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CONSENSUS 共识

George J. Graham, Jr.
小乔治-J-格雷厄姆
Few concepts have played more central roles in the development of political theory and had a more complex history than "consensus." The idea of "shared public agreement" has been employed to serve the prescriptive ends of political theorists in many often conflicting ways. "Consensus" and "consent," the related activity of giving support or joining in an agreement by individuals or groups, have been employed as the proper standards of evaluating politics and political regimes in terms of the harmonious political solutions of the classics, the general will of JeanJacques Rousseau, the constitutional form of rule of Edmund Burke, and the stability generated by agreement in modern systems and institutional theories, as well as in contemporary normative and empirical democratic theories. Marxist utopian views, by adding the caveat concerning current shared public agreement as being 'false consciousness,' depend upon a future consensus even more; the neoMarxian interpretations of society, such as that of Jürgen Habermas, dwell on consensus-after-discourse as a similar utopian solution. In sum,'consensus' - like its closely associated term 'democracy' - is a
在政治理论的发展过程中,没有什么概念比 "共识 "发挥了更重要的作用,也没有什么概念比 "共识 "有着更复杂的历史。"共同的公共协议 "这一概念被政治理论家们用来达到规定性的目的,而这些目的往往是相互冲突的。"共识 "和 "同意",即个人或群体支持或加入协议的相关活动,曾被用作评价政治和政治制度的适当标准,如经典中的和谐政治解决方案、让-雅克-卢梭的普遍意愿、埃德蒙-伯克的宪政统治形式、现代制度和体制理论中的协议所产生的稳定性,以及当代规范和实证民主理论。 马克思主义的乌托邦观点将当前的公共共识视为 "虚假意识",从而更加依赖于未来的共识;新马克思主义对社会的阐释,如尤尔根-哈贝马斯(Jürgen Habermas)的阐释,则将话语之后的共识作为类似的乌托邦解决方案。 总之,"共识"--就像与其密切相关的 "民主"--是一个
Author's Note: Throughout this chapter the following conventions are applied in reference to concepts: Single quotation marks designate a formal reference to a concept; double quotation marks, either an informal reference to a concept or standard stylistic usage; no quotation marks, ordinary usage. I wish to acknowledge support for this study of consensus under a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship and grants from the Vanderbilt University Research Council, and careful criticisms of the text by Scarlett G. Graham, Giovanni Sartori, and Susan Fortier Cleary.
作者注:本章在引用概念时采用以下惯例:单引号表示正式引用概念;双引号表示非正式引用概念或标准文体用法;无引号表示普通用法。感谢约翰-西蒙-古根海姆纪念奖学金和范德比尔特大学研究委员会的资助,以及斯嘉丽-G-格雷厄姆(Scarlett G. Graham)、乔瓦尼-萨尔托里(Giovanni Sartori)和苏珊-福蒂埃-克利里(Susan Fortier Cleary)对本文的认真批评。

term all want to own for their theories. Unfortunately, the term usually gains its normative currency before it has been given any precise definition with empirical content by which to apply the concept in concrete political analysis. Were 'consensus' less important in analyzing the questions that bind political science as a discipline, one would quickly jettison it as hopelessly vague and ambiguous in its applications. Fortunately, systematic assessment of the meanings of 'consensus' and 'consent' permits one to commence the salvaging of these key concepts for both scientific and normative analyses.
这是所有人都想为自己的理论拥有的术语。遗憾的是,这个术语通常在被赋予任何具有经验内容的精确定义之前,就已经获得了规范性的通行证,从而可以在具体的政治分析中应用这一概念。 如果 "共识 "在分析政治学作为一门学科所面临的问题时不那么重要,那么人们很快就会抛弃它,认为它在应用中含糊不清、模棱两可,无可救药。幸运的是,通过对 "共识 "和 "同意 "的含义进行系统的评估,我们可以开始为科学分析和规范分析挽救这些关键概念。
The fact that even empirical public opinion research always touches normative aspects of consensus in studying the public's shared values makes it important to begin by recognizing the normative footing. Political theory can deal with norms and beliefs in two decidedly different ways. Political philosophy often focuses on the reasons for a prescription generated out of a metaphysic whereas political science must focus on actually studying norms and values, and how they affect individuals, groups, societies, and governments, for the purpose of explaining the phenomena. Today it seems relatively easy to separate the philosophical and scientific dimensions, but this separation is a recent development in the growth of political analysis. Recognition of the general shared cultural functions of values that can be isolated through a society's consensus, as by Alfred Weber, opens the study of such values in a scientific way. Nevertheless, the history of consensus as an important concept in political analysis requires that we recognize that some of the most interesting usages of the concept precede the philosophy/science dichotomy. Especially in the study of consensus in systems-level analyses, there often is a mixture of prescriptive-philosophical and descriptive-scientific meanings that makes it necessary to treat with care the connotations with normative import. Not just classical (e.g., Plato and Aristotle) and modern (e.g., Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke) political philosophies, but all systems level (e.g., Easton, Deutsch, Friedrich, and Parsons) analyses have at least hints of the prescriptive dimension. In order to clarify usages, then, one must bracket the prescriptive dimension while preserving the descriptive dimension of consensus theory at this grand level.
即使是经验性的民意研究,在研究公众的共同价值观时也总是会触及共识的规范方面,这就使得我们必须首先认识到规范的基础。政治理论可以通过两种截然不同的方式来处理规范和信仰。政治哲学通常侧重于从形而上学的角度来探讨开药方的原因,而政治学则必须侧重于实际研究规范和价值观,以及它们如何影响个人、群体、社会和政府,从而达到解释现象的目的。如今,将哲学和科学层面分开似乎相对容易,但这种分离是政治分析发展过程中的最新进展。阿尔弗雷德-韦伯(Alfred Weber)认识到,通过社会共识可以分离出价值观的一般共享文化功能,这为以科学的方式研究这些价值观开辟了道路。 然而,作为政治分析中的一个重要概念,共识的历史要求我们认识到,在哲学/科学二分法之前,这个概念的一些最有趣的用法就已经出现了。尤其是在系统层面的分析中研究共识时,往往会混杂着规定性-哲学性和描述性-科学性的含义,因此有必要谨慎对待具有规范意义的内涵。不仅古典(如柏拉图和亚里士多德)和现代(如马基雅维里、霍布斯和洛克)政治哲学,而且所有系统层面(如伊斯顿、多伊奇、弗里德里希和帕森斯)的分析都至少暗示了规范性维度。因此,为了厘清用法,我们必须在保留共识理论在这一宏大层面的描述性维度的同时,将规定性维度置于括号内。
Thus there are multiple purposes of this analysis. First, the basic types of meanings of the state of 'consensus' and its activity form, 'consent,' are to be surveyed by identifying major usages in the literature of political science. Second, those confusions generated by the meanings assigned to them are to be isolated. Third, a clarification of
因此,本分析具有多重目的。首先,通过确定政治科学文献中的主要用法,调查 "共识 "及其活动形式 "同意 "的基本含义类型。其次,将分离出这些含义所产生的混淆。第三,澄清

the concept for use in scientific analysis is advanced. And fourth, the special role of conceptual analysis in dealing with concepts that have both prescriptive and descriptive connotations is demonstrated by means of a construction of 'consensus' and 'consent' in a form useful for both empirical research and for praxis applications.
第四,通过构建 "共识 "和 "同意 "的形式,展示了概念分析在处理具有规定性和描述性内涵的概念时的特殊作用。第四,通过构建 "共识 "和 "同意 "的形式,展示了概念分析在处理具有规定性和描述性内涵的概念时所发挥的特殊作用,这种形式既适用于实证研究,也适用于实践应用。

I. DEFINITIONS OF CONSENSUS
I.共识的定义

The meaning of 'consensus' is apparently clear and precise when it is employed as a simple lexical definition. For example, Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (1956) defines it as follows: "1. agreement, especially in opinion; hence, 2. general opinion." The apparent precision of the definition quickly disappears when one wonders about how much agreement, about what, and how general it must be in order to have 'consensus.' The always interesting H. W. Fowler's A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1965) points up the recognition of these questions in saying "consensus means unanimity, or unanimous body, of opinion or testimony." This more precise meaning seems to resolve ambiguity, but every effort to apply the concept's meaning falls victim to the failure to provide sufficient guidance to the meaning's referent: consensus among whom? To have consensus, according to Fowler, we have unanimity among some members of a particular group, but there is no isolated extension until we somehow introduce the group. We have undenotativeness unless the meaning designates further properties; both fuzziness of boundaries and of inclusion/exclusion exist. As a political or social concept, we may find usage of the concept applied to any group (e.g., a consensus of the Labour Party cabinet members or of an entire society) on anything, but we are thereby only defining a relational term that serves as a lexical primitive rather than a standard social or political science concept. We could adopt this relational meaning, of course, as a step toward nominal scientific objectives, but we would be rejecting the history of 'consensus' in social and political analysis. (Seldom would Fowler's primitive definition, with its requirement of unanimity, fit any but an 'ideal type' analysis.)
当 "共识 "被用作一个简单的词汇定义时,其含义显然是清晰而准确的。例如,《韦伯斯特新世界美国语言词典》(1956 年)将其定义如下:"1.一致意见,尤其是意见一致;因此,2.普遍意见"。该定义表面上的精确性很快就消失了,因为人们不禁要问,要想达成 "共识",必须要有多大程度的一致、对什么达成一致以及有多普遍。一向有趣的 H. W. Fowler 的《现代英语用法词典》(1965 年)指出了对这些问题的认识,他说:"consensus 意味着意见或证词的一致,或一致的机构"。"这一更为精确的含义似乎解决了含糊不清的问题,但应用这一概念含义的每一次努力都因未能为含义的所指提供足够的指导而成为受害者:谁之间的共识?福勒认为,要达成共识,我们必须在特定群体的某些成员之间达成一致,但在我们以某种方式引入群体之前,并不存在孤立的外延。除非意义指定了更多的属性,否则我们就具有不可指定性;边界的模糊性和包含/排除的模糊性都是存在的。作为一个政治或社会概念,我们可能会发现这个概念的用法适用于任何群体(例如工党内阁成员或整个社会的共识),但我们因此只是定义了一个关系术语,作为一个词汇基元,而不是一个标准的社会或政治科学概念。当然,我们可以采用这种关系含义,作为实现名义上的科学目标的一步,但我们将摒弃 "共识 "在社会和政治分析中的历史。 (除了 "理想类型 "分析外,福勒的原始定义很少能符合一致同意的要求)。)
A recent dictionary of political science terms should answer some of our puzzles, but unfortunately it too remains very ambiguous. It gives this definition of consensus:
最近出版的一本政治学术语词典应该能解答我们的一些困惑,但遗憾的是,它也仍然非常含糊不清。该词典对 "共识 "给出了这样的定义
Agreement within a group on some goal, value, or matter of opinion.
群体内部就某些目标、价值观或意见达成一致。
Consensus, in relatively small groups and on relatively clear-cut issues, may sometimes be complete. In larger groups, and certainly in whole societies, consensus on an issue is likely to be only partial at any given time and to vary in degree through time. . . . Significance: within a political system, some degree of consensus on relative values and issues is essential to the perpetuation of the system. Without consensus the system would disintegrate and be destroyed by social conflict. Consensus thus constitutes a cohesive, integrative, supportive element in the system. A pluralist, democratic polity may tolerate considerable cleavage on the substantive questions as long as sufficient consensus exists on resolving conflicts through nonviolent, majoritarian procedures with respect for minority rights. The degree of consensus on basic political values within a society is affected by the political socialization process, the level of satisfaction with the performance of the system, and the homogeneity of society [Plano et al., 1982: 27].
在相对较小的群体中,在相对明确的问题上,共识有时可能是完全的。在较大的群体中,当然在整个社会中,任何时候对某个问题的共识都可能只是部分的,而且随着时间的推移,共识的程度也会有所不同。. . .意义:在一个政治体制中,就相对价值和问题达成一定程度的共识对该体制的延续至关重要。没有共识,制度就会瓦解,就会被社会冲突所摧毁。因此,共识是制度中一个具有凝聚力、整合性和支持性的要素。一个多元民主政体可以容忍在实质性问题上存在相当大的分歧,只要在通过尊重少数人权利的非暴力、多数派程序解决冲突方面存在足够的共识。社会内部对基本政治价值观的共识程度受到政治社会化进程、对制度表现的满意程度以及社会的同质性的影响[Plano et al.,1982: 27]。
Many aspects of consensus are touched by the definition and explanation of the concept's significance, but the meaning of the term is ambiguous and vague, hiding, as we shall see, several different concepts of consensus within one statement.
定义和对概念意义的解释触及了共识的许多方面,但这个词的含义却模棱两可、含糊不清,正如我们将看到的那样,在一个表述中隐藏着几种不同的共识概念。
A final set of dictionary definitions is worth introducing in full because it provides a rather complete statement and history of ordinary usages of the terms 'consensus' and 'consent.' Here, reproduced with the original abbreviations, Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1961) provides more connotative import than most dictionaries, but also makes clear why the ordinary usages abound in vagueness and ambiguity:
最后一组字典定义值得全面介绍,因为它对 "共识 "和 "同意 "这两个词的普通用法提供了相当完整的陈述和历史。在这里,《韦伯斯特第三版新国际英语词典》(1961 年)转载了原版缩写,提供了比大多数词典更多的内涵,但也清楚地说明了为什么普通用法充满了模糊性和歧义:
consensus n. [L, fr. consensus past part. of consentire to feel together, agree - more at CONSENT] 1 a: harmony, cooperation, or sympathy esp. in different parts of an organism b: group solidarity in sentiment and belief (a kind of unspoken consensus . . . appeared - Henry Dicks) (broad group consensus, as manifested in the folkways, mores, and other institutional usages - H. A. Bloch) 2 a: general agreement UNANIMITY, ACCORD (the consensus of opinion, based on reports that had drifted back from the border John Hershey) b: collective opinion: the judgment arrived at by most of those concerned (in the consensus of the critics - Current Biog.) 3: a formal statement of religious belief: CONFESSION
共识 n. [L, fr. consensus past part. of consentire to feel together, agree - more at CONSENT] 1 a: 和谐、合作或同情,特别是有机体不同部分的和谐、合作或同情 b: 情感和信仰上的群体团结(一种不言而喻的共识......出现了--亨利-迪克斯)(广泛的群体共识,表现为民风、习俗和其他制度性惯例--H. A. 布洛赫) 2 a: 普遍一致 UNANIMITY, ACCORD(根据从边境飘回的报告,约翰-赫希达成的共识) b: 集体意见:判断。A. Bloch) 2 a: 一般协议 UNANIMITY, ACCORD(根据从边境漂流回来的报告达成的意见共识 John Hershey) b: 集体意见:大多数相关者达成的判断(在批评家的共识中--Current Biog:忏悔
The "action" dimension is captured with similar results in the following:
在 "行动 "维度上,也取得了类似的结果:
consent vt. [ME consenten, fr. OF consentir, . consentire to feel together, agree, consent, fr. com- + sentire to feel - more at SENSE] 1 archaic:to be in harmony or concord esp. in opinion, statement, or sentiment 2: to express a willingness (as to accept a proposition or to carry out a particular action): give assent or approval: AGREE - usu. used with to (consent to shoulder a debt) (consent to cross-examination) syn see ASSENT
consent vt.[ME consenten, fr.OF consentir, consentire 感觉一致,同意,同意,fr. com- + sentire 感觉--更多信息请访问 SENSE] 。1 archaic:和谐或一致,特别是在意见、声明或情感上 2:表示愿意(如接受一个主张或执行一个特定的行动): 表示同意或赞同:同意--与to(同意承担债务)(同意接受交叉询问)合成,见 "同意"。
consent n. [ME, fr. consent, consente, fr. consentir, v.] 1 a: compliance or approval esp. of what is done or proposed by another: ACQUIESCENCE, PERMISSION (to do something without consent) (to find general consent to his opinion) (the passionless consent of the human mind - W. L. Sperry) b: capable, deliberate, and voluntary agreement to or concurrence in some act or purpose implying physical and mental power and free action distinguished from assent: see AGE OF CONSENT 2 archaic: correspondence in parts, qualities, operations: HARMONY,
consent n. [ME, fr. consent, consente, fr. consentir, v.] 1 a: 顺从或赞同,特别是对他人所做的或所提议的:ACQUIESCENCE, PERMISSION(未经同意而做某事)(对他的意见普遍表示同意)(人类心灵的无激情同意--W. L. Sperry) b:有能力的、深思熟虑的、自愿的同意或赞同某种行为或目的,意味着身心力量和自由行动,有别于同意:见同意的年龄 2 古义:在部分、品质、操作上的对应:和谐、
COHERENCE 3: agreement among persons usu. as to a course of action or concerning a particular point of view or opinion (by common consent the host drank first) (by the consent of scholars . . . it is by far the greatest - Choice and Interesting Books); specif: voluntary agreement in political theory by a people to organize a civil society and give authority to the government (the consent theory meant that the people as a whole were sovereign Russell Davenport) 4 archaic: the being of one mind: ACCORD, UNANIMITY 5 obs: OPINION, FEELING - of consent obs. ACCESSORY (some villains of my court are of consent . . . in this - Shak.)
一致 3:人与人之间就某一行动方针或就某一观点或意见达成的一致(by common consent the host drank first)(经学者同意......它是迄今为止最伟大的 - Choice and Interesting Books);specif:政治理论中的自愿协议,由人民组织公民社会并赋予政府权力(同意理论意味着人民作为一个整体拥有主权 Russell Davenport) 4 archaic:同心同德:ACCORD, UNANIMITY 5 obs:意见、感觉--同意的意思 obs.ACCESSORY (some villains of my court are of consent . . . in this - Shak.)
All of these more or less formal definitions are helpful in grasping the range of ideas touched upon by the use of the term consensus. In order to advance the task of clarification, several important usages of 'consensus' are selected that typify the function of the concept in social theory. The one commonality that links the diversity of meanings is the role of consensus, or consensual agreement, among the associated members who are in agreement. Both the most general and the most specific meanings, we shall see, attempt to isolate a particular role for agreement within a particular collectivity. From notions as vague as the seamless web of social fabric, through those dealing with shared values, to those as concrete as agreement of at least of a group on any
所有这些或多或少比较正式的定义都有助于理解 "共识 "一词所涉及的各种观点。为了推进澄清工作,我们选取了 "共识 "的几个重要用法,这些用法体现了这一概念在社会理论中的作用。将各种含义联系在一起的一个共同点是,在意见一致的相关成员中,共识或一致同意的作用。我们将看到,无论是最笼统的含义还是最具体的含义,都试图在特定的集体中分离出协议的特定作用。从社会结构的无缝网络这样模糊的概念,到涉及共同价值观的概念,再到一个群体中至少 个成员在任何问题上达成一致这样具体的概念,我们都可以在这里找到。

