7 Language, Power, and the MCP's Lost Nation, 1939-1940
语言、权力和迷失的民族：1939-1940 年的 MCP

By the start of the Second World War, English-educated Chinese elites were talking about the emerging Malayan nation, as the younger generation of Chinese, Malays, and Indians had been brought up in similar lifestyles of combined education in English schools. The Straits Times reported that harmony already existed in Malaya, yet the concern was whether Malaya would remain a peaceful society. Despite the rise of "narrow nationalism" and "racial prejudices," the hope was that citizens were "building up a Malayan unity, an affinity of morals, of thoughts, of aspirations" - in other words, a Malayan nation.
到第二次世界大战爆发时，受过英语教育的中国精英们已经开始谈论新兴的马来亚民族，因为年轻一代的华人、马来人和印度人都是在英语学校接受的类似的混合教育。海峡时报报道说，马来亚已经存在和谐，但令人担忧的是马来亚是否会继续保持和平社会。尽管“狭隘的民族主义”和“种族偏见”抬头，但人们仍然希望公民能够“建立马来亚的团结，道德、思想、志向的一致性”——换句话说，建立马来亚民族。

Members of the Chinese community imagined themselves as part of the Malayan nation but retained their Chinese identity. After the start of the Japanese invasion of China, Chinese writers in Singapore and Malaya abandoned their search for "Nanyang color" and devoted their writing to China.
华裔社群成员将自己视为马来亚民族的一部分，但保留了他们的中国身份。在日本入侵中国开始后，新加坡和马来亚的华文作家放弃了对“南洋色彩”的追求，将他们的写作奉献给了中国。

Yet, according to Chin Peng, MCP members identified with Malaya and felt responsible for fighting for its independence. Maintaining an allegiance to both Malaya and China was the way Chinese overseas communities functioned, namely by establishing links at both ends of their sojourning corridors: China and their host environments. The MCP's embeddedness in the local environment and its connection to China were expressed in its documents, where minzu referred to either or both Malaya and China in different sentences. The overlapping meanings of minzu continued to mean different things in different contexts. Minzu was also used to mean "nationalities" for the various ethnic groups living in Malaya, who were to comprise the "national united front." In addition, minzu was used in the context of class divisions and referred to the proletariat.
尽管如此，陈平认为，马来亚共产党党员认同马来亚并认为自己有责任为马来亚的独立而奋斗。 马来亚共产党党员认同一个国家和中国是海外华人社区运作的方式，即在中国和其寄居环境这两个地方建立联系。马来亚共产党植根于当地环境并与中国有着密切的联系，这一点在其文件中有所体现，在不同的句子中，“民族”一词既指马来亚，也指中国。 “民族”一词在不同语境下具有不同的含义，它也被用来指马来亚的不同民族，这些民族将组成“民族统一战线”。此外，“民族”一词也被用在阶级划分方面，指无产阶级。

The word minzu resembles what literary theory has called a floating signifier. We can see its meaning as moving, or sojourning, between Malaya and China. This ability to use one word to represent what would seem to be significantly different concepts reflected the MCP's comfort with these multiple or overlapping ideas of national identity and to which nation, minzu, it belonged. What appears to us as a logical contradiction or confusion was not so for MCP authors. One of my goals has been to recover the world in which the activists of the MCP lived and to sufficiently translate their experience to readers today to show how such a multivalent use of the word minzu could serve the MCP leadership quite satisfactorily, and more so that such use of minzu could come quite naturally to people in that environment. The MCP's use of minzu in this way also provided flexibility, gave the MCP the opportunity to participate in both Malayan and Chinese national projects, and reconciled these two identities within the MCP.
“民 族”这个词与文学理论中所称的“漂浮能指”相似。我们可以看到它的意义在马来亚和中国之间移动或游走。用一个词来代表看似截然不同的概念的能力反映了马来亚共产党对这些多重或重叠的民族认同观念以及“民 族”所属的国家认同的认同。在我们看来是逻辑矛盾或困惑的东西，对马来亚共产党作者来说并非如此。我的目标之一是恢复马来亚共产党活动家所处的世界，并将他们的经验充分地翻译给今天的读者，以 menunjukkan 这样一个多重的“民族”词语如何能够很好地满足马来亚共产党领导层的需要，并且这种词语的使用在那种环境下对人们来说是多么自然。马来亚共产党以这种方式使用“民族”也提供了灵活性，使马来亚共产党有机会参与马来亚和中国民族项目，并在马来亚共产党内部调和这两种认同。

One example is the discourse of "national interests" (minzu liyi). In the context of the MCP's decision to change its policy from pro-British to anti-British, minzu meant both China and Malaya or it was ambiguous. The MCP described the point of view among members of the Chinese bourgeoisie in the "MCP Resolutions of the Second Enlarged CC Plenum," published in February 1940: the bourgeoisie saw Britain as China's "international friend" (guoji youren) in the same manner as Malays and Indians saw Britain as a protector and Hitler as an enemy. The document stated: "Hence, for national interests [minzu liyi], we must not fight against the British or carry out protests, and during the hardship of war we must all bear the burden." In the same document, the MCP described Malaya's special characteristics as follows: "Feudal forces in each of Malaya's nationalities [Malaiya ge minzu] sell off national interests [minzu liyi] and join the front of national traitors." The national traitors were those who had established legal labor organizations and yielded to British demands, diminishing the revolutionary influence among the masses and suppressing the revolution. Here, minzu refers to Malaya, yet in establishing a democratic republic, the MCP wanted to "rely not on British running dogs, but on [its] own 'national forces' [minzu ziji de liliang]." Whether minzu refers to Malaya or China here is ambiguous.
一个例子是“民族利益”（minzu liyi）的话语。在马来亚共产党决定将其政策从亲英改为反英的背景下，“minzu”既指中国，也指马来亚，或者说它很模糊。马来亚共产党在 1940 年 2 月发表的“马来亚共产党第二次扩大会议决议”中描述了中国资产阶级成员中的一种观点：资产阶级将英国视为中国的“国际友人”（guoji youren），就像马来人和印度人将英国视为保护者和希特勒视为敌人一样。该文件指出：“因此，为了民族利益[minzu liyi]，我们不能与英国作战或进行抗议，在战争的艰苦时期，我们都必须承担起负担。” 在同一文件中，马来亚共产党描述了马来亚的特殊性如下：“马来亚各个民族[Malaiya ge minzu]的封建势力出卖民族利益[minzu liyi]，加入卖国贼的行列。” 卖国贼是指那些建立合法劳工组织并屈服于英国要求的人，他们削弱了革命在群众中的影响力，镇压了革命。 在这里，“民族”指的是马来亚，但在建立民主共和国的过程中，马来亚共产党希望“不依赖英国的走狗，而是依赖[其]自己的‘民族力量’[民族自己的力量]”。“民族”在这里是指马来亚还是中国，尚不清楚。

In the MCP brochure "Forward!" the term "Malayan people" (Malaiya renmin), clearly echoing CCP and Soviet discourse, was juxtaposed with the idea of national traitors (minzu pantu): "Day by day the anti-imperialist struggle of the whole Malayan people deepens [quan Ma renmin de minzu fandi douzheng]." However, in the preceding sentence, the idea of national traitors was used together with the term hanjian. The Malayan people were the Malayan nation, whereas the term "national traitor" (minzu pantu) referred to those collaborating with the Japanese. Here, minzu refers to the Chinese.
在马来西亚共产党小册子“前进！”中，“马来人”(马来亚人民)，显然呼应了中共和苏联的论述，被与“民族叛徒”(民族叛徒)的概念并列：“整个马来亚人民的民族解放斗争日益深入[全世界马来亚人民的民族解放斗争]”。 然而，在前面的句子中，“民族叛徒”一词与“汉奸”一词一起出现。 马来亚人民是马来亚民族，而“民族叛徒”(民族叛徒)是指那些与日本人合作的人。 在这里，“民族”指的是中国人。

The MCP promoted its united front through the Racial Emancipation League (Minzu jiefang lianmeng), established in 1936. In 1937, prior to the outbreak of war in China, the MCP changed its own name and the names of the CYL and the MFLU by adding the words ge minzu (all nationalities) to them. Its new name was Malaiya ge minzu gongchandang (All-Nationalities Communist Party of Malaya). At the same time, the outbreak of war in 1937 intensified MCP concerns over Japanese aggression in China and China salvation work among the Chinese community. In 1938, the MCP abolished the Multiracial Liberation Youth League (Ge minzu jiefang qingniantuan). However, the rhetoric of Chinese liberation through the liberation of colonial peoples, Malays in this case, continued, and ultimately helped to shape the identification of the Chinese community with the territory of Malaya shared with other ethnic communities, Malays and Indians.
马来亚共产党通过 1936 年成立的民族解放联盟（Minzu jiefang lianmeng）宣传其统一战线。 1937 年，在抗战爆发前，马来共产党及其下属的马来亚共青团和马来亚解放联合会组织，在各自的名称前面增加“各民族”三个字，名称分别改为马来亚各民族共产党（Malaiya ge minzu gongchandang），马来亚各民族共产主义青年团和马来亚各民族解放联合会。同时，1937 年抗日战争的爆发加剧了马来共产党对日本侵略中国和开展华侨救亡工作的关注。 1938 年，马来共产党解散了各民族解放青年团。 然而，解放殖民地人民（在本例中指马来人）以实现中华民族解放的口号仍在继续，最终有助于在与马来人、印度人等其他民族共享的马来亚领土上，形成华人社区的认同。

Minzu also referred to Malaya and to all three ethnic groups (Malayan, Indian, and Chinese) in the expression minzu tongyi zhanxian, "national united front" or "united front of nationalities." The Malayan minzu was to be liberated through the liberation of the Chinese (Zhongguo minzu), both huaqiao and in China, and other oppressed nations. The MCP's nation, as in the national movement, was the national united front (minzu tongyi zhanxian) that the MCP claimed to have established before the war. It included all ethnic groups (ge minzu) and all classes (ge jiceng renmin) - workers and peasants, shop workers, clerks (literally the "urban petty bourgeoisie," chengshi xiao zichan jieji), and soldiers - but excluded the "capitulationist" bourgeoisie.
民族一词也指马来亚以及“民族统一战线”中包含的所有三个族群（马来人、印度人和中国人）。马来民族应通过解放中国人（中国民族），包括华侨和中国境内的中国人，以及其他被压迫民族来获得解放。马共的民族，即民族运动中的民族，是指马共声称在战前建立的民族统一战线（民族统一战线），包括所有民族（各民族）和所有阶级（各级人民）——工人和农民、商店工人、店员（字面意思是“城市小资产阶级”，城市小资产阶级）和士兵——但不包括“投降主义”的资产阶级。

The MCP was skeptical about the alleged harmony in Malayan society, as it was British dominance that provided a check to hostilities among the different ethnic groups. Malays were poor, and they could not compete with the Chinese, who outnumbered them in Singapore by a factor of two even in agriculture, where they had been predominant, because "their tools [were] dated." Indians mostly worked on rubber plantations, and Japanese owned the richest iron mines in Malaya, in Johor, and in Trengganu, while Arabs and Jews were real estate owners in the cities. In 1935-1940, even in legal workers' organizations, there was no united front of different ethnic groups, and the Chinese comprised most of the labor movement. For example, of 33,000 members of the Malayan Federation of Labour, 5,002 were Indian immigrants and 150 were Malays.
马来亚共产党对马来亚社会所谓的和谐持怀疑态度，因为正是英国人的统治才控制了不同种族群体之间的敌意。马来人很穷，他们无法与华人竞争，即使在农业领域，华人的人数也是他们的两倍，尽管农业曾是他们的主要产业，因为“他们的工具[已经]过时”。印度人主要在橡胶园工作，日本人则拥有马来西亚最富有的铁矿，位于柔佛和登嘉楼，而阿拉伯人和犹太人则是城市的地产所有者。 在 1935-1940 年，即使在合法的工人组织中，也没有不同种族群体之间的统一战线，而华人构成了大多数的劳工运动。例如，在马来亚工会联合会的 33,000 名成员中，有 5,002 名是印度移民，150 名是马来人。

Despite the various international engagements of the Nanyang communists, the discourse of internationalism (guoji zhuyi) appeared in MCP documents for the first time in the late 1930s and it had several meanings. One was allying with the Soviet Union because it supported China and with the workers and peasants of capitalist countries for the anticolonial emancipation movement in the Far East, the Nanyang, and China, as well as the effort to form a joint labor movement among Malaya's ethnic groups. It was manifested in the following strikes with the participation of non-Chinese: at a rubber plantation near Malacca in 1931, at a coal mine in 1937 with 5,000 to 6,000 participants, at a strike involving 2,000 tram workers in 1938, and at two strikes in 1939, one at a government heavy machinery factory and one involving the refusal to unload cargo from Japanese vessels at a Singapore port.
南洋共产党尽管在国际上有多种接触，但直到 20 世纪 30 年代末，“国际主义”一词才出现在马来共产党的文件中，它有多种含义。其中之一是与支持中国的苏联结盟，与资本主义国家工人和农民结盟，支持远东、南洋和中国的反殖解放运动，以及在马来亚各民族中建立联合工会的努力。 这体现在 1931 年马六甲附近橡胶种植园罢工、1937 年有 5000 至 6000 人参加的煤矿罢工、1938 年有 2000 名电车工人参加的罢工以及 1939 年的两次罢工，一次是在政府重型机械厂，一次是拒绝在新加坡港口为日本船只卸载货物。

The MCP, as before, imagined political organization along ethnic lines and presented itself to the Comintern as the only "real political party" in Malaya, as Malays and Indians did not have one. Although its influence among Malays and Indians was not "as strong as among the Chinese,"17 the MCP argued that it could become a central factor in multiethnic Malayan politics. The MCP proclaimed that in the "strategy of the antiimperialist united front, in order to solve the nationalities question [ minz u wenti], the party [had] to pay attention to the common interests of different and the particular interests of particular minzu to redefine the strategy in accordance with the revolutionary situation. The MCP set the following program for Malays (Malai minzu): to focus on their independence movement and the establishment of an independent democratic republic, and to get rid of British puppet sultans and landlords. The party had to lead workers, peasants, and urban residents (shimin) in small, everyday struggles from their economic awakening (jingii juewu) into an awakening of the independence movement (duli yundong de juewu) and into fraternal feelings toward and a united movement with the Chinese and Indians.
马来亚共产党像以前一样，设想了以民族为基础的政治组织，并向共产国际宣称自己是马来亚唯一的“真正的政党”，因为马来人和印度人没有政党。 虽然它在马来人和印度人中的影响力不如在华人中“强大”， 但马来亚共产党声称它可以成为马来亚多民族政治中的一个核心因素。马来亚共产党宣称，在“反帝统一战线的策略中，为了解决民族问题[minz u wenti]，党[必须] 关注不同 的共同利益和特定民族的特定利益，以根据革命形势重新定义策略。 马来亚共产党为马来人（马来民族）制定了以下纲领： 争取独立运动和建立独立民主共和国，摆脱英国傀儡苏丹和地主。 The party had to lead workers, peasants and urban residents (市民) from small, everyday struggles into an economic awakening (经济觉醒) and then into an awakening of the independence movement (独立运动的觉醒), and cultivate fraternal feelings and unity with the Chinese and Indians.

