TOWARD A THEORY OF STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND SALIENCE: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLE OF WHO AND WHAT REALLY COUNTS
邁向利害關係人識別與顯著性理論：界定誰和什麼真正重要的原則

Since Freeman (1984) published his landmark book, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, the concept of “stakeholders” has become embedded in management scholarship and in managers’ thinking. Yet, as popular as the term has become and as richly descriptive as it is, there is no agreement on what Freeman (1994) calls “The Principle of Who or What Really Counts.” That is, who (or what) are the stakeholders of the firm? And to whom (or what) do managers pay attention? The first question calls for a normative theory of stakeholder identification, to explain logically why managers should consider certain classes of entities as stakeholders. The second question calls for a descriptive theory of stakeholder salience, to explain the conditions under which managers do consider certain classes of entities as stakeholders.
自從 Freeman（1984 年）發表了他的里程碑式著作《戰略管理》（Strategic Management：A Stakeholder Approach》一書發表以來，「利益相關者」這個概念已經深入管理學界和管理者的思考之中。然而，儘管這個名詞已經變得如此流行，而且具有豐富的描述性，但對於 Freeman（1994）所稱的「誰或什麼才是真正重要的原則」卻沒有一致的看法。也就是說，誰（或什麼）是公司的利益相關者？管理者又該注意誰（或什麼）？第一個問題需要一個利益相關者識別的規範理論，從邏輯上解釋為什麼管理者應該將某幾類實體視為利益相關者。第二個問題需要利益相關者顯著性的描述性理論，以解釋管理者確實將某些類別的實體視為利益相關者的條件。

Stakeholder theory, reviewed in this article, offers a maddening variety of signals on how questions of stakeholder identification might be answered. We will see stakeholders identified as primary or secondary
本文所回顧的利害關係人理論，對於如何回答利害關係人識別的問題，提供了種種令人抓狂的訊號。我們會看到利益相關者被認定為主要或次要

stakeholders; as owners and nonowners of the firm; as owners of capital or owners of less tangible assets; as actors or those acted upon; as those existing in a voluntary or an involuntary relationship with the firm; as rights-holders, contractors, or moral claimants; as resource providers to or dependents of the firm; as risk-takers or influencers; and as legal principals to whom agent-managers bear a fiduciary duty. In the stakeholder literature there are a few broad definitions that attempt to specify the empirical reality that virtually anyone can affect or be affected by an organization’s actions. What is needed is a theory of stakeholder identification that can reliably separate stakeholders from nonstakeholders.
利益相關者包括：公司的所有者和非所有者；資本所有者或非有形資產所有者；行為者或被行為者；與公司存在自願或非自願關係者；權利持有者、承包商或道德要求者；公司的資源提供者或依賴者；風險承擔者或影響者；以及代理管理者對其負有受託責任的法律委託人。在利害關係人的文獻中，有一些廣泛的定義試圖明確說明實際的現實，即幾乎任何人都可能影響組織的行為或受到組織的行為影響。我們所需要的，是能夠可靠區分利害關係人與非利害關係人的利害關係人識別理論。

Also in the stakeholder literature are a number of narrow definitions that attempt to specify the pragmatic reality that managers simply cannot attend to all actual or potential claims, and that propose a variety of priorities for managerial attention. In this article we suggest that the question of stakeholder salience-the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims-goes beyond the question of stakeholder identification, because the dynamics inherent in each relationship involve complex considerations that are not readily explained by the stakeholder framework as it currently stands. What is needed also is a theory of stakeholder salience that can explain to whom and to what managers actually pay attention.
在利害關係人的文獻中，也有許多狹義的定義，試圖說明管理者根本無法顧及所有實際或潛在要求的現實，並提出各種管理者關注的優先順序。在這篇文章中，我們提出利益相關者顯著性的問題，也就是管理者對相互競爭的利益相關者主張給予優先權的程度，這個問題超越了利益相關者識別的問題，因為每種關係中固有的動態因素都涉及到複雜的考量，而目前的利益相關者架構無法輕易解釋這些因素。我們還需要一套利害關係人顯著性理論，以解釋管理者實際上會注意哪些人、哪些事。

Among the various ways of identifying stakeholders, as well as in the agency, behavioral, ecological, institutional, resource dependence, and transcration cost theories of the firm, we have found no single attribute within a given theory that can guide us reliably on these issues. However, we find that one can extract from these literatures the idea that just a few attributes can be used to identify different classes of stakeholders in a firm’s environment. We begin our analysis with Freeman’s definition of stakeholder-" any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives" (1984: 46)-and develop a theory of stakeholder identification drawn from these various theoretical literatures. We start with a broad definition so that no stakeholders, potential or actual, are excluded from analysis arbitrarily or a priori. We then propose that classes of stakeholders can be identified by their possession or attributed possession of one, two, or all three of the following attributes: (1) the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm, (2) the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the firm. This theory produces $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha comprehensive typology of stakeholders based on the normative assumption that these variables define the field of stakeholders: those entities to whom managers should pay attention.
在識別利害關係人的各種方法中，以及在公司的代理理論、行為理論、生態理論、制度理論、資源依賴理論和轉移成本理論中，我們都沒有發現某個理論中的單一屬性可以在這些問題上為我們提供可靠的指導。然而，我們發現可以從這些文獻中萃取出一個觀點，那就是僅僅幾個屬性就可以用來識別公司環境中不同類別的利益相關者。我們從 Freeman 對利益相關者的定義開始分析--「任何能夠影響組織目標的達成，或受到組織目標達成影響的團體或個人」（1984: 46）--並從這些不同的理論文獻中發展出一套利益相關者識別理論。我們從廣義的定義開始，這樣就不會任意或先驗地將任何利益相關者，無論是潛在的或實際的，排除在分析之外。然後我們提出，利益相關者的類別可以通過他們擁有或被認為擁有以下一個、兩個或全部三個屬性來識別：(1) 利益相關者影響公司的力量，(2) 利益相關者與公司關係的合法性，以及 (3) 利益相關者對公司要求的迫切性。此理論基於這些變數定義了利益相關者的領域：經理人應該關注的實體這一規範性假定，產生了 $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha 利益相關者的綜合類型。

Building upon this typology, we further propose a theory of stakeholder salience. In this theory we suggest a dynamic model, based upon the identification typology, that permits the explicit recognition of situational uniqueness and managerial perception to explain how managers prioritize stakeholder relationships. We demonstrate how the identifica-
在此類型學的基礎上，我們進一步提出了利益相關者顯著性理論。在此理論中，我們以識別類型學為基礎，提出了一個動態模型，允許明確承認情境的獨特性和管理感知，以解釋管理者如何優先處理利益相關者關係。我們將說明如何識別利益相關者的顯著性。
tion typology allows predictions to be made about managerial behavior with respect to each class of stakeholder, as well as predictions about how stakeholders change from one class to another and what this means to managers. In the theory of stakeholder salience, we do not argue that managers should pay attention to this or that class of stakeholders. Rather, we argue that to achieve certain ends, or because of perceptual factors, managers do pay certain kinds of attention to certain kinds of stakeholders. Knowing what types of stakeholders actually exist, which our identification typology facilitates, and why managers respond to them the way they do, which our notion of salience clarifies, sets the stage for future work in stakeholder theory that specifies how and under what circumstances managers can and should respond to various stakeholder types.
在利益相關者顯著性理論中，我們並不認為管理者應該關注這一類或那一類利益相關者。在利益相關者顯著性理論中，我們並不認為管理者應該關注這個或那個類別的利益相關者。相反，我們認為，為了達到某些目的，或者由於感知因素，管理者確實會對某類利益相關者給予某種關注。我們的識別類型學有助於瞭解利益相關者實際存在的類型，而我們的顯著性概念則澄清了為什麼管理者會以這種方式回應他們，這為利益相關者理論的未來工作奠定了基礎，該理論明確了管理者如何以及在什麼情況下可以並應該回應各種利益相關者類型。

The argument proceeds as follows. First, we review the stakeholder literature, laying out the various explicit and implicit positions on “The Principle of Who or What Really Counts.” We then present our defense of the three key attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-as identifiers of stakeholder classes and briefly examine the major organizational theories to discern how they handle these three crucial variables. Next we introduce managers and salience into the discussion and present our analysis of the stakeholder classes that result from possession of one, two, or three of these attributes, giving special attention to the managerial implications of the existence and salience of each stakeholder class. Finally, we further illustrate the theory’s dynamic qualities by showing how stakeholders can shift from one class to another, with important consequences for managers and the firm itself, and we explore the research questions and directions that emerge from the theory.
論證過程如下。首先，我們回顧了利害關係人的文獻，闡述了「誰或什麼真正重要」這一原則的各種明確和隱含的立場。接著，我們提出了三個關鍵屬性--權力、合法性和迫切性--作為利益相關者類別的識別標誌，並簡要檢視了主要的組織理論，以瞭解它們是如何處理這三個關鍵變量的。接下來，我們將管理者和顯著性引入討論，並分析因擁有其中一、二或三項特質而產生的利害關係人類別，並特別注意每個利害關係人類別的存在和顯著性對管理的影響。最後，我們進一步說明這個理論的動態特質，顯示利益相關者如何從一個類別轉換到另一個類別，對管理者和公司本身造成重要的後果，我們也探討從這個理論衍生出來的研究問題和方向。

For more than a decade the stakeholder approach to understanding the firm in its environment has been $a$$a$aa powerful heuristic device, intended to broaden management’s vision of its roles and responsibilities beyond the profit maximization function to include interests and claims of nonstockholding groups. Stakeholder theory, in contrast, attempts to articulate a fundamental question in a systematic way: which groups are stakeholders deserving or requiring management attention, and which are not? In this section we examine how scholars have so far answered these central questions. Who is a stakeholder, and what is a stake? What does stakeholder theory offer that is not found in other theories of the firm?
十多年來，以利益相關者的方法來了解公司所處的環境，一直是 $a$$a$aa 強而有力的啟發式工具，其目的在於擴大管理階層對其角色與責任的視野，使其超越利潤最大化的功能，將非持股團體的利益與主張納入其中。相較之下，利害關係人理論則試圖以系統化的方式闡述一個基本問題：哪些團體是值得或需要管理階層關注的利害關係人，哪些不是？在本節中，我們將探討學者們迄今為止是如何回答這些核心問題的。誰是利害關係人，什麼是利害關係？利益相關者理論提供了哪些其他公司理論所沒有的東西？

There is not much disagreement on what kind of entity can be a stakeholder. Persons, groups, neighborhoods, organizations, institutions, societies, and even the natural environment are generally thought to qualify as actual or potential stakeholders. We find that it is the view
對於什麼樣的實體可以成為利害關係人，並沒有太大的分歧。一般認為，個人、團體、鄰里、組織、機構、社會，甚至自然環境，都有資格成為實際或潛在的利害關係人。我們發現
taken about the existence and nature of the stake that presents an area of argument, because it is upon the basis of “stake” that “what counts” is ultimately decided.
我們對於利害關係的存在與性質提出了一個爭論的領域，因為「什麼算數」最終是在「利害關係」的基礎上決定的。

Early vagueness in definition. In an early statement Jones defined corporate social responsibility as “the notion that corporations have an obligation to constituent groups in society other than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract, indicating that a stake may go beyond mere ownership” (1980: 59-60). He then asked the pragmatic questions stakeholder theory still seeks to answer: “What are these groups? How many of these groups must be served? Which of their interests are most important? How can their interests be balanced? How much corporate money should be allotted to serve these interests?” (1980: 60).
早期定義模糊。在早期的聲明中，Jones 將企業社會責任定義為「企業對社會中除股東之外的其他組成群體所負有的義務，超越法律或工會契約所規定的義務，表示利害關係人可能超越純粹的所有權」(1980: 59-60)。接著，他提出了利益相關者理論仍在尋求回答的實用問題："這些團體是什麼？有多少這些團體必須得到服務？他們的哪些利益最重要？如何平衡他們的利益？應該分配多少企業資金來服務這些利益？(1980: 60).

These questions are still being explored in stakeholder literature and management thinking. Alkhafaji, for example, defines stakeholders as “groups to whom the corporation is responsible” (1989: 36). Thompson, Wartick, and Smith define stakeholders as groups “in relationship with an organization” (1991: 209). Most scholars, however, have attempted to specify a more concrete stakeholder definition, albeit with limited success.
這些問題仍在利害關係人文獻與管理思維中探索。例如，Alkhafaji 將利益相關者定義為「公司對其負責的團體」(1989: 36)。Thompson、Wartick 和 Smith 將利益相關者定義為「與組織有關係的群體」（1991: 209）。然而，大多數學者都試圖明確一個更具體的利害關係人定義，儘管成效有限。

Broad or narrow view? Windsor (1992) correctly points out that stakeholder theorists differ considerably on whether they take a broad or narrow view of a firm’s stakeholder universe. Freeman and Reed (1983) recognized early on that there would be serious differences of opinion about broad versus narrow definitions of “Who or What Really Counts.” Their broad definition of a stakeholder as an individual or group who “can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives” (1983: 91) is virtually identical to Freeman’s (1984) definition. And their narrow definition reverted to the language of the Stanford Research Institute (1963), defining stakeholders as those groups “on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival” (1983: 91).
寬廣或狹隘的觀點？Windsor (1992) 正確地指出，利害關係人理論家對於公司的利害關係人領域採取廣義或狹義的觀點，有相當大的差異。Freeman 和 Reed (1983) 很早就意識到，在「誰或什麼真正重要」的廣義與狹義定義上會有嚴重的意見分歧。他們對利益相關者的廣義定義為「能夠影響組織目標的實現，或受到組織目標實現影響」的個人或團體（1983: 91），這與 Freeman（1984）的定義幾乎完全相同。而他們的狹義定義則回到了斯坦福研究所(1963)的用語，將利益相關者定義為「組織持續生存所依賴的團體」(1983: 91)。

Freeman’s now-classic definition is this: “A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (1984: 46). This is certainly one of the broadest definitions in the literature, for it leaves the notion of stake and the field of possible stakeholders unambiguously open to include virtually anyone. In this definition the basis of the stake can be unidirectional or bidirectional-“can affect or is affected by”-and there is no implication or necessity of reciprocal impact, as definitions involving relationships, transactions, or contracts require. Excluded from having a stake are only those who cannot affect the firm (have no power) and are not affected by it (have no claim or relationship).
Freeman 現在的經典定義是這樣的：「組織中的利害關係人是（定義上）任何能夠影響組織目標的達成或受到組織目標達成影響的團體或個人」（1984：46）。這絕對是文獻中最廣泛的定義之一，因為它讓利害關係人的概念和可能的利害關係人領域毫無疑問地開放，幾乎包括任何人。在這個定義中，利害關係人的基礎可以是單向或雙向的──「能夠影響或受到影響」──而沒有像涉及關係、交易或契約的定義所要求的互惠影響的含意或必要性。只有那些無法影響公司（沒有權力）且不受公司影響（沒有主張或關係）的人，才能排除在利害關係之外。