issue, attitude, or subject, the role of consensus is related to the collectivity itself. The role of consensus almost always deals with the consequence of a linkage among individuals into a collectivity on the basis of sharing an attitude, policy opinion, ideology, or even scientific method. The theories of consensus abound in the literature, but nearly all presume (as did August Comte) that sharing of "general ideas" by "individual intelligences" is essential for a community or society to survive:
就问题、态度或主题而言,共识的作用与集体本身有关。共识的作用几乎总是涉及个人之间基于共同的态度、政策意见、意识形态甚至科学方法而联系成一个集体的结果。 关于共识的理论在文献中比比皆是,但几乎所有的理论都假定(正如奥古斯特-孔德所假定的),"个体智慧 "共享 "一般观念 "对于社区或社会的生存至关重要:
Ideas govern the world or throw it into confusion; in other words the whole social mechanism rests ultimately on opinion. The great political and moral crisis of present societies stems, in the last analysis, from intellectual anarchy.
思想支配世界或使世界陷入混乱;换句话说,整个社会机制最终取决于舆论。归根结底,当今社会巨大的政治和道德危机源于思想的无政府状态。
It is in terms of the consequences of various types of shared beliefs that the selected usages can best be contrasted. It will therefore be a difficult concept because precision is difficult to achieve with a concept that links social phenomena (state of agreement) with individual commitments (activity of consent).
正是从各种共同信念的后果的角度出发,才最有可能对选定的用法进行对比。因此,这将是一个困难的概念,因为一个将社会现象(一致同意的状态)与个人承诺(同意的活动)联系起来的概念很难做到精确。

II. "CONSENSUS" AND CLASSICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
II."共识 "与古典政治哲学

The most general usage of shared social agreentent arises in the classics wherein the whole of society was viewed as an entity bound by a particular regime form. What made a political community a community was the common perception of and the shared beliefs in its goals, purposes, and institutions. Perfect community was a goal, of course, and closer to an "ideal type" than an empirical concept. Also, the usages of Plato and Aristotle were deeply involved with prescriptions. The notion currently called social consensus in our literature was central to both their theories because political institutions, roles, duties, and powers - as well as their social counterparts - were seen as based on myths and beliefs that made harmonious interactions possible. Plato, in his direct construction of a myth, and Aristotle, in his dependence on beliefs that could bind self-interested classes into commitment to an authority structure based on excellence or to a mixed constitution, isolated the general role of consensus found in all later social theories: "Consensus," as a classical conception, is agreement among members of a community on the purposes of the community, on its method of
共同社会共识最普遍的用法出现在经典作品中,整个社会被视为受特定政权形式约束的实体。政治共同体之所以成为共同体,是因为对其目标、宗旨和制度有着共同的认识和信念。当然,完美的共同体只是一个目标,更接近于一种 "理想类型",而不是一个经验概念。此外,柏拉图和亚里士多德的用法也与 "规定 "密切相关。目前在我们的文献中被称为 "社会共识 "的概念是他们理论的核心,因为政治体制、角色、义务和权力--以及它们的社会对应物--都被视为建立在神话和信仰的基础上,这些神话和信仰使得和谐的互动成为可能。柏拉图直接构建了一个神话,亚里士多德则依赖于信仰,这些信仰可以将自利的阶级约束在一个以卓越为基础的权威结构中,或约束在一个混合的宪法中,从而孤立了后来所有社会理论中共识的一般作用:作为一个经典概念,"共识 "是指社群成员之间就社群的目的、社群的方法和社群的目标达成的一致意见。

decision making, on who should make those decisions, and thereby, on what particular decisions should be made.?
决策、由谁来决策,以及应该做出哪些特定的决策?
This can be simplified to "public agreement on the common goals and methods of legitimate decision making in a political community." For both Plato and Aristotle, unanimity of social commitment in a just state was desired. Plato articulated an abstract argument that, if all shared in the beliefs (were part of the consensus), then there was justice (each actor's consent provided his legitimation of the regime, yielding temperance). Aristotle, always more concrete, linked shared beliefs about a constitution (a state of consensus) with stability. Each saw both individual (psychological) and social harmony as a consequence of shared agreements. Both realized unanimity was a goal or a possible condition, not a condition often found in reality. Their normative intention, of course, was to give good arguments for achieving and maintaining the shared social commitment. Social division and conflict were the inevitable consequences of unconstrained dissent. In both theories one quickly recognizes that agreement on purpose leads to acceptance of policies, with rules of decision making the important mechanism for conflict (dissensus) resolution. Unlike modern, usually democratic theories of consensus, Plato emphasized purpose or goal agreement over rules or procedures of government agreement, though he both failed to draw the contrast strongly and saw the myth as determining who makes decisions. Aristotle more favorably focuses on institutions designed for active citizen involvement in articulating common purposes.
这可以简化为 "就政治社会中合法决策的共同目标和方法达成公共协议"。对柏拉图和亚里士多德而言,在一个公正的国家中,社会承诺的一致性是人们所期望的。柏拉图提出了一个抽象的论点,即如果所有人都有共同的信念(都是共识的一部分),那么就有了正义(每个行为者的同意都为政权提供了合法性,从而产生了节制)。亚里士多德总是更具体,他把对宪法(共识状态)的共同信念与稳定性联系在一起。他们都认为个人(心理)和社会和谐是共同协议的结果。他们都认识到,一致是一个目标或可能的条件,而不是现实中经常出现的条件。当然,他们的规范性意图是为实现和维持共同的社会承诺提供充分的论据。社会分裂和冲突是不受约束的异议不可避免的后果。在这两种理论中,人们很快就会认识到,对目的的一致会导致对政策的接受,而决策规则则是解决冲突(分歧)的重要机制。与现代共识理论(通常是民主共识理论)不同,柏拉图强调目的或目标的一致,而不是政府协议的规则或程序,尽管他并没有将两者进行强烈的对比,也没有将神话视为决定决策的人。亚里士多德更倾向于关注旨在让公民积极参与表达共同目的的机构。
The classical assessments of socially shared values permits the isolation of three dimensions of sharing to be accounted for in a concept of consensus. These dimensions are each dealt with in the classics, but not distinctly separated for analytic purposes. First, the abstract goals or purpose of a collectivity must be shared to have a shared agreement. Second, the proper procedures for decision making must be agreed upon to have a shared agreement. Third (and this seems to follow from the former agreements), the particular policies to be enforced must be shared to maintain the shared agreement. Note that the classical discussions have not required a particular kind of agreement in the discussions of shared goals, means or policies - it is merely agreement on any social goals, means, or policies. The arguments for particular agreements are based on their respective metaphysics. Plato and Aristotle prescribe what agreements each believes lead to the best social and individual consequences, but these prescriptions are not of concern
对社会共享价值的经典评估允许将共享的三个层面分离出来,在共识的概念中加以说明。这些维度在经典著作中都有涉及,但没有为了分析的目的而截然分开。首先,一个集体的抽象目标或宗旨必须是共享的,这样才能达成共识。其次,必须就决策的适当程序达成一致,才能达成共同协议。第三(这似乎是根据前几项协议得出的结论),必须共享要执行的特定政策,以维持共享协议。请注意,在讨论共同目标、手段或政策时,经典的讨论并没有要求达成某种特定的协议--这只是就任何社会目标、手段或政策达成一致。对特定协议的论证是基于各自的形而上学。柏拉图和亚里士多德规定了各自认为能带来最佳社会和个人后果的协议,但这些规定与以下问题无关

here except for their suggestion of empirical consequences to look for. Their common suggestion that shared beliefs lead to "stability" provides one example of an empirical hypothesis that remains with us today. Their assumption that shared goals and procedures lead to accepting policies decided by proper procedures also is central to many systems theories. The problem is to develop a precise concept wherein the three dimensions of the phenomenon are appropriately linked because, in the real world, they may not be so linked.
在这里,除了他们提出的关于寻找经验性后果的建议之外。他们普遍认为,共同的信念会导致 "稳定",这为我们提供了一个经验假设的例子,而这一假设至今仍然存在。他们认为,共同的目标和程序会导致人们接受由适当程序决定的政策,这一假设也是许多系统理论的核心。问题是要建立一个精确的概念,将现象的三个层面恰当地联系起来,因为在现实世界中,它们可能并不是这样联系的。
How much agreement on goals is needed to offset a low agreement on procedures and still maintain sufficient agreement on policy outcomes to maintain stability in a political community? Are some "goals" more congruent with some "procedures" in a consensus? Are different shared beliefs equally adequate as guides for action that lead to individual and social stability? These questions - and many more that can be generated - are difficult, but empirical. The three dimensions provide a starting point for later reconstruction, which will require definitions treating the classical understanding of a social consensus as a polar type combined from three different sorts of agreement. Indeed, the analysis of these relations is the central problematic of David Easton's "systems" approach to politics, wherein he employs the reservoir of public support at each of these three levels as the shared commitment that leads to legitimate authority and the capacity of a political system to persist over time under conditions of stress.
需要在目标上达成多少共识才能抵消在程序上的低共识,并在政策结果上保持足够的共识以维持政治社会的稳定?在共识中,某些 "目标 "与某些 "程序 "是否更加一致?不同的共同信念是否同样足以作为实现个人和社会稳定的行动指南?这些问题--以及可能产生的更多问题--是困难的,但却是经验性的。这三个维度为以后的重构提供了一个起点,重构需要定义,将对社会共识的经典理解视为由三种不同协议组合而成的两极类型。事实上,对这些关系的分析正是戴维-伊斯顿(David Easton)的 "系统 "政治学方法的核心问题,他将这三个层面上的公众支持作为共同的承诺,从而形成合法的权威和政治体系在压力条件下长期存在的能力。
It should be noted that the classical understanding is not a concept but a conception of social agreement: A conception is both a "concept i) in the early process of being conceived" and it incorporates "ii) all the compatible meanings associated with a word" (this definition of 'conception' is in the COCTA glossary, Sartori, this volume). This can be explained by the interrelatedness of the life experience as articulated in classical philosophy. Social and political concepts were not distinguished. Each part was conceived in terms of the whole. As a consequence, the three dimensions of the social agreement were not clearly distinguished. Agreement was both social and political seen as a single phenomenon. This merging of the three dimensions of agreement does not permit analysis to focus on the possibility, for example, that strong agreement on procedures for decision making may permit serious disagreements within society over the proper goals of society without endangering social order (stability), an important empirical claim by democratic theorists (Friedrich, 1942).
应该指出的是,经典理解不是一个概念,而是一种社会约定俗成的观念:概念既是 "i) 处于早期构想过程中的概念",又包含 "ii) 与一个词相关的所有兼容含义"("概念 "的这一定义见 COCTA 术语表,Sartori,本卷)。这可以用古典哲学中阐述的生命体验的相互关联性来解释。社会概念和政治概念没有区分。每个部分都是从整体的角度来考虑的。因此,社会协议的三个层面没有明确区分。协议既是社会现象,也是政治现象。 这种将协议的三个维度合并在一起的做法,使得分析无法关注以下可能性,例如,在决策程序上达成强有力的协议,可能会使社会内部对社会的适当目标产生严重分歧,而不会危及社会秩序(稳定),这是民主理论家的一个重要的经验性主张(Friedrich, 1942)。
Plato and similar theorists see the development of consensus on common purposes as a way of "sublimating" the sources of political conflict, according to Sheldon Wolin (1960), and thereby focusing attention away from the consensus on procedures for active citizen involvement in conflict resolution as a means for achieving sufficient social agreement for harmony. Plato eliminates the need for considering these citizen-related procedures by removing the sources of political conflict in order to assure stability; in sum, for Wolin, Plato eliminates "politics" as we understand it by developing commonly shared beliefs throughout society. Aristotle, in contrast, employs the agreement as a means for an individual citizen's dealing with conflict: Constitutional arrangements and the corresponding shared beliefs permit an agreement on regime to emerge in which each interest sees the constitution as the best possible settlement for its interests (for extensive discussion of these points, see Graham, 1971a: 20-25). The role of procedures (especially institutions) dominates Aristotle's Politics, providing a focus on settlements in a condition of conflict. Consensus becomes what we would now call a political phenomenon. The approaches to shared agreement by Plato and Aristotle are important in developing an empirical concept even though each provides an emphasis that is perhaps explained by 'evaluative connotations.' Indeed, the difference between the type of consensus needed by an authoritarian or closed system and a democratic or open system may parallel, when empirically measured against stability, this prescriptively guided dichotomy between Plato and Aristotle. But this possibility is empirical and will be explored below in the reconstruction of 'consensus.'
根据谢尔顿-沃林(Sheldon Wolin,1960 年)的观点,柏拉图和类似的理论家认为,就共同目的达成共识是 "升华 "政治冲突根源的一种方式,从而将注意力从公民积极参与冲突解决程序的共识上转移开来,将其作为实现和谐的充分社会共识的一种手段。柏拉图通过消除政治冲突的根源以确保稳定,从而消除了考虑这些与公民相关的程序的必要性;总之,在沃林看来,柏拉图通过在全社会发展共同的信仰,消除了我们所理解的 "政治"。与此相反,亚里士多德将协议作为公民个人处理冲突的一种手段:宪法安排和相应的共同信念允许就制度达成一致,其中每个利益方都将宪法视为其利益的最佳解决方案(关于这些观点的广泛讨论,见 Graham, 1971a: 20-25)。程序(尤其是制度)的作用在亚里士多德的《政治学》中占主导地位,为冲突条件下的解决提供了一个焦点。共识成为我们现在所说的政治现象。柏拉图和亚里士多德对共同协议的处理方法对于形成一个经验概念非常重要,尽管他们各自都强调了一个或许可以用 "评价内涵 "来解释的重点。事实上,专制或封闭系统所需的共识类型与民主或开放系统所需的共识类型之间的差异,在根据稳定性进行经验衡量时,可能与柏拉图和亚里士多德之间这种规范性指导下的二分法相似。但这种可能性是经验性的,将在下文重构 "共识 "时进行探讨。