The MCP regarded Chinese "patriotic" anti-Japanese actions as acts of internationalism. If in the early 1930s Comintern internationalism meant support for the communist Chinese Revolution, in 1939 it justified support for the liberation of China from the Japanese. The MCP's multiethnic united front, promoted by the Comintern, was also a continuation of its earlier impulse as a Chinese organization to embed itself in the local environment (as was the discourse of Malayan nationalism):
中国共产党将中国“爱国主义”的抗日行动视为国际主义的行为。如果说在 20 世纪 30 年代初，共产国际的国际主义意味着支持中国共产主义革命，那么在 1939 年，它则为支持中国人民从日本侵略者手中解放出来提供了正当理由。中国共产党在共产国际的推动下建立的多民族统一战线，也是其作为一个中国组织将自身融入当地环境的一种延续（就像马来亚民族主义的话语一样）：

Today, in order to help the anti-Japanese war of our motherland, we need national liberation [minzujiefang]. That means we must support the Chinese anti-Japanese war and the democratization and constitutional movement; isolate capitalists so they don't dare capitulate; achieve liberty of residence and business for huaqiao in Malaya and protest deportations; participate in the Malaya all-peoples liberation movement and antiwar struggle [ge minzu de jiefang yundong and fanzhan douzheng]; aid the independence movement of Malays [Malai minzu de duli yundong]; and fight together for the establishment of the Malayan democratic republic.
为了援助祖国的抗日战争，我们需要民族解放。这意味着，我们必须支持中国的抗日战争和民主宪政运动；孤立资本家，使他们不敢投降；争取马来亚华侨的居住和经商自由，反对驱逐；参加马来亚各族人民的解放运动和反战斗争；援助马来民族的独立运动；共同奋斗，建立马来亚民主共和国。

In MCP discourse, to liberate Southeast Asia was to help the liberation of China. One MCP document said, "[t]he pressing need of today's China is to aid the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of the colonial countries of the Nanyang. The liberation movement of the Chinese people [Zhongguo renmin de jiefang yundong] supports the anti-imperialist struggle of the colonial countries of the Far East and the Nanyang [peihe yuandong Nanyang ge zhimindi guojia minzu de fandi douzheng]." The struggles of the oppressed peoples (minzu geming douzheng de bei yapo minzu) and their national liberation (minzu jiefang) were possible only if those peoples opposed imperialist wars and allied with the Soviet Union. The MCP stated, " he slogan of the rising together of the national revolutions of China and of the colonies in the Nanyang [Nanyang ge zhimindi de minzu geming tong Zhongguo de minzu geming] has a pressing meaning today." This was why it argued that:
在马共的论述中，解放东南亚就是帮助中国解放。一份马共文件称，“当今中国迫切需要援助南洋殖民地国家人民的革命斗争。中国人民的解放运动支持远东和南洋殖民地国家人民的反帝斗争[配合援助南洋各殖民地国家民族的反正斗争]。”只有这些人民反对帝国主义战争，并与苏联结盟，被压迫人民的斗争（民族革命斗争中的被压迫民族）和他们的民族解放（民族解放）才是可能的。马共指出：“ 今天，中国和南洋殖民地的民族革命兴起口号[南洋各殖民地的民族革命同中国的民族革命]具有紧迫的意义。”这就是为什么它认为：

Not only for the interests of the independence of the motherland [zuguo duli] but also for their own security, huaqiao in the colonial countries of the Nanyang must stand together with brothers of all other oppressed nations [ge bei yapo minzu xiongdi] and carry out an antiwar and anti-imperialist movement to overthrow their local rulers [dangdi de tongzhi] and establish an independent and free country ... This is the most realistic, the most powerful way to help the anti-Japanese war of the motherland [zuguo kangzhan]; nobody can do this honorable duty for us.
不仅为了祖国的独立利益，也为了他们自己的安全，南洋殖民地国家的华侨必须与所有其他被压迫民族的兄弟团结起来 [ge bei yapo minzu xiongdi]，开展反战反帝运动，推翻当地统治者 [dangdi de tongzhi]，建立一个独立自由的国家...... 这是帮助祖国抗战最现实、最有力 [zuguo kangzhan] 的方式；没有人能为我们完成这项光荣的使命。 [code0]

The MCP's continuing discourse on the cooperation of various peoples was also reinforced by a CCP-GMD united front rhetoric of cooperation between the huaqiao and the Nanyang peoples (Nanyang ge minzu) in working toward their common goal of establishing a multiethnic ( ge minzu de), antifascist, national united front (minzu tongyi zhanxian). Thus, the communist party, the avant-garde of the proletariat of all of the colonial countries of the Nanyang, for the success of the national liberation movement (minzu jiefang yundong) had to organize the China Salvation Movement and the revolutionary unity of the huaqiao, promote the friendship and joint struggle of the huaqiao with local brothers from oppressed nations or peoples (dangdi bei yapo minzu xiongdı), and aid the Chinese resistance. For the success of the resistance and the national revolution in China, as well as to boost China's international prestige, the colonies in the Nanyang had to be liberated through a joint struggle by the huaqiao and the local oppressed nations. One example of such cooperation was the fact that the Indian branch of the MCP in Singapore adopted a new name, the Friends of China Society.
华侨与南洋人民之间的合作。中国共产党作为南洋所有殖民地无产阶级的先锋，为了民族解放运动的成功，必须组织中国救亡运动和华侨的革命团结，增进华侨与当地被压迫民族或人民兄弟的友好关系和共同斗争，帮助中国抵抗。 为了中国人民在抗战和国民革命中的胜利，以及提高中国在国际上的声誉，南洋的殖民地必须通过华侨和当地被压迫民族的共同斗争获得解放。 印度共产党新加坡支部将名称改为“中国之友社”，表明双方合作的一个例子。

However, in practice, despite the MCP's goal of creating "a joint organization of workers of various minzu in the spirit of internationalist solidarity, the MCP was not able to attract Malays into its ranks; it only attracted some Indians who were connected with the Indian Communist Party, the Indian National Congress, and other Indian independence organizations. The MCP blamed this on British "divide and rule" policies that had resulted in Malays and Indians joining reformist unions during the protest wave of However, MCP propaganda, even when written in English, in fact talked only to the Chinese. For example, although the address beginning "To fellow commercial countrymen of all nationalities," which urged readers to protest the introduction of a commercial enactment act, addressed "commercial circles of all nationalities" (ge minzu shangjie tongbao), it called on them to go to the Chinese protectorate and make a petition against the act.
然而，在实践中，尽管马来亚共产党的目标是“以国际主义团结精神创建各民族工人的联合组织”， 但马来亚共产党未能吸引马来人加入其队伍；它只吸引了一些与印度共产党、印度国民大会和其他印度独立组织有联系的印度人。马来亚共产党将此归咎于英国的“分而治之”政策，导致马来人和印度人在 的抗议浪潮中加入了改良主义工会。然而，马来亚共产党的宣传，即使是用英语写的，实际上也只针对中国人。例如，虽然以“全体各民族的商业同胞”为开头的呼吁读者抗议商业法案的颁布的讲话，提到了“各民族的商业界”（各民族商业界同胞），但它要求他们到中国保护国进行请愿，反对该法案。

In practice, internationalism at times contradicted the MCP's Chinese patriotism, but the orthodoxy prescribed that CCP members overseas had to be both Chinese and internationalist. In 1939, MCP members lamented, "[s]ome comrades adopt a neutral attitude toward the imperialist war; some comrades call themselves huaqiao and forget they are internationalists [guojizhuyizhe]!" This new guojizhuyi of the MCP was likely borrowed from CCP discourse. For example, the influence of Mao's speech at the sixth plenum is obvious: "Can an internationalist [guojizhuyizhe] communist party member also be a patriot [aiguozhuyizhe]? I think he not only can, but he must." Similarly, Bo Gu argued that there was no contradiction between revolutionary nationalism and internationalism. Another source stated that the nationalism of the GMD (Guomindang de minzuzhuyi) and communist internationalism (gongchandang de guojizhuyi) had to merge (heqilar). Starting with the internationalist brigades in Spain, internationalism had been prescribed by the Comintern, and now the CCP was carrying it out on the international scene.
在实践中，国际主义有时与民革的中国爱国主义相矛盾，但正统的观点认为，海外中共党员必须既是中国人又是国际主义者。1939 年，民革党员哀叹，“有些同志对帝国主义战争采取中立态度；有些同志自称华侨，却忘记了自己是国际主义者[国际主义者]！” 中国共产党的新国际主义很可能借鉴了中共的路线。例如，毛泽东在六中全会上的讲话的影响是显而易见的：“一个国际主义者[国际主义者]的共产党党员也能爱国[爱国主义者]吗？我认为他不仅可以，而且必须。” 同样，博古认为，革命民族主义和国际主义之间并不矛盾。 另一种说法是，国民党的民族主义（国民党 de minzuzhuyi）和共产国际主义（gongchandang de guojizhuyi）必须合并（heqilar）。 从国际纵队在西班牙开始，国际主义就已被共产国际所规定，现在中国共产党正在国际舞台上执行这一原则。

Li, "Malaya Today," p. 82.
李 · "今日之马来亚"，第 82 页。

Malaiya gongchandang Xingzhou shiwei [Singapore City Committee of the MCP], "Wei fandui shangye zhuce tiaolie gao ge minzu shanglei tongbao shu," November 18, 1939, RGASPI 495/62/28/6; Malayan Communist Party Singapore Executive Committee, "To Fellow Commercial Countrymen of All Nationalities. Strong Protest Against the Commercial Enactment Act," November 18, 1939, RGASPI 495/62/28/103-4.
马来亚共产党新加坡市委，“反对商业登记条例告各民族同胞书”，1939 年 11 月 18 日，RGASPI 495/62/28/6；马来亚共产党新加坡执行委员会，“告各民族同胞书，强烈抗议商业登记条例”，1939 年 11 月 18 日，RGASPI 495/62/28/103-4。

29 "Magong di er ci zhongzhihuiyi jueyian [The Resolutions of the Second Plenum of the Executive Committee of the CC MCP]," p. 26.
二十九 “马共第二次执行委员会扩大会议决议案 [中国共产党中央执行委员会第二次扩大会议决议]”，第 26 页。

Mao Zedong, "Zhongguo gongchandang zai minzu zhanzheng zhong de diwei [The Role of the CCP in the National War]," Speech at the 6th Plenum of the CC, October 14, 1938, in Mao Zedong xuanji, di er juan [Collected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 2] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1991), pp. 519-536, esp. p. 520.
毛泽东，“中国共产党在民族战争中的地位[The Role of the CCP in the National War]，”1938 年 10 月 14 日在中央委员会第六次全体会议上的讲话，载于《毛泽东选集》第二卷（北京：人民出版社，1991 年），第 519-536 页，特别是第 520 页。

Bo Gu, "Guojizhuyi he geming de minzuzhuyi [Internationalism and Revolutionary Nationalism]," Fiefang [Liberation] 36 (1938), pp. 16-20.
Bo Gu，《国际主义和革命的民族主义》（发表于 1938 年），出自解放杂志第 36 期，16-20 页。

Heng De, "Guoji xingshi lun minzu zhanzheng zhong de Zhongguo gongchandang [Discussing the CCP in the National War and the International Situation]," Xinli [New Force] 12 (1938), pp. 6-8.
恒德，“国际形势论民族战争中的中国共产党[论中国共产党在民族战争和国际形势中的作用]”，《新力》第 12 期（1938 年），第 6-8 页。

In the same manner as in the 1920s and 1930s, the MCP's focus on the huaqiao and its new discourse on internationalism, guojizhuyi, were connected to the discourse on the combined emancipation of the huaqiao and the oppressed nations. This "internationalism," built on the Comintern's proletarian internationalism, represented modernity and progressiveness juxtaposed against the backwardness (luohou) and "narrow nationalism" of the masses. Internationalism was also the new translation of the idea of Sun Yatsen that the rise of the colonies and the rise of China were connected. Emancipating the huaqiao from the oppression of the colonial governments of the Nanyang and emancipating the oppressed peoples of the Nanyang and of China proper from imperialism fit the impulse to be embedded in the local environment while also staying connected to China, and it reconciled nationalism and internationalism in MCP ideology. The MCP was self-critical for focusing too much on the huaqiao, an orientation that was not sufficient to represent the needs of the whole nation, and on China Salvation work, just as in 1929 when Li Lisan had accused the Nanyang party of "making a Chinese Revolution in the Nanyang."
二十世纪二三十年代，马来亚共产党与华侨的关系以及其国际主义的新话语，与华侨和被压迫民族的共同解放话语联系在一起。这种建立在共产国际的无产阶级国际主义基础上的“国际主义”，代表着现代化和进步，与群众的落后和“狭隘民族主义”形成鲜明对比。国际主义也是孙中山“殖民地兴起中国兴起”思想的新诠释。将华侨从南洋殖民政府的压迫中解放出来，将中国本地的南洋和被压迫民族从帝国主义的压迫中解放出来，符合了既要融入当地环境，又要与中国保持联系的冲动，并在马来亚共产党意识形态中将民族主义与国际主义调和起来。 中共和平时期南洋党史的重新认识 南洋问题一直是中国共产党在和平时期海外工作研究中的一个薄弱环节。在 20 世纪 80 年代以前，中共和平时期南洋党史的研究主要集中在“华侨中心论”， 即片面强调华侨工作的重要性，忽略了其他群体的需求。这种观点在 20 世纪 20 年代后期到 30 年代前期尤为突出，当时中共中央的“全国总暴动”路线导致南洋党的“南洋中心论”倾向，即认为中国革命可以在南洋取得胜利。1927 年，中共中央派瞿秋白、王明等人赴南洋指导工作，要求南洋党以开展“华侨救亡工作”为主。1929 年，李立三指责南洋党“搞华侨革命”，并提出“华侨革命是为广东红军筹款”。这种“华侨中心论”的观点将南洋党的任务窄化为仅为国内革命服务，忽视了南洋地区自身发展的需求。 20 世纪 80 年代以后，随着中共和平时期海外工作研究的深入，对南洋党史的认识开始发生变化。学者们开始注意到南洋地区的特殊性，即它既是中国的一部分，又是海外华人社会，因此南洋党的工作应该既要考虑华侨的需求，也要考虑当地社会的发展。这种新的认识为我们重新审视中共和平时期南洋党史提供了新的视角。"

