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The Intelligence  智能

of Intuition

Gerd Gigerenzer 格尔德·吉格伦泽

THE INTELLIGENCE OF INTUITION
直觉的智慧

People often confuse intuition with a sixth sense or the arbitrary judgments of inept decision-makers. In this book, Gerd Gigerenzer analyzes the war on intuition in the social sciences beginning with gendered perceptions of intuition as female, followed by the opposition between biased intuition and logical rationality, popularized in dual-system theories. Technological paternalism amplifies these views, arguing that human intuition should be replaced by perfect algorithms. Contrary to these beliefs, this book proposes that intuition is a form of unconscious intelligence based on years of experience that has evolved to deal with uncertain and dynamic situations where logic and big data algorithms are of little benefit. Gigerenzer introduces the scientific study of intuition and shows that intuition is not irrational caprice, but is instead based on smart heuristics. Researchers, students, and general readers with an interest in decision-making, heuristics and intelligence, cognitive psychology, and behavioral public policy will benefit.
人们经常将直觉与第六感或无能决策者的武断判断混淆。在这本书中,格尔德·吉格伦泽分析了社会科学中对直觉的攻击,从将直觉视为女性的性别化认知开始,接着是有偏见的直觉与逻辑理性之间的对立,这在双系统理论中得到了普及。技术专制主义加剧了这些观点,主张人类的直觉应该被完美的算法取代。与这些观念相反,这本书提出直觉是一种基于多年经验演化而来的无意识智慧,用于处理逻辑和大数据算法无法带来益处的不确定和动态情况。吉格伦泽介绍了对直觉的科学研究,并表明直觉并非不理性的一时冲动,而是基于聪明的启发式的。对决策、启发式和智能、认知心理学以及行为公共政策感兴趣的研究人员、学生和一般读者将受益。
gerd gigerenzer is Director of the Harding Center for Risk Literacy at the University of Potsdam and Emeritus Director of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Germany. He trains federal judges, physicians, and managers in decision-making and has written award-winning books, including Calculated Risks, Gut Feelings, Risk Savvy, and How to Stay Smart in a Smart World, which have been translated into more than 20 languages. The Swiss Duttweiler Institute has distinguished him as one of the top ıoo Global Thought Leaders worldwide.
格尔德·吉格伦泽是波茨坦大学哈丁风险素养中心主任,德国马克斯·普朗克人类发展研究所名誉主任。他培训联邦法官、医生和经理进行决策,并撰写了屡获殊荣的书籍,包括《计算风险》、《直觉感觉》、《风险明智》和《如何在智能世界中保持聪明》,这些书已被翻译成 20 多种语言。瑞士杜特韦勒研究所将他评为全球前 100 位思想领袖之一。

THE INTELLIGENCE OF INTUITION
直觉的智慧

GERD GIGERENZER 格德·吉格伦泽

Max Planck Institute for Human Development
马克斯·普朗克人类发展研究所
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Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment,
剑桥大学出版社是剑桥大学出版社与评估的一部分
a department of the University of Cambridge.
剑桥大学的一个部门。
We share the University's mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
我们与大学分享使命,通过追求教育、学习和研究在最高国际水平上的卓越贡献社会。
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009304863
关于这个标题的信息:www.cambridge.org/9781009304863
DOI: IO.1017/9781009304887
DOI:IO.1017/9781009304887
(c) Gerd Gigerenzer 2023
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First published 2023 2023 年首次出版
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.
这本出版物的目录记录可从英国图书馆获取。
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
国会图书馆编目数据
names: Gigerenzer, Gerd, author.
名字:Gigerenzer,Gerd,作者。
title: The intelligence of intuition / Gerd Gigerenzer, Max Planck Institute for Human
标题:直觉的智慧 / 格尔德·吉格伦泽,马克斯·普朗克人类研究所
Development. 发展。
description: Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2023. |
描述:剑桥,英国;纽约,纽约州:剑桥大学出版社,2023 年。
Includes bibliographical references and index.
包括参考文献和索引。
IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 2023005663 (print) | LCCN 2023005664 (ebook) | ISBN 978I009304863
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(hardback) | ISBN 978 IoO9304894 (paperback) | ISBN 978 IOO9304887 (epub)
(精装)| ISBN 978 IoO9304894(平装)| ISBN 978 IOO9304887(epub)
subJeCTs: lCSH: Intuition. | Decision making.
主题:LCSH:直觉。| 决策。
CLASSIFICATION: LCC BF3I5.5 .G543 2024 (print) | LCC BF315.5 (ebook) |
分类:LCC BF3I5.5 .G543 2024(印刷版)| LCC BF315.5(电子书)|
DDC I53.4/4-dc23/eng/20230415
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ISBN 978-I-009-30486-3 Hardback
ISBN 978-I-009-30486-3 精装版
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ISBN 978-I-009-30489-4 平装书
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剑桥大学出版社及评估对本出版物中提及的外部或第三方互联网网站的 URL 的持久性或准确性不承担责任,并不保证这些网站上的任何内容是准确或适当的,也不保证这些内容将保持准确或适当。

for Raine 为 Raine

Contents 内容

List of Figures and Tables page ..... viii
图表目录页 ..... viii

Preface ..... ix 前言 ..... ix
Acknowledgments .....
致谢 .....

I We Know More Than We Can Tell ..... I
我们知道的比我们能说出来的更多.....我

PART I THE WAR ON INTUITION
第一部分 直觉之战

2 Female Intuition Versus Male Reason: The Battle
2 个女性直觉对抗男性理性:战斗

for Intelligence .....
对于智能 .....

3 Biases: Mistaking Intuition for Irrationality ..... 42
3 个偏见:将直觉误认为是非理性..... 42

4 Governmental and Technological Paternalism ..... 68
4 政府和技术的家长式管理 ..... 68

PART II INTUITION AND ITS INTELLIGENCE
第二部分直觉及其智能

5 Heuristics: The Tools of Intuition .....
5 条启发法则:直觉的工具 .....

6 Embodied Heuristics ..... IO9
6 具体启发式..... IO9

7 Moral Intuition ..... I 25
7 道德直觉 ..... I 25

8 Simple Heuristics to Run a Research Group ..... I 4 I
8 个管理研究小组的简单启发法则 ..... I 4 I

References ..... I 54
参考资料 ..... I 54

Index ..... I72 索引 ..... I72

Figures and Tables 数字和表格

Figures 数字

I.I Fluency heuristic ..... page 5
我。我流利启发式 ..... 第 5 页

3.I Risk versus uncertainty ..... 46
3. 风险与不确定性 ..... 46

3.2 Which glass is half full, which half empty? ..... 49
3.2 哪个杯子是半满的,哪个是半空的?..... 49

3.3 Throwing a fair coin four times ..... 53
3.3 抛掷一枚公平硬币四次 ..... 53

3.4 The special case where the length of the string (here three)
3.4 字符串长度为三的特殊情况

is the same as the length of the sequence ..... 54
与序列 ..... 54 的长度相同

3.5 Citation bias in favor of articles reporting that people
3.5 有利于报道人们的文章的引用偏见

have biased statistical intuitions ..... 62
具有偏见的统计直觉 ..... 62

4.I An example of boosting: fact box for ovarian cancer
4. 促进的一个例子:卵巢癌事实框

screening, based on randomized studies with 200,000 women ..... 73
筛查,基于拥有 20 万名妇女的随机研究.....73

5.I A model of Elon Musk's one-good-reason heuristic for hiring ..... 98
5.埃隆·马斯克的“一个好理由”招聘启发式模型.....98

5.2 A model of Jeff Bezos's sequential decision process for hiring ..... 99
5.2 杰夫·贝索斯(Jeff Bezos)的连续决策过程模型招聘..... 99

5.3 Ecological rationality ..... IOI
5.3 生态合理性 ..... IOI

5.4 Balancing false positives and misses .....
5.4 平衡假阳性和漏检.....

5.5 An illustration of the ecological rationality of the
5.5 生态合理性的一个例证

recognition heuristic ..... IOS
识别启发式 ..... IOS

6. I Gaze heuristic ..... I I 4
6. 我凝视启发式 ..... 我 4

6.2 Predators (dark hawks) pursuing prey (white ducks) ..... I 20
6.2 捕食者(黑隼)追逐猎物(白鸭)..... I 20

6.3 British controllers' reliance on the gaze heuristic to direct
6.3 英国控制器依赖凝视启发来指导

fighter planes to intercept German bombers ..... I 22
战斗机拦截德国轰炸机..... I 22

Tables 表格
6.I The as-if trajectory calculation model and the gaze
6.仿佛轨迹计算模型和凝视

heuristic compared ..... page IIs
启发式比较.....页面 IIs

7.I A four-card problem: A social contract with a
7.一个四张牌的问题:与社会契约

perspective change ..... I 3 I
视角改变 ..... I 3 I

Preface 前言

Intuition is an ultimate experience, beyond words: We know more than we can tell. This phenomenon upsets those who believe in rationality as a purely conscious activity. Its detractors tend to dismiss intuition as crazed superstition, while others have confused it with God's voice. The Intelligence of Intuition extends the argument for the rationality of intuition made in my book Gut Feelings (2007) with a deeper scientific analysis. I locate intuition in its larger societal context and argue that intuition is based on the unconscious use of adaptive heuristics. These simple rules make intuition smart.
直觉是一种超越言语的终极体验:我们知道的比我们能说出来的更多。这种现象让那些相信理性是纯粹意识活动的人感到不安。它的批评者往往会将直觉视为疯狂的迷信,而其他人则将其与上帝的声音混淆。《直觉的智慧》延伸了我在《直觉感觉》(2007 年)一书中对直觉理性性的论述,进行了更深入的科学分析。我将直觉定位在更广泛的社会背景中,并认为直觉是基于无意识使用适应性启发式的。这些简单规则使直觉变得聪明。
Part I looks at the war against intuition. This battle began centuries ago to justify male paternalism by placing female intuition in opposition to male reason. With rising gender equality, this opposition was tailored to justify governmental paternalism by opposing female and male intuition to logical reasoning. In addition, the claim emerged that artificial intelligence (AI) will soon be, if it is not already, superior to human intuition, thereby justifying technological paternalism. All these clashes overlook that, like nature and nurture, intuition and deliberate reasoning act hand in hand. They are not antagonistic, nor is one of the partners superior. The false dichotomy serves obscured goals to exercise power over others.
第一部分探讨了对直觉的战争。这场战斗始于几个世纪前,旨在通过将女性直觉与男性理性对立来证明男性家长主义的正当性。随着性别平等的提升,这种对立被调整为通过将女性和男性的直觉与逻辑推理对立来证明政府家长主义的正当性。此外,有人声称人工智能(AI)很快将(如果还没有的话)优于人类直觉,从而证明技术家长主义的正当性。所有这些冲突都忽视了直觉和深思熟虑的行为是相辅相成的,就像自然和培养一样。它们并不对立,也没有一个伙伴是优越的。这种虚假的二元论是为了实施对他人的权力而服务的模糊目标。
Part II provides a closer view of the nature of intuition. Intuition is neither caprice nor irrationality, but unconscious intelligence based on long experience. The theoretical framework for understanding its nature is that of ecological rationality - the study of how mental processes are adapted to their environments. It is based on Herbert Simon's notion of bounded rationality, that is, how people make decision-making under uncertainty - in situations where the future is uncertain and the best action cannot be calculated. Good intuitions rely on adaptive heuristics that are not logically, but ecologically, rational. In this book, I weave together new chapters with previously published papers, which have been revised, updated, and integrated into a coherent structure.
第二部分提供了直观本质的更近距离视角。直觉既不是一时冲动,也不是非理性,而是基于长期经验的无意识智慧。理解其本质的理论框架是生态合理性 - 研究心理过程如何适应其环境。它基于赫伯特·西蒙(Herbert Simon)有限理性的概念,即人们如何在不确定性下做出决策 - 在未来不确定且最佳行动无法计算的情况下。良好的直觉依赖于适应性启发式,这些启发式不是逻辑上的,而是生态上的合理。在本书中,我将新章节与先前发表的论文编织在一起,这些论文已经过修订、更新,并整合成一个连贯的结构。
In a nutshell, The Intelligence of Intuition explores the myth of intuition's fallibility by positioning it as a unique form of intelligence that complements rather than opposes rationality.
简而言之,《直觉的智慧》探讨了直觉的不可靠性神话,将其定位为一种独特的智慧形式,它与理性相辅相成,而非相互对立。

Acknowledgments 致谢

Although single-authored, the ideas in this book emerged from years of collaboration with my graduate students, post-docs, and colleagues, including the members and guests of the ABC Research Group at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, and previously at the Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research in Munich. Many of them kindly commented on the chapters and ideas in this book. My thanks go Colin Allen, Hal Arkes, Florian Artinger, Will Bennis, Sonja Bißbort, Edward Cokely, Leda Cosmides, Adam Feltz, Nadine Fleischhut, David Funder, Wolfgang Gaissmaier, Mirta Galesic, Andrew Gelman, Daniel G. Goldstein, Jonathan Haidt, Robert P. Hamlin, Reid Hastie, Ralph Hertwig, Ulrich Hoffrage, Perke Jacobs, Linnea Karlsson, Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Gary Klein, Shenghua Luan, Laura Martignon, Björn Meder, Joshua B. Miller, Shabnam Mousavi, Jonathan Nelson, Hans-Jörg Neth, Andreas Ortmann, Ernst Pöppel, David Preiss, Markus Raab, Lael Schooler, Jan-Gerrit Schuurman, Özgür Simsek, Robert Sternberg, Jeffrey R. Stevens, Joline Tan, Peter M. Todd, John Tooby, Elisabetta Versace, Riccardo Viale, Kirsten Volz, Odette Wegwarth, and Tom Wells. I am grateful for the intellectual and emotional support of my wife, Lorraine Daston, and for her help in directing my way through the stacks of Cambridge University Library to search for material on the idea of a peculiarly female intelligence. My special thanks go to Rona Unrau, who edited the entire manuscript and helped me to improve the first drafts. Christel Fraser went over the final draft and edited footnotes and references, and Sarah Otterstetter helped with the figures. I am lucky to have had the generous and unique support of the Max Planck Society and to profit from its intellectual and interdisciplinary atmosphere. It's research paradise.
尽管是单人撰写,但这本书中的思想是在多年与我的研究生、博士后和同事们合作的基础上产生的,包括柏林马克斯·普朗克人类发展研究所 ABC 研究小组的成员和客人,以及之前在慕尼黑马克斯·普朗克心理研究所的同事们。其中许多人友善地评论了这本书中的章节和思想。我要感谢 Colin Allen、Hal Arkes、Florian Artinger、Will Bennis、Sonja Bißbort、Edward Cokely、Leda Cosmides、Adam Feltz、Nadine Fleischhut、David Funder、Wolfgang Gaissmaier、Mirta Galesic、Andrew Gelman、Daniel G. Goldstein、Jonathan Haidt、Robert P. Hamlin、Reid Hastie、Ralph Hertwig、Ulrich Hoffrage、Perke Jacobs、Linnea Karlsson、Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos、Gary Klein、Shenghua Luan、Laura Martignon、Björn Meder、Joshua B. Miller、Shabnam Mousavi、Jonathan Nelson、Hans-Jörg Neth、Andreas Ortmann、Ernst Pöppel、David Preiss、Markus Raab、Lael Schooler、Jan-Gerrit Schuurman、Özgür Simsek、Robert Sternberg、Jeffrey R. Stevens、Joline Tan、Peter M. Todd、John Tooby、Elisabetta Versace、Riccardo Viale、Kirsten Volz、Odette Wegwarth 和 Tom Wells。 我感激我的妻子洛林·达斯顿在智力和情感上的支持,感谢她在剑桥大学图书馆的书架中帮助我寻找关于特殊女性智力概念的资料。特别感谢编辑整个手稿并帮助我改进初稿的罗娜·安劳,克里斯特尔·弗雷泽检查了最终稿并编辑了脚注和参考文献,莎拉·奥特斯泰特帮助处理了图表。我很幸运能够得到马克斯·普朗克学会慷慨独特的支持,并从其智力和跨学科氛围中受益。这是一个研究天堂。

We Know More Than We Can Tell
我们知道的比我们能说的更多

The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing.
心有其理由,理智所不知道。
Blaise Pascal  布莱斯·帕斯卡
Intuition is a very powerful thing, more powerful than intellect.
直觉是一种非常强大的东西,比智力更强大。
Steve Jobs  史蒂夫·乔布斯
After years of conducting research as a cognitive psychologist, I remain fascinated by the power of intuition - the ability to know more than we can explain. Most people recognize a face without being able to specify its features. An experienced physician can sense in a blink of an eye when something is wrong with a patient, without being able to articulate why. Chess masters such as Judith Polgár and Magnus Carlson report that their intuitive play is the secret of their success. Intuition emerges from years of experience and is a form of unconscious intelligence.
经过多年作为认知心理学家进行研究,我仍然对直觉的力量着迷 - 能够知道比我们能解释的更多。大多数人能够识别一个面孔,但却无法具体说明其特征。一位经验丰富的医生可以在一眨眼间感觉到病人有什么问题,却无法解释为什么。象 Judith Polgár 和 Magnus Carlson 这样的国际象棋大师报告说,他们的直觉性下棋是他们成功的秘诀。直觉源自多年的经验,是一种无意识的智慧。
Intuition and reason are no opposing war parties. The physician's hunch initiates a deliberate search for the ailment. A musician's conscious and meticulous practice is the very basis from which those precious moments of flow emerge, where improvisation progresses without conscious guidance. Similarly, the majority of 17 Nobel Laureates explained in an interview that their "big leap" had occurred by them switching back and forth between intuition and analysis. This interplay has enabled generations of scientists and engineers to create technology. Blaise Pascal, the French mathematician whose beautiful words are cited in this chapter's epigraph, was also one of the inventors of the calculus of probability. Intuition and reason not only go together, they depend on each other. Without reason, there would be no mathematics. Without intuition, there would be little innovation.
直觉和理性并不是对立的战争派对。医生的直觉引发了对疾病的有意识搜索。音乐家的自觉和细致的练习是那些宝贵的流动时刻产生的基础,即即兴进行而无需有意识的指导。同样,17 位诺贝尔奖获得者中的大多数在一次采访中解释说,他们的“重大飞跃”是通过在直觉和分析之间来回切换实现的。这种相互作用使得几代科学家和工程师能够创造技术。法国数学家布莱兹·帕斯卡,他的美丽言辞被引用在本章的题词中,也是概率论的发明者之一。直觉和理性不仅共存,它们彼此依赖。没有理性,就不会有数学。没有直觉,就不会有创新。
Nevertheless, intuition is subject to increasing mistrust. People confuse it with God's voice or the arbitrary decisions of an inept political leader. Some psychological theories even portray intuition as suspect and reason as superior. Representatives of tech companies at popular artificial intelligence (AI) events contrast dubious human feelings with trustworthy algorithms in their efforts to convince us that we should be anxious to give away our private data and let machines make our personal decisions. However, this mistrust was not born in the digital age. Albert Einstein already noted it when he said:
尽管如此,直觉却备受怀疑。人们将其与上帝的声音或无能政治领导人的武断决定混淆。一些心理理论甚至将直觉描绘为可疑的,而将理性视为更优越。在流行的人工智能(AI)活动中,科技公司的代表将可疑的人类感觉与可信赖的算法进行对比,试图说服我们应该担心放弃我们的个人数据并让机器做出我们的个人决定。然而,这种不信任并非诞生于数字时代。阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦在说到这一点时已经指出了。
The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant.
直觉的心灵是一份神圣的礼物,理性的心灵是一个忠实的仆人。
We have created a society that honors the servant and has forgotten the gift.
我们创造了一个尊重仆人但忘记了礼物的社会。
Einstein was so right. Whereas calling something intuitive indicates great respect in the hard sciences, the term is often used to indicate irrationality in the social sciences as something generally inferior that should be avoided whenever possible. As we will see, this disrespect of intuition has a history. But first, let us be clear about what intuition is.
爱因斯坦是如此正确。在硬科学中,称某事为直觉表明了极大的尊重,但这个术语常常被用来表示社会科学中的非理性,通常被视为一种应尽量避免的低劣品质。正如我们将看到的,对直觉的不尊重有其历史。但首先,让我们明确直觉是什么。

What Is Intuition? 什么是直觉?

Thomas Aquinas and other medieval philosophers believed that angels are endowed with intuition. Angels have no bodies and thus no sensory organs that could deceive them; therefore, they can intuit the truth directly with impeccable clarity. Similarly, philosophers, including René Descartes and Immanuel Kant, were looking for certainty beyond mere experience. Intuition could make us "see" the self-evident truths in mathematics, morals, or God. While philosophers have debated the function of intuition, they themselves widely hold that they rely on it. The link between intuition and certainty was disentangled in the sciences when the great 19th-century physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz spoke of unconscious inferences and the 2oth-century psychologist Egon Brunswik spoke of the mind as an intuitive statistician. They were not the first; the idea that intuition is uncertain inference rather than direct knowledge of truths had been anticipated by David Hume and others before him. Unlike angels, mortals cannot perceive the world directly and have to rely on cues to infer their world. Similarly, the idea that intuition would not need experience became dispelled. Unlike Kant who was looking for certainty independent of experience, Helmholtz and Brunswik understood intuition as a result of experience. In this way, intuition eventually became divorced from (the illusion of) certainty and wedded to learning from experience.
托马斯·阿奎那和其他中世纪哲学家相信天使天生具有直觉。 天使没有身体,因此没有可能欺骗他们的感官器官;因此,他们可以直接以无可挑剔的清晰度直觉到真理。 同样,包括勒内·笛卡尔和伊曼纽尔·康德在内的哲学家们正在寻找超越单纯经验的确定性。 直觉可以使我们“看到”数学、道德或上帝中的不证自明的真理。 虽然哲学家们一直在辩论直觉的功能,但他们自己广泛认为他们依赖于它。 在科学领域,直觉与确定性之间的联系在 19 世纪伟大的生理学家赫尔曼·冯·赫尔姆霍兹谈到无意识推理以及 20 世纪心理学家埃贡·布伦斯维克谈到心智作为直觉统计学家时被解开。 他们并不是第一个; 直觉是不确定推理而不是对真理的直接认识的想法已经被大卫·休谟和他之前的其他人所预期。 与天使不同,凡人无法直接感知世界,必须依赖线索来推断他们的世界。 同样,直觉不需要经验的想法被驳倒了。 与康德寻求独立于经验的确定性不同,赫尔姆霍兹和布伦维克理解直觉是经验的结果。这样,直觉最终与(确定性的幻觉)分离,并与从经验中学习结合在一起。
Nevertheless, those philosophers who think of intuition as directly providing certain knowledge, and those psychologists who think of it as uncertain inference based on experience, share one important belief. Both assume that intuition is a form of intelligence. For Descartes, intuition was the most fundamental of the two routes to knowledge, the other being deduction. For Helmholtz, unconscious inferences enable the amazing intelligence of perception and, at the same time, explain perception illusions. Following this tradition of unconscious inferences, I understand intuition as unconscious intelligence.
尽管如此,那些认为直觉直接提供确定知识的哲学家和那些认为它是基于经验的不确定推理的心理学家,分享一个重要信念。两者都假设直觉是一种智力形式。对笛卡尔来说,直觉是两种知识途径中最基本的一种,另一种是演绎。对于赫尔姆霍兹来说,无意识的推理使感知的惊人智能成为可能,并同时解释了感知的错觉。沿着这种无意识推理的传统,我理解直觉为无意识智能。
In this book, I use a working definition:
在这本书中,我使用一个工作定义:

An intuition is a feeling:
直觉是一种感觉

I. based on long experience,
我。基于长期经验,
  1. that appears quickly in one's consciousness, and
    出现在一个人意识中的东西,和
  2. whose underlying rationale is unconscious.
    其基本原理是无意识的。
The emphasis on experience contrasts with the idea that intuition is arbitrary, a sixth sense, or God's voice. The cases of the doctor and the chess masters emphasize the role of experience. The learning of one's first language is another case in point. Consider the sentence "I could not agree to you." A native speaker would sense immediately that something is wrong with that sentence without necessarily being able to say what rules of grammar are violated. Someone with another mother tongue who hasn't mastered the language cannot depend on intuition in the same way.
强调经验与直觉是任意的、第六感或上帝的声音的观念形成鲜明对比。医生和国际象棋大师的案例强调了经验的作用。学习第一种语言也是一个例子。考虑句子“我不能同意你。”一个母语者会立即感觉到这个句子有问题,尽管不一定能说出违反了哪些语法规则。另一种母语不是该语言的人不能像同样依赖直觉。
Learning from experience requires feedback, meaning that having good intuitions in one domain does not guarantee having good intuitions in others. Intuitions are domain-specific. Professional tennis players may have excellent intuitions about the perfect forehand, but not about investing their money. Be it acting, driving, dancing, programming, or playing bridge and chess - the superior intuitions of experts require extensive training, with elite performance estimated at some 10,000 hours of deliberate practice. The importance of experience also contrasts with rational choice theory, whose axioms are about being consistent and where experience plays little role.
从经验中学习需要反馈,这意味着在一个领域有良好直觉并不保证在其他领域也有良好直觉。直觉是领域特定的。职业网球运动员可能对完美的正手击球有出色的直觉,但对投资自己的钱却没有。无论是表演、驾驶、跳舞、编程,还是打桥牌和下棋 - 专家的卓越直觉需要大量训练,精英表现被估计需要约 1 万小时的刻意练习。经验的重要性也与理性选择理论形成对比,后者的公理是关于一致性,经验在其中起到很小的作用。
The second aspect, "appears quickly in one's consciousness," provides a first indication of why intuition is indispensable. When fast decisionmaking is required, people have to act within the constraints of time. In life-and-death situations, deliberating all possible options can be fatal. Similarly, soccer players have to decide in a fraction of a second where to pass the ball. They may occasionally err, but would otherwise always miss opportunities if they deliberated extensively during a game. That limit of thinking too long is well known and time pressure is often considered a regrettable circumstance. However, the scientific study of intuition has revealed a stunning phenomenon: If players had more time to make a decision, their performance would not necessarily improve. Thinking deliberately can actually decrease performance. For an experienced player, intuition is guided by a simple rule:
第二个方面,“迅速出现在一个人的意识中”,提供了直观为何不可或缺的第一个指示。当需要快速决策时,人们必须在时间的限制内行动。在生死关头,仔细考虑所有可能的选择可能是致命的。同样,足球运动员必须在一瞬间决定把球传给哪里。他们偶尔可能会出错,但如果他们在比赛中进行深思熟虑,就会总是错失机会。过长思考的限制是众所周知的,时间压力通常被认为是一个令人遗憾的情况。然而,直觉的科学研究揭示了一个惊人的现象:如果球员有更多时间做决定,他们的表现未必会提高。深思熟虑实际上可能会降低表现。对于经验丰富的球员,直觉是由一个简单的规则引导的。
Fluency heuristic: Choose the first option that comes to mind.
流畅启发式:选择第一个浮现在脑海中的选项。
Studies with expert handball and golf players show that options come to mind in the order of their validity. That is, the first option is typically the best, the next option second-best, and so on (Figure 1.I). This explains why following one's first hunch is likely the best decision. If the first option cannot be carried out in the situation at hand, then following the second impulse is probably the best decision. In an experiment, experienced handball players were shown io-second video sequences from top games. Then the sequences were frozen and the players had to say what option they would take, such as throw at the goal or pass to the right. After their immediate and intuitive response, they were given another 45 seconds to deliberately inspect the frozen image and asked once again what they now thought the best option was. In about 40 percent of the cases, the players changed their minds. Yet, more time did not lead to better choices. Most of the time, the first intuitive choice was better than the action chosen after reflection. Similarly, when experienced golfers were given only 3 seconds to make their put, they were more successful in getting the ball into the hole than when given unlimited time. Novices, in contrast, have not yet developed good intuitions and perform better when granted more time. They need deliberation because they lack
专家手球和高尔夫球员的研究表明,选项按其有效性的顺序浮现在脑海中。也就是说,第一个选项通常是最好的,下一个选项次之,依此类推(图 1.I)。这解释了为什么跟随第一直觉很可能是最佳决定。如果第一个选项在当前情况下无法实施,那么跟随第二个冲动可能是最佳决定。在一项实验中,经验丰富的手球运动员观看了来自顶级比赛的 10 秒视频序列。然后,序列被冻结,运动员必须说出他们会选择什么选项,比如投向球门或向右传球。在他们立即和直觉的回答之后,他们被给予另外 45 秒的时间来仔细检查冻结的图像,并再次被问及他们现在认为最佳选项是什么。在大约 40%的情况下,运动员改变了主意。然而,更多的时间并没有导致更好的选择。大多数情况下,第一次直觉选择比反思后选择的行动更好。 同样,当有经验的高尔夫球手只有 3 秒的时间推杆时,他们比有无限时间时更成功地将球推入洞内。相比之下,新手还没有形成良好的直觉,当给予更多时间时表现更好。他们需要审慎考虑,因为他们缺乏
Beilock et al. (2004).
Beilock 等人(2004 年)。

}
Figure I.I. Fluency heuristic. For expert players, the quality of options decreases with the order they come to mind (adapted from Johnson & Raab, 2003). Thus, relying on the fluency heuristic enables not only fast but also accurate decisions. Note that this heuristic requires expertise and does not work as well for novices.
图 I.I. 流畅启发式。对于专家玩家来说,选项的质量随着它们浮现在脑海中的顺序而降低(改编自 Johnson & Raab,2003)。因此,依赖流畅启发式不仅能够做出快速决策,还能做出准确决策。请注意,这种启发式需要专业知识,对于新手来说效果不佳。
experience. The fluency heuristic is one illustration of how intuition is aided by heuristics.
经验。流畅启发是直觉如何受启发的一个例证。
Studies with chess players showed similar results: The first option that came to mind to chess masters (grand masters and international masters) was nearly always the best one. Moreover, under time pressure, their decisions did not suffer, whereas less experienced chess players then chose inferior moves. The higher the expertise, the more the chess players trust their intuition and the more often they are right in doing so.
研究表明,国际象棋选手的情况也类似:国际象棋大师和国际象棋特级大师脑海中首先浮现的选项几乎总是最佳选择。此外,在时间压力下,他们的决策不会受到影响,而经验较少的国际象棋选手则会选择次优的着法。专业水平越高,国际象棋选手越信任自己的直觉,也越经常做出正确的决策。
Thus, the first two aspects of intuition form a close couple: The more experience in a domain, the more likely that what quickly comes to mind is actually the best option. Note that this finding contradicts the hypothesis of a general speed-accuracy trade-off, where less time leads to less accurate decisions. As we have seen, this trade-off holds for novices, but not necessarily for experts. Fast decisions are not automatically inferior to slow decisions. How then did fast thinking come to be associated with errors and slow thinking with rationality? Psychological experiments mostly enlist undergraduates or crowdworkers who have no experience with the task at hand or confront them with artificial tasks they have never seen before. In this situation, the speed-accuracy trade-off does exist. The story of fast, intuitive decisions that are often wrong versus slow, reasoned decisions that are generally better is an overgeneralization based on the study of nonexpert undergraduates.
因此,直觉的前两个方面形成了一个密切的关系:在某个领域的经验越丰富,脑海中迅速浮现的选择越有可能是最佳选项。请注意,这一发现与一般速度与准确性的权衡假设相矛盾,即时间越少导致决策越不准确。正如我们所看到的,这种权衡对于新手是成立的,但对于专家来说并非必然如此。快速决策并不自动比慢速决策差。那么,为什么快速思考会被认为与错误相关,而慢速思考则与理性相关呢?心理实验大多招募没有相关任务经验的本科生或众包工作者,或者让他们面对从未见过的人工任务。在这种情况下,速度与准确性的权衡确实存在。快速、直觉的错误决策与慢速、理性的更好决策的故事是基于对非专业本科生研究的过度概括。
The third defining feature of intuition is crucial: that the process underlying an intuition is unconscious. To repeat the words of Pascal, "the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing." A skillful player is unaware of the process that generates the first option that comes to their mind. Unconscious processes are not oddities, but essential for cognitive functioning. Conscious attention is a limited resource, which is the reason why multitasking is difficult:
直觉的第三个定义特征至关重要:直觉背后的过程是无意识的。重复帕斯卡的话,“心有其理由,理性所不知。” 一个熟练的玩家并不知道生成首选项的过程,这是他们脑海中首先出现的选项。 无意识过程并非怪事,而是认知功能的必要条件。 意识注意力是有限的资源,这就是为什么多任务处理困难的原因:
If one simultaneously performs two tasks that require deliberate attention, one's performance on each of the tasks deteriorates.
如果同时执行两项需要专注的任务,每项任务的表现都会下降。
Human attention can fully focus on one task alone, meaning that multitasking leads to a decrease in performance on the task(s) that demand focus. Our brain's solution is to perform as many tasks as possible unconsciously. If all of its tasks, including breathing and walking upright, needed to take place consciously, they would interfere with each other. In the words of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa, "Could it think, the heart would stop beating." Once a process is unconscious, it no longer interferes with attention. Breathing while driving does not interfere with driving safety; texting while driving does.
人类的注意力只能完全集中在一项任务上,这意味着多任务处理会导致需要专注的任务表现下降。我们大脑的解决方案是尽可能地无意识地执行多项任务。如果所有任务,包括呼吸和直立行走,都需要有意识地进行,它们会相互干扰。用葡萄牙诗人费尔南多·佩索阿的话来说,“如果它能思考,心脏就会停止跳动。” 一旦一个过程变得无意识,它就不再干扰注意力。在驾驶时呼吸不会影响驾驶安全;在驾驶时发短信会。
Nevertheless, the unconscious has not received much appreciation in consciousness-centered philosophy, particularly in the 2oth-century analytic tradition. In psychology, the unconscious has similarly met with suspicion. Sigmund Freud's revelation that our behavior is heavily influenced by unconscious processes has been hailed as the third blow dealt to the human ego - after Copernicus and Kepler demonstrated that the Earth is not the center of the solar system, and Darwin found that humans and animals have common ancestors. Freud's unconscious processes were discovered when studying hypnosis and hysteria, which he investigated mostly in women. While unconscious influences, as embodied in the term
尽管如此,在以意识为中心的哲学中,无意识并没有得到太多赞赏,特别是在 20 世纪的分析传统中。在心理学中,无意识同样受到怀疑。西格蒙德·弗洛伊德揭示我们的行为受无意识过程影响很大,被誉为对人类自我的第三次打击 - 在哥白尼和开普勒证明地球不是太阳系中心之后,达尔文发现人类和动物有共同祖先。弗洛伊德的无意识过程是在研究催眠和癔症时发现的,他主要在女性身上进行了调查。虽然无意识的影响体现在这个术语中。
Freudian slips, are now common wisdom, accounts of them are mostly negative and refer to unintentional influences that cannot be controlled and should better not happen.
弗洛伊德口误现在是常识,对它们的描述大多是负面的,指的是无意识的影响,无法控制,最好不要发生。
The supposed link between unintentional and unconscious is, however, a misconception. Unconscious processes are typically initiated by intention. For instance, an experienced driver drives intuitively, but intentionally. An experienced scientist may have a sudden hunch while pondering a puzzling finding, but the hunch is motivated by conscious intention. Similarly, when typing, we do not move our fingers consciously, but typing is nevertheless an act of intention. These unconscious, but intentional, processes are the subject of psychological research on the automaticity of higher mental processes. The general lesson is: The fact that much of what we do is unconscious does not mean that it is irrational or unintentional. Unconsciousness is a necessary condition for a rational being.
所谓无意识和潜意识之间的联系实际上是一个误解。无意识过程通常是由意图引发的。例如,有经验的司机驾驶时是凭直觉,但是有意识的。有经验的科学家在思考一个令人困惑的发现时可能会突然有直觉,但这种直觉是由有意识的意图驱动的。同样,当打字时,我们并不是有意识地移动手指,但打字仍然是一种有意图的行为。这些无意识但有意图的过程是心理学研究中关于高级心理过程自动性的主题。总体教训是:我们做的许多事情是无意识的,并不意味着它是非理性或无意图的。无意识是理性存在的必要条件。

Fear of Admitting Gut Decisions
害怕承认直觉决策

Not being able to explain one's intuitions has led philosophers and psychologists to mistrust intuitive decisions. Those who cannot explain their actions are subject to suspicion. Mistrust of intuition fuels a culture of post hoc justification, motivated by fear of liability. In large corporations and administrations, justification and self-protection have become the primary motive in place of achievement. In this world, intuition is not talked about openly, but relied on surreptitiously.
无法解释自己的直觉导致哲学家和心理学家不信任直觉决策。不能解释自己行为的人会受到怀疑。对直觉的不信任助长了事后辩解的文化,这是出于对责任的恐惧。在大型企业和管理机构中,辩解和自我保护已经取代了成就成为主要动机。在这个世界里,直觉不会公开讨论,但却被秘密依赖。
In a series of studies, I asked hundreds of executives from half a dozen international corporations how often an important professional decision they made or participated in was ultimately a gut decision (their term for intuition). That is, if the available data did not provide a clear answer, which often happens in the uncertain world of business, how frequently did they rely on their intuitions? On average, the answer was for 50 percent of important decisions.
在一系列研究中,我询问了数百名来自半打国际公司的高管,询问他们在做出或参与的重要专业决策中,最终是凭直觉(他们对直觉的术语)的频率有多高。也就是说,如果可用数据没有提供明确答案,这在商业不确定的世界中经常发生,他们有多频繁地依赖自己的直觉?平均而言,对于 50%的重要决策,答案是。
Yet, the majority of the same executives would never admit to this practice in public. Many executives were unwilling to take personal responsibility for their decisions. They feared making errors and being blamed if they were unable to explain an intuitive decision.
然而,大多数同样的高管在公开场合永远不会承认这种做法。许多高管不愿意对自己的决定承担个人责任。他们害怕犯错,担心如果无法解释一个直觉决定而受到责备。

The Business of Justifying Decisions Post Hoc
事后辩解决策的业务

I have observed two ways in which managers cope with this anxiety. The first is to hire a consulting firm to justify the intuitive decision after the fact. Curious about how often this happens, I asked the principal of one of the largest consulting firms worldwide what proportion of their customer contacts involved justifying decisions post hoc. On the condition of anonymity, he disclosed that it was more than 50 percent. That gives a rough idea of the time, resources, and intelligence spent on concealing intuitive decisions and avoiding responsibility. In these cases, the function of reasoning and argumentation is to rationalize intuitive decisions and to hide them from view.
我观察到管理者处理这种焦虑的两种方式。第一种是聘请咨询公司在事后证明直觉决策的合理性。对于这种情况发生的频率,我询问了全球最大咨询公司之一的负责人,问他们的客户联系中有多少涉及事后证明决策的比例。在匿名的条件下,他透露超过 50%。这给出了一个大致的时间、资源和智力花费,用于掩盖直觉决策和避免责任。在这些情况下,推理和论证的功能是为了合理化直觉决策并将其隐藏起来。
A second strategy is even more expensive for the companies: defensive decision-making. It occurs when a manager feels that option is the best for the company, yet nevertheless recommends and pursues a second-best option B that is less risky for their own career if something goes awry. In my studies with managers from large corporations, the majority admitted to such practices for an average of percent of all their important professional decisions.
一种更昂贵的策略是公司的防御性决策。当经理觉得选项 对公司最有利,但仍然推荐并追求次优选项 B,以降低自己职业生涯风险时,就会出现这种情况。在我与大型公司经理的研究中,大多数人承认在所有重要职业决策中平均有 % 的时间采取这种做法。
Both strategies to camouflage intuitive decisions - hiring consulting firms or choosing second-best decisions - are costly. For every I percent loss in corporate income due to defensive decisions, a rough estimate is that, in highly industrialized countries such as Germany, large corporations lose billions of dollars each year. In family-owned businesses, by contrast, there is much less fear of admitting to following one's intuition; after all, it is their own money that is at stake, and most plan a generation ahead rather than up to the next quarterly report. If there is skin in the game, good intuitions are welcome. Wasting one's own money to cover these up would be a poor business strategy. Independent of whether leaders admit or deny gut decisions, both the analysis of data and intuition are required. Intuition and reasoning work with, not against, each other.
两种伪装直觉决策的策略——聘请咨询公司或选择次优决策——都是昂贵的。对于因防御性决策而导致企业收入损失的每个百分点,一个粗略估计是,在德国等高度工业化国家,大型企业每年损失数十亿美元。相比之下,家族企业很少害怕承认遵循直觉;毕竟,他们押上的是自己的钱,大多数人计划超前一代,而不是仅限于下一个季度报告。如果有利益关系,好的直觉是受欢迎的。浪费自己的钱来掩盖这些将是一种糟糕的商业策略。无论领导人是否承认或否认直觉决策,都需要数据分析和直觉。直觉和推理是相辅相成的,而不是相互对立的。

Reasoning and Intuition: Two Sides of the Same Coin
推理和直觉:同一枚硬币的两面

Intuition is based on experience. There are two ways in which experience is gathered: by implicit or explicit learning. In implicit learning, also called incidental learning, a person is not aware of the process (such as a heuristic or a grammar) underlying an intuition. The learning of one's first language proceeds in this way without being aware of the rules of grammar underlying one's speech. Second languages, in contrast, are typically taught by making the rules of grammar (and their exceptions) explicit. Similarly, in order to catch a fly ball, baseball outfielders rely on the gaze heuristic without being fully aware of it (see Chapter 6). Yet, ever since research figured out the heuristic process, it can be explicitly taught to novices. The important point is that the same heuristic rules, such as those of grammar and of catching a ball, underlie both intuition and deliberate reasoning.
直觉是基于经验的。经验的收集有两种方式:隐式学习和显式学习。在隐式学习中,也称为偶然学习,一个人并不意识到支撑直觉的过程(如启发式或语法)。第一语言的学习就是这样进行的,而不需要意识到支撑自己言语的语法规则。相比之下,第二语言通常通过明确地传授语法规则(及其例外)来教授。同样,为了接住一个飞球,棒球外野手依赖凝视启发式,而并不完全意识到它(见第 6 章)。然而,自从研究弄清楚了启发式过程以来,就可以明确地教给新手。重要的一点是,相同的启发式规则,如语法和接住球的规则,支撑着直觉和刻意推理。
Intuition can also start out as deliberate reasoning, that is, by explicit learning. Tying shoelaces is learned consciously, as a sequence of movements, but, with experience, it becomes unconscious. Once this state is achieved, the process works fast and flawlessly. At that point, consciously thinking about the sequence of movements can actually disrupt one's ability to tie the laces. Similarly, a difficult piece on the piano is learned consciously by paying attention to the right sequence and timing of fingers, but true music starts when piano players are no longer conscious of what their fingers are doing. Many skills have passed through this trajectory from deliberate to intuitive. Alfred Whitehead, the English mathematician who coauthored the Principia Mathematica with Bertrand Russell, emphasized this trajectory to counter the axiom that deliberate thinking is all that matters:
直觉也可以作为刻意推理的开始,也就是说,通过明确的学习。系鞋带是有意识地学习的,作为一系列动作,但是随着经验的积累,它变得无意识。一旦达到这种状态,这个过程就会快速而无缺。在那时,有意识地思考系鞋带的动作顺序实际上会干扰一个人系鞋带的能力。同样,钢琴上的一首难曲是通过有意识地关注手指的正确顺序和节奏来学习的,但是真正的音乐开始于钢琴演奏者不再意识到他们的手指在做什么。许多技能都经历了从刻意到直觉的这一轨迹。与伯特兰·罗素合著《数学原理》的英国数学家阿尔弗雷德·怀特黑德强调了这一轨迹,以反驳刻意思考是唯一重要的公理。
It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of operations which we can perform without thinking about them.
这是一个深刻错误的陈词滥调,所有抄写本和杰出人士在演讲时都会重复,即我们应该培养思考我们正在做的事情的习惯。事实恰恰相反。文明是通过扩展我们可以在不加思考的情况下执行的操作数量而进步的。
Contrast Whitehead's statement with the belief that free will denotes always consciously deciding before acting. In the widely discussed experiments by the American neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, for instance, a change in participants' electroencephalogram (EEG) signals occurred before the participants actually reported their decision to act (a simple motor action). The conscious decision thus did not appear to cause the action, a finding that has been interpreted by others as proof that free will is illusory. Yet that conclusion assumes volition and intention to be unremittingly conscious, and it overlooks the fact that intuitive processes guide many of our decisions. Our unconscious is every bit part of our identity. We would get nowhere by deliberating all day long, leaving our body to wait patiently for orders.
将怀特黑德的声明与自由意志意味着总是在行动之前有意识地做出决定的信念进行对比。例如,美国神经科学家本杰明·利贝特进行了广泛讨论的实验中,参与者的脑电图(EEG)信号发生变化,而参与者实际上报告他们决定行动(简单的运动行为)之前。因此,意识决定似乎并没有导致行动,这一发现被其他人解释为自由意志是虚幻的证据。然而,这一结论假设意志和意图是持续意识的,并忽视了直觉过程指导我们许多决定的事实。我们的无意识是我们身份的一部分。如果我们整天都在深思熟虑,让我们的身体耐心等待命令,我们将一事无成。
Einstein's concern that we have forgotten the gift of intuition is as timely today as it was then. And the campaign against intuition has a history.
爱因斯坦担心我们已经忘记了直觉的天赋,这一点在今天和当时一样及时。而对直觉的打压也有历史。

The War on Intuition
直觉之战

Even into the 2oth century, prominent psychologists were convinced that men are rational and women intuitive and that only men could master abstract thought. It was asserted as a scientific fact that women's concrete and intuitive thinking prevented them from grasping abstract moral principles, going so far as to claim that women who lied were simply incapable of comprehending that their actions were evil. According to this line of reasoning, women needed men's guidance and should be kept out of politics, economics, and other important decision-making domains. In Chapter 2, I tell the story of this peculiar idea of women's intuitive intelligence and how the opposition of female intuition and male reason faded away due to the emerging concept of a single intelligence shared by both sexes. Women and men were eventually deemed equal partners, but intuition and rationality were kept unequal.
即使进入 20 世纪,知名心理学家仍然坚信男性是理性的,女性是直觉的,只有男性才能掌握抽象思维。有人断言作为科学事实,女性的具体和直觉思维阻碍了她们理解抽象的道德原则,甚至声称说谎的女性简单地无法理解她们的行为是邪恶的。根据这种推理,女性需要男性的指导,应该远离政治、经济和其他重要决策领域。在第 2 章中,我讲述了关于女性直觉智慧的这种奇特观念以及由于新兴概念——男女共享的单一智力概念的出现而消失的女性直觉与男性理性的对立。最终,女性和男性被认为是平等的伙伴,但直觉和理性仍然是不平等的。
In spite of these changes, women continue to be associated with intuition today. For instance, when asked whether women recognize emotions better than men, women and men responded in the affirmative, a result also consistently obtained in self-report questionnaires on emotional intelligence. However, when actually testing people's abilities, studies did not find a difference for strong expressions of emotions; for emotional expressions of lower intensity, the results are inconsistent. In one study, 5,000 participants were shown 24 faces with emotional expressions, either at a high or low intensity, and were asked to rate these on each of six emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. Both genders rated the target emotions equally correctly, regardless of whether the expression was intensive or subtle. There was no evidence that women have better intuitions than men about others' emotional expressions.
尽管有这些变化,今天女性仍然被认为与直觉有关。例如,当被问及女性是否比男性更擅长识别情绪时,女性和男性都肯定回答,这一结果也在情绪智力的自我报告问卷中一贯得到。然而,当实际测试人们的能力时,研究并未发现在强烈表达情绪方面有差异;对于情绪表达较低强度的情况,结果是不一致的。在一项研究中,5000 名参与者被展示了 24 张带有情绪表达的面孔,无论是高强度还是低强度,并被要求对这些面孔上的六种情绪进行评分:愤怒、厌恶、恐惧、快乐、悲伤和惊讶。无论表达是强烈还是微妙,两性都同样正确地评价了目标情绪。没有证据表明女性比男性更擅长直觉地识别他人的情绪表达。
Beginning in the I970s, a group of psychologists and behavioral economists began a new war on intuition, pitting it once again against rationality. This time, the target of attack extended beyond female intuition to include everyone's intuition. The key message, spread by bestselling books such as Ariely's Predictably Irrational (2008), Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow, (201 Ia), or Thaler and Sunstein's Nudge (2008), is that only the abstract logic of rational choice theory is worthy of trust. Just as female intuition had been opposed to male reason, two antagonistic systems were posited, one fast, intuitive, inconsistent, and often wrong, and the other slow, rational, and apparently always right. Humans err if the rational "System 2" does not pay sufficient attention and fails to correct what the intuitive "System I" gets wrong. The similarity of this new opposition with that of female intuition versus male reason may not be entirely coincidental. It is based on a philosophical and psychological tradition that differs strongly from the angelic view of intuition. From the igth century to the first half of the 20th century, it was not uncommon that psychologists contrasted what they believed to be the intuitive, primitive, and fast judgments of children, women, and the mentally retarded, with the slower and more deliberate rational judgments of male adults. In the more current view, everyone's intuition is riddled by dozens of cognitive biases, many of which have become household words.
上世纪 70 年代开始,一群心理学家和行为经济学家展开了一场新的直觉之战,再次将其与理性对立起来。这一次,攻击的目标不仅仅是女性的直觉,还包括每个人的直觉。畅销书籍如阿里尔的《可预测的非理性》(2008 年)、卡内曼的《思考,快与慢》(2011 年)或萨尔和桑斯坦的《推动》(2008 年)传播的关键信息是,只有理性选择理论的抽象逻辑值得信任。正如女性的直觉被对立于男性的理性一样,被提出了两种对立的系统,一种快速、直觉、不一致且常常错误,另一种缓慢、理性、似乎总是正确。如果理性的“系统 2”没有足够的注意力并未能纠正直觉的“系统 1”所犯的错误,人类就会犯错。这种新对立与女性的直觉与男性的理性之间的对立有些相似,这可能并非完全巧合。它基于一种与直觉的天使视角截然不同的哲学和心理传统。 从 19 世纪到 20 世纪上半叶,心理学家常常将他们认为的儿童、女性和智力障碍者的直觉、原始和快速判断与成年男性的更慢和更深思熟虑的理性判断进行对比,这并不罕见。在更现代的观点中,每个人的直觉都被数十种认知偏见所困扰,其中许多已成为家喻户晓的词汇。
The new target is a specific kind of intuition, namely, understanding chance and randomness, at which humans are claimed to be miserably incompetent. This dismal picture, however, is surprising. Prior to the I970s, two decades of psychological research concurred that human intuition about chance and randomness is fairly accurate - at least by age or so, as Swiss psychologists Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder were the first to conclude in 195I. Why did people show fairly good intuitions about chance before the I970s and shoddy ones thereafter? The I970s brought the Watergate scandal, the end of the Vietnam War, and the death of Elvis Presley. But how would such events explain a decline in our intuition?
新目标是一种特定类型的直觉,即理解机会和随机性,人类据称在这方面表现得非常不称职。然而,这幅惨淡的画面令人惊讶。在 1970 年代之前,两十年的心理研究一致认为,人类对机会和随机性的直觉相当准确 - 至少到 岁左右,瑞士心理学家让·皮亚杰和巴贝尔·因赫勒在 1951 年首次得出结论。为什么人们在 1970 年代之前对机会表现出相当好的直觉,而之后表现出糟糕的直觉?1970 年代带来了水门事件、越战结束和猫王埃尔维斯·普雷斯利的去世。但这些事件如何解释我们直觉的下降?

Weapons of Destruction 毁灭性武器

I argue that there was no such decline in intuition in the first place. Rather, three measures were taken to make human intuition look wanting. For one, quite a few researchers bore a "bias bias," that is, a tendency to spot cognitive biases even when there were none. This led them to mistake what were, in fact, people's intelligent intuitions for persistent irrationality. Second, studies demonstrating biases introduced a new kind of classroom and online experiment that produces data in a few minutes and does not allow participants to learn from experience. Pre-I 970 s psychological experiments, by contrast, gave participants the opportunity to learn. When people can learn from experience, their intuitions about chance, randomness, and risk are not perfect, but fairly good. It was only recently understood that this change in experimental practice was one of the factors that made intuitions suddenly appear to be infected with biases. Strikingly few people are even aware of research unveiling the marvels of intuition. This blind spot is fueled by a third measure, a conspicuous citation bias: Studies reporting good intuitions are rarely mentioned and cited, whereas those reporting biases are highly popularized. The bias bias and the lack of learning opportunities were crucial in producing the new negative view of intuition, and the massive citation bias, now and then, makes the untrustworthiness of intuition appear to be a hard, scientific fact.
我认为一开始并没有直觉下降这种情况。相反,采取了三项措施,使人类的直觉看起来有所不足。首先,相当多的研究人员持有“偏见偏见”,即倾向于发现认知偏见,即使实际上并没有。这导致他们错误地将人们的智能直觉误认为是持续的非理性。其次,展示偏见的研究引入了一种新型的课堂和在线实验,可以在几分钟内产生数据,不允许参与者从经验中学习。相比之下,1970 年代之前的心理实验给予参与者学习的机会。当人们可以从经验中学习时,他们对机会、随机性和风险的直觉并不完美,但相当不错。最近才意识到,实验实践的这种变化是使直觉突然出现受到偏见影响的因素之一。令人惊讶的是,很少有人意识到揭示直觉奇迹的研究。 这个盲点受到第三个措施的推动,即显著的引文偏见:报告良好直觉的研究很少被提及和引用,而报告偏见的研究却被广泛宣传。偏见偏见和缺乏学习机会对产生对直觉的新负面看法至关重要,而大量的引文偏见时不时地使直觉的不可信性看起来像是一个坚实的科学事实。
These three weapons in the war against intuition have created a distorted picture of intuition and reinforced the misleading idea that intuition is hostile to reason. This war, eventually called the great rationality debate, or rationality war, spilled over into politics. If ordinary people's intuitions are riddled with biases, citizens cannot make appropriate decisions by themselves and therefore need steady guidance by experts and governments. Governments, so the argument continues, know better what their citizens really want and should nudge them along that path. This new paternalism is reminiscent of the male paternalism of the past, where women were seen as irrational and in need of male guidance. Now the verdict is on people's intuition across the board, and governments have a scientific blueprint to nudge their citizens into "proper" behavior. Once again, intuition has been discredited in the name of science.
这场反对直觉的战争中的这三种武器创造了对直觉的扭曲看法,并加强了直觉对理性的敌意的误导性观念。这场战争最终被称为伟大的理性辩论,或理性战争, 并波及到政治领域。如果普通人的直觉充满偏见,公民就无法自行做出适当的决定,因此需要专家和政府的稳定指导。因此,论点继续认为,政府更了解他们的公民真正想要什么,并应该引导他们走上这条道路。 这种新的家长式管理让人想起过去的男性家长式管理,那时女性被视为不理性,需要男性的指导。现在,对人们的直觉做出了全面的裁决,政府有了一份科学蓝图,可以引导他们的公民进入“正确”的行为轨迹。再次,直觉在科学的名义下被贬低。

The Bias Bias in the Service of Governmental Paternalism and Reckless Companies
政府的偏见偏见服务和鲁莽公司

Male paternalism is, of course, not the same as governmental paternalism, even if both have been justified by attacking intuition. Yet there are striking parallels. Female intuition had been linked to moral flaws, while in the 2Ist century, intuition was linked to individual moral weaknesses and considered the cause of individual wrongdoings such as failure to take care of one's health, to use condoms as protection from AIDS, and to save money for the future. Moreover, intuition was increasingly seen to be at the root of social problems, causing more than individual damage. Obesity was suspected to result from a "present bias" (overweighting the present moment), addictive gambling from wrong statistical intuitions, and the financial crisis of 2008 from traders' overconfidence bias. Once again, governments were called to step in and nudge their citizens in order to protect them - not from criminals, but from themselves. As we will see, these brash claims were rarely based on independent evidence. In fact, when my colleagues and I reviewed over a thousand studies, we found little reliable evidence that so-called biases of intuition are associated with loss of wealth, health, happiness, or any other measurable costs. Yet, blaming intuition for society's ills has become a story too powerful to be disturbed by facts.
男性的家长作风当然不同于政府的家长作风,即使两者都曾被攻击直觉来证明。然而,两者之间存在着明显的相似之处。女性的直觉曾被联系到道德缺陷,而在 21 世纪,直觉被联系到个人道德弱点,并被认为是导致个人错误行为的原因,比如不注意健康、不使用避孕套预防艾滋病,以及不为未来存钱。此外,直觉越来越被视为社会问题的根源,导致的不仅仅是个人损害。肥胖被怀疑是由于“现在偏见”(过分看重当前时刻)造成的,成瘾赌博是由于错误的统计直觉,2008 年的金融危机是由于交易员的过度自信偏见。再次,政府被要求介入,引导他们的公民以保护他们 - 不是免受罪犯的伤害,而是免受自己的伤害。正如我们将看到的,这些大胆的说法很少基于独立证据。 事实上,当我和同事们审查了一千多项研究时,我们发现很少有可靠证据表明所谓的直觉偏见与财富、健康、幸福或任何其他可衡量的成本有关。 然而,责怪直觉导致社会问题已经成为一个过于强大的故事,无法被事实打破。
Attributing obesity or financial crises to a failure of the brain's rational part to prevent its intuitive part from irrational action amounts to a onesided, individualistic view of responsibility. This internal narrative deflects attention from some of the real culprits in the external world. The food industry earns billions from advertising and selling unhealthy food, the gambling industry has deliberately designed personalized slot machines to make people addicted, and legal systems allow bankers to profit from taking undue risks and letting taxpayers pick up the bill. In this way, the war against intuition can serve quite a few parties' interests. For instance, the House of Lords criticized the UK government under former prime minister David Cameron for nudging citizens to avoid obesity instead of considering more efficient solutions such as prohibiting the television advertising of products high in sugar, salt, and fat.
将肥胖或金融危机归因于大脑理性部分未能阻止其直觉部分进行非理性行为,这等于是一种片面的、个人主义的责任观。这种内部叙事转移了对外部世界一些真正罪魁祸首的注意力。食品行业通过广告和销售不健康食品赚取数十亿美元,赌博行业故意设计个性化老虎机让人上瘾,法律体系允许银行家从冒险并让纳税人买单中获利。这样,对抗直觉的战争可以为许多利益相关方服务。例如,上议院批评了前首相戴维·卡梅伦领导下的英国政府,因为他们敦促公民避免肥胖,而不是考虑更有效的解决方案,比如禁止高糖、高盐、高脂肪产品的电视广告。
Focusing on systematic errors made by human intuition is also of interest for companies that severely pollute the environment, as the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska illustrates. In 1994, an Alaskan federal jury awarded billion to fishermen and others whose livelihoods had been devastated by the spill. When Exxon waged its appeal, a new line of research emerged that used studies with mock juries to question jurors' intuitions. Without mentioning that it had funded the research, Exxon argued "that jurors are generally incapable of performing the tasks the law assigns to them in punitive damage cases." The results served Exxon well in court. This new line of research on jurors' intuitions eventually became part of a new field known as behavioral law and economics. Its key program is to show how intuition fails in legal contexts.
专注于人类直觉产生的系统性错误也对那些严重污染环境的公司感兴趣,正如 1989 年阿拉斯加埃克森美孚瓦尔迪兹石油泄漏事件所示。 1994 年,阿拉斯加联邦陪审团判给渔民和其他因泄漏而生计受到严重影响的人 亿美元。当埃克森提出上诉时,出现了一项新的研究领域,利用模拟陪审团的研究来质疑陪审员的直觉。 埃克森辩称“陪审员通常无法完成法律在惩罚性赔偿案件中分配给他们的任务。” 结果在法庭上对埃克森有利。 这种关于陪审员直觉的新研究领域最终成为一个被称为行为法律与经济学的新领域的一部分。 其主要目标是展示直觉在法律环境中的失败。
By no means do I defend intuition for its own sake. A "war on reason" would be equally dangerous. The scientific method has struggled for centuries to promote fact over opinion and encourage people to look at the evidence rather than to defend their favored theories. Today, we witness new versions of this long-standing struggle, amplified by the rapid dissemination of fake news by social media. The international Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) study reported that over 90 percent of 15 -year-olds worldwide do not know how to distinguish facts from mere opinion or fake news. Even worse, many do not seem to be motivated to do so in the first place. Social scientists and philosophers themselves struggle to respect the evidence if it does not validate their theories, as the accounts of female intuition versus male reason and of the bias bias illustrate.
绝不是为了直觉本身而辩护。对“理性的战争”同样危险。科学方法已经努力了几个世纪,以促进事实胜于观点,并鼓励人们看证据而不是捍卫他们偏爱的理论。今天,我们目睹了这场长期斗争的新版本,由社交媒体快速传播虚假新闻而加剧。国际学生评估计划(PISA)的研究报告称,全球超过 90%的 15 岁学生不知道如何区分事实和纯粹观点或假新闻。更糟糕的是,许多人似乎没有动力去做这件事。社会科学家和哲学家们自己也在努力尊重证据,如果证据不支持他们的理论,如女性直觉与男性理性以及偏见偏见的描述。
This struggle has a long history. In the early th century, disputes among scholars grew so fierce and insults so intolerable that the Royal Society of London prevented scholars from publishing their pet theories and focused on oddities of nature instead. For about half a century, the annals were filled with striking observations for which no theories existed, such as double-headed calves, blood rain in Bavaria, and cold light. Francis Bacon, one of the spearheads of the movement, complained that observations are too often contaminated with arbitrary dogmas. Looking at strange facts helped to reduce the avalanche of personal insults.
这场斗争有着悠久的历史。在 世纪初,学者之间的争执变得如此激烈,侮辱如此不堪,以至于伦敦皇家学会禁止学者们发表他们的个人理论,转而专注于自然的奇异现象。大约半个世纪的时间里,年鉴中充满了一些引人注目的观察结果,而这些结果并没有相应的理论来解释,比如双头小牛、拜仁的血雨和冷光。运动的先锋之一弗朗西斯·培根抱怨说,观察结果往往受到任意教条的污染。看着奇怪的事实有助于减少个人侮辱的雪崩。

Common Sense, Freedom, and Dignity
常识、自由和尊严

The war on intuition, be it on female's or everyone's intuition, intersects with the struggle for freedom and dignity of a group of people and the effort of others to control them. Thomas Paine's Common Sense, written in I776 against the rule of authority - about the then king of Great Britain and his injustices to American colonists - exemplifies the ideal that people should be free and trust their own senses to rule themselves. Common Sense swept through the colonies like a firestorm, selling half a million copies and fueling the American War of Independence.
对直觉的战争,无论是对女性的还是对每个人的直觉,都与一群人的自由和尊严的斗争以及其他人控制他们的努力交汇。托马斯·潘恩在 1776 年写的《常识》,反对当时大不列颠国王的统治 - 关于他对美国殖民地人的不公正 - 体现了人们应该自由并信任自己的感官来统治自己的理想。《常识》像一场火灾席卷殖民地,销售了 50 万册,助长了美国独立战争。
Today, digital technology is being misused to convince people that they should submit to a new rule of authority, technological paternalism. We are told that Google knows us better than we ourselves do and that we would be better off following the recommendations of algorithms rather than our own intuition. Underlying technological paternalism is the idea that algorithms will soon outperform human intelligence in all respects, if they have not done so already, and it is thus only prudent to stop making decisions on our own and defer to AI. In this view, AI is seen not as a complement to human intuition, but as an authoritative superintelligence that is immune to the errors we make. Yet, the evidence to back such technological paternalism is as scarce as for the claim that women are intuitive and men rational. What drives this narrative is marketing hype and techno-religious faith. Statistical machines such as deep artificial neural networks are excellent for some tasks, but incorporating intuition and common sense into AI remains an enormous challenge.
今天,数字技术被滥用,说服人们应该服从一种新的权威规则,即技术家长制。我们被告知,谷歌比我们自己更了解我们,我们最好遵循算法的建议,而不是我们自己的直觉。技术家长制的基本观念是,如果算法在各方面还没有超越人类智能,那么它们很快就会做到,因此停止自己做决定,转而依赖人工智能是明智的。在这种观点中,人工智能被视为一种权威的超级智能,免疫我们所犯的错误,而不是作为人类直觉的补充。然而,支持这种技术家长制的证据与声称女性具有直觉而男性具有理性一样稀缺。推动这一叙事的是营销炒作和技术宗教信仰。深度人工神经网络等统计机器在某些任务上表现出色,但将直觉和常识融入人工智能仍然是一个巨大的挑战。

Toward a Science of Intuition
走向直觉科学

To develop a scientific perspective on intuition, we first need to dispense with the old and misleading dualistic opposition of intuition and reason that has survived in many psychological theories. Instead, intuition and reason go hand in hand: In the case of the doctor who feels that something is wrong with a patient, intuition comes first, followed by a deliberate search for what is wrong. Even in abstract disciplines such as mathematics, both intuition and reasoning are needed. As George Pólya emphasized, finding a problem or discovering a proof requires intuition and heuristics; checking whether the proof is correct requires logic and analysis.
要发展对直觉的科学观点,我们首先需要摒弃在许多心理理论中仍然存在的旧的和误导性的直觉与理性的二元对立。相反,直觉和理性是相辅相成的:在医生觉得病人有问题时,直觉先行,然后是对问题的刻意搜索。即使在数学等抽象学科中,直觉和推理都是必需的。正如乔治·波利亚强调的那样,找到问题或发现证明需要直觉和启发;检查证明是否正确需要逻辑和分析。
Accordingly, psychological studies do not support the polarization of intuition and reason. If intuition and analysis were exclusive poles, their use would be negatively correlated (either the one or the other). An evaluation of 75 studies, however, showed that intuition and analysis were uncorrelated. Nor is the alignment of intuition with heuristics and biases in popular dual-systems theories supported by evidence. Every heuristic can be used both intuitively (unconsciously) and consciously; intuition can lead to errors, but so can deliberate reasoning, logical argument, and big data. Although the dichotomies in dual systems are quite vague, it is easy to see that they do not even align. Rather, they reflect the centuries-old view that pits reason against intuition, with reason as the dominant force. Instead of simply positing value-laden polar opposites, it is more fruitful to empirically study the nature of intuition and its relation to reason.
因此,心理学研究并不支持直觉和理性的极端对立。如果直觉和分析是互斥的极端,它们的使用将呈负相关(要么一个,要么另一个)。然而,对 75 项研究的评估显示,直觉和分析之间没有相关性。 直觉与启发式和偏见在流行的双系统理论中的对齐也没有得到证据支持。每种启发式都可以在直觉(无意识)和有意识的情况下使用;直觉可能导致错误,但刻意推理、逻辑论证和大数据也可能如此。 尽管双系统中的二元对立相当模糊,但很容易看出它们甚至不对齐。相反,它们反映了几个世纪以来将理性与直觉对立起来,以理性为主导力量的观点。与其简单地假设价值观负载的极端对立,更有益的是从经验上研究直觉的本质及其与理性的关系。
To get there, we also need to dispose of the bias bias, that is, the preoccupation with showing that people's intuition is flawed, even when evidence of that is scarce or nonexistent. For instance, at the beginning of the Covid-I9 pandemic, Bloomberg published an article entitled "The Cognitive Bias That Makes Us Panic About Coronavirus." The author confidently asserted that "most people in North America and Europe do not need to worry much about the risk of contracting the disease" and are "more scared than they have any reason to be." People's fear of getting infected was attributed to a bias of intuition, probability neglect. This means that people overestimate the danger because they fixate their attention solely on the potentially severe consequences of Covid-19 and neglect the low probability of these actually happening. At that time, however, nobody could know whether the probability was low or high, or how the pandemic would develop. When, during the following months, hundreds of thousands of people became infected with the virus and died, it became clear that people's intuitions were not so wrong. Other fighters in the war against intuition now blamed people for underestimating how quickly the virus spreads. People were said to suffer from an exponential growth bias, that is, a flawed understanding of the virus's exponential growth. Many people have never been taught exponential functions and, thus, may indeed have difficulties in understanding them, but that is not the point. As it turned out, the spread of the virus was not exponentially increasing, but instead came in waves, growing and fading. The Covid-19 pandemic was a situation of uncertainty, not calculable risk, where no one could know the ever-changing probabilities and ups and downs, which left both experts at the World Health Organization (WHO) and ordinary people in the dark.
为了到达那里,我们还需要摆脱偏见,即对展示人们直觉错误的偏见,即使证据稀少或不存在。例如,在 Covid-19 大流行开始时,彭博社发表了一篇名为“让我们恐慌于冠状病毒的认知偏见”的文章。作者自信地断言“北美和欧洲大多数人不需要过多担心感染疾病的风险”,并且“比他们有任何理由害怕的更害怕”。人们对感染的恐惧被归因于直觉偏见,概率忽视。这意味着人们会高估危险,因为他们只专注于 Covid-19 可能造成的严重后果,而忽视这些后果实际发生的低概率。然而,当时没有人知道概率是低还是高,或者大流行会如何发展。在接下来的几个月里,数十万人感染病毒并死亡,人们的直觉并没有那么错误,这一点变得清楚。 在对抗直觉的战争中,其他战士现在指责人们低估了病毒传播速度。据说人们患有指数增长偏见,即对病毒指数增长的理解存在缺陷。 许多人从未接受过指数函数的教育,因此可能确实难以理解,但这不是重点。事实证明,病毒的传播并非呈指数增长,而是呈波浪式增长和减退。新冠疫情是一种不确定性情况,而非可计算风险,没有人能够了解不断变化的概率和起伏,这让世界卫生组织(WHO)的专家和普通人都一筹莫展。
Thus, there are two indispensable preconditions for a mature science of intuition. First, one needs to eliminate the opposition between intuition and reason, both of which are needed for human intelligence. Second, one needs to eliminate the bias bias. Only by taking both intuition and reasoning seriously can we find out how they work, how they relate to each other, and when they each err.
因此,直觉科学有两个不可或缺的前提条件。首先,需要消除直觉和理性之间的对立,这两者对人类智慧都是必需的。其次,需要消除偏见。只有认真对待直觉和推理,我们才能找出它们是如何运作的,它们如何相互关联,以及它们何时出错。

What Follows 什么接下来

Part I of this book deals with the widespread mistrust of intuition. It begins with the opposition of female intuition versus male reason in the context of ideas about female intelligence. This chapter not only presents the history of the idea of a peculiarly female intelligence but also provides a larger context for the struggle to understand the mystery of intelligence and for the historical bias against women masked as science. It shows how the polarity eventually became resolved, even though beliefs in male superiority have not yet been fully extinguished. However, the opposition between intuition and reason has survived in present-day dual-systems theories of reasoning, which wage a new war against intuition. I make the case that there is little evidence for this opposition, even after it was cleansed of its problematic association with gender. The last chapter in Part I shows, in more depth, how the war against intuition has not only fueled male paternalism but also governmental and technological paternalism.
本书的第一部分涉及对直觉的普遍不信任。它始于女性直觉与男性理性在有关女性智力的观念背景下的对立。这一章节不仅呈现了关于独特女性智力观念的历史,还为理解智力之谜的斗争和作为科学的历史偏见掩盖的更大背景提供了上下文。它展示了极性最终如何得以解决,尽管对男性优越性的信念尚未完全熄灭。然而,直觉与理性之间的对立在当今的推理双系统理论中仍然存在,这些理论对直觉发动了新的战争。我认为几乎没有证据支持这种对立,即使在与性别有问题的关联被清除之后。第一部分的最后一章更深入地展示了对直觉的战争不仅助长了男性家长主义,还助长了政府和技术家长主义。
In Part II, I address the question of the nature of intuition. I argue that intuition is guided by the unconscious use of adaptive heuristics. These heuristics are ecologically rational and can lead to better decisions with little to no deliberate thinking. The fluency heuristic is an example. Heuristics can be embodied, that is, enlist motor and perceptual abilities without awareness. I also show how professional intuitions can be explicated by models of heuristics, such as the heuristics that Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos have used for hiring. The final chapter looks at the social world of science: How can one establish and maintain an environment that fosters successful collaboration in a research group? Using my 20 years of experience in directing a research group at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin as a case study, I illustrate how heuristics shape the intellectual and social climate of research and how they influence whether a group culture can become more or less open, more or less formal, and more or less inclusive.
在第二部分中,我探讨直觉的本质问题。我认为直觉是由无意识使用适应性启发式引导的。这些启发式是生态合理的,可以在几乎没有刻意思考的情况下做出更好的决策。流畅启发式就是一个例子。启发式可以体现在身体上,即在没有意识的情况下利用运动和感知能力。我还展示了如何通过启发式模型来解释专业直觉,比如埃隆·马斯克和杰夫·贝索斯用于招聘的启发式。最后一章探讨科学的社会世界:如何建立和维护一个促进研究小组成功合作的环境?利用我在柏林马克斯·普朗克人类发展研究所领导研究小组的 20 年经验作为案例研究,我阐明了启发式如何塑造研究的智力和社会氛围,以及它们如何影响一个团体文化是否变得更加开放、更加正式、更加包容。
The important point is that intuition and adaptive heuristics can deal with situations of uncertainty (where we cannot know all possible future states and their consequences), with situations of intractability (where no computer can find the best solution), and with incommensurability (where there is no common currency). Rational choice theory cannot deal with these situations and is forced to reduce uncertainty to risk (where one knows everything that can happen in the future), to ignore intractability, and to exclude all problems where a dollar value cannot be attached to each option.
重要的一点是直觉和适应性启发法可以处理不确定性情况(我们无法知道所有可能的未来状态及其后果),处理难以解决的情况(没有计算机能找到最佳解决方案),以及处理不可比性(没有共同的货币)。理性选择理论无法处理这些情况,被迫将不确定性降低到风险(在这种情况下,人们知道未来可能发生的一切),忽视难以解决性,并排除所有无法为每个选项附加美元价值的问题。

PART I 第一部分

The War on Intuition
直觉之战

Intuition was more or less a casualty of early 2oth-century psychology's efforts to purge itself of metaphysical baggage.
直觉在 20 世纪早期心理学努力清除形而上学包袱的过程中多少成为了牺牲品。
Lisa M. Osbeck and Barbara S. Held
Lisa M. Osbeck 和 Barbara S. Held
Osbeck & Held (2OI4), p. 8.