III. MODERN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
III.现代政治哲学

Modern political philosophy moves toward the treatment of consensus as an empirical condition rather than an "ideal." Where Plato and Aristotle see social agreement supporting common purposes and institutions, as a condition necessary to order and stability, modern political philosophers view the agreement as a set of conventions shared by a public. This change does not seem drastic here because the natural right arguments and prescriptions of the classics have not been introduced, thus making Aristotle more "modern" in appearance than would a full presentation. Nevertheless, modern political philosophers approach "consensus" and "consent" as the development of human
现代政治哲学将共识视为一种经验条件而非 "理想"。柏拉图和亚里士多德将支持共同目的和制度的社会共识视为秩序和稳定的必要条件,而现代政治哲学家则将共识视为公众共享的一套惯例。这种变化在这里似乎并不剧烈,因为没有引入经典中的自然权利论证和规定,因此亚里士多德的表象比全面介绍更 "现代"。然而,现代政治哲学家将 "共识 "和 "同意 "作为人类发展的

constructs rather than treat agreement as a given divine or natural phenomenon that must be preserved. The conceptions are artifacts, albeit important ones.
这些概念是一种建构,而不是将协议视为必须加以保护的既定的神圣或自然现象。概念是人工制品,尽管是重要的人工制品。
Several diverse conceptions of consensus are important in modern political philosophy. From Machiavelli's propositions linking the prince's power and longevity to maintaining public consent by means of treating the public beliefs as variables to be manipulated in developing and achieving power, through Hobbes' analytic constructs explaining authority as based on the consent of members of a society yielded to a sovereign because of their psychological characteristics, to Locke's employment of "consensus" as the social agreement (the ultimate majority agreement that legitimates a particular regime form) which itself depends upon "consent" on particular decisions to maintain direct public support, the moderns attempt to sort out the empirical consequences of public agreement and disagreement and the role of consent. In isolating examples of modern analyses of consensus, I select two versions that focus on the general shared opinions of society, but with different prescriptive intents; Burke, who wishes to minimize social and political change in order to preserve stability, employs consensus as an agreement that must be conserved to maintain current institutions; Rousseau, who wished to "improve" government and its attention to the public, employs consensus as an agreement to be used to judge the actions of government in its response to the public. Selecting theorists with these contrary prescriptive ubjectives serves to permit us to compare the underlying empirical conceptions and empirical, hypotheses in which their concepts are employed.
在现代政治哲学中,有几种不同的共识概念非常重要。从马基雅维利将公众信仰视为发展和实现权力过程中可操控的变量,从而将王子的权力和长寿与维持公众同意联系起来的命题,到霍布斯将权威解释为基于社会成员因其心理特征而屈服于君主的同意的分析性建构,再到洛克将 "共识 "作为社会协议(使特定政权形式合法化的最终多数协议),而共识本身又取决于对特定问题的 "同意"、到洛克将 "共识 "作为社会协议(使特定政权形式合法化的最终多数协议),而这种协议本身又依赖于对特定决策的 "同意 "来维持公众的直接支持,现代人试图理清公众协议和分歧的经验后果以及同意的作用。伯克希望最大限度地减少社会和政治变革以维护稳定,他将共识作为一种必须维护以维持现有体制的协议;卢梭希望 "改善 "政府及其对公众的关注,他将共识作为一种协议,用于评判政府在回应公众时所采取的行动。 选择具有这些相反的规定性目标的理论家,可以让我们比较其概念所依据的经验概念和经验假设。
Edmund Burke suggests that consensus on goals and on the proper procedures of government are the sources for a society's defining itself; one becomes a member of a community by sharing in its norms. Thus normative guidance and personal prescriptions are givens, at birth, for each member of a community. The "givens" differ, of course, depending on the community, but they define for individuals what is "good" for individuals and society. Moreover, the shared general opinion specifies the general goals for society and the proper procedures and institutions of government. Burke saw the consensus as evolving over time in response to experience. Change was necessary to fit shared beliefs to developing reality, but change that is too rapid could destroy the agreement. (We will see that this is not so different from Rousseau as most interpretations suggest.) Essentially, Burke defines 'consensus' as shared public agreement on social and individual purposes and the
埃德蒙-伯克(Edmund Burke)认为,就政府的目标和适当程序达成共识是社会自我定义的源泉;一个人通过分享社会规范而成为社会成员。因此,对于每个社会成员来说,规范性指导和个人规定都是与生俱来的。当然,"给定 "因社区而异,但它们为个人定义了什么对个人和社会是 "好 "的。此外,共同的普遍意见还规定了社会的总体目标以及政府的适当程序和机构。伯克认为,共识是随着时间的推移和经验的积累而不断演变的。为了使共同的信念适应不断发展的现实,变革是必要的,但过快的变革可能会破坏共识。(我们将看到,这与卢梭的解释并无太大区别)。从根本上说,伯克将 "共识 "定义为公众对社会和个人目的的共同约定,以及

procedures appropriate for applying and adapting them to particular problems.
适用于特定问题的应用和调整程序。
Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggests that one treat the individual's purposes and goals in a society as the source for comprehending the general will, a shared purpose, which ought guide government. If one focuses on the prescriptive presuppositions, it is easy to overlook the fundamental empirical conception he employs. The general will is based on a community's agreement on social goals based on its common interests and on the government's charge to make particular interpretations of these goals. Once Rousseau's conception is extended by his observations as to how a contract establishes formally as rights what existed in nature as custom and by his rules for the Legislator that indicate he should base the articulation of a general will on existing customs and traditions, Rousseau's empirical conception can be equated with that stated for Burke. The chief difference is that Burke focuses on the perspective that the shared norms are adaptations and commitments that evolve from pragmatic responses to human experience while Rousseau sees the shared norms as based on individuals' shared interests in communal existence. In fact, both perspectives entail compatible empirical presuppositions which can be tested if all concepts are properly defined.
让-雅克-卢梭建议人们将个人在社会中的目的和目标作为理解普遍意愿的源泉,即一种共同的目的,它应该指导政府。如果只关注规定性的前提,就很容易忽略他所采用的基本经验概念。普遍意志的基础是一个社会基于其共同利益对社会目标达成的一致意见,以及政府负责对这些目标做出的特殊解释。一旦卢梭的概念通过他的观察得到延伸,即契约如何将自然界中作为习俗存在的东西正式确立为权利,以及他为立法者制定的规则(这些规则表明立法者应根据现有的习俗和传统来阐明普遍意志),卢梭的经验概念就可以等同于伯克的经验概念。两者的主要区别在于,伯克的观点侧重于共同准则是对人类经验的实用性反应所产生的适应和承诺,而卢梭则认为共同准则是基于个人在共同生存中的共同利益。事实上,这两种观点都包含相容的经验预设,如果对所有概念进行适当定义,就可以对这些预设进行检验。
The function of the modern conceptions of consensus are clear in Burke and Rousseau. At least empirically, each offers an explanation of community in terms of shared beliefs. Both assume that a consensus on purposes and procedures is the key to legitimate - consented to government. Both treat the givens of a society (a particular set of goals) as the contents of the goal consensus; Burke sees appropriate procedures as givens; Rousseau sees procedures as contingent on the goals which include consent. The consequences of a strong consensus for both are stability of government and a strong sense of community and moral guidance for the individuals within the community. Moreover, each asserts sets of empirical claims about 'consensus.'
现代共识概念的功能在伯克和卢梭身上显而易见。至少在经验上,他们都从共同信仰的角度解释了社会。他们都认为,就目的和程序达成共识是政府合法化的关键。伯克认为适当的程序是给定的;卢梭则认为程序取决于包括同意在内的目标。对二者而言,强烈共识的后果是政府的稳定和强烈的共同体意识,以及对共同体中个人的道德指导。此外,二者都对 "共识 "提出了一系列经验性的主张。
The following propositions about consensus (basic general opinions) are asserted in the works of Burke:
伯克的著作中提出了以下关于共识(基本的普遍意见)的命题:
B1: A high usage of deliberation in political decision making increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
B1:在政治决策中大量使用商议会增加 "共识 "的力量。
B2: High experience among decision makers increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
B2:决策者的丰富经验会增强 "共识 "的力量。
B3: Avoidance of abrupt changes in public norms and procedures increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
B3:避免公共准则和程序的突然改变会增强 "共识 "的力量。
B4: Practically founded public norms and procedures increase the strength of a 'consensus.'
B4:切实可行的公共准则和程序会增强 "共识 "的力量。
B5: A common religious heritage increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
B5:共同的宗教遗产会增强 "共识 "的力量。
B6: Educational instruction in public norms and procedures increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
B6:有关公共规范和程序的教育指导会增强 "共识 "的力量。
These propositions parallel propositions about consensus (general will) asserted in the works of Rousseau:
这些命题与卢梭著作中关于共识(普遍意志)的命题相类似:
R1: A high level of political participation increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
R1:政治参与度高会增强 "共识 "的力量。
R2: A high faith in political leadership increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
R2:对政治领导的高度信任会增强 "共识 "的力量。
R3: Minimum physical satisfaction of animal (natural or unlearned) needs must be maintained in order to maintain a 'consensus.'
R3:为了保持 "共识",必须满足动物(自然的或未学习的)最低限度的生理需求。
R4: Education inculcating moral norms increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
R4:灌输道德规范的教育会增强 "共识 "的力量。
R5: Compatibility among a society's religious beliefs and between religious beliefs and political beliefs increases the strength of a 'consensus.'
R5:一个社会的宗教信仰之间以及宗教信仰与政治信仰之间的兼容性会增强 "共识 "的力量。
Together, these hypotheses prescribe how a state of agreement can be increased (or decreased), but the underlying empirical claims also are interesting propositions for scientific analysis. Each hypothesis could be stated with conflict as the reverse consequence.
这些假设共同规定了如何增加(或减少)一致状态,但其背后的经验主张也是科学分析的有趣命题。每个假设都可以用冲突作为反向结果。
These conceptions of consensus, similar to the classics, fail to give sufficient precision for research. Because they are general, the meanings cannot be easily linked to particular societies. Neither theorist assumes perfect agreement in any society - indeed Burke fears that philosophers will destroy the agreements, while Rousseau fears that rulers will ignore them. Each sees the consensus as having two general dimensions (goals and institutions) that are linked to achieving particular policy agreements. Each assumes conflict is a given in society and can be controlled by consensus, but in a contingent way. If political settlements are guided by consensus on goals and procedural norms, there will be
这些共识概念与经典概念类似,无法为研究提供足够的精确性。因为它们是一般性的,其含义不能轻易地与特定社会联系起来。两位理论家都没有假定任何社会都能达成完美的共识--事实上,伯克担心哲学家会破坏共识,而卢梭则担心统治者会无视共识。两位理论家都认为共识有两个一般层面(目标和制度),与实现特定的政策协议相关联。他们都认为冲突是社会的必然现象,可以通过共识来控制,但以一种偶然的方式。如果政治解决是在目标和程序规范共识的指导下进行的,那么就会有

stable rule. For both, legitimate rule is judged by government's acting according to the 'consensus.' A member of the public thus 'consents' to rule that follows the 'consensus.' Because both analyses focus on the problem of political communities rather than group consensus, the referent of the agreements is all of the members of a society. Total agreement in a community provides the extreme form of consensus.
稳定的统治。对两者而言,合法统治的评判标准是政府按照 "共识 "行事。因此,公众成员 "同意 "遵循 "共识 "的统治。由于这两种分析都侧重于政治共同体而非群体共识的问题,因此协议的参照物是社会的所有成员。社会中的完全一致提供了共识的极端形式。

