Anthropology and emotion 人類學和情緒
Author(s): Andrew Beatty 作者：Andrew Beatty
Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, September 2014, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 545-563
資料來源：The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, September 2014, Vol：The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute，2014 年 9 月，第 20 卷，第 3 期（2014 年 9 月），第 545-563 頁

Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
出版者：大不列顛及愛爾蘭皇家人類學會
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43907704
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Emotion researchers, it is often said, irresistibly call to mind the fable of the blind men and the elephant, each right in his own way, none getting the whole beast (Russell 2003: 145). Where does emotion begin and end? Is it a matter of interpretation, feeling, category, situation, response, expression, or some or all of these? Perhaps there is no beast to capture and the ‘whole’ is a chimera: not an elephant but a unicorn. Yet the lack of palpable substance or enclosing skin, far from casting doubt on the enterprise, has spurred ever-greater efforts at definition and synthesis. The problem - the ‘blindness’ is less in the selectivity than in the partiality that leads so often to the formula (always in protesting italics), ‘X is the emotion’. For William James (1884), our feeling of bodily change is the emotion; for the psychologist Nico Frijda (2004), it’s the ‘action tendency’; for the philosopher Robert Solomon (1993 [1976]: 125), the judgement; and so on, through the many formulas - of facial expression, semantic structure, and discourse that make similar claims of equivalence. The definitional problem can’t be made to go away by putting all the parts together, because the parts may be only contingently related; some parts may be more essential than others (an elephant is still an elephant without its tail); and, of course, there are feelings, judgements, action programmes, scenarios, and facial expressions that aren’t emotional. So how to tell which ones are?
人們常說，情緒研究者不可抗拒地讓人想起盲人摸象的寓言故事，每個人都以自己的方式做對了事情，但卻沒有一個人看懂整頭野獸（Russell 2003: 145）。情感的起點與終點在哪裡？它是詮釋、感覺、類別、情境、反應、表達，或是其中某些或全部的問題嗎？或許沒有野獸可以捕捉，「整體」是一個騙局：不是大象，而是獨角獸。然而，缺乏可觸摸的實體或外皮，不但不會讓人對這項事業產生懷疑，反而會刺激人們在定義與綜合方面做出更大的努力。問題 - 「盲目」並不在於選擇性，而在於偏頗性，以致於經常出現「X 是情感」的公式 (總是以抗議的斜體)。對於 William James (1884)來說，我們身體變化的感覺就是情緒；對於心理學家 Nico Frijda (2004)來說，它是「行動趨勢」；對於哲學家 Robert Solomon (1993 [1976]: 125)來說，它是判斷；如此類推，透過許多公式--臉部表情、語義結構與論述，提出類似的等值主張。這個定義問題不是把所有部分放在一起就能解決的，因為這些部分可能只是偶然相關；有些部分可能比其他部分更重要（沒有尾巴的大象還是大象）；當然，有些感覺、判斷、行動計畫、情境和臉部表情都不是情緒性的。那麼，如何分辨哪些是情感呢？

Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 20, 545-563
皇家人類學會期刊 (N.S.) 20, 545-563
© Royal Anthropological Institute 2014
© 皇家人類學學院 2014

That very basic question, still lacking a conclusive answer in psychology and philosophy, is interestingly complicated by research in other societies. Away from home, not only do our common-sense judgements about what counts as emotion falter; their uncertainty weakens the conceptual basis of the judgements themselves. So a new difficulty arises: what to do about exceptions? Durkheim liked to argue that one well-founded ethnographic case could prove a general sociological law. More plausibly, Margaret Mead held that one solid exception was enough to confound a universal claim. Her easy-going Samoans forever altered adolescence; her Tchambuli jumbled gender. The celebrated counter-examples - Tahitians, Ifaluk, Ilongot, and Utku - have all posed challenges of this kind. What becomes of hard-wired emotions if the Tahitians don’t feel sad or the Eskimo don’t get angry?
這個最基本的問題，在心理學和哲學上仍缺乏確切的答案，但在其他社會的研究卻讓這個問題變得複雜有趣。離開家鄉之後，我們對於何謂情緒的常識判斷不僅會搖擺不定，它們的不確定性還會削弱判斷本身的概念基礎。因此，一個新的難題出現了：如何處理例外？Durkheim 喜歡辯稱，一個有根據的人種學個案可以證明一般的社會學定律。瑪格麗特‧米德（Margaret Mead）則認為，一個確鑿的例外足以混淆一個普遍的說法。她的隨和的薩摩亞人永遠改變了青春期；她的Tchambuli人混亂了性別。著名的反例 - 塔希提人 (Tahitians)、伊法魯克人 (Ifaluk)、伊隆戈人 (Ilongot) 和烏圖人 (Utku) - 都提出了這類的挑戰。如果塔希提人不傷心或愛斯基摩人不生氣，那麼硬線情感會變成什麼？

As the questions suggest, anthropology’s contribution to the understanding of emotion has been both descriptive and critical; in the best cases ethnography and critique are two sides of the same coin. In the work of Levy (1973; 1984), Lutz (1988), White (1994), and Shweder (1994), the comparison implicit in any fieldwork account is raised to a theoretical level, as imported categories are made to confront awkward facts. In different ways, these authors have shown that emotions are inextricable elements of thinking, speaking, and acting; and that we ignore them at our peril.
正如這些問題所暗示的，人類學對於理解情感的貢獻，既是描述性的，也是批判性的；在最好的情況下，民族志和批判是同一個硬幣的兩面。在Levy (1973; 1984)、Lutz (1988)、White (1994)與Shweder (1994)的著作中，任何田野工作敘述中隱含的比較都被提升到理論層次，因為舶來品的類別要面對尷尬的事實。這些作者以不同的方式表明，情緒是思考、說話和行動中不可分割的元素；我們忽視情緒是要冒險的。

For most of our discipline’s brief history, however, emotion has not been a theoretical focus. Its integrity as a concept has been assumed, its cross-cultural identity taken for granted, its empirical role in social processes either scorned or obscurely acknowledged as fundamental. Not so much ‘the blind men and the elephant’ - which suggests at least a groping interest - as ‘the elephant in the room’. The centrality of emotion in human life is part of its elephant-like invisibility. Imposing but oddly intangible, neither out there nor in here, all-important or totally irrelevant: no wonder we anthropologists have difficulties with our emotions. The difficulties, I shall argue, are conceptual and methodological, and, like many of the most taxing issues in anthropology, they are perennial. So the selective history I begin with is of more than antiquarian interest: it identifies problems and positions that remain starting-points for any discussion. I shall be tracing a history of neglect that runs counter to the progress achieved in other anthropological fields - a story of missed opportunities and roads not taken; all, of course, retraced with the comfort of hindsight. But there’s no room for smugness: this is the testament of a repentant sinner.
然而，在我們學科短暫的歷史中，情緒並不是理論的焦點。它作為一個概念的完整性已被假定，它的跨文化特性被認為是理所當然的，它在社會過程中的經驗角色不是被蔑視就是被隱晦地承認為是基本的。與其說是「盲人摸象」，不如說是「房間裡的大象」。情緒在人類生活中的核心地位，正是其大象般的隱匿性的一部分。它強烈但奇怪地無形，既不在外面，也不在這裡，既不重要，也完全不相關：難怪我們人類學家在情感方面會遇到困難。我想說的是，這些困難是概念上和方法上的，而且就像人類學中許多最棘手的問題一樣，它們是長期存在的。因此，我以選擇性的歷史作為開端，其意義不僅在於古蹟的興趣：它所指出的問題與立場，仍是任何討論的起點。我將追溯一段被忽視的歷史，它與其他人類學領域所取得的進展背道而馳--一個錯失機會與未走道路的故事；當然，所有這一切都可以在事後回顧時重新追溯。但我們不能自鳴得意：這是一個懺悔的罪人的見證。

I shall be addressing two separate but related problems: on the one hand, a patchy recognition of emotion, often amounting to neglect; on the other, a failure in reporting, a critical lack of detail. One can underrate emotion by ignoring it, or one can underrate it by putting it in the wrong words, letting it slip through the gaps. If the problems are related, so are the solutions. To give emotion its due, to restore the heartbeat to ethnography, we have to think harder about what goes on in the field and how best to put experience into words. ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}
我將討論兩個獨立但相關的問題：一方面，對情感的認知不夠，往往等同於忽視；另一方面，報告失敗，嚴重缺乏細節。我們可能會因為忽略情緒而低估情緒，也可能會因為用錯字，讓情緒從縫隙中溜走而低估情緒。如果問題是相關的，那麼解決方法也是相關的。為了賦予情感應有的價值，為了恢復民族志的心跳，我們必須更努力地思考田野裡發生了什麼，以及如何以最好的方式將經驗用文字表達出來。 ${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1}

Now, as every student knows, the modern tradition of fieldwork ethnography was more or less founded by Malinowski. In the manifesto-like introduction to Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), he made a distinction between the collection of data about social organization and the ‘imponderabilia of actual life’ - the moment-bymoment flow of behaviour which the anthropologist was uniquely able to record. To grasp the imponderabilia, and through them, the ‘native point of view’, you had to
現在，每個學生都知道，現代田野工作民族志的傳統或多或少是由 Malinowski 創立的。在《Argonauts of the Western Pacific》(1922) 宣言式的引言中，他區分了社會組織資料的收集與「實際生活的不確定性」（imponderabilia of actual life），也就是人類學家能夠獨一無二地記錄下來的每時每刻的行為流程。為了掌握這些不確定因素，並透過它們掌握「原住民的觀點」，您必須
come down off the verandah, the creaking stage of old-style fieldwork interviews, to observe speech in its living context. It was the newly discovered, or at least newly theorized, method of participant observation that revealed to Malinowski the critical contrast between what people do and what they say or think they do. The method emphasized what Roger Sanjek, in a review of fieldwork practices, calls ‘situated listening’ and ‘speech-in-action participant-observation’ (1990: 233), as opposed to ‘formal interviews with seated informants’ (1990: 246). We must bear this crucial contrast in mind in assessing recent studies of emotion. All too often we have forgotten the lesson of the master.
從陽台上走下來，從舊式田野訪談的吱吱作響的台子上走下來，在活生生的情境中觀察說話。正是這種新發現的，或者至少是新理論的參與觀察方法，向馬林諾夫斯基揭示了人們所做的與他們所說的或認為他們所做的之間的關鍵對比。這種方法強調Roger Sanjek在田野工作實踐的回顧中所說的「情境聆聽」和「言語-行動-參與觀察」（1990: 233），而不是「與坐著的提供資料者進行正式訪談」（1990: 246）。在評估最近的情緒研究時，我們必須牢記這個重要的對比。我們常常忘記了大師的教誨。

The extraordinarily rich descriptions that Malinowski produced would not have been possible without his clearly articulated discovery of ‘subject, method, and scope’, as his first chapter is entitled. However, what worked for the kula did not work quite so well for emotion. Consider a well-known example, cited by his biographer as a prototype of the extended-case method; an example so dear to Malinowski’s heart that he reproduced it with little alteration from his fieldnotes in two separate accounts (Young 2004: 402). This was the story of the expulsion of the chief’s son, Namwana Guya’u, from Omarakana. Namwana had accused his rival, the chief’s sister’s son, of seducing his wife and had reported him to the colonial resident. The outrage that followed the seducer’s imprisonment led to Namwana’s formal denunciation and exile. For village and ethnographer the consequences were momentous: the loss of an influential man and key informant, the chief’s semi-withdrawal from active life, the grief-stricken death of his wife, and a ‘deep rift in the whole social life of Kiriwina’ (Malinowski 1926: 105). Michael Young reads in Malinowski’s account the sympathy of one interloper for another. Both men lacked rights in the village (in the system of matriliny, the chief’s son had rights only in his mother’s natal village) and were dependent on chiefly patronage; both were at the mercy of colonial power: Malinowski as a wartime ‘enemy alien’, Namwana as a native subject. Parallels aside, Malinowski presents the case in structural terms as a struggle between mother-right and father love, matrilineal authority and paternal interest (1929: 13). The personal elements that would thicken the meaning - character, dialogue, development - are edited out. You can’t blame Malinowski for seizing the opportunity to clinch a decisive sociological point. But the emotions - the imponderabilia - have been filtered. The back-story is summary; the description sparse. Malinowski’s hero and literary model, Joseph Conrad, would not have approved. It would be good to know what the participants felt: felt in the fullest sense - how they judged the events; how public humiliation affected the imprisoned philanderer and the well-born cuckold; how the long-standing feud between them stoked anger and retribution; how the linking but invisible women - the chief’s sister and the unfaithful wife - judged the unfolding situation and were reconciled with the warring men; and how, emotionally and linguistically, the whole thing was framed by differently positioned parties. The sociological case is nailed, trophy-like, for future admiration; but we learn little from this account about the way emotions are constituted or experienced in an exotic setting. We can see they matter a good deal; but the method of reporting does not let us see how or why they matter.
如果沒有 Malinowski 對「主體、方法與範圍」的明確發現（正如他第一章的標題），就不可能有 Malinowski 所做的異常豐富的描述。然而，對於庫拉（kula）來說有效的方法，對於情感卻不太有效。馬林諾夫斯基的傳記作者引用了一個著名的例子，作為擴展個案方法的原型；這個例子在馬林諾夫斯基心目中是如此珍貴，以至於他在兩個不同的記述中，幾乎沒有改動地重現了他的田野筆記（Young 2004: 402）。這是關於酋長的兒子 Namwana Guya'u 被 Omarakana 驅逐的故事。Namwana 指控他的對手，也就是酋長妹妹的兒子勾引他的妻子，並向殖民地居民舉報。誘奸者入獄後引起的憤怒導致 Namwana 被正式譴責和流放。對於村莊和民族學家來說，後果是重大的：失去了一位有影響力的人和關鍵的線人，酋長半退出積極的生活，他的妻子悲痛欲絕地去世，以及「Kiriwina 整個社會生活的深刻裂痕」(Malinowski 1926: 105)。Michael Young 在 Malinowski 的描述中，讀出了一個插足者對另一個插足者的同情。這兩個人在村莊中都沒有權利（在母系制度中，酋長的兒子只在他母親出生的村莊中擁有權利），並且依賴酋長的贊助；兩人都受到殖民權力的擺佈：Malinowski 是戰時的「外國敵人」，Namwana 則是原住民。撇開相似性不談，Malinowski 以結構性的方式將這個案例呈現為母權與父愛、母系權威與父系利益之間的鬥爭 (1929：13)。個人的元素，如角色、對話、發展等，都被刪除了。 你不能怪 Malinowski 抓住這個機會，在社會學上取得了決定性的成果。但情感--不確定因素--已被過濾。背景故事簡要，描述稀疏。Malinowski 的英雄和文學典範 Joseph Conrad 一定不會同意。如果能知道參與者的感受：最完整的感受 - 他們如何判斷這些事件；公開的羞辱如何影響被囚禁的花花公子和生得好的戴綠帽者；他們之間的宿怨如何激起憤怒和報復；有聯繫但隱形的婦女 - 酋長的妹妹和不忠的妻子 - 如何判斷正在發展的情勢，並與交戰的男人和解；以及在情感和語言上，整件事如何被不同定位的當事人框定。這個社會學案例被釘在戰利品上，以供日後欣賞；但我們從這個記載中，對於情感在異國環境中的構成或體驗方式，卻學到甚少。我們可以看到情緒很重要；但報導的方法卻沒有讓我們看到情緒如何或為何會重要。