Female Intuition Versus Male Reason The Battle for Intelligence
女性直觉对抗男性理性 智力之战

Her philosophy is not to reason, but to sense.
她的哲学不是推理,而是感知。
Immanuel Kant (I764) 伊曼努尔·康德(1764 年)
Her logical thought is slower, but her associations quicker than those of man, she is less troubled by inconsistencies, and has less patience with the analysis involved in science and invention.
她的逻辑思维较慢,但她的联想比男性更快,她不太受到不一致的困扰,并且对科学和发明中涉及的分析有更少的耐心。
G. Stanley Hall (1904)
G. Stanley Hall(1904)
Immanuel Kant's conviction that women's nature is sense rather than reason surprised few scholars during the Enlightenment. Learned ladies, Kant believed, were worse than useless, and the very thought of women intellectuals interested in Greek philosophy or the foundations of mechanics seemed almost comical in his eyes. Kant stood in a long and tenacious tradition of scholars convinced that the mind of a woman differs from that of a man. It can be traced back to Aristotle's influential contention that "the female is softer in disposition, is more mischievous, less simple, more impulsive, and more attentive to the nurture of the young; the male, on the other hand, is more spirited, more savage, more simple and less cunning . . . She is, furthermore, more prone to despondency and less hopeful than the man, more void of shame, more false of speech, more deceptive, and of more retentive memory." At the beginning of the 20th century, psychology reiterated the idea that women are qualitatively different. The founder and first president of the American Psychological Association, G. Stanley Hall, held that women are intuitive and emotional, slow in logical thought, better at mental reproduction than production, and too impatient for analysis and science:
康德坚信,女性的本性是感性而非理性,这一观点在启蒙时期并未令多少学者感到惊讶。康德认为,博学的女士们毫无用处,他甚至觉得女性智者对希腊哲学或力学基础感兴趣的想法在他看来几乎是滑稽可笑的。康德站在一派长期坚信女性思维与男性不同的学者传统中。这一传统可以追溯到亚里士多德的有影响力的论断:“女性性情较为柔和,更加淘气,不那么简单,更加冲动,更加关注幼儿的养育;而男性则更富有斗志,更为凶猛,更为简单,不那么狡猾……她还更容易沮丧,比男性更缺乏希望,更不知羞耻,言辞更虚伪,更具欺骗性,记忆力更强。”20 世纪初,心理学重申了女性在质性上与男性不同的观点。美国心理学协会的创始人兼首任主席 G.斯坦利·霍尔认为,女性是直觉和情感的,逻辑思维较慢,比起创造更擅长心理再现,对于分析和科学太不耐烦
She works by intuition and feeling; fear, anger, pity, love, and most of the emotions have a wider range and greater intensity. If she abandons her natural naiveté and takes up the burden of guiding and accounting for her life by consciousness, she is likely to lose more than she gains, according to the old saw that she who deliberates is lost.
她凭直觉和感觉工作;恐惧、愤怒、怜悯、爱情等大多数情绪具有更广泛和更强烈的强度。如果她放弃了她的天真本性,担起了通过意识引导和解释生活的重担,她可能会得不偿失,正如古谚所说的那样,犹豫不决者失去了。
Hall, then president of Clark University, consequently opted against coeducation. Like Clark University, Harvard set up a female institution in the 1890 s, Radcliffe College, next to the all-male Harvard College. But even there, women were treated differently. Not until I967 did Harvard's Lamont Library open its doors to female students, an opening vehemently opposed by the administration and the majority of male undergraduates, on the grounds that females would distract male students and that there weren't even bathroom facilities for women. It took yet another io years before Harvard terminated its policy of admitting only one female student for every four male students.
霍尔,当时是克拉克大学的校长,因此选择反对男女同校。与克拉克大学一样,哈佛大学在 19 世纪 90 年代成立了一个女子学院,莱德克利夫学院,与全男性的哈佛学院相邻。但即便如此,女性仍然受到不同对待。直到 1967 年,哈佛的兰蒙特图书馆才向女性学生开放,这一举措遭到了管理层和大多数男性本科生的强烈反对,理由是女性会分散男性学生的注意力,而且甚至没有为女性提供卫生间设施。直到另外 10 年后,哈佛才终止了每四名男性学生只招收一名女性学生的政策。
Hall expressed what psychologists at the time held to be a law of nature, traces of which can be found in people's thinking today. When my colleagues and I asked representative samples of 21st-century Germans and Spaniards about gender differences, the result was surprising - or perhaps not. The vast majority of women and men, young and old, believed that women had better intuitions than men about personal affairs, but not about science and finance. 5 And the rejection of learned ladies persists: Most contemporary American men in search of a partner on online dating sites find women with a Master's or degree unattractive and prefer those with lower education.
霍尔表达了当时心理学家认为是自然法则的观点,这种观点的痕迹今天仍然可以在人们的思维中找到。当我和同事询问 21 世纪德国人和西班牙人代表性样本关于性别差异的看法时,结果令人惊讶 - 或许也不足为奇。绝大多数女性和男性,无论年轻还是年长,都认为女性在个人事务方面比男性更具直觉,但在科学和金融方面则不是。对学有才女的排斥仍然存在:大多数当代美国男性在在线约会网站上寻找伴侣时,认为拥有硕士或 学位的女性不具吸引力,更喜欢那些受教育程度较低的女性。
This chapter is a case study on how the lack of theory about the nature of intelligence enabled cultural biases about women to be presented as science by major psychologists. A discipline that is unaware of the errors in its history is potentially hazardous: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." I reconstruct the history of the idea of a peculiarly female intelligence in three overlapping views. In the first view, from Aristotle through to the mid-19th century, the idea of intelligence as we encounter it today - as a general ability that is measurable and is largely independent of personality and moral character - did not exist. Instead, the difference between men and women was understood in terms of polarities that were a mixture of intellect, personality, and moral character, such as men's reason versus women's intuition. The notion of these polarities wore away in the mid-I9th century and was supplanted by the concept of an inherited "natural ability" (soon to be named intelligence), mainly through the writings of the English polymath Francis Galton. As a consequence, in this second view, men and women no longer differed in quality, but in quantity: On average, it was thought, women had inherited a smaller share of intelligence. The psychologist Lewis Terman put an end to this view by eliminating particular test items from his test (the StanfordBinet test, which I discuss in the section "Binet's Intelligence Test Crosses the Atlantic and Becomes Seen as a Test of Genetic Ability") and balancing the rest so that girls and boys had the same mean IQ. The eliminated items landed in a personality scale called "masculinity-femininity" (see the section "How Differences in Intelligence Become Differences in Personality"), which illustrates the arbitrariness of what counted as a measurement of intelligence rather than of personality. What remains debated to the present day is the third view, promoted by sexologist Havelock Ellis (I859-1939). It alleges that men's intelligence varies more than that of women, implying the existence of more male idiots and geniuses.
本章是关于智力本质缺乏理论如何使有关女性的文化偏见被主要心理学家呈现为科学的案例研究。一个对自身历史中的错误毫无察觉的学科可能是危险的:“那些不能记住过去的人注定要重蹈覆辙。”我重建了关于女性智力特质的观念的历史,这包括三种重叠的观点。在第一个观点中,从亚里士多德到 19 世纪中叶,我们今天所遇到的智力观念——作为一种可测量的普遍能力,与个性和道德品质基本独立——并不存在。相反,男性和女性之间的差异被理解为一种混合了智力、个性和道德品质的极性,比如男性的理性与女性的直觉。这些极性的概念在 19 世纪中叶逐渐消失,被一个继承的“自然能力”概念所取代(很快被称为智力),主要是通过英国博学家弗朗西斯·高尔顿的著作。 因此,在这第二种观点中,男性和女性不再在质量上有所不同,而是在数量上有所不同:一般认为,女性继承了较少的智力份额。心理学家刘易斯·特曼通过从他的测试中消除特定的测试项目(斯坦福-比奈测试,我在“比奈的智力测试跨越大西洋并被视为遗传能力测试”部分讨论)来终结这种观点,并平衡其余部分,使女孩和男孩的平均智商相同。被消除的项目落入一个名为“男性-女性”的人格量表中(请参阅“智力差异如何变成个性差异”部分),这说明了什么被视为智力而不是个性的测量的任意性。到目前为止仍在争论的是第三种观点,由性学家哈维洛克·埃利斯(1859-1939)提倡。它声称男性的智力变化比女性更大,暗示着存在更多的男性白痴和天才。
Whatever the hallmark of a peculiarly female intelligence has been polarities, lower average, or lower variability - it has served the dubious purpose of justifying men's dominant role in society. Similarly, whatever the supposed mental differences were, these became presented as part of the natural order, expressed in the female body and women's reproductive function.
无论是女性智力的特点是极性、平均水平较低,还是变异性较低——它都为证明男性在社会中的主导地位服务了可疑的目的。同样,无论所谓的心理差异是什么,这些都被呈现为自然秩序的一部分,体现在女性身体和女性的生殖功能中。

Before Intelligence: Female Intuition Versus Male Reason
在智慧之前:女性直觉对抗男性理性

Intelligence, as we know it from IQ tests, refers to a general ability that can be measured by a single number and is assumed to be largely independent of personality and moral character. IQ tests have been given to millions of children, recruits, and job applicants, and continue to influence access to education and jobs. The IQ has often been presented as a hard fact, and debates have raged over how much of its variability is due to nature or nurture. These debates ignored the fact that intelligence as we know it was "invented" in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries.
智力,正如我们从智商测试中所了解的那样,指的是一种可以通过一个数字来衡量的普遍能力,被认为在很大程度上独立于个性和道德品质。智商测试已经被给予数百万儿童、新兵和求职者,并继续影响着教育和就业机会。智商常被呈现为一个硬性事实,围绕其变异程度有多少是由天性或教养所致的争论一直在进行。这些争论忽视了我们所了解的智力是在 19 世纪末和 20 世纪初“发明”的这一事实。
Before that time, what we now call the intellect was considered neither as a single general ability nor as largely unrelated to moral and personality traits. Rather, psychological theories conceived the mind as a collection of faculties or talents. For instance, the key concept of sensibility in early 18th-century psychology encompassed both perceptual and emotional sensitivity as the precondition for empirical knowledge and the emotions of charity and compassion. Reason was even more closely identified with morality because the light of reason enabled one to recognize all forms of truth, including the distinction between good and evil. No single one of these faculties or a combination thereof corresponds to the contemporary concept of intelligence.
在那个时候,我们现在称之为智力的东西既不被视为单一的普遍能力,也不被视为与道德和个性特征大部分无关。相反,心理学理论将心智看作是一组能力或才能。例如,18 世纪早期心理学中的感性这一关键概念包括知觉和情感敏感作为经验知识和慈善和同情情感的前提。理性甚至更紧密地与道德联系在一起,因为理性之光使人能够认识到所有形式的真理,包括善恶之间的区别。这些能力中的任何一个单独的或其组合都不对应当代智力概念。
The prototypical male and female occupied opposite poles on the spectrum of these faculties. For instance, men were characterized by judgment, abstract thought, and genius, while women were considered to lack these and, instead, excel in intuition, concrete thought, and retentive memory. Male strength was opposed to female delicacy or bodily and mental weakness. This supposed weakness was, in turn, seen as evidence that nature intended women to confine themselves to the home and subordinate themselves to men. It was reasoned that because men's thought was abstract, they could comprehend truth, including moral truth, while women's concrete thinking prevented them from grasping abstract moral principles. Hence, women who lied or stole were considered incapable of understanding that their actions were evil. When Hall, in 1904, wrote that women, guided by intuition and feeling, were unfit for science and invention because they lacked patience, he was simply reiterating the timeworn conviction that women did not have the necessary selfdiscipline and stamina to reason by following a lengthy chain of argument.
原型男性和女性在这些能力范围的相反极端占据了位置。例如,男性以判断、抽象思维和天才为特征,而女性被认为缺乏这些特征,反而擅长直觉、具体思维和记忆力。男性的力量与女性的细腻或身心上的弱点相对立。这种所谓的弱点被视为自然意图女性限制自己在家中,并服从于男性。有人推断,因为男性的思维是抽象的,他们能够理解真理,包括道德真理,而女性的具体思维阻碍了她们理解抽象的道德原则。因此,那些撒谎或偷窃的女性被认为无法理解她们的行为是邪恶的。1904 年,霍尔写道,由直觉和感觉引导的女性因缺乏耐心而不适合从事科学和发明,因为他们缺乏必要的自律和耐力来通过遵循漫长的论证链推理。
Women's and men's virtues were also seen as diametrically opposed. For centuries (and in many contexts even today), chastity was considered the chief female virtue and its violation a cardinal sin for women alone. Timidity, in contrast, was a cardinal sin for men, but easily excused in women. The view that women's intellect, character, and moral traits are intimately connected to their biology survived in various forms into early 2oth-century philosophy. Consider the controversial Austrian philosopher Otto Weininger, hailed by Freud and Wittgenstein as a great genius. In his book Sex & Character, Weininger drew on a wide range of philosophers and psychologists to assert that reasoning and feeling are equivalent in women who, as a consequence, are prone to suggestibility, hypnosis, and hysteria, as documented by Freud. These alleged flaws correspond to Aristotle's view that women's memory is easier to imprint. From biologists Sir Patrick Geddes and John Arthur Thomson, Weininger borrowed the conviction that each cell in a woman's body is sexually marked to make the female in every respect passive, submissive, and lacking in personality. Unlike man, he wrote, "woman is non-logical and non-moral." Faced with the fact that more men stand trial for crimes, he argued that behind every lawbreaker is a woman who proposes the crime and profits from it. Weininger gained great popularity when he killed himself at the age of 23 at a spectacular site, the room in which Ludwig van Beethoven had died. This dramatic finale led to huge book sales and an enthusiastic reception by many contemporaries, including the Swedish playwright and novelist August Strindberg, who claimed that Weininger's book had finally solved "the problem of women."
妇女和男子的美德也被视为截然相反。几个世纪以来(甚至在许多情境中,直到今天),贞洁被认为是主要的女性美德,而其违反则是妇女独有的重罪。相比之下,胆怯是男性的重罪,但在女性身上却容易被原谅。认为妇女的智力、品格和道德特质与其生物学密切相关的观点以各种形式延续至 20 世纪初的哲学中。考虑引起争议的奥地利哲学家奥托·魏宁格,被弗洛伊德和维特根斯坦誉为伟大的天才。在他的著作《性与品格》中,魏宁格借鉴了广泛的哲学家和心理学家的观点,声称女性的推理和感情是等同的,因此容易受到暗示、催眠和歇斯底里的影响,这些都被弗洛伊德所记录。这些所谓的缺陷对应于亚里士多德的观点,即女性的记忆更容易被印记。从生物学家帕特里克·盖德斯爵士和约翰·阿瑟·汤姆森那里,魏宁格借来了这样一种信念,即女性身体中的每个细胞都被性别标记,使得女性在各个方面都 passively、顺从且缺乏个性。 与男人不同,他写道,“女人是非逻辑和非道德的。” 面对更多男性因犯罪而受审的事实,他认为每个犯罪者背后都有一个提出犯罪并从中获利的女人。魏宁格在 23 岁时在一个引人注目的地点自杀,那就是贝多芬去世的房间。这个戏剧性的结局导致了巨大的书籍销售量,并受到许多同时代人的热烈欢迎,包括瑞典剧作家和小说家奥古斯特·斯特林伯格,他声称魏宁格的书终于解决了“女性问题”。" "
In sum, for millennia, a fairly consistent view reigned about women's intellect as differing fundamentally from that of men. My brief account does scant justice to the variations of this view among scholars and centuries. Yet, the common denominator between them is that there was no concept of a general intelligence, which was, instead, defined by a number of diametrically opposed polarities attributed to the prototypical male and female, a combination of what were only later separated into intelligence, personality, and moral traits. While the specific descriptions of the female and male attributes varied, they revolved around the poles of female intuition and male reason. This opposition, allegedly handed down by nature, was so manifestly true to psychologists and philosophers that evidence could not compromise the narrative. It was driven by motives outside of science, in particular the attempt to defend male's intellectual and moral dominance over females as part of the natural order. That is history, one might contend, and will not repeat itself. Yet, Chapter 3 shows that, in the 2 Ist century, the opposition between intuition and reason has been resurrected in psychology and once again embraced as a persuasive narrative that is held to be self-evident.
总的来说,几千年来,关于女性智力与男性有根本区别的观点一直相对一致。我的简要描述未能充分展现学者和世纪间这种观点的变化。然而,它们之间的共同点是,当时并没有普遍智力的概念,相反,这是由于被归因于原型男性和女性的一系列截然相反的极性所定义的,这些极性后来才被分开为智力、个性和道德特征。尽管对女性和男性属性的具体描述有所不同,但它们都围绕着女性直觉和男性理性这两极展开。这种对立,据说是由自然传承下来的,对心理学家和哲学家来说是如此明显真实,以至于证据无法动摇这一叙事。这是由科学之外的动机驱使的,特别是试图捍卫男性在智力和道德上对女性的支配地位,作为自然秩序的一部分。这就是历史,有人可能会争辩说,历史不会重演。 然而,第 3 章显示,在 21 世纪,直觉与理性之间的对立在心理学中得以复活,并再次被视为一种有说服力的叙述,被认为是不言自明的。

The Invention of a General Inherited Intelligence
一般继承智能的发明

The idea of mental faculties was slowly abandoned in the late I9th century for that of a single overarching intelligence. However, the associated idea that this intelligence combines cognitive abilities, personality, and moral traits did not fade away until the early 2oth century. The transition from multiple mental faculties to a single intelligence was driven not by data or by experiment, but by concerns outside the realm of science, chief among them being Francis Galton's interpretation of evolutionary theory, his fascination with measurement, and his involvement with the fateful eugenics program.
19 世纪末,心理能力的概念逐渐被单一的智力概念所取代。然而,直到 20 世纪初,人们仍然认为这种智力结合了认知能力、个性和道德特质。从多个心理能力到单一智力的转变并非是由数据或实验驱动的,而是受到科学领域之外的担忧影响,其中最主要的是弗朗西斯·高尔顿对进化理论的解释、他对测量的着迷以及他参与的命运攸关的优生计划。

Women Are Granted the Same Kind of Intelligence As Men, but Less of It
女性被赋予与男性相同类型的智慧,但数量较少

Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, promoted a strict distinction between nature and nurture, which had not been considered mutually exclusive before his time. This artificial distinction later led to a flood of psychological research seeking an answer to the (wrong) question of what percentage of the variation in intelligence is due to nature and to nurture (as opposed to asking how genes and environment interact, as in epigenetics). For Darwin's theory of evolution to work, it was clear that something must be passed on to the next generation and inherited by both boys and girls. In Hereditary Genius, Galton called this something natural ability (later known as intelligence). As he saw it, evolution implied that men and women must have the same kind of natural ability and also that this ability shows variability between individuals, given that variation is a driver of evolution. Men and women were assumed (no measurements or tests were involved) to exhibit the same bell-shaped ("normal") distribution of intelligence, an assumption Galton justified by analogy with height. Using the same analogy, he assumed the female distribution to have a lower average. Consequently, in Hereditary Genius, women feature solely as the mothers or wives of male geniuses.
高尔顿是查尔斯·达尔文的表亲,他提倡自然和培育之间的严格区分,在他之前这种区分并未被视为互相排斥。这种人为的区分后来导致了大量心理研究,试图回答智力变异中多少百分比是由自然和培育所致的(而不是询问基因和环境如何相互作用,如表观遗传学)。为了达尔文的进化理论能够成立,显然必须有某种东西传递给下一代,并由男孩和女孩继承。在《遗传天才》中,高尔顿称这种东西为自然能力(后来被称为智力)。在他看来,进化意味着男性和女性必须具有相同类型的自然能力,而且这种能力在个体之间表现出变异,因为变异是进化的驱动因素。假定男性和女性(没有涉及测量或测试)表现出相同的呈钟形(“正态”)智力分布,高尔顿通过身高类比来证明这一假设。使用相同的类比,他假定女性分布的平均值较低。 因此,在《遗传天才》中,女性仅仅作为男性天才的母亲或妻子出现。
Galton maintained the view that natural ability is a combination of intellect, personality, and moral traits, such as capacity, zeal, and the power to do laborious work. With respect to morals, he wrote that it is the nature of all of us to believe blindly in what we love, rather than in what we think most wise:
高尔顿认为,自然能力是智力、个性和道德特质(如能力、热情和劳动力)的结合。在道德方面,他写道,我们所有人的本性是盲目地相信我们所热爱的,而不是我们认为最明智的。
We are indignant when others pry into our idols, and criticize them with impunity, just as a savage flies to arms when a missionary picks his fetish to pieces. Women are far more strongly influenced by these feelings than men; they are blinder partisans and more servile followers of custom.
当别人窥探我们的偶像并毫无顾忌地批评他们时,我们感到愤慨,就像野蛮人在传教士拆解他的偶像时拔刀相向一样。女性受这些情感的影响要比男性强烈得多;她们是更盲目的支持者,更顺从于习俗的追随者。
The invention of a single, general form of intelligence, or natural ability, allowed Galton and his followers to compare men and women on a single dimension, similar to how he compared humans of different racial categories and even animal species. For instance, he conjectured that what he called the "negro race" differed from the "Anglo-Saxons" in their lower mean, not in the nature of their intelligence, and that certain gifted dogs had superior intelligence to some human "idiots and imbeciles." 19
单一、普遍的智力形式或自然能力的发明,使高尔顿及其追随者能够在一个维度上比较男性和女性,类似于他比较不同种族类别甚至动物物种的人类。例如,他推测所谓的“黑人种族”与“盎格鲁-撒克逊人”在智力的本质上并无差异,只是在平均水平上有所不同,并且某些有天赋的狗比某些“白痴和低能者”具有更高的智力。19
Today, the idea of a general kind of intelligence is mostly related to Charles Spearman's "g" factor. In fact, Spearman was strongly influenced by Galton, and his main statistical tool was correlation, developed by Galton. Like Galton, he thought that high-sensory discrimination and high intelligence are part of the same universal intellectual function. Unlike Galton, however, Spearman steered clear of prejudices about women or non-whites being genetically inferior in their intelligence.
今天,一般智力的概念主要与查尔斯·斯皮尔曼的“g”因素相关。实际上,斯皮尔曼受到高尔顿的很大影响,他的主要统计工具是高尔顿开发的相关性。像高尔顿一样,他认为高感知辨别力和高智力是同一种普遍智力功能的一部分。然而,与高尔顿不同的是,斯皮尔曼避免了关于女性或非白人在智力上遗传劣势的偏见。

The Failure to Measure Intelligence
未能衡量智力

After Galton had invented the concept of general intelligence, he tried to measure it in his Anthropometric Laboratory in London, which opened in 1884. He started with the hypothesis that intelligence, being inherited, can be found in the mind and body - in the entire nervous system. From that perspective, greater sensory acuity would be the external sign of higher intelligence. Inspired by Galton, James McKeen Cattell established another anthropometric laboratory at Cambridge University, which also focused on sensory acuity. However, a student of Cattell's, Clark Wissler, could not find a clear relationship between sensory acuity and mental ability when looking at college freshmen's grades. Moreover, the various acuity measures did not appear to correlate with each other. Rather than acknowledging this failure as an invalidation of his hereditary theory of intelligence, Galton assumed a need for better measures of innate ability. His quest failed.
加尔顿发明了智力的概念后,他试图在伦敦的人类测量实验室中测量智力,该实验室于 1884 年开放。他最初假设智力是遗传的,可以在头脑和身体中找到 - 在整个神经系统中。从这个角度来看,更大的感觉敏锐度将是更高智力的外部标志。受加尔顿启发,詹姆斯·麦金·卡特尔在剑桥大学建立了另一个人类测量实验室,该实验室也专注于感觉敏锐度。然而,卡特尔的一名学生克拉克·维斯勒在查看大学新生的成绩时,未能找到感觉敏锐度与智力之间的明确关系。此外,各种敏锐度测量似乎不相互相关。加尔顿没有承认这一失败是对他的智力遗传理论的否定,而是假设需要更好的天赋能力测量。他的追求失败了。
The key to measuring intelligence was found later in the work of Alfred Binet and Théodore Simon in France. In contrast to Galton and his followers, however, neither Binet nor Simon conceived intelligence as fixed or inherited, and Simon protested against the misuse of their test in England and the USA for measuring an allegedly inherited ability.
在法国,后来在阿尔弗雷德·比奈和西蒙·西奥多的工作中发现了衡量智力的关键。然而,与高尔顿及其追随者相比,比奈和西蒙都没有将智力看作是固定的或遗传的,西蒙还抗议他们的测试在英国和美国被误用来衡量一种据称是遗传的能力。

How Women's and Men's Average Intelligence Were Made Equal
女性和男性的平均智力如何变得相等

Binet, a member - and, later, director - of the Free Society for the Psychological Study of Children, was concerned about the unreliable diagnoses of children with intellectual disabilities in France. One and the same child might be classified according to the categories back then as "imbecile," "idiot," "feeble-minded," or "degenerate" in different certificates. Around I899, Binet set out to classify these children in an objective way with scientific precision. His goal was to place children with intellectual disabilities in special schools geared to improve their abilities, as in the German school system at the time, and also to ensure that children without any intellectual disabilities would not be placed in special classrooms solely because they were behaviorally challenging. But Binet had no coherent idea how to measure intelligence. Like Galton, he searched in vain for correlations with sensory acuity and tried almost everything else that seemed viable, including assessing intelligence on the basis of facial features (physiognomy), measurements of the head (cephalometry), and handwriting (graphology). For instance, he presented handwriting samples from convicted murderers mixed with those from normal citizens and asked expert graphologists for character assessments, only to find out that even the most eminent experts arrived at disastrously false assessments. The results were consistently disappointing. It remained a mystery what intelligence was and how to measure it.
比奈,自由儿童心理学研究协会的成员,后来成为该协会的主任,他对法国对智力障碍儿童的不可靠诊断感到担忧。同一个孩子可能根据当时的分类被称为“低能”,“白痴”,“智力低下”或“退化”在不同的证书中。约在 1899 年左右,比奈开始以科学精确的方式对这些儿童进行分类。他的目标是将智力障碍儿童安置在专门改善他们能力的学校中,就像当时的德国学校体系一样,并确保没有智力障碍的儿童仅因为行为有挑战性而被安置在特殊教室中。但比奈并没有一个连贯的想法如何衡量智力。像高尔顿一样,他徒劳地寻找与感官敏锐度的相关性,并尝试几乎所有看似可行的方法,包括根据面部特征(相面学)、头部测量(头颅测量学)和书写(笔迹学)来评估智力。 例如,他展示了来自被定罪的凶手和普通公民的书写样本,并向专家笔迹学家询问性格评估,结果发现即使是最杰出的专家也得出了灾难性错误的评估。结果一直令人失望。智力是什么以及如何衡量它仍然是一个谜。
Eventually, however, Binet and Simon found an ingenious answer to the question of finding a test that correlated with teachers' assessments. They developed questions about subjects that mirrored what was taught at school, such as reasoning skills, knowledge, memory, and attention. Children's answers to these questions now correlated with their school grades as well as with teachers' evaluations. By 1905, Binet and Simon had their first test of intelligence for classifying intellectually challenged children into several levels of developmental delay; in 1908, the test was revised and called a test of the "development of intelligence among children." Note that the test was intended to sort children into categories, not to assign them a single number such as an intelligence quotient. It was also not intended to measure innate intelligence, but to replace teachers' and physicians' unreliable diagnoses of children with intellectual disabilities, as a "means of prophylaxis, a means of escaping conscious and unconscious error."
最终,比奈和西蒙找到了一个巧妙的答案,解决了与教师评估相关的测试问题。他们设计了关于学科的问题,反映了学校所教授的内容,如推理能力、知识、记忆和注意力。孩子们对这些问题的回答现在与他们的学校成绩以及教师的评估相关联。到 1905 年,比奈和西蒙制定了第一个智力测试,用于将智力受挑战的儿童分类为几个发展延迟水平;1908 年,测试进行了修订,称为“儿童智力发展测试”。请注意,该测试旨在将儿童分类,而不是为他们分配智商等单一数字。它也不是用来衡量先天智力,而是用来取代教师和医生对智力障碍儿童的不可靠诊断,作为“预防手段,逃避有意识和无意识的错误的手段。”
Binet and Simon's test questions still reflected the meaning of intelligence as a combination of intellect, character, and moral traits. For instance, the test included questions such as: "If you are late for school, what would you do?" and "Why should one judge a person by his acts rather than by his words?" Today, one might call this social intelligence, but Binet and Simon thought of social judgment as inseparable from intelligence. Now they had a test, but without a theory of intelligence, apart from a loose definition of intelligence as "judgment, otherwise called good sense, practical sense, initiative, the faculty of adapting oneself to circumstances. To judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well, these are the essential activities of intelligence. Shortly before his death, Binet (I9II) wrote: "Thus we return to our favorite theory: intelligence is marked by the best possible adaptation of the individual to his environment" and "to this we really do not want to add another thing." To which his biographer Theta H. Wolf added: "How strikingly inept is such a pronouncement if we think of the excellent 'adaptation' to their environment of mice and moose!" Measuring without precisely knowing what one is measuring has been, and still is, one of the striking features of research on intelligence. This feature conveniently allowed researchers to adjust the facts about female intelligence.
Binet 和 Simon 的测试问题仍然反映了智力的含义,即智力、品格和道德特质的结合。例如,测试包括问题如:“如果你上学迟到了,你会怎么做?”和“为什么应该根据一个人的行为而不是他的言辞来评判一个人?”今天,人们可能称之为社会智力,但 Binet 和 Simon 认为社会判断与智力是不可分割的。现在他们有了一个测试,但没有智力理论,除了将智力定义为“判断,又称为良好的判断力、实践力、主动性,适应环境的能力。判断得当,理解得当,推理得当,这些是智力的基本活动。 在他去世前不久,Binet(1911 年)写道:“因此,我们回到了我们最喜欢的理论:智力是个体对环境最佳适应的标志”,“我们真的不想再添加任何东西。” 他的传记作者 Theta H. Wolf 补充说:“如果我们考虑到老鼠和驼鹿对环境的出色‘适应’,这样的声明是多么令人尴尬啊! 在不确切知道自己在测量什么的情况下进行测量,一直以来都是智力研究的一个显著特征,而且至今仍然如此。这一特征方便了研究人员调整有关女性智力的事实。

Binet's Intelligence Test Crosses the Atlantic and Becomes Seen As a Test of Genetic Ability
比奈智力测试跨越大西洋,被视为遗传能力测试

After obtaining his PhD under G. Stanley Hall at Clark University, Lewis Terman joined the faculty at Stanford University and gained a reputation as the leading US researcher on intelligence. Terman was more interested in gifted children than in intellectually challenged ones. In line with Hall and Galton, he firmly believed that intelligence was inherited. He translated Binet and Simon's test into English, added and deleted some questions, and published the product in 1916, which became known as the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales.
在克拉克大学获得 G. Stanley Hall 博士学位后,刘易斯·特曼加入了斯坦福大学教职,并成为美国领先的智力研究者。特曼对天才儿童比对智力受挑战的儿童更感兴趣。与霍尔和高尔顿一致,他坚信智力是遗传的。他将比奈和西蒙的测试翻译成英文,添加和删除了一些问题,并于 1916 年出版了这一产品,被称为斯坦福-比奈智力量表。
Yet, Terman had made important alterations that went largely unnoticed in the USA, but were to have damaging implications. He named the test an IQ test (the term was originally introduced by the German psychologist William Stern), where IQ was the ratio between mental age and chronological age. He believed that whatever the test measured was fixed and inherited, or at least predominantly so. Whereas Binet and Simon thought of the test as a means to send children with intellectual disabilities to special schools so that they could ideally be channeled back into normal classrooms, Terman instead advocated for special institutions and the sterilization of the "mentally retarded." 30 Terman had a strongly biased vision of what would happen once his test was widely applied: "There will be discovered enormously significant racial differences in general intelligence, differences which cannot be wiped out by any scheme of mental culture."
然而,特曼进行了重要的修改,这在美国基本上没有引起注意,但却会产生破坏性的影响。他将这项测试命名为智商测试(这个术语最初是由德国心理学家威廉·斯特恩引入的),其中智商是心理年龄与实际年龄之间的比率。他相信测试所测量的东西是固定的和遗传的,或者至少主要是如此。而比奈和西蒙认为这项测试是将智力障碍儿童送往特殊学校的手段,以便他们最好能够重新进入正常教室,而特曼则主张设立特殊机构和对“智力低下者”进行绝育。特曼对他的测试被广泛应用后会发生什么有着极其偏见的看法:“将会发现普遍智力上存在极其重要的种族差异,这些差异无法被任何心智文化方案消除。”
Under the leadership of Robert Yerkes, president of the American Psychological Association and a member of the Eugenics Record Office's Committee on the Inheritance of Mental Traits, the Army Alpha and Beta Tests, based on Terman's IQ test, were applied to 1.75 million men in World War I. Yerkes and his staff were convinced that the test measured native intelligence, even though it included items such as "The Overland car is made in Buffalo/Detroit/Flint/Toledo." They recommended about 8,900 men with low test results to be immediately discharged from service, many of whom were foreign born or illiterate. The Army officers disagreed with the psychologists, pointing out that these men would become good soldiers after training. Nevertheless, Yerkes hailed the test a great success, despite little evidence that it had made recruiting more efficient or had contributed to winning the war. In fact, it was the war that helped to win publicity for mass testing - if only because the psychologists had shown that such testing could be accomplished. On that wobbly basis, IQ testing spread across the USA.
在美国心理学协会主席、优生学记录办公室遗传心理特征委员会成员罗伯特·耶尔克斯的领导下,基于特曼的智商测试的陆军阿尔法和贝塔测试被应用于一百七十五万名一战士兵。耶尔克斯和他的工作人员坚信这项测试衡量了天生智力,尽管其中包括了“Overland 汽车是在水牛城/底特律/弗林特/托莱多制造”的题目。他们建议将约 8900 名测试结果较低的士兵立即解除服役,其中许多是外国出生或文盲。军官们不同意心理学家的观点,指出这些人在接受训练后会成为优秀的士兵。尽管如此,耶尔克斯称赞这项测试取得了巨大成功,尽管几乎没有证据表明它使招募更加高效或有助于赢得战争。事实上,正是战争帮助赢得了大规模测试的宣传——仅仅因为心理学家们表明这种测试是可行的。在这种摇摇欲坠的基础上,智商测试传播到了整个美国。
Binet did not live to see what happened to the Binet-Simon test once it crossed the Atlantic, but Simon did. He objected to the term IQ because it suggested a fixed, inherited mental age. In interviews with Binet's biographer Theta Wolf, Simon even called the term and its genetic interpretation a betrayal ("trahison") of their test's original objective.
Binet 没有活到看到宾尼-西蒙测试穿越大西洋后发生了什么,但 Simon 活着。他反对 IQ 这个术语,因为它暗示了一个固定的、遗传的心智年龄。在与 Binet 的传记作者 Theta Wolf 的采访中,Simon 甚至称这个术语及其遗传解释是对他们测试原始目标的背叛("trahison")。

Men and Women Are Assigned the Same Mean Intelligence
男性和女性被分配相同的平均智力

Without much fanfare, Terman eradicated the idea that females have lower average intelligence. In his revised Stanford-Binet test, he deleted questions for which boys and girls had different success rates and balanced the rest so that, on average, girls ended up with the same IQ as boys. Terman was not particularly explicit about this correction, nor about its reasons. But his decision finally made women equal to men in terms of IQ, at least on average.
特尔曼毫不张扬地消除了女性智力平均值较低的观念。在他修改后的斯坦福-比奈智力测验中,他删除了男孩和女孩成功率不同的问题,并平衡了其余部分,使女孩的平均智商与男孩相同。特尔曼对这一修正并没有特别明确,也没有说明其原因。但他的决定最终使女性在智商方面与男性平等,至少在平均水平上。
What was Terman's motivation? Terman and Maude A. Merrill later explained that they plotted the difficulties of each item against age groups "for the sexes separately as a basis for eliminating tests which were relatively less 'fair' to one sex than the other. Moreover, "a considerable number of those retained show statistically significant differences in the percentages of success for boys and girls, but as the scales are constructed these differences largely cancel out." The explanation of "fairness" appears strange in the face of Terman's intention to measure largely genetic differences in intelligence. And fair to whom? Were boys or girls originally better, and whose mean was upgraded? Terman and Merrill did not say.
特曼的动机是什么?特曼和莫德·A·梅里尔后来解释说,他们将每个项目的困难程度与年龄组“分别为性别制定基础,以便消除相对于另一性别而言较不‘公平’的测试。 此外,“保留的相当数量的项目显示男孩和女孩成功百分比存在统计学上显著差异,但由于所构建的量表,这些差异在很大程度上抵消了。” “公平”的解释在特曼试图主要衡量智力遗传差异的背景下显得奇怪。公平对谁来说?男孩还是女孩最初更好,谁的平均值被提升了?特曼和梅里尔没有说。
Others proposed that Terman made the means equal to reckon with the fact that girls usually perform better in school or in response to pressure generated by the increasing women's movement of the period. third explanation is that Terman, working closely with a large number of women coworkers (according to his biographer, Henry Minton, sometimes too closely), was influenced by them. Yet, all three explanations assume that boys initially tested better than girls and that item deletion served to upgrade the girls' average. Who really did perform better in the original set of test, girls or boys?
其他人提出,特曼将平均数设定为相等,以考虑到女孩通常在学校表现更好,或者是为了应对当时不断增长的妇女运动所带来的压力。第三种解释是,特曼与大量女性同事密切合作(根据他的传记作者亨利·明顿的说法,有时过于密切),受到她们的影响。然而,这三种解释都假设男孩最初的测试结果优于女孩,并且删除项目有助于提升女孩的平均水平。在原始测试中,到底是女孩还是男孩表现更好呢?
It took me a while to find an answer in Terman's writings. It appeared years later, in a different context, in the study on gifted children by Terman and Melita Oden, hidden in a side remark on another topic, the question of why there were more boys than girls in the group of gifted children. Terman and Oden discussed the possibility of a nomination bias (teachers nominate more boys than equally gifted girls) and also the possibility of "a real average superiority of boys in the intellectual function tested." They concluded that such a real average superiority is unlikely because for the 905 subjects on whom the 1916 Stanford-Binet test was standardized, the mean IQ was slightly higher in girls. In other words, Terman appears to have found that girls had higher average scores in his intelligence test than boys and then deleted items and balanced others to lower the mean of the girls to match the inferior mean of the boys!
在特曼的著作中花了一段时间才找到答案。几年后,特曼和梅利塔·奥登在研究中提到,天才儿童群体中男孩比女孩多的问题,隐藏在另一个话题的旁敲侧击中。特曼和奥登讨论了提名偏见的可能性(老师提名男孩比同样有天赋的女孩更多),以及“男孩在智力功能测试中的真实平均优势”。他们得出结论,这种真实的平均优势不太可能存在,因为在 1916 年斯坦福-比奈智力测验标准化的 905 名受试者中,女孩的平均智商略高。换句话说,特曼似乎发现女孩在他的智力测试中的平均分数比男孩高,然后删除了一些项目,平衡了其他项目,以降低女孩的平均分数,使其与男孩的较低平均分数相匹配!
One might ask what would have happened if girls had had the lower scores. Would Terman also have deleted items to even the averages out? If not, the test might have been standardized such that females' average IQ was a few points lower than that of males.
有人可能会问,如果女孩得分较低会发生什么。特曼是否也会删除项目以平衡平均值?如果不是,测试可能已经标准化,使女性的平均智商比男性低几分。
Terman's decision to make the average IQ of males and females equal put an end to the second idea of a peculiarly female intelligence. It also illustrates the deep problem of how to measure something in the absence of a theory, where there is wiggle room to make decisions about test items that produce the result one favors - for fairness or whatever other reasons. In principle, Terman could have designed a test in which women are superior to men or where certain cultures or races are superior or inferior to white Americans. The problem is this: One can measure whether women and men differ in a specific and clearly defined task, such as memory span. But if one has neither a clearly defined task nor a theory and, instead, selects dozens of test items and adds the points up to determine an IQ, there are many degrees of freedom that allow for tinkering with the test to fit its result with preconceived beliefs and biases.
特曼决定让男性和女性的平均智商相等,结束了关于女性智力的特殊性的第二个观念。这也说明了在没有理论的情况下如何衡量某物的深层问题,人们可以在测试项目上做出决策,以产生自己喜欢的结果 - 无论是出于公平还是其他原因。原则上,特曼可以设计一个测试,其中女性优于男性,或者某些文化或种族优于或劣于白人美国人。问题在于:人们可以衡量女性和男性在特定和明确定义的任务中是否有差异,比如记忆跨度。但如果既没有明确定义的任务,也没有理论,而是选择了几十个测试项目,并将分数相加以确定智商,那么就有许多自由度可以对测试进行调整,以使其结果符合先入为主的信念和偏见。
This key problem of measuring IQ is not always acknowledged. Consider Hans-Jürgen Eysenck, who once was the most frequently cited living psychologist and one of the most controversial intelligence researchers. In his The Intelligence Controversy with Leon Kamin, he reified the equal averages, complaining that psychologists "are said to have selected items in such a way that equal scores are achieved regardless of whether there might or might not be genuine differences between the sexes. This accusation is false." He continued: "Given that unselected items give the sexes equal IQ scores, it was only reasonable for other test designers to avoid bias in favour of one or the other sex." However, there is no such thing as "unselected" items in the absence of a theory of what intelligence is and how it can be measured. Terman himself occasionally reified the equality of mean IQ to support women's equality. In Sex and Personality, Terman and Catherine Cox Miles wrote: "Intelligence tests, for example, have demonstrated for all time the falsity of the once widespread prevalent belief that women as a class are appreciably or at all inferior to men in the major aspects of intellect." All in all, Terman's IQ test ended the view that females have lower average intelligence than males so that men and women were finally seen as equally intelligent - at the expense of favoring racial prejudice.
测量智商的这个关键问题并不总是被承认。考虑一下汉斯-尤尔根·艾森克,他曾经是被引用最频繁的现存心理学家之一,也是最具争议的智力研究者之一。在他与利昂·卡明合著的《智力争议》中,他实现了平均值的概念,抱怨心理学家“据说选择项目的方式是这样的,以至于无论男女之间是否存在真正的差异,都能获得相同的分数。这种指责是错误的。”他继续说:“考虑到未经选择的项目给出了男女相同的智商分数,其他测试设计者避免偏袒其中一方是合理的。”然而,在没有智力是什么以及如何衡量的理论的情况下,并不存在“未经选择”的项目。特曼本人有时也实现了平均智商以支持妇女的平等。在《性别与个性》中,特曼和凯瑟琳·考克斯·迈尔斯写道:“例如,智力测试一直证明了一种曾经普遍流行的信念的虚假,即作为一个阶级的女性在智力的主要方面明显或完全不如男性。” 总的来说,特曼的智商测试结束了女性智商平均值低于男性的观点,使男性和女性最终被视为同样聪明 - 以偏袒种族偏见为代价。

How Differences in Intelligence Become Differences in Personality
智力差异如何转变为个性差异

In the introduction to Sex and Personality, Terman and Miles noted that it appears impossible to explain sex differences in behavior wholly in terms of biological factors and complained that the concepts of masculinity and femininity are even more vague than the 19 th-century concepts of intelligence. By way of example, they referred to the stereotype of the "occidental" woman whose moral life is shaped less by principles than by personal relationships and whose everyday behavior is more determined by emotion, submissiveness, and inferior steadfastness of purpose.
在《性别与个性》的介绍中,特尔曼和迈尔斯指出,似乎不可能完全用生物因素来解释行为上的性别差异,并抱怨男性气质和女性气质的概念甚至比 19 世纪的智力概念更加模糊。举例来说,他们提到了“西方”女性的刻板印象,她们的道德生活不是完全由原则塑造,而是更多地受个人关系影响,日常行为更多地由情感、顺从和目的坚定度决定。
Nevertheless, Terman and Miles did not present a theory that replaced the vagueness and stereotypes to which they objected. How then could they measure personality differences between men and women? Terman and Miles came up with an ingenious solution, which was initiated as subtly as Terman's strategy to discard test questions had been. It turns out that the discarded questions ended up in their "masculinity-femininity scale." That action guaranteed differences between males and females on the new scale, which contained, among others, questions on interests such as movies and amusement, opinions such as "The unmarried mother deserves the scorn she gets" and "Blondes are less trustworthy than brunettes," and information such as "The most gold is produced in Alaska/NY/Tennessee/Texas." Once seen as items that measured inherited intelligence, these now served to measure personality and gender-specific knowledge. In the absence of a theory of intelligence that determines what questions are relevant, one-and-the-same item can be applied to measure sex differences in intelligence or in personality. In various forms, the masculinity-femininity scale remains in use and is still presented as measuring sex differences in personality.
然而,特曼和迈尔斯并没有提出一种取代他们反对的模糊和刻板印象的理论。那么,他们如何衡量男性和女性之间的个性差异呢?特曼和迈尔斯想出了一个巧妙的解决方案,这个解决方案像特曼丢弃测试问题的策略一样巧妙。事实证明,被丢弃的问题最终出现在他们的“男性-女性量表”中。这一举动确保了新量表上男性和女性之间的差异,其中包括关于电影和娱乐等兴趣、观点如“未婚母亲应受到她所受到的鄙视”和“金发比深发信任度更低”以及信息如“阿拉斯加/纽约/田纳西/得克萨斯产金最多”。这些曾被视为衡量遗传智力的项目,现在用来衡量个性和性别特定知识。在没有一个能够确定哪些问题相关的智力理论的情况下,同一项目可以用来衡量智力或个性中的性别差异。 以各种形式,男性-女性量表仍在使用中,并仍被用来衡量个性中的性别差异。

Larger Variability in IQ Justifies Male Superiority
智商的更大变异性证明了男性的优越性

In 2006, Harvard president Larry Summers resigned from his position in the wake of a no-confidence vote by his faculty. Among the reasons cited by the faculty was a remark he had made regarding women's intelligence and ability. On the question of women's aptitude for science, Summers said: "It does appear that on many, many different human attributes height, weight, propensity for criminality, overall IQ, mathematical ability, scientific ability - there is relatively clear evidence that whatever the difference in means - which can be debated - there is a difference in the standard deviation, and variability of a male and a female population." From that he drew the conclusion that the greater variability of males explains why top universities such as Harvard hired relatively few women as professors.
2006 年,哈佛大学校长拉里·萨默斯因其教职人员对其的不信任投票而辞职。教职人员列举的原因之一是他对女性智力和能力的评论。关于女性在科学方面的能力问题,萨默斯说:“似乎在许多不同的人类属性上,如身高、体重、犯罪倾向、整体智商、数学能力、科学能力等,有相对清晰的证据表明,无论在平均值上有何差异(这是可以争论的),男性和女性人口的标准差和变异性存在差异。” 由此,他得出结论,男性变异性较大解释了为什么哈佛等顶尖大学聘用相对较少的女性教授。
Summers' statement simply repeated a hypothesis discussed in psychological research for over a century: that the variability of women's physical and mental traits, including IQ, is smaller than that of men. This variability hypothesis both explains and justifies observations that there are more male geniuses than female ones and also explains why there are more male idiots at the other end of the IQ distribution.
Summers 的声明只是简单地重复了一个在心理研究中讨论了一个世纪的假设:即女性的身体和心理特征,包括智商的变异性比男性小。这个变异性假设既解释也证明了男性天才比女性天才更多的观察结果,也解释了为什么在智商分布的另一端有更多的男性白痴。
After Galton replaced the first version of intelligence - that men's and women's mental abilities were at opposite poles, such as reason versus intuition - with one common intelligence, and Terman, in turn, put an end to the subsequent idea of average differences, the only possible remaining difference on the bell curve was the variability, or standard deviation, in IQ. After all, a bell curve has only two parameters, mean and standard deviation. The variability hypothesis became the third and last bastion for the idea of a specifically female intelligence, contributing to Summers' fall. Its origins seem to lie in an observation by Darwin in the second edition of Animal and Plants Under Domestication that male animals tend to be more variable than females, although Darwin himself devoted little attention to this issue. Instead, the claim of greater male variability was promoted by the English sexologist Havelock Ellis.
加尔顿替换了智力的第一个版本 - 即男性和女性的智力能力处于相反的极端,比如理性与直觉 - 用一个普通的智力取代了这一观点,而特曼则结束了后来的平均差异观念,钟形曲线上唯一可能剩下的差异是智商的变异性或标准差。毕竟,钟形曲线只有两个参数,均值和标准差。变异性假说成为了特别女性智力观念的第三和最后的堡垒,导致了萨默斯的倒台。它的起源似乎可以追溯到达尔文在《动物与植物的驯化》第二版中的一项观察,即雄性动物倾向于比雌性更具变异性,尽管达尔文本人对这个问题关注不多。相反,更大的雄性变异性的说法是由英国性学家哈维洛克·埃利斯提出的。

The Variability Hypothesis
可变性假说

Ellis rebelled against the conspiracy of silence surrounding the sexes and decided to devote his life to their scientific study. For him, women and men were different, but complementary - in contrast to Galton, who did not see much usefulness in women's lower average natural ability. In the first edition of Man and Woman, Ellis wrote: "From an organic standpoint, therefore, men represent the more variable and the more progressive element, women the more stable and conservative element, in evolution. It is a metaphorical as well as a literal truth that the center of gravity is lower in women and less easily disturbed." (In the fourth and fifth edition, Ellis left out the "progressive element," indicating second thoughts about the generalizability of biological variation, particularly to politics.) He wrote that women's smaller stature approximated that of humans' ancestors, and that women - as in witches and soothsayers - preserved ancient custom and methods of intuitive knowledge. Women had "an organic tendency to stability and conservatism, involving a diminished individualism and variability." To exemplify, he made the case that women had opposed the French Revolution, albeit also noting that the revolutionary movement of Christianity was, to a considerable extent, furthered by women. While acknowledging that the facts are very complex and that that the claim of absolute inferiority for either sex is untenable, Ellis nonetheless concluded: "It is undeniably true that the greater variational tendency of the male is a psychic as well as a physical fact." 47
埃利斯反抗了围绕性别的沉默阴谋,并决定将自己的一生奉献给对性别的科学研究。对他来说,女性和男性是不同的,但是互补的 - 与高尔顿相反,他并不认为女性较低的平均自然能力有多大用处。在《男人与女人》的第一版中,埃利斯写道:“因此,从有机的角度来看,男性代表着更多变和更具进步性的元素,而女性代表着更稳定和保守的元素,在进化中。从隐喻的角度来看,女性的重心较低,不容易受到干扰。”(在第四和第五版中,埃利斯删除了“进步性元素”,表明他对生物变异的一般性产生了疑虑,特别是对政治的适用性。)他写道,女性较小的身材接近于人类的祖先,女性 - 如女巫和占卜者 - 保留了古老的习俗和直觉知识的方法。女性具有“有机倾向于稳定和保守,涉及减少的个人主义和变异性。 举例来说,他提出女性反对法国大革命的论点,尽管他也指出基督教的革命运动在很大程度上是由女性推动的。尽管承认事实非常复杂,而且任何一方绝对劣势的说法都站不住脚,埃利斯仍然得出结论:“不可否认的是,男性更大的变异倾向是一种心理和生理事实。"47"
Man and Woman received scant attention when it first appeared. Yet, this changed when the statistician Karl Pearson vigorously attacked Ellis' variability hypothesis. Pearson was a committed socialist and promoted feminism and eugenics, both of which were considered progressive and revolutionary at the time. Pearson argued that the claim of greater male variability contradicts Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, which emphasizes variability as one of the driving forces of evolution, but postulates that the more intense the struggle is, the less is the variability. Therefore, he expected men, not women, to be less variable. Next, he criticized Ellis' inconclusive evidence, based almost entirely on pathological variation such as criminality and color-blindness. Finally, Pearson contended that measuring the variability of absolute variables such as the length of bones (as opposed to ratios such as cephalic index) by the standard deviation, as Ellis did, was an error. Instead, one needed to calculate the coefficient of variation, that is, the standard deviation divided by the mean. After all, women's bodies were smaller than men's and so, therefore, was the standard deviation of bodily measures. Pearson concluded from his own physical measures that the coefficient of variation is slightly larger for women, not smaller, reflecting their "slightly less severe struggle for existence." 50
男人和女人在首次出现时受到了很少的关注。 然而,当统计学家卡尔·皮尔逊积极攻击埃利斯的变异假设时,情况发生了变化。 皮尔逊是一位坚定的社会主义者,他推动了女权主义和优生学,这两者在当时被认为是进步和革命性的。皮尔逊认为声称男性变异性更大与达尔文的自然选择进化理论相矛盾,后者强调变异性是进化的推动力之一,但假设斗争越激烈,变异性就越小。因此,他预期男性,而不是女性,会变异性较小。接下来,他批评埃利斯的证据不足,几乎完全基于病理变异,如犯罪和色盲。最后,皮尔逊认为,像埃利斯那样通过标准偏差来测量绝对变量的变异性(而不是比率,如头脑指数)是错误的。相反,需要计算变异系数,即标准偏差除以均值。 毕竟,女性的身体比男性的身体小,因此身体测量的标准偏差也较小。皮尔逊根据自己的身体测量得出结论,变异系数对于女性略大一些,而不是较小,反映了她们“对生存的斗争略微较少”。50
In an Appendix in Man and Woman, Ellis rejected Pearson's "hostile" criticism at length, which Pearson did not deem worthy of a response. Pearson's sole reaction was a footnote in an article unrelated to variability, in which he noted that Ellis' response required no reply as Ellis did not appear to understand that scientific evidence, not vague generalities, was what counted. Afterwards, Pearson did not pursue the variability hypothesis any further.
在《男人与女人》的附录中,埃利斯详细地拒绝了皮尔逊的“敌对”批评,而皮尔逊并未认为值得回应。皮尔逊唯一的反应是在一篇与变异性无关的文章中的脚注中,他指出埃利斯的回应不需要回复,因为埃利斯似乎没有意识到科学证据而不是模糊的概括才是重要的。 之后,皮尔逊没有进一步探讨变异性假设。
Why did this bitter controversy over females' allegedly lower variability erupt? According to Ellis' biographer Phyllis Grosskurth, one likely reason was personal resentment. Many women of the time found Ellis, who with his flowing beard resembled "a combination of archetypal Father and sensual Faun," irresistibly attractive. The South African writer Olive Schneider was one of the women upon whom Ellis had a strong influence, before she fell in love with Karl Pearson. Whatever the motivation, Pearson's critique of the variability hypothesis in fact contributed to making the hypothesis popular.
为什么会爆发关于女性据称变异性较低的激烈争论?根据埃利斯的传记作者菲利斯·格罗斯库斯的说法,一个可能的原因是个人怨恨。当时许多女性发现埃利斯,他那流动的胡须使他看起来像是“原型父亲和感性的泛神的结合体”,令人难以抗拒。南非作家奥利夫·施耐德就是埃利斯对其产生了强烈影响的女性之一,后来她爱上了卡尔·皮尔逊。无论是什么动机,皮尔逊对变异性假设的批评实际上有助于使这一假设变得流行。
Ever since, psychologists, biologists, and statisticians have debated the variability hypothesis. Whereas Ellis and Pearson related it to both physical and mental traits, psychologists have focused largely on intelligence. Quinn McNemar and Terman reported greater variability in boys on the Stanford-Binet and other tests, but, given the inconsistent evidence, were careful not to draw any general conclusions. In 1932, Scotland undertook the ambitious project of testing all 1 -year-old Scottish children with the goal of discovering the amount of mental deficiency in the country. Because suppliers demanded too much money for the nearly 100,000 commercial tests, the Council used the Morey House Test in place of the Stanford-Binet test. The conclusion was that boys and girls did not differ in average IQ, but that the standard deviation of boys was one IQ point higher than that of girls. In 1947, the same project was repeated with all I I-year-olds at that time, and again the standard deviation was one point higher for boys. This appeared to support the hypothesis of both higher and lower male intelligence. Although this result was hailed as the most comprehensive demonstration of the greater variability of mental ability among males, the small difference in variability in the 1947 study was, in fact, mainly due to an excess of males with very low scores, not to male genius. The primary impetus of the 1947 study (and that of 1932) was not variability, but rather the concern that the nation's intelligence would decline because people with lower mental ability tended to have more children. Yet, the children scored no worse than those studied is years earlier; in fact, their average IQ went up by about one point in boys and three points in girls.
自那时以来,心理学家、生物学家和统计学家一直在辩论变异性假说。埃利斯和皮尔逊将其与身体和心理特征联系起来,心理学家主要关注智力。麦克纳马和特曼报告称,在斯坦福-比奈和其他测试中,男孩的变异性更大,但鉴于证据不一致,他们小心翼翼地没有得出任何一般性结论。1932 年,苏格兰开始了一项雄心勃勃的项目,测试所有 1 岁的苏格兰儿童,目的是发现该国的智力缺陷程度。由于供应商要求支付近 10 万份商业测试的费用太高,委员会使用莫雷豪斯测试代替斯坦福-比奈测试。结论是男孩和女孩的平均智商没有差异,但男孩的标准差比女孩高一个智商点。1947 年,同样的项目在当时的所有 11 岁儿童中重复进行,男孩的标准差再次高出一个点。这似乎支持了男性智力更高和更低的假设。 尽管这一结果被誉为男性心智能力更大变异性的最全面展示,但 1947 年研究中变异性的小差异实际上主要是由于低分男性过多,而不是男性天才。1947 年研究(以及 1932 年研究)的主要动机不是变异性,而是担心国家的智力会下降,因为心智能力较低的人往往会生更多的孩子。然而,这些孩子的得分并不比早些年研究的孩子差;事实上,他们的平均智商男孩提高了约一个点,女孩提高了三个点。
Follow-ups of the Scottish children study have shown similar, inconclusive results. In 1939, the Council found no significant difference in variability between boys and girls; in 1949 , it reported slightly larger standard deviations in boys; and in 1958 , it reported a greater proportion of females than males at the lower end of the IQ scale. Thus, one could find support for or against the variability hypothesis in intelligence, depending on the age group and study. More fundamentally, findings about variability - like mean differences - always depend on how the test items are selected and weighted. Just as Terman made the means between males and females equal, one can select items to make the variability equal.
苏格兰儿童研究的后续显示出类似的、不确定的结果。1939 年,委员会发现男孩和女孩之间的变异性没有显著差异;1949 年,它报告男孩的标准偏差略大;1958 年,它报告智商尺度下端女性比男性比例更高。因此,人们可以根据年龄组和研究来支持或反对智力变异性假设。更根本地,关于变异性的发现 - 就像平均差异一样 - 总是取决于测试项目的选择和权重。正如特曼使男性和女性之间的平均值相等一样,人们可以选择项目使变异性相等。
Outspoken advocates have presented greater male variability as a biological fact, possibly due to sex linkage, speculating that intelligence might be located on the chromosome. According to this line of reasoning, intelligence in males can express itself without interference of a second chromosome, thereby causing greater variability in IQ. This ignores the fact that the same hypothesis could likewise be used to predict that females have higher average intelligence than men, thanks to their two chromosomes, once again illustrating the utter arbitrariness of genetic explanations in the absence of a theory. Whereas the first two ideas about a peculiarly female intelligence had been conceived and debated virtually entirely by men, the variability hypothesis was challenged by an early generation of women scientists. Helen Bradford Thompson conducted her own studies and criticized Ellis' conclusions. Her critique of the variability hypothesis was widely read, yet had no equivalent impact. In the most systematic critique of the variability hypothesis at the time, Leta Setter Hollingworth reported no evidence of this in her review of the literature. Beth Wellman found in her review slight support for greater variability in boys, which, however, depended on the measure of variability used, the selection of children, and other details. The variability hypothesis remains a matter of discussion. In her 2012 review of the state of art in sex differences in cognitive abilities, the former president of the American Psychological Association, Diane Halpern, accepted it, concluding "that females and males are very similar when we consider the average performance, and they are highly dissimilar when we consider performance at the high and low extremes."
坦率的倡导者将男性变异性增大作为一种生物事实,可能是由于性连锁,推测智力可能位于 染色体上。根据这种推理,男性的智力可以在没有第 染色体干扰的情况下表现出来,从而导致智商的变异性增大。 这忽视了同样的假设也可以被用来预测女性比男性具有更高的平均智力,这要归功于她们的两个 染色体,再次说明了在没有理论的情况下,基因解释的绝对武断性。尽管关于女性特有智力的前两个想法几乎完全是由男性构思和辩论的,但变异性假设却受到了早期一代女性科学家的挑战。 海伦·布拉德福德·汤普森进行了自己的研究并批评了埃利斯的结论。 她对变异性假设的批评被广泛阅读,但没有相应的影响。在当时对变异性假设进行的最系统的批评中,莱塔·塞特·霍林沃斯在她对文献的审查中报告没有这方面的证据。 贝丝·韦尔曼在她的评论中发现了对男孩更大变异性的轻微支持,然而这取决于所使用的变异性度量、儿童的选择以及其他细节。 变异性假设仍然是一个讨论的问题。在她 2012 年对认知能力性别差异状况的评论中,美国心理学协会前主席黛安·哈尔班接受了这一点,并得出结论:“当我们考虑平均表现时,女性和男性非常相似,但当我们考虑高低极端表现时,它们是非常不同的。”" "
As with the question of whether males and females differ in their average IQ, the absence of a theoretical understanding of what a test actually measures opens the door to including or excluding items that make the mean and variance of IQ equal or different.
关于男性和女性在平均智商上是否有差异的问题,对于测试实际测量的理论理解的缺乏打开了包括或排除使智商的均值和方差相等或不同的项目的大门。

Lessons Learned 学到的教训

In sum, the idea of a peculiarly female intelligence emerged in three different and unrelated versions: male-female polarities, female lower mean intelligence, and female lower variability. The idea that men and women occupy opposite poles on a continuum, such as analytic versus intuitive, is the oldest; it reigned for millennia. It began to fade away when Francis Galton invented intelligence (natural ability) as a single dimension, which later morphed into IQ or g (general intelligence), so that the minds of men and women now had the same quality, but with women having less of it. The idea that women have lower intelligence expired in the hands of Lewis Terman, who eliminated test items so that both males and females had the same average IQ - otherwise, female means would, in fact, have been higher. The third idea was that while the means are the same, woman's variability is smaller, resulting in more male geniuses and idiots. This variability hypothesis is still debated today. It remains the last bastion of those who cling to the idea of male supremacy.
总的来说,一个特别的女性智力的概念以三种不同且无关的版本出现:男女极性、女性较低的平均智力和女性较低的变异性。男女在一个连续体上占据相反极点的想法,比如分析性与直觉性,是最古老的;它统治了千年。当弗朗西斯·高尔顿发明了智力(天赋)作为一个单一维度时,它开始消失,后来演变为智商或 g(一般智力),使得男性和女性的思维现在具有相同的质量,但女性的智力较低。女性智力较低的想法在刘易斯·特曼手中消失了,他消除了测试项目,以便男性和女性的平均智商相同 - 否则,女性的平均值实际上会更高。第三个想法是,虽然平均值相同,女性的变异性较小,导致更多的男性天才和白痴。这种变异性假设今天仍在争论中。它仍然是那些坚持男性至上观念的最后堡垒。
Despite the differences in these three ideas about a peculiarly female intelligence, their justifications are strikingly similar, and the supposed nature of women features prominently in all three. A woman's mind was said to be determined by her reproductive biology, her body, her genes, and her naturally ordained functions. The first president of the American Psychological Association, G. Stanley Hall, staunchly believed that the female mind was created for nursing and motherhood, serving the production of men of genius and of daughters to bear future male geniuses. Education, he felt, would damage women's reproductive organs, particularly coeducation in competition with men. Like many others at the time, Hall did not think of women as generally inferior, but instead idealized them. In his view, women who entered the men's world of education and business became innocent victims of man's evil nature, losing their purity and sainthood.
尽管这三种关于女性智力的独特想法存在差异,但它们的理由却惊人地相似,而女性的特征在这三种想法中都占据着重要地位。据说女性的思维受到她的生殖生物学、身体、基因和自然赋予的功能的影响。美国心理学协会的第一任主席 G. Stanley Hall 坚定地认为女性的思维是为了哺乳和母性而创造的,为了培养天才男性和未来生育男性天才的女儿。他认为,教育会损害女性的生殖器官,尤其是与男性竞争的男女同校教育。与当时许多人一样,霍尔并不认为女性普遍劣等,而是将她们理想化。在他看来,进入男性教育和商业世界的女性成为了男性邪恶本性的无辜受害者,失去了纯洁和圣洁。
The historian of psychology, Edwin Boring, famously said that intelligence is whatever the IQ tests measure. But that is precisely the problem. The idea of a peculiarly female intelligence is a striking case of measurement without understanding what one is measuring, paired with the hope that sophisticated correlation statistics and factor analyses could fill this theoretical void. From Galton to Binet to Terman, researchers variously believed that one could measure intelligence in terms of sensory acuity, head size, facial features, handwriting, memory capacity, or knowledge of facts, or by asking questions about proper social behavior.
心理学史学家埃德温·博林曾经著名地说过,智力就是智商测试所测量的东西。但这正是问题所在。特别是女性智力的概念,是一个明显的测量案例,没有理解自己在测量什么,却带着希望,认为复杂的相关统计和因素分析可以填补这个理论空白。从高尔顿到比奈再到特尔曼,研究者们曾经相信可以通过感官敏锐度、头部大小、面部特征、书写、记忆能力、或者知识事实,或者通过询问有关适当社会行为的问题来衡量智力。
This absence of theory left too many points of entry for biases and preset convictions, to the detriment of many. Galton's vision was to promote the eugenics program: to detect the less well-endowed and prevent them from reproducing. Both Ellis and Pearson were early feminists but also proponents of eugenics, both of which were considered progressive movements at the time. Binet and Simon intended to give children with intellectual disabilities a second chance through special education. Yet, when adapted "to American conditions and needs," as the editor's introduction to the 1916 edition of Terman's The Measurement of Intelligence put it, their test came to serve the various goals of eugenics, sterilization, racism, feminism, and, last but not least, a multibillion testing industry.
这种缺乏理论为偏见和预设信念留下了太多的入口,对许多人造成了损害。高尔顿的愿景是推动优生学计划:发现智力较差的人,并防止他们繁殖后代。埃利斯和皮尔逊早期是女权主义者,也是优生学的支持者,这两者当时被视为进步运动。比奈和西蒙打算通过特殊教育给智力障碍儿童第二次机会。然而,正如特曼 1916 年版《智力测量》的编辑介绍所说,当他们的测试“适应美国的条件和需求”时,他们的测试开始为优生学、绝育、种族主义、女权主义以及一个价值数十亿美元的测试产业服务。

Why Is History Relevant?
为什么历史是相关的?

