纳粹精英 ||奥托·奥伦多夫（Otto Ohlendorf）：不墨守成规的党卫军领袖和经济官员

14 奥托·奥伦多夫：不墨守成规，不锈钢 Leader 和经济职能人员汉娜索瓦德奥托
Ohlendorf，出生时最小之这四个孩子之富裕的农民上
1907 年 2 月 4 日在 Hoheneggelsen 近汉诺威在-
从小就对政治感到恐惧。 1
他最初的倾向受到了影响由他的父亲向这
传统的资产阶级保守阵营（ DNVP）、
很快就被更激进的取向所取代。在 1925 年，虽然他还是在文法学校奥伦多夫加入这他从哪里他是转移到这不锈钢 1927 年（成员数880). 他变成了成员之这NSDAP 跟这会员数 6531 （接收这队伍的黄金徽章之荣誉）。此后他积极奉献他-
自我传播之
国家社会主义。即使他还是在学校在这安德烈阿努姆语法
希尔德斯海姆的学校（1917-28 年），奥伦多夫帮助自建向上这当地党组织在我有- 亨格尔森。他
在以下情况下放弃此特定活动他 started 到
学习法律和政治学在大学之莱比锡和哥廷根
（1928-31 年），最初参与这纳粹学生协会和这
莱比锡的党支部。因为他did 不找到这政治活动
在那里令人满意，他搬家了自
哥廷根只用了两个学期。这里
更大的政治可能性是打开自奥伦多夫。从这夏天之 1929 年，他被授予这任务之赢了。区之 Northeim 为这党。奥伦多夫太成功了那这NSDAP 能够自赢得一个
选举中的绝对多数，这是第一次在区级，在这地区之
汉诺威南部。在完成法律资格考试后这夏天之
1931 年，Ohlendorf 获得了奖学金，为此，教授之经济学， Jens 彼得 Jessen，有放他的名字前锋，自去自意大利
大约一年的时间里，到这大学之
帕维亚。这次停留，即自使他自学习政治学和
法西斯社团主义机构，以及自
为他的学术生涯做好准备，留下了相当多的马克上这未来课程之 Ohlendorf's 餐厅生命。他成为一个确信的对手之
意大利法西斯主义。他的主要批评是针对他所认为的这
专制、专制的特征之这
法西斯国家机构，和
反对社团主义。根据自 Ohlendorf's 餐厅想法、“社区” 之人民“，因为他放
它，应该处于中心和主动部分 155
R. Smelser 等人（编辑），纳粹精英
© 帕尔格雷夫·麦克米伦，麦克米伦出版有限公司的一个部门，1993 年

156 奥托·奥伦多夫
通过“人民意识的代表”。他拒绝了
个人统治，他后来也认为如现存在 “Fiihrer
第三帝国的州。奥伦多夫接受了国家社会主义的主张
非常认真地体现一种特定的哲学，并发展了自己的哲学，
高度个人化的哲学，特别是在
经济学领域。苏
他不仅与党的官方政治路线发生冲突
各种观点，但偶尔甚至会对其进行相当大胆的批评。
然而，这种批评的意愿绝不能掩盖事实那奥伦多夫
是一位坚定不移的纳粹主义者，他付出了
全心全意地支持纳粹哲学的基本原则，例如例如它的种族主义。 2
除了他的政治研究，奥伦多夫还打算利用这段时间在意大利如
这是他“毕生事业”的起点，如他这么说。由这个他 1932 1933 1934. 3 1936 Ohlendorf suc- 11123 如

157 由在办公室办公室由和为是在在 1938 是在这OAF 在1939 他是
晋升为国家贸易集团首席秘书。奥伦- 在1939 不锈钢在1939 在奥伦多夫如他都他在在