Nor do we learn much from similar fieldwork cases of Malinowski’s student Raymond Firth, an equally copious ethnographer who limited his coverage of emotion because of
我們也沒有從類似 Malinowski 的學生 Raymond Firth 的田野工作案例中獲益良多。
a preconception about what might count as psychology. In documenting what he calls family sentiments, Firth warns with a shudder: ‘But the use of the term “sentiment” in this book [We, the Tikopia] implies not a psychological reality but a cultural reality; it describes a type of behaviour which can be observed, not a state of mind which must be inferred’ (1957 [1936]: 160). To be fair, a late essay (Firth 1985), delivered on Malinowski’s centenary, does directly address an emotional episode, another case of a chief’s distraught son. But Firth’s analysis, which concerns intelligibility, gets stuck on the binaries of reason and affect, verbal and non-verbal behaviour, rationality and irrationality; it doesn’t tell us much about emotion, or indeed Tikopia emotion. And I say this in spite of Michael Carrithers’ otherwise persuasive appreciation of the case, which he incorporates into a powerful argument - very much to my taste - for the narrative understanding of behaviour (Carrithers 1992: 159-60). ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} By and large, emotions were just too imponderable for functionalist methodology; they escaped the subject, method, and scope.
對於何謂心理學的成見。在記錄他所謂的家庭情感時，Firth 不寒而慄地警告說：「但在這本書[We, the Tikopia]中，「情感」一詞的使用所暗示的不是心理現實，而是文化現實；它描述的是一種可以觀察到的行為類型，而不是一種必須推斷的心態」（1957 [1936]: 160）。平心而論，在 Malinowski 一百週年紀念時發表的一篇晚期論文 (Firth 1985)，確實直接論述了一個情緒事件，也就是另一個酋長兒子憂心忡忡的案例。但 Firth 的分析關乎可理解性，他的分析停留在理性與情感、言語與非言語行為、理性與非理性的二元對立上，並沒有告訴我們關於情感或 Tikopia 情感的太多事。儘管Michael Carrithers在其他方面對這個案例有很有說服力的評價，而且他把這個案例納入了一個強而有力的論據--非常符合我的口味--來支持對行為的敘事性理解（Carrithers 1992: 159-60），我還是這麼說。 ${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} 大體而言，對於功能主義方法論而言，情緒是太難思索的；它們逃離了主題、方法與範圍。

On the other theoretical wing, one foot on the verandah, Radcliffe-Brown and his followers also shied away from a fuller exploration of naturally occurring emotions, preferring what they termed social sentiments, the culturally standard dispositions appropriate to a son or daughter, chief, rival, or ally. These sentiments were cast in simple terms as solidarity, hostility, affection, and respect unmixed with idiosyncrasy, temperament, or curriculum vitae. The structural functionalists followed Durkheim in their ruthless purging of individual psychology. ‘Psychological facts’ had no bearing on ‘social facts’, which were the sole concern of sociology and anthropology.
在理論的另一邊廂，Radcliffe-Brown 和他的追隨者也迴避了對自然產生的情感進行更全面的探討，而傾向於他們所謂的社會情感，即文化上標準的性情，適合於兒子或女兒、首領、對手或盟友。這些情感被簡化為團結、敵意、親情和尊重，而不摻雜特異性、性情或履歷。結構功能主義者跟隨杜克海姆對個人心理進行了無情的清洗。心理事實」與「社會事實」無關，而「社會事實」是社會學與人類學唯一關心的議題。
French structuralism took up a different strand of the legacy but kept the taboo. Lévi-Strauss went even further than Durkheim in rejecting any explanatory role for emotions.
法國的結構主義承繼了不同的遺產，但保留了禁忌。Lévi-Strauss 甚至比 Durkheim 更進一步，拒絕情感的任何解釋作用。

Actually, impulses and emotions explain nothing: they are always results, either of the power of the body or of the impotence of the mind. In both cases they are consequences, never causes. The latter can be sought only in the organism, which is the exclusive concern of biology, or in the intellect, which is the sole way offered to psychology, and to anthropology as well (Lévi-Strauss 1962: 71).
事實上，衝動和情緒什麼都無法解釋：它們永遠都是結果，或是身體的力量，或是心靈的無能。在這兩種情況下，它們都是結果，而不是原因。後者只能在生物體中尋找，那是生物學專門關注的，或是在智力中尋找，那是提供給心理學以及人類學的唯一方法（Lévi-Strauss 1962: 71）。

A strict Cartesian dualism prevented him from seeing emotions as having any cognitive content, or, to put it slightly differently, intellect as embodied (Lévi-Strauss 1981: 667-8); which meant omitting the motivations, judgements, tactics, and expressions that comprise emotions and animate social life. For Lévi-Strauss, emotions are mere effects. Yet in the flow of events, effects are causes of further effects. Emotions, moreover, have motivational value: we seek pleasure, avoid pain. Even granted a narrow view of emotions as sentiments, Lévi-Strauss cut out much of what the ethnographer can observe. Since he relied mainly on published texts rather than fieldnotes, his examples are doubly depleted. It was only a small step from the functionalist schemata he drew upon to an algebraic notation of dispositions, with positive and negative values. This was kinship drained of human significance. In a generation, anthropology had passed from Malinowski’s exuberant realism, in which people and their emotions were highly visible, if not a focus in themselves, to a plane of abstraction which left them far behind.
嚴格的笛卡兒二元論阻止他將情感視為具有任何認知內容，或稍微不同的是，將智力視為具體化（Lévi-Strauss 1981: 667-8）；這意味著省略了構成情感與社會生活的動機、判斷、策略與表達。對 Lévi-Strauss 來說，情緒只是一種效果。然而，在事件的流程中，效果是進一步效果的原因。此外，情緒具有動機價值：我們尋求快樂，避免痛苦。即使狹隘地將情緒視為情緒，Lévi-Strauss還是剔除了很多民族學家可以觀察到的東西。由於他主要依賴已出版的文獻而非田野筆記，因此他的例子加倍枯竭。從他借鑒的功能主義圖式到具有正負數值的性情代數記號，只是一小步。這是抽乾了人類意義的親屬關係。在一代人的時間裡，人類學從馬林諾夫斯基的誇張現實主義中走了出來，在馬林諾夫斯基的現實主義中，人和他們的情感即使不是焦點，也是高度可見的，而在馬林諾夫斯基的現實主義中，人和他們的情感即使不是焦點，也是高度可見的。

As the home of what became psychological anthropology, America was more hospitable to emotion. Built on the massive corpus of Boasian descriptive ethnography,
作為心理人類學的發源地，美國對情感更加熱情。建立在龐大的波亞斯描述性人種學的基礎上、

American anthropology made culture, not society or the individual, its cornerstone. Boas himself was keen to distinguish culture as a historical product from individual thought and feeling. Above an assumed ‘psychic unity of mankind’, what varied across cultures was the content of cognitions, not the faculties or forms of experience (Shore 1996: 22). Boas would not have agreed with his distant heirs that ‘emotional experience is not precultural but preeminently cultural’ (Lutz 1988: 5, emphasis added), that the passions, quite simply, are ‘cultural’ (Geertz 1980: 124). Although his students - the Culture and Personality pioneers - saw emotion as a key variable in a design for living, they took for granted the conception of emotion and its objective status as a natural kind. Their concern was not with what emotions were but what they did; how they were shaped by everyday routines; how they moulded the ethos.
美國人類學的基石是文化，而非社會或個人。博厄斯本人也非常熱衷於將作為歷史產物的文化與個人的思想感情區分開來。在假定的「人類精神統一」之上，不同文化的差異在於認知的內容，而非經驗的能力或形式 (Shore 1996: 22)。Boas不會同意他遠方的繼承者所說的「情感經驗不是先文化的，而是先文化的」(Lutz 1988: 5, 強調是後加的)，激情，很簡單，是「文化的」(Geertz 1980: 124)。雖然他的學生--文化與人格的先驅--將情感視為生活設計的關鍵變數，但他們想當然地將情感的概念及其客觀地位視為一種自然。他們關心的不是情緒是什麼，而是情緒做了什麼；情緒如何被日常生活塑造；情緒如何塑造風氣。
The attempt to pin feelings to forms was most explicit in Bateson’s Naven (1958 [1936]), an ambitious synthesis of British structural and American cultural approaches. Bateson analysed stereotyped sequences in latmul encounters, coining the term schismogenesis for the competitive escalation and breakdown between partners. Schismogenesis, he proposed, was a widespread form of interaction evident in marital squabbles, class war, even the arms race. Curiously, in Bali, where he later worked, it was lacking. Instead, a tendency to excite then dissipate emotion - an ‘absence of climax’ - led to what he and Mead called a schizoid personality (Bateson & Mead 1942). On almost every measure, Bali was different (in emotion studies it’s the perennial exception, the view from Mars); but no less than in the Sepik, Balinese emotions, daily routines, and cultural values were tightly interlinked in a functional circuit.
貝特森的《納文》（1958 [1936]）是英國結構學和美國文化學方法的雄心勃勃的綜合體，其中最明確的嘗試是將感覺固定在形式上。Bateson分析了latmul邂逅中的定型序列，創造了 「分裂」（schismogenesis）一詞來描述夥伴之間的競爭升級和破裂。他提出，分裂是一種普遍的互動形式，在婚姻爭吵、階級戰爭，甚至軍備競賽中都很明顯。奇怪的是，在他後來工作過的巴厘島，卻沒有這種現象。相反，一種先激動後緩和的情緒趨勢--「高潮的缺失」--導致了他和米德所謂的分裂型人格（Bateson & Mead 1942）。巴厘島幾乎在所有方面都與眾不同（在情緒研究方面，巴厘島是一個常年的例外，它是火星上的景觀）；但巴厘島的情緒、日常作息和文化價值觀在功能迴圈中緊密相連，這一點不亞於塞皮克島。
All this clarity came at a cost. A focus on patterns and processes destroyed the specificity of emotion episodes, winnowing out the passionate individual, turning the love and anger of real people into the synthetic passions of generic Balinese, Papuans, and Samoans: culture-specific, not person-specific, emotions. Despite its gossipy tone and one’s memory of it as rich in emotions, Mead’s Samoa book contains not a single description of an emotional sequence witnessed by the author. The technique is one of ethnographic generalization - ‘Cases of passionate jealousy do occur, but they are matters for extended comment and amazement’ (Mead 1972 [1928]: 131) - or summary - ‘The rage of Lola was unbounded and she took an immediate revenge, publicly accusing her rival of being a thief and setting the whole village by the ears’ (1972 [1928]: 145). The manner - discursive, undramatic in the strict sense - sacrifices verisimilitude for presentational coherence.
所有這些清晰度都是有代價的。對模式和過程的關注破壞了情緒事件的特異性，剔除了充滿激情的個體，將真實人物的愛與憤怒變成了一般巴厘島人、巴布亞人和薩摩亞人的合成激情：特定文化而非特定人物的情緒。儘管米德的薩摩亞著作以八卦為基調，在人們的記憶中也充滿了豐富的情感，但這本書中卻沒有一處描述作者親眼目睹的情感序列。其手法是人種學上的概括--「熱情妒忌的案例確實發生，但這些案例只會引起廣泛的評論和驚訝」（Mead 1972 [1928]: 131）--或總結--「Lola 的憤怒是無限的，她立即採取報復行動，公開指控她的對手是小偷，並把整個村莊的人都嚇得瞠目結舌」（1972 [1928]: 145）。這種方式 - 敘事性、非戲劇性的嚴格意義 - 犧牲了真實性以求呈現的一致性。