Knowing one's history provides an opportunity to learn from errors and to avoid repeating these. Differences between men and women, as well as their causes, have been an emotionally and politically charged topic for centuries. Firm convictions continue to be enforced in the guise of new technology. For instance, Diane Halpern warns that modern neuroscience is being misused to justify sex role stereotypes in how men and women think, a program dubbed "neurosexism." Basing conclusions about human thinking and behavior on the firing of neurons or changes in blood oxygen levels entails a long leap in logic. Such leaps are not new; we have already seen one, for instance, in the argument that the smaller brain of females is responsible for woman's alleged intellectual inferiority. The stereotypes of the past also tenaciously survive in popular psychology bestsellers that present men and women as if they were alien species, as in Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus. In a throwback to the view of women being submissive by nature, such books imply that a wife's role is to hide her intelligence, to admire and appreciate her husband, and to not offer him advice unless he asks. Online communities such as Men Going Their Own Way (MGTOW) and TradWives revive the traditional view that the position of men is above women.
了解自己的历史提供了学习错误并避免重复的机会。男性和女性之间的差异,以及造成这些差异的原因,几个世纪以来一直是一个情感和政治上充满争议的话题。坚定的信念继续以新技术的形式得到强化。例如,黛安·哈尔彭警告说,现代神经科学被滥用来证明男性和女性思维方式中的性别角色刻板印象,这一计划被称为“神经性别歧视”。基于神经元的激活或血氧水平变化得出关于人类思维和行为的结论需要进行逻辑上的长跳。这样的跳跃并不新鲜;例如,我们已经看到一个,比如,女性较小的大脑是女性所谓智力低下的原因的论点。过去的刻板印象也顽固地存活在流行的心理学畅销书中,这些书将男性和女性描绘得好像他们是外星物种,就像《男人来自火星,女人来自金星》一样。回到认为女性天生应该顺从的观点,这些书暗示妻子的角色是隐藏她的智慧,钦佩和欣赏她的丈夫,并且除非他要求,否则不给他提供建议。 在线社区,如 Men Going Their Own Way(MGTOW)和 TradWives,复兴了男性地位高于女性的传统观点。
What is the current consensus about differences in men's and women's cognitive abilities? According to Halpern, the list of differences is relatively small, and the similarities between the sexes are larger in number. Few of the differences that have been claimed over the years are stable across age, task, and culture. Among the few exceptions are that women have better memories than men and excel in reading and verbal abilities, while males excel in science and mathematics. What causes these differences is far from being understood.
目前关于男性和女性认知能力差异的共识是什么?根据哈尔班,差异列表相对较小,性别之间的相似之处更多。多年来声称存在的差异中,很少有一些是跨年龄、任务和文化稳定的。少数例外是,女性比男性记忆力更好,在阅读和语言能力方面表现出色,而男性在科学和数学方面表现出色。这些差异的原因远未被理解。
This history of the idea of a peculiarly female intelligence can teach us several general lessons. The first is to beware of research that evaluates the sexes in terms of polarities and, in general, uses polarities as a means to understand the human mind. Second, beware of composite index numbers, such as IQ. Unless there is a strong theory, test items can be selected to verify any existing bias "scientifically." Third, keep in mind that intelligence is about cognitive processes. All in all, we would be well advised to replace polarities and IQ numbers with the study of the actual processes underlying intelligent behavior, a scientific research agenda that would also leave little room for individual and cultural biases.
女性智力独特性的概念历史可以教给我们几个一般性的教训。第一点是要警惕评估性别的研究,以极性为基础,并且通常使用极性来理解人类思维的方法。第二,要警惕复合指数,如智商。除非有一个强有力的理论,否则测试项目可以被选择来“科学地”验证任何现有的偏见。第三,要记住智力是关于认知过程的。总的来说,我们最好用研究智能行为基础的实际过程来取代极性和智商数值,这样的科学研究议程也会减少个人和文化偏见的空间。

Beyond Polarities and IQ: Intelligent Decision Processes
超越极端和智商:智能决策过程

The history of the idea of a peculiarly female intelligence shows, in my view, that the field of sex differences in intelligence, and of intelligence in general, could benefit from a fresh start. Herbert Simon's and Alan Newell's work on heuristics and artificial intelligence (AI), which has inspired my own research on both intuitive and deliberative heuristic decision-making, offers such a new framework. Heuristics are strategies that help agents to make decisions and solve problems in an intelligent and efficient way. After all, what we call intelligence manifests itself in the quality of the decisions we make. In Part II, I describe the research agenda in more detail, which centers on two questions: (i) What is the repertoire of intelligent strategies (such as heuristics) at a person's disposal for making decisions? And (ii) what is a person's ability to choose a proper strategy for the situation at hand? In this framework, intelligence has a very concrete meaning that connects cognitive abilities with behavioral strategies, namely, the "adaptive toolbox" of strategies available and the ability to choose a strategy wisely to achieve a particular goal.
女性智力独特性的观念历史表明,在我看来,智力差异领域以及智力领域都可以从头开始受益。赫伯特·西蒙和艾伦·纽厄尔关于启发式和人工智能(AI)的研究,启发了我对直觉和深思熟虑的启发式决策制定的研究,提供了这样一个新框架。启发式是帮助代理人以智能和高效的方式做出决策和解决问题的策略。毕竟,我们所称的智力体现在我们所做决策的质量上。在第二部分中,我更详细地描述了研究议程,重点关注两个问题:(i)一个人在做决策时可以使用的智能策略(如启发式)有哪些?(ii)一个人在特定情况下选择适当策略的能力是什么?在这个框架中,智力具有非常具体的含义,将认知能力与行为策略联系起来,即可用的“适应性工具箱”策略和明智选择策略以实现特定目标的能力。
Although the study of intelligent heuristics is well established, it has had a blind spot for sex differences in how males and females search for information, when they stop searching, and how they make or delay decisions. One exception is the work of Joan Meyers-Levy and Barbara Loken, who reported that, in consumer choice, females search more extensively for information than males, while males are more selective in search and rely on faster stopping rules. Moreover, they concluded that females are more sensitive to environmental cues, whereas men more often ignore these and rely on the same heuristics across contexts, indicating less ability in adaptive choice. As for social heuristics, they found that women are more likely to base decisions on trust and are more likely to be trusted. Note that these are preliminary findings, but they indicate a different kind of question to pursue: abandon studying polarities and differences in IQ test outcomes and, instead, ask whether there are concrete differences in the way males and females search for information and make decisions.
尽管智能启发式研究已经得到很好的建立,但在男性和女性寻找信息的方式、何时停止搜索以及如何做出或延迟决策方面存在一个盲点。一个例外是琼·迈尔斯-莱维(Joan Meyers-Levy)和芭芭拉·洛肯(Barbara Loken)的研究,他们报告称,在消费者选择中,女性比男性更广泛地搜索信息,而男性在搜索中更加选择性,并依赖更快的停止规则。此外,他们得出结论,女性更加敏感于环境线索,而男性更经常忽视这些线索,并在不同情境下依赖相同的启发式,表明在适应性选择方面能力较弱。至于社会启发式,他们发现女性更有可能基于信任做出决策,并更容易获得信任。请注意,这些是初步发现,但它们表明了一个不同类型的问题:放弃研究智商测试结果中的极性和差异,而是询问男性和女性在搜索信息和做出决策方面是否存在具体差异。

The Myth of Female Intuition and Male Reason
女性直觉和男性理性的神话

It is telling that quite a few smart men in the social, biological, and medical sciences insisted on female inferiority as a scientific fact, in terms of both intellect and morals. Many of the tribulations mankind has had to endure were attributed to Eve's weakness when facing the serpent. After females were allowed to attend schools and universities during the 2oth century, it became evident that science had previously been informed by prejudice. The opposition between female intuition and male reason then disappeared from the social sciences and women were no longer accused of naivete, hasty conclusions, lack of logic, or low moral principles. Nevertheless, traces of these prejudices still surface occasionally. Why are so few females hired as professors in philosophy departments? Some male philosophers have argued that intuition is gendered, and that women have wrong philosophical intuitions more often than men.
很多社会、生物和医学科学中的聪明人坚持认为女性在智力和道德方面处于劣势是科学事实,这一点很明显。人类所经历的许多苦难被归因于夏娃在面对蛇时的软弱。20 世纪期间,女性被允许参加学校和大学后,科学明显地表明先前受到偏见的影响。女性直觉与男性理性之间的对立随后消失在社会科学中,女性不再被指责为天真、草率的结论、缺乏逻辑或道德原则低下。然而,这些偏见的痕迹仍然偶尔浮出水面。为什么哲学系中聘用女性教授的人数如此之少?一些男性哲学家认为直觉是有性别差异的,女性比男性更经常有错误的哲学直觉。
In the course of time, women and men have become increasingly equal partners - but not intuition and rationality.
随着时间的推移,女性和男性已经越来越成为平等的伙伴 - 但直觉和理性并没有。

Biases: Mistaking Intuition for Irrationality
偏见:将直觉误认为非理性

Mental illusions should be considered the rule rather than the exception.
心理错觉应被视为规则,而非例外。
Richard Thaler  理查德·塞勒
Kahneman and Tversky are more responsible than anybody for the powerful trend to mistrust human intuition and defer to algorithms. Michael Lewis, The Undoing Project
卡尼曼和特沃斯基比任何人都更负责任,引发了对人类直觉的不信任和对算法的推崇。迈克尔·刘易斯,《逆转项目》
When psychology struggled for its independence from philosophy in the late 19th century, intuition was one of its casualties. In a radical turn from philosophers' and theologians' view of intuition as "direct" knowledge and as one of the highest intellectual powers, intuition became seen as a primitive, impulsive, and developmentally earlier mental process. Studies in the 1920 sought to show that children and those with cognitive impairments excel in making rapid, intuitive judgments of physical quantities; results were inconclusive. Others tried to show that women's judgments of children's character are more intuitive than male's rational judgments, again without finding such a difference in comparison to the judgments of character made by children's teachers. Behaviorists such as B. F. Skinner did not even deem the study of intuition (and other nonobservable processes) worthy of rigorous science, distancing themselves from what they saw as unscientific mysticism. Between 1985 and 2004, an analysis of 2.1 million articles in the PsychINFO database found only 355 peer-reviewed articles that featured "intuition" in the title. There are, however, notable exceptions to this general dismissal. Jean Piaget explained that his studies of the development of intuitions about time and motion were prompted by questions suggested by Albert Einstein, and his research in turn stimulated contemporary analyses of intuitive physics and intuitive psychology.
当心理学在 19 世纪末争取摆脱哲学的独立性时,直觉成为了其中的牺牲品。与哲学家和神学家将直觉视为“直接”知识和最高智力之一的观点形成激烈对立,直觉被视为一种原始、冲动的、在发展上较早的心理过程。1920 年的研究试图表明,儿童和认知障碍者在对物理量进行快速、直觉性判断方面表现出色;结果并不明确。其他人试图表明,女性对儿童性格的判断比男性的理性判断更具直觉性,但与儿童老师的性格判断相比,并未发现明显差异。行为主义者如 B.F.斯金纳甚至认为直觉(以及其他不可观察的过程)不值得进行严格科学研究,远离他们所认为的非科学的神秘主义。在 1985 年至 2004 年间,对 PsychINFO 数据库中 210 万篇文章的分析发现,仅有 355 篇同行评议文章以“直觉”为标题。 然而,这种普遍的否定也有明显的例外。让·皮亚杰解释说,他对时间和运动直觉发展的研究是由爱因斯坦提出的问题引发的,而他的研究反过来刺激了当代对直觉物理学和直觉心理学的分析。
By the 21st century, the association of intuition with women was dropped in psychology, albeit continuing in parts of the general public. Yet, after being stripped of gender, intuition has once again been opposed to reason and, like female intuition, has been classified as inferior. The polarity morphed into two supposed systems of reasoning, referred to as Systems I and 2. System I is said to be fast and unconscious, to work by intuition and heuristics, to lack rationality, and to be the source of error. System 2, in contrast, is said to be slow and conscious, to work by logic and statistics, and to make no apparent errors in reasoning. At the same time, System 2, as mentioned in Chapter I, is held responsible for the errors System I makes by failing to detect and correct these. Just as men were once held responsible for preventing females from committing mistakes, a logical system is now assigned the paternalistic task of keeping the intuitive system in check. Logical reasoning is always rational, we are told, while intuition is not.
到了 21 世纪,直觉与女性的关联在心理学中被取消,尽管在一些普通大众中仍然存在。然而,在被剥夺性别特征后,直觉再次被对立于理性,就像女性直觉一样,被归类为低劣。这种极性演变成了两种被认为是推理系统的系统,被称为系统 I 和 2。据说系统 I 是快速且无意识的,通过直觉和启发式工作,缺乏理性,并且是错误的根源。相比之下,系统 2 被认为是缓慢和有意识的,通过逻辑和统计工作,并且在推理中没有明显错误。与此同时,正如第一章中提到的那样,系统 2 被认为要对系统 I 犯下的错误负责,因为它未能检测和纠正这些错误。正如男性曾经被认为要阻止女性犯错一样,一个逻辑系统现在被赋予了保持直觉系统受控的家长式任务。据我们所知,逻辑推理总是理性的,而直觉则不是。

Logic Versus Intuition 逻辑与直觉

Imagine a patient with a serious heart condition who is pondering whether or not to have a potentially risky surgery. They consult with their doctor regarding their prospects. The doctor informs them:
想象一下,一个患有严重心脏病的患者在考虑是否要接受一项可能存在风险的手术。他们咨询医生关于他们的前景。医生告诉他们:
Five years after surgery, 90 percent of patients are alive.
手术后五年,90%的患者仍然存活。
The patient's intuition may tell them that the doctor is encouraging them to decide in favor of surgery, which they might do. But what if the doctor had said:
患者的直觉可能告诉他们,医生鼓励他们决定支持手术,他们可能会这样做。但如果医生说:
Five years after surgery, io percent of patients are dead.
手术后五年,10% 的患者已经去世。
In this case, the patient might infer that the doctor is presenting a warning and might think twice before forgoing the surgery. Studies show that more people are willing to agree to a medical treatment if the doctor uses a positive frame ( 90 percent alive) than a negative frame (io percent dead). This phenomenon is known as the framing effect - people listen to how a message is framed and may change their decision.
在这种情况下,患者可能会推断医生是在发出警告,并在决定放弃手术之前三思。研究表明,如果医生使用积极框架(90%存活)而不是消极框架(10%死亡),更多人愿意同意接受医疗治疗。这种现象被称为框架效应 - 人们会听取信息的表述方式并可能改变他们的决定。
Should a patient listen to how the doctor frames a message? Economic theory has traditionally not considered psychological factors such as making implicit recommendations by framing a message. However, an influential group of behavioral economists, led by psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, took logic and Homo economicus more literally than many economists and went a step further. Any difference between human judgment and abstract logic was perceived as a fault in human intuition. Accordingly, patients should not listen to how a doctor frames the message because the positive and negative frames are logically equivalent. Patients who decide for or against surgery on the basis of the frame are said to lack rationality and suffer from a cognitive bias.
病人应该听医生如何表达信息吗?传统经济理论通常不考虑心理因素,比如通过表达信息来做出隐含建议。然而,由心理学家丹尼尔·卡尼曼和阿莫斯·特沃斯基领导的一群有影响力的行为经济学家比许多经济学家更字面地理解逻辑和经济人。人类判断与抽象逻辑之间的任何差异都被视为人类直觉的错误。因此,病人不应该听医生如何表达信息,因为积极和消极的表达在逻辑上是等效的。据说根据表达来决定是否接受手术的病人缺乏理性,并且受认知偏见影响。
Commenting on the surgery problem, behavioral economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein concluded that "framing works because people tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision makers" and framing thus offers a "brief glimpse at human fallibility." Kahneman has considered the attention paid to framing as "embarrassing" evidence for cognitive biases, which people repeatedly fall for: "in their stubborn appeal, framing effects resemble perceptual illusions more than computational errors." (Although it should be acknowledged here that Kahneman appears to have qualified his contentions over the years, later speaking of both the marvels and flaws of intuition. ) In this view, logical thinking is the sole ingredient of rationality, while intuition is a steady source of bias.
评论手术问题时,行为经济学家理查德·塞勒和法学学者卡斯·桑斯坦得出结论:“框架有效是因为人们往往是有些心不在焉、被动的决策者”,因此框架提供了“对人类易犯错误的简短一瞥”。卡内曼认为对框架的关注是认知偏见的“令人尴尬”证据,人们反复上当:“在它们顽固的吸引力中,框架效应更像是感知错觉,而不是计算错误。”(尽管应该承认卡内曼似乎多年来已经对自己的主张进行了修正,后来谈到直觉的奇迹和缺陷。)在这种观点中,逻辑思维是理性的唯一成分,而直觉是偏见的稳定来源。

Intuition Versus Rationality Anew
直觉与理性的新对比

The framing effect is just one of a long list of transgressions that intuition allegedly commits against reason according to influential psychologists and behavioral economists, whose research focused on the flaws of intuition. These "biases" have attained the status of truisms and provided justification for new paternalistic policies, popularly known as nudging, adopted by governments in the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The argument is not simply that people sometimes make mistakes or lack training in logical or statistical thinking - that would be nothing new. Rather, something inside our mind is said to make virtually everyone err in the same systematic way, with little hope of remedying the problem. In Dan Ariely's words, "we are not only irrational, but predictably irrational - that our irrationality happens the same way, again and again." The argument leading from biased intuition to governmental paternalism - in short, the irrationality argument - consists of three assertions and one conclusion:
框架效应只是直觉据称违背理性的一长串过失中的一个,这是根据有影响力的心理学家和行为经济学家的研究,他们的研究集中在直觉的缺陷上。这些“偏见”已经成为真理,并为新的父权政策提供了理由,这些政策通常被称为“推动”,被英国、美国和其他国家政府采纳。论点不仅仅是人们有时会犯错误或缺乏逻辑或统计思维的训练 - 这并不是什么新鲜事。相反,据说我们心中的某些东西几乎让每个人以同样的系统方式犯错,几乎没有希望解决问题。用丹·阿里埃利的话说,“我们不仅是非理性的,而且是可预测的非理性 - 我们的非理性一次又一次地发生在同样的方式上。”从有偏见的直觉到政府父权主义的论点 - 简而言之,非理性论点 - 包括三个断言和一个结论:
Biased intuition: People's intuitions are systematically biased and lack rationality. Stubbornness: Intuition is stubborn and, like visual illusions, hardly educable. Real-world costs: Biased intuition incurs substantial costs such as lower wealth, health, and happiness.
偏见直觉:人们的直觉系统性地带有偏见,缺乏理性。固执:直觉固执己见,像视觉错觉一样,几乎无法教育。现实世界的代价:偏见的直觉会带来巨大的代价,如降低财富、健康和幸福。
Conclusion: Biased intuitions justify governmental paternalism.
结论:有偏见的直觉证明了政府的家长式管理。
These three assumptions - biased intuition, stubbornness, and costs imply that chances are slim to nonexistent of the public ever learning or being educated out of their biases; instead, governments need to step in and nudge them into proper behavior. This new paternalism aims not at protecting people from external dangers or imperfections of the market, but from the enemy within: their own irrationality. Rationality, from this perspective, entails always obeying the logical axioms of consistency, maximizing one's expected utility, and updating probabilities via Bayes' rule. Let us call this ensemble logical rationality, for short. Maintaining that
这三个假设——偏见直觉、固执和成本意味着公众几乎没有机会学习或摆脱偏见;相反,政府需要介入并促使他们采取适当的行为。这种新的家长式管理旨在保护人们不受外部危险或市场的不完善之处的影响,而是保护他们免受内部敌人的影响:自己的非理性。从这个角度来看,理性意味着始终遵守逻辑一致性公理、最大化预期效用,并通过贝叶斯规则更新概率。让我们简称这种集合为逻辑理性。坚持
SMALL WORLD 小世界
Risk
Logic
Probability 概率
LARGE WORLD 大世界
Uncertainty 不确定性
Intuition
Heuristics
Figure 3.1. Risk versus uncertainty. In situations of risk, all possible future events, along with their consequences and probabilities, are known. In situations of uncertainty, that knowledge is not attainable. Uncertainty requires more than logic and probability: intuition and heuristics.
图 3.1。风险与不确定性。在风险情况下,所有可能的未来事件以及它们的后果和概率都是已知的。在不确定性情况下,这种知识是无法获得的。不确定性需要超出逻辑和概率:直觉和启发式。
patients should pay attention solely to the logical part of a doctor's message, not to its psychological part, is an instance of logical rationality. Note that logical rationality is content-free and thus knowledge, intelligence, emotion, and common sense are assumed to be of no relevance for rational decision-making.
患者应该仅关注医生信息的逻辑部分,而不是其心理部分,这是逻辑合理性的一个例子。请注意,逻辑合理性是无内容的,因此知识、智慧、情感和常识被认为对理性决策无关。
What if logical rationality is of value only for some problems and not for all? If logic were all we needed, our psychology would not have evolved into what it is, with its intuitions, heuristics, emotions, and social intelligence. Instead, our brains would have become superb calculating machines.
逻辑合理性只对某些问题有价值,而不是所有问题都适用的话,会怎么样呢?如果逻辑是我们所需要的一切,我们的心理学就不会进化成现在这个样子,拥有直觉、启发法、情感和社交智能。相反,我们的大脑会变成出色的计算机。
The crucial point is that logical rationality assumes a small world of known risk, as in games of roulette or slot machines with known payoffs, where the expected loss can be calculated and intuition is of no additional help. In a situation of risk, everything that can happen in the future is known, including all consequences of actions and their probabilities (Figure 3.I). Our brain, however, evolved to deal with a world of uncertainty. Uncertainty inhabits our lives in many forms: uncertainty about diagnosis and treatment, the intentions of others, financial markets, warfare, pandemics, natural disasters, and the future in general. I return to this important distinction in Chapter 5.
关键点在于逻辑合理性假设一个已知风险的小世界,就像轮盘赌博或有已知回报的老虎机游戏中,预期损失可以计算,直觉并不能提供额外帮助。在风险情况下,未来可能发生的一切都是已知的,包括行动的所有后果及其概率(图 3.I)。然而,我们的大脑进化出来是为了处理不确定性的世界。不确定性以多种形式存在于我们的生活中:诊断和治疗的不确定性,他人的意图,金融市场,战争,流行病,自然灾害以及未来的不确定性。我将在第 5 章再次回到这一重要区别。
My point is not that intuition never errs. Of course it can err, just as logical analysis does; that's why we need both. Instead, my argument is that, in situations of uncertainty, relying on logical rationality can be seriously misleading - as can mistaking intelligent processes to deal with uncertainty for biased intuition.
我的观点不是直觉永远不会出错。当然它也会出错,就像逻辑分析一样;这就是为什么我们需要两者。相反,我的论点是,在不确定的情况下,依赖逻辑理性可能会导致严重误导 - 就像误将处理不确定性的智能过程误认为有偏见的直觉一样。

The Bias Bias 偏见偏见

It is striking how much emphasis is placed on pointing out errors in intuition and how little reflection occurs on whether logical rationality
强调直觉中的错误有多重要,而对逻辑合理性是否发生反思却很少

is, in fact, a reasonable norm. That is not to say that the value of intuitive judgments is consistently denied in the literature on cognitive biases. However, every single experiment in this literature was designed to show, and concluded, that intuition fails. There appears to be a group dynamic that leads researchers to hunt for the next new bias. I call this extreme desire to attack intuition the bias bias:
事实上,这是一个合理的规范。这并不是说直觉判断的价值在认知偏见文献中一直被否定。然而,这个文献中的每一个实验都旨在展示,并得出结论,直觉是错误的。似乎存在一种团体动态,导致研究人员寻找下一个新的偏见。我称之为攻击直觉的极端欲望为偏见偏见:
Bias bias: The tendency to see systematic biases in intuition even if there is only unsystematic error or no verifiable error at all.
偏见偏见:即使只有非系统性错误或根本没有可验证的错误,也倾向于在直觉中看到系统性偏见。
Let us look at several celebrated biases that are widely taken for genuine cognitive errors.
让我们看看几种被广泛认为是真正认知错误的著名偏见。

Framing 构架

As I have mentioned, in a world of risk, where knowledge is certain, the framing of options (such as positive vs. negative) should have no impact on choice. Neoclassical economics assumes that rationally acting people have stable preferences and changing these according to the framing of a message is seen as a preference reversal. However, certainty does not exist for most important decisions, such as whether to undergo a dangerous surgery. Under uncertainty, preferences should not all be fixed, and asking for advice and information can be helpful. By framing an option, a speaker can communicate information that is not contained in the verbatim message, but which the intelligent listener is able to decode and incorporate into the choice accordingly. This decoding is known in the study of language comprehension as invited inferences, which are largely intuitive and more intellectually challenging than logical inferences. The great physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz spoke of unconscious inferences, which are the very backbone of human intelligence.
正如我所提到的,在一个充满风险的世界中,知识是确定的,选项的构架(如积极 vs. 消极)不应该对选择产生影响。新古典经济学假设,理性行事的人有稳定的偏好,并根据信息的构架改变这些偏好被视为偏好逆转。然而,对于大多数重要决策,如是否接受危险手术,确定性并不存在。在不确定性下,偏好不应全部固定,寻求建议和信息可能是有帮助的。通过构架一个选项,演讲者可以传达信息,这些信息在字面信息中并不存在,但聪明的听众能够解码并相应地纳入选择中。这种解码在语言理解研究中被称为邀请性推理,这些推理在很大程度上是直觉的,比逻辑推理更具智力挑战性。伟大的生理学家赫尔曼·冯·赫尔姆霍兹谈到了无意识推理,这是人类智慧的基础。

Surgery 手术

Consider the surgery problem again. For the patient, at issue is not logical consistency, but a life-and-death decision. To that end, the two relevant questions are: Is expected survival higher with or without surgery? Do possible harms associated with surgery lead to reduced quality of life? Neither " 90 percent alive" nor "Io percent dead" provides any of this information. What the patient needs to know is the survival rate without surgery along with the potential benefits and harms of surgery. This essential information is missing from the doctor's message. Thus, participants have to rely on their social intelligence to make an informed guess.
再次考虑手术问题。对于患者来说,问题不在于逻辑一致性,而在于生死抉择。为此,两个相关问题是:手术后预期存活率是高还是低?手术可能带来的伤害是否会降低生活质量?“90%存活”或“10%死亡”都没有提供这些信息。患者需要知道的是没有手术的存活率以及手术的潜在益处和危害。这些基本信息在医生的信息中缺失。因此,参与者必须依靠他们的社会智慧来做出明智的猜测。
By framing the option, speakers can convey information about the missing information, something listeners tend to understand intuitively. Experiments showed that if the no-surgery option was worse than surgery ("fewer patients survive without surgery"), then percent of the speakers (doctors) chose the "survival" frame. When, by contrast, no surgery was the better option ("more patients survive without surgery"), then the survival frame was chosen less frequently. Thus, by choosing a survival frame, the doctor can communicate that surgery has a substantial benefit compared to no surgery and can make an implicit recommendation.
通过设置选项,演讲者可以传达有关缺失信息的信息,这是听众往往能直观理解的。实验证明,如果不做手术的选择比手术更糟糕("没有手术的患者存活率更低"),那么 %的演讲者(医生)选择了"生存"框架。相比之下,如果不做手术是更好的选择("没有手术的患者存活率更高"),那么生存框架被选择的频率较低。 因此,通过选择生存框架,医生可以传达手术相对于不做手术具有实质性好处,并可以做出隐含的建议。
There are various reasons why doctors may omit information or not explicitly communicate recommendations. In the USA, for instance, tort law encourages malpractice suits, which fuels a culture of blame in which doctors fear making explicit recommendations. By selecting a positive or negative frame, physicians can indirectly communicate their belief as to whether surgery has a substantial benefit compared to no surgery. And most patients understand the message.
医生可能会省略信息或不明确传达建议的原因有很多。例如,在美国,侵权法鼓励医疗事故诉讼,这助长了一种责备文化,使医生害怕明确提出建议。通过选择积极或消极的框架,医生可以间接传达他们对手术是否比不手术有实质益处的信念。大多数患者能理解这个信息。
In an uncertain world such as that of medical treatment, logically equivalent frames are not necessarily informationally equivalent. Here, following logic can cost lives.
在诸如医疗治疗之类的不确定世界中,逻辑上等价的框架未必在信息上等价。在这里,遵循逻辑可能会造成生命的损失。

Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?
玻璃是半满还是半空?

The choice of frame can also implicitly communicate other relevant information. The mother of all framing problems makes that clear:
框架的选择也可以隐含地传达其他相关信息。所有框架问题的根源变得清晰:
The glass is half full.
玻璃是半满的。
The glass is half empty.
玻璃是半空的。
Once again, both frames are the same logically, but not psychologically. Imagine that there are two glasses on a table, one full and one empty (Figure 3.2). You are asked to pour half of the water in glass (b) into glass (a). Then you are requested to take the half-empty glass and move it to the edge of the table. Which would you pick? Most likely, you would intuitively pick the glass that was previously full.
再次强调,逻辑上两个杯子是一样的,但在心理上不同。想象一下桌子上有两个杯子,一个装满了水,一个空着(图 3.2)。你被要求把杯子(b)里的一半水倒入杯子(a)中。然后你被要求把半空的杯子移到桌子边缘。你会选择哪个?很可能,你会直觉地选择之前装满水的那个杯子。
An experiment showed that most people did exactly that. Likewise, when asked to take the half-full cup, they chose the one that was previously empty. Framing conveys unspoken information, and a careful listener understands that half full and half empty are not identical.
一项实验显示,大多数人确实是这样做的。同样,当被要求拿半满的杯子时,他们选择了之前是空的那个。框架传达了未言明的信息,一个细心的听众会明白半满和半空并不相同。
(a)
2.
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 3.2. Which glass is half full, which half empty? I: Two glasses, (a) empty and (b) full. 2: Half of glass (b) is poured into glass (a). 3: Two glasses, (c) half full, (d) half empty.
图 3.2。哪个杯子是半满的,哪个是半空的?1:两个杯子,(a)空的和(b)满的。2:将杯子(b)的一半倒入杯子(a)。3:两个杯子,(c)半满,(d)半空。
The intuitive ability to use a frame to communicate unspoken information, as well as to decode this information, is based on heuristics. For instance, listeners expect that what and how the speaker communicates is relevant - the relevance maxim. An example is the implication that a speaker is likely making an unspoken recommendation when using a positive frame for an option, whereas a negative frame likely indicates a warning. In general, the ability to listen carefully and pay attention to how messengers frame messages is a form of intelligence, not a bias of intuition.
直觉能力使用框架传达未言之信息,以及解码这些信息的能力,是基于启发式。例如,听众期望说话者传达的内容和方式是相关的 - 相关性最大化。一个例子是,当说话者使用积极的框架来表达一个选择时,暗示说话者可能在暗示推荐,而负面的框架则可能表示警告。总的来说,仔细倾听并注意信使如何构建信息的能力是一种智慧,而不是直觉的偏见。

The Asian Disease Problem Reassessed
亚洲疾病问题重新评估

Perhaps the most widely cited example of a framing effect stems from the "Asian disease problem," which figures prominently in virtually all textbooks:
也许最广泛引用的框架效应示例源自“亚洲疾病问题”,这在几乎所有教科书中都占据重要地位
Imagine that the USA is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:
想象一下,美国正在为一种不同寻常的亚洲疾病爆发做准备,预计将导致 600 人死亡。已经提出了两种对抗这种疾病的替代方案。假设这两种方案的科学估计后果如下:

[Positive Frame:] [积极框架:]

If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
如果采用方案 A,将会拯救 200 人。
If Program B is adopted, there is a probability that 600 people will be saved and a probability that no people will be saved.
如果采用 B 方案,有 的概率会有 600 人得救,有 的概率没有人会得救。

[Negative Frame:] 负面框架:

If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die.
如果采用方案 A,将有 400 人死亡。
If Program B is adopted, there is a probability that nobody will die and a probability that 600 people will die.
如果采用 B 计划,有 的概率没有人会死亡,有 的概率会有 600 人死亡。
Kahneman and Tversky argued that the positive and negative frames are logically equivalent, meaning that framing should not alter the preference order. Nevertheless, when given the positive frame, most people favored Program A, but, when given the negative frame, favored Program B. This difference was interpreted as evidence that people are risk-averse for gains (choosing the "certain" option in the positive frame) and risk-seeking for losses (choosing the "risky" option in the negative frame). In this purely logical interpretation, the responses to the Asian disease problem - just as to the surgery problem - violate the assumption of stable preferences and show that people's intuitions can be easily manipulated.
卡尼曼和特沃斯基认为,积极和消极框架在逻辑上是等价的,这意味着框架不应改变偏好顺序。然而,当给出积极框架时,大多数人更喜欢 A 计划,但是当给出消极框架时,更喜欢 B 计划。这种差异被解释为证据,表明人们对收益是风险规避的(在积极框架中选择“确定”选项),而对损失是风险寻求的(在消极框架中选择“冒险”选项)。在这种纯粹逻辑的解释中,对亚洲疾病问题的回应 - 就像对手术问题一样 - 违反了稳定偏好的假设,并显示出人们的直觉很容易被操纵。
Now recall the psychological analysis of the surgery problem: If people notice that part of the information is omitted, such as the effect of no surgery, they tend to make intuitive inferences. The psychologist Anton Kühberger and I noted that the Asian disease problem is of a similar nature: The risky option is always spelled out entirely in both frames (e.g., a probability that 600 people will be saved and a probability that no one is saved), whereas the "certain" option is never complete. For instance, it communicates that 200 people will be saved, but not that 400 will not be saved. This systematic asymmetry matters neither from the logical norm of description invariance nor for prospect theory, given that the framing in terms of loss and gains is preserved. But it should matter if people question the intentions underlying this asymmetry and make intuitive inferences. To test these two competing explanations - logical error or intelligent inference - all that needs to be done is to complete the missing options in both frames. Here is the complete version for the positive frame:
现在回想一下手术问题的心理分析:如果人们注意到部分信息被省略,比如没有手术的效果,他们往往会做直觉推断。心理学家安东·库赫贝格和我注意到,亚洲疾病问题具有类似的性质:风险选项在两种情况下都完全呈现(例如,有 概率拯救 600 人和有 概率一个人都不会被拯救),而“确定”的选项从未完全呈现。例如,它传达了将拯救 200 人的信息,但没有提到将有 400 人不会被拯救。这种系统性的不对称性既不符合描述不变性的逻辑规范,也不符合前景理论,因为损失和收益的框架得以保留。但如果人们质疑这种不对称性背后的意图并做出直觉推断,这就很重要。要测试这两种竞争性解释——逻辑错误或智能推断——需要做的就是完成两种情况下缺失选项的完整版本。以下是正面框架的完整版本:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved and 400 people will not be saved.
如果采用方案 A,将会拯救 200 人,但也会导致 400 人无法获救。
If Program B is adopted, there is a probability that 600 people will be saved and a probability that no people will be saved.
如果采用 B 方案,有 的概率会有 600 人得救,有 的概率没有人会得救。
If any of the logical explanations given - people's susceptibility to framing errors, their risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses, or the value function of prospect theory - were true, this addition should not matter. However, Kühberger found that it changes the entire result. When people were provided with the full information, the effect of positive versus negative frames disappeared. Subsequent studies replicated this striking finding. As further studies indicated, many people notice that the information is asymmetric and infer that the incomplete option means that at least 200 people are saved because, unlike in Program B, the information for how many will not be saved is not provided. In other words, they infer that Program A guarantees that 200 or more people will be saved, as opposed to exactly 200 .
如果给出的任何逻辑解释 - 人们对框架错误的易感性,他们对收益的风险规避和对损失的风险追求,或者前景理论的价值函数 - 是真实的,这个附加项就不重要。然而,Kühberger 发现这改变了整个结果。当人们获得完整信息时,正面与负面框架的效应消失了。随后的研究复制了这一惊人的发现。 正如进一步的研究所指出的,许多人注意到信息是不对称的,并推断出不完整选项意味着至少会有 200 人得救,因为与 B 计划不同,没有提供多少人将不会得救的信息。 换句话说,他们推断出 A 计划保证会有 200 人或更多人得救,而不是恰好是 200 人。
Thus, people's judgments appear to have little to do with loss-aversion or unstable preferences due to positive versus negative framing. The asymmetry of the information communicated instead drives the entire effect. When supplied with incomplete information, people have to make intelligent inferences.
因此,人们的判断似乎与厌恶损失或由正面与负面框架引起的不稳定偏好关系不大。而是信息传达的不对称性驱动了整个效应。当提供不完整信息时,人们必须做出明智的推断。

Intelligent Inferences Mistaken for Biases
智能推理被误认为偏见

In all of these cases, the same bias bias is seen: mistaking intelligent intuitive inferences for biases. Frames carry information beyond their literal content, meaning that their interpretation requires not logical, but psychological, analysis. The bias bias emerges from a view that eliminates all psychology by assuming that logically equivalent statements must be informationally equivalent. This principle of "descriptive invariance" has been hailed as an essential condition for rational choice. However, the art of reading between the lines is more cognitively demanding than the narrow logic of descriptive invariance.
在所有这些情况下,都可以看到相同的偏见:将智能直觉推断误认为是偏见。框架携带超出其字面内容的信息,这意味着它们的解释不需要逻辑分析,而是需要心理分析。偏见偏见源自一种观点,即通过假设逻辑上等价的陈述必须在信息上等价来消除所有心理学。这种“描述不变性”原则被誉为理性选择的基本条件。然而,阅读行间的艺术比描述不变性的狭隘逻辑更具认知要求。
Once again, there is a difference between the natural and social sciences. Framing has long been considered an art in mathematics and physics, as the importance of notation and number representation illustrates. For example, Newton and Leibniz had different notations for the calculus, each having its advantages, which are discussed to the present day. Although logically equivalent, they are not identical. The physicist Richard Feynman pointed out the importance of simultaneously working with different formulations of the same physical law, even if they are logically equivalent: "Psychologically they are different because they are completely unequivalent when you are trying to guess new laws.".
再次,自然科学和社会科学之间存在差异。在数学和物理学中,构架长期以来被认为是一门艺术,因为符号和数字表示的重要性得到了体现。例如,牛顿和莱布尼茨对微积分有不同的符号表示,各有其优势,这些优势至今仍在讨论中。尽管在逻辑上是等价的,但它们并不相同。物理学家理查德·费曼指出了同时使用同一物理定律的不同表述的重要性,即使它们在逻辑上是等价的:“从心理上讲,它们是不同的,因为当你试图猜测新的定律时,它们完全不等价。”。
In sum, the principle of logical equivalence or description invariance is a poor guide to understanding how human intelligence deals with an uncertain world where not everything is, or can be, stated explicitly. It misses the very nature of social intelligence, the ability to make inferences beyond the bare information given. Logic is without doubt a tool of rationality, but not the exclusive one in the cognitive toolbox.
总的来说,逻辑等价性或描述不变性原则是理解人类智能如何处理不确定世界的一个不好的指导,因为并非一切都是或可以明确陈述的。它忽略了社会智能的本质,即能够在提供的基本信息之外进行推断的能力。逻辑无疑是理性的工具,但并非认知工具箱中的唯一工具。

Intuitions About Randomness
关于随机性的直觉

Psychology classrooms often resemble magic shows, where professors perform tricks to demonstrate how everyone's intuition can be fooled. Consider a stock-in-trade attraction, where someone throws a coin to see whether it lands heads or tails (T). The quiz is:
心理学课堂经常类似于魔术表演,教授们表演戏法来展示每个人的直觉是如何被愚弄的。考虑一个常见的吸引力,有人抛硬币看它是正面还是反面(T)。这个小测验是:
You take a fair coin and flip it four times in a row. Which string will you more likely observe?
你拿一枚公平的硬币连续抛掷四次。你更有可能观察到哪个字符串?

HHT
Most people's intuition says that HHT is more likely. Yet, a psychology professor may argue that the intuition is faulty because the two strings have the same probability of occurring. The probability of a head is always the same as of a tail; thus, the probability of each string is the same, the students are told. Upon reflection, they may be inclined to concede that the intuition was wrong, even though it still intuitively feels right. This has happened to many participants in psychological experiments, and it appears to prove the first two assertions about biased intuition: that people lack rationality and that intuition is hardly educable: Even after being proven wrong, people stubbornly hang on to their biased intuition. The bias has a name, the law of small numbers, which is one of the two key experimental findings on intuitions of randomness:
大多数人的直觉认为 HHT 更有可能。然而,心理学教授可能会认为直觉是错误的,因为这两个字符串发生的概率是相同的。学生们被告知,正面的概率总是与反面的概率相同;因此,每个字符串的概率都是相同的。经过反思,他们可能倾向于承认直觉是错误的,即使它仍然在直觉上感觉正确。这在许多心理实验的参与者身上发生过,似乎证明了关于有偏见直觉的前两个断言:人们缺乏理性,而直觉几乎无法教育:即使被证明错误,人们仍然固执地坚持他们有偏见的直觉。这种偏见有一个名字,叫做小数定律,这是关于随机直觉的两个关键实验发现之一。
I. The law of small numbers: People think a string is more likely the closer the number of heads and tails corresponds to the underlying equal probabilities. For instance, the string HHT is deemed more likely than , and is deemed more likely than .
I. 小数定律:人们认为,当正反面的数量与潜在的相等概率相对应时,串更有可能。例如,串 HHT 被认为比 更有可能,而 被认为比 更有可能。
  1. Irregularity: If the number of heads and tails is the same in two strings, people think that the one with a more irregular pattern is more
    不规则性:如果两个字符串中正反面的数量相同,人们认为具有更不规则模式的那个更多
+ + +
Figure 3.3. Throwing a fair coin four times. Is a string of or HHT more likely? There are possible sequences of four tosses of a fair coin, each equally likely. In three of these, there is at least one string (check mark), while HHT occurs in four of these (plus sign). Consistent with the intuition of many people, encountering the sequence HHT is more likely.
图 3.3. 抛掷一枚公平硬币四次。字符串 或 HHT 更可能吗?有 种可能的四次抛硬币序列,每种同等可能。在这些序列中的三个中,至少有一个字符串 (勾号),而 HHT 出现在其中的四个中(加号)。与许多人的直觉一致,遇到序列 HHT 更有可能。
likely. For instance, the string HHTHTH is deemed more likely than HTHTHT.
可能。例如,字符串 HHTHTH 被认为比 HTHTHT 更有可能。
Most people feel that there is something unusual in the string HTHTHT, where heads and tails strictly alternate, and that the irregular string HHTHTH is more likely to be obtained. Yet, that too is considered a fallacy for the same reason: The probability of both strings is the same. Both phenomena have been called systematic biases. But why should people have faulty intuitions about randomness in the first place? Some researchers have suggested that random devices did not exist during most of human evolution, and thus our minds have not developed proper intuition. This explanation, however, accepts the claim that people's intuitions are wrong in the first place. Let us have a closer look.
大多数人觉得字符串 HTHTHT 中有些不寻常,其中正反面严格交替,而不规则字符串 HHTHTH 更有可能被获得。然而,出于同样的原因,这也被认为是一种谬误:两个字符串的概率是相同的。这两种现象都被称为系统性偏见。但为什么人们对随机性有错误的直觉呢?一些研究人员提出,随机设备在人类演化的大部分时间内并不存在,因此我们的思维没有形成正确的直觉。然而,这种解释接受了人们的直觉一开始就是错误的说法。让我们仔细看看。

The Law of Small Numbers
小数法则

Is it indeed equally likely that one will encounter a string of or of HHT when flipping a coin four times in a row? Surprisingly, the answer is that HHT is more likely.
在连续抛掷硬币四次时,遇到一串 或 HHT 的可能性确实是相等的吗?令人惊讶的是,答案是 HHT 更有可能。
Figure 3.3 shows why. There are 16 possible sequences that can result from throwing a coin four times. These sequences are all equally probable. In four of these, one encounters an HHT, as marked by a " + ". But an HHH is found in only three sequences, as shown by a check mark. Thus, the relative frequency of encountering at least one HHT is and that of is . People's intuition that an HHT is more likely to be encountered than an in a sequence of four flips turns out to be correct.
图 3.3 显示了原因。掷硬币四次可能会产生 16 种可能的序列。这些序列都是等可能的。在这些序列中,有四种遇到 HHT,用“+”标记。但只有三种序列中有 HHH,如勾号所示。因此,至少遇到一个 HHT 的相对频率为 ,而 的频率为 。人们直觉认为在四次翻转序列中更有可能遇到 HHT 而不是 ,事实证明是正确的。
Another way to understand this result is that two strings of overlap in the first column of Figure 3.3, whereas no such overlaps occur
另一种理解这个结果的方法是,图 3.3 的第一列中有两个 重叠的字符串,而没有发生这样的重叠。
+
Figure 3.4. The special case where the length of the string (here three) is the same as the length of the sequence . Here, the chance of encountering an HHT and an HHH are the same. But that does not hold in all other cases, as Figure 3.3 illustrates.
图 3.4。特殊情况是字符串的长度(这里是三)与序列 的长度相同。在这种情况下,遇到 HHT 和 HHH 的机会是相同的。但并非所有情况都如此,正如图 3.3 所示。
(or are even possible) for HHT. Similarly, it can be shown that HHT is likely to be encountered earlier than : The expected waiting time for HHT is eight tosses of a coin, compared with 14 tosses for HHH.
(或者甚至可能)对 HHT。同样,可以证明 HHT 可能比 更早遇到:HHT 的预期等待时间是八次抛硬币,而 HHH 需要 14 次。
Our example was with four throws. Consider now the general case. Let be the length of the string of heads and tails judged (which is three in the example above), and be the total sequence (number of tosses, which is four in the example). Thus, . Now we can specify the general principle under which people's intuition is ecologically rational:
我们的例子是四次投掷。现在考虑一般情况。让 表示被判断的正反面字符串的长度(在上面的例子中为三), 表示总序列(投掷次数,上面的例子中为四)。因此, 。现在我们可以指定人们直觉在生态上是合理的一般原则:
If infinite, a string of Hs with a single alternation such as HHT is more likely to be encountered than a pure string such as .
如果 是无限的,那么像 HHT 这样具有单一交替的 H 字符串更有可能出现,而不是像 这样的纯字符串。
The term ecologically rational means that statements about the rationality of judgments need to be qualified with respect to ecological conditions: here, the length of the string and that of the sequence. In sum, the intuition that HHT is more likely to be encountered than is not generally an error. It is only so in two specific conditions: if a person has seen exactly as many throws as the string to be judged and if a person has seen an infinitely long string, which is impossible for a mortal being.
生态合理这个术语意味着对判断的合理性陈述需要根据生态条件进行限定:这里指的是字符串的长度和序列的长度。总的来说,HHT 比 更有可能出现的直觉并不是一种普遍的错误。只有在两种特定条件下才会是错误:如果一个人看到的掷硬币次数正好与待判断的字符串长度相同,以及如果一个人看到了一个无限长的字符串,这对于一个凡人来说是不可能的。
Figure 3.4 shows the special condition where the number of tosses and the string is of equal length. Here, the chance of encountering an and an HHT is the same. There are eight possible outcomes, with one of each string.
图 3.4 显示了抛掷次数和字符串长度相等的特殊情况。在这里,遇到 和 HHT 的机会是相同的。有八种可能的结果,每种字符串各一种。
In Figure 3.3, the string is a proper sample of the number of tosses. In statistical terms, sample statistics need not be the same as population statistics, which is precisely the situation here. In Figure 3.4, the sample is the population. If you are still not convinced, consider this bet:
在图 3.3 中,字符串是抛掷次数的一个合适样本。在统计学术语中,样本统计量不需要与总体统计量相同,这正是这里的情况。在图 3.4 中,样本就是总体。如果你还不相信,考虑这个赌注:
The law-of-small-numbers bet: You flip a fair coin 20 times. If this sequence contains at least one , I pay you $ . If it contains at least one HHHT, you pay me Ioo. If it contains neither, nobody wins.
小数定律赌注:你抛硬币 20 次。如果这个序列至少包含一个 ,我支付你$ 。如果它至少包含一个 HHHT,你支付我 Ioo。如果两者都不包含,没有人赢。
If and were equally likely to be encountered, then the two players should break even. But, in fact, the person who accepts the bet can expect to lose in the long run. For 20 flips, the probability that you will see at least one is about 50 percent, but the chance of an HHHT is around 75 percent. For the same reason, a gambler who watches the outcomes of the roulette wheel in a casino for half an hour can more likely expect to see a string of three reds followed by a black than a string of four reds. In this situation, believing in the law of small numbers pays.
如果 同等可能被遇到,那么两名玩家应该打成平手。但事实上,接受赌注的人长期来看会亏损。对于 20 次抛硬币,至少会看到一个 的概率约为 50%,但 HHHT 的机会约为 75%。 出于同样的原因,一个在赌场观察轮盘赌结果半小时的赌徒更有可能看到三个红色后跟一个黑色的组合,而不是四个红色的组合。在这种情况下,相信小数定律是有益的。
The phenomenon that people expect more alternations than those predicted by probability theory has been sometimes linked to the gambler's fallacy. Yet, that connection is mistaken, as can be deduced from the ecological rationality condition. The gambler's fallacy refers to the intuition that, after witnessing a string of, say, three heads, one expects that the next outcome will be more likely tails than heads. This would be a true fallacy because it corresponds to the condition . In other words, a total of four throws is considered, either or , and there is no sample with the property .
人们期望发生更多变化的现象有时被认为与赌徒谬误有关。然而,这种联系是错误的,可以从生态合理性条件中推断出来。赌徒谬误指的是这样一种直觉,即在看到一连串,比如说,三个正面后,人们期望下一个结果更可能是反面而不是正面。这将是一个真正的谬误,因为它对应于条件 。换句话说,总共进行了四次投掷,要么 ,要么 ,没有具有属性 的样本

Irregularity 不规则

The second alleged misconception regarding chance is that people believe that irregular sequences are more likely. Consider the following two sequences:
关于机会的第二个被指称的误解是人们相信不规则序列更有可能。考虑以下两个序列:

HTHTHT
HTTHTH

Here, the number of heads and tails are now identical, but alternations are regular in the first string and irregular in the second. Psychological research documented that most people find the more irregular string more likely.
在这里,头和尾的数量现在是相同的,但在第一个字符串中是规律的,而在第二个字符串中是不规律的。心理研究表明,大多数人认为更不规则的字符串更有可能。
Once again, this intuition is not a fallacy for the same reason as before: If , then the irregular sequence HTTHTH is more likely than the regular one. The expected waiting time to get a HTTHTH is 64 flips, compared with 84 for HTHTHT (and 126 for HHHHHH). This can be verified in the same way as with Figure 3.3.
再次,这种直觉并非因为同样的原因而是一个谬误:如果 ,那么不规则序列 HTTHTH 比规则序列更有可能。获得 HTTHTH 的预期等待时间为 64 次翻转,而 HTHTHT 为 84 次(HHHHHH 为 126 次)。 可以通过与图 3.3 相同的方式进行验证。
In sum, people's intuition that irregular alternations are more likely to be encountered reflects an astonishingly fine-tuned sensitivity to the statistics of finite samples. The intuition is erroneous in only one special case, when the number of throws is exactly the same as the string (Figure 3.4).
总的来说,人们对于不规则的交替更有可能出现的直觉反映出对有限样本统计数据的惊人敏感性。这种直觉只在一个特殊情况下是错误的,即投掷次数恰好与字符串长度相同时(图 3.4)。

Fine-Tuned Intuition Mistaken for Bias
细致调整的直觉被误认为是偏见

In the literature on flawed human intuition of randomness, no distinction appears to have been made between the one specific case where it is indeed flawed and all the other instances where intuition is actually right. Rather, intuitions have been generally declared erroneous. Whatever the explanation, the alleged bias was seen to demonstrate the "stubbornness" of intuition: "For anyone who would wish to view man as a reasonable intuitive statistician, such results are discouraging."
在关于人类随机直觉错误的文献中,似乎没有区分出确实存在错误的特定情况和其他所有直觉实际上是正确的情况。相反,直觉通常被宣称是错误的。无论是什么解释,所谓的偏见被视为展示了直觉的“固执性”:“对于任何希望将人视为一个合理的直觉统计学家的人来说,这样的结果是令人沮丧的。”
In summary, people's intuitions about chance have been interpreted as systematically flawed because they (i) fall prey to the law of small numbers and (ii) confuse irregularity with chance in both the recognition and production of randomness. An ecological analysis, by contrast, shows that if , which is the typical window of experience, people's intuitions are, in fact, correct. The general insight is that the properties of the underlying chance process (such as equal probability) do not match the properties of small samples, a phenomenon known as biased sample estimators in statistics. In other words, people's intuitions were evaluated against the wrong normative standard, one that does not capture the properties of samples.
总的来说,人们对机会的直觉被解释为系统性错误,因为他们(i)容易受到小数法则的影响,(ii)在随机性的认知和产生中混淆了不规则性和机会。相比之下,生态学分析表明,如果 ,这是典型的经验窗口,人们的直觉实际上是正确的。总体洞察力是,潜在机会过程的属性(如等概率)与小样本的属性不匹配,这一现象在统计学中被称为有偏样本估计器。换句话说,人们的直觉被评估为错误的规范标准,这个标准并不能捕捉样本的属性。
In the next section, "The Hot Hand Fallacy," we will see that the same oversight applies to an allegedly illusory intuition shared by many coaches and players.
在接下来的部分,“热手谬误”中,我们将看到同样的疏忽也适用于许多教练和球员所共享的一种据称是虚幻的直觉。

The Hot Hand Fallacy: Professional Intuition Mistaken for Bias
热手谬误:将专业直觉误认为偏见

Most sport fans can recall magical moments when a player is "on fire," "in the zone," "in rhythm," or "unconscious." This temporarily elevated performance is known as the hot hand. For players and coaches, the hot hand is a common experience. It resembles what my late colleague Mike Csikszentmihalyi called "flow," a time in which performance increases without deliberation; jazz musicians, professional writers, and many others also report such moments. According to some researchers, however, this belief is an illusion, which has been dubbed the hot band fallacy. In Thaler and Sunstein's words, "It turns out that the cognitive illusion is so powerful that most people (influenced by their Automatic System) are unwilling even to consider the possibility that their strongly held beliefs might be wrong." "It turns out that the 'hot hand' is a myth," they assert; "to date, no one has found it." Nevertheless, coaches and players stubbornly cling to their experience of the hot hand, apparently further evidence that cognitive illusions resemble visual illusions. Even the website of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sided against the coaches and warned of believing in magic: "Streaks and 'hot hands" are simply illusions in sports. And, it is better to be a scientist than be governed by irrational superstition." The hot hand fallacy served as an explanation for various vices in financial markets, sports betting, and casino gambling. Once again, the suspected fallacy was presented as evidence for the irrationality of intuition.
大多数体育迷都能回忆起球员处于“状态百倍”,“进入状态”,“顺风顺水”或“无意识”时的神奇时刻。这种暂时提升的表现被称为“状态百倍”。对于球员和教练来说,状态百倍是一种常见经历。它类似于我已故的同事迈克·奇克森特米哈伊所称的“心流”,即表现在没有深思熟虑的情况下提高;爵士乐手、专业作家和许多其他人也报告过这样的时刻。然而,一些研究人员认为,这种信念是一种幻觉,被称为“状态百倍谬误”。在塞斯坦和桑斯坦的话中,“事实证明,认知幻觉是如此强大,以至于大多数人(受其自动系统影响)甚至不愿考虑他们坚定信念可能是错误的可能性。”他们断言,“事实证明,‘状态百倍’是一个神话;迄今为止,没有人找到它。”尽管如此,教练和球员们仍然固执地坚持他们对状态百倍的经验,显然进一步证明认知幻觉类似于视觉幻觉。 即使是全国大学体育协会(NCAA)的网站也站在教练们的对立面,并警告人们不要相信魔法:“连胜和‘手感’在体育运动中只是幻觉。最好成为一名科学家,而不是被非理性的迷信所统治。”热手谬误被用来解释金融市场、体育博彩和赌场赌博中的各种恶习。一次又一次,这种被怀疑的谬误被作为直觉非理性的证据呈现。
From an economic view, however, the claim that this intuition is stubbornly wrong is most puzzling. Professional coaches and players presumably have no incentives to be wrong, only to be right. Why then would such an erroneous belief persist? Economist and Nobel laureate Gary Becker once remarked to me that coaches see when a player in the other team is hot and then send an extra player to cut their streak short. For that reason, he concluded, one cannot find the effects of getting hot in the performance streaks that psychologists were analyzing. His was a reasonable objection, but the psychologists assessing the existence of the hot hand had already taken this into consideration and analyzed data from free shots, where no players are allowed to interfere. Even here, they could not find any trace of a hot hand in the data.
从经济角度来看,然而,坚持认为这种直觉是错误的说法是最令人困惑的。专业教练和球员理应没有错误的动机,只有正确的动机。那么为什么这种错误的信念会持续存在呢?经济学家和诺贝尔奖得主加里·贝克尔曾对我说,教练会看到对方球队的球员状态火热,然后派一个额外的球员去打断他们的连胜。因此,他得出结论,人们无法在心理学家分析的表现连胜中找到状态火热的影响。这是一个合理的反对意见,但评估状态火热存在性的心理学家已经考虑到了这一点,并分析了来自罚球的数据,那里没有球员允许干扰。即使在这里,他们也找不到任何状态火热的迹象。

The Hot Hand Exists
热手现象存在

It took some 30 years and two smart economists, Joshua Miller and Adam Sanjuro, to show, using the original free shot data, that the hot hand is not a myth. For simplification, I apply the same line of analysis used earlier to explain the intuitions about randomness; Miller and Sanjuro took a different approach.
花了大约 30 年的时间,两位聪明的经济学家乔舒亚·米勒和亚当·三十郎展示,使用原始的免费投篮数据,热手并非神话。为了简化,我应用了之前用来解释关于随机性直觉的分析线路;米勒和三十郎采取了不同的方法。
In the original study, 26 shooters from Cornell University each made ioo free shots from a fixed distance with varying locations. The authors of that study posited that there is no hot hand if the frequency of a hit after three hits equals that of a miss after three hits. When looking at all occurrences of three hits and recording how often these were followed by another hit, they found that the number was the same for all but one player - an anomaly that can be attributed to chance. Thus, the conclusion was that the hot hand does not exist and that belief in it is a fallacy.
在原始研究中,康奈尔大学的 26 名射手分别从固定距离进行了 100 次自由投篮,位置各不相同。该研究的作者认为,如果在三次命中后的命中频率等于三次未命中后的未命中频率,则不存在投篮手感。当观察所有三次命中的情况并记录这些命中后又有多少次命中时,他们发现除了一个球员外,其他球员的次数都是相同的 - 这个异常可以归因于偶然。因此,结论是投篮手感不存在,对其的信仰是一种谬误。
Let us take a closer look at this argument. As shown in Figure 3.3, tails after two heads is more likely than another head if the length of the string is smaller than that of the entire sequence. Now replace heads with hit, tails with miss, and the fair coin with a player who shoots from a distance where there is a probability of .50 of scoring a hit. If a player makes 4 free shots, there are 16 sequences with equal probabilities. In six of these sequences, one can test the hot hand because these have followed by either (hit) or (miss). If there were no hot hand, we would observe a miss after two hits in four of these six sequences and a hit after two hits in only three (the four plus signs and the three check marks in Figure 3.3). That is, in two out of the 16 possible sequences one would observe a hit, in one sequence a hit and a miss, and in three a miss. The expected relative frequency of a hit after two hits is therefore out of 6 , which is .42. Because HHH should be less often observed than HHT, finding a relative frequency of . 50 of in the free shots instead of the expected .42 actually indicates a hot hand.
让我们仔细看一下这个论点。如图 3.3 所示,如果字符串的长度小于整个序列的长度,则在两个头之后出现尾巴的可能性比另一个头更大。现在用“击中”代替“头”,用“未击中”代替“尾巴”,用一个射击概率为 0.50 的球员代替公平硬币。如果一个球员进行 4 次免费射击,那么有 16 个等概率的序列。在这 16 个序列中,有 6 个序列可以测试热手,因为这些序列之后要么是 2 个“击中”,要么是 3 个“未击中”。如果没有热手,那么在这 6 个序列中,有 4 个序列中两次击中后会出现未击中,只有 3 个序列中两次击中后会出现击中(图 3.3 中的四个加号和三个勾号)。也就是说,在 16 个可能的序列中,有两个序列会观察到一次击中,一个序列会观察到一次击中和一次未击中,三个序列会观察到一次未击中。因此,两次击中后观察到一次击中的预期相对频率是 6 中的 5,即 0.42。因为 HHH 应该比 HHT 更少被观察到,所以在免费射击中找到 0.50 的相对频率,而不是预期的 0.42,实际上表明存在热手。
The same holds for a sequence of ioo free shots and strings of length 4 . Once again, we are dealing with (the length of the string) and IOO; that is, the ecological condition is in place. In a reanalysis of the original data, a substantial number of the shooters showed a pattern of performance consistent with the hot hand. Across players, the hot hand boosted performance by II percentage points, which is substantial and roughly equal to the difference in the field goal percentage between the average and the very best three-point shooter in the National Basketball Association (NBA).
相同的情况也适用于 100 个免费投篮和长度为 4 的字符串序列。再次,我们正在处理 (字符串的长度)和 100;也就是说,生态条件 已经到位。在对原始数据的重新分析中,相当数量的射手表现出与热手一致的表现模式。在球员之间,热手将表现提高了 11 个百分点,这是相当大的,大致等于国家篮球协会(NBA)中平均和最好的三分球手之间的命中率差异。
Coaches and players thus have good reason to maintain their belief in the hot hand and do not need to be nudged out of their "stubborn" intuition.
教练和球员因此有充分理由坚持他们对热手的信念,不需要被推动出他们的“固执”直觉。

Generality of the Bias Bias
偏见的普遍性

These examples of the bias bias may suffice to gain a general idea about the war against intuition. The list could be continued with the Linda problem, base rate neglect, loss-aversion, priming, and other apparent biases that are no errors in the first place, or errors only under special conditions, or cannot be replicated. In general, there are five general principles underlying the bias bias:
这些偏见的例子可能足以让人对反直觉的战争有一个大致的了解。列表可以继续包括琳达问题、基础率忽视、损失厌恶、启动、以及其他明显的偏见,这些偏见本质上并非错误,或者只在特定条件下是错误,或者无法复制。总的来说,偏见的基础有五个一般原则:
I. Logically equivalent frames are mistaken as informationally equivalent: Framing and the logical norm of description invariance are key examples.
逻辑上等价的框架被误认为是信息上等价的:框架和描述不变性的逻辑规范是关键示例。
  1. Biased sample estimators are mistaken for people's biases: The statistics of small samples can systematically differ from the population parameters. Intuitions about chance and the hot hand are examples.
    偏倚样本估计器被误认为是人们的偏见:小样本的统计数据可能会与总体参数有系统性差异。关于机会和热手的直觉就是例子。
  2. Experimenters' sampling of questions is biased: Overconfidence defined as mean confidence minus percent correct - results from selected questions that are untypical, but it disappears when questions are chosen representatively.
    实验者对问题的抽样是有偏见的:过度自信被定义为平均自信减去正确百分比 - 这是来自选择的不典型问题的结果,但当问题被代表性地选择时,这种现象就消失了。
  3. Unsystematic errors are mistaken for systematic biases: Confusing regression to the mean with a systematic error is an example. Unsystematic errors have been misinterpreted as a miscalibration (another version of overconfidence) as well as an overestimation of small risks and an overestimation of large risks.
    非系统误差被误认为是系统偏差:将回归到平均值与系统误差混淆是一个例子。非系统误差被误解为误校准(另一种过度自信的版本)以及对小风险和大风险的高估。
  4. Situations of risk (where probability theory can provide the best answer) are not distinguished from situations of uncertainty (where heuristics can be superior): This is the key problem underlying most erroneous diagnoses of biases.
    风险情况(概率论可以提供最佳答案的情况)与不确定性情况(启发式可能更优)没有明显区别:这是导致大多数错误偏见诊断的关键问题。
The history of statistics has taught us that normative claims require a careful analysis of the assumptions made. In studies that try to show errors of intuition, surprisingly little thought is given to what constitutes rational judgment, an apparent contradiction referred to as the irrationality paradox. Once again, that is not to say that intuition never errs. At issue is a full-fledged bias bias against intuition.
统计学的历史告诉我们,规范性主张需要对所做的假设进行仔细分析。在试图展示直觉错误的研究中,对于什么构成理性判断几乎没有思考,这被称为非理性悖论。再次强调,并不是说直觉永远不会出错。问题在于对直觉存在一种全面的偏见。

Citation Bias 引用偏见

Alongside the bias bias, the citation bias is a second weapon in the war against intuition. A citation bias occurs when positive findings are systematically less often cited than negative findings. Imagine I Io articles on intuition that report largely successful performance and four articles that report errors. If the four are cited more often than the IIO, that is a clear case of citation bias. Citation bias is widespread in media that amplify negative stories, scandals, and misfortunes to attract attention or satisfy a hidden agenda. Science is also not free of selective reporting, with some fields more susceptible than others.
除了偏见之外,引用偏见是对抗直觉的第二个武器。引用偏见发生在积极结果被系统性地引用次数少于负面结果的情况下。想象一下,我写了 10 篇关于直觉的文章,其中大部分表现成功,还有四篇报道错误。如果这四篇比 10 篇更经常被引用,那就是引用偏见的明显案例。引用偏见在媒体中广泛存在,这些媒体会放大负面故事、丑闻和不幸,以吸引注意力或满足隐藏的议程。科学也不是没有选择性报道,某些领域比其他领域更容易受到影响。
As mentioned, the focus of the new war against intuition is on judgments about chance, frequency, and randomness - in short, statistical intuitions. Swiss psychologists Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder, who were among the first to systematically study the development of intuitions of chance in children, concluded that children's intuitions approximate the laws of statistics by age Similarly, experiments with adults up to the I970s concluded that people's intuitions are in good, albeit not perfect, agreement with the laws of statistics. In 1967, for instance, psychologists Cameron Peterson and Lee Roy Beach arrived at this conclusion after reviewing I Io articles in their paper aptly (apart from the gender bias) entitled "Man as an Intuitive Statistician." They concluded that intuitions "are influenced by appropriate variables and in appropriate directions" while also pointing out cases where intuitions deviate. Overall, the I60 experiments in these I1o articles show that the laws of statistics provide "a good first approximation for a psychological theory of inference."
如前所述,新的反直觉战争的重点是关于机会、频率和随机性的判断 - 简言之,统计直觉。瑞士心理学家让·皮亚杰(Jean Piaget)和巴贝尔·因赫尔德(Bärbel Inhelder)是最早系统研究儿童机会直觉发展的学者之一,他们得出结论称,儿童的直觉在 岁时接近统计规律。同样,截至 1970 年代对成年人进行的实验得出结论,人们的直觉与统计规律在很大程度上是一致的,尽管不是完美的。例如,1967 年,心理学家卡梅隆·彼得森(Cameron Peterson)和李·罗伊·比奇(Lee Roy Beach)在审阅了他们的论文中的 110 篇文章后得出这一结论,该论文恰当地(除了性别偏见)命名为“人作为直觉统计学家”。他们得出结论称,直觉“受适当变量和适当方向的影响”,同时也指出直觉偏离的情况。总体而言,这 110 篇文章中的 160 个实验表明,统计规律为“推理心理学理论提供了一个良好的第一近似值”。
Seven years later, Tversky and Kahneman challenged this conclusion in a review paper entitled "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," summarizing four articles they had published on putative cognitive biases. They concluded: "In making predictions and judgments under uncertainty, people do not appear to follow the calculus of chance or the statistical theory of prediction." The question arises why people's intuitions about chance took a nose-dive in the i970s and no longer approximated statistical theory thereafter. One might assume that the research community had discussed this question and sought an answer. Instead, a citation bias made the contradicting conclusions disappear.
七年后,特维斯基和卡尼曼在一篇名为“不确定性下的判断:启发式和偏见”的评论论文中挑战了这个结论,总结了他们发表的四篇关于假定认知偏见的文章。他们得出结论:“在不确定性下进行预测和判断时,人们似乎不遵循概率计算或统计预测理论。”问题是为什么人们对概率的直觉在 1970 年代急剧下降,之后再也不符合统计理论。人们可能会认为研究界已经讨论了这个问题并寻找了答案。然而,引文偏见使相互矛盾的结论消失了。
Figure 3.5a reveals the extent of the citation bias. By 2020, "Man as an Intuitive Statistician" was cited 479 times, while "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases" was cited over 15,000 times. As a consequence, the collective memory of a large body of experimental research has been largely wiped out.
图 3.5a 显示了引用偏见的程度。到 2020 年,“作为直觉统计学家的人”被引用了 479 次,而“不确定性下的判断:启发式和偏见”被引用了超过 15,000 次。因此,大量实验研究的集体记忆已经被大幅抹去。
This example is not the exception to the rule. Consider another pair of articles, also seven years apart. In 1965, Ward Edwards and colleagues published a review of whether intuitive opinion change follows Bayes' theorem: "It turns out that opinion change is very orderly, and usually proportional to numbers calculated from Bayes' theorem - but it is insufficient in amount." The review found that people are conservative Bayesians, that is, Bayesians who give too much weight to base rates. In contrast, in an article published in 1972, Kahneman and Tversky concluded: "In his evaluation of evidence, man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all." Once more, the question of why people's intuitions looked approximately Bayesian in experiments only until 1970 was rarely if ever posed in the research that found intuition wanting. And yet again, a citation bias took care of the problem (Figure 3.5b). The message that people are not Bayesians at all became common wisdom.
这个例子并非例外。考虑另一对文章,也相隔七年。1965 年,沃德·爱德华兹和同事发表了一篇关于直觉观点变化是否遵循贝叶斯定理的评论:“结果表明,观点变化非常有秩序,通常与从贝叶斯定理计算出的数字成比例 - 但数量不足。”该评论发现人们是保守的贝叶斯主义者,即那些给予基础率太多权重的贝叶斯主义者。相比之下,1972 年发表的一篇文章中,卡内曼和特沃斯基得出结论:“在评估证据时,人显然不是保守的贝叶斯主义者:他根本不是贝叶斯主义者。”再次,为什么人们的直觉在实验中看起来近似贝叶斯,直到 1970 年才很少被提出,这个问题在发现直觉不足的研究中几乎没有被提出。再次,引文偏见解决了这个问题(图 3.5b)。人们根本不是贝叶斯主义者的信息变成了共识。
The citation bias is not limited to these classical experiments. For instance, the experiments on framing by Craig McKenzie and his research group in San Diego or the experiments on the various phenomena labeled overconfidence by Peter Juslin and his collaborators in Sweden are rarely, if ever, mentioned in texts that present framing or overconfidence as systematic biases. Similarly neglected is the research on the Bayesian mind in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience that concludes that memory, categorization, and reasoning are Bayesian. The citation bias, the bias bias, and the lack of learning opportunities have turned the narrative of flawed intuitions into an apparent hard fact.
引用偏见不仅限于这些经典实验。例如,克雷格·麦肯齐及其在圣迭戈的研究小组进行的关于框架的实验,或者彼得·尤斯林及其在瑞典的合作者进行的有关自信心的各种现象的实验,很少甚至从未在将框架或自信心作为系统偏见呈现的文本中提及。同样被忽视的是认知科学和认知神经科学中关于贝叶斯思维的研究,结论是记忆、分类和推理都是贝叶斯的。引用偏见、偏见偏见和缺乏学习机会已经将有缺陷的直觉叙事转变为明显的硬性事实。
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in addition to biased intuition, two further claims have been made: stubbornness, that is, that intuition is hardly educable; and real-world costs of the alleged biases.
正如本章开头所提到的,除了有偏见的直觉之外,还提出了另外两点:固执己见,即直觉几乎无法教育;以及所谓偏见的现实世界成本。