158 奥托·奥伦多夫奥伦多夫由他如
预警系统 -
这就是这不锈钢领导-
他们必须得到处理由
一个敢于这样做的人
阐明令人不快的事情。在这一点上，该政权已经完全到达自己，如
很快就变得明朗起来。到时候困难的开头战争阶段是
最迟，批评的声音似乎并不在
一切都适合胜利的心情，而且很快他
上级更关注奥伦多夫如
一个自以为是的理论家，而不是经济专家，以及
组织者。简而言之：Ohlendorf 是在
又是麻烦。他与
尤其是希姆莱，情况越来越糟糕。全国主任这不锈钢
（RFSS）本人在意识形态上自负很高，不喜欢
他认为 Ohlendorf 的“使命感” 如妄。由- Sonal 反感将
也发挥了作用。希姆莱眼中的奥伦多夫出现如
“令人难以忍受、毫无幽默感的普鲁士人”，作为一个“失败主义者”和 'pessimist' 和如
这是他坚定不移的意识形态立场的结果，如这
“国家社会主义圣杯的守护者”。分歧从来没有
然而，走得太远了，以至于奥伦多夫是被迫离开 SS 的。四分五裂课程他
在那里的事业稳步发展，使他担任了不锈钢
警察总长和中将。 4
在更广泛的公众心目中，Ohlendorf 是鲜为人知他工作
安全或经济政策，而不是因为他的参与在意识形态战争
对抗苏联。6 月起1941 直到 7 月1942 他是任务负责人力D, 在
第 11 集团军的地区，在他的指挥下，被谋杀90 000
人。根据他自己的描述，奥伦多夫
抵制这项任务，他将其追溯到一项倡议by Heydrich. The Chief of the Security Office (RHSA) probably intended to force the 'unsoldierly, soft intellectual, who lacked a soldier's hardness and political clarity', into unconditional loyalty to National Socialism by involving him in mass destruction and, under the motto 'we're all in the same boat', to deprive him of the opportunity of opposition as well as making him a docile tool of the RHSA. Possibly the 'other-worldly' theoretician was also to be confronted by 'practice', as cruel as it was dirty. By all appearances Heydrich not only had Himmler's support in this but was also strengthened by the vote of Bormann, the Director of the Party Chancellery, who also disliked Ohlendorf's unorthodox inclination to anthroposophism. Ohlen- dorf evidently attempted to evade the assignment to Russia on several occasions by pointing out his reserved occupation at the National Trade Group. But it is questionable whether he did this to avoid becoming entangled in the planned mass destruction in Russia, about which he had information through his work in the RHSA. It is possible he was also held back by his concern for the fate of the middle class and his work in the National Trade Group. Nevertheless in the end he was no longer able to avoid the assignment.

Hanno Sowade 159 Contrary to what might have been supposed from his initial refusal, on his own evidence Ohlendorf endeavoured 'to fulfil all the tasks he was given in Russia . . . honestly, to the best of his ability and with a clear conscience'. For the National Socialist Ohlendorf this meant that he put part of the core of his ideology into practice and tried to destroy life which according to Nazi ideology had no right to existence. He actively strove to deploy his Task Force as 'effectively as possible'. To this end he made efforts, for example, to improve its relationship with the High Command of the 11th Army (AOK 11), which had been bad at the beginning of the campaign, in order to expand his unit's field of action, which was severely restricted by the AOK 11 on the basis of an agreement between the overall Supreme Command of the Army (OKW) and the RFSS, which had been laid down by army officialdom. In addition to Ohlendorf's intervention, the increasing threat from partisans finally made the AOK 11 deploy to the full all the resources at its disposal, and thereby also gave Task Force D more freedom to operate. This step was taken by AOK 11 in the full knowledge of the Task Forces's activities. They had been informed about them from the beginning of the campaign by reports from Ohlendorf and his unit commanders as well as those of their own local commanders. After the initial disputes had been settled, general harmony and cooperation prevailed between Ohlendorf and his outfit and the 11th Army, which had been under the command of Manstein since September 1941. Task Force D's increasing freedom of movement is reflected in a macabre way in the 'Report on Events in the USSR'; that is the collected reports of the Task Forces, which form the basis of our own figures. While about 400 persons were murdered in the first two months, the number doubled for the period from mid-August until mid-September 1941 and reached its high point in the last two weeks of September 1941 with approximately 22 500 victims. In total, from 22 June 1941 until March 1942, Ohlendorf and his men killed around 91 000 Jews, gypsies, communists and members of persecuted groups. Ohlendorf, who by his own account" made efforts to minimise the moral burden on his subordinates, did not entertain any doubts about the 'legality' of his activity. He consciously stayed on longer as chief of a task force than any of his colleagues in office who had taken up their duties at the same time as him. In his own words, to begin with, in the summer of 1941, he had been glad no longer to be exposed to the disputes and the inimical surroundings of Berlin. The real reason for his long stay in Russia was that as a convinced National Socialist, he believed in the necessity of the policy of mass extermination. Ohlendorf's racism was 'differentiated' enough to make distinctions which allowed him to recruit units of Crimean Tartars and use them as support troops. But this does not change the fact that Ohlendorf emphatically refused an early recall from Russia, since he was convinced, by his own account, that he could achieve more for National Socialism by his 'activities on population policy' than in office work for

