Plato’s Aesthetics 柏拉图的美学

If aesthetics is the philosophical inquiry into beauty, or another aesthetic value, and art, then the striking feature of Plato’s dialogues is that he devotes as much time as he does to both topics and yet treats them oppositely. Art, mostly as represented by poetry, is closer to a greatest danger than any other phenomenon Plato speaks of. Beauty is close to a greatest good. Can there be such a thing as “Plato’s aesthetics” that contains both positions?
如果美学是对美或其他美学价值以及艺术的哲学探讨，那么柏拉图对话的一个显著特征是，他在这两个主题上花费了同样多的时间，却以相反的方式对待它们。艺术，主要是通过诗歌表现的，离柏拉图所谈论的任何其他现象更接近于最大的危险。美则接近于最大的善。是否可以存在一种“柏拉图的美学”，同时包含这两种立场？

Strictly speaking the phrase “Plato’s aesthetics” is anachronistic, given that this area of philosophy only came to be identified in the last few centuries. But even those who take aesthetics more broadly and permit the term will still find something exploratory in Plato’s treatments of art and beauty. He might be best described as seeking to discover the vocabulary and issues of aesthetics. For this reason Plato’s readers will not come upon a single aesthetic theory in the dialogues. For the same reason they are uniquely situated to watch core concepts of aesthetics being defined: beauty, imitation, inspiration.
严格来说，“柏拉图的美学”这个短语是时代错误的，因为这个哲学领域直到最近几个世纪才被认定。但即使是那些更广泛地看待美学并允许使用这个术语的人，仍然会在柏拉图对艺术和美的论述中发现一些探索性的内容。他可能最好的描述是试图发现美学的词汇和问题。因此，柏拉图的读者在对话中不会遇到单一的美学理论。出于同样的原因，他们独特地处于观察美学核心概念被定义的地位：美、模仿、灵感。

There is something more to be said about the label “aesthetics” that is important about Plato. One normally speaks of aesthetics or a philosophy of art when the theory covers more than a single art form. For understandable reasons the Platonic dialogues focus on poetry, with special energy directed toward dramatic poetry. Tragedy and comedy were culturally dominant art forms during Socrates’ lifetime and much of Plato’s. Innovative, memorable, and now long enduring, Athenian drama invited scrutiny. Even so, and tellingly, when the dialogues comment on poetry they also look at it in tandem with the visual arts – not capriciously either, but in keeping with an ancient Greek tradition of comparing art forms – and in this approach toward an overarching theory they deserve to be described as practicing or undertaking the philosophy of art.
关于“美学”这个标签，还有更多值得一提的内容，这对柏拉图来说是重要的。通常，当理论涵盖的不止一种艺术形式时，人们才会谈论美学或艺术哲学。出于可理解的原因，柏拉图的对话集中于诗歌，特别是对戏剧诗歌的关注。悲剧和喜剧在苏格拉底和柏拉图的生前是文化上主导的艺术形式。创新、令人难忘且历久弥新的雅典戏剧引发了审视。即便如此，值得注意的是，当对话评论诗歌时，它们也会与视觉艺术一起审视——这并不是随意的，而是遵循古希腊比较艺术形式的传统——在这种对整体理论的探讨中，它们应被描述为实践或进行艺术哲学。

James Porter argues that analogizing between art forms characterized a culture of sensualist aesthetic thinking before Plato and so makes possible the early appearance of a general idea “art.” Poetry commented on architecture, drama on rhetoric (Porter 2010, 188). In another fashion tragedy compared itself to sculpture (Pappas 2012b, 325). Even if one finds some of these interpretations of aesthetic analysis controversial, there is no denying that the Homeric “shield of Achilles” passage (Iliad 18.479–609) implies a parallel between the shield’s presentation of war and peace and the treatment of those subjects in Homer. What Hephaestus depicts on the shield, Homer depicts in his epics (Cunningham 2007, Francis 2009).
詹姆斯·波特认为，在柏拉图之前，艺术形式之间的类比特征体现了一种感性美学思维的文化，从而使得“艺术”这一普遍概念的早期出现成为可能。诗歌评论建筑，戏剧评论修辞（波特 2010, 188）。以另一种方式，悲剧将自己与雕塑进行比较（帕帕斯 2012b, 325）。即使有人认为这些美学分析的解释存在争议，但不可否认的是，荷马的“阿基琉斯之盾”段落（伊利亚特 18.479–609）暗示了盾牌对战争与和平的呈现与荷马对这些主题的处理之间的平行关系。赫淮斯托斯在盾牌上描绘的，荷马在他的史诗中描绘的（坎宁安 2007, 弗朗西斯 2009）。

The poet Simonides makes analogizing between art forms explicit. “Painting is silent poetry and poetry is painting that speaks” (Plutarch The Glory of the Athenians 3.1, 346f-347a). A common element unites the forms of art even though poetry casts itself as the standard that painting fails to achieve (possessing as it does the voice that painting lacks).
诗人西蒙尼德斯明确指出艺术形式之间的类比。“绘画是无声的诗歌，而诗歌是会说话的绘画”（普鲁塔克 雅典人的荣耀 3.1, 346f-347a）。尽管诗歌将自己视为绘画未能达到的标准（因为它拥有绘画所缺乏的声音），但一种共同的元素将这些艺术形式联系在一起。

Plato’s explication of poetic mimêsis by means of the mimêsis in painting (see below on Republic Book 10) belongs in this analogizing tradition, as Aristotle’s account of mimêsis will after him (Poetics Chapter 4 1448b4–19; Halliwell 2002, 178). On both theories, painting and poetry belong together as fellow species within a larger artistic genus. However faulty the theory that joins them, it attempts to describe the broader genus.
柏拉图通过绘画中的模仿对诗歌的模仿进行阐释（见下文《理想国》第 10 卷），属于这种类比传统，亚里士多德对模仿的论述在他之后也将如此（《诗学》第 4 章 1448b4–19；哈利威尔 2002, 178）。在这两种理论中，绘画和诗歌作为更大艺术种类中的同类物种而共同存在。尽管将它们联系在一起的理论存在缺陷，但它试图描述更广泛的种类。

At the same time, Plato appears to consider painting on its own terms, and not merely illustrating a process also found in poetry. Many passages speak in approving terms of painting and sculpture, or recognize the skill involved in making them as a technê “profession, craft” (Ion 532e–533a; Gorgias 430c, 448b, 453c–d, 503e; Protagoras 318b–c; see Demand 1975, Halliwell 2002, 37–43). Even the famously anti-poetic Republic contains positive references to paintings and drawings. Sometimes these are metaphors for acts of imagination and political reform (472d, 500e–501c), sometimes literal images whose attractiveness helps to form a young ruler’s character (400d–401a), in any case visual arts appreciated on their own terms and for their own sake.
与此同时，柏拉图似乎将绘画视为其自身的艺术形式，而不仅仅是诗歌中也存在的一个过程。许多段落以赞许的语气谈论绘画和雕塑，或承认制作它们所涉及的技能作为一种技艺“职业，工艺”（伊翁 532e–533a；高尔吉亚斯 430c, 448b, 453c–d, 503e；普罗塔戈拉斯 318b–c；见 Demand 1975, Halliwell 2002, 37–43）。即使是以反诗著称的理想国也包含对绘画和素描的积极提及。有时这些是想象和政治改革行为的隐喻（472d, 500e–501c），有时是字面意义上的图像，其吸引力有助于塑造年轻统治者的性格（400d–401a），无论如何，视觉艺术都被独立欣赏，并因其自身的价值而受到重视。

When the Republic treats painting and poetry together, in other words, it does so possessed of an independent sense of visual depiction. It aims at developing a philosophy of art.
当《共和国》将绘画和诗歌结合在一起时，换句话说，它是以一种独立的视觉表现感来进行的。它旨在发展一种艺术哲学。

The subject “Plato’s aesthetics” calls for care. If perennially footnoted by later philosophers Plato has also been much thumbnailed. Clichés accompany his name. It is worth going slowly through the main topics of Plato’s aesthetics—not in the search for a theory unlike anything that has been said, but so that background shading and details may emerge, for a result that perhaps contrasts with the commonplaces about his thought as a human face contrasts with the cartoon reduction of it.
“柏拉图的美学”这一主题需要谨慎对待。如果说后来的哲学家们对柏拉图的论述不断附注，那么柏拉图的形象也常常被简化。陈词滥调伴随着他的名字。值得慢慢梳理柏拉图美学的主要主题——而不是寻求一种与以往所说的完全不同的理论，而是让背景阴影和细节浮现出来，以便得出一个或许与关于他思想的常见看法形成对比的结果，就像人类面孔与其卡通化简化形象之间的对比。

In what follows, citations to passages in Plato use “Stephanus pages,” based on a sixteenth-century edition of Plato’s works. The page numbers in that edition, together with the letters a–e, have become standard. Almost every translation of Plato includes the Stephanus page numbers and letters in the margins, or at the top of the page. Thus, “Symposium 204b” refers to the same brief passage in every edition and every translation of Plato.
在以下内容中，对柏拉图段落的引用使用“斯特凡努斯页码”，基于十六世纪的柏拉图作品版。该版本的页码以及字母 a–e 已成为标准。几乎每个柏拉图的翻译在边缘或页面顶部都包含斯特凡努斯页码和字母。因此，“宴会 204b”在每个版本和每个翻译的柏拉图中都指的是相同的简短段落。

• 1. Beauty 美丽
  • 1.1 Hippias Major
    1.1 希皮亚斯大
  • 1.2 Beauty and art 1.2 美与艺术
  • 1.3 Beauty and nature 1.3 美与自然
  • 1.4 The Form of beauty
    1.4 美的形式
• 2. Imitation 模仿
  • 2.1 Mimêsis in Aristophanes
    2.1 模仿在阿里斯托芬的作品中
  • 2.2 Republic 2–3: impersonation
  • 2.3 Republic 10: copy-making
    2.3 共和国 10: 复制制作
  • 2.4 Sophist
    2.4 智者
  • 2.5 Closing assessment 2.5 结案评估
• 3. Divine Inspiration 3. 神圣启示
  • 3.1 Ion 3.1 离子
  • 3.2 Phaedrus
    3.2 费德鲁斯
• 4. Imitation, Inspiration, Beauty and the Occasional Wisdom in Poetry
  模仿、灵感、诗歌中的美与偶尔的智慧
• Bibliography 参考文献
• Academic Tools 学术工具
• Other Internet Resources 其他互联网资源
• Related Entries 相关条目

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1. Beauty 美丽

The study of Plato on beauty begins with a routine caution. The Greek adjective kalon only approximates to the English “beautiful.” Not everything Plato says about a kalos, kalê, or kalon thing will belong in a summary of his aesthetic theories.
柏拉图对美的研究始于一种常规的谨慎。希腊形容词kalon仅仅接近于英语中的“美丽”。柏拉图关于kalos、kalê或kalon的事物所说的并不一定都属于他美学理论的总结。

Readers can take the distinction between Greek and English terms too far. It always feels more scrupulous to argue against equating terms from different languages than to treat them interchangeably. And the discussion bears more on assessments of Platonic ethical theory than on whatever subject may be called Plato’s aesthetics.
读者可能会过于强调希腊和英语术语之间的区别。与其将不同语言的术语等同起来，争论这种等同关系总是显得更加谨慎。而讨论更多地涉及对柏拉图伦理理论的评估，而不是任何可以称之为柏拉图美学的主题。

But even given these qualifications the reader should know how to distinguish what is beautiful from what is kalon. The terms have overlapping but distinct ranges of application. A passage in Plato may speak of a face or body that someone finds kalon, or for that matter a statue, a spoon, a tree, a grassy place to rest (Phaedrus 230b). In those cases, “beautiful” makes a natural equivalent, and certainly a less stilted one than the alternatives. Yet even here it is telling that Plato far more often uses kalon for a face or body than for works of art and natural scenery. As far as unambiguous beauties are concerned, he has a smaller set in mind than we do (Kosman 2010).
但即便考虑到这些限定，读者仍应知道如何区分什么是美的，什么是kalon。这两个术语的适用范围有重叠但又各自独特。柏拉图的一段话可能会提到某人认为的面孔或身体是kalon，或者说一尊雕像、一把勺子、一棵树、一个草地休息的地方（Phaedrus 230b）。在这些情况下，“美丽”是一个自然的等价词，当然比其他选择更不显得生硬。然而，即便在这里，值得注意的是，柏拉图使用kalon来形容面孔或身体的频率远高于艺术作品和自然风景。就明确的美而言，他心中所想的范围比我们要小（Kosman 2010）。

More typically kalon appears in contexts to which “beautiful” would fit awkwardly if at all. For both Plato and Aristotle—and in many respects for Greek popular morality—kalon plays a role as ethical approbation, not by meaning the same thing that agathon “good” means, but as a special complement to goodness. At times kalon narrowly means “noble,” often and more loosely “admirable.” The compound kalos k’agathos, the aristocratic ideal, is all-round praise for a man (i.e. an adult male human being), not “beautiful and good” as its components would translate separately, but closer to “splendid and upright.” Here kalon is entirely an ethical term. Calling virtue beautiful feels misplaced in modern terms, or even perverse; calling wisdom beautiful, as the Symposium does (204b), will sound like a mistake (Kosman 2010, 348–350).
更典型的是，kalon 出现在“美丽”这个词在语境中显得不合适的情况下。对于柏拉图和亚里士多德而言——在许多方面对于希腊的流行道德观——kalon 作为伦理赞许发挥着作用，它并不意味着与 agathon “善”相同的东西，而是作为对善的特殊补充。有时 kalon 狭义上意味着“高贵”，而更常见且宽泛地意味着“令人钦佩”。复合词 kalos k’agathos，这个贵族理想，是对一个人的全面赞美（即成年男性），并不是字面上“美丽和善良”，而更接近于“辉煌和正直”。在这里，kalon 完全是一个伦理术语。在现代语境中，称美德为美丽似乎不合适，甚至有些扭曲；而称智慧为美丽，如《宴会》中所述（204b），听起来像是一个错误（Kosman 2010, 348–350）。

Some commentators try to keep kalon and “beautiful” close to synonymous despite differences in their semantic ranges (Hyland 2008). David Konstan rejuvenated the question by emphasizing the beauty not in uses of the adjective kalon but in the related noun kallos (Konstan 2014, Konstan 2015). As welcome as Konstan’s shift of focus is regarding Greek writing as a whole, it runs into difficulties when we read Plato; for the noun kallos carries associations of physical, visual attractiveness, and Plato is wary of the desire that such attractiveness arouses. His dialogues, and notably the Hippias Major, more often examine to kalon when asking about a property named by a noun, wanting to know “what it is to be kalon,” or (as Jonathan Fine has rightly emphasized) “what makes all beautiful things beautiful and is in no way ugly.”
一些评论者试图将kalon和“美丽”视为近义词，尽管它们的语义范围存在差异（Hyland 2008）。大卫·孔斯坦通过强调与形容词kalon相关的名词kallos中的美来重新审视这个问题（Konstan 2014，Konstan 2015）。尽管孔斯坦对希腊写作整体的关注转移是受欢迎的，但在阅读柏拉图时却遇到了困难；因为名词kallos带有身体和视觉吸引力的联想，而柏拉图对这种吸引力所引发的欲望持谨慎态度。他的对话，尤其是Hippias Major，更常探讨to kalon，在询问由名词命名的属性时，想要知道“什么是kalon，”或者（正如乔纳森·法因所强调的）“是什么使所有美的事物美丽，并且绝不丑陋。”

Besides seeking a Greek equivalent for “beautiful,” translators from Greek look for a different word when rendering kalon into English. One understandably popular choice is “fine,” which applies to most things labeled kalon and is also appropriate to ethical and aesthetic contexts (so Woodruff 1983). There are fine suits and string quartets but also fine displays of courage. Of course modern English-speakers have fine sunsets and fine dining as well, this word being even broader than kalon. That is not to mention fine points or fine print. And whereas people frequently ask what beauty really consists in, so that a conversation on the topic might actually have taken place, it is hard to imagine worrying over “what the fine is” or “what is really fine.”
除了寻找“美丽”的希腊语对应词，希腊语翻译者在将kalon翻译成英语时还会寻找其他词汇。一个可以理解的流行选择是“fine”，这个词适用于大多数被标记为kalon的事物，并且在伦理和美学语境中也很合适（见 Woodruff 1983）。有精美的西装和弦乐四重奏，也有勇气的精彩表现。当然，现代英语使用者也有美丽的日落和精致的餐饮，这个词的范围甚至比kalon更广。更不用说细节或细则了。而人们常常询问美的真正本质，以至于可能真的进行过关于这个话题的讨论，但很难想象有人会担心“fine 是什么”或“什么才是真正的 fine”。

The deciding criterion will be not philological but philosophical. Studying the Hippias Major each reader should ask whether Plato’s treatment of to kalon sounds relevant to questions one asks about beauty today.
决定标准将不是语言学的，而是哲学的。在研究《希皮亚斯大篇》时，每位读者都应该问，柏拉图对美的理想的处理是否与当今关于美的问题相关。

1.1 Hippias Major
1.1 大希皮亚斯

The Hippias Major was considered Platonic in antiquity, but faced accusations of inauthenticity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Tarrant 1927). One peculiarity of the dialogue is Socrates’ extended pretext that his own objections to Hippias come from an unnamed third party (who sounds a lot like Socrates) who has levied these same arguments against him (e.g. 288d, 290e, 304d). This feature of the Hippias Major may read as un-Platonic, although to strikes some as a sign of Plato’s wit (Guthrie 1975, IV, 176).
《大希皮亚斯》在古代被认为是柏拉图主义的，但在十九和二十世纪遭遇了不真实性的指控（塔兰特 1927）。对话的一个特征是苏格拉底长时间的借口，声称他对希皮亚斯的反对意见来自一个未具名的第三方（听起来很像苏格拉底），这个第三方对他提出了相同的论点（例如，288d，290e，304d）。《大希皮亚斯》的这一特征可能被视为不符合柏拉图主义，尽管对某些人来说，这却是柏拉图机智的表现（古思里 1975，IV，176）。

It has also been noted that Aristotle quotes from Plato’s much shorter dialogue Hippias Minor (Metaphysics 5.30 1025a6–8). If Plato would not have written two works with the same name, the longer Hippias Major must be a forgery. But after all he may well have given two works the same title.
也有人指出，亚里士多德引用了柏拉图更短的对话《小希皮亚斯》（《形而上学》5.30 1025a6–8）。如果柏拉图没有写两部同名的作品，那么较长的《大希皮亚斯》一定是伪作。但毕竟，他很可能给两部作品起了相同的标题。

Today the debate seems to lie in the past. Most scholars agree that Plato wrote the Hippias Major, and its sustained inquiry into beauty is seen as central to Platonic aesthetics.
今天的争论似乎已经成为过去。大多数学者一致认为柏拉图写了《大希比亚斯》，其对美的持续探讨被视为柏拉图美学的核心。