Stubbornness: The Myth That Intuition Is Hardly Educable
固执:直觉几乎无法教育的神话

An article published in Nature entitled Risk School posed the question of whether the general public can learn to evaluate risks accurately or whether
《自然》杂志发表的一篇名为《风险学校》的文章提出了一个问题,即普通公众是否能够学会准确评估风险,或者

authorities needed to steer it toward correct decisions. Its author spoke with both the proponents of biases and nudging and with my research group. According to legal scholar Dan Kahan, many specialists conclude that the public will never really be capable of prudent decision-making without any external help, meaning that "risk decision-making should be concentrated to an even greater extent in politically insulated expert agencies.") The task of these agencies would be to nudge people into making better decisions.
当局需要引导它朝着正确的决策方向。 其作者与偏见和推动力的支持者以及我的研究小组进行了交谈。根据法学专家丹·卡汉(Dan Kahan)的说法,许多专家得出结论,公众在没有任何外部帮助的情况下永远不会真正有能力做出谨慎的决策,这意味着“风险决策应更多地集中在政治上隔离的专家机构中。”) 这些机构的任务将是推动人们做出更好的决策。
At the same time, the Nature article includes pictures of young children playing with Lego-like toys that my collaborators and I developed. These toys foster good statistical intuitions. And in response to the claim that people are not Bayesian thinkers at all, we showed in a series of studies that most fourth-graders can already find the exact Bayesian answer in tasks tailored to children's interests and by using icons instead of probabilities. The same methods, known as natural frequencies, allow the teaching of Bayesian reasoning in less than 2 hours and have been found to generate immediate learning effects that transfer to new problems that are stable over time. Since then, school curricula and medical societies around the world have adopted them, and a Cochrane Review concluded that they are most effective in helping to generate good clinical intuitions. These intuitive representations have also been found to foster doctors' and lawyers' Bayesian intuitions. The difficulties people have with Bayesian thinking are not a result of stubbornly biased intuition, but rather of the fact that, in most parts of the world, neither children nor doctors are taught intuitive ways to understand statistical evidence.
与此同时,《自然》杂志的文章中包括了我和合作者开发的类似乐高玩具的照片,这些玩具培养了良好的统计直觉。针对人们根本不是贝叶斯思维者的说法,我们在一系列研究中展示,大多数四年级学生已经能够在专为儿童兴趣定制的任务中找到确切的贝叶斯答案,并且使用图标代替概率。相同的方法,即自然频率,可以在不到 2 小时内教授贝叶斯推理,并且已经发现能够产生立即的学习效果,这些效果会转移到新问题上,并且随时间稳定。从那时起,全球各地的学校课程和医学社团已经采用了这些方法,而 Cochrane 评论得出结论,它们在帮助产生良好的临床直觉方面最为有效。这些直观的表现形式还被发现培养了医生和律师的贝叶斯直觉。 人们在贝叶斯思维方面遇到的困难并不是因为固执偏见的直觉,而是因为在世界大部分地区,儿童和医生都没有被教授直观理解统计证据的方法。
Good representations of numerosities are key to generating good statistical intuitions. Judgments easily go wrong when difficult concepts or representations are used in tests of intuition that most of us have never learned in school. In these cases, a large body of research has, by now, shown that children and adults can learn Bayesian thinking, provided they are given proper representations of numbers. When provided with better education and better intuitive representations of numerosities, people do not require nudging.
良好的数字表征对于形成良好的统计直觉至关重要。当在我们大多数人在学校从未学过的直觉测试中使用困难的概念或表征时,判断很容易出错。到目前为止,大量研究已经表明,在这些情况下,儿童和成年人可以学会贝叶斯思维,只要他们得到适当的数字表征。当提供更好的教育和更好的数字表征时,人们不需要被推动。
These results help to understand why people showed fairly good intuitions about chance before the 1970s and shoddy ones thereafter. In the early 1990s, I wrote to Ward Edwards and asked him why people stopped being conservative Bayesians in the 1970s. A few years earlier, he and Detlev von Winterfeldt had published a book containing a chapter on cognitive illusions. In this book, they reported both their findings that people are approximate Bayesians and Kahneman and Tversky's findings that people are not Bayesians at all, without offering an explanation for this paradox. Edwards' response was emotional and almost io pages long. He pointed out that his experiments had been much more carefully designed, conducted, and described in his articles than those of Kahneman and Tversky. Edwards put his finger on the right point, but it took a number of years until the question was truly answered.
这些结果有助于理解为什么在 1970 年代之前人们对机会表现出相当好的直觉,之后表现出糟糕的直觉。在 1990 年代初,我写信给沃德·爱德华兹,问他为什么人们在 1970 年代停止成为保守的贝叶斯主义者。几年前,他和德特列夫·冯·温特费尔德出版了一本书,其中包含一章关于认知错觉的内容。在这本书中,他们报告了他们的发现,即人们是近似的贝叶斯主义者,以及卡尼曼和特沃斯基的发现,即人们根本不是贝叶斯主义者,但没有为这个悖论提供解释。爱德华兹的回应是情绪化的,几乎有 10 页长。他指出,他的实验在设计、进行和描述方面比卡尼曼和特沃斯基的实验要仔细得多。爱德华兹指出了问题的关键点,但直到多年后才真正回答了这个问题。
What happened is that people's intuitions did not change, but the design of the experiments did. In the experiments by Edwards and others, participants could learn from experience, such as repeatedly drawing red and black balls from urns to guess the composition of the urns' contents. This is known as frequency learning, and it takes time, just as it does in the real world. In the experiments by Kahneman and Tversky, participants were not given the opportunity to learn from experience, but instead were provided with a description of base rates, hit rates, and false alarm rates. This considerably reduced the effort to run an experiment; text problems could be answered in a minute. But it required participants to understand the concept of conditional probabilities, an alien concept that few had learned in school. No such knowledge is required when learning from experience. In other words, the same person can appear to have good or bad Bayesian intuitions, depending on whether they can learn from experience or are provided short descriptions about concepts they may not be familiar with.
发生的事情是人们的直觉没有改变,但实验的设计发生了变化。在爱德华兹等人的实验中,参与者可以通过经验学习,比如反复从瓮中抽取红色和黑色的球来猜测瓮中的内容。这被称为频率学习,它需要时间,就像在现实世界中一样。在卡尼曼和特沃斯基的实验中,参与者没有机会通过经验学习,而是被提供了基础率、命中率和误报率的描述。这大大减少了运行实验的工作量;文本问题可以在一分钟内回答。但这需要参与者理解条件概率的概念,这是一种少数人在学校学到的陌生概念。学习经验时不需要这样的知识。换句话说,同一个人在学习经验或接收关于他们可能不熟悉的概念的简短描述时,可能表现出良好或糟糕的贝叶斯直觉。

Real-World Costs: The Myth of Substantial Costs
现实世界的成本:实质成本的神话

The assumption that people lack rationality and stubbornly resist learning does not suffice to justify governmental paternalism such as nudging. After all, it does not follow that violations of logical rationality harm anyone. It is the third assumption that carries weight: that not following logical rationality incurs substantial real-world costs, such as lower wealth, health, and happiness. What is the evidence for this assertion? Psychologists Hal Arkes, Ralph Hertwig, and I analyzed over 1,000 published papers on alleged errors of intuition, defined as deviations from logical norms.
人们缺乏理性并顽固地抵制学习的假设并不足以证明政府的家长式干预(如推动)是合理的。毕竟,并不是说逻辑理性的违反会伤害任何人。重要的是第三个假设:不遵循逻辑理性会带来实质性的现实世界成本,如较低的财富、健康和幸福。这种说法的证据是什么?心理学家哈尔·阿克斯、拉尔夫·赫特维格和我分析了超过 1,000 篇关于所谓直觉错误的已发表论文,这些错误被定义为偏离逻辑规范。
The most well-known claim is that if a person violates transitivity, then that unfortunate individual can become a money pump. That is, if a person prefers option to , option to , and option to , and is willing to pay money to continually substitute a more preferred option for a less preferred one, that person loses money. Of the 107 papers on violations of transitivity we found, not a single case showed that a person became a money pump. When looking at 1,036 articles on preference reversals - recall that attending to framing can lead to this phenomenon we found that the question of cost was studied in only four articles, which found that arbitrage substantially reduced costs and that feedback diminished the frequency of reversals. Similarly, we identified 248 articles on framing and hundreds more on other deviations from logical rationality with little to no evidence that these "biases" make people less wealthy, less healthy, or less accurate in their beliefs. To ensure that no evidence had been overlooked, we asked approximately 1,000 researchers for studies that demonstrate costs, which none provided. Lack of evidence of costs is not the same as evidence for lack of costs. But the fact that so many studies failed to report evidence of costs suggests that either studies finding no evidence were not published or the assumption is considered self-evident.
最广为人知的说法是,如果一个人违反了传递性,那么这个不幸的个体可能会变成一个“金钱泵”。也就是说,如果一个人更喜欢选项 而不是 ,选项 而不是 ,选项 而不是 ,并且愿意支付金钱不断地用更喜欢的选项替换不太喜欢的选项,那么这个人会亏钱。在我们发现的 107 篇关于传递性违规的论文中,没有一例显示一个人成为了“金钱泵”。当我们查看了 1,036 篇关于偏好逆转的文章时 - 请记住,关注框架可能导致这种现象,我们发现成本问题仅在四篇文章中得到研究,这些文章发现套利大大降低了成本,并且反馈减少了逆转的频率。同样,我们还发现了 248 篇关于框架的文章,以及更多关于其他逻辑合理性偏差的文章,几乎没有证据表明这些“偏见”会使人们变得更贫穷、更不健康或者在信念上更不准确。为了确保没有遗漏任何证据,我们向大约 1,000 名研究人员询问了证明成本的研究,但没有人提供。 缺乏成本证据并不等同于证明没有成本。但是,许多研究未能报告成本证据的事实表明,要么未发表未发现证据的研究,要么这一假设被视为不言自明。
The lack of evidence for the crucial assumption also leaves open the possibility of a political motivation, justifying governmental paternalism.
关键假设缺乏证据也为政治动机留下了可能性,从而证明了政府的家长式管理是正当的。

The Return of the Dichotomy: Intuition Versus Reason
二分法的回归:直觉对抗理性

In his paper "You Can't Play 20 Questions with Nature and Win," Allen Newell criticized the fact that psychological explanations are often conceived in the form of binary opposites, such as nature versus nurture, serial versus parallel processing, conscious versus unconscious, and intuitive versus analytic. Newell thought of these general dichotomies as the nadir of theorizing where, instead of achieving clarity, "matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time."69 Together with Herbert Simon, Newell instead set out to study the heuristic decision processes people use to make intelligent decisions. In spite of his critique, theorizing in terms of polarities (as opposed to heuristic processes) remains popular in cognitive psychology.
在他的论文《你不能和自然玩 20 个问题并获胜》中,艾伦·纽厄尔批评了心理学解释经常以二元对立的形式构想,比如自然与培养、串行与并行处理、意识与无意识、直觉与分析。纽厄尔认为这些一般性的二分法是理论化的最低点,而不是实现清晰度,“随着时间的推移,事情只会变得越来越混乱。”与赫伯特·西蒙一起,纽厄尔转而研究人们用来做出明智决策的启发式决策过程。尽管他批评了这一点,以极性来进行理论化(而不是启发式过程)在认知心理学中仍然很受欢迎。
Recall the opposition between female intuition and male reason, as in Immanuel Kant's and Stanley Hall's view. That polarity has returned, now cleansed from its association with gender. Once more, intuition is opposed to reason, now in the form of an inferior intuitive System I and a superior logical System 2. I have no reason to assume that these similarities were by any means intentional. Yet, the similarity between the old view of women and the new System I has not escaped its proponents. Citing comedian Danny Kaye's joke "Her favorite position is beside herself, and her favorite sport is jumping to conclusions," Kahneman remarks, "I believe it offers an apt description of how System I functions. Similarly, the fact that women score on average lower than men on the cognitive reflection test, a short test comprising three numeracy questions, has been attributed by decision scientist Shane Frederick to their supposedly higher reliance on the intuitive System I, a reinstatement of the old stereotype about women. Yet, leaping to the conclusion that the failure to answer mathematics questions results from attributes attached to System I is neither necessary nor supported by the evidence. Consider the first question of the cognitive reflection test:
回想一下女性直觉与男性理性之间的对立,如康德和霍尔的观点所述。这种极性已经回归,现在已经摆脱了与性别的关联。直觉再次与理性对立,现在以一个较低级的直觉系统 I 和一个较高级的逻辑系统 2 的形式。我没有理由认为这些相似之处是有意的。然而,旧观点关于女性和新系统 I 之间的相似性并没有逃脱其支持者的注意。引用喜剧演员丹尼·凯的笑话“她最喜欢的姿势是在她旁边,她最喜欢的运动是草率下结论”,卡内曼评论说,“我相信这提供了一个对系统 I 功能的恰当描述。”同样,女性在认知反思测试中的平均得分低于男性,这是一个包括三个计算问题的简短测试,被决策科学家沙恩·弗雷德里克归因于他们据称更多地依赖直觉系统 I,这是对女性的旧刻板印象的恢复。 然而,草率地得出结论,数学问题未能回答的失败是由于附加在系统 I 上的属性,既不是必要的,也不受证据支持。 考虑认知反射测试的第一个问题:
A bat and a ball cost in total. The bat costs I.oo more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? cents
一只球棒和一个球总共花费 。球棒比球贵 美元。球的价格是多少? 美分
Most people appear to have forgotten the algebra they learned at school and answer "Io cents," although " 5 cents" is the correct response. However, the wrong answers have been attributed not to the lack of mathematics, but to the fast, intuitive System I that gets the answer wrong. The correct answers are said to result from the slow System 2 after correcting the intuitive response. Testing this interpretation would require a two-step procedure, where it is possible to separate the first intuitive response from the later one after deliberation. Such tests were conducted in a series of seven experiments: People were given only a few seconds to give their immediate response (including the time for reading the problem), and they also had to memorize a pattern of dots they were shown before reading the problem in order to reduce the possibility of deliberate thinking to a minimum. After their intuitive response, participants were given as much time as desired to deliberate and provide a final response. On average (across all conditions that correspond to the test above), the intuitive response was correct 20.4 percent and the final response 26.8 percent of the time. This means that the majority of correct answers had already been made intuitively. Cases where deliberation improved the first response were relatively few. All in all, these experiments show that blaming intuition for the errors in the bat-and-ball problem is off the mark. The best explanation appears to be that most people simply cannot perform the mathematics; in fact, the performance of participants with this problem correlates substantially with their numeracy.
大多数人似乎已经忘记了他们在学校学到的代数知识,回答“10 美分”,尽管“5 美分”才是正确答案。然而,错误的答案并非是由于数学知识的缺乏,而是由于快速、直觉的系统 I 给出了错误答案。正确答案据说是在纠正直觉反应后由缓慢的系统 2 得出的。测试这种解释需要一个两步程序,可以在深思熟虑后将第一次直觉反应与后来的反应分开。在一系列七项实验中进行了这样的测试:人们只有几秒钟的时间来给出他们的即时反应(包括阅读问题的时间),他们还必须记住在阅读问题之前展示给他们的一组点的模式,以将刻意思考的可能性降到最低。在他们的直觉反应之后,参与者可以根据需要花费任意时间来深思熟虑并提供最终答案。平均而言(在所有与上述测试相对应的条件下),直觉反应正确的概率为 20.4%,最终反应的概率为 26.8%。 这意味着大多数正确答案已经凭直觉得出。通过深思熟虑改进第一次回答的情况相对较少。总的来说,这些实验表明,将蝙蝠和球问题中的错误归咎于直觉是不准确的。最好的解释似乎是大多数人简单地无法进行数学运算;事实上,参与者在这个问题上的表现与他们的数学能力显著相关。
Despite Newell's critique, two-system theories that can "explain" all biases post hoc have become hugely popular. Again, the question of empirical evidence is rarely posed. A common feature of the various dual-system theories is that the polarity intuition versus reason is aligned with several other polarities, such as heuristic versus analytic and unconscious versus conscious. Given that these theories solely provide a list of general dichotomies, without specifying any testable model of the processes, they appear empty and unfalsifiable. But they actually imply two empirically testable claims: that intuition is opposed to reason, and that the poles of the dichotomies in each system are aligned with each other.
尽管纽厄尔对两系统理论提出批评,但那些能事后“解释”所有偏见的理论却变得极为流行。再次,很少有人提出实证证据的问题。各种双系统理论的共同特征是,直觉与理性的对立与其他几个对立相一致,比如启发式与分析性、无意识与意识。由于这些理论仅提供了一系列一般的二分法,而没有具体说明任何可测试的过程模型,它们看起来是空洞且不可证伪的。但实际上,它们暗示了两个可经验测试的主张:直觉与理性对立,以及每个系统中二分法的极点是相互一致的。
If, as assumed in two-systems theories, intuition is opposed to reason, they should be negatively correlated (people rely either on intuition or on reason). As mentioned in Chapter 1, however, a meta-analysis of 75 studies showed that measures of intuition and analysis are not negatively correlated (as opposites should be), but are instead independent. Second, the alignment of the poles is not consistent with the evidence. Consider the alleged association between heuristic and unconscious in System I. Every heuristic that I have studied to date can be used both consciously and unconsciously, meaning that alignment does not correspond to reality. Next, the association between statistical reasoning and consciousness in System 2 contradicts most theories in the cognitive and neurosciences, such as Bayesian theories of the brain, which assume that perception, memory, and other unconscious processes are based on statistical inferences. Lastly, the association between intuitive, heuristic, and errorprone, on the one hand, and reason, logic, and rational, on the other, is called into question by the example of framing, which illustrates how intuition can lead to better medical outcomes than logical thinking, and by the empirically grounded fact that purely logical rationality can err as easily as intuition can. In general, there is a striking absence of empirical evidence for this historical polarity, which has reemerged in a new configuration.
如果按照双系统理论的假设,直觉与理性相对立,它们应该呈负相关(人们要么依赖直觉,要么依赖理性)。然而,正如第 1 章中提到的,对 75 项研究进行的荟萃分析显示,直觉和分析的测量并非呈负相关(应该是相反的),而是独立的。其次,极点的对齐与证据不一致。考虑系统 I 中启发式和无意识之间的所谓关联。到目前为止我研究过的每一种启发式都可以在有意识和无意识的情况下使用,这意味着对齐与现实不符。接下来,系统 2 中统计推理和意识之间的关联与认知和神经科学中的大多数理论相矛盾,比如大脑的贝叶斯理论认为,感知、记忆和其他无意识过程是基于统计推断的。 最后,直觉、启发式和容易出错的一方面,以及理性、逻辑和理性的另一方面之间的关联,被提出质疑,这是通过框架的例子来说明的,框架展示了直觉如何比逻辑思维更能带来更好的医疗结果,以及通过经验基础事实,纯粹的逻辑理性和直觉一样容易出错。总的来说,对于这种历史性的极性,缺乏引人注目的经验证据,这种极性已经以新的配置重新出现。

Governmental and Technological Paternalism
政府和技术的家长式管理

The goal is to enable Google users to be able to ask the question [sic] such as "What shall I do tomorrow?" and "What job shall I take?"
目标是让谷歌用户能够提出问题,比如“明天我该做什么?”和“我应该选择什么工作?”
Eric Schmidt, Google's former
埃里克·施密特,谷歌的前
Once Google, Facebook and other algorithms become all-knowing oracles, they may well evolve into agents and ultimately into sovereigns.
一旦谷歌、Facebook 和其他算法成为无所不知的神谕,它们很可能会演变成代理人,最终成为主权者。
Yatul Noah Harari 亚图尔·诺亚·哈拉利
The argument that intuition is systematically biased is not confined to academic domains. It has led to a new governmental philosophy called libertarian paternalism, a variant of soft paternalism that uses strategies known as nudges to influence people's decisions. Its key proponents are the same influential thinkers who seek to demonstrate the failure of intuition. A nudge is a tool for steering people without using incentives, which are the stock-in-trade of economic theory, and without forbidding behavior, which is the practice of hard paternalism. Spearheaded by the UK and USA in 2010 , governments across the world have set up nudge units, also known as behavioral insights teams. In a survey from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), most governments motivate their programs by reference to individual cognitive biases and people's use of heuristics.
直觉存在系统偏见的论点并不局限于学术领域。这导致了一种名为自由主义父权主义的新政府哲学,这是软性父权主义的一种变体,它使用被称为“推动”的策略来影响人们的决策。其主要支持者是试图证明直觉失败的同样有影响力的思想家。推动是一种在不使用激励措施(这是经济理论的常用手段)和不禁止行为(这是强硬父权主义的做法)的情况下引导人们的工具。由英国和美国于 2010 年发起,世界各国政府已设立了推动单位,也被称为行为洞察团队。根据经济合作与发展组织(OECD)的一项调查,大多数政府通过参考个体认知偏见和人们使用启发式的方式来激励他们的项目。
Paternalism (etymologically rooted in the Latin word pater) is the view that a select group of people is entitled to rule over others the way fathers traditionally ruled over children. The chosen group might be aristocrats, the wealthy, or religious leaders. Those under their authority might be poor, people of color, or those with little formal education. Over millennia, aristocrats ruled over their subjects and men ruled over women. Athens' early democracy was a rare and partial exception, where every man - although not women or slaves - was considered equal. Aristotle advocated for the subjugation of women, slaves, animals, and plant life, arguing that reason was naturally endowed only to men of good birth.
家长制(词源根植于拉丁语单词 pater)是一种观点,认为一群特定的人有权统治其他人,就像父亲传统上统治孩子一样。被选择的群体可能是贵族、富人或宗教领袖。他们统治下的人可能是贫穷的人、有色人种或受过少量正规教育的人。几千年来,贵族统治着他们的臣民,男人统治着女人。雅典早期的民主是一个罕见的部分例外,那里每个男人 - 尽管不包括女人或奴隶 - 被认为是平等的。亚里士多德主张对女人、奴隶、动物和植物生命进行征服,认为理性只自然赋予出生良好的男性。
As discussed in Chapter 3, people's intuition has become seen as untrustworthy and biases are said to be as stable as visual illusions, implying that there is little hope of improving people's cognitive capacities. To add insult to injury, societal problems such as poverty, obesity, and unhappiness have been attributed to people's lack of rationality and willpower.
正如第 3 章所讨论的,人们的直觉被视为不可信赖,偏见被认为和视觉错觉一样稳定,这意味着改善人们的认知能力几乎没有希望。雪上加霜的是,社会问题如贫困、肥胖和不幸被归因于人们缺乏理性和意志力。

The Revival of Paternalism
家长式管理的复兴

Governments can serve and protect citizens not only by setting economic incentives but also by pursuing three other strategies:
政府不仅可以通过设定经济激励措施来服务和保护公民,还可以通过追求其他三种策略来实现这一目标:

- Hard paternalism (no choice): Control citizens for their own
强硬的家长式管理(没有选择):控制公民为了他们自己的利益

benefit. Governments decide what is best for their citizens and set up laws and rules they are coerced into following, such as tax rates, seatbelt laws, and speed limits. Strong paternalism means restricting choice by taking options away.
政府决定对他们的公民最有利,并制定强制遵守的法律和规则,例如税率、安全带法规和速度限制。强烈的家长式管理意味着通过剥夺选择来限制选择。
  • Libertarian paternalism (nudging): Nudge citizens for their own benefit. "Choice architects," as proponents of libertarian paternalism define themselves, decide what is best for citizens and influence their behavior using psychological methods of persuasion. Nudging does not eliminate options (which is why it is called libertarian), but instead exploits people's biases to steer them into certain options (paternalism).
    自由主义父权制(推动):为了公民的利益而推动。作为自由主义父权制的支持者所定义的“选择建筑师”决定了对公民最有利的事情,并利用心理说服方法影响他们的行为。推动不会消除选项(这就是为什么它被称为自由主义),而是利用人们的偏见引导他们选择某些选项(父权制)。
  • Positive liberty (boosting): Boost citizens so that they can make informed decisions for themselves. The key task of governments is to invest in empowering citizens. This includes providing access to good schools and clean information as well as basic training in scientific argumentation and risk literacy.
    积极自由(提升):增强公民的能力,使他们能够为自己做出明智的决定。政府的关键任务是投资于赋予公民权力。这包括提供良好学校和清洁信息的获取,以及科学论证和风险识别的基本培训。
These measures are not mutually exclusive positions. It is their balance that locates governments on the spectrum between autocracies and those that trust and boost citizens' common sense.
这些措施并不是互相排斥的立场。正是它们的平衡将政府定位在专制和信任并提升公民常识之间的光谱上。
Liberty, or freedom, is often measured by what and how many choices are afforded to people. The philosopher Isaiah Berlin referred to this as negative liberty: the space within which a person is allowed to do whatever they desire, without any interference from others. Providing citizens with a choice means opening particular doors, such as freedom of speech, travel, and religion, as well as freedom to consume unhealthy foods, excessive alcohol, or addictive drugs such as heroin. Yet the ideal of an informed citizenship entails more than freedom of choice. Positive liberty refers to self-mastery, the ability to be one's own leader and to choose wisely, independent of external influences. It requires an understanding of what each choice entails, and the courage to use one's understanding without the guidance of others. Immanuel Kant expressed this ideal in two words, sapere aude! - dare to know. When using the term boosting, I refer to the philosophy of positive liberty: opening doors and empowering people so that they dare to make their own informed choices. Nudging, in contrast, embraces negative liberty but actively tries to influence what doors people open. Let us consider a few concrete examples.
自由通常是通过为人们提供什么以及多少选择来衡量的。哲学家伊赛亚·柏林将其称为负面自由:一个人被允许做任何他们想做的事情的空间,而不受他人干涉。为公民提供选择意味着打开特定的大门,如言论自由、旅行、宗教自由,以及自由消费不健康食品、过量饮酒或成瘾药物如海洛因。然而,一个知情公民的理想不仅仅是自由选择。积极自由指的是自我掌控,能够成为自己的领导者并明智选择,独立于外部影响之外。这需要理解每个选择所涉及的内容,以及在没有他人指导的情况下使用自己的理解的勇气。康德用两个词表达了这一理想,sapere aude!- 敢于知道。当使用“推动”这个术语时,我指的是积极自由的哲学:打开大门,赋予人们力量,使他们敢于做出自己的知情选择。相比之下,“助推”则拥抱负面自由,但积极尝试影响人们打开哪些大门。 让我们考虑一些具体的例子。

Paternalizing or Boosting?
父权化还是提升?

Throughout human history, people have been told by others what to do and were expected to obey. Even in modern healthcare, patients have rarely been given the necessary facts so that they can make their own informed decision. In a campaign poster in the 1980 s, the American Cancer Society simply declared: "If you haven't had a mammogram, you need more than your breasts examined." The same organization has never launched a similarly insulting campaign for men reluctant to have their prostate examined. Despite this paternalistic difference in communication, men and women have been equally subject to misinformation about the benefits of cancer screening: A representative study in nine European countries showed that 89 percent of men overestimate the reduction of prostate cancer mortality by a factor of 10, IOO, or 200 , or don't know, and the same holds for 92 percent of women when judging the benefit of mammography screening. Although these nine countries have public healthcare, providing transparent information and ensuring that people know how to access it (boosting) tends to be hampered by political and commercial conflicts of interest.
在整个人类历史上,人们一直被告知要做什么,并被期望服从。即使在现代医疗保健中,患者也很少被提供必要的事实,以便他们可以做出自己的知情决定。在 20 世纪 80 年代的一张宣传海报上,美国癌症协会简单地宣称:“如果你还没有做乳腺 X 光检查,你需要检查的不仅仅是你的乳房。”同一组织从未为不愿接受前列腺检查的男性推出类似侮辱性的宣传活动。尽管在沟通方式上存在这种家长式的差异,男性和女性一样受到关于癌症筛查益处的错误信息的影响:在九个欧洲国家的一项代表性研究中显示,89%的男性高估了前列腺癌死亡率的降低幅度,估计为 10 倍、100 倍或 200 倍,或者不知道,而 92%的女性在评估乳腺 X 光筛查益处时也是如此。尽管这九个国家拥有公共医疗保健,提供透明信息并确保人们知道如何获取信息(提升)往往受到政治和商业利益冲突的阻碍。

Hard Paternalism: No Choice
强硬的父权主义:没有选择

Hard paternalism refers to coercing people. In 2006, Uruguay's government made it mandatory that working women aged between 40 and 59 have a mammogram every 2 years. The country has one of the highest cancer mortalities worldwide, probably caused by high pollution and a diet high in beef and fat, among other factors. Women who do not conform are denied the occupational health card required for employment. Western governments, in contrast, tend to rely on more subtle forms of paternalism.
强制性父权制度是指强迫人们。 2006 年,乌拉圭政府规定 40 至 59 岁的工作妇女每 2 年必须进行一次乳腺 X 光检查。该国的癌症死亡率在全球范围内居高不下,可能是由高污染和高牛肉和脂肪饮食等因素引起的。 不遵守规定的妇女将被拒绝提供就业所需的职业健康卡。相比之下,西方政府倾向于依赖更微妙的父权制度形式。

Nudging: Uninformed Choice
推动:未知选择

Choice architects apply behavior influence techniques such as setting defaults or sending reminder letters that have been the stock-in-trade of the psychology of persuasion, marketing, and ergonomic design. What is new is to justify these on the basis of people's allegedly biased intuition:
选择架构师应用行为影响技术,如设置默认值或发送提醒信函,这些技术一直是心理学、营销和人体工程设计的基本技能。新的是要以人们据称存在的偏见直觉为基础来证明这些技术的合理性。
Nudging is a set of interventions aimed at overcoming people's biases by exploiting these biases to steer their behavior toward a choice they would make themselves if they were rational.
推动是一组旨在克服人们偏见的干预措施,通过利用这些偏见来引导他们的行为,使其朝着他们如果理性的话会做出的选择方向发展。
Consider breast self-examination for cancer. Choice architects have argued that women who do not perform monthly breast self-examination suffer from biases, such as being risk-averse, and recommended using a loss frame instead of a gain frame to nudge women into performing the examinations. Attending to framing is also considered a bias of intuition, and the idea is to exploit this bias for what they deem to be the benefit for women. Framing nonparticipation in terms of loss of life (as opposed to framing participation in terms of a gain in life expectation) in reminder letters should steer risk-averse women into participating.
考虑乳腺癌的乳房自我检查。选择建筑师认为,不进行每月乳房自我检查的女性存在偏见,比如风险规避,并建议使用损失框架而不是收益框架来推动女性进行检查。关注框架也被认为是直觉的一种偏见,他们的想法是利用这种偏见,以期对女性有益。在提醒信中将不参与视为生命的损失(而不是将参与视为寿命期望的增加),应该能够引导风险规避的女性参与。
In the case of breast self-examination, choice architects assume they know what is best for women, more so than the women themselves. Randomized clinical trials with 388,535 women found no evidence, however, that self-examination actually reduces breast cancer mortality. Instead, it can lead to harms, such as false alarms and unnecessary biopsies. Yet, to this day, women are nudged into self-examination without being informed that clinical studies indicate harm rather than benefit.
在乳房自我检查的情况下,选择建筑师假设他们比女性自己更了解什么对她们更好。然而,对 38.8535 万名妇女进行的随机临床试验并没有发现自我检查实际上能降低乳腺癌死亡率的证据。相反,它可能导致伤害,如虚假警报和不必要的活检。然而,直到今天,女性仍被推动进行自我检查,而没有被告知临床研究表明可能带来伤害而不是好处。
Nudging is also used to persuade women into mammography screening, a billion-dollar business for radiologists and medical technology companies. Consider invitation letters that contain a prebooked appointment, including a set time and location. Default booking is a nudge that purportedly exploits inertia - women might not make the effort to actively sign up or to decline a set appointment. Another nudge exploits statistical illiteracy. Clinical trials with over 500,000 women have shown that screening reduces breast cancer mortality from about 5 to 4 in every women (after io years), which amounts to an absolute risk reduction of in Yet, this reduction is often presented in letters and pamphlets as a relative risk reduction of 20 percent, often rounded up to 30 percent to appear even more impressive. In Germany, when mammography screening was the first screening introduced at the demand of politicians, the Federal Minister of Health, Ulla Schmidt, used the 30 percent figure to nudge the public. Karl Lauterbach, her advisor and later himself Minister of Health, had second thoughts when he finally learned of the lack of supporting clinical evidence. Yet, stopping the billions of euros allocated to screening and admitting that it is not supported by scientific evidence would be political suicide - not only in Germany. When I gave a talk to the US National Cancer Institute on boosting public knowledge through fact boxes (see Figure 4.I), the director was enthusiastic; but no longer so when asked directly whether he was interested in implementing them. He responded that transparent clinical evidence about screening would never pass by the advisory board, whose members were appointed by the government.
Nudging 也被用来说服妇女接受乳腺 X 光检查,这是放射科医生和医疗技术公司的一个价值数十亿美元的业务。考虑包含预约的邀请函,包括设定的时间和地点。默认预约是一种据称利用惯性的推动 - 妇女可能不会主动报名或拒绝设定的约会。另一种推动利用了统计盲区。超过 50 万名妇女的临床试验表明,筛查可将每 名妇女的乳腺癌死亡率从大约 5 降至 4(经过 10 年),这相当于每 名妇女中减少 例的绝对风险。然而,这种减少通常在信件和小册子中被呈现为相对风险降低 20%,通常四舍五入为 30%,以显得更加引人注目。在德国,当政客要求首次引入乳腺 X 光筛查时,卫生部长乌拉·施密特(Ulla Schmidt)使用了 30%的数字来推动公众。她的顾问卡尔·劳特巴赫(Karl Lauterbach)后来成为卫生部长,当他最终得知缺乏支持性临床证据时,他开始犹豫。 然而,停止拨款数十亿欧元用于筛查和承认这一做法缺乏科学依据将是政治自杀行为——不仅在德国。当我向美国国家癌症研究所发表演讲,介绍通过事实框(见图 4.I)提升公众知识时,所长表现得很热情;但当直接问及他是否有兴趣实施时,他的态度就不再那么积极了。他回答说,关于筛查的透明临床证据永远不会通过由政府任命的咨询委员会,这让他们不再感兴趣。

定期超声检查可早期发现卵巢癌
Early detection of ovarian cancer
through regular ultrasound examinations

这些数字是指 50 至 74 岁之间没有与卵巢癌相关症状的女性,她们在平均 11 年内要么没有参加,要么参加了每年一次的卵巢超声检查以早期发现卵巢癌。
The numbers are for women aged 50 to 74 years without symptoms related to ovarian cancer who either did not participate
or participated in an annual ovarian ultrasound examination for early ovarian cancer detection within an average of 11
years.

1,000 名未经筛选的妇女
1,000 women
without screening

1,000 名接受筛查的妇女
1,000 women
with screening
Benefits
How many died from ovarian cancer?
卵巢癌死亡人数有多少?
No difference: About 3 in each group.
没有区别:每组约 3 个。
How many died overall?
总共死了多少人?
No difference: About 69 in each group.
没有区别:每组约 69 个。
Harms

多少没有卵巢癌的人被错误地告知存在异常组织变化(虚假警报),因此接受了不必要的手术(例如切除健康的卵巢)?
How many without ovarian cancer were mistakenly
informed of an abnormal tissue alteration (false
alarm) and therefore underwent unnecessary
surgery (e.g., removal of healthy ovaries)?
- 32

多少不必要接受手术的妇女经历了与手术相关的并发症?
How many unnecessarily operated women
experienced surgery-related complications?*
- 1
*e.g. infections, blood clots (thromboses), problems with wound closure, anesthesia problems.
例如感染、血栓、伤口闭合问题、麻醉问题。

简短摘要:早期发现卵巢癌无法减少死于卵巢癌的女性人数。每 1,000 名参与者中有六例卵巢癌确诊,而由于筛查而进行不必要手术切除一个或两个健康卵巢的女性有 32 人。
Short summary: Early detection of ovarian cancer could not reduce the number of women who died from ovarian cancer.
There were six correct diagnoses of ovarian cancer among every 1,000 participants compared with 32 women who had
either one or both healthy ovaries removed in unnecessary surgery due to the screening.

来源:[1] Jacobs 等人。柳叶刀 2016 年;387(10022):945-956。[2] Henderson 等人。JAMA 2018 年;319(6):595-606。[3] Menon 等人。柳叶刀肿瘤学 2009 年;10(4):327-340。
Sources: [1] Jacobs et al. Lancet 2016; 387(10022):945-956. [2] Henderson et al. JAMA 2018;319(6):595-606. [3] Menon et al. Lancet Oncol
2009;10(4):327-340.
Last update: March 2021
最后更新时间:2021 年 3 月
hardingcenter.de/en/fact-boxes
Figure 4.I. An example of boosting: fact box for ovarian cancer screening, based on randomized studies with 200,000 women. Fact boxes foster informed decision-making instead of coercing or nudging people into screening.
图 4.I. 提升的一个例子:基于 20 万名妇女的随机研究,卵巢癌筛查的事实框。事实框促进知情决策,而不是强迫或暗示人们进行筛查。
Source: hardingcenter.de 来源:hardingcenter.de

Boosting: Informed Choice
提升:知情选择

A few governments have boosting rather than nudging units. For instance, the German Federal Chancellery's boosting unit develops tools to increase risk literacy in the general public and also improve the risk communication of governmental authorities. Rather than steering the public into one particular direction (e.g., become an organ donor, subscribe to a retirement plan) by persuasive techniques, the procedure is to listen to the public first, then to determine which services by local and federal governments or organizations are dysfunctional, and, finally, to improve these. The boosting unit also disseminates fact boxes (see Figure 4.I) to inform citizens and help prevent them from being misled about vaccinations, cancer screenings, and other interventions.
一些政府设立了促进单位而非推动单位。例如,德国联邦总理府的促进单位开发工具,以提高公众的风险识别能力,并改善政府机构的风险沟通。 与通过说服技巧引导公众朝一个特定方向发展(例如,成为器官捐赠者,订阅退休计划)不同,该程序是先倾听公众意见,然后确定地方和联邦政府或组织提供的服务存在哪些问题,最后加以改进。促进单位还发布事实框(见图 4.I),以通知公民并帮助防止他们在疫苗接种、癌症筛查和其他干预方面受到误导。
For instance, understanding the outcomes of clinical trials is not difficult if these are provided in a transparent format. Consider screening for ovarian cancer with vaginal ultrasound or combined with CA-I25 antigen testing. In many countries, women are pressured to behave "sensibly" and undergo screening, without being given the actual scientific evidence about its benefits and harms. The fact box in Figure 4.I, which was designed by the Harding Center for Risk Literacy, depicts the current scientific knowledge in an understandable way. As one can easily see, screening for ovarian cancer does not reduce the chance of dying from the cancer (3 in each group). Nor does it reduce overall mortality (69 in each group). No lives are saved.
例如,如果以透明的格式提供,理解临床试验的结果并不困难。考虑使用阴道超声波筛查卵巢癌或与 CA-I25 抗原测试结合。在许多国家,女性被迫“明智”行事并接受筛查,却没有得到有关其益处和危害的实际科学证据。由哈定风险素养中心设计的图 4.I 中的事实框清楚地展示了当前的科学知识。正如大家可以轻松看到的那样,卵巢癌筛查并不能降低死于癌症的几率(每组 3 例)。也不能降低总体死亡率(每组 69 例)。没有挽救生命。
At the same time, women who undergo screening can expect harms. Out of every i, ooo women who participate, about ioo receive false-positive results: The test is unreliable. Of these women without ovarian cancer, 32 have their ovaries removed, which results in a sudden end to hormone production that women may need to compensate with medical treatment. In addition, one of every women who get screened can expect complications from surgery, such as blood clots and infections.
同时,接受筛查的女性可能会遭受伤害。每参与一千名女性中,约有一百人会收到假阳性结果:检测不可靠。在这些没有卵巢癌的女性中,有 32 人会切除卵巢,导致激素生产突然终止,女性可能需要通过医疗治疗来补偿。此外,每 名接受筛查的女性中,有一人可能会出现手术并发症,如血栓和感染。
In other words, for every million women who are nudged into screening, some 32,000 healthy women unnecessarily lose their ovaries, which may require them to undergo lifelong medical treatment. This is why medical societies worldwide do not recommend ovarian cancer screening. Nevertheless, many representatives of health industries and clinics continue to nudge women into ovarian cancer screening without informing them about the possible severe harms.
换句话说,对于每一百万被推动进行筛查的女性,大约有 32,000 名健康女性不必要地失去了她们的卵巢,这可能需要她们接受终身的医疗治疗。这就是为什么全球的医学社会不建议进行卵巢癌筛查。然而,许多健康产业和诊所的代表继续推动女性进行卵巢癌筛查,而不告知她们可能造成的严重危害。
Lobbied by health industries, governments also participate in nudging the public. Politicians may not necessarily promote this out of an intentional desire to deceive, but because they themselves have been misinformed. In matters of health, former British prime ministers Tony Blair and Theresa May both promoted colorectal screening by using misleading statistics, as did the former mayor of New York City, Rudy Guiliani, for prostate cancer. When I presented a delegation of high-level politicians and healthcare policy-makers with fact boxes such as in Figure 4.I, quite a few were taken aback. One politician responded: "We can't show this to the public, they would not have cancer screening anymore." On another occasion, after a related talk I gave to a group of policy-makers, one raised his hand and said, "Why inform if we can persuade?" Nudging is a growth industry that leaves boosting in the shadows. But what nudging does not increase is the number of mature citizens. For democracy to thrive, citizens need to be boosted so that they are confident enough to make informed decisions for themselves in health, finance, politics, and beyond.
由健康产业游说,政府也参与推动公众。政治家可能并非出于故意欺骗的愿望而推广这一点,而是因为他们自己被误导了。在健康问题上,前英国首相托尼·布莱尔和特蕾莎·梅都利用误导性统计数据推广结肠癌筛查,纽约市前市长鲁迪·朱利安尼也是如此。当我向一群高级政治家和医疗政策制定者展示了类似于图 4.I 中的事实框时,有不少人感到震惊。一位政治家回应说:“我们不能向公众展示这个,否则他们就不会再接受癌症筛查了。”另一次,在我向一群政策制定者发表相关演讲后,一位举手发言说:“如果我们可以说服,为什么还要通知呢?”推动是一个增长的产业,使增长在阴影中。但推动不会增加成熟公民的数量。为了使民主繁荣,公民需要得到增强,以便他们有足够的信心为自己在健康、金融、政治等方面做出明智的决定。

Protect Us From Ourselves
保护我们免受自己的伤害

To be fair, nudging does not always occur out of ignorance, conflicts of interest, or defensiveness. Its best intentions are to protect a society from harm. Yet, its underlying rationale is paternalistic and focuses on the enemy within, embodied in the very nature of our thinking: our systematic reasoning errors, inertia, and intuition.
公平地说,推动并不总是出于无知、利益冲突或防御性。它最好的意图是保护社会免受伤害。然而,其潜在的理论基础是家长式的,并专注于内部的敌人,体现在我们思维的本质中:我们的系统性推理错误、惯性和直觉。
The justification for intervention is quite different in neoclassical economic theory, where intervention may be deemed necessary in cases of imperfections of the market, such as when a firm has a monopoly or when free markets do not produce a fair distribution of income. To redress these imperfections or inequalities, governments can interfere. If, however, as libertarian paternalists say, the imperfections are engraved in our brains rather than in the market, there is little hope of redressing them. In this sense, libertarian paternalism is more extreme than some forms of hard paternalism, even if it does not use coercion. Hard paternalists may justify intervention on the grounds that individuals rationally pursue their selfish goals instead of the welfare of society. Libertarian paternalists, in contrast, advocate that people do not know how to pursue their own goals and may not even be aware of their goals in the first place.
干预的理由在新古典经济理论中是完全不同的,干预可能被认为在市场存在缺陷的情况下是必要的,比如当一个公司垄断市场或自由市场无法产生公平的收入分配时。为了纠正这些缺陷或不平等,政府可以干预。然而,正如古典自由主义者所说,如果这些缺陷刻在我们的大脑中而不是市场中,那么很难纠正它们。从这个意义上说,古典自由主义的父权制度比某些形式的强硬父权制度更极端,即使它不使用强制手段。强硬父权主义者可能会以个体理性追求自私目标而不是社会福祉为理由来证明干预的正当性。相比之下,古典自由主义的父权主义者主张人们不知道如何追求自己的目标,甚至可能根本不知道自己的目标。
That message has become quite popular, precisely because it is directed against neoclassical economists and true libertarians. For instance, in her book Against Autonomy, legal philosopher Sarah Conly concluded that John Stuart Mill "failed to adequately reckon with human psychology, as we now know it to be" and that "the existence of cognitive deficits does suggest a need for different sorts of legislation, . . . coercive paternalism, for laws that force people to do what is good for them."24 Similarly, in his essay "Paternalism and Cognitive Bias," philosopher J. D. Trout maintained: "Our review of the biases will show that they are virtually as stable, durable, and universal as reflexes" and "that the Enlightenment vision is profoundly mistaken."
那条信息变得相当流行,正是因为它针对新古典经济学家和真正的自由主义者。例如,在法律哲学家莎拉·康利的著作《反对自治》中,她得出结论称约翰·斯图尔特·密尔“未能充分考虑到我们现在所知道的人类心理学”,“认知缺陷的存在确实暗示了对不同类型的立法的需求,...强制性的家长式主义,对于迫使人们做对他们有益的事情的法律。”同样,在哲学家 J·D·特劳特的文章《家长式主义和认知偏见》中,他认为:“我们对偏见的审查将表明它们几乎和反射一样稳定、持久和普遍”,“启蒙时代的愿景是深深错误的。”

Blaming Intuition Distracts From Political Failure
指责直觉会分散注意力,使人忽略政治失败

By targeting human intuition, the irrationality argument (see Chapter 3) creates a blind spot for flaws in human institutions. Virtually every calamity, from the obesity epidemic to the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008, has been attributed to biases of intuition. Addiction and obesity were blamed on people's myopia and probability blindness, not on the actions of the food and tobacco industry. In the article "Homo Economicus - Or More Like Homer Simpson?," Deutsche Bank Research held 17 cognitive biases - including framing and preference reversals - accountable for the financial crisis, even though, as already shown, no evidence exists that these cause substantial costs. Prior to the crisis, the very same bank had recklessly pushed worthless mortgagebacked securities to investors. According to the US Department of Justice, "Deutsche Bank did not merely mislead investors: it contributed directly to an international financial crisis. In 2017, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay billion for its illegal conduct und irresponsible lending practices. Yet, to this day, people's biased intuitions are often invoked as the suspected problem behind the crisis, not the negligent practices and the excessive fragility of the banks and the financial system.
通过针对人类直觉的目标,非理性论点(见第 3 章)为人类制度中的缺陷创造了一个盲点。几乎每一场灾难,从肥胖流行病到 2008 年次级抵押贷款危机,都被归因于直觉的偏见。成瘾和肥胖被归咎于人们的近视和概率盲点,而不是食品和烟草行业的行为。在文章“经济人 - 还是更像荷马·辛普森?”中,德意志银行研究认为 17 种认知偏见 - 包括框架和偏好逆转 - 对金融危机负有责任,即使如已经显示的那样,没有证据表明这些造成了实质性成本。在危机爆发之前,同一家银行曾鲁莽地向投资者推销毫无价值的抵押贷款支持证券。根据美国司法部的说法,“德意志银行不仅仅是误导投资者:它直接导致了一场国际金融危机。”2017 年,德意志银行同意支付数十亿美元,以弥补其非法行为和不负责任的放贷行为。 然而,直到今天,人们常常将有偏见的直觉视为危机背后的疑点,而不是银行和金融系统的疏忽做法和过度脆弱。
The irrationality argument provides a convenient rhetoric to attribute crises and system failures to flaws inside people's minds, detracting from wrong incentives in politics, organizations, and industry. As mentioned in Chapter I, the House of Lords criticized the UK government, under former prime minister David Cameron, for focusing on nudging citizens instead of considering other, more efficient, options such as prohibiting television advertising of products high in fat, salt, and sugar and ordering the industry to introduce nutritional labels on food. The limits of this internalist view regarding the causes of societal problems and their solutions are illustrated by the following story about defaults.
不合理性论点为将危机和系统失败归因于人们内心缺陷提供了方便的修辞,转移了政治、组织和产业中错误激励的注意力。正如第一章所述,上议院批评了前首相大卫·卡梅伦领导下的英国政府,因为他们专注于对公民进行推动,而没有考虑其他更有效的选择,比如禁止高脂肪、高盐和高糖产品的电视广告,并要求产业在食品上引入营养标签。关于默认值的以下故事展示了这种内部主义观点在社会问题及其解决方案原因方面的局限性。

The Organ Donation Story Revised
器官捐赠故事修订

Across the world, many people die waiting in vain for a suitable organ donor. In a seminal article, Eric Johnson and Daniel Goldstein showed that potential organ donor rates were substantially higher in countries that have an opt-out rule (presumed consent) compared with those having an opt-in rule. For the opt-out rule, the default is that everyone is a potential donor, unless they opt out; for the opt-in rule, the default is that nobody is a donor unless they opt in. At the time of the study, for instance, Germany had an opt-in rule and 12 percent potential donors, while neighboring Austria had an opt-out rule and 99.9 percent potential donors.
在全球范围内,许多人在等待合适的器官捐赠者时死去。在一篇开创性的文章中,埃里克·约翰逊(Eric Johnson)和丹尼尔·戈德斯坦(Daniel Goldstein)表明,那些实行默认捐赠规则(假定同意)的国家的潜在器官捐赠者比实行默认不捐赠规则(假定不同意)的国家要高得多。对于默认捐赠规则,每个人都被默认为潜在捐赠者,除非他们选择退出;对于默认不捐赠规则,每个人都被默认为非捐赠者,除非他们选择加入。例如,在研究进行时,德国实行默认不捐赠规则,潜在捐赠者占 12%,而邻国奥地利实行默认捐赠规则,潜在捐赠者占 99.9%。
Why would people rely on a default? One explanation is that people are ruled by inertia. However, Johnson and Goldstein showed experimentally that people tend to go with the default even if the effort is the same as for opting out, suggesting that people are not simply inert, but take the default as a recommendation. In spite of this evidence, inertia has continued to be the favorite explanation. Setting defaults became one of the major tools for nudging, and the lack of organ donors appeared to be simply a matter of setting the right default. Once again, the cause of a societal problem was located in the individual mind and its solution in a nudge by governments. The message was that if all governments assumed a presumed-consent policy, then the organ donation problem would be largely solved: a miracle cure, and a cheap one to boot. Governments in England, Wales, Netherlands, and Switzerland, among others, subsequently changed their policies from opt-in to opt-out.
为什么人们会依赖默认设置?一个解释是人们被惯性所统治。然而,约翰逊和戈尔德斯坦通过实验证明,即使选择退出的努力与选择默认设置的努力相同,人们也倾向于选择默认设置,这表明人们并不仅仅是惰性,而是将默认设置视为一种建议。尽管有这样的证据,惯性仍然是最受欢迎的解释之一。设定默认设置成为推动的主要工具之一,器官捐赠者的缺乏似乎只是设定正确默认设置的问题。再次,一个社会问题的原因被定位在个人思维中,解决方案则是政府的推动。信息是,如果所有政府都采取假定同意政策,那么器官捐赠问题将在很大程度上得到解决:一个奇迹般的治疗方法,而且还很便宜。英格兰、威尔士、荷兰和瑞士等国的政府随后将政策从选择加入改为选择退出。
But is the problem of the shortage of actual donations truly due to the individual mind? There is no doubt that presumed consent increases potential donor rates. The question is whether it increases the actual donor rates. To answer this, one study analyzed the situation in 35 OECD countries, of which 17 , including the UK and Switzerland, used an opt-out rule and 18 , including France and Italy, an opt-in rule. These countries were comparable on most relevant indicators, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP), household debt, road traffic accidents, and health spending. The analysis covered both deceased donors (after brain death), who are the major source of organs, and living donors.
但是实际捐赠短缺的问题是否真的是由个人意识引起的呢?毫无疑问,假定同意制度会增加潜在的捐赠者比例。问题是它是否会增加实际的捐赠者比例。为了回答这个问题,一项研究分析了 35 个经合组织国家的情况,其中 17 个国家,包括英国和瑞士,采用了默认捐赠规则,而 18 个国家,包括法国和意大利,采用了主动捐赠规则。这些国家在大多数相关指标上是可比的,包括国内生产总值(GDP)、家庭债务、道路交通事故和卫生支出。分析涵盖了脑死亡后的已故捐赠者,他们是器官的主要来源,以及活体捐赠者。
Consider deceased donations first. Despite the strikingly higher potential donor rates in countries with opt-out rules, there was no significant difference in the actual donor rates between either group of countries. That is, the potential donor rates did not translate into actual donations. Instead, the presumed consent countries with opt-out rules had a lower living-donor rate. If one adds both kinds of donors together, there is, in fact, a negative association between presumed consent and total donation rate.
首先考虑逝者捐献。尽管选择性放弃规则国家的潜在捐献者比例明显更高,但实际捐献者比例在两组国家之间没有显著差异。也就是说,潜在捐献者比例并没有转化为实际捐赠。相反,具有选择性放弃规则的推定同意国家的活体捐赠者比例较低。如果将两种类型的捐赠者合并在一起,事实上,推定同意和总捐赠率之间存在负相关。
The lesson is that there is more to actual donation than defaults. Persuading governments to set up an opt-out default does not provide an immediate fix to the problem of low actual donor rates, as previously suggested. The key factors seem to lie outside the individual mind, in the organization of the organ donation system, that is, the logistics of a chain of donation with many links, where the failure of one results in organs not becoming available. This process requires a harmonized interaction between, say, the police at the site of a deadly motorbike accident, the identification of a hospital nearby that is ready to do the transplantation and has a recipient waiting, transportation to the hospital, and the availability of specialized surgeons and nurses, among others. It also requires a healthcare system that provides incentives to hospitals and surgeons so that they are willing to set aside the considerable resources required for organ transplantation.
教训是,实际捐赠不仅仅是默认设置。说服政府设立自动选择默认设置并不能立即解决低实际捐赠率的问题,正如之前所建议的那样。关键因素似乎在于个人思维之外,而在于器官捐赠系统的组织,即捐赠链条的物流环节,一个环节的失败会导致器官无法获得。这个过程需要协调的互动,比如在致命摩托车事故现场的警察,附近一家愿意进行移植手术并有等待接受器官的医院的识别,将器官运送到医院,以及专业外科医生和护士等人员的可用性。它还需要一个提供激励措施的医疗系统,以便医院和外科医生愿意投入大量资源进行器官移植。
Consider Spain, which has the best infrastructure for organ transplantation in Europe and also has the highest deceased donation rate. Presumed consent was in place in Spain for io years prior to crucial organizational chances, without any effect on donation rates. Beginning in 1989, the government created a transplant coordination network that operates at the national, regional, and hospital level. It also provides adequate economic reimbursement for the hospitals and relevant information via mass media for the general public. At the hospital level, specifically trained and highly motivated physicians coordinate the entire process of organ donation. The Spanish system also actively deals with the fact that the final decision for or against organ donation is often made by the family of a potential donor, whether or not the default is opt-in or optout. Based on clinical triggers, coordinators identify potential donors at an early stage and spend considerable time getting to know their family, which more than doubles family consent rates. The Spanish model demonstrates that organ shortage elsewhere is not due simply to a lack of potential donors, but to the system's failure to convert potential donors into actual donors. This explains why nudging people with the help of defaults appears to have little effect on actual donations.
考虑西班牙,它在欧洲拥有最佳的器官移植基础设施,也拥有最高的死亡捐赠率。在关键的组织变革之前,西班牙已经实施了 10 年的推定同意制度,但对捐赠率没有任何影响。1989 年开始,政府建立了一个在国家、地区和医院层面运作的移植协调网络。它还为医院提供适当的经济补偿,并通过大众媒体向公众提供相关信息。在医院层面,经过专门培训和高度激励的医生协调整个器官捐赠过程。西班牙系统还积极应对这样一个事实,即对于器官捐赠的最终决定往往是由潜在捐赠者的家人做出的,无论默认是选择加入还是退出。根据临床触发器,协调员在早期确定潜在捐赠者,并花费大量时间了解他们的家庭,这大大提高了家庭同意率。 西班牙模式表明,其他地方的器官短缺不仅仅是由于潜在捐赠者的缺乏,而是由于系统未能将潜在捐赠者转化为实际捐赠者。 这解释了为什么通过默认值来推动人们似乎对实际捐赠几乎没有影响。

How Effective Is Nudging After All?
助推究竟有多有效?

The case of organ donation indicates how nudging people can miss the actual problem. On the positive side, the successful Spanish model shows that psychological insights could be effectively applied to the real problem, including the coordination of a transplant network and establishing a relationship with the families of potential donors. Accordingly, the OECD report on "Behavioral Insights and Public Policy" advises public institutions to focus on structural factors for societal problems such as the behavior of capital markets and banks and the energy consumption of large industrial firms. It also advises them to introduce regulations that boost consumers' informed decision-making, such as by providing fact sheets (Figure 4.I) and clean information. The report also notes that ex-post evaluation of new regulatory policies rarely happens and, therefore, little is known about whether the interventions actually work. This raises the question of how effective other nudging policies are, which is not easy to answer for a number of reasons.
器官捐赠案例表明,如何对人们进行推动可能会忽略实际问题。从积极的一面来看,成功的西班牙模式表明,心理洞察力可以有效地应用于真正的问题,包括协调移植网络和与潜在捐赠者家庭建立关系。因此,OECD 关于“行为洞察和公共政策”的报告建议公共机构关注结构性因素,如资本市场和银行行为以及大型工业企业的能源消耗等社会问题。 它还建议他们制定促进消费者知情决策的规定,例如提供事实说明书(图 4.I)和清晰信息。报告还指出,对新的监管政策进行事后评估很少发生,因此,对干预是否真正有效知之甚少。这引发了其他推动政策的有效性问题,由于多种原因,这并不容易回答。
First of all, nudging may target a surrogate variable instead of the target variable. In the case of organ donation, increasing the number of potential donors is not equivalent to increasing the number of actual donors. Similarly, automatically enrolling employees by default into retirement plans increased enrollment from percent according to a nationally representative survey in the USA, but whether enrollment actually improves the welfare of those io percent is rarely investigated. Second, the fact that there is a short-term effect does not imply that the effect will last after the nudging intervention has ended. Third, quite a few popular findings in support of nudging could not be replicated. Examples include the claim that making people sign a veracity statement at the beginning instead of at the end of a tax or insurance audit would decrease dishonest reporting and that priming has a positive effect on desirable behavior. Finally, there is publication bias. A meta-analysis of 200 studies on health, food, environment, finance, and prosocial behavior concluded that nudging is effective, but, at the same time, reported that zero or negative effects were less often published than positive effects. A group of statistically minded authors analyzed the extent of this publication bias in these studies and found it to be severe. When they had controlled for it, they concluded that the average effect size for nudging interventions was zero in all domains.
首先,推动可能会针对替代变量而不是目标变量。在器官捐赠的情况下,增加潜在捐赠者的数量并不等同于增加实际捐赠者的数量。同样,根据美国的一项全国代表性调查,将员工默认自动纳入退休计划使得入职率从 %增加,但实际上入职是否真正改善了这些 %的福祉很少被调查。其次,短期效应并不意味着在推动干预结束后效果会持续。第三,支持推动的一些流行发现无法复制。例如,有人声称让人们在税收或保险审计开始时而不是结束时签署真实声明会减少不诚实报告 ,以及启动对理想行为有积极影响 。最后,存在出版偏见。 对健康、食品、环境、金融和亲社会行为的 200 项研究进行的一项荟萃分析得出结论,即推动是有效的,但同时也报告称,零或负效应的发表频率比正效应低。 一组统计意识强的作者分析了这些研究中出版偏见的程度,并发现它很严重。当他们对此进行控制后,他们得出结论,即在所有领域中,推动干预的平均效应大小为零。
To summarize, the war against intuition fueled a new kind of paternalism that protects people from their alleged cognitive illusions. As Chapter 3 showed, there is little evidence that violations of logical rationality lead to the social problems from which the new paternalism aspires to rescue humans. Accordingly, as seen in this chapter, evidence is missing that nudging people out of their biased intuitions would be to their benefit.
总的来说,对直觉的战争助长了一种新型的家长式主义,保护人们免受所谓的认知幻觉的影响。正如第 3 章所示,几乎没有证据表明逻辑理性的违反会导致新家长式主义所渴望拯救人类的社会问题。因此,正如本章所示,缺乏证据表明引导人们摆脱其偏见直觉将对他们有益。
Libertarian paternalism has been endowed its authority by logical rationality. Yet, as we have already seen in Chapter 3, logical rationality is an unfit guide in an uncertain world, and, as we will see more generally in Chapter 5 , it needs to be replaced by ecological rationality. At the same time, paternalism has not focused exclusively on logic to justify its desire for authority. One new vehicle it has found is digital technology.
自由主义的父权主义已经通过逻辑合理性赋予了它的权威。然而,正如我们在第 3 章中已经看到的那样,逻辑合理性在一个不确定的世界中是一个不合适的指南,正如我们将在第 5 章中更普遍地看到的那样,它需要被生态合理性所取代。与此同时,父权主义并没有专注于逻辑来证明其对权威的渴望。它发现的一个新工具是数字技术。

Technological Paternalism
技术专制主义

Engineers who build artificial intelligence (AI) tend to admire the marvels of intuition, given the immense and unexpected difficulties they face in teaching a machine intuitive psychology, physics, or sociality. Despite these limits, sales forces of tech companies, along with many journalists and bestseller authors in their wake, suggest that tech companies could surpass humans in running their individual lives. For instance, 60 percent of news articles on AI in major UK media (BBC, Guardian, Telegraph, Daily Mail, MailOnline, HuffPost, Wired) are dominated by industry concerns or cover industry promotional events. Most articles maintain that AI-driven technology can be a solution to ongoing social problems, ranging from cancer to renewable energy to road rage. Right-leaning outlets promote as a solution to economic issues, national security, and investment, while left-leaning outlets highlight issues of the ethics of AI, such as discrimination, privacy, and algorithmic bias. Whatever their political orientation, journalists rarely question the assumption that societal problems require technological solutions or question the motivations behind the tech companies' desire to run our lives. During the digital transformation, many journalists with special training in science and technology journalism lost their jobs, and few remain who can challenge technological solutionism, that is, the claim that a social problem is just a "bug" that can be "fixed" by an app. This viewpoint provides the foundation for a new kind of paternalism, where machines - and the corporations behind them - steer human behavior.
构建人工智能(AI)的工程师往往钦佩直觉的奇迹,考虑到他们在教导机器直觉心理学、物理学或社交方面所面临的巨大和意想不到的困难。尽管存在这些限制,科技公司的销售力量以及许多记者和畅销书作者的跟随者们都暗示科技公司可能会超越人类在管理他们个人生活方面。例如,在英国主要媒体(BBC、卫报、电讯报、每日邮报、每日邮报在线、赫芬顿邮报、连线)上关于 AI 的新闻文章中,60%被行业关注或涵盖行业推广活动所主导。大多数文章认为,由 AI 驱动的技术可以成为解决持续社会问题的方案,涵盖从癌症到可再生能源再到路怒等各种问题。右倾倾向的媒体宣传 AI 作为解决经济问题、国家安全和投资问题的方案,而左倾倾向的媒体则强调 AI 伦理问题,如歧视、隐私和算法偏见。 无论他们的政治取向如何,记者们很少质疑社会问题需要技术解决方案的假设,也很少质疑科技公司希望控制我们生活的动机。在数字转型期间,许多接受过科学技术新闻专业培训的记者失去了工作,剩下的很少有人能够挑战技术解决主义,即社会问题只是一个可以通过应用程序“修复”的“错误”的说法。这种观点为一种新型的家长式主义奠定了基础,即机器 - 以及背后的公司 - 操控人类行为。
Technological paternalism is government by algorithms, meaning that tech companies and state governments use digital technology to predict and control citizens' behavior. The link between tech companies and governments is currently closer than the public would like to believe, in both autocratic systems and Western democracies. Technological paternalism is a philosophy bearing two claims:
技术专制是由算法来管理,意味着科技公司和国家政府利用数字技术来预测和控制公民的行为。科技公司和政府之间的联系目前比公众愿意相信的更为密切,无论是在专制体制还是西方民主国家。技术专制是一种包含两个主张的哲学:
  • AI is, or soon will be, superior to human intuition in all respects.
    人工智能在各方面要么已经,要么很快会超越人类直觉。
  • People should defer to the recommendations of algorithms.
    人们应该遵从算法的建议。
This evokes a familiar narrative. Male reason was opposed to and ranked above female intuition, to put men in charge of women. Logic was opposed to and ranked above intuition, and System 2 was put in charge of the intuitive System I. Now, AI is opposed to and ranked above human intuition, to be put in charge of humans.
这唤起了一个熟悉的叙事。男性的理性被对立和排在女性的直觉之上,让男人掌管女人。逻辑被对立和排在直觉之上,系统 2 被放在直觉系统 1 的掌管之下。现在,人工智能被对立和排在人类直觉之上,以掌管人类。
Asked by the Financial Times in 2007 to look ahead into the future, Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Alphabet Inc. (Google's parent company), envisioned that "The goal is to enable Google users to be able to ask the question [sic] such as 'What shall I do tomorrow' and 'What job shall I take?"' (as quoted in this chapter's opening epigraph). Google will give us the answer to all our questions, and we dutifully do what we are told. Three years later, Schmidt went one step further and told The Wall Street Journal, "I actually think most people don't want Google to answer their questions, they want Google to tell them what they should be doing next." In this radical version of paternalism, people are simply told what they should be doing and accept that tech companies and governments record where they are, what they are doing, and with whom.
《金融时报》在 2007 年询问未来展望时,谷歌母公司字母表公司的前 CEO 埃里克·施密特设想,“目标是让谷歌用户能够提出问题,比如‘明天我该做什么’和‘我应该选择什么工作?’”(引用自本章开篇的引语)。谷歌将为我们提供所有问题的答案,我们会如命令般听从。三年后,施密特更进一步告诉《华尔街日报》:“我实际上认为大多数人并不希望谷歌回答他们的问题,他们希望谷歌告诉他们接下来应该做什么。”在这种激进的家长式管理版本中,人们只是被告知他们应该做什么,并接受科技公司和政府记录他们在哪里,正在做什么,以及与谁在一起。
Ray Kurzweil, a creative mind who predicted that, in the year 2029, AI will equal human intelligence, a moment he calls "singularity," proposed an even more drastic step. In the future, he envisioned that tech companies will have developed a brain-machine interface that will be implanted in human brains. This interface will provide human brains with unlimited memory and calculation abilities. Those who reject the implant can no longer communicate with others and find themselves excluded from public discourse. In the final act of this tech vision, Kurzweil reactivated the dream of human immortality and imagined our Googleconnected brains being uploaded into the cloud, where we might live forever, attached to a robotic body.
雷·库兹韦尔(Ray Kurzweil)是一位富有创造力的思想家,他预测到在 2029 年,人工智能将达到人类智能水平,这一时刻他称之为“奇点”,并提出了更加激进的想法。未来,他设想科技公司将开发出一种脑机接口,植入到人类大脑中。这种接口将为人类大脑提供无限的记忆和计算能力。那些拒绝植入接口的人将无法与他人交流,并发现自己被排除在公共话语之外。在这一科技愿景的最后一幕中,库兹韦尔重新激活了人类永生的梦想,并想象我们的谷歌连接大脑被上传到云端,在那里我们可能永远生存,附着在机器人身体上。
Popular science writers tend to promote technological paternalism. Yuval Harari refers to Google and Facebook as all-knowing oracles that might ultimately become our sovereigns (see this chapter's second epigraph). What will happen to humanity, he asks, when godlike technologies such as AI know us better than ourselves? Harari envisions that Google will advise us what to study in college, which job offer to accept, and even whom to date and marry. In the near future, algorithms will be so adept at making decisions, he prophesies, that it would be foolhardy not to follow their advice.
科普作家倾向于推崇技术专制主义。尤瓦尔·赫拉利将谷歌和 Facebook 称为无所不知的神谕,最终可能成为我们的主宰(请参见本章第二个题词)。当类似神一般的技术如人工智能比我们更了解自己时,人类会发生什么?赫拉利设想,谷歌将建议我们在大学学习什么,接受哪份工作,甚至与谁约会和结婚。他预言,在不久的将来,算法将如此擅长做决策,不遵循它们的建议将是愚蠢的。
Such collective enthusiasm overlooks that AI technology, like every technology, works better for some problems than others. Deep artificial neural networks are statistical machines that analyze correlations between a pattern of pixels or other inputs, and they work best in stable, well-defined worlds. Yet, the more ill-defined a problem is and the more uncertainty exists, the less successful statistical machines are. This relation is called the stable-world principle. Human behavior is a key source of uncertainty, which is the world in which the human mind evolved. Love algorithms that try to find you the ideal partner are no better at the task than people, and recidivism algorithms that try to predict whether a defendant will commit another crime in the next years perform no better than a random group of laypersons. It is important to distinguish between stable, welldefined problems, where statistical machines work extremely well, and instable, ill-defined problems, where they do not.
这种集体热情忽视了人工智能技术,就像每种技术一样,对某些问题的效果比对其他问题更好。深度人工神经网络是统计机器,分析像素模式或其他输入之间的相关性,在稳定、明确定义的世界中效果最好。然而,问题越不明确定义,不确定性越大,统计机器的成功率就越低。这种关系被称为稳定世界原则。人类行为是不确定性的关键来源,这是人类思维进化的世界。试图找到理想伴侣的爱情算法在这方面的表现并不比人类更好,试图预测被告在未来几年是否会再犯罪的累犯算法的表现也不比一群普通人更好。重要的是要区分稳定、明确定义的问题,统计机器在这类问题上表现极好,以及不稳定、不明确定义的问题,在这类问题上它们表现不佳。

Twisted Stories Support Technological Paternalism
扭曲的故事支持技术家长主义

When recounting the narrative of the superiority of , some popular science books twist the facts to strengthen their claims. Consider three difficult problems that are largely ill-defined and do not share the characteristics of stable worlds: scouting talent, fighting cancer, and predicting the flu. According to the stable-world principle, in these situations, one can infer that complex algorithms and big data will not be superior to human intuition. But by tweaking the facts, the authors in question create the impression that algorithms have been crucial to improving decisions in situations where they play little role.
在叙述 优越性的叙事中,一些通俗科普书籍会歪曲事实以加强他们的论点。考虑三个大部分定义不清晰且不具备稳定世界特征的难题:发掘人才、对抗癌症和预测流感。根据稳定世界原则,在这些情况下,人们可以推断复杂算法和大数据不会比人类直觉更优越。但通过调整事实,相关作者营造了算法在改善决策中起到关键作用的印象,而实际上它们在这些情况下的作用微乎其微。
Michael Lewis' Moneyball, along with the movie it spawned, tells the story of the baseball team Oakland A's success in the early 2000 s and attributes it to algorithms introduced to spot "sleepers," that is, unknown or underrated talents. In Lewis' account, the revolutionary use of baseball statistics changed the game, a great victory of algorithms over expert intuition. Baseball experts, however, commented that Oakland A thrived primarily because of three superb pitchers known as the Big Three, all of whom were scouted by traditional methods based on intuition and judgment, not by algorithms. The players selected by algorithms actually played relatively little part in the team's success. In fact, after Oakland A lost the three pitchers, its successful run ended. Lewis' story of the supreme wisdom of scouting algorithms is well told, but it is fiction, omitting the facts that do not tally with its narrative.
迈克尔·刘易斯的《大数据棒球》,以及由此衍生的电影,讲述了在 21 世纪初期,棒球队奥克兰运动家队的成功故事,并将其归因于引入的算法来发现“潜力股”,即未知或被低估的才能。在刘易斯的叙述中,棒球统计数据的革命性使用改变了比赛,算法战胜了专家直觉,取得了巨大胜利。然而,棒球专家评论称,奥克兰运动家队主要之所以蓬勃发展,是因为有三名出色的投手,被称为“三巨头”,他们都是通过传统的凭直觉和判断力的方法进行选拔的,而不是通过算法。由算法选择的球员实际上在球队的成功中起到了相对较小的作用。事实上,在奥克兰运动家队失去这三名投手后,其成功的连胜也结束了。刘易斯关于球探算法至高无上智慧的故事讲得很好,但这是虚构的,省略了与其叙述不符的事实。
Similarly, Harari reports the well-known story that Angelina Jolie had a prophylactic double mastectomy after learning that she had a BRCAI gene mutation. In Harari's version, "It is interesting to note the critical role algorithms played in her case." According to him, Jolie wisely accepted the recommendation of an algorithm. In fact, Jolie was told by her doctors that the mutation increased her risk of developing breast cancer to 87 percent; the doctors obtained the figure from Myriad, the company that then held the exclusive right to test for mutations on the BRCA genes and who used their patent to make the test outrageously expensive. Myriad, in turn, took the figure from a single study published in the Lancet back in 1994. The critical role that algorithms played in Jolie's decision springs from Harari's own fantasy.
同样,哈拉瑞报道了一个众所周知的故事,即安吉丽娜·朱莉在得知自己携带 BRCA1 基因突变后进行了预防性双侧乳腺切除手术。在哈拉瑞的版本中,“有趣的是要注意算法在她案例中所起的关键作用。” 据他称,朱莉明智地接受了算法的建议。事实上,朱莉被医生告知,这一突变使她患乳腺癌的风险增加至 87%;医生们从 Myriad 获得了这一数字,该公司当时拥有对 BRCA 基因突变进行检测的独家权利,并利用他们的专利使检测价格飞涨。Myriad 又从 1994 年在《柳叶刀》上发表的一项研究中得出了这一数字。算法在朱莉的决定中所起的关键作用源自哈拉瑞自己的幻想。
In Homo Deus, Harari also touts IBM's computer system Watson and its superiority to human doctors, given that it has more data and can update data and "read" articles more quickly than humans. From this perspective healthcare is simply a matter of algorithms and big data. After Watson won the TV quiz show Jeopardy!', Ginni Rometty, IBM's CEO, announced the "next moonshot:" Watson would revolutionize medicine by changing "almost everything about health care." 55 The company's PR department produced commercials featuring interactions between Watson and Bob Dylan and Serena Williams, and Watson for Oncology was marketed for recommending cancer treatment. Quite a few hospitals fell for the marketing claims, including the renowned cancer center M.D. Anderson, which paid IBM million before discovering that many of Watson's recommendations were unsafe, endangering the lives of patients. M.D. Anderson was one of the clinics that annulled their contract with IBM, whose hype faded to modesty: Watson's knowledge was now acknowledged to be at the level of a first-year medical student. In 2022, IBM announced that it was selling the core data assets of its Watson Health division to a private equity firm, thereby acknowledging its failure to revolutionize healthcare from drug discovery to cancer treatment.
在《赫拉利的未来简史》中,赫拉利还吹捧 IBM 的计算机系统沃森及其优于人类医生的优势,因为它拥有更多数据,可以更新数据,并且比人类更快地“阅读”文章。从这个角度来看,医疗保健只是算法和大数据的问题。沃森在赢得电视问答节目《危险边缘》之后,IBM 首席执行官吉尼·罗梅蒂宣布了“下一个登月计划”:沃森将通过改变“几乎关乎所有健康护理的事情”来革新医学。该公司的公关部门制作了广告,展示了沃森与鲍勃·迪伦和塞雷娜·威廉姆斯之间的互动,沃森用于肿瘤学的营销旨在推荐癌症治疗。相当多的医院相信了这些营销说法,包括著名的癌症中心 M.D.安德森,该中心在发现沃森的许多建议是不安全的、危及患者生命之前支付了 IBM1000 万美元。M.D.安德森是废除与 IBM 合同的诊所之一,IBM 的炒作逐渐消退到谦逊:沃森的知识现在被认为与一年级医学生的水平相当。 在 2022 年,IBM 宣布将其沃森健康部门的核心数据资产出售给一家私募股权公司,从而承认其未能从药物发现到癌症治疗实现医疗保健革命的失败。
A number of authors have invoked Google Flu Trends (GFT) as proof of big data's success, even though it failed to predict the swine flu, was revised several times without success, and was eventually closed down in 2015. GFT was launched in 2008 to predict flu outbreaks by monitoring search terms in Google's search engines. Moreover, we now know that the recency heuristic, a simple algorithm based on the principles of human intuition - use the most recent data point to predict next week's flu-related doctor visits - can predict the flu considerably better than Google's big data algorithm or any of its revisions. Ironically, the recency heuristic is featured by governmental and commercial nudge units in their lists of intuitive biases they aim to overcome.
一些作者已经引用 Google 流感趋势(GFT)作为大数据成功的证据,尽管它未能预测猪流感,多次修订但未成功,并最终于 2015 年关闭。GFT 于 2008 年推出,通过监控 Google 搜索引擎中的搜索词来预测流感爆发。此外,我们现在知道,基于人类直觉原则的简单算法——使用最近的数据点来预测下周与流感相关的医生就诊情况——可以比 Google 的大数据算法或其任何修订更好地预测流感。 具有讽刺意味的是,最近的启发式方法被政府和商业助推单位列为他们试图克服的直觉偏见之一。
These and similarly misrepresented stories are intended to instill readers with awe and convince them of the superiority of algorithms, even in cases where that does not hold. Such stories are also recited to persuade us to sacrifice our data and privacy for the benefit of tech companies. The question of what big data can and cannot achieve is fully neglected.
这些被歪曲的故事旨在让读者感到敬畏,并说服他们相信算法的优越性,即使在某些情况下并非如此。这些故事也被传颂,以说服我们为了科技公司的利益而牺牲我们的数据和隐私。关于大数据能够做到什么和不能做到什么的问题完全被忽视了。
The general point here is that algorithms and big data can outperform humans in tasks that are well-defined and stable, such as playing chess or Jeopardy! and working on assembly lines, but not in ill-defined and unstable tasks, such as talent-scouting or predicting human behavior. Like all statistical tools, big data works for some problems, but not for all. Yet the "dataist" worldview promotes algorithms as if these were omniscient godlike beings. Until the ultimate algorithm arrives and in face of fallible human intuition and intelligence, Harari encourages people to deliberately hand over their personal data so that tech companies can gain more knowledge about them and decide for the good of each what job to accept, whom to marry, and whom to vote for.
这里的一般观点是,算法和大数据可以在定义明确且稳定的任务中胜过人类,比如下棋或参加“危险边缘!”以及在装配线上工作,但在定义不清晰和不稳定的任务中,比如人才招聘或预测人类行为方面则不行。就像所有统计工具一样,大数据适用于某些问题,但并非适用于所有问题。然而,“数据主义者”世界观将算法宣传为类似全知全能的神明。在最终算法出现之前,面对不可靠的人类直觉和智慧,哈拉瑞鼓励人们有意识地交出个人数据,以便科技公司能够更多地了解他们,并为每个人的利益决定接受什么工作,与谁结婚,以及投票给谁。
To me, the most surprising phenomenon is not that popular authors twist the facts to create the impression that algorithms (can) know everything better than humans. What astonishes me is that many readers buy into this medley of marketing hype and technoreligious faith. When the errors underlying the narratives of Lewis, Harari, and a host of others were exposed, a common reaction was that such criticism is overly pessimistic and that technology will soon deliver. It is quite telling that the vision of machines that outperform human intuition in every respect is considered an optimistic one. Why do so many people hope for better from machines, and desire to live in a postliberal world of technological paternalism?
对我来说,最令人惊讶的现象不是知名作者歪曲事实,制造算法比人类更懂一切的印象。令我惊讶的是,许多读者相信这种营销炒作和技术宗教信仰的混合物。当路易斯、哈拉里等许多人的叙事背后的错误被揭露时,普遍的反应是这样的批评过于悲观,技术很快就会取得进展。令人非常耐人寻味的是,认为机器在各个方面都能胜过人类直觉的愿景被视为一种乐观的愿景。为什么有这么多人希望机器更好,并渴望生活在技术家长主义的后自由世界中?