Naven, one of anthropology’s Great Books, illustrates the gains and losses of pigeonholing emotions. I cite it here because the balance sheet is still relevant and because Bateson was unusually - obsessively - reflexive in his approach and knew very well what he had to leave out. Here we find, more starkly formulated, the peculiar relation between reporting, circumstance, and summary that Malinowski had developed and that generations of anthropologists came to adopt - at a price - as ethnographic method. In his introduction Bateson asks how the ethnographer can capture scientifically what literature conveys by ‘impressionistic’ techniques. ‘The emotional background’, he writes, ‘is causally active within a culture, and no functional study can ever be reasonably complete unless it links up the structure and pragmatic working of the culture with its emotional tone or ethos’ (Bateson 1958 [1936]: 2). But his focus is on formalized behaviour and sentiments; and his argument, frustrating and dazzling by turns, succeeds only to the extent that he can persuade us such sentiments do
Naven 是人類學的名著之一，它說明了將情緒鴿子化的得失。我在此引述這本書，是因為它的資產負債表仍然適用，也因為貝特森（Bateson）在他的研究方法中具有異乎尋常--執著--的反思性，而且非常清楚他必須遺漏什麼。在這裡，我們發現，馬林諾夫斯基（Malinowski）所發展的報告、情況與總結之間的特殊關係，被一代又一代的人類學家以代價採納為民族志的方法。在引言中，Bateson 詢問民族學家如何以科學的方式捕捉文學以「印象式」技術傳達的內容。他寫道：「情感的背景」，「在一種文化中是因果活躍的，任何功能性的研究都不可能是合理完整的，除非它將文化的結構與實用的運作與它的情感基調或精神聯繫起來」（Bateson 1958 [1936]: 2）。但他的重點在於形式化的行為與情感；而他的論點，在令人沮喪與眩目之餘，成功的程度只在於他能說服我們，這些情感確實存在。
indeed dominate Iatmul life. From the evidence, we cannot know. Naven is famously theory-driven, with Bateson a kind of anti-Malinowski, herding the facts like docile sheep from one hypothetical fold to another. But among the confining frames there are glimpses of stray facts, unformulated emotions - the feelings behind the ‘emotional background’, one might say. Bateson witnesses a funeral and puzzles over the half-hearted sobbing of the men and their relieved lapse into competitive boasting. ‘They escaped entirely from a situation which was embarrassing’, he writes, ‘because it seemed to demand a sincere expression of personal loss, an expression which their pride could scarcely brook’ (Bateson 1958 [1936]: 154). Ethos triumphs over inchoate feeling. But the psychic cost, like the peculiar ambivalence Bateson found in Iatmul sexual antagonism, remains unexplored. How are unauthorized emotions experienced? What subterranean life do they lead? How does the personal trauma of initiation get transformed into the ‘pride of the male ethos’? Legitimate anthropological questions: but they could not be asked when the object of inquiry was ‘culturally standardized behavior’.
確實主宰了 Iatmul 的生活。根據證據，我們無法得知。納文是著名的理論驅動者，貝特森是一種反馬林諾夫斯基，把事實像溫順的羊群一樣從一個假設的圈子趕到另一個圈子。但在這些侷限的框架中，卻隱約可以窺見游離的事實、未經表達的情緒──也可以說是「情感背景」背後的感受。貝特森目睹了一場葬禮，對於人們半信半疑的啜泣，以及他們如釋重負地陷入競爭性的誇耀中感到困惑。他寫道：「他們完全擺脫了令人尷尬的處境」，「因為這似乎需要真誠地表達個人的損失，而他們的自尊心幾乎無法忍受這種表達」（Bateson 1958 [1936]: 154）。倫理勝過不成熟的感覺。但其心理代價，就像 Bateson 在 Iatmul 性對抗中發現的特殊矛盾性一樣，仍有待探索。未經授權的情感是如何體驗的？它們過著怎樣的地下生活？啟蒙的個人創傷如何轉化為「男性倫理的驕傲」？這些都是合理的人類學問題：但當探究的對象是「文化標準化的行為」時，這些問題就無法提出。

Emotion’s multidimensionality makes it a casualty of any ‘systems’ approach. Subordinate a feeling to a system and you lose the interplay between contexts - cultural, social, and biographical - that gives emotions their resonance, their practical significance. In fact, the more analytical one’s approach, the sharper the definitions, the vaguer the emotion concept - which suggests we are victims either of a category mistake or of false precision (Averill 1994: 145).
情緒的多面性使它成為任何「系統」方法的犧牲品。將情感從屬於一個系統，你就失去了文化、社會和傳記等背景之間的相互作用，而這些背景賦予了情感共鳴和實際意義。事實上，分析性越強的方法，定義越鮮明，情緒概念就越模糊--這表明我們不是類別錯誤的受害者，就是錯誤的精確性的受害者（Averill 1994: 145）。

Functionalism and structuralism reduced emotions to dispositions, shadows of structure. In Talcott Parsons’s mid-century rethinking of the social sciences, emotion was even more elusive. Parsons’s maxim was the irreducibility of psychological, sociological, and cultural phenomena, each ‘level’ having its own characteristics (Kuper 1999: chap. 2). In the division of labour, anthropologists were assigned ‘culture’, sociologists ‘society’, and psychologists ‘personality’. But where did emotion belong? Each scholarly tribe could claim emotion as its own only by losing two of the dimensions. For the anthropologists, it had to be cultural or nothing. But what was emotion torn from its psychological moorings?
功能主義和結構主義把情感貶低為處置、結構的陰影。在 Talcott Parsons 於世紀中期對社會科學的重新思考中，情感甚至更加難以捉摸。帕森斯的格言是心理、社會學和文化現象的不可還原性，每一個「層次」都有其自身的特徵（Kuper 1999: chap. 2）。在分工上，人類學家被指定為「文化」，社會學家被指定為「社會」，而心理學家則被指定為「人格」。但情緒屬於何方？每個學術部落只有失去其中兩個維度，才能將情感視為自己的東西。對於人類學家來說，情感必須是文化的，否則什麼都不是。但是，脫離了心理基礎的情感又是什麼呢？
The answer came in a different conception of emotion, one that better fitted the cultural mould. If human beings were cultural beings, as Parsons’s chief anthropological exponent argued, so must their emotions be cultural. ‘Not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts’, wrote Clifford Geertz in 1962 (1973: 81). This was a radical claim, far from the dilute Freudianism that had cramped the Culture and Personality school. But in its strong sense it was not picked up for many years, not even by Geertz himself. In this early essay, Geertz was moving towards the idea of culture as a tissue of symbols. He later gave philosophical ballast to the conception by appeal to Wittgenstein’s strenuously public concept of meaning, for which the axiom ‘an “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria’ (1958: 153) might serve as banner. In the Bali essays of the 1960s and 1970s, however, emotions appear as manipulable entities, psychological ready-mades rather than cultural artefacts. Here’s an example. ‘What the cockfight says it says in a vocabulary of sentiment - the thrill of risk, the despair of loss, the pleasure of triumph … Attending cockfights and participating in them is, for the Balinese, a kind of sentimental education’ (Geertz 1973: 449). This is not very different from Bateson and Mead on Bali. Culture shapes what nature provides. What’s new is
答案來自不同的情緒概念，一個更符合文化模式的概念。帕森斯的主要人類學代表認為，如果人類是文化的存在，那麼他們的情感也必須是文化的。1962年，Clifford Geertz寫道：「不僅是思想，情緒也是文化藝術品」(1973: 81)。這是一個激進的主張，遠遠不是文化與人格學派(Culture and Personality school)所採用的淡化弗洛伊德主義(dilute Freudianism)。但是，就其強烈的意義而言，它多年來都沒有被採納，甚至連 Geertz 本人也沒有採納。在這篇早期的論文中，Geertz趨向於將文化視為符號組織的觀點。他後來引用維特根斯坦(Wittgenstein)強烈公開的意義概念，為這個概念賦予哲學上的基礎，而「內在過程」("inner process" stands in need of outward criteria)(1958:153)這個公理可以作為旗幟。然而，在1960與1970年代的巴里文論中，情緒似乎是可操縱的實體，是心理學上的現成品，而非文化上的藝術品。以下是一個例子。「鬥雞所表達的是一種情感詞彙 - 冒險的快感、失落的絕望、勝利的愉悅......對巴厘島人而言，觀看鬥雞和參與鬥雞是一種情感教育」（Geertz 1973: 449）。這與貝特森 (Bateson) 和米德 (Mead) 在峇里島的觀點並無太大差異。文化塑造自然所提供的東西。新的是
the text analogy, the idea that the parade of emotions forms a social commentary, a native sociology.
文字的類比，情感的遊行形成了一種社會評論，一種原生的社會學。

We are a long way from the thrusting individuals of Argonauts or Crime and custom, far removed from real imponderable emotions - which is no doubt what Geertz intends. His Balinese are constructed, faceless, generic. But so the culture had made them: they lacked individuated personalities, were scarcely differentiated by name, and existed in ‘a motionless present, a vectorless now’ (Geertz 1973: 404). In a Platonic inversion of ethnographic perception, Geertz writes (in a later essay): ‘It is dramatis personae, not actors, that endure: indeed it is dramatis personae, not actors, that in the proper sense really exist’ (1983: 62). Emptied of subjectivity and history, Balinese fulfilled the interpretative ideal, epitomizing texts, acting out categories, valorizing the method. No need for narrative context or even ordinary off-the-verandah observation. In their thoughts and emotions, Balinese were as symbol-bound, as suspended in webs of meaning, as Radcliffe-Brown’s Mother’s Brother had been functional in his. Reality fitted theory hand in glove.
我們與 Argonauts 或 Crime and custom 中的衝突個體相距甚遠，也遠離了真實的不可思議的情感 - 這無疑是 Geertz 的用意所在。他筆下的巴厘島人是建構出來的、無臉的、一般的。但文化就是這樣造就了他們：他們缺乏個性化的人格，幾乎沒有名字的區別，存在於「一動不動的現在、無向量的現在」（Geertz 1973: 404）。在柏拉圖式的人種學知覺的反轉中，Geertz（在後來的一篇文章中）寫道：「它是戲劇人物（dramatis personae）：在柏拉圖式的顛倒中，Geertz（在後來的文章中）寫道：「是戲劇人物，而不是演員，在持續著：事實上，是戲劇人物，而不是演員，在適當的意義上真正存在著」（1983: 62）。摒棄了主觀性與歷史，巴厘人實現了詮釋的理想，縮影了文本、演繹了類別、推崇了方法。不需要敘事背景，甚至不需要普通的觀察。在他們的思想和情感中，巴厘島人被符號束縛著，懸浮在意義網中，就像 Radcliffe-Brown 的 Mother's Brother 在他的功能中一樣。現實與理論是相輔相成的。

Geertz’s bracketing of the biographical, his focus on the public forms of knowledge, on cultural framing rather than subjective qualia, set the course for a generation. Anything outside this programme amounted to mind-reading. Interpretivism inspired many fine-grained accounts of the person that enriched the literature but left out actual persons. It was as if the symbols and models had the experiences on the actor’s behalf. What was left over when texts had been interpreted and symbols logged was private sensation, amenable to neither observation nor analysis. In this perspective, individuality was equated with privacy (in the philosophical sense), an anthropological no-man’s-land.
Geertz 對傳記的括弧、他對知識公共形式的關注、對文化框架而非主觀質量的關注，為一代人定下了方向。任何在此方案之外的東西都等同於讀心術。詮釋主義啟發了許多對人的細節描述，豐富了文學，卻遺漏了真實的人。就好像符號和模型代表了演員的經驗。當文本被詮釋、符號被記錄之後，剩下來的就是私人的感覺，既不適合觀察也不適合分析。從這個角度來看，個性等同於隱私（哲學意義上的隱私），是人類學上的無主之地。

Such was the orthodoxy as constructionism took hold from the 1980s, heralded twenty years earlier by Geertz’s claim that emotions were cultural artefacts. Contrary voices arguing for transcultural factors lingered here and there. Renato Rosaldo (1989) and Unni Wikan (1992) argued from common experience (an approach treated sceptically in Beatty 2005a; 2010). Phenomenological anthropologists continued to assert the primacy of the body, the experiencing self, or other avatars of consciousness. But the dominant modes remained the summary report, the case study fitted to a thesis, the colourful vignette, and the generalizing, comparative statement.
這就是建構主義在 1980 年代蔚為風潮的正統觀念，而 20 年前 Geertz 聲稱情緒是文化的人工製品，就預示了這一觀念。反對跨文化因素的聲音不絕於耳。Renato Rosaldo (1989) 和 Unni Wikan (1992) 辯稱情感是共同經驗（Beatty 2005a; 2010 對此持懷疑態度）。現象學人類學家繼續堅持身體、經驗自我或其他意識化身的首要地位。但主流模式仍然是摘要報告、配合論點的個案研究、色彩繽紛的小故事，以及概括性的比較陳述。