160 Otto Ohlendorf the National Trade Group. Moreover according to Ohlendorf, the ac- complishment of the 'task' gave him a feeling of being right. He had several opportunities, over the entire duration of his assignment, to return early to Berlin, under 'dishonourable' or 'honourable' circumstances. 5 He was finally brought back from Russia in the summer of 1942 by the circles which had banished him there a year earlier. To all appearances, Himmler had need of the services of his uncomfortable but tried and tested opinion researcher, Ohlendorf, on account of the smouldering crisis of confidence after the first winter of the war against Russia and after the assassination of Heydrich. The attempt to make him more docile by involving him in mass murder in the USSR had failed. Ohlendorf remained the committed and critical ideologue and his position had been additionally strengthened by having passed the 'test'. His readiness to criticise must not however be seen in the same light as the opposition to Hitler and the NSDAP which increased towards the end of the Third Reich. It was not Ohlendorf's intention to bring down the existing order, but to stabilise the system by pointing out what were in his opinion existing abuses and working against them. Even his old teacher, Professor Jessen, who was a member of the group involved in the assassination attempt on 20 July 1944, was to discover this. Since in Ohlendorf's eyes Jessen might have betrayed National Socialism, he did not use his influence to help him; it is a matter for conjecture whether or not he could have prevented the execution. The results of the opinion research conducted by the SD Internal Affairs, which Ohlendorf directed until the end of the war, had consider- able influence on the leadership of the Third Reich. Concrete measures used to stabilise the system, ranging from the deployment of the Gestapo to Hitler's speeches, can be traced back to SD reports. Nonetheless, without the criteria and orientation of the public opinion research being put into question, the 'Reports from the Reich' increasingly attracted criticism from leading National Socialists. The reason for this is probably that, along with the growing loss of confidence in the face of the threatened defeat, the reports also became more critical and admonitory and this was perceived as defeatism by various people who heard them and who did not know the facts. Since the truth and the exposure of their own mistakes were unacceptable, an attempt was made to keep them from the public. In summer 1943 (after the intervention of Goebbels, who had objected to the manner of the report of his 'Palace of Sport' speech of 18 February 1943) it reached the point where the 'Reports' were replaced by 'SD Reports on Domestic Matters', which were only available to a substantially smaller audience. After further protests in summer 1944 Bormann and Ley pro- hibited Party and DAF officials from cooperating with the SD. In Ohlen- dorf's opinion this meant that the duty of the interior intelligence service, to make available reports on the mood of the population at short notice, could no longer be fulfilled. The reports were reduced from the summer of

Hanna Sowade 161 1944 to reports on single items, with the exception of the reaction to 20 July 1944. Nevertheless the SO-Internal Affairs continued to function until the spring of 1945 and during this time the reporting on, for example, the mood of the workers, reveals the secret fears of the regime as clearly as Office III of the RHSA. Ohlendorf continued to be a convinced believer in the concept of opinion research, and in May 1945 he made an offer to the last functioning government of the Reich to establish a new 'intelligence service on domestic affairs, covering different aspects of life'. 6 Even after his return from Russia Ohlendorf retained his close links with the economic sphere. In the summer of 1942, Secretary of State Landfried, as the representative of a group within the Ministry of Economics which opposed Speer's economic policy, was already attempting to win Ohlen- dorf for the Ministry, since he was a proven proponent of policies favour- able to the middle class and- as Section Head in the RHSA, a member of the powerful SS. This attempt failed primarily because of Rimmler's opposition. He did not want a member of the SS to expound on economic policy in opposition to Speer, thereby allowing any set-backs in the war economy to be put at the door of the SS. One year later, in November 1943, Ohlendorf was allowed to join the Economics Ministry as a Minis- terial Director and deputy to the Secretary of State, Dr Hayler, who was newly appointed at the same time. The reason he was now available stemmed from the fact that Himmler, who had taken over the Ministry of the Interior in August 1943, planned to expand his comprehensive plan for state security by attaining potential influence in the Ministry of Economics while at the same time pursuing his ambitions in the realm of internal security. In contrast to the summer of 1942 there were now no obstacles in his way, since after the 'Fuhrer's Decree on the concentration of the war economy' of 2 September 1943, the Ministry of Economics was released from duties relating to the armaments sector of the economy and was responsible for 'fundamental matters of economic policy' and maintaining supplies to the population. There were many indications that Rimmler's expectations were primarily supposed to be fulfilled by Dr Hayler, who was among Rimmler's personal friends and who had received the post of Secretary of State. Ohlendorf should be regarded more as a 'second string', in view of the personal differences which existed with Himmler, although these were not so great as to prevent his release for duty. However because of Hayler's deteriorating health and weak leadership by the Economics Minister Funk, the restructuring of the Economics Ministry, which began at the end of 1943, was to be basically taken in hand by Ohlendorf. The 'new direction' at the Economics Ministry amounted to the attempt of a group (which aside from Ohlendorf, Himmler, Funk and Hayler, included other leading National Socialists) to find an answer to the crisis of confidence which beset the regime in 1943 after Stalingrad, and which was com- pounded by the dissent the 'shake-out of personnel' and the closure of