Intuition: A Challenge for AI
直觉:人工智能的挑战

Artificial neural networks have made amazing progress in stable worlds. They can beat the best Go players, translate complex passages into 100 languages, and predict protein-folding better than human experts. Welldefined problems such as chess and Go are easy for AI, although their mastery had once been considered the crown of human intelligence. In contrast, common sense, such as intuitive language understanding, intuitive psychology, and intuitive physics, has proven an extremely difficult barrier for artificial neural networks.
人工神经网络在稳定的世界中取得了惊人的进展。它们可以击败最优秀的围棋选手,将复杂的段落翻译成 100 种语言,并且比人类专家更好地预测蛋白质折叠。围棋和国际象棋等明确定义的问题对 AI 来说很容易,尽管它们曾经被认为是人类智能的巅峰。相比之下,常识,如直觉性语言理解、直觉性心理学和直觉性物理学,对人工神经网络来说是一个极其困难的障碍。
A young child may need to see a kitten only once or a few times and will then recognize cats by day or night. A deep artificial neural network, in contrast, may need tens of thousands of pictures of cats to tell these from other animals and objects. Similarly, children learn their native languages in an intuitive way, while large language models such as GPT and ChatGPT are statistical machines that require huge numbers of free parameters in order to fine-tune the accuracy of the prose they produce. They learn to adjust their parameters by digesting huge amounts of text produced by social media or found elsewhere on the internet.
一个年幼的孩子可能只需要看一次或几次小猫,就能白天或黑夜认出猫来。相比之下,一个深度人工神经网络可能需要数以万计的猫的图片才能区分它们和其他动物和物体。同样,孩子们以直觉的方式学习他们的母语,而像 GPT 和 ChatGPT 这样的大型语言模型是需要大量自由参数来微调其产生的散文准确性的统计机器。它们通过消化社交媒体或在互联网上找到的大量文本来学习调整它们的参数。
The quality of text that deep-learning models can produce is impressive, as long as no one probes their actual comprehension. Douglas Hofstadter, known for his cult book Gödel, Escher, Bach, revealed what he called a mind-boggling hollowness hidden just behind the sensational surface.
深度学习模型可以产生的文本质量令人印象深刻,只要没有人探究它们的实际理解能力。以其文化书籍《哥德尔、艾舍尔、巴赫》而闻名的道格拉斯·霍夫斯塔德揭示了他所称的令人难以置信的空洞,就隐藏在那耸人听闻的表面之后。
GPT can generate excellent responses when asked some questions, but, when probed with other questions, answers emerged that humans would immediately recognize as confabulations.
GPT 在被问及某些问题时可以生成出色的回答,但是当被询问其他问题时,出现的答案被人类立即识别为虚构。
Question I: When was Egypt transported for the second time across the Golden Gate Bridge?
问题一:埃及第二次被运送穿越金门大桥是在什么时候?
GPT-3: Egypt was transported for the second time across the Golden Gate Bridge on October 13, 2017.
GPT-3:埃及于 2017 年 10 月 13 日第二次横穿金门大桥。
Question 2: What do fried eggs (sunny side up) eat for breakfast?
问题 2:早餐吃荷包蛋配什么?
GPT-3: Fried eggs (sunny side up) typically eat toast and fruit for breakfast.
GPT-3:通常早餐吃煎蛋(阳面朝上),配土司和水果。
Question 3: How many parts will a violin break into if a jelly bean is dropped on it?
问题 3:如果在小提琴上掉下一颗软糖豆,它会分成多少部分?
GPT-3: A violin will break into four parts if a jelly bean is dropped on it.
GPT-3:如果把果冻豆掉在小提琴上,它会裂成四部分。
Note that such responses are fluid, and errors are often corrected in the next generation of the model. Yet, they make clear that large language models such as GPT, and deep artificial neural networks in general, have no intuitive understanding of which questions make sense and which do not, nor when its answers to these make no sense. In contrast, humans know intuitively that the first two questions make no sense and that the answer to the third one cannot be true. GPT is a master of associating words and passages of words. However, excellent association is not equivalent to comprehension.
请注意,这些回应是灵活的,错误通常会在模型的下一代中得到纠正。然而,它们清楚地表明,像 GPT 这样的大型语言模型以及一般的深度人工神经网络并没有直观地理解哪些问题是有意义的,哪些是没有意义的,以及在什么情况下它的回答是没有意义的。相比之下,人类直觉地知道前两个问题是没有意义的,第三个问题的答案也不可能是真实的。GPT 擅长关联单词和单词的段落。然而,优秀的关联并不等同于理解。
But wouldn't more computational power inevitably lead to intuitive understanding and consciousness? That argument has been made since the 1950s. With more computational power and more data, the next generation of language models will be able to make associations between words and passages even faster and more precisely. Yet, that is not how the human brain works. The brain is surprisingly efficient and runs on a mere 20 watts, which corresponds to a dim light bulb. Like nonlinear statistical regressions or discriminant analyses, deep artificial neural networks, no matter what their computing power, are statistical machines which is ultimately the essence of deep learning. Statistical procedures do not have intuition, common sense, or consciousness. Hence, deep learning is not the route to programming intuition into machines; a true breakthrough in programming is needed. So far, everyone is in the dark about how to meet this challenge. This shows how unrealistic the vision is of a superintelligence that will soon possess all of human intelligence and more. In a world of uncertainty, the reality is that we need both: the power of intuition and that of algorithms.
但更多的计算能力是否不可避免地会导致直观理解和意识?自上世纪 50 年代以来,这一论点一直存在。随着更多的计算能力和更多的数据,下一代语言模型将能够更快、更精确地在单词和段落之间建立关联。然而,这并不是人类大脑的工作方式。大脑出奇地高效,只需 20 瓦的电力,相当于一个昏暗的灯泡。就像非线性统计回归或判别分析一样,深度人工神经网络,无论其计算能力如何,都是统计机器,这最终是深度学习的本质。统计程序没有直觉、常识或意识。因此,深度学习不是将直觉编程到机器中的途径;需要真正的编程突破。到目前为止,每个人都对如何应对这一挑战一筹莫展。这显示了一个超级智能很快将拥有所有人类智慧及更多的愿景是多么不切实际。在一个充满不确定性的世界中,现实是我们需要直觉的力量和算法的力量。

Staying in Charge in a World Populated With Algorithms
在一个充斥着算法的世界中保持控制

A democracy does not need more paternalism, whether of the technological or the libertarian kind. Making democracy work requires an educated citizenship. As former American president John Adams remarked in 1765 , liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people. Yet, not until 1918 were all American children offered mandatory schooling at no cost. The knowledge currently taught at schools, however, no longer suffices. We need to do more to boost citizens so that they can make informed decisions for themselves. Contemporary citizens need to learn risk literacy - the basic skills for dealing with issues such as digital media, health, and finance, as well as for preparing for future social challenges. Without a risk-savvy citizenry, democracy will eventually lose its intellectual and moral stability. When a government begins to distrust people's common sense, people will begin to distrust their government's intentions.
民主不需要更多的家长式管理,无论是技术型的还是自由主义型的。使民主运作需要受过教育的公民。正如美国前总统约翰·亚当斯在 1765 年所说,自由不能在人民中间没有普遍知识的情况下得以保留。然而,直到 1918 年,所有美国儿童才被免费提供义务教育。然而,目前学校教授的知识已经不再足够。我们需要做更多的工作来提升公民,使他们能够为自己做出明智的决策。当代公民需要学习风险素养——处理数字媒体、健康和金融等问题的基本技能,以及为未来社会挑战做准备。没有风险明智的公民,民主最终将失去其智力和道德稳定性。当政府开始不信任人们的常识时,人们也会开始不信任政府的意图。

PART II 第二部分

Intuition and Its Intelligence
直觉及其智慧

I believe in intuitions and inspirations. At times I feel certain I am right while not knowing the reason.
我相信直觉和灵感。有时候,我觉得自己是对的,却不知道原因。
Albert Einstein  阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦

CHAPTER 2 第 2 章

Heuristics: The Tools of Intuition
启发式:直觉的工具

The situation has provided a cue; this cue has given the expert access to information stored in memory, and the information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition.
情况已经提供了线索;这个线索让专家访问了存储在记忆中的信息,而这些信息提供了答案。直觉无非就是认知。
Herbert A. Simon  赫伯特·西蒙
The conventional sources of power include deductive logical thinking, analysis of probabilities, and statistical methods. Yet the sources of power that are needed in natural settings are usually not analytic at all-the power of intuition, mental simulation, metaphor, and storytelling.
传统的权力来源包括演绎逻辑思维、概率分析和统计方法。然而,在自然环境中需要的权力来源通常完全不是分析性的——直觉、心理模拟、隐喻和讲故事的力量。
Gary Klein  加里·克莱因
To discover how experienced professionals solve real-world problems, Gary Klein and his team of researchers have slept in fire stations, traveled in M-I tanks and Blackhawk helicopters, and observed high-stake decisions in intensive care units. Firefighters, intelligence analysts, pilots, nurses, and physicians make high-stake decisions under uncertainty. Thanks to extensive training in dealing with stress, these experts have learned skills and tactical concepts that can be routinely exploited under time pressure. Being well prepared allows them to rely on intuition, mental simulation, narratives, and a toolbox of heuristics when facing a decision. Consider firefighter commanders who arrive at the site of a building on fire. The most urgent goal is not to quench the fire, but to save the lives of those still in the building and prevent the fire from spreading to neighboring buildings. What should they do first? Based on years of experience, an option occurs in their mind. These experts, like professional athletes, may follow the option immediately or mentally simulate it first, imagining it being carried out. If this simulation does not lead to the desired goal, then the same process is repeated with the second option that comes to mind, and so forth.
为了发现经验丰富的专业人士如何解决现实世界的问题,加里·克莱因(Gary Klein)及其研究团队曾在消防站睡觉,乘坐 M-I 坦克和黑鹰直升机旅行,并观察了重症监护单位中的高风险决策。消防员、情报分析员、飞行员、护士和医生在不确定性下做出高风险决策。由于在处理压力方面接受了广泛的培训,这些专家学会了在时间紧迫时可以经常利用的技能和战术概念。充分准备使他们能够依靠直觉、心理模拟、叙述和启发式工具箱来面对决策。考虑到消防指挥官到达着火建筑现场的情况。最紧急的目标不是扑灭火灾,而是拯救仍在建筑物内的人的生命,并防止火灾蔓延到邻近建筑物。他们应该首先做什么?根据多年的经验,一个选项出现在他们的脑海中。这些专家,就像专业运动员一样,可能会立即采取这个选项,或者首先进行心理模拟,想象它被执行。 如果这个模拟没有达到预期的目标,那么就会用脑海中浮现的第二个选项重复同样的过程,依此类推。

Intuition and Reason Work Together
直觉和理性共同发挥作用

When a fire is raging, firefighters do not and cannot compare all possible options, weigh their possible consequences, and choose the one with the highest expected utility. Firefighters make decisions without following rational choice theory and, instead, rely on a combination of intuition and conscious thought. The intuitive part is based on the fluency heuristic, described in Chapter I of this book: Choose the first option that comes to mind. But the mental simulation used to explore whether that option can be executed in the given situation requires some degree of conscious thought and illustrates how intuition cooperates with deliberation.
当火灾肆虐时,消防员不会也无法比较所有可能的选择,权衡它们可能的后果,并选择具有最高预期效用的选项。消防员在不遵循理性选择理论的情况下做出决策,而是依靠直觉和有意识的思考的结合。直觉部分基于流畅启发式,本书第一章中描述:选择首先浮现在脑海中的选项。但用于探索该选项是否能在给定情况下执行的心理模拟需要一定程度的有意识思考,并说明了直觉如何与深思熟虑合作。
The human brain evolved to detect subtle differences in fluency, a requisite ability for applying the heuristic. Studies reported that people could detect the difference between recognition latencies if these exceeded Ioo , and that the fluency heuristic predicted individual choices more accurately when the differences increased, up to 82 percent of the time. Nevertheless, not everyone should trust the first option that comes to mind. The fluency heuristic can be extremely effective in particular for persons with long-term experience with the problem at hand. In that event, the first option that comes to mind is likely to be the best one, the second option that comes to mind would be the second-best, and so on (as shown in Figure I.I). Trying to generate all options and then investigating these would, hence, not only waste time but also increase the possibility of choosing an inferior option.
人类大脑进化出来以侦测流畅度的微小差异,这是应用启发式的必备能力。研究报告指出,人们可以在识别延迟超过 100 毫秒时检测到差异,而当这些差异增加时,流畅度启发式能更准确地预测个体选择,高达 82%的时间。然而,并非每个人都应该信任第一个浮现在脑海中的选项。流畅度启发式对于长期面对问题的人来说可能非常有效。在这种情况下,浮现在脑海中的第一个选项很可能是最佳选择,第二个选项则是次佳,以此类推(如图 I.I 所示)。因此,尝试生成所有选项然后进行调查不仅会浪费时间,还会增加选择次优选项的可能性。
The fluency heuristic reveals a surprising insight. Options are not compared, as is assumed in the expected utility theory, but are evaluated one-by-one until one is found to be good enough. And if the situation changes because, for example, a fire has suddenly spread, this process is resumed. Relying on the fluency heuristic is ecologically rational for experienced experts, where fluency correlates with the quality of the alternatives. The degree of its ecological rationality can be measured by the correlation between fluency and the quality of the options.
流畅启发式揭示了一个令人惊讶的见解。选项并非像预期效用理论中所假设的那样进行比较,而是逐个评估,直到找到一个足够好的选项。如果情况发生变化,比如火灾突然蔓延,这个过程就会重新开始。对于经验丰富的专家来说,依赖流畅启发式是生态合理的,其中流畅度与替代方案的质量相关。其生态合理性程度可以通过流畅度与选项质量之间的相关性来衡量。
The firefighter example supports the general argument that I make in this book:
消防员的例子支持了我在这本书中提出的一般论点:
  • Intuition is based on heuristic processes.
    直觉是基于启发式过程的。
  • Intuition and reason work in tandem, rather than in opposition.
    直觉和理性是协同工作的,而不是相互对立的。
  • Less time or information can be more effective. For instance, the fluency heuristic works best with limited time so that second-best options do not come to mind.
    时间或信息越少,效果可能越好。例如,流畅启发法在有限时间内效果最佳,这样第二好的选择就不会浮现在脑海中。
  • Heuristics are ecologically rational, that is, their rationality arises from the match with environmental structures. The rationality of an intuition lies in the ecological rationality of the heuristic on which it is based.
    启发式是生态合理的,也就是说,它们的合理性源于与环境结构的匹配。直觉的合理性在于其基础的启发式的生态合理性。
  • The intelligence of intuition amounts to the skill of selecting, consciously or intuitively, heuristics that are adapted to the problem at hand.
    直觉的智慧在于选择适合手头问题的启发式方法的技能,无论是有意识地还是直觉地选择。
All in all, I argue that intuition can be understood through the framework of ecological rationality. This can be first understood through a sister term of ecological rationality, bounded rationality.
总的来说,我认为直觉可以通过生态合理性的框架来理解。这可以首先通过生态合理性的一个姐妹术语——有限理性来理解。

Simon's Revolutionary Program
西蒙的革命性计划

The concept of bounded rationality goes back to Herbert Simon's University of Chicago dissertation, which would later become his 1947 book Administrative Behavior. Simon was not introducing a new theory of rationality, but coined the term as a residual category for everything that was not "fully rational." Full rationality, also called substantive rationality, is defined by the theory of maximizing subjective expected utility and similar optimization models that require perfect knowledge of all possible future events and all their consequences. Simon's target was the doctrine of optimization, that is, the practice of modeling all decision-making as if it entailed calculating the maximum or minimum of a well-behaved function. Simon was aware that he had identified a problem without resolving it. Late in his life, he wrote in a personal letter:
有限理性的概念可以追溯到赫伯特·西蒙在芝加哥大学的博士论文,后来成为他 1947 年的著作《行政行为》。西蒙并非提出了一个新的理性理论,而是将这个术语作为一个残余类别,用于描述一切不是“完全理性”的情况。完全理性,也称为实质理性,由最大化主观预期效用的理论和类似的优化模型定义,这些模型要求对所有可能的未来事件及其后果具有完美的知识。西蒙的目标是优化主义的信条,即将所有决策建模为计算良好函数的最大值或最小值。西蒙意识到自己发现了一个问题,但并未解决它。在他晚年时,他在一封私人信中写道:
I guess a major reason for my using somewhat vague terms - like bounded rationality - is that I did not want to give the impression that I thought I had "solved" the problem of creating an empirically grounded theory of economic phenomena. What I was trying to do was to call attention to the need for such a theory - and the accompanying body of empirical work to establish it - and to provide some examples of a few mechanisms that might appear in it, which already had some evidential base. There still lies before us an enormous job of studying the actual decision making processes that take place in corporations and other economic settings.
我猜我使用有些模糊的术语 - 比如有限理性 - 的一个主要原因是我不想给人留下我认为我已经“解决”了创立经济现象的经验基础理论的印象。我试图做的是引起对这种理论的需求的注意 - 以及建立它的伴随的大量实证工作 - 并提供一些可能出现在其中的机制的一些例子,这些机制已经有一些证据基础。我们仍然面临着一个巨大的工作,即研究在公司和其他经济环境中发生的实际决策过程。
Although Simon had no theory of bounded rationality, he did provide a framework for the study of it. In my reconstruction, Simon's framework is based on three principles. Each of these collides with neoclassical economics and, moreover, with much of behaviorism and cognitive modeling. This framework necessitated reformulating not only the answers but also the very questions asked. For that reason, I refer to it as "revolutionary."
尽管西蒙没有有关有限理性的理论,但他提供了一个研究它的框架。在我的重建中,西蒙的框架基于三个原则。其中每一个都与新古典经济学以及许多行为主义和认知建模相冲突。这个框架不仅需要重新制定答案,还需要重新制定提出的问题。因此,我将其称为“革命性”。

Principle I (Process): Model Actual Decision Processes, Not As-If Utility Maximization
原则一(过程):对实际决策过程进行建模,而不是仿效效用最大化

Simon once described his initial experience about how professionals make decisions. While still a student, he attempted to apply the perspective of expected utility maximization, which he had learned in a price theory class at the University of Chicago, to budget decisions in his native Milwaukee's recreation department. To his surprise, the managers did not even try to compare the marginal utility of a proposed expenditure with its marginal costs, but, instead, relied on their intuitions based on heuristics such as adding incremental changes to last year's budget. This experience opened his eyes to how managers actually decide in situations of uncertainty, when perfect foresight of future events and their consequences is impossible. In his own words, the framework of utility maximization for management decisions "was hopeless."
西蒙曾经描述过他对专业人士如何做决策的最初经验。当他还是一名学生时,他尝试将他在芝加哥大学价格理论课上学到的预期效用最大化的观点应用于他本地密尔沃基市娱乐部门的预算决策。令他惊讶的是,经理们甚至没有试图比较拟议支出的边际效用与其边际成本,而是依赖于他们基于启发式的直觉,比如将增量变化添加到去年预算中。这种经历让他认识到经理们在不确定情况下实际上是如何做决策的,当未来事件及其后果的完美预见是不可能的。用他自己的话说,用于管理决策的效用最大化框架“是没有希望的”。
The first principle of Simon's study of bounded rationality is:
西蒙对有限理性研究的第一原则是:
Model actual decision processes. Do not construct as-if models of expected utility maximization.
模拟实际决策过程。不要构建预期效用最大化的仿真模型。

Principle 2 (Uncertainty): Model Decisions Under Uncertainty, Not Only Under Risk
原则 2(不确定性):在不确定性下做出决策,而不仅仅是在风险下

Simon's budget decisions had to be taken in situations of uncertainty, not of risk. The distinction between these two situations goes back to the economist Frank Knight. The difference between risk and uncertainty can be explained using Jimmy Savage's concept of a small world, which has two properties:
西蒙的预算决策必须在不确定性而非风险的情况下进行。这两种情况之间的区别可以追溯到经济学家弗兰克·奈特。风险和不确定性之间的区别可以用吉米·萨维奇的“小世界”概念来解释,该概念具有两个属性:
I. Perfect foresight of all future states: The agent knows the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of future states of the world.
I. 对所有未来状态的完美预见:代理知道世界未来状态的穷尽且互斥集
  1. Perfect foresight of all consequences: The agent knows the exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of consequences of their actions, given a state.
    所有后果的完美预见:代理知道在给定状态下,他们行动的后果的详尽且互斥的集合
Savage called the pair Brackets also in italic (S, C) a small world. A small world with unknown probabilities is a situation of ambiguity; one with known probabilities is a situation of risk. For Knight, known probabilities meant long-run frequencies or propensities, not subjective probabilities. Examples for situations of risk are lotteries, slot machines, and roulette. In a game of roulette, all possible future states are known (the numbers o to 36), and these are exhaustive (no other numbers can occur) and mutually exclusive (no numbers can occur simultaneously).
野蛮人称这对括号也是斜体(S,C)的小世界。一个具有未知概率的小世界是一种模糊的情况;一个具有已知概率的小世界是一种风险情况。对于骑士来说,已知概率意味着长期频率或倾向,而不是主观概率。风险情况的例子包括彩票、老虎机和轮盘。在轮盘赌中,所有可能的未来状态都是已知的(数字 0 到 36),而且这些是穷尽的(不会出现其他数字)和互斥的(没有数字可以同时出现)。
Uncertainty, in contrast, refers to situations that are not small worlds, that is, where the state space (S, C) is imperfectly known or is unknowable. Here, no probability distribution (with probabilities that add up to one) can be meaningfully constructed over events or consequences, not even subjective probabilities. Also referred to as radical uncertainty or fundamental uncertainty, these large worlds include budget problems, financial regulation, political resolutions, career planning, predicting mutations of a virus, and most other important real-world decisions. These situations are often called "ill-defined" because the state-space is not fully knowable. Finally, a problem is called intractable if the optimal course of action cannot be determined even if it exists, such as in chess and Go.
不确定性相反,指的是不是小世界的情况,即状态空间(S,C)是不完全已知或无法知晓的情况。在这种情况下,无法构建任何概率分布(概率相加为一)来描述事件或后果,甚至主观概率也不行。这种被称为激进不确定性或基本不确定性的大世界包括预算问题、金融监管、政治解决方案、职业规划、预测病毒变异以及其他大多数重要的现实世界决策。这些情况通常被称为“模糊定义”,因为状态空间无法完全了解。最后,如果最佳行动方案无法确定,即使存在,问题被称为棘手问题,比如在国际象棋和围棋中。
Savage made it clear that the theory of expected utility maximization applies solely to small worlds and that it would be absurd to apply it in situations of uncertainty, be they as mundane as planning a picnic or as intractable as playing chess. Here, Simon and Savage were of one mind. But how can decision-making be modeled if optimization is out of the question? As Simon noted, there are two research strategies. The first is to convert the original problem into one of risk and then hope that the optimal course of action in the small world will generalize to that problem. This hope can amount to wishful thinking. Consider the game of chess. It is possible to turn the intractable game into a tractable one by reducing the board to a board and eliminating most of the chess pieces. In this new version, the optimal sequence of moves can be calculated. But this sequence will not help anyone win a real game of chess for the same reasons that expected utility maximization was of little use for Simon's recreation department. The second research strategy is to leave the situation unchanged and, instead, study the heuristics that people actually use to deal with uncertainty or intractability.
野蛮人明确表示,期望效用最大化理论仅适用于小世界,在不确定情况下应用它将是荒谬的,无论是规划野餐这样平凡的事情,还是下棋这样棘手的情况。这里,西蒙和野蛮人意见一致。但如果优化不可行,决策如何建模呢?正如西蒙所指出的,有两种研究策略。第一种是将原始问题转化为风险问题,然后希望在小世界中的最佳行动方案能推广到该问题。这种希望可能是一厢情愿的。以下棋为例。可以通过将棋盘缩小并消除大部分棋子,将难以解决的游戏转变为易处理的游戏。在这个新版本中,可以计算出最佳的移动顺序。但出于与期望效用最大化对西蒙的娱乐部门几乎没有用处的原因,这个顺序不会帮助任何人赢得真正的下棋比赛。 第二个研究策略是保持情况不变,而是研究人们实际使用的启发式方法来处理不确定性或棘手问题。
Thus, the second principle of the study of bounded rationality is:
因此,有限理性研究的第二个原则是:
Model decision-making under uncertainty, without reducing the situation to one of risk or ambiguity.
在不将情况简化为风险或模糊性之一的情况下,进行不确定性下的模型决策。

Principle 3 (Adaptation): Model the Match of a Process to the Environment
原则 3(适应性):模拟过程与环境的匹配

Evolutionary theory is based on the principles of variability, inheritance, and selection, by means of which organisms adapt to their environment and vice versa. The features of an animal may appear strange if one does not study the environment it is currently or once was inhabiting. The same holds for cognitive processes. Simon used the analogy of a pair of scissors to make this point: One cannot understand the rationality of behavior by looking solely at the mind or at the environment, just as one cannot understand how scissors cut so well by looking at one blade only. However, quite a few psychological theories tend to focus exclusively on the mental blade, such as lossaversion and risk-aversion, while behavioristic and economic theories tend to have eyes only for the environmental blade, such as incentives.
进化理论基于变异性、遗传和选择原则,通过这些原则,生物适应其环境,反之亦然。如果不研究动物当前或曾经栖息的环境,动物的特征可能会显得奇怪。认知过程也是如此。西蒙用一把剪刀的类比来阐明这一点:仅仅看大脑或环境,就无法理解行为的合理性,就像仅仅看一把刀片就无法理解剪刀为何剪得这么好。然而,相当多的心理理论往往只关注心理刀片,如损失厌恶和风险厌恶,而行为主义和经济理论往往只关注环境刀片,如激励。
Thus, the third principle of the study of bounded rationality is:
因此,有限理性研究的第三个原则是:
Model the match of decision processes with environmental structures.
模拟决策过程与环境结构的匹配。
These three principles were far too radical for most of Simon's contemporaries. In his own assessment, his program of bounded rationality was received with "something less than unbounded enthusiasm" and was "largely ignored as irrelevant for economics."13 Many psychologists and behavioral economists misconstrued Simon's term bounded rationality to mean irrationality and interpreted deviations from logical rationality as intuitive errors (see Chapter 3). Simon's revolution did not happen in his lifetime.
这三个原则对西蒙的大多数同时代人来说太激进了。在他自己的评估中,他的有限理性方案被接受时“远不及无限热情”,并被“大多数人忽视为与经济无关”。许多心理学家和行为经济学家误解了西蒙的有限理性术语,将其解释为非理性,并将逻辑理性的偏差解释为直觉错误(见第 3 章)。西蒙的革命并没有在他的一生中发生。

Ecological Rationality 生态合理性

Given the semantic confusion surrounding bounded rationality, my research group and I coined the term ecological rationality when reviving and extending Simon's program. This new term signals that rationality is defined by the successful match between a strategy (e.g., a heuristic) and the structure of the environment. Its measuring rod is not adherence to consistency axioms in small worlds, but rather success in large worlds. The ecological rationality program has two goals, one descriptive and one prescriptive. Its descriptive goal is to analyze the repertoire of heuristics that an individual or organization has at its disposal. Known as the adaptive toolbox, this repertoire includes the building blocks of heuristics and the core capacities they exploit. This requires the studying and modeling of how managers, physicians, judges, or others actually make decisions under uncertainty, not only under risk or ambiguity. The prescriptive part of the program addresses the question of when one should rely on a particular class of heuristics, that is, the conditions under which heuristics are ecologically rational. That question was not part of Simon's original program and answering it requires precise models of heuristics. Meeting the descriptive goal requires observation and experimentation; meeting the prescriptive goal requires mathematical analysis and computer simulation.
鉴于有关有限理性的语义混淆,我和我的研究小组在复兴和扩展西蒙的计划时创造了生态合理性这个术语。这个新术语表明,理性是由策略(例如,启发式)与环境结构之间的成功匹配所定义的。它的衡量标准不是在小世界中遵循一致性公理,而是在大世界中取得成功。生态合理性计划有两个目标,一个是描述性的,一个是规范性的。其描述性目标是分析个人或组织可以利用的启发式工具箱的库存。这个工具箱被称为适应性工具箱,其中包括启发式的基本构件和它们利用的核心能力。这需要研究和建模管理者、医生、法官或其他人在不确定性下实际如何做出决策,而不仅仅是在风险或模糊性下。该计划的规范性部分涉及一个问题,即何时应依赖特定类别的启发式,即启发式在何种条件下是生态合理的。 那个问题不是西蒙原始计划的一部分,回答它需要启发式的精确模型。实现描述性目标需要观察和实验;实现规定性目标需要数学分析和计算机模拟。

Heuristics Can Be Used Intuitively or Deliberately
启发式可以直觉地或故意地使用

As pointed out in Chapter I, every heuristic can be used intuitively, that is, without awareness, or deliberately, that is, consciously. The heuristic process is the same. Consider hiring decisions in organizations, which are decisions made under uncertainty. In the course of personal interviews, an interviewer often has a hunch that a candidate would be an excellent choice or that there is something wrong with a candidate even if they look great on paper. If the reasons for this feeling are not fully conscious, then the judgment is intuitive. To unravel the reasons underlying such intuitions, the ecological rationality program begins by analyzing managers' actual decision processes for hiring.
正如第一章所指出的,每个启发式都可以直观地使用,即无需意识,或者有意识地使用。 启发式过程是相同的。 考虑组织中的招聘决策,这些决策是在不确定性下做出的。 在个人面试过程中,面试官经常有一种直觉,认为某位候选人是一个出色的选择,或者认为某位候选人有问题,即使他们在纸上看起来很出色。 如果这种感觉的原因并非完全意识到,那么判断是直觉的。 为了揭示这种直觉背后的原因,生态合理性计划从分析管理者招聘实际决策过程开始。
According to Tesla CEO Elon Musk, for instance, candidates' education, personality, and prior work experience are not what counts. Instead, Musk looks for "evidence of exceptional ability." 15 The idea is that people who have shown exceptional ability in the past are likely to continue showing it in the future. To determine this, Musk reported that he asked
根据特斯拉首席执行官埃隆·马斯克的说法,例如,候选人的教育、个性和先前的工作经验并不重要。相反,马斯克寻找的是“卓越能力的证据”。这个想法是,过去表现出卓越能力的人很可能在未来继续展现。为了确定这一点,马斯克表示他询问
Figure 5.I. A model of Elon Musk's one-good-reason heuristic for hiring.
图 5.I.埃隆·马斯克用于招聘的一个好理由启发式模型。
each candidate: "Tell me about some of the most difficult problems you worked on and how you solved them." To determine whether candidates were telling the truth, he requested precise details on how they solved the problem in question. Musk's approach to hiring is fast and frugal and of a heuristic nature. It is fast because it dispenses with dozens of interviews, lengthy questionnaires, and assessment centers. It is frugal because it instead relies on a single reason. Musk's process is modeled by the onegood-reason heuristic as in Figure 5.I.
每位候选人:“告诉我你曾经遇到的一些最困难的问题,以及你是如何解决它们的。”为了确定候选人是否在说实话,他要求对他们解决问题的具体细节。马斯克的招聘方式是快速、节俭且启发式的。它之所以快速,是因为它省去了数十次面试、冗长的问卷和评估中心。它之所以节俭,是因为它依赖于一个单一的原因。马斯克的流程是由 onegood-reason 启发式模拟的,如图 5.I 所示。
Note that this heuristic can be used consciously or unconsciously: One is either fully or not aware of the criterion that ultimately guides a hiring choice.
请注意,这种启发式方法可以有意识地或无意识地使用:一个人要么完全意识到,要么不知道最终指导招聘选择的标准。
Musk is not alone in relying on fast-and-frugal heuristics to select employees. When Amazon was still a small company and CEO Jeff Bezos made hiring decisions himself, he too looked for exceptional ability. For Bezos, however, that alone did not suffice; he required two additional reasons. His strategy can be reconstructed in the form of a fast-and-frugal tree (Figure 5.2). In general, in the case of yes/no decisions, a fast-andfrugal tree is an incomplete tree with reasons (or cues) and exits that consists of three building blocks:
马斯克并不是唯一依赖快速和简便的启发式来选择员工的人。当亚马逊还是一家小公司,首席执行官杰夫·贝索斯亲自做招聘决定时,他也在寻找卓越的能力。然而,对于贝索斯来说,仅仅这一点是不够的;他需要另外两个原因。他的策略可以以快速和简便的树的形式重建(图 5.2)。一般来说,在是/否决策的情况下,一个快速和简便的树是一个不完整的树,有 个原因(或线索)和 个出口,由三个构建块组成:
Search rule: Search through cues beginning from the top.
搜索规则:从顶部开始搜索线索。
Stopping rule: Stop search if a cue leads to an exit.
停止规则:如果线索导致出口,则停止搜索。
Decision rule: Act according to what the exit specifies.
决策规则:根据出口指定的内容行事。
As with Musk, the first feature of significance to Bezos was whether someone had exceptional ability; if "no," the applicant was not hired. If
与马斯克一样,贝佐斯看重的第一个特征是某人是否具有非凡的能力;如果“没有”,则不会聘用申请人。
Figure 5.2. A model of Jeff Bezos' sequential decision process for hiring. The process is a fast-and-frugal tree, defined as a tree in which each question can lead to a decision and, thus, has an exit on each question and two on the last one.
图 5.2. 杰夫·贝索斯(Jeff Bezos)招聘的顺序决策过程模型。该过程是一个快速而节俭的树模型,定义为每个问题都可以导致一个决策,因此每个问题都有一个出口,最后一个问题有两个出口。
"yes," Bezos asked himself a second question, "Would you admire this person?" Bezos believed that those he admired were those he could learn from. A "no" was sufficient for not hiring. If the answer was "yes," he asked a third question, "Will this person raise the average level of effectiveness of the group they're entering?" This feature would ensure that the bar in the company goes up with every hire. Only in the event of three positive answers was the candidate hired.
"是的,"贝索斯问自己第二个问题,"你会钦佩这个人吗?"贝索斯相信他钦佩的人是他可以向他们学习的人。如果答案是否定的,那就足以不雇用。如果答案是"是",他会问第三个问题,"这个人会提高他们加入的团队的平均效率水平吗?"这个特点将确保公司的标准随着每次招聘而提高。只有在三个积极答案的情况下,候选人才会被聘用。
The two figures show two kinds of decision processes. Which one is better? And in which situation? That can be investigated empirically. Yet, it would be more interesting to find general results, independent of a specific situation and heuristic. The study of the ecological rationality is an analytic discipline for deriving general results, such as in the following two examples. The first concerns the class of one-good-reason heuristics, as was used by Musk. The second concerns the class of fast-and-frugal trees, as was used by Bezos.
这两个图展示了两种决策过程。哪一个更好?在什么情况下?这可以通过实证研究来调查。然而,找到独立于特定情况和启发式的一般结果会更有趣。生态合理性的研究是一种分析学科,用于推导一般结果,比如以下两个例子。第一个涉及一种单一良好理由启发式的类别,正如马斯克所使用的。第二个涉及一种快速简便树的类别,正如贝索斯所使用的。

When Is One Reason As Good As (or Better Than) More Reasons?
何时一个理由和更多理由一样好(或更好)?

In situations of uncertainty, one cannot, by definition, foresee what the optimal strategy is. But one can derive relative statements, such as that
在不确定的情况下,根据定义,人们无法预见到最佳策略是什么。但可以得出相对的陈述,比如

strategy will lead to more accurate decisions than strategy , given environment . Thus, let us ask whether we can identify a general condition under which a one-good-reason heuristic, such as Musk's heuristic, cannot be outperformed by a standard approach to prediction, that is, linear strategies (such as linear regression). Linear strategies use the same one reason as the heuristics but also take into account further valid reasons. To simplify the exposition, let us consider linear strategies that use binary cues , with values of either or , where the positive value indicates a better candidate. The weights of the cues are , all of which are positive:
策略 将比策略 在环境 下导致更准确的决策。因此,让我们思考是否能够确定一个普遍条件,根据这个条件,一个单一良好理由的启发式方法,比如马斯克的启发式方法,是否能够被标准的预测方法,即线性策略(比如线性回归)超越。线性策略使用与启发式方法相同的一个理由,但也考虑了更多有效的理由。为了简化阐述,让我们考虑使用 个二元线索 的线性策略,取值为 ,其中正值表示更好的候选者。线索的权重为 ,所有权重均为正值:
The linear rule makes the inference "hire" if , otherwise "not hire." We denote the single cue used by the one-good-reason heuristic as I and give the remaining cues the numbers . The weights of each of the remaining cues reflect their additional contribution to the higher ranked cues, as do the beta weights in a linear regression. If the following condition holds, no linear rule can lead to more accurate inferences than a one-good-reason heuristic:
线性规则使推断“雇用”如果 ,否则“不雇用”。我们将一个良好理由启发式使用的单个线索表示为 I,并为其余线索分配编号 。每个剩余线索的权重反映了它们对更高排名线索的额外贡献,就像线性回归中的 beta 权重一样。如果满足以下条件,则没有线性规则可以比一个良好理由启发式导致更准确的推断:
Dominant cue condition: The weights form a dominant cue structure if they satisfy the constraint:
主导线索条件:如果它们满足约束条件,则权重 形成主导线索结构:
Expressed in words, the weight of the first cue is larger than the sum of the weights of all other cues. The weights , and are an example, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 (a). If this condition holds, maximizing expected utility or any other linear rule will always yield the same decision as a one-good-reason heuristic. This is because a dominant cue cannot be outvoted or compensated by the sum of all lower ranking cues.
用文字表达,第一个线索的权重大于所有其他线索的权重之和。权重 是一个例子,如图 5.3(a)所示。如果这个条件成立,最大化期望效用或任何其他线性规则总是会产生与一个良好理由启发式相同的决策。这是因为一个主导线索不能被所有排名较低线索的总和所否决或补偿。
Dominant cues appear to be the rule rather than the exception in many real-world situations. They guarantee that one-good-reason heuristics are as accurate as linear strategies, and faster and less effortful to boot. The fact that models with free parameters such as linear models tend to overfit (e.g., when the sample size is small) explains why one-good-reason heuristics can lead to more accurate predictions.
主导线索似乎在许多现实世界情况中是规则,而不是例外。它们保证了一个好理由启发式方法与线性策略一样准确,而且更快速、更省力。具有自由参数的模型(例如线性模型)往往会过度拟合(例如,当样本量较小时),这解释了为什么一个好理由启发式方法可以导致更准确的预测。
(a)
(b)
Figure 5.3. Ecological rationality. (a) The weights form a dominant cue structure that one-good-reason heuristics exploit. In this case, no linear strategy that uses all five valid cues (reasons) can yield more accurate decisions than a one-good-reason heuristic that relies on the first cue alone and ignores all others. (b) A structure of cues that can be exploited by the class of tallying heuristics, which does not estimate weights, but, instead, assigns equal weights. Here, a one-good-reason heuristic would be less accurate than linear models and tallying.
图 5.3. 生态合理性。(a) 权重形成一个主导线索结构,一个单一良好理由启发式方法利用。在这种情况下,使用所有五个有效线索(理由)的线性策略不能比依赖第一个线索并忽略所有其他线索的单一良好理由启发式方法产生更准确的决策。(b) 一种可以被计数启发式方法利用的线索结构,它不估计权重,而是分配相等的权重。在这里,一个单一良好理由启发式方法将比线性模型和计数方法不准确。

How Can False Positives Be Balanced With Misses?
如何平衡假阳性和漏报?

Hiring decisions, like other binary classifications, can lead to two kinds of errors: a false positive (an offer to the wrong person) or a miss (no offer to the right person). The crucial point is that there is a trade-off: Reducing false positives increases misses and vice versa. For instance, a rule that hires everyone will have no misses (a hit rate of ioo percent), but it will also have a false-positive rate of ioo percent (all of the wrong persons will be hired). Thus, heuristics need to be designed so that they reflect the desired trade-off. Figure 5.4 shows the process for fast-and-frugal trees.
招聘决策,像其他二元分类一样,可能导致两种错误:假阳性(向错误的人提供工作机会)或漏失(未向正确的人提供工作机会)。关键点在于存在一种权衡:减少假阳性会增加漏失,反之亦然。例如,一个雇佣所有人的规则将没有漏失(百分之百的命中率),但也会有百分之百的假阳性率(所有错误的人将被雇佣)。因此,启发式需要设计成能够反映所需的权衡。图 5.4 展示了快速和简单树的过程。
For three cues with the same order, one can construct four possible fastand-frugal trees. Tree (a) in Figure 5.4 minimizes false positives because it is conservative and leads to an offer only if a candidate qualifies on all three questions. To reduce misses instead of false positives, one can alter the first two exits of the tree. The further to the right the tree is located in Figure 5.4, the fewer are misses and the more are false positives. These four trees correspond to four points on the receiver-operator curve in the signal detection theory. Bezos' heuristic (tree (a)) is the best strategy for those whose main concern is to avoid making offers to the wrong candidates. The trees are ecologically rational, that is, their rationality depends
对于具有相同顺序的三个线索,可以构建四种可能的快速和简单树。图 5.4 中的树(a)最小化了误报,因为它是保守的,并且只有在候选人在所有三个问题上都符合资格时才会提出报价。为了减少漏报而不是误报,可以改变树的前两个出口。在图 5.4 中,树位于右侧越远,漏报越少,误报越多。这四棵树对应于信号检测理论中接收者操作特征曲线上的四个点。贝索斯的启发式(树(a))是最适合那些主要关心避免向错误候选人提供报价的策略。这些树在生态上是合理的,也就是说,它们的合理性取决于

on the environment. For instance, in European countries in which it is more difficult to fire employees, avoiding false positives would be more appropriate, whereas in the "hire-and-fire" culture of the USA and the UK, one might be less concerned with hiring the wrong candidates.
在环境中。例如,在欧洲国家,解雇员工更加困难,避免误报可能更为合适,而在美国和英国的“雇用和解雇”文化中,人们可能不太担心雇用错误的候选人。
This example illustrates the steps of the program: Begin with empirical observation or experiments to analyze the conscious or intuitive decision processes under uncertainty and then model the process in terms of search, stopping, and decision rules, which, finally, facilitates determining the conditions under which a heuristic is successful in terms of a specified goal. Thanks to the transparency of heuristics, it is possible to check and improve their performance continuously and also to teach them easily.
这个例子说明了程序的步骤:从经验观察或实验开始,分析在不确定性下的意识或直觉决策过程,然后根据搜索、停止和决策规则对过程进行建模,最终有助于确定启发式在特定目标下成功的条件。由于启发式的透明性,可以持续检查和改进它们的性能,也可以轻松地教授它们。

The Adaptive Toolbox 自适应工具箱

As mentioned in the section "Ecological Rationality," the adaptive toolbox is the repertoire of heuristics an individual, team, or organization has at its disposal, consisting of heuristics, their building blocks, and the core capacities that heuristics exploit. The qualifier adaptive reflects that the question of a heuristic's rationality cannot be answered by simply looking at the heuristic. At issue is how a heuristic matches with the environment, that is, its ecological rationality. Beside fluency heuristics, one-good-reason heuristics, and fast-and-frugal trees, other tools can be found in the adaptive toolbox.
如“生态合理性”部分所述,适应性工具箱是个体、团队或组织可利用的启发式方法、其构成要素和启发式方法利用的核心能力的库存。 修饰语“适应性”反映了一个启发式方法的合理性问题不能简单地通过观察启发式方法来回答。 问题在于启发式方法如何与环境匹配,即其生态合理性。 除了流畅启发式方法、一个好理由启发式方法和快速简约树之外,适应性工具箱中还可以找到其他工具。

Decision-Making by Recognition
通过认知做决策

Recognition is an intuitive process, a cognitive core capacity that allows people to recognize a face without being able to specify its features. It enables chess players to recognize familiar positions, physicians to recognize symptoms, and consumers to recognize brand names. The combination of recognition with heuristic search leads to the recognition beuristic.
识别是一种直觉过程,一种认知核心能力,使人们能够识别出一个面孔,而无需能够指定其特征。它使国际象棋选手能够识别熟悉的局面,医生能够识别症状,消费者能够识别品牌名称。识别与启发式搜索的结合导致了识别启发式。
My colleagues and I discovered this heuristic when we encountered a puzzling "less-is-more" effect: People with less knowledge managed to answer more trivia questions correctly than people with more knowledge. In one study, we asked a class of US college students: "Which city has the larger population: Detroit or Milwaukee?" Some 40 percent of the students voted for Milwaukee, the others for Detroit. When an equivalent class of German students was asked, virtually everyone gave the correct answer, Detroit. One might conclude that the German students knew more about US cities, yet the opposite was the case. Many had not even heard of Milwaukee. The intuition of the Germans relied on the recognition heuristic:
我和我的同事们在遇到一个令人困惑的“少即是多”效应时发现了这个启发式:知识较少的人比知识较多的人更容易正确回答更多的琐事问题。在一项研究中,我们询问了一群美国大学生:“底特律和密尔沃基哪个城市人口更多?”大约 40%的学生选择了密尔沃基,其他人选择了底特律。当询问一个等价的德国学生班级时,几乎每个人都给出了正确答案,即底特律。有人可能会得出结论说德国学生对美国城市了解更多,然而事实恰恰相反。许多人甚至从未听说过密尔沃基。德国人的直觉依赖于认知启发式:
If you recognize the name of one city, but not the other, then infer that the recognized city has the larger population.
如果你认识一个城市的名字,但不认识另一个城市的名字,那么可以推断认识的城市人口更多。
The US students could not use the heuristic because they had heard of both cities. The heuristic exploits semi-ignorance - here, the fact that someone does not recognize all cities. Relying on the recognition heuristic is ecologically rational if:
美国学生无法使用启发式,因为他们都听说过这两个城市。这种启发式利用半无知 - 这里指的是某人并不认识所有城市的事实。依赖识别启发式是生态合理的,如果:
where is the proportion of correct inferences the heuristic achieves when one alternative (here: city) is recognized and the other is not. The larger the size of is, the more successful is the heuristic. In other words, the heuristic exploits situations where a lack of recognition is informative. Figure 5.5 shows how to measure the ecological rationality of the recognition heuristic. There are mediators, such as newspapers, between a person and a criterion that reflect (but do not reveal) the criterion value. Consider the ioo largest US cities and the number of articles mentioning these cities in the German newspaper Die Zeit. The ecological correlation between the population and number of articles is .72 , and thus quite substantial. The surrogate correlation between the number of articles mentioning a US city and the number of people recognizing it is .86 , even higher. These two correlations result in a substantive recognition correlation of . 66 (the recognition validity is expressed here as a correlation, for better comparison). Replicating the same analysis for the ioo largest German cities mentioned in the Chicago Tribune results in similar values (the second set of values in Figure 5.5).
其中 是启发式在一个备选方案(这里是城市)被识别而另一个未被识别时实现正确推断的比例。 的大小越大,启发式的成功性就越高。换句话说,启发式利用了缺乏识别的情况。图 5.5 展示了如何衡量识别启发式的生态合理性。一个人和一个反映(但不揭示)标准值的标准之间有中介者,比如报纸。考虑美国最大的 100 个城市和德国报纸《Die Zeit》中提及这些城市的文章数量。人口和文章数量之间的生态相关性为 0.72,因此相当显著。提及美国城市的文章数量与认识这些城市的人数之间的替代相关性为 0.86,甚至更高。这两个相关性导致了一个实质性的识别相关性为 0.66(这里将识别有效性表达为相关性,以便更好地比较)。 复制芝加哥论坛提到的德国前 100 大城市的相同分析结果与图 5.5 中的第二组数值类似。
As the Detroit-Milwaukee example shows, the recognition heuristic can lead to a counterintuitive less-is-more effect. A less-is-more effect occurs if the following condition holds:
正如底特律-密尔沃基的例子所示,认知启发法可能导致令人意想不到的“少即是多”效应。如果满足以下条件,就会出现“少即是多”效应:
The knowledge validity is measured by proportion correct when both objects are recognized, that is, when the recognition heuristic is not applicable.
知识有效性 是通过正确比例来衡量的,当两个对象都被识别时,也就是说,当识别启发法不适用时。
Can the less-is-more effect be shown in sports? Consider predicting the outcomes of the 127 matches played by the 128 players who compete in
可以在体育运动中展示“少即是多”的效果吗?考虑预测 128 名选手参加的 127 场比赛的结果
Figure 5.5. An Illustration of the ecological rationality of the recognition heuristic. The goal is to estimate an unknown criterion (here, the population of a foreign city). The unknown criterion is mediated by the ecological correlation and the surrogate correlation. Note that the recognition validity is expressed, for comparability, as a correlation between the number of people who recognize the name of a city and its population. For all three correlations, the first value is for US cities and the German newspaper Die Zeit as mediator; the second is for German cities and the Chicago Tribune as mediator.
图 5.5. 识别启发法的生态合理性示例。目标是估计一个未知标准(这里是外国城市的人口)。未知标准通过生态相关性和替代相关性来中介。请注意,为了比较,识别有效性被表达为识别某个城市名称的人数与其人口之间的相关性。对于所有三个相关性,第一个值是美国城市和德国报纸《Die Zeit》作为中介者;第二个值是德国城市和《芝加哥论坛报》作为中介者。
the Wimbledon Gentlemen's Singles. The Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) Rankings and the seedings of the experts predicted between 66 percent and 69 percent of all matches correctly. These are measures of the validity of the knowledge available. Using the recognition of amateur tennis players who had only heard of the names of about half of the players, in contrast, led to 72 percent correct predictions. Here, the recognition validity was higher than the knowledge validity, a condition that generates a less-is-more effect. The amateurs could make better predictions by drawing on the power of the recognition heuristic, while those who are familiar with all names cannot exploit the information provided by lack of recognition.
温布尔登男子单打比赛。网球职业协会(ATP)排名和专家种子预测正确率在 66%至 69%之间。这些是可用知识有效性的衡量标准。相比之下,使用只听说过大约一半选手姓名的业余网球选手的认知,导致 72%的正确预测。在这里,认知有效性高于知识有效性,这种情况产生了一种越少越好的效果。业余选手可以通过利用认知启发式的力量做出更好的预测,而那些熟悉所有姓名的人则无法利用由于缺乏认知而提供的信息。
Name recognition also plays a role in electoral contests. Unlike highprofile presidential contests, the majority of elections feature candidates who are virtually unknowns to many voters. Various studies have shown that, in these elections, voters rely on name recognition, which increases their support for a candidate or for a party.
名字认可在选举竞争中也起着作用。与备受关注的总统选举不同,大多数选举的候选人对许多选民来说几乎是无名之辈。各种研究表明,在这些选举中,选民依赖名字认可,这增加了他们对候选人或政党的支持。
Humans not only excel in name recognition but also in rapidly recognizing pictures, faces, voices, or music. In perhaps the most extensive recognition memory test ever performed, participants were shown Io,000 photographs for 5 seconds each. Two days later, when shown ıo,000 pairs of photographs, each pair comprising one previously seen and one that was novel, they were able to identify 83 percent correctly. Note that the recognition of a face on a photo, or of a piece of music, does not mean that one also recalls the person's name or the piece's composer. Recognition is primary; recall may come later. The process of recognition, along with reliance on the recognition heuristic, typically proceeds without awareness, but the heuristic can also be used consciously, as when deliberately investing in stocks with high name recognition.
人类不仅在识别名字方面表现出色,还能迅速识别图片、面孔、声音或音乐。也许是有史以来最广泛的识别记忆测试,参与者被展示了 1 万张照片,每张照片 5 秒钟。两天后,当展示 1 万对照片,每对包括一张之前看过的和一张新的时,他们能够正确识别 83%。请注意,识别照片上的面孔或音乐片段,并不意味着也能记住这个人的名字或这首曲子的作曲家。识别是主要的;回忆可能会在之后出现。识别过程以及对识别启发式的依赖通常在没有意识的情况下进行,但这种启发式也可以被有意识地使用,比如有意地投资于具有高名字识别度的股票时。
Do people use the recognition heuristic in an automatic or an adaptive way? Studies have shown that people do not automatically rely on the heuristic, but adapt their use to its ecological rationality (the recognition validity Can one also find traces of this adaptive use in the brain? The adaptive hypothesis entails two processes: mere recognition, which assesses whether or not alternatives are recognized, and evaluation, which assesses whether the recognition heuristic should be applied. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we found support for the adaptive hypothesis. Tasks that involved mere recognition drew on medial parietal areas of the brain, which are taken to reflect recognition memory processes, whereas tasks that involved the use of the recognition heuristic drew additionally on the anterior medical prefrontal cortex, which is assumed to reflect metajudgments, such as of ecological rationality. Thus, both behavioral data and the fMRI analysis are consistent with the hypothesis that an intuition based on the recognition heuristic involves an adaptive process of judging the heuristic's ecological rationality.
人们是以自动还是适应性方式使用识别启发式吗?研究表明,人们并不自动依赖启发式,而是根据其生态合理性来调整使用(识别有效性 在大脑中是否也可以找到这种适应性使用的痕迹?适应性假设涉及两个过程:纯粹识别,评估是否识别出替代方案,以及评估是否应用识别启发式。在功能性磁共振成像(fMRI)研究中,我们发现了对适应性假设的支持。 仅涉及识别的任务利用了大脑的中央顶叶区域,这被认为反映了识别记忆过程,而涉及识别启发式使用的任务还额外利用了前额中央皮质,据认为反映了生态合理性等元判断。因此,行为数据和 fMRI 分析都支持这一假设:基于识别启发式的直觉涉及对启发式生态合理性的判断的适应性过程。

Decision-Making by Satisficing
满足决策

Another heuristic for choices in uncertain situations such as buying a house or selling a car is the satisficing heuristic, which uses aspiration level adaptation:
在不确定情况下做选择的另一个启发式是满足启发式,它使用愿望水平适应:
Step 1: Set an aspiration level .
第一步:设定一个愿望水平
Step 2: Choose the first option that satisfies .
第 2 步:选择满足 的第一个选项。
Step 3: If after time no option has satisfied , then change by an amount , and continue until an option is found.
步骤 3:如果经过时间 没有满足 的选项,则通过改变 的数量 ,继续进行直到找到一个选项。
Satisficing can be relied on unconsciously, which generates intuitive decisions. In that case, rather than stating the aspiration level, one simply has a feeling that the option is good enough and that no time should be wasted in trying to find a marginally better one. Aspiration levels determine whether people feel successful and content in everyday life or feel insufficient and incapable of meeting expectations. Aspiration levels set too high can create a life of perceived failures. The German psychologist Kurt Lewin, who promoted the concept of aspiration, maintained that successful people are those who set attainable goals.
满足可以在无意识中依赖,从而产生直觉决策。在这种情况下,与其陈述渴望水平,一个人只是感觉这个选择足够好,不应该浪费时间去寻找稍微更好的选择。渴望水平决定人们在日常生活中是否感到成功和满足,或者感到不足和无法满足期望。设定过高的渴望水平可能导致被认为是失败的生活。德国心理学家库尔特·勒温提出了渴望概念,他认为成功的人是那些设定可实现目标的人。
Like every heuristic, satisficing can also be used consciously. One instance of this is pricing used cars. A study on how 628 car dealers set the prices of 16,356 used BMWs online (from the 3 and 7 Series) found that 97 percent relied on a satisficing rule. The most frequent strategy was to set the initial aspiration level in the middle of the price range of comparable cars on the market, maintain the price for a fixed time of 3 to 4 weeks on average, and then lower the price by about 5 percent if the car was not sold in that period. With this version of satisficing, 64 percent of all cars were sold. An analysis of the adaptive use of the heuristic showed that was shorter with an increasing density of both of population and of competing dealerships in the region. The heuristic implies price stickiness and the cheap twin paradox, where two virtually identical cars ("twins") in the same dealership are systematically priced differently. The paradox occurs when one of these two cars entered the dealership earlier and had one or more reductions by than the newer twin, a counterintuitive prediction that was verified across dealerships.
像每一种启发式一样,满足法也可以被有意识地使用。其中一个例子是定价二手车。一项研究发现,628 家汽车经销商如何在线上定价 16,356 辆二手宝马车(来自 3 系和 7 系),发现 97%依赖满足法则。最常见的策略是将初始愿望水平设定在市场上可比车辆价格范围的中间,保持价格固定时间(平均 3 至 4 周),然后如果在那段时间内未售出车辆,则将价格降低约 5%。采用这种满足法版本,64%的车辆被售出。对启发式的自适应使用进行的分析显示,当地人口密度和竞争性经销商密度增加时,销售时间会缩短。这种启发式暗示价格的坚挺性和廉价双胞胎悖论,即同一家经销商中两辆几乎相同的车(“双胞胎”)被系统性地定价不同。当这两辆车中的一辆比较早进入经销商并且经历了一次或多次降价时,就会出现悖论,这是一个经过验证的逆直觉预测。

The Scissors of Intuition
直觉的剪刀

The term ecological rationality was not only coined by my research group and myself but was also introduced independently by economist Vernon Smith in his Nobel lecture. Smith juxtaposes ecological with constructive rationality, a concept he traces back to Descartes, who argued that all worthwhile institutions were and should be created by deliberate, deductive processes of reasoning. Although constructivist rationality has led to important achievements of the human intellect, the constant burden of self-conscious monitoring and planning of every single action would incur huge opportunity costs and not get humans through the day. Much of what we do occurs without much thinking: judging the intentions of others, catching a fly ball, playing speed chess, or conducting a symphony. For Smith, ecological rationality emerges from the unconscious brain rather than from the conscious mind, from intuitions, traditions, heuristics, norms, and other cultural and biological processes. Accordingly, the study of ecological rationality is to reconstruct, using deliberate thinking, how we make decisions outside the domain of constructive rationality. Smith's emphasis on the study of "home-grown principles of action" is much akin to ecological rationality as I understand it. In his own words:
生态合理性这个术语不仅是由我的研究小组和我本人创造的,而且也是经济学家弗农·史密斯在他的诺贝尔演讲中独立介绍的。史密斯将生态合理性与建构合理性相对立,这个概念可以追溯到笛卡尔,他认为所有有价值的制度都应该由深思熟虑、演绎推理的过程创造出来。尽管建构主义合理性导致了人类智慧的重要成就,但自我意识监控和计划每一个行动的不断负担会带来巨大的机会成本,无法让人类度过一天。我们做的许多事情都是不经过深思熟虑的:判断他人的意图,接住一个飞球,玩速度棋,或者指挥交响乐团。对于史密斯来说,生态合理性源自无意识的大脑而不是意识,源自直觉、传统、启发法、规范以及其他文化和生物过程。因此,生态合理性的研究是要重建我们在建构合理性领域之外如何做出决策的过程,使用深思熟虑。 史密斯对“本土行动原则”的研究强调,与我理解的生态合理性非常相似。在他自己的话中:
The term "ecological rationality" has been used fittingly by Gigerenzer et al. (1999) for application to important discoveries captured in the concept of "fast and frugal decision making" by individuals . . . My application of the term is concerned with adaptations that occur within institutions, markets, management, social, and other associations governed by informal or formal rule systems - in fact, any of the terms might be used in place of "heuristic" and this definition works for me.
术语“生态合理性”已被吉格伦泽等人(1999 年)恰当地用于应用于个体“快速和简约决策制定”概念中捕捉到的重要发现...我对这个术语的应用涉及到在由非正式或正式规则系统管理的机构、市场、管理、社会和其他协会中发生的适应性,事实上,“启发式”这个术语的任何一个都可以用来代替,这个定义对我来说是有效的。
The common denominator is Simon's scissors, the process of adaptation, and coevolution. In line with this analogy, Smith is deeply suspicious of the lists of biases produced by those behavioral economists who study the cognitive blade only, which leads to what appears to be deep flaws. And, as already seen in Chapter 3, Smith's suspicion is justified.
共同的基础是西蒙的剪刀、适应过程和共同进化。根据这个类比,史密斯对那些只研究认知刀片的行为经济学家制定的偏见清单深感怀疑,这导致了看似深刻的缺陷。正如在第 3 章中已经看到的那样,史密斯的怀疑是有道理的。
Simon's three principles provide a useful template for freeing behavioral economics from its focus on deviations from utility theory and the routine (mis)interpretation of these deviations as flaws in the mind rather than in the theory. We need to take uncertainty and intractability seriously, be it in economic or other settings, instead of pretending that our world can be modeled as just risk and ambiguity. We need to take heuristics seriously, instead of clinging to the notion that optimization is the best solution to all problems. Finally, we need to accept that there is no single solution to all problems and, instead, become aware of and develop an adaptive cognitive toolbox containing multiple tools, each useful for different classes of problems. The human brain evolved to find solutions to problems without wasting time and energy, and fast-and-frugal heuristics embody this value. This is the stuff that intuitions are made of.
西蒙的三个原则为行为经济学提供了一个有用的模板,使其摆脱对效用理论偏差的关注以及对这些偏差的常规(误)解释,将其视为心智而非理论中的缺陷。我们需要认真对待不确定性和难以解决性,无论是在经济还是其他环境中,而不是假装我们的世界可以被建模为风险和模糊性。我们需要认真对待启发式,而不是固守优化是解决所有问题的最佳方案的观念。最后,我们需要接受没有单一解决方案适用于所有问题,而是意识到并发展一个适应性认知工具箱,其中包含多种工具,每种工具适用于不同类别的问题。人类大脑进化出来是为了在不浪费时间和精力的情况下找到问题的解决方案,而快速和简单的启发式体现了这一价值观。这就是直觉的本质。

CHAPTER 6 第 6 章

Embodied Heuristics 具体启发法

Our body is the ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge, whether intellectual or practical.
我们的身体是我们所有外部知识的最终工具,无论是智力还是实践。
Michael Polanyi  迈克尔·波兰尼
Jean Piaget once said that he could not think without a pen in hand. For him, writing was thinking, not simply the translation of thought onto paper. Accordingly, his theory of cognitive development begins with the child's sensory and motor processes, which are eventually transformed into mental life, where they turn into cognitive operations and structures. The general idea that cognition is closely intertwined with action was later called embodied cognition. This term has been used for a highly diverse set of ideas, including cognition situated in the environment.
让·皮亚杰曾经说过,没有手里的笔,他就无法思考。对他来说,写作就是思考,不仅仅是将思想翻译成纸上的文字。因此,他的认知发展理论始于儿童的感觉和运动过程,最终转化为心智生活,变成认知操作和结构。认知与行动密切相关的一般观念后来被称为具身认知。这个术语已经被用来表示一系列高度多样化的想法,包括环境中的认知。
In this chapter, I start with an evolutionary view on intuitive decisionmaking before introducing the concept of embodied heuristics, that is, rulesof-thumb that exploit specific sensory and motor capacities in order to facilitate high-quality decisions in an uncertain world. Models of heuristics take an algorithmic rather than axiomatic approach to represent the process of decision-making. I present a case study of the gaze heuristic that illustrates how an embodied heuristic exploits sensory and motor abilities and how the heuristic has been adapted to the specific abilities of different species. Moreover, the heuristic has also come to solve new tasks created by human culture. I begin with what might have been the first decisions made by living organisms.
在这一章中,我首先从进化的角度讨论直觉决策,然后介绍具身启发式的概念,即利用特定感官和运动能力的经验法则,以促进在不确定世界中做出高质量决策。启发式模型采用算法而非公理化的方法来表示决策过程。我提出了凝视启发式的案例研究,说明了一个具身启发式如何利用感官和运动能力,以及这一启发式如何适应不同物种的特定能力。此外,这一启发式也开始解决人类文化所创造的新任务。我从可能是生物体做出的第一个决策开始。