In contrast, Clarkson offers one of the narrower definitions of stakeholders as voluntary or involuntary risk-bearers: “Voluntary stakeholders bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm. Involuntary stakehold-
相比之下，Clarkson 提供了一個較狹義的定義，將利益相關者界定為自願或非自願的風險承擔 者："自願的利害關係人因為投資了某種形式的資本 (人力或財務)、某種有價值的東西，而承擔某種形式的風險。非自願利害關係人
ers are placed at risk as a result of a firm’s activities. But without the element of risk there is no stake” (1994: 5). A stake, in this sense, is only something that can be lost. The use of risk to denote stake appears to be a way to narrow the stakeholder field to those with legitimate claims, regardless of their power to influence the firm or the legitimacy of their relationship to the firm. This search for legitimacy, we argue later, is necessary to understand fully a firm’s stakeholder environment, but it also can be a powerful blinder to the real impact of stakeholder power and claim urgency. We argue, in contrast to the position of all those who appear to focus primarily on legitimacy, that this narrower view captures only one key attribute of stakeholder salience to managers.
公司的活動會使投資者面臨風險。但如果沒有風險元素，就沒有利害關係」（1994：5）。在這個意義上，利害關係只是可能失去的東西。用風險來表示利害關係，似乎是縮窄利害關係人領域的一種方式，使其只侷限於有合法訴求的利害關係人，而不考慮其影響公司的力量或其與公司關係的合法性。我們稍後指出，這種尋求合理性的做法，對於充分瞭解公司的利害關係人環境是必要的，但也可能會讓人看不清利害關係人的權力與主張迫切性的真正影響。我們認為，與所有那些似乎主要著重於合法性的人的立場相反，這種狹隘的觀點只捕捉到了利益相關者對管理者來說顯著性的一個關鍵屬性。

Between the broad and narrow are many other efforts to define what constitutes a stakeholder. The range of definitions as it has developed chronologically appears in Table l.
在廣義與狹義之間，還有許多其他界定利害關係人的努力。按照時間順序發展的定義範圍如表 l 所示。

Major differences between broad and narrow views. Narrow views of stakeholders are based on the practical reality of limited resources, limited time and attention, and limited patience of managers for dealing with external constraints. In general, narrow views of stakeholders attempt to define relevant groups in terms of their direct relevance to the firm’s core economic interests. For example, several scholars define stakeholders in terms of their necessity for the firm’s survival (Bowie, 1988; Freemon & Reed, 1983; Näsi, 1995); as noted, Clarkson (1995) defines stakeholders as those who have placed something at risk in relationship with the firm, whereas Freeman and Evan (1990), Hill and Jones (1992), and Cornell and Shapiro (1987) speak of stakeholders as contractors or participants in exchange relationships.
廣義與狹義觀點的主要差異。狹義的利害關係人觀點是基於資源有限、時間與注意力有限、管理者處理外部限制的耐性有限等實際現實。一般而言，狹義的利益相關者觀點試圖從與公司核心經濟利益直接相關的角度來定義相關群體。例如，幾位學者根據利益相關者對公司生存的必要性來定義利益相關者（Bowie，1988；Freemon & Reed，1983；Näsi，1995）；如前所述，Clarkson（1995）將利益相關者定義為那些在與公司的關係中將某些東西置於風險中的人，而 Freeman 和 Evan（1990）、Hill 和 Jones（1992）以及 Cornell 和 Shapiro（1987）則將利益相關者說成是交換關係中的承包商或參與者。

A few scholars narrow the field of relevant groups in terms of their moral claims, arguing that the essence of stakeholder management should be the firm’s participation in creating and sustaining moral relationships (Freeman, 1994; Wicks, Gilbert, & Freeman, 1994), or the firm’s fulfilling its affirmative duty to stakeholders in terms of fairly distributing the harms and benefits of the firm’s actions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Evan & Freeman, 1988; Langtry, 1994). In any case, we see those favoring a narrow definition of stakeholders as searching for a “normative core” of legitimacy so that managers can be advised to focus on the claims of a few legitimate stakeholders.
少數學者從道德主張的角度縮小相關群體的範圍，認為利害關係人管理的本質應該是公司參與創造和維持道德關係（Freeman, 1994; Wicks, Gilbert, & Freeman, 1994），或是公司履行對利害關係人的肯定責任，公平分配公司行動的損害和利益（Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Evan & Freeman, 1988; Langtry, 1994）。無論如何，我們認為那些贊成狹義界定利害關係人的人，是在尋找合法性的「規範核心」，好讓管理者能被建議專注於少數合法利害關係人的訴求。

The broad view of stakeholders, in contrast, is based on the empirical reality that companies can indeed be vitally affected by, or they can vitally affect, almost anyone. But it is bewilderingly complex for managers to apply. The idea of comprehensively identifying stakeholder types, then, is to equip managers with the ability to recognize and respond effectively to a disparate, yet systematically comprehensible, set of entities who may or may not have legitimate claims, but who may be able to affect or are affected by the firm nonetheless, and thus affect the interests of those who do have legitimate claims.
相對而言，廣義的利害關係人觀則是建立在經驗現實的基礎上，即公司確實會受到幾乎任何人的重大影響，或公司會對幾乎任何人造成重大影響。但是，對於管理者來說，要應用這種觀點是非常複雜的。因此，全面識別利害關係人類型的想法，是要讓管理者有能力識別並有效应對一組不同但系統性可理解的實體，這些實體可能有也可能沒有合法的訴求，但卻可能影響公司或受到公司的影響，進而影響那些有合法訴求的實體的利益。

The ultimate aim of stakeholder management practices, according to
利益相關者管理實務的最終目的，根據

Who Is a Stakeholder? A Chronology
誰是利害關係人？年表

1990
Thompson et al., 1991: 209
Thompson 等人, 1991: 209
Savage et al., 1991: 61
Savage 等人，1991：61
Hill & Jones, 1992: 133

Brenner, 1993: 205

Carroll, 1993: 60

Freeman, 1994: 415
Wicks et al., 1994: 483
Wicks 等人, 1994: 483
Langtry, 1994: 433

Starik, 1994: 90

Clarkson, 1994: 5

Clarkson, 1995: 106

Näsi, 1995: 19
Brenner, 1995: 76, n. 1
Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 85
contract holders  合約持有人
in “relationship with an organization”
在「與組織的關係」中
“have an interest in the actions of an organization and … the ability to influence it”
「與某組織的行動有利害關係，並......有能力影響該組織」
“constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . . established through the existence of an exchange relationship” who supply "the firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)’
「對公司有合法要求的成員......通過交換關係的存在而建立」，他們向 "公司提供關鍵資源（貢獻），作為交換，每個人都期望其利益得到滿足（通過誘因）'。
“having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with an organization [such as] exchange transactions, action impacts, and moral responsibilities”
「與組織有一些合法的、非瑣碎的關係，[例如] 交換交易、行動影響和道義責任」。
“asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business”-may be affected or affect…
"聲稱在業務中擁有一種或多種利害關係」-可能受到影響或影響...
participants in “the human process of joint value creation”
共同創造價值的人類過程」的參與者
“interact with and give meaning and definition to the corporation”
「與公司互動，並賦予公司意義與定義」
the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm
公司對他們的福祉負有重大責任，或他們對公司有道德或法律上的要求
“can and are making their actual stakes known”-“are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization”
可以並正在公開他們的實際利害關係」-「受到或可能受到某些組織的影響，或正在或可能成為某些組織的影響者」-「可以並正在公開他們的實際利害關係」-「受到或可能受到某些組織的影響，或正在或可能成為某些組織的影響者」。
“bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm” or “are placed at risk as a result of $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha firm’s activities”
"因投資某種形式的資本 (人力或財務、有價值的東西) 於公司而承受某種形式的風險」或「因 $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha 公司的活動而承受風險」。
“have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities”
「擁有或要求公司及其活動的所有權、權利或利益」
“interact with the firm and thus make its operation possible”
「與公司互動，從而使其運作成為可能」
“are or which could impact or be impacted by the firm/organization”
「正在或可能影響公司/組織」
“persons or groups with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity”
「在公司活動的程序和/或實體方面擁有合法權益的個人或團體」
this view, could be firm centered or system centered; that is, managers might want to know about all of their stakeholders for firm-centered purposes of survival, economic well-being, damage control, taking advantage of opportunities, “doing in” the competition, winning friends and influencing public policy, coalition building, and so forth. Or, in contrast, managers might want an exhaustive list of all stakeholders in order to participate in a fair balancing of various claims and interests within the firm’s social system. Both the former public affairs approach and the latter social responsibility approach require broad knowledge of actual and potential actors and claimants in the firm’s environment.
也就是說，管理者可能希望瞭解所有的利益相關者，以達到以公司為中心的目的，包括生存、經濟福祉、損害控制、利用機會、在競爭中勝出、贏得朋友、影響公共政策、建立聯盟等等。或者，與此相反，管理者可能想要一份詳盡無遺的所有利益相關者清單，以便在公司的社會體系中公平地平衡各種要求和利益。前者的公共事務方法和後者的社會責任方法都需要對公司環境中實際和潛在的參與者和索賠者有廣泛的瞭解。

Claimants versus influencers. In order to clarify the term “stake,” we need to differentiate between groups that have a legal, moral, or presumed claim on the firm and groups that have an ability to influence the firm’s behavior, direction, process, or outcomes. Savage, Nix, Whitehead, and Blair (1991) consider two attributes to be necessary to identify a stakeholder: (1) a claim and (2) the ability to influence a firm. Brenner (1993) and Starik (1994), however, pose these attributes as either/or components of the definition of those with a stake.
索賠人與影響者。為了澄清「利害關係人」一詞，我們需要區分對公司有法律、道德或假定要求的團體，以及有能力影響公司行為、方向、過程或結果的團體。Savage、Nix、Whitehead 和 Blair (1991) 認為識別利益相關者必須具備兩個屬性：(1) 索賠要求和 (2) 影響公司的能力。然而，Brenner (1993) 和 Starik (1994) 則將這些屬性視為利益相關者定義中非此即彼的組成部分。

In our view this is a muddled set, confusing and contrasting two of the three criteria we see as important. Influencers have power over the firm, whether or not they have valid claims or any claims at all and whether or not they wish to press their claims. Claimants may have legitimate claims or illegitimate ones, and they may or may not have any power to influence the firm. Power and legitimacy are different, sometimes overlapping dimensions, and each can exist without the other. A theory of stakeholder identification must accommodate these differences.
我們認為這是一套混亂的標準，混淆並對比了我們認為重要的三項標準中的兩項。影響者對公司有影響力，不論他們是否有有效的索賠或任何索賠，也不論他們是否想提出索賠。索賠人可能有合法的索賠，也可能有不合法的索賠，他們可能有也可能沒有任何影響公司的權力。權力與合法性是不同的層面，有時甚至是重疊的層面，兩者可以缺一不可。利益相關者識別理論必須兼顧這些差異。

Actual versus potential relationship. Another crucial question leading to the comprehensibility of the term “stake” is whether an entity can be a stakeholder without being in actual relationship with the firm. Some scholars (e.g., Ring, 1994) emphatically answer, " No." We argue that, on the contrary, the potential relationship can be as relevant as the actual one. Clarkson’s (1994) idea of involuntary stakeholders as those with something not willfully placed at risk addresses the potentiality issue somewhat. Starik quite clearly includes potential when he refers to stakeholders as those who “are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization” (1994: 90). We suggest that a theory of stakeholder identification and salience must somehow account for latent stakeholders if it is to be both comprehensive and useful, because such identification can, at a minimum, help organizations avoid problems and perhaps even enhance effectiveness.
實際關係與潛在關係。導致「利害關係人」一詞難以理解的另一個關鍵問題是，一個實體是否可以在與公司沒有實際關係的情況下成為利害關係人。有些學者 (例如 Ring, 1994) 強調回答：「不可以」。我們認為，恰恰相反，潛在的「利害關係」與實際的「利害關係」同樣相關。Clarkson (1994)的非自願利害關係人的觀念，是指那些沒有故意將某些東西置於風險中的利害關係人。Starik 將利益相關者稱為「受到或可能受到某些組織的影響，或者是或可能是某些組織的影響者」(1994: 90) 時，很明確地將潛在的利益相關者包括在內。我們建議，利益相關者識別與顯著性的理論，必須以某種方式說明潛在的利益相關者，這樣才能既全面又有用，因為這樣的識別至少可以幫助組織避免問題，甚至可能提高效率。

Power, dependence, and reciprocity in relationships. If the firm and a stakeholder have a relationship, what is the nature of that relationship? The literature offers a confusing jumble of answers to this question, but most answers use a power-dependence frame of some sort. As Table 2 shows, some definitions focus on the firm’s dependency on stakeholders for its survival; some focus on the stakeholder’s dependency on the firm
關係中的權力、依賴和互惠。如果公司與利害關係人存在關係，那麼這種關係的本質是什麼？對於這個問題，文獻提供了混亂的答案，但大多數答案都使用了某種權力依賴框架。如表 2 所示，有些定義著重於公司為了生存而對利害關係人的依賴；有些則著重於利害關係人對公司的依賴。

A Sorting of Rationales for Stakeholder Identification
利益相關者識別的理據分類

The firm and stakeholder are in relationship:
公司與利害關係人的關係：
Thompson et al., 1991: 209-in “relationship with an organization”
Thompson 等人，1991：209-「與組織的關係」
Brenner, 1993: 205-“having some legitimate, non-trivial relationship with an organization [such as] exchange transactions, action impacts, and moral responsibilities”
Brenner, 1993: 205-「與組織有一些合法的、非瑣碎的關係，[例如] 交換交易、行動影響，以及道德責任」。
Freeman, 1994: 415-participants in “the human process of joint value creation”
Freeman, 1994: 415-「人類共同創造價值的過程」中的參與者
Wicks et al., 1994: 483-“interact with and give meaning and definition to the corporation”
Wicks 等人，1994：483-「與公司互動，並賦予公司意義和定義」。

The stakeholder exercises voice with respect to the firm:
利害關係人對公司行使發言權：
Starik, 1994: 90-“can and are making their actual stakes known”-“are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization”
Starik，1994：90-「能夠並且正在讓人知道他們的實際利害關係」-「正在或可能受到某些組織的影響，或正在或可能成為某些組織的影響者」。

The firm is dependent on the stakeholder:
公司依賴於利害關係人：
Stanford memo, 1963-“those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist” (cited in Freeman & Reed, 1983, and Freeman, 1984)
史丹佛大學備忘錄，1963-「沒有他們的支持，組織將不復存在的團體」（引自 Freeman & Reed, 1983，以及 Freeman, 1984）。
Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-Narrow: “on which the organization is dependent for its continued survival”
Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-狹義：「組織賴以繼續生存」。
Bowie, 1988: 112, n. 2-“without whose support the organization would cease to exist” Näsi, 1995: 19-“interact with the firm and thus make its operation possible”
Bowie, 1988: 112, n. 2--「沒有他們的支持，組織將不復存在」 Näsi, 1995: 19--「與公司互動，從而使其運作成為可能」。

The stakeholder has power over the firm:
利害關係人對公司擁有權力：
Freeman, 1984: 46-“can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”
Freeman, 1984: 46-「可以影響組織目標的達成，或受到組織目標達成的影響」。
Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-“can affect or is affected by a business”
Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-「可影響企業或受企業影響」。
Savage et al., 1991: 61-“have an interest in the actions of an organization and … the ability to influence it”
Savage 等人，1991：61-「對組織的行動有興趣，並且...有能力影響組織」。
Carroll, 1993: 60-“asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business”-may be affected or affect . . .
Carroll, 1993: 60-「聲稱在業務中擁有一種或多種利害關係」-可能受到影響或影響.
Starik, 1994: 90-“can and are making their actual stakes known”-“are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization”
Starik，1994：90-「能夠並且正在讓人知道他們的實際利害關係」-「正在或可能受到某些組織的影響，或正在或可能成為某些組織的影響者」。
Brenner, 1995: 76, n. l-“are or which could impact or be impacted by the firm/organization”
Brenner, 1995: 76, n. l-「是或可能影響或被影響的公司/組織」

Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm
Langtry, 1994: 433-公司對他們的福祉負有重大責任，或者他們對公司有道德或法律上的要求。

Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-Wide: “can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objectives”
Freeman & Reed, 1983: 91-廣泛：「可影響組織目標的實現，或誰會受到組織目標實現的影響」。
Freeman, 1984: 46-“can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”
Freeman, 1984: 46-「可以影響組織目標的達成，或受到組織目標達成的影響」。
Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-“can affect or is affected by a business”
Freeman & Gilbert, 1987: 397-「可影響企業或受企業影響」。
Carroll, 1993: 60-“asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business”-may be affected or affect…
Carroll, 1993: 60-「聲稱在商業中擁有一種或多種利害關係」-可能會受到影響或影響...