Yet the propaganda concerning a multiethnic anti-Japanese united front in fact cultivated the association of Chinese with Malaya. For example, as traveling communist theatrical troupes performed antiJapanese propaganda to racially mixed kampung audiences, they shaped local Chinese notions of Chinese as one of three races within a shared national territorial space. This was a crucial shift in the development of the anti-Japanese resistance, first for the purpose of Chinese salvation, then to protect Malaya as a sovereign territory. As the troupes performed Malay songs and plays about Malay and Indian experiences, Chinese realized that the anti-Japanese united front was not only about the defense of China but also about the common struggle with all Malayan minzu against Japanese aggression.
大马多元民族抗日统一战线的宣传实际上强化了马来亚的华人认同。例如，当巡回演出的共产党戏剧团在种族混合的甘榜观众面前演出抗日宣传时，他们塑造了当地华人作为共同民族领土空间内三个种族之一的观念。这是抗日斗争发展的一个关键转变，起初是为了拯救中国，后来是为了保护马来亚作为主权领土。当剧团表演马来歌曲和关于马来人和印度人经历的戏剧时，华人意识到，抗日统一战线不仅是为了保卫中国，也是为了所有马来亚民族共同反对日本侵略的斗争。

Another meaning of minzu in MCP texts, "proletariat," showed how the MCP limited its "nation" by excluding the Chinese "comprador bourgeoisie" in Malaya, who were the MCP's most important constituency in reality but not in discourse.
在马来亚共产党文本中，"民族"的另一个含义是"无产阶级"，这表明马来亚共产党如何通过排除中国"买办资产阶级"来限制其"民族"。而实际上，"买办资产阶级"才是马来亚共产党最重要的支持力量，但在其论述中却没有被提及。

The Bourgeoisie and the MCP before the War
战前的资产阶级与共产党

Only under the leadership of the proletariat and the party is national emancipation [minzu jiefang] possible.
只有在无产阶级和党的领导下，民族解放才有可能。

CC MCP,  CC MCP，

In 1921, Comintern envoy Sneevliet, while visiting Shanghai, noted that Chinese immigrants comprised "the capitalist elements of the Kuomintang."
1921 年，共产国际使者史尼夫利在访问上海时指出，中国移民构成了“国民党内的资本主义分子”。

[They] have always financed the workers' party and expect it to reunify China, to establish law and order, to eradicate the divisive influence of the constantly fighting Tuchuns [warlords] and the defence of China's independence from foreign domination. This Chinese bourgeoisie is situated in the colonies and has only begun very recently to set up firms in China. It has no clear political goal. The leadership of the Kuomintang can never really express the needs of this group.
[他们]一直资助工人党，并希望它能统一中国，建立法律和秩序，根除不断争斗的军阀的分裂影响，以及保卫中国免受外国统治的独立。这个中国资产阶级位于殖民地，直到最近才开始在中国建立公司。它没有明确的政治目标。国民党的领导层永远不可能真正表达这个群体 的需求。

During the 1930 s, this disappointment of the Chinese overseas with the GMD increased as Japanese aggression escalated and as Chiang Kaishek's policy with regard to Japan was more widely seen as appeasement.
在 1930 年代，随着日本侵略的升级以及蒋介石对日政策被更广泛地视为绥靖，海外华侨对国民党政府的失望情绪日渐高涨。

In contrast, the MCP offered a new Bolshevik language with which to speak about the needs of the Chinese community. Many of the MCP's members were "shop employees" (dianyuan), and the MCP made efforts to conduct communist propaganda among small traders. In 1929, the MCP wrote to the Comintern that the ban by the British government on the sale of food in the streets of Malaya could be used as a propaganda opportunity. However, it was no exaggeration to say that every Chinese immigrant had come to the Nanyang to become a "bourgeois," so communist propaganda did not make much sense to them. In 1928-1929, Xu Jie, in an attempt to convince a huaqiao merchant to embrace communist ideas, tried in vain to explain to him that the world economy had an impact on the Malayan situation, but the attitude of Chinese migrants was that everybody came to the Nanyang to get rich. Similarly, Philippine Chinese communist Gao Zinong complained that Chinese immigrants in the Philippines cared only about becoming rich (renao qiucai), and Chinese communists in San Francisco had difficulty explaining to the workers who were members of Chinese associations, tong and gongsi, that they were being exploited, for they "usually [became] bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeoisie when they [went] back to China." Additionally, Chinese students were "usually the sons of wealthy and official families, so they [were] opportunistic and reactionary." 41 However, the Cuban Communist Party, which had a strong base among immigrant communities, including the Chinese, was popular among not only workers but also among petty peddlers (gongren yu xiao shangren).
与之形成鲜明对比的是，马来亚共产党为华人群体的需求提供了一种新的布尔什维克语言。马来亚共产党的许多成员是“店员”（店员），马来亚共产党努力在小商人中进行共产主义宣传。1929 年，马来亚共产党致函共产国际，称英国政府禁止在马来亚街头售卖食品可以作为宣传机会。然而，说每个中国移民都来到了南洋成为“资产阶级”，这绝非夸张之词，所以共产主义宣传对他们来说意义不大。1928-1929 年，许杰试图说服一位华侨商人接受共产主义思想，并试图向他解释世界经济对马来亚局势的影响，但中国移民的态度是，每个人都来南洋是为了发财。 同樣地，菲律賓華裔共產黨員高子農抱怨，菲律賓的華人移民只關心發財致富 (renao qiucai)，舊金山華僑工會的共產黨員很難向華僑會館、堂口和公司成員解釋他們受到了剝削，因為他們“通常在回到中國後 [成為] 資產階級或小資產階級。” 此外，華僑學生“通常出身於富人和官宦家庭，所以他們 [是] 機會主義者和反動派。” 41 然而，在華僑社群中擁有堅實基礎的古巴共產黨，不僅在工人中受歡迎，在小商販 (gongren yu xiao shangren) 中也受歡迎。

Ho Chi Minh's report about the situation in the MCP in November 1930 stated that: "[Among 1,500 members], the great majority are workers: seamen, builders, rubber workers, miners, etc. There is a small number of intellectuals (schoolteachers and students) and independents (such as restaurant keepers). To a certain extent, they follow the communal economic process of the emigrating Chinese: either trying to save some money to develop what little they possess in their home land or to possess something if they have nothing. For example, it was common for those with a "low cultural level" (wenhua shuiping dide) to open bicycle repair shops or to become drivers because the chances to become capitalists were relatively few (nengcheng zibenjia de jiaoshao). These migrants, as a rule, did not take part in revolutionary activities, in contrast to intellectuals such as Zhang Xia who became party members.
胡志明 1930 年 11 月关于马来亚共产党情况的报告指出：“[在 1500 名党员中]，绝大多数是工人：海员、建筑工人、橡胶工人、矿工等。只有一小部分知识分子（教师和学生）和独立人士（如餐馆老板）。在某种程度上，他们遵循中国移民的社区经济进程：要么试图攒钱发展他们在本土拥有的微薄财产，要么在他们一无所有的情况下拥有一些东西。例如，对于“文化水平低”的人来说，开自行车修理店或成为司机是很常见的，因为成为资本家的机会相对较少。这些移民原则上不参加革命活动，这与张霞等成为党员的知识分子不同。

Among this constituency, national salvation was the cause. In 1928, the NPC considered commemorating the three-month anniversary of the clash between Japanese and GMD troops in Ji'nan, which had resulted in a Japanese expansion after the GMD retreated, to be its most important activity. This event had been commemorated by both the GMD and the CCP, and while the NPC could not do it openly and therefore rather planned a rally and boycott of Japanese products under the name of the Anti-Japanese Chinese Residents' Association, it also planned to distribute propaganda advocating the return of the foreign concessions to China, the anti-imperialist unity of "all oppressed nationalities and classes," and the freedoms of speech, print, assembly, and strike. It also promoted a wage increase, an eight-hour workday, and the abolition of unjust taxes and the registration of Chinese schools. On August 3, some Singapore Chinese workers stopped working, students skipped classes, and Chinese businesses, schools, and organizations lowered their flags. A rally of 300 participants, mostly Hainanese, resolved to pressure the "national [Chinese] government" to conduct an open foreign policy, to carry out a boycott of Japanese goods, to punish speculators, and to protest the adoption of five points of the Japanese Demands. The police dispersed the rally and arrested several, including an "important communist." After a second five-month anniversary rally, a number of Hainanese night schools were closed. Reflecting on these activities, members of the Fujianese masses, who were most patriotic and were often looked down on as reactionary, believed that national salvation was the right cause, whether led by communists or others.
在这一选区中，民族救亡运动是其主张。1928 年，国民党中央执行委员会将纪念济南惨案三周年作为其最重要的活动，该事件发生在日军与国民党军队在济南的冲突之后，由于国民党撤退，日军随后进行了扩张。这一事件得到了国民党和共产党的共同纪念，虽然国民党中央执行委员会不能公开进行纪念，因此以中华民族反日会的名义策划了一次集会和抵制日货活动，但它还计划散发宣传材料，主张收回外国在华租界、"所有受压迫的民族和阶级"的 ضد امبرياليست 统一战线以及言论、出版、集会和罢工的自由。它还主张增加工资、实行八小时工作制，以及废除不公正的税收和取消对华学校的注册。 8 月 3 日，一些新加坡华人工人停工，学生停课，华商、学校和组织下半旗致哀。 由 300 名参与者组成的集会，其中多为海南人，决心向“国民政府”施压，要求其进行公开的外交政策，抵制日货，惩罚投机者，并抗议接受日本五项要求。警察驱散了集会，逮捕了数人，包括一名“重要共产党人”。在第二次五周年纪念集会之后，一些海南夜校被关闭。福建群众对此事进行了反思，他们是最爱国的，但也常常被视为反动派，他们认为救国是正确的事业，无论是由共产党还是其他人领导。

At least since 1928-1929, the Nanyang party had borrowed money from the "masses" and had not always been able to repay it. Lisan warned that the communists might join forces with the revolutionary bourgeoisie in anti-imperialism, but this cooperation should be political, not economic. In 1930, 20 percent of the 1,400 party members were "liberal businessmen." In Singapore, among the Chinese community, 20 percent were merchants and 60 percent were "toiling masses and liberal businessmen." Both were the main targets of the MCP's propaganda, as many small business owners had gone bankrupt during the depression, while laborers had lost their jobs. In the early 1930s, among party leaders, there were petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and members of the working class.
至少从 1928 年到 1929 年，娘惹党就借了“群众”的钱，却无法偿还。 李立三警告说，共产党人可能会与革命资产阶级在反帝斗争中联合起来，但这种合作应该是政治上的，而不是经济上的。 1930 年，1400 名党员中有 20% 是“自由商人”。在新加坡，华人群体中，20% 是商人，60% 是“劳动群众和自由商人”。 这两类人都是马共宣传的主要对象，因为许多小企业主在经济萧条期间破产，而工人则失去了工作。在 20 世纪 30 年代初，在党的领导人中，有小资产阶级、知识分子和工人阶级成员。

Despite all these illustrations of the importance of a business-minded community to communist activities, from the beginning the bourgeoisie were to be excluded from the revolutionary Malayan nation led by the Malayan national communist party. Fu Daqing, representing the Comintern's opinion, stated that the national bourgeoisie were not a revolutionary force in Malaya, despite the definition of the Nanyang Revolution as a bourgeois democratic revolution. The MCP was left with the unresolved contradiction that the bourgeoisie were helping to finance the party but had to be excluded from the Malayan Revolution. However, at the founding conference, before Fu Daqing announced his resolution, attendees attempted to solve this contradiction between the two models - one of a Bolshevik party and the other of a Chinese association and decided not to exclude the bourgeoisie from their revolution. It was clear to them that the national bourgeoisie were oppressed and weak, except for in the Philippines and Ceylon (they likely meant the Chinese), and "demanded independence to develop their class interest," which the MCP interpreted as "a sort of anti-imperialist revolutionary action." 53
尽管所有这些说明都表明一个具有商业头脑的社区对共产主义活动的重要性，但从一开始，资产阶级就被马来亚民族共产党领导的革命马来亚民族排除在外。代表共产国际观点的傅大庆表示，马来亚民族资产阶级不是马来亚的一支革命力量，尽管南洋革命的定义是一场资产阶级民主革命。马来亚共产党面临着一个尚未解决的矛盾，即资产阶级正在帮助资助该党，但必须被排除在马来亚革命之外。然而，在成立大会上，在傅大庆宣布了他的决议之前，与会者试图解决这两个模式之间的矛盾——一个是布尔什维克政党，另一个是华人协会——并决定不将资产阶级排除在他们的革命之外。 对于他们来说，很明显，除了菲律宾和锡兰（他们很可能指的是中国）之外，民族资产阶级都受到压迫和软弱，并且“要求独立以发展其阶级利益”，这被马共解释为“一种 反帝革命行动”。53

In Burma, Siam, Java, Annam, and Malaya, the MCP stated, " he exploitation is so severe that there is no national bourgeoisie beyond agents of imperialist wholesale dealers. They are counterrevolutionary, but they are so weak, although we cannot say they are not bourgeoisie and do not have thoughts of a patriarchal society ... Yet we have to oppose the imperialists and work hard to secure freedoms of assembly, speech, press, commerce, organization, education, and strike. Furthermore, this movement for democratic freedoms would be carried out by the proletariat, who would seize power. The minutes of the MCP"s founding meeting state that: "We should not forsake the democratic movement because of the counterrevolution of the bourgeoisie. We must lead the majority of the oppressed masses to secure their true democratic rights. Therefore, we have to attempt to establish democratic republics in the Malayan states. This is an essential condition to make a united front of the oppressed peoples." Thus, the bourgeoisie, specifically small business owners - or independents, as Ho Chi Minh called them - had a role to play because they were interested in a political force that would represent them in their movement for democratic rights in the countries where they were living. Comintern representative Fu Daqing translated the "democratic movement" advocated by the MCP into the Bolshevik "demands of the masses, which became the most important slogan of MCP indigenization promoted by the Comintern.
在缅甸、暹罗、爪哇、安南和马来亚，马来亚共产党声明，‘ 剥削如此严重，以至于除了帝国主义批发商的代理人之外，就没有民族资产阶级。他们是反革命的，但他们太弱了，尽管我们不能说他们不是资产阶级，也没有父权社会的思想……但我们必须反对帝国主义，努力争取集会、言论、出版、商业、组织、教育和罢工的自由。 此外，这场争取民主自由的运动将由无产阶级领导，他们将掌握权力。马来亚共产党成立大会的会议记录指出：“我们不应因资产阶级的反革命而放弃民主运动。我们必须领导大多数受压迫群众争取他们真正的民主权利。因此，我们必须试图在马来亚各州建立民主共和国。这是建立被压迫人民统一战线的一个必要条件。 因此，资产阶级，特别是小型企业主——或像胡志明所说的独立人士——在其中发挥了作用，因为他们希望有一种政治力量能够在他们争取民主权利的运动中代表他们。 共产国际代表傅大庆将马来亚共产党倡导的“民主运动”翻译成布尔什维克的“群众要求” ，这成为共产国际推动的马来亚共产党本土化最重要的口号。

