In the spring of this year, Moscow’s new military appointee overseeing security in the Kursk province dismantled a council tasked with protecting the vulnerable border region. Col. Gen. Alexander Lapin said the military alone had the strength and the resources to protect Russia’s border, according to an official in Russian security services.
今年春天，莫斯科的新任军事官员负责库尔斯克省的安全，解散了一个负责保护脆弱边境地区的委员会。俄罗斯安全部门的一位官员表示，亚历山大·拉平中将认为，只有军方才能拥有保护俄罗斯边界所需的力量和资源。
That plan left yet another hole in Russia’s weak border defenses, which crumbled earlier this month when Ukrainian troops executed a lightning offensive across the border into Kursk. Ukrainian troops crossed the border to find Russian troops in disarray. They surged ahead and now say they occupy more than 400 square miles of Russian territory.
这个计划在俄罗斯脆弱的边防中又留下了一个漏洞，早在本月初，乌克兰军队在库尔斯克边境发起了闪电攻势，导致俄罗斯军队崩溃。乌克兰军队越过边境，发现俄罗斯军队一片混乱。他们迅速推进，现在声称已占领超过400平方英里的俄罗斯领土。
To be sure, Lapin alone didn’t open the gates to the first foreign invasion of Russian territory since World War II. He was faced with a critical shortage of men. But his misstep is characteristic of a top brass often out of touch with battlefield realities, which now plagues Moscow as it seeks to oust Ukrainian forces from its territory.
毫无疑问，拉平并不是唯一一个打开自第二次世界大战以来俄罗斯领土首次遭受外国入侵大门的人。他面临着严重的人手短缺。然而，他的失误反映了高层指挥官常常与战场现实脱节的特点，这种情况如今困扰着莫斯科，因为它试图将乌克兰军队驱逐出其领土。
Ukrainian front line 乌克兰前线
Ukrainian forces in Russian territory
乌克兰军队在俄罗斯境内
Russian forces 俄罗斯军队
RUSSIA 俄罗斯
BELARUS 白俄罗斯
KURSK REGION 库尔斯克地区
Kursk 库尔斯克
Sumi 苏米
Kyiv 基辅
Kharkiv 哈尔科夫
Chasiv Yar 查西夫亚尔
UKRAINE 乌克兰
Pokrovsk 波克罗夫斯克
Kherson 赫尔松
Mariupol 马里乌波尔
MOL. 摩尔。
Odesa 敖德萨
100 miles 100英里
Black Sea 黑海
100 km 100公里
注意：截至8月19日的情况
来源：战争研究所和美国企业研究所的关键威胁项目
Since the start of the war, Russia’s centralized, top-down thinking, one of the defining features of Russia under President Vladimir Putin, has backfired on the battlefield. It has hampered sober planning in the Kremlin, and when those plans have failed, it has prevented Russian forces from improvising to react to fast-moving developments.
自战争开始以来，俄罗斯的集中式自上而下思维，作为普京总统执政下的一个显著特征，在战场上遭遇了挫折。这种思维方式妨碍了克里姆林宫进行理性规划，而当这些计划失败时，又阻止了俄罗斯军队灵活应对快速变化的局势。
“Putin’s power vertical is still in place but for now it’s working against Russian objectives on the ground,” said William Courtney, a former American diplomat and adjunct senior fellow at Rand. “And with Russia’s planning coming all from the top, its responses to unexpected, fast-moving events are incredibly impaired, with no one on the ground taking initiative.”
“普京的权力垂直结构依然存在，但目前它正在阻碍俄罗斯在地面上的目标，”前美国外交官、兰德公司兼职高级研究员威廉·科特尼表示。“由于俄罗斯的决策完全来自高层，对突发和快速变化事件的反应极为受限，地面上没有人能够主动采取行动。”
It is unclear whether the interagency council dissolved by Lapin, a body that combined military officers with local and regional security officials, would have helped organize a coherent response from Moscow. But without a centralized body in charge of Russia’s response, Moscow’s efforts to oust Kyiv’s forces have so far been chaotic and ineffective. That has left Russian security agencies such as the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service, which are in charge of domestic security, and Russia’s Defense Ministry, which is in charge of fighting inside Ukraine, jostling to lead the response.