162 Otto Ohlendorf non-essential plant had aroused in the middle class. In Ohlendorf's view the prime cause was Speer and the 'un-National-Socialist' armaments policy he was conducting at the time, which was inimical to the middle class. The aims and duties which were now devolved on the Ministry of Economics consisted on one hand in securing the provision of supplies to the population, undoubtedly important as a means of stabilising the system. Alongside this, however, the Ministry of Economics was to take over the leading role in the conduct of the economy, which meant in concrete terms preserving the possibility of a National Socialist-style economy in the future and developing the basis for the inception of an internal security policy. By his own account Ohlendorf intended to support Speer's economic order during the war - up to a point - since changing it during the fifth year of the war would have led to great set-backs in armament production. At the same time he regarded Speer's ideas as a short-term solution and planned to replace them in the future, that is after the war, by a 'National Socialist economic order'. Until that time the initial phases of this Nazi economic order were to be disseminated by propaganda, for the purpose of stabilising the regime only. The problem for Ohlendorf was that in his view no such Nazi economic order existed, since its theoretical development had been neglected before the seizure of power and this had not been made up for afterwards. In order to correct this Ohlendorf created a kind of 'think tank' to assist him in the Ministry of Economics. In it he gathered colleagues whom he selected on the basis of their achievements, independent of Party membership, and provided them generously with resources. In spite of his origins on a farm, Ohlendorf's idea of a Nazi economic order was not determined by the agrarian romanticism then widespread, since he regarded industry as necessary for the survival of the Nazi state. He rejected the idea of transferring sovereign state functions to econ- omists, as Speer had done, just as he rejected a planned economy. Ohlen- dorf saw the basis of the post-war economic structure in private ownership and initiatives by private enterprise. This did not mean a 'free market economy', since the state was to act as a coordinator and purveyor of contracts, without intervening with competition or in the organisational structure of businesses. Towards the end of the war as defeat drew nearer, Ohlendorf came into contact with the post-war planning in industrial circles, since the Ministry of Economics was the agency responsible for internal security measures. In this role he proved himself to be an important mediator and coordinator for the various sections within industry, and in addition was uniquely suited by his office as Chief of the SO-Internal Affairs to give a degree of superficial cover to these illegal actions. For its part, the Ministry of Economics, by virtue of Ohlendorf's commitment, could, for example, share in the results of the work of Ludwig Erhard. In spite of these contacts with the post-war planning of the private sector, in which each side sought to influence the other, and Ohlendorf's intensive