Despite its antibourgeois rhetoric, Nanyang communists had ties with "merchants and intellectuals" who admittedly had a strong national ideology. British analysts pointed out that communist propaganda was effective because "of the anti-imperialist cry, which [had] its appeal to all Chinese whether Communist or not." The AIL's strategy focused mainly on the "national and petty bourgeoisie as on the main mass of [its] organization."59 According to an article in La Dépêche Indochinoise of March 7, 1933, Comintern agent Joseph Ducroux had been arrested together with Fu Daqing, the secretary of the MCP, and the Comintern-MCP liaison, Huang Muhan, on June 1, 1931, in the company of "rich Chinese who had a book about communism with them."
尽管其反资产阶级言论，南洋共产党人与“商人及知识分子”有联系，这些人公认地具有强烈的民族意识形态。 英国分析人士指出，共产主义宣传之所以有效，是因为“反帝国主义的呼声，这引起了所有中国人的共鸣，无论他们是共产主义者还是非共产主义者”。 AIL 的策略主要针对“民族资产阶级和小资产阶级，作为其组织的主要群众”。 据 1933 年 3 月 7 日《印度支那邮报》的一篇文章称，共产国际特工约瑟夫·杜克鲁克斯于 1931 年 6 月 1 日与马来亚共产党秘书长傅大庆和共产国际-马来亚共产党联络员黄慕涵一起被捕，当时他们与“随身携带共产主义书籍的富裕中国人”在一起。

In 1932, during the campaign against the Alien Registration Ordinance, the MCP argued that although the national bourgeoisie of all minzu (ge minzu zichan jieji) were not usually a revolutionary force, and although they feared a worker-peasant revolution, during times of economic crisis, they, like others, were dissatisfied with the British imperialists. They therefore became useful to the anti-imperialist movement. Hence, the MCP was to use this attitude among the bourgeoisie. However, the party had to make sure not to compromise the goals of the Malayan Revolution but rather to lead the bourgeoisie to abandon their capitalist mentality in order to develop an anti-imperialist organization and engage with the small bourgeoisie (xiao zichan jieji). Throughout, the MCP insisted that the driving force of the Malayan Revolution (Malaiya geming) remained the proletariat the and peasants, not the petty urbanites and the national bourgeoisie.
在 1932 年，反对外侨登记条例运动期间，马共认为，尽管所有民主人士的民族资产阶级（各个民族资产阶级）通常不是一支革命力量，而且他们害怕工人农民革命，但他们在经济危机时期和其他民众一样，对英国帝国主义者感到不满。因此，他们对反帝运动是有益的。因此，马共应利用资产阶级中的这种态度。然而，该党必须确保不损害马来亚革命的目标，而是要领导资产阶级放弃他们的资本主义心态，以便发展一个反帝组织，并与小资产阶级（小资产阶级）合作。马共始终坚持，马来亚革命的驱动力仍然是无产阶级和农民，而不是小城市居民和民族资产阶级。

It did not take long for the MCP to realize that the bourgeoisie were also its rival for the allegiance of the masses. In 1932, to prevent the Chinese community from siding with the Chinese bourgeoisie, the MCP planned to explain that Chinese capitalists had exploited the discourse on national interests to convince other classes to sell out their own interests and to support the capitalists to achieve the interests of the capitalist class. National interests (minzu liyn) were those of the Chinese, and their representative was the MCP. Thus, the MCP's proletarian nation was emerging. The MCP also began to argue that the bourgeoisie were using the backward masses (luohou qunzhong) "to walk the road of peace under their leadership." Yet again, after the Chinese community protested the ordinance, the MCP considered the national bourgeoisie to be oppressed by the fascist British imperialists.
麦克白很快意识到，资产阶级也是它争取群众拥护的竞争对手。1932 年，为了防止中国民众与中国资产阶级站在一起，麦克白计划解释说，中国资本家利用民族利益的论述来说服其他阶级出卖自己的利益，并支持资本家实现资本家阶级的利益。民族利益（民族利益）是中华民族的利益，其代表是中国共产党。因此，中国共产党的无产阶级民族正在形成。麦克白也开始争论说，资产阶级正在利用落后群众“在他们的领导下走和平之路”。然而，中国民众抗议该法令后，麦克白再次认为，民族资产阶级受到了法西斯英国帝国主义者的压迫。

The MCP's campaign in support of the Chinese "soviet" revolution was successful among the most unlikely constituency of a communist party-not the MCP's imagined destitute masses or members of the communist party, who, in contrast, did nothing beyond "issuing circulars and empty talk [kongtan zhuyi],"63 but the most natural supporters of a Chinese association: the bourgeoisie. They could afford to invest in a political force that claimed to be more nationalist and modern than the GMD and that would form a better government in their country of heritage, that is, China, and they sought to improve their position in Malaya. In the Malayan economy of 1933, which had barely started to show signs of recovery, the alleged successes in the Soviet Union looked appealing, especially as the CCP in China was perceived as struggling for China's national independence and freedom (Zhongguo minzu zhi duli yu ziyou).
苏共在中国“苏维埃”革命中的宣传活动在共产党最不可能的支持者中取得了成功，即共产党想象中的赤贫群众或党员，他们仅仅“发号施令和空谈”。 相反，中国协会最自然的支持者——资产阶级，却对此表现出了极大的热情。 他们有能力投资于一个自称比国民党更民族主义、更现代的政治力量，这个力量将在他们的祖籍国中国建立更好的政府，并因此改善他们在马来亚的地位。 在 1933 年马来亚的经济中，经济刚刚开始显现复苏的迹象，苏联所谓取得的成功就显得非常有吸引力，特别是考虑到中国共产党被认为在为中国的民族独立和自由而斗争。

The MCP rhetoric offered a way to deal with China's present national crisis, while the imperialists, as the MCP explained, were eager to divide China into colonies, and the GMD government appeared inefficient and was selling off China's national interests in exchange for imperialist loans. Aside from establishing the Union to Aid China's Soviet Revolution, the MCP also planned, on behalf of a community school (shetuan xuexiao), to send a telegram to protest the GMD's attack on the CCP base areas and to congratulate the Red Army on its victories. The MCP also planned to organize tours in CCP base areas: "[There, workers and peasants] build a free and happy life, and all participate in political and cultural life, enjoy real [shijide] freedom and political rights, an eight-hour working day, and Sundays off." In contrast, the GMD-occupied areas (tongzhi zhixia) were ravaged by unemployment, exploitation, conflicts among warlords, cold, hunger, and natural disasters. The MCP therefore implied that the GMD had exhausted its Mandate of Heaven.
## 简体中文翻译： **中国共产党 (MCP) 的宣言提供了一种应对中国当前国家危机的途径。正如中国共产党所解释的，帝国主义者热衷于将中国瓜分殖民，而国民政府则显得无能，并以帝国主义贷款为代价出卖中国的国家利益。除了成立援助中国苏维埃革命的联盟外，中国共产党还计划代表一个社区学校 (shetuan xuexiao) 发送电报，抗议国民政府对中共根据地的进攻，并祝贺红军的胜利。中国共产党还计划组织前往中共根据地的旅行：“[在那里，工人和农民] 建设自由幸福的生活，并积极参与政治和文化生活，享有真正的 (shijide) 自由和政治权利，实行八小时工作制，星期天休息。” 相比之下，国民政府统治的地区 (tongzhi zhixia) 则饱受失业、剥削、军阀混战、饥寒交迫和自然灾害的蹂躏。因此，中国共产党暗示国民政府已经失去了天命。 **

The MCP was concerned about the general economic position of the Chinese community in Malaya, not only the economic position of the proletariat. In describing the effect of British policies on Malaya since 1930, the MCP talked only about the deterioration of Chinese economic interests. It was concerned about the big Chinese bourgeoisie in Malaya losing their economic position. Besides unemployment, salary cuts, and an increase in working hours, in 1939 the MCP reported a dramatic decline in Chinese ownership of rubber plantations (from a "majority" down to 16 percent) and tin mines (down from 80 percent to 34 percent since
马来亚共产党担心马来亚华人社区的整体经济状况，而不仅仅是无产阶级的经济状况。在描述了 1930 年以来英国政策对马来亚的影响时，马来亚共产党只谈到了华人工商业利益的恶化。它担心马来亚的华人资产阶级失去自己的经济地位。除了失业、降薪和工作时间增加，马来亚共产党在 1939 年还报告了华人橡胶种植园所有权的急剧下降（从“多数”下降到 16%）和锡矿所有权的下降（从 80%下降到 34%，因为）

1912-1913). Big plantations were growing in size, while small plantations, owned by Chinese and Indians, had disappeared. Although it is unclear from where the MCP obtained these figures, the MCP likely blamed the effects of the Great Depression as well as long-term British efforts. Since the late nineteenth century, the British government had outlawed Chinese secret societies and regulated the labor contract system, thereby eroding relations between Chinese employers and employees, monopolized a lucrative trade in opium, spirits, and tobacco, and banned gambling, which had previously made mining lucrative even on poorer-yielding tin land.
（1912-1913 年）。大型种植园规模不断扩大，而由华人、印第安人拥有的小型种植园则消失了。 尽管目前尚不清楚马来亚共产党是如何获得这些数据的，但马来亚共产党很有可能将此归因于经济大萧条的影响以及英国政府的长期政策。自 19 世纪后期以来，英国政府一直在取缔华人秘密会社并规范劳务合同制，这恶化了华人雇主和雇员之间的关系。英国政府还垄断了利润丰厚鸦片、烈酒和烟草贸易，并禁止了赌博，而赌博此前即使在出产率较低的锡矿地上也能使采矿业获利。

The 1937 economic crisis likewise affected the export of tin and rubber. The Chinese, unlike the British, were not allowed to use the latest mining equipment. After the start of the war, the government banned the import of tin, iron, and rubber without government permission, instituted government control over overseas money remittances, imposed new taxes, and limited Chinese production of rice and tea. The British "deprived the huaqiao of the liberty to save China (jiuguo ziyou)." This manifested in the closure of Chinese organizations, deportations, press censorship, the abolition of unemployment aid, and the introduction of mandatory military training for men. The MCP explained that although the Chinese played an important role in the Malayan economy, they remained dependent on British imperialism because the British could take Chinese property at any time. The Malayan Chinese were interested in a strong China that would be able to protect their property, and the MCP shared this interest.
1937 年的经济危机也影响了锡和橡胶的出口。与英国人不同，中国人被禁止使用最新的采矿设备。战争爆发后，政府禁止进口锡、铁和橡胶，需要政府许可才能汇款，征收新税，并限制中国生产大米和茶叶。英国人"剥夺了华侨救国自由"。这体现在关闭中国组织、驱逐出境、新闻审查、取消失业救济金和对男性实行强制性军事训练。马来亚共产党解释说，虽然华人曾在马来亚经济中发挥重要作用，但他们仍然依赖英国帝国主义，因为英国人可以随时没收华人的财产。马来亚华人希望一个强大的中国能够保护他们的财产，而马来亚共产党也持这种观点。

The bourgeoisie's interest in a better government in China and the MCP's ambiguous attitude toward the bourgeoisie facilitated the latter's support of the party in 1934. However, the Bolshevik concept of a proletarian nation and its anticolonial attitude translated into antibourgeois language, which the MCP had adopted as a communist party from the time of its establishment. This radical language intensified with the beginning of the anticipated world war and mass protests, which apppeared to be the impending revolutionary era and which undermined the MCP's support base.
资产阶级对更有效的中国政府的兴趣和中共对资产阶级的模糊态度促成了后者在 1934 年对该党的支持。然而，布尔什维克关于无产阶级民族的概念及其反殖民态度转化为反资产阶级语言，中共作为共产党从其成立之日起就采用了这种语言。这种激进的语言随着预期世界大战和群众抗议的开始而加剧，这似乎是即将到来的革命时代，并损害了中共的支持基础。

War, Mass Protests, the United Front, and Anti-British Policy The MCP's goal was to overthrow the British government in Malaya as a part of the world proletarian revolution. Anti-imperialism made sense to the MCP as a form of protest against the British government's discrimination of Chinese migrants. In 1930, an officeholder of the British Malayan branch of the GMD, Fang Chih-cheng, explained the reasoning behind anti-imperialism while discussing the banning of the GMD with the governor of Malaya, Cecil Clementi. In 1927, Hong Kong GMD News had called for the overthrow of the British, and in reference to this, Fang said, "[a]ntiimperialism [does] not mean we oppose the British, it means we oppose the people who encroach upon Chinese . . . Imperialists do not mean any particular nation but those people who encroach upon Chinese. This explanation sheds light on the layers of meaning in the MCP's anti-British attitudes too.
战争、大规模抗议、统一战线和反英政策 马共的目标是作为世界无产阶级革命的一部分推翻马来亚的英国政府。反帝国主义对马共来说是抗议英国政府歧视华人移民的一种形式。1930 年，国民党马来亚支部干部方治成在与马来亚总督西西尔·克莱门蒂讨论国民党被取缔时，解释了反帝国主义背后的理由。1927 年，香港国民党新闻曾呼吁推翻英国统治，对此，方说，“反帝国主义[并不]意味着我们反对英国人，而是意味着我们反对那些侵犯中国人的[人]...帝国主义者不是指任何特定的民族，而是指那些侵犯中国人的[人]。 这一解释也阐明了马共反英态度中包含的多种含义。

However, not everyone in the Chinese community shared anti-British sentiments. In order to earn the support of overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, in 1923 Sun Yatsen had to ally with those who were on good terms with the British government, since his anti-British stance had alienated many. Since the early days of its establishment, the MCP had to explain to fellow Chinese why they had to oppose the British. A pamphlet distributed in 1930 on the anniversary of Lenin's death is an example of the adaptation of the communist message to local cultural codes, which was the MCP's goal and was reminiscent of Li Lisan's techniques while mobilizing workers in the Anyuan mines. The pamphlet opened with a question: "Why shall we protest against imperialism?" It then explained that imperialism was like a tiger sitting in front of one's house, where one's wife and children were: "You call for a friend, and you must either force the tiger to leave or kill it. Our Malaya [women de Malaiya] is exactly in this situation . . . British imperialism is the tiger that prevents us from improving our own lives."71
然而，并非所有华人社区都持有反英情绪。为了获得香港海外华人的支持，孙中山在 1923 年被迫与那些与英国政府关系良好的人结盟，因为他的反英立场让许多人疏远了他。 从成立之初，马来亚共产党就不得不向其他华人解释他们为何必须反对英国。1930 年列宁逝世周年纪念日发表的一份小册子便是将共产主义信息调整为当地文化规范的一个例子，这是马来亚共产党的一个目标，让人想起李立三在组织安源矿工时的策略。 这份小册子开头提出一个问题：“我们为何要抗议帝国主义？” 它接着解释道，帝国主义就像一只坐在你家门口的老虎，那里住着你的妻子和孩子：“你请求朋友的帮助，你必须迫使老虎离开或者杀死它。我们的马来亚（我们的女性 Malaiya）正处于这样的境地……英国帝国主义是阻止我们改善自身生活的猛虎。”71