The Hippias Major follows Socrates and the famous sophist Hippias through a sequence of attempts to define to kalon. Socrates badgers Hippias, in classic Socratic ways, to identify beauty’s general nature, and Hippias answers with definitions, three in all. For instance, “a beautiful young woman is beautiful” (287e). This one scarcely appears to qualify as a definition, and could be taken for one of those non-definition “mere examples” that Socrates complains about, in other dialogues, as not even on the road to a general account (Euthyphro 5d–6e, Laches 190e–191e, Meno 72a–b). After all Hippias has put himself forward as a fact-filled polymath. In real life he compiled the first list of Olympic victors, and might have written the first history of philosophy. On that reading, his over-ingestion of specifics has left him unable to digest his experience and generalize to a philosophical definition.
《大希比亚斯》跟随苏格拉底和著名的智者希比亚斯，通过一系列尝试来定义美好。苏格拉底以经典的苏格拉底方式不断追问希比亚斯，以识别美的普遍性质，而希比亚斯则用三种定义作答。例如，“一个美丽的年轻女性是美丽的”（287e）。这一点几乎不算作定义，可能被视为苏格拉底在其他对话中所抱怨的那些非定义的“仅仅是例子”，甚至连通往一般性描述的道路都没有（《尤西弗罗》5d–6e，《拉凯斯》190e–191e，《梅农》72a–b）。毕竟，希比亚斯自认为是一个充满事实的博学者。在现实生活中，他编制了第一份奥林匹克胜利者名单，并可能撰写了第一部哲学史。从这个角度来看，他对具体细节的过度关注使他无法消化自己的经验并概括出哲学定义。

On the other hand Socrates makes no methodological rebuke to Hippias of the kind that other interlocutors like Euthyphro hear. He might realize that Hippias is proposing an exemplar of beauty, not a mere token but a standard and even a way of thinking generally about that property (Politis 2021, 17). Understood in these terms, Hippias knows that Socrates is seeking an essence for beauty, although he still goes wrong in proposing exemplars known from Homer – woman, tripod, mare, cauldron, gold, two-handled bowl (Iliad 23.261–270, 539–611) and appealing to Greek aristocrats (Gold 2021).
另一方面，苏格拉底并没有像其他对话者（如厄尔西弗罗）那样对希皮亚斯进行方法论上的指责。他可能意识到希皮亚斯提出的是一个关于美的典范，不仅仅是一个象征，而是一个标准，甚至是一种普遍的思维方式（Politis 2021, 17）。从这个角度理解，希皮亚斯知道苏格拉底在寻求美的本质，尽管他在提出从荷马那里得知的典范时仍然犯了错误——女人、三脚架、母马、锅、黄金、双耳碗（伊利亚特 23.261–270, 539–611），并且向希腊贵族求助（Gold 2021）。

After giving up on seeking a definition from Hippias, Socrates tries out three of his own. These are philosophical generalizations but they fail too, and—again in classic Socratic mode—the dialogue ends unresolved. In one excursus Socrates says beauty “is appropriate [prepei]” and proposes defining it as “what is appropriate [to prepon]” (290d). Although ending in refutation this discussion (to 294e) is worth a look as the anticipation of a modern debate. Philosophers of the eighteenth century argue over whether an object is beautiful by satisfying the definition of the object, or independently of that definition (Guyer 1993). Kant calls the beauty that is appropriateness “dependent beauty” (Critique of Judgment, section 16). Such beauty threatens to become a species of the good. Within the accepted corpus of genuine Platonic works beauty is never subsumed within the good, the appropriate, or the beneficial. Plato seems to belong in the same camp as Kant in this respect. (On Platonic beauty and the good see Barney 2010.) Nevertheless he is no simple sensualist about beauty. The very temptation in Plato to link the beautiful with the good and to assess it intellectually is part of why Porter calls him and Aristotle “formalists,” who diverted ancient theorizing about art from its sensualist origins (Porter 2010).
在放弃从希皮亚斯那里寻求定义后，苏格拉底尝试了三个自己的定义。这些是哲学上的概括，但也都失败了，再次以经典的苏格拉底方式，对话以未解决的状态结束。在一个插曲中，苏格拉底说美“是适当的 [prepei]”，并提议将其定义为“适当的 [to prepon]”（290d）。尽管以反驳告终，这段讨论（到 294e）值得一看，因为它预示了现代辩论。十八世纪的哲学家们争论一个物体是否因满足物体的定义而美，或独立于该定义（Guyer 1993）。康德称适当性的美为“依赖美”（判断力批判，第 16 节）。这种美威胁着成为善的一种形式。在被接受的真正柏拉图作品的语料库中，美从未被归入善、适当或有益之中。在这方面，柏拉图似乎与康德属于同一阵营。（关于柏拉图的美与善，见 Barney 2010。）然而，他并不是一个简单的感性主义者。柏拉图将美与善联系起来并进行智力评估的诱惑，正是波特称他和亚里士多德为“形式主义者”的原因之一，他们将古代关于艺术的理论从其感性主义的起源中转移开来（Porter 2010）。

Despite its inconclusiveness the Hippias Major reflects the view of beauty found elsewhere in Plato:
尽管其结论不明确，大希比亚斯反映了柏拉图在其他地方对美的看法：

1. Beauty behaves as canonical Forms do. It possesses the reality that they have and is discovered through the same dialectical inquiry that brings other Forms to light. Socrates wants Hippias to explain a) the property that is known when any examples of beauty are known (essence of beauty), b) the cause of all occurrences of beauty, and more precisely c) the cause not of the appearance of beauty but of its real being (286d, 287c, 289d, 292c, 294e, 297b).
   美的表现方式与典范形式相似。它拥有这些形式所具备的现实性，并通过同样的辩证探究被发现，这种探究也使其他形式显现。苏格拉底希望希皮亚斯解释 a) 当任何美的例子被知晓时所知的属性（美的本质），b) 所有美的发生的原因，以及更准确地说 c) 美的出现的原因，而不是其真实存在的原因（286d, 287c, 289d, 292c, 294e, 297b）。
2. Nevertheless beauty is not just one Form among others. It stands out among those beings, for it bears some close relationship to the good (296d), even though Socrates argues that the two are distinct (296e ff., 303e ff.).
   然而，美并不仅仅是其他形式中的一种。它在这些存在中脱颖而出，因为它与善有某种密切关系（296d），尽管苏格拉底认为二者是不同的（296e ff., 303e ff.）。
3. Socrates and Hippias appeal to artworks as examples of beautiful things but do not treat those as central cases (290a–b, 297e–298a). Artworks are neither the aristocrat’s prize possessions and status symbols, nor the countercultural philosopher’s inherently valuable items. So too generally Plato conducts his inquiry into beauty at a distance from his discussion of art. (But the Republic and the Laws both contain exceptions to this generalization: Lear 2010, 361.)
   苏格拉底和希皮亚斯将艺术作品作为美的例子，但并不将其视为核心案例（290a–b, 297e–298a）。艺术作品既不是贵族的珍贵财物和地位象征，也不是反文化哲学家所认为的内在有价值的物品。普拉托通常也在与艺术讨论保持距离的情况下进行对美的探讨。（但《理想国》和《法律》都对这一概括有例外：Lear 2010, 361。）

These three aspects of Platonic beauty work together and reflect beauty’s unique place in Plato’s metaphysics, something almost both visible and intelligible.
这三个方面的柏拉图美相互作用，反映了美在柏拉图形而上学中的独特地位，这种地位几乎既可见又可理解。

1.2 Beauty and art 1.2 美与艺术

The three principles of beauty in the Hippias Major also apply in the Symposium, Plato’s other analysis of beauty. In the Symposium Socrates claims to be quoting his teacher Diotima on the subject of love, and in the lesson attributed to her she calls beauty the object of every love’s yearning. She spells out a soul’s progress toward ever-purer beauty, from one body to all, then through all beautiful souls to laws and kinds of knowledge, finally reaching beauty itself (210a–211d). The object of erotic longing, despite being contained within visible experience, can induce a desirous (and thoughtful) observer’s progress toward purely intelligible beauty.
在《大希比亚斯》中美的三原则同样适用于柏拉图的另一部美的分析作品《饗宴》。在《饗宴》中，苏格拉底声称他在引用他的老师迪奥提玛关于爱的主题，在归于她的教导中，她将美称为每一种爱的渴望的对象。她详细阐述了灵魂向更纯粹的美的进步，从一个身体到所有身体，然后通过所有美丽的灵魂到达法律和知识的种类，最终达到美本身（210a–211d）。尽管欲望的对象存在于可见的经验中，但它可以引导渴望（和深思）的观察者向纯粹可理解的美的进步。

Diotima describes the poet’s task as the begetting of wisdom and other virtues (209a). Ultimately desiring what is beautiful, the poet produces works of verse. And who (Diotima asks) would not envy Homer or Hesiod (209d)? But aside from these passages the Symposium seems prepared to treat anything but a poem as an exemplar of beauty. In a similar spirit the Philebus’s examples of pure sensory beauty exclude pictures (51b–d).
迪奥提玛将诗人的任务描述为智慧和其他美德的孕育（209a）。最终渴望美的诗人创作出诗篇。那么，谁（迪奥提玛问）会不羡慕荷马或赫西俄德呢（209d）？但除了这些段落，《会饮篇》似乎准备将任何除了诗歌之外的东西视为美的典范。在类似的精神下，《菲勒布斯篇》中纯粹感官美的例子排除了图画（51b–d）。

The Republic contains tokens of Plato’s reluctance to associate poetry with beauty. The dialogue’s first discussion of poetry, whose context is education, censors poems that corrupt the young (377b–398b). Then almost immediately Socrates speaks of cultivating a fondness for beauty among the young guardians. Let them see gracefulness (euschêmosunê) in paintings and illustrative weaving, a sibling to virtue (401a). Their taste for beauty will help them prefer noble deeds over ugly vulgar ones (401b–d, 403c). How can Plato have seen the value of beauty to education and not mentioned the subject in his earlier criticisms? Why couldn’t this part of the Republic concede that false and pernicious poems affect the young through their beauty?
《理想国》包含了柏拉图对将诗歌与美联系起来的犹豫。对诗歌的首次讨论，背景是教育，审查了那些腐蚀年轻人的诗篇（377b–398b）。然后，苏格拉底几乎立即谈到在年轻的守护者中培养对美的喜爱。让他们在绘画和插图编织中看到优雅（euschêmosunê），这是美德的姐妹（401a）。他们对美的品味将帮助他们更倾向于高尚的行为而非丑陋的庸俗行为（401b–d, 403c）。柏拉图怎么会看到美对教育的价值，却在他早期的批评中没有提到这个主题？为什么《理想国》的这一部分不能承认虚假和有害的诗歌通过其美影响年轻人？

The answer is that the Republic denies the legitimacy of the beauty in poetry. Republic 10 calls that beauty deceptive. Take away the decorative language that makes a poetic sentiment sound right and put it into ordinary words, and it becomes unremarkable, as young people’s faces beautified by youth later show themselves as the plain looks they are (601b). The Republic can hardly deny some attractive effect that poetry has, for people enjoy the way poems can present experience to them. Yet it resists calling this attractiveness beauty.
答案是，《理想国》否认了诗歌中美的合法性。《理想国》第 10 卷称这种美是具有欺骗性的。去掉那些使诗意听起来正确的修饰语言，用普通的词汇表达，它就变得平淡无奇，就像年轻人的面容被青春美化后，最终显露出他们本来的平凡面貌（601b）。《理想国》几乎无法否认诗歌所具有的一些吸引力，因为人们喜欢诗歌能够向他们呈现的体验。然而，它抵制将这种吸引力称为美。

1.3 Beauty and nature 1.3 美与自然

As if to accentuate the difference between art and nature, Plato’s reader finds emphatic and repeated assertions of appreciation for the beauty in nature.
似乎为了强调艺术与自然之间的差异，柏拉图的读者发现对自然之美的欣赏有着明确而反复的表述。

Plato stands out among ancient authors where the admiration of natural scenes and settings is concerned. Pausanias’s Description of Greece (the closest thing to a travel guide in antiquity) seems not to notice the spectacular views in the countryside it moves through (Pretzler 2007, 59–62). If anything, bucolic scenes myth provided opportunities for rape (Homer Hymn to Demeter 5–14; Euripides Ion 889ff.). But Plato’s Phaedrus follows Socrates and young Phaedrus on their walk through the countryside until they stop and sit and cool their feet. Socrates declares it a kalê … katagôgê “beautiful spot to rest” (230b). This may be the only extant Greek passage that calls any area or natural scenery beautiful.
柏拉图在古代作者中因对自然景观和环境的赞美而脱颖而出。普桑尼亚斯的希腊志（古代最接近旅行指南的作品）似乎并未注意到它所经过乡村的壮丽景色（普雷茨勒 2007, 59–62）。如果说有什么的话，田园场景的神话提供了强奸的机会（荷马德墨忒耳颂 5–14；欧里庇得斯伊翁 889ff.）。但柏拉图的斐德罗跟随苏格拉底和年轻的斐德鲁斯在乡间散步，直到他们停下来坐下，凉爽他们的双脚。苏格拉底称之为kalê … katagôgê“美丽的休息地点”（230b）。这可能是现存的唯一一段称任何地区或自然景观为美丽的希腊文段落。

Further from the nature that surrounds human observers is the ouranos, a word that means “heaven” but that in Plato’s Timaeus also denotes the visible world (28a–b). The Timaeus calls the ouranos and the whole kosmos beautiful (28b, 29a, 30a–d; see 53b, 54a, 68e on the beauty of the world’s elements). One does not have to guard against or qualify one’s admiration for heavenly beauty. Taking in the fine sight of the stars has taught human souls number, the inquiry into nature as a whole, and therefore philosophy (47a–b). The pseudo-Platonic Epinomis, which shows Plato’s influence, likewise traces thoughts of number to astronomical observations (977a–978e). The Laws credits the movement of the stars with inspiring belief in gods (966d–e). Any serious person who admires nature’s beauty will learn from it.
人类观察者周围的自然之外是ouranos，这个词意为“天堂”，但在柏拉图的Timaeus中也指可见的世界（28a–b）。Timaeus称ouranos和整个kosmos为美丽（28b, 29a, 30a–d；见 53b, 54a, 68e 关于世界元素之美）。人们不必对天上的美丽保持警惕或有所保留。欣赏星星的美丽使人类的灵魂学会了数字，探究自然的整体，因此也学会了哲学（47a–b）。伪柏拉图的Epinomis，显示了柏拉图的影响，同样将数字的思考追溯到天文观察（977a–978e）。Laws认为星星的运动激发了对神的信仰（966d–e）。任何认真欣赏自然之美的人都会从中学习。

1.4 The Form of beauty
1.4 美的形式

It is fundamental to understanding Platonic beauty as part of Plato’s aesthetics that Plato sees no opposition between the pleasures that beauty brings and the goals of philosophy. The Timaeus suffices to make that point when it credits contemplation of the heavens with the origins of philosophy.
理解柏拉图美的本质作为柏拉图美学的一部分是至关重要的，因为柏拉图并不认为美带来的愉悦与哲学的目标之间存在对立。《Timaeus》足以证明这一点，因为它将对天空的沉思视为哲学的起源。

More broadly, many passages associate a Form with beauty: Cratylus 439c; Euthydemus 301a; Laws 655c; Phaedo 65d, 75d, 100b; Phaedrus 254b; Parmenides 130b; Philebus 15a; Republic 476b, 493e, 507b. Plato mentions beauty as often as he speaks of any property that admits of philosophical conceptualization, and for which a Form therefore exists. Thanks to the features of Forms as such, we know that this entity being referred to must be something properly called beauty, whose nature can be articulated without recourse to the natures of particular beautiful things. (See especially Phaedo 79a and Phaedrus 247c on properties of this Form.)
更广泛地说，许多段落将一种形式与美联系在一起：Cratylus 439c；Euthydemus 301a；Laws 655c；Phaedo 65d, 75d, 100b；Phaedrus 254b；Parmenides 130b；Philebus 15a；Republic 476b, 493e, 507b。柏拉图提到美的频率与他谈论任何可以进行哲学概念化的属性一样高，因此存在一种形式。由于形式的特征，我们知道所提到的这个实体必须是被恰当地称为美的东西，其本质可以在不诉诸于特定美丽事物的本质的情况下进行阐述。（特别参见Phaedo 79a 和Phaedrus 247c 关于这一形式的属性。）

Beauty is Plato’s example of a Form as frequently as it is for a pair of reasons. On one hand it bears every mark of the Forms. It is an evaluative concept as much as justice and courage are, and suffers from disputes over its meaning as much as they do. The Theory of Forms seeks to guarantee stable referents for disputed evaluative terms; so if anything needs a Form, beauty does, and it will have a Form if any property does.
美是柏拉图形式的一个例子，原因有两个方面。首先，它具备形式的所有特征。它是一个评估概念，正如正义和勇气一样，并且在其意义上也遭受争议，正如它们所经历的那样。形式理论旨在为有争议的评估术语提供稳定的指称；因此，如果有什么需要形式的话，美就是其中之一，如果任何属性都有形式的话，美也将拥有一种形式。

In general, a Form F differs from an individual F thing in that the property F may be predicated unambiguously and plainly of the Form. The Form F is F. An individual F thing both is and is not F. In this sense the same property F may be predicated only equivocally of the individual (e.g. Republic 479a–c). Plato’s analysis of equivocally F individuals (Cratylus 439d–e, Symposium 211a) recalls observations that everyone makes about beautiful objects. They fade with time; require an offsetting ugly detail; elicit disagreements among observers; lose their beauty outside their context (adult shoes on children’s feet). Such limitations of individual things are rarely as clear where other Form properties are concerned as they are for beauty. Odd numbers may fail to be odd in some hard-to-explain way, and large objects may or may not grow small as the years go by, but the ways in which beautiful things fall short of perfection are obvious even to the unphilosophical.
一般来说，形式F与个体F事物的不同在于，属性F可以明确而清晰地归于形式。形式F 是 F。一个个体F事物既是又不是F。从这个意义上说，同一属性F只能模棱两可地归于个体（例如，共和国 479a–c）。柏拉图对模棱两可的F个体的分析（克拉提鲁斯 439d–e，宴会 211a）回忆起每个人对美丽物体的观察。它们随着时间的推移而褪色；需要一个抵消的丑陋细节；引发观察者之间的分歧；在其上下文之外失去美感（成人鞋子穿在儿童脚上）。个体事物的这些局限性在其他形式属性方面通常不如在美的方面那么明显。奇数可能以某种难以解释的方式不再是奇数，而大型物体随着岁月的流逝可能会变小，也可能不会，但美丽事物在完美方面的不足即使对非哲学家来说也是显而易见的。

While typical qua Form, physical beauty is atypical in being a Form that humans want to know. The process known as anamnêsis or recollection is more plausible for beauty than it is for most other properties. The philosophical merit of equivocally F things is that they come bearing signs of their incompleteness, so that the inquisitive mind wants to know more (Republic 523c–524d). Therefore, beauty promises more effective reflection than any other property of things. Beauty alone is both a Form and a sensory experience (Phaedrus 250d).
虽然典型的形式，物理美在作为一种人类want了解的形式上是非典型的。被称为anamnêsis或回忆的过程对于美来说比大多数其他属性更为可信。模棱两可的F事物的哲学价值在于它们带有不完整性的迹象，因此好奇的心灵想要了解更多（Republic 523c–524d）。因此，美比事物的任何其他属性更能有效地反映。美既是一种形式，又是一种感官体验（Phaedrus 250d）。