TABLE 2 (continued)  表 2（續）
Starik, 1994: 90-“can and are making their actual stakes known”-“are or might be influenced by, or are or potentially are influencers of, some organization”
Starik，1994：90-「能夠並且正在讓人知道他們的實際利害關係」-「正在或可能受到某些組織的影響，或正在或可能成為某些組織的影響者」。
Brenner, 1995: 76, n. l.-“are or which could impact or be impacted by the firm/organization”
Brenner, 1995: 76, n. l.-「是或可能影響或被影響的公司/組織」。

The firm and stakeholder are mutually dependent:
公司與利害關係人相互依存：
Rhenman, 1964-“are depending on the firm in order to achieve their personal goals and on whom the firm is depending for its existence” (cited in Näsi, 1995)
Rhenman, 1964-「依賴公司來達成他們的個人目標，而公司的存在也是依賴他們」（轉引自 Näsi, 1995）
Ahlstedt & Jahnukainen, 1971-“driven by their own interests and goals are participants in a firm, and thus depending on it and whom for its sake the firm is depending” (cited in Näsi, 1995)
Ahlstedt & Jahnukainen，1971--「受自身利益和目標驅使，成為公司的參與者，因此依賴於公司，而公司也為其所依賴」（引自 Näsi，1995）。

The firm and stakeholder are in contractual relationship:
公司與利害關係人是契約關係：
Cornell & Shapiro, 1987: 5-“claimants” who have “contracts”
Cornell & Shapiro, 1987: 5- 擁有「契約」的「索賠者」。
Carroll, 1989: 57-“asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes”-“ranging from an interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company’s assets or property”
Carroll, 1989: 57-「聲稱擁有一種或多種這類利害關係」-「從利益到權利 (法律或道德) 到公司資產或財產的所有權或法律所有權不等」。
Freeman & Evan, 1990-contract holders
Freeman & Evan，1990-合約持有人
Hill & Jones, 1992: 133 -“constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . . established through the existence of an exchange relationship” who supply “the firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)”
Hill & Jones, 1992: 133 -「對公司有合法要求的成員......透過交換關係的存在而建立」，他們提供「公司重要的資源 (貢獻)，作為交換，每個人都期望自己的利益得到滿足 (透過誘因)」。

Evan & Freeman, 1988: 75-76-“have a stake in or claim on the firm”
Evan & Freeman, 1988: 75-76 -「與公司有利害關係或對公司有權利要求」。
Alkhafaji, 1989: 36-“groups to whom the corporation is responsible”
Alkhafaji, 1989: 36-「公司對其負責的團體」。
Carroll, 1989: 57-“asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes”-“ranging from an interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company’s assets or property”
Carroll, 1989: 57-「聲稱擁有一種或多種這類利害關係」-「從利益到權利 (法律或道德) 到公司資產或財產的所有權或法律所有權不等」。
Hill & Jones, 1992: 133-“constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm . . . established through the existence of an exchange relationship” who supply “the firm with critical resources (contributions) and in exchange each expects its interests to be satisfied (by inducements)”
Hill & Jones, 1992: 133-「對公司有合法要求的成員......透過交換關係的存在而建立」，他們提供「公司重要的資源 (貢獻)，而在交換時，每個人都期望自己的利益得到滿足 (透過誘因)」。
Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm
Langtry, 1994: 433-公司對他們的福祉負有重大責任，或者他們對公司有道德或法律上的要求。
Clarkson, 1995: 106-“have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities”
Clarkson, 1995: 106-「擁有或主張擁有公司及其活動的所有權、權利或利益」。

Clarkson, 1994: 5-“bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value, in a firm” or “are placed at risk as a result of $a$$a$aa firm’s activities”
Clarkson, 1994: 5-「承擔某種形式的風險，因為投資了某種形式的資本 (人力或財務、有價值的東西)在公司」或「因為 $a$$a$aa 公司的活動而被置於風險之中」。

The stakeholder has a moral claim on the firm:
利害關係人對公司有道德要求：
Evan & Freeman, 1988: 79-“benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by, corporate actions”
Evan & Freeman, 1988: 79-「從公司行動中獲益或受到傷害，其權利受到公司行動的侵犯或尊重」。
Carroll, 1989: 57-“asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes”-“ranging from an interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company’s assets or property”
Carroll, 1989: 57-「聲稱擁有一種或多種這類利害關係」-「從利益到權利 (法律或道德) 到公司資產或財產的所有權或法律所有權不等」。

Langtry, 1994: 433-the firm is significantly responsible for their well-being, or they hold a moral or legal claim on the firm
Langtry, 1994: 433-公司對他們的福祉負有重大責任，或者他們對公司有道德或法律上的要求。
Clarkson, 1995: 106-“have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities”
Clarkson, 1995: 106-「擁有或主張擁有公司及其活動的所有權、權利或利益」。
Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 85-“identified through the actual or potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing as a result of the firm’s actions or inactions”
Donaldson & Preston, 1995: 85-「透過他們因公司的作為或不作為而經歷或預期經歷的實際或潛在傷害和利益來識別」。

Stakeholder Interests-Legitimacy Not Implied
利害關係人的利益-合法性並非暗示
The stakeholder has an interest in the firm:
利害關係人與公司有利害關係：
Carroll, 1989: 57-“asserts to have one or more of these kinds of stakes”-“ranging from an interest to a right (legal or moral) to ownership or legal title to the company’s assets or property”
Carroll, 1989: 57-「聲稱擁有一種或多種這類利害關係」-「從利益到權利 (法律或道德) 到公司資產或財產的所有權或法律所有權不等」。
Savage et al., 1991: 61-“have an interest in the actions of an organization and . . . have the ability to influence it”
Savage et al., 1991: 61-「對組織的行動有興趣，並且......有能力影響組織」。
Carroll, 1993: 60-“asserts to have one or more of the kinds of stakes in business”-may be affected or affect
Carroll, 1993: 60-「聲稱在業務中擁有一種或多種利害關係」-可能受到影響或影響
Clarkson, 1995: 106-“have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities”
Clarkson, 1995: 106-「擁有或主張擁有公司及其活動的所有權、權利或利益」。
for upholding its rights, minimizing harms, or achieving its interest; and some focus on the mutuality of power-dependence relations (although, interestingly, we found no definition that emphasized mutual power, and only two from Scandinavia that emphasized mutual dependence).
為了維護其權利、減少傷害或實現其利益；有些則著重於權力-依賴關係的相互性（但有趣的是，我們沒有發現任何強調相互權力的定義，只有兩個來自斯堪的納維亞的定義強調相互依賴）。

As shown, a broad-view sorting of stakeholders along previously defined dimensions is still somewhat overwhelming.
如圖所示，依據先前定義的維度對利害關係人進行廣視角排序，仍然有些令人難以招架。

Sorting criteria. Thus, although Freeman’s (1984) definition is widely cited in the literature, it is not accepted universally among scholars working in the stakeholder minefields. Narrowing the range of stakeholders requires applying some acceptable and justifiable sorting criteria to the field of possibilities. Some additional approaches are relationship based, built on acknowledged transactional conditions, such as the existence of a legal or implied contract, an exchange relationship, or an identifiable power-dependence relationship. Others are claim based, citing the existence or attribution of a legal or moral right, a real or attributed benefit or harm, or merely an interest.
分類標準。因此，儘管 Freeman (1984) 的定義在文獻中被廣泛引用，但在利益相關者雷區工作的學者中卻未被普遍接受。縮小利益相關者的範圍，需要對可能的領域應用一些可接受且合理的分類標準。有些額外的方法是以關係為基礎，建立在公認的交易條件上，例如存在合法或隱含的契約、交換關係或可識別的權力依存關係。其他則是以主張為基礎，引述法律或道德權利的存在或歸屬、實際或歸屬的利益或傷害，或僅是利益。

Overall, the information in Table 2 suggests that scholars who attempt to narrow the definition of stakeholder emphasize the claim’s legitimacy based upon contract, exchange, legal title, legal right, moral right, at-risk status, or moral interest in the harms and benefits generated by company actions and that, in contrast, scholars who favor a broad definition emphasize the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm’s behavior, whether or not there are legitimate claims. As a bridging concept, we argue that the broad concept of stakeholder management must be better defined in order to serve the narrower interests of legitimate stake-
總體而言，表 2 中的資訊顯示，試圖縮窄利害關係人定義的學者，強調權利要求的合法性是基於契約、交換、法律所有權、法律權利、道德權利、風險地位，或對公司行動所產生的傷害與利益的道德利益；相對而言，贊成廣義定義的學者，則強調利害關係人影響公司行為的力量，無論是否有合法的權利要求。作為一個橋接概念，我們認為利益相關者管理的廣義概念必須有更好的定義，才能服務於合法利益相關者的狹義利益。
holders. Otherwise, influencing groups with power over the firm can disrupt operations so severely that legitimate claims cannot be met and the firm may not survive. Yet, at the same time, it is important to recognize the legitimacy of some claims over others. Power and legitimacy, then, are necessarily core attributes of a comprehensive stakeholder identification model. We argue that when these attributes are evaluated in light of the compelling demands of urgency, a systematic, comprehensible, and dynamic model is the result.
持有人。否則，對公司有影響力的團體可能會嚴重擾亂公司的營運，以致於無法滿足合法的要求，公司也可能無法生存。然而，與此同時，也必須承認某些主張比其他主張的合法性。因此，權力和合法性必然是全面利益相關者識別模型的核心屬性。我們認為，當這些屬性依據迫切性的需求來評估時，就會產生一個有系統、可理解且動態的模型。

As we see from the preceding discussion of the stakeholder literature, one can extract just a few attributes to identify different classes of stakeholders that are salient to managers in certain respects. We also can see that stakeholder power and legitimacy of the claim frequently are treated as competing explanations of stakeholder status, when instead they are partially intersecting variables. Interestingly, this conceptual competition between power and legitimacy is reflected in virtually every major theory of the firm-particularly in agency, behavioral, institutional, population ecology, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories. This state-of-the-field provides an opportunity for a theory of stakeholder identification to move us forward by showing how power and legitimacy interact and, when combined with urgency, create different types of stakeholders with different expected behavioral patterns regarding the firm.
正如我們從前文對利害關係人文獻的討論中所看到的，我們只需要抽取幾個屬性，就可以識別出在某些方面對管理者來說很重要的不同類別的利害關係人。我們也可以看到，利害關係人的權力和主張的合法性經常被視為利害關係人地位的競爭性解釋，而事實上它們是部分交叉的變數。有趣的是，這種權力與合法性之間的概念競爭，幾乎反映在所有主要的公司理論中，尤其是代理理論、行為理論、制度理論、人口生態理論、資源依賴理論和交易成本理論。這個領域的現況為利益相關者識別理論提供了一個機會，讓我們可以藉由顯示權力與合法性如何互動，以及當與迫切性結合時，如何創造出不同類型的利益相關者，並對公司有不同的預期行為模式，來推動我們向前邁進。

Agency, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories are particularly helpful in explaining why power plays such on important role in the attention managers give to stakeholders. The central problem agency theory addresses is how principals can control the behavior of their agents to achieve their, rather than the agent’s, interests. The power of agents to act in ways divergent from the interests of principals may be limited by use of incentives or monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), so that managers are expected to attend to those stakeholders having the power to reward and/or punish them. Resource dependence theory suggests that power accrues to those who control resources needed by the organization, creating power differentials among parties (Pfeffer, 1981), and it confirms that the possession of resource power makes a stakeholder important to managers. Transaction cost theory proposes that the power accruing to economic actors with small numbers bargaining advantages will affect the nature of firm governance and structure (Williamson, 1975, 1985). That is, stakeholders outside the firm boundary who participate in a very small competitive set can increase transaction costs to levels that justify their absorption into the firm, where the costs of hierarchy are lower than the transaction costs of market failure-a clear indication of their significance to managers (Jones & Hill, 1988).
代理理論、資源依賴理論和交易成本理論特別有助於解釋為什麼權力在管理者對利益相關者的關注中扮演著如此重要的角色。代理理論要解決的核心問題是，委託人如何控制其代理人的行為，以達到委託人的利益，而非代理人的利益。代理人的行為偏離委託人利益的權力可能會受到激勵或監督的限制 (Jensen & Meckling, 1976)，因此預期管理者會關注那些有權獎勵和/或懲罰他們的利害關係人。資源依賴理論（Resource dependence theory）認為，權力會累積到那些控制組織所需資源的人身上，造成各方之間的權力差異（Pfeffer，1981），並確認擁有資源權力會讓利害關係人對管理者而言變得重要。交易成本理論提出，擁有少量議價優勢的經濟行動者所累積的權力，將會影響公司治理與結構的本質（Williamson, 1975, 1985）。也就是說，在公司邊界以外、參與極小競爭集的利害關係人，可以將交易成本提高到有理由將他們吸收到公司中的水準，在這種情況下，層級結構的成本比市場失效的交易成本更低--這清楚地表明了他們對管理者的重要性（Jones & Hill, 1988）。

These three organizational theories teach us why power is a crucial variable in a theory of stakeholder-manager relations. But, as previously
這三種組織理論告訴我們，為什麼權力是利害關係人與經理人關係理論中的關鍵變數。但是，正如之前
noted, power alone does not help us to fully understand salience in the stakeholder-manager relationship. There remain stakeholders who do not have power, but who nevertheless matter to firms and managers. Other means to identify “Who or What Really Counts” are needed.
我們注意到，僅有權力並不能幫助我們完全理解利益相關者與管理者之間關係的顯著性。還有一些利益相關者雖然沒有權力，但對公司和管理者來說卻很重要。我們需要其他方法來確定「誰或什麼真正重要」。