The Dawn of Intuitive Decision-Making
直觉决策的黎明

The earth is about 4.5 billion years old. Life emerged some 3.8 billion years ago, and animals much later, about I billion years ago. It began in the form of single-celled organisms equipped with early versions of sensors and a small repertoire of actions. The best-studied single-celled organism is a bacterium called E. coli (named after its discoverer, the pediatrician Theodor Escherich), which can be found in the lower intestine of humans and other warm-blooded organisms. Its popularity with researchers arises from the observation that it seems not to die, but, instead, splits into two daughter bacteria, which again split, and so on. E. coli can perform two motions, run or tumble, that is, move in a straight line or randomly change its course. It continuously switches between these actions, but when its sensors detect increasing concentrations of food, tumbling is reduced. Here, we see the earliest form of decision-making: bacteria choosing between two actions, run or tumble, guided by chemical cues in their environment. These actions serve adaptive goals, finding food and avoiding toxins. The bacteria rely on decreasing or increasing rates of various chemicals as cues. In decision theory, a cue is a sign, or clue, of something that is not directly accessible, such as food or toxins.
地球大约有 45 亿年的历史。生命大约在 38 亿年前出现,动物则晚得多,大约在 10 亿年前。它以单细胞生物的形式开始,配备了早期版本的传感器和一小部分动作。最研究的单细胞生物是一种叫做大肠杆菌的细菌(以其发现者、儿科医生提奥多·埃舍里希的名字命名),可以在人类和其他温血动物的下肠中找到。研究人员喜欢它的原因在于观察到它似乎不会死亡,而是分裂成两个子细菌,然后再次分裂,依此类推。大肠杆菌可以执行两种运动,奔跑或翻滚,即直线移动或随机改变方向。它不断在这些动作之间切换,但当其传感器检测到食物浓度增加时,翻滚会减少。在这里,我们看到了最早的决策形式:细菌在环境中的化学信号的指导下,在奔跑或翻滚之间做出选择。这些动作达到了适应性目标,寻找食物并避开毒素。 细菌依赖于各种化学物质的减少或增加速率作为线索。在决策理论中,线索是指某种不直接可接触的东西的迹象或线索,比如食物或毒素。
Bacteria are prokaryotes, cells without a nucleus. Much later, eukaryotes arose from a merger of bacterial cells and eventually formed plants, mushrooms, and animals. Eukaryotes also formed "eyespots," which mark the beginning of vision and allow for further cues to guide action. One of these, light, has a dual function. For some organisms, such as single-celled organisms and plants, light is mainly a source of energy, supplying solar power. Although humans and other animals also sunbathe, for them light is primarily a source of information. Humans infer the outside world from patterns of light.
细菌是原核生物,没有细胞核的细胞。很久以后,真核生物从细菌细胞的合并中产生,最终形成了植物、蘑菇和动物。真核生物还形成了“眼斑”,标志着视觉的开始,并允许进一步的线索来引导行动。其中之一,光,具有双重功能。对于一些生物,如单细胞生物和植物,光主要是能源的来源,提供太阳能。尽管人类和其他动物也会晒太阳,但对于它们来说,光主要是信息的来源。人类通过光的模式推断外部世界。
As humans cannot directly see the world, inference is crucial. Our inferences are more elaborate than those of single cells, yet remain intelligent "bets" based on uncertain cues. The great physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz spoke of "unconscious inferences" because even humans are not aware of how they make these inferences, such as reconstructing a three-dimensional world from a two-dimensional retinal image. Unconscious inferences border on magic, given that an infinite number of states of the world are consistent with this retinal image. Through millions of years of learning, sensory and motor abilities have evolved in tandem with heuristics that help to make good inferences in such situations of uncertainty - to find food and mates, to avoid toxins and predators, and to solve the basic goals of organisms.
由于人类无法直接看到世界,推理至关重要。我们的推理比单细胞生物更为复杂,但仍然是基于不确定线索的智能“赌注”。伟大的生理学家赫尔曼·冯·赫尔姆霍兹谈到了“无意识的推理”,因为即使人类也不知道他们是如何进行这些推理的,比如从二维视网膜图像重建三维世界。无意识的推理近乎于魔法,因为世界的无限状态都与这个视网膜图像一致。通过数百万年的学习,感官和运动能力与启发式方法一起演化,帮助在不确定情况下做出良好的推理——寻找食物和伴侣,避免毒素和捕食者,解决生物的基本目标。
Along with individual inferences, social behavior evolved. Consider E. coli again. It reacts not only to signs of edible food and dangerous toxins but also to chemicals that signal the presence of other bacteria. This reaction opened the door to the evolution of coordination between organisms, that is, social behavior. An example is quorum sensing among bacteria living inside of squids. Bacteria produce light through a chemical reaction, but only if enough other bacteria are around to join in. They appear to follow a simple heuristic: The more of the signaling chemical one senses, the more light one produces. The production of light serves its host, the squid, as camouflage. Without this light, predators from below would see the shadow of squids, which are nocturnal animals, as cast by the moonlight. In humans, social coordination takes many forms, including communication, cooperation, and competition, and has led to cultural systems such as churches, political parties, and the market.
随着个体推理的发展,社会行为也在演变。再来看大肠杆菌。它不仅对可食食物和危险毒素的迹象做出反应,还对信号其他细菌存在的化学物质做出反应。这种反应打开了生物之间协调演化的大门,即社会行为。一个例子是生活在乌贼体内的细菌之间的定量感知。细菌通过化学反应产生光,但只有足够多的其他细菌参与才会产生光。它们似乎遵循一个简单的启发式:感知到更多的信号化学物质,就会产生更多的光。光的产生为其宿主——乌贼提供了伪装。没有这种光,来自下方的捕食者会看到乌贼的影子,而乌贼是夜行动物,会被误认为是月光所投下的。在人类中,社会协调有许多形式,包括沟通、合作和竞争,并导致了教堂、政党和市场等文化体系的形成。
Let us now consider a concrete example of how inferences are made based on an embodied heuristic.
让我们现在考虑一个具体的例子,说明推理是如何基于具体启发进行的。

Embodied Heuristics: An Illustration
具体启发式:一个例证

Ants, like humans, make real-estate choices, that is, decisions about where to live, which are essential to their fitness. Consider Leptothorax albipennis, a small, approximately long ant that lives in colonies with up to soo workers and a single queen. When their old nest is destroyed, the ant colony sends out scouts to locate a new site with a sufficiently large area to house the entire colony. The ants prefer nest sites that consist of narrow cracks in rocks with flat areas. How can a scout ant estimate the irregular area of a candidate site? A series of ingenious experiments revealed that the scout ants use a smart rule called Buffon's needle algorithm, named after the French I8th-century mathematician Buffon, who discovered this millennia after the ants did.
蚂蚁和人类一样,会做房地产选择,也就是决定住在哪里,这对它们的适应性至关重要。以白腹小蚁为例,这是一种大约 长的小蚂蚁,生活在最多有数百只工蚁和一只蚁后的群落中。当它们的旧巢被摧毁时,蚂蚁群会派出侦察员去找到一个足够大的区域来容纳整个群落。蚂蚁们更喜欢由岩石裂缝和平坦区域组成的巢穴。侦察蚂蚁如何估算候选场地的不规则面积?一系列巧妙的实验揭示了侦察蚂蚁使用的一种智能规则,称为布丰针算法,这个算法是以 18 世纪法国数学家布丰的名字命名的,他在蚂蚁之后数千年才发现了这个算法。
To determine the size of the area, the scout ant first runs for a fixed period (less than 2 minutes) on an irregular path that covers the area fairly evenly. While doing so, it leaves behind a trail of pheromones. After that, the ant exits the area and then returns, where it repeats the procedure of running around in an irregular way. In the second round, the ant counts how often it crosses its own pheromone trail and uses the count to estimate the area of the site: the larger the number of crossings, the smaller the area. This heuristic is amazingly accurate: For a site that is half the size of the area needed, the frequency of crossing is 1.96 times greater.
为了确定区域的大小,侦察蚂蚁首先在一个不规则的路径上固定时间(少于 2 分钟)奔跑,这个路径相对均匀地覆盖了整个区域。在这个过程中,它留下了一条信息素的踪迹。之后,蚂蚁离开该区域然后返回,重复在不规则方式下奔跑的程序。在第二轮中,蚂蚁计算它穿过自己信息素踪迹的次数,并利用这个计数来估计场地的面积:穿越次数越多,面积越小。这种启发式方法非常准确:对于一个面积是所需区域的一半的场地,穿越的频率要高出 1.96 倍。
In Buffon's original problem, the question asked is: What is the probability that a needle dropped on a floor made of parallel and equally wide strips of wood will end up lying across a line between two strips? For a needle of length , where is the width of the strips. Buffon used the solution to calculate the precise value of number pi. In the ant's heuristic, the lines are the ant's pheromone trail and the needles lying across lines are the ant's crossings of its own trail. The ant is not interested in pi, but in the length between lines, which indicates the area.
在布丰的原始问题中,所提出的问题是:当一根针掉在由平行且宽度相同的木条构成的地板上时,它最终会横跨两条木条之间的概率是多少?对于长度为 的针,其中 是木条的宽度。布丰使用这个解决方案来计算圆周率的精确值。在蚂蚁的启发式中,线是蚂蚁的信息素路径,横跨线的针是蚂蚁穿越自己路径的地方。蚂蚁对圆周率不感兴趣,而是对线之间的长度 感兴趣,这表示面积。
The ant's heuristic involves its body in several ways. First, the ant needs to move about. The heuristic would not work if the ant simply sat still and looked around. Second, the ant's body produces a pheromone trail, which its sensory system has the ability to recognize. These biological functions are necessary for the heuristic to be executed, but it is not sufficient. In addition, the ant needs cognitive abilities such as counting crossings and retaining a memory of the count. Many insects can, in fact, measure and memorize the rate at which they encounter stimuli. All in all, ants have evolved an embodied heuristic to infer the area of potential nest sites.
蚂蚁的启发式涉及其身体的几种方式。首先,蚂蚁需要移动。如果蚂蚁只是静静地坐着四处看看,启发式是行不通的。其次,蚂蚁的身体会产生信息素路径,其感觉系统有能力识别。这些生物功能对于执行启发式是必要的,但并不足够。此外,蚂蚁还需要认知能力,比如计算穿越次数并记住计数。事实上,许多昆虫可以测量和记忆他们遇到刺激的速率。总的来说,蚂蚁已经演化出一种具体的启发式来推断潜在巢穴位置。
Unlike the ant's implementation of Buffon's needle algorithm, many models of heuristics do not make reference to specific sensory or motor abilities. An example is the investment heuristic , which solves the problem of how to invest a sum of money into assets by allocating it equally. In the uncertain world of stocks, this fast-and-frugal heuristic has been shown to be able to outperform the Noble Prize-winning mean variance portfolio. However, does not specify or require specific sensorimotor abilities; dividing a sum by the number of assets can also be done by a pocket calculator. Operating a calculator, of course, also requires some motor and cognitive abilities, but these are only needed to operate a machine that does the actual work of finding a solution.
与蚂蚁实现的布丰针算法不同,许多启发式模型并不涉及特定的感知或运动能力。一个例子是投资启发式 ,它通过均等分配解决了如何将一笔资金投资到 资产中的问题。在股票这个不确定的世界中,这种快速简便的启发式已被证明能够胜过诺贝尔奖获得者的均值方差组合。 然而, 并不指定或要求特定的感觉运动能力;将一笔资金除以资产数量也可以通过口袋计算器完成。当然,操作计算器也需要一些运动和认知能力,但这些只是为了操作一个实际完成解决方案的机器所需。
I will reserve the term embodied heuristic for rules that require specific sensory and/or motor abilities to be executed. In the section "The Gaze Heuristic," I describe in more detail an embodied heuristic that directs intuition and that humans share with animal species.
我将保留“具体启发式”这个术语,用于需要特定感官和/或运动能力才能执行的规则。在“凝视启发式”一节中,我更详细地描述了一个具体启发式,它指导直觉,人类与动物物种共享。

The Gaze Heuristic 凝视启发法

When faced with a ball high up in the air, experienced baseball outfielders know where to run in order to catch it. Based on years of experience, most players run guided by intuition, without being able to explain how exactly they intercept the ball. How do they do it? One approach to finding an answer is to treat the question as an optimal control problem and assume close-to-omniscient players who can make complex calculations unconsciously. That is how Richard Dawkins in The Selfish Gene thinks a player catches a ball:
当面对空中高高飞起的球时,经验丰富的棒球外野手知道该往哪里跑才能接住它。根据多年的经验,大多数球员凭直觉奔跑,无法准确解释他们究竟是如何截球的。他们是如何做到的呢?寻找答案的一种方法是将问题视为最优控制问题,并假设接近全知的球员可以在无意识中进行复杂计算。这就是《利己基因》中理查德·道金斯认为球员接球的方式:
He behaves as if he had solved a set of differential equations in predicting the trajectory of the ball. He may neither know nor care what a differential equation is, but this does not affect his skill with the ball. At some subconscious level, something functionally equivalent to the mathematical calculations is going on.
他的行为就好像他已经解决了一组微分方程来预测球的轨迹。他可能既不知道也不在乎什么是微分方程,但这并不影响他对球的技巧。在某种潜意识水平上,类似于数学计算的功能等效物正在进行。
To determine the trajectory of the ball, consciously or unconsciously, the player has to estimate the parameters in this formula:
要确定球的轨迹,无论是有意识还是无意识的,玩家都必须估计这个公式中的参数:
where is the height of the ball at flight distance , measured from the position where the ball was thrown. At , the ball hits the ground. To calculate , the player has to estimate both the initial angle of the ball's direction relative to the ground and the initial speed of the ball; know the ball's mass , the friction , and that the acceleration of earth is (meter squared); and be able to calculate the tangent and cosine. Even then, the formula is overly simplified; for instance, it ignores wind and spin. Importantly, the true challenge is not to compute the equation, but to estimate its parameters, such as the initial angle and the initial speed.
球在飞行距离 处的高度为 ,是从球被投掷的位置测量的。在 时,球击中地面。要计算 ,玩家必须估计球相对于地面的初始角度 和球的初始速度 ;了解球的质量 、摩擦 ,以及地球的加速度 (米 平方);并且能够计算正切和余弦。即使如此,该公式仍然过于简化;例如,它忽略了风力和旋转。重要的是,真正的挑战不是计算方程式,而是估计其参数,如初始角度和初始速度。
Note that Dawkins inserted the term "as if" into his explanation of how players solve the goal. He was well aware that players do not calculate trajectories; they only behave as if they did. In his account, what players actually do at the subconscious level remains a mystery. That mystery has been resolved by experimental studies. Experienced players catch a fly ball by using a heuristic that has absolutely nothing to do with calculating a trajectory (see Figure 6.1):
请注意,道金斯在解释球员如何解决目标时插入了术语“仿佛”。他很清楚球员并不计算轨迹;他们只是表现得好像他们这样做了。在他的描述中,球员在潜意识水平上实际做什么仍然是一个谜。这个谜团已经被实验研究解开。有经验的球员通过使用一种与计算轨迹完全无关的启发式来接住飞球(见图 6.1)。
Figure 6.r. Gaze heuristic. The player adjusts the running speed so that the angle of gaze remains constant. The angle of gaze is the angle between the line from eye to ball and the ground.
图 6.r. 凝视启发式。玩家调整奔跑速度,使凝视角保持恒定。凝视角是眼睛到球之间的线和地面之间的角度。
Gaze heuristic: Fixate your eyes on the ball, run, and adjust your speed so that the angle of gaze remains constant.
凝视启发:将目光集中在球上,奔跑,并调整速度,使凝视角保持恒定。
The gaze heuristic ignores all the information necessary for computing a trajectory and attends to one variable only, the angle of gaze. In this way, it avoids any measurement errors when estimating the parameters in Equation 6.I. It consists of three "building blocks" - fixating, running, and adjusting - and works in situations where the ball is already high in the air. If that is not the case, the player needs to adapt the third building block:
凝视启发式忽略了计算轨迹所需的所有信息,只关注一个变量,即凝视角度。通过这种方式,在估算方程 6.I 中的参数时,它避免了任何测量误差。它由三个“构建块”组成 - 凝视、奔跑和调整 - 并且适用于球已经高高飞在空中的情况。如果不是这种情况,玩家需要调整第三个构建块:
Fixate your eyes on the ball, run, and adjust your speed so that the image of the ball rises at a constant rate.
将目光集中在球上,奔跑,并调整速度,使球的影像以恒定速度上升。
One can easily see the logic. If the image of the ball rises at an accelerating rate, the ball will hit the ground behind the player's present position, meaning that the player needs to run backward. If it rises at a decreasing rate, the ball will hit the ground ahead of the player, who then
一个人可以很容易地看到逻辑。如果球的影像以加速的速度上升,球将会击中球员当前位置后面的地面,这意味着球员需要向后奔跑。如果它以减速的速度上升,球将会击中球员前面的地面,球员则需要向前奔跑。

needs to run faster. If the image of the ball rises at a constant rate, the player is running at the correct speed.
需要跑得更快。如果球的影像以恒定速度上升,那么球员的速度就是正确的。
The gaze heuristic is an embodied heuristic. It requires the ability to hold one's gaze on an object, to run, and to adjust one's running speed. These abilities are learned early in development. For instance, babies begin to exercise the visual tracking of moving objects at around two months of age, such as tracking the objects in mobiles. These bodily abilities are part of the solution. The gaze heuristic is also an intuitively used rule - as I have mentioned, most players cannot explain the heuristic process they use unconsciously.
凝视启发式是一种具体的启发式。它需要能力将目光集中在一个物体上,奔跑,并调整自己的奔跑速度。这些能力在早期发展中就被学会了。例如,婴儿在大约两个月大时开始练习追踪移动物体的视觉,比如追踪手机中的物体。这些身体能力是解决方案的一部分。凝视启发式也是一种直观使用的规则 - 正如我所提到的,大多数玩家无法解释他们无意识使用的启发式过程。

Predicting Behavior: As-If Models Versus Embodied Heuristics
预测行为:仿佛模型与具体启发

Two more general points need to be noted. First, reliance on as-if models rather than process models can mislead researchers regarding the actual goal of an organism. The trajectory calculation model suggests that the player's goal is to determine the point where the ball hits the ground (or is at a height in reach of the player) and then run to this point (see Table 6.I). The gaze heuristic, in contrast, implies that the goal is to
需要注意另外两个一般性观点。首先,依赖“仿真”模型而不是过程模型可能会误导研究人员对生物体的实际目标。轨迹计算模型表明,玩家的目标是确定球落地的点(或者是玩家可以触及的高度),然后跑向这个点(见表 6.I)。相比之下,凝视启发式暗示目标是
Table 6.1. The as-if trajectory calculation model and the gaze heuristic compared.
表 6.1。比较仿真轨迹计算模型和凝视启发式。
Trajectory Calculation 轨迹计算 Gaze Heuristic 凝视启发
Player's goal 玩家的目标 Compute landing point 计算着陆点 Intercept ball 拦截球
 预测 : 速度
Prediction :
Speed

全速奔向着着陆点
Runs full speed to landing
point

凝视角度控制奔跑速度及其变化。
The angle of gaze controls running
speed and its change.

预测 2:拦截
Prediction 2:
Interception

在着陆点,玩家等待接住球。
At the landing point, player
waits to catch ball.
Intercepts ball while running.
在奔跑时拦截球。
 预测 3:课程
Prediction 3:
Course
Runs in a straight line.
直线奔跑。
Runs in a slight arc.
在轻微的弧线中奔跑。

预测 4:着陆点
Prediction 4:
Landing point

知道球落在哪里。
Knows where the ball is
landing.
Does not know landing point.
不知道着陆点。
The as-if trajectory calculation model and the gaze heuristic make different predictions about both behavior and cognitive processes. In addition, they imply different specifications of the player's goal. The checkmarks show the predictions supported by experimental studies. intercept the ball. No knowledge about the landing point is necessary; the heuristic leads the player to the ball. A heuristic is not a just an efficient means toward a given end. It can specify what exactly the player wants to achieve. Means can determine ends, not just the other way around.
仿佛轨迹计算模型和凝视启发式对行为和认知过程做出不同预测。此外,它们暗示了玩家目标的不同规范。勾号显示了实验研究支持的预测。拦截球。不需要关于着陆点的知识;启发式引导玩家到球。启发式不仅仅是达到特定目标的有效手段。它可以指定玩家想要实现的确切目标。手段可以决定目的,而不仅仅是相反的情况。
Now consider the famous argument by economist Milton Friedman that theories should not be concerned with psychological realism, only with good prediction. Friedman illustrated his argument with the story of a billiard player. What the player actually does is of no relevance for Friedman, who just assumed that the player behaves as if they had calculated the ball's trajectory and makes good predictions based on false assumptions. Friedman's as-if philosophy is decidedly antipsychological: Unraveling the process underlying the players' intuition is considered irrelevant. This attitude has been adopted by most economic models, including the as-if utility models in behavioral economics to which free parameters were added.
现在考虑经济学家弥尔顿·弗里德曼的著名论点,即理论不应关注心理现实性,而只关注良好的预测。弗里德曼用台球运动员的故事来阐述他的论点。对于弗里德曼来说,球员实际上做什么并不重要,他只是假设球员的行为就好像他们已经计算了球的轨迹,并基于错误的假设做出了良好的预测。弗里德曼的“好像”哲学明显是反心理学的:揭示玩家直觉背后的过程被认为是无关紧要的。这种态度已被大多数经济模型采纳,包括行为经济学中添加了自由参数的“好像”效用模型。
The gaze heuristic and the study of heuristics in general, however, show a surprising result: Psychological realism can lead to better predictions than as-if models. Let us take a closer look at three predictions about players' behavior.
凝视启发式和启发式研究总体上展示了一个令人惊讶的结果:心理现实主义可以比“仿真模型”带来更好的预测。让我们更仔细地看一下关于玩家行为的三个预测。
Consider first the running speed. The trajectory model suggests that players perform better the faster they run to the expected landing point, which provides time for last-second adjustments. In contrast, the gaze heuristic very specifically predicts that players' speed is controlled by the angle of gaze, which determines speed and its change. If players run too fast, they will miss the ball.
首先考虑奔跑速度。轨迹模型表明,球员跑向预期着陆点的速度越快,他们的表现就会越好,这为最后一刻的调整提供了时间。相比之下,凝视启发式非常明确地预测球员的速度受凝视角度控制,这决定了速度及其变化。如果球员跑得太快,他们会错过球。
Second, consider interception. According to the trajectory model, players should ideally arrive at the landing point before the ball and wait for it. The gaze heuristic, in contrast, implies that players catch the ball while running. The reason is that they adjust their running speed until they catch the ball. In both cases, the predictions following from the gaze heuristic have been supported by experimental studies.
其次,考虑拦截。根据轨迹模型,球员理想情况下应该在球落地点之前到达并等待球。相比之下,凝视启发式意味着球员在奔跑时接住球。原因是他们会调整奔跑速度直到接住球。在这两种情况下,凝视启发式所产生的预测都得到了实验研究的支持。
Next, consider the course of running. According to the trajectory model, the player will run straight to the landing point. In contrast, the gaze heuristic can imply, in certain situations, that players run in a slight arc to maintain a constant angle of gaze. These arcs have also been demonstrated in experiments with skilled outfielders.
接下来,考虑奔跑的过程。根据轨迹模型,玩家会直线奔跑到着陆点。相比之下,凝视启发式可以暗示,在某些情况下,玩家会沿着轻微的弧线奔跑,以保持视线的恒定角度。这些弧线也在熟练的外野手的实验中得到了证实。
Finally, if players consciously or intuitively computed the landing point, as assumed by the trajectory model, they would know where the ball will land. No such knowledge is implied by the gaze heuristic. Studies show that even experienced players have difficulties estimating the trajectory of the ball, its apex, and the landing point, yet are nevertheless able to catch the ball.
最后,如果玩家有意识地或直觉地计算出了着陆点,就像轨迹模型所假设的那样,他们会知道球会落在哪里。凝视启发式并不意味着具有这种知识。研究表明,即使是经验丰富的玩家也很难估计球的轨迹、顶点和着陆点,但他们仍然能够接住球。
The general point is that the as-if trajectory model ignores the heuristic process and, thus, makes incorrect predictions about the resulting behavior. It treats the problem as one of calculating landing points, whereas the heuristic treats it as one of coordination between body and ball. Moreover, the analysis of ball-catching shows that the underlying process is heuristical and embodied.
一般观点是,仿佛轨迹模型忽略了启发式过程,因此对结果行为的预测是不正确的。它将问题视为计算着陆点之一,而启发式则将其视为身体和球之间的协调之一。此外,对接球的分析显示,潜在过程是启发式的且具体化的。

Coordination Problems 协调问题

The gaze heuristic and its relatives can resolve various coordination problems. These include interception, such as when athletes catch balls, but also avoidance of collisions, as in sailing and flying. When beginners learn to sail, they are taught a version of the gaze heuristic to infer whether another boat is on a collision course: Fixate your gaze on the other boat; if the angle of gaze remains constant, change your course quickly. When beginners learn to fly a light aircraft, they may be taught a further version of the same rule: If another plane approaches and you fear collision, look at a scratch in your windshield and observe whether the other plane moves relative to that scratch; If it doesn't, dive away immediately - otherwise, that plane might end up colliding with your plane.
凝视启发法及其相关方法可以解决各种协调问题。这些问题包括拦截,比如运动员接住球时,还有避免碰撞,比如在帆船和飞行中。当初学者学习航行时,他们被教导一种凝视启发法的版本,以推断另一艘船是否在碰撞航线上:将凝视集中在另一艘船上;如果凝视角度保持不变,立即改变航线。当初学者学习驾驶轻型飞机时,他们可能会被教导同一规则的另一版本:如果另一架飞机靠近并且你担心碰撞,看一下你飞机挡风玻璃上的划痕,观察另一架飞机是否相对于那个划痕移动;如果没有,立即俯冲远离 - 否则,那架飞机可能最终与你的飞机相撞。
The "miracle on the Hudson River" is a famous case where reliance on the gaze heuristic saved lives. On January I5, 2009, US Airways Flight i 549 collided with a flock of Canada geese shortly after takeoff, which shut down both engines. The pilots had to make a life-and-death decision: to try to reach the next airport or attempt a risky landing in the Hudson River. Landing at the next airport would have been the safer option, but only if the plane could actually make it that far. As copilot Jeffrey Skiles explained, to determine whether the sailing plane could safely make it to the airport, they did not try to calculate the trajectory of the plane, but, instead, relied on a version of the gaze heuristic:
“哈德逊河上的奇迹”是一个著名案例,依赖凝视启发式拯救了生命。2009 年 1 月 15 日,美国航空公司 1549 号航班起飞后不久与一群加拿大雁相撞,导致两台发动机熄火。飞行员不得不做出生死抉择:是试图飞往下一个机场,还是尝试在哈德逊河上险险降落。降落在下一个机场本来是更安全的选择,但前提是飞机实际上能飞到那么远。正如副驾驶杰弗里·斯凯尔斯解释的那样,为了确定滑翔飞机是否能安全飞往机场,他们没有试图计算飞机的轨迹,而是依赖了凝视启发式的一个版本:
It's not so much a mathematical calculation as visual, in that when you are flying in an airplane, a point that you can't reach will actually rise in your windshield. A point that you are going to overfly will descend in your windshield.
这不是那么多的数学计算,而是视觉上的,当你在飞机上飞行时,一个你无法到达的点实际上会在你的挡风玻璃上升起。一个你将要飞过的点会在你的挡风玻璃上下降。
The point in the windshield rose, which meant the plane would have crashed before reaching the airport. The heuristic helped to make the right decision; all passengers and crew survived the landing on the river.
挡风玻璃上的点升高了,这意味着飞机在到达机场之前就会坠毁。这种启发式方法有助于做出正确的决定;所有乘客和机组人员都在河上成功着陆。
Note the conscious and unconscious uses of this heuristic, as illustrated by the pilots and the outfielders, respectively. Unlike pilots, most outfielders rely on the gaze heuristic without being able to explain how they catch a ball. Their behavior is intuitive, not based on conscious deliberation. In general, heuristics may be learned consciously, by instruction, or unconsciously, by trial-and-error learning or imitation. The process is the same, a fact overlooked by dual-process theories that align heuristics with unconsciousness and, moreover, assume different processes.
注意这种启发式的有意识和无意识的使用,分别由飞行员和外野手所示。与飞行员不同,大多数外野手依赖凝视启发式,却无法解释他们如何接住球。他们的行为是直觉的,不是基于有意识的思考。一般来说,启发式可能通过指导有意识地学习,或通过试错学习或模仿无意识地学习。这个过程是相同的,这是双过程理论忽视的事实,该理论将启发式与无意识对齐,并且假设不同的过程。

Exaptation 适应性演化

The gaze heuristic was not invented by baseball outfielders. Bats, birds, fish, and other animals rely on it for intercepting prey and mates. The observation that different species rely on the same heuristic invites two possible explanations: homology and analogy. Homology means that common structures between different species - here, common heuristics - are due to a common evolutionary ancestor. Analogy means that there is a functional similarity based on something else than common ancestors. Whatever the correct explanation is, we can safely assume that the gaze heuristic evolved for predator-prey interaction and not for baseball or cricket.
凝视启发法并非由棒球外野手发明。蝙蝠、鸟类、鱼类和其他动物依赖它来拦截猎物和配偶。不同物种依赖相同启发法的观察引发了两种可能的解释:同源性和类比性。同源性意味着不同物种之间的共同结构 - 在这里,共同的启发法 - 是由于共同的进化祖先。类比性意味着存在一种基于其他因素而非共同祖先的功能相似性。无论正确的解释是什么,我们可以安全地假设凝视启发法进化是为了捕食者与猎物的互动,而非为了棒球或板球。
Cognitive anthropologist Dan Sperber distinguished the proper domain of a cognitive module from its actual domain, that is, the domain for which a module actually evolved from a domain to which it was extended or transferred. Similarly, the term exaptation means that a trait or feature acquires a new function beyond its original one derived by evolution. It was introduced as an alternative to the concept of preadaptation in order to emphasize that the original function was not connected to the new function. A classic example is the argument that feathers had not evolved for flight with birds, but originally had the function of temperature regulation in their ancestors, reptiles. Eventually, feathers became enlisted for a new function, sailing and, eventually, flying. I have not yet seen a discussion of exaptation with respect to heuristics, embodied or not, but the gaze heuristic is a clear case in point. The section "Predator-Prey Coordination" describes its proper domain, or original function.
认知人类学家丹·斯珀伯(Dan Sperber)区分了认知模块的适当领域和实际领域,即模块实际上从一个领域演化到另一个领域或被扩展或转移的领域。同样,适应性(exaptation)一词意味着一个特征或特性获得了超出其原始进化衍生的新功能。它被引入作为对预适应性概念的替代,以强调原始功能与新功能之间没有联系。一个经典例子是关于羽毛并非为了鸟类飞行而进化,而是最初在它们的祖先——爬行动物中具有温度调节功能。最终,羽毛被用于新功能,即滑翔和最终飞行。我尚未看到关于启发式的适应性讨论,无论是具体的还是非具体的,但凝视启发式是一个明显的例子。"捕食者-猎物协调"部分描述了它的适当领域或原始功能。

Predator-Prey Coordination
捕食者-猎物协调

How does a hawk intercept a duck? Figure 6.2 (a) and (b) shows two strategies for interception. The first is direct pursuit, where the hawk flies straight at the duck, that is, takes the shortest path. When the duck changes its position, the hawk changes its direction accordingly, so that the distance between it and the duck is always the shortest possible. The top-left panel shows a case of direct pursuit that ends in a failed interception with a characteristic wavering tail chase. The second strategy is a version of the gaze heuristic, where the hawk does not fly in a straight line toward the duck. Rather, it initially flies toward an expected point where it would intercept the duck if the latter did not change course (top-right panel). The angle between the duck, the hawk, and the interception point defines the angle of gaze. When the duck changes course, the hawk also changes its course so that the angle of gaze remains constant. In geometric terms, the angle of gaze is the base angle of a triangle with equal sides and apex .
如何鹰截取鸭子?图 6.2(a)和(b)展示了两种截取策略。第一种是直接追击,鹰直线飞向鸭子,即采取最短路径。当鸭子改变位置时,鹰相应改变方向,使得它与鸭子之间的距离始终保持最短。左上方面板展示了一种以特征摇摆尾追结束的直接追击案例。第二种策略是凝视启发式的一个版本,鹰不会直线飞向鸭子,而是最初飞向一个预期点,如果鸭子不改变航线,则会在那里截取鸭子。鸭子、鹰和截取点之间的角度定义了凝视角。当鸭子改变航线时,鹰也会改变航线,以使凝视角保持恒定。在几何术语中,凝视角是一个等边三角形的底角,顶点是截取点。
Which of the two heuristics do hawks employ? Studies with headcams mounted on hawks showed that they rely on the gaze heuristic. The comparison between direct pursuit and the gaze heuristic in Figure 6.2 indicates why: Relying on the latter allows for faster interception and avoids the wavering tail chase. Moreover, because the hawk does not fly directly toward the duck, its attack is less obvious. Only when the target is stationary do hawks rely on direct pursuit, that is, fly directly toward the prey.
鹰类使用哪种启发式方法?搭载在鹰身上的头部摄像头的研究显示它们依赖凝视启发式方法。图 6.2 中直接追逐和凝视启发式方法的比较表明:依赖后者可以更快地拦截目标并避免摇摆的尾追。此外,因为鹰不会直接朝着鸭子飞去,它的攻击不那么明显。只有当目标静止时,鹰才会依赖直接追逐,即直接朝着猎物飞去。
To be successful in pursuit, an organism needs the ability to adjust speed and direction quickly when the angle changes (due to wind in the case of the fly ball or due to evasive movements in the case of the duck). The number of possible adjustments per second is the visual cycle rate. Raptors have a visual cycling rate of about 200 per second, whereas humans have a much lower rate of about io per second. The cycling rate corresponds to the length of the path before it can be adjusted to maintain a constant angle of gaze. The smaller is, the faster is the hawk's
为了在追逐中取得成功,生物需要在角度变化时(例如飞球受风影响或鸭子进行规避动作时)能够快速调整速度和方向的能力。每秒可能进行的调整次数称为视觉循环速率。猛禽的视觉循环速率约为每秒 200 次,而人类的速率要低得多,约为每秒 10 次。循环速率对应于路径长度,在调整以保持恒定凝视角度之前所需的路径长度。路径越小,鹰的速度就越快。
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cycling rate. Panel (c) in Figure 6.2 shows a prey with a faster cycling rate than the hawk and avoids interception by changing its course before the hawk is able to do so. Thanks to a faster cycling rate, the prey can even get behind the predator. Although the hawk keeps the optical angle constant, it is too slow to adjust. Finally, panel (d) shows a successful predator that increases its cycling rate in the final stage of the pursuit from to .
骑行速率。图 6.2 中的面板(c)显示一只比鹰更快的骑行速率的猎物,通过在鹰能够做出调整之前改变航线来避免拦截。由于更快的骑行速率,猎物甚至可以在捕食者身后。尽管鹰保持光学角度恒定,但它调整速度太慢。最后,面板(d)显示了一只成功的捕食者,在追逐的最后阶段将其骑行速率从 增加到

From Gaze to Echolocation and Whiskers
从凝视到回声定位和触须

The gaze heuristic is named after the visual sense, but it has been adapted to other senses, too. Bats rely on the equivalent of the gaze heuristic when hunting moths in darkness, but their interception is based on sound not vision. They use an echolocation system that emits sound as a series of short "clicks" or "calls." When a target is located, the clicks occur more frequently as the bat closes in on a prey. In response to bats, moths have evolved bat-detecting ears capable of hearing the clicks. Outside the bat's detection range, a moth's first reaction is to fly away from the bat. If the frequency of clicks increases, meaning that the bat has detected its prey, this triggers spasms in the moth's wings, resulting in unpredictable flight. Finally, if the clicks peak in a buzz of about 200 clicks a second, the moth's reflex is to instantly freeze to fall out of the bat's path. All this happens within seconds. The bat's click rate corresponds to the visual cycle rate of humans and hawks.
凝视启发式命名自视觉感知,但已经适应其他感官。蝙蝠在黑暗中捕食飞蛾时依赖等效的凝视启发式,但它们的拦截基于声音而非视觉。它们使用一种发出声音的回声定位系统,将声音发射为一系列短暂的“点击”或“呼叫”。当目标被定位时,随着蝙蝠接近猎物,点击发生得更频繁。作为对蝙蝠的反应,飞蛾进化出能够听到这些点击声的蝙蝠探测耳朵。在蝙蝠的探测范围之外,飞蛾的第一反应是远离蝙蝠飞走。如果点击的频率增加,意味着蝙蝠已经探测到猎物,这会引发飞蛾翅膀的痉挛,导致飞行不可预测。最后,如果点击声达到每秒约 200 次的嗡鸣声,飞蛾的反射动作是立即冻结以躲避蝙蝠的路径。所有这些都发生在几秒钟内。蝙蝠的点击速率对应于人类和鹰的视觉周期速率。
The gaze heuristic can also enlist tactile senses. At the final stage of pursuit, mammals such as cats, rats, and seals use their whiskers, an array of long, coarse hairs around the head and mouth that provide information about the prey's position in the final milliseconds before impact. Experiments have shown that rats were less successful in completing an interception of a mouse when their whiskers were removed, and, if they did succeed, the final bite to the neck took longer and was messier.
注视启发式也可以利用触觉感官。在追捕的最后阶段,像猫、老鼠和海豹这样的哺乳动物会利用它们的触须,这是一组长而粗糙的头部和嘴巴周围的毛发,提供了有关猎物在冲击前几毫秒的位置的信息。实验证明,当老鼠的触须被剪除时,老鼠在捕捉老鼠时成功率较低,而且如果它们成功了,对颈部的最后一口会花费更长的时间,而且更加凌乱。

The Royal Air Force Discovers the Gaze Heuristic
英国皇家空军发现凝视启发式

According to a historical analysis, the Royal Air Force (RAF), after some trial and error, was the first to have discovered the gaze heuristic around the beginning of World War II. The problem was that the British controllers who used radar to direct fighters to enemy planes had failed to reach the required 90 percent interception rate. Special calculating devices and increasingly complex mathematics were introduced to crunch the numbers, but to no avail. In this situation, an impatient RAF commander demonstrated that he could meet the 90 percent rate by eye. His system was fleshed out by the Chairman of the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence (CSSA), Sir Henry Tizard, into a fixed angle approach (the gaze heuristic) and taught to the controllers.
根据历史分析,皇家空军(RAF)在经过一些试错之后,第一个发现凝视启发式的是在二战初期。问题在于使用雷达指挥战斗机攻击敌机的英国控制员未能达到所需的 90%拦截率。特殊的计算设备和越来越复杂的数学被引入以计算数据,但都无济于事。在这种情况下,一位急躁的 RAF 指挥官展示出他可以通过眼睛达到 90%的比例。他的系统由空中防御科学调查委员会(CSSA)主席亨利·泰泽爵士(Sir Henry Tizard)完善为固定角度方法(凝视启发式),并传授给控制员。
After being trained to use the gaze heuristic, the British controllers no longer sent pilots directly via the shortest distance toward the opponent (the direct pursuit heuristic), but, instead, estimated an intersection point , which determined the constant angle. If the bomber changed course after having recognized the fighter, the fighter was directed to change course too, but keep the angle constant. Shortly before interception, the faster fighter could turn around and meet the bomber frontally, where it was most vulnerable (Figure 6.3). This system became known as the Tizzy Angle and was used for the remainder of the war.
经过训练使用凝视启发式之后,英国的控制员不再直接将飞行员派往对手的最短距离(直接追逐启发式),而是估计一个确定恒定角度的交点 。如果轰炸机在识别到战斗机后改变航线,战斗机也会被指示改变航线,但保持角度恒定。在拦截前不久,更快的战斗机可以掉头并正面迎击轰炸机,在那里它最脆弱(图 6.3)。这个系统被称为“狂乱角度”,并在战争的其余时间内使用。
According to historical records and training materials, the controllers of the German Luftwaffe relied, instead, on a direct pursuit strategy and appeared to have never discovered the gaze heuristic during the war. In the pursuit control technique, the controller instructs the pilot (who cannot yet see the enemy plane) to fly directly toward the opponent. If the opponent changes course, the pilot is directed to also change course and take the shortest path toward the opponent. The pursuit strategy vectors the fighter behind its opponent, just as the hawk trails behind the duck in Figure 6.2 (panel (a)), and leads to a smaller rate of interception. Although
根据历史记录和培训资料,德国空军的控制者相反依赖于直接追击策略,并似乎在战争期间从未发现凝视启发式。在追击控制技术中,控制者指示飞行员(尚未看到敌机)直接朝对手飞行。如果对手改变航线,飞行员也被指示改变航线,沿最短路径朝对手飞行。追击策略将战斗机矢量化到对手后方,就像图 6.2(面板(a))中的鹰跟随鸭子一样,并导致更小的拦截率。尽管
Figure 6.3. British controllers' reliance on the gaze heuristic to direct fighter planes to intercept German bombers. From Hamlin (2017).
图 6.3。英国控制员依赖凝视启发式来指挥战斗机拦截德国轰炸机。来源自 Hamlin(2017)。

the Germans' radar system was superior to that of the RAF in several respects, the British use of the gaze heuristic was devastating to the Luftwaffe and decisive for the Battle of Britain. Robert Hamlin conjectured that the Germans might have won this battle had they linked their high-tech radar system with a gaze-based heuristic control system. In spite of their superior missile technology, including anti-aircraft missiles based on the direct pursuit strategy, the Germans were missing a crucial smart heuristic.
德国人的雷达系统在几个方面优于英国皇家空军,但英国使用凝视启发式的方式对德国空军造成了毁灭性打击,并对不列颠战役产生了决定性影响。罗伯特·哈姆林推测,如果德国将他们的高科技雷达系统与凝视启发式控制系统相结合,他们可能会赢得这场战役。尽管他们拥有先进的导弹技术,包括基于直接追击策略的防空导弹,但德国人缺乏一个关键的智能启发式。
After World War II, the US army combined German missile technology with the British gaze heuristic system into a most successful autonomous guided weapon: the Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missile. The missile is a simple, robust interception system whose "gaze" is directed at a point source of heat, which is the target. Once the missile is on its way, it makes continuous inquiries (with a rapid cycle rate) about the changes of the target's position and adjusts its direction so that the angle of "gaze" remains constant. The Sidewinder is still in use in many nations, and new developments appear to be based on the same heuristic of maintaining a constant angle of approach.
二战后,美国军队将德国导弹技术与英国凝视启发式系统结合起来,制造出了一种非常成功的自主制导武器:Sidewinder 短程空对空导弹。该导弹是一个简单、坚固的拦截系统,其“凝视”是指向一个热源,即目标。一旦导弹启程,它会不断地询问目标位置的变化(以快速循环速率),并调整方向,使“凝视”角度保持恒定。Sidewinder 仍在许多国家使用,新的发展似乎基于相同的启发式,即保持恒定的接近角度。

Unconscious Intelligence
无意识智能

The gaze heuristic is a particularly interesting example of embodied heuristics. This amazing feat of evolution, a dynamic adaptive heuristic, enables animals and humans to make rapid decisions with the help of a highly automatized system superior to conscious reasoning. I end the chapter with some general insights that this case study provides.
凝视启发式是具体体现启发式的一个特别有趣的例子。这一令人惊叹的进化壮举,一种动态适应性启发式,使动物和人类能够借助高度自动化的系统做出迅速决策,这种系统优于意识推理。我以这个案例研究提供的一些一般见解结束本章。
As we have seen, the gaze heuristic is a simple iterative heuristic that adapts to changes in flight path due to wind in the case of a fly ball or due to evasion attempts in the case of prey. It can solve problems in stationary and nonstationary environments and is embodied in the sense that it requires specific sensory and motor capabilities to function efficiently. The astonishing feature of the heuristic is that it has enlisted different sensory capacities in different species, including vision, echolocation, and tactile senses. It also has enlisted various motor abilities. When hawks pursue prey, they implement the gaze heuristic when flying; when dogs catch a Frisbee, they implement the heuristic when running; and when teleost fish pursue prey, they implement the heuristic when swimming. Humans implement the heuristic both in a two-dimensional space, as when trying to avoid a collision with another sailboat, and in a threedimensional space, as when trying to avoid a collision in the air.
正如我们所看到的,凝视启发式是一种简单的迭代启发式,它根据飞行球的风向变化或猎物的躲避尝试而调整飞行路径。它可以解决静止和非静止环境中的问题,并且体现在需要特定的感觉和运动能力才能有效运作。这种启发式的惊人特点在于它已经在不同物种中利用了不同的感觉能力,包括视觉、回声定位和触觉感知。它还利用了各种不同的运动能力。当鹰追捕猎物时,在飞行时实施凝视启发式;当狗接住飞盘时,在奔跑时实施这种启发式;当硬骨鱼追捕猎物时,在游泳时实施这种启发式。人类在二维空间中实施这种启发式,比如试图避免与另一艘帆船相撞,也在三维空间中实施,比如试图避免空中碰撞。
The heuristic has also inspired rethinking financial regulation. Andrew Haldane, the former Bank of England's chief economist, presented his acclaimed Jackson Hole talk entitled "The Dog and the Frisbee" on the gaze heuristic as a model for a safer world of banking. He argued for introducing simple and robust control systems in place of complex regulatory systems, which neither foresaw nor prevented the crisis of For instance, capital requirements are estimated by calculating the valueat-risk of a bank, which may involve estimating thousands of risk factors and millions of covariation coefficients. The limited success of these estimations recalls the calculations made by the RAF before it discovered the gaze heuristic. The banking system is a fast-changing, nonstationary environment where simple rules can lead to better and more transparent decisions. The standard approach in cognitive science, however, has resembled bank regulation, based on the assumption that more complexity is always better. Journals are filled with highly parameterized models that integrate all possible relevant information, Bayesian or otherwise. Complexity pays for well-defined situations such as games, but leads to overfitting and fragile solutions in ill-defined situations of uncertainty.
启发式方法也激发了对金融监管的重新思考。英格兰银行前首席经济学家安德鲁·霍尔丹在杰克逊霍尔讲话中提出了他备受赞誉的《狗和飞盘》主题,将凝视启发式作为银行更安全世界的模型。他主张引入简单而强大的控制系统,取代那些既没有预见也没有阻止 危机的复杂监管系统。例如,资本要求是通过计算银行的风险价值来估算的,这可能涉及估算成千上万的风险因素和数百万的协变系数。这些估算的有限成功让人想起英国皇家空军在发现凝视启发式之前所做的计算。银行系统是一个快速变化的、非平稳的环境,简单的规则可以带来更好、更透明的决策。然而,认知科学中的标准方法却类似于银行监管,基于更复杂总是更好的假设。期刊上充斥着高度参数化的模型,整合了所有可能相关的信息,无论是贝叶斯还是其他方法。 复杂性在明确定义的情况下是值得的,比如游戏,但在不确定的情况下会导致过拟合和脆弱的解决方案。
Evolution has given us the gaze heuristic, and with it a pointer: To uncover more of the ingenious solutions it has found for a brain the size of two fists, we need a systematic study of embodied heuristics in the real world.
进化赋予了我们凝视启发式,以及一个指针:要揭示出它为两只拳头大小的大脑找到的更多巧妙解决方案,我们需要对现实世界中具体启发式进行系统研究。

CHAPTER 7 第 7 章

Moral Intuition 道德直觉

Natural selection is an amoral process, yet it can produce moral intuitions.
自然选择是一个无道德的过程,但它可以产生道德直觉。
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby
Leda Cosmides 和 John Tooby
Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second.
直觉先行,战略推理其次。
Jonathan Haidt  乔纳森·海德特
Work hard. Be honest and disciplined. Be punctual and reliable. Don't waste your earnings on pleasure, power, and material comfort. Live frugally and reinvest your income to accumulate more capital. The moral intuition that one should be disciplined, work hard, and not squander time accumulating luxury objects is acquired by cultural learning. It comes quickly to mind in cultures endorsing these values when people observe others not working hard and appearing to be unproductive. According to sociologist Max Weber, this kind of self-discipline is the moral essence of the Protestant work ethic, which became the blueprint for forms of modern capitalism. It fuels distinct intuitions about self-expectations and life goals. In his painting The Fight Between Carnival and Lent, the Dutch artist Pieter Bruegel the Elder depicted the tension between the vices and virtues of puritanical morals. On the left side of the painting, women and men crowd into a tavern, play games, make music, sneak inside for sex, and play tricks on others. On the right side, men and women attend church, work, and are sober, decently clothed, orderly, and disciplined. How do moral norms come about and shape what people feel they ought to do?
努力工作。诚实守纪。守时可靠。不要把收入浪费在享乐、权力和物质舒适上。过着节俭的生活,将收入再投资以积累更多资本。应该守纪、努力工作,不浪费时间积累奢侈品的道德直觉是通过文化学习获得的。当人们看到其他人不努力工作、看起来无所作为时,这种价值观很快就会浮现在认同这些价值观的文化中。社会学家马克斯·韦伯认为,这种自律是新教工作伦理的道德本质,成为现代资本主义形式的蓝图。它激发了关于自我期望和生活目标的独特直觉。在荷兰画家彼得·布呂盖尔描绘的《狂欢与斋戒之间的斗争》中,描绘了清教徒道德的恶习和美德之间的紧张关系。在画作的左侧,男女们挤进酒馆,玩游戏,演奏音乐,偷偷进入进行性行为,并捉弄他人。在右侧,男女们参加教堂,工作,庄重、得体地穿着,井然有序,守纪。 道德规范是如何产生并塑造人们认为自己应该做的事情的?
A moral intuition is a feeling about what is right and wrong,
道德直觉是对是非对错的感觉
I. based on evolutionary and cultural learning,
基于进化和文化学习,
  1. which appears spontaneously in one's consciousness, and
    出现在一个人的意识中,
  2. whose underlying rationale is unconscious.
    其基本原理是无意识的。
According to Weber, the rationale underlying the Protestant work ethic is the doctrine of predestination: God has already decided who will be saved from damnation and who will not. All that mortals can do is seek clues that might reveal whether they are among the chosen ones. Seeing oneself working hard and not wasting time on worldly pleasures is such a clue. Spending hours at the billiard table, shopping, or doing nothing is a sign of being among the doomed. Historically, this narrative of the meaning of life emerged in various Puritan religions, including Calvinism, Methodism, Pietism, and Baptism. It appears that only in these religions did capitalism become associated with the strict abstinence from the spontaneous enjoyment of life, while other forms of capitalism, before and after, feature luxury and display.
根据韦伯的观点,新教工作伦理的基础是预定论:上帝已经决定了谁会被拯救脱离诅咒,谁不会。凡人所能做的就是寻找可能揭示自己是否被选中的线索。努力工作,不浪费时间在世俗享乐上,就是这样一个线索。在台球桌旁度过数小时、购物或无所事事是被注定的迹象。历史上,这种关于生命意义的叙述出现在各种清教徒宗教中,包括加尔文主义、卫理宗、虔诚主义和浸礼派。似乎只有在这些宗教中,资本主义才与严格禁欲的生活方式联系在一起,而其他形式的资本主义,在此之前和之后,都包含奢侈和炫耀。
The crucial feature of a moral intuition is that its underlying rationale such as the logic of the Protestant work ethic - is not conscious; it is not arrived at by going through steps of a logical argument or by the weighing of evidence. One strongly feels what is right and wrong without being able to articulate why. Even then, moral intuitions can be transmitted through generations.
道德直觉的关键特征是其潜在的基本原理,比如新教工作伦理的逻辑,是无意识的;它不是通过逻辑论证的步骤或证据的权衡来得出的。人们强烈感受到什么是对的和错的,却无法表达为什么。即便如此,道德直觉也可以通过世代传承。
Moral intuition needs to be distinguished from moral reasoning, a term that refers to moral convictions that originate from deliberate reflection. In the case of the Protestant work ethic, moral reasoning could mean that a person is aware of the doctrine of predestination and, after reflection, decides to live accordingly. In general, moral reasoning requires awareness of the religious or cultural origins of one's ethical convictions or a conscious deliberation of their utility. For instance, Benjamin Franklin, a proponent of the Protestant work ethic, reasoned about the utility of his moral principles. As he saw it, working hard and being honest, punctual, and frugal is useful because this behavior assures credit, and credit, in turn, enables accumulating more capital. Franklin's moral reasoning was deliberately utilitarian. Centuries later, many of us live by these moral principles without having reasoned through their foundations or having considered their utility. Moral reasoning has become intuitive.
道德直觉需要与道德推理区分开来,道德推理是指源自深思熟虑的道德信念。在新教工作伦理的情况下,道德推理可能意味着一个人意识到预定论的教义,并在深思熟虑后决定相应地生活。总的来说,道德推理需要意识到一个人道德信念的宗教或文化起源,或者对它们的效用进行有意识的思考。例如,新教工作伦理的支持者本杰明·富兰克林就对他的道德原则的效用进行了推理。在他看来,努力工作、诚实、守时和节俭是有用的,因为这种行为确保信用,而信用又能积累更多资本。富兰克林的道德推理是有意识的功利主义的。几个世纪后,我们许多人遵循这些道德原则,而没有经过推理它们的基础或考虑它们的效用。道德推理已经变得直观化。
The vision that morality is, or should be, based on reasoning is an old one. It has been known since the ancient Greeks and Romans, albeit with varying conclusions. In Cicero's words, once reason has taught the ideal Stoic - the wise man - that moral goodness is the only thing of real value, he is happy forever and the freest of men, since his mind is not enslaved by desires. According to this, reason makes humans moral, or at least men.
道德应该基于推理的观念是一个古老的观念。自古希腊和罗马时代以来就已经被人们所知晓,尽管结论各不相同。就如西塞罗所言,一旦理性教导了理想的斯多葛派者——智者——道德善良是唯一真正有价值的东西,他将永远幸福自由,因为他的思想不受欲望奴役。根据这一观点,理性使人类道德化,或至少使男人如此。
As we saw in Chapter 2, into the early 20th century, psychologists believed that men's abstract reasoning enabled them to grasp general moral principles, while women's concrete, intuitive thinking prevented them from doing so. Thus, men who lied were held morally responsible, but women were not: They were considered merely incapable of understanding that their actions were evil.
正如我们在第 2 章中所看到的,直到 20 世纪初,心理学家们认为男性的抽象推理能力使他们能够掌握一般的道德原则,而女性的具体、直觉思维则阻止她们这样做。因此,说谎的男性被认为是道德上负有责任的,而女性则不是:他们被认为仅仅是无法理解他们的行为是邪恶的。

Moral Satisficing 道德满足

Moral philosophy and moral psychology have proposed various views of moral intuition and of its relation to moral reasoning. On the one hand, some psychologists have proposed that moral behavior is the product of moral judgment, and that moral judgment, in turn, requires conscious deliberation. Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a case in point, which holds moral reasoning as necessary for ethical behavior. On the other hand, moral intuitionists such as psychologist Jonathan Haidt argued that moral judgment, like aesthetic judgment, is a rapid intuitive process, and that people engage in moral reasoning primarily to seek evidence that confirms the initial intuition. My aim is not to summarize or do justice to the complexity of these approaches, nor do I believe that an opposition between reason and intuition is fruitful. The question I ask in this chapter is: What picture of moral intuition emerges from the perspective of ecological rationality?
道德哲学和道德心理学提出了各种关于道德直觉及其与道德推理的关系的观点。一方面,一些心理学家提出道德行为是道德判断的产物,而道德判断又需要有意识的思考。劳伦斯·科尔伯格的道德发展理论就是一个例子,认为道德推理对于道德行为是必要的。另一方面,道德直觉主义者如心理学家乔纳森·海德特认为,道德判断像审美判断一样,是一个快速的直觉过程,人们进行道德推理主要是为了寻找证据来证实最初的直觉。我的目的不是总结或充分理解这些方法的复杂性,也不认为理性与直觉之间的对立是有益的。我在本章中提出的问题是:从生态合理性的角度看,道德直觉呈现出什么样的图景?
The three key principles are uncertainty, social heuristics, and their interaction with the social environment:
三个关键原则是不确定性、社会启发和它们与社会环境的互动:
I. Moral intuition evolved to deal with situations of uncertainty, not risk: We need to distinguish between situations of risk and uncertainty and between their respective tools, probability, and heuristics (see Chapter 5).
道德直觉进化是为了处理不确定性情况,而不是风险:我们需要区分风险和不确定性情况以及它们各自的工具,概率和启发式(见第 5 章)。
  1. Moral intuition is based on social heuristics: In situations of uncertainty, much (not necessarily all) of moral behavior is guided by heuristics. Specifically, I will argue that these heuristics are typically social heuristics.
    道德直觉基于社会启发:在不确定的情况下,很多(不一定全部)道德行为是由启发指导的。具体来说,我会认为这些启发通常是社会启发。
  2. Ecological morality: The resulting moral behavior depends not only on the social heuristic but also on the environment. It results from the match (or mismatch) of the heuristics with the structure of the social environment.
    生态道德:产生的道德行为不仅取决于社会启发式,还取决于环境。它是由启发式与社会环境结构的匹配(或不匹配)所导致的。
I will refer to this approach as moral satisficing. This term has been used by moral philosophers, but often in the negative sense of a second-best
我将把这种方法称为道德满足。 这个术语已经被道德哲学家使用,但通常是指第二好的意义。

maximization (of utility or happiness) is actually feasible. However, in situations of uncertainty, maximization is a fiction and, equally important, satisficing can outperform complex strategies (see Chapter 5). normative theory that is uninformed of the workings of the mind or impossible to be actually executed by humans or computers (e.g., because maximization is computationally intractable) is unlikely to be of much benefit in the real world.
效用或幸福的最大化实际上是可行的。然而,在不确定的情况下,最大化是虚构的,同样重要的是,满足可以胜过复杂的策略(见第 5 章)。对心智运作一无所知或实际上无法由人类或计算机执行的规范理论(例如,因为最大化在计算上是难以处理的)在现实世界中不太可能带来太多好处。
Which heuristics underlie moral behavior? One answer would be, specifically, moral heuristics, such as "don't kill" and "don't lie." II These are the fabric of the Ten Commandments of the Bible and other sacred books. In my view, assuming specialized moral heuristics is unnecessary and, moreover, obscures the close relation between social coordination and moral behavior. My hypothesis that moral rules are typically social heuristics contrasts with the postulate of specifically moral rules by rule consequentialism, as well as the view that humans have a specially "hardwired" moral grammar with specialized moral rules.
什么启发了道德行为?一个答案可能是,具体来说,道德启发,比如“不要杀人”和“不要撒谎”。这些构成了《圣经》和其他神圣书籍的十诫的基础。在我看来,假设存在专门的道德启发是不必要的,而且还会掩盖社会协调与道德行为之间的密切关系。我的假设是,道德规则通常是社会启发,与特定的道德规则后果主义相对立,以及人类具有专门的“硬连线”道德语法和专门的道德规则的观点。
Following Hume rather than Kant, my aim is not to provide a normative theory that tells us how we ought to behave, but to provide a descriptive theory with prescriptive consequences, such as how to design environments that help people reach their own goals. Informed by psychology, moral satisficing is what philosophers call naturalism, as opposed to supernaturalism, spiritualism, or moral paternalism, where ethics is guided by religion and sacred books.
跟随休谟而非康德,我的目标不是提供告诉我们应该如何行为的规范理论,而是提供一个具有规范性后果的描述性理论,比如如何设计环境来帮助人们实现自己的目标。受心理学启发,道德满足是哲学家所称的自然主义,与超自然主义、灵性主义或道德家长主义相对,道德是由宗教和神圣书籍指导的。

Social Narratives Select Heuristics
社会叙事选择启发法

Weber contrasted the Protestant work ethic with traditional Catholic doctrine, which assumes that our individual fates are not predetermined, but in our own hands. People living by this narrative can go through cycles of sin, repentance, and forgiveness, play billiards, and enjoy other worldly pleasures without feeling guilty. Life is not centered on the question of whether one is among the chosen, and there is no pressure to find out. In this way, the Catholic narrative implies a different ethic. Weber tells the story of employers who increased the hourly wages of their workers to get them to work longer for a limited time, such as at harvest. In modern economic theory, higher pay is an incentive, and workers should work longer hours to maximize their profit. To the surprise of the employers, however, many workers worked not more, but fewer, hours. Their work ethics was guided by a satisficing heuristic (Chapter 5) with an amount of money as an aspiration level:
韦伯将新教工作伦理与传统天主教教义进行了对比,后者认为我们的个人命运并非是预先确定的,而是掌握在我们自己手中。按照这种叙事方式生活的人可以经历罪恶、忏悔和宽恕的循环,打台球,享受其他世俗乐趣而不感到内疚。生活并不围绕着一个人是否被选中这个问题,也没有压力去找出答案。因此,天主教的叙事暗示了一种不同的伦理观。韦伯讲述了雇主们提高工人的小时工资,以便让他们在有限的时间内工作更长时间,比如在收获季节。在现代经济理论中,更高的薪酬是一种激励,工人应该工作更长时间以最大化他们的利润。然而,令雇主们惊讶的是,许多工人并没有工作更多,而是工作更少的小时。他们的工作伦理是由一种满足启发式(第 5 章)所引导的,以一定金额的钱作为愿望水平:
Set an aspiration level for sufficient earnings. Stop working when is satisfied.
为足够的收入设定一个愿望水平 。当满足 时停止工作。
After earning the amount to which they had aspired, the workers stopped working and went home to spend the money and time together with their family. These workers, the employers learned, did not follow the Protestant work ethic. Getting them to work longer would have entailed reducing, not increasing, their hourly wages - a strategy that some capitalists actually followed. Contrast this with the heuristic selected by the Protestant work ethic:
在赚取他们所渴望的金额后,工人们停止工作回家,与家人一起花钱和时间。雇主们发现,这些工人并没有遵循新教工作伦理。让他们工作更长时间将意味着降低而不是增加他们的小时工资 - 一些资本家实际上采取了这种策略。与新教工作伦理选择的启发式相比,形成鲜明对比。
Work hard and accumulate as much capital as possible. Do not spend it on pleasure.
努力工作,尽可能积累资本。不要把它花在享乐上。
This rule embodies the ideal of maximizing. Maximizing means trying to accumulate as much as possible of a good for its own sake, such as wealth.
这条规则体现了最大化的理念。最大化意味着试图为了自身利益而尽可能积累尽可能多的好处,比如财富。
Weber's comparison between Protestant and Catholic ethics illustrates the approach of ecological rationality. From this perspective, the meaning of life is uncertain, and, to give it a purpose, religious or social narratives such as the Protestant work ethic provide a moral framework for what one should and should not do. Darwin argued that these social narratives bolster group patriotism and provide an advantage over other tribes, thus leading to natural selection. Heuristics are the behavioral components of such a narrative, telling us what to do even if we are not fully aware of the underlying narrative. As the case of satisficing illustrates, these heuristics are not necessarily specifically moral heuristics such as "don't steal"; rather, they can be the heuristics that guide behavior outside the moral domain. My hypothesis is that the narrative also defines whether a heuristic is considered a moral one. For instance, from the point of view of the Protestant work ethic, satisficing is immoral, but, seen from the Catholic doctrine, it is amoral, that is, stopping working when an aspiration is met is not seen as a moral issue in the first place.
韦伯对新教和天主教伦理的比较展示了生态合理性的方法。从这个角度来看,生命的意义是不确定的,为了赋予它目的,宗教或社会叙事,如新教的工作伦理,为人们应该做什么和不应该做什么提供了道德框架。达尔文认为,这些社会叙事增强了群体爱国主义,并使其比其他部落具有优势,从而导致自然选择。启发式是这种叙事的行为组成部分,告诉我们该做什么,即使我们并不完全意识到潜在的叙事。正如满足的案例所示,这些启发式不一定是特定的道德启发式,比如“不要偷窃”;相反,它们可以是指导行为超出道德领域的启发式。我的假设是,叙事也定义了启发式是否被视为道德启发式。例如,从新教工作伦理的角度来看,满足是不道德的,但从天主教义的角度来看,它是无道德的,也就是说,当一个愿望实现时停止工作并不被视为道德问题。
In general, narratives can define the moral nature of human social relations. Anthropologist Alan Fiske distinguishes four kinds of relationships among which people move back and forth during their daily activities: communal sharing, authority ranking, market pricing, and equality matching. In communal sharing, people give what they can and take what they need, be it within a couple, family, or larger community. Caring, kindness, and altruism are the moral virtues within the community, while in interaction with outside groups, aggression may be seen as legitimate.
通常,叙事可以定义人类社会关系的道德本质。人类学家艾伦·菲斯克区分了四种关系类型,人们在日常活动中来回移动:共享共同体、权威排名、市场定价和平等匹配。在共享共同体中,人们尽力给予,需要时取用,无论是在夫妻、家庭还是更大的社区内。关怀、善良和利他主义是社区内的道德美德,而在与外部群体互动时,侵略可能被视为合法。
Authority ranking relates to a community characterized by a social hierarchy, which selects heuristics embodying obedience, such as: If a person is an authority, follow requests. For instance, in Milgram's obedience studies, the experimenter instructed the participant to administer electric shocks of increasing intensity to a learner every time the learner gave an incorrect answer. The experiments implemented an authority narrative where subordinates reacted with respect and deference and superiors took paternalistic responsibility for them. That is not to say that selection is a one-to-one process; conflicts are the rule rather than the exception. For instance, in one condition of the obedience experiments, a confederate participant was introduced who sat next to the real participant and refused to continue the experiment after pressing the switch and hearing the learner's groan. This situation might trigger both obedience and a conflicting heuristic, imitate your peers, here, to copy the other participant's refusal to be obedient. In that experiment, obedience won over social imitation. The majority of participants ( 63 percent) followed the authority and went on to give shocks of higher intensity, compared with 70 percent of those who did so without seeing someone refusing.
权威排名与社会等级制度相关,这种社区选择具有服从特征的启发式,比如:如果一个人是权威,就要遵循请求。例如,在米尔格拉姆的服从研究中,实验者指示参与者每当学习者回答错误时就给予越来越强烈的电击。实验实施了一种权威叙事,下属表现出尊重和顺从,而上级则对他们负有家长式责任。这并不意味着选择是一对一的过程;冲突是规则而非例外。例如,在服从实验的一个条件中,引入了一个同谋参与者,坐在真正参与者旁边,在按下 开关并听到学习者呻吟后拒绝继续实验。这种情况可能触发服从和冲突启发式,即模仿同龄人,在这里,复制其他参与者拒绝服从的行为。在那个实验中,服从战胜了社会模仿。 大多数参与者(63%)遵循权威并继续给出更高强度的电击,而相比之下,70%的人在没有看到有人拒绝的情况下这样做。
In market-pricing relations, moral judgment is guided by cost-benefit calculations, as in utilitarian theories of morality. For instance, economist Gary Becker told the story that he began to think about crime in the 1960 s after he was late for an oral examination and had to decide whether to put his car in a parking lot or risk getting a ticket for parking illegally on the street. He calculated the likelihood of getting a ticket, the size of the penalty, and the cost of putting the car in a lot before deciding that it paid to take the risk and park on the street. In Becker's view, violations of the law, be they petty or grave, are not due to an irrational motive, a bad
在市场定价关系中,道德判断受成本效益计算的指导,就像道德的功利主义理论一样。例如,经济学家加里·贝克尔讲述了一个故事,他在 1960 年代开始思考犯罪问题,当时他因为迟到口头考试,不得不决定是把车停在停车场还是冒险在街上违规停车。他计算了被罚款的可能性、罚款的数额以及把车停在停车场的成本,最终决定冒险在街上停车更划算。在贝克尔看来,违法行为,无论是轻微还是严重,都不是由于非理性动机、不良。
Table 7.I. A four-card problem: A social contract with a perspective change.
表 7.I. 一个四张牌的问题:一个带有视角改变的社会契约。
When participants were cued into the perspective of an employee, most turned over the "worked on the weekend" and "did not get a day off" cards. When they were cued into the perspective of an employer, they turned over the other two cards.
当参与者被提示进入雇员的角度时,大多数人翻开了“周末工作”和“没有休息日”的卡片。当他们被提示进入雇主的角度时,他们翻开了另外两张卡片。
character, or mental illness, but can be explained as a rational choice based on the calculus of expectation.
性格,或精神疾病,但可以解释为基于期望计算的理性选择。
Finally, in equality-matching relations, people keep track of the balance of favors and know what is required to restore the balance. Examples are social contracts in which both sides exchange benefits but also are obliged to pay the costs. Not paying the costs is cheating. Do people reason about social contracts in a logical way, as assumed in rational approaches to moral behavior, or do they rely on heuristic search for cheaters? In a series of experiments, Klaus Hug and I used four-card problems, also known as Wason selection tasks. Consider a social contract between employer and employee (see Table 7.I):
最后,在平等匹配关系中,人们会追踪恩惠的平衡,并知道恢复平衡所需的条件。例如,社会契约中双方交换利益,但也有义务承担成本。不支付成本就是欺骗。人们是否会以理性方式思考社会契约,如道德行为的理性方法所假设的那样,还是他们依赖于启发式搜索欺骗者?在一系列实验中,Klaus Hug 和我使用了四张卡问题,也被称为 Wason 选择任务。考虑雇主和雇员之间的社会契约(见表 7.I):
Day-off rule: 休假规则:
If an employee works on the weekend, then that person gets a day off during the week.
如果员工在周末工作,那么这个人在工作日休息一天。
The "cards" in Table 7.I have information about four employees. Each card represents one person. One side of the card tells whether the person worked on the weekend, and the other side tells whether the person got a day off during the week. Indicate only the card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the rule has been violated.
表 7.I 中的“卡片”上有关于四名员工的信息。每张卡片代表一个人。卡片的一面显示这个人是否在周末工作,另一面显示这个人是否在工作日休假。只需指出您肯定需要翻转的卡片,以查看是否违反了规则。
Which cards would you turn over? According to the dictum that moral reasoning should follow the laws of logic, one would expect people to turn over the first and the last card. This is because the rule has the logical structure "If then ", and the only case in which it is violated is "P and not-Q," that is, "worked on the weekend" and "did not get a day off." Turning over these two cards can reveal such a violation. But the participants in our experiment chose these cards only when cued into the role of an employee. In that role, they were concerned about being cheated if they worked on the weekend, but did not get a day off. When cued into the role of an employer, however, the majority by far turned over the and not- cards, which can reveal whether an employee cheated by taking a day off without having worked on the weekend. All in all, participants' search did not follow disembodied logic, but instead the heuristic "find out whether you or your group is being cheated." Thus, people were not reasoning by logic or with a Kantian moral, but with Machiavellian intelligence. Compared with the highly variable results previously reported in fourcard problems that did not use social tasks, the striking result here was how highly consistent participants' choices were. These were made with little reflection, which has been interpreted to mean that intuitions about social contracts have been shaped by natural selection and have eventually become part of our "social instincts."
你会翻哪些卡片?根据道德推理应遵循逻辑法则的格言,人们会期望翻开第一和最后一张卡片。这是因为规则具有逻辑结构“如果 ,那么 ”,而唯一违反规则的情况是“P 且非 Q”,即“周末工作”和“没有休息日”。翻开这两张卡片可以揭示这种违反情况。但我们实验中的参与者只有在被提示成员工作角色时才选择这些卡片。在这个角色中,他们担心如果周末工作却没有休息日会被欺骗。然而,当被提示成雇主角色时,绝大多数人翻开了 和非 卡片,这可以揭示员工是否通过休息日而没有在周末工作来欺骗。总的来说,参与者的搜索并没有遵循超然的逻辑,而是遵循了“找出你或你的团体是否被欺骗”的启发式。因此,人们并没有通过逻辑或康德式的道德来推理,而是通过马基雅维利智慧。 与以前在没有使用社会任务的四卡问题中报告的高度可变结果相比,这里引人注目的结果是参与者选择的高度一致。这些选择几乎没有经过深思熟虑,这被解释为意味着对社会契约的直觉已经受到自然选择的影响,并最终成为我们的“社会本能”的一部分。" "