目前尚不清楚拉平解散的跨机构委员会——一个将军事官员与地方和地区安全官员结合在一起的机构——是否能够帮助组织莫斯科的统一反应。然而，由于缺乏一个集中负责俄罗斯反应的机构，莫斯科迄今为止试图驱逐基辅军队的努力显得混乱且无效。这导致负责国内安全的俄罗斯内务部和联邦安全局，以及负责在乌克兰境内作战的俄罗斯国防部，争相主导反应。
乌克兰军队越过边界，发现俄罗斯军队陷入混乱。照片由Svet Jacqueline为《华尔街日报》提供
乌克兰军队目前已占领超过400平方英里的俄罗斯领土。照片由Svet Jacqueline为《华尔街日报》提供
“Russia is still pulling together its reaction to this incursion by Ukraine. There has been a fairly slow and scattered reaction to it,” said Gen. Christopher Cavoli, commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations on Thursday. “Part of that is because it wouldn’t exactly be clear who’s in charge.”
“俄罗斯仍在对乌克兰的这一入侵进行反应，反应相对缓慢且分散，”北大西洋公约组织指挥官克里斯托弗·卡沃利将军在周四的外交关系委员会上表示。“这部分是因为并不完全清楚谁在掌控局面。”
The Russian defense ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment. It hasn’t publicly issued an explanation for how it allowed Ukrainian forces to cross into Russian territory. Hours after Ukraine’s incursion, Russia’s chief of general staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, said Lapin’s forces and border guards were working “to destroy the enemy in areas directly adjacent to the Russian-Ukrainian border.”
俄罗斯国防部没有回应评论请求，也没有公开解释为何允许乌克兰军队越过俄罗斯领土。在乌克兰入侵几个小时后，俄罗斯总参谋长瓦列里·格拉西莫夫将军表示，拉平的部队和边防警卫正在“摧毁直接邻近俄乌边界的敌人”。
Gerasimov hasn’t made any public appearances since the incursion.
格拉西莫夫自从入侵以来就没有公开露面。
The initial response is reminiscent of the first hours of the insurrection led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, who led the mercenary Wagner group in Ukraine. He sent his forces toward Moscow to unseat his rivals he blamed for Russia’s military problems—Gerasimov and the then-defense minister, Sergei Shoigu.
最初的反应让人联想到叶夫根尼·普里戈任领导的叛乱初期，他在乌克兰指挥着雇佣军瓦格纳集团。他派遣部队前往莫斯科，试图推翻他所指责的俄罗斯军事问题的对手——格拉西莫夫和当时的国防部长谢尔盖·绍伊古。
叶夫根尼·普里戈任派遣部队前往莫斯科以推翻对手，几个月后他的飞机发生爆炸，导致他身亡。照片：阿尔捷姆·普里亚欣/SOPA图片/Zuma新闻社
Despite days of signals that he was planning to launch an insurrection, the Kremlin was caught off guard and froze in the face of Prigozhin’s actions, said Courtney. Prigozhin, who ultimately halted the rebellion on its march toward Moscow, died two months later when his plane exploded midflight above Russia.
尽管几天前就有迹象表明他计划发动叛乱，但克里姆林宫仍然措手不及，面对普里戈任的行动陷入了僵局，科特尼表示。普里戈任最终在向莫斯科进军的过程中停止了叛乱，但在两个月后，他的飞机在俄罗斯上空爆炸身亡。
In the days leading up to Ukraine’s invasion, Russia’s military correspondents have said, Lapin’s command had sent reports to Moscow warning that Ukrainian forces were building their numbers on the front line. But the trick had been employed on both sides before as a tactic of psychological warfare, people familiar with border maneuvers said, and Moscow dismissed the warnings.
在乌克兰入侵前的日子里，俄罗斯的军事记者表示，拉平的指挥部已向莫斯科发出报告，警告乌克兰军队在前线增兵。然而，据了解边境行动的人士称，这一策略在双方之前都曾被用作心理战，而莫斯科对此警告并未重视。
Regardless of the intelligence about military movements, troops under Lapin’s command still failed to act by enforcing defensive lines or laying mines as Russian soldiers had done last year to stymie a major and well-telegraphed Ukrainian counteroffensive. When Ukrainian soldiers entered the no-man’s-land between Ukraine and Russia, they were met with no resistance and, inside Russia, no territorial defense forces to help slow them down.