Organizational theories with an open-system orientation (Scott, 1987), including institutional and population ecology theories, help us to understand the crucial effects of the environment upon organizations, but they are less helpful when it comes to understanding power in stakeholdermanager relationships. In both theories organizational legitimacy is linked closely with survival (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977, and Carroll & Hannan, 1989, respectively). In the socially constructed world within which managers engage stakeholders, these two theories suggest that “legitimate” stakeholders are the ones who “really count.” Under institutional theory, “illegitimacy” results in isomorphic pressures on organizations that operate outside of accepted norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Under population ecology theory, lack of legitimacy results in organizational mortality (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). According to these two theories, legitimacy figures heavily in helping us to identify stakeholders that merit managerial attention. However, emphasizing legitimacy and ignoring power leave major gaps in a stakeholder identification scheme, because some legitimate stakeholders have no influence.
具有開放系統取向的組織理論（Scott，1987），包括制度理論和人口生態理論，有助於我們理解環境對組織的重要影響，但在理解利害關係人-經理關係中的權力時，這些理論的幫助較小。在這兩種理論中，組織的合法性都與生存密切相關（分別見 Meyer & Rowan, 1977 和 Carroll & Hannan, 1989）。在管理者與利益相關者接觸的社會建構世界中，這兩種理論都認為「合法」的利益相關者才是「真正重要的」。根據制度理論，「非法性」導致組織在公認的規範之外運作時受到同形壓力 (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)。根據人口生態理論，缺乏合法性會導致組織死亡（Carroll & Hannan, 1989）。根據這兩種理論，合法性在幫助我們識別值得管理者關注的利害關係人方面發揮了重要作用。然而，強調合法性而忽略權力，會在利害關係人識別方案中留下重大缺口，因為有些合法的利害關係人並沒有影響力。

A final attribute that profoundly influences managerial perception and attention, although not the primary feature of any particular organizational theory, is implicit in each. Agency theory treats this attribute in terms of its contribution to cost, as does transaction cost theory. Behavioral theory (Cyert & March, 1963) treats it as a consequence of unmet “aspirations.” Institutional, resource dependence, and population ecology theories treat it in terms of outside pressures on the firm. This attribute is urgency, the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention. Whether dealing with the prevention of losses, the pursuit of goals, or selection pressures, one constant in the stakeholder-manager relationship is the attention-getting capacity of the urgent claim. Urgency, as we discuss below, adds a catalytic component to a theory of stakeholder identification, for urgency demands attention.
最後，有一個特質深刻地影響了管理者的觀念和注意力，儘管它並非任何特定組織理論的主要特徵，但卻隱含在每一種理論中。代理理論(Agency Theory)以其對成本的貢獻來處理這一特性，交易成本理論(Transaction Cost Theory)也是如此。行為理論 (Cyert & March, 1963) 將其視為未滿足「期望」的結果。制度理論、資源依賴理論和人口生態理論則將其視為公司面臨的外部壓力。這個屬性就是迫切性，也就是利害關係人的訴求需要立即注意的程度。無論是處理防止損失、追尋目標或選擇壓力，利害關係人與管理者關係中的一個常量就是緊急訴求吸引注意力的能力。正如我們在下文所討論的，急迫性為利害關係人識別理論增加了一個催化成分，因為急迫性要求關注。

In summary, it is clear that no individual organizational theory offers systematic answers to questions about stakeholder identification and salience, although most such theories have much to tell us about the role of power or legitimacy (but not both) in stakeholder-manager relations. Urgency, in contrast, is not a main focus of any organizational theory, but it is critical nonetheless to any theory that purports to identify stakeholders and to explain the degree of attention paid to them by managers. Therefore, we suggest that to better understand “The Principle of Who and What Really Counts,” we need to evaluate stakeholder-manager relationships systematically, both actual and potential, in terms of the relative absence or presence of all or some of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and/or urgency.
總括而言，很明顯沒有任何一種組織理論能對利害關係人的識別與顯著性問題提供有系統的答案，雖然大多數這類理論都能告訴我們關於權力或合法性（但不是兩者）在利害關係人與管理者關係中的角色。相反，緊迫性並不是任何組織理論的主要焦點，但它對任何旨在識別利益相關者並解釋管理者對他們的關注程度的理論來說都是至關重要的。因此，我們建議，為了更好地理解「誰和什麼才是真正重要的原則」，我們需要有系統地評估利益相關者與管理者之間的關係，無論是實際的關係還是潛在的關係，都要考慮到所有或部分屬性的相對缺失或存在：權力、合法性和/或迫切性。

Power. Most current definitions of power derive, at least in part, from the early Weberian idea that power is “the probability that one actor within a social relationship would be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber, 1947). Pfeffer rephrases Dahl’s (1957) definition of power as “a relationship among social actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not otherwise have done” (1981: 3). Like Pfeffer and Weber, we concur that "power may be tricky to define, but it is not that difficult to recognize: ‘[it is] the ability of those who possess power to bring about the outcomes they desire’ " (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974: 3). This leads to the following question: How is power exercised, or, alternatively, what are the bases of power?
權力。目前大多數關於權力的定義，至少部分來自早期 Weberian 的想法，即權力是「社會關係中的一個行為者，儘管受到阻力，仍能執行自己意志的可能性」（Weber，1947）。Pfeffer 將 Dahl (1957) 對權力的定義重新表述為「一種社會行為者之間的關係，在這種關係中，一個社會行為者 A 能夠讓另一個社會行為者 B 做一些 B 否則不會做的事情」(1981: 3)。就像 Pfeffer 和 Weber 一樣，我們同意「權力的定義可能很棘手，但要認清它卻不那麼困難：『[它是] 那些擁有權力的人帶來他們想要的結果的能力』」(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974: 3)。這引出了以下的問題：權力是如何行使的，或者，權力的基礎是什麼？

French and Raven’s (1960) typology of power bases is one framework commonly cited in the organizational literature in answer to this question, but from a sociological perspective it is messy, for there is not a sorting logic at work to create the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories a true typology requires. Etzioni (1964) suggests a logic for the more precise categorization of power in the organizational setting, based on the type of resource used to exercise power: coercive power, based on the physical resources of force, violence, or restraint; utilitarian power, based on material or financial resources; and normative power, based on symbolic resources. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
French 和 Raven (1960) 的權力基礎類型學是組織文獻中為了回答這個問題而經常引用的一個框架，但是從社會學的角度來看，這個框架是雜亂無章的，因為它沒有一個分類邏輯來創建一個真正的類型學所需要的相互排斥和詳盡無遺的類別。Etzioni（1964）建議了一種邏輯，根據行使權力所使用的資源類型，對組織環境中的權力進行更精確的分類：強迫性權力，以武力、暴力或約束等物理資源為基礎；功利性權力，以物質或財務資源為基礎；規範性權力，以象徵性資源為基礎。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}

Therefore, a party to a relationship has power, to the extent it has or can gain access to coercive, utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will in the relationship. We note, however, that this access to means is a
因此，關係中的一方只要擁有或能夠獲得強制、功利或規範的手段，就有能力在關係中強加自己的意願。然而，我們注意到，這種手段的取得是一種

The use of a gun, a whip, or a lock is physical since it affects the body; the threat to use physical sanctions is viewed as physical because the effect on the subject is similar in kind, though not in intensity, to the actual use. Control based on application of physical means is ascribed as coercive power.
使用槍、鞭子或鎖是有形的，因為它會影響身體；威脅使用有形的制裁也被視為有形的，因為對對象的影響在種類上與實際使用相似，儘管在強度上不同。以使用實體手段為基礎的控制被歸類為強制力。

Material rewards consist of goods and services. The granting of symbols (e.g. money) which allow one to acquire goods and services is classified as material because the effect on the recipient is similar to that of material means. The use of material means for control purposes constitutes utilitarian power.
物質報酬包括商品和服務。賦予符號 (例如：金錢) 可以讓人獲得商品和服務，這類符號被歸類為物質，因為它對接受者的影響與物質手段類似。使用物質手段來達到控制的目的，就構成了功利性的權力。

Pure symbols are those whose use does not constitute a physical threat or a claim on material rewards. These include normative symbols, those of prestige and esteem; and social symbols, those of love and acceptance. When physical contact is used to symbolize love, or material objects to symbolize prestige, such contacts or objects are viewed as symbols because their effect on the recipient is similar to that of “pure” symbols. The use of symbols for control purposes is referred to as normative, normative-social, or social power. (1964: 59)
純粹的符號是指其使用並不構成人身威脅或對物質報酬的要求。這些符號包括規範符號 (normative symbols)，即關於聲望和尊敬的符號；以及社會符號 (social symbols)，即關於愛和接受的符號。當使用身體接觸來象徵「愛」，或使用物質物品來象徵「聲望」時，這些接觸或物品都被視為象徵，因為它們對接受者的影響與「純粹」的象徵類似。使用符號來達到控制的目的被稱為規範、規範-社會或社會力量。(1964: 59)
variable, not a steady state, which is one reason why power is transitory: it can be acquired as well as lost.
這也是為什麼權力是短暫的原因之一：它可以獲得，也可以失去。

Legitimacy. It is apparent from our analysis in Table 2 that narrowdefinition scholars, particularly those seeking a “normative core” for stakeholder theory, are focused almost exclusively on defining the basis of stakeholder legitimacy. Whether or not that core of legitimacy is to be found in something “at risk,” or in property rights, in moral claims, or in some other construct, articulations of “The Principle of Who or What Really Counts” generally are legitimacy based.
合法性。從表二的分析可以看出，狹義界定學者，尤其是那些為利益相關者理論尋求「規範核心」的學者，幾乎完全專注於界定利益相關者合法性的基礎。無論合法性的核心是否可以在「危險」的東西、財產權、道德主張或其他建構中找到，「誰或什麼真正重要」原則的闡述一般都是以合法性為基礎。

However, the notion of “legitimacy,” loosely referring to socially accepted and expected structures or behaviors, often is coupled implicitly with that of power when people attempt to evaluate the nature of relationships in society. Davis, for example, distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate use of power by declaring, “In the long run, those who do not use power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it” (1973: 314). Many scholars seeking to define a firm’s stakeholders narrowly also make an implicit assumption that legitimate stakeholders are necessarily powerful, when this is not always the case (e.g., minority stockholders in a closely held company), and that powerful stakeholders are necessarily legitimate (e.g., corporate raiders in the eyes of current managers).
然而，當人們嘗試評估社會關係的本質時，「合法性」的概念，鬆散地指社會接受和期望的結構或行為，往往與權力的概念暗中結合。舉例來說，Davis 在區分合法與不合法的權力運用時宣稱：「長遠而言，那些不以社會認為負責任的方式運用權力的人，往往會失去權力」（1973: 314）。許多學者試圖狹義地定義公司的利害關係人，也隱含了一個假設，就是合法的利害關係人一定是有權勢的，但事實卻不一定如此（例如，在一家嚴密持有的公司中，小股東就是有權勢的利害關係人），而有權勢的利害關係人也一定是合法的（例如，在現任管理者眼中的公司掠奪者）。

Despite this common linkage, we accept Weber’s (1947) proposal that legitimacy and power are distinct attributes that can combine to create authority (defined by Weber as the legitimate use of power) but that can exist independently as well. An entity may have legitimate standing in society, or it may have a legitimate claim on the firm, but unless it has either power to enforce its will in the relationship or a perception that its claim is urgent, it will not achieve salience for the firm’s managers. For this reason we argue that a comprehensive theory of stakeholder salience requires that separate attention be paid to legitimacy as an attribute of stakeholder-manager relations.
儘管存在這種共同的聯繫，我們仍接受 Weber（1947）的建議，即合法性和權力是不同的屬性，它們可以結合起來創造權威（Weber 定義為權力的合法使用），但也可以獨立存在。一個實體可能在社會上有合法的地位，也可能對公司有合法的要求，但除非它在關係中有強制執行其意志的權力，或認為其要求是迫切的，否則對公司的管理者來說，它不會有顯著性。因此，我們認為利益相關者顯著性的全面理論，需要將合法性作為利益相關者與管理者之間關係的屬性，加以單獨關注。

Recently, Suchman (1995) has worked to strengthen the conceptual moorings of the notion of legitimacy, building upon Weber’s functionalism (1947), Parsons’ structural-functional theory (1960), “open systems” theory (Scott, 1987), and institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The definition that Suchman suggests is broad based and recognizes the evaluative, cognitive, and socially constructed nature of legitimacy. He defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995: 574).
最近，Suchman (1995) 以 Weber 的功能主義 (1947)、Parsons 的結構功能理論 (1960)、「開放系統」理論 (Scott, 1987) 以及制度理論 (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 為基礎，致力於強化合法性概念的概念基礎。Suchman 提出的定義基礎廣泛，並承認合法性的評估、認知和社會建構性質。他將合法性定義為「一個實體的行動在某個社會建構的規範、價值、信念和定義系統中是可取、正確或適當的一種普遍認知或假設」（1995: 574）。

Although this definition is imprecise and difficult to operationalize, it is representative of sociologically based definitions of legitimacy and contains several descriptions that are useful in our approach to stakeholder identification. Therefore, we accept and utilize Suchman’s definition of legitimacy, recognizing that the social system within which legiti-
雖然這個定義並不精確，也很難操作，但它代表了社會學上對合法性的定義，並包含了一些對我們的利害關係人識別方法有用的描述。因此，我們接受並使用 Suchman 對於合法性的定義，並認識到合法性所處的社會體系，是一個以社會學為基礎的社會。
macy is attained is a system with multiple levels of analysis, the most common of which are the individual, organizational, and societal (Wood, 1991). This definition implies that legitimacy is a desirable social good, that it is something larger and more shared than a mere self-perception, and that it may be defined and negotiated differently at various levels of social organization.
合法性的達成是一個具有多層次分析的系統，其中最常見的是個人、組織和社會（Wood，1991）。這個定義意味著合法性是一種理想的社會利益，它是一種比純粹的自我認知更廣泛、更為人所共享的東西，而且它可能在社會組織的不同層次有不同的定義和協商。

Urgency. Viewing power and legitimacy as independent variables in stakeholder-manager relationships takes us some distance toward a theory of stakeholder identification and salience, but it does not capture the dynamics of stakeholder-manager interactions. We propose that adding the stakeholder attribute of urgency helps move the model from static to dynamic. “Urgency” is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “calling for immediate attention” or “pressing.” We believe that urgency, with synonyms including “compelling,” “driving,” and “imperative,” exists only when two conditions are met: (1) when a relationship or claim is of a time-sensitive nature and (2) when that relationship or claim is important or critical to the stakeholder. Thus, similar to Jones’ (1993) description of moral intensity as a multidimensional construct, we argue that urgency is based on the following two attributes: (1) time sensitivity-the degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or relationship is unacceptable to the stakeholder, and (2) criticality-the importance of the claim or the relationship to the stakeholder. We define urgency as the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention.
迫切性。將權力與合法性視為利害關係人與經理人關係中的獨立變數，讓我們朝向利害關係人識別與顯著性的理論邁進了一段距離，但卻無法捕捉利害關係人與經理人互動的動態。我們建議加入利益相關者的緊迫性屬性來幫助模型從靜態走向動態。在 Merriam-Webster 字典中，「迫切性 」被定義為 「需要立即注意 」或 「迫切」。我們認為，只有在滿足以下兩個條件時，「迫切性」（同義詞包括「強迫性」、「驅動性」和「必須性」）才會存在：(1) 關係或主張具有時間敏感性；(2) 關係或主張對利害關係人而言是重要或關鍵的。因此，與 Jones（1993）將道德強度描述為一個多維度的結構類似，我們認為緊迫性基於以下兩個屬性：(1) 時間敏感性--管理者延遲處理索賠或關係的程度是利害關係人所不能接受的；(2) 關鍵性--索賠或關係對利害關係人的重要性。我們將緊急性定義為利害關係人的主張需要立即注意的程度。

