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Chinese policymakers identify solar cells, electric vehicles, and lithium-ion batteries (known as the “New Three”) as emerging export drivers for China. A switch from the “Old Three”, i.e., furniture, home appliance and clothing, to the “New Three” demonstrates the government’s desire for and progress towards industrial upgrade. However, increased trade tensions have cast a long shadow over the outlook for “New Three” exports. Investors are wondering if tariff hikes on “New Three” exports will pose significant downside risks to China’s economic growth. We address this question in this note.
中国政策制定者确定太阳能电池、电动汽车和锂离子电池（被称为“新三驾马车”）为中国新兴出口驱动力。从“旧三驾马车”（即家具、家电和服装）转向“新三驾马车”表明政府希望并正在实现产业升级。然而，不断升级的贸易紧张局势给“新三驾马车”出口前景蒙上了一层长长的阴影。投资者担心对“新三驾马车”出口征收关税是否会对中国经济增长构成重大下行风险。我们在本文中探讨这个问题。
Based on our analysis, tariff hikes on Chinese “New Three” exports, including the recent tariffs announced by the Biden administration, are unlikely to pose significant downside risks to China’s GDP growth this year. China has become the most important supplier of “New Three” products in the world, but the majority of the overall production has been for domestic consumption. The “New Three” exports only account for 4.5% of Chinese headline exports (and those to the US only account for 0.4% of Chinese headline exports), therefore the macro growth impact should be limited in the near term.
根据我们的分析，包括拜登政府最近宣布的关税上调在内，对中国“新三大”出口的关税上调不太可能对中国今年的 GDP 增长构成重大下行风险。中国已成为世界上“新三大”产品最重要的供应国，但绝大部分产量都用于国内消费。中国的“新三大”出口仅占中国总出口的 4.5%（其中对美国的出口仅占中国总出口的 0.4%），因此宏观增长影响在短期内应该是有限的。
By geography, Europe is the largest market for Chinese “New Three” exports, accounting for around 45% of total “New Three” exports from China. In contrast, the US alone only consumes 0.2% of solar cell and 1% of electric vehicles (EV) exported by China, thanks to elevated US tariffs imposed in the 2018-19 trade war. Given this, trade frictions with Europe would be more damaging for Chinese exports of “New Three” than further tariff escalation by the US in this area.
就地理位置而言，欧洲是中国“新三大”出口最大的市场，占中国“新三大”出口总量的约 45%。相比之下，仅美国就消费了中国出口的太阳能电池的 0.2%和电动汽车的 1%，这要归功于 2018-19 年贸易战中美国实施的高关税。基于此，与欧洲的贸易摩擦对中国“新三大”出口的影响将比美国在这一领域进一步加征关税更具破坏性。
The focus of trade policy regarding China differs across US and EU, even more so should former US President Trump win the November Presidential election. The recent tariffs announced by the Biden administration and the ongoing investigations initiated by the EU target specific sectors, which account for a relatively small share of Chinese exports. Given US imports of EV and solar cells from China have been very small in the recent years, the direct growth impact of US tariff hikes on those products should be negligible in our view. But Trump has suggested a 60% tariff on all imports from China, which could induce around 2pp drag to China’s GDP growth based on our estimates.
就中国贸易政策的重点而言，美国和欧盟之间存在差异，尤其是如果前美国总统特朗普赢得 11 月的总统选举。拜登政府宣布的最近关税和欧盟发起的持续调查针对特定行业，这些行业占中国出口的相对较小份额。鉴于美国近年来从中国进口的电动汽车和太阳能电池规模非常小，我们认为美国对这些产品加征关税的直接增长影响应该可以忽略不计。但特朗普曾建议对所有从中国进口的商品征收 60%的关税，根据我们的估计，这可能导致中国国内生产总值增长率下降约 2 个百分点。
Chinese policymakers and state media identify solar cells, electric vehicles, and lithium-ion batteries (known as the “New Three”) as emerging drivers of high-quality growth. These sectors are often referred to as high-tech and high value-added industries, and the strong growth of “New Three” symbolizes China’s rise in global value chains. Our previous analysis also suggests that the “New Three” could partially offset the drag on growth from the property downcycle, given the rapid expansion of “New Three” and a shrinking property sector.