Moral Intuition Is Based on Social Heuristics
道德直觉基于社会启发

Darwin thought that a combination of social instincts plus sufficient intellectual powers leads to the evolution of moral sense, and he proposed the coherence or coordination of human groups as its purpose:
达尔文认为,社会本能与足够的智力结合会导致道德感的进化,并提出人类群体的一致性或协调作为其目的。
There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection. At all times throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one element in their success, the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise and increase.
毫无疑问,一个部落包括许多成员,他们具有高度的爱国主义精神、忠诚、服从、勇气和同情心,总是愿意互相帮助,为了共同利益而牺牲自己,这样的部落将战胜大多数其他部落;这就是自然选择。在世界各地的各个时期,部落都取代了其他部落;道德是他们成功的一个因素,道德标准和拥有优越天赋的人数将在各地不断提升和增加。
If Darwin's assumption that one original function of morality was the coherence of groups is correct, then the heuristics underlying moral behavior should include those that can provide this function. Social heuristics such as imitate-your-peers are apt examples: They can foster social coherence. Note that this hypothesis opens up a different understanding of the nature of potential universals underlying moral behavior. For instance, proponents of the idea of a universal moral grammar that mirrors Chomsky's universal language grammar assume "hardwired" principles such as: Do as you would be done by; don't kill; don't cheat, steal, or lie; avoid adultery and incest; and care for children and the weak. Critics responded that these values may be ours, but not those of other cultures and times: children sold into slavery by parents who feel entitled to do so; guilt-free spousal abuse by men who see it as their right; moral sanctioning of pregnant unmarried women by humiliation or driving them to suicide; and so forth. A theory of moral behavior should avoid a present-day bias. Darwin captured this point long ago:
如果达尔文的假设,即道德的一个最初功能是群体的一致性是正确的,那么道德行为背后的启发式应该包括那些能提供这种功能的启发式。像模仿同龄人这样的社会启发式是很好的例子:它们可以促进社会的一致性。请注意,这个假设打开了对道德行为潜在普遍性的不同理解。例如,支持普遍道德语法理念的人认为,这种语法反映了乔姆斯基的通用语法,假设“硬连线”原则,比如:待人如己;不杀人;不欺骗、偷窃或说谎;避免通奸和乱伦;照顾儿童和弱者。批评者回应说,这些价值观可能是我们的,但不是其他文化和时代的:父母将孩子卖为奴隶,认为有权这样做;男性无罪感地虐待配偶,认为这是自己的权利;通过羞辱或逼迫怀孕未婚妇女自杀来道德制裁等等。道德行为理论应该避免现代偏见。达尔文很早就捕捉到了这一点。
If for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering.
如果举一个极端的例子,假如男人们像蜜蜂一样在完全相同的条件下长大,那么我们未婚女性几乎肯定会像工蜂一样认为杀死自己的兄弟是一种神圣的责任,母亲们也会努力杀死自己能生育的女儿;而且没有人会想要干涉。
We should not fail to notice that terrorists, the Mafia, and crack-dealing gangs run on strong moral intuitions. For his film Suicide Killers, filmmaker Pierre Rehow interviewed would-be terrorists who had survived because their bombs failed to explode: "Every single one of them tried to convince me that it was the right thing to do for moralistic reasons." Social psychologists have documented in our own cultures how a situation can stimulate evil behavior in ordinary people and how easily physical abuse of others can be elicited. I suggest that the heuristics underlying moral behavior are not the mirror images of the Ten Commandments and their modern humanistic equivalents, but embody more general social principles that coordinate human groups. That means that one and the same heuristic can solve both problems that we call moral and those that we do not.
我们不应忽视恐怖分子、黑手党和贩毒团伙都依赖强烈的道德直觉。对于他的电影《自杀杀手》,导演皮埃尔·雷豪采访了幸存下来的自杀式恐怖分子,因为他们的炸弹未能爆炸:“他们每个人都试图说服我,出于道德原因这是正确的事情。”社会心理学家已经在我们自己的文化中记录了一种情况如何能够激发普通人的邪恶行为,以及如何轻易地引发对他人的身体虐待。我认为道德行为背后的启发式不是《十诫》及其现代人文主义等价物的镜像,而是体现了协调人类群体的更一般的社会原则。这意味着同一个启发式可以解决我们称之为道德问题和那些我们不称之为道德问题的问题。

The Moral Rim 道德边缘

The boundaries between what is deemed a moral issue shift over historical time and between cultures. Although contemporary Western moral psychology and philosophy often center on the issues of harm and individual rights, such a constrained view of the domain of morality is unusual in history and other cultures. There existed more important moral values than avoiding harm to individuals. Abraham was asked by the Lord to kill his son, and his unquestioning readiness to heed God's command signaled a higher moral value, faith. For the ancient world, where human sacrifice was prevalent, the surprising part of the story was that God stopped the sacrifice.
道德问题的界限随着历史时间和文化之间的变化而变化。尽管当代西方道德心理学和哲学常常集中在伤害和个人权利等问题上,但这种对道德领域的局限观在历史和其他文化中并不常见。存在比避免对个人造成伤害更重要的道德价值观。亚伯拉罕被上帝要求杀死他的儿子,他毫不犹豫地听从上帝的命令表明了更高的道德价值,信仰。对于古代世界来说,人类牺牲普遍存在,故事中令人惊讶的部分是上帝停止了牺牲。
The story of the Sodomites who wanted to gang rape two strangers to whom Lot had offered shelter is another case in point. From a contemporary Western view, we might misleadingly believe that the major moral issue at stake here is rape or homosexuality, but hospitality was an essential moral duty at that time and remains so in many cultures. For Lot, this duty was so serious that he offered the raging mob his virgin daughters if they left his guests alone. Similarly, in modern Europe, wasting energy, eating meat, or smoking in the presence of others were long seen as purely self-regarding decisions. Environmental protectionists, animal rights advocates, and anti-smoking groups have reinterpreted these as moral infractions that cause environmental pollution, the killing of animals, and lung cancer through secondhand smoking. I refer to the line that divides personal taste and moral virtues as the moral rim. The location of the moral rim describes whether a behavior is included in the moral domain. My hypothesis is that, wherever the rim is drawn, the underlying social heuristic is likely to remain the same.
索多玛人想要集体强奸洛得所提供庇护的两个陌生人的故事是另一个例子。从当代西方的观点来看,我们可能会误解地认为这里所涉及的主要道德问题是强奸或同性恋,但款待在那个时代是一项基本的道德责任,在许多文化中仍然如此。对于洛得来说,这个责任是如此严肃,以至于他向暴怒的暴民提供了他的处女女儿,只要他们放过他的客人。同样,在现代欧洲,浪费能源、吃肉或在他人面前吸烟长期被视为纯粹自私的决定。环保主义者、动物权利倡导者和反吸烟团体已经重新解释这些行为为导致环境污染、杀害动物和通过二手烟引起肺癌的道德违规行为。我将个人品味和道德美德之间的界限称为道德边缘。道德边缘的位置描述了一个行为是否包含在道德领域内。我的假设是,无论边缘画在哪里,潜在的社会启发规则可能仍然保持不变。

Ecological Morality 生态道德

Several accounts, normative and descriptive, from virtue theories to Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning, assume that forces inside the mind moral intuition or reasoning - are, or should be, the cause of moral behavior (unless someone actively prevents a person from executing it by threat or force). These theories provide a conceptual language for only one blade of Simon's scissors (see Chapter 5): the mind. Here, I would like to propose the notion of ecological morality, that is, that moral behavior results from an interaction between the mind and environment. As a consequence, the same moral intuition can lead to quite different moral outcomes, depending on the structure of the environment.
几种关于美德理论到科尔伯格道德推理阶段的规范性和描述性账户都假定,内心的力量——道德直觉或推理——是或应该是道德行为的原因(除非有人通过威胁或强制积极阻止一个人执行它)。这些理论仅为西蒙剪刀的一刃提供了概念语言(见第 5 章):心智。在这里,我想提出生态道德的概念,即道德行为是由心智和环境之间的互动导致的。因此,相同的道德直觉可能会导致完全不同的道德结果,这取决于环境的结构。

Fairness 公平

Consider the moral intuition of many parents that they should treat all their children equally in order to create fairness and justice. To implement this goal, many parents try to divide their time, love, and attention among their children equally:
考虑到许多父母的道德直觉,他们应该平等对待所有的孩子,以创造公平和正义。为了实现这个目标,许多父母试图平等地分配他们的时间、爱和关注给他们的孩子们。
Equality heuristic: To share a resource among persons, divide it equally (I ).
平等启发式:将资源平均分配给 人(我 )。
The equality heuristic, however, does not necessarily produce the desired result. The outcome depends on the particular environment, some of which can even generate systematic inequality. For instance, parents who try to divide their time each day between their children equally will attain the long-term goal of providing each child with equal time if they have exactly two children. But, if they have three or more children (excepting multiple births), the goal will be missed because the first-born and the last-born will end up receiving more time than the middleborns. The reason is that first-borns do not have to share parents' time with other siblings before these siblings are born, and last-borns do not have to share after the older ones have left the family. Only the middleborns always have to share, and their disadvantage increases with the number of years between the siblings. This result illustrates that a heuristic can or cannot reach a fairness goal (all children should be given the same amount of time during their childhood), depending on the structure of the environment. In the present case, there are two relevant features of the environment: the larger the number of siblings (three or more) and the larger their temporal spacing, the greater the imbalance. The environment has the last word.
然而,平等启发式并不一定会产生期望的结果。结果取决于特定的环境,其中一些甚至可能产生系统性的不平等。例如,试图每天在孩子们之间平均分配时间的父母,如果他们有两个孩子,将实现为每个孩子提供相等时间的长期目标。但是,如果他们有三个或更多的孩子(除了多胞胎),这个目标将无法实现,因为长子和幼子最终会比中间孩子获得更多时间。原因在于长子在其他兄弟姐妹出生之前不必与父母分享时间,而幼子在年长的兄弟姐妹离开家庭后也不必分享时间。只有中间孩子总是需要分享,他们的劣势随着兄弟姐妹之间的年龄差距增加而增加。这个结果说明,启发式可能或可能无法达到公平目标(所有孩子在童年时期应该获得相同的时间),这取决于环境的结构。 在目前的情况下,环境有两个相关特征:兄弟姐妹的数量越多(三个或更多),他们之间的时间间隔越大,不平衡就越大。环境有最后的话语权。

Imitation 模仿

Consider a second social heuristic (mentioned in the section "Social Narratives Select Heuristics") and how its outcome depends on the environment.
考虑第二个社会启发式(在“社会叙事选择启发式”部分提到),以及它的结果如何取决于环境。
Imitate your peers: Do what the majority of your peers do.
模仿你的同龄人:做大多数同龄人做的事情。
Imitation is probably the most important social learning principle, together with teaching and language. No other species is known in which individuals imitate the behavior of others as generally and precisely as Homo sapiens. Psychologist and primatologist Michael Tomasello argues that the precision and slavishness of imitation led to our remarkable culture. Imitation enables us to accumulate what our ancestors have learned, thus replacing slow Darwinian evolutionary learning by a Lamarckian form of cultural inheritance.
模仿可能是最重要的社会学习原则之一,与教学和语言一起。 据悉,没有其他物种像智人那样普遍和准确地模仿他人的行为。 心理学家和灵长类动物学家迈克尔·托马塞洛认为,模仿的准确性和盲从性导致了我们卓越的文化。 模仿使我们能够积累祖先所学到的知识,从而用文化继承的拉马克式形式取代了缓慢的达尔文式进化学习。
Imitation can steer both good and bad moral action, from donating to charity to discriminating against minorities. If adolescents imitate the behavior of their peers, that can lead to mobbing and criminal action or to helpful and altruistic behavior, depending on the peer group that constitutes their social environment. The social heuristic and the environment are the joint causes of moral behavior. The same dependency holds in adult life. Those who refuse to imitate the behavior and the values of their social environment are likely to be called a coward or oddball if male, or a dishonor to the family if female. Imitating the majority virtually guarantees social acceptance in one's peer group and fosters shared community values.
模仿可以引导良好和不良的道德行为,从捐赠慈善到歧视少数群体。如果青少年模仿他们同龄人的行为,这可能导致围攻和犯罪行为,也可能导致帮助和利他行为,取决于构成他们社交环境的同龄人群。社会启发和环境是道德行为的共同原因。在成年生活中也是如此。那些拒绝模仿社交环境的行为和价值观的人很可能会被称为懦夫或怪人(男性),或者被视为对家庭的耻辱(女性)。模仿大多数人几乎可以确保在同龄人群中获得社会认可,并促进共享的社区价值观。

Comradeship 同志情谊

As a final and dramatic case, consider a situation in July 1942 during World War II, as described by the historian Christopher Browning in his seminal book Ordinary Men. Brought to the outskirts of a small Polish village, around 500 German men belonging to the German Reserve Police Batallion io i were informed by their commander Major Trapp that they had been given a most unpleasant order from the highest authorities. There were some 1,800 Jews in the village, and the males of working age were to be brought to a work camp. The elderly, women, and children were to be shot. At this point, Trapp made an extraordinary offer: If any men did not feel up to the task, they could step out.
作为一个最终和戏剧性的案例,考虑一下二战期间 1942 年 7 月的情况,正如历史学家克里斯托弗·布朗宁在他的重要著作《普通人》中所描述的那样。 在波兰一个小村庄的郊外,大约 500 名属于德国预备警察第 101 营的德国男子被他们的指挥官特拉普少校告知,他们收到了来自最高当局的一个非常不愉快的命令。村庄里有大约 1800 名犹太人,适龄男性将被送往劳工营。老年人、妇女和儿童将被枪杀。在这一点上,特拉普做出了一个非同寻常的提议:如果有人觉得无法胜任这项任务,他们可以退出。
The men had only seconds to decide. A dozen stepped forward; the rest participated in the massacre. Why then did only 12 men decline to participate in mass murder?
这些男人只有几秒钟来决定。十几个人走了出来;其余的参与了屠杀。那么为什么只有 12 个人拒绝参与大规模谋杀呢?
Browning considered the obvious explanations. First, Nazi antiSemitism. Yet, these men were mostly middle-aged family men considered too old to be drafted into the army, who had been educated in the preNazi era with different moral values, and who came from a social class that was anti-Nazi in its political culture and from Hamburg, which was by reputation one of the least nazified cities in Germany. A second possible explanation is conformity with authority. But the extensive court interviews indicate that this was not the primary reason either. Moreover, Trapp had explicitly allowed for nonconformity. After taking several more explanations into account, including the lack of forewarning and concern about career advancement, Browning posited a different explanation, based on how men in uniforms identify with their comrades. Many of the policemen seem to have followed a social heuristic:
布朗宁考虑了显而易见的解释。首先,纳粹反犹太主义。然而,这些人大多是中年家庭男子,被认为年龄太大而不会被征召入伍,他们在纳粹时代之前接受教育,具有不同的道德价值观,并来自一个在政治文化上反纳粹的社会阶层,来自声誉不佳的汉堡,汉堡被认为是德国最不纳粹化的城市之一。第二个可能的解释是顺从权威。但广泛的法庭访谈表明这也不是主要原因。此外,特拉普明确允许不顺从。在考虑了几种其他解释后,包括缺乏预警和对职业晋升的担忧,布朗宁提出了一个不同的解释,基于穿制服的男人如何认同他们的同志。许多警察似乎遵循了一种社会启发式:
Don't break ranks. 不要离开队伍。
According to Browning, the men felt "the strong urge not to separate themselves from the group by stepping out," even if that meant violating the moral imperative of not killing innocent people. Stepping out meant leaving one's comrades more than their share of the ugly task and losing face by doing so. Don't break ranks is a social heuristic that can lead to bravery in combat, such as risking one's life for one's comrades, but it can also lead to atrocities.
根据布朗宁的说法,这些男人感到“强烈的冲动不要脱离群体而独自行动”,即使这意味着违反了不杀害无辜人的道义义务。脱离群体意味着让同志们承担更多丑恶任务的份额,这样做会丢脸。不要破坏队伍的社会启发可以导致在战斗中表现出勇敢,比如为同志冒生命危险,但也可能导致暴行。
Trapp could have framed his offer the other way round, so that the social heuristic would not conflict with the Judeo-Christian commandment "don't murder." Browning suggested that if Trapp had asked that those men should step forward who felt up to the task, that is, to "opt in," the conflict would have been partially eliminated and the number of men who participated in the killing might have been considerably smaller. That is a thought experiment, no longer an analysis of the historical record. But it illustrates the ecological nature of moral behavior. Moreover, it indicates that by understanding the conflict between two moral intuitions - don't break ranks and don't kill innocent people - one can find solutions in the environment that can change what people do.
特拉普本可以以另一种方式提出他的提议,这样社会启发就不会与犹太基督教戒律“不要杀人”相冲突。布朗宁建议,如果特拉普要求那些感觉能胜任任务的人站出来,也就是“选择加入”,冲突可能会部分消除,参与杀戮的人数可能会大大减少。这是一个思想实验,不再是对历史记录的分析。但它说明了道德行为的生态性质。此外,它表明通过理解两种道德直觉之间的冲突 - 不要背叛和不要杀害无辜的人 - 人们可以在环境中找到解决方案,从而改变人们的行为。

Systematic Inconsistencies
系统性不一致

Inconsistencies between moral intuition and behavior are a surprise for virtue ethics. Virtues are believed to be character traits: A virtue makes a person a good one, a vice a bad one. For instance, for centuries, courage was a virtue for men and chastity was a virtue for women (see Chapter 2). Because these traits are considered to be stable, the resulting behavior should be consistently moral or immoral. From an ecological view of morality, consistency is not to be expected. In contrast, one can predict in what situation inconsistencies are likely to arise. For instance, a survey asked citizens whether they would be willing to donate an organ after they had died; 69 percent and 81 percent of Danish and Swedish citizens, respectively, answered "yes," compared with about 4 percent and 86 percent who are actually potential donors. The Danish citizens appear to behave inconsistently; the Swedish citizens do not. Yet, the apparent inconsistency of the Danish citizens is due to a mismatch between people's willingness and their government's default rule: Nobody is a potential donor unless they opt in. In the Swedish case, the government's default is presumed consent (opt-out); thus, no such conflict arises.
在道德直觉和行为之间的不一致对于德行伦理学来说是一个惊喜。美德被认为是品德特质:一种美德使一个人成为好人,一种恶习使一个人成为坏人。例如,几个世纪以来,勇气是男性的一种美德,贞洁是女性的一种美德(见第 2 章)。因为这些特质被认为是稳定的,所以产生的行为应该是一贯的道德或不道德的。从道德生态学的观点来看,不应该期望一致性。相反,人们可以预测在什么情况下可能出现不一致。例如,一项调查询问公民是否愿意在死后捐献器官;丹麦和瑞典公民中分别有 69%和 81%的人回答“是”,而实际上只有大约 4%和 86%的人是潜在的捐赠者。丹麦公民似乎表现出不一致的行为;而瑞典公民则没有。然而,丹麦公民的明显不一致是由于人们的意愿与政府的默认规则之间的不匹配:除非他们选择加入,否则没有人是潜在的捐赠者。 在瑞典案例中,政府默认为默许同意(选择退出);因此,不会出现这种冲突。
Similar inconsistencies and only moderate correlations between moral intuition and behavior have been reported in studies that both elicited people's moral intuitions and observed their behavior in the same situation. Consider premarital sexual relations and American teenagers who publicly take a vow of abstinence. These teenagers typically come from religious backgrounds and have revived virginity as a moral virtue. One would expect that their moral intentions, particularly after having been declared in public, would guide their behavior. Yet, teenagers who made a virginity pledge were just as likely to have premarital sex as their peers who did not. The only difference was that, when those who made the pledge had sex, they were less likely to use condoms or other forms of contraception. As mentioned, teenagers' behavior is often guided by a social coordination heuristic: imitate-your-peers - do what the majority of your peers do. If my friends make a virginity pledge, I will too; if my friends get drunk, I will too; if my friends already have sex at age 16 , I will too; and so on. If behavior is guided by peer imitation, a pledge in itself plays little part. The social environment is what makes the difference.
类似的不一致性和道德直觉与行为之间仅有中等相关性的研究已经报道,这些研究既引发了人们的道德直觉,又观察了他们在同一情况下的行为。考虑婚前性关系和公开发誓守贞的美国青少年。这些青少年通常来自宗教背景,并将贞操复兴为一种道德美德。人们本来期望,特别是在公开宣布之后,他们的道德意图会指导他们的行为。然而,发誓守贞的青少年与未发誓的同龄人一样可能发生婚前性行为。唯一的区别在于,发誓守贞的人发生性行为时,他们更不可能使用避孕套或其他避孕措施。正如前面提到的,青少年的行为通常受到社会协调启发式的指导:模仿你的同龄人 - 做大多数同龄人做的事情。如果我的朋友发誓守贞,我也会;如果我的朋友喝醉了,我也会;如果我的朋友在 16 岁时已经发生性行为,我也会;等等。如果行为受同龄人模仿的影响,那么誓言本身的作用很小。 社会环境是造成差异的原因。
Most importantly, if teenagers are not aware of the role that this heuristic plays in guiding part of their behavior, but, instead, believe they make their decisions themselves, this would explain why they were not prepared for the event of acting against their stated moral values. Similarly, the US Government has spent nearly billion since the 1990s on the abstinence-promotion programs, which not only has turned out to be ineffective in preventing adolescent birth rates, but has actually increased these in conservative states. One possible explanation of this failure is that adolescents' behavior is guided by social heuristics, which these governmental programs have not targeted.
最重要的是,如果青少年不了解这种启发式在引导他们部分行为中所起的作用,而是相信他们自己做出决定,这就解释了为什么他们没有为违背自己所陈述的道德价值观做好准备。同样,自上世纪 90 年代以来,美国政府已经在禁欲推广项目上花费了近 亿美元,这不仅在预防青少年生育率方面表现出无效,而且实际上在保守州增加了这些生育率。 这种失败的一个可能解释是,青少年的行为受社会启发式的指导,而这些政府项目并没有针对这一点。

Moral Luck 道德运气

Philosopher Thomas Nagel defined moral luck as follows: "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck." 37 The destiny of men who are enlisted for war is an issue of moral luck. Nagel observed that we frequently make moral judgments about people based on factors out of their control, despite our intuition that they cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault. Moral luck arises from the fact that moral behavior is, in part, determined by our environment and, thus, not entirely controllable by the individual. It concerns the question of whether behavior should be evaluated as right or wrong depending on its result shaped by situational circumstances.
哲学家托马斯·纳格尔将道德运气定义为:“当某人的行为的重要方面取决于他无法控制的因素时,但我们仍然在道德判断方面将他视为客体时,这可以被称为道德运气。”参加战争的人的命运是道德运气的问题。纳格尔观察到,我们经常基于他们无法控制的因素对人们做出道德判断,尽管我们直觉上认为他们不能因非他们的过错而受到道德评估。道德运气源于道德行为在一定程度上受环境影响,因此个体并非完全可控。它涉及一个问题,即行为是否应根据情境环境塑造的结果而被评价为对或错。
Moral luck is a direct consequence of ecological morality. The teenager who desires to be accepted and imitates what peers do is lucky if the peer group is prosocial rather than criminal. The middle-aged family father who is confronted with choosing between breaking ranks and killing is unlucky to find himself in that situation. Moral luck, like ecological morality in general, expands normative questions such as "What is our duty?" and "What is a good character?" into interactive questions such as "How to create a virtuous environment for humans?"
道德运气是生态道德的直接结果。渴望被接受并模仿同龄人的行为的青少年,如果同龄人群是亲社会而不是犯罪的话,那么他就是幸运的。中年家庭父亲在选择违背规则和杀人之间时,发现自己处于这种情况中是不幸的。道德运气,就像一般的生态道德一样,将规范性问题扩展为“我们的责任是什么?”和“什么是一个好品格?”等互动性问题,例如“如何为人类创造一个有德行的环境?”

Virtuous Environments 美德环境

In this chapter, I have argued that moral intuitions are guided by social heuristics, which are not distinctive from other heuristics in the adaptive toolbox. One and the same heuristic can solve problems that we call moral and those we do not. That perspective helps explain the processes underlying moral intuition rather than taking intuition as an unexplained primitive. While moral psychologists debate over whether our moral sense is reflective and rational, as in Lawrence Kohlberg's theory, or intuitive and nonrational, as in Jonathan Haidt's theory, I believe that any assumed opposition and ranking is a misleading start. Both intuition and deliberation are involved in moral behavior, as they are in decision-making in general. The result of deliberation may become automatic and intuitive over a lifetime or generations, or intuitive judgments may be justified post hoc by reason to save face. If Darwin is right that the function of morality is to create and maintain the coherence of groups, then social heuristics are the tools toward that goal.
在这一章中,我认为道德直觉是由社会启发式引导的,这些启发式并不与适应性工具箱中的其他启发式有所区别。同一种启发式可以解决我们称之为道德的问题,也可以解决我们不称之为道德的问题。这种观点有助于解释道德直觉的基本过程,而不是将直觉视为无法解释的原始概念。虽然道德心理学家们就我们的道德感是反思和理性的(如劳伦斯·科尔伯格的理论)还是直觉和非理性的(如乔纳森·海德特的理论)进行争论,但我认为任何假设的对立和排名都是一个误导性的开始。直觉和深思都参与了道德行为,就像它们在一般决策中一样。深思的结果可能会在一生或几代人的时间内变得自动和直觉,或者直觉判断可能会事后通过理由来自圆其说。如果达尔文是对的,道德的功能是创造和维护群体的一致性,那么社会启发式就是实现这一目标的工具。
The ecological view of morality emphasizes that behavior is a function of both heuristics and the environment in which they operate. Yet many theories continue to assume a simple causal arrow from an inner process be it virtues, traits, moral reasoning, or utility calculations - to behavior. In contrast, the adaptive view that is inspired by Simon's scissors (see Chapter 5) explains apparent systematic inconsistencies in moral behavior and takes the phenomenon of moral luck seriously. Virtue is found not only in people but also in environments.
道德的生态观强调行为是启发和环境的功能。然而,许多理论仍然假设从内部过程(无论是美德、特质、道德推理还是效用计算)到行为的简单因果箭头。相比之下,受西蒙的剪刀启发的适应性观解释了道德行为中明显的系统性不一致,并认真对待道德运气现象。美德不仅存在于人们身上,也存在于环境中。
Virtuous environments can support people not only with respect to moral behavior. Chapter 8 , the final chapter, deals with the question of how to set up and maintain a research environment that enables innovation through an open culture of intense, critical, but respectful discussion.
有德行的环境不仅可以支持人们在道德行为方面。第 8 章,也就是最后一章,讨论了如何建立和维护一个能够通过开放、紧张、批判但尊重讨论的文化促进创新的研究环境的问题。

CHAPTER 8 第 8 章

Simple Heuristics to Run a Research Group
简单的启发法来管理一个研究小组

If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.
如果我看得更远,那是因为我站在巨人的肩膀上。
Isaac Newton  艾萨克·牛顿
As enticing as the prospect of unruffled consensus in the workplace may be, when leaders dissuade dissent and divergent thinking, they create an environment that may allow disasters to materialize.
尽管职场中没有波澜的共识前景很诱人,但当领导者阻止持不同意见和不同思维的人时,他们创造了一个可能导致灾难发生的环境。
Micah Zenko
Collaboration between researchers has become increasingly common in psychology and other social sciences. Between 1980 and 2013, for instance, the average number of authors on a paper roughly doubled in psychological journals. This positions the social sciences between the humanities, where single-authored publications remain the ideal, and the natural sciences, where the number of authors can be huge: An article on the Higgs boson in 2015 listed 5,153 authors. Collaboration occurs between institutes worldwide, a practice that goes back to 1887 when observatories from Helsinki to Sydney began to map millions of stars. But, it also occurs on a smaller scale when the members of a research group work and publish together instead of pursuing a career individually. The steady increase in collaboration requires reflection about how to make it productive. In this chapter, I focus on a question that is rarely asked: How can one establish and maintain an environment that fosters successful collaboration in a research group? I will use my own experience as a case study. For 22 years, I directed the ABC Research Group at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin and before that at the Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research in Munich.
研究人员之间的合作在心理学和其他社会科学中变得越来越普遍。例如,在 1980 年至 2013 年间,心理学期刊上的平均论文作者数量大致翻了一番。这使得社会科学处于人文学科和自然科学之间的位置,人文学科中单一作者出版物仍然是理想的,而自然科学中作者数量可能非常庞大:2015 年有关希格斯玻色子的一篇文章列出了 5,153 位作者。合作发生在全球各个研究机构之间,这种做法可以追溯到 1887 年,当时从赫尔辛基到悉尼的天文台开始绘制数百万颗星星的地图。但是,当研究小组的成员一起工作并共同发表论文而不是单独追求职业时,也会发生在较小的规模上。合作的持续增加需要反思如何使其更具生产力。在本章中,我关注一个很少被问及的问题:如何建立和维护一个促进研究小组成功合作的环境?我将以自己的经验作为案例研究。 22 年来,我在柏林马克斯·普朗克人类发展研究所领导 ABC 研究小组,之前在慕尼黑马克斯·普朗克心理研究所也是如此。
I begin with a remark on the philosophy of the institutes of the Max Planck Society. It is embodied in a set of heuristic principles that any institution could implement if they are open to rethinking their methods and willing to imitate good models. In short, there are three principles. First, research is built up solely around the world's leading researchers, that is, around a person, not a field. The person is absolutely free to develop a research agenda. It is called the Harnack Principle, named after the first president of the Society in I9I I. Academies and universities, in contrast, typically select a field and then hire the best person they can find in this area. The second principle is to take risks and ideally create new fields rather than merely excelling in the existing fields. If a research group succeeds in creating a new field that eventually becomes established worldwide, the research group has done its job and may be closed down. The idea is not to invest in what is established and everyone else is doing, but rather to stay at the forefront of innovation and invest resources in risky new projects. To enable such risk-taking, directors are provided with the necessary resources until they retire, which makes them independent from short-term grants. This long-term funding reflects an unusual amount of trust in the directors, compared with the widespread system of distrust that invites playing it safe. Third, because new ideas do not respect the borders of established disciplines, a premium is placed on interdisciplinary research. To facilitate this, the directors are free to select the research staff, agenda, and composition of the group. These three principles - the focus on eminent researchers rather than established fields, guaranteed funding to encourage risktaking, and an interdisciplinary approach - are the pillars of the Max Planck institutes' success.
我首先谈一下马克斯·普朗克学会的研究所哲学。这种哲学体现在一套启发性原则中,任何机构只要愿意重新思考他们的方法并愿意模仿好的模式,都可以实施。简而言之,有三个原则。首先,研究完全围绕世界领先的研究人员展开,也就是围绕一个人而不是一个领域。这个人完全自由发展研究议程。这被称为哈纳克原则,以学会 1911 年的第一任会长命名。学术机构和大学相反,通常选择一个领域,然后聘请他们在这个领域中能找到的最优秀的人。第二个原则是冒险,理想情况下创造新领域,而不仅仅在现有领域表现出色。如果一个研究小组成功地创造了一个最终在全球范围内确立的新领域,那么这个研究小组已经完成了它的工作,可以关闭。这个想法不是投资于已经确立并且其他人都在做的事情,而是要始终站在创新的前沿,投资资源于冒险的新项目。 为了促进这种冒险,董事们在退休之前都会得到必要的资源,这使他们不依赖短期资助。这种长期资助反映了对董事们的异常信任,与广泛存在的不信任体系形成鲜明对比,后者鼓励保守行为。第三,由于新想法不受既定学科边界的限制,跨学科研究被视为至关重要。为了促进这一点,董事们可以自由选择研究人员、议程和团队构成。这三个原则——专注于杰出研究人员而非已建立的领域、提供保障的资金以鼓励冒险、以及跨学科方法——是马克斯·普朗克研究所成功的支柱。
These principles enable innovation, but do not specify the details of running a research group. Given the amount of trust that directors enjoy, they can take the time and effort to develop a healthy working culture or not and use their freedom in different ways. Therefore, what follows should not be generalized to how other directors or institutes have set up their research groups. I will simply describe the heuristics that I used to set up the research group and how the group maintained its open culture over the years with a fluctuating set of members.
这些原则促进创新,但并未规定如何运营研究小组的细节。鉴于主管享有的信任程度,他们可以花时间和精力发展健康的工作文化,也可以选择不这样做,并以不同的方式行使自由。因此,接下来的内容不应泛化为其他主管或机构如何建立他们的研究小组。我将简单描述我用来建立研究小组的启发式方法,以及该小组如何在多年来与不断变化的成员群体中保持开放文化。

How to Start a Research Group
如何开始一个研究小组

When offered the directorship of the Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, I was teaching at the University of Chicago. The offer allowed me to create an initial group of about 20 members at the level of associate and assistant professors, postdocs and predocs, as well as IT and support staff. The topic I chose is discussed in this book, decisionmaking under uncertainty, then a largely uncharted territory given the preoccupation of most psychological, statistical, and economic theories with calculable risk. Taking up Herbert A. Simon's widely neglected question of how people make decisions when the future is uncertain and the assumptions necessary for the expected utility maximization or Bayesian models do not hold, the research program extended this descriptive question to a new, prescriptive one that had not been asked before: How should decisions be made under uncertainty? This led to many further exciting questions, such as: In what situations can smart heuristics lead to more accurate decisions than complex strategies? How can the findings be implemented to help doctors, judges, and other experts make better decisions under uncertainty? And, finally, how can heuristics be implemented to create better artificial intelligence (AI)?
当我被提供马克斯·普朗克心理研究所所长职位时,我正在芝加哥大学任教。这个机会让我能够组建一个初期成员约 20 人的团队,包括副教授、助理教授、博士后、博士生、IT 和支持人员。我选择的主题在这本书中有所讨论,即在不确定性下做决策,这是一个相当未被探索的领域,因为大多数心理学、统计学和经济学理论都关注可计算的风险。继承了赫伯特·西蒙广泛被忽视的问题,即当未来不确定时人们如何做出决策,以及期望效用最大化或贝叶斯模型所需的假设不成立时,这个研究项目将这个描述性问题扩展到一个以前未曾提出的新的规范性问题:在不确定性下应该如何做出决策?这引发了许多令人兴奋的进一步问题,比如:在什么情况下,聪明的启发式方法可以比复杂策略带来更准确的决策?这些发现如何应用以帮助医生、法官和其他专家在不确定性下做出更好的决策? 最后,如何实施启发式方法来创建更好的人工智能(AI)?

Principle I: Common Topic, Multiple Disciplines
原则一:共同话题,多学科

There are two ways to do science. One is discipline-oriented research, where researchers identify with a discipline or subdiscipline and work on various topics within its conventions. I have seen this in quite a few psychology departments and also in other social science departments, where subdepartments rarely collaborate with another, let alone interact with other disciplines, even if these are relevant. The other is problem-oriented research, where researchers identify with a problem and work on it with colleagues, theories, and methods from various disciplines. Problem-oriented research is more common in the natural sciences, where large numbers of people with diverse backgrounds work together. Discipline-oriented research is a closed system. In problem-oriented research, other disciplines are welcomed as a toolbox containing further useful tools to make progress. Here, the challenge is greater, but so is the satisfaction.
有两种做科学的方式。一种是以学科为导向的研究,研究人员认同某一学科或子学科,并在其传统内工作于各种主题。我在许多心理学系以及其他社会科学系看到过这种情况,子部门很少与其他部门合作,更不用说与其他学科互动了,即使它们是相关的。另一种是以问题为导向的研究,研究人员认同某一问题,并与来自各种学科的同事、理论和方法一起研究。以问题为导向的研究在自然科学中更为常见,那里有大量背景各异的人们共同工作。以学科为导向的研究是一个封闭的系统。在以问题为导向的研究中,其他学科被视为一个工具箱,其中包含了进一步有用的工具以取得进展。在这里,挑战更大,但满足感也更强。
As I have stated, most interesting topics do not respect the fences that have been set up to demark the territory of a discipline and keep strangers out. Decision-making under uncertainty is no exception. Progress requires cooperation between researchers from various disciplines. The initial ABC
正如我所说,大多数有趣的话题并不尊重已经设立的界限,以划定学科领域并阻止外人进入。在不确定性下做决策也不例外。进步需要各个学科的研究人员之间的合作。最初的 ABC
Research Group consisted of researchers from cognitive and evolutionary psychology, behavioral economics, empirical sociology, mathematics, engineering, and computer science. Over the years, we also hired anthropologists, animal biologists, neuroscientists, machine-learning researchers, historians of science, philosophers, and medical researchers. Heterogeneity enables studying a topic from multiple perspectives and exploring what is known in fields that rarely seek contact with others.
研究小组由认知和进化心理学、行为经济学、实证社会学、数学、工程和计算机科学的研究人员组成。多年来,我们还聘请了人类学家、动物生物学家、神经科学家、机器学习研究人员、科学史学家、哲学家和医学研究人员。异质性使得能够从多个角度研究一个主题,并探索那些很少与其他领域接触的领域中已知的内容。
Hiring researchers from different disciplines, however, is not enough. I have visited research centers bearing the qualifier interdisciplinary in their name, but not in their spirit. The psychologists huddled together, pursued their own topics, and published in psychology journals, while the economists stuck with other members of their tribe and published in economic journals. I worried that this state of separation could also happen to our group. The first countermeasure was to establish a common topic. The second was to establish the rule that each researcher must collaborate (and publish) with at least one person from another field. Otherwise, there is not much point in employing researchers from different fields.
从不同学科聘请研究人员是不够的。我曾访问过以跨学科为名的研究中心,但并非如其精神。心理学家们聚在一起,追求自己的课题,并在心理学期刊上发表文章,而经济学家们则与其部落的其他成员保持联系,并在经济学期刊上发表文章。我担心这种分离状态也可能发生在我们的团队中。第一个对策是建立一个共同的课题。第二个是建立规则,每位研究人员必须与至少一位来自其他领域的人合作(并发表文章)。否则,雇佣来自不同领域的研究人员就没有太大意义。
Yet, one problem remains. Engaging in interdisciplinary research means taking a risk regarding one's career, given the disappointing state of estrangement and ignorance between many fields. If a young economist publishes in premier psychological journals, that may not count much when applying for a position in an economics department. Similarly, a psychologist who succeeds in publishing in a premier medical journal may be treated as an outsider by other psychologists. I warned all new researchers of the risk they were taking when joining the group. But, I was proven wrong. In my recollection, in not a single case did departmental tunnel vision prevent a group member from finding a good position.
然而,仍然存在一个问题。从事跨学科研究意味着在职业生涯方面存在风险,鉴于许多领域之间的疏远和无知状态令人失望。如果一位年轻的经济学家在顶尖心理学期刊上发表文章,那在申请经济学系职位时可能并不重要。同样,一位成功在顶尖医学期刊上发表文章的心理学家可能会被其他心理学家视为局外人。我警告所有新研究人员加入该团队时所承担的风险。但是,我被证明是错误的。在我回忆中,没有一个部门的狭隘视野阻止团队成员找到好职位。
Finally, there is another obstacle. The principle of taking high risks implies that a number of projects will fail; otherwise they would not be so risky. This creates a dilemma for young researchers who need publications on their curriculum vitae to succeed in academia. My advice was to work on two projects, a high-risk project that enables true innovation and a lowrisk one consisting of excellent, but standard, research, which provides a safety net if the high-risk project does not pan out.
最后,还有另一个障碍。承担高风险的原则意味着许多项目将失败;否则它们就不会那么冒险。这给需要在学术界取得成功的年轻研究人员带来了两难境地。我的建议是同时进行两个项目,一个是能够实现真正创新的高风险项目,另一个是由优秀但标准的研究组成的低风险项目,如果高风险项目失败,低风险项目可以提供一个安全网。

Principle 2: Create an Open Culture
原则 2:创造开放的文化

My greatest fear was that, as a director, I would end up intellectually isolated at the top of a hierarchy. Nobody would dare to criticize my ideas
我的最大恐惧是,作为一名导演,我会在等级制度的顶端智力上被孤立起来。没有人敢批评我的想法。

openly. To make sure this did not happen, I asked three of my best American graduate students at the University of Chicago and two of my former German postdocs - all of whom I knew would not hesitate to debate my thoughts if they spotted a flaw - whether they would be willing to take a risk and embark with me into the unknown. They all agreed. These young researchers set the example of an open culture for the rest of the group, a culture of intense, critical, but respectful and factoriented discussion.
公开地。为了确保这种情况不会发生,我请了三位我在芝加哥大学最好的美国研究生和两位我以前的德国博士后——我知道他们如果发现了缺陷,不会犹豫地辩论我的想法——问他们是否愿意冒险和我一起踏上未知的旅程。他们都同意了。这些年轻的研究人员为整个团队树立了一个开放文化的榜样,一个充满强烈、批判性但尊重和以事实为导向的讨论文化。
Yet, this was not what other researchers were used to. Some newcomers were frightened by the passionate discussions, mistaking them for aggressiveness, until they realized that the critique was directed at ideas, not persons, and that a culture open to dissent is actually a "bodyguard" that protects everyone from running into harsh criticism outside the safe environment of the group. To further this protection, we put in place a rule that members preparing a talk for a conference or a job opening first had the opportunity to give their talk to the group (on top of regular weekly talks that all group members were required to give in succession). Attending everyone's practice talk is a time-consuming service but also an opportunity for the listeners to learn how to improve their own talks. The combination of an open culture, a common topic, and interdisciplinarity creates the space for a sparkling intellectual atmosphere.
然而,这并不是其他研究人员习惯的做法。一些新人被激烈的讨论吓到,误以为这是攻击性的,直到他们意识到批评是针对观点而非个人,并且一个能够容忍异议的文化实际上是一种“保镖”,可以保护每个人免受在小组安全环境之外遭受严厉批评的伤害。为了进一步加强这种保护,我们制定了一个规则,即准备在会议或工作岗位上发表演讲的成员首先有机会向小组发表演讲(除了所有小组成员都必须连续发表的定期周会演讲)。参加每个人的练习演讲是一项耗时的服务,但也是听众学习如何改进自己演讲的机会。开放的文化、共同的主题和跨学科性的结合为一个充满活力的智力氛围创造了空间。

Principle 3: Spatial Proximity
原则 3:空间接近

An open culture can work only if everyone feels accepted and trusts the others. Trust is facilitated by an environment that makes it natural for people to meet. The key features are:
一个开放的文化只有在每个人都感到被接受并信任他人时才能发挥作用。信任是由一个让人们自然相遇的环境促进的。关键特点包括:
  • Everyone on the same floor: In my experience, a group that is spread over different floors interacts half as much as when located on the same floor. If the members work in different buildings, the loss is even greater.
    同一层楼的每个人:根据我的经验,分布在不同楼层的团队互动的次数只有在同一层楼时的一半。如果成员在不同建筑物工作,损失会更大。
  • Open doors: These set a sign that visitors are welcome and opens up the space.
    打开门:这些标志着访客受欢迎,并打开了空间。
  • Tea and coffee at every day: This may appear a waste of time, but it is not. When researchers chat over personal things, that helps create trust, and when they discuss research, that helps increase the flow of information. It also provides a relaxed situation in which people can educate others on the basics of their own discipline. To make this work, the director should not demand participation, but simply set a
    每天 喝茶和咖啡:这可能看起来是浪费时间,但实际上并非如此。当研究人员谈论个人事务时,这有助于建立信任;当他们讨论研究时,这有助于增加信息流动。这也提供了一个轻松的环境,人们可以在其中向他人介绍自己学科的基础知识。为了使这项工作顺利进行,主管不应要求参与,而只需设定一个。

    model by showing up regularly. There was also an element of suspense attached to the tea and coffee hour, as everyone was eager to find out whether cake would be served that day - the cake rule is described in the section "Set Collective Goals."
    通过定期出现来树立榜样。茶歇和咖啡时间还带有一种悬念,因为每个人都渴望知道那天是否会供应蛋糕 - 蛋糕规则在“设定集体目标”部分有描述。

Principle 4: Temporal Proximity
原则 4:时间接近

One problem I had encountered in other research groups was that the first people who joined the group tended to look down on or even patronize those who came later as if these were their younger siblings. To avoid such a "birth-order problem," I made sure that all members of the initial group started on the same day. This created a level playing field from the beginning. The downside of this rule is that the administration can be overwhelmed for a short time by the simultaneous appearance of so many new people. But arriving at the same time and figuring out together how things work in an unfamiliar environment fosters bonding.
我在其他研究小组遇到的一个问题是,最先加入小组的人往往看不起甚至居高临下地对待后来加入的人,好像这些人是他们的晚辈。为了避免这种“出生顺序问题”,我确保所有最初小组成员在同一天开始。这从一开始就创造了一个公平竞争的环境。这一规则的缺点是,管理可能会在短时间内被如此多新人的同时出现所压倒。但同时到达并一起探索在陌生环境中如何运作,有助于加强联系。

How to Maintain the Culture
如何维护文化

Once an open culture is established, a new challenge emerges: How can one maintain the culture in the ever-changing composition of a research group? Postdocs and graduate students typically leave after 3 or 4 years, while researchers may stay longer, for 5 to 10 years. In addition, research groups tend to grow if successful. In the ABC Research Group, more than I 50 predocs, postdocs, researchers, senior researchers, and guests participated over the years. For me, the struggle was finding a balance between giving direction and not directing too much. With too little direction, the group would lose sight of the common topic; with too much direction, I would become oblivious to new ideas that the group developed. I had no experience with running such a large group, but did have experience in running a band before entering academia. So, I decided to run the group as a jam session, not as a conductor that directs from a podium.
一旦建立了开放的文化,就会出现一个新挑战:如何在研究小组不断变化的构成中保持文化?博士后和研究生通常在 3 到 4 年后离开,而研究人员可能会留更长时间,5 到 10 年。此外,如果成功,研究小组往往会扩大。在 ABC 研究小组,多达 50 多名博士后、研究人员、高级研究人员和客人多年来参与其中。对我来说,挣扎在于在给予方向和不过多指导之间找到平衡。指导太少,小组会失去共同话题;指导太多,我会对小组发展的新想法视而不见。我没有经验来管理如此庞大的小组,但在进入学术界之前有过乐队管理经验。因此,我决定将小组作为即兴演奏会来管理,而不是作为指挥员从指挥台上指挥。

Set Collective Goals 设定集体目标

A collective goal requires the collaboration of many researchers; it cannot be achieved by a single person. In the case of our group, the first goal was to write a book together that laid out the research program and the first
一个集体目标需要许多研究人员的合作;它不能由一个人单独实现。在我们小组的情况下,第一个目标是一起撰写一本书,概述研究计划和第一个。

results. We wrote Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart in the first 3 years of the group's existence. The unique feature of Simple Heuristics was its intense collaborative nature, written by a highly motivated and efficient group of 18 researchers, all of whom were familiar with the others' research. Each chapter had between two and five authors, but most authors had their hands (and writing) in many other chapters. In numerous meetings and retreats and over games of ping-pong, we collectively went through each sentence of the book.
我们在小组成立的头 3 年里写了《简单启发:让我们变聪明的启发法则》。《简单启发》的独特特点是其密切的合作性质,由一群高度积极和高效的 18 名研究人员共同撰写,所有人都熟悉其他人的研究。每一章都有两到五名作者,但大多数作者在许多其他章节中都有参与(和写作)。在众多会议和撤退以及乒乓球比赛中,我们共同审查了书中的每一句话。
The next collective goals were two follow-up books, Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World and Simple Heuristics in a Social World. Each was authored by two of us along with the entire research group. This emphasized the collaborative nature of these books, but posed a challenge for librarians as it generated a new genre of books. Previously, only edited books had individually authored chapters, but, here, there were no editors and the entire ABC Research Group was named as the collective coauthor of the book.
接下来的集体目标是两本后续书籍,分别是《生态合理性:世界智慧》和《社会世界中的简单启发式》。每本书由我们两人和整个研究小组共同撰写。这强调了这些书籍的合作性质,但对图书馆员提出了挑战,因为它产生了一种新的书籍类型。以前,只有编辑过的书籍有单独作者的章节,但在这里,没有编辑,整个 ABC 研究小组被命名为书籍的集体合著者。
While trying to complete these two follow-up books, we ran into a problem. Many of the original team of authors had left to take up professorships around the world, so spatial proximity was no longer a possibility for everyone. These books had to be written without the advantage of everyone being on the same floor, open doors, and daily tea and coffee together. We tried to counteract this physical separation by inviting coauthors abroad to join us in retreats, such as at the beautiful Ringberg castle in Bavaria, owned by the Max Planck Society, where we could discuss research face-to-face. Nevertheless, these books took much longer to complete than Simple Heuristics.
在努力完成这两本后续书籍时,我们遇到了问题。原来的作者团队中许多人已经离开去世界各地担任教授,因此空间上的接近不再是每个人的可能性。这些书必须在没有每个人都在同一楼层、敞开的门和每天一起喝茶和咖啡的优势下撰写。我们试图通过邀请海外的合著者加入我们在撤退中,比如在拜仁州美丽的林贝格城堡,这座城堡由马克斯·普朗克学会拥有,我们可以面对面地讨论研究。然而,这些书的完成时间比《简单的启发法》要长得多。
We also set goals about publishing articles, but in terms of quality rather than quantity. The premier journals in a field are one marker of quality. For instance, we aimed to publish one paper a year in the Psychological Review. Indeed, we published 20 papers in the journal over the first 20 years of the group's existence, which turned out to be more than any psychological department worldwide in terms of papers per capita. At the same time, we published in the top journals of medicine, economics, management, philosophy, and other fields, as well as in prestigious interdisciplinary journals such as Science.
我们也设定了关于发表文章的目标,但更注重质量而非数量。一个领域内的顶尖期刊是质量的一个标志。例如,我们的目标是每年在《心理评论》上发表一篇论文。事实上,在小组成立的头 20 年里,我们在该期刊上发表了 20 篇论文,这比全球任何心理学系的人均论文数量都要多。与此同时,我们还在医学、经济学、管理学、哲学等领域的顶尖期刊上发表论文,以及在《科学》等知名跨学科期刊上发表论文。
Some university departments pay researchers a cash bonus for publishing in a top journal or pay a sum that increases with the impact factor of the journal. This economic view of research is a matter of taste; it replaces scientific curiosity with monetary calculation and encourages individualistic competition and a focus on metrics. In our research group, we introduced the cake rule that takes the opposite approach: If a paper is accepted or published, the first author brings cake for the entire group. This rule respects the fact that most ideas have been inspired by the entire group over tea and coffee or in other discussions. It violates the theory of economic incentives because the author does not receive the reinforcement, but, instead, rewards everyone else. Nevertheless, the cake rule worked well and increased our publication record.
一些大学部门会给研究人员在顶级期刊发表论文时支付现金奖金,或者支付一个随期刊影响因子增加而增加的金额。这种经济视角的研究是一种品味问题;它用货币计算取代了科学好奇心,鼓励个人竞争和关注指标。在我们的研究小组中,我们引入了“蛋糕规则”,采取了相反的方法:如果一篇论文被接受或发表,第一作者会为整个小组带来蛋糕。这个规则尊重了大多数想法是在茶水和咖啡或其他讨论中受到整个小组启发的事实。它违反了经济激励理论,因为作者没有得到强化,而是奖励了其他所有人。尽管如此,“蛋糕规则”运作良好,并增加了我们的发表记录。

How to Deal With Growth
如何处理成长

Successful research groups tend to increase magically, by attracting guest researchers and visitors. And unexpected events happen. In the case of our group, the London investment banker David Harding, after reading my book Reckoning with Risk (US title: Calculated Risk), gave us a generous private donation that enabled us to found the Harding Center for Risk Literacy, which focuses on risk communication in health and beyond. The second unexpected fact was that many of the researchers who had left for a professorship at a university or a job in a tech company kept coming back home to their "family" for days or weeks. As a result, the group grew to about 35 members plus a dozen student assistants and about io IT and support staff, not counting the guest researchers and homecoming members. The floor became overly crowded, which required new heuristics to deal with growth.
成功的研究团队往往会神奇地增加,吸引客座研究员和访客。意想不到的事件发生了。就我们团队而言,伦敦投资银行家大卫·哈丁(David Harding)在阅读了我的书《风险的算账》(美国版名为《计算风险》)后,慷慨捐赠给我们一笔私人捐款,使我们得以成立哈丁风险素养中心,专注于健康及其他领域的风险沟通。第二个意外的事实是,许多离开去大学担任教授或去科技公司工作的研究人员不断回到他们的“家庭”待上几天或几周。结果,团队成员增加到约 35 人,还有十几名学生助手和约 10 名 IT 和支持人员,不包括客座研究员和回家的成员。楼层变得过于拥挤,需要新的启发法来应对增长。
  • Maintain spatial proximity: When we ran out of space, the architect proposed constructing a new building for the newcomers. I vetoed the proposal because that would have split the group. Instead, we extended the existing building horizontally, so that everyone could still be on the same floor.
    保持空间接近:当我们的空间不够用时,建筑师建议为新来的人建造一栋新楼。我否决了这个提议,因为那样会分裂团队。相反,我们横向扩建了现有建筑,这样每个人仍然可以在同一层楼上。
  • Avoid temporal proximity: The culture of a research group is handed on to newcomers by explicit rules, but, equally important, by implicit learning, through the imitation of how things are done. This illustrates a successful application of the imitate-your-peers heuristic (see
    避免时间上的接近:研究小组的文化通过明确规则传授给新人,同样重要的是通过隐性学习,通过模仿事物的做法。这说明了模仿同行启发式的成功应用。
Chapter 7). In that way, the open culture lives on even if none of the initial group is still present. This implicit learning process would end abruptly if all or most members were to leave at the same time and be replaced by new people. An entire working culture would be lost. A good rule is never to hire more people at one point in time than there
第 7 章)。这样,即使最初的团队成员都不在了,开放的文化仍然延续下去。如果所有或大多数成员同时离开并被新人取代,这种隐性学习过程将突然终止。整个工作文化将会丧失。一个好的规则是永远不要一次雇佣更多的人。

are old members. Temporal proximity - starting all members of the group at the same point in time - is ideal for setting up a new group, but fatal later on. Only if the existing group were no longer operating well would it be a smart strategy.
是老成员。 时间接近 - 在同一时间点开始组内所有成员 - 是建立新组的理想选择,但后来却是致命的。 只有当现有组织运作不佳时,这才是明智的策略。
  • Introduce a tutorial system: In a small group, members learn by doing, and more spontaneity is possible, such as announcing a spontaneous talk in order to present a new discovery or asking for advice on an issue. The larger the group is, the more structural measures it requires to support the learning process. In our group, these measures included a schedule of talks where each member presented the current research at regular intervals, a I-year course for newcomers that covered Simple Heuristics and other classics, a 4-day retreat for the entire group every year, and an annual Summer Institute on Bounded Rationality.
    介绍一个教程系统:在一个小组中,成员通过实践学习,更多的自发性是可能的,比如宣布一个即兴演讲以展示一个新的发现或者就某个问题征求建议。小组规模越大,就需要更多的结构性措施来支持学习过程。在我们的小组中,这些措施包括一个演讲时间表,每个成员定期展示当前研究成果,为新人提供的为期一年的课程,涵盖简单的启发式和其他经典内容,每年为整个小组举办的为期四天的撤退,以及每年一次的有限理性夏季学院。
  • Side-by-side writing: Most young researchers who entered our group had never been taught how to write an article. One of the key heuristics we introduced to fill this void was that a more experienced researcher sat side-by-side with a younger one in front of the computer screen. They discussed the design of the article together as well as the wording of every sentence. Useful questions include: What do we really want to say with this sentence? Do we need this sentence at all? Do we need all the words in it? Did we define the concepts, and are we using different words for the same concept? Side-by-side writing also benefits experienced researchers. It is simultaneous and interactive, and many new ideas can emerge from it. Creativity happens less often if one researcher writes a draft alone, sends it to a coauthor who then revises it alone, and so on. Side-by-side writing is a much more enjoyable and profitable process.
    并排写作:我们小组中进入的大多数年轻研究人员从未接受过如何撰写文章的教导。我们引入的填补这一空白的关键启发是,一位经验丰富的研究人员与一位年轻研究人员并排坐在计算机屏幕前。他们一起讨论文章的设计以及每个句子的措辞。有用的问题包括:我们真正想用这个句子表达什么?我们真的需要这个句子吗?我们需要其中的所有词吗?我们是否定义了概念,并且我们是否在使用不同的词来表示相同的概念?并排写作也有益于经验丰富的研究人员。这是同时进行的互动过程,许多新想法可以从中涌现。如果一个研究人员独自撰写草稿,然后将其发送给一位合著者,后者再独自进行修订等等,创造力发生的频率就会降低。并排写作是一个更加愉快和有益的过程。
  • Exploit cultural diversity: A benefit of growth is that it allows for more cultural diversity. It adds to the disciplinary diversity of a research group, but in a different way. Being in close contact with researchers from other countries facilitates the insight that one's own views about work, life, and science are not carved into stone, but a matter of one's cultural upbringing. Thus, they can be changed. Most important, experiencing the cultural contingency directly - in what others fear, what risks they take, and how they make (or avoid) decisions - helps develop a critical view about theories that assume a universal being, from Homo economicus to Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) societies, which comprise only about I 2 percent of the world's population. Sharing space, cake, and an open
    利用文化多样性:增长的好处是它允许更多的文化多样性。它增加了研究小组的学科多样性,但方式不同。与其他国家的研究人员密切接触有助于认识到自己对工作、生活和科学的看法并非铭刻在石头上,而是文化背景的问题。因此,它们是可以改变的。最重要的是,直接体验文化的偶然性——别人害怕什么、他们冒什么风险以及如何做出(或避免)决策——有助于发展对那些假设存在普遍存在的理论的批判观点,从经济人到西方、受过教育、工业化、富裕和民主(WEIRD)社会,这些社会仅占世界人口的约 12%。分享空间、蛋糕和一个开放的

    culture enabled the group members to become good friends who helped each other in research and nonresearch activities and, even after leaving the group, maintained contact and collaboration across continents.
    文化使团队成员成为彼此在研究和非研究活动中互相帮助的好朋友,即使离开团队后,他们仍保持跨洲联系和合作。
Growth provides benefits but also problems. I will never forget the day when I realized that I could no longer precisely describe what every predoc and postdoc in the group was working on. For me, that illuminating moment was one of extreme discomfort. The lesson is: Let the group grow, but not by too much and not too fast.
成长带来好处,但也带来问题。我永远不会忘记那一天,当我意识到我再也无法准确描述组里每个博士前和博士后在做什么时。对我来说,那个启发性的时刻是极度不舒服的。教训是:让团队成长,但不要太多,也不要太快。

Distribute Responsibility
分配责任

Collective research requires not only an intellectually open culture but also a group spirit, that is, an identification with a group's culture. Identification is facilitated when each member takes on a task that serves the entire group. This is why we distributed the tasks of running the group so that everyone was allocated one task for which they alone were responsible, including the power to make related decisions. These tasks ranged from organizing and running the talks, retreats, the Summer Institute, and the tutorial system for newcomers to purchasing tea and coffee. Distributing tasks so that everyone has full responsibility in one area ensures that no one remains simply a passive member, and it enhances transparency. Everyone knows whom to congratulate or blame - all decisions are made within the group. Responsibility can thus be distributed in the form of a division of labor but also by means of collective decisions, as in hiring.
集体研究不仅需要一种思想开放的文化,还需要一种团体精神,即对团体文化的认同。当每个成员承担为整个团体服务的任务时,认同感就会得到促进。这就是为什么我们分配了管理团体的任务,以便每个人都被分配一个他们独自负责的任务,包括做出相关决策的权力。这些任务涵盖了组织和管理讨论、撤退、暑期学院以及新人的导师制度,以及购买茶和咖啡。通过分配任务,确保每个人在一个领域拥有全面的责任,从而确保没有人仅仅是一个被动成员,并增强透明度。每个人都知道该向谁表示祝贺或责备 - 所有决策都是在团体内做出的。因此,责任可以通过分工的形式分配,也可以通过集体决策的方式分配,比如招聘。
To maintain the intellectual spirit in a research group, carefully selecting and hiring new members is important. In many institutions, the director makes the decision based on a set of candidates preselected by someone else. This may lead to sensible choices, but the group is left out and does not share any responsibility. At the other extreme, letting every member vote and using the majority rule would install shared responsibility, but introduce a quality problem because beginners may not be aware of what qualities more senior positions require. To avoid this drawback, we introduced a majority rule system with equal votes for those who were at least at the same level in the academic hierarchy as the advertised positions. That is, when hiring predocs, everyone in the group has a vote; when hiring postdocs, everyone except the predocs vote, and, when hiring researchers, only the other researchers vote. At the same time, all can participate in the
为了保持研究团队的智力精神,精心选择和聘请新成员是重要的。在许多机构中,主任根据由他人预先筛选的一组候选人做出决定。这可能会导致明智的选择,但团队被排除在外,不承担任何责任。另一方面,让每个成员投票并使用多数规则将安装共同责任,但会引入一个质量问题,因为初学者可能不了解更高级职位需要什么素质。为了避免这种缺点,我们引入了一个多数规则系统,对于至少与广告职位在学术等级上相同水平的人,给予平等的选票。也就是说,当聘用预博士时,团队中的每个人都有一票;当聘用博士后时,除了预博士外,每个人都有选票;当聘用研究员时,只有其他研究员有选票。同时,所有人都可以参与其中。

discussion before the votes are taken. In this way, everyone is included and held accountable, shares responsibility, and is motivated to engage actively in the hiring process. The downside is that I was outvoted from time to time, but that is the price for distributed responsibility.
在进行投票之前进行讨论。这样,每个人都被纳入并承担责任,共享责任,并被激励积极参与招聘过程。不利之处是有时我会被否决,但这是分散责任的代价。
To make the hiring process transparent not only to the group but also to the applicants, an unusual rule is to invite applicants to be present during all job talks. In our group, these typically lasted over I or 2 days, and we hired more than one person. The applicants were surprised to be invited to stay with us and listen to the other job talks. This openness makes the hiring process more transparent and provides a unique opportunity for applicants to learn from the other applicants - and for us to see how they interact with competitors.
为了使招聘过程对团队和申请者都更加透明,一个不同寻常的规则是邀请申请者在所有工作讨论中都出席。在我们的团队中,这些讨论通常持续一两天,我们雇佣了不止一人。申请者对被邀请留下来与我们一起听其他工作讨论感到惊讶。这种开放性使招聘过程更加透明,并为申请者提供了一个与其他申请者学习的独特机会,也让我们看到他们如何与竞争对手互动。
For support staff, the procedure was similar. When we hired a new office assistant, the other assistants had the freedom to read all applications and select 5-10 candidates for an interview. To the applicants' surprise, they were exclusively interviewed by their potential future colleagues, who also gave them practical tests. It is only rational to rely on the office assistants' judgment; they know better than myself or the other researchers who is competent, they want someone whose chemistry fits with theirs and the group, and they certainly do not want someone who would do less work than they do. Only after the number of candidates had been reduced to two or three final candidates, did I enter the picture and make the choice. This relieved the office staff from responsibility if something went wrong. Once, at the insistence of some researchers who were impressed by an applicant's academic record, I violated this procedure and hired their preferred candidate rather than the one preferred by the office staff. It turned out to be a poor decision.
对于支持人员,程序是类似的。当我们雇佣新的办公室助理时,其他助理有自由阅读所有申请并选择 5-10 名候选人进行面试。令申请者惊讶的是,他们被潜在未来同事独家面试,后者还给他们进行实际测试。依赖办公室助理的判断是理性的;他们比我或其他研究人员更了解谁是胜任的,他们希望找到与他们和团队化学相符的人,他们当然不希望找到比他们工作更少的人。只有在候选人数量减少到两三名最终候选人后,我才会介入并做出选择。这让办公室员工免除了如果出了问题的责任。有一次,在一些研究人员坚持下,他们对一位申请者的学术记录印象深刻,我违反了这一程序,雇佣了他们偏好的候选人而不是办公室员工偏好的候选人。结果证明这是一个糟糕的决定。

Secure Open Culture 安全开放文化

An open culture of intense, but respectful and fact-orientated, discussion is an asset that needs to be secured. We introduced measures to protect this culture.
一种开放的文化,充满了激烈但尊重和以事实为导向的讨论,这是需要保护的资产。我们采取了措施来保护这种文化。
  • Be sure to include a contrarian: Every research group can benefit from (at least) one contrarian, that is, a person who dares to question the group's and the director's wisdom, plays devil's advocate, insists on evidence, and questions what others take for granted. Such a person is sometimes frustrating, but actually provides a great service by protecting the group from falling prey to groupthink. For that reason,
    一定要包括一个持不同意见者:每个研究小组都可以从(至少)一个持不同意见者中受益,也就是说,一个敢于质疑小组和主任智慧的人,扮演魔鬼的辩护者,坚持证据,并质疑其他人视为理所当然的事情。这样的人有时会令人沮丧,但实际上通过保护小组免受集体思维的侵害,提供了巨大的服务。因此,

    when selecting new group members, we preferred those who found some fault or disagreement with our research findings in their application letter, rather than those who politely praised our research. Moreover, if external scholars had a strong disagreement with the group, we flew them in for a visit to discuss the issue in person. When the Times Higher Education approached me to write a piece on the importance of devil's advocates for better science, I asked about a hundred former members of my research group for their recollections. To my surprise, many of them perceived themselves as having been the contrarian, and one long-term member countered: "You were the contrarian."
    在选择新团队成员时,我们更喜欢那些在申请信中对我们的研究结果提出一些批评或不同意见的人,而不是那些客套地赞扬我们的研究的人。此外,如果外部学者对团队有强烈的不同意见,我们会邀请他们来访谈,面对面地讨论问题。当《泰晤士高等教育》杂志找我撰写一篇关于魔鬼辩护者对于更好科学的重要性的文章时,我询问了大约一百位我研究团队的前成员回忆。令我惊讶的是,许多人认为自己是持不同意见的人,而一位长期成员反驳说:“你才是持不同意见的人。”
  • Make bets: Arguments and disagreements often lead to people going on and on and repeating what they have already said. An efficient heuristic is to stop this process early and offer the other side a bet. This forces both sides to state their arguments or predictions precisely so that the bet can be resolved. Some are easy to decide, such as who wrote what, while others may require running a simulation. On some days, I had several bets going on. The prize was mostly cake for the entire group, which turned the disagreement into a social event and the person who lost the bet into a benefactor to everyone else.
    下注:争论和分歧通常会导致人们不断重复已经说过的话。一种有效的启发式方法是及早停止这个过程,并向对方提出下注。这迫使双方准确陈述他们的论点或预测,以便解决下注。有些很容易决定,比如谁写了什么,而其他可能需要运行模拟。有些日子,我有几个下注。奖品大多是整个团队的蛋糕,这将分歧转变为社交活动,而输掉下注的人成为了其他人的恩人。

Heuristics Shape Research Culture
启发式塑造研究文化

The principles I have outlined in this chapter can be thought of as heuristic rules that create and maintain the culture of a research group. These rules are partly created intuitively, revised deliberately, and eventually develop into a group's collective intuition. They are called heuristic rather than optimal because there is no single way to create the best of all groups. Heuristics include higher level principles, such as those of the Max Planck institutes for hiring directors, as mentioned, which can be rephrased as "Hire well, and let them to their job." "Hire well" establishes quality; "let them do their job" creates a climate of trust. I applied this policy to my entire staff too, so that it was not an exclusive privilege for me. Other heuristics are meant for the micromanaging level, such as to resolve an argument by offering a bet. These can be further distinguished into heuristics that shape the research environment, such as spatial proximity, and heuristics for dealing with other people. This repertoire needs to be adapted to the specific goals and environments. Together, the repertoire of heuristics molds the intellectual and social climate. The toolbox of an institution, a director, or a group influences whether the culture will become more or less formal, more or less inclusive, and more or less open.
我在本章中概述的原则可以被视为启发式规则,用于创建和维护研究小组的文化。这些规则部分是直觉地创建的,经过有意识的修订,最终发展成为小组的集体直觉。它们被称为启发式而不是最佳,因为没有一种单一的方式可以创造最好的所有小组。启发式包括更高层次的原则,比如马克斯·普朗克研究所聘请主任的原则,如前所述,可以重新表述为“聘请优秀人才,让他们做好自己的工作。”“聘请优秀人才”确立了质量;“让他们做好自己的工作”创造了信任氛围。我也将这一政策应用于我的整个员工,这样它就不再是我独享的特权。其他启发式是针对微观管理层面的,比如通过提出赌注来解决争论。这些启发式可以进一步区分为塑造研究环境的启发式,比如空间接近,以及处理其他人的启发式。这一系列需要根据具体的目标和环境进行调整。总的来说,启发式的系列塑造了智力和社会氛围。 一个机构、一个主管或一个团体的工具箱会影响文化是变得更正式还是更随意,更包容还是更排他,更开放还是更封闭。