Although it was virtually ignored until now in any explicit sense in the stakeholder literature, the idea of paying attention to various stakeholder relationships in a timely fashion has been a focus of issues management (Wartick & Mahon, 1994) and crisis management scholars for decades. Eyestone (1978) highlighted the speed with which an issue can become salient to a firm, and Cobb and Elder discussed the important role symbols play in creating time urgency: “Symbols such as ‘Freedom Now’ have an advantage because they connote a specific time commitment to action. It one is attempting to mobilize a public against some outside threat, one must emphasize the rapidity with which the opponent is gaining strength” (1972: 139).
雖然在利益相關者的文獻中，到現在為止幾乎都沒有任何明確的意義，但是及時關注各種利益相關者關係的想法，幾十年來一直是問題管理（Wartick & Mahon, 1994）和危機管理學者的研究重點。Eyestone（1978）強調了問題對公司的顯著影響速度，而 Cobb 和 Elder 則討論了符號在創造時間緊迫感方面所扮演的重要角色："像「立即自由」這樣的符號具有優勢，因為它們意味著行動的具體時間承諾。當一個人試圖動員大眾對抗外來威脅時，他必須強調對手正在迅速壯大"(1972: 139)。

However, although time sensitivity is necessary, it is not sufficient to identify a stakeholder’s claim or “manager relationship” as urgent. In addition, the stakeholder must view its claim on the firm or its relationship with the firm as critical or highly important. Some examples of why a stakeholder would view its relationship with the firm as critical include the following:
然而，儘管時間敏感性是必要的，但僅將利 益相關人的要求或「經理關係」確定為緊急還不夠。此外，利害關係人必須將其對公司的主張或與公司的關係視為關鍵或高度重要。以下舉例說明利益相關者為何認為其與公司的關係至關重要：

Table 3 summarizes the constructs, definitions, and origins of the concepts discussed thus far in the article. To support a dynamic theory of stakeholder identification and salience, however, we need to consider several additional implications of power, legitimacy, and urgency. First, each attribute is a variable, not a steady state, and can change for any particular entity or stakeholder-manager relationship. Second, the existence (or degree present) of each attribute is a matter of multiple perceptions and is a constructed reality rather than an “objective” one. Third, an individual or entity may not be “conscious” of possessing the attribute or, if conscious of possession, may not choose to enact any implied behaviors. These features of stakeholder attributes, summarized below, are important to the theory’s dynamism; that is, they provide a preliminary framework for understanding how stakeholders can gain or lose salience to a firm’s managers:
表 3 總結了本文迄今為止所討論的概念的構造、定義和起源。然而，為了支持利益相關者識別和顯著性的動態理論，我們需要考慮權力、合法性和迫切性的幾個額外含義。首先，每一個屬性都是變數，而不是穩定狀態，對於任何特定的實體或利害關係人與經理的關係而言，都可能發生變化。其次，每個屬性的存在（或存在的程度）是多種認知的結果，是一種建構的現實，而不是「客觀」的現實。第三，個人或實體可能不會「意識到」擁有該屬性，或者即使意識到擁有該屬性，也可能不會選擇實施任何隱含的行為。下文總結的利益相關者屬性的這些特點，對於理論的動態性非常重要；也就是說，這些特點提供了一個初步的框架，讓我們了解利益相關者對公司管理者而言，是如何獲得或失去顯著性的：

Thus, with respect to power, for example, access to the means of influencing another entity’s behavior is a variable, with both discrete and continuous features. As we argued earlier, power may be coercive, utilitarian, or normative-qualitatively different types that may exist independently or in combination. Each type of power may range from nonexistent to complete. Power is transitory-it can be acquired as well as lost. Further, possession of power does not necessarily imply its actual or intended use, nor does possession of power imply consciousness of such possession by the possessor or “correct” perception of objective reality by the perceivers. An entity may possess power to impose its will upon a firm, but unless it is aware of its power and willing to exercise it on the firm, it is not a stakeholder with high salience for managers. Rather, latent power exists in stakeholder relationships, and the exercise of
因此，以權力為例，獲得影響另一個實體行為的手段是一個變數，同時具有離散和連續的特徵。正如我們之前所說的，權力可能是強制性、功利性或規範性的--定性的不同類型，可能獨立存在，也可能結合在一起。每種類型的權力可能從不存在到完全存在。權力是過渡性的，既可以獲得，也可以失去。此外，權力的擁有不一定意味著它的實際或預期使用，權力的擁有也不意味著擁有者有意識到這種擁有，或感知者對客觀現實的 「正確 」感知。一個實體可能擁有將其意志強加於公司的權力，但除非它意識到自己的權力，並願意對公司行使這種權力，否則對管理者而言，它並不是一個具有高度顯著性的利益相關者。相反，潛在的權力存在於利害關係人關係中，而權力的行使則會影響利害關係人的利益。

TABLE 3  表 3
Key Constructs in the Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience
利益相關者識別與顯著性理論中的關鍵結構

stakeholder power is triggered by conditions that are manifest in the other two attributes of the relationship: legitimacy and urgency. That is, power by itself does not guarantee high salience in a stakeholder-manager relationship. Power gains authority through legitimacy, and it gains exercise through urgency.
利益相關者的權力是由關係的其他兩個屬性所表現出來的條件所引發的，這兩個屬性就是合法性和迫切性。也就是說，在利益相關者與管理者的關係中，權力本身並不保證高突出性。權力通過合法性獲得權威，通過迫切性獲得行使。

Legitimacy, like power, is a variable rather than a steady state- $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha dynamic attribute of the stakeholder-manager relationship. It may be present or absent. If it is present, it is based upon a generalized virtue that is perceived for or attributed to a stakeholder at one or more social levels of analysis. Claimants may or may not correctly perceive the legitimacy of their claims; likewise, managers may have perceptions of stakeholder legitimacy that are at variance with the stakeholder’s own perception.
合法性與權力一樣，是利益相關者與管理者之間關係的一個變數，而不是一個穩定的狀態 $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha 動態屬性。它可能存在，也可能不存在。如果存在，它是基於一個或多個社會分析層級中，利益相關者所認為或歸咎於利益相關者的一般美德。主張者可能正確地認知其主張的合法性，也可能不正確地認知其主張的合法性；同樣地，管理者對於利害關係人合法性的認知，也可能與利害關係人本身的認知不同。

Also, like the power attribute, legitimacy’s contribution to stakeholder salience depends upon interaction with the other two attributes: power and urgency. Legitimacy gains rights through power and voice through urgency.
此外，與權力屬性一樣，合法性對利益相關者顯著性的貢獻取決於與其他兩個屬性的互動：權力和迫切性。合法性通過權力獲得權利，而聲音則通過迫切性獲得。

Finally, urgency is not a steady-state attribute but can vary across stakeholder-manager relationships or within a single relationship across time. As is true of power and legitimacy, urgency is a socially constructed perceptual phenomenon and may be perceived correctly or falsely by the stakeholder, the managers, or others in the firm’s environment. For example, neighbors of a nuclear power plant that is about to melt down have a serious claim on that plant, but they may not be aware of the time pressure and criticality and, thus, may not act on their claim. Urgency by itself is not sufficient to guarantee high salience in the stakeholdermanager relationship. However, when it is combined with at least one of the other attributes, urgency will change the relationship and cause it to increase in salience to the firm’s managers. Specifically, in combination with legitimacy, urgency promotes access to decision-making channels, and in combination with power, it encourages one-sided stakeholder action. In combination with both, urgency triggers reciprocal acknowledgment and action between stakeholders and managers.
最後，緊迫感並不是一種穩定狀態的屬性，而是可以在不同的利害關係人與經理人關係中或在單一關係中隨時間改變。正如權力和合法性一樣，緊迫感是一種社會建構的感知現象，利益相關者、管理者或公司環境中的其他人對它的感知可能是正確的，也可能是錯誤的。例如，一個核電廠即將熔化，其鄰居對該核電廠提出了嚴重的訴求，但他們可能沒有意識到時間壓力和危急性，因此可能不會採取行動。緊急性本身不足以保證利益相關者-經理關係中的高突出性。然而，當緊急性與至少一種其他屬性結合時，緊急性將改變關係，使其對公司管理者的顯著性增加。具體來說，與合法性結合時，緊迫感會促進決策渠道的使用；與權力結合時，緊迫感會鼓勵利害關係人採取單方面的行動。在兩者的結合下，緊迫性會引發利害關係人與管理者之間的對等認同與行動。

These three features of stakeholder attributes-variable status, perceptual quality, and variable consciousness and will-lay the groundwork for a future analysis of the dynamic nature of stakeholder-manager relations. The common “bicycle-wheel” model of a firm’s stakeholder environment does not begin to capture the ebb and flow of changes in stake-holder-manager relations or the fact that these relations are multilateral and often coalitional, not bilateral and independent. We explore the dynamic possibilities of the theory of stakeholder salience briefly in the concluding section, but it seems clear that a great deal more paradigmatic development is now possible because of our ability to recognize theoretically that stakeholder-manager relations are not static but, rather, are in constant flux.
利益相關者屬性的這三個特點--可變的地位、可感知的品質、可變的意識和意志--為未來分析利益相關者-經理關係的動態性質奠定了基礎。常見的公司利害關係人環境「單車輪」模型無法捕捉到利害關係人與經理關係的起伏變化，也無法捕捉到這些關係是多邊的、經常是聯盟的，而不是雙邊的、獨立的這一事實。我們將在結論部分簡要探討利益相關者顯著性理論的動態可能性，但顯而易見的是，由於我們有能力在理論上認清利益相關者與經理人的關係不是靜態的，而是不斷變化的，因此現在有可能進行更多的範例發展。

Cyert & March (1963) contributed to the management literature the notion of organizations as coalitions of individuals and organized “sub coalitions” (1963: 27), with “disparate demands, changing foci of attention, and limited ability to attend to all problems simultaneously” (1963: 43), which, under uncertainty, must seek feedback from the environment (1963: 12). Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) picked up the idea of organizations as coalitions of varying interests and contributed the notion that organizations are “other-directed” (1978: 257), being influenced by actors that control critical resources and have the attention of managers (1978: 259-260). In developing their stakeholder-agency model, Hill and Jones (1992) employed the agency theory view of the firm as a nexus of contracts between stakeholders and managers at a central node, where managers
Cyert & March (1963)為管理文獻貢獻了組織是由個人和有組織的「次聯盟」(1963: 27)所組成的聯盟概念，這些「次聯盟」有「不同的需求、不斷變化的關注焦點，以及同時處理所有問題的有限能力」(1963: 43)，在不確定的情況下，這些次聯盟必須從環境中尋求回饋(1963: 12)。Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 接納了組織作為不同利益聯盟的觀點，並提出了組織是「他者導向」（other-directed）（1978: 257）的概念，受到控制關鍵資源並獲得管理者關注的行動者的影響（1978: 259-260）。在發展利益相關者-代理模式時，Hill 和 Jones (1992) 採用了代理理論的觀點，將企業視為利益相關者與管理者之間在中心節點上的契約關係，管理者
have the responsibility to reconcile divergent interests by making strategic decisions and allocating strategic resources in a manner that is most consistent with the claims of the other stakeholder groups (1992: 134). They write:
有責任協調不同的利益，以最符合其他利害關係人群體主張的方式，做出策略性決策和分配策略性資源（1992: 134）。他們寫道：

The idea that the organization is an environmentally dependent coalition of divergent interests, which depends upon gaining the attention of (making claims upon) managers at the center of the nexus to effect reconciliations among stakeholders, suggests that the perspective of managers might be vital. We propose that, although groups can be identified reliably as stakeholders based on their possession of power, legitimacy, and urgency in relationship to the firm, it is the firm’s managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive management attention. In short, one can identify a firm’s stakeholders based on attributes, but managers may or may not perceive the stakeholder field correctly. The stakeholders winning management’s attention will be only those the managers perceive to be highly salient. ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}
組織是一個依賴於環境的不同利益的聯盟，它有賴於獲得處於關聯中心的管理者的關注（向管理者提出要求）來實現利益相關者之間的協調，這種想法表明，管理者的觀點可能是至關重要的。我們建議，儘管基於團體所擁有的權力、合法性以及與公司關係的緊迫性，可以可靠地將其識別為利益相關者，但公司的管理者才是決定哪些利益相關者是突出的，因此會受到管理者關注的人。簡而言之，我們可以根據特質來識別公司的利害關係人，但管理階層可能會也可能不會正確認知利害關係人領域。只有那些被管理者視為高度重要的利益相關者，才能贏得管理層的關注。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2}

Therefore, if managers are central to this theory, what role do their own characteristics play? The propositions we present later suggest that the manager’s perception of a stakeholder’s attributes is critical to the manager’s view of stakeholder salience. Therefore, we suggest, although space constraints prohibit systematic development here, that managerial characteristics are a moderator of the relationships presented in this article. For example, managers vary greatly in their environmental scanning practices (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988) and in their values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Differences in managerial values are illustrative of the moderating effects of management characteristics (Frederick, 1995). Greer and Downey (1982) have found that managers’ values relative to social regulation have a strong effect on how they react to stakeholders covered by these statutes. Another value theorists suggest as important in
因此，如果管理者是這個理論的核心，那麼他們自身的特質又扮演什麼角色呢？我們稍後提出的命題表明，管理者對利益相關者屬性的看法對管理者對利益相關者顯著性的看法至關重要。因此，儘管篇幅所限，我們無法在此作有系統的發展，但我們認為管理者的特質是本文所提出的關係的調節因子。例如，管理者的環境掃描實踐（Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 1988）和價值觀（Hambrick & Mason, 1984）有很大的差異。管理者價值觀的差異說明了管理特性的調節作用（Frederick，1995）。Greer 和 Downey (1982) 發現，管理者相對於社會法規的價值觀，對他們如何對這些法規所涵蓋的利害關係人作出反應，有很大的影響。另一個價值理論家認為在

this relationship is management’s sense of self-interest or self-sacrifice. Although some theorists have suggested that all behavior ultimately is self-interested (Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 1974), several social scientists have questioned the common assumption of self-interest and have suggested that people often act in ways that benefit others, even to their own detriment (see Etzioni, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Perrow, 1986). Like Perrow (1986) and Brenner and Cochran (1991), we treat managerial characteristics as a variable and suggest that it will be an important moderator of the stakeholder-manager relationship.
這種關係是管理階層的自利或自我犧牲意識。雖然有些理論家認為所有的行為最終都是利己的（Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 1974），但有幾位社會科學家對利己的普遍假設提出了質疑，並認為人們的行為往往是利人的，甚至是利己的（見Etzioni, 1988; Granovetter, 1985; Perrow, 1986）。與 Perrow (1986) 以及 Brenner 和 Cochran (1991)一樣，我們將經理人特徵視為一個變數，並認為它將成為利害關係人與經理人關係的重要調節因素。