中国政策制定者和官方媒体将太阳能电池、电动汽车和锂离子电池（被称为“新三驾马车”）确定为高质量增长的新兴驱动力。这些行业通常被称为高科技和高附加值产业，“新三驾马车”的强劲增长象征着中国在全球价值链中的崛起。我们先前的分析还表明，“新三驾马车”可能在一定程度上抵消房地产周期下行对增长的拖累，鉴于“新三驾马车”的快速扩张和房地产行业的萎缩。
However, China’s rapid advances in green technology have triggered increasing concerns in the west over China’s potential overcapacity problem in these sectors and the impact of cheap Chinese exports of these products on domestic production. For example, on May 14, the White House announced raising tariffs on $18bn imported goods from China including electric vehicles (from 25% to 100%), batteries (from 7.5% to 25%) and solar cells (from 25% to 50%), effective from 2024.[1] The EU commission also launched their anti-subsidy investigation into China’s EV. Some investors are wondering if tariff hikes on “New Three” exports will pose significant downside risks to China’s economic growth and are asking about the different implications from US/EU trade policy against Chinese “New Three” exports.
然而，中国在绿色技术方面的快速进步引发了西方对中国在这些领域潜在产能过剩问题以及中国廉价出口这些产品对国内生产的影响日益关注。例如，白宫于 5 月 14 日宣布，将对从中国进口的价值 180 亿美元的商品征收关税，包括电动汽车（从 25%提高到 100%）、电池（从 7.5%提高到 25%）和太阳能电池（从 25%提高到 50%），自 2024 年生效。欧盟委员会也对中国电动汽车展开了反补贴调查。一些投资者担心对“新三驾马车”出口征收关税是否会给中国经济增长带来重大下行风险，并询问美国/欧盟针对中国“新三驾马车”出口的贸易政策是否会产生不同的影响。
To address these two questions, we first investigate the role of “New Three” exports in the Chinese economy. After gauging the growth boost from “New Three” production in China using input-output tables, we estimate the downside risks from potential tariff hikes on “New Three” exports. Our major takeaways are twofold: 1) the contribution to GDP growth from “New Three” exports remains small, therefore tariff hikes are unlikely to pose significant downside risks to China’s GDP growth this year; 2) tariff hikes from the EU would be more damaging to the Chinese economy than additional tariff hikes from the US since the EU is the dominant importer of Chinese “New Three” products.
针对这两个问题，我们首先调查了“新三大”出口在中国经济中的作用。在利用投入产出表评估中国“新三大”生产带来的增长助推之后，我们估计了潜在关税上调对“新三大”出口的下行风险。我们的主要结论有两个方面：1）“新三大”出口对 GDP 增长的贡献仍然较小，因此今年关税上调不太可能对中国的 GDP 增长构成重大下行风险；2）与美国的额外关税上调相比，来自欧盟的关税上调对中国经济的破坏更为严重，因为欧盟是中国“新三大”产品的主要进口国。
Policymakers and state media often cite the shifting export drivers from the “Old Three” to the “New Three” to demonstrate the progress of China’s industrial upgrade. The “Old Three” refer to furniture, home appliance and clothing, which are more labor-intensive with lower value-added, compared with the “New Three”. In 2017-2023, Chinese “Old Three” exports in nominal USD terms grew by 2.6% on average per year (vs. 6.9% per year for headline exports), while “New Three” exports expanded by 40% per year. The share of “New Three” in Chinese exports rose to 4.5% by the end of 2023, from around 1% in 2018, while that of “Old Three” fell in the past years (Exhibit 1).