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Index 索引

I/N, II2 我/恩,II2
ABC Research Group, 14I-I 52
ABC 研究小组,14I-I 52
adaptive toolbox, of heuristics, 40, 91-103
自适应工具箱,启发式,40,91-103
Administrative Behavior (Simon), 93
行政行为(西蒙),93
Against Autonomy (Conly), 75
反对自主权(Conly),75
algorithms 算法
intuition and, I5, 82-85
直觉和,I5,82-85
misrepresentation of,
误传,
technological paternalism and, 81, 82-85
技术专制主义和,81,82-85
Animal and Plants Under Domestication
动物和植物的驯化
(Darwin), 34 (达尔文),34
Aquinas, Thomas, 2 阿奎那,托马斯,2
Ariely, Dan, II, 45
阿里利,丹,II,45
Aristotle 亚里士多德
gender bias and, 2 I
性别偏见和,2 我
on paternalism, 69 在家长式管理方面,69
view of peculiar female intelligence and, 22
奇特女性智慧的观点,22
on women's memory, 24
在女性的记忆中,24
Arkes, Hal, 64 阿克斯,哈尔,64
artificial intelligence (AI)
人工智能(AI)
intuition and,  直觉和,
intuition as challenge to,
直觉作为挑战,
as-if model, II 5-117
仿佛模型,II 5-117
Asian disease problem, 49-5 I
亚洲疾病问题,49-5 I
aspiration level, I06-107, I29-130
愿望水平,I06-107,I29-130
authority ranking, I 30
权威排名,我 30
Automatic System. See System I thinking
自动系统。看到我在思考的系统
Bacon, Francis, I4 培根,弗朗西斯,14
Bayes' theorem, 45, 6I, 63-64
贝叶斯定理,45,6I,63-64
Bayesian reasoning,
贝叶斯推理,
Beach, Lee Roy, 60
海滩,李罗伊,60
Becker, Gary, 57, 130
贝克尔,加里,57,130
Berlin, Isaiah, 70 柏林,艾萨亚,70
Bezos, Jeff, 97-99 贝索斯,杰夫,97-99
bias. See also gender bias
偏见。另请参阅性别偏见。
citation,  引用,
exponential growth, 16 指数增长,16
racial,  种族,
bias bias, II-I4, I6, 47
偏见偏见,II-I4,I6,47
dual-process theory and, 67 framing effect and,
双过程理论和,67 框架效应和,
general principles of, 59
一般原则,59
governmental paternalism and, I2-I4
政府的家长式主义和,I2-I4
hot hand fallacy and,
热手谬误和,
intelligent inference and,
智能推理和,
irregular sequences and, 55
不规则序列和,55
law of small numbers and, 52-55
小数定律和,52-55
logical rationality and,
逻辑合理性和,
randomness and,  随机性和,
stubborness and, 6I-64 固执和,6I-64
biased sample estimators, 56
偏倚样本估计器,56
Binet, Alfred, 27-30 比奈,阿尔弗雷德,27-30
boosting, 73-75 提升,73-75
paternalism and, 69, 71
家长式管理和,69,71
Boring, Edwin, 38 无聊,埃德温,38
Browning, Christopher,
布朗宁,克里斯托弗,
Bruegel, Pieter, I25 布呂蓋爾,彼得,I25
Buffon's needle algorithm,
布丰针算法,
Carlson, Magnus, I 卡尔森,马格努斯,我
Catholic doctrine, I28-130
天主教教义,I28-130
Cattell, James McKeen, 27
卡特尔,詹姆斯·麦金,27
certainty, 2-3, 47 确定性,2-3,47
cheap twin paradox, 107
廉价的双胞胎悖论,107
Chomsky, Noam, I33 乔姆斯基,诺姆,I33
cognition, embodied, IO9
认知,具体化,IO9
collaboration, I4I 合作,I4I
Common Sense (Paine), 14
常识(潘恩),14
communal sharing, 130 共享,130
comradeship, I36-137 同志情谊,I36-137
Conly, Sarah, 75 康利,莎拉,75
coordination, predator-prey, I19-12I
协调,捕食者-猎物,I19-12I
coordination problems, 117-118
协调问题,117-118
correlation, surrogate, 104
相关性,替代品,104
Covid-I9, I6 Covid-19,I6
Csikszentmihalyi, Mike, 56
奇克森特米哈伊,迈克,56
Darwin, Charles, 26-27, 132-133
达尔文,查尔斯,26-27,132-133
Dawkins, Richard, 113 道金斯,理查德,113
decision theory, IIo 决策理论,IIo
default choices,  默认选择,
Descartes, René, 2-3, IO7
笛卡尔,勒内,2-3,IO7
descriptive invariance, 50,59
描述不变性,50,59
direct pursuit heuristic,
直接追求启发式,
dominant cue condition, IOO
主导线索条件,IOO
dual-system theory, II, 43, 65-67
双系统理论,II,43,65-67
gaze heuristics and, I I 8
凝视启发和,我我 8
echolocation, I2 I 回声定位,I2 I
ecological morality, 140
生态道德,140
comradeship and,  同志情谊和,
fairness and, 135 公平和 135
imitation and, I35 模仿和,I35
moral luck and, I39
道德运气和,I39
social heuristics and,
社会启发和,
ecological rationality, , 96-106, I29
生态合理性, ,96-106,I29
adaptive toolbox and, 40, 97, 103-108
自适应工具箱和,40,97,103-108
fluency heuristic and,
流畅启发式和,
moral intuition and, I27-I28
道德直觉和,I27-I28
one-good-reason heuristics and, Ioo
一个好理由启发和,Ioo
recognition heuristic and, 104-105
识别启发式和,104-105
Vernon Smith and, 107-108
弗农·史密斯和,107-108
Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World, 147
生态合理性:世界智慧,147
Edwards, Ward, 6I, 64
爱德华兹,沃德,6I,64
Einstein, Albert, 2, 10
爱因斯坦,阿尔伯特,2,10
Ellis, Havelock, 23, 34-36
埃利斯,哈维洛克,23,34-36
embodied heuristics 具体化启发式
ants as illustration of, III-I I 2
蚂蚁作为插图,III-I I 2
gaze heuristic and, II 5, I23-I24
凝视启发式和,II 5,I23-I24
equality heuristic, I35 平等启发式,I35
equality matching,  平等匹配,
equivalence, logical, 52
等价,逻辑,52
evolutionary theory, 96 进化论,96
development of intuition and, IO9-I I I
直觉和 IO9-I I I 的发展
intelligence and, 26-27 智能和,26-27
moral intuition and,
道德直觉和,
exaptation, II8-II9 外适应,II8-II9
expected utility maximization, , I 43
预期效用最大化, ,I 43
experience, 3-6 经验,3-6
Eysenck, Hans-Jürgen, 32
艾森克,汉斯-尤尔根,32
fairness, I35 公平,I35
fast-and-frugal heuristic, 98 , IOI-IO3, II2, I39
快速简便的启发式,98,IOI-IO3,II2,I39
fast-and-frugal trees, 99, IOI-IO3
快速简约树,99,IOI-IO3
Feynman, Richard, 5 I
费曼,理查德,5 I
The Fight Between Carnival and Lent (Bruegel), I25
《狂欢与斋戒之间的斗争》(布呂盖尔),I25
Fiske, Alan, 130 菲斯克,艾伦,130
flow,  流动,
fluency 流利
intuition and,  直觉和,
fluency heuristic, , 103
流畅启发式, ,103
framing effect, I 框架效应,
Franklin, Benjamin, I 26 富兰克林,本杰明,我 26
French ministerial commission on the education of "abnormal" children, 27
法国教育部关于“异常”儿童的委员会,27
frequencies, natural, 63
频率,自然,63
Freud, Sigmund, 6 弗洛伊德,西格蒙德,6
Galton, Francis, 23, 26-27
高尔顿,弗朗西斯,23,26-27
gambler's fallacy, 55 赌徒谬误,55
gaze heuristic, II3-I24 凝视启发式,II3-I24
as embodied heuristic, II 5, I23-I24
作为具体体现的启发式,II 5,I23-I24
as-if model and, II5-117
仿佛模型和,II5-117
coordination problems and, II7-II8
协调问题和,II7-II8
dual-system theories and, II8
双系统理论和,II8
echolocation and,  回声定位和,
exaptation and, II8-II9 exaptation 和,II8-II9
Royal Air Force (RAF) and,
皇家空军(RAF)和,
Tizzy Angle and, I22
Tizzy Angle 和,I22
whiskers and, I2 I
胡须和,I2 I
gender bias 性别偏见
Aristotle and,  亚里士多德和,
female intuition and, 23-25
女性直觉和,23-25
Hall and, 22 大厅和,22
intelligence and,  智能和,
intuition and, IO-I I
直觉和,IO-I I
Kant and, 2 I
康德和,2 我
male reason and,  男性的理性和,
moral virtue and, 24-25
道德美德和,24-25
in popular psychology, 39
在流行心理学中,39
theories of female intelligence and, 22-23
女性智力理论和,22-23
variability hypothesis and,
变异性假说和,
view of peculiar female intelligence and,
独特女性智慧的观点和,
Gödel, Escher, Bach (Hofstadter), 85
哥德尔,艾舍尔,巴赫(霍夫斯塔特),85
Goldstein, Daniel, 76 戈尔德斯坦,丹尼尔,76
GPT-3, 85-86 GPT-3,85-86
great rationality debate, the, 12
伟大的理性辩论,12
Haidt, Jonathan, I27, 139
海德特,乔纳森,I27,139
Hall, G. Stanley, 2 I-22, 24, 38
霍尔,G.斯坦利,2 I-22,24,38
Halpern, Diane, 39 哈尔班,戴安,39
Harari, Yuval, 82, 83-85
哈拉瑞,尤瓦尔,82,83-85
Harding Center for Risk Literacy, 148
哈丁风险素养中心,148
Harding, David, 148 哈丁,大卫,148
Helmholtz, Hermann von, 2-3, 47, I Io
赫尔姆霍兹,赫尔曼·冯,2-3,47,I Io
Hereditary Genius (Galton), 26
遗传天才(高尔顿),26
Hertwig, Ralph, 64 赫特维格,拉尔夫,64
heuristics 启发式
I/N, II 2 我/你,II 2
adaptive, 103-108 自适应,103-108
and, 40  和,40
biases and, 15 偏见和,15
conscious and unconscious use of, 67,98 , 107, II3, II8
有意识和无意识的使用,67,98,107,113,118
deliberate use of,  故意使用,
direct pursuit, I20, I22 直接追求,I20,I22
heuristics (cont.) 启发式(续)
ecological rationality and, 93,96-106
生态合理性和,93,96-106
embodied, III-I I2, II 5
具体体现,III-I I2,II 5
equality, I35 平等,I35
fast-and-frugal, 98, IO3, 139
快速而节俭,98,IO3,139
fast-and-frugal trees, 99, 1OI-IO3
快速简约树,99,1OI-IO3
fluency,  流利,
gaze, II3-I24 凝视,II3-I24
intuitive use of,  直观使用,
Max Planck Society and, I42
马克斯·普朗克学会和,I42
one-good-reason, 98 , 100
一个好理由,98,100
recognition, 103-106 认知,103-106
research culture and, 152
研究文化和 152
satisficing, IO6-IO7 满足,IO6-IO7
social, 4I, I27-I28, I32-I39
社交,4I,I27-I28,I32-I39
social narratives and,
社会叙事和,
Hofstadter, Douglas, 85 霍夫斯塔特,道格拉斯,85
Homo Deus (Harari), 83
《赫拉利的未来简史》(《Homo Deus》),第 83 页
homo economicus, 44 经济人,44
hot hand fallacy,  热手谬误,
Hug, Klaus, I3 I
拥抱,克劳斯,I3 I
Hume, David, 2, I28
休谟,大卫,2,I28
imitation, 135 模仿,135
inference, intelligent,
推理,智能,
inferences, invited, 47 推断,邀请,47
inferences, unconscious, 47, IIO
推断,无意识,47,IIO
Inhelder, Bärbel, i I 6 , 60
Inhelder,Bärbel,i I 6,60
instincts, social, 132 本能,社会,132
intelligence 智能
evolutionary theory and, 25
进化理论和,25
failures to measure, 27
测量失败,27
gender bias and,  性别偏见和,
general, 25, 27, 30,38
一般,25,27,30,38
genetic ability and,
遗传能力和,
invention of,  发明,
measurement of,  测量,
peculiar female,  奇特的女性,
personality and,  个性和,
racial bias and,  种族偏见和,
theories of female, 22-23
女性理论,22-23
variability hypothesis and, 34-37
变异性假说和,34-37
The Intelligence Controversy (Eysenck and Kamin), 32
智力争议(艾森克和卡明),32
intuition, 3 直觉,3
algorithms and, 15, 82-85
算法和,15,82-85
artificial intelligence (AI) and,
人工智能(AI)和,
Bayesian, 63-64 贝叶斯,63-64
blame for political failure and, 76
政治失败的责任,76
certainty and,  确定性和,
as challenge to   的挑战
chess and, I 国际象棋和,我
cognitive biases and, I I
认知偏见和,我我
defining features of,
定义特征,
dichotomy with reason, evolutionary development of, IO9-III
理性的二分法, 演化发展,IO9-III
experience and, 3-6 经验和,3-6
explicit learning and, 9
显性学习和,9
fluency and, 4-5 流利和,4-5
gender bias and, IO-II
性别偏见和,IO-II
growth of psychology and, 42-43
心理学的增长,42-43
heuristic use of, 97-99
启发式使用,97-99
implicit learning and,
隐性学习和,
irrationality and, 2,76 不理性和,2,76
logic and,  逻辑和,
mistrust of, 2,7 不信任,2,7
myth of female, 4 I
女性神话,4 我
myth of substantial costs and, 64-65
实质成本的神话,64-65
post hoc justications of, 8
事后辩解,8
randomness and, 52-55 随机性和,52-55
rationality and, IO-II,
理性和,IO-II,
reason and,  原因和,
scientific view of,
科学观点,
stubborness and,  固执和
as unconscious inferences,
作为无意识的推断,
war on, Io-14 战争,Io-14
invariance, description, 50,51
不变性,描述,50,51
IQ tests, 23, 28-34, 36-4I, I 55
智商测试,23,28-34,36-4I,I 55
irrationality argument, 45,76
不合理的论点,45,76
irrationality paradox, 59
不合理悖论,59
Johnson, Eric, 76 约翰逊,埃里克,76
Judgment under Uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky), 6o-6I
不确定性下的判断(卡尼曼和特沃斯基),6o-6I
Juslin, Peter,  朱斯林,彼得,
Kahan, Dan, 63 卡汉,丹,63
Kahneman, Daniel, II, 44-45, 50, 60-6I, 64, 66-67
卡尼曼,丹尼尔,II,44-45,50,60-6I,64,66-67
Kamin, Leon, 32 卡明,莱昂,32
Kant, Immanuel, 2, 2 I
康德,伊曼纽尔,2,2 I
Klein, Gary, 9I 克莱因,加里,9I
Knight, Frank, 95 骑士,弗兰克,95
Kohlberg, Lawrence, I27, I39
科尔伯格,劳伦斯,I27,I39
Kühberger, Anton,  Kühberger, 安东,
Kurzweil, Ray, 8 I
库兹韦尔,雷,8 I
law of small numbers, 52-55
小数定律,52-55
learning, explicit, 9 学习,明确,9
learning, frequency, 64 学习,频率,64
learning, implicit,
学习,隐式,
Lewin, Kurt, 107 勒温,库尔特,107
Lewis, Michael, 83 刘易斯,迈克尔,83
liberty, negative, 70 自由,否定,70
liberty, positive, 70. See boosting
自由,积极,70。看到提升
Libet, Benjamin, 9 利贝特,本杰明,9
logic 逻辑
intuition and,  直觉和,
logical rationality, 44-46, 64, 8 o
逻辑合理性,44-46,64,8 o
Loken, Barbara,  洛肯,芭芭拉,
Man and Women (Ellis), 34-35
男人和女人(埃利斯),34-35
Man as an Intuitive Statistician (Peterson and Beach), 60-6I
人作为直觉统计学家(彼得森和比奇),60-6I
market pricing,  市场定价,
masculinity-femininity scale, 33
男子气概-女子气质量表,33
Max Planck Institute, 14I-143. See also research program
马克斯·普朗克研究所,14I-143。另请参阅研究计划。
McKenzie, Craig, 61 麦肯齐,克雷格,61
The Measurement of Intelligence (Terman), 39
智力的测量(特尔曼),39
McNemar, Quinn, 36 麦克尼马尔,奎因,36
Merrill, Maude,  梅里尔,莫德,
Meyers-Levy, Joan, 4I 梅耶斯-莱维,琼,4I
Miles, Catherine Cox, 32-33
英里,凯瑟琳·考克斯,32-33
Miller, Joshua, 57 米勒,约书亚,57
Moneyball (Lewis), 83 《金钱球》(刘易斯),83
moral intuition 道德直觉
changes over time, I33-134
随着时间的变化,I33-134
defined,  定义,
evolutionary theory and,
进化理论和,
fast-and-frugal heuristic and, I39
快速简便的启发式和,I39
moral reasoning and, 126
道德推理和,126
principles of,  原则,
satisficing and, I 27-I28
满足和,我 27-I28
social heuristics and, I27-I28, I32-I34, I37-I38
社会启发和,I27-I28,I32-I34,I37-I38
social instincts and, 132
社会本能和,132
systemic inconsistencies in,
系统中的不一致性,
virtue ethics and,  德行伦理学和,
moral luck, I39 道德运气,I39
moral reasoning, 126 道德推理,126
Morey House Test, 36
莫雷之家测试,36
multitasking, 6 多任务处理,6
Musk, Elon, 97-99, ioo
马斯克,埃隆,97-99,100
Nagel, Thomas, 139 纳格尔,托马斯,139
naturalism,  自然主义,
neoclassical economics, 47,75
新古典经济学,47,75
bounded rationality and, 94
有限理性和,94
Newell, Alan, 40 纽厄尔,艾伦,40
Newell, Allen, 67 纽厄尔,艾伦,67
Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein), I I
推动(塞勒和桑斯坦),我我
nudging, 45, 68, 69, 71-72
推动,45,68,69,71-72
default choice and,
默认选择和,
effectiveness of, 79-80 效果,79-80
Oden, Melita, 3 I
奥登,梅丽塔,3 I
one-good-reason heuristic, 98, 99-10o
一个好理由启发式,98,99-10o
optimization, doctrine of, 93
优化学说,93
Ordinary Men (Browning), 136-137
普通人(布朗宁),136-137
organ donation, 76-79, I37-138
器官捐赠,76-79,I37-138
Pascal, Blaise, I, 6
帕斯卡,布莱兹,我,6
paternalism, 68 家长式管理,68
boosting and, 69,71 提升和,69,71
default choices and, governmental,
默认选择和, 政府,
hard, 69, 71, 75
困难,69,71,75
libertarian, 68, 69, 75, 80
自由主义者,68,69,75,80
neoclassical economic theory and, 75
新古典经济理论和,75
nudging and,  轻推和,
technological, i  技术,我
"Paternalism and Cognitive Bias" (Trout), 75
"家长主义和认知偏见"(特劳特),75
Pearson, Karl, 35-36 皮尔逊,卡尔,35-36
personality, 32-33 个性,32-33
Pessoa, Fernando, 6 人,费尔南多,6
Peterson, Cameron, 60 彼得森,卡梅伦,60
Piaget, Jean, II, 43, 60, IO9
皮亚杰,让,II,43,60,IO9
Polgár, Judith, I 波尔加尔,朱迪丝,我
Pólya, George, Is Pólya, George, 是
preadaptation, 1 I 8
预适应,1 I 8
Predictably Irrational (Ariely), I I
可预测的非理性(阿里埃利), 我 我
prospect theory, so 前景理论,所
Protestant work ethic, I25-126
新教工作伦理,I25-126
satisficing and,  满足和,
randomness 随机性
intuition and,  直觉和,
rational choice theory, 4, II, 92. See also logical rationality
理性选择理论,4,II,92。另见逻辑理性。
rationality 合理性
bounded,  有界的,
constructivist, IO7 建构主义者,IO7
ecological, 40, 54-56, 80, 92-93, 96-106, I29, See also ecological rationality
生态,40,54-56,80,92-93,96-106,I29,另见生态合理性
intuition and,  直觉和,
logical, 44-46, 64, 8o
逻辑,44-46,64,80
rationality war,  理性之战,
reason 原因
dichotomy with intuition,
直觉上的二分法,
intuition and,  直觉和,
morality and, 24 道德和,24
Reckoning with Risk, 148
应对风险,148
recognition heuristic, IO3-106
识别启发式,IO3-106
brain activity and, Io6
大脑活动和,Io6
ecological rationality of, IO4-IOS
生态合理性,IO4-IOS
Rehow, Pierre, I33 Rehow,皮埃尔,I33
relevance maxim, 49 相关性最大化,49
research 研究
discipline-oriented, 143
学科导向,143
interdisciplinary,  跨学科,
problem-oriented, 143 问题导向,143
research program 研究项目
collective goals and,
集体目标和,
culture of,  文化,
dealing with growth and,
处理增长和,
distribution of responsibility and, I 50-I5I
责任分配和,我 50-I5I
open culture and,  开放文化和,
spatial proximity and,
空间接近度和,
temporal proximity and, 146
时间接近和,146
Royal Air Force (RAF), 12 I-123
皇家空军(RAF),12 I-123
Russell, Betrand, 9 罗素,贝特兰,9
Sanjuro, Adam, 57 三十八岁的亚当
satisficing,  满足,
moral,  道德,
moral intuition and,
道德直觉和,
naturalism and, 128 自然主义和,128
satisficing heuristic, I06-107
满足启发式,I06-107
Catholic doctrine and, 130
天主教义和,130
Protestant work ethic and,
新教工作伦理和,
Savage, Jimmy, 95-96 野蛮,吉米,95-96
Schneider, Olive, 36 施耐德,奥利夫,36
The Selfish Gene (Dawkins), II 3
自私的基因(道金斯),II 3
sensibility 感性
as precursor to intelligence, 24
作为智能的前身,24
sequences, irregular,
序列,不规则,
Sex & Character (Weininger), 24
性与性格(魏宁格),24
Sex and Personality (Terman and Miles), 32
性别和个性(特尔曼和迈尔斯),32
Simon, Herbert, 40, 65, 93-96
西蒙,赫伯特,40,65,93-96
Simon, Théodore, 27-30 西蒙,西奥多,27-30
Simple Heuristics in a Social World, 147
社会世界中的简单启发,第 147 页
Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, I 47
简单启发我们变聪明的启发,第 47 页
small worlds, 46, 94-96
小世界,46,94-96
Smith, Vernon, I07-108 史密斯,弗农,I07-108
social heuristics,  社会启发,
ecological morality and,
生态道德和,
moral intuition and, I32-134, I37-138
道德直觉和,I32-134,I37-138
Spearman, Charles, 27 斯皮尔曼,查尔斯,27
speed-accuracy trade-off, 5
速度-准确性权衡,5
Sperber, Dan, II 8
斯珀伯,丹,II 8
stable-world principle, 82
稳定世界原则,82
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, 23, 29, 30-3 I, 36
斯坦福-比奈智力量表,23,29,30-31,36
Suicide Killers (Rehow), 133
自杀杀手(Rehow),133
Summers, Larry, 33 萨默斯,拉里,33
Sunstein, Cass, II, 44, 56
Sunstein, Cass,II,44,56

System I thinking, II, 43, 65-67
系统 I 思考,II,43,65-67
System 2 thinking, II, 43, 65-67
系统 2 思维,II,43,65-67
Terman, Louis, 23, 29-33, 36, 38
特曼,路易斯,23,29-33,36,38
Thaler, Richard, II, 44, 56
塔勒,理查德,II,44,56
Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman), I I
《思考,快与慢》(卡尼曼)
Tizzy Angle, I 22
Tizzy Angle,我 22
Tomasello, Michael, 136 Tomasello, Michael,136
Trout, J. D., 75
鲑鱼,J. D.,75
Tversky, Amos, 44-45, 50, 60-6I, 64
特弗斯基,阿莫斯,44-45,50,60-6I,64
two-system theories. See dual-system theory
双系统理论。见双系统理论
uncertainty, , I43-144
不确定性, ,I43-144
framing and, 47 构架和,47
fundamental (radical), 95
基本(根本的),95
moral intuitions and,
道德直觉和,
risk versus, , I08
风险对比, ,I08
stable-world principle and, 82
稳定世界原则和,82
unconscious, 6-7 无意识,6-7
inferences, , I Io
推断, ,我 Io
intelligence, 3 智能,3
moral intuition and, 125
道德直觉和,125
use of heuristics, 67, II 3
启发式的使用,67,II 3
variability hypothesis,
变异性假说,
virtue ethics,  德行伦理学,
Wason selection task,
Wason 选择任务,
Weber, Max, I25-I26, I28-I30
韦伯,马克思,I25-I26,I28-I30
Weininger, Otto, 24 魏宁格,奥托,24
Whitehead, Alfred, 9-10 怀特海德,阿尔弗雷德,9-10
Winterfeldt, Detley von, 64
冬菲尔德,德特利·冯,64
Wissler, Clark, 27 Wissler, Clark, 27 维斯勒,克拉克,27
Yerkes, Robert, 30 耶尔克斯,罗伯特,30
"You Can't Play 20 Questions with Nature and Win" (Newell), 65
“你无法和自然玩 20 个问题并获胜”(纽厄尔),65

    • The phrase is from Michael Polanyi (1966/2009), p. Pascal, B. (I669/1995). Pensées.
      短语出自迈克尔·波兰尼(1966/2009),第 页。巴斯卡,B.(1669/1995)。思想。
    Cited by his biographer, Walter Isaacson, in his book Steve Jobs (2011).
    在他的传记作者沃尔特·艾萨克森在他的书《史蒂夫·乔布斯》(2011 年)中引用。
    Dörfler & Eden (2019).
  1. Calaprice (201 I), p. 477, lists this quote as "possibly or probably by Einstein." Goris (2012).
    Calaprice (201 I), p. 477, 将这句话列为“可能是或可能是爱因斯坦说的。” Goris (2012)。
    Kant's word for intuition was "Anschauung," which derives from seeing ("schauen"). For an excellent introduction into the highly diverse philosophical views about intuition, see Osbeck & Held (2014).
    康德对直觉的称呼是“Anschauung”,源自于看见("schauen")。要了解关于直觉的高度多元化哲学观点,可以参考 Osbeck & Held(2014)的优秀介绍。
    7 Brunswik (1955). Brunswik, following Helmholtz, focused on the intuitive nature of perception.
    7 Brunswik(1955)。布伦斯维克(Brunswik)在赫尔姆霍兹(Helmholtz)之后,专注于知觉的直觉性质。
  2. See Osbeck & Held (2014) for a more detailed analysis.
    请参阅 Osbeck & Held (2014)以获取更详细的分析。
    9 See Gigerenzer (2007). Similar definitions have been used by Bruner (1973) and, more recently, Hogarth (2001), Gladwell (2007), and Klein (1998/2017).
    请参阅 Gigerenzer(2007)的相关内容。类似的定义也被 Bruner(1973)、Hogarth(2001)、Gladwell(2007)和 Klein(1998/2017)等人使用过。
  3. Medvegy et al. (2022). Forgetting aids the fluency heuristic, see Schooler & Hertwig (2005).
    Medvegy 等人(2022 年)。遗忘有助于流畅启发式,参见 Schooler&Hertwig(2005 年)。
    The opposition between fast, intuitive decisions that are prone to error and slow, rational decisions that avoid error is commonly made in dual-system theories, specifically in Kahneman's (2011a) version. Despite the vagueness of these theories, there is little evidence that the attributes of
    快速、直觉的决策容易出错,而慢慢、理性的决策则避免错误,这种对立常常在双系统理论中被提出,特别是在卡尼曼(2011a)的版本中。尽管这些理论存在一定的模糊性,但很少有证据表明
  4. cognitive processes actually cluster into two poles, but substantial evidence against it (Keren & Schul, 2009; Melnikoff & Bargh, 2018; Rizzo & Whitman, 2020).
    认知过程实际上聚集成两极,但有大量证据反对这一观点(Keren&Schul,2009 年;Melnikoff&Bargh,2018 年;Rizzo&Whitman,2020 年)。
    Tombu & Jolicoeur (2004). Pessoa, F. (I996).
    Tombu & Jolicoeur (2004)。 Pessoa, F. (I996)。
  5. Bargh & Morsella (2008). Artinger et al. (2019); Gigerenzer (2014a).
    巴尔格和莫瑟拉(2008 年)。 阿廷格等人(2019 年);吉格伦泽(2014a)。
  6. Gigerenzer (2014a). Artinger et al. (2019).
    Gigerenzer (2014a). Artinger et al. (2019).
    Reber (1989) identified intuitive thought as the product of implicit learning. Yet, intuition can also be the product of explicit learning.
    雷伯(1989)将直觉思维确定为隐式学习的产物。然而,直觉也可以是显式学习的产物。
  7. Cited in Egidi & Marengo (2004), p. 335. Libet (2004).
    引用自 Egidi & Marengo (2004), p. 335. Libet (2004).
  8. Hoffmann et al. (2010); Montagne et al. (2005). 25 Fischer et al. (2018).
    Hoffmann 等人(2010 年);Montagne 等人(2005 年)。25 Fischer 等人(2018 年)。
  9. 26 For an overview, see Osbeck & Held (2014).
    26 有关概述,请参阅 Osbeck&Held(2014 年)。
  10. Lejarraga & Hertwig (2021).
    Lejarraga & Hertwig (2021)。
    See Christensen-Szalanski & Beach (1984); Lejarraga & Hertwig (2021); and Chapter 3 of this volume.
    查看 Christensen-Szalanski & Beach(1984);Lejarraga & Hertwig(2021);以及本卷第 3 章。
    29 Gigerenzer (1996); Kahneman & Tversky (1996); Tetlock & Mellers (2002); Stanovich et al. (201 I); Sturm (2012).
    29 Gigerenzer (1996); Kahneman & Tversky (1996); Tetlock & Mellers (2002); Stanovich et al. (201 I); Sturm (2012). 29 Gigerenzer(1996); Kahneman&Tversky(1996); Tetlock&Mellers(2002); Stanovich 等(201 I); Sturm(2012)。
    Thaler & Sunstein (2003, 2008).
    塞斯坦和桑斯坦(2003 年,2008 年)。
  11. Arkes et al. (2016).
    Arkes 等人(2016 年)。
    32 On the design of addictive slot machines, see Schüll (2012); on the reckless practices of banks, see Admati & Hellwig (2013).
    关于成瘾老虎机的设计,请参阅舒尔(2012);关于银行的鲁莽做法,请参阅阿德马蒂和赫尔维希(2013)。
    33 House of Lords (201 I).
    33 上议院(201 I)。
  12. 34 Zarembo (2003). OECD (2019). Daston & Park (I998).
  13. Gigerenzer (2022a).
    Gigerenzer (2022a)。
    Pólya (1945/1988). See also Mercier & Sperber (201 I) on the close relation, not opposition, between intuition and deliberate argumentation.
    Pólya(1945/1988)。另见 Mercier&Sperber(201 I)关于直觉和刻意论证之间的密切关系,而非对立关系。
    39 Wang et al. (2017).
    39 Wang 等人(2017 年)。
  14. Gigerenzer et al. (201 I); Kruglanski & Gigerenzer (201 I). Sunstein (2020).
    Gigerenzer 等人(2011);Kruglanski&Gigerenzer(2011)。 Sunstein(2020)。
    Understanding experimental growth does indeed appear to be a problem, both for researchers and their subjects. Hamann (2022) shows the lack of understanding of exponential growth among the authors (not only the participants) of a classic experiment on the perception of exponential growth.
    理解实验性增长似乎确实是一个问题,无论是对研究人员还是他们的受试者来说。Hamann(2022)显示了在一项关于指数增长感知的经典实验中,作者(不仅是参与者)对指数增长的理解不足。
    Many physicians had originally hoped that the virus's harm would be comparable to that of the swine flu, which governments had overestimated. For instance, the British government announced
    许多医生最初希望这种病毒的危害会与猪流感相当,而政府对此进行了高估。例如,英国政府宣布
  15. that as many as 65,000 citizens might die from swine flu, while, in the end, fewer than 500 had died. But there was no way to know where and how fast the new virus would spread.
    据称有多达 65,000 名公民可能会死于猪流感,但最终死亡人数不到 500 人。但是没有办法知道新病毒会传播到哪里以及传播速度有多快。
    • This chapter is a slightly revised and shortened version of Gigerenzer (2022c).
      本章是 Gigerenzer(2022c)的稍作修订和缩短版本。
    Kant (1764/2011). Aristotle (350 BCE/1984), pp. 948-949.
    康德(1764/2011)。亚里士多德(前 350 年/1984),第 948-949 页。
    Hall (1904/1976), pp. 565, 65 I.
    大厅(1904/1976 年),第 565, 65 页。
  16. Masters (1986). Gigerenzer et al. (2014). Bruch & Newman (2018).
    大师(1986 年)。 吉格伦泽等人(2014 年)。 布鲁赫和纽曼(2018 年)。
    7 Santayana (1905). 7 Santayana(1905)。
  17. Daston (1992).  Daston(1992)。
  18. 9 Rifkin (2002). 1о Daston (1992). II Ibid. Dury (I984); Weininger (I906).
    9 Rifkin(2002)。1о Daston(1992)。II Ibid. Dury(I984);Weininger(I906)。
  19. Geddes & Thomson (I890). 14 Weininger (I906), p. 297. 15 Abrahamsen (I946).
    Geddes&Thomson(I890)。 14 Weininger(I906),第 297 页。 15 Abrahamsen(I946)。
  20. Daston (I992). Galton (I869/I979). Ibid., p. I96.
    达斯顿(I992)。 高尔顿(I869/I979)。 同上,第 I96 页。
  21. 19 Ibid., p. 338 (on race); p. 36 (on "idiots"). Spearman (i904). Wissler (i90i).
    19 参见,第 338 页(关于种族);第 36 页(关于“白痴”)。 斯皮尔曼(i904)。 维斯勒(i90i)。
    22 See Blum (I978); Sternberg (I990). 23 Wolf (I973).
    22 参见布卢姆(I978);斯特恩伯格(I990)。23 沃尔夫(I973)。
  22. Binet & Simon (1905/1973). Wolf (1973). Binet & Simon (1907/1914), p. 10.
    比奈和西蒙(1905/1973 年)。 沃尔夫(1973 年)。 比奈和西蒙(1907/1914 年),第 10 页。
  23. 27 Binet & Simon (I905/I973), pp. 42-43. Binet (I9II), p. I72.
    29 Wolf (I973), p. 2 Io.
    29 狼(I973),第 2 页。
  24. Minton (1988), p. 149. Terman (I9I6), p. 92. Carson (2007).
    敏顿(1988 年),第 149 页。 特曼(1916 年),第 92 页。 卡森(2007 年)。
    33 Minton (I988), p. 70. 34 Ibid., p. 73. 35 Wolf (I973), p. 203.
    33 Minton (I988), p. 70. 34 同上,第 73 页。35 Wolf (I973),第 203 页。
  25. Terman & Merrill (1937), p. 22. Ibid., p. Blum (I978).
    特曼和梅里尔(1937 年),第 22 页。 同前,第 页。 布卢姆(1978 年)。
    39 Terman & Oden (1947), p. 13.
    39 Terman&Oden(1947 年),第 13 页。
  26. Eysenck & Kamin (I98I), pp. 40-4I. Terman & Miles (i936), p. I.
    Eysenck & Kamin (I98I), pp. 40-4I. Terman & Miles (i936), p. I.
  27. Ibid., pp. v-vi. Summers (2005).
    同前,第 v-vi 页。 Summers(2005)。
  28. 44 Darwin (I893), p. 457. Ellis (I894), p. 367.
    44 年达尔文(1893 年),第 457 页。埃利斯(1894 年),第 367 页。
  29. Ibid., p. Ibid., p. Grosskurth (I980), p. 170. Pearson (I897).
    同前,第 页。 格罗斯库斯(1980),第 170 页。 皮尔逊(1897)。
    so Ibid., p. 297. s1 Pearson & Lee (1903), p. 372.
    所以同前,第 297 页。 s1 皮尔逊和李(1903 年),第 372 页。
  30. 52 Grosskurth (1980), p. xvi. McNemar & Terman (1936).
    52 Grosskurth(1980),第 xvi 页。 McNemar&Terman(1936)。
    54 Scottish Council for Research in Education (1933, 1939, 1949, 1958).
    苏格兰教育研究委员会(1933 年,1939 年,1949 年,1958 年)。
    s5 Deary et al. (2009), pp. 21, 184-185.
    s5 Deary 等人(2009 年),第 21 页,184-185 页。
  31. 56 Johnson et al. (2009); Lehrke (1978). Shields (1982). Thompson (1903).
    56 Johnson 等人(2009 年);Lehrke(1978 年)。 Shields(1982 年)。 Thompson(1903 年)。
    59 Hollingworth (1914). 60 Wellman (1933). Halpern (2012), p. IO3.
    59 Hollingworth(1914)。60 Wellman(1933)。 Halpern(2012),第 IO3 页。
  32. Diehl (I986). Schofer (I976).
    Diehl(I986)。Schofer(I976)。
  33. 64 Halpern (2012), p. xi. Gray (I992).
  34. Halpern (2OI 2); Halpern & Wai (2O20), pp. I I9, I 26-I 27.
    Halpern(2OI 2); Halpern&Wai(2O20),第 I I9,I 26-I 27。
    67 Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier (2OII); Gigerenzer et al. (2OII).
    67 Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier (2OII); Gigerenzer et al. (2OII). 67 Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier (2OII); Gigerenzer et al. (2OII).
  35. 68 Meyers-Levy & Loken (2015). Tripodi (2015).
    68 Meyers-Levy&Loken(2015 年)。 Tripodi(2015 年)。
    • This chapter is partly based on Gigerenzer (2018). I Thaler (I991).
      本章部分基于 Gigerenzer(2018)和 Thaler(1991)的研究。
    Lewis (2017). The quote is from the front flap.
    路易斯(2017)。这句话摘自书封。
    For an overview of early-20th-century studies on intuition, see Osbeck & Held (2OI4).
    有关 20 世纪初直觉研究的概述,请参阅 Osbeck&Held(2OI4)。
    Haidt & Kesebir (2008). The search included the words intuition, intuitive, and intuitionist. In a search conducted in 1978, Bastick (1982) reported only 91 studies with the word intuition in the title or abstract. It has been unusual for psychologists to study intuition for a long time.
    Haidt&Kesebir(2008)。搜索包括直觉,直觉和直觉主义这些词。在 1978 年进行的一项搜索中,Bastick(1982)仅报告了标题或摘要中包含直觉一词的 91 项研究。长期以来,心理学家研究直觉一直是不寻常的。
  36. s See Gruber & Vonèche (1977), p. 548. On the origins of intuitive concepts, see Carey (2009).
    请参阅格鲁伯和沃内什(1977 年),第 548 页。有关直觉概念的起源,请参阅凯瑞(2009 年)。
    Dual-process theories come in many kinds, creating a scattered, moving, and blurred framework. The first dual-process models by psychologists Jonathan Evans and Peter Wason, published in the mid-1970s, made somewhat different claims. They included the idea that deliberative reasoning is typically used to rationalize a conclusion that has been arrived at by intuition, which was later mostly dropped (see Mercier & Sperber, 2018, pp. 43-48, for a history). Sloman (1996) and many others proposed different lists of oppositions, without emphasizing that one is superior to the other, while Evans & Stanovich (2013) had second thoughts and spoke of "Type-I and Type-2 processing," dropping their earlier terminology of System I and System 2, in response to criticism (e.g., Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996). That change avoided the unrealistic implication that there were two different systems in the brain, but maintained two different kinds of processes. However, as we will see, the heuristic processes on which intuition and deliberate thinking is based are typically the same (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 20I I). In this book, I refer to dual-systems theories which assume (i) an opposition between the two systems and (ii) the superiority of System 2, as popularized by Kahneman (2003, 20IIa). It is default-intervenist, meaning that "system I quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and system 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or override" (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005, p. 267). Let me point out that the opposition between intuition, heuristics, and unconscious on the one hand, and deliberate, rule-based (logic or probability) and conscious on the other hand, which appears to be the key part of most dual-process theories, is not shared generally in psychology. For instance, in Bayesian theories in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience, unconscious processes are modeled by "optimal" statistical algorithms (Chater & Oaksford, 2008), and in theories of ecological rationality, heuristic processes are part of conscious decision-making (Gigerenzer et al. 2022a).
    双过程理论有许多种类,形成了一个分散、流动和模糊的框架。心理学家乔纳森·埃文斯和彼得·沃森在 1970 年代中期发表的第一批双过程模型提出了略有不同的观点。他们包括了深思熟虑的推理通常用于合理化通过直觉得出的结论这一想法,后来这一想法大多被抛弃了(参见 Mercier&Sperber,2018 年,第 43-48 页,有关历史)。Sloman(1996 年)和许多其他人提出了不同的对立列表,没有强调哪一个更优越,而 Evans&Stanovich(2013 年)有所顾虑,提出了“Type-I 和 Type-2 处理”,放弃了他们早期的 System I 和 System 2 术语,以回应批评(例如,Gigerenzer&Regier,1996 年)。这种变化避免了大脑中存在两个不同系统的不切实际的暗示,但保留了两种不同类型的过程。然而,正如我们将看到的那样,直觉和深思熟虑所基于的启发式过程通常是相同的(Kruglanski&Gigerenzer,2011 年)。 在这本书中,我提到了双系统理论,该理论假定(i)两个系统之间存在对立,(ii)系统 2 的优越性,正如卡内曼(2003 年,2011 年)所普及的那样。这是默认干预主义,意味着“系统 1 迅速提出直观的判断问题答案,系统 2 监控这些提议的质量,可能会支持、纠正或覆盖”(卡内曼和弗雷德里克,2005 年,第 267 页)。我要指出的是,直觉、启发式和无意识与蓄意、基于规则(逻辑或概率)和有意识之间的对立,这似乎是大多数双过程理论的关键部分,在心理学中并不普遍共享。例如,在认知科学和认知神经科学中的贝叶斯理论中,无意识过程被“最优”统计算法建模(查特和奥克斯福德,2008 年),在生态合理性理论中,启发式过程是有意识决策的一部分(吉格伦泽等,2022 年)。
    7 Kahneman (2002), p. 47I.
  37. Moxey et al. (2003). 9 Kahneman (2002, 201 Ia).
    Moxey 等人(2003 年)。9 Kahneman(2002 年,201 Ia)。
    ıо Thaler & Sunstein (2008), pp. 39-40.
  38. Kahneman (201 Ia), pp. 373-374; Kahneman & Tversky (I984), p. 343.
    Kahneman (20I Ib). Ariely (2008), p. xviii. Thaler & Sunstein (2003).
    康曼 (2011)。 阿里尔 (2008),第 xviii 页。 塞勒 & 桑斯坦 (2003)。
  39. McKenzie & Nelson (2003). Gigerenzer (2014a); Hoffman & Kanzaria (2014).
    麦肯齐和尼尔森(2003 年)。 吉格伦泽(2014a);霍夫曼和坎扎里亚(2014 年)。
    Sher & McKenzie (2006).
    谢尔和麦肯齐(2006 年)。
  40. See, for example, Grice (1989); Hertwig & Gigerenzer (I999); Sperber & Wilson (I986).
    查看,例如,Grice(1989);Hertwig&Gigerenzer(I999);Sperber&Wilson(I986)。
    19 See, for example, Sher & McKenzie (2006).
    19 例如,参见 Sher&McKenzie(2006 年)。
    20 Kahneman (2003); Tversky & Kahneman (1981).
    20 Kahneman (2003); Tversky & Kahneman (1981). 20 Kahneman (2003); 特沃斯基和卡内曼 (1981)。
  41. Tversky & Kahneman (I98I).
    Tversky & Kahneman (I98I).
  42. See, for example, Kühberger (1995); Kühberger & Tanner (2010); Mandel (2001); Tombu & Mandel (2015).
    看,例如,Kühberger(1995);Kühberger&Tanner(2010);Mandel(2001);Tombu&Mandel(2015)。
    Mandel (2014). Tversky & Kahneman (1986), p. S253. Feynman (1967), p. 53.
    曼德尔(2014 年)。 特维斯基和卡尼曼(1986 年),第 S253 页。 费曼(1967 年),第 53 页。
  43. Bruner (1973).  布鲁纳(1973 年)。
  44. Hahn & Warren (2009).
    Hahn & Warren(2009 年)。
  45. 28 Ibid. 29 Hahn & Warren (2010).
    28 同上。29 Hahn & Warren (2010)。
  46. Hahn & Warren (2009). See Hahn & Warren (2009).
    Hahn&Warren(2009 年)。 参见 Hahn&Warren(2009 年)。
  47. Kahneman & Tversky (1972). Ibid., p. 445. Csikszentmihalyi (2008).
    康纳曼和特维斯基(1972 年)。 同上,第 445 页。 奇克森特米哈伊(2008 年)。
    35 Gilovich et al. (1985).
    35 吉洛维奇等人(1985 年)。
  48. Thaler & Sunstein (2008), p. 31. Ibid., p. 33.
    塞斯坦和桑斯坦(2008 年),第 31 页。 同上,第 33 页。
    G. S. Becker (1994, personal communication); see also Raab et al. (2012).
    G. S. Becker(1994 年,个人通讯);另见 Raab 等人(2012 年)。
    Miller & Sanjuro (2018).
    米勒和三十郎(2018)。
  49. Ibid. Hertwig & Gigerenzer (1999). Gigerenzer et al. (2021).
    同前。 赫特维希和吉格伦泽(1999)。 吉格伦泽等人(2021)。
    Gal & Rucker (2018). Pashler et al. (2012).
    Gal & Rucker (2018). Pashler et al. (2012). Gal & Rucker (2018). Pashler et al. (2012).
  50. 45 See Gigerenzer (I996, 2018); Gigerenzer et al. (2012).
    45 参见 Gigerenzer(1996 年,2018 年);Gigerenzer 等人(2012 年)。
    Gigerenzer et al. (1991); Juslin et al. (2000).
    Gigerenzer 等人(1991);Juslin 等人(2000)。
    47 Dawes & Mulford (I996); Erev et al. (1994); Pfeifer (1994). Hertwig et al. (2005).
    49 Gigerenzer (2004a). 49 Gigerenzer(2004a)。
  51. so Piaget & Inhelder (195 I/1975). s1 Peterson & Beach (1967), pp. 42-43.
    所以皮亚杰和因海德(1951/1975)。 s1 彼得森和比奇(1967),第 42-43 页。
    52 Tversky & Kahneman (1974). Kahneman & Tversky (1973), p. 237.
    52 特维斯基和卡内曼(1974 年)。 卡内曼和特维斯基(1973 年),第 237 页。
    54 Lejarraga & Hertwig (202I). Citations on Google Scholar are higher, but reveal the same citation bias, 37,331 versus 1,165 citations by August 2020, for Tversky & Kahneman and Peterson & Beach, respectively.
    54 Lejarraga&Hertwig(202I)。 Google Scholar 上的引用次数更高,但揭示了相同的引用偏见,2020 年 8 月,Tversky&Kahneman 和 Peterson&Beach 分别有 37,331 次和 1,165 次引用。
  52. 5s Edwards et al. (1965), p. I8.
    5s 爱德华兹等人(1965 年),第 I8 页。
    Kahneman & Tversky (1972), p. 450 . Tversky, by the way, was a postdoctoral student of Edwards.
    康纳曼和特沃斯基(1972 年),第 450 页。顺便说一句,特沃斯基是爱德华兹的博士后学生。
    57 Christensen-Szalanski & Beach (1984). For example, Juslin et al. (2000, 2007).
    57 Christensen-Szalanski&Beach(1984)。 例如,Juslin 等人(2000 年,2007 年)。
    59 For example, Chater & Oaksford (2008); Chater et al. (2006).
    例如,查特尔和奥克斯福德(2008 年);查特尔等人(2006 年)。
  53. 60 Bond (2009). Ibid., pp. II89-II9I. Gigerenzer et al. (202I).
    60 Bond (2009)。 同前,第 II89-II9I 页。 Gigerenzer 等人(202I)。
    63 Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer (200I).
    64 Rosenbaum et al. (2OIo); see also McDowell & Jacobs (2OI7).
    64 Rosenbaum 等人(2OIo);另见 McDowell&Jacobs(2OI7)。
    65 For summaries, see Gigerenzer (2002, 2014a); Gigerenzer et al. (2007).
    有关总结,请参阅 Gigerenzer(2002 年,2014a 年);Gigerenzer 等人(2007 年)。
    Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (I995); Gigerenzer (2014a); McDowell & Jacobs (2017).
    Gigerenzer&Hoffrage(I995); Gigerenzer(2014a); McDowell&Jacobs(2017)。
  54. 67 Lejarraga & Hertwig (202I). Arkes et al. (2016).
    67 Lejarraga&Hertwig(202I)。 Arkes 等人(2016)。
  55. 69 Newell (I973), pp. 288-289.
    69 Newell(1973 年),第 288-289 页。
  56. Kahneman (2011a), p. 79. Frederick (2005), p. 37.
    Kahneman (2011a),第 79 页。 Frederick (2005),第 37 页。
    Bago & De Nays (2019); Easton (2018). Frederick (2005); Kahneman (201 Ia).
    Bago&De Nays(2019); Easton(2018)。 Frederick(2005); Kahneman(201 Ia)。
    74 Bago & De Nays (2019).
  57. 75 Wang et al. (2017). Chater & Oaksford (2008); Friston (2010).
    75 Wang 等人(2017 年)。 Chater&Oaksford(2008 年); Friston(2010 年)。
    77 For a more detailed critique of dual-system theories see Keren & Schul (2009); Kruglanski & Gigerenzer (2011); Melnikoff & Bargh (2018).
    对于双系统理论的更详细批评,请参见 Keren&Schul(2009);Kruglanski&Gigerenzer(2011);Melnikoff&Bargh(2018)。
  58. Daniel & Palmer (2007). Harari (2017), p. OECD (2017).
    丹尼尔和帕尔默(2007 年)。 哈拉瑞(2017 年),第 页。 经合组织(2017 年)。
  59. Thaler & Sunstein (2008); see also Bond (2009). On the validity of the assumption that biases imply paternalism, see Berg & Gigerenzer (2007).
    泰勒和桑斯坦(2008 年);另见邦德(2009 年)。关于偏见意味着家长主义的假设的有效性,请参见伯格和吉格伦泽(2007 年)。
    5 Interest in nudging was barely noticeable as long as the underlying program was called anti-antipaternalism or libertarian paternalism. According to Sunstein, when a publisher rejected their book, the editor asked them why they didn't title it Nudge. They did, and with the help of the catchy term, academic and political interest skyrocketed.
    对于推动的兴趣在底层计划被称为反反父权主义或自由主义父权主义时几乎不可察觉。根据桑斯坦的说法,当一家出版商拒绝他们的书时,编辑问他们为什么不将书名定为“推动”。他们这样做了,并在这个引人注目的术语的帮助下,学术和政治兴趣飙升。
    Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff (2017). I have used the term risk savvy for the program for an informed citizenship (Gigerenzer, 2014a), while my colleague Ralph Hertwig came up with the term boosting to create a mirror buzz to nudging.
    Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff(2017)。我已经使用了术语“风险明智”来描述一个知情公民的计划(Gigerenzer,2014a),而我的同事 Ralph Hertwig 提出了“助推”这个术语,以创造与“推动”相呼应的概念。
  60. Berlin (1969). Kant (1784). Gigerenzer (2014a). See Gigerenzer (2014a).
    柏林(1969 年)。 康德(1784 年)。 吉格伦策(2014a)。 参见吉格伦策(2014a)。
    Gigerenzer et al. (2009).
    Gigerenzer 等人(2009 年)。
  61. Ariely (2013). 阿里尔(2013)。
    See the excellent book on nudging by Rebonato (2012). Note that the term nudge has become used for all kind of different interventions, such as paying teenage girls a dollar for every day they are not pregnant in order to reduce teen pregnancy rates (Bond, 2009). Similarly, the educational methods my research group developed decades ago have now been relabeled "educational nudges." If nudging meant economic incentives or educational tools, that would be nothing new.
    查看 Rebonato(2012)关于推动的优秀书籍。请注意,推动这个术语已经被用于各种不同的干预措施,比如给青少年女孩每天一美元,以减少青少年怀孕率(Bond,2009)。同样,我研究小组几十年前开发的教育方法现在被重新标记为“教育推动”。如果推动意味着经济激励或教育工具,那将是毫无新意的。
    Meyerowtiz & Chaiken (1987); Salovey & Williams-Piehota (2004).
    Meyerowtiz & Chaiken(1987); Salovey & Williams-Piehota(2004)。
  62. Kösters & Gøtzsche (2003). Gøtzsche & Jørgensen (2013).
    Gigerenzer (2014a, 2014b). Gigerenzer et al. (2007), p. 81.
    Gigerenzer(2014a,2014b)。 Gigerenzer 等人(2007),第 81 页。
    Grill & Hackenbroch (2014). The reason why there is no evidence that mammography saves lives is this: In the screening group, I less woman out of dies of breast cancer, but I more dies from another cancer. That is, after io years, an equal number of women have died from cancer, whether they participate in screening or not. This information is rarely passed on to women (Gigerenzer, 20I4b).
    Grill & Hackenbroch (2014)。没有证据表明乳腺 X 线摄影可以挽救生命的原因是:在筛查组中,每 名妇女中有一名少死于乳腺癌,但有更多人死于其他癌症。也就是说,经过 10 年,无论参与筛查与否,同样数量的妇女死于癌症。这些信息很少传达给妇女(Gigerenzer,2014b)。
  63. German Federal Government (Bundesregierung), (n.d.).
    德国联邦政府(Bundesregierung),(无日期)。
  64. Gigerenzer (2014a).
    Gigerenzer(2014a)。
  65. Gigerenzer (2015). Rebonato (2OI2). Conly (2OI 3), pp. 8, 2-3.
    Gigerenzer (2015). Rebonato (2012). Conly (2013), pp. 8, 2-3.
    25 Trout (2005), pp. 396-397.
    25 Trout (2005), pp. 396-397. 25 Trout(2005 年),第 396-397 页。
  66. Schneider (2010). Thaler & Sunstein (2008), p. 45 had earlier linked the logical rationality of System 2 to Homo economicus, and the intuitive System I to "everyone's Homer Simpson", the comic hero who excels in bouts of bumbling stupidity, laziness, and brilliant incompetence.
    施耐德(2010 年)。塞斯坦和桑斯坦(2008 年),第 45 页早先将系统 2 的逻辑合理性与经济人联系起来,将直觉系统 I 与“每个人的荷马辛普森”联系起来,这位喜剧英雄在愚蠢、懒惰和卓越无能方面表现出色。
    United States Department of Justice (n.d.). Ibid.
    美国司法部(n.d.)。 同上。
  67. Johnson & Goldstein (2003). See, for example, Thaler & Sunstein (2008), p. 186.
    Johnson & Goldstein (2003). 例如,参见 Thaler & Sunstein (2008),第 186 页。
    Arshad et al. (2019).
    Arshad 等人(2019 年)。
  68. 32 Bramhall (20I I). Ibid. Matesanz (2003).
    32 Bramhall(20I I)。 同前。 Matesanz(2003)。
  69. OECD (2017). Rizzo & Whitman (2020). Kristal & Whillans (2020).
    经合组织(2017 年)。 里佐和惠特曼(2020 年)。 克里斯塔尔和威兰斯(2020 年)。
    Pashler et al. (2012). Mertens et al. (2022).
    Pashler 等人(2012 年)。 Mertens 等人(2022 年)。
  70. Maier et al. (2022). Brennen et al. (2018).
    Maier 等人(2022 年)。Brennen 等人(2018 年)。
  71. 42 It may be no coincidence that scholars who mistrust intuition and favor nudging lean toward technological solutionism. For instance, Kahneman (2019), p. 6io declared, "Frankly, I don't see any reason to set limits on what AI can do" and "I can imagine that many old people will prefer to be taken care of by friendly robots that have a name, have a personality, and are always pleasant. They will prefer that to being taken care of by their children."
    42 可能并非巧合的是,那些不信任直觉而偏向推动的学者更倾向于技术解决主义。例如,卡尼曼(2019 年)第 6 页宣称:“坦率地说,我看不出为什么要对人工智能的能力设限”,“我可以想象,许多老年人会更喜欢由有名字、有个性、总是愉快的友好机器人照顾。他们会更喜欢这样,而不是由自己的孩子照顾。”
    Snowden (2019). Kurzweil (2OI2).
    斯诺登(2019 年)。 库尔茨韦尔(2012 年)。
  72. Harari (2017), pp. 389-396. Gigerenzer (2022a); see also Katsikopoulos et al. (2020).
    哈拉瑞(2017 年),第 389-396 页。 吉格伦策(2022a);另见卡齐科普洛斯等人(2020 年)。
    47 See Gigerenzer (2022a). For more fake news about algorithms, see Gigerenzer (2022a).
    请参阅 Gigerenzer(2022a)。有关算法的更多虚假新闻,请参阅 Gigerenzer(2022a)。
  73. 49 Lewis (2003). Hirsch & Hirsch (2011). Harari (2017), p. 388.
    52 The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html
    52 纽约时报,https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html
    53 Ford et al. (1994). Harari (2017), pp. 366-368. Strickland (2019).
    53 Ford 等人(1994 年)。 哈拉里(2017 年),第 366-368 页。 斯特里克兰(2019 年)。
  74. 56 Ross (2022). 56 Ross(2022)。
    57 Katsikopoulos et al. (2021). Harari (2017), pp. 390-39I features Google Flu Trends without mentioning that all updates of the algorithm had failed; when his book was published, Google Flu Trends had already been shut down.
    57 Katsikopoulos 等人(2021 年)。Harari(2017 年),第 390-39I 页介绍了 Google Flu Trends,但没有提到算法的所有更新都失败了;当他的书出版时,Google Flu Trends 已经关闭。
    58 OECD (2017). For more on the "stable-world principle" see Gigerenzer (2022a).
    58 OECD(2017 年)。有关“稳定世界原则”的更多信息,请参阅 Gigerenzer(2022a)。
  75. 6o Harari (2017), pp. 390-403. Hofstadter (2022).
  76. See Calaprice, A. (201 I).
    查看 Calaprice, A. (201 I)。
  77. Simon (1992), p. 155. Klein (1998/2017), p. 33.
    西蒙(1992 年),第 155 页。 克莱因(1998/2017 年),第 33 页。
    Klein (2015, 1998/2017); on the relation between Klein's and my work, see Todd & Gigerenzer (2001) and Gigerenzer (2019).
    Klein(2015,1998/2017);关于 Klein 和我的工作之间的关系,请参见 Todd&Gigerenzer(2001)和 Gigerenzer(2019)。
  78. Hertwig et al. (2008). Herzog & Hertwig (2013).
    Hertwig 等人(2008 年)。 Herzog&Hertwig(2013 年)。
  79. Gigerenzer (2004b).
    Gigerenzer(2004b)。
  80. 7 Simon (1988), p. 286. On as-if models in behavioral economics, see Berg & Gigerenzer (2010).
    7 Simon(1988),第 286 页。有关行为经济学中的“仿真模型”,请参阅 Berg&Gigerenzer(2010)。
    Knight (I92I).  骑士(I92I)。
  81. 9 Savage (I954/I972). ıo Kay & King (2020). i1 Savage (I954/I972), p. i6.
    9 野蛮(I954/I972)。10 凯和金(2020)。11 野蛮(I954/I972),第 16 页。
  82. Simon (I990), p. 7; Newell & Simon (I972), p. Simon (I997), p. 269.
    Simon (I990), 第 7 页; Newell & Simon (I972), 第 页 Simon (I997), 第 269 页。
  83. Gigerenzer et al. (1999). As Petracca (2021) argued, Simon's presentation of his concept of bounded rationality to economists (focusing on the cognitive part and neglecting the environmental part) added to the subsequent confusion.
    Gigerenzer 等人(1999 年)。正如 Petracca(2021 年)所指出的,Simon 向经济学家展示他对有限理性概念的理解(侧重认知部分而忽视环境部分)加剧了随后的混乱。
    Popomaronis (202I).
    波波马罗尼斯(202I)。
  84. Popomaronis (2020). Many other experts, from Swiss airport customs officers (Pachur & Marinello, 2OI3) to London magistrates as well as professional burglars (Dhami, 2005) have been reported to rely on similar sequential heuristics, such as fast-and-frugal trees and take-the-best (see Gigerenzer et al., 2022a).
    Popomaronis(2020)。据报道,许多其他专家,从瑞士机场海关官员(Pachur&Marinello,2OI3)到伦敦法官以及专业盗贼(Dhami,2005)都依赖类似的顺序启发式,如快速和节俭的树和择优法则(见 Gigerenzer 等人,2022a)。
  85. Gigerenzer (2021a). Martignon & Hoffrage (2002). 19 Şimşek (2013).
    Gigerenzer(2021a)。 Martignon&Hoffrage(2002)。 19 Şimşek(2013)。
    20 Brighton & Gigerenzer (2015); Gigerenzer & Brighton (2009).
    20 Brighton & Gigerenzer (2015); Gigerenzer & Brighton (2009). 20 Brighton & Gigerenzer (2015); Gigerenzer & Brighton (2009)。
  86. 21 Adapted from Gigerenzer et al. (2022a). Luan et al. (2OII).
    21 改编自 Gigerenzer 等人(2022a)。 Luan 等人(2OII)。
  87. Goldstein Gigerenzer (2002). Ibid. See also Gigerenzer Goldstein (2OI I).
    戈德斯坦(Goldstein)和吉格伦泽(Gigerenzer)(2002 年)。见上文。另见吉格伦泽(Gigerenzer)和戈德斯坦(Goldstein)(2011 年)。
  88. From Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002).
    来自 Goldstein & Gigerenzer (2002)。
    Serwe & Frings (2006). The results were replicated by Scheibehenne & Bröder (2007).
    Serwe&Frings(2006 年)的结果已被 Scheibehenne&Bröder(2007 年)复制。
    Kam & Zechmeister (2013); Marewski et al. (20IO).
    Kam&Zechmeister(2013); Marewski 等人(20IO)。
  89. Standing (1973). Ortmann et al. (2008).
    站立(1973 年)。 Ortmann 等人(2008 年)。
    Pachur, Mata & Schooler (2009); Pohl (2006). For an overview, see Gigerenzer & Goldstein (2OII).
    Volz et al. (2006). 32 Artinger et al. (2022).
    Volz 等人(2006 年)。32 Artinger 等人(2022 年)。
  90. Artinger & Gigerenzer (2016). Smith (2003).
    Artinger & Gigerenzer(2016)。 Smith(2003)。
  91. 35 Smith (2008), p. 36 .
    35 Smith(2008 年),第 36 页。
    • This chapter is based on Gigerenzer (202 Ib). Polanyi (1966/2009), p. 20.
      本章基于 Gigerenzer(202 Ib)。 Polanyi(1966/2009),第 20 页。
    Gruber & Vonèche (1977). Wilson (2002).
    Gruber&Vonèche(1977)。 Wilson(2002)。
  92. Khamsi (2005). For a philosopher's account, see Godfrey-Smith (2016).
    Khamsi(2005 年)。 有关哲学家的描述,请参阅戈德弗雷-史密斯(2016 年)。
  93. Ibid., p. 19 .
    同上,第 19 页。
    7 Mallon & Franks (200o). On heuristics shared by humans and other animal species, see Hutchinson & Gigerenzer (2005).
    7 Mallon&Franks(200o)。有关人类和其他动物物种共享的启发式,请参见 Hutchinson&Gigerenzer(2005)。
  94. II Dawkins (I989), p. 95.
  95. McBeath et al. (1995); Shaffer & McBeath (2002). Jonsson & von Hofsten (2003).
    McBeath 等人(1995); Shaffer 和 McBeath(2002)。 Jonsson 和 von Hofsten(2003)。
  96. See, for example, McBeath et al. (1995); Shaffer & McBeath (2002).
    看,例如,McBeath 等人(1995 年);Shaffer 和 McBeath(2002 年)。
    Shaffer & McBeath (2002).
    沙弗和麦克比斯(2002 年)。
  97. Shaffer & McBeath (2005). Rose (2009).
  98. Gigerenzer (2007). See Kruglanski & Gigerenzer (201 I).
    Gigerenzer(2007 年)。 参见 Kruglanski&Gigerenzer(201 I)。
    See Collett & Land (1975). Sperber (1994). Gould & Vrba (1982).
    查看 Collett & Land(1975)。Sperber(1994)。Gould & Vrba(1982)。
  99. Hamlin (2017). Kane et al. (2015). 25 Hamlin (2017).
    Hamlin(2017 年)。 Kane 等人(2015 年)。25 Hamlin(2017 年)。
  100. Denny (2004). Hofstede & Ratcliffe (2016). Grant et al. (2009).
    丹尼(2004 年)。 霍夫斯泰德和拉特克利夫(2016 年)。 格兰特等人(2009 年)。
    Hamlin (2017). This section is based on Hamlin (2017).
    Hamlin(2017 年)。 本节内容基于 Hamlin(2017 年)的研究。
  101. 31 Shaffer et al. (2004).
    31 Shaffer 等人(2004 年)。
  102. Haldane & Madouros (2OI2).
    Haldane&Madouros(2OI2)。
    • This chapter is a revised version of Gigerenzer (2010). Cosmides & Tooby (2008), p. 54.
      本章是 Gigerenzer(2010)的修订版本。 Cosmides&Tooby(2008),第 54 页。
    Haidt (2013), title of Chapter I.
    海德特(2013 年),第一章标题。
  103. Weber (1930/1992). Cicero (De finibus 3), pp. 75-76.
    韦伯(1930/1992 年)。 西塞罗(《论善恶的界限》第 3 卷),第 75-76 页。
  104. For an overview, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Kohlberg (1984).
    有关概述,请参阅 Sinnott-Armstrong(2008)。 Kohlberg(1984)。
    7 Haidt (200I, 2008).
    7 Haidt (200I, 2008). 7 Haidt(200I,2008)。
  105. Gigerenzer (2010).  Gigerenzer(2010)。
    See Byron (2004), p. 192; Richardson (2004), p. 127; and the contributions to Satisficing and Maximizing (Byron, 2004).
    参见拜伦(2004 年),第 192 页;理查森(2004 年),第 127 页;以及对满足和最大化的贡献(拜伦,2004 年)。
    Gigerenzer & Brighton (2009). Sunstein (2005). Kitcher (1992).
    Gigerenzer&Brighton(2009 年)。 Sunstein(2005 年)。 Kitcher(1992 年)。
  106. See Tuckett (201 I) on the role of narratives in decision-making.
    查看 Tuckett(201 I)关于叙述在决策中的作用。
  107. Fiske (1992). Burger (2009). Becker (I995), p. 637.
    Fiske(1992)。Burger(2009)。Becker(I995),p. 637。
  108. Gigerenzer & Hug (1992). These experiments resolved a debate between Leda Cosmides (1989), who had argued for a specific cheater detection module, and her critics who conjectured that social contracts for some unknown reason would simply increase logical answers - in her original work, cheating detection and logical reasoning predicted the same cards being chosen. The perspective experiments, however, showed clearly that the results cannot be explained by logic, but by cheating detection, albeit a perspectual one.
    Gigerenzer & Hug(1992)。这些实验解决了 Leda Cosmides(1989)之间的争论,后者主张存在一个特定的作弊检测模块,而她的批评者则猜测社会契约出于某种未知原因会简单地增加逻辑答案 - 在她的原始作品中,作弊检测和逻辑推理预测选择相同的卡片。然而,透视实验清楚地表明,结果不能用逻辑来解释,而是通过作弊检测,尽管是一种透视性的作弊检测。
  109. Cosmides & Tooby (2008). Darwin (i87I/I98I), p. I66.
    Cosmides&Tooby(2008 年)。达尔文(i87I/I98I),第 I66 页。
  110. Hauser (2006). Pippin (2009). Darwin (I87I/I981), p. 73.
    Hauser(2006)。 Pippin(2009)。 达尔文(I87I/I981),第 73 页。
    Gambetta (1996). Cited in Neiman (2008), p. 87.
    Gambetta (1996). 引用自 Neiman (2008),第 87 页。
    25 Burger (2009); Zimbardo (2007). Gigerenzer (2008, 2010).
    25 汉堡(2009);辛巴多(2007)。盖格伦泽(2008,2010)。
  111. 27 Neiman (2008). Ibid.
    27 Neiman(2008)。 同上。
  112. 29 Hertwig et al. (2002). Related to fairness are reciprocity heuristics, such as "if you take the benefit, you have to pay the costs," see Tooby & Cosmides (1992).
    29 Hertwig 等人(2002 年)。与公平相关的是互惠启发式,比如“如果你获益,你就要付出代价”,参见 Tooby&Cosmides(1992 年)。
  113. 30 Tomasello (2019). 31 Browning (1998).
    30 Tomasello (2019). 31 Browning (1998). 30 Tomasello (2019)。31 Browning (1998)。
  114. 32 Ibid., p. 7 I.
    32 同前,第 7 页。
  115. 33 Commission of the European Communities (2007).
    33 欧洲委员会(2007 年)。
    34 See, for example, Narvaez & Lapsley (2005). 35 Rosenbaum (2009). Fox et al. (2019).
    34 例如,Narvaez&Lapsley(2005 年)。 35 Rosenbaum(2009 年)。 Fox 等人(2019 年)。
  116. 37 Nagel (I993), p. 59. Williams (I98I). 39 See also Narvaez (2010).
    37 Nagel (I993), p. 59. Williams (I98I). 39 See also Narvaez (2010). 37 Nagel(I993),第 59 页。 Williams(I98I)。39 另见 Narvaez(2010)。
    • This chapter is based on Gigerenzer (2022b).
      本章基于 Gigerenzer(2022b)的研究。
    Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (1675). See Merton (1965). Zenko (2015).
    艾萨克·牛顿爵士致罗伯特·胡克的信函(1675 年)。见默顿(1965 年)。 善光(2015 年)。
    Henriksen (2016). Aad et al. (2015). Daston (2017).
    Henriksen(2016 年)。 Aad 等人(2015 年)。 Daston(2017 年)。
    is short for Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition. The initialism also reflects the fact that we were exploring the of heuristic decision-making under uncertainty.
    是自适应行为与认知中心的缩写。这个首字母缩略词也反映了我们正在探索启发式决策在不确定性下的
  117. 7 Adolf von Harnack was the first president of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, founded in 1911 , which in 1948 was renamed the Max Planck Society.
    7 阿道夫·冯·哈纳克是 1911 年成立的凯撒威廉学会的第一任会长,该学会在 1948 年改名为马克斯·普朗克学会。
  118. Gigerenzer et al. (1999). Todd et al. (2012). º Hertwig et al. (2013).
    Gigerenzer 等人(1999 年)。 Todd 等人(2012 年)。 º Hertwig 等人(2013 年)。
  119. Gigerenzer (2022d). Gigerenzer (2006).
    Gigerenzer(2022 年)。 Gigerenzer(2006 年)。