Legal Theory Lexicon 法律理論詞彙表
"All the concepts that fit."
"所有適合的概念。"
Legal Theory Lexicon 065: The Nature of Law
法律理論詞彙 065：法律的本質
Introduction 引言
What is the nature of law? This question has occupied center stage jurisprudence and philosophy of law in the modern era, and has been the central occupation of contemporary analytic jurisprudence. This entry in the Legal Theory Lexicon aims to give an overview of the “What is Law?” debate.
法律的本質是什麼？這個問題在現代法理學和法律哲學中佔據了中心舞台，並且是當代分析法理學的核心議題。本條目旨在法律理論詞典中概述「法律是什麼？」的辯論。
Historically, the answer to the question, “What is law?,” is thought to have two competing answers. The classical answer is provided by natural law theory, which is frequently characterized as asserting that there is an essential relationship between law and morality or justice. The modern answer is provided by legal positivism, which, as developed by John Austin, asserted that law is the command of the sovereign backed by the threat of punishment.
歷史上，對於「法律是什麼？」這個問題的回答被認為有兩種相互競爭的答案。古典的答案來自自然法理論，該理論通常被描述為主張法律與道德或正義之間存在本質的關係。現代的答案則來自法律實證主義，該理論由約翰·奧斯丁發展，主張法律是主權者的命令，並以懲罰的威脅作為支持。
Contemporary debates over the nature of law focus on a revised set of positions. Legal positivism is represented by analytic legal positivists, like H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and Scott Shapiro. There is another strand of legal positivism that is represented by Hans Kelsen; this version is very influential in Europe and elsewhere, but not as prominent in Anglophone legal philosophy.
當代關於法律本質的辯論集中於一組修訂過的立場。法律實證主義由分析法律實證主義者代表，如 H.L.A.哈特、約瑟夫·拉茲和斯科特·夏皮羅。還有另一種法律實證主義的分支由漢斯·凱爾森代表；這一版本在歐洲及其他地區影響深遠，但在英語國家的法律哲學中並不那麼突出。
The natural law tradition is defended by John Finnis. And a new position, interpretivism is represented by the work of the late Ronald Dworkin.
自然法傳統由約翰·芬尼斯辯護。而一種新的立場，詮釋主義則由已故的羅納德·德沃金的作品所代表。
In some ways, the title of this Lexicon entry is misleading, because of our focus on the “What is law?” question as it has been approached by contemporary legal philosophers. There are other important perspectives on the nature of law that focus on law’s functions rather than the the meaning of the concept or the criteria of legal validity. For example, the sociological tradition includes important work on the nature of law by Max Weber and Niklas Luhmann. These issues are discussed by Brian Tamanaha in