决策者和官方媒体经常引用从“老三大”向“新三大”转变的出口驱动力，以展示中国工业升级的进展。 “老三大”指的是家具、家电和服装，这些行业更加劳动密集，附加值较低，与“新三大”相比。在 2017 年至 2023 年期间，中国“老三大”出口在名义美元方面年均增长 2.6%（与整体出口年均增长 6.9%相比），而“新三大”出口年均增长 40%。到 2023 年底，中国出口中“新三大”的份额升至 4.5%，而 2018 年左右约为 1%，而“老三大”的份额在过去几年中有所下降（见附件 1）。
A shift from the “Old Three” to the “New Three” coincides with a closer trade linkage between China and Europe. By export destination, Europe is the largest market for China’s “New Three” exports, while the US is the largest market for China’s “Old Three” exports, closely followed by Europe (Exhibit 2). Europe consumed 46% of the solar cells, 50% of the electric vehicles, and 39% of the Lithium-ion batteries exported by China in 2023.[2] In contrast, the US only consumed 0.2% of the solar cells, 1% of the electric vehicles, and 21% of the Lithium-ion battery exported by China (see appendix for more details).[3] The divergence in solar cells and electric vehicles is mainly driven by existing US tariffs on Chinese exports of solar cells and electric vehicles. For example, Chinese exports of electric vehicles face a 27.5% tariff in the US market (vs. a 10% tariff in the EU market), mostly imposed during the 2018-19 trade war.[4]
从“旧三大”向“新三大”转变，与中国和欧洲之间更紧密的贸易联系相吻合。按出口目的地看，欧洲是中国“新三大”出口的最大市场，而美国是中国“旧三大”出口的最大市场，紧随其后的是欧洲。欧洲消费了中国在 2023 年出口的太阳能电池的 46％，电动汽车的 50％和锂离子电池的 39％。相比之下，美国仅消费了中国出口的太阳能电池的 0.2％，电动汽车的 1％和锂离子电池的 21％（有关更多详细信息，请参见附录）。太阳能电池和电动汽车的分歧主要是由美国对中国太阳能电池和电动汽车出口征收的关税所驱动。例如，中国出口的电动汽车在美国市场上面临着 27.5％的关税（而在欧盟市场上为 10％的关税），这主要是在 2018-19 年贸易战期间征收的。
Source: China Customs, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
来源：中国海关，高盛全球投资研究
The member states of CIS are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
独联体成员国包括亚美尼亚、阿塞拜疆、白俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、摩尔多瓦、俄罗斯、塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦
Source: China Customs, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
数据来源：中国海关、高盛全球投资研究
China has become the most important supplier of “New Three” products in the world. As noted by our equity research team, China's share of global production was around 60% for electric vehicles, 86% for batteries, and 85-97% for solar products in 2022. The build-up of production capacity also led to relatively low utilization rates. The utilization rate of China’s electric vehicle capacity was 54% in 2023, and 61% for the battery sector. The utilization rate of China’s solar product capacity stays in the range of 50-60%, according to the China Photovoltaic Industry Association. The majority of overall Chinese “New Three” production is for domestic consumption (Exhibit 3). Exports account for 19%/28%/42% production of electric vehicles/batteries/solar modules, respectively.
中国已成为全球最重要的“新三电”产品供应商。正如我们的股权研究团队所指出的，2022 年中国在全球电动汽车产量中占比约 60%，电池占比 86%，太阳能产品占比 85-97%。生产能力的增加也导致了相对较低的利用率。2023 年中国电动汽车产能利用率为 54%，电池行业为 61%。根据中国光伏行业协会的数据，中国太阳能产品产能利用率保持在 50-60%的范围内。中国“新三电”产量的大部分用于国内消费（见附件 3）。出口占中国电动汽车/电池/太阳能模块产量的 19%/28%/42%。
Chinese exports of “New Three” have experienced rapid expansion in recent years, from US$20bn in 2017 to US$150bn in 2023. Premier Li Qiang highlighted the “New Three” exports in RMB terms registered 30% growth in 2023 in the government work report, much higher than the muted headline nominal export growth (0.6% in RMB terms). Chinese “New Three” products also gained shares in global markets significantly over the past few years (Exhibit 4). The share of solar cells (Li-ion battery) in world exports increased from around 30% (less than 40%) in 2010s to 55% (51%) in 2022. The share of electric vehicles jumped from only 1% in 2017 to 10% in 2022.[5]
中国的“新三大”出口在近年来经历了快速扩张，从 2017 年的 200 亿美元增长到 2023 年的 1500 亿美元。李强总理在政府工作报告中强调，2023 年“新三大”出口以人民币计价增长了 30%，远高于名义出口增长率（人民币计价为 0.6%）。中国的“新三大”产品在过去几年在全球市场上也显著增加了份额（见附表 4）。太阳能电池（锂离子电池）在世界出口中的份额从 2010 年代的约 30%（不到 40%）增加到 2022 年的 55%（51%）。电动汽车的份额从 2017 年的仅 1%增长到 2022 年的 10%。
Though the export value of “New Three” expanded by more than six times in 2017-2023, the boost to domestic growth from "New Three" exports remained minor given its small share in the economy. Leveraging our framework on green capex, we investigate how much the “New Three” exports directly and indirectly contributed to China’s GDP. Our estimates suggest a small but rising growth boost, taking into consideration induced demand for upstream sectors (Exhibit 5). This is in line with our previous analysis: domestic demand remains the lion’s share of China’s electric vehicle production, and the impact of renewable energy sectors on GDP mainly operates through large investment in wind and solar power generation and its induced production across upstream sectors which are more domestic by nature.