So the Phaedrus (250d–256b) and Symposium ignore people’s experiences of other properties when they describe the first movement into philosophizing. Beautiful things remind souls of their mystery as no other visible objects do, and in his optimistic moments Plato welcomes people’s attention to them.
所以斐德罗（250d–256b）和饗宴在描述人们进入哲学思考的初始阶段时忽视了人们对其他属性的体验。美丽的事物以其他可见物体无法比拟的方式提醒灵魂它们的神秘，而在他乐观的时刻，柏拉图欢迎人们对这些事物的关注。

The optimistic moments are not easy to sustain. To make beauty effective for learning, Plato needs to rely on its desirability (as foregrounded in Konstan 2015), but also on the soul’s ability to transfer its desiring from the visible to the intelligible (Philebus 65e). Plato is ambivalent about visual experience. Sight may be like knowledge metaphorically; metonymically it calls to mind the ignorant senses (Pappas 2015, 49). The sight of beauty must overcome itself to become the higher sight of a higher beauty.
乐观的时刻并不容易维持。为了使美在学习中发挥作用，柏拉图需要依赖其可取性（如 Konstan 2015 中所强调），同时也依赖于灵魂将其欲望从可见的转移到可理解的（菲勒布斯 65e）。柏拉图对视觉体验持矛盾态度。视觉在比喻上可能类似于知识；在转喻上，它唤起了无知的感官（Pappas 2015, 49）。美的视觉必须超越自身，才能成为更高美的更高视觉。

When the transfer of attention and desire succeeds, beauty’s unmatched pedagogical effects show why Plato talks about its goodness and good consequences, sometimes even its identity with “the good” (Laws 841c; Philebus 66a–b; Republic 401c; Symposium 201c, 205e; but the relationship between beautiful and good, especially in Symposium, is controversial: White 1989). These desirable effects also explain why Plato speaks grudgingly of beauty in art and poetry, lest the dangerous arts find a place in the development of good thinking. Another question matters more than either poetry or beauty does: What leads a mind toward knowledge and the Forms? Things of beauty do so excellently well. Poems mostly don’t. When poems (or paintings) set the mind running along unphilosophical tracks away from what is abstract and intelligible, the attractions they possess will reveal themselves as meretricious. The corrupting cognitive effect exercised by poems demonstrates their inability to function as Plato knows the beautiful object to function.
当注意力和欲望的转移成功时，美的无与伦比的教育效果显示了为什么柏拉图谈论它的善良和良好后果，有时甚至将其与“善”认同（法律 841c；菲勒布斯 66a–b；理想国 401c；宴会 201c, 205e；但美与善之间的关系，尤其是在宴会中，是有争议的：怀特 1989）。这些令人向往的效果也解释了为什么柏拉图对艺术和诗歌中的美持保留态度，以免危险的艺术在良好思维的发展中找到立足之地。另一个问题比诗歌或美更为重要：是什么引导心灵走向知识和理念？美的事物在这方面表现得极为出色。诗歌大多则不然。当诗歌（或绘画）使心灵沿着非哲学的轨道远离抽象和可理解的事物时，它们所拥有的吸引力将显露出其虚伪性。诗歌所施加的腐蚀性认知效果表明它们无法像柏拉图所理解的美的对象那样发挥作用。

The corrupting effect needs to be spelled out. What prevents poems from behaving as beautiful objects do? The answer will have to address the orienting question in Plato’s aesthetics, namely: What fosters philosophical enlightenment, and what obstructs it?
腐蚀效应需要明确说明。是什么阻止诗歌像美丽的物体那样表现？答案必须解决柏拉图美学中的导向问题，即：什么促进哲学启蒙，什么又阻碍它？

2. Imitation 模仿

The top candidate for the cause of error (or something worse than mere ignorance) in art is mimêsis, a word most commonly translated into English as “imitation.” Other translations include “representation” and “emulation.” And to make things confusing, the transliterated Greek word sans diacritical mark has come to be accepted as English (“mimesis”).
艺术中错误（或比单纯无知更糟糕的东西）的主要候选原因是mimêsis，这个词在英语中最常被翻译为“模仿”。其他翻译包括“表现”和“仿效”。更令人困惑的是，去掉变音符号的希腊语音译词已被接受为英语（“mimesis”）。

All the translations capture something of the word’s meaning. As long as “imitation” is used with the awareness that it will not mean everything that mimêsis does, it makes a serviceable translation. “Imitate” functions well enough as the verb mimeisthai; so does “mimic.” (See Sörbom 1966; also Marušič 2011.)
所有的翻译都捕捉到了这个词的一部分含义。只要“模仿”这个词的使用者意识到它并不意味着mimêsis所包含的所有内容，它就可以作为一个可用的翻译。“模仿”作为动词mimeisthai的功能也足够好；“模拟”也是如此。（见 Sörbom 1966；另见 Marušič 2011。）

One may just use the Greek mimêsis, as this discussion will do. For simplicity’s sake some prefer the now-English “mimesis.” But this last choice brings a risk. The English word “mimesis” has begun picking up its own contexts and connotations, becoming English proportionately as it ceases to substitute for the Greek word.
可以直接使用希腊语的mimêsis，正如本讨论所做的那样。为了简单起见，有些人更喜欢现在的英语“mimesis”。但这个选择带来了风险。英语单词“mimesis”开始形成自己的语境和内涵，逐渐成为英语的一部分，而不再替代希腊语单词。

Besides mimêsis Plato sometimes speaks of a mimêma. “Imitation” like mimêsis can refer either to a process or to its outcome. You engage in the act of imitation in order to produce an imitation. A mimêma however is only ever a copy, not also the copying act that produced it.
除了模仿，柏拉图有时还提到模仿物。“模仿”像模仿一样，可以指一个过程或其结果。你进行模仿的行为是为了产生一个模仿物。然而，模仿物仅仅是一个复制品，而不是产生它的复制行为。

(Mateo Duque was of much help in thinking through issues in the coming sections.)
马特奥·杜克在思考接下来部分的问题时提供了很大帮助。

2.1 Mimêsis in Aristophanes
2.1 模仿在阿里斯托芬中

Authors before Plato used mimêsis more vaguely than he did, neither attaching the word to a poetic process nor implying its fraudulence —with one important exception. The comedies of Aristophanes, obsessed with Euripides and with all tragedy (Birds 787, 1444; Clouds 1091; Plutus 423–4), introduce comments about tragic stagecraft that say mimeisthai and mimêsis in pejorative ways.
柏拉图之前的作者对模仿的使用比他更模糊，既没有将这个词与诗歌过程联系起来，也没有暗示其欺骗性——有一个重要的例外。阿里斯托芬的喜剧，沉迷于欧里庇得斯和所有悲剧（鸟 787, 1444; 云 1091; 普鲁托斯 423–4），引入了关于悲剧舞台技艺的评论，以贬义的方式提到模仿和模仿。

Although comedy is sometimes identified as antagonist to philosophy in the “ancient quarrel” that Plato speaks of between philosophy and poetry (Most 2011), Aristophanes has also long been seen as Plato’s precursor in the moralistic critique of poetry. The two share conservative sensibilities that outweigh Aristophanes’ slander of Socrates in Clouds (Nussbaum 1980). But Aristophanes’ influence on Plato also extends to the nature of mimêsis. He uses that word in a technical sense that describes what actors do in a play, and with Platonic suggestions of fraud or concealment.
尽管喜剧有时被视为柏拉图所说的哲学与诗歌之间“古老争论”的对立面（Most 2011），阿里斯托芬也长期被视为柏拉图在对诗歌的道德批判中的前驱。两者共享的保守情感超过了阿里斯托芬在云中对苏格拉底的诽谤（Nussbaum 1980）。但阿里斯托芬对柏拉图的影响也延伸到模仿的本质。他以技术性的方式使用这个词，描述演员在剧中的行为，并带有柏拉图式的欺骗或隐瞒的暗示。

In addition to the face-off between Aeschylus and Euripides in Frogs, one might cite Aristophanes’ Women Celebrating the Thesmophoria, which calls mimêsis a disruption of life and opposes it to nature. Moreover Women Celebrating the Thesmophoria finds an ambiguity in dramatic imitation that anticipates Plato. In that play, as in the Republic, mimêsis mixes together composition and performance, the invention of characters and the portrayal of them (Pappas 1999).
除了艾斯基罗斯与欧里庇得斯在青蛙中的对峙外，还可以提到阿里斯托芬的庆祝忒斯摩福利亚的女性，该剧将模仿视为对生活的干扰，并将其与自然对立。此外，庆祝忒斯摩福利亚的女性在戏剧模仿中发现了一种模糊性，这预示着柏拉图。在这部剧中，正如在理想国中一样，模仿将创作与表演、角色的发明与其描绘混合在一起（帕帕斯 1999）。

2.2 Republic 2–3: impersonation
2.2 共和国 2–3: 冒充

The Aristophanic ambiguity between composition and performance appears, in Plato, in Book 3 of the Republic, which is one of the two dialogues (along with Laws, in Book 4) that investigates mimêsis as a characteristic specific to poetry.
在柏拉图的《理想国》第三卷中，阿里斯托芬的创作与表演之间的模糊性显现出来，这是两部探讨作为诗歌特征的模仿的对话之一（另一部是《法律》第四卷）。

Books 2 and 3 of the Republic assess poetry’s role in the curriculum for the city’s guardian class. At least ostensibly, their purpose is pedagogical. The first part of this argument runs from the final pages of Book 2 through the first part of Book 3, condemning the images of gods and demigods that Homer and the tragedians have produced (377e–392c). Pernicious stories about gods and heroes blaspheme the divine, and set bad examples for young warriors. Socrates focuses on the harmful effect of saying that the gods quarrel (378c), and that Cronus castrated his father and was overthrown in turn by Zeus. Gods are good and should not be said to cause harm (379b).
《理想国》第二卷和第三卷评估了诗歌在城市守护者阶级课程中的角色。至少表面上，它们的目的是教育性的。这一论点的第一部分从第二卷的最后几页延续到第三卷的前半部分，谴责荷马和悲剧作家所描绘的神和半神的形象（377e–392c）。关于神和英雄的有害故事亵渎了神圣，并为年轻的战士树立了坏榜样。苏格拉底关注于说神明争吵的有害影响（378c），以及克罗诺斯阉割了他的父亲，并被宙斯推翻的故事。神是善良的，不应被说成造成伤害（379b）。

The emphasis on content and the focus on what children hear make this part of the discussion seem to have only limited relevance to aesthetics. But in the first place, the restrictions on poetry expand as the argument goes on, from what “nurses and mothers” must attend to (377c) to proclamations that some stories “shouldn’t be told” (378b), that no one should hear of a god’s causing evil (380b–c), and that a play asserting such a thing shouldn’t be allowed to train a chorus (383c). What at first should not be heard by the young finally should not be heard at all.
对内容的强调和对儿童所听内容的关注使得这一部分讨论似乎与美学的相关性有限。但首先，随着论证的深入，诗歌的限制逐渐扩大，从“护士和母亲”必须关注的内容（377c）到一些故事“不应该被讲述”的宣言（378b），再到任何人都不应听到神造成邪恶的事情（380b–c），以及声称这种事情的戏剧不应被允许训练合唱团（383c）。起初不应被年轻人听到的内容，最终根本不应被听到。

In the second place, strictures on what may be said about the gods goes beyond content to hint at the formal analysis that comes in Book 3. When ruling out tales about divinities in disguise, Socrates says that gods would not change their form. A god would not be a goêtês “sorcerer” (380d). The comment is both the oblique first connection between poetry and sorcery in the Republic, and also the first mention of impersonation. Gods who change their form are playing a dramatic part, and practicing sorcery when they do.
其次，对关于神灵的言论的严格限制超越了内容，暗示了第三卷中的形式分析。当排除关于伪装神灵的故事时，苏格拉底说神灵不会改变他们的形态。一个神不会是一个goêtês “巫师”（380d）。这一评论既是《理想国》中诗歌与巫术之间的间接首次联系，也是对伪装的首次提及。改变形态的神灵在扮演戏剧角色，并在此过程中进行巫术。

Socrates concludes his criticism of how poetry presents gods and heroes and asks about the lexis “style” of narration. Poetic narration can take place through narration alone, through mimêsis alone, or by combining the two (392d).
苏格拉底总结了他对诗歌如何呈现神祇和英雄的批评，并询问叙述的lexis“风格”。诗意叙述可以仅通过叙述进行，也可以仅通过mimêsis进行，或者将两者结合起来（392d）。

Already this way of differentiating among storytelling methods proceeds irregularly, as if one were to analyze walking into pure walking, running, and a combination of the two, and declared that to be an explanation of running. Such an analysis would mark the act of running as deviant walking. Likewise the taxonomy of narrations presumes that mimêsis is deviant.
这种区分叙事方法的方式已经是不规则的，仿佛有人将纯粹的走路、跑步以及两者的结合进行分析，并声称这就是对跑步的解释。这种分析将跑步的行为标记为偏离走路。同样，叙述的分类法假设模仿是偏离的。

The subsequent pages continue treating mimêsis as something comprehensible only under the sign of anomaly and failure. Socrates defines imitation, develops two arguments against it, and finally proclaims that no mimetic poetry will be admitted into the city that the Republic is founding.
后续页面继续将模仿视为只有在异常和失败的标志下才能理解的事物。苏格拉底定义了模仿，提出了两个反对它的论点，最后宣称在理想国所建立的城市中，不会允许任何模仿的诗歌进入。

The defining example establishes mimêsis as impersonation or emulation. Homer’s poems alternate between third-person accounts of events (in which Homer narrates in his own voice) and speeches made by the characters involved in those events. In the latter instances, Homer “makes himself like” the characters speaking, deceptively producing a speech “as if he were someone else” (393b). The poet “hides himself” (393d), thus even losing personal autonomy.
定义性的例子将模仿确立为模仿或效仿。荷马的诗歌在第三人称叙述事件（荷马以自己的声音叙述）和事件中角色的发言之间交替。在后者的情况下，荷马“使自己像”正在发言的角色，欺骗性地产生一种“仿佛他是其他人”的演讲（393b）。诗人“隐藏自己”（393d），因此甚至失去了个人自主性。

When Homer recounts Agamemnon’s rebuke to the priest Chryses, Socrates says, he uses the abusive language that a warriors’ king would use when such a king refused to show mercy (393a–c).
当荷马叙述阿伽门农对祭司克律斯的斥责时，苏格拉底说，他使用了战士之王在拒绝施以怜悯时会使用的辱骂语言（393a–c）。

This passage leaves the presentation of character ambiguous between the act of writing or composing the words of a character like Agamemnon, and the act of reciting (performing, acting out) those words. Epic poets likely put together their works and also performed them, therefore acting out the parts; dramatic poets may well have spoken parts in character as they wrote; such independent dramatic traditions as the Japanese noh featured players who both wrote plays and acted in them (Hare 2008, 40). The ambiguity between writing and reciting (which already appeared in Aristophanes) lets Socrates deploy more than one argument against the presentation of characters.
这段文字在角色的呈现上模糊了写作或创作像阿伽门农这样的角色的词语与朗诵（表演、演绎）这些词语的行为之间的界限。史诗诗人可能既创作他们的作品，也进行表演，因此演绎角色；戏剧诗人在写作时也可能以角色的身份发言；像日本的能剧这样的独立戏剧传统中，演员既编写剧本又在其中表演（Hare 2008, 40）。写作与朗诵之间的模糊性（这在阿里斯托芬的作品中已经出现）使得苏格拉底能够针对角色的呈现提出多个论点。

The main argument is blunt but clear, and it is plausible enough. What the new city really does not want is the presentation of base types, because performing such parts fosters the behaviors that are found in the persons being mimicked (395c–397e). Attempts to read this impersonation as attention to appearance alone (Lear 2011) have the advantage of unifying Book 3 with Book 10, but sacrifice the psychological simplicity behind the argument.
主要论点直截了当但清晰，而且相当可信。新城市真正不想要的是基础类型的表现，因为执行这些部分会促进被模仿者的行为（395c–397e）。将这种模仿解读为仅仅关注外表的尝试（Lear 2011）虽然有助于将第三卷与第十卷统一起来，但却牺牲了论点背后的心理简单性。

If acting a part does lead to taking on the characteristics of the part, then in one respect the Republic has a powerful point to make, and in another respect generates a misleading argument. The point is powerful inasmuch as it lets the newly formed city ban all portrayals of vicious and ignoble characters but not those of brave soldiers, philosophers, and other wholesome types. Moreover the factual premise is believable. Taking on someone else’s traits and tics can have a more lasting effect than the Republic’s critics sometimes acknowledge. Actors even today comment on how a role changed them. Those who play lovers in movies sometimes fall in love.
如果扮演一个角色确实会导致承担该角色的特征，那么在某种程度上，《理想国》有一个强有力的观点要表达，而在另一个方面则产生了一个误导性的论点。这个观点之所以强有力，是因为它允许新成立的城市禁止所有对恶劣和卑鄙角色的描绘，而不禁止勇敢的士兵、哲学家和其他健康类型的描绘。此外，事实前提是可信的。承担他人的特征和习惯可能比《理想国》的批评者有时所承认的更具持久影响。即使在今天，演员们也会评论一个角色如何改变了他们。那些在电影中扮演恋人的人有时会坠入爱河。

Even this most plausible part of the argument runs into trouble. Plato’s list of things unworthy of imitation proves surprisingly commodious. Alongside villains one finds women, slaves, animals, musical instruments, gears and pulleys, and sounds of water. And these last examples beg the question. Sounding like machinery does not make the imitator more like a gear or pulley. Nor do actors start to behave and think as if they were flowing water. The impersonatory act must be a deranged practice only insofar as all impersonation is deranged. But that more fundamental derangement had been what the argument was aiming to prove.
即使是这个最合理的论点部分也遇到了麻烦。柏拉图列出的不值得模仿的事物清单出乎意料地宽泛。除了恶棍之外，还包括女性、奴隶、动物、乐器、齿轮和滑轮，以及水声。这些最后的例子引发了问题。听起来像机械并不会使模仿者更像齿轮或滑轮。演员也不会开始表现得像流动的水。模仿行为必须是一种失常的实践，正如所有模仿都是失常的。然而，这种更根本的失常正是论点试图证明的。

What significantly misleads in this argument amounts to more than the passing hyperbole. The case against mimêsis exploits the ambiguity between impersonation as something a writer does and impersonation as the performer’s task. Eric Havelock (1963) stressed the importance of this ambiguity to Book 3, but understated the degree to which Plato exploited the ambiguity. The most convincing part of Book 3 has to assume that mimêsis is performance, both because such effects as thunder are mimicked in performance, not on the page; and because the bad effects of impersonation on character make more sense when describing young actors’ playing a vicious role than grown playwrights in the act of writing that role.
在这个论点中，显著的误导不仅仅是夸张。针对模仿的论点利用了作家所做的模仿与表演者的任务之间的模糊性。埃里克·哈弗洛克（1963）强调了这种模糊性对第三卷的重要性，但低估了柏拉图利用这种模糊性的程度。第三卷中最有说服力的部分必须假设模仿是表演，因为雷声等效果是在表演中模仿的，而不是在纸上；而且，当描述年轻演员扮演恶劣角色时，模仿对角色的负面影响比成年剧作家在创作该角色时更有意义。