尽管有关于军事行动的情报，拉平指挥下的部队仍未采取行动，既没有加强防线，也没有像去年俄罗斯士兵那样布置地雷，以阻止乌克兰的重大且早已预告的反攻。当乌克兰士兵进入乌克兰与俄罗斯之间的无人区时，他们没有遇到任何抵抗，而在俄罗斯境内，也没有领土防卫部队来减缓他们的进攻。
在乌克兰入侵前的日子里，俄罗斯的军事记者表示，亚历山大·拉平的指挥部警告称，乌克兰军队正在前线集结。照片来源：多纳特·索罗金/TASS/Zuma Press
Ukrainian forces used electronic jamming to disable communications, leaving Russian forces unable to contact their commanders. Lightly armed Russian forces were trapped behind the front line and scattered into the forest. Some mounted localized resistance, ambushing Ukrainian forces who moved in to mop up behind the assault troops. But hundreds of Russian soldiers, many of them conscripts, just surrendered.
乌克兰军队利用电子干扰技术切断了通信，导致俄罗斯军队无法与指挥官联系。轻装的俄罗斯部队被困在前线后方，分散在森林中。一些士兵进行了局部抵抗，伏击了进入清理攻击部队后方的乌克兰军队。然而，数百名俄罗斯士兵，许多是征召入伍的，选择了投降。
“In Moscow, they simply were not pondering that a scenario like this could happen,” said Konrad Muzyka, director of Poland-based Rochan Consulting, focusing on the Russian military.
“在莫斯科，他们根本没有想到会发生这样的情况，”专注于俄罗斯军队的波兰罗汉咨询公司负责人孔拉德·穆兹卡表示。
The defensive planning was almost as disastrous as Russia’s initial invasion itself when military planners relying on faulty intelligence—and a belief that the Ukrainian military would crumble under a full-scale assault—sent armored columns into Ukraine in parade formation, making them easy targets for drones and antitank weapons.
防御计划几乎和俄罗斯最初的入侵一样糟糕，军事规划者依赖错误的情报，以及对乌克兰军队在全面攻击下会崩溃的错误信念，导致他们将装甲部队以阅兵式的队形派入乌克兰，使其成为无人机和反坦克武器的易受攻击目标。
解析：乌克兰如何成功入侵俄罗斯
乌克兰控制了数百平方英里的俄罗斯领土，俘获了数百名战俘，并摧毁了克里姆林宫的初步增援。《华尔街日报》解释了基辅对俄罗斯领土的最大攻击。照片：路易莎·纳克斯
Likewise, when the Ukrainian soldiers drove into Russia, their first armed resistance was from the 488th motor rifle regiment of the 144th motor rifle brigade, a unit consisting almost entirely of conscripts, who according to Russian policy aren’t supposed to fight inside Ukraine. The demands of the front had depleted the manpower and resources of Russia’s forces.
同样，当乌克兰士兵进入俄罗斯时，他们首次遭遇的武装抵抗来自第144摩托步兵旅的第488摩托步兵团，这个单位几乎完全由应征入伍的士兵组成，而根据俄罗斯的政策，他们不应在乌克兰作战。前线的需求已经耗尽了俄罗斯军队的人力和资源。
Under normal circumstances, they would have had around 120 armored vehicles, including tanks and armored personnel carriers. In their first armed encounter, the conscripts likely had between 10 and 20, said Muzyka.
在正常情况下，他们应该拥有大约120辆装甲车辆，包括坦克和装甲人员运输车。然而，在他们第一次武装冲突中，征兵者可能只有10到20辆，穆兹卡表示。
It wasn’t the first time poor planning and a lack of men had come together under Lapin’s command. In early September 2022, Ukrainian forces launched a surprise attack in northeast Ukraine. Without the Russians having sufficiently fortified their thin front-line positions, Ukrainians blew past them using fast-moving field vehicles, followed by heavier armored echelons. Russia’s offensive line crumbled and Ukraine managed to reclaim thousands of square miles in northeastern Ukraine.
