往往會陷入困境」。這句話的意思是，如果企業利潤每年以 7%7 \% 的速度增長，而股票（代表企業利潤的一部分）每年以 20%20 \% 的速度升值一段時間，最終股票相對於其收益的價格會非常高，以至於會有風險。(我最近向 Warren 詢問這句話的來源，他告訴我他從來沒有說過）。但我覺得這句話很棒，所以我一直在用)。
The point is that when stocks rise too fast - out of proportion to the growth in the underlying companies’ earnings - they’re unlikely to keep on appreciating. Michael Cembalest has another chart that makes this point. It shows that prior to two years ago, there were only four times in the history of the S&P 500 when it returned 20%20 \% or more for two years in a row. In three of those four instances (a small sample, mind you), the index declined in the subsequent two-year period. (The exception was 1995-98, when the powerful TMT bubble caused the decline to be delayed until 2000. But then the index lost almost 40%40 \% in three years.) 重點是當股價上漲過快，與相關公司的盈利成長不成比例時，就不太可能持續升值。Michael Cembalest 的另一張圖表也說明了這一點。它顯示，在兩年前之前，標準普爾 500 指數歷史上只有四次連續兩年的回報率 20%20 \% 或以上。在這四次中的三次（請注意，這只是一個小樣本），該指數在隨後的兩年期間均出現下跌。(1995-98 年是個例外，當時強大的 TMT 泡沫導致指數下跌延遲至 2000 年。但那時指數在三年內幾乎跌了 40%40 \% ）。
In the last two years, it’s happened for the fifth time. The S&P 500 was up 26%26 \% in 2023 and 25%25 \% in 2024, for the best two-year stretch since 1997-98. That brings us to 2025. What lies ahead? 在過去兩年裡，這已經是第五次發生了。標準普爾 500 指數在 2023 年上升 26%26 \% ，在 2024 年上升 25%25 \% ，為 1997-98 年以來最好的兩年。這樣我們就到了 2025 年。前方是什麼？
The cautionary signs today include these: 今天的警示訊號包括這些：
the optimism that has prevailed in the markets since late 2022, 自 2022 年末以來，市場上彌漫著樂觀的氣氛、
the above average valuation on the S&P 500, and the fact that its stocks in most industrial groups sell at higher multiples than stocks in those industries in the rest of the world, 高於標準普爾 500 指數的平均估值，以及大多數工業群股票的銷售倍數高於世界其他地區同業股票的事實、
the enthusiasm that is being applied to the new thing of AI, and perhaps the extension of that positive psychology to other high-tech areas, 應用在人工智慧這個新興事物上的熱情，也許是將積極心理學延伸到其他高科技領域、
the implicit presumption that the top seven companies will continue to be successful, and 隱含的假設是前七大公司將繼續成功，以及
the possibility that some of the appreciation of the S&P has stemmed from automated buying of these stocks by index investors, without regard for their intrinsic value. 標準普爾的部分升值可能是因為指數投資人自動買進這些股票，而沒有考慮其內在價值。
Finally, while I’m at it, although it’s not directly related to stocks, I have to mention Bitcoin. Regardless of its merit, the fact that its price rose 465%465 \% in the last two years doesn’t suggest an overabundance of caution. 最後，說到這裏，雖然與股票沒有直接關係，但我不得不提到比特幣。無論其優點如何，其價格在過去兩年中的上漲 465%465 \% 並不能說明過度的謹慎。
I often find that, just as I’m about to release a memo for publication, something comes along that demands inclusion, and it has happened again. On the last day of 2024, I received something from two sources that fits that description: 我經常發現，就在我要發表備忘錄的時候，有東西出現了，需要收錄在備忘錄中，而且這種情況又發生了。在 2024 年的最後一天，我從兩個來源收到了符合上述描述的東西：
The graph, from J.P. Morgan Asset Management, has a square for each month from 1988 through late 2014, meaning there are just short of 324 monthly observations ( 27 years x 12). Each square shows the forward p/e ratio on the S&P 500 at the time and the annualized return over the subsequent ten years. The graph gives rise to some important observations: 這張圖來自 J.P. Morgan Asset Management，從 1988 年到 2014 年底，每個月都有一個方格，也就是說只有不到 324 個月的觀察（27 年 x 12）。每個方格顯示當時標準普爾 500 指數的遠期市盈率，以及隨後十年的年化報酬率。該圖表引發了一些重要的觀察：
There’s a strong relationship between starting valuations and subsequent annualized ten-year returns. Higher starting valuations consistently lead to lower returns, and vice versa. There are minor variations in the observations, but no serious exceptions. 起始估值與隨後的十年年化報酬率之間存在強烈關係。起始估值越高，回報越低，反之亦然。觀察結果有微小的差異，但沒有嚴重的例外。
Today’s p//e\mathrm{p} / \mathrm{e} ratio is clearly well into the top decile of observations. 今天的 p//e\mathrm{p} / \mathrm{e} 比率顯然已進入觀察的前十分之一。
In that 27-year period, when people bought the S&PS \& P at p//e\mathrm{p} / \mathrm{e} ratios in line with today’s multiple of 22 , they always earned ten-year returns between plus 2%2 \% and minus 2%2 \%. 在這 27 年間，當人們以 p//e\mathrm{p} / \mathrm{e} 比率買入 S&PS \& P 與今日的 22 倍數一致時，他們賺取的十年回報總是在正 2%2 \% 與負 2%2 \% 之間。