On the other hand performance does not involve a whole population. It brings about the worst effects to a fraction of the city. The Athenian population mostly did not perform dramatic roles. They may have enjoyed drama in the theater, but banning plays from the city calls for seeing something inherently wrong with dramatic works themselves, whether as performed or just as written, and so with a quality in them that follows from the mimêsis in the composition of them. The conclusion to this passage makes clear that the city will ban all mimetic works:
另一方面，表演并不涉及整个群体。它对城市的一部分产生了最糟糕的影响。雅典的人口大多数并没有扮演戏剧角色。他们可能在剧院中享受戏剧，但禁止在城市上演戏剧则意味着对戏剧作品本身存在某种根本性的错误，无论是作为表演还是仅仅作为书面作品，因此它们在创作中所体现的模仿特质也随之而来。该段落的结论明确指出，城市将禁止所有模仿作品：

If a man were to arrive in the city whose wisdom [sophia] empowered him to become everything and to mimic all things—together with the poems he wanted to perform [epideixasthai]— we would worship him as someone holy [hieron] and wonderful and pleasant, but tell him there is no man like him in our city, nor by our traditional law [themis] can come to be here; and we would send him off to another city after pouring myrrh on his head and crowning him with wool. (398a)
如果一个人来到这个城市，他的智慧 [sophia] 使他能够成为一切并模仿所有事物——连同他想要表演的诗歌 [epideixasthai]——我们会崇拜他，视他为神圣 [hieron]、奇妙和令人愉悦的人，但告诉他在我们的城市里没有像他这样的人，按照我们的传统法律 [themis] 也无法来到这里；然后我们会在他头上洒上没药，给他戴上羊毛冠，送他去另一个城市。(398a)

The religious language is lavish. No ordinary deeds are being excluded but ones that smell of sacred power. And the city fathers running mimetic poetry out of town have broadened their scope from the young guardians’ education to the cultural life of a community. The literary representation of characters will receive no hearing anywhere. It is even doubtful whether the city will permit dramatic poems to circulate in written form, as if their very potential for being performed rendered them toxic. The sins of performance extend to the allegedly performative author of dramatic parts.
宗教语言华丽而奢侈。没有普通的行为被排除在外，但那些散发神圣力量的行为却被排除在外。管理模仿诗歌的城市长官们已经将他们的范围从年轻守护者的教育扩大到社区的文化生活。角色的文学表现将在任何地方都得不到听取。甚至怀疑城市是否会允许戏剧诗以书面形式流通，仿佛它们的表演潜力使它们变得有毒。表演的罪恶延伸到所谓的戏剧部分的表演作者。

The poet is a visitor because mimetic poetry has no natural home in the philosophers’ town. (Maybe Plato is thinking of literal outsiders, like tragic playwrights from Syracuse: Monoson 2012, 163.) Moreover he arrives offering to recite his poems. That they are his makes him a poet, that he comes to recite them makes him a performer. Thus he embodies the ambiguity built into Book 3’s definition of mimêsis. If the fate of imitative composition stands or falls with the fate of imitative performance, a reasonable worry about behaviors that young people experiment with balloons into an argument against a body of literature. The equivocation between performance and composition lets the argument proceed to its grand conclusion.
诗人是一个访客，因为模仿诗歌在哲学家的城镇中没有自然的归属。（也许柏拉图在想字面上的外来者，比如来自锡拉库萨的悲剧剧作家：Monoson 2012, 163。）此外，他来到这里是为了朗诵他的诗歌。诗歌是他的使他成为一个 poet，而他来朗诵它们使他成为一个 performer。因此，他体现了《书 3》中对 mimêsis 定义中内置的模糊性。如果模仿创作的命运与模仿表演的命运息息相关，那么对年轻人实验行为的合理担忧就会膨胀成对一部文学作品的反对论证。表演与创作之间的模棱两可使论证得以推进到其宏大的结论。

Book 3 took its assessment of poetry beyond criticism into aesthetics by developing imitation as a formal concept. This is to say 1) that one can distinguish poetic mimêsis from poetic narration by looking for a formal element in the poetry; and 2) that mimêsis may make poetry more deleterious than it would otherwise be, but does not work these bad effects by itself, only when the characters represented are bad to begin with. The definition of imitation in Book 3 entails no general ideas of similarity or likeness, and it remains confined to one art form.
第三卷将对诗歌的评估从批评扩展到美学，通过将模仿发展为一个形式概念。这就是说 1) 可以通过寻找诗歌中的一个形式元素来区分诗意的模仿与诗意叙述；以及 2) 模仿可能使诗歌比其他情况下更具危害性，但这些不良影响并不是单独产生的，只有当所表现的角色本身就是坏的时才会发生。第三卷中对模仿的定义并不涉及相似性或相像的一般概念，而是局限于一种艺术形式。

Book 10 will look at imitation from a different perspective. Space does not permit a review of all existing proposals about how to square the two passages. Whether Books 3 and 10 offer compatible accounts of mimêsis, and how one might make them compatible, remains the most controversial question about Plato’s aesthetics. (See Belfiore 1984, Halliwell 1988, Nehamas 1982; and for a superb summary of the main proposals, Naddaff 2002, 136n8. Lear 2011 is a recent argument in favor of the two passages’ agreement with one another.) Still one may trust a few summative statements. Republic 10 revises the formal aspects of mimêsis with an imagistic depiction that entails more than direct quotation. The enhanced concept cannot be understood without reference to the Republic’s psychological theory. And in its expanded form the term refers to something bad in itself.
第十卷将从不同的角度看待模仿。空间不允许对所有现有提案进行回顾，以便协调这两段文字。无论第三卷和第十卷是否提供了兼容的模仿解释，以及如何使它们兼容，仍然是关于柏拉图美学的最具争议的问题。（参见 Belfiore 1984，Halliwell 1988，Nehamas 1982；关于主要提案的精彩总结，见 Naddaff 2002，136n8。Lear 2011 是支持这两段文字相互一致的最新论证。）尽管如此，人们仍然可以相信一些总结性的陈述。《理想国》 第 10 卷修订了模仿的形式方面，采用了一种意象化的描绘，超越了直接引用。增强的概念无法在不参考《理想国》的心理理论的情况下理解。而在其扩展形式中，该术语指的是某种本身就是坏的东西。

If Books 2 and 3 presented an account of the content in poetry and then an analysis of its form, Book 10 may be said to show how form invents content (to use a phrase attributed to the novelist Gilbert Sorrentino). The result is that, where the critique of mimêsis in Book 3 allowed a loophole making representation acceptable if it portrayed virtuous characters, the argument in Book 10 will promise that such an outcome will never happen (605a). Good mimêsis presents bad people.
如果第二和第三本书呈现了诗歌内容的叙述，然后分析其形式，那么第十本书可以说展示了形式如何创造内容（用小说家吉尔伯特·索伦蒂诺所说的话）。结果是，在第三本书中对模仿的批评允许了一个漏洞，使得如果表现出美德角色，表现是可以接受的，而第十本书中的论点则承诺这样的结果永远不会发生（605a）。好的模仿呈现坏人。

2.3 Republic 10: copy-making
2.3 理想国 10: 复制制作

As the Sophist also does (see below), Book 10 of the Republic treats mimêsis as a process at work in more art forms than drama. The topic in this passage, roughly the first half of Book 10 (595a–608b), is a mimêsis common to painting and poetry and much like picturing or copying. It is a relationship between a visible original and its visible likeness.
正如智者所做的（见下文），《理想国》第 10 卷将模仿视为在比戏剧更多的艺术形式中运作的一个过程。本段落的主题，大致是第 10 卷的前半部分（595a–608b），是绘画和诗歌共有的模仿，与描绘或复制非常相似。这是一个可见的原作与其可见的相似物之间的关系。

As Book 10 begins, Socrates links the coming treatment with what Book 3 had said about imitation and also establishes the difference between the passages. What follows will defend Book 3’s banishment of “imitative poetry” in terms that the Republic developed after Book 3. “Now that we have differentiated the soul’s eidê,” Socrates says, the danger of imitation becomes more evident (595a–b). An eidos is a kind, and this phrase “kinds of soul” is usually taken to mean the parts of the soul that Book 4 distinguished (435b–441c, 445d). The Republic’s theory of reason, spirit, and desire can enlarge what had been in Book 3 no more than suspicion about the impersonation of ignoble people. The new argument will charge poetry with upsetting the balance among the soul’s parts. (Daniel Mailick contributed to this discussion of the Republic’s psychological theory.)
当第 10 卷开始时，苏格拉底将即将讨论的内容与第 3 卷关于模仿的论述联系起来，并且确立了段落之间的区别。接下来将以《理想国》在第 3 卷之后发展的术语来辩护第 3 卷对“模仿诗歌”的驱逐。“现在我们已经区分了灵魂的种类，”苏格拉底说，模仿的危险变得更加明显（595a–b）。种类是一个类别，这个短语“灵魂的种类”通常被理解为第 4 卷所区分的灵魂的部分（435b–441c, 445d）。《理想国》的理性、精神和欲望理论可以扩展第 3 卷中对卑鄙之人模仿的怀疑。新的论点将指责诗歌破坏灵魂各部分之间的平衡。（丹尼尔·梅利克对此《理想国》的心理理论进行了讨论。）

In all Socrates presents three theses during this first half of Book 10:
在书籍第 10 卷的前半部分，苏格拉底提出了三个论点：

1. Poetic mimêsis, like the kind found in painting, is the imitation of appearance alone, and its products rank far below truth. (596e–602c)
   诗意的模仿，如同在绘画中所见，仅仅是对外观的模仿，其产物远低于真理。 (596e–602c)
2. Therefore poetic mimêsis corrupts the soul, weakening the rational impulse’s control over the person’s other drives and desires. (602c–608b)
   因此，诗意的模仿腐蚀了灵魂，削弱了理性冲动对个人其他驱动和欲望的控制。(602c–608b)
3. It should therefore be banned from the good city.
   因此，它应该被禁止在这个美好的城市中。

The argument supporting (1) seeks to spell out how badly poetry and painting fare at grasping and communicating knowledge. Partly because they do so badly, but also for other reasons, mimetic arts bring moral and psychological ill effects (2).
支持（1）的论点试图阐明诗歌和绘画在理解和传达知识方面表现得多么糟糕。部分原因是它们表现得很差，但也有其他原因，模仿艺术带来了道德和心理上的不良影响（2）。

The words “imitation of appearance” in (1) follow from a three-way differentiation:
（1）中的“外观的模仿”源于三种区分：

1. Form (of couch, of table) made by a god.
   形式（沙发的，桌子的）是由神所创造的。
2. Individual things (couches, tables) made by humans.
   个体事物（沙发、桌子）由人类制造。
3. Paintings (of couch or table) made by imitators.
   画作（沙发或桌子的画）由模仿者创作。

The carpenter works with eyes aiming “toward [pros]” the Form (596b)—not with eyes on the Form, but looking in that direction—so the individual couch the carpenter makes is something less than the Form: an honest failing after a decent try. If the Form is an object of knowledge, human creators at least possess true opinion (601e).
木匠的工作是目光指向“[优点]”的形式（596b）——不是目光在形式上，而是朝那个方向看——因此木匠制作的个体沙发是低于形式的：一次诚实的失败，经过了体面的尝试。如果形式是知识的对象，人类创造者至少拥有真实的观点（601e）。

Thus category II is never referred to as a realm of imitation, and – as a result – the table depicted in a painting does not turn into (in the popular phrase) the “imitation of an imitation.” The argument against art does not focus on what a carpenter or other skilled worker does in making an artifact. Nevertheless Plato’s phrase “imitation of appearance” does characterize artistic mimêsis as a compounded problem. Imitation intensifies a weakness present in existing objects; it not only fails but fails doubly. The good-faith effort at approximating to the Form of the couch produced a visible object. Visible objects represented in artistic imitation possess both intelligible and visible properties, and that imperfection in objects leaves them vulnerable to being imitated only in their visible aspects.
因此，第二类从未被称为模仿的领域，因此，画中描绘的桌子并不会变成（在流行的说法中）“模仿的模仿”。对艺术的反对并不集中在木匠或其他熟练工人在制作工艺品时所做的事情上。然而，柏拉图的“外观的模仿”确实将艺术的mimêsis描述为一个复杂的问题。模仿加剧了现有物体中的一种弱点；它不仅失败，而且双重失败。对沙发形式的善意接近产生了一个可见的物体。在艺术模仿中表现出的可见物体同时具有可理解和可见的属性，而物体中的这种不完美使它们在可见方面仅仅容易被模仿。

Those visible aspects are the subject matter for a visual representation. When you look at a couch from different perspectives, you are still looking at the same couch, when that object is understood intelligibly. But the couch seen from different perspectives makes for different paintings. Therefore the painting must be not an image of the couch but an image of its appearance (598a).
那些可见的方面是视觉表现的主题。当你从不同的角度看沙发时，你仍然是在看同一个沙发，只要这个物体被理解得清晰明了。然而，从不同角度看到的沙发会形成不同的画作。因此，画作必须不是沙发的图像，而是其外观的图像（598a）。

The same difference applies if the painter depicts a shoemaker (598b–c), erring in that representation of a human professional by dint of lacking the professional’s knowledge. The painter gives us a shoemaker as seen by one who has no idea what shoemakers know, as the dramatic poet represents everything in a character except what that character knows. A full and true account of a doctor must include medical knowledge, or else you are not describing the reality of the doctor.
如果画家描绘一个鞋匠（598b–c），同样的差异也适用，因为他在表现这个人类职业时缺乏专业知识。画家呈现给我们的是一个鞋匠的形象，但这个形象来自于一个对鞋匠所知一无所知的人，就像戏剧诗人描绘角色时，除了角色所知的内容外，其他一切都在表现中。对医生的完整而真实的描述必须包括医学知识，否则你就无法描述医生的现实。

Skipping ahead for a moment, the Republic’s reader finds a second three-way distinction (601c–602a) that criticizes imitation from another perspective:
跳过一会儿，《共和国》的读者发现了第二个三重区分（601c–602a），从另一个角度批评模仿：

1. User (of a flute or bridle) who knows.
   用户（笛子或缰绳的使用者）懂得。
2. Maker (of flute or bridle) who has correct belief.
   制造者（笛子或缰绳的制造者）有正确的信念。
3. Imitator (of flute or bridle) who is ignorant.
   模仿者（笛子或缰绳的模仿者）无知。

This intriguing new list is hard to make sense of. The three items belong alongside the previous three-part ranking. The carpenter who makes a table resembles the leatherworker making the bridle; both tripartitions put the visual imitator lowest. But why do flautists and jockeys suddenly appear in the top spot, in place of a god so supreme as to create even Forms?
这个引人入胜的新列表很难理解。这三项与之前的三部分排名相辅相成。制作桌子的木匠与制作缰绳的皮革工匠相似；这两种三分法都将视觉模仿者放在最低的位置。但为什么笛子演奏者和骑师突然出现在最高的位置，取代了一个甚至能创造形式的至高神呢？

The answer might appear among the particular manufactured objects that these passages refer to. For the reader familiar with Greek religion, both rankings evoke Athena. The couch- and table-making carpenter practices a trade whose patron is Athena, while myths known to Plato depict her as the original user of both flute (Pindar 12th Pythian Ode) and bridle (Pindar 13th Olympian Ode). These associations put the imitator at the opposite pole from a god, rendering the products of imitation not only lowly nothings but malevolently profane, even blasphemous. Athena’s technologies permit the forces that would threaten civilized life to find their place within a city, but imitators exist outside the space of these civilizing technologies (Pappas 2013). One need not subject the passage to so much pressure in the effort to make it fit alongside the earlier tripartite hierarchy, but those who see religious lines running through the Republic’s arguments about art might want to develop this interpretation.
答案可能出现在这些段落所提到的特定制造物品中。对于熟悉希腊宗教的读者来说，这两种排名都唤起了雅典娜。制作沙发和桌子的木匠从事的行业以雅典娜为保护神，而柏拉图所知的神话则将她描绘为笛子（皮达尔第 12 首Pythian Ode）和缰绳（皮达尔第 13 首Olympian Ode）的最初使用者。这些关联使得模仿者与神明处于对立的极端，使模仿的产品不仅显得微不足道，而且恶意亵渎，甚至是亵渎神明。雅典娜的技术使得威胁文明生活的力量能够在城市中找到其位置，但模仿者则存在于这些文明技术的空间之外（帕帕斯 2013）。不必对这一段施加如此大的压力以使其与早期的三分层次相适应，但那些认为宗教线索贯穿于《理想国》关于艺术的论点中的人，可能希望发展这种解释。

The argument thus far posits painting as the default case of mimêsis (Golden 1975, Nehamas 1982, Belfiore 1984, Moss 2007). But Socrates springboards beyond pictorial art to condemn tragedy and its “father” Homer. Homer was ignorant, never taught a useful thing to anyone (599b–600e). This apparent ad hominem attack is designed to show that poetry too imitates appearance. For that purpose it suffices to show that one esteemed poet writes without knowledge. If great poetry can come out of someone ignorant, then poetry must not require knowledge. Even if ignorance is not necessary for the composition of poetry Homer’s example demonstrates that the two are compatible.
到目前为止，这个论点将绘画视为模仿的默认案例（Golden 1975，Nehamas 1982，Belfiore 1984，Moss 2007）。但苏格拉底超越了绘画艺术，谴责悲剧及其“父亲”荷马。荷马无知，从未教过任何有用的东西（599b–600e）。这种明显的人身攻击旨在表明，诗歌同样模仿外表。为了这个目的，只需证明一位受人尊敬的诗人是在无知的情况下创作。如果伟大的诗歌可以出自一个无知的人，那么诗歌就不需要知识。即使无知并不是创作诗歌的必要条件，荷马的例子也表明两者是兼容的。

An obvious complaint comes to mind. “Someone can be ignorant and still write great poetry!” Plato nods in glum agreement, for this is exactly the problem. Nothing good will come of an activity that can not only be attempted ignorantly but even succeeded at in ignorance. The success of the ignorant suffices to prove that no knowledge comes into play in poetic imitation. Poetry too imitates no more than appearance.
一个明显的抱怨浮现在脑海中。“有人可以无知，但仍然写出伟大的诗歌！”柏拉图沮丧地点头同意，因为这正是问题所在。任何一种不仅可以在无知中尝试，而且甚至可以在无知中成功的活动，都不会带来什么好结果。无知者的成功足以证明在诗歌模仿中没有知识的参与。诗歌也不过是模仿表象而已。

The pictorial sense of mimêsis now has eclipsed the embodying or role-playing sense that the argument in Book 3 exploited. Aristotle will follow the Republic in conceiving mimêsis in both ways, although he keeps the two separate. When Aristotle identifies two natural grounds for the appeal of mimêsis, one describes enactment (Poetics 4 1448b6) and the other pictorial depiction (Poetics 4 1448b12). Book 10 is trying to attack poetry that enacts human characters on the grounds that it thereby resembles pictures.
现在，模仿的图像感已经超越了第三卷中所利用的体现或角色扮演的意义。亚里士多德将遵循《理想国》，以两种方式构思模仿，尽管他将两者分开。当亚里士多德确定模仿吸引力的两个自然基础时，一个描述的是表演（《诗学》 4 1448b6），另一个描述的是图像描绘（《诗学》 4 1448b12）。第十卷试图攻击那些表现人类角色的诗歌，理由是它因此而类似于图画。