尽管“新三大”出口价值在 2017-2023 年间增长超过六倍，但由于其在经济中所占份额较小，因此“新三大”出口对国内增长的助力仍然有限。借助我们关于绿色资本支出的框架，我们研究了“新三大”出口对中国国内生产总值的直接和间接贡献。我们的估算表明，考虑到上游行业的诱发需求，这种增长助力虽小但在逐渐增加，这与我们先前的分析一致：国内需求仍占中国电动汽车生产的主要份额，可再生能源行业对国内生产总值的影响主要通过对风能和太阳能发电的大规模投资及其在上游行业中诱发的生产来实现，而这些行业更具国内性。
Chinese “New Three” export growth has lost some steam since the second half of 2023 in value terms, partially due to price cuts amid intensified competition (Exhibit 6). Export value of solar cells dropped by 31% yoy in Q1 2024 with unit price down 45% yoy, thanks to overcapacity and ongoing initiatives from the US/EU to onshore manufacturing capacity. Export price of Lithium-ion battery declined by around 22% yoy in Q1 2024 due to excess capacity. The GS Battery equity research team expects a soft landing scenario for the industry – overcapacity pressure is likely to ease thanks to capex deceleration. Export price of electric vehicles also fell by 7.5% yoy in Q1 2024. The GS Auto equity research team expects resilient growth of electric vehicle export volume with continued price competition.
中国的“新三大”出口增长自 2023 年下半年以来在价值方面有所放缓，部分原因是由于激烈竞争中的价格下调（见附件 6）。太阳能电池的出口价值在 2024 年第一季度同比下降了 31%，单位价格同比下降了 45%，这要归功于产能过剩以及美国/欧盟正在推动国内制造能力。2024 年第一季度锂离子电池的出口价格由于产能过剩而下降了约 22%。GS 电池股票研究团队预计该行业将出现软着陆情景 - 由于资本支出放缓，产能过剩压力可能会减轻。2024 年第一季度电动汽车的出口价格也同比下降了 7.5%。GS 汽车股票研究团队预计电动汽车出口量将保持强劲增长，并持续价格竞争。
Excess capacity in the “New Three” sectors raised concerns from US officials and European Commission. The latest data suggests capacity utilization rate of automobile and electric machinery/equipment sectors fell below their respective pre-Covid range (Exhibit 7). US Treasury Secretary Yellen expressed concerns on China’s overcapacity issue, triggering strong pushback from Chinese officials. On October 4, 2023, the European Commission launched anti-subsidy probe into Chinese electric vehicle exports to the EU. The Financial Times reported that preliminary duties could come as early as May with a deadline in July. Permanent duties would be imposed in November if supported by a majority of EU member states. Overall, the risk of renewed trade frictions is on the rise.