Up to this point in the article, we have argued that a definition of “The Principle of Who or What Really Counts” rests upon the assumptions, first, that managers who want to achieve certain ends pay particular kinds of attention to various classes of stakeholders; second, that managers’ perceptions dictate stakeholder salience; and third, that the various classes of stakeholders might be identified based upon the possession, or the attributed possession, of one, two, or all three of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. We now proceed to our analysis of the stakeholder classes that result from the various combinations of these attributes, as shown in Figure 1.
到此為止，我們已經論證了 「誰或什麼才是真正重要的原則 」的定義是基於以下假設：第一，想要達成特定目的的管理者會對不同類型的利益相關者給予特定的關注；第二，管理者的觀念決定了利益相關者的顯著性；第三，不同類型的利益相關者可以根據其擁有或被認為擁有的一個、兩個或全部三個屬性（權力、合法性和迫切性）來識別。如圖 1 所示，我們現在開始分析這些屬性的不同組合所產生的利害關係人類別。

FIGURE 1  圖一
Qualitative Classes of Stakeholders
利害關係人的定性類別

We first lay out the stakeholder types that emerge from various combinations of the attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Logically and conceptually, seven types are examined-three possessing only one attribute, three possessing two attributes, and one possessing all three attributes. We propose that stakeholders’ possession of these attributes, upon further methodological and empirical work, can be measured reliably. This analysis allows and justifies identification of entities that should be considered stakeholders of the firm, and it also constitutes the set from which managers select those entities they perceive as salient. According to this model, then, entities with no power, legitimacy, or urgency in relation to the firm are not stakeholders and will be perceived as having no salience by the firm’s managers.
我們首先闡述了利益相關者的類型，這些類型是由權力、合法性和緊迫性三種屬性的不同組合所產生的。在邏輯和概念上，我們檢視了七種類型--三種只擁有一種屬性、三種擁有兩種屬性、一種擁有所有三種屬性。我們提出，利益相關者擁有這些屬性的程度，在進一步的方法與實證工作後，可以被可靠地量測。這一分析允許並證明了應該被視為公司利益相關者的實體的識別，同時也構成了管理者從中選擇他們認為突出的實體的集合。根據這個模型，對公司而言沒有權力、合法性或迫切性的實體不是利害關係人，也不會被公司的管理者視為具有顯著性。

In conjunction with the analysis of stakeholder types, and based on the assumption that managers’ perceptions of stakeholders form the crucial variable in determining organizational resource allocation in response to stakeholder claims, we also present several propositions leading to $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha theory of stakeholder salience.
在分析利益相關者類型的同時，基於管理者對利益相關者的看法是決定組織資源分配以回應利益相關者訴求的關鍵變數這一假設，我們也提出了幾個命題，引導出 $\alpha$$\alpha$alpha\alpha 利益相關者顯著性理論。

Therefore:  因此：

The low salience classes (areas 1, 2, and 3), which we term “latent” stakeholders, are identified by their possession or attributed possession of only one of the attributes. The moderately salient stakeholders (areas 4, 5, and 6) are identified by their possession or attributed possession of two of the attributes, and because they are stakeholders who “expect something,” we call them “expectant” stakeholders. The combination of all three attributes (including the dynamic relations among them) is the defining feature of highly salient stakeholders (area 7).
低度顯著的利害關係人類別（區域 1、2 和 3），我們稱之為「潛在」利害關係人，他們只擁有或被認為擁有其中一種屬性。中度顯著的利害關係人 (區域 4、5 及 6) 是透過他們擁有或被認為擁有兩個屬性來識別的，由於他們是「期待某事」的利害關係人，我們稱他們為「期待的」利害關係人。所有三種屬性的組合 (包括它們之間的動態關係) 是高度顯著利益相關者 (領域 7) 的界定特徵。

In this section we present our analysis of the stakeholder classes that the theory identifies, paying special attention to the managerial implications of the existence of each stakeholder class. We have given each class a descriptive name to facilitate discussion, recognizing that the names are less important than the theoretical types they represent. We invite the indulgence of the reader as we alliterate these descriptive names as a mnemonic device to promote recall and as a further means to suggest a starting point for future dialogue.
在本節中，我們將針對該理論所指出的利害關係人類別進行分析，並特別注意每個利害關係人類別的存在對管理的影響。為了方便討論，我們為每個類別都起了一個描述性的名稱，但我們也意識到，這些名稱不如它們所代表的理論類型來得重要。我們請讀者多多包涵，因為我們將這些描述性的名稱押韻，作為一種記憶工具，以促進記憶，同時也作為一種進一步的手段，為未來的對話提出一個起點。

As Figure 2 illustrates, latent stakeholders are those possessing only one of the three attributes, and include dormant, discretionary, and demanding stakeholders. Expectant stakeholders are those possessing two attributes, and include dominant, dependent, and dangerous stakeholders. Definitive stakeholders are those possessing all three attributes. Finally, individuals or entities possessing none of the attributes are nonstakeholders or potential stakeholders.
如圖 2 所示，潛在利害關係人是指只擁有三種屬性之一的利害關係人，包括休眠利害關係人、酌處利害關係人和要求利害關係人。預期的利害關係人擁有兩種屬性，包括支配型、依賴型和危險型利害關係人。確定的利害關係人是指具備所有三種屬性的利害關係人。最後，不具備任何特質的個人或實體為非利害關係人或潛在利害關係人。

Stakeholder Typology: One, Two, or Three Attributes Present
利害關係人類型：存在一個、兩個或三個屬性

With limited time, energy, and other resources to track stakeholder behavior and to manage relationships, managers may well do nothing about stakeholders they believe possess only one of the identifying attributes, and managers may not even go so far as to recognize those stakeholders’ existence. Similarly, latent stakeholders are not likely to give any attention or acknowledgment to the firm. Hence:
由於追蹤利害關係人行為和管理關係的時間、精力和其他資源有限，管理者很可能對他們認為只具備其中一種識別特質的利害關係人不採取任何行動，管理者甚至可能不會承認這些利害關係人的存在。同樣地，潛在的利害關係人也不可能對公司給予任何關注或肯定。因此：

Proposition la: Stakeholder salience will be low where only one of the stakeholder attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-is perceived by managers to be present.
命題 la：如果管理者只覺得利益相關者屬性（權力、合法性和迫切性）中的一種存在，則利益相關者的顯著性就會很低。
In the next few paragraphs we discuss the reasoning behind this expectation as it applies to each class of latent stakeholder, and we also discuss the implications for managers.
在接下來的幾個段落中，我們將討論適用於每一類潛在利害關係人的預期背後的理由，並討論對管理者的影響。

Dormant stakeholders. The relevant attribute of a dormant stakeholder is power. Dormant stakeholders possess power to impose their will on a firm, but by not having a legitimate relationship or an urgent claim,
休眠的利害關係人。休眠利益相關者的相關屬性是權力。休眠的利害關係人擁有將其意志強加於公司的權力，但卻沒有合法的關係或迫切的要求、
their power remains unused. Examples of dormant stakeholders are plentiful. For instance, power is held by those who have a loaded gun (coercive), those who can spend a lot of money (utilitarian), or those who can command the attention of the news media (symbolic). Dormant stakeholders have little or no interaction with the firm. However, because of their potential to acquire a second attribute, management should remain cognizant of such stakeholders, for the dynamic nature of the stakeholdermanager relationship suggests that dormant stakeholders will become more salient to managers if they acquire either urgency or legitimacy.
他們的力量仍未被利用。休眠利益相關者的例子比比皆是。舉例來說，那些擁有上膛槍（強迫性）、能夠花很多錢（功利性）或能夠引起新聞媒體注意（象徵性）的人擁有權力。休眠期的利益相關者與公司很少或根本沒有互動。然而，由於他們有可能獲得第二個屬性，管理階層應該對這些利害關係人保持警覺，因為利害關係人與管理階層關係的動態性質顯示，如果休眠的利害關係人獲得迫切性或合法性，他們對管理階層來說就會變得更加突出。

Although difficult, it is oftentimes possible to predict which dormant stakeholders may become salient. For example, while employees who have been fired or laid off from an organization could be considered by the firm to be dormant stakeholders, experience suggests that these stakeholders can seek to exercise their latent power. The multiple shootings at postal facilities by ex-U.S. mail employees (coercive), the filing of wrongful dismissal suits in the court system (utilitarian), and the increase in “speaking out” on talk radio (symbolic) all are evidence of such combinctions.
儘管很難，但通常可以預測哪些休眠的利害關係人可能會變得突出。舉例來說，儘管被公司開除或解雇的員工可能會被公司視為休眠的利害關係人，但經驗顯示，這些利害關係人可能會尋求行使其潛在權力。前美國郵政員工在郵政設施中的多次槍擊事件（強迫性）、在法院系統中提起的不當解僱訴訟（功利性），以及在廣播電台中 「直言 」的增加（象徵性）都是這種組合的證明。

Discretionary stakeholders. Discretionary stakeholders possess the attribute of legitimacy, but they have no power to influence the firm and no urgent claims. Discretionary stakeholders are a particularly interesting group for scholars of corporate social responsibility and performance (see Wood, 1991), for they are most likely to be recipients of what Carroll (1979) calls discretionary corporate social responsibility, which he later redefined as corporate philanthropy (Carroll, 1991). The key point regarding discretionary stakeholders is that, absent power and urgent claims, there is absolutely no pressure on managers to engage in an active relationship with such a stakeholder, although managers can choose to do so.
自由裁量的利益相關者。自由裁量利益相關者具有合法性的特徵，但他們沒有影響公司的權力，也沒有迫切的要求。對於研究企業社會責任和績效的學者來說，自由裁量利益相關者是一個特別有趣的群體（見 Wood, 1991），因為他們最有可能成為 Carroll（1979）所稱的自由裁量企業社會責任的接受者，他後來將自由裁量企業社會責任重新定義為企業慈善事業（Carroll, 1991）。關於自由裁量的利害關係人的關鍵點是，在沒有權力和迫切要求的情況下，管理者絕對沒有壓力去與這樣的利害關係人建立積極的關係，儘管管理者可以選擇這樣做。

Not all recipients of corporate philanthropy are discretionary stake-holders-only those with neither power over nor urgent claims on the firm. Examples of discretionary stakeholders include beneficiaries of the Take-A-Taxi program in the Twin Cities, in which the Fingerhut company picks up the tab for anyone who feels they have consumed too much alcohol to drive, and nonprofit organizations, such as schools, soup kitchens, and hospitals, who receive donations and volunteer labor from such companies as Rhino Records, Timberland, Honeywell, JustDesserts, and LeviStrauss.
並非所有企業慈善事業的受惠者都是自由裁量的利害關係人，只有那些對公司既無權力也無迫切訴求的人才是自由裁量的利害關係人。自由裁量利害關係人的例子包括雙子城 Take-A-Taxi 計畫的受益人，Fingerhut 公司為任何認為自己喝了太多酒而無法開車的人付帳；非營利組織，例如學校、施粥處和醫院，接受來自 Rhino Records、Timberland、Honeywell、JustDesserts 和 LeviStrauss 等公司的捐款和義工服務。

Demanding stakeholders. Where the sole relevant attribute of the stakeholder-manager relationship is urgency, the stakeholder is described as “demanding.” Demanding stakeholders, those with urgent claims but having neither power nor legitimacy, are the “mosquitoes buzzing in the ears” of managers: irksome but not dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing management attention, if any at all. Where stakeholders are unable or unwilling to acquire either the power or the legitimacy necessary to move their claim into a more salient status, the “noise” of urgency is insufficient to project a stakeholder claim
要求型利益相關者。當利益相關者與管理者之間關係的唯一相關屬性是迫切性時，利益相關者就會被描述為 「要求型」。要求型利益相關者，即那些有迫切需求，但既沒有權力也沒有合法性的利益相關者，是管理者的 「耳邊嗡嗡叫的蚊子」：煩人但不危險，惱人但不值得管理者過多關注，如果有的話。當利益相關者無法或不願意獲得必要的權力或合法性，以將其訴求提升到更顯著的地位時，迫切性的「噪音」就不足以將利益相關者的訴求投射出來。
beyond latency. For example, a lone millenarian picketer who marches outside the headquarters with a sign that says, “The end of the world is coming! Acme chemical is the cause!” might be extremely irritating to Acme’s managers, but the claims of the picketer remain largely unconsidered.
超越延遲。例如，一個孤獨的千禧年挑戰者在總部門外舉著 "世界末日即將到來！Acme chemical is the cause!"這可能會讓 Acme 的經理們非常惱火，但這位挑戰者的主張在很大程度上仍未被考慮。

As we consider the potential relationship between managers and the group of stakeholders with two of the three identifying stakeholder attributes, we observe a qualitatively different zone of salience. In analyzing the situations in which any two of the three attributes-power, legitimacy. and urgency-are present, we cannot help but notice the change in momentum that characterizes this condition. Whereas one-attribute lowsalience stakeholders are anticipated to have a latent relationship with managers, two-attribute moderate-salience stakeholders are seen as “expecting something,” because the combination of two attributes leads the stakeholder to an active versus a passive stance, with a corresponding increase in firm responsiveness to the stakeholder’s interests. Thus, the level of engagement between managers and these expectant stakeholders is likely to be higher. Accordingly:
當我們考慮管理者與利益相關者之間的潛在關係時，如果利益相關者的三種特質中有兩種出現，我們就會看到一個質上不同的顯著性區域。在分析三種屬性（權力、合法性和迫切性）中任何兩種屬性出現的情況時，我們不能不注意到這種情況的動力變化。單一屬性的低焦點利害關係人被預期與管理者有潛在的關係，而雙屬性的中度焦點利害關係人則被視為「有所期待」，因為兩種屬性的結合會使利害關係人採取主動而非被動的立場，公司對利害關係人利益的回應也會相對增加。因此，管理者與這些有期望的利益相關者之間的接觸程度可能會更高。因此：

Proposition lb: Stakeholder salience will be moderate where two of the stakeholder attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-are perceived by managers to be present.
命題 lb：當管理者認為利害關係人的兩個特質（權力、合法性和迫切性）存在時，利害關係人的顯著性就會適中。
We describe the three expectant stakeholder classes (dominant, dependent, and dangerous) in the following paragraphs.
我們將在以下段落描述三種期待利益相關者類別 (支配、依賴和危險)。

Dominant stakeholders. In the situation where stakeholders are both powerful and legitimate, their influence in the firm is assured, since by possessing power with legitimacy, they form the “dominant coalition” in the enterprise (Cyert & March, 1963). We characterize these stakeholders as “dominant,” in deference to the legitimate claims they have upon the firm and their ability to act on these claims (rather than as a forecast of their intentions with respect to the firm-they may or may not ever choose to act on their claims). It seems clear to us, at least, that the expectations of any stakeholders perceived by managers to have power and legitimacy will “matter” to managers.
支配利益相關者。在利益相關者既有權勢又合法的情況下，他們對公司的影響力是有保證的，因為他們擁有權勢和合法性，形成了企業中的 「支配聯盟」（Cyert & March，1963）。我們將這些利益相關者稱為「支配者」，是尊重他們對公司的合法要求，以及他們對這些要求採取行動的能力（而不是預測他們對公司的意圖--他們可能選擇也可能不選擇對他們的要求採取行動）。至少在我們看來很清楚的是，任何被管理者認為有權力和合法性的利益相關者的期望，對管理者來說都是 「重要的」。