As if to bridge the gap between the two critiques, Socrates goes on to argue that poetry harms the soul. He says that poetry’s illusions fortify the worst part of the soul and turn it against the best. The first stretch of this argument (602c–603b) uses theoretical language taken from the Republic’s psychological theory, while the second (603b–608b) appeals to observable phenomena surrounding performances of tragedies.
似乎为了弥合这两种批评之间的差距，苏格拉底继续论证诗歌对灵魂的伤害。他说，诗歌的幻象强化了灵魂中最糟糕的部分，并使其反对最好的部分。这一论证的第一部分（602c–603b）使用了来自《理想国》心理理论的理论语言，而第二部分（603b–608b）则诉诸于围绕悲剧表演的可观察现象。

Socrates returns to his analogy between poetry and painting. If you are partly taken in by a painting’s tricked-up table apparition but you partly spot the falseness, which part of you does which? The soul’s rational impulse must be the part that knows the painting is not a real table. But Book 4 had established a fundamental principle: When the soul inclines in more than one direction at a time, this conflict represents the activity of more than one faculty or part of the soul (436b; recalled in Book 10’s argument at 602e). So being taken in by an optical or artistic illusion must be the act of some part of the soul distinct from reason. Painting and tragedy both inspire reactions that do not come from one’s calculating capacity.
苏格拉底回到他对诗歌和绘画的类比。如果你部分被一幅画的虚假桌子幻象所吸引，但你又部分看到了其虚假性，那么你内心的哪个部分在做什么？灵魂的理性冲动一定是知道这幅画不是一张真实桌子的部分。但是第四卷确立了一个基本原则：当灵魂同时朝多个方向倾斜时，这种冲突代表了灵魂中多个能力或部分的活动（436b；在第十卷的论证中回顾于 602e）。因此，被光学或艺术幻觉所迷惑一定是灵魂中某个部分的行为，而非理性。绘画和悲剧都激发出不来自于个人计算能力的反应。

Invoking Book 4’s psychological theory integrates the critique of poetry of Book 10 into the Republic’s overarching argument. The Republic identifies justice with a balance among reason, spirit or anger, and the desires. This controlled balance is the happiest state available for human souls, and the most virtuous. Because imitation undoes the soul’s justice, it brings both vice and misery.
引用第四卷的心理理论将第十卷对诗歌的批评整合进《理想国》的总体论证中。《理想国》将正义与理性、精神或愤怒以及欲望之间的平衡相联系。这种受控的平衡是人类灵魂所能达到的最幸福状态，也是最有德行的。因为模仿破坏了灵魂的正义，它带来了恶行和痛苦。

The Republic does not specify the irrational part in question. Thinking the sun is the size of your hand does not feel like either anger overwhelming you or desires tempting. What do illusions have to do with irrationality of motive?
《理想国》并没有具体说明所涉及的非理性部分。认为太阳的大小和你的手一样，并不感觉像是愤怒压倒了你或欲望在诱惑你。幻觉与动机的非理性有什么关系？

Again commentaries differ. A complex and fertile debate continues to worry over how perceptual error undermines mental health or moral integrity (Nehamas 1982, Moss 2007). Part of the answer comes from Books 8–9, which sketch four character types graded from best to worst. These are eidê in a different sense of that word, meaning not the parts or separate motives within one soul but the species that one might sort souls into. This taxonomy of soul-types deserves to play a larger role than it has in the discussion of imitation.
再次评论各不相同。一个复杂而富有成果的辩论继续关注感知错误如何削弱心理健康或道德完整性（Nehamas 1982, Moss 2007）。部分答案来自于第 8 至 9 卷，其中勾勒出四种性格类型，从最好到最差。这些是eidê在该词的另一种意义上，指的不是一个灵魂内部的部分或独立动机，而是可以将灵魂分类的种类。这种灵魂类型的分类法在模仿讨论中应当发挥比目前更大的作用。

The pleasures of the lowest soul-eidos are illusory and feed on illusion. Unreal appearances produce unreliable pleasures, which are all the keener and madder for the ontologically light quality of their instigating images. Book 9 says that desire delights not in true beings but in “idols [eidôlois] of true pleasure” and painted images, eskiagraphêmenais (586b). Skiagraphia – the root within this last word – was an impressionistic manner of painting that juxtaposed contrasting hues to create illusionistic shadow and intensify color (Keuls 1974, Demand 1975, Petraki 2018). Plato disapproved specifically of skiagraphia (Parmenides 165c–d, Phaedo 69b). In fact the Republic’s attacks on painting are sometimes interpreted narrowly as applying only to skiagraphia.
最低灵魂的eidos的快乐是虚幻的，依赖于幻觉。虚假的表象产生不可靠的快乐，而这些快乐因其引发图像的本体轻质特性而显得更加强烈和疯狂。第 9 卷指出，欲望并不在真实存在中找到乐趣，而是在“真实快乐的偶像[eidôlois]”和绘画图像中，eskiagraphêmenais（586b）。Skiagraphia——这个最后一个词的根——是一种印象派的绘画方式，通过对比色调的并置来创造幻觉阴影并增强色彩（Keuls 1974, Demand 1975, Petraki 2018）。柏拉图特别不赞成skiagraphia（Parmenides 165c–d, Phaedo 69b）。事实上，《共和国》对绘画的攻击有时被狭义地解读为仅适用于skiagraphia。

Thus where Book 9 examines the desirous part of the soul and finds its objects to be mere idols, Book 10 determines mimêsis to be a show of mere idols and concludes that it keeps company with the soul’s desirous part. In that case the pictorial quality of poetic mimêsis might be a distraction, its main fault residing in its illusionistic character.
因此，第 9 卷探讨了灵魂的欲望部分，并发现其对象仅仅是偶像，第 10 卷则确定模仿只是偶像的表象，并得出结论，它与灵魂的欲望部分相伴。在这种情况下，诗意的模仿的图像特质可能是一种干扰，其主要缺陷在于其幻觉特性。

The terminology in Book 9 underscores the connection between these arguments. The tyrant is “at the third remove” from the oligarch, his pleasure “a third-place idol [tritôi eidôlôi]” compared to the truth (alêtheia) of the oligarchic soul’s pleasure (587c). Meanwhile the oligarch’s soul stands third below the “kingly man [tou basilikou]” (587d). Only ten pages later Book 10 echoes this terminology when it calls the imitator “third from the king [basileôs] and from the truth [alêtheias]” (597e; cf. 602c). In other words, the language in Book 10 brings Book 9’s equation of base pleasures with illusory ones into its attack on art. If Book 10 can show that an art form fosters interest in illusions it will have gone a long way toward showing that the art form keeps company with irrational desires.
第九卷中的术语强调了这些论点之间的联系。暴君与寡头之间“相隔三层”，他的快乐是与寡头灵魂的快乐（587c）相比的“第三位偶像 [tritôi eidôlôi]”，而寡头的灵魂则位于“王者 [tou basilikou]”之下的第三位（587d）。仅仅十页后，第十卷在称模仿者为“距离国王 [basileôs] 和真理 [alêtheias] 三层之遥”时（597e；参见 602c）呼应了这一术语。换句话说，第十卷的语言将第九卷中将低级快乐与虚幻快乐等同的论述引入了对艺术的批判。如果第十卷能够表明某种艺术形式促进对幻觉的兴趣，那么它就已经在证明该艺术形式与非理性欲望相伴随方面迈出了重要一步。

Another essential step in the argument is the recognition that what Book 3 acknowledged as an exception to its critique, namely the imitation of virtuous thoughtful characters, is not apt ever to take place. Socrates has tragedy in mind (comedy secondarily), and observes that playwrights neither know the quiet philosophical type nor profit from putting that nice type on stage before spectators who came to the theater to see something showily agitated (604e–605a). At one stroke Plato intensifies his condemnation of mimêsis, no longer a dangerous technique when it presents the wrong kinds of people but a technique that seldom presents any other kind.
另一个论证中的关键步骤是认识到《书籍三》中承认的对其批评的例外，即模仿有德思考的角色，实际上是不可能发生的。苏格拉底心中想到的是悲剧（喜剧则是次要的），并观察到剧作家既不了解安静的哲学类型，也无法从将这种优秀类型呈现在前来剧院观看热闹场面的观众面前中获利（604e–605a）。柏拉图在这一刻加深了对模仿的谴责，这种技术在呈现错误类型的人时不再是危险的，而是一种很少呈现其他类型的技术。

Tragedy’s hero, who is inherently impulsive and impassioned, acts contrary to the dictates of reason. An illusion of virtue guides him. His son dies, and rather than save his tears for a private moment he lets them flow publicly and at length (603e–604a). The spectators’ reason is appalled; their other impulses rejoice (605c–e). They reckon that there is no harm in weeping along with the hero, enjoying an emotional release without the responsibility one feels in real-life situations. We grow accustomed not merely to feeling strong emotions, but to feeling them without the oversight of reason at work. This is how dramatic illusion induces bad habits of indulging the passions. The soul that had spent its life learning self-control sets about unlearning it.
悲剧的英雄本性冲动而热情，行为与理性的指引相悖。一个美德的幻觉引导着他。他的儿子去世了，他没有将眼泪留给私密的时刻，而是让眼泪在公众面前流淌，且流淌得很久（603e–604a）。观众的理性感到震惊；他们的其他冲动却感到欢愉（605c–e）。他们认为与英雄一同哭泣没有坏处，享受情感的释放而不承担现实生活中的责任。我们不仅习惯于感受强烈的情感，还习惯于在没有理性监督的情况下感受这些情感。这就是戏剧幻觉如何诱发沉溺于激情的不良习惯。那个一生学习自我控制的灵魂开始逐渐忘却这一点。

Incidentally this argument turns on an assumption that Plato asserts without discussion, that mimêsis is the presentation or representation of characters (e.g. 603c; 605a, c). Although Book 10 sometimes speaks of mimêsis in other terms (mimêsis of virtues: 600e), the argument about fostering passions requires that objects of poetic representation be humans. When what we call literary works practice what we call representation, Plato claims that they represent human beings. For him as for Aristotle drama presents prattontas “people doing things,” but where Aristotle emphasizes the things done, for Plato it is the people. Character is the essence of epic and drama. (Halliwell 1988 argues otherwise.)
顺便提一下，这个论点基于一个柏拉图未加讨论的假设，即模仿是对角色的呈现或再现（例如 603c；605a，c）。尽管第 10 卷有时用其他术语谈论模仿（美德的模仿：600e），但关于培养激情的论点要求诗歌再现的对象必须是人类。当我们所称的文学作品实践我们所称的再现时，柏拉图声称它们再现的是人类。对他和亚里士多德来说，戏剧呈现的是行动者“人们在做事情”，但亚里士多德强调的是所做的事情，而柏拉图则强调的是人。角色是史诗和戏剧的本质。（哈利威尔 1988 年对此持不同观点。）

Plato’s emphasis on character already predisposes him not to find philosophical worth in literature. The reason for mistrusting individual characters becomes explicit in Laws. A character speaks from a single point of view. Bring several characters together representing several idiosyncratic perspectives on the world and the very idea of deriving a general statement from the work becomes impossible (Laws 719c–d). This situation is as it were the dramatic corollary to a general principle in mimêsis, that it represents plurality or multiplicity and so is forever indeterminate, undeterminable. Seeing the plurality of personages in a work as generative of its illusions might help to explain how poetry resembles paintings. But the analogy remains obscure.
柏拉图对角色的强调使他倾向于不在文学中发现哲学价值。在法律中，对个别角色的不信任的原因变得明确。一个角色从单一的视角发声。将几个角色聚集在一起，代表对世界的几种特立独行的视角，便使得从作品中得出一般性陈述的想法变得不可能（法律719c–d）。这种情况可以说是模仿中一个一般原则的戏剧性推论，即它代表多样性或多重性，因此永远是不确定的、不可确定的。将作品中角色的多样性视为其幻觉的生成可能有助于解释诗歌如何类似于绘画。但这种类比仍然模糊。

2.4 Sophist
2.4 智者

Plato’s Sophist, often called a later work than the Republic, proposes its own account of mimêsis. It pursues imitation for the different purpose of defining what a sophist is. But the sophist—whom the main speaker calls an imitator (mimêtês) and sorcerer (goêtês) (235a)—is not far removed from the deceiving poet (Notomi 2011, 311–313).
柏拉图的智者，常被称为比理想国晚的作品，提出了自己对模仿的解释。它追求模仿的不同目的，以定义什么是智者。但智者——主讲者称之为模仿者（mimêtês）和巫师（goêtês）（235a）——与欺骗性的诗人并没有太大区别（Notomi 2011, 311–313）。

And although the Sophist’s theory of imitation diverges from the one in Republic 10, similarities between them preponderate. As the Republic does, the Sophist characterizes imitation mockingly as the creation of a whole world, and accuses imitation of misleading the unwary (234b–c), even if it also predicts more optimistically that people grow up to see through false likenesses (234d). Again as in Republic 10 imitation is contrasted with a god’s work—except that in the Sophist gods make all living things (265c–d) and also images, eidôla (266a): dreams, shadows, reflections.
尽管智者的模仿理论与理想国10 中的理论有所不同，但它们之间的相似性占主导地位。正如理想国所做的那样，智者嘲讽地将模仿描述为创造一个完整的世界，并指责模仿误导无知者（234b–c），即使它也更乐观地预测人们会成长为能够看透虚假相似的人（234d）。同样在理想国10 中，模仿与神的作品形成对比——只不过在智者中，神创造所有生物（265c–d）以及图像，eidôla（266a）：梦、影子、反射。

The representation that Plato charges sophists with is fraudulent. It is the kind that makes not an honest likeness (eikasia) but an illusory image, a phantasma (235d–236b). Makers of realistic statues are attending not to what a human figure really looks like but to what looking at it is like. In drawing the distinction between these kinds of representations – a distinction that incidentally appears in no other dialogue (Halliwell 2021, 34) – the Sophist does strike a conciliatory tone not found in Republic 10. Here, it appears that a branch of the mimetic profession retains the power to produce a reliable likeness of an object. But the consolation proves fleeting. Reliable imitation plays no role in a definition of sophists, would presumably play no role in talk of poets either, and seems to make an appearance only for the purpose of being shuffled offstage as the excluded mimêsis, that which the imitation being talked about differs from.
柏拉图指责的诡辩家所呈现的形象是欺诈性的。这种形象并不是诚实的相似（eikasia），而是一个虚幻的影像，一个phantasma（235d–236b）。制作逼真雕像的人关注的并不是人类形象的真实样貌，而是观看它的感觉。在区分这些表现形式时——这一区分在其他对话中并未出现（Halliwell 2021, 34）——《诡辩家》确实表现出一种在《理想国》第 10 卷中找不到的和解语气。在这里，似乎模仿职业的一个分支仍然保留着产生对象可靠相似的能力。但这种安慰是短暂的。可靠的模仿在对诡辩家的定义中没有作用，显然在谈论诗人时也不会起作用，似乎只是在被排除的mimêsis的目的下出现，即所谈论的模仿与之不同。

The Sophist marginalizes positive imitation when it takes up mimêsis a second time, subdividing the production of illusions to identify a species in which imitators use their own voice and bodies: “This part is called imitation [mimêsis]” (267a). The Eleatic Stranger who is speaking recognizes that he has appropriated the general word for the specific act of enacting false images. We also notice that theatrical enactment becomes, on this analysis, a subset of pictorial image-making. “Let’s designate this to be what we call the imitative profession [mimêtikon].” Everything else in the large genus can go by some other name (267a).
智者在第二次提到模仿时边缘化了积极的模仿，细分了幻象的产生，以识别一种模仿者使用自己声音和身体的类型：“这一部分被称为模仿 [模仿]”（267a）。正在发言的厄拉提克陌生人意识到他已经将一般词汇用于具体的实施虚假图像的行为。我们还注意到，在这一分析中，戏剧表演成为了图像制作的一个子集。“让我们将其指定为我们所称的模仿职业 [模仿职业]。”大类中的其他一切可以用其他名称来称呼（267a）。

Narrowing the process down to impersonation should make clear that Plato finds a sophist’s imitativeness to resemble a poet’s. Moreover this development neutralizes suggestions that mimêsis might have a good side. The imitative technê will have many manifestations, including those legitimate practices that the Statesman and other dialogues refer to. But the real work of mimêsis, the one that is worth defining and that applies to dominant art forms, is mendacious impersonation. Where Republic 3’s taxonomy made imitation look like a freakish variety of narration, this use of a word both generically and specially excludes good imitation as the exception and the problem case. Essentially speaking the art of mimêsis is a bad and lying art.
将过程缩小到模仿应该清楚地表明，柏拉图认为智者的模仿性与诗人的模仿性相似。此外，这一发展中和了关于mimêsis可能有好的一面的暗示。模仿的technê将有许多表现形式，包括国君和其他对话中提到的那些合法实践。但真正的mimêsis，值得定义并适用于主流艺术形式的，是虚假的模仿。在理想国第 3 卷的分类中，模仿看起来像是一种怪异的叙述变体，而这种词的通用和特殊用法则将良好的模仿排除在外，视其为例外和问题案例。从本质上讲，mimêsis的艺术是一种糟糕且虚假的艺术。

After all, as the Stranger says, there is a shortage of names for types of mimêsis. The ancients did not work hard enough making all relevant philosophical distinctions (267d). It is as if Plato were saying: “Colloquial language being loose, I will sometimes use mimêsis in the broader sense that contains epistemically sound practices, even though the core sense of the word is pejorative.”
毕竟，正如陌生人所说，关于模仿的类型名称是短缺的。古人没有足够努力地进行所有相关的哲学区分（267d）。这就像柏拉图在说：“口语语言比较松散，我有时会使用模仿这个词的更广泛意义，包含认知上合理的实践，尽管这个词的核心意义是贬义的。”

2.5 Closing assessment 2.5 结案评估

This coverage of mimêsis in Plato will seem too strong in one respect and too weak or incomplete in another. It emphasizes core Platonic arguments about mimetic poetry. But the dialogues are far-ranging documents, and a reader discovers these core arguments among passages that argue to opposite effect, or deploying the vocabulary of mimêsis in contradictory ways.
对于柏拉图中关于模仿的论述，在某种意义上似乎过于强烈，而在另一种意义上又显得过于薄弱或不完整。它强调了柏拉图关于模仿诗歌的核心论点。但这些对话是广泛的文献，读者在那些论证相反效果的段落中发现这些核心论点，或者以矛盾的方式使用模仿的词汇。

For instance: If mimêsis brings about deceptive effects in the poetry about human beings, it also accounts for the visible universe, which Plato’s Timaeus calls an imitation of its intelligible model (39e; and see 44d) – and which, as already seen, that dialogue calls beautiful. For that matter human learning about the natural world also mimics an intelligible reality (47c, 80b) (Spinelli 2021). In the political domain, the Statesman calls existing constitutions mimêmata of moral truths, with no implication of fraud in them (297c). The funeral speech in the Menexenus urges the young to copy their elders’ virtues (236e). Such passages suggest a rehabilitation for the process that the Republic treats as counterfeiting (Robinson 2016).
例如：如果模仿在关于人类的诗歌中产生了欺骗性的效果，它也解释了可见的宇宙，柏拉图的蒂迈欧斯称其为其可理解模型的模仿（39e；见 44d）——而且，正如已经看到的，该对话称其为美丽。就此而言，人类对自然世界的学习也模仿了一种可理解的现实（47c，80b）（Spinelli 2021）。在政治领域，政治家称现有的宪法为道德真理的模仿物，并没有暗示其中存在欺诈（297c）。在梅内克斯中的葬礼演讲敦促年轻人效仿长辈的美德（236e）。这些段落暗示了对理想国所视为伪造的过程的恢复（Robinson 2016）。