IV. CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE USAGES
IV.当代政治学用法

Most contemporary usages of 'consensus' are rooted in the classical and modern political philosophy conceptions. Consensus as a concept is the response of theorists attempting to firm up and assess the merits of earlier conceptions. Is a consensus necessary for stability, and if so, can serious diversity and conflict over goals nonetheless exist if sufficient intensity of agreement on procedures exists? That is, can society develop based only on consensus on rules of the game? Or, are myths necessary? Can basic beliefs be shifted rapidly, without violence, in an authoritarian culture? Though the list can be greatly extended, these questions alone indicate that political science presumes some conception of consensus. The problems of politics are closely related to grasping the shared norms which make a political community. The interest in the problems increases as one focuses attention on democratic societies and the appropriate role of the public. Indeed, consensus and pluralism becomes a very special topic because pluralist societies are seen as increasingly challenging the agreements on goals in societies.
共识 "的当代用法大多源于古典和现代政治哲学概念。共识作为一个概念,是理论家们试图巩固和评估早期概念优劣的回应。共识是否是稳定的必要条件?如果是,那么,如果在程序上存在足够强度的一致意见,是否还能存在严重的多样性和目标冲突?也就是说,社会的发展能否仅仅基于对游戏规则的共识?或者说,神话是必要的吗?在专制文化中,基本信仰能否在不使用暴力的情况下迅速转变?尽管这些问题的范围可以大大扩展,但仅从这些问题就可以看出,政治学预设了某种共识的概念。政治问题与把握构成政治共同体的共同准则密切相关。当人们关注民主社会和公众的适当角色时,对这些问题的兴趣就会增加。事实上,共识和多元化已成为一个非常特殊的话题,因为多元化社会被视为对社会目标协议的日益挑战。
Several studies can be identified that provide typical contemporary efforts to define 'consensus.' These fall into two general categories: some attempt to preserve the abstract macro-conception of shared beliefs; others attempt to provide clear referents for the concept. Efforts to define 'consensus' seem caught between the horns of adequate precision and adequate richness of usage, a dilemma that can be resolved only by playing extension off intension - in a feedback process - to the point of mastering designations that permit precise boundaries for general concepts. Before dealing with the problem of reconstructing a concept of 'consensus' along these lines, however, some examples of 'consensus'-in-use must be introduced.
有几项研究提供了当代界定 "共识 "的典型方法。这些研究分为两大类:一些研究试图保留共同信念这一抽象的宏观概念;另一些研究则试图为这一概念提供明确的参照物。定义 "共识 "的努力似乎陷入了足够精确和足够丰富用法的两难境地,只有在反馈过程中通过外延与内涵的博弈来解决这一难题,从而掌握能够为一般概念划定精确界限的名称。不过,在讨论按照这些思路重建 "共识 "概念的问题之前,必须先介绍一些使用中的 "共识 "的例子。
A general empirical notion of consensus is found in the works of Robert M. MacIver. He links customs, mores, and the communal laws and practices together in the notion of ruling myths. "By myths we
罗伯特-M-麦基弗(Robert M. MacIver)的著作中提出了共识的一般经验概念。他用统治神话的概念将习俗、风尚、社区法律和惯例联系在一起。"我们所说的神话

mean the value-impregnated beliefs that men hold, that they live by or live for" (MacIver, 1947: 4, see also p. 28). The myths bind individuals into a social system because myth, through customs, transforms examples into the institutions of society. Changes in myths follow social changes (e.g., improvements in education and culture). Governmental authority, social order, duty, and support for institutions all come from this "greater consensus" without which the "fundamental order of the community would fall apart" (MacIver, 1947: 85). MacIver's myth, or "greater consensus," parallels Burke and Rolsseau on 'consensus' with the difference being that he limits his theoretical goal to explaining the motivations and interests entailed in mun's obeying tine laws; in other words, 'consensus' is presented as an empirical concept-a concept designed merely to isolate specified conditions. MacIver's meanings are terribly general, but they preserve the richness of classical and modern political philosophy versi'sns. He somewhat merges the consensus on goals with the consensus on procedures, but provides us with clear propositions about their relations with each other and with policy consensus.
是指人们所持有的、他们赖以生存或为之而生存的价值浸透的信念"(MacIver,1947:4,另见第 28 页)。神话将个人束缚在社会体系中,因为神话通过习俗将实例转化为社会制度。神话的变化伴随着社会的变迁(如教育和文化的进步)。政府权威、社会秩序、责任和对制度的支持都来自于这种 "更大的共识",没有这种共识,"社会的基本秩序就会分崩离析"(MacIver, 1947: 85)。麦克弗的神话或 "更大的共识 "与伯克和罗尔索关于 "共识 "的论述相似,不同之处在于,他将理论目标局限于解释人们遵守法律的动机和利益;换言之,"共识 "是作为一个经验性概念提出的--一个仅仅用来孤立特定条件的概念。麦克弗的含义非常笼统,但却保留了古典和现代政治哲学的丰富内涵。他在某种程度上将目标共识与程序共识合二为一,但却为我们提供了关于它们之间以及它们与政策共识之间关系的清晰命题。
Charles E. Merriam also dealt with "consensus" and "consent" at this level, as noted in the following:Consent involves a wide variety of ways and means in different
查尔斯-梅里亚姆(Charles E. Merriam)也在这一层面上论述了 "共识 "和 "同意",其论述如下:"同意 "涉及各种不同的方式和手段。

societies with widely different culture patterns. Among these devices
文化模式迥异的社会。在这些设备中

are the development of a body of doctrine to be beliervd -
这些都是应予相信的教义体系的发展。

credenda-inculcated and generally accepted propaganda, on the
在湮没无闻、广为接受的宣传中,在......

border line between education and symbolism, forms of participation
教育与象征之间的界线,参与的形式

and cooperation in political society [Merriam, 1945: 95-96; see also,
和政治社会中的合作[梅里亚姆,1945 年:95-96; see also、

Merriam, 1964:119-135].
Consent involves a wide variety of ways and means in different societies with widely different culture patterns. Among these devices are the development of a body of doctrine to be believed credenda-inculcated and generally accepted propaganda, on the border line between education and symbolism, forms of participation and cooperation in political society [Merriam, 1945: 95-96; see also, Merriam, 1964: 119-135].
在文化模式大相径庭的不同社会中,"同意 "涉及各种各样的方式方法。这些手段包括在教育与象征之间的边界线上,发展一套被信奉的学说,以及政治社会中的参与与合作形式[梅里亚姆,1945:95-96;另见梅里亚姆,1964:119-135]。
The credenda, or general forms of belief, may be grouped into "(1) respect for government - differential attitudes; (2) obedience; (3) sacrifice; and (4), monopoly of legality" (1945: 97). The miranda of politics supply the symbolic and ceremonial bases for attachment to the system; the credenda, bases for the more rational acceptance of the system (1964: chap. 4). Merriam argues that these attitudes and understandings can be seen in practices, group conventions, written documents and agreements that set the "subordination, superordination, and co-ordination" of a political community (1945: 213, 215). Constitutional custom and general opinion are key ingredients of 'consensus.' The consensus on institutions derives from a mix of rational argument and symbolic commitments.
信条或一般信仰形式可分为"(1) 尊重政府--不同的态度;(2) 服从;(3) 牺牲;(4) 垄断合法性"(1945:97)。政治的 "miranda "提供了依附于制度的象征性和仪式性基础;"credenda "提供了更理性地接受制度的基础(1964 年:第 4 章)。梅里亚姆认为,这些态度和理解可以从惯例、群体公约、书面文件和协议中看出,它们规定了政治社会的 "从属关系、上级关系和协调关系"(1945:213,215)。宪法习惯和普遍意见是'共识'的关键要素。关于制度的共识来自理性论证和象征性承诺的结合。
A second type of general definition is suggested by Francis Canavan's distinction between consensus on overall goals and procedures, and on public policy (1961). The abstract level of consensus on goals and procedures sets the stage for working out moral and political choices. The function of 'consensus' is to make political discourse about concrete policies possible. Thus the 'consensus' provides the shared presuppositions that, following Stephen Toulmin's notion of 'limiting questions,' isolate normative limits within which we reason in ethical (and political) discourse. Canavan clarifies the especially abstract character of the 'consensus' in order to underscore the vague relation of goal and policy agreements which was seen so clearly demonstrated in Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma (1964). This dichotomy was present in the classical and modern political theory notions, but it was less clearly drawn. It also has been central in debates within democratic theory over the relations between agreements on abstract values and over particular meanings.
弗朗西斯-卡纳万(Francis Canavan)将总体目标和程序共识与公共政策共识区分开来(1961 年),提出了第二类一般性定义。就目标和程序达成共识这一抽象层面为做出道德和政治选择奠定了基础。而 "共识 "的作用则是使关于具体政策的政治讨论成为可能。因此,"共识 "提供了共同的前提条件,按照斯蒂芬-图尔敏(Stephen Toulmin)的 "限制性问题"(limiting questions)概念,"共识 "隔离了我们在道德(和政治)话语中进行推理的规范限制。 卡纳万澄清了 "共识 "的特别抽象性,以强调目标与政策协议之间的模糊关系,这种关系在贡纳尔-米达尔(Gunnar Myrdal)的《美国的困境》(1964)中得到了清晰的体现。这种二分法在古典和现代政治理论概念中都有,但不那么清晰。它也是民主理论中关于抽象价值协议与特定意义协议之间关系的争论的核心。
A third major general usage focuses on consensus on procedures; that is, on the "rules of the game." Although Friedrich later (1963) focuses on myth, beliefs, and purposes as essential to a consensus that holds a system together and as essential to developing legitimacy, he also provides the most cited conception of procedural consensus in The New Belief in the Common Man (1942). He sees agreements on values and principles as unnecessary if a community agrees on procedural rules for political action. In his earlier arguments it is clear that he sees consensual agreement on goals and purposes as antithetical to democracy. All that is needed is a consensus on a "common way of acting in spite of disagreement on fundamentals" (1942: 191). Or, as Harry V. Jaffa (1958: 750-751) puts it, the essentials of the American consensus are (1) agreement to disagree, and (2) agreement to let the majority rule. This usage is common in theories of group politics (Truman, 1951) and studies of folkways in governmental bodies (Matthews, 1960: chap. 5).
第三种主要的一般用法侧重于就程序达成共识,即就 "游戏规则 "达成共识。尽管弗里德里希后来(1963 年)把重点放在神话、信仰和目的上,认为它们是维系一个系统的共识的关键,也是发展合法性的关键,但他在《普通人的新信仰》(1942 年)一书中也提出了程序性共识这一最常被引用的概念。 他认为,如果一个社会就政治行动的程序规则达成一致,那么就没有必要就价值观和原则达成一致。从他早先的论述中可以看出,他认为就目标和宗旨达成共识是与民主背道而驰的。他所需要的只是就 "尽管在基本原则上存在分歧,但共同的行动方式 "达成共识(1942:191)。或者,正如哈里-V-贾法(Harry V. Jaffa)(1958: 750-751)所说,美国共识的基本要素是:(1)同意持不同意见;(2)同意让多数人统治。这种用法在群体政治理论(杜鲁门,1951 年)和政府机构民风研究(马修斯,1960 年:第 5 章)中很常见。
Two operational conceptions of consensus are sufficient to type the definitions of 'consensus' by operational definition. The first, offered by McClosky (1964: 363), defines consensus as "a level of agreement reaching 75 percent." He explicitly discounts any reference to
共识的两个操作性概念足以按操作性定义对 "共识 "进行分类。麦克劳斯基(1964:363)提出的第一种概念将共识定义为 "达到 75% 的一致程度"。他明确排除了
feelings of solidarity, the willingness to live together, to obey the laws, to accept the existing government as legitimate. Nor does it refer to an abstract state of mind [p. 363].
团结的情感、共同生活的意愿、遵守法律、接受现有政府为合法政府。它也不是指一种抽象的精神状态[第 363 页]。
In sum, the dimensions of "consensus" that have stimulated theorists for centuries have been excluded. A second operational definition, that imposed by Prothro and Grigg (1960: 286), raises the standard for 'consensus' to . By measuring agreement to broadly stated democratic principles and narrow, concrete applications to policies, they discovered that a consensus on abstracts exists in their sample, but one on concrete applications of the abstracts does not. The study illustrates the possibility of directly linking a concept that has clear boundaries to the salient issues that give life to interpretations of the general conception. The study has serious theoreitical problems, but they do not lessen the significance of demonstrating the possibility of developing measures that link the general and the particular agreements in a democracy.
总之,几个世纪以来一直激励着理论家的 "共识 "层面被排除在外。第二个操作性定义,即 Prothro 和 Grigg(1960: 286)提出的定义,将 "共识 "的标准提高到 。通过衡量对广义的民主原则和狭义的具体政策应用的同意程度,他们发现在他们的样本中存在对抽象原则的共识,但对抽象原则的具体应用却没有共识。这项研究说明,可以将一个界限分明的概念与突出的问题直接联系起来,从而使对一般概念的解释具有生命力。这项研究存在严重的理论问题,但这并不影响它的意义,因为它证明了在民主社会中制定将一般协议与特殊协议联系起来的措施的可能性。
Although many particular studies of the various dimensions of consensus are available in the research literature of political science (especially in the public opinion studies of the American system), the most comprehensive treatment of consensus at a theoretical level that explores the empirical linkages of the dimensions was that of V. O. Key, Jr., in Public Opinion and American Democracy (1963). isolates the role of public beliefs in their service as "opinion dikes" within which the limits and possibilities of leadership actions are isolated. He provides careful assessment of the variations of consensus that are possible on particular policy decisions: Supportive consensus is public agreement on already existing policies; permissive consensus is public agreement that if a policy is proposed by the government, it will be accepted; consensus of decision is public agreement resulting from an action - as, for example, the American experience of accepting the governmental response to Pearl Harbor. Key points out that such agreements as that which followed Pearl Harbor are multiple consensus as well because they cross normal political divisions. All of these particular forms of agreements that are so central to explaining a government's capacity to alleviate conflict fill in the abstract content of what Key has in mind by the idea of opinion dikes. Only by incorporating the particular agreements (supportive, permissive, and decision) can one grasp how it is that a democratic form of regime can develop general consensus in the conflict-oriented political arena of a pluralist democracy.
尽管政治学研究文献(尤其是美国制度的舆论研究)中有许多关于共识各个层面的具体研究,但在理论层面对共识进行最全面的处理、探讨共识各个层面之间的经验联系的是小V.O.基(V. O. Key)在《舆论与美国民主》(1963年)中的研究。 将公众信念作为 "舆论堤坝 "的作用分离出来,在此范围内,领导行动的局限性和可能性被分离出来。他仔细评估了特定政策决策中可能出现的各种共识:支持性共识是指公众对现有政策的认同;允许性共识是指公众认为如果政府提出一项政策,该政策就会被接受;决策性共识是指公众对某项行动的认同--例如,美国接受政府对珍珠港事件的反应的经历。 Key 指出,珍珠港事件后达成的协议也属于多重共识,因为它们跨越了正常的政治分歧。所有这些特殊形式的协议对于解释政府缓解冲突的能力至关重要,它们填补了 Key 所设想的 "意见堤坝 "这一概念的抽象内容。只有将特定协议(支持性协议、允许性协议和决定性协议)纳入其中,我们才能理解民主形式的政权是如何在多元民主国家以冲突为导向的政治舞台上形成普遍共识的。
One sees that both rules of the game agreement and goal agreement play important roles in achieving particular policy agreements, and vice versa. Key himself, in another book, points out that "a democratic order can operate effectively only on the foundation of a widely shared
我们可以看到,游戏规则协议和目标协议在实现特定政策协议方面都发挥着重要作用,反之亦然。基本人在另一本书中指出,"民主秩序只有在广泛认同的基础上才能有效运作。

consensus. That consensus defines the limits of political conflict, and those who advocate measures outside that range may expect to be treated roughly" (1958: 8). But he goes on to note that while "democratic politics" may be a "politics of limited objectives in the short run, it may also be, paradoxically, that a durable democratic order must rest on a presupposition of unlimited objectives in the long run" (1958: 8). This, he sees, as the source of the "mystique" of democracy, that losses today may turn to success later. More rigorous attention to definitions will better prepare one for resolving the puzzle of how much of each dimension of agreement is needed in what contexts.
共识。这种共识确定了政治冲突的界限,那些主张采取超出这一范围的措施的人可能会受到粗暴对待"(1958: 8)。但他接着指出,虽然 "民主政治 "可能是一种 "短期目标有限的政治,但矛盾的是,持久的民主秩序必须建立在长期目标无限的前提之上"(1958:8)。他认为,这就是民主 "神秘性 "的来源,今天的失利可能会在日后转化为成功。对定义的更严格关注将使我们更好地解决这样一个难题:在什么情况下需要多少协议的每个方面。