In November, a couple of leading banks came out with projected ten-year returns for the S&P 500 in the low- to mid-single digits. The above relationship is the reason. It shouldn’t come as a surprise that the return on an investment is significantly a function of the price paid for it. For that reason, investors clearly shouldn’t be indifferent to today’s market valuation. 11 月，幾家領先的銀行發表了標準普爾 500 指數的十年預測回報率，在低位數到中位數。這就是上述關係的原因。投資的回報率在很大程度上取決於投資所付出的代價，這一點並不應該令人感到驚訝。因此，投資人顯然不該對今日的市場估值無動於衷。
You might say, “making plus-or-minus-2% wouldn’t be the worst thing in the world,” and that’s certainly true if stocks were to sit still for the next ten years as the companies’ earnings rose, bringing the multiples back to earth. But another possibility is that the multiple correction is compressed into a year or two, implying a big decline in stock prices such as we saw in 1973-74 and 2000-02. The result in that case wouldn’t be benign. 您可能會說：「賺到正負 2% 並不是世界上最糟糕的事情」，如果股票在未來十年都靜止不動，因為公司的獲利上升，使倍數回歸正軌，這當然是對的。但另一種可能性是，倍數修正被壓縮在一年或兩年內，這意味著股票價格大幅下跌，就像我們在 1973-74 年和 2000-02 年看到的情況一樣。在這種情況下，結果不會是好的。
The above are the things to worry about. Here are the counterarguments: 以上是需要擔心的事情。以下是反駁意見：
the p/e ratio on the S&P 500 is high but not insane, 標準普爾 500 指數的市盈率很高，但並非瘋狂、
the Magnificent Seven are incredible companies, so their high p/e ratios could be warranted, Magnificent Seven 都是令人難以置信的公司，因此他們的高市盈率是合理的、
I don’t hear people saying, “there’s no price too high;” and 我沒聽到有人說「沒有太高的價格」；而且
the markets, while high-priced and perhaps frothy, don’t seem nutty to me. 儘管市場價格高企，也許有泡沫，但在我看來並不瘋狂。
As I said at the start of this memo, I’m not an equity investor, and I’m certainly no expert on technology. Thus, I can’t speak authoritatively about whether we’re in a bubble. I just want to lay out the facts as I see them and suggest how you might think about them . . . just as I did 25\mathbf{2 5} years ago. 正如我在這份備忘錄的開頭所說，我不是股票投資者，更不是科技專家。因此，我無法權威性地評論我們是否處於泡沫之中。我只想列出我所看到的事實，並建議您如何思考這些事實......就像我多年前所做的一樣。
I hope you’ll keep reading for the next 25 ! 我希望您能繼續閱讀接下來的 25 ！
January 2, 2025 2025 年 1 月 2 日
This memorandum expresses the views of the author as of the date indicated and such views are subject to change without notice. Oaktree has no duty or obligation to update the information contained herein. Further, Oaktree makes no representation, and it should not be assumed, that past investment performance is an indication of future results. Moreover, wherever there is the potential for profit there is also the possibility of loss. 本備忘錄表達作者截至所示日期的觀點，該等觀點如有變更，恕不另行通知。Oaktree沒有責任或義務更新本文件中的資訊。此外，Oaktree不表示，也不應假設，過去的投資表現是未來業績的指標。此外，只要有獲利的可能性，就有虧損的可能性。
This memorandum is being made available for educational purposes only and should not be used for any other purpose. The information contained herein does not constitute and should not be construed as an offering of advisory services or an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any securities or related financial instruments in any jurisdiction. Certain information contained herein concerning economic trends and performance is based on or derived from information provided by independent third-party sources. Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. (“Oaktree”) believes that the sources from which such information has been obtained are reliable; however, it cannot guarantee the accuracy of such information and has not independently verified the accuracy or completeness of such information or the assumptions on which such information is based. 本備忘錄僅供教育用途，不得用於任何其他目的。本文所含資訊不構成且不應被詮釋為在任何司法管轄區內提供諮詢服務或要約出售或招攬購買任何證券或相關金融工具。本文中包含的某些有關經濟趨勢和表現的資訊是基於或來自獨立第三方來源提供的資訊。Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. ("Oaktree")相信這些資訊的來源是可靠的；但是，Oaktree不能保證這些資訊的準確性，也沒有獨立核實這些資訊或這些資訊所依據的假設的準確性或完整性。
This memorandum, including the information contained herein, may not be copied, reproduced, republished, or posted in whole or in part, in any form without the prior written consent of Oaktree. 未經 Oaktree 事先書面同意，不得以任何形式拷貝、複製、再版或公佈本備忘錄的全部或部分內容，包括其中包含的資訊。