Recent studies of Platonic mimêsis take the point further, as in a collection edited by Julia Pfefferkorn and Antonino Spinelli (2021). The contributors to that volume examine the appearances of mimêsis outside the “aesthetic” passages to which thought about the concept is usually confined, and they identify a variety of positive functions for the process. So mimêsis plays a role in recollection (Candiotto 2021), and in the ethical effort to assimilate oneself to the divine nature (Männlein-Robert 2021). Stephen Halliwell argues for the general point that “there is no unified and stable conception of mimesis to be found in Plato, let alone a uniformly negative conception” (Halliwell 2021, 29). The Republic’s philosophers themselves engage in mimetic work, whether in embodying the spirit of the new city’s laws (485c) or when patterning themselves after what is most real (500c). We even find philosophers symbolically painting the good city (Halliwell 2021, Marrin 2023).
最近对柏拉图的模仿的研究进一步探讨了这一观点，例如由朱莉亚·佩费尔科恩和安东尼诺·斯皮内利编辑的合集（2021）。该卷的贡献者们考察了模仿在通常被限制于“美学”段落之外的表现，并识别出这一过程的多种积极功能。因此，模仿在回忆中发挥作用（坎迪奥托 2021），以及在道德努力中使自己与神圣本质相融合（曼莱因-罗伯特 2021）。斯蒂芬·哈利威尔主张一个普遍观点：“在柏拉图那里找不到统一和稳定的模仿概念，更不用说统一的消极概念了”（哈利威尔 2021，29）。《理想国》的哲学家们本身就参与了模仿的工作，无论是在体现新城市法律的精神（485c），还是在模仿最真实的事物（500c）。我们甚至发现哲学家们象征性地描绘了美好的城市（哈利威尔 2021，马林 2023）。

The complexity surrounding mimêsis may be hardest to sort out when humans are said to learn from nature. The beauty that Plato assigns to nature has been noted, and its place in the growth of knowledge. But there too mimêsis enters the picture. The Menexenus’s speech goes so far as to affirm that women imitate the earth when they bear children (238a). The Timaeus’s praise for seeing and studying the order in the skies describes the psychic betterment that comes of “copying” stellar movements with similar movements in one’s soul (47b–c).
围绕模仿的复杂性在于，当人类被认为从自然中学习时，可能最难以理清。柏拉图赋予自然的美已被注意到，并且它在知识增长中的地位也得到了认可。但在这里，模仿也进入了画面。《梅内克斯》的演讲甚至肯定了女性在生育时模仿大地（238a）。《蒂迈欧斯》对观察和研究天空秩序的赞美描述了通过“复制”星体运动与灵魂中类似运动所带来的心理改善（47b–c）。

Even in response to Book 10’s anti-poetic argument, a sympathetic reader might make the case that the poet’s error lies not in imitation per se, but in deploying that appealing technique without also, in the process, representing the true look of virtue.
即使在回应第十卷的反诗论时，一个同情的读者也可能会认为，诗人的错误不在于模仿per se，而在于使用这种吸引人的技巧时，没有同时展现出美德的真实面貌。

A reading of the Republic’s attack on imitation may silence many of the complicating objections by emphasizing that poetry goes wrong (in formal terms) only insofar as it operates not as simple mimêsis, but in particular the mimêsis of persons. Something about performing an individual’s part brings out the great ignorance and potential for corrupting souls, and the desirable types of mimêsis cited in the Republic and elsewhere tend to make the object of imitation something other than individual humans. This reply itself does have to admit objections, though, such as young philosophers’ efforts to act like upright and serious dialecticians (539c; see Menexenus 236e).
对《理想国》对模仿的攻击的解读可能会通过强调诗歌在形式上只有在不作为简单的模仿时才会出错，从而消除许多复杂的反对意见，特别是对个体的模仿。表演个体角色的某种方式揭示了巨大的无知和腐蚀灵魂的潜力，而《理想国》及其他地方提到的理想模仿类型往往使模仿的对象成为其他而非个体人类。尽管如此，这一回应本身也必须承认反对意见，例如年轻哲学家努力表现得像正直和严肃的辩证法家（539c；见梅内克斯 236e）。

But insisting on the mimêsis of persons also invites broader systematic worries. Why should this one narrowly defined act of character-presentation fall prey to charges that it issues in images of appearance, when other mimetic acts avoid that charge? Just how is drama relevantly like painting when (for example) narrative is not?
但坚持对人物的模仿也引发了更广泛的系统性担忧。为什么这个狭义定义的角色呈现行为会受到它产生外观形象的指责，而其他模仿行为却避免了这种指控？当叙事（例如）并不相关时，戏剧与绘画到底有何相似之处？

Suppose that question does find an answer, and that mimetic poetry about individuals remains guilty of generating mere imitations of appearance. The Sophist’s reference to divine copy-making then invites another worry, in the face of which this discussion of mimêsis can appear too weak. According to the Sophist, the images that gods produce in their kind of imitation are shadows and reflections, and the products of truly bad mimêsis are to be something worse than that. But what could be metaphysically lower than a shadow? Coming back to the Republic one finds shadows and reflections occupying the bottom-most domain of the Divided Line (510a). Where does poetic imitation belong on that ranking?
假设这个问题确实找到了答案，而关于个体的模仿诗仍然被指责为仅仅生成外表的模仿。那么，智者对神圣复制的提及就引发了另一个担忧，在这种情况下，这段关于模仿的讨论显得过于薄弱。根据智者的说法，神所产生的那种模仿的图像是阴影和反射，而真正糟糕的模仿的产物则是比这更糟糕的东西。但有什么东西在形而上学上比阴影更低呢？回到理想国，可以发现阴影和反射占据了分割线的最低领域（510a）。诗意的模仿在这个排名中属于哪里？

One may articulate the worry in the Republic’s language. Shadows and reflections belong in the category of near ignorance. Imitation works an effect worse than ignorance, not merely teaching nothing but worse than that engendering a positive and perverse inclination toward ignorance. Plato observes that the ignorant prefer to remain as they are (Symposium 204a), but this turn toward ignorance is different from such complacency. It suggests a wish to know less than one does.
人们可以用《共和国》的语言表达这种担忧。阴影和反射属于近乎无知的范畴。模仿产生的效果比无知更糟，不仅什么都不教，甚至还会导致对无知的积极和扭曲的倾向。柏拉图观察到，无知者更愿意保持现状（《饗宴》204a），但这种向无知的转变与这种自满是不同的。它暗示着一种希望知道的比自己所知道的更少的愿望。

The theoretical question also implies a practical one. If mimêsis poisons the soul, why do people swallow it? Plato’s attack on poetry saddles him with an aesthetic problem of evil.
理论问题也暗示了一个实践问题。如果模仿毒害了灵魂，为什么人们还要吞下它？柏拉图对诗歌的攻击使他面临一个美学上的恶的问题。

Republic 10 shows signs of addressing the problem with the vocabulary of magic. Socrates begins by promising that insight into mimêsis operates as a countercharm (595b). People need countercharms because the imitator is a “sorcerer [goêtês],” therefore a deceiver (598d; cf. 602d). Earlier he said that sorcery robs people of knowledge (413b–c). Finally the indictment of Homer’s ignorance ends by saying his poetry casts a spell (601b). As the English “charm” does, this noun kêlêsis can mean “appeal” but also a conjuration. Poetry works magically to draw in the audience that it then degrades.
理想国 10 显示出用魔法的词汇来解决这个问题的迹象。苏格拉底首先承诺，洞察模仿的运作如同一种反咒语（595b）。人们需要反咒语，因为模仿者是一个“巫师[goêtês]”，因此是一个欺骗者（598d；参见 602d）。他早些时候说过，巫术剥夺了人们的知识（413b–c）。最后，对荷马无知的指控以他的诗歌施加了魔法（601b）结束。正如英语中的“魅力”一样，这个名词kêlêsis可以意味着“吸引”，但也可以指一种召唤。诗歌以魔法的方式吸引观众，然后又贬低他们。

References to magic serve poorly as explanations but do indicate a need for explanation. Plato sees that some power must be drawing people to give up both knowledge and the taste for knowledge. What is striking about this deus ex machina explaining poetry’s attractiveness in the Republic is what it does not say. In other dialogues the magic of poetry is attributed to one version or another of divine inspiration. Odd that the Republic makes no reference to inspiration in poetry when dialogues as different as the Apology and the Laws mention it and the Ion and the Phaedrus spell out how it works. The Republic’s only invocation of such an event pertains to philosophical education (499b). Odder still, Plato almost never cites imitation and divine inspiration together (the lone exception Laws 719c), as if to say that the two are incommensurable accounts of poetry. Will inspiration play a role ancillary to imitation, or do the two approaches to poetry have nothing to do with one another?
对魔法的提及作为解释效果不佳，但确实表明了对解释的需求。柏拉图认为，某种力量必定在吸引人们放弃知识和对知识的渴望。令人惊讶的是，这个在《理想国》中解释诗歌吸引力的机械神所说的内容是它所不说的。在其他对话中，诗歌的魔力被归因于某种版本的神圣灵感。奇怪的是，《理想国》在讨论诗歌时没有提到灵感，而《辩护篇》和《法律篇》却提到了这一点，《伊翁篇》和《斐德罗篇》则详细说明了它是如何运作的。《理想国》唯一提到这种事件的地方与哲学教育有关（499b）。更奇怪的是，柏拉图几乎从不同时提到模仿和神圣灵感（唯一的例外是《法律篇》719c），仿佛在说这两者是对诗歌不可通约的解释。灵感会在模仿的辅助角色中发挥作用，还是这两种对诗歌的理解毫无关系？

3. Divine Inspiration 3. 神圣启示

In simplest form “inspiration” names the claim that poets are aided in producing their own poetry. At lucky moments a god takes them over and brings value to the poem that it could not have had otherwise.
在最简单的形式中，“灵感”指的是诗人在创作自己诗歌时受到帮助的说法。在幸运的时刻，一位神灵会占据他们，赋予诗歌一种否则无法拥有的价值。

That much is a common idea. Either a divine source provides the poet with information needed for writing the poem (information about past events or the gods’ lives, for example); or more generally the source gives the poet the talent needed for writing anything. The idea is far from original with Plato. Within Greek culture alone there are Homer and Hesiod before Plato, who begin their great works asking a Muse to “speak into” them; after him Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1099b9, 1179b20–23) (Büttner 2011). Plato will find new meanings in, and new uses for, an idea that has a cultural and religious meaning before him and a long traditional life after him (Ledbetter 2003, Murray 1981, Tigerstedt 1970).
这个观点是一个普遍的想法。要么是一个神圣的源泉为诗人提供写作诗歌所需的信息（例如关于过去事件或神灵生活的信息）；要么更一般地说，这个源泉赋予诗人写作任何东西所需的才能。这个想法远非柏拉图所独创。在希腊文化中，早于柏拉图的荷马和赫西俄德在他们的伟大作品开头请求缪斯“对他们倾诉”；在他之后，亚里士多德（尼科马科伦理学 1099b9, 1179b20–23）（Büttner 2011）。柏拉图将在一个在他之前具有文化和宗教意义的思想中发现新的含义和新的用途，并在他之后有着悠久的传统生命（Ledbetter 2003, Murray 1981, Tigerstedt 1970）。

Plato’s version of the idea has proved durable and influential. The old chestnut about a fine line between genius and insanity is only the best-known legacy of Platonic inspiration, as popularized in one way by Cesare Lombroso’s work on “psychiatric art” (Lombroso 1891, 2); in another way by Percy Bysshe Shelley, who translated the Ion in 1821 believing its account of poetic madness supported his own defense of poetry (Shelley 1840).
柏拉图的思想版本证明了其持久性和影响力。关于天才与疯狂之间微妙界限的老生常谈只是柏拉图灵感的最著名遗产之一，这一观点在切萨雷·隆布罗索关于“精神病艺术”的研究中得到了普及（隆布罗索 1891, 2）；在另一种方式上，珀西·比希·雪莱在 1821 年翻译了伊翁，认为其对诗歌疯狂的描述支持了他对诗歌的辩护（雪莱 1840）。

The topic occurs throughout Plato’s corpus. Platonic characters mention inspiration in dialogues as different as the Apology and the Laws. Socrates on trial tells of his frustrated effort to learn from poets. Their verses seemed excellent but the authors themselves had nothing to say about them (Apology 22b). Socrates concludes that poets work instinctively and while inspired, enthousiazontes, as prophets and soothsayers also do (theomanteis, chrêsmôidoi), as opposed to writing on the basis of sophia (22c). The opposition between wisdom and inspiration does not condemn poets. They write by some nature (phusei tini), as if inspiration were a normally occurring human instinct.
这个主题贯穿于柏拉图的著作中。柏拉图的角色在《辩护篇》和《法律篇》等不同的对话中提到灵感。苏格拉底在审判中讲述了他从诗人那里学习的挫折。他们的诗句似乎很优秀，但作者本人对这些诗句却无话可说（《辩护篇》22b）。苏格拉底得出结论，诗人是本能地创作的，而在灵感的驱动下，enthousiazontes，就像先知和占卜者一样（theomanteis，chrêsmôidoi），而不是基于sophia（22c）进行创作。智慧与灵感之间的对立并不谴责诗人。他们以某种天性创作（phusei tini），仿佛灵感是一种正常发生的人类本能。

For its part Laws 719c links the effects of inspiration to the nature of drama and its multiple perspectives:
对于其部分，法律 719c 将灵感的效果与戏剧的性质及其多重视角联系起来：

When the poet sits on the Muse’s tripod [en tôi tripodi tês Mousês] he is not in his right mind [emphrôn] but ready to flow like a fountain; and because his profession [technê] is that of imitation [mimêseôs], then in creating people [anthrôpous] who are set against one another he is compelled to contradict himself frequently, and he does not know [oiden] whether these or the other thing of what he says are true [alêthê]. But it is not for a lawmaker to make two statements about a single topic in a law. (719c–d)
当诗人坐在缪斯的三脚架上 [en tôi tripodi tês Mousês] 时，他并不理智 [emphrôn]，而是准备像喷泉一样流淌；因为他的职业 [technê] 是模仿 [mimêseôs]，所以在创造相互对立的人 [anthrôpous] 时，他常常被迫自相矛盾，并且他不知道 [oiden] 他所说的这些或其他的事情是否真实 [alêthê]。但是，立法者不应在法律中对单一主题做出两个陈述。(719c–d)

As in the Republic, mimêsis leaves the spectator bereft of either truths to evaluate or any wish to assess them. (It is, as there, the imitation of human beings.) As in the Apology, inspiration means the poet has no truths to transmit. When the god’s power comes the poet’s goes. Lawmakers work differently from that. And this contrast between inspiration and the origin of laws—occurring in a dialogue devoted to discovering the best laws for cities—hardly suggests an endorsement for inspiration.
正如在 《理想国》 中，mimêsis 使观众失去了评估真理的能力或任何评估它们的愿望。（正如那里一样，这是对人类的模仿。）正如在 《辩护词》 中，灵感意味着诗人没有真理可传达。当神的力量降临时，诗人的力量就消失了。立法者的工作方式与此不同。而这种灵感与法律起源之间的对比——发生在一个致力于发现城市最佳法律的对话中——几乎并不暗示对灵感的支持。

But it is also true that the passage puts the poet on a tripod, i.e. the symbol of Apollo’s priestesses. Whatever brings a poet to write verse also draws divine wisdom out of priestesses; and Plato regularly defers to the authority of oracles. Even supposing that talk of inspiration denies individual control and credit to the poet, the priestess shows that credit and control are not all that matter. She does her best when her mind intrudes least on what she is saying. Her pronouncements have the prestige they do, not despite her loss of control, but because of it (Pappas 2012a). Her audience can trust the god speaking through her.
但同样可以说，这段文字将诗人置于一个三脚架上，即阿波罗女祭司的象征。无论是什么促使诗人创作诗歌，也会从女祭司那里引出神圣的智慧；而柏拉图常常尊重神谕的权威。即使假设灵感的谈论否定了诗人的个人控制和功劳，女祭司也表明，功劳和控制并不是唯一重要的。她在思维对所说内容干扰最少时表现最佳。她的宣言之所以具有威望，并不是尽管她失去了控制，而是正因为如此（Pappas 2012a）。她的听众可以信任通过她发声的神灵。

Another passage in the Laws attributes even reliable historical information to poets writing under the influence of the Muses and Graces (682a). Indeed the Laws overtly credit philosophical conversation to such inspiration (811c, with thanks to Kemal Batak for this reminder). The Meno makes inspiration its defining example of ignorant truth-speaking. Politicians, prophets, and soothsayers alike, “when inspired [enthousiôntes], speak truly [alêthê] about many things, but do not know what they are talking about” (99c). Socrates then calls prophets, soothsayers, and all poets theioi “divine” because of how well they speak without possessing knowledge (99c–d).
在《法律》中另一个段落甚至将可靠的历史信息归功于在缪斯和优雅的影响下创作的诗人（682a）。实际上，《法律》明确将哲学对话归功于这种灵感（811c，感谢 Kemal Batak 的提醒）。《梅诺篇》将灵感作为无知真理发言的定义例子。政治家、先知和占卜者一样，“当他们受到启发时[enthousiôntes]，会关于许多事情说出真实的[alêthê]，但并不知道自己在说什么”（99c）。苏格拉底因此称先知、占卜者和所有诗人为theioi“神圣的”，因为他们能够在没有知识的情况下如此流利地表达（99c–d）。

In these more tangential remarks, Plato seems to be affirming 1) that inspiration is really divine in origin, and 2) that this divine action that gives rise to poetry guarantees value in the result. It may remain the case that the poet knows nothing. But something good must come of an inspiration shared by poets and priestesses, and often enough that good is truth.
在这些更为边缘的评论中，柏拉图似乎在 affirming 1) 灵感确实源于神性，以及 2) 这种神圣的行动所产生的诗歌保证了结果的价值。诗人可能一无所知。但从诗人和女祭司共享的灵感中必然会产生一些好的东西，而这个好的东西往往是真理。

3.1 Ion 3.1 伊翁

Plato’s shortest dialogue, the Ion may be the only one that all his readers would situate within aesthetics. It does not address poetry alone. The character Ion is a performer and interpreter of Homer’s poems, not a poet. Meanwhile, most of what are classed as arts today—painting, sculpture, music—appear in this dialogue as activities for which the problems of irrationality and knowledge signally fail to arise (532e–533c; for painting as technê cf. Gorgias 448c, Protagoras 312d). Nevertheless the Ion belongs in aesthetics by virtue of its focus on artistic inspiration, and the question it provokes of what inspiration implies about poetry’s merits.
柏拉图最短的对话《伊翁》可能是所有读者都将其归入美学的唯一作品。它并不仅仅讨论诗歌。角色伊翁是荷马诗歌的表演者和解读者，而不是诗人。同时，今天被归类为艺术的大多数活动——绘画、雕塑、音乐——在这部对话中出现时，非理性和知识的问题显然并未出现（532e–533c；关于绘画作为技艺，参见高尔吉亚斯 448c，普罗塔戈拉斯 312d）。尽管如此，《伊翁》因其对艺术灵感的关注而属于美学，并引发了关于灵感对诗歌价值的含义的问题。