Thus, we might expect that dominant stakeholders will have some formal mechanism in place that acknowledges the importance of their relationship with the firm. For example, corporate boards of directors generally include representatives of owners, significant creditors, and community leaders, and there is normally an investor relations office to handle ongoing relationships with investors. Most corporations have a human resources department that acknowledges the importance of the firm-employee relationship. Public affairs offices are common in firms
因此，我們可以預期主要的利害關係人會有一些正式的機制，確認他們與公司關係的重要性。舉例來說，公司董事會通常包括所有者、重要債權人和社區領袖的代表，而且通常會有一個投資者關係辦公室來處理與投資者的持續關係。大多數公司都設有人力資源部門，以承認公司與員工關係的重要性。公共事務辦公室在公司中很常見
that depend on maintaining good relationships with government. In addition, corporations produce reports to legitimate, powerful stakeholders, including annual reports, proxy statements, and, increasingly, environmental and social responsibility reports. Dominant stakeholders, in fact, are those stakeholders that so many scholars are trying to establish as the only stakeholders of the firm. In our typology dominant stakeholders expect and receive much of managers’ attention, but they are by no means the full set of stakeholders to whom managers should or do relate.
這取決於與政府保持良好的關係。此外，公司也製作報告給合法、有權勢的利害關係人，包括年報、代理聲明，以及越來越多的環境與社會責任報告。事實上，許多學者都試圖將主權利害關係人確立為公司唯一的利害關係人。在我們的分類中，主導利益相關者期望並獲得管理者的大量關注，但他們絕非管理者應該或已經與之建立關係的全部利益相關者。

Dependent stakeholders. We characterize stakeholders who lack power but who have urgent legitimate claims as “dependent,” because these stakeholders depend upon others (other stakeholders or the firm’s managers) for the power necessary to carry out their will. Because power in this relationship is not reciprocal, its exercise is governed either through the advocacy or guardianship of other stakeholders, or through the guidance of internal management values.
依附性利益相關者。我們將沒有權力但有迫切合法訴求的利害關係人稱為「依附型」，因為這些利害關係人依賴他人（其他利害關係人或公司管理者）的權力來執行他們的意志。由於這種關係中的權力並不是對等的，因此權力的行使是透過其他利害關係人的倡導或監護，或是透過內部管理價值觀的引導來管理。

Using the case of the giant oil spill from the Exxon Valdez in Prince William Sound as an example, we can show that several stakeholder groups had urgent and legitimate claims, but they had little or no power to enforce their will in the relationship. To satisfy their claims these stakeholders had to rely on the advocacy of other, powerful stakeholders or on the benevolence and voluntarism of the firm’s management. Included in this category were local residents, marine mammals and birds, and even the natural environment itself (Starik, 1993). For the claims of these dependent stakeholders to be satisfied, it was necessary for dominant stake-holders-the Alaska state government and the court system-to provide guardianship of the region’s citizens, animals, and ecosystems. Here a dependent stakeholder moved into the most salient stakeholder class by having its urgent claims adopted by dominant stakeholders, illustrating the dynamism that can be modeled effectively using the theory and principles of stakeholder identification and salience suggested here.
以威廉王子海灣的埃克森 Valdez 號巨型漏油事件為例，我們可以看到幾個利害關係人團體都有緊急且合法的訴求，但他們在關係中卻幾乎沒有強制執行自己意願的力量。為了滿足他們的要求，這些利益相關者不得不依賴其他強大利益相關者的倡議或公司管理階層的仁慈和自願。這類利益相關者包括當地居民、海洋哺乳類動物和鳥類，甚至自然環境本身（Starik，1993）。為了滿足這些從屬利益相關者的要求，阿拉斯加州政府和法院系統等主導利益相關者有必要為該地區的居民、動物和生態系統提供監護。在此，依附性利害關係人因其緊急要求被支配性利害關係人採納而晉升為最顯著的利害關係人類別，這說明了使用此處建議的利害關係人識別和顯著性理論與原則可有效建模的動態性。

Dangerous stakeholders. We suggest that where urgency and power characterize a stakeholder who lacks legitimacy, that stakeholder will be coercive and possibly violent, making the stakeholder “dangerous,” literally, to the firm. “Coercion” is suggested as a descriptor because the use of coercive power often accompanies illegitimate status.
危險的利害關係人。我們認為，當缺乏合法性的利害關係人具有迫切性和權力時，該利害關係人將具有強迫性，甚至可能具有暴力傾向，從字面上來看，該利害關係人對公司而言是「危險」的。之所以建議使用「強迫」作為形容詞，是因為強迫力的使用往往與不合法地位相伴而生。

Examples of unlawful, yet common, attempts at using coercive means to advance stakeholder claims (which may or may not be legitimate) include wildcat strikes, employee sabotage, and terrorism. For example, in the 1970s General Motors’ employees in Lordstown, Ohio, welded pop cans to engine blocks to protest certain company policies. Other examples of stakeholders using coercive tactics include environmentalists spiking trees in areas to be logged and religious or political terrorists using bombings, shootings, or kidnappings to call attention to their claims. The actions of these stakeholders not only are outside the bounds of legitimacy but are dangerous, both to the stakeholder-manager relationship and to the individuals and entities involved.
試圖使用強制手段來推動利害關係人的主張（可能合法，也可能不合法）的非法但常見的例子包括野貓式罷工、員工破壞和恐怖主義。例如，在 1970 年代，俄亥俄州 Lordstown 通用汽車公司的員工將汽水罐焊接在引擎蓋上，以抗議公司的某些政策。其他利害關係人使用強迫策略的例子包括環保人士在要砍伐的區域釘上樹木，以及宗教或政治恐怖份子使用炸彈、槍擊或綁架來引起人們對其主張的注意。這些利害關係人的行為不僅超出了合法性的範圍，而且對利害關係人與管理者之間的關係以及所涉及的個人和實體而言都是危險的。

It is important for us to note that we, along with other responsible individuals, are very uncomfortable with the notion that those whose actions are dangerous, both to stakeholder-manager relationships as well as to life and well-being, might be accorded some measure of legitimacy by virtue of the typology proposed in this analysis. Notwithstanding our discomfort, however, we are even more concerned that failure to identify dangerous stakeholders would result in missed opportunities for mitigating the dangers and in lower levels of preparedness, where no accommodation is possible. Further, to maintain the integrity of our approach to better define stakeholders, we feel bound to “identify” dangerous stakeholders without “acknowledging” them, for, like most of our colleagues, we abhor their practices. We are fully aware that society’s “refusal to acknowledge” after identification of a dangerous stakeholder, by counteracting terror in all its forms, is an effective counteragent in the battle to maintain civility and civilization. The identification of this class of stakeholder is undertaken with the support of this tactic in mind.
我們必須指出，我們與其他負責任的個人，對於那些其行動對利害關係人與管理者之間的關係，以及生命與福祉都有危險的人，可能會因為本分析所提出的類型，而被賦予某種程度的合法性，感到非常不舒服。儘管我們感到不安，但我們更擔心的是，如果無法識別出危險的利害關係人，就會錯失減緩危險的機會，並在無法通融的情況下降低防備水準。此外，為了維持我們更好定義利益相關者方法的完整性，我們覺得有義務「識別」危險的利益相關者，而不是「承認」他們，因為我們和大多數同事一樣，對他們的做法深惡痛絕。我們充分意識到，社會在識別出危險的利害關係人之後「拒絕承認」，藉由反制各種形式的恐怖行為，是維護禮貌與文明之戰的有效反制劑。對這類利害關係人的識別，就是在支持這種策略的前提下進行的。

Previously, we defined “salience” as the degree to which managers give priority to competing stakeholder claims. Thus:
在此之前，我們將「顯著性」定義為管理者對相互競爭的利害關係人主張給予優先權的程度。因此：

Proposition lc: Stakeholder salience will be high where all three of the stakeholder attributes-power, legitimacy, and urgency-are perceived by managers to be present.
命題 lc：當管理者認為利益相關者的三個特質（權力、合法性和迫切性）都存在時，利益相關者的顯著性就會很高。
By definition, a stakeholder exhibiting both power and legitimacy already will be a member of a firm’s dominant coalition. When such a stakeholder’s claim is urgent, managers have a clear and immediate mandate to attend to and give priority to that stakeholder’s claim. The most common occurrence is likely to be the movement of a dominant stakeholder into the “definitive” category.
根據定義，同時具有權力與合法性的利害關係人已經是公司支配聯盟的成員。當這樣的利益相關者的主張很緊急時，管理者就有明確而立即的任務，去關注和優先處理該利益相關者的主張。最常見的情況可能是佔優勢的利害關係人晉升為「確定」類別。

For example, in 1993 stockholders (dominant stakeholders) of IBM, General Motors, Kodak, Westinghouse, and American Express became active when they felt that their legitimate interests were not being served by the managers of these companies. A sense of urgency was engendered when these powerful, legitimate stakeholders saw their stock values plummet. Because top managers did not respond sufficiently or appropriately to these definitive stakeholders, they were removed, thus demonstrating in a general way the importance of an accurate perception of power, legitimacy, and urgency; the necessity of acknowledgment and action that salience implies; and, more specifically, the consequences of the misperception of or inattention to the claims of definitive stakeholders.
例如，1993 年，IBM、通用汽車、柯達、西屋、美國運通等公司的股東 (主要利害關係人) 覺得這些公司的經理人沒有為他們的合法利益服務時，他們開始積極行動。當這些強大、合法的利害關係人看到他們的股票價值暴跌時，他們的緊迫感便油然而生。由於高階經理人沒有充分或適當地回應這些確實的利害關係人，因此他們被罷免了，從而以一般的方式顯示了準確認知權力、合法性和迫切性的重要性；認知和行動的必要性，這意味著顯著性；以及，更明確地說，錯誤認知或不注意確實利害關係人要求的後果。

Any expectant stakeholder can become a definitive stakeholder by acquiring the missing attribute. As we saw earlier, dependent Alaskan citizens became definitive stakeholders of Exxon by acquiring a powerful
任何預期的利害關係人都可以藉由取得缺失的屬性而成為確切的利害關係人。正如我們之前所看到的，依附於埃克森公司的阿拉斯加公民通過獲得強大的
ally in government. Likewise, the “dangerous” African National Congress became a definitive stakeholder of South African companies when it acquired legitimacy by winning free national elections.
政府中的盟友。同樣地，「危險」的非洲人國民大會（African National Congress）在贏得全國自由選舉而取得合法地位後，也成為南非公司的確切利害關係人。

In our analysis we have proposed that stakeholders possess some combination of three critical attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. We predict that the salience of a particular stakeholder to the firm’s management is low if only one attribute is present, moderate if two attributes are present, and high if all three attributes are present.
在我們的分析中，我們提出利益相關者擁有三種關鍵屬性的組合：權力、合法性和迫切性。我們預測，如果只有一種屬性，特定利益相關者對公司管理階層的顯著性就會很低；如果有兩種屬性，顯著性就會適中；如果三種屬性都有，顯著性就會很高。

As our earlier discussion demonstrates, latent stakeholders can increase their salience to managers and move into the “expectant stakeholder” category by acquiring just one of the missing attributes. If the stakeholder is particularly clever, for example, at coalition building, political action, or social construction of reality, that stakeholder can move into the “definitive stakeholder” category (characterized by high salience to managers), starting from any position-latent, expectant, or potential.
正如我們之前的討論所顯示的，潛在利益相關者只需獲得其中一個缺失的屬性，就能提高他們對管理者的顯著性，並進入「期望利益相關者」的類別。如果利害關係人特別聰明，例如在建立聯盟、政治行動或現實的社會建構方面，該利害關係人就可以從任何位置（潛在、期待或潛在）開始，晉升為「確定的利害關係人」類別（特點是對管理者而言具有高度顯著性）。

Static maps of a firm’s stakeholder environment are heuristically useful if the intent is to raise consciousness about “Who or What Really Counts” to managers or to specify the stakeholder configuration at a particular time point. But even though most theorists might try for static clarity, managers should never forget that stakeholders change in salience, requiring different degrees and types of attention depending on their attributed possession of power, legitimacy, and/or urgency, and that levels of these attributes (and thereby salience) can vary from issue to issue and from time to time.
如果要提高管理者對「誰或什麼才是真正重要的」的意識，或在特定時間點明確指出利害關係人的配置，那麼公司利害關係人環境的靜態地圖在啟發學上是有用的。但是，即使大多數理論家會嘗試保持靜態的清晰度，管理者也不應該忘記，利益相關者的顯著性是會改變的，他們需要不同程度和類型的關注，這取決於他們所擁有的權力、合法性和/或迫切性，而且這些屬性的程度（以及顯著性）會因議題和時間而異。

We can observe an example of stakeholder dynamism in recent events in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC) began as a group with an urgent claim but not a legitimate one, given the ruling South African culture and government, and it had no power. At first it was a latent, demanding stakeholder. The ANC next moved into the “dangerous category” by using coercive power. However, this did not lead to definitive status. It was only by acquiring legitimacy while relinquishing the use of coercive power, and thus becoming a dependent stakeholder, that the ANC was able to achieve definitive status, high salience, and eventual success.
我們可以從南非最近發生的事件中看到利益相關者活力的例子。非洲人國民大會 (ANC) 一開始是一個有迫切訴求的團體，但鑒於南非的統治文化和政府，它的訴求並不合法，也沒有權力。起初，它是一個潛伏的、有要求的利害關係人。接下來，ANC 藉由運用強制權力，進入「危險類別」。然而，這並沒有帶來確定的地位。只有在取得合法性的同時放棄使用強制性權力，從而成為依賴性利益相關者，非洲人國民大會才能取得確實地位、高度顯著性，並最終取得成功。

Thus, when the ANC moved its urgent claim into the world environment, the claim’s legitimacy was established, and the ANC, as well as the South Africans it represented, became an expectant, dependent stakeholder of the multinational enterprises (MNEs) located in South Africa. As a dependent stakeholder, the ANC was able to acquire the protection, advocacy, and guardianship of more salient stakeholders (especially
因此，當非洲人國民大會將其迫切的主張轉移到世界環境中時，其主張的合法性就建立起來了，而非洲人國民大會以及它所代表的南非人，就成為了位於南非的跨國企業（MNEs）所期待的、依附性的利益相關者。作為依附性利益相關者，南非國民大會能夠獲得更突出的利益相關者（特別是南非的跨國企業）的保護、倡導和監護。
investors). With the powerful advocacy of these stakeholders, the ANC moved into the “definitive” zone of the stakeholder attribute model for South African MNEs. In fact, it is now widely acknowledged that the worldwide divestment/disinvestment movement, led by MNE stockholders, was a major force in the transformation of the South African system of government and the rise to political power of the ANC (e.g., see Paul, 1992).
投資者）。在這些利害關係人的強力倡導下，ANC進入了南非MNE利害關係人屬性模型的「確定」區域。事實上，現在人們普遍承認，由多國企業股東領導的世界性撤資/撤離投資運動，是南非政府體制轉型和非洲人國民黨崛起成為政治力量的主要力量（例如，見Paul，1992）。