这并不是拉平指挥下第一次出现糟糕的计划和人手不足的情况。2022年9月初，乌克兰军队在东北乌克兰发起了一次突袭。由于俄罗斯没有充分巩固他们薄弱的前线阵地，乌克兰军队利用快速移动的野战车辆突破了防线，随后是重型装甲部队的跟进。俄罗斯的进攻线崩溃，乌克兰成功收复了东北乌克兰数千平方英里的土地。
Following the debacle, Chechen strongman leader Ramzan Kadyrov called for his resignation: “I would demote Lapin to private, strip him of his awards and send him to the front lines with a machine gun.”
在这场风波之后，车臣强人领导人拉姆赞·卡德罗夫呼吁辞职：“我会把拉平降职为士兵，剥夺他的所有荣誉，并让他带着机枪上前线。”
乌克兰军队几乎毫无阻碍地穿越了乌克兰的苏梅地区，进入了俄罗斯。照片由Svet Jacqueline为《华尔街日报》提供
俄罗斯国防部尚未公开解释为何允许乌克兰军队进入俄罗斯领土。照片由Svet Jacqueline为《华尔街日报》提供
Some among Russia’s vocal military correspondents thought the criticism was unfair as Lapin had only recently been moved to the area where Russian lines collapsed. Nonetheless, the officer was soon removed from his post and later reappointed as deputy commander of Russia’s forces in Ukraine.
一些俄罗斯的军事记者认为这种批评不公平，因为拉平最近才被调到俄罗斯防线崩溃的地区。尽管如此，这名军官很快就被免职，随后又被重新任命为俄罗斯在乌克兰部队的副指挥官。
That fiasco caused the Kremlin to rethink its manpower problem, and a month later Russia started a general mobilization to shore up its thin defenses. Since then, the monetary incentives of contract service have kept volunteers coming into Russian draft offices at a rate of about 1,000 a day. That has kept Russia’s war machine chewing off bits of Ukraine in a grinding war of attrition, but high losses have cut away at strategic reserves, constraining how much manpower the Kremlin can now direct at Kursk.
这场灾难促使克里姆林宫重新审视其人力资源问题，一个月后，俄罗斯开始了全面动员，以增强其薄弱的防御。从那时起，合同服务的经济激励吸引了每天约1000名志愿者涌入俄罗斯的征兵办公室。这使得俄罗斯的战争机器在一场消耗战中不断蚕食乌克兰的领土，但高额的损失削弱了战略储备，限制了克里姆林宫目前能够在库尔斯克投入的人力。
SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS 分享你的想法
What does Ukraine’s invasion of Russia mean for the future of the war? Join the conversation below.
乌克兰入侵俄罗斯对战争的未来意味着什么？欢迎在下方参与讨论。
Now, as Russia tries to gain an advantage on its own territory, it is bringing some forces from eastern Ukraine, even if that means taking away manpower from the front line. The bungled response showed that Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory hit Moscow’s weak spot: contingency planning.
现在，俄罗斯试图在自己的领土上获得优势，正在从乌克兰东部调动一些部队，尽管这意味着要从前线抽调人力。拙劣的反应显示，乌克兰对俄罗斯领土的侵入触及了莫斯科的弱点：应急计划。
“It has certainly demonstrated the creativity and the battlefield prowess of the Ukrainians,” said Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder. “They clearly have compelled the Russians to struggle in their response.”
“这确实展示了乌克兰人的创造力和战场能力，”五角大楼发言人帕特·赖德少将表示。“他们显然迫使俄罗斯在回应中陷入困境。”
Michael R. Gordon, Daria Matviichuk, Isabel Coles and Lara Seligman contributed to this article.
迈克尔·R·戈登、达里亚·马特维丘克、伊莎贝尔·科尔斯和拉拉·塞利格曼共同撰写了这篇文章。
Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com
请通过电子邮件联系托马斯·格罗夫，邮箱地址是 thomas.grove@wsj.com
The War in Ukraine 乌克兰战争Ⓞ
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