As a rhapsode Ion travels among Greek cities reciting and explicating episodes from Homer. Between the recitation and the interpretation, such performances offered much latitude for displays of talent, and Ion’s talent has won him first prize at a contest in Epidaurus. (For some discussion of the rhapsode’s work see Gonzalez 2011, González 2013.)
作为一名吟唱者，伊翁在希腊城市之间游历，吟诵并阐释荷马的片段。在吟诵与解读之间，这种表演为才华的展示提供了很大的空间，而伊翁的才华使他在埃皮达鲁斯的比赛中获得了第一名。（有关吟唱者工作的讨论，请参见冈萨雷斯 2011 年，冈萨雷斯 2013 年。）

Ion’s conversation with Socrates falls into three parts, covering idiosyncrasy (530a–533c), inspiration (533c–536d), and ignorance (536d–542b). Ion likes and understands only Homer; Homer composes, and Ion presents the Homeric composition, in a possessed state; and Homer doesn’t know the subjects he talks about, any more than Ion knows the subjects about which he quotes Homer. Both the first and the third sections support the claims made in the second, which should be seen as the conclusion to the dialogue, supported in different ways by the discussions that come before and after it. The idiosyncrasy in Ion’s attachment to Homer shows that Homer, and Ion because of him, function thanks to a divine visitation. But because Ion resists accepting the claim that he is deranged in his performances, Socrates presents a fallback argument. Ion is unqualified to assess any of the factual claims that appear in Homer, about medicine, chariot racing, or anything else. When Socrates compels him to choose between divine inspiration and a very drab brand of knowing nothing, Ion agrees to be called inspired.
伊翁与苏格拉底的对话分为三个部分，涵盖了特质（530a–533c）、灵感（533c–536d）和无知（536d–542b）。伊翁只喜欢并理解荷马；荷马创作，而伊翁在一种被附身的状态下呈现荷马的作品；荷马对他所谈论的主题并不知情，正如伊翁对他引用荷马的主题也一无所知。第一部分和第三部分支持第二部分的论点，第二部分应被视为对话的结论，前后讨论以不同方式支持这一结论。伊翁对荷马的依恋中的特质表明，荷马以及因他而存在的伊翁，都是由于神圣的启示而发挥作用。但由于伊翁拒绝接受他在表演中失常的说法，苏格拉底提出了一个后备论点。伊翁没有资格评估荷马中出现的任何事实主张，无论是关于医学、战车比赛还是其他任何事情。当苏格拉底迫使他在神圣灵感和一种非常乏味的无知之间做出选择时，伊翁同意被称为有灵感。

This is to say that although poets’ and their readers’ ignorance – the subject of the dialogue’s final section – does emerge as a fact, it is nevertheless a fact in need of interpretation. The ignorance of poets and in poetry is never Plato’s last word. Whether ignorance means as in the Ion that the gods inspire poetry, or as in Republic 10 that imitative poetry imitates appearance alone, it matters less in itself than in its implications. Nor does ignorance alone demonstrate that poets are possessed. The proof of Ion’s ignorance supports inspiration but does not suffice to generate that doctrine.
这就是说，尽管诗人及其读者的无知——对话最后一部分的主题——确实作为一个事实出现，但这仍然是一个需要解释的事实。诗人和诗歌中的无知从来不是柏拉图的最终结论。无知是否意味着在伊翁中，众神启发诗歌，或在理想国第 10 卷中，模仿诗歌仅仅模仿表象，这本身的重要性不如其所带来的含义。无知本身也并不能证明诗人是被附身的。伊翁的无知的证据支持了灵感，但不足以产生这一教义。

The idiosyncrasy treated in this dialogue’s opening section, by comparison, is (for Plato) irrational on its face. The idiosyncrasy appears as soon as Socrates asks Ion about his technê (530b). That essential Platonic word has been mistranslated “art” or “craft.” “Skill” is not bad; but perhaps a technê most resembles a profession. The word denotes both a paying occupation and the possession of expertise. In Ion’s case Socrates specifies that the expertise for a rhapsode includes the ability to interpret poetry (530c). Ion rates himself superior to all his competitors at that task, but concedes that he can interpret only Homer (531a). Even though Homer and other poets sometimes address the same subjects, Ion has nothing to say about those others. He confesses this fact without shame or apology, as if his different responses reflected on the poets instead of on his talents. Something in Homer brings out Ion’s eloquence, and other poets lack that quality.
在这段对话的开头部分，所讨论的特异性相比之下，对于柏拉图来说，表面上是非理性的。特异性在苏格拉底询问伊翁关于他的technê（530b）时便显现出来。这个重要的柏拉图词汇常被误译为“艺术”或“工艺”。“技能”也不错；但或许technê更像是一种职业。这个词既指一种有报酬的职业，也指拥有专业知识。在伊翁的案例中，苏格拉底明确指出，作为一个吟唱者的专业知识包括解读诗歌的能力（530c）。伊翁认为自己在这项任务上优于所有竞争对手，但承认他只能解读荷马的作品（531a）。尽管荷马和其他诗人有时会涉及相同的主题，伊翁对其他诗人却无话可说。他毫不羞愧或道歉地承认这一事实，仿佛他的不同反应反映的是诗人而不是他的才能。荷马的某种特质激发了伊翁的口才，而其他诗人则缺乏这种特质。

Socrates argues that one who knows a field knows it whole (531e–532a). This denial of the knowledge of particulars in their particularity also appears at Charmides 166e; Phaedo 97d; Republic 334a, 409d. It is not that what is known about an individual thing cannot transfer to other things of the same kind; rather that the act of treating an object as unique means attending to and knowing those qualities of it that do not transfer, and so knowing them as nontransferable qualities. This attitude toward particulars qua particulars is an obstacle to every theoretical expertise. It is the epistemic analogue to the irrational one-on-one erotic bond that Aristophanes describes in Plato’s Symposium (191c–d).
苏格拉底认为，了解一个领域的人是全面了解它的（531e–532a）。这种对个体事物在其特殊性上知识的否定也出现在查尔米德斯 166e；斐多 97d；共和国 334a, 409d。并不是说对个别事物的了解不能转移到同类的其他事物上；而是将一个对象视为独特的行为意味着关注并了解那些不可转移的特质，从而将其视为不可转移的特质。对个体事物作为个体事物的这种态度是每一种理论专长的障碍。它是与阿里斯托芬在柏拉图的宴会（191c–d）中描述的非理性一对一情感纽带的认识论类比。

It may well be that what Ion understands about Homer happens to hold true of Hesiod. But if this is the case, Ion will not know it. He does not generalize from one to many poets, and generalizing is the mark of (what Socrates considers) a professional. Diotima’s speech in the Symposium supplies a useful comparison. She differentiates between love that clings to particular objects and a philosophical erôs that escapes its attachment to particulars to pursue general knowledge (210b). Ion’s investment in Homer, like the lover’s lowest grade of attachment, reveals (and also causes) an unwillingness to move toward understanding.
这可能是伊翁对荷马的理解恰好适用于赫西俄德。但如果是这样，伊翁将不会知道。他并没有从一个诗人推广到多个诗人，而这种推广是（苏格拉底所认为的）专业人士的标志。迪奥提玛在《宴会》中的演讲提供了一个有用的比较。她区分了依附于特定对象的爱与一种哲学的爱（erôs），后者摆脱对特定事物的依附，追求一般知识（210b）。伊翁对荷马的投入，像恋人最低级别的依附，揭示了（并且也导致了）他不愿意朝理解的方向发展。

And so Ion presents Socrates with a conundrum. Although the man’s love for Homer prohibits him from possessing expertise, Socrates recognizes how well Ion performs at his job. How to account for success minus skill? Socrates needs to diagnose Ion by means of some positive trait he possesses, not merely by the absence of knowledge.
因此，伊翁给苏格拉底提出了一个难题。尽管这个人对荷马的热爱使他无法拥有专业知识，但苏格拉底意识到伊翁在工作中表现得非常出色。如何解释成功与技能之间的关系？苏格拉底需要通过伊翁所拥有的一些积极特质来诊断他，而不仅仅是通过知识的缺乏。

Socrates therefore speaks of poets and those they move as entheous. He elaborates an analogy. Picture an iron ring hanging from a magnet, magnetized so that a second ring hangs from the first and a third from that second one. Magnets are Muses, the rings attached to them poets, the second rings the poets’ interpreters, third the rhapsodes’ audiences. (For a recent treatment of this image see Wang 2016.)
苏格拉底因此将诗人及其所感动的人称为神灵充满的。他详细阐述了一个类比。想象一个悬挂在磁铁上的铁环，磁铁的磁性使得第二个环悬挂在第一个环上，第三个环又悬挂在第二个环上。磁铁是缪斯，附着在它们上的环是诗人，第二个环是诗人的解读者，第三个环是朗诵者的观众。（有关这一形象的最新研究，请参见王 2016 年。）

Plato’s image captures the transfer of charisma. Each iron ring has the capacity to take on the charge that holds it. But the magnetism resides in the magnet, not in the temporarily magnetized rings. No ring is itself the source of the next ring’s attachment to it. Homer analogously draws poetic power from his Muse or god and attracts a rhapsode by means of borrowed power. Maybe in order to vest the great power in a paternal source superseding the Muses, Socrates shifts in the course of his analogy from casting the magnet-stone as feminine Muse (e.g. 533d–534c, 536a) to speaking of the masculine ho theos “the god,” perhaps to be identified with Apollo (534c–d, 536a). Whatever his source is, Ion once charged with Homer’s energy collects enthusiastic fans, as if to his own person and as if by technê—but, to be clear, only as if. The analogy lets poets and rhapsodes appear charismatic without giving them credit for their own charm.
柏拉图的形象捕捉了魅力的转移。每个铁环都有能力承载住它的电荷。但磁性存在于磁铁中，而不在暂时被磁化的环中。没有一个环本身是下一个环附着于它的源头。荷马以类似的方式从他的缪斯或神那里汲取诗意的力量，并通过借来的力量吸引朗诵者。也许为了将伟大的力量赋予一个超越缪斯的父源，苏格拉底在类比的过程中将磁石从女性缪斯（例如 533d–534c, 536a）转变为谈论男性的ho theos“神”，或许可以与阿波罗（534c–d, 536a）相认。不论他的源头是什么，伊翁一旦充满了荷马的能量，就会聚集热情的粉丝，仿佛是对他自己的人格的吸引，仿佛是通过技艺——但，明确来说，仅仅是仿佛。这个类比让诗人和朗诵者看起来充满魅力，而不需要给予他们自己魅力的功劳。

Socrates takes a further step to pit inspiration against reason. “Epic poets who are good at all are never masters of their subject. They are inspired and possessed [entheoi ontes kai katechomenoi]” (533a). Inspiration now additionally means that poets are irrational, as it never meant before Plato. This superadded irrationality explains why Ion rejects Socrates’ proposal, in a passage that is frequently overlooked. He is not unhinged during his performances, Ion says; not katechomenos kai mainomenos, possessed and maddened (536d). Inspiration has come to imply madness and the madness in it is what Ion tries to reject.
苏格拉底进一步将灵感与理性对立起来。“那些优秀的史诗诗人从来不是他们所研究主题的主人。他们是被灵感驱动和附身的[entheoi ontes kai katechomenoi]”（533a）。灵感现在还意味着诗人是非理性的，这在柏拉图之前从未有过。这种附加的非理性解释了为什么伊翁拒绝苏格拉底的提议，这一段常常被忽视。他在表演时并没有失去理智，伊翁说；不是katechomenos kai mainomenos，被附身和疯狂（536d）。灵感已经暗示着疯狂，而其中的疯狂正是伊翁试图拒绝的。

What went wrong? The image of rings and magnets is slyer than it appeared. While the analogy rests transparently on one feature of magnetism, it also smuggles in a second. Socrates describes iron rings hanging in straight lines or branching. Although each ring may have more than a single ring dependent upon it, no ring is said to hang from more than one. But real rings hang in other ways, all the rings clumped against the magnet, or one ring clinging to two or three above it. Why does Socrates keep the strings of rings so orderly?
出了什么问题？环和磁铁的形象比看起来更复杂。虽然这个类比明显基于磁性的一种特征，但它也暗含了第二种特征。苏格拉底描述了悬挂成直线或分支的铁环。尽管每个环可能有多个依赖于它的环，但没有一个环被说成是悬挂在多个环上。然而，真实的环以其他方式悬挂，所有环都聚集在磁铁上，或者一个环紧紧依附在上面的两个或三个环上。苏格拉底为什么要让这些环的排列如此整齐？

Here is one suggestion. Keeping Homer clung only to his Muse or god, and Ion clung only to Homer, preserves the idiosyncrasy that gave Socrates the excuse to deny expertise to Ion. Otherwise a magnet and rings would show how genuine knowledge is transmitted. Suppose you say that a Muse leads the doctor Hippocrates to diagnostic insights that he tells his students and they tell theirs. That much divine help is all that the image of magnet and rings strictly implies. It poses no threat to a profession’s understanding of itself. But no one would claim that a doctor can learn only from a single other doctor, or that a doctor treats a unique group of adulatory patients. That constraint on medical practice would threaten its status as technê; and that is exactly the constraint added by the array of rings as Socrates describes it. (For a contrasting and compelling reading of this passage, see Chapter 3 of Capra 2015.)
这里有一个建议。让荷马仅仅依附于他的缪斯或神，而伊翁仅仅依附于荷马，保留了使苏格拉底拒绝承认伊翁专业知识的特性。否则，磁铁和环将展示真正知识是如何传递的。假设你说缪斯引导医生希波克拉底获得诊断见解，他将这些见解告诉他的学生，而他们又告诉他们的学生。这种神圣的帮助正是磁铁和环的形象所严格暗示的。它对一个职业自我理解没有威胁。但没有人会声称医生只能从一位其他医生那里学习，或者医生只治疗一群崇拜的患者。这种对医学实践的限制将威胁其作为技艺的地位；而这正是苏格拉底所描述的环阵所增加的限制。（有关这一段落的对比和引人注目的解读，请参见 Capra 2015 的第 3 章。）

Analogies always introduce new traits into the thing being described. But Plato’s readers should become suspicious because the feature that slips into this figure, the orderly hanging of the rings, is neither called for by the way iron actually transmits magnetic force, nor neutral in effect. Plato has distorted magnetism to make it mean not inspiration simpliciter but something crazy.
类比总是会为被描述的事物引入新的特征。但柏拉图的读者应该对此产生怀疑，因为这个比喻中滑入的特征，即环的有序悬挂，既不是由铁实际传递磁力的方式所要求的，也不是中性的。柏拉图扭曲了磁性，使其意味着不仅仅是灵感simpliciter，而是一些疯狂的东西。

The combination of possession and madness in the Ion’s version of inspiration makes it hard to decide whether the dialogue registers some approval for inspired poetry or condemns it entirely. Readers have drawn opposite morals from this short work. (On this controversy see Stern-Gillet 2004.) As Socrates characterizes enthousiasmos, it denies Ion’s professional credibility, not to mention his sanity. But there is religion to think of. If not traditionally pious, Plato is also not the irreverent type who would ascribe an action to divinities in order to mock it. And consider the example of inspired verse mentioned here. Socrates cites Tynnichus, author of only one passable poem, which was a tribute to the Muses (534d). It’s as if the Muses wanted to display their power, Socrates says, by proving that their intervention could elicit a good poem even from an unskilled author. If this is Socrates’ paradigm of inspired poetry, then whatever else inspiration also explains, it appears particularly well suited to producing praise of the gods. And praise of the gods is the poetic form that Plato respects and accepts (Republic 607a).
在伊翁的灵感版本中，拥有与疯狂的结合使得很难判断对话是否对灵感诗歌表示某种认可，或是完全谴责它。读者从这部短作中得出了相反的道德教训。（关于这一争议，见 Stern-Gillet 2004。）正如苏格拉底所描述的enthousiasmos，它否定了伊翁的专业可信度，更不用说他的理智了。但还有宗教需要考虑。如果说柏拉图不传统虔诚，他也不是那种会为了嘲弄而将某个行为归因于神灵的人。再考虑一下这里提到的灵感诗的例子。苏格拉底引用了提尼库斯，他只创作了一首尚可的诗，那是一首献给缪斯的颂歌（534d）。苏格拉底说，仿佛缪斯想要展示她们的力量，通过证明她们的干预甚至可以从一个不熟练的作者那里引出一首好诗。如果这就是苏格拉底对灵感诗的范例，那么无论灵感还解释了什么，它似乎特别适合于赞美神明。而对神明的赞美正是柏拉图尊重和接受的诗歌形式《理想国》 607a。

Finally there is a version of the same problem that arose regarding the Apology, Laws, and Meno, that the Ion calls soothsayers and diviners possessed (chrêsmôidos, mantis: 534d). That already seems to justify inspiration. Add in that Socrates calls the diviner’s practice a technê (538e; cf. 531b) and this dialogue seems to be saying that an activity can be both professional and the result of divine possession.
最后，有一个与《辩护篇》、《法律篇》和《梅诺篇》相关的相同问题版本，《伊翁篇》称之为占卜者和被神灵附体的预言者（chrêsmôidos, mantis: 534d）。这似乎已经为灵感提供了合理性。再加上苏格拉底称占卜者的实践为技术（538e；参见 531b），这个对话似乎在说，一种活动可以既是专业的，又是神灵附体的结果。

So what does the charge of madness mean? The word makes Ion recoil—but what does he know about higher states of understanding? Maybe madness itself needs to be reconceived. The Ion says far from enough to settle the question. But Plato’s other sustained discussion of inspiration returns to the language of madness and finds some forms of it permissible, even philosophical.
那么“疯狂”的指控意味着什么？这个词让伊翁退缩——但他对更高的理解状态了解多少呢？也许疯狂本身需要重新构思。伊翁所说的远远不足以解决这个问题。但柏拉图对灵感的另一番深入讨论回到了疯狂的语言，并发现其中一些形式是可以接受的，甚至是哲学性的。

3.2 Phaedrus
3.2 费德鲁斯

When introducing the Phaedrus’s major speech on erôs (244a–250d), Socrates defines desirous love as a species of mania, madness, in a context that comments on philosophy and poetry with an aside about mimêsis a few pages later.
在介绍Phaedrus关于erôs（244a–250d）的主要演讲时，苏格拉底将渴望之爱定义为一种mania，即疯狂，这一背景评论了哲学和诗歌，并在几页后提到mimêsis。

