SOME EVIDENCE ON THE UNIQUENESS OF BANK LOANS*
关于银行贷款独特性的一些证据*

Although the economic rationale for commercial banks and other financial intermediaries is not well understood, recent theories of financial intermediation have focused on the role of banks in information production and transmittal [see, for example, Leland and Pyle (1977). Campbell and Kracaw (1980), and Diamond (1984)]. Banks and other intermediaries, the argument goes, have a cost advantage over other outsiders in producing and transferring information, either because of something intrinsic in the intermediation process. as Leland and Pyle and Diamond suggest. or because information production and the provision of transaction and other intermediary services are complementary activities. An implication of this view is that bank loans are different from publicly placed debt because banks know more about a company’s prospects than other investors do.
尽管人们对商业银行和其他金融中介机构的经济学原理还不甚了解，但近期的金融中介理论主要关注银行在信息生产和传递中的作用[例如，参见 Leland and Pyle (1977).坎贝尔和克拉考（1980 年）以及戴蒙德（1984 年）]。这种观点认为，银行和其他中介机构在生产和传递信息方面比其他外部机构具有成本优势，这或者是因为中介过程中的某些内在因素，如利兰、派尔和戴蒙德所言，或者是因为信息生产和提供交易及其他中介服务是互补的活动。这一观点的含义是，银行贷款不同于公开发行的债务，因为银行比其他投资者更了解公司的前景。

The emphasis on information transmission contrasts sharply with an alternate hypothesis about the role of banks in the economy. The alternative holds that their special function is to provide transaction services through the issuance of demand deposits. On the asset side, banks are assumed to be simply passive portfolio managers [see Fama (1980)].
对信息传递的强调与关于银行在经济中作用的另一种假设形成了鲜明对比。另一种假设认为，银行的特殊职能是通过发行活期存款提供交易服务。在资产方面，假设银行只是被动的投资组合管理者[见 Fama (1980)]。

This paper provides evidence on whether commercial banks provide any special service with their lending activity that is not available from other lenders (i.e., on whether bank loans are unique). This evidence comes first from an examination of the incidence of the reserve requirement tax, and second from an analysis of the stock price response to announcements of bank loans, private placements of debt, and public straight debt issues.
本文提供了商业银行在贷款活动中是否提供了其他贷款人无法提供的特殊服务的证据（即银行贷款是否具有独特性）。这些证据首先来自对存款准备金税发生率的研究，其次来自对银行贷款、私人配售债务和公开直接发行债务公告的股价反应的分析。

My first examination extends research by Fama (1985), who studies the incidence of reserve requirements on bank certificates of deposit (CDs). He argues that because close substitutes for bank CDs, such as commercial paper or bankers’ acceptances, exist and because CDs provide no special transaction services, reserve requirements on CDs must be borne by bank borrowers. In support of this conjecture, Fama finds no significant differences between the average yields on CDs and on high-grade commercial paper or bankers’ acceptances. Fama concludes that because bank borrowers bear the cost of reserve requirements there must be something special about bank loans that distinguishes them from other types of privately placed and publicly placed debt.
我的第一个研究扩展了 Fama（1985）的研究，他研究了存款准备金对银行存单（CD）的影响。他认为，由于存在商业票据或银行承兑汇票等银行存单的近似替代品，并且由于存单不提供特殊的交易服务，存单的准备金要求必须由银行借款人承担。为了支持这一猜想，法玛发现 CD 的平均收益率与高等级商业票据或银行承兑汇票的平均收益率之间没有显著差异。法玛的结论是，由于银行借款人承担了准备金要求的成本，因此银行贷款一定有其特殊之处，有别于其他类型的私募债务和公募债务。

A problem with Fama’s conclusion is that the reserve requirement tax could be at least partially offset by a subsidy from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the form of deposit insurance supplied at less than actuarially fair prices. A more powerful test of the incidence of the reserve tax, provided here, examines the behavior of $CD$$CD$CDC D rates around changes in reserve requirements, when no offsetting changes in deposit insurance prices occur. My results support Fama’s conclusion that the reserve tax is borne by bank borrowers.
法马的结论存在一个问题，即存款准备金税至少可以部分地被联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）以低于精算公允价格提供的存款保险补贴所抵消。这里提供的对准备金税发生率的一个更有力的测试，是在存款保险价格没有发生抵消性变化的情况下，检查 $CD$$CD$CDC D 利率在准备金要求变化前后的行为。我的结果支持法马的结论，即准备金税由银行借款人承担。

A second source of evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans comes from a comparison of stock price responses to the announcements of bank loan agreements and other types of debt offerings. In analyzing the function of commercial banks, Kane and Malkiel (1965) and more recently Fama (1985) and Bernanke (1984), argue that bank loans are a form of inside debt, because banks have information about the borrower that is not available to other securities holders. As inside debt, bank loans are a way of avoiding the underinvestment problem associated with information asymmetries. Specifically, in the context of the Myers and Majluf model (1984), loans by banks (as inside debt) are similar to financial slack (internally generated funds). One testable implication of the bank-debt-as-inside-debt hypothesis is that because bank loans avoid the information asymmetries associated with public debt offerings, a non-negative stock price response will be associated with their announcement. For similar reasons, if private placements acquired by insurance companies are also inside debt, a non-negative stock price response is expected.
关于银行贷款独特性的第二个证据来源于对银行贷款协议公告和其他类型债务发行公告的股价反应的比较。在分析商业银行的功能时，Kane 和 Malkiel（1965 年）以及最近的 Fama（1985 年）和 Bernanke（1984 年）认为，银行贷款是一种内部债务，因为银行拥有其他证券持有者无法获得的借款人信息。作为内部债务，银行贷款是避免与信息不对称相关的投资不足问题的一种方式。具体来说，在迈尔斯和马吉卢夫模型（1984 年）中，银行贷款（作为内部债务）类似于金融松弛（内部产生的资金）。银行贷款作为内部债务假说的一个可检验的含义是，由于银行贷款避免了与公开发债相关的信息不对称，因此银行贷款的公布会带来非负的股价反应。出于类似的原因，如果保险公司获得的私募也是内部债务，预计股价也会出现非负反应。