V. SOURCES OF CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION
V.概念混淆的根源

Each major type of conception of "consensus" surveyed above represents a literature of similar usages, but the brief survey is sufficient to illustrate the sources of conceptual confusion. The conceptions commonly fail to keep the terms, meanings, and referents congruent. The general conceptions fail to set boundaries for referent, and those that set boundaries fail to include adequately the entire theoretical meaning. The dilemma on the meaning-referent continuum can be traced in part to a dilemma on the word-meaning continuum.
上文调查的 "共识 "概念的每种主要类型都代表了类似用法的文献,但简短的调查足以说明概念混淆的根源。这些概念通常无法使术语、含义和所指保持一致。一般概念未能为所指设定界限,而设定了界限的概念又未能充分包含整个理论意义。意义-指涉连续体上的困境部分可以追溯到词-意义连续体上的困境。
Consensus, for all general conceptions, deals with shared values that arise from experience, traditions, and practices. Each conception incorporates the assumption of a political-social community that is given its structure by the consensus. The consensus somehow binds individuals into a collectivity. Different ways of treating consensus, however, can be seen as early as the contrast between Plato's focusing on the removal of potential agreement threatening conflict from society and Aristotle's focusing on the proper institutions for providing citizens the means of resolving differences. Each of the conceptions contributes something "meaningful" to our own conception, but the overall result is clearly confusing. At least in the abstract, consensus on goals (or purposes) can bind individuals, as can consensus on procedures. Moreover, there is a common characteristic to each conception if we view a consensus's function in society. And to hinder our effort to overcome ambiguity, few scholars of society would conceive of the consensual agreement as solely either on goals or on procedures; we suspect that consensus often entails both.
就所有一般概念而言,共识涉及从经验、传统和实践中产生的共同价值观。每种概念都包含一个政治-社会共同体的假设,该共同体的结构由共识赋予。共识以某种方式将个人结合成一个集体。然而,对待共识的不同方式早在柏拉图与亚里士多德之间的对比中就可看出,柏拉图侧重于从社会中消除潜在的协议威胁冲突,而亚里士多德则侧重于为公民提供解决分歧的适当机构。每一种概念都为我们自己的概念贡献了一些 "有意义 "的东西,但总体结果显然是混乱的。至少从抽象的角度来看,关于目标(或宗旨)的共识可以约束个人,关于程序的共识也可以约束个人。此外,如果我们看待共识在社会中的功能,那么每种概念都有一个共同的特点。而且,为了阻碍我们克服模糊性的努力,很少有研究社会的学者会把共识仅仅视为关于目标或关于程序的协议;我们猜想,共识往往包含两者。
Because of the different foci of theorists, the discussion has often become collectively ambiguous (and conceptions of consensus often receive special terms or labels to preserve the nuances provided by the theorist). An empirical theory role of 'consensus' can be developed by recognizing that 'consensus' can be identified as a concept entailing three dimensions of agreement within a public: shared agreement (1) on general collective goals, (2) on procedures for decision making, and (3) on specific policy agreements. These dimensions are independent of the particular normative intentions or contestable labels employed in the literature, such as Rousseau's 'general will,' which entails 'consensus' plus a 'positive value connotation'; the traditional general meanings in the literature all carry some value connotations. Even general systems theorists treat system maintenance in such a way that many critics see the theory as conservative ideology. The primary task, then, is to salvage in our definitions the sameness of meaning while rejecting the explicit value connotations from our content. In addition, one must sort out statements using the concept's 'meaning component' from those using its 'value connotation,' as was done above for Burke and Rousseau. If in the definition of 'consensus' and its usages we can eliminate the value connotations of 'general opinion' and 'general will,' we have a case for treating their common meaning components as possible synonyms - qua empirical concept - for 'consensus.' We have already seen that Burke and Rousseau each provides interesting hypotheses about 'consensus' that can be studied scientifically.
由于理论家的侧重点不同,讨论往往变得集体模糊不清(共识的概念往往被赋予特殊的术语或标签,以保留理论家提供的细微差别)。通过认识到 "共识 "可以被确定为一个概念,它包含公众内部达成一致的三个方面:(1)关于一般集体目标的共同一致意见;(2)关于决策程序的共同一致意见;(3)关于具体政策协议的共同一致意见,就可以发展出 "共识 "的实证理论作用。这些维度与文献中使用的特定规范意图或有争议的标签无关,如卢梭的 "普遍意志",它包含 "共识 "和 "积极的价值内涵";文献中传统的一般含义都带有一定的价值内涵。即使是一般系统理论家对待系统维护的方式,也让许多批评家将该理论视为保守的意识形态。 因此,我们的首要任务是在我们的定义中挽救意义的同一性,同时从我们的内容中摒弃明确的价值内涵。此外,我们还必须将使用概念 "意义成分 "的陈述与使用概念 "价值内涵 "的陈述区分开来,正如上文对伯克和卢梭所做的那样。如果在'共识'的定义及其用法中,我们可以剔除'一般意见'和'一般意愿'的价值内涵,那么我们就有理由将它们的共同意义成分作为'共识'的可能同义词--就经验概念而言。我们已经看到,伯克和卢梭各自提供了关于'共识'的有趣假设,可以对其进行科学研究。
A major difficulty in clarifying consensus rests on the lack of consensus, if you will, on the possibility of linking general concepts to operational definitions. It is currently impossible to provide operational measures of (1) agreement on abstract goals, and (2) agreement on procedures that can be weighted to see how much consensus - which combines (1) and (2) - is necessary for stability. Those scholars who respect only quantitative studies may reject the analytic utility of 'consensus' too quickly on the grounds that we cannot demonstrate that it operates in society as theorists suggest. See especially the too-quick rejection of most theoretical works on the basis of statistical photographs of the survey samples of Ann Arbor and Tallahassee by Prothro and Grigg (1960: 276-294). Confusion is generated by an attempt to eliminate problems by ignoring them as unmeasurable rather than to struggle with balancing extension and intension. (Indeed, once sufficient measures of stability and of the two dimensions are derived, data
澄清共识的一个主要困难在于缺乏共识,可以说是缺乏将一般概念与可操作定义联系起来的可能性。目前还无法提供可操作的衡量标准来衡量(1)对抽象目标的共识,以及(2)对程序的共识,这些标准可以通过加权来衡量(1)和(2)相结合的共识对于稳定性的必要性。那些只尊重定量研究的学者可能会过快地否定 "共识 "的分析作用,理由是我们无法证明社会中存在理论家所建议的共识。请参阅 Prothro 和 Grigg(1960 年:276-294)根据对安阿伯和塔拉哈西调查样本的统计照片对大多数理论著作的过快否定。试图通过忽略无法测量的问题来消除问题,而不是努力平衡外延和内涵,从而产生了混乱。(事实上,一旦对稳定性和两个维度进行了充分测量,数据

can be collected that should provide a basis for establishing the empirical relations.)
收集到的数据应能为建立经验关系提供依据)。
The only difficulty that rivals the normative and the measurement problems as a source of confusion is the problem of ambiguity among the key terms employed in almost every definiens of 'consensus.' This applies both to such terms as 'myth,' 'convention,' 'belief,' 'rules of the game,' and 'tradition,' and to the terms specifying relations among such characteristics. Here one must emphatically note that there also is ambiguity as to what 'consensus' is not: Some argue it is not ideology; others would include ideology - as practice; and still others would include abstract ideologies - as distinct from ideology as practice. These confusions combine to intensify the collective ambiguity on the meaning of 'consensus.' Until students of politics can provide definitions of concepts that employ established terms, lexical primitives, stipulated terms, and precise statements of relations among these, the conceptual confusion will continue. It should be quickly added that currently the confusion exists because theorists do not attempt to develop major concepts in conjunction with clarification of other key concepts in the semantic field. Efforts to clarify must break this circle of confusion.
唯一能与规范问题和测量问题相提并论的困难是几乎所有 "共识 "定义中使用的关键术语的模糊性问题。这既适用于 "神话"、"惯例"、"信仰"、"游戏规则 "和 "传统 "等术语,也适用于说明这些特征之间关系的术语。在此,我们必须强调的是,对于 "共识 "不是什么,也存在着歧义:一些人认为它不是意识形态;另一些人认为它包括作为实践的意识形态;还有一些人认为它包括抽象的意识形态--有别于作为实践的意识形态。这些混淆结合在一起,加剧了 "共识 "含义的集体模糊性。除非政治专业的学生能够提供使用既定术语、词性基元、规定术语的概念定义,并准确表述这些术语之间的关系,否则概念上的混淆将继续存在。需要迅速补充的是,目前之所以存在这种混乱,是因为理论家们并没有尝试在发展主要概念的同时澄清语义领域的其他关键概念。澄清的努力必须打破这种混乱的怪圈。
A first step out of the confusion surrounding consensus is to separate macro-level societal concepts and micro-level individual-group concepts. 'Consensus' refers to a state of agreement among individuals, but the term traditionally references a social condition that requires macrolevel concepts. It is true that a survey can ask individuals if each "shares" in the 'consensus' (in particular values, norms, procedural commitments, or policy question resolutions), but the agreement itself is social. On the other hand, 'consent' is an activity of an individual (or in some cases, a group), a condition best isolated with micro-level concepts. If many or most individuals 'consent,' of course a 'consensus' exists. It therefore is true that consent can be summarized as if a societal level phenomenon, but it is an activity, not a state (or condition that exists at a measurable quantitative level). We shall see that this simple separation into macro- and micro-levels, and into state or condition of agreement and activity of agreeing, will help below in developing the appropriate semantic fields for 'consensus' and 'consent.'
摆脱围绕共识的困惑的第一步是将宏观层面的社会概念与微观层面的个人群体概念分开。共识 "指的是个人之间达成一致的状态,但这个词传统上指的是一种社会状况,需要宏观层面的概念。诚然,调查可以询问个人是否 "分享""共识"(特别是价值观、规范、程序承诺或政策问题决议),但共识本身是社会性的。另一方面,"同意 "是个人(或在某些情况下是群体)的活动,这一条件最好与微观层面的概念相分离。如果许多人或大多数人'同意',当然就存在'共识'。因此,"同意 "的确可以被概括为一种社会层面的现象,但它是一种活动,而不是一种状态(或存在于可测量的量化层面的条件)。我们将看到,这种简单的宏观和微观层面的区分,以及同意的状态或条件和同意的活动的区分,将有助于下文为 "共识 "和 "同意 "建立适当的语义领域。
Politics and society are complex phenomena. Perhaps always there will be more dimensions to every social phenomenon than is first suggested by analysis. The more we know about psychology, language, and interactions, the more complex our concepts must be. Aristotle's
政治和社会是复杂的现象。也许每一种社会现象都会有比最初分析所显示的更多的层面。我们对心理、语言和互动了解得越多,我们的概念就必须越复杂。亚里士多德的

warning against seeking more than probable knowledge becomes applicable in attempting to develop meanings for "consensus" that contain sufficient defining characteristics to apply to myriad societies. Because politics and society are so complex, we must take care to provide boundedness that does not too greatly constrain the denotativeness of the concept. The isolation of defining characteristics from the myriad usages of 'consensus' in the next section's reconstruction requires that the resulting general definition possess sufficient precision to meet these goals.
在试图为 "共识 "赋予足够的定义特征以适用于无数社会的含义时,"不要寻求超过可能的知识 "这一警告就变得适用了。由于政治和社会是如此的复杂,我们必须注意提供约束性,以免过多地限制概念的指称性。在下一节的重构中,要从 "共识 "的各种用法中分离出定义特征,就要求由此产生的一般性定义必须足够精确,以实现这些目标。

IV. THE CLARIFICATION IV.澄清

Reconstruction of a concept is difficult in cases wherein the defining characteristics either are themselves not well defined or must be abstracted from general arguments. Nevertheless, certain characteristics seem to be central to most of the conceptions of consensus. (See Table 2.1.) Collective ambiguity is illustrated in these contrasts, but commonality is also found. Individual ambiguity - inconsistent usage of a theorist in a single work - is sometimes the result of errors in communication caused by the generality of the concept, but the clearest cases of individual ambiguity occur, strangely, in the technically most precise studies (McClosky, and Prothro and Grigg) because operational definitions are developed, employed in testing hypotheses, and then used to discuss claims from the literature based on entirely different meanings for the concept 'consensus.' The reconstruction of 'consensus' requires that these meanings be analyzed.
在定义特征本身没有明确界定或必须从一般论据中抽象出来的情况下,重建一个概念是很困难的。然而,某些特征似乎是大多数共识概念的核心(见表 2.1)。(见表 2.1)这些对比说明了集体模糊性,但也发现了共性。个体模糊性--理论家在单个作品中的用法不一致--有时是由于概念的普遍性导致的交流错误造成的,但最明显的个体模糊性案例却奇怪地出现在技术上最精确的研究中(麦克劳斯基、普罗斯罗和格瑞格),因为操作性定义被开发出来,用于检验假设,然后用于讨论文献中基于完全不同含义的'共识'概念的主张。重建'共识'需要对这些含义进行分析。
There are many important characteristics associated with the various conceptions, but here only eight are introduced. First, 'consensus' is usually viewed as an historically evolved set of beliefs in the sense of traditions, customs, and experience serving as the bases for the shared norms. This diachronic characteristic has exceptions in the metatemporal conceptions of the classics and the operational definitions. Plato provides an ideal type separated from the conventions of society - thus not needing history - while the operational definitions are "singlepoint measures" - thus requiring multiple research applications to capture a diachronic dimension. Second, the concept is usually viewed as a social phenomenon capturing dimensions difficult to measure by microanalytic techniques because of difficulties in aggregating results. Third, the substantive concept 'consensus' is generally reserved for
与各种概念相关的重要特征有很多,这里只介绍八个。首先,"共识 "通常被视为一套历史演变而来的信念,即以传统、习俗和经验作为共同准则的基础。在经典的元时概念和操作定义中,这一非同步特征有例外。柏拉图提供了一种脱离社会习俗的理想类型--因此不需要历史,而操作定义则是 "单点测量"--因此需要多种研究应用来捕捉非同步维度。其次,这一概念通常被视为一种社会现象,由于难以汇总结果,因此难以用微观分析技术来衡量。第三,"共识 "这一实质性概念通常用于