Hanno Sowade 163 efforts to create a Nazi economic system for the future, his work in this area was denied long-lasting success. 7 On 23 May 1945, Ohlendorf, who had heard of the end of the war while in the service of the last functioning national government, gave himself up as a prisoner to the allies. Within the context of the trial of the SS Task Forces (Case 9), he astonished the court by the open manner in which he gave an account of himself. Even now, Ohlendorf was irremediably convinced of the justice of his philosophy and therefore of his deeds. The court could not fully make up its mind about this 'Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde' as the chairman of the Military Tribunal called him - the loyally devoted family man, the correct economist and civil servant, who had fought selflessly for the interests of the middle classes, and the mass murderer all in the per- son of Ohlendorf. According to the relevant guidelines it condemned 'Mr Hyde' to death on 10 April1948. Otto Ohlendorf was executed on 7 June 1951 in Landsberg!Lech. 8 NOTES These references must confine themselves to a few selected facts- some of them are short summaries. Readers are referred to the extensive references in the quoted literature, and especially Herbst (economics) and Krausnick; Wilhelm (Task Force), as well as to the recommended sources as a whole. The overall source for the entire biography is: United States Military Police (USMP) Case 9, Interroga- tion of Ohlendorf, dated 8.10.1947, University Library Gottingen. 1. For the dates of Ohlendorf's life: Ohlendorf's curriculum vitae dated 26.4.1936, BA NS 20 119-27 Bl.106f.; Ohlendorf to Hohn, dated 18.5.1936, ibid., Bl.119ff.; affidavit of SS-Brigade Leader Ohlendorf: Personal notes dated 1.4.1947, IfZ N0-2857; draft of a curriculum vitae by Ohlendorf, dated 3.1947, Nachlass Ohlendorf (Na01). 2. Ohlendorf to his brother Heinz, dated 3.7.1932, Na01; numerous other letters to family members in NaOl. 3. USMP, Case 9, Dokumentenbuch I der Verteidigung (Dok. Buch I), Dok. 1, la, 36, NaOl; Ohlendorf to his fiancee K. Wolpers, dated 25.11.1933, NaOl. They married on 10.6.1934 and had five children. 4. Dok. Buch I, Dok 2--4, 14-18, 20f., 26. 5. Ohlendorf, letters from Russia Nr. 7, 11, 14, 40, 43, 46 to his wife, Na01; USMP, Case 9, Eidesstattliche ErkHirung Dr Braune, Na01; much other ma- terial in Na01, for example 'Wie kames zu meinem Russland-einsatz' (How did I come to be sent to Russia?); 'Der Ablauf meines Einsatzes in Russland' (The course of my deployment in Russia); 'Historische Tatsachen zur Aufstellung, Aufgabe und Tatigkeit der EGr. im Russlandfeldzug' (Historical facts about the setting-up, duties and activities of the Task Forces in the Russian campaign)- all undated (within the time scale of the court case!) 6. Dok. Buch I, Dok. £f., 11, 25; USMP, Case 9, Eidesstattliche Erkliirung von Dr Bohmer, NaOl; Ohlendorf to Schwerin von Krosigk in May 1945, IfZ MA 660.

164 Otto Ohlendorf 7. Ohlendorf to Himmler dated 16.10.1942, lfZ MA 331; marginal note by Himm- ler dated 21.10.1943, ibid.; Ohlendorf to his wife dated 3.12.1943, Na01; Dok. Buch I, Dok. 1a, 11, 15, 19, 30; Ohlendorf's lecture on 19.4.1944 at the Convention of the Agricultural Councils, Na01; Ohlendorf's lecture to the Chief Advisory Council for Industry, 4.7.1944, ibid. 8. Das Urteil im Einsatzgruppenprozess, K. Leszczynski (ed.) p. 145ff. BIBLIOGRAPHY Primary Sources Fal/9. Das Urteil im Einsatzgruppen prozess, gefiillt am 10. Apri/1948 in Nurnberg vom Militiirgerichtshof der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, edited by K. Lesz- czynski (Berlin, 1963); F. Kersten, Totenkopf und Treue. Heinrich Himmler ohne Uniform (Hamburg, undated) p. 247ff; Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsver- brecher vor dem Internationalen Militiirsgerichtshof Nurnberg, 14.11.1945- 1.10.1946, 42 vols (Nuremberg, 1947ff); Prozessakten Fall IX, University Library, Gottingen; Nachlass Ohlendorf, in the possession of Mrs K. Ohlendorf. Secondary Literature There is still no comprehensive scholarly biography of Ohlendorf, but some parts of his life have been covered by studies devoted to broader themes. These can be grouped under the following headings: SS Activities: H. Hohne, Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS (Giitersloh, 1967); SD Activities: S. Aron- son, Reinhard Heydrich und die Fruhgeschichte von Gestapo und SD (Stuttgart, 1971); Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938-1945. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS, edited by H. Boberach, 17 vols (Herrsching, 1984); A. Ramme, Der Sicherheitsdienst der SS. Zu seiner Funktion im faschistischen Machtapparat und im Besatzungsregime des sogennanten Generalgouvernements Polen (Berlin, 1970); A. Smith, 'Life in Wartime Germany. Colonel Ohlendorf's Opinion Service', in The Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (1972) p. 2ff; The Task Forces: H. Krausnick and H.-H. Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938-1942 (Stuttgart, 1981); the Economy: W.A. Boelke, Die deutsche Wirtschaft 1930-1945. lnterna des Reich- swirtschaftsministeriums (DUsseldorf, 1983); L. Herbst, Der Totale krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideolo- gie und Propaganda 1939-1945 (Stuttgart, 1982). This work contains the most comprehensive attempt so far at an evaluation of Ohlendorf's life and gives a detailed account of his work in the field of political economy as one of its central themes. This present biography takes up many of the points it makes in the field of economics. The Trial: F. Bayle, Psychologie et Ethique du Nationai-Socialisme (Paris, 1953) p. 33ff, 462ff; R.M.W. Kempner, SS im Kreuzverhor (Munich, 1964).