I examine the stock price response to publicly announced bank credit agreements, private placements, and publicly placed straight debt issues.
我研究了股票价格对公开宣布的银行信贷协议、私人配售和公开发行的直接债务的反应。

Abnormal performance is positive and statistically significant for bank loan announcements and nonpositive for publicly placed straight debt issues. These results are similar to those reported by Mikkelson and Partch (1986). Surprisingly, a negative and statistically significant stock price response is observed for debt placed privately with insurance companies. Most notably. I find a negative stock price response for private placements and straight debt issues used to repay bank loans. These results suggest that bank loans are unique, but they are not fully consistent with the inside-debt argument, as I discuss below.
银行贷款公告的异常表现为正数，且在统计上有显著意义，而公开发行的直接债务公告的异常表现则为负数。这些结果与 Mikkelson 和 Partch（1986 年）报告的结果相似。令人惊讶的是，在保险公司私下发行的债务中，股价反应为负数，且在统计上有显著意义。最值得注意的是我发现用于偿还银行贷款的私募债和直接发债的股价反应均为负值。这些结果表明，银行贷款是独一无二的，但与内部债务的论点并不完全一致，我将在下文讨论。

The remainder of the paper is organized into five sections. In section 2. I analyze the incidence of the reserve requirement tax. In section 3, I describe my sample of bank credit agreements and debt offerings. The stock price effects associated with these borrowing arrangements are examined in section 4. In section 5 , several explanations for the observed stock price behavior are explored. A brief conclusion is provided in section 6.
本文的其余部分分为五节。第 2 节。我分析了存款准备金税的影响。在第 3 部分，我描述了银行信贷协议和债务发行的样本。第 4 部分考察了与这些借款安排相关的股价效应。第 5 部分探讨了观察到的股价行为的几种解释。第 6 节给出了简要结论。

The current reserve requirement on short-term CDs with original maturity of less than 180 days is $3\mathrm{\%}$$3\mathrm{\%}$3%3 \%. In the absence of any special service provided to bank borrowers or any special service to CD holders, a reserve requirement tax would result in the elimination of CD financing. In a competitive deposit market other depositors (non-CD holders) will not bear the tax, because if a bank attempted to shift the tax to them, other banks not issuing CDs would bid them away. Bank stockholders cannot be expected to pay the tax because non-bank lenders (who are not subject to the reserve tax) would have a higher risk-adjusted return.
目前对原始到期日少于 180 天的短期 CD 的准备金要求是 $3\mathrm{\%}$$3\mathrm{\%}$3%3 \% 。在没有向银行借款人提供任何特殊服务，也没有向 CD 持有人提供任何特殊服务的情况下，征收存款准备金税将导致取消 CD 融资。在竞争性存款市场中，其他存款人（非 CD 持有人）不会承担该税，因为如果银行试图将该税转嫁给他们，其他不发行 CD 的银行就会竞相将其抢走。不能指望银行股东支付税款，因为非银行贷款人（不需缴纳准备金税）将获得更高的风险调整收益。
Fama (1985) argues that CD holders do not bear the reserve requirement tax and that therefore bank loans are special. This conclusion is based on his finding no significant difference between the yield on CDs and the yields on commercial paper and bankers’ acceptances. Fama’s evidence is not fully convincing, for two reasons. First, the reserve tax could be borne not by borrowers but by the FDIC through the provision of deposit insurance at less than actuarially fair prices. Second, CDs are insured only to $\mathrm{\$}100,000$$\mathrm{\$}100,000$$100,000\$ 100,000, whereas the typical denomination is $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 million, so their rates may contain a defaul* premium. If the default risk on CDs is greater than for commercial paper, observed yields on the two securities may be identical even though CD owners pay the reserve tax.
Fama (1985) 认为，CD 持有人不需要缴纳存款准备金税，因此银行贷款是特殊的。这一结论的依据是他发现 CD 的收益率与商业票据和银行承兑汇票的收益率之间没有显著差异。法玛的证据并不完全令人信服，原因有二。首先，准备金税可能不是由借款人承担，而是由联邦存款保险公司通过以低于精算公允价格提供存款保险来承担。其次，CD 的保险金额仅为 $\mathrm{\$}100,000$$\mathrm{\$}100,000$$100,000\$ 100,000 ，而典型的面额为 $\mathrm{\$}1$$\mathrm{\$}1$$1\$ 1 百万，因此其利率可能包含违约*溢价。如果 CD 的违约风险大于商业票据，那么即使 CD 所有者支付了准备金税，观察到的两种证券的收益率也可能相同。

An alternative method of examining the incidence of the reserve tax is to examine the behavior of CD yields in relation to the yields on other money market instruments around changes in reserve requirements. Without any contemporaneous change in insurance costs, an increase in reserve require-
研究准备金税影响的另一种方法是研究在准备金要求发生变化时，CD 收益率与其他货币市场工具收益率的关系。在保险成本没有发生任何同期变化的情况下，准备金要求的提高会导致 CD 收益率的下降。