As a part of the CCP's united front policy, in 1938 the MCP adopted a proBritish stance because Great Britain was "China's friend,"72 and in 1939, it pledged its cooperation on the condition that universal franchise and other democratic freedoms would be granted to all ethnic communities. However, it reserved the right to mobilize workers against the British. At the same time, following the line of the CCP, the MCP celebrated the Soviet-Nazi nonaggression pact of August 23, 1939, and touted the USSR as a model liberator of oppressed nations that helped the national liberation movements of oppressed peoples (beiyapo renmin he minzujiefangyundong) in the annexed territories in Poland, Finland, the Baltic region, and Bessarabia. "In accordance with the Comintern resolutions' spirit and Malaya's internal situation," the MCP promoted overthrowing the British government and establishing a democratic republic of Malaya (minzhu gongheguo).
作为中共统一战线政策的一部分，马来亚共产党于 1938 年采取了亲英立场，因为英国是“中国的盟友”。721939 年，马来亚共产党承诺配合抗战，条件是所有族裔社区都享有普选权和其他民主自由。然而，马来亚共产党保留了发动工人反对英国的权利。 同时，遵照中共的路线，马来亚共产党赞扬了 1939 年 8 月 23 日苏德互不侵犯条约，并吹捧苏联是遭受压迫的国家榜样，帮助在波兰、芬兰、波罗的海地区和贝萨拉比亚等被吞并领土上的遭受压迫的人民和民族解放运动（beiyapo renmin he minzujiefangyundong）。根据共产国际决议的精神和马来亚的内部情况，“马来亚共产党”鼓吹推翻英国政府，建立马来亚民主共和国（minzhu gongheguo）。

Also contradictory were the assorted goals of the MCP. These included a parliament consisting of an assembly of all parties and anti-imperialist organizations, selected by all people in each state; freedoms of assembly, speech, print, belief, and strike, as well as the opportunity for wage increases, unemployment aid, and disaster payments; development of the national economy (apparently the Malayan economy) and self-government of customs; an eight-hour workday; social security, male-female equality, maternity leave, and abolition of the Mui Tsai system; democratization of the military; education in the national language (minzu yuwen) as well as free education for the impoverished; the unification of all oppressed nations of the world; opposition to war, defense of the Soviet Union by all peaceloving nations, and punishment of fascists, national traitors, and corrupt bureaucrats; national independence and the development of a national culture; support for the resistance in China and the national liberation movement of India; and a united anti-imperialist front of all nationalities. On the margins of this page, a Comintern Chinese reader asked: "What are the tactics [celüe] to carry this out??76
马来亚共产党 (MCP) 的目标也存在矛盾。这些目标包括：由各党派和反帝组织组成的议会，由各州人民普选产生；集会、言论、出版、信仰和罢工的自由，以及提高工资、失业救济和救灾金的机会；民族经济（显然是马来亚经济）的发展和海关自治；八小时工作制；社会保障、男女平等、产假和废除 mui tsai 制度；军队民主化；用民族语言 (minzu yuwen) 进行教育以及为贫困人口提供免费教育；世界所有被压迫民族的联合；反对战争，所有爱好和平的国家都应该保卫苏联，并惩罚法西斯分子、民族叛徒和腐败的官僚；民族独立和发展民族文化；支持中国抵抗运动和印度民族解放运动；建立由所有民族组成的统一的反帝阵线。 在页边空白处，一位共产国际的中国读者问道：“如何开展这项工作的策略是什么？”76

The reaction to British wartime economic measures after Britain's entry into the war on September 3, 1939, which resulted in longer working hours, price increases, and disproportionally smaller pay increases in Singapore, was widespread protests. The MCP reported "more than one hundred thousand workers" participating in strikes from September 1939 to January 1940. In October, the MCP sounded victorious, as its June resolutions had correctly predicted the imperialist war that triggered
英国于 1939 年 9 月 3 日参战后，英国战时经济措施招致新加坡工人们的普遍抗议，这些措施导致更长的工作时间、物价上涨以及不成比例的小幅加薪。马来亚共产党报告称，从 1939 年 9 月到 1940 年 1 月，有“超过十万名工人”参与罢工。共产党在 10 月份表示胜利，因为它的 6 月决议正确地预测了触发这场帝国主义战争的事件。

Figure 7.1 Anti-British drawing, 1940.
图 7.1 反对英国的漫画，1940 年。

Published with permission of the National Archives, UK.
经英国国家档案馆许可发布。

the national liberation movement. The MCP interpreted these widespread protests to be a result of the growing anti-imperialism of the toiling masses and small bourgeoisie and as an opportune time to start a revolution in the Nanyang. The MCP proclaimed, " he only road for the people of Malaya is to overthrow the British to achieve national independence [minzu duli.. The MCP now resented its infantile (youxiang) prewar policy of cooperation with the British (yu Ying hezuo). The MCP decided that as the political party of class interests and national and social liberation (minzu and shehuijiefang), it could not cooperate with the main enemy of all nationalities (ge minzu), which was suppressing Malaya's rights in politics, the economy, and culture. Yet the MCP did not rule out cooperation with the British in the future.
民族解放运动。 马来亚共产党将这些广泛的抗议解释为一种由于劳苦大众和小资产阶级的反帝国主义情绪的增长，同时也是在南洋发动革命的良机。马来亚共产党宣称：“ 马来亚人民唯一的道路是推翻英国人，实现民族独立（minzu duli.. ” 现在马来亚共产党对自己战前与英国合作的幼稚（youxiang）政策感到痛心疾首。马来亚共产党认为，作为一个代表阶级利益和民族以及社会解放（minzu and shehuijiefang）的政党，它不可能与所有民族的共同敌人合作，而该敌人正在政治、经济和文化领域压制马来亚的权利。然而，马来亚共产党没有排除将来与英国人合作的可能性。

An anti-British MCP drawing (see Figure 7.1) addresses the compatriots of "all peoples" (ge minzu tongbao) and promotes "national" unity (minzu tuanjie), demonstrating the continuing multiple meanings of minzu. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, the message is that Chinese national unity and Malayan national unity concern the same nation (minzu). This is another example of anti-British propaganda that targeted common Chinese with simple and understandable language. It was built around the British breaching of social norms, such as raping, butchering, and forcibly seizing domestic animals, relieving themselves in public, drinking, and summarily arresting and suppressing protesters.
反英马共宣传画（图 7.1）针对“各民族同胞”（ge minzu tongbao），号召“民族团结”（minzu tuanjie），证明了“民族”一词的多重含义。无论是有意还是无意，其信息都是将中国民族团结与马来亚民族团结视为同一个民族（minzu）。这是另一种针对普通中国人的反英宣传，使用简单易懂的语言。它围绕着英国人违反社会规范的行为，如强奸、屠杀、强行没收家禽、在公共场所大小便、酗酒以及随意逮捕和镇压抗议者等事件展开。

Soon, however, the MCP recognized that its anti-British policy was inadequate: "In an unfavorable situation, the party must not call the masses under its slogans, such as 'Overthrow British imperialism' and 'Oppose the imperialist war' but work from the slogans initiated by the masses and in accordance with the 'degree of awakening' of the masses [juewu chengdu], for only in this case can the masses come to the party. The MCP's antiBritish policies were at odds with the mood of the Chinese community. Although those who upheld the anti-Japanese resistance movement had more influence "than the capitulationists," they did not resist British imperialism. The MCP had tried to recruit among the Corps for the Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Motherland, comprising small bourgeoisie, traders, intellectuals, students, workers, and shop clerks, by explaining how in fact British policy "indirectly compromised with Japan and sold out anti-Japanese war interests. However, the party's radicalism prevented the masses from joining. The MCP had been outlawed, and participants in protests were sometimes killed by police, as during the rally on May 1, 1940 or during the coal miners' strike in 1937 in Batu Arang, which was a major MCP success in organizing labor.
很快，然而，中共意识到其反英政策是不充分的：“在不利形势下，党不能用‘打倒英帝国主义’和‘反对帝国主义战争’等口号号召群众，而必须从群众提出的口号出发，并根据群众的‘觉悟程度’工作，因为只有这样，群众才能走到党这边来。” 中共的反英政策与华人群体的 настроения 不符。虽然那些坚持抗日运动的人比“投降主义者”更有影响力，但他们并不反对英国帝国主义。中共试图通过解释英国政策“实际上与日本妥协并出卖了抗日战争利益”来在由小资产阶级、商人、知识分子、学生、工人和店员组成的“抗日救国军”中招募成员。 然而，该党的激进主义阻止了群众加入。 镇压马来亚共产党及其工会运动 1930 年代后半期，马来亚共产党（简称“马共”）领导了一系列反对英国殖民统治的罢工和抗议活动。作为回应，英国当局于 1948 年宣布马共為非法组织，并展开了全面的镇压行动，逮捕和拘留了数千名党员和支持者。 为了摧毁党的组织和影响力，当局采取了各种残暴的手段，包括酷刑、失踪和法外处决。根据一些估计，在紧急状态期间，約有 10,000 人被杀害，其中包括許多平民。 以下是紧急状态期间发生的一些主要事件： • 1948 年 6 月：当局宣布进入紧急状态，逮捕了数百名 suspected 参与马共的人员。 • 1949 年 2 月：共产党领导人 Chin Peng 发动武装起义，标志着武装斗争的开始。 • 1951 年：新任命的英国高级专员 Malcolm MacDonald 实施了一系列 "人心攻势" 措施，旨在争取民心并鼓励共产党人投降。 • 1955 年：共产党人同意就停战进行谈判。这一谈判导致了 1957 年签订的《紧急状态和解备忘录》。 紧急状态于 1960 年 7 月 31 日正式结束，标志着这場血腥的镇压的结束。然而，对马共的镇压行动并未完全停止。事实上，共产党人的小股部队继续在丛林中战斗，直到 1989 年才最终与政府签署和平协议。

The MCP decided to stop its anti-British policy prior to October 1940, when the CCP in Hong Kong, which coordinated the united front in Southeast Asia, instructed it to do so. In fact, the MCP had started to doubt the effectiveness of the policy in February of that year, although it continued to put forward the slogan of independence. The MCP changed its policy based on local conditions: "We do not say in our program to kick the British out of Malaya, because at least they do not help the fascists. We say, 'Establish a democratic system' rather than 'Kick out the British.' However, in the long run, we must plan to kick out the British and establish a self-determined democratic republic, because British interests are incompatible with the interests of all Malaya's oppressed peoples [ge bei yapo minzu]." 88
The source text has already been translated into Simplified Chinese. Here is the translation without any additional text: > **马来亚共产党决定在 1940 年 10 月之前停止其反英政策，此前，中共驻香港协调东南亚统一战线的机构指示其这样做。** **实际上，马来亚共产党从当年 2 月开始怀疑该政策的有效性，尽管它继续提出独立的口号。** **马来亚共产党根据当地情况改变了其政策：“我们没有在我们的纲领中说要赶走英国人，因为至少他们不帮助法西斯。我们说，‘建立一个民主制度’而不是‘赶走英国人’。然而，从长远来看，我们必须计划赶走英国人，建立一个自治的民主共和国，因为英国利益与所有马来亚被压迫人民的利益是不相容的。” [88]**

Although on the wave of unrest the MFLU's membership grew from 20,000 in April 1939 to 50,000 in the picture of the MCP's triumphant leadership in the labor unrest of 1937-1939 and its strengthened power base is undermined by its own reflections. When the struggles "had already become a part of everyday life for various nationalities . . . the party did not work at the lower level of the united front," had a "disdainful" (prezritel'noe) attitude toward the labor movement organization, and was at the tail of the working masses. Overall, the MCP portrayed the workers' movement as having been under its leadership since its beginning, but because the communists "did not always correctly understand the conditions and tasks of the workers' movement, they often remained without the leadership of communists, and failed." Workers' protests were economic struggles and were not anti-imperialist. In 1935-1940, labor organizations in Malaya operated legally, and since workers' struggles were sometimes successful, workers were under the illusion that they could improve their lot without a political struggle against British imperialism.
尽管马来亚反殖民运动经历了动荡，马来亚劳工联合会的成员人数从 1939 年 4 月的 2 万人增长到 的 5 万人，但马来亚共产党对 1937-1939 年劳工运动的成功领导和随之提升的权力基础 却受到了自身内部的反思影响。当斗争 “已经成为各民族日常生活的一部分时…该党未能在一战线的较低层面上开展工作，” 对劳工运动组织持 “轻蔑” (prezritel'noe) 的态度，并且落后于工人群众。总的来说，马来亚共产党将工人运动描绘成自始至终都在其领导之下，但由于共产党人“并不总是正确理解工人运动的条件和任务，他们经常在没有共产党领导的情况下继续活动，并最终失败。” 工人抗议是经济斗争，而不是反帝国主义斗争。在 1935-1940 年，马来亚的劳工组织合法运作，并且由于工人的斗争有时会取得成功，工人们便产生了一种错觉，认为他们可以在不进行反英帝国主义政治斗争的情况下改善自己的生活。

In 1940, as an effect of growing pro-British attitudes, the labor union registration law, and the Industrial Court Ordinance, meant to settle industrial disputes via industrial courts and to refuse registration if a union had participated in unlawful activity, there was an overall downturn in labor protests. The MCP campaigned against the ordinance (see Figure 7.2) but nonetheless had to adjust its tactics to this new situation. Since February, the party's following and membership had plummeted, especially in north Malaya, in Penang, and in Perak. Some had joined yellow trade unions, and this was in addition to the fact that previously reported numbers of the "masses" had been exaggerated by percent. The party was connected only with the upper strata of mass organizations. Most activities occurred in Singapore, which was the only place where the masses were not considered backward by the MCP. The party did not have a basis in urban centers, the most important rubber plantations, mines, or big industries. The party's discussion movement (taolun yundong) and "legalist" protests were "superficial lectures."
1940 年，随着支持英国态度的增长，旨在通过工业法庭解决劳资纠纷并拒绝为参与非法活动的工会注册的工会注册法和工业法庭条例， 劳工抗议活动总体呈下降趋势。 马来亚共产党反对该条例（见图 7.2），但仍不得不调整其策略以适应这一新情况。自 2 月以来，该党的追随者和党员人数急剧下降，尤其是在马来亚北部、槟城和霹雳州。 有些人加入了黄色工会，而且先前报告的“群众”人数被夸大了 百分比。该党只与群众组织的上层有联系。大多数活动发生在新加坡，这是唯一一个马来亚共产党没有认为群众落后的地区。该党没有在城市中心、最重要的橡胶种植园、矿山或大型工业中站稳脚跟。该党的讨论运动（taolun yundong）和“合法主义”抗议是“肤浅的说教”。

Figure 7.2 MCP propaganda against the trade union registration ordinance introduced by the government of the Straits Settlements in 1939, ca. 1940. Published with permission of the National Archives, UK.
图 7.2 马共反宣传画，反对 1939 年海峡殖民地政府推行的工会注册条例，约 1940 年。 图片由英国国家档案馆许可发布。

92 Ibid., pp. 37-39.
92 同上，第 37-39 页。

Yong, Origins of Malayan Communism, p. 277.
## 翻译 源语言：英语 目标语言：简体中文 ## 源文本 Yong, Origins of Malayan Communism, p. 277. ## 译文 **永，马来亚共产主义的起源，第 277 页。**

Tai Yuen, Labour Unrest, p. 172.
太原, 劳工动乱，第 172 页。

The number increased in Malacca, Johor Bahru, and Kedah. In south Malaya, Singapore, and Johor Bahru, the "masses" who participated in protests became more "reliable." "Maijin [Forward]," pp. 62-63; "CC New Resolutions."
马六甲、新山和吉打州的数量有所增加。在马来亚南部、新加坡和新山，“参与抗议的‘群众’变得更加‘可靠’。” “马来人 [前进]，”第 62-63 页；“中央委员会新决议”。