Despite a century of progress on other fronts, a tendency towards the generic - the death of emotion - has persisted practically unchanged up to the present. I will come to the exceptions, but among several objections two are paramount, and it is worth spelling them out at this half-way mark. The first objection to generic reporting or explanation goes as follows. Emotions might be third-person constructions, a collective product, but they are first-person experiences and not reducible to any of their ingredients. Their particularity is to do with their subjectivity, their me-focus (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner & Gross 2007; Goldie 2000; Roberts 1988; Solomon 1993 [1976]). Unlike most other things that are in some sense culturally constructed - norms, values, cultural models - their sine qua non is their personal reference. You feel anger because it is you who are insulted; sad because the loss is yours. Others may read the situation in similar terms, recognizing the loss or insult, but they don’t experience the emotion. Emotions are particular or they are nothing. As psychologists have long recognized, an
儘管一個世紀以來在其他領域取得了進展，但通俗化的趨勢--情感的消亡--實際上一直持續到現在。我將來會談到例外的情況，但在幾個反對意見中，有兩個是最重要的，值得在中途說明。第一種反對一般報告或解釋的意見如下。情緒可能是第三人稱的建構，是集體的產物，但它們是第一人稱的經驗，不能還原為任何成分。它們的特殊性在於它們的主觀性，它們以我為中心（Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner & Gross 2007; Goldie 2000; Roberts 1988; Solomon 1993 [1976]）。不像其他大多數在某種意義上由文化建構的東西 - 規範、價值觀、文化模式 - 他們的必要條件是他們的個人參考。你感到憤怒，因為受侮辱的是你；悲傷，因為損失是你的。其他人也許會以類似的字眼來解讀這種情況，認知到損失或侮辱，但他們不會體驗到這種情緒。情緒是特定的，不然就什麼都不是。正如心理學家長期以來所認知的
adequate account of emotion has to reckon with this primary fact. It is the first objection to a generalizing format.
對情感的充分說明必須考慮到這個主要事實。這是對概括格式的第一個反對意見。

The second is that emotions are biographical: primed by evolution, to be sure; shaped by culture; constrained by subject position; but given personal relevance and intensity by individual history. Psychoanalysts have long made this claim; but it finds powerful new support in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. To quote one recent study, an emotion experience is a conceptual structure stored in memory whose conditions include current perceptions, cognitions, actions, and core affect. A specific emotion conceptualization (e.g., a context-specific conceptualization of anger) … reinstates how these conditions have been experienced in the past’ (Barrett et al. 2007: 386). Clearly, this is a view that opens the way to a narrative account of the sort I want to promote here. This biographical kind of particularity is not quite the same as the first, the quality of reflexivity or self-reference. It has to do with the fact that nobody else can lead my life: my biography, memories, and psychological formation are my own. These personal circumstances, built over time, sedimented in character and temperament, affect - not to say determine - emotional experience and the course of relations between people. A psychoanalyst would say as much. But for the anthropologist this biographical story is not purely internal or individual, much less isolable from the living context. What counts here is the embedding of emotion in interwoven lives, not its remembrance in the bubble of an interview.
第二種說法是：情緒是傳統的：可以肯定的是，它是由進化引發的；由文化塑造的；受主體位置的限制；但個人歷史賦予了個人的相關性和強度。精神分析學家早已提出這個主張，但在認知心理學和神經科學中找到了新的有力支持。引用最近的一項研究，情緒經驗是儲存在記憶中的概念結構，其條件包括當前的感知、認知、行動和核心情感。特定的情緒概念化（例如，憤怒的特定情境概念化）......恢復了這些條件在過去是如何被體驗的"（Barrett 等人，2007：386）。很明顯，這個觀點為我在此想要推廣的那種敘述開闢了道路。這種傳記式的特殊性與第一種特殊性，即反身性或自我參照的特質並不完全相同。它與一個事實有關，那就是沒有其他人可以帶領我的生活：我的傳記、記憶和心理形成都是我自己的。這些個人情況，隨著時間的推移而形成，沉澱在性格和氣質中，影響著 - 更不用說決定著 - 情緒經驗和人與人之間關係的進程。心理分析師也會這麼說。但對於人類學家來說，這個傳記故事並非純粹是內在或個人的，更不可能與生活背景隔離。這裡重要的是情感在交織的生活中的嵌入，而不是在訪談的泡沫中的記憶。
These two sorts of particularity, the egocentric and the biographical (both of them resistant to a generalizing format), pose different implications for the ethnographer. They represent the inner and outer dimensions of experience: consciousness, on the one hand; lives and histories, on the other. They are filtered out by any systems approach that fails to connect the cultural, social, and psychological, and that removes emotion from the stream of history. By this measure, an account framed in terms of cultural categories, scripts, social tensions, emotion display rules, or any other synchronic or schematic analysis will fall short.
這兩種特殊性，自我中心的和傳記性的(兩者都抗拒概括的形式)，對民族志學家有不同的影響。它們代表了經驗的內在與外在層面：一方面是意識，另一方面是生活與歷史。任何未能將文化、社會與心理連繫起來，並將情感從歷史的洪流中剔除的系統方法，都會將它們濾除。根據這個標準，以文化類別、腳本、社會張力、情緒顯示規則或任何其他同步或圖式分析為框架的說明都是不夠的。
An example might be Lutz’s Unnatural emotions (1988), which depends on the analysis of emotion terms excerpted from minimally contextualized episodes, interviews, and word-sorting tests. The vast irregular hinterland of meaning that inheres in past experiences, personal confrontations, non-linguistic behaviour, and unvoiced reflection is hidden in a method that prioritizes and isolates verbal performance and stereotypical script-definition. Like Mead’s Samoa book, Unnatural emotions lacks detailed descriptions of emotion episodes; the ethnographer’s advantage sacrificed for argument’s sake. One could say the same of another landmark discourse study, Michelle Rosaldo’s Knowledge and passion, whose first sixty or so pages avoid extended examples - except for a single brilliant fieldwork anecdote (1980:33-4) that upsets the argument by placing ethnographer and subjects within a layered story. Instead of naturalistic episodes illustrating Ilongot emotions, Rosaldo strings together sayings and usages put to her as Ilongot (in a telling formula) ‘explain themselves’ (1980:36). Thick commentary rather than thick description. Only thus can Rosaldo claim that ’ $[t$$[t$[t[t ]heir talk of hearts has less to do with histories that give reasons than with the fact that hearts that stand apart are “moved”, “turn in upon themselves”, “itch”’, and so on (1980: 43), the vocabulary comprising a static folk psychology, not a history of persons. How could it be otherwise when the method precludes ‘histories’ and emphasizes instead the alienness of Ilongot emotions?
一個例子可能是 Lutz 的 Unnatural emotions (1988)，它依賴於分析從最小情境化的事件、訪談和詞彙分類測試中摘錄出來的情緒詞彙。過去的經驗、個人的對抗、非語言的行為，以及未曾發聲的反省，都隱藏著龐大的不規則意涵腹地，而這種方法將語言表現與刻板的腳本定義視為優先與孤立。就像 Mead 的薩摩亞著作一樣，Unnatural emotions 缺乏對情緒事件的詳細描述；民族學家的優勢為了爭論而犧牲。另一本里程碑式的論述研究，Michelle Rosaldo的《知識與熱情》也是同樣的情況，該書前六十頁左右的篇幅避開了延伸的例子--除了一則精采的田野工作軼事(1980:33-4)，這則軼事將民族學家與研究對象置於一個層次分明的故事中，打亂了論點。Rosaldo 並非以自然的事件來說明 Ilongot 人的情緒，而是將 Ilongot 人（以一個說故事的公式）向她「解釋自己」（1980:36）時所說的說話和用法串連起來。厚評論而非厚描述。唯有如此，Rosaldo才能聲稱：「 $[t$$[t$[t[t 他們談論的心，與提供理由的歷史無關，而與分開的心被「移動」、「轉向自己」、「癢」等事實無關」(1980: 43)，這些詞彙包含了靜態的民間心理學，而非人的歷史。當這種方法排除「歷史」，而強調伊隆戈人情感的疏離感時，又怎會不是這樣呢？

One test of any anthropological account is a simple but seldom-asked question: If I were that person or belonged to that set of people, would the analysis include what seems most significant to me? ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} Is my anger fully explained by my structural position as a slighted Mother’s Brother, or by its place within a contrast set of emotion categories, or by its expression as a human universal? None of the above. Positioning, expression, strategy, and circumstances frame the context and possibilities; but what gives the context resonance - in effect, what produces the emotion as a self-referring, biographical event - is its location in time among figures with similarly distinctive but interlaced histories. This is what ethnography has to reckon with.
測試任何人類學說法的一個簡單但很少被問到的問題：如果我是那個人或屬於那一群人，分析是否會包括對我來說最重要的東西？ ${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} 我的憤怒是否完全可以用我作為一個被輕視的母親的弟弟的結構性地位來解釋，或者用它在一組對比的情緒類別中的位置來解釋，或者用它作為人類普遍性的表達來解釋？以上都不是。定位、表達、策略和環境構成了情境和可能性；但賦予情境共鳴--實際上，賦予情緒自我指涉、傳記性事件--的是它在時間中的位置，在具有相似的獨特但交錯的歷史的人物中的位置。這就是人種學必須考量的。

The analogy with drama is suggestive. The significance of a Hamlet soliloquy depends not only on semantic meaning but also on the orientation of characters, the state of the plot, and the possibilities ahead: half the speeches are about action or inaction. An ethnographer in Elsinore had better not rely on semi-structured interviews (‘Hamlet, what makes you depressed?’) or word-sorting tasks (‘Claudius, list synonyms for guilt’); or, having convened a friendly focus group beneath the battlements, hypothetical scenarios (‘Let’s talk about our mothers’). Confronted with the standard instruments of emotion research, do our informants, like Hamlet, feel a little out of joint? They gamely answer, but what are their answers worth? At some abstract level we might learn something about how people think about emotions in interviews, but not how they think or feel in practice; much less how emotions occur, are subjectively experienced, how they filter, frame, or direct sequences of action.
與戲劇的類比具有暗示性。哈姆雷特獨白的意義不僅取決於語義，也取決於人物的取向、劇情的狀態以及未來的可能性：一半的演講都是關於行動或不行動。人種學家在埃爾西諾最好不要依靠半結構化的訪談（「哈姆雷特，是什麼讓你感到沮喪？」）或詞彙排序任務（「克勞迪斯，列出內疚的同義詞」）；或者，在城垛下召集一個友好的焦點小組，假設情景（「讓我們談談我們的母親」）。面對標準的情緒研究工具，我們的受訪者是否也像哈姆雷特一樣，覺得有點失常？他們很有耐性地回答，但是他們的答案有什麼價值呢？在某種抽象層面上，我們可能會瞭解到人們在訪談中是如何思考情緒的，但卻無法瞭解到他們在實踐中是如何思考或感受的；更無從得知情緒是如何發生、如何主觀體驗、如何篩選、框定或指導行動序列的。

We have identified the problem - a failure either to recognize or to adequately report emotion - but are no nearer a solution. A parallel with a classical discussion points the way. For Aristotle the chief device by which the drama elicits emotions is plot. It is through the unfolding of action that emotion is not simply represented but produced. The audience undergoes the fear and pity of tragedy by witnessing the events on stage. (Aristotle [2001 [c. 330 BC$]$$]$]] : 96] singles out reversal of fortune and recognition as the most emotive plot elements.) But plot is only one dimension. In a well-constructed drama, plot is the revelation of characters in interaction. What befalls the tragic hero is a function of his flawed make-up. For Henry James this equation is the engine of fiction. ‘What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of character?’ (1972 [1884]: 37).
我們已經找出了問題的所在--既沒有認知到也沒有充分報告情感--但是還沒有接近解決方案。與古典討論的平行點為我們指明了方向。對亞里斯多德來說，戲劇誘發情感的主要手段是情節。透過動作的展開，情感不只是被表現出來，而是被製造出來。觀眾透過目睹舞台上發生的事件，感受到悲劇的恐懼與憐憫。(亞里斯多德 [2001 [約公元前 330 $]$$]$]] : 96]特別指出運氣的逆轉和認同是最能激發情感的劇情元素）。但情節只是一個層面。在一齣構思精巧的戲劇中，情節是人物互動的揭示。悲劇英雄的遭遇是他的缺陷所造成的。對於 Henry James 來說，這個等式是小說的引擎。人物性格是什麼？What is incident but the illustration of character?" (1972 [1884]: 37)。