Madness comes in two general forms: the diseased state of mental dysfunction, and a divergence from ordinary rationality that a god sometimes brings (265a–b). The first is a passing fit of possession, the other the encompassing condition of someone’s soul (with thanks here to Joshua Wilner). The divine latter condition subdivides into love, Dionysian frenzy, oracular prophecy, and poetic composition (244b–245a). In all four cases the possessed or inspired person (enthousiazôn: 241e, 249e, 253a, 263d) can accomplish what is impossible for someone in a sane state. All four cases are associated with particular deities and traditionally honored.
疯狂一般有两种形式：一种是精神功能失调的病态，另一种是神灵有时带来的与普通理性相悖的状态（265a–b）。第一种是短暂的附身状态，第二种是某人灵魂的全面状态（在此感谢约书亚·威尔纳）。神圣的后者状态细分为爱、酒神的狂热、神谕预言和诗歌创作（244b–245a）。在这四种情况下，被附身或受到启发的人（enthousiazôn：241e, 249e, 253a, 263d）能够完成一个理智状态下的人无法做到的事情。这四种情况都与特定的神灵相关，并受到传统的尊崇。

On reconciling the possession described in the Ion with that in the Phaedrus, see Gonzalez 2011 for extended discussion. Briefly we can say that the madness of the Phaedrus is separated from ordinary madness as the Ion’s version is not, and is classified pointedly as good derangement. Bad kinds exist too. But, being a god, Eros can’t do anything bad (242d–e). The greatest blessings flow from divine mania (244a).
关于将伊翁中描述的占有与斐德罗中的占有进行调和，详见 Gonzalez 2011 的扩展讨论。简而言之，我们可以说，斐德罗中的疯狂与普通的疯狂是分开的，而伊翁的版本则不是，并且被明确分类为良性的错乱。也存在坏的类型。但作为一个神，爱神厄洛斯不能做任何坏事（242d–e）。最大的祝福来自于神圣的狂热（244a）。

The Phaedrus does not associate the possessed condition with idiosyncrasy. To account for the madness of love Socrates describes an otherworldly existence in which souls ride across the top of heaven enjoying direct visions of the Forms (247c–d). After falling into bodily existence a soul responds to beauty more avidly than it does to any other qualities for which there are Forms.
《斐德罗》并不将被占有的状态与特质联系在一起。为了说明爱的疯狂，苏格拉底描述了一种超凡的存在，在这种存在中，灵魂在天堂的顶端飞驰，享受对理念的直接视野（247c–d）。在堕入肉体存在后，灵魂对美的反应比对任何其他有理念的特质的反应更为热切。

Associating beauty with certain cases of inspiration suggests that poetry born of inspiration might also have philosophical worth. But before welcoming the lost sheep Plato back to the poetry-loving fold, recognize the Phaedrus’s qualifying remarks about which poetry one may now prize. It cannot be imitative. When Socrates ranks human souls depending on how much otherworldly being they saw before falling into bodily form—philosophers come in first on this ranking—the poet or other mimêtikos occupies sixth place out of nine (248e).
将美与某些灵感的案例联系起来，暗示了源于灵感的诗歌可能也具有哲学价值。但在欢迎失落的羊柏拉图回到热爱诗歌的怀抱之前，要认识到Phaedrus对现在可以珍视的诗歌的限定性评论。它不能是模仿的。当苏格拉底根据人类灵魂在堕入肉体形态之前所见的超凡存在的程度对其进行排名时——哲学家在这个排名中位居第一——诗人或其他mimêtikos则在九个等级中位列第六（248e）。

Indeed the argument of the Phaedrus only identifies a single type of poem that the Muses call forth: the poem that “embellishes thousands of deeds of the ancients to educate [paideuei] later generations” (245a). But Plato exempts hymns to gods and encomia of heroes from even his harshest condemnation of poetry (Republic 607a). Quite compatibly with the Republic’s exemption the Ion specifies a hymn to the Muses as its example of inspiration and the Phaedrus describes the praise of heroes. Whenever possible Plato reserves the benefits of inspiration for the poems he does not have reason to condemn. And this restriction on which poems derive a true merit from being inspired leaves inspiration a long way from guaranteeing value for poetry as a whole.
确实，Phaedrus的论点仅识别出一种缪斯所召唤的诗歌类型：那首“装饰古人千百事迹以教育[paideuei]后代”的诗（245a）。但柏拉图将对神的颂歌和对英雄的颂扬从他对诗歌的最严厉谴责中豁免（Republic 607a）。与Republic的豁免相一致，Ion将对缪斯的颂歌作为其灵感的例子，而Phaedrus则描述了对英雄的赞美。每当可能时，柏拉图将灵感的好处保留给他没有理由谴责的诗歌。而这种对哪些诗歌因灵感而获得真正价值的限制，使得灵感距离保证诗歌整体的价值还有很长的路要走。

4. Imitation, Inspiration, Beauty and the Occasional Wisdom in Poetry
模仿、灵感、诗歌中的美与偶尔的智慧

Mimêsis fails, when it does, in two ways. 1) It originates in appearance rather than in reality, so that judged on its own terms the product of imitation has an ignoble pedigree (Republic 603b). 2) The imitative arts positively direct a soul toward appearances, away from proper objects of inquiry. A mirror reflection might prompt you to turn around and look at the thing being reflected, but an imitation keeps your eyes on the copy alone.
模仿在失败时有两种方式。1）它源于表象而非现实，因此在其自身的标准下，模仿的产物具有卑微的血统（理想国 603b）。2）模仿艺术积极引导灵魂关注表象，而远离适当的探究对象。镜子中的反射可能促使你转身去看被反射的事物，但模仿只会让你的目光停留在复制品上。

Although the dialogues offer few arguments for the second claim, the perverseness with which mimêsis leads one to prefer appearance partly follows from a contrast between traditional visual art and its later developments. Aeschylus had allegedly praised the religiosity of the rougher old visual forms, by comparison with later visually exciting statues that inspired less of a sense of divinity (Porphyry On Abstinence from Animal Food 2.18). Early votive objects, sometimes no more representational than a plank or oblong stone, were treated as markers of the gods’ presence and points of contact with unseen powers (Faraone 1992, Collins 2003). Stone and wooden figures could serve as surrogates for absent humans, as when mourners buried an effigy in place of an irrecoverable body (Herodotus Histories 6.58; Vernant 2006, 322; Bremmer 2013), or treated a grave marker as if it were the buried person (Euripides Alcestis 348–356; see Burkert 1985, 193–194). Whereas the mimetic relationship connects a visible likeness with its visible original, such objects though visible link to invisible referents.
尽管对第二个主张的对话提供的论据不多，但模仿所引发的偏好外表的扭曲性，部分源于传统视觉艺术与其后发展之间的对比。埃斯库罗斯据说赞美了粗糙的旧视觉形式的宗教性，相较于后来的视觉刺激雕像，这些雕像激发的神圣感较少（波尔菲里《论禁食动物食品》2.18）。早期的祭品，有时仅仅是一个木板或长方形石头，被视为神灵存在的标志和与看不见的力量接触的点（法拉翁 1992，柯林斯 2003）。石头和木制人像可以作为缺席人类的替代品，例如，当哀悼者埋葬一个雕像以代替无法恢复的尸体时（希罗多德《历史》6.58；维尔南特 2006，322；布雷默 2013），或者将墓碑视为埋葬者本人（欧里庇得斯《阿尔克斯提斯》348–356；见布尔克特 1985，193–194）。而模仿关系将可见的相似物与其可见的原物连接起来，这些物体虽然可见，却与不可见的指称相联系。

Plato seems to distinguish between the pious old art and its modernized forms, as he distinguishes analogously among poems. Statues suggest communication with divinities (Laws 931a, Phaedrus 230b). Wax likenesses participate in the magic of effigies (Laws 933b). Metaphorically the dialogues imagine a body as a statue that invites comparison with its invisible referent the soul (Charmides 154c, 157d–158c; Symposium 215b, 216d–e), or as a sêma “tomb” but also “sign” of the soul within (Cratylus 400b–c, Gorgias 493a). Compared to such referential relations, the mimetic art object’s reference to what is visible can feel like a forcible misdirection of attention to appearances and to delight with visibility as such.
柏拉图似乎区分了虔诚的古老艺术及其现代化形式，就像他在诗歌中进行类似的区分。雕像暗示与神灵的沟通（法律 931a, 斐德罗 230b）。蜡像参与了偶像的魔力（法律 933b）。隐喻上，对话将身体想象为一座雕像，邀请与其不可见的参照物灵魂进行比较（查尔米德斯 154c, 157d–158c; 宴会 215b, 216d–e），或者作为一个sêma “墓碑”，但也是灵魂的“标志”（克拉提鲁斯 400b–c, 高尔吉亚斯 493a）。与这种指称关系相比，模仿艺术对象对可见事物的指称可能会让人感觉像是强行将注意力转向表象，以及对可见性的愉悦。

Beauty by comparison begins in the domain of intelligible objects, since there is a Form of beauty. And more than any other property for which a Form exists, beauty engages the soul and draws it toward philosophical deliberation, toward thoughts of absolute beauty and subsequently (as we imagine) toward thoughts of other concepts.
美的比较始于可理解对象的领域，因为存在一种美的形式。与其他任何存在形式的属性相比，美更能吸引灵魂，引导其进行哲学思考，思考绝对美，随后（如我们所想）思考其他概念。

It has been noted that some appearances of mimêsis give it a role to play in philosophizing, as when recollecting the Forms or assimilating oneself to the divine nature. This constructive turn does not seem to be made available to the poems or paintings that imitate individual human beings. If one seeks something in poetry and the arts that would function oppositely to mimetic poetry and would serve philosophical enlightenment, inspiration might offer the most promising possibility.
有人注意到，模仿的某些表现赋予了它在哲学思考中的角色，比如在回忆形式或使自己与神性相融合时。这种建设性的转变似乎并不适用于模仿个体人类的诗歌或绘画。如果有人在诗歌和艺术中寻求与模仿诗歌相对立的东西，并能提供哲学启迪，那么灵感可能是最有希望的可能性。

A significant datum here comes from the Republic, which despite its stance against much poetry still draws from notable poems in its argument. The “noble lie” (414b–415d), by means of which Socrates proposes to teach future citizens the differences among them, reworks the Hesiodic “ages of humanity” from Works and Days (107–179). Hesiod must have understood something important about people that the Republic’s city will turn into its civic lesson (Van Noorden 2010). And Geoffrey Bakewell has shown how the appearances of verses from Aeschylus progress, as the Republic goes on, to form good advice to the city and its control over music. Seven against Thebes “deserves a place in Kallipolis” (Bakewell 2017, 274).
这里一个重要的数据来自于《理想国》，尽管它对许多诗歌持反对态度，但在其论证中仍然引用了著名的诗篇。“高贵的谎言”（414b–415d），通过这一方式，苏格拉底提议教导未来的公民识别彼此之间的差异，重新构造了赫西俄德的“人类时代”，出自《工作与时日》（107–179）。赫西俄德一定对人类有一些重要的理解，而《理想国》的城市将把这些理解转化为公民的教训（Van Noorden 2010）。而杰弗里·贝克威尔展示了埃斯库罗斯的诗句在《理想国》中如何逐步演变，形成对城市及其对音乐控制的良好建议。《七攻忒拜》“在卡利波利斯中占有一席之地”（Bakewell 2017, 274）。

Where Hesiod is concerned one may multiply examples from the Symposium and Critias, but most of all from Plato’s Timaeus, that show the dialogues engaged with that great archaic poet as interlocutor and source (Boys-Stones and Haubold 2010). Plato could credit the wisdom in such poems to the inspiration that had fallen upon their authors.
关于赫西俄德，可以从《会饮篇》和《克里提亚斯篇》中举出许多例子，但最重要的是来自柏拉图的《蒂迈欧斯篇》，这些对话与这位伟大的古代诗人作为对话者和来源进行了探讨（Boys-Stones 和 Haubold 2010）。柏拉图可以将这些诗歌中的智慧归功于降临在其作者身上的灵感。

Does such wisdom as good poetry contains necessarily come from the domain of Forms? The Phaedrus comes closest to saying so, both by associating the gods with Forms (247c–e), and by rooting inspired love in recollection (251a). But this falls short of showing that the poets’ divine madness likewise originates among objects of greater reality. It might, but does not have to.
这样的智慧，如同优秀的诗歌所包含的，是否必然来自于形式的领域？《斐德罗斯》最接近于这样说，既通过将神与形式联系起来（247c–e），又通过将灵感之爱根植于回忆中（251a）。但这并不足以证明诗人的神圣疯狂同样源于更真实的对象。它可能是，但并不一定。

It has been argued that because reason plays a role for Plato in predictive dreaming (see Timaeus 71e–72a), reason is therefore also at work in cognitive states that resemble the inspired condition of the soothsayer. Given such resemblance, the function of reason in predictive dreaming would imply a role for reason whenever inspiration comes (Büttner 2011). Yet the dialogues never speak of dreaming on a par with mantic prophecy. Socrates speaks twice of his own dreams in the dialogues and expects to find truth in them (Crito 44b, Phaedo 60e–61a), but does not equate his dreaming with a possessed condition.
有人认为，由于理性在柏拉图的预言梦中发挥作用（见Timaeus 71e–72a），因此理性也在类似于先知灵感状态的认知状态中起作用。鉴于这种相似性，理性在预言梦中的功能意味着每当灵感出现时，理性也会发挥作用（Büttner 2011）。然而，对话中从未将梦境与占卜预言相提并论。苏格拉底在对话中两次提到自己的梦，并期望在梦中找到真理（Crito 44b, Phaedo 60e–61a），但并不将自己的梦境等同于被附身的状态。

The Ion says less about poetry’s divine origins than the Phaedrus does, certainly nothing that requires an interpreter to discover Forms within the Muse’s magnetism. Laws 682a and Meno 99c–d credit the inspired condition with the production of truths, even in poetry. Neither passage describes the truths about Forms that philosophical dialectic would lead to, but that might be asking too much. Let it suffice that inspiration originates in some truth.
伊翁对诗歌神圣起源的描述不如斐德罗那样深入，当然也没有什么需要解释者去发现缪斯魅力中的理念的内容。法律682a 和梅诺99c–d 将灵感状态与真理的产生联系在一起，即使是在诗歌中。两个段落都没有描述哲学辩证法所能引导的关于理念的真理，但这可能要求过高。只需知道灵感源于某种真理即可。

What about the effects of inspired poetry? Could such poetry turn a soul toward knowledge as beautiful faces do? The Phaedrus does say that Muse-made poems teach future generations about the exploits of heroes. Inspired poetry at least might set a good example. But one can find good examples in verse without waiting for inspiration. Even Republic 3 allows for instances in which the young guardians imitate virtuous characters.
受启发的诗歌有什么影响？这样的诗歌能否像美丽的面孔一样引导灵魂走向知识？《斐德罗篇》确实说过，缪斯所作的诗歌教导未来的世代关于英雄的壮举。至少，受启发的诗歌可能树立一个良好的榜样。但人们可以在诗歌中找到良好的榜样，而不必等待灵感。甚至《理想国》第 3 卷也允许年轻的守护者模仿美德角色的例子。

A clear opposition between imitation and inspiration, or any clear relationship between them, would suggest a coherent whole that can be titled “Plato’s aesthetics.” In the absence of such a relationship it is hard to attribute an aesthetic theory to Plato as one can straightforwardly do with Aristotle.
模仿与灵感之间的明确对立，或它们之间的任何明确关系，将暗示一个可以称为“柏拉图的美学”的连贯整体。在缺乏这种关系的情况下，很难将美学理论归因于柏拉图，就像可以直接归因于亚里士多德一样。

If unification is possible for the elements of Plato’s aesthetics, that may arrive from another direction. Religion has not been explored as much as it should in connection with Plato’s aesthetics, even though a religious orientation informs what he has to say about beauty, inspiration, and imitation. The quasi-divine status that beauty has in the Symposium; the Republic’s characterization of the imitator as enemy to Athena and other gods; and of course inspiration, which cannot be defined without appeal to divine action: All three subjects suggest that Plato’s aesthetics might come together more satisfactorily within Plato’s theology. The question is worth pursuing now, for scholarship of recent decades has advanced the study of Greek religion, providing the resources for a fresh inquiry into the fundamental terms out of which Plato constructs his aesthetics.
如果柏拉图美学的元素可以统一，那可能来自另一个方向。尽管宗教在与柏拉图美学的关系中尚未得到应有的探讨，但宗教取向确实影响了他对美、灵感和模仿的看法。美在《宴会篇》中的准神圣地位；《理想国》中对模仿者的描述将其视为雅典娜和其他神祇的敌人；当然还有灵感，无法在不诉诸于神圣行为的情况下定义：这三个主题都表明，柏拉图的美学可能在柏拉图的神学中更为令人满意地结合在一起。这个问题现在值得深入探讨，因为近几十年的学术研究推动了对希腊宗教的研究，为重新探讨柏拉图构建其美学的基本术语提供了资源。

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Other Internet Resources 其他互联网资源

• The Perseus Project, Tufts University; a collection of ancient writings on line. Plato’s works in both Greek in English with any number of linguistic and scholarly tools.
  珀尔修斯计划，塔夫茨大学；一个在线古代文献的集合。柏拉图的作品以希腊语和英语呈现，并配有多种语言和学术工具。
• Maecenas: Images of Ancient Greece and Rome, was formerly hosted at SUNY/Buffalo, now available at the Internet Archive.
  梅塞纳斯：古希腊和古罗马的图像，曾在纽约州立大学/布法罗校区托管，现在可在互联网档案馆找到。
• DMOZ Directory, meta-source no longer updated. It’s a guide to over 100 sites in ancient philosophy. These vary in richness but make many resources available, some of them appropriate for beginners and others for advanced scholars.
  DMOZ 目录，不再更新的元资源。它是一个关于古代哲学的 100 多个网站的指南。这些网站的丰富程度各不相同，但提供了许多资源，其中一些适合初学者，另一些则适合高级学者。
• Plato and Aristotle on Tragedy, a fine outline of the issues that Plato and Aristotle address in speaking of tragedy; a greater focus on tragedy in particular than in the present entry.
  柏拉图与亚里士多德论悲剧，对柏拉图和亚里士多德在讨论悲剧时所涉及问题的良好概述；比本条目更专注于悲剧。

Related Entries 相关条目

aesthetics: and the philosophy of art | Aristotle | beauty | Plato | Plato: ethics and politics in The Republic | Plato: middle period metaphysics and epistemology | Plato: rhetoric and poetry | Plato: shorter ethical works
美学与艺术哲学 | 亚里士多德 | 美 | 柏拉图 | 柏拉图：在《理想国》中的伦理与政治 | 柏拉图：中期形而上学与认识论 | 柏拉图：修辞与诗歌 | 柏拉图：较短的伦理著作

Acknowledgments 致谢

Parts of section 1 were informed and guided by the work of Jonathan Fine. Parts of 2.3 and 2.5 are indebted to arguments made by Taylor Kloha (specifically, on what a full and true account of something requires and how the poet’s error lies not in imitating per se but in doing so without representing the full and true account). I am also grateful to Elvira Basevich, Daniel Mailick, and Andrea Tisano for their help with earlier versions of this entry. And special thanks go to Joshua Wilner for his comments and assistance.
第一部分的内容受到乔纳森·法因的工作启发和指导。第二部分的 2.3 和 2.5 部分得益于泰勒·克洛哈提出的论点（具体来说，关于完整和真实的事物描述所需的内容，以及诗人的错误不在于模仿本身，而在于未能完整和真实地呈现）。我还要感谢埃尔维拉·巴塞维奇、丹尼尔·梅利克和安德烈亚·蒂萨诺对早期版本的帮助。特别感谢约书亚·威尔纳的评论和协助。