CO 273/662/50336.
代码 0 CO 273/662/50336。

In March 1940, the MCP started a political unity movement (zhengzhi tongyi yundong) to improve the party's connection with the masses. To improve comrades' insufficient understanding of CC resolutions and of lower-level comrades (xiaceng tongzhi) in party and labor unions, the party was to participate in yellow unions and other "organizations of the masses," to promote non-party activists to positions of leadership, to guide the masses to places where protests were to take place and encourage them to participate, and to "fit the education to the moods of the masses." Each member had to establish connections with ten or several tens of members of the masses. To succeed, comrades needed only "not to fear difficulties" (bu pa mafan) and to creatively (chuangzaode) lead the masses, especially after the suppression of the struggles. For the first time, the party organization was called backward (dang zuzhi de luohou): "If the party doesn't Bolshevize, it will be behind the masses." The party was torn between the ideology of a Bolshevik party and the specific context of its situation and constituency. Even where the party organized small groups of five to twenty people not only could it not handle the masses but instead the masses handled the party (bawo). Where there used to be more than ten comrades and hundreds of masses, there now remained only tens of masses and just over ten comrades. Closed doors based on class outlook (jieji guandian), or on a narrow-minded rightist outlook, did not let party membership grow.
1940 年 3 月，中共发起政治统一运动（zhengzhi tongyi yundong），以加强党与群众的联系。为了解决党员对中央决议和基层同志（xiaceng tongzhi）在党和工会中理解不足的问题，党要参与黄色工会和其他“群众组织”，提拔非党积极分子担任领导职位，引导群众到抗议场所，鼓励他们参与，并“使教育适应群众的情绪”。 每个党员都要与十几个或几十个群众建立联系。 要取得成功，同志们只需要“不怕困难”（bu pa mafan），并创造性地（chuangzaode）领导群众，尤其是在斗争受到镇压之后。 第一次，党组织被冠以落后（dang zuzhi de luohou）：“如果党不布尔什维克化，就会落后于群众。” 该党在其意识形态作为布尔什维克政党及其具体情况和选民之间左右为难。 即使在五到二十人的小型小组中，党也不能领导群众，反而被群众领导(包围)。以前有十多个同志和数百名群众的地方，现在只剩下十几个群众和十多个同志。基于阶级观点(阶级观点)，或者狭隘的右倾观点，关起门来不发展党员。

While continuing to promote development of the organizations of other ethnic groups (ge minzu zuzhi) and continuing to criticize its own "immigrant mentality, as a part of the CCP's united front the MCP focused mainly on huaqiao in its efforts to fundraise for China's anti-Japanese resistance in Chinese associations. Since the early 1930s, organizations based on native place and dialect connections had become "an indispensable operational framework for any large-scale social campaign," as patriotism had become a necessary quality for any status claimant in Singapore. During the China Salvation fundraising campaign, CCP envoys launched propaganda among Chinese overseas communities worldwide through Chinese associations. The MCP was establishing a network of secret study societies (yanjiuhui) and small groups (xiaozu), such as newspaper reading groups (dubaoban) in Chinese associations. In 1936, the MCP formed a united front with the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Union (Xinjiapo huaqiao kang Ri lianhehui) and founded the All-Malaya Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese National Salvation Union (Quan Malaiya huaqiao kang Ri lianhehui). The MCP's active participation in the China Salvation Movement thus boosted its support base.
在继续推动其他民族团体（少数民族组织）的发展，并持续批评其“移民心态”的同时，作为中共统一战线的一部分，马来亚共产党主要集中在华侨群体中筹款，用于支持中国抗日战争中的中国协会。自 1930 年代初以来，基于籍贯和方言关系的组织已成为“任何大规模社会运动中不可或缺的运作框架”，因为爱国主义已成为任何身份要求者在新加坡的必要品质。在“救亡运动”筹款活动中，中共特使通过华侨社团在世界各地的华人侨民中开展宣传。马来亚共产党正在华侨社团中建立秘密学习小组和研究小组（如报纸阅读小组）。

However, the traditional role of Chinese associations in Singapore as intermediaries with the Chinese community, resolving conflicts and mobilizing community support in close connection with the British government, contradicted the anti-British and anti-bourgeoisie MCP discourse, and thus the party slogans did not attract the members of the Chinese associations. Blaming this again on the backwardness of the masses, the MCP abandoned its work in China Salvation organizations (kang yuan zuzhi) and ceased to carry out open propaganda in some Chinese associations (gongkai shetuan gongzuo), as in Perak, because it was afraid that its propaganda would push the masses the way of reactionaries despite their anti-imperialist moods. Some had overestimated the progressiveness and revolutionary spirit (gemingxing yu jinbuxing) of the masses. The CC thus insisted on reviving propaganda and fundraising in those organizations.
然而，随着殖民统治的加强，这些华人社团与英国政府的密切联系、调解华人社区内部矛盾、发动华人社区支持英殖民政府的传统角色，与马共的反殖民、反资产阶级意识形态相冲突，导致马共的宣传口号无法吸引华人社团成员。马共再次将此归咎于群众落后，放弃在华侨救亡组织（康元组织）中的工作，并停止在一些华人社团（公开社团工作）中进行公开宣传，如霹雳州，因为他们担心其宣传会将反帝情绪浓厚的群众推向反动派的阵营。一些人高估了群众的进步性和革命性。因此，中央委员会坚持在这些组织中恢复宣传和筹款。
**Code breakdown:** * `code0`**: This code marks the beginning of a section of the text that explains the contradiction between the traditional role of Chinese associations and the MCP's anti-British and anti-bourgeoisie discourse. * `code1`**: This code marks the beginning of a section of the text that describes the MCP's mistaken belief about the progressiveness of the masses and their subsequent decision to stop propaganda in certain organizations. * `code2`**: This code marks the beginning of a section of the text that states that some people had overestimated the progressiveness and revolutionary spirit of the masses. * `code3`**: This code marks the beginning of a section of the text that describes the CC's decision to revive propaganda and fundraising in those organizations.

Complications in the MCP's relations with the bourgeoisie were a result of tension between its two sides: one as a Chinese organization and the other as a Bolshevik party. As a Chinese organization, the MCP relied on community members for support, but as a Bolshevik party, it had to exclude them. This tension is clear in MCP texts. Before the war, the MCP, like other Chinese organizations, had promoted the slogan of labor-capital cooperation (laozi hezuo). Chinese guilds traditionally included both owners and employees. While some argued that this slogan meant abandoning class interests, proponents argued that the slogan was a part of the party's national united front tactics (minzu tongyi zhanxian celüe), used to bring the revolutionary part of the bourgeoisie to the national liberation movement (minzu jiefang yundong), and it did not mean promoting "unconditional cooperation with capitalists." 112
由于其既是中华组织又是布尔什维克政党这一双重身份，中国共产党与资产阶级的关系复杂，存在着矛盾。作为中华组织，中共需要依靠社会各阶层的支持，但作为布尔什维克政党，它又必须排除他们。这种矛盾在中共的文献中体现得非常明显。在战前，中共和其他中华组织一样，也曾提出劳资合作（laozi hezuo）的口号。中国传统的行业协会包括所有者和雇员两部分。 虽然有人认为这个口号意味着放弃阶级利益，但支持者则认为它只是共产党民族统一战线策略的一部分，旨在将革命的资产阶级纳入民族解放运动（minzu jiefang yundong），而不是“无条件地与资本家合作”。 112

The MCP's attitude toward the bourgeoisie was optimistic in the beginning, since the national economy (minzu jingji) and the position of the bourgeoisie had been greatly affected by British wartime policies, as had all other strata of the population (ge jieji renmin), including huaqiao workers and small bourgeoisie. The MCP argued, "Fascists under the mask of nationalism suppress the national liberation movement [minzu jiefang yundong] . . . Sultans are [therefore] helping the British, but the national bourgeoisie [minzu zichan jieji] are not satisfied with the British policy and are progressive [jinbu pai de] like Tan Kah Kee." Notably, though Tan Kah Kee had always been critical of the communists, he was never criticized by the communists in return and was likely sympathetic to their cause.
民族资本家早期对中产阶级的态度比较乐观，因为民族经济（minzu jingji）和中产阶级的利益都受到了英国战时政策的冲击，包括其他阶层的人民（ge jieji renmin），例如华侨工人和小资产阶级。 中共认为，“法西斯分子披着民族主义的外衣，压制民族解放运动 [minzu jiefang yundong] ……苏丹人因此在帮助英国，但民族资产阶级[minzu zichan jieji] 对英国政策并不满意，并像陈嘉庚一样是进步人士[jinbu pai de]。” 值得注意的是，尽管陈嘉庚一直批评共产党人，但共产党人从未反过来批评他，并且有可能同情他们的事业。

By February 1940, the MCP declared that the call for concord between labor and capital by the Chinese chamber of commerce and Chinese consul Gao Lingbai was nothing else but a selling off of the national interest (minzu liyi), because the bourgeoisie presented their class interest as the national interest. The Nanyang merchants' theory of labor and capital cooperation meant "selling out minzu liyi and sacrificing the interests of the workers. Clearly, minzu in this sentence referred to the workers. The MCP concluded that the united front of various nationalities represented the interests of all strata of the population (ge jieceng renmin) but that the concessionist bourgeoisie had to be opposed. Thus, the MCP's renmin did not include the bourgeoisie despite the fact that the MCP supposedly promoted a cross-class alliance. Even Comintern reader Wang Ming, judging from the handwriting, was not convinced by this logic and scribbled a comment against this paragraph: "Where is the united front [tongyi zhanxian hezai]?" 116
到 1940 年 2 月，马来亚共产党宣称，中华总商会和中华总领事高凌百提出的劳资协商不过是出卖民族利益，因为资产阶级把自己的阶级利益说成是民族利益。南洋商人的劳资合作论意味着“出卖民族利益，牺牲工人的利益。” 显然，这里的“民族”指的是工人阶级。马来亚共产党得出结论，各民族的统一战线代表了全体人民的利益，但必须反对让步的资产阶级。因此，马来亚共产党的“人民”不包括资产阶级，尽管马来亚共产党声称要建立跨阶级的联盟。即使是根据笔迹判断，共产国际读者王明也不认同这种逻辑，并在这段话旁边写下了一条批语：“统一战线在哪里？” [116]

At the same time, the MCP argued that capitalists had become the "loyal stooges" of British policy because the aforementioned Chinese consulate in Singapore and Perak's Chinese chamber of commerce promoted Sino-British friendship. To the MCP, this meant that the interests of Malayan Chinese capitalists (Ma hua da zichan jieji) were the same as British interests: to put China into a position of colonial slavery. To a Comintern reader, the MCP's discourse about the bourgeoisie was confusing, and Wang Ming scribbled on the margins of the same MCP document: "The attitude toward the bourgeoisie is unclear [dui zichan jieji de taidu shi mohude].
同时，马来亚共产党认为资本家已成为英国政策的“忠实走狗”，因为上述新加坡中国领事馆和霹雳中华总商会曾促进中英友好关系。 对于马来亚共产党而言，这意味着马来华资资本家（马来华人达资产阶级）的利益与英国利益一致，即把中国置于殖民奴役地位。 对于共产国际读者来说，马来亚共产党关于资产阶级的论述是令人困惑的，王明在同一份马来亚共产党文件中写道：“对资产阶级的态度不明确 [对资产阶级的态度是模糊的]”。

In 1939-1940, in addition to its negative effects, such as the soaring prices of daily necessities, the war also brought an economic boom beneficial for the bourgeoisie. Perhaps this was the reason that by 1940 , the MCP had begun to identify the national interest exclusively with the interests of the proletariat despite the rhetoric of the united front, which was supposed to conflate national and class interests (jieji liyz). The MCP's nation, like Li Dazhao's imagined China in 1920, was a "proletarian nation." As such, the MCP's minzu was its anti-imperialist front. That included residents of central cities - the urban masses, such as shop workers, coolies, and handicraftsmen, as well as the proletariat and peasants and petty bourgeoisie (xiao zichan jieji). To the MCP, to mobilize these people meant to mobilize (dongyuan) the whole nation (quan minzu), "without which we can't speak about mobilization of most of the people [daduoshu renmin de liang].”121 However, this nation was not under the MCP's influence.
1939-1940 年间，除了日用品价格飞涨等负面影响外，战争也给资产阶级带来了有利可图的经济繁荣。 也许这就是为什么到 1940 年，中共和产党开始将国家利益与无产阶级利益等同起来，尽管它一直以来都鼓吹统一战线，试图将国家利益和阶级利益结合在一起（阶级利益）。 中共的国家，就像李大钊 1920 年想象中的中国，是一个“无产阶级国家”。 因此，中共的民族是以反帝为旗帜的统一战线。 这包括了中心城市居民——城市大众，如商店工人、苦力、手工业者，以及无产阶级、农民和小资产阶级（小资产阶级）。 对于中共来说，发动这些人就意味着发动“全民”， “没有它，我们不能说发动了大多数人民 [大多数人民的良]。”121 然而，这个民族却不受中共的影响。

The party bitterly admitted that it was not influential even among Chinese immigrants and reported that in Trengganu, Selangor, and Johor its organizations were weak and communist influence was almost unnoticeable. The number of Malays and Indians in the party was negligible, and the number of workers among its leaders, from the CC to lower-level cells, was very small. The leaders of the party organization were, "as a rule," Chinese communists. The situation regarding the MCP's influence in the Chinese community was gloomy. The party's view on this deserves to be quoted in full:
马来亚共产党承认，即使在华侨中，它也没有什么影响力。该党在登嘉楼、雪兰莪和柔佛等州的组织薄弱，共产主义的影响几乎可以忽略不计。马来人和印度人在党内的数量微不足道，工人在党内领导层中的数量，从中央委员会到基层组织，都非常少。该党组织的领导人“通常都是”中国共产党人。 马共在华人社区的影响力令人沮丧。该党对此的看法值得全文引用：

Figure 7.3 Street scene in Singapore, ca. 1940.
图 7.3 约 1940 年新加坡街头场景。

Singapore Federation of the Chinese Clan Associations Collection. Courtesy of the National Archives of Singapore.
新加坡中华总商会收藏。由新加坡国家档案馆提供。