societywide agreements rather than for group applications (although this is not universally true in the literature). Fourth, the concept incorporates agreements on goals, procedures, and policies and their interrelations. This is, of course, necessary for achieving sufficient generality to permit common meaning before moving down the "ladder of abstraction" in applications of 'consensus' to differently structured societies. Fifth, the concept (although society-based) can be measured by testing whether individuals do in fact hold commitments to the same norms (on goals, procedures, policies). Sixth, the concept therefore is of a state or condition of 'consensus' that is causually related to 'consent' at the individual level; 'consenting' adds to the 'consensus' or, indeed, consenting may be a consequence of being part of the 'consensus.' Seventh, the concept 'consensus' is employed as the measure of a public's having legitimated authority (institutions, etc.) through 'consent.' And, eighth, the concept is used to identify the symbols, values, norms, and ideals that make individual and social moral discourse possible; shared commitment to the general ideas in a 'consensus' establish the limits for individuals' working out the particulars of disagreements over meanings.
第四,这一概念包含了目标、程序和政策协议以及它们之间的相互关系。第四,这一概念包含了关于目标、程序和政策及其相互关系的协议。当然,这是在将 "共识 "应用于不同结构社会的 "抽象阶梯 "之前,为达到足够的普遍性以实现共同含义所必需的。第五,这一概念(尽管是基于社会的)可以通过检验个人是否确实对相同的规范(目标、程序、政策)做出承诺来衡量。第六,"共识 "是一种状态或条件,与个人层面的 "同意 "有因果关系;"同意 "是 "共识 "的补充,或者说,同意可能是成为 "共识 "一部分的结果。第七,"共识 "这一概念被用来衡量公众是否通过 "同意 "使权威(机构等)合法化。第八,"共识 "这一概念被用来识别使个人和社会道德话语成为可能的符号、价值观、规范和理想;对 "共识 "中一般观念的共同承诺为个人解决意义分歧的具体细节确立了限制。
From these characteristics it is possible to summarize seven points to be considered in reconstructing this concept:
根据这些特点,我们可以总结出在重新构建这一概念时需要考虑的七个要点:
(1) Consensus is a diachronic phenomenon with all socially shared norms adapted to conditions over time.
(1) 共识是一种非同步现象,所有社会共享规范都会随着时间的推移而适应各种条件。
(2) Consensus refers to a condition of shared norms within a society that structures the relations among members (i.e., it is societywide but can be reduced to individual components since the shared norms obviously are to be found as well in individual belief systems).
(2) 共识是指社会中共同准则的一种状况,它构建了社会成员之间的关系(即,它是全社会的,但也可以归结为个人的组成部分,因为共同准则显然也可以在个人信仰体系中找到)。
(3) The norms shared can include any combination of 'goals for society,' 'procedures for collective decision making,' and 'standards entailed in particular policies.'
(3) 共享的准则可以包括 "社会目标"、"集体决策程序 "和 "特定政策所包含的标准 "的任何组合。
(4) The structure of a consensus can vary as to the particular weights of agreement on the goal norms or the procedural norms, thus providing different possibilities of institutional arrangements.
(4) 共识的结构可以因目标规范或程序规范协议的具体权重而异,从而为制度安排提供了不同的可能性。
(5) Acceptance of policy norms is interlinked with acceptance of goal and procedural norms. This is usually seen as the dynamic
(5) 对政策规范的接受与对目标和程序规范的接受相互关联。这通常被视为动态的

of the system leading to consent. As 'consent' increases, so too does 'consensus.'
系统的 "同意"。随着'同意'的增加,'共识'也会增加。
(6) Institutions, actions of government and leaders, and policies are measured by individuals (and therefore the collectivity) according to their congruence with shared goals and procedural norms, thus yielding individual (and therefore collective) consent - the source of legitimacy.
(6) 个人(因此也是集体)根据制度、政府和领导人的行动以及政策是否符合共同目标和程序规范来衡量它们,从而获得个人(因此也是集体)的同意--合法性的来源。
(7) Moral and political discourse in search of settlement among interests depends upon possessing agreement on goals and procedures.
(7) 在道德和政治话语中寻求利益的解决取决于在目标和程序上达成一致。
These points lead to identification of a few concepts-in-use from the literature that are treated as exceptions in this reconstruction. Operational definitions of 'consensus' from survey research must be viewed as outside the semantic fields developed below because they are not justified as being related to 'consensus' qua political concept; the measures are merely of agreement per se and, in the future, can be better constructed. The classical conceptions, too, must be viewed as exceptions because their ideas - although I believe they are useful in grasping the general role of social-political agreement and in beginning the reconstruction of its role in society - must be "interpreted" to fit the meanings in later literatures. Valuable though the classical understanding is in the 'context of discovery,' it should be noted that reconstruction and construction of concepts must focus on the 'context of validation.' Moreover, by bracketing the classical and operational concepts, all of the concepts-in-use of 'consensus' incorporate, more or less, the eight characteristics that permit acceptance of the seven points as guidance in reconstruction.
这些观点促使我们从文献中找出了几个正在使用的概念,并将其作为例外情况进行重构。调查研究中关于 "共识 "的操作性定义必须被视为在下文所阐释的语义领域之外,因为这些定义与 "共识 "这一政治概念并无关联;这些衡量标准仅仅是对协议本身的衡量,而且将来可以更好地构建。古典概念也必须被视为例外,因为它们的观点--尽管我认为它们有助于把握社会政治协议的一般作用并开始重建其在社会中的作用--必须被 "解释 "以适应后来文献中的含义。尽管古典理解在 "发现的语境 "中是有价值的,但应该注意的是,概念的重建和构建必须关注 "验证的语境"。此外,通过对经典概念和操作性概念的括弧划分,所有使用中的 "共识 "概念都或多或少地包含了允许接受七点作为重构指导的八个特征。
To deal with all seven points, 'consensus' can be defined as a "state of agreement, which varies in intensity and scope over time, incorporating the goals for society, the procedures for decision making, and the particular policies. The shared goals can include symbolic as well as theoretical commitments - including the commitment to have no particular commitment as is entailed in goals such as 'tolerance.' Procedural commitments can range from authoritarian to democratic. Policy choices that are consistent with the shared goals and procedures can vary in as many ways as the imagination can struggle. The important point is that the degree and intensity of a consensus will depend on a society's degree and intensity of commitment to shared norms. Once the notion is treated as a complex variable, the related
就所有七点而言,"共识 "可定义为 "一种协议状态,其强度和范围随时间而变化,包括社会目标、决策程序和特定政策。共同目标可以包括象征性承诺和理论性承诺--包括'宽容'等目标所包含的无特定承诺。程序承诺的范围可以从专制到民主。与共同目标和程序相一致的政策选择可以有多种多样的方式,就像想象力所能挣扎的那样。重要的一点是,共识的程度和强度取决于一个社会对共同准则的承诺程度和强度。一旦将这一概念视为一个复杂的变量,相关的

accompanying concepts - legitimacy, moral discourse, stability, and so on - can be employed in developing a theory of consensus.
在发展共识理论时,可以使用相应的概念--合法性、道德话语、稳定性等。
How can we deal with such a general notion and achieve boundaries for our meaning? Can 'consensus,' with its three dimensions, be used comparatively in spite of our incapacity to project that, say, goal agreement procedural agreement policy agreement goal agreement procedural agreement policy agreement? Yes, and no. The fact that 'consensus' in a particular society can vary over time warns one that cross-national comparisons will be improved only as techniques of measurement improve. Indeed, variation in longitudinal studies, too, faces a similar problem. Nevertheless, in applying our concept it becomes possible to deal with each dimension at its aggregate (i.e., 'consensus') in relation to other concepts in the semantic field (such as 'stability'). The question as to how much 'consensus' is necessary for 'stability' is the query of the statesman; as political scientists we ask how 'consensus' in varying measures covaries with 'stability'. (This is, of course, the question that would eventually provide the intelligent response to the statesman's query.) Most importantly, it is already possible to develop indicators of the consensus on particular symbols, norms, and values (whether representative of goal, procedure, or policy) within particular societies (as illustrated by McClosky and by Prothro and Grigg). Indeed, the intensity of an individual's commitment to procedural and goals norms and to policy outcomes can be measured. Though the concept 'consensus' cannot be replaced by the indicators, nonetheless it is possible to develop a precise denotation of all shared norms, and the percentage of the public sharing it, by testing whether each norm is, in fact, shared. This leaves our general concept intact, although it requires that some set of indicators for consensus be developed each time one wishes to employ the term in particular studies.
我们如何处理这样一个笼统的概念,并为我们的意义划定界限?尽管我们无法预测,比如说, 目标一致 程序一致 政策一致 目标一致 程序一致 政策一致,但具有三个维度的 "共识 "是否可以比较使用?是,也不是。特定社会中的 "共识 "会随着时间的推移而变化,这一事实告诫我们,只有随着测量技术的改进,跨国比较才能得到改善。事实上,纵向研究中的差异也面临着类似的问题。不过,在应用我们的概念时,我们可以将每个维度的总体(即 "共识")与语义领域的其他概念(如 "稳定性")联系起来处理。政治家会问 "稳定 "需要多少 "共识";作为政治学家,我们会问不同程度的 "共识 "与 "稳定 "的关系如何。(当然,这个问题最终会对政治家的疑问做出明智的回答)。最重要的是,我们已经可以为特定社会中的特定符号、规范和价值观(无论是代表目标、程序还是政策)的共识制定指标(如麦克劳斯基以及普罗斯罗和格里格所说明的)。事实上,个人对程序和目标规范以及政策结果的承诺强度是可以衡量的。 尽管 "共识 "这一概念不能被指标所取代,但通过检验每项规范是否确实得到了共享,我们还是有可能对所有共享规范以及共享规范的公众比例做出精确的定义。 虽然这要求每次在特定研究中使用该术语时,都要制定一套共识指标,但我们的一般概念仍保持不变。
A reconstruction is therefore difficult because it requires a complex notion that incorporates three dimensions without being able yet to specify fully the relations among them. If the combined consensus of society is posited as covarying with stability, our theory can relate consensus-conflict to stability-instability. Moreover and importantly, we can relate particular structures of consensus - such as democratic ones that rely heavily upon agreement on rules of the game - to the level of this procedural agreement that is necessary to offset conflict over goals that lower the level of stability. Nevertheless, ambiguity is overcome by assigning the term 'consensus' to complex meaning with
因此,重建是困难的,因为它需要一个复杂的概念,包含三个维度,但又不能完全明确它们之间的关系。如果把社会的综合共识假定为与稳定性共生,那么我们的理论就可以把共识-冲突与稳定性-不稳定性联系起来。此外,重要的是,我们可以将特定的共识结构--如主要依赖于对游戏规则达成一致的民主结构--与这种程序性协议的水平联系起来,而这种程序性协议是抵消降低稳定水平的目标冲突所必需的。尽管如此,通过赋予 "共识 "一词复杂的含义,我们还是克服了模糊性。

quantified specification of agreements on each dimension. This permits one to test such important phenomena as the assumption that totalitarian regimes require, for stability, more goal consensus; democratic regimes, procedural consensus. The relations between monistic and pluralistic social structures and the structure of the consensus will allow for empirical study into which structure is most successful in maintaining stability. The extension of 'consensus' includes all shared agreements on each of the three dimensions as these dimensions are structured by their interrelationship. 'Consensus' can exist between the extremes of full agreement on all three dimensions to full disagreement on all three - an unlikely but logically possible form of 'conflict.'
对每个维度的协议进行量化说明。这样就可以检验一些重要的现象,如极权主义政权的稳定需要更多的目标共识;民主政权需要程序共识。一元和多元社会结构与共识结构之间的关系将有助于对哪种结构在维护稳定方面最为成功进行实证研究。共识 "的外延包括三个维度中每个维度上的所有共同协议,因为这些维度是由其相互关系构成的。共识 "可以存在于三个维度完全一致和三个维度完全不一致这两个极端之间--这是一种不太可能但逻辑上可能存在的 "冲突 "形式。
This reconstructed concept which focuses on the condition of shared agreements, basically, restates the common characteristics without asserting that other concepts in the semantic field are part of the concept. The roles of 'consensus' can be restated in terms of its relation to other concepts as propositions to be tested: 'Consensus' varies with 'legitimacy," or "public acceptance of the power of government." Similarly, 'consensus' varies with 'authority,' or "public acceptance of the legitimacy of power." Each of the empirical hypotheses of Burke and Rousseau serve as examples that can be stated with this reconstruction from the literature. One finds "agreement on the goals for society" as including the less general concept 'moral code,' "shared value standards for individual behavior." One can test whether "trust in leadership" varies with 'consensus'. Propositions from political philosophy generally accepted (and skeptically treated) as truisms - such as 'consensus' varies with 'stability' - can be systematically examined; the seeming truism becomes a falsifiable proposition open to scientific examination.
这一重构的概念侧重于共同协议的条件,基本上重述了其共同特征,但并未断言语义领域中的其他概念也是这一概念的一部分。共识 "的作用可以从它与其他概念的关系来重述,作为有待检验的命题:"共识 "与 "合法性 "或 "公众对政府权力的认可 "存在差异。同样,"共识 "也会随 "权威 "或 "公众对权力合法性的接受程度 "而变化。伯克和卢梭的每一个经验假说都可以作为例子,用文献中的这种重构来说明。人们会发现,"对社会目标的共识 "包括不太笼统的概念 "道德规范",即 "个人行为的共同价值标准"。我们可以检验 "对领导的信任 "是否会随着 "共识 "的变化而变化。政治哲学中被普遍接受(和怀疑)为不言而喻的命题--如 "共识 "随 "稳定性 "的变化而变化--可以得到系统的检验;貌似不言而喻的命题变成了可以科学检验的可证伪命题。
The concept also permits usage in conjunction with the admittedly vague theories concerning political education and consensus; 'political socialization to consensual values' leads to an increase in 'consensus. Indeed, precision in the reconstruction permits effective assessment of the relative success in socializing a public to accept democratic goals as compared with procedural norms. Leadership techniques and the role of leadership experience can be investigated in terms of their effects on 'consensus' and its dimensions. Moreover, the debate over the effects of 'citizenship participation' and 'stability' can be appropriately studied by investigating the effects of 'citizenship participation' on 'consensus.'
这一概念还可以与政治教育和共识等公认的模糊理论结合起来使用;"共识价值观的政治社会化 "会导致 "共识 "的增加。 事实上,与程序性规范相比,精确的重构可以有效评估公众接受民主目标的社会化进程是否相对成功。领导技巧和领导经验的作用可以从它们对 "共识 "及其维度的影响角度进行研究。此外,通过研究 "公民参与 "对 "共识 "的影响,可以适当地研究有关 "公民参与 "和 "稳定 "影响的争论。
An added benefit of the reconstruction is that it permits the ordering of concepts by suggesting questions about the entire semantic field in
重构的另一个好处是,它可以通过提出关于整个语义领域的问题,对概念进行排序。

which the term is used: Does the goal agreement dimension of consensus not capture the meaning of a public ideology? The procedure agreement, the institutional and process meanings of a constitution? Can we not better treat MacIver's definition of 'myth' as "value impregnated beliefs" as a source or cause of 'consensus"? In fact, the claim of MacIver that changing myths eventually lead to changing custom and thus to transforming institutions can be more clearly dealt with by theories stating how 'myths,' 'custom,' and 'consensus' relate to changing institutions.
的含义:共识的目标一致维度是否没有捕捉到公共意识形态的含义?宪法的程序协议、制度和过程含义?难道我们不能更好地将麦基弗将 "神话 "定义为 "价值浸染的信仰 "作为 "共识 "的来源或原因吗?事实上,麦基弗认为,神话的改变最终会导致习俗的改变,进而导致制度的变革,这一点可以通过阐述 "神话"、"习俗 "和 "共识 "与制度变革之间的关系的理论得到更清晰的阐述。
The individual, of course, is the building block of a 'consensus.' Legitimacy results from many individuals' legitimating a regime. The individual is, for the modern normative theorists, the beneficiary of 'consensus' because sharing in the public norms rather than pursuing private interests defines the 'moral life.' Although each of the societallevel concepts are inevitably related to a collection of individuals, it is important to recognize that 'consent' as an activity cannot now be directly translated into an aggregate measure. Notions of 'duty,' for example, certainly receive the standard of action from the 'consensus,' but the action of doing one's duty is related to consenting to the standard. The study of 'consensus' and 'consent' perhaps best can be treated as separable tasks because the state or condition ('consensus') and the activity ('consent') currently are used in separable semantic fields.
当然,个人是'共识'的基石。合法性来自于许多个人对制度的认可。在现代规范理论家看来,个人是'共识'的受益者,因为共享公共规范而非追求私人利益定义了'道德生活'。尽管每一个社会层面的概念都不可避免地与个人集合相关,但重要的是要认识到,"同意 "作为一种活动,现在还不能直接转化为一种总体衡量标准。例如,"义务 "的概念固然从 "共识 "中获得了行动标准,但履行义务的行动却与对标准的同意有关。对 "共识 "和 "同意 "的研究也许最适合作为可分离的任务来处理,因为状态或条件("共识")和活动("同意")目前是在可分离的语义领域中使用的。
The treatment of 'consensus' as reconstructed here emphasizes the importance of overcoming a serious disjunction in the literature between theory and research. The most obvious result of tracing down references in the current scholarly literature is evidenced in Table 2.2, which simply compares cross-references drawn from the two essays on 'consensus,' each by a distinguished scholar, that appear side-by-side in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (Sills, 1968). The first column lists the direct and indirect cross-references for the concept per se; the second, for research related to it. Except for 'democracy,' the related cross-references do not provide a link between the concept 'consensus' and the study of it. This is especially interesting because the indirect cross-references to research cite many political theorists. The problem seems to be that research focuses more on the 'consent' semantic field than on 'consensus.' The reconstruction suggested here overcomes the limited research prospects for 'consensus.'
本文对 "共识 "的重构强调了克服文献中理论与研究之间严重脱节的重要性。追溯当前学术文献中的参考文献最明显的结果见表 2.2,该表简单比较了《国际社会科学百科全书》(Sills,1968 年)中并列的两篇关于 "共识 "的论文中的交叉引用,这两篇论文各由一位著名学者撰写。第一栏列出了该概念本身的直接和间接交叉引用;第二栏列出了与之相关的研究。除 "民主 "外,相关交叉引用并未提供 "共识 "概念与相关研究之间的联系。这一点尤为有趣,因为与研究相关的间接交叉引用引用了许多政治理论家的观点。问题似乎在于研究更多地关注 "同意 "语义领域而非 "共识"。本文建议的重建克服了'共识'研究前景有限的问题。
The discussion of the semantic fields of 'consensus' and 'consent' within political analysis could be made more complex if either of two
在政治分析中讨论 "共识 "和 "同意 "的语义领域可能会变得更加复杂,如果出现以下两种情况之一
TABLE 2.2 表 2.2
Conceptual and Study Cross-References for "Consensus" as Listed in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
国际社会科学百科全书》中所列 "共识 "的概念和研究对照表