Another example of dynamism in stakeholder attributes is offered by Näsi, Näsi, and Savage (1994). This case, involving a business owner, workers, and the courts, illustrates how a dependent stakeholder worker group (one with a legitimate and urgent claim) can increase its salience to a firm’s managers by aligning itself with other stakeholders (in this case, a union and the courts) who have the power to impose their will upon a stubborn business owner.
Näsi、Näsi 和 Savage (1994) 提供了利益相關者屬性動態的另一個例子。這個案例涉及企業老闆、工人和法院，說明了一個從屬的利益相關者工人團體（一個有合法且迫切要求的團體）如何透過與其他利益相關者（在這個案例中是工會和法院）結盟來提高其對公司管理者的顯著性，而其他利益相關者有能力將他們的意志強加給固執的企業老闆。

Thus, using our identification typology, we are able to explain stakeholder salience and dynamism systematically. This new capability has implications for management, research, and for the future of the stakeholder framework.
因此，利用我們的識別類型學，我們能夠有系統地解釋利益相關者的顯著性和動態性。這種新能力對管理、研究以及利害關係人架構的未來都有影響。

On the basis of the model we develop in this article, we can envision refinements in long-standing management techniques designed to assist managers in dealing with multiple stakeholders’ interests. Presently, management techniques based on the stakeholder heuristic are being utilized to help managers deal effectively with multiple stakeholder relationships. Current methods include identification of stakeholder roles (e.g., employees, owners, communities, suppliers, and customers), analysis of stakeholder interests, and evaluation of the type and level of stakeholder power (e.g., see current textbooks by Carroll, 1993; Frederick, Post, Lawrence, & Weber, 1996; and Wood, 1994).
在本文所建立的模型基礎上，我們可以預見，長期以來協助管理者處理多方利害關係人利益的管理技巧，將會更加精進。目前，基於利害關係人啟發式的管理技巧已被運用於協助管理者有效處理多重利害關係人的關係。目前的方法包括識別利害關係人的角色 (例如：員工、所有者、社群、供應商和客戶)、分析利害關係人的利益，以及評估利害關係人權力的類型和層級 (例如：參見 Carroll, 1993; Frederick, Post, Lawrence, & Weber, 1996; and Wood, 1994).

The approach introduced in this paper has the potential to improve upon current practice. To current techniques that emphasize power and interests, the model we suggest adds the vital dimensions of legitimacy and urgency. Further, this model enables a more systematic sorting by managers of stakeholder-manager relationships as these relationships attain and relinquish salience in the dynamics of ongoing business. In addition, our three-attribute model permits managers to map the legitimacy of stakeholders and therefore to become sensitized to the moral implications of their actions with respect to each stakeholder. In this sense, our model supports and initiates normative thought in the managerial context. Thus, these refinements contribute to the potential effectiveness of managers as they deal with multiple stakeholder interests. And, as these refinements find their way into accepted practice, we can further envision subsequent rounds of inquiry, which test whether “new maps” result in “new methods.”
本文介紹的方法有可能改善當前的做法。對於目前強調權力和利益的技術，我們建議的模型增加了合法性和迫切性這兩個重要的層面。此外，隨著利益相關者與經理之間的關係在持續的業務動態中取得和失去顯著性，這個模型可以讓經理對利益相關者與經理之間的關係進行更系統化的分類。此外，我們的三個屬性模型允許管理者對利益相關者的合法性進行映射，從而對他們的行為對每個利益相關者的道德影響變得敏感。從這個意義上說，我們的模型支持並啟動了管理情境中的規範思考。因此，當管理者處理多方利害關係人利益時，這些改進有助於提高他們的潛在效率。而且，當這些改進被認可成為實踐時，我們可以進一步展望後續的探究，以測試 「新的地圖 」是否會帶來 「新的方法」。

Stakeholder theory, we believe, holds the key to more effective management and to a more useful, comprehensive theory of the firm in society.
我們相信，利害關係人理論是更有效管理的關鍵，也是更有用、更全面的社會中公司理論的關鍵。

Focusing attention on salience in the manager-stakeholder relationships existing in a firm’s environment appears to be a productive strategy for researchers and managers alike in realizing these aspirations. The stakeholder identification typology we have developed here is amenable to empirical operationalization and to the generation of testable hypotheses concerning, for example, predictions about the circumstances under which a stakeholder in one category might attempt to acquire a missing attribute and thus enhance its salience to a firm’s managers. We have not developed such operational definitions and hypotheses here, for lack of space, but we believe that such development is the next logical step in articulating completely “The Principle of Who or What Really Counts.”
對於研究人員和管理人員來說，將注意力集中在公司環境中存在的管理者與利益相關者關係的突出性上，似乎是實現這些願望的有效策略。我們在此發展的利害關係人識別類型學是可以實證操作的，也可以產生可驗證的假設，例如，預測某一類別的利害關係人在何種情況下可能會嘗試取得缺失的屬性，從而提高其對公司管理者的顯著性。由於篇幅所限，我們並未在此提出這樣的操作性定義與假設，但我們相信，這樣的發展是徹底闡明「誰或什麼真正重要」原則的下一個邏輯步驟。

Specifically, we call for empirical research that answers these questions: Are present descriptions of stakeholder attributes adequate? Do the inferences we make herein hold when examining real stakeholdermanager relationships? Are there models of interrelationships among the variables identified here (and possible others) that reveal more subtle, but perhaps more basic, systematics? We realize that for these and other such questions to be addressed, item and scale development, demographic calibration, and second-order model building, among other things, are necessary.
具體來說，我們呼籲進行實證研究，以回答這些問題：目前對於利害關係人屬性的描述是否足夠？在研究真實的利害關係人-經理關係時，我們在此所做的推論是否成立？這裡所指出的變數（以及其他可能的變數）之間的相互關係模型，是否揭示了更微妙但也許更基本的系統？我們意識到，要解決這些問題和其他類似問題，必須進行項目和量表開發、人口統計校準以及二階模型建立等工作。

In the process we hope that additional clarity can be achieved at the conceptual level as well. We ask, what are the implications of this model and its subsequent tests for additional research on power, legitimacy, and urgency? More importantly, are power, legitimacy, and urgency really the correct and parsimonious set of variables in understanding stakeholdermanager relationships? We acknowledge that despite their level of emphasis in the second Toronto conference, and despite our logical and theoretical justification of their importance in developing a more inferential and empirically based stakeholder theory, other stakeholder attributes also may be well suited to stakeholder analysis-and we call for the critical evaluation of our choices.
在這個過程中，我們希望在概念層面也能達到更多的清晰度。我們要問，這個模型及其後的測試，對權力、合法性和迫切性的其他研究有什麼影響？更重要的是，在理解利害關係人與經理的關係時，權力、合法性和迫切性真的是一組正確而合理的變量嗎？我們承認，儘管在第二次多倫多會議中，我們強調了它們的重要性，也儘管我們從邏輯和理論上證明了它們在發展更具推論性和實證性的利害關係人理論中的重要性，但其他利害關係人屬性也可能非常適合利害關係人分析--我們呼籲大家對我們的選擇進行批判性評估。

Finally, in attempting to build momentum in the development of stakeholder theory, we are acutely aware that we have necessarily made sweeping assumptions that, for the sake of clarity in a preliminary articulation, are passed over, with the implicit understanding that for the theory to hold, these must be revisited and assessed. For example, we assume and argue that power and legitimacy are distinct attributes. But some might cast one as a subset of the other. To build our identification typology, we treat each attribute as “present or absent,” when it is clear that each operates on a continuum or series of continua. Each of these issues, and others like them, point toward additional inquiry that can enrich the theory and add to its usefulness.
最後，在嘗試建立利益相關者理論發展動力的過程中，我們清楚地意識到，為了初步闡述的清晰性，我們必然會做出一些籠統的假設，但這些假設都被忽略了，我們隱含的理解是，為了讓理論站得住腳，這些假設必須被重新審視和評估。例如，我們假設並辯稱權力與合法性是截然不同的屬性。但有些人可能會將其中一個視為另一個的子集。為了建立我們的識別類型，我們將每種屬性視為「存在或不存在」，但很明顯，每種屬性都是在一個連續體或一系列連續體上運作的。這些問題，以及其他類似的問題，都指向可以豐富理論和增加其有用性的額外探究。

Many stakeholder scholars, in attempting to narrow the range of “Who or What Really Counts” in a firm’s stakeholder environment, are
許多利害關係人學者在嘗試縮小公司利害關係人環境中「誰或什麼真正重要」的範圍時，都會
searching for the bases of legitimacy in stakeholder-manager relationships. When scholars such as Freeman, Clarkson, Donaldson, Preston, and Dunfee argue that stakeholder theory must articulate a “normative core,” they are looking for a compelling reason why some claims and some relationships are legitimate and worthy of management attention and why others are not. They discount the importance of power in stake-holder-manager relations, arguing that the important thing is whether the stakeholder has legitimate (e.g., moral, legal, and property-based) claims.
在利益相關者與管理者的關係中尋找合法性的基礎。當 Freeman、Clarkson、Donaldson、Preston 和 Dunfee 等學者認為，利害關係人理論必須闡明「規範核心」時，他們正在尋找一個令人信服的理由，說明為什麼某些主張和某些關係是合法的，值得管理階層重視，而為什麼其他主張和關係是不合法的。他們貶低了權力在利害關係人與管理者關係中的重要性，認為重要的是利害關係人是否有合法（例如道德、法律和財產）的主張。

The theory of stakeholder identification and salience developed in this article in no way discredits this search for a legitimate normative core for stakeholder theory. It makes sense to articulate theoretically why certain groups will hold legitimate, possibly stable claims on managers and firm; these are the stakeholders who should really count. Our aim, however, is to expand scholarly and management understanding beyond legitimacy to incorporate stakeholder power and urgency of a claim, because these attributes of entities in a firm’s environment-and their dynamism over periods of time or variation in issues-will make a critical difference in managers’ ability to meet legitimate claims and protect legitimate interests. We offer this preliminary theory as a way of understanding which stakeholders do really count.
本文所發展的利害關係人識別與顯著性理論，絕對沒有抹煞為利害關係人理論尋找合法規範核心的努力。從理論上闡明為什麼某些群體會對管理者和公司持有合法的、可能是穩定的主張是有道理的；這些利益相關者才是真正重要的利益相關者。然而，我們的目標是要擴大學術與管理層對合法性的理解，將利益相關者的權力與訴求的迫切性納入其中，因為公司環境中實體的這些屬性，以及它們在不同時期或不同問題上的動態性，將對管理者滿足合法訴求與保護合法利益的能力產生關鍵性的影響。我們提出這個初步理論，作為了解哪些利害關係人真正重要的方法。

In 1978 William C. Frederick (in a paper subsequently published in 1994) observed that business and society scholarship was in a transition from a moral focus on social responsibility $\left({\mathrm{CSR}}_1\right)$$\left({\mathrm{CSR}}_1\right)$(CSR_(1))\left(\mathrm{CSR}_{1}\right) to an amoral focus on social responsiveness ( ${\mathrm{CSR}}_2)$$\left.{\mathrm{CSR}}_2\right)${:CSR_(2))\left.\mathrm{CSR}_{2}\right). When stakeholder theory focuses only on issues of legitimacy, it acquires the fuzzy moral flavor of ${\mathrm{CSR}}_1$${\mathrm{CSR}}_1$CSR_(1)\operatorname{CSR}_{1}. Focusing only on stakeholder power, however, as several major organizational theories would lead us to do, yields the amorality and self-interested action focus of ${\mathrm{CSR}}_2$${\mathrm{CSR}}_2$CSR_(2)\mathrm{CSR}_{2}. Instead, we propose a merger.
1978 年，William C. Frederick（在其後於 1994 年發表的一篇論文中）指出，商業與社會學術正處於從注重社會責任的道德 $\left({\mathrm{CSR}}_1\right)$$\left({\mathrm{CSR}}_1\right)$(CSR_(1))\left(\mathrm{CSR}_{1}\right) 向注重社會回應的非道德 ${\mathrm{CSR}}_2)$$\left.{\mathrm{CSR}}_2\right)${:CSR_(2))\left.\mathrm{CSR}_{2}\right) 過渡的階段。當利益相關者理論只專注於合法性問題時，它就獲得了 ${\mathrm{CSR}}_1$${\mathrm{CSR}}_1$CSR_(1)\operatorname{CSR}_{1} 的模糊道德色彩。然而，如果像幾種主要的組織理論所引導我們做的那樣，只專注於利益相關者的權力，則會產生 ${\mathrm{CSR}}_2$${\mathrm{CSR}}_2$CSR_(2)\mathrm{CSR}_{2} 的非道德性和自利行動焦點。相反，我們提出了合併的建議。

In sum, we argue that stakeholder theory must account for power and urgency as well as legitimacy, no matter how distasteful or unsettling the results. Managers must know about entities in their environment that hold power and have the intent to impose their will upon the firm. Power and urgency must be attended to if managers are to serve the legal and moral interests of legitimate stakeholders.
總而言之，我們認為利害關係人理論必須考慮權力、迫切性以及合法性，無論結果如何令人不快或不安。管理者必須瞭解環境中擁有權力並有意欲將其意志強加於公司的實體。如果管理者要為合法利害關係人的法律和道德利益服務，就必須關注權力和迫切性。

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Ronald K. Mitchell is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Business at the Unjversity of Victoria. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Utah. His research interests focus on entrepreneurship-specifically, the study of expert information processing theory, strategic management, and stakeholder theory as they apply to entrepreneurs, ventures, and the venturing environment.
Ronald K. Mitchell 是維多利亞大學商學院的助理教授。他在猶他大學獲得了博士學位。他的研究興趣集中於創業，特別是研究專家資訊處理理論、策略管理和利益相關者理論，因為這些理論適用於創業者、企業和創業環境。
Bradley R. Agle is an assistant professor of management at the Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Washington. His research interests include strategic leadership, with particular emphasis on its ethical dimension, moral development, stakeholder theory, and corporate social performance.
Bradley R. Agle 是匹茲堡大學 Katz 商學院的管理學助理教授。他在華盛頓大學獲得博士學位。他的研究興趣包括策略領導力，特別強調其道德層面、道德發展、利害關係人理論以及企業社會績效。
Donna J. Wood is a professor of business administration at the Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh. She is a founder and rising president of the International Association for Business and Society (IABS) and has served as Chair of the Social Issues in Management Division of the Academy of Management. Currently, she is Editor of the IABS journal, Business & Society. Her research interests focus on corporate social performance and stakeholder theory, international business and society, collaborative sacial problem solving, business ethics, and busi-ness-government relations.
Donna J. Wood 是匹茲堡大學 Katz 商學院的工商管理教授。她是國際商業與社會協會 (IABS) 的創辦人和現任主席，並曾擔任管理學院 (Academy of Management) 社會問題管理部 (Social Issues in Management Division) 的主席。目前，她是 IABS 期刊《商業與社會》的編輯。她的研究興趣集中在企業社會績效與利害關係人理論、國際商業與社會、協作性社會問題解決、商業道德以及企業與政府關係。