There are two forces among the broad masses of workers and peasants, only around seventeen thousand people; all are Malay sprouts [Malai douhua], immigrants from bankrupt villages back home [guonei]. [They are] middle class, poor peasants, and agricultural laborers, bankrupt middle business owners from the cities, and lowerlevel [xiaceng] laborers. Since the 1929 world economic depression, a lot of local [bendi] petty capitalists have gone bankrupt and become proletariat [wuchanzhe]. For these historical factors, the revolutionary force of the masses of Chinese immigrants in Malaya [Ma huaqiao zhong] for the most part cannot have a proletarian class consciousness [meiyou nenggou juyou danchun de wuchan jieji yishi]. There are about several tens of thousands of [shu wan] workers under the party's influence who have gone through training via economic struggles, and their class consciousness [jieji juewu] has risen. However, we must admit that the greater part of the masses has strong nationalist ideas [nonghou de minzu guannian], which, because of British oppression . . . grow day by day. They support the anti-Japanese war, unity, and progressiveness. However, party influence over this force is not common [bu pubiande], and what is common [pubiande] is backwardness luohouxing].
在马来亚的广大工人农民群众中，有两股力量，只有大约 17000 人；都是马来豆芽[马来豆腐]，是来自国内破产村庄的移民。[他们是]中产阶级、贫苦农民和农业工人，来自城市的中产阶级破产商人，以及下层[下层]劳动者。自从 1929 年世界经济萧条以来，很多当地的[本地]小资本家破产，成为无产者[无产者]。由于这些历史因素，马来亚华侨群众的革命力量在很大程度上不能具有无产阶级的阶级意识[没有能够具有纯真的无产阶级意识]。有几十万[数万]受党影响经过经济斗争锻炼的工人阶级，他们的阶级觉悟[阶级觉悟]有了提高。但是，我们必须承认，广大群众中存在着强烈的民族主义思想[浓厚的民族观念]，由于英国的压迫……。日益增长。他们支持抗日战争，团结进步。 然而，党对这支力量的影响并不普遍，普遍的是落后性。

Another force is the urban petty bourgeoisie, urban residents, students, and intellectuals [chengshi xiao zichan jieji shimin xuesheng zhishi fenzi]. This force has been oppressed by the British for years. The national bourgeoisie are almost all bankrupt and are more and more disappointed with Malaya as the war unfolds and they see the resistance war [kangzhan] as an investment opportunity in China. They support the anti-Japanese war and unity [tuanjie] and are progressive, but
城市小资产阶级、城市居民、学生和知识分子（城市小资产阶级市民学生知识分子）。这个群体多年来一直受到英国人的压迫。随着战争的进行，民族资产阶级几乎都破产了，并且对马来亚越来越失望。他们将抗日战争视为在中国的一次投资机会。他们支持抗日战争和团结（团结），并且是进步的，但是
they are pessimistic about its perspectives; they are dissatisfied with the British imperialists but lack self-confidence and have vacillation and fear.
他们对它的前景持悲观态度；他们对英国帝国主义者不满，但缺乏自信，并有动摇和恐惧。

The comprador capitalists and defeatists have influence over the masses with their ideology of nationalism and its backward [minzu guannian ji qi luohouxing] and opportunist policy [touji zhengzhi]. Because of all this, and the narrow classmindedness of the comrades and mechanistic application of the party line . . . it makes the job of defeatists easier. For instance, because comrades everywhere raise anti-British slogans, masses support concessionist [toujian tuoxie pai] slogans ... Also, the slogan of class struggle helped the activity of concessionist organizations. This is a grave warning that if the party doesn't abandon its class narrowmindedness, the danger of breaking from the masses is looming.
买办资产阶级和失败主义者用他们的民族主义意识形态及其落后性和机会主义政策 [minzu guannian ji qi luohouxing] 和机会主义政策 [touji zhengzhi] 对群众施加影响。正因为如此，以及同志们的狭隘的阶级意识和对党的路线的机械应用……。这使得失败主义者更容易得逞。例如，由于各地的同志都喊出了反英口号，群众支持妥协主义的口号[toujian tuoxie pai] ……。此外，阶级斗争的口号也有利于让步主义组织的活动。这是一个严重的警告，如果党不放弃其狭隘的阶级意识，分裂群众的危险就迫在眉睫。

Thus, anti-British, antiwar, and anti-bourgeoisie slogans alienated the masses. Although the party claimed to have a symbolic large number of followers, "several tens of thousands," the workers' economic awakening superseded a class awakening (jingji juewu chaoguo jueji juewu and the masses feared (haipa xinli) the party because of the "enemy's propaganda." 126 Open displays of anti-British sentiment caused police reprisals, and by July 1940, 229 communist leaders, mostly students and trade union agitators, had been arrested. The MCP was to lead Malaya's proletarian nation in the "national" movement, yet the MCP's united front remained an objective, not a reality. As a result, the MCP was leading a national movement without a nation.
因此，反英、反战、 和反资产阶级的口号使群众疏远。尽管该党声称拥有象征性的众多追随者，“数万”，但工人的经济觉醒超越了阶级觉醒（经济觉悟超越阶级觉悟 ，群众因“敌人的宣传”而害怕（害怕心理）该党。126 公开反英情绪导致了警察的报复，到 1940 年 7 月，229 名共产党领导人，主要是学生和工会煽动者，被逮捕。 马共将在“民族”运动中领导马来亚的无产阶级民族，但马共的统一战线仍然是一个目标，而不是现实。结果，马共领导了一场没有民族的民族运动。

National Party without a Nation
无国家政党

Now the situation in the party is like when one has just crossed a bridge and has set out to travel on a big road to a faraway destination.
现在的党内形势，就像刚过桥，踏上直达远方的大道，准备去远方进行长时间旅行的情景。

CC MCP, early
CC MCP，早期

The MCP's participation in the China Salvation Movement likely boosted its membership. In February 1937, among the twelve-member committee of the Singapore Overseas Chinese National Salvation Association (Xinjiapo qiao kang Ri lianhehui), six were MCP members and one was a CYL member. Until September 1940, the MCP continued to use the AEBUS, which had been organized in December 1937, as its front organization. In 1939, AEBUS membership was estimated at In spite of this, the narrative of the MCP's uninterrupted growth in popularity, which resulted in estimates of 5,000 members in invites questions, because regardless of the very likely increase in the influence of communist ideas, the party was losing its membership, not only its constituency. The MCP's claim of 10,000 members in 1937 was obviously an exaggeration, as MCP documents reveal a different order of membership figures, and its growth relied on "persuading opportunists" in Singapore. Party membership was 379 in March 1937, 1,000 in April 1939, and 500 later in 1939, since we know that the membership doubled to 1,000 by January 1940. Membership again increased to 1,700 in May 1940. Even though the development of party organizations was made a priority over the development of mass organizations, it was halted by arrests, inaction, expulsions, and abolition of the category of reserve member (houbu).
中共同盟参与中国救亡运动可能提升了其成员数量。 1937 年 2 月，在新加坡海外华侨国民救亡协会（新加坡侨抗日联合会）的十二人委员会中，六人是中共同盟成员，一人是共青团成员。 直到 1940 年 9 月，中共同盟继续使用 1937 年 12 月组织的抗日救亡同盟会作为其公开组织。 1939 年，抗日救亡同盟会的成员估计为 。 尽管如此，中共同盟人气持续增长的说法（导致 1941 年成员估计为 5,000 人）值得质疑，因为无论共产党思想的影响力很可能增加，该党都在失去其成员，而不仅仅是其选民。 中共同盟声称在 1937 年拥有 10,000 名成员显然是夸大其词， 因为中共同盟文件显示了不同的成员人数规模，其增长依赖于在新加坡“说服机会主义者”。 1937 年 3 月党员人数为 379 人，1939 年 4 月为 1,000 人，1939 年晚些时候为 500 人，因为我们知道到 1940 年 1 月党员人数增加了一倍，达到 1,000 人。 会员人数在 1940 年 5 月再次增加到 1700 人。 尽管将党的组织发展置于群众组织发展之上，但由于逮捕、不作为、开除和废除候补党员（houbu）类别，其发展还是受阻。

The MCP's exclusion of small bourgeoisie was also the reason it was losing members. Because the MCP did not recruit petty bourgeoisie and did not let new members enter the party ("narrow closed-doorism"), it became "a secret organization with a narrow class outlook" (mimi de xiaai de jieji guandian instead of promoting the unity of classes and national interests (jieji liyi he minzu liyi shi yizhide). "Narrow-minded patriotism" (aiguozhuyı) was linked to narrow-minded class ideas: "Many comrades think that the core of the national liberation struggle is workers and peasants (although there are a lot of factories, plantations, etc. where there is no party nucleus), and they overlook the petty bourgeoisie [xiao zichan jieji]. They think they are the core of the national liberation struggle, while in fact they exercise closed doorism." They focused on workers and peasants and labeled the "petty bourgeoisie and the backward masses [luohou qunzhong]" as having "vacillation" and "defeatism." 137 As a result, the MCP broke "national" unity [fenhua minzu de tuanjie]: "If our party counts on workers' and peasants' movements and not on an allnational movement [quan minzu yundong], how can we struggle against the enemies?" Thus, to neutralize the effect of the British hiring labor unions (gonghui dang) to break up workers' struggles, the MCP even decided to work among secret societies (sihuidang) and to apply a "warm national feeling" (qingqie de minzu ganqing) in order to unite the workers (lianjie), much as the CCP had sought nonideological methods of attracting new members with its united front tactics. At the same time, summarily advocating (luantichu) the slogan that workers had no motherland (gongren wu zuguo) was also against the anti-imperialist united front (fandi tongyi zhanxian).
## 翻译结果： 由于排斥小资产阶级，国民党失去了许多党员。由于国民党没有吸收小资产阶级，也不允许新党员入党（“狭隘的关门主义”），它变成了“一个视野狭隘的秘密组织” (mimi de xiaai de jieji guandian)，而不是促进阶级和民族利益的统一（jieji liyi he minzu liyi shi yizhide). 。 “狹隘的爱国主义” (aiguozhuyı) 与狹隘的阶级观念联系在一起: “许多同志认为民族解放斗争的核心力量是工农 (尽管有很多工厂和种植园没有党组织)，而忽视了小资产阶级。他们认为自己是民族解放斗争的核心力量，实际上他们采取了关门主义。” 他们集中精力于工人和农民，并将“小资产阶级和落后群众” 斥为“动摇”和“失败主义”。结果，马共破坏了“民族”团结[分裂民族的团结]：“如果我们党依靠工人农民运动，而不是依靠全民族运动[全民运动]，我们如何才能与敌人作斗争？” 因此，为了抵消英国雇佣工会（工会党）破坏工人斗争的影响，马共甚至决定在秘密会社（四会党）中开展工作，并运用“温暖的民族感情”（亲切的民族感情）以团结工人（连结），就像中共利用其统一战线策略寻求非意识形态方法吸引新成员一样。 同时，概括地主张（罗列出）工人没有祖国（工人无祖国）的口号也违背了反帝统一战线（反帝统一战线）。

"Reactionary capitalists" attacked the party for representing narrow class interests and stated that the GMD was more successful in China Salvation work and attracted the same constituency the MCP was targeting. These were the immigrant bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, workers, and cultural workers. The MCP argued that the GMD had attracted a following because it offered career and investment opportunities in China, as it existed semi-legally and worked through legal mass social organizations, newspapers, and Chinese schools. The GMD started to hold drama performances and meetings and "lied to the masses" that the CCP no longer existed. On the other hand, the Corps for the Resistance to Japan and Salvation of the Motherland recruited Chinese to serve as officers in the army in China, with a support base among the petty bourgeoisie, traders, intellectuals, and students. In Kuala Lumpur, even "big capitalists" and writers only "reluctantly accepted" workers and shop clerks. The MCP implied that there was an audience that could be receptive to its propaganda.
"反动资本家"攻击该党代表狭隘的阶级利益 ，并声称国民党在救亡工作中更成功，吸引了共产党所针对的相同选民。这些人是移民资产阶级、小资产阶级、工人和文化工作者。共产党认为，国民党之所以能够吸引追随者，是因为它在中国提供了职业和投资机会，因为它以半合法的形式存在，并通过合法的社会大众组织、报纸和中国学校开展工作。国民党开始举行戏剧表演和集会，"欺骗群众"说共产党已经不存在。另一方面，抗日救国军招募中国人到中国军队担任军官，在小资产阶级、商人、知识分子和学生中拥有支持基础。在吉隆坡，即使是"大资本家"和作家也只"勉强接受"工人和店员。 共产党暗示，它可以找到接受其宣传信息的受众。

Instead, the MCP had never sounded so desperate, for it had been defeated by the bourgeoisie and the GMD, whom the MCP had excluded from its "nation" in the battle for the allegiance of the masses. The organizations of the masses "became the tools of capitalists," and the party lost its independence. The capitalists, in contrast, had put forward slogans of capital-labor cooperation, cooperation with the British (Zhong Ying qingxi), and a people's diplomacy (guomin waijiao). To deal with these, the party was to abandon its narrow-minded class outlook, implement open Chinese organizations (gongkai shetuan), and establish party organizations according to territorial divisions (streets), as it had been advocating since not according to industry, as had been the Comintern's policy. In February 1940, the MCP reverted to the slogans of encouraging the development of national capitalist enterprises and again advocated the establishment of a parliamentary republic. However, the MCP argued: "[This will not be] a soviet republic, as Malays' national liberation [minzu jiefang] is not at the stage of the national struggle of workers and peasants [gongnong minzu douzheng], so it is still in the period of bourgeois revolution [zichan jieji geming]." The question of land reform, however, remained a point in the MCP's program.
相反，中共从未如此绝望，因为它在争夺民众支持的斗争中败给了资产阶级和国民党，而中共将其排除在其“民族”之外。群众的组织“成了资本家的工具”，党失去了独立性。 相比之下，资本家却提出了资劳合作、中英亲善、国民外交等口号。 为了应对这些，党要放弃狭隘的阶级观点，实行公开的社会团体，按街道（而不是像共产国际的政策那样按行业）建立党的组织，这一点自 以来就一直主张。1940 年 2 月，中共重新提出鼓励发展民族资本企业，并再次主张建立议会共和国。 然而，马来亚共产党认为：“这不会成为苏维埃共和国，因为马来人的民族解放 [minzu jiefang] 还没有达到工人和农民的民族斗争 [gongnong minzu douzheng] 阶段，所以它仍然处于资产阶级革命 [zichan jieji geming] 时期。” 然而，土地改革问题仍然是马来亚共产党纲领中的一个要点。

The MCP alluded to Mao to explain that the party was weak because it did not have a strong theoretical standpoint, neither did it carry out its activities based on practical conditions:
麦卡普暗示毛，党之所以软弱，是因为它没有坚强的理论基础，也没有根据实际情况开展活动：

As our teachers taught us ... a Bolshevik party does not fall from the sky [yi ge Buershiweike dang bing bu shi cong tiankong diaoxialai de] but appears through struggles and suffering. However, until now there have been comrades who treat revolutionary theory [geming de lilun] as something off topic [mobuzhao bianji de dongxi]. They are fatalistic [tongtian youming]. Struggles are not initiated by comrades from smaller struggles . . . Because of comrades' ideological [yishi] vacillations, the party doesn't have the power to change the environment [gaizao huanjing]. The party is weak. The results of political mobilization have shown that the party cannot become the political leader of the national liberation movement. The party is so backward [luohou] that it has become an obstacle to the forward development of the national liberation movement.
正如我们的老师教导我们，... 一个布尔什维克党不是从天上掉下来的，而是经过斗争和苦难出现的。然而，迄今为止，仍有一些同志把革命理论当成了无关紧要的东西，他们抱有宿命论的思想。同志們没有從小規模的鬥爭開始鬥爭... 由於同志們的思想搖擺不定，黨沒有力量改變環境。党很弱。政治动员的结果表明，该党不能成为民族解放运动的政治领导者。该党是如此落后，以至于成为民族解放运动前进发展的绊脚石。