"共识的概念 "a
"The Concept of
Consensus" a

"共识研究 "b
"The Study of
Consensus" b
Direct (see also): 直接(另见):

权威 冲突 合作 民主 平等 意识形态 规范 价值观
Authority
Conflict
Cooperation
Democracy
Equality
Ideology
Norms
Values

民主 多数决制 现代化 社会化
Democracy
Majority Rule
Modernization
Socialization
Indirect (other related materials):
间接(其他相关材料):
Law 法律

政治社会学 公众舆论 社会契约 Burke Hobbes Locke Mill Paine Rousseau Tocqueville
Political
Sociology
Public Opinion
Social Contract
Burke
Hobbes
Locke
Mill
Paine
Rousseau
Tocqueville
a. Edward Shils (1968: 266).
a.Edward Shils(1968:266)。
b. Lipsitz (1968: 271).
b.Lipsitz (1968: 271).
important related problems were introduced. The first is the problem of fitting 'political culture' within the semantic field of 'consensus.' In part the problem is that of synonymy. The number of meanings assigned to the label "political culture" are just as entangled as those we have explored surrounding 'consensus,' and often they overlap with consensus. The obligation correctly to test equivalence of usages before asserting synonymy prevents even partial demonstration of how each of the many usages of "political culture" fit the 'consensus' field. Indeed, much of the research into political culture is closely related to the denotative side of the meaning of consensus. 'Political culture,' because of its overlap with 'consensus,' should (once it is itself clarified) be a concept that permits one to particularize structures of consensus as one moves down the ladder of abstraction in researching particular societies. One must remain cautious in these assertions, however, because the concept 'political culture' must be reconstructed before one dare assert even this much about how it fits within the semantic field of 'consensus.'
提出了一些重要的相关问题。首先是将 "政治文化 "纳入 "共识 "语义领域的问题。在某种程度上,这是一个同义词问题。赋予 "政治文化 "这一标签的意义数量与我们围绕 "共识 "所探讨的意义数量一样错综复杂,而且常常与共识重叠。在断言同义之前,我们有义务正确检验各种用法之间的等同性,这甚至妨碍了我们对 "政治文化 "的众多用法中的每一种用法如何与 "共识 "领域相匹配进行部分论证。事实上,对政治文化的研究大多与 "共识 "含义的指称方面密切相关。由于 "政治文化 "与 "共识 "有重叠之处,因此(一旦其本身得到澄清)"政治文化 "应该是一个允许人们在研究特定社会时,沿着抽象的阶梯将共识结构具体化的概念。然而,我们必须对这些断言保持谨慎,因为在我们敢于断言'政治文化'如何与'共识'的语义领域相吻合之前,我们必须对'政治文化'这一概念进行重构。
The second problem that could be introduced is that of relating the political science and sociological semantic fields of 'consensus.' Ultimately, I believe this problem can be resolved with little difficulty even though one sociologist, Orrin E. Klapp (1957), may overstate the importance of consensus when he suggests that
第二个可能引入的问题是如何将政治学和社会学的 "共识 "语义领域联系起来。尽管一位社会学家奥林-E-克拉普(Orrin E. Klapp,1957 年)可能夸大了共识的重要性,但我相信这个问题最终可以迎刃而解。
consensus should have an importance in sociology comparable to that of energy in physics - namely as a unifying concept, an abstraction that will include and relate more specific concepts and data. Light, heat, sound, and electromagnetism are forms of energy; so, I think, culture, structure, norm, role, symbol, and so on, should be treated as forms of consensus.
共识在社会学中的重要性应与能量在物理学中的重要性相当--即作为一个统一的概念,一个抽象的概念,它将包括并联系更具体的概念和数据。光、热、声音和电磁都是能量的形式;因此,我认为,文化、结构、规范、角色、符号等都应被视为共识的形式。
Klapp's own sociological semantic fields for 'consensus' adds 'anomie,' 'class,' 'consciousness,' 'integration,' 'morale,' 'norm,' 'race,' 'solidarity,' 'status,' and 'system.' Few of these terms are not relevant to a political science reconstruction, but the research and theoretical literatures of the two disciplines currently are separated by sufficient differences to recognize that one must very carefully align the two. This future effort, however, should prove of value to each semantic field because the two disciplines' conceptual analyses struggle with similar difficulties although in different fields. For example, the problem of designing a concept that permits the testing of propositions about the degree of consensus is pursued by T. J. Scheff (1967). In sum, the two semantic fields (even if maintained as distinct) provide for each other at least symbiotic treatments (for valuable examples, see Horowitz, 1962: 177-188; Newcombe, 1959: 277-292; Riley et al., 1952: 197-206; Gross, 1956: 174-179; and Gibbs, 1965: 586-594).
克拉普自己的社会学语义领域为 "共识 "添加了 "反常"、"阶级"、"意识"、"融合"、"士气"、"规范"、"种族"、"团结"、"地位 "和 "制度"。这些术语很少与政治学的重建无关,但目前这两个学科的研究和理论文献之间存在着足够的差异,因此我们必须非常谨慎地将两者统一起来。不过,这种未来的努力应该会证明对每个语义领域都有价值,因为这两个学科的概念分析虽然领域不同,但都在努力解决类似的难题。例如,T. J. Scheff(1967 年)就在研究如何设计一个概念来检验有关共识程度的命题。总之,这两个语义领域(即使保持其独特性)为彼此提供了至少是共生的处理方法(有价值的例子见 Horowitz, 1962: 177-188;Newcombe, 1959: 277-292;Riley 等人, 1952: 197-206;Gross, 1956:174-179; and Gibbs, 1965:586-594).

VII. 'CONSENSUS' FOR EMPIRICAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
VII.实证分析和规范分析的 "共识

The reconstruction of 'consensus' is, of course, a scientific enterprise, with the objective of the effort being a more useful concept for political theory and research. Throughout, although recognizing that normative connotations abound in the literature, commitment to the scientific enterprise has allowed assessment of the empirical content of conceptions developed by others with normative connotations in mind. The analyst's own values need not be introduced in analysis since, by restricting his role to that of an observer, he can define, describe, and
当然,重建 "共识 "是一项科学事业,其目标是为政治理论和研究提供一个更有用的概念。自始至终,尽管认识到文献中充斥着规范性内涵,但对科学事业的承诺允许对他人在考虑到规范性内涵的情况下提出的概念的经验内容进行评估。分析师在分析中不必引入自己的价值观,因为通过将自己的角色限制为观察者,他可以定义、描述和

explain. Indeed, the effort here seems to build upon the point of A. D. Lindsay in regard to theorizing about shared beliefs and societies:The thing that matters to the state or any association is not what
解释。事实上,这里的努力似乎是建立在 A. D. Lindsay 关于共同信仰和社会理论化的观点之上:对国家或任何协会来说,重要的不是什么

political theorists think about it but what its own members suppose it
政治理论家对它的看法,而是它自己的成员认为它

to be: their beliefs about it and their loyalties to the purposes it is
是:他们对它的信念,以及他们对它的目的的忠诚。

supposed to support, in virtue of which they go on paying their taxes
他们本应支持,但却因此继续纳税

or subscriptions and act as loyal members of it. There would be no
或订阅,并成为其忠实成员。没有

state or association in practice if this kind of theory were not part of
如果这种理论不是《世界人权宣言》的一部分

the actual facts [1962: 41].
1962: 41]。
The thing that matters to the state or any association is not what political theorists think about it but what its own members suppose it to be: their beliefs about it and their loyalties to the purposes it is supposed to support, in virtue of which they go on paying their taxes or subscriptions and act as loyal members of it. There would be no state or association in practice if this kind of theory were not part of the actual facts [1962: 41].
对国家或任何社团来说,重要的不是政治理论家对它的看法,而是它的成员对它的假设:他们对它的信仰以及他们对它所支持的目标的忠诚,他们凭着这些信念继续纳税或缴纳会费,并作为它的忠诚成员行事。如果这种理论不是事实的一部分,那么实际上就不会有国家或协会[1962: 41]。
This point allows the members of a public to provide the particulars of a society's normative standards as shared in its 'consensus' rather than interject our own assessment as to whether the society's standards are proper. We, of course, may personally choose to do so, but not as political scientists: at the top of a conceptual ladder of abstraction the definition must be general enough to apply to all societies, no matter whether they are "open" or "closed," "monistic" or "pluralistic," or whether we personally consider them to be "good" or "evil." What counts in assessing a reconstructed concept of 'consensus' is that it clarifies and improves our research into a society's normative structure. The understanding of 'consensus' will have praxis implications for political action. But these are implications from the perspective of a political actor, not a scientific observer.
这一点允许公众成员提供社会 "共识 "中共享的规范标准的具体内容,而不是插入我们自己对该社会标准是否适当的评估。当然,我们个人可以选择这样做,但作为政治学家不能这样做:在抽象概念阶梯的顶端,定义必须足够宽泛,以适用于所有社会,无论它们是 "开放 "还是 "封闭",是 "一元 "还是 "多元",也无论我们个人认为它们是 "善 "还是 "恶"。评估 "共识 "概念的重构,最重要的是它能澄清和改进我们对社会规范结构的研究。对 "共识 "的理解将对政治行动产生实践影响。但这些影响是从政治行动者的角度出发的,而不是从科学观察者的角度出发的。
Few of our universal concepts, such as 'consensus,' 'ideology,' 'stability,' 'integration,' or even 'party,' are free of evaluative connotations although they may be less apparent in the latter terms. Close attention to systematic conceptual analysis permits one to bracket these connotations and deal with them rather than discard all theories tainted by them. Many scholars now argue that 'positivism' itself carries evaluative connotations, so the goal of empirical concept clarification must keep separate the scientific conceptualization and the evaluative connotations even if those we analyze do not. Indeed, most critics of empirical analysis criticize special language usages from a different, usually ideological, language system than that of a disciplined profession's technical language; that is, in Wittgenstien's sense, they attempt to discard the scientific Lebensform with its special language constructed for the purpose of explanation on the bases of some other language system. It is important in the process of developing a scientific language to employ different or qualified terms (such as 'consensus') if we are focusing solely on the empirical dimension of a term's meaning, as was
我们的普遍概念,如 "共识"、"意识形态"、"稳定"、"一体化",甚至 "政党",几乎都不带有评价性内涵,尽管在后一类术语中这些内涵可能不那么明显。对系统概念分析的密切关注使我们能够剔除这些内涵并加以处理,而不是抛弃所有受其玷污的理论。现在,许多学者认为,"实证主义 "本身就带有评价性内涵,因此,实证概念澄清的目标必须将科学概念化与评价性内涵分开,即使我们分析的那些概念并不如此。事实上,大多数实证分析的批评者所批评的特殊语言用法来自不同的语言系统,通常是意识形态的语言系统,而不是学科专业的技术语言系统;也就是说,在维特根斯坦的意义上,他们试图抛弃科学的生活形态及其在其他语言系统基础上为解释目的而构建的特殊语言。在发展科学语言的过程中,如果我们只关注术语意义的经验维度,那么使用不同的或有限定的术语(如 "共识")是非常重要的,正如我们在《科学》一书中所做的那样。

done above for Burke ('general opinion') and Rousseau ('general will'). Had Burke and Rousseau been able to do so themselves, they may have realized areas of agreement in their work - and indeed been able belter to debate each other rationally on the real evaluative connotations which distinguished them. Had they seen that each's theory depended on consensus, the normative and empirical ambiguities would have been more easily avoided.
如果伯克("一般观点")和卢梭("一般意志")能够做到这一点,他们可能会意识到自己作品中的一致之处--并且确实能够就区别于他们的真正评价性内涵进行理性辩论。如果伯克和卢梭自己能够这样做,他们可能就会意识到他们的工作中存在着一致的地方--事实上,他们还能够就区分他们的真正的评价内涵进行理性的辩论。如果他们看到各自的理论依赖于共识,那么规范和经验上的模糊之处就会更容易避免。
Because traditional theories have been incorporated in this analysis without finding enormous differences between them and contemporary theories, concept construction seems to be in order as our measurements of the dimensions and their interrelations improve. The fimal construction of 'consensus' will inevitably parallel the reconstruction in the previous section. Although there are these loose ends resulting from the measurement difficulties, the only real loss in clarifying the traditional meanings of consensus are those associated with "a sense of belongingness" and similar vague qualities. But these can be viewed as accompanying characteristics or as additional causes and/or consequences of a high level of consensus. Our definition does not unsctule the string of neighboring and associated words (Rule 7 of Sartori, this volume) because it can be related in empirical hypotheses to the others. The terms cross-referenced with 'consensus' in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences are 'authority,' 'conflict,' 'cooperation,' 'democracy,' 'equality,' 'ideology,' 'norms,' and 'values' (Shils, 1968: 226). None are equivalents for 'consensus.' All terms can be defined and used in meaningful hypotheses about consensus or are components of the definition of 'consensus.' Thus, Rule 7 (Sartori, this volume) is also satisfied. This reflects sufficient parsimony in treatment of accompanying characteristics that, if the definiens is adequate in terms of specificity, we have satisfied Rules 8 and 9 (Sartori, this volume). Unfortunately, the entailed terms remain sufficiently ambiguous, and the relational terms unspecified by a precise logic, so that full construction remains a task to be completed as clarification of the semantic field is improved by pursuing careful rescarch.
由于传统理论已被纳入本分析中,但并未发现它们与当代理论之间存在巨大差异,因此,随着我们对各维度及其相互关系的测量结果不断改进,概念的构建似乎是有必要的。共识 "概念的构建不可避免地要与上一节中的重构并行。尽管由于测量困难而出现了一些枝节,但在澄清共识的传统含义方面,唯一真正的损失是那些与 "归属感 "和类似的模糊品质相关的含义。但这些都可以看作是高度共识的伴随特征或额外原因和/或结果。我们的定义并不排除邻近词和相关词的串联(萨托利规则 7,本卷),因为它可以在经验假设中与其他词相关联。在《国际社会科学百科全书》中,与 "共识 "相互参照的术语有 "权威"、"冲突"、"合作"、"民主"、"平等"、"意识形态"、"规范 "和 "价值观"(Shils, 1968: 226)。它们都不能等同于 "共识"。所有术语都可以定义并用于有关共识的有意义的假设中,或者是 "共识 "定义的组成部分。因此,规则 7(萨托利,本卷)也得到了满足。这反映了在处理伴随特征时的充分简约性,如果定义在具体性方面是充分的,我们就满足了规则 8 和 9(萨托利,本卷)。 遗憾的是,蕴含的术语仍然足够含糊,关系术语也没有精确的逻辑说明,因此,在通过仔细的重新搜索改善语义领域的澄清之后,完整的构建仍然是一项有待完成的任务。
The reconstructed concept, however, serves as a very useful concept in theoretical analysis and social research. The effort to move toward a construction is facilitated by identifying ways in which 'consensus' (as here defined) can lead to important generalizations, and then research, in conjunction with other concepts in its semantic field. For example, the concept can be employed to develop a typology of different styles of legitimate and illegitimate opposition groups, as these groups are
不过,重构后的概念在理论分析和社会研究中是一个非常有用的概念。通过确定 "共识"(此处的定义)可导致重要概括的方式,然后结合其语义领域中的其他概念进行研究,可促进构建共识的努力。例如,可以利用这一概念对合法和非法反对派团体的不同风格进行分类,因为这些团体是