“新三大”行业的过剩产能引起了美国官员和欧洲委员会的担忧。最新数据显示，汽车和电机械/设备行业的产能利用率已经低于其各自的疫情前范围（见附件 7）。美国财政部长耶伦对中国的产能过剩问题表示担忧，引发了中国官员的强烈反击。2023 年 10 月 4 日，欧洲委员会对中国电动汽车出口到欧盟发起了反补贴调查。《金融时报》报道称，初步关税可能最早在 5 月出台，最后期限为 7 月。如果得到欧盟多数成员国的支持，将于 11 月实施永久性关税。总体而言，贸易摩擦再次升级的风险正在上升。
Though signs of protectionism are growing, the recent US/EU focus on trade policy regarding China has been centered on specific sectors, which account for a relatively small share in Chinese exports. For example, Chinese exports of wind turbine and parts only account for 0.1pp of total exports. Therefore, the impact on specific sectors might be sizeable, but the macro implication would be limited. To analyze the effect of tariffs on Chinese exports of “New Three”, we leverage the framework from the 2018-19 experience.[6] Our estimates suggest the overall impact on China’s growth would be small (3bp per 10% tariff hike from the US and EU on “New Three” exports from China). That said, former US President Trump has suggested a 60% tariff on all imports from China, which would induce around a 2pp drag to China’s GDP growth, based on our estimates, if fully implemented without any policy offset.
尽管保护主义迹象日益增多，但最近美国/欧盟在涉华贸易政策上的关注集中在特定领域，这些领域在中国出口中所占比重相对较小。例如，中国对风力涡轮机及零部件的出口仅占总出口的 0.1 个百分点。因此，对特定领域的影响可能是可观的，但宏观影响将是有限的。为了分析关税对中国“新三大”出口的影响，我们利用了 2018-19 年的经验框架。我们的估计表明，美国和欧盟对中国“新三大”出口征收 10%关税将对中国经济增长的整体影响很小（每提高 10%关税将使中国增长减少 3 个基点）。也就是说，前美国总统特朗普曾建议对所有从中国进口的商品征收 60%的关税，根据我们的估计，如果完全实施且没有任何政策抵消，这将使中国的 GDP 增长减少大约 2 个百分点。
Thanks to previously imposed trade policies, only 2% of US imports of battery electric vehicles (BEV) were from China in 2023, while more than half of the EU’s imports came from China (Exhibit 8). Tariff hikes from the US would therefore have much limited direct impact on Chinese producers of “New Three” compared to tariff hikes from the EU (for example, see our Battery equity research team's takeaways on the US tariff hike on batteries and battery-related imports from China). Instead, industrial policies, including subsidies to local manufacturers, could weaken China’s cost advantages and keep imports from China low. For example, the battery cell costs in the US are 21% higher than that of Chinese exports without government subsidies. However, production costs in the US would be 16% lower than Chinese exports once subsidies from the Inflation Reduction Act are taken into consideration. Though tariff hikes from the EU would be more damaging, the European producers and policymakers are both worried about China’s responses to potential tariff hikes, given that China remains a large market for European carmakers and their supply chain reliance on raw material and components made by China. As a result, the EU may be reluctant to impose tariff rates similar to the US on Chinese “New Three” products, at least in the near term.
由于之前实施的贸易政策，2023 年美国电池电动汽车（BEV）进口量仅有 2%来自中国，而欧盟超过一半的进口来自中国（见附件 8）。因此，与欧盟的关税上涨相比，美国的关税上涨对“新三大”中国生产商的直接影响将大大受限（例如，查看我们电池股权研究团队关于美国对中国电池及相关进口关税上涨的观点）。相反，包括对本地制造商的补贴在内的工业政策可能削弱中国的成本优势并保持来自中国的进口量较低。例如，美国的电池单体成本比没有政府补贴的中国出口高出 21%。然而，考虑到通货膨胀减少法案的补贴后，美国的生产成本将比中国出口低 16%。 尽管欧盟的关税上调可能会造成更大的损害，但欧洲生产商和决策者都担心中国对潜在关税上调的反应，因为中国仍然是欧洲汽车制造商及其供应链对中国生产的原材料和零部件依赖较大的市场。因此，欧盟可能不愿意在短期内对中国的“新三大”产品征收类似于美国的关税率。
Xinquan Chen and Yuting Yang
陈新权和杨雨婷
The member states of CIS are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
独联体成员国是亚美尼亚，阿塞拜疆，白俄罗斯，哈萨克斯坦，吉尔吉斯斯坦，摩尔多瓦，俄罗斯，塔吉克斯坦和乌兹别克斯坦。
Source: China Customs, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
来源：中国海关，高盛全球投资研究
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