In the looser weave of ordinary life, extraneous factors intervene. Stuff happens. The procession of events doesn’t run on the rails of character but expresses the vast complexity of the world, of which we know only our own little corner. Most realist fiction - James notwithstanding - is a compromise between the poetic compression of the stage and the ungraspable complexity of offstage reality. Narrative plausibility depends entirely on the plot-character mechanism, so that what people say and do follows from the past without being entirely predictable. But plausibility isn’t verisimilitude. (A melodrama may be plausible within generic conventions but lack verisimilitude.) What makes a fiction seem true, rather than merely plausible, is its representativeness, the reader’s sense of its fidelity to experience of the external world.
在平凡生活中，外來因素會介入。事情發生了。事件的進程並不是在人物性格的軌道上運行，而是表達了世界的巨大複雜性，而我們只知道其中的一個小角落。大多數現實主義小說（儘管有詹姆斯）都是舞台上的詩意壓縮與台下難以把握的複雜現實之間的折衷。敘事的可信度完全取決於情節-人物的機制，因此人們的言行都是依循過去的，但又不是完全可以預測的。但可信性不是真實性。(在一般慣例中，劇情劇可能是可信的，但缺乏真實性）。讓小說看起來真實，而不只是似是而非的，是它的代表性，也就是讀者對它忠於外部世界經驗的感覺。

In most ethnography, plausibility and verisimilitude are differently constructed. Lacking a narrative perspective, you don’t ask yourself, ‘Would this person do that, given what we know about her?’ but ‘Would she do that, given the cultural premises?’
在大多數民族志中，可信度和真實性是以不同方式建構的。由於缺乏敘事角度，你不會問自己：「考慮到我們對這個人的認識，她會這麼做嗎？」而是「考慮到文化前提，她會這麼做嗎？

Ethnographic plausibility is about logical consistency. Verisimilitude is harder to specify. When Levy (1973: 304) tells us of a Tahitian man, abandoned by his wife, who felt not sad but sluggish and ill, the account is plausible, given the premises (no explicit concept of sadness, a resistance to negative emotions), but without narrative background it remains, to me at least, mysterious. Levy (1984), whose background is psychoanalytical and who staged psychodynamic interviews in the field, sees such cases as culturally shaped misrecognition, so that a loss that we should associate with sadness is experienced as fatigue. Misrecognizing emotion is a common enough event. But the fatigue following loss of a spouse is surely unlike the fatigue following a day digging taro. Levy’s account requires the Tahitian to misconstrue not only his sadness but also his tiredness. It may be that Tahitians don’t mentalize the bodily feelings that accompany an appraisal of loss; that they don’t dwell on the loss. Or to use Shweder’s (1994) term, they don’t emotionalize the feeling. But only an account with time-depth and biographical density could justify such a claim.
人種學上的可信性是指邏輯上的一致性。真實性比較難確定。當 Levy (1973: 304)告訴我們一個被妻子拋棄的大溪地男人，他感覺到的不是悲傷，而是遲鈍和不舒服時，從前提（沒有明確的悲傷概念，對負面情緒的抗拒）來看，這個描述是可信的，但如果沒有敘事背景，至少對我來說，它仍然是神秘的。Levy (1984)的背景是精神分析，他在現場進行了心理動力學訪談，他認為這種情況是文化上形成的誤認，因此我們應該與悲傷聯繫起來的損失卻被經驗為疲勞。誤認情緒是很常見的事。但是，失去配偶後的疲勞肯定不同於挖一天芋頭後的疲勞。Levy 的描述要求大溪地人不僅要誤解他的悲傷，也要誤解他的疲憊。也許是大溪地人不會把喪失時的身體感受心理化；他們不會沉浸在喪失中。或者用 Shweder (1994) 的術語，他們不會把感覺情感化。但只有具有時間深度和傳記密度的描述才能證明這種說法的合理性。

If plausibility depends on internal consistency, one of the ways in which verisimilitude - especially in the reporting of emotions - is enhanced is through inconsistency, the out-of-character lapse, the capacity to do things that surprise. Real human beings surprise us not just because we are fallible observers but because we don’t have access to all the facts: the secret histories and evolutions of motive that underlie behaviour. This hidden aspect is especially significant in emotion because of its reflexivity and partial privacy; and the point holds even in societies where the individual soul is not a matter of much interest. I think back to an event during my fieldwork in Nias, an island in Indonesia. After a thirty-year reign, the chief of my host village had died - a prolonged, public passing that was welcomed - and regretted - as the end of an era. In the hall of the great house that was the hub of village life he lay in his coffin, surrounded by relatives, dressed for eternity. As clansmen gathered to pay their respects and air their grievances, the seniors rose one by one to make speeches. The chief’s great rival, his deputy, who had awaited this moment for half a life, got up to speak. He was the leading orator, a master of staged emotion: people watched his face and hung on his voice, expecting him to put their feelings into words. But how to strike the right note: magnanimous but not triumphant, compassionate but gently critical - as form required, since the spirit’s path to the otherworld is blocked by unvoiced resentment? And how would he conceal a lifetime of envy beneath the grudging admiration? He hailed the crowd and began, then seconds into his speech - his chin dropped and the words choked. Instead of the usual passionate flow, a strangled cry. Stranger still was the effect of his appearance. There was something different about him that I only twigged when I noticed the chief’s older brother, another grizzled veteran. Using a homemade concoction of boot polish and turps, both men, overnight, had dyed their hair jet black; both uncannily rejuvenated by the chief’s death. I cannot separate the peculiar emotional tone of this transformation from its symbolism and the situation that evoked it. The occasion demanded sorrow, and half found it in the deputy’s stifled sob; but the checked words and the youthful appearance suggested liberation, perhaps even elation in his rival’s passing. The black hair was a personal symbol; one that the audience registered but whose meaning could not be spelled out. The disturbing transformation was repeated a year later when, hours after a murderous clash between his lineage mates (both rivals for his land), the same deputy marched through the village in tennis shorts. It would be trivializing to call it a fashion statement; but the deputy’s
如果可信度取決於內部一致性，那麼增強真實性（尤其是在情感報導方面）的方法之一就是不一致性、出格的失誤，以及做出讓人驚訝的事情的能力。真實的人讓我們感到驚訝，不只是因為我們是容易犯錯的觀察者，而是因為我們無法獲得所有的事實：行為背後的秘密歷史和動機演變。由於情感的反射性和部分隱私性，這種隱藏的一面在情感中尤其重要；即使在個人靈魂不太受重視的社會中，這一點也是成立的。我回想起在印尼尼亞斯島（Nias）進行田野調查時發生的一件事。我所在村莊的酋長在統治了三十年之後去世了，這是一個長時間的公開逝世，人們對此表示歡迎和遺憾，認為這是一個時代的結束。在作為村莊生活中心的大房子的大廳中，他躺在棺材裡，四周圍繞著親戚，穿著永恆的衣服。族人聚集在一起，向他致敬並訴說他們的不滿，長輩們逐一起立致詞。酋長最大的競爭對手，也就是他的副手，已經等待這一刻半輩子了，他起身發言。他是領導演說的演說家，也是舞台情感的大師：人們看著他的臉，聽著他的聲音，期待著他把他們的感受說出來。但如何才能說得恰到好處：寬宏大量但不得意忘形，充滿同情但溫和地批判--這是形式所要求的，因為靈魂通往另一個世界的道路會被無法表達的怨恨所阻礙？他又該如何將一生的妒忌隱藏在勉強的欽佩之下？他向群眾致意並開始演講，但演講才開始幾秒鐘，他的下巴就垂了下去，說話也哽咽了。他沒有像往常一樣激情澎湃，而是哽咽地哭了起來。 更奇怪的是他的外表。當我注意到酋長的哥哥，另一位灰頭土臉的老兵時，我才發現他有些與眾不同。這兩個人都用自制的靴子油和松脂，在一夜之間把頭髮染成了漆黑色；兩人都因酋長的死而煥發了青春活力，令人難以置信。我無法把這次變身的特殊情感基調與它的象徵意義和喚起它的情境分開。這個場合需要悲傷，而副手哽咽的聲音中就有一半是悲傷；但他那經過檢查的說話和年輕的外表卻暗示了他的解放，也許甚至是對於他的對手去世的欣喜。黑色的頭髮是個人的象徵；觀眾會記住這個象徵，但卻無法詮釋其意義。令人不安的轉變在一年後重演，在他的同族夥伴（兩人都是他的土地競爭對手）之間發生謀殺衝突數小時後，同一位副手穿著網球短褲在村子裡遊行。如果稱之為時尚宣言，未免過於輕描淡寫。
white shorts and pale unsunned legs had a startling effect on the villagers, who had only ever seen him in sombre sarong or trousers. Everyone knew he had been the intended victim; everyone could see he had profited from the murder. But why the parade? With one rival killed and another led away to justice, what was he playing at? I saw it as a gesture of defiance, a triumph not only over his enemy, but also over death; for his enemy - like the grim reaper - had been stalking him, dagger in hand, for days.
白色的短褲和蒼白的雙腿讓村民們大吃一驚，因為他們只看過他穿著陰沉的紗布或褲子。每個人都知道他是預定的受害者，每個人都看得出他從謀殺中獲利。但為什麼要遊行呢？一個敵人被殺，另一個被帶走接受法律制裁，他在玩什麼呢？我認為這是一種挑釁的姿態，不僅是對敵人的勝利，也是對死亡的勝利；因為他的敵人就像死神一樣，手持匕首，已經跟蹤他好幾天了。
A narrative of the fieldwork would have to make something of these oddities - the black hair and the white shorts - precisely because they fall outside ethnographic stereotype. Closer to parapraxis than praxis, they tell us nothing general; but therein lies their significance. They remind us that the occasion, expression, and meaning of emotion are personal and particular (there being no such thing as a general emotion); and that emotions focus a range of concerns, which is why they are anthropologically interesting. In fact, no synthetic example or capsule summary could tell us half so much about power and status in Nias as emotion-laden incidents of this kind. To make proper sense of them I’d have to unravel a history of reversals and humiliations. I’d spool back twenty years to the deputy’s wedding day, when the chief had barred the door of the great house to him, turning him away with a foul oath. I’d recover the tale - scarcely mentionable - of how his grandmother had been abducted on a headhunting raid and had married into the chief’s lineage, a slave become a bride. I’d retrace the stories of how he had subsidized the bridewealth of his nephew, the future murderer; and of the resentment that had grown between them until the day fate had placed the wrong victim in the way. I might not come away with a hypothesis, but I’d have a better understanding of the play of emotion, the twisting together of envy, resentment, and revenge; and of how the little, half-intended details mean everything. This would not be a psychoanalytic history; instead it would return to the broad context, which has a powerful transpersonal reality: perspectival, but not purely egocentric; historical, but not stratigraphic in the Freudian manner; a story embedded in other stories.
田野調查的敘述必須對這些奇特之處有所描述，例如黑色頭髮和白色短褲，正因為它們超出了民族學的刻板印象。比起實踐，它們更接近parapraxis，沒有告訴我們任何一般性的東西；但它們的意義就在此。它們提醒我們，情緒的場合、表達和意義都是個人的、特殊的（並不存在一般性的情緒）；情緒集中了一系列的關注，這就是它們在人類學上有趣的原因。事實上，沒有任何一個綜合例子或撮要能像這類充滿情緒的事件一樣，告訴我們關於尼亞斯的權力和地位的一半。為了正確理解這些事件，我必須揭開一段逆轉和羞辱的歷史。我會把時間回溯到二十年前副手結婚的那天，當時酋長禁止他進入大房子的大門，並用惡毒的誓言把他拒之門外。我追溯他祖母如何在一次獵頭行動中被綁架，然後嫁到酋長家，由奴隸變成新娘的故事--幾乎沒有提及。我會追溯他如何資助他的侄子，也就是未來的殺人犯的聘禮，以及他們之間的怨恨，直到有一天命運安排了一個錯誤的受害者。我也許無法得出一個假設，但我對於情感的渲洩、嫉妒、怨恨和復仇的糾纏，以及那些半真半假的小細節是如何意味著一切，會有更深的理解。這不是精神分析的歷史；相反地，它會回到寬廣的情境中，它具有強大的超個人現實：透視，但不是純粹的自我中心；歷史，但不是佛洛伊德式的地層學；一個嵌入其他故事中的故事。

It’s the pressure of the past - the traces of previous encounters in memory, dispositions, expectations, and grey hairs - that make for what E.M. Forster (1962 [1927]) called round characters: individuals with depth, agency, and the capacity to surprise. And it’s the time-dimension provided by narrative that conveys reality.
正是過去的壓力 - 記憶中以前相遇的痕跡、性情、期望和白髮 - 造就了 E.M. Forster (1962 [1927])所說的圓形人物：有深度、有能動性、有驚喜能力的個體。而正是敘事所提供的時間維度傳達了現實。