assessed by members of the public along the three dimensions (Ciraham, 1971c). The typology permits specification of hypotheses about the groups' styles of action that are easily subjected to empirical testing. Part of the process of conceptual analysis that we often overlook is the intellectual excitement that occurs as careful reconstruction of a term provides suggestions for new theories and explanations as we work with the concept and its precise relation with other terms in the semantic field, such as 'legitimacy.'
Ciraham, 1971c)。这种类型学允许对群体的行动风格提出假设,而这些假设很容易进行实证检验。在概念分析的过程中,我们经常忽略的是,当我们在处理概念及其与语义领域中其他术语(如 "合法性")的精确关系时,对一个术语的仔细重构为新理论和新解释提供了建议,从而产生了智力上的兴奋。
A related point should be added concerning the gap between the concept 'consensus' and research employing the term. The gap, as we noted above, seems related to the lack of linkage between the scocial and individual levels of analysis. Few research studies have seriously attempted to connect 'consensus' and its consequences. Excceptions, such as the socialization research that emerged from David Easton's systems approach, are far outweighed by the studies of opinion that were so simply designed that they failed to lest the relevant propensitions. As the semantic fields come into) better focus, so) do the important research propositions and therefore portential research dosigns.
与此相关的一点是,"共识 "概念与使用该术语的研究之间存在差距。如上文所述,这一差距似乎与社会分析和个人分析之间缺乏联系有关。很少有研究认真尝试将 "共识 "与其后果联系起来。例外情况,如戴维-伊斯顿(David Easton)的系统方法所产生的社会化研究,远远超过了那些设计简单、没有考虑到相关倾向的舆论研究。 随着语义领域得到更好的关注,重要的研究命题也得到了关注,因此也就有了可能的研究方向。
There remains a special difficulty in dealing with 'consensus' that emerges from the different semantic fields of 'conserisus' and 'consent.' The functions of 'consensus,' so) to speak, are often seen best in human activity: "Dikes of opinion" provide, according to Key, limits on the choices by leaders in their efforts to gain 'consent.' Many similar examples can be found, and very often the focus is on the activity of political leaders (Payne, 1965). Gabriel A. Almond (1950), for example, provides a model of 'elite consensus' as the key to understanding American foreign policy. The important point is that one notices a special role of 'leadership' in attempting to connect the semantic fields of 'consensus' and 'consent.' Morerver, different approaches to resolving conflict (e.g., compromise, corsperation) are themselves related to leadership. The dynamic that permits 'consensus' to be viewed as breth a cause and an effect in its relation with 'stability' and, indeed, 'legitimacy' may be the product of the fact that leaders are both limited by 'consensus' in forming policy agreements and at the sarne time are legitimated in their efforts by the evolving 'consensus.' Again, the reconstruction of 'consensus' prepares us to move forward toward a construction that will permit definitions of all terms in the proper semantic field, and advance toward linking the field of 'consensus' with that of 'consent.'
在处理 "consensus"(共识)时,仍有一个特殊的难题,它产生于 "conserisus "和 "consent "这两个不同的语义领域。可以说,"共识 "的功能通常在人类活动中体现得淋漓尽致:Key 认为,"意见堤坝 "为领导者在努力争取 "同意 "时的选择提供了限制。类似的例子不胜枚举,而焦点往往集中在政治领袖的活动上(Payne,1965 年)。例如,加布里埃尔-阿尔蒙德(Gabriel A. Almond,1950 年)提供了一个 "精英共识 "模型,作为理解美国外交政策的关键。重要的一点是,人们注意到 "领导 "在试图连接 "共识 "和 "同意 "这两个语义领域时所扮演的特殊角色。此外,解决冲突的不同方法(如妥协、合作)本身也与领导力有关。共识 "在与 "稳定 "以及 "合法性 "的关系中既是因又是果,这种动态可能是这样一个事实的产物:领导者在形成政策协议时既受 "共识 "的限制,同时又因不断发展的 "共识 "而使其努力合法化。同样,对'共识'的重构为我们提供了条件,使我们能够在适当的语义领域内对所有术语进行定义,并将'共识'领域与'同意'领域联系起来。

NOTES 注释

  1. See for the examples, in order, Strauss (1953); Graham (1970: 80-98); Graham (1972: 29-45); Easton (1965); Deutsch (1963); Friedrich (1963); Ranney and Kendall (1956); McClosky (1964: 361-382); McClosky et al. (1960: 406-27); Prothro and Grigg (1960: 276-294); and Wolff (1968: chap. 5). The best general introduction to the term remains Partridge (1971).
    例子依次参见 Strauss (1953);Graham (1970: 80-98);Graham (1972: 29-45);Easton (1965);Deutsch (1963);Friedrich (1963);Ranney and Kendall (1956);McClosky (1964: 361-382);McClosky et al. (1960: 406-27);Prothro and Grigg (1960: 276-294);以及 Wolff (1968: 第五章)。对该术语最好的一般性介绍仍然是 Partridge (1971)。
  2. In addition to the general reflections of Karl Marx and the more concrete arguments about evolving and future community norms of Lenin, see Jürgen Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests (1971). It should be noted that although the study of false consciousness and utopian projections falls into prescriptive theory and questions that will not be pursued in this analysis because of space and relevance, Marx's work has influenced many current empirical conceptions and studies. The special work in the area of developing an open-ended consensus process for rational public deliberation by Habermas can be best pursued in Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics (1970); Theory and Practice (1973); Legitimation Crisis (1975); and Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), whose titles suggest both their relevance and Marx's influence.
    除了卡尔-马克思的一般性思考和列宁关于演变中和未来社区规范的更为具体的论证之外,还可参阅于尔根-哈贝马斯的《知识与人类利益》(1971 年)。需要指出的是,尽管对虚假意识和乌托邦预测的研究属于规定性理论和问题,由于篇幅和相关性的原因,本分析报告将不再继续探讨,但马克思的著作影响了当前许多实证概念和研究。哈贝马斯在发展开放式共识过程以促进理性公共审议领域的特殊工作,可在《迈向理性社会》一书中进行深入探讨:学生抗议、科学与政治》(1970 年)、《理论与实践》(1973 年)、《合法化危机》(1975 年)和《传播与社会的演变》(1979 年),这些著作的标题既表明了它们的相关性,也表明了马克思的影响。
  3. Giovanni Sartori's forthcoming Democratic Theory Revisited (chap. 5) deals carefully with the importance of precise definition in relating 'consent' and 'consensus' to 'democracy.'
    乔瓦尼-萨托利(Giovanni Sartori)即将出版的《重新审视民主理论》(第 5 章)仔细论述了准确定义 "同意 "和 "共识 "与 "民主 "之间关系的重要性。
  4. See the discussion of Alfred Weber by Brecht (1959: 350-352) where it is clear that Weber's antiscientific attitude does not prevent one's use of his insights in developing scientifically useful concepts and theories to capture the empirical dimensions of consensus.
    参见布莱希特对阿尔弗雷德-韦伯的论述(1959:350-352),其中明确指出,韦伯的反科学态度并不妨碍人们利用他的见解来发展科学上有用的概念和理论,以捕捉共识的经验层面。
  5. The role of language usage in defining communities and the meaning of shared existence is central in our analysis. See, for an application to scientific communities, Kuhn (1970); for political science, Bluhm (1982).
    在我们的分析中,语言用法在界定社群和共同存在的意义方面所起的作用至关重要。关于科学社群的应用,请参见 Kuhn (1970);关于政治学,请参见 Bluhm (1982)。
  6. Cours de philosophie positive, fifth ed., vol. I, p. 26, translated by and quoted in Aron (1968: vol. I, 128), sets the general framework for our considerations.
    Cours de philosophie positive》,第五版,第一卷,第 26 页,由 Aron 翻译并引用(1968 年:第一卷,128 页),为我们的思考设定了总体框架。
  7. These general summaries of the classical conception are drawn from Graham (1971a: 19-36) which provides a summary of Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics on social order and the many necessary references for this discussion.
    这些对古典概念的概括摘自 Graham (1971a: 19-36),该书对柏拉图的《共和国》和亚里士多德的《政治学》中有关社会秩序的内容进行了总结,并为本讨论提供了许多必要的参考资料。
  8. See his A System Analysis of Political Life (1965), passim, but especially chap. 18. It should be noted that Easton's analysis is relevant in future efforts to deal with the possible synonymy between 'consensus' and 'political culture.'
    见他的《政治生活的系统分析》(1965 年),各章,尤其是第 18 章。18.需要指出的是,伊斯顿的分析对今后处理 "共识 "与 "政治文化 "之间可能存在的同义关系具有重要意义。
  9. Giovanni Sartori (1973) carefully traces the separation of the "political" and "social." The importance of recognizing that the classical works do not employ this distinction cannot be overemphasized.
    乔瓦尼-萨托利(Giovanni Sartori,1973 年)仔细追溯了 "政治 "与 "社会 "的分离。认识到古典著作并没有采用这种区分,其重要性无论如何强调都不为过。
  10. See, for extensive defense of the interpretations here summarized, Graham (1970, 1972).
    关于此处概述的解释的广泛辩护,见 Graham (1970, 1972)。
  11. Toulmin (1960) treats the development of ethical discourse under shared norms (which limit questions) and the extension of norms (and thus limiting questions) in a way that should permit the development of an empirical model for change in a political consensus.
    图尔敏(Toulmin,1960 年)在论述共同规范(限制问题)下的伦理话语发展以及规范的扩展(从而限制问题)时,采用的方式应能为政治共识的变化建立一个经验模型。
  12. See Kendall (1963: 21-49) and Hyneman (1964: 272) for two examples of democratic theorists who see limits on the disagreements over goals.
    参见 Kendall (1963: 21-49)和 Hyneman (1964: 272),这两位民主理论家认为目标分歧是有限度的。
  13. See his Man and His Government (1963) for the later version that treats the recognition of order as "what may appear as an utterly chaotic arrangement to an outsider who does not share the values and beliefs of the particular community [but] may in fact constitute order of a high degree to those who share these values" (p. 338).
    参见他的《人与政府》(1963 年)的后期版本,该版本将对秩序的认识视为 "对于不认同特定社区的价值观和信仰的外人来说,可能是一种完全混乱的安排,[但]对于认同这些价值观的人来说,实际上可能构成高度的秩序"(第 338 页)。
  14. Other important works that should also be consulted on the particular dimensions of consensus include Leiserson (1958: 66-68, 138); Key, (1958: 243-245); Hyman (1959); Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955); Smith et al., (1956); Lane and Sears (1964); Burdick and Brodbeck (1959); and N. H. Nie et al. (1976). The major advantage of Key's work, although based on surveys that are now dated, is that he does develop the many dimensions of consensus in a single theoretical structure (albeit a most general one).
    关于共识的特定维度,还应参考的其他重要著作包括:Leiserson (1958: 66-68, 138);Key, (1958: 243-245);Hyman (1959);Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955);Smith et al. (1956);Lane and Sears (1964);Burdick and Brodbeck (1959);以及 N. H. Nie et al. (1976)。Key 的研究虽然是基于现已过时的调查,但其主要优势在于他确实在一个单一的理论结构(尽管是一个最一般的结构)中发展了共识的多个维度。
  15. Key (1963: 32-53). See also chapter 5 of Sartori's forthcoming Democratic Theory Revisited.
    Key (1963: 32-53).另见 Sartori 即将出版的《重新审视民主理论》第 5 章。
  16. This charge is seldom established in a precise way, but rather depends on reading potential interpretive consequences into an empirical theory. For an example of such misreading compare David Easton (1964) with Spragens (1973: 77-83).
    这种指控很少以精确的方式确立,而是取决于将潜在的解释性后果解读为经验理论。这种误读的一个例子是大卫-伊斯顿(David Easton,1964 年)与斯普拉贡斯(Spragens,1973 年:77-83 年)的比较。
  17. Graham and Pride (1972: 272-310) measures intensity of commitment on each dimension. See also Graham and Pride (1971).
    Graham 和 Pride(1972:272-310)对每个维度的承诺强度进行了测量。另见 Graham 和 Pride (1971)。
  18. See especially chapter 3 of Dahl (1956) where this proposition parallels one from his model of consensus on polyarchy norms. Dahl's actual set of relations describing the process is presented as a system that could be applied to any particular norms, democratic or authoritarian.
    特别参见 Dahl(1956 年)的第 3 章,其中这一命题与他的多政体规范共识模型中的一个命题相似。达尔描述这一过程的一系列实际关系被视为一个可适用于任何特定规范(民主或专制)的系统。
  19. Graham (1971b: 54-78, 191-193) deals with the potential for developing a scientific observer perspective that incorporates in its concepts the political actor's perspective. For an extension of the analysis, see Graham (1982).
    格雷厄姆(1971b: 54-78, 191-193)论述了发展科学观察者视角的可能性,这种视角的概念中包含了政治行为者的视角。该分析的延伸见 Graham (1982)。
  20. The relation between political socialization and consensual values, drawn from Easton's systems analysis, is the focus of such works as Hess and Torney (1967) and Easton and Dennis (1969). The weaknesses of the design of most other public opinion research on consensus are discussed in Willhoite (1963: 299-303) and Everson (1970: ).
    从伊斯顿的系统分析中得出的政治社会化与共识价值观之间的关系是赫斯和托尼(1967)以及伊斯顿和丹尼斯(1969)等著作的重点。Willhoite(1963:299-303)和 Everson(1970: )讨论了大多数其他有关共识的民意研究在设计上的弱点。

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