The Comintern's requirements that the MCP embrace the goals of Bolshevization both empowered and hindered the party. Reinhart Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte, or history of concepts, tells us that a concept, a "word representing an idea that is both powerful enough in a certain discourse to direct thought and ambiguous enough to hold within it a range of meanings," "establishes a particular horizon for potential experience and conceivable theory and in this way sets a limit." Concepts both empower and hinder social actors. Bolshevik language deprived the MCP of its nation, yet it also provided the MCP with a discourse that justified its
共产国际要求中国共产党接受布尔什维克化的目标，这既赋予了该党权力，又对其进行了限制。莱因哈特·科塞雷克的概念史告诉我们，一个概念，“代表一种思想的词，在某种话语中既具有足够的强大性来指导思维，又具有足够的模糊性来容纳一系列含义”，它“为潜在经验和可理解理论建立了一个特定范围，从而设定了界限。”

Figure 7.4 MCP publication "Forward!" 1939. Published with permission of the RGASPI.
图 7.4 MCP 出版物“前进！” 1939 年。 经俄罗斯国家社会政治历史档案馆许可发布。

ambitions to govern and to become a state. This change in the MCP's language was first triggered by its wish to be accepted as a Comintern section, something that required it to become a Bolshevik party. The MCP learned how to speak Bolshevik from the CCP.
共产党建立国家的雄心壮志及其转变为国家。这种变化最初是由马来亚共产党希望被共产国际接纳为其分支机构而引发的，这需要它成为一个布尔什维克政党。马来亚共产党从中国共产党那里学习如何说布尔什维克话。

On the eve of the war, the MCP amplified the discourse of strengthening its theoretical level and discipline as well as the discourse of sacrifice for the party. All three elements had been promoted by the Comintern since 1934. In the CCP, the Eighth Route Army's spirit of self-sacrifice had been crucial for the success of the Red Army, and thus sacrifice for the party and sacrifice for the nation converged. The publication "Forward!" stated that: "As Malaya's revolutionary situation is ripening, the party must raise the comrades' theoretical level of Marxist-Leninism and their decisiveness to sacrifice." The MCP resolutions similarly argued: "If party members today do not understand communism, how can there be a guarantee that tomorrow they will be willing to sacrifice and shed their blood for it? Party membership was not uniform. The same "Forward!" publication said, "[s]ome comrades are ready to sacrifice for the party; some comrades do not read the party program carefully." Lack of discipline and irresponsible chatter (luan tan) destroyed many party organizations.
在战争前夕，马来亚共产党加强了理论水平和纪律的宣传，以及为党牺牲的宣传。这三项内容自 1934 年以来一直受到共产国际的推广。 在中共内部，八路军的自我牺牲精神对红军的成功至关重要， 因此为党和为国的牺牲精神融合在一起。《前进！》期刊指出：“随着马来亚革命形势的日益成熟，党必须提高同志们的马克思列宁主义理论水平和为其牺牲的决心。” 马来亚共产党决议也同样指出：“如果今天的党员不理解共产主义，怎么保证他们明天会愿意为其牺牲流血？” 党员队伍并不统一。《前进！》期刊指出，“有些同志愿意为党牺牲；有些同志不仔细阅读党纲。”缺乏纪律和不负责任的闲聊（luan tan）摧毁了许多党组织。

The MCP worked to achieve its ideal of a Bolshevik party organization wishing for Comintern recognition and funding. The goals of Bolshevization included having a coherent, simple, and homogenous language, a centralized structure, armed forces, and the ability to penetrate all groups of society. This transformation had begun within the MCP by the beginning of the war in 1939-1940. Most significant, superior Bolshevik organizational capacity brought with it further aspirations, and realizing all these aspects of its goals drove the MCP to strive for the role of a state and a bureaucratized government, an effort that, simply put, backfired, as we have seen in this chapter. This echoes Kuhn's thesis about the Taiping vision: imported ideas and organizational models "fit" local needs but also introduce new aspirations that might not work in the long run.
马来亚共产党（马共）为实现其作为符合共产国际和资金的布尔什维克政党的理想而努力。布尔什维化的目标包括拥有连贯、简单和同质的语言、集中化的结构、武装部队，以及渗透社会所有群体的能力。1939-1940 年战争开始时，这种转变已在马共内部开始。最重要的是，优越的布尔什维克组织能力带来了进一步的愿望，实现其目标的方方面面使马共努力争取成为一个国家和官僚政府，这一努力简单地说，适得其反，正如我们在本章中所看到的。这与库恩关于太平天国愿景的论点相呼应：进口的思想和组织模式“符合”当地需要，但也引入了新的愿望，这些愿望从长远来看可能无效。

The MCP also increased propaganda in the army and contemplated armed action. In 1940, the MCP started to talk about building its own armed forces. Since 1933, the MCP had advocated for the expansion of the Correction and Investigation Troops (Jiucha dui) as "the only armed force of the workers," which it argued should have stopped being "a tool in the struggle against the Three Star Party." The party was also to learn the peasants' psychology (xinli) and their needs in order to organize peasant self-defense committees. The party criticized those members who thought that because the party was antiwar, it should not participate in the army. Citing Togliatti's speech at the seventh Comintern congress, the CC advocated propaganda in the army to "learn how to use arms and turn the rifle onto the enemies of the nation minz diren] and how to organize the unemployed and other masses into the army." The enemies of the nation in this sentence were clearly the Japanese, and minzu referred to both Malaya and China. Like a millenarian Chinese organization, the MCP was awaiting an imperialist war, and when that war broke out, the MCP called for taking up arms against the British government, which it had contemplated since 1930: "As the British imperialists are confused because of the rise of revolutions in China and India, we should call upon all the oppressed peoples of Malaya to fight against the imperialists' interference in China and India, and we should prepare for our own revolutionary armed force to oppose the imperialist war. This is our unforgettable task!
中共还加强了对军队的宣传，并考虑采取武装行动。1940 年，中共开始谈论建立自己的武装力量。自 1933 年以来，中共一直主张扩大“工人唯一的武装力量”——纠察队，并认为纠察队应该不再是“反对三星党斗争的工具”。该党还将了解农民的心理（心理）和他们的需求，以便组织农民自卫委员会。 该党批评那些认为该党反战而不应该参加军队的人。 中央委员会引用陶里亚蒂在第七次共产国际代表大会上的讲话，主张在军队中进行宣传，以“学习如何使用武器，把枪口对准民族的敌人 minz diren] 和如何将失业者和其他群众组织到军队中”。 这句话中的民族敌人显然是日本人，而民族则指的是马来亚和中国。 像一个千禧年的中国组织，马来亚共产党正等待着一场帝国主义战争，当战争爆发时，马来亚共产党呼吁拿起武器反对英国政府，它从 1930 年就考虑到了这一点：“由于中国和印度的革命兴起，英帝国主义者正处于混乱之中，我们应该呼吁马来亚所有被压迫的人民起来反对帝国主义者对中国和印度的干涉，我们应该为我们自己的革命武装力量做好准备，以反对帝国主义的战争。 这是我们不可忘记的任务！

The tension between the MCP's goals as a Chinese organization (the mediator between the Chinese vis-à-vis the British colonial government) and its goals as a Bolshevik party (the overthrowing of the rule of the British government and of the capitalists) resulted in its lack of support. Radical Bolshevik language was at odds with the goals of Chinese associations, whose methods the MCP applied and to whose constituency it tried to appeal. The majority of the Chinese community was neither anti-British nor anticapitalist.
## 中文翻译： 由于中宣部作为中国组织（中英殖民政府之间的调解人）与作为布尔什维克政党（推翻英国政府和资本家的统治）的目标之间的紧张关系，导致其缺乏支持。激进的布尔什维克语言与中国社团的目标不一致，中宣部采用了中国社团的方法，并试图争取其支持。大多数华人社区既不反英也不反资本主义。

At first, MCP members enjoyed the communist language of the cult of the proletariat, which came with the global prestige of the Comintern and the prospect of cash support. By 1934, they had gotten a dose of reality and had abandoned their metaphorical language of excluding the bourgeoisie as a potential "revolutionary force." They therefore practiced united front tactics, as did the CCP during the same time period, the early 1930s, in Shanghai. This was dictated by the MCP's logic of survival as an overseas Chinese organization. The united front strategy, as well as the changing policy toward the British government, was born locally, not imposed by the Comintern or by the CCP. Over the course of the 1930 s, the MCP was supported by some affluent members of the Chinese community, as were other parties in Southeast Asia, such as in Taiwan, because the overseas bourgeoisie were concerned about a better government in China.
最初，马来亚共产党人享受着无产阶级崇拜的共产主义语言，这语言伴随着共产国际的全球声望和现金支持的前景。到 1934 年，他们已经尝到了现实的滋味，放弃了他们隐喻性的排斥资产阶级成为潜在“革命力量”的语言。因此，他们像 20 世纪 30 年代初在上海的中共一样，采取了统一战线策略。 这是马来亚共产党作为海外华人组织生存逻辑决定的。统一战线策略以及对英国政府政策的变化，是在本地产生的，而不是共产国际或中共强加的。在 20 世纪 30 年代，马来亚共产党像台湾等其他东南亚地区的政党一样，得到了一些富裕的华人社区成员的支持，因为华侨关心的是中国有一个更好的政府。

The Bolshevik concept of a proletarian nation and anti-British rhetoric hindered the MCP in its ability to attract a following and excluded the Chinese bourgeoisie as potential members of its communist party. That happened, ironically, when the MCP redirected its attention back toward Chinese associations in the Nanyang as part of its united front tactics.
布尔什维克关于无产阶级民族和反英言论的概念阻碍了马来亚共产党在吸引追随者方面的能力，并将中国资产阶级排除在共产党潜在成员之外。具有讽刺意味的是，当马来亚共产党将其注意力重新转移到南洋的中华会馆作为其统一战线策略的一部分时，这种情况发生了。

Moreover, the bourgeoisie became the party's rival for the allegiance of the masses during the protest wave of 1939 .
## 在 1939 年的抗议浪潮中，资产阶级也成为了党派争夺群众支持的对手。

The MCP's work among non-Chinese was unsuccessful. A multiethnic united front was therefore a means to reach the MCP's main goal: Malaya's national independence and a Malayan multinational nation-state. The MCP's all-minzu united front, promoted by the CCP-GMD united front for the benefit of the China Salvation Movement, echoed the indigenization of a Chinese organization, or its double rootedness in the host and sending societies. At the same time, organizational indigenization was in fact an aspect of Bolshevization that the Comintern required.
马来亚共产党在非华人群体中的工作收效甚微。因此，多民族统一战线成为实现马来亚共产党主要目标的一种手段：马来亚民族独立和马来亚多民族民族国家。马来亚共产党的全民民族统一战线，在中共-国民党统一战线为中国救亡运动的利益而推动下，呼应了一个中国组织的本土化，或其在东道国和派遣国社会的双重根源。与此同时，组织本土化实际上是共产国际要求的布尔什维化的一个方面。

Other aspects of Bolshevik discourse empowered the MCP to become a state that could be legitimately rooted in both Malaya and China. Minzu was a key word in MCP rhetoric, a signifier of MCP members' national allegiance, which was split between China and Malaya. After the creation of the MCP in 1930, minzu invariably referred to Malaya. Then, after the MCP's campaign against the Alien Registration Ordinance, which stressed the divide between those born and those not born in Malaya, minzu more often signified China than Malaya. By the start of the war, the MCP's minzu was China again. This occurred because the MCP, as the organization representing the interests of the Chinese, was responding to the negative impact of the British wartime policies toward the huaqiao bourgeoisie. Although the MCP propagated the united front of all minzu of Malaya and stimulated Chinese identification with Malaya, in the documents, the MCP continued to refer to China as motherland, zuguo, and to Malaya as "All-Malaya," quan Ma.
## 翻译： 布尔什维克话语的其他方面赋予马共成为一个可以合法地扎根于马来亚和中国的国家的力量。民族是马共修辞中的一个关键词，它标志着马共成员的民族认同，这种认同在中国和马来亚之间存在分歧。1930 年马共成立后，民族一词始终指代马来亚。此后，马共反对外国人登记条例的斗争，强调了在马来亚出生的人和没有在马来亚出生的人之间的分歧，民族一词更多地指代中国而非马来亚。到战争开始时，马共的民族意识再次指向中国。这是因为马共作为代表华人利益的组织，正在应对英国战时政策对华侨资产阶级的负面影响。尽管马共宣传马来亚所有民族的统一战线，并激发了华人对马来亚的认同感，但在文件 中，马共仍然将中国称为祖国，将马来亚称为“全马来亚”。

In July 1941, the MCP proclaimed that the victory in the Malayan antiJapanese war and the Malayan national liberation (minzu jiefang) movement enhanced the prospects of independence for the Malayan nation. This was conditioned by the progress of the national liberation movement and the victory of the resistance both in China and in the Soviet Union. Thus, the Malayan anti-Japanese war and the Chinese resistance were of one accord (yizhi de). The MCP had two goals: to liberate Malaya and to liberate China. Bolshevik discourse also empowered the MCP in its ambitions to govern and to become the state. This was reflected in an amplified discourse of sacrifice for the party, significantly more theoretical Marxist-Leninist language, the importance of propaganda in the army, and finally the call to arms, which became crucial for the MCP during the war. The MCP drama propaganda and anti-Japanese activity helped shape Chinese community identification as one of the three minzu living in the territory of Malaya, which echoed and helped to facilitate the three races (san da zhongzu) notion of Malayan nationalism.
1941 年 7 月，马来亚共产党宣布，马来亚抗日战争和马来亚民族解放运动的胜利，提升了马来亚民族独立的前景。 这得益于中国和苏联的民族解放运动和抵抗战争的胜利。 因此，马来亚抗日战争和中国抗战是一致的（一致的）。 马来亚共产党有两个目标：解放马来亚和解放中国。 布尔什维克话语也赋予了马来亚共产党在执政和成为国家的雄心壮志。 这反映在为党牺牲的放大话语中，显著增加了理论马克思列宁主义语言、军队宣传的重要性，以及最后号召人民拿起武器，这对马来亚共产党在战争期间至关重要。 马来亚共产党的戏剧宣传和抗日活动帮助塑造了华人群体的认同，使其成为马来亚领土上三个民族之一，这呼应并促进了马来亚民族主义的三大民族（三大种族）概念。

For an example of the discourse of san da zhongzu, see Liang Yingming, "Malaixiya zhongzu zhengzhi xia de huaren yu Yinduren shehui [Chinese and Indians under Malaysian Racial Policy]," in Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu [Studies of Chinese Overseas] 1 (1992), pp. 1-7.
了解三大事务的论述，请参阅梁英明著，"马来西亚种族政策下的华人与印度人社会 [马来西亚种族政策下的华人与印度人社会]"，载于《华侨华人历史研究》 [《华侨华人历史研究》]，1 期（1992 年），第 1-7 页。