If the aim is to be true to life - and what else is there to be true to? - most of us can probably think of ethnographic examples that have the right qualities. (Unfortunately, narrative ethnography, prolix by definition, is not susceptible to capsule summary.) My own list would include Abu-Lughod (1993), Jackson (2004), Read (1965), Scheper-Hughes (1992), Stoller and Olkes (1989), Vitebsky (2005), and Wikan (1990); with Briggs (1970) especially impressive on emotion. But I want to cite a fictional example because it brings out all of the elements of emotion that only an omniscient narrator can capture but from which, nevertheless, ethnographers can learn. Here we have the elephant from trunk to tail: the eliciting situation and perception; the social framework and self-interested involvement; the values that frame judgement; the dialectic of interpretation and affect; the layered time perspective; the bodily arousal and facial expression (spontaneous, managed); the elusive relation between experience and emotion category; and the implications for action. (Let anyone who thinks emotions
如果我們的目標是忠於生活 - 那還有什麼可以忠於生活呢？- 我們大多數人也許都能想到一些民族志的例子，它們都具備這樣的特質。(不幸的是，敘事民族志的定義是冗長的，不容易用膠囊概括）。我自己的名單包括 Abu-Lughod (1993)、Jackson (2004)、Read (1965)、Scheper-Hughes (1992)、Stoller and Olkes (1989)、Vitebsky (2005) 和 Wikan (1990)；其中 Briggs (1970) 的情感研究尤其令人印象深刻。但我想舉一個虛構的例子，因為它帶出了只有全知的敘述者才能捕捉到的所有情感元素，但民族志學家可以從中學習。在這裡，我們可以看到大象從頭到尾：引發情緒的情境和感知；社會框架和自我利益的介入；價值觀對判斷的影響；詮釋和情緒的辯證；多層次的時間觀點；身體的亢奮和面部表情（自發的、管理的）；經驗和情緒類別之間難以捉摸的關係；以及對行動的影響。(讓任何認為情緒
are no more than feelings ponder that list.) In the episode, which I can only sample here, all these elements are anatomized; but what’s most compelling is the careful sequencing of perception, interpretation, arousal, reflection, expression, and action. Nothing is taken for granted.
)。在我只能在此作為範例的劇集中，所有這些元素都被剖析出來；但最引人注目的是感知、詮釋、喚醒、反思、表達和行動的仔細排序。沒有任何事情是理所當然的。

The episode, loosely based on a real event, is from Tolstoy’s novel Resurrection (1962 [1899]). A nobleman, the wealthy Prince Nekhluyov, is summoned as a juror. In court he unexpectedly confronts in the dock a woman whom he had seduced as a youth ten years earlier and whose life he has thoughtlessly ruined. Once an innocent domestic servant, now a prostitute, Maslova is on trial for killing one of her clients. Nekhluyov recognizes her, and his thoughts race back to their earlier affair. But she seems not to know him. We follow the prince’s thoughts in silent commentary on proceedings, but the narrator doesn’t name his emotions, noting only that he has difficulty breathing. When the examination begins, Nekhluyov ‘stared at Maslova, while a complex, painful process took place in his soul’ (Tolstoy 1962 [1899]: 57). Then she turns her eyes on him from the prisoners’ bench:’ “Is it possible she recognized me?” ’ thought Nekhluyov in terror, feeling the blood rushing to his face; but Maslova immediately turned away, without distinguishing him from the others, and again fixed her eyes anxiously on the assistant prosecutor’ (1962 [1899]: 64).
這段故事取材自托爾斯泰的小說《復活》（Resurrection，1962 [1899]）。一位貴族，富有的 Nekhluyov 王子，被傳喚為陪審員。在法庭上，他出乎意料地在被告席上面對十年前他在年輕時引誘的女人，而他卻不經意地毀了她的一生。Maslova 曾是一名無辜的家庭傭人，現在則是一名妓女，她因殺害一名嫖客而受審。Nekhluyov 認出了她，他的思緒回到了他們早年的風流往事。但她似乎不認識他。我們跟隨王子的思緒，默默地評論著審訊過程，但敘述者沒有說出他的情緒，只指出他呼吸困難。當檢查開始時，Nekhluyov「盯著 Maslova，而在他的靈魂中發生了一個複雜、痛苦的過程」（Tolstoy 1962 [1899]: 57）。'"她有可能認出我嗎？「Nekhluyov驚恐地想道，感覺血都湧上了臉；但Maslova立即轉過身去，沒有把他和其他人區分開來，而是再次焦急地盯著助理檢察官」（1962 [1899]: 64）。

When the court goes into recess, Tolstoy tells in flashback the story of the seduction, and twenty-five pages later we re-enter court, privy to Nekhluyov’s knowledge and agonized conscience. As part of that ‘complex, painful process’ alluded to, Nekhluyov’s moral discomfort has given way to something more urgent, compounding ‘terror’ with an acute self-consciousness. The terror is of exposure, of the nobleman recognized by his degraded victim, the high at the mercy of the low. The emotion succeeding the initial unmixed ‘terror’ is not named. Instead, Tolstoy presents the prince’s consciousness of evolving bodily reactions. The context suggests both guilt and shame (Nekhluyov feels bad about what he has done but also fears for his reputation), or rather the precursors to these emotions, as well as the named terror. In the philosopher Robert Solomon’s (1993 [1976]) terms, Nekhluyov’s reaction is a rapid judgement of his own responsibility for the woman’s fate and of the effect on him of the thought that others may come to know this. But with his customary penetration, Tolstoy emphasizes the priority of self-preservation over moral reflection, the endangered self over the endangered soul. The terror and the rush of blood are the urgent self-perception, not yet elaborated or consciously felt as shame and guilt.
當法庭休庭時，托爾斯泰以倒叙的方式講述了誘奸的故事，25 頁之後，我們再次進入法庭，窺探 Nekhluyov 的知識和痛苦的良知。作為「複雜、痛苦的過程」的一部分，Nekhluyov 在道德上的不安已轉化為更緊迫的事情，將「恐怖」與敏銳的自我意識複合在一起。這種恐怖是暴露的恐怖，是貴族被其墮落的受害者認出的恐怖，是高貴者被卑賤者擺佈的恐怖。在最初的不混合的「恐怖」之後的情緒並沒有被命名。相反地，托爾斯泰呈現了王子對身體反應演變的意識。這種情境暗示了內疚與羞愧 (Nekhluyov 對於自己的所作所為感到愧疚，但也擔心自己的名譽)，或者說是這些情緒的前兆，以及已命名的恐怖。用哲學家 Robert Solomon (1993 [1976])的話來說，Nekhluyov 的反應是迅速判斷出自己對這位女士的命運應負責任，以及想到其他人可能會知道這件事對他的影響。但托爾斯泰以其慣有的滲透力，強調自我保護優先於道德反省，瀕臨死亡的自我優先於瀕臨死亡的靈魂。恐怖和血液的奔流是緊急的自我感知，尚未被闡述或有意識地感受到羞愧和內疚。
The compressed power of the courtroom scene is slowly released in the action of the next 500 pages, so it matters to get it right. Tolstoy achieves his effect through narrative layering and minute observation of unfolding emotions. As readers - and perhaps as non-fiction writers - we admire and despair. But the humble ethnographer can extract some encouragement. The lesson is to integrate emotion with action in sufficient narrative depth to capture those two key aspects: its me-focus and its biographical import, the particularity of which makes emotion what it is and accounts for its social repercussions.
法庭場景的壓縮力量會在接下來 500 頁的動作中慢慢釋放，因此必須正確處理。托爾斯泰透過層次分明的敘事和對情感發展的細微觀察來達到效果。作為讀者--也許作為非小說作家--我們既欽佩又沮喪。但是，卑微的民族學家可以從中得到一些鼓勵。這方面的教訓是要在足夠的敘事深度下，將情感與行動結合，以捕捉兩個關鍵層面：以我為中心及其傳記意義，情感的特殊性造就了它，也解釋了它的社會反響。

If we are interested in giving emotions their due, we have to work into our ethnography, as the best examples do, the confrontation between the teeming complexity of the world and the first-person perspective that reorders it: the capacity of emotions, as Solomon puts it, to constitute a world (1995: 193). Call it frame and focus or panoply
如果我們有興趣賦予情感其應有的地位，我們就必須在民族志中，就像最好的例子一樣，將世界的複雜性與重新排序的第一人稱視角之間的對抗納入其中：正如所羅門所說的，情感構成一個世界的能力（1995: 193）。可稱之為框架與焦點或 panoply
and perspective: emotions seize what pertains to us; they respond to what external reality casts up in the way of frustration, loss, and opportunity; and they do so according to our dispositions, training, and history. Yet I want to insist that neither a phenomenological account nor a psychoanalytic one tells the whole story. For if, as Solomon has argued, an emotion is a judgement, an assessment of the circumstances affecting $me$$me$mem e, it’s also an action in a world made by others: a response - of pleasure, fear, or anger - to what lies beyond our control, to what disturbs our equilibrium, our goals and desires: the terrible figure in the witness box. And this tension between inner and outer imperatives - to overstate an opposition - must be at the heart of a fully anthropological account and can only be captured in narrative. The dialectic of provocation, judgement, response, and re-evaluation, however swift, is not the work of a moment. Life is a movie, not a snapshot.
和觀點：情緒抓住與我們有關的東西；它們回應外在現實以挫折、損失和機會的方式投射出來的東西；它們根據我們的性情、訓練和歷史來這樣做。然而，我要堅持的是，現象學或精神分析的說法，都沒有說出故事的全部。因為，如果一如所羅門所說的，情緒是一種判斷，是對影響 $me$$me$mem e 的環境的評估，它也是他人所創造的世界中的一種行動：對於我們無法控制的事物、對於擾亂我們的平衡、我們的目標與慾望的事物的回應──愉悅、恐懼或憤怒：在證人席上的可怕人物。而這種內在與外在要求之間的張力--誇大對立--必須是完全人類學描述的核心，而且只能在敘事中捕捉到。挑釁、判斷、回應、再評估的辯證，無論如何迅速，都不是一時三刻的工作。生命是一部電影，而非快照。

In her book Upheavals of thought (2001), the philosopher Martha Nussbaum has argued the case for a cognitive view of emotions, as opposed to (William) Jamesian theories, which make cognition secondary to visceral response. She differs from certain other cognitivists in rejecting a synchronic explanation that would ‘sever emotions from their past and depict them as fully and reliably determined by present input about one’s current situation’ (Nussbaum 2001: 177). ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} But her point is equally applicable to constructionist accounts that ignore or compress the temporal dimension, which Nussbaum - as I do - takes to be essential. ‘In a deep sense’, she writes, ‘all human emotions are in part about the past, and bear traces of a history that is at once commonly human, socially constructed, and idiosyncratic’ (2001: 177). Those three time-bound properties have been taken up in different kinds of inquiry: the commonly human in developmental psychology, the socially constructed in anthropology, and the idiosyncratic in fiction. In my view, all three belong in ethnography. Recall my deputy headman and his dynastic struggles. What history issued in that stifled speech of tribute and that puzzling rejuvenation? The common human factors are thwarted ambition, sibling (or, rather, cousin) rivalry, personal offence, loss, and survival; factors which no doubt echo deeper childhood experiences. These ingredients of emotion are what psychologist Richard Lazarus (1994) calls ‘core relational themes’: the abstract scenarios that frame appraisals of situations and motivate emotions. Each of them in itself is a capsule story, a story basic to the human condition.
哲學家 Martha Nussbaum 在她的著作 Upheavals of thought (2001)中，提出了認知情緒觀點的論據，有別於 (William) James 的理論，後者將認知視為內在反應的次要部分。她與某些其他認知主義者的不同之處，在於她拒絕同步性的解釋，也就是「將情緒從它們的過去中分割出來，並將它們描繪成完全且可靠地由一個人當前處境的當前輸入所決定」(Nussbaum 2001: 177)。 ${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} 但她的觀點同樣適用於忽略或壓縮時間維度的建構主義說法，而Nussbaum--和我一樣--認為時間維度是不可或缺的。在深層意義上」，她寫道：「所有的人類情感都有一部分是關於過去的，並且帶有歷史的痕跡，而這段歷史同時是人類共有的、社會建構的、以及特異的。這三種有時間限制的特性在不同類型的探究中被採用：發展心理學中的一般人類、人類學中的社會建構，以及小說中的特異性。在我看來，這三種特性都屬於民族志。回想起我的副頭人和他的王朝鬥爭。在那窒礙人心的朝貢之聲和那令人費解的復興之聲中，隱含著什麼樣的歷史？人類的共同因素是野心受挫、兄弟姊妹（或者說是堂兄弟姊妹）之間的敵對、個人犯罪、損失以及生存；這些因素無疑與更深層的童年經驗相呼應。這些情緒成分就是心理學家 Richard Lazarus (1994) 所謂的「核心關係主題」：構成情境評估與激發情緒的抽象情境。每一個主題本身都是一個膠囊故事，一個人類基本狀況的故事。

The socially constructed elements would include the record of feasting and ceremonial exchange that organize status competition among big men; but also ongoing tensions in the lineage cycle, such that cousins farming different tracts of shared land begin to assert individual control at the expense of rivals: a ready motive for murderous conflict.
社會建構的元素將包括宴會與儀式交流的記錄，這些記錄組織了大人物之間的地位競爭；但也包括世系循環中持續的緊張，例如耕作不同共有土地的表兄弟開始以犧牲對手為代價，主張個人的控制權：這是殺人衝突的現成動機。

The idiosyncratic history would be the dark memories of raiding and abduction, the repressed past out of which the dynastic struggle is spun. This history casts the deputy as Edmund to the chiefs Edgar, the natural talent against the legitimate heir, the man of words against the man of authority. ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} As a personal history, not a bare record of fact, it would include the hallmarks of character that shaped their rivalry for a generation: the chiefs wooden correctness, his booming certitude and simple piety; the deputy’s subtlety and resentment, his restless scepticism, and his capacity to surprise: the black hair and the white shorts.
特立獨行的歷史將是襲擊和綁架的黑暗回憶，是被壓抑的過去，而王朝的鬥爭正是從這段歷史中衍生出來的。這段歷史將副手埃德蒙（Edmund）塑造成酋長埃德加（Edgar）的對手，將天分者塑造成合法繼承人的對手，將言論者塑造成權威者的對手。 ${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 作為一部個人歷史，而非赤裸裸的事實記錄，它將包括塑造了他們一代人競爭關係的性格特徵：首領的木頭般正確、他的鏗鏘有力的確信和簡單的虔誠，副手的細膩和怨恨、他的不安分的懷疑主義，以及他的驚人能力：黑色的頭髮和白色的短褲。

Pan-human, culturally specific, idiosyncratic: I can tease apart the factors, but no account of the emotions at the deathbed scene could justly privilege one set over another. Take away one dimension and the whole thing collapses.
泛人類、特定文化、特異性：我可以將這些因素區分開來，但對於臨終場景的情緒，沒有任何一種說法可以將其優先於另一種說法。剔除一個層面，整件事就會崩塌。

With this hefty preamble, let me now specify in theoretical form how emotions implicate narrative, and vice versa; how they are made for each other. ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6}
有了這個龐大的前言，現在讓我以理論形式說明情感如何牽連敘事，反之亦然；兩者如何互為因果。 ${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6}

In the cognitivist view, emotions are ‘intentional’ (Solomon 1980). One is not just angry, but angry at someone or about some state of affairs. (Objectless affects are moods.) Dissolve the object, alter the cognition, and the emotion vanishes. As Roberts puts it, emotions are ‘concern-based construals of ourselves, others, and our situations’ (1988: 208). ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7}
在認知主義者的觀點中，情緒是「有意的」(Solomon 1980)。一個人不只是生氣，而是對某人或對某種狀態生氣（無客體的情緒是心情）。(無對象的情緒就是心情。) 消解對象、改變認知，情緒就消失了。正如Roberts所說，情緒是「對我們自己、他人和我們的處境的基於關心的構成」(1988: 208)。 ${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7}

A mere cognition does not necessarily imply much of a narrative. Simple emotions have simple objects. One is angry at having one’s rattle removed. One fears the wolf. But most emotions - and especially those with moral content like pride and regret have a more complex structure. Shweder (1994:37) and Goldie (2000: 92) call it a narrative structure; psychologists refer to appraisals and relational themes. The linguist Anna Wierzbicka (1999) presents scripts for emotion words, showing how nearsynonyms like ‘anger’ and ‘indignation’ can be differentiated by their underlying scenarios. None of these authors (Goldie apart) allows much time-depth to the situational interpretation - of loss, danger, or opportunity. The cognitive package is small. For my purposes, however, it is enough to recognize that in the cognition one grasps a meaningful temporal sequence; and that, in the interesting cases, the sequence links persons in moral frames and reverberates with prior encounters and stories; that the swift narrative of contextual interpretation draws from deeper currents, stories within stories. ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}
單純的認知不一定意味著太多的敘述。簡單的情緒有簡單的對象。一個人對於自己的搖鈴被拿走感到憤怒。一個人害怕狼。但是大多數的情緒，尤其是那些有道德內容的情緒，像是驕傲和遺憾，都有更複雜的結構。Shweder (1994:37) 和 Goldie (2000: 92) 稱之為敘事結構；心理學家則稱之為評估和關係主題。語言學家 Anna Wierzbicka (1999) 提出了情緒字彙的腳本，顯示了「憤怒」和「憤慨」這些近義詞如何透過其潛在的情境來區別。這些作者（Goldie 除外）都沒有為情境詮釋（損失、危險或機會）預留許多時間深度。認知的包裝很小。然而，就我的目的而言，我們只要認知到，在認知中，我們掌握了一個有意義的時間序列；而且，在有趣的案例中，這個序列將道德框架中的人連繫起來，並與先前的遭遇和故事產生迴響；情境詮釋的快速敘述來自更深層的潮流，故事中的故事。 ${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8}

A second sense in which emotion implicates narrative is that people refer to shame, guilt, and hope to explain past and predict future behaviour. ‘He hung his head in shame’. ‘She felt gratitude for the gift’. ‘Clear up the mess, your father will be angry!’ An attributed emotion is like a chapter heading: we know, roughly, what follows. This is not only because emotion words encode scripts but also because, as Frijda (2004) has taught us, emotions comprise action tendencies.
情緒牽涉敘事的第二個意義是，人們引用羞恥、內疚和希望來解釋過去和預測未來的行為。他羞愧地垂下頭"。「她對這份禮物感到感激」。收拾爛攤子，你爸會生氣的！'。歸因的情緒就像一章的標題：我們大致知道接下來會發生什麼。這不僅是因為情緒詞編碼腳本，也因為 Frijda (2004) 告訴我們，情緒包含行動趨勢。

A third connection points to the discursive role of emotion. Anthropologists have done most to show how emotions are manipulated in speech, performed for audiences, and used to persuade, evade, and dominate. Research in Pacific societies has revealed how emotion talk provides an idiom for political activity, both as a tool of negotiation and as a reflection on political processes (Lutz & Abu-Lughod 1990; White & Kirkpatrick 1985). In looking at oratory in Nias, I found that heart idioms - hearts that were ‘scorched’, ‘squeezed’, or ‘heavy’ - function as tactical levers in debate, winning concessions and fending off demands. Cardiac idioms make up a rhetoric of moral suasion rather than a folk psychology or theory of the person (Beatty 2012). Whether that disqualifies them as emotion words is another question. They are certainly enacted with passion; they provoke an emotional response; and they imply action tendencies, which is why they have rhetorical force. All of these tactical and performative uses of passion imply story-like structures and call, in turn, for narrative treatment.
第三種聯繫指向情緒的論述角色。人類學家已做了最多的工作來顯示情緒如何在言語中被操縱，如何為聽眾表演，以及如何被用來說服、迴避和支配。對太平洋社會的研究揭示了情緒談話如何為政治活動提供成語，既作為協商的工具，也作為對政治過程的反思（Lutz & Abu-Lughod 1990; White & Kirkpatrick 1985）。在考察尼亚斯的演说时，我发现心脏习语--「焦灼的」、「挤压的 」或 「沉重的 」心脏--在辩论中发挥着战术杠杆的作用，赢得让步并抵御要求。心的成語構成了一種道德說服的修辭，而非民間心理學或人的理論 (Beatty 2012)。至於這是否會讓它們失去情感用語的資格，則是另一個問題。它們當然是以熱情來闡述；它們激起情緒反應；它們暗示行動趨勢，這就是它們具有修辭力的原因。所有這些策略性與表演性的激情使用，都意味著類似故事的結構，進而需要敘事性的處理。

A fourth connection derives from the patterning of social life. Michael Carrithers (1992: $159-70$$159-70$159-70159-70 ) has eloquently shown how our capacity to operate across cultural boundaries, or indeed within them, depends on our skill at reading situations, grasping the plot, and recognizing - or constructing in turn - the narratives that give shape to events. Emotions would qualify as a special, highly developed, instance of the capacity to construe form, motive, backstory, personal relevance, and consequence: whether in
第四種聯繫來自社會生活的模式化。Michael Carrithers (1992: $159-70$$159-70$159-70159-70 )雄辯滔滔地說明，我們跨越文化邊界，或在文化邊界內運作的能力，是如何取決於我們閱讀情境、掌握情節、認識或反過來建構敘述的技巧，而這些敘述則賦予事件以形態。情緒可以說是一種特殊的、高度發展的能力，可以詮釋形式、動機、背景故事、個人相關性和後果：無論是在......還是在......。
the snap judgement of a jealous glance or in the more deeply pondered apprehensions of hatred, love, and regret. Owing to their constitutive particularity, however, emotions are especially liable to misconstrual by outsiders, and, for this, detailed narrative is the only remedy. For the same reasons, by filling the gaps that synchronic analysis leaves as mysteries, narrative supplies a defence against the more extravagant claims of cultural relativism - the outlandish emotions that could exist in some parallel universe but in practice don’t.
無論是妒忌的一瞥，還是憎恨、愛和遺憾的深思。然而，由於其構成的特殊性，情感特別容易被外人誤解，因此，詳細的敘述是唯一的補救方法。基於同樣的理由，敘事透過填補同步分析留下的謎團，提供了對文化相對主義更奢侈的要求的防禦--那些可能存在於平行宇宙但實際上不存在的離奇情感。

Fifth, as thinkers going back to Aristotle have pointed out, narratives are mostly about emotion-eliciting situations, reversals of fortune (Bruner 1990).
第五，正如從亞里斯多德開始的思想家所指出的，敘事大多是關於激發情緒的情境、運氣的逆轉（Bruner 1990）。

Finally, and most importantly, emotions, I have argued, have a time-depth and a biographical resonance that elude synchronic analysis. A grasp of the narrative structure of emotion illuminates not only the tangle of pressures and constraints (those specific to individual characters, those that go with role) but also the possibilities inherent in the situation that the person feeling emotion registers and weighs. A narrative account allows for the subjective experience of free will - however we want to qualify it - and the possibility of reflexive moral action.
最後，也是最重要的是，我認為情緒具有時間深度和傳記共鳴性，無法進行同步分析。掌握情緒的敘事結構，不僅能闡明糾纏不清的壓力和限制（個別角色特有的壓力和限制，以及角色的壓力和限制），還能闡明感受情緒的人所記錄和衡量的情境中固有的可能性。敘事敘述允許自由意志的主觀經驗--無論我們如何定義它--以及反射性道德行動的可能性。

Several arguments can be made against a narrative approach to emotion. I shall deal with them briefly. First, and most radical, is the claim that there is no valid crosscultural category of emotion in the first place - therefore nothing to narrate (Beatty 2013; Shweder 1994; Wierzbicka 1999; Wilce 2009: 36-8). ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} There are feelings, thoughts, interpretations, and responses; but only in Western thought do they cohere as the package we call emotion. Most languages lack a superordinate emotion category. English words like ‘anger’ and ‘sadness’ find no exact matches. As Wierzbicka (1999: 3) puts it, English doesn’t carve nature at its joints. Yet, as she shows, descriptive definition, if not word-for-word translation, is always possible. And this possibility depends on deeper affinities that undercut linguistic relativism: for the elements of appraisal, feeling, and response do, in practice, hang together, suggesting that emotions are fuzzy categories with real-world correlates. The French concept of sentiment or the Javanese rasa-different in shape but overlapping in substance - could equally serve as startingpoints for cross-cultural comparison. We can come at the problem from different angles. Nature’s joints, as it turns out, are quite flexible.
有幾個論點可以反對情感的敘事方法。我將簡略談談這些論點。首先，也是最激進的，是聲稱首先不存在有效的跨文化情感類別--因此沒有什麼可敘述的（Beatty 2013; Shweder 1994; Wierzbicka 1999; Wilce 2009: 36-8）。 ${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 情感、思想、詮釋和反應是存在的；但只有在西方思想中，它們才會結合為我們稱之為情感的包裝。大多數語言缺乏上位情感類別。像「憤怒」和「悲傷」這樣的英語詞彙找不到完全匹配的。正如 Wierzbicka (1999: 3) 所說，英語不會在自然界的接縫處雕刻。然而，正如她所顯示的，描述性的定義，即使不是字對字的翻譯，總是有可能的。而這種可能性取決於削弱語言相對主義的更深層次的親和性：因為評價、感覺和反應這些元素實際上是連結在一起的，這表明情感是具有真實世界關聯性的模糊類別。法國的情感 (sentiment) 概念或爪哇的拉薩 (rasa) - 形狀不同，但內容重疊 - 同樣可以作為跨文化比較的起點。我們可以從不同的角度來看這個問題。事實證明，大自然的關節相當靈活。

But I would go further and assert that - whatever their ontological status as cultural inventions, biological states, or constructed social roles - emotions are unified experiences; and this subjective unity, which bears heavily on social processes, is due to their conceptual or narrative structure as construals of personal situations (Goldie 2012; Roberts 1988; Shweder 1994; Solomon 1993 [1976]). We can leave the neuroscientists to quarrel over the milliseconds separating appraisal, visceral feedback, and action-readiness, and the order in which they occur, rather as we marvel at physicists arguing over the moments following the Big Bang. Our job is to get the experience right and to work out its significance in the stream of life - to recover the imponderabilia.
但我想更進一步地斷言：無論情緒在本體論上是文化發明、生物狀態或建構的社會角色，它們都是統一的經驗；而這種主觀的統一性，對社會過程有很大的影響，是因為它們的概念或敘事結構是對個人情境的詮釋（Goldie 2012；Roberts 1988；Shweder 1994；Solomon 1993 [1976]）。我們可以讓神經科學家去爭論評估、內臟回饋和行動準備之間相隔的毫秒數，以及它們發生的順序，就像我們讚嘆物理學家爭論宇宙大爆炸之後的時刻一樣。我們的工作是要正確地獲得經驗，並找出它在生命之流中的意義--恢復不確定因素。

A second objection to a narrative approach might depend on a rejection of narrative rather than emotion. On this view, it would be ethnocentric to apply one to the other because some people - like the Yolmo of Nepal - favour imagistic accounts of experience; or because, like Mead’s Samoans, they avoid psychological explanations of behaviour; or because, like certain other Pacific groups, they affirm the ‘opacity of other minds’ (Desjarlais 1992; Hollan & Throop 2011; Mead 1972 [1928]). This objection strictly applies to interpretative genres; it doesn’t alter the fact that people everywhere
第二個反對敘事方法的理由可能是拒絕敘事而非情感。根據這個觀點，因為有些人 - 就像尼泊爾的 Yolmo - 喜歡經驗的想像描述；或因為像 Mead 的薩摩亞人一樣，他們避免行為的心理解釋；或因為像某些其他太平洋群體一樣，他們肯定「其他心靈的不透明性」(Desjarlais 1992; Hollan & Throop 2011; Mead 1972 [1928])，所以把其中一個套用在另一個上是民族中心主義的做法。這種反對意見嚴格適用於詮釋類型；它並沒有改變一個事實，那就是世界各地的人們都有自己的詮釋類型。
link characters and events in plots to comment, explain, predict, and blame. This is true whether cause and effect apply to ego and id, partible persons, the stars, humours, or vengeful gods. And it remains true whether narrative looms large as epic, small as anecdote, or hides in accusations and excuses. For, as Bruner (1990) and Carrithers (1992) have shown, narrative is integral to sociality. So too, of course, is emotion; and so is each to the other, since anger, hope, and regret are forms of explaining, predicting, and judging. Whether we think in pictures or stories, resist or relish mind-reading, speak as we or $I$$I$II, love or loathe anecdotes, we are all narrators because we all have emotions; and emotions tell their own story. As ethnographers, we should never forget the fact.
將情節中的人物和事件連繫起來，以評論、解釋、預測和責備。無論因果關係適用於自我與本我、可分的人、星星、幽默感或復仇的神，這都是真實的。無論敘事是大如史詩、小如軼事，或是隱藏在指控與藉口中，都是如此。正如 Bruner (1990) 和 Carrithers (1992) 所說，敘事是社會性不可或缺的一部分。當然，情緒也是如此；彼此也是如此，因為憤怒、希望和遺憾都是解釋、預測和判斷的形式。無論我們是以圖畫或故事來思考，抗拒或喜歡讀心術，以我們或 $I$$I$II 的方式說話，喜歡或厭惡軼事，我們都是敘述者，因為我們都有情緒；而情緒講述他們自己的故事。身為民族志學家，我們絕不應該忘記這個事實。

I am grateful to Deborah James and the Department of Anthropology at the London School of Economics for their invitation to deliver the Malinowski Memorial Lecture, and to the JRAI Editor and anonymous reviewers. I would also like to thank Mercedes Garcia Oteyza and Michael Carrithers for their comments.
我感謝 Deborah James 和倫敦經濟學院人類學系邀請我發表馬林諾夫斯基紀念演講，並感謝 JRAI 編輯和匿名審稿人。我也要感謝 Mercedes Garcia Oteyza 和 Michael Carrithers 的評論。
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} Emotion leaves few areas untouched: this essay is necessarily selective. Questions of epistemology, reflexivity, affect theory, human development, and political economy in emotion research are considered in Beatty (2005a; 2005b; 2010; 2012; 2013; in press).
${}^1$${}^1$^(1){ }^{1} 情感幾乎沒有觸及任何領域：這篇論文必然是有選擇性的。Beatty (2005a; 2005b; 2010; 2012; 2013; in press)考慮了情感研究中的認識論、反身性、情感理論、人類發展和政治經濟等問題。
${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} Firth (1985: 35) identifies ‘areas of similar basic experience of the external world’ as a key to the intelligibility of his example. Carrithers (1992: 159-61) refers to our grasp of a ‘universal pattern’ in ‘the basic idea’ that Rangifuri was ‘upset’ and in ‘distress’ (1992: 166). I want to ask, what kind of distress? How was his acting teke (‘angry’, ‘objecting’) conceived, felt, shared, resisted, or ignored? Only a fuller narrative could tell us why or whether Rangifuri’s father didn’t share his grief; how, given the apparent depth of feeling, Rangifuri and the chief could be so swiftly reconciled; and what were the chief’s own sentiments towards the dead youth, his ultimate heir. To these ethnographic questions basic patterns provide no answers. Firth’s account is too laconic and schematic to dispel the mysteries or illuminate the nature of teke. While I follow Carrithers in endorsing narrative as an ethnographic tool, when it comes to emotion I place less trust in ‘consensible patterns’ or the common ground of experience (Beatty 2005a; 2010). My argument will be that such common denominators - by definition - give small insight into the specificity and diversity of emotion.
${}^2$${}^2$^(2){ }^{2} Firth (1985: 35)指出「對外在世界有類似基本經驗的區域」是他的例子可理解性的關鍵。Carrithers (1992: 159-61)提到我們在Rangifuri「沮喪」與「苦惱」的「基本概念」中掌握到「普遍模式」(1992: 166)。我想問的是，什麼樣的苦惱？他的行為 Teke (「憤怒」、「反對」) 是如何被構想、感受、分享、抗拒或忽略的？只有更完整的敘述才能告訴我們，為什麼或是否 Rangifuri 的父親沒有分擔他的悲傷；鑒於表面上的深厚感情，Rangifuri 和酋長如何能如此迅速地和解；以及酋長自己對死去的青年、他最終的繼承人有何情感。對於這些人種學上的問題，基本模式並沒有提供答案。Firth 的敘述過於簡潔和圖式化，無法揭開teke的神秘面紗或闡明teke的本質。雖然我跟隨 Carrithers，贊同以敘事作為民族志的工具，但當談到情感時，我就不那麼信任「可共認的模式」或經驗的共同基礎 (Beatty 2005a; 2010)。我的論點是，根據定義，這樣的共通點對情感的特異性和多樣性只提供了很小的洞察力。
${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} Cohen puts it well: ‘My objection to the kind of generalization in which we indulged is that it has little or no authenticity in our own experience. Therefore I do not see how we can be content with it as an account of other people’ (1994: 16, original emphasis). In similar vein, Abu-Lughod advocates (and exemplifies) ‘narrative ethnographies of the particular’, which would reflect the fact that ‘particulars, which are always present (as we know from our own personal experiences), are also always crucial to the constitution of experience’ (1991: 157). For a recent discussion, see Rapport (2010).
${}^3$${}^3$^(3){ }^{3} Cohen說得很好：「我反對我們所沉溺的那種概括，因為它在我們自己的經驗中幾乎沒有真實性。因此，我看不出我們如何能滿足於它對其他人的描述」(1994: 16, 原本的重點)。與此類似，Abu-Lughod 主張（並舉例說明）「特殊性的敘事民族志」，這將反映出「特殊性總是存在的（正如我們從自己的個人經驗所知道的），對經驗的構成也總是至關重要的」（1991: 157）。最近的討論，請參閱 Rapport (2010)。
${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} Among her targets is Solomon, though his position does take past occurrences into account (and in a way I find congenial): ‘Every emotion is a judgment that presupposes the entire body of previous emotional judgments to supply its context and its history as well as “paradigm cases” for it to consider if not follow’ (Solomon 1993 [1976]: 137).
${}^4$${}^4$^(4){ }^{4} 她的目標之一是所羅門，儘管他的立場確實考慮到過去的發生（而且是以一種我認為合適的方式）：每種情緒都是一種判斷，而這種判斷的前提是之前所有的情緒判斷，這些情緒判斷提供了情境、歷史以及「範例」，讓情緒判斷即使不遵循這些範例，也可以加以考量」(Solomon 1993 [1976]: 137)。
${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} Idiosyncratic, but also culturally shaped and, in Carrithers’ (1992) term, cross-culturally ‘consensible’.
${}^5$${}^5$^(5){ }^{5} 偶發的，但也是文化形成的，用Carrithers (1992)的術語來說，是跨文化的「共識」。
${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} It will be clear that I am not just talking about narrative as text, but about the narrative structure of emotions as construals of events. This is not the place for a discussion of narratology. In Beatty (2010) I consider the historians’ debates on narrative and cognition with reference to emotion.
${}^6$${}^6$^(6){ }^{6} 很明顯，我不只是在談論作為文本的敘事，而是在談論情感作為事件構成的敘事結構。這不是討論敘事學的地方。在 Beatty (2010) 一書中，我考慮了歷史學家對於敘事與認知的辯論，並參考了情感。
${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} The insight goes back to Magda Arnold, fifty years ago, and ultimately to Aristotle.‘To arouse an emotion, the object must be appraised as affecting me in some way, affecting me personally as an individual with my particular experience and my particular aims’ (Arnold, cited in Parkinson 1994: 6). It gained anthropological formulation in Michelle Rosaldo’s (1984) conception of emotions as ‘embodied thoughts’, and ethnographic illustration in claims, for example, that Ifaluk and Balinese people make no distinction between feeling and thinking (Lutz 1988: 92; Wikan 1990: 35-7) - a translation confusion, according to Wierzbicka (1999: 278-9). In fact the notion that thought and feeling are indistinct in non-Western traditions is an exoticizing version of the view now widely held in philosophy and cognitive psychology that feeling and thinking are closely interwoven, for example, in moral reasoning and in the subjective experience of emotion (Barrett et al. 2007: 390).
${}^7$${}^7$^(7){ }^{7} 這個見解可以追溯到五十年前的Magda Arnold，最後也可以追溯到亞里斯多德。「要喚起一種情緒，對象必須被評價為以某種方式影響著我，影響著作為個人的我，影響著我特定的經驗和特定的目標」（Arnold，引自Parkinson 1994: 6）。Michelle Rosaldo (1984)把情緒當作「具體思想」的概念，從人類學的角度來看，這個觀點獲得了表述，而人種學上的說法，例如，Ifaluk和巴厘人不區分感覺和思考（Lutz 1988: 92; Wikan 1990: 35-7）--根據Wierzbicka (1999: 278-9)，這是一種翻譯上的混淆。事實上，在非西方的傳統中，思想與感覺是不分明的，這種觀點是現今在哲學與認知心理學中廣泛持有的觀點的異國化版本，即感覺與思考是緊密交織在一起的，例如在道德推理與情感的主觀經驗中(Barrett et al. 2007: 390)。
${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} Time-depth varies between emotions (surprise, love) - and between theorists. For Ekman, emotions happen over seconds or minutes (1994: 16). Goldie sees emotions not as events but as processes that may unfold over years (conceptually distinct from briefer component episodes) (2000: 12-14; 69; 2012: 61-4). I would prefer to distinguish between dispositions (e.g. to love someone) and occurrent emotions (to experience a surge of love) (Ben Ze’ev 2010: 55).
${}^8$${}^8$^(8){ }^{8} 不同的情緒（驚喜、愛）--不同的理論家--時間深度也不同。對Ekman來說，情緒發生在幾秒鐘或幾分鐘之內(1994: 16)。Goldie 認為情緒不是事件，而是可能持續多年的過程 (在概念上有別於較短暫的片段)(2000: 12-14; 69; 2012: 61-4)。我更願意區分處置（例如愛一個人）和發生情緒（經歷愛情的澎湃）（Ben Ze'ev 2010: 55）。
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} The psychological and philosophical literature on this question is extensive. For overviews, see Goldie (2010) and Russell (1991). For current debates, see the interdisciplinary journal Emotion Review.
${}^9$${}^9$^(9){ }^{9} 關於這個問題的心理學和哲學文獻非常廣泛。有關概述，請參閱 Goldie (2010) 和 Russell (1991)。有關當前的爭論，請參閱跨學科期刊《情感評論》(Emotion Review)。

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Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 20, 545-563
皇家人類學會期刊 (N.S.) 20, 545-563
© Royal Anthropological Institute 2014
© 皇家人類學學院 2014

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Andrew Beatty teaches at Brunel University. He is the author of Society and exchange in Nias (Oxford University Press, 1992), Varieties of Javanese religion (Cambridge University Press, 2009), A shadow falls: in the heart of Java (Faber, 2009), and After the ancestors: an anthropologist’s tale (Cambridge University Press, in press). He is currently completing a book on emotion for Cambridge University Press.
Andrew Beatty 在布魯內爾大學任教。他著有《尼亞斯的社會與交流》（牛津大學出版社，1992 年）、《爪哇宗教的種類》（劍橋大學出版社，2009 年）、《陰影墜落：在爪哇的中心》（Faber，2009 年）以及《祖先之後：人類學家的故事》（劍橋大學出版社，正在出版）。他目前正在為劍橋大學出版社完成一本關於情感的著作。

Department of Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, UK. Andrew.Beatty@brunel.ac.uk
Department of Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, UK.Andrew.Beatty@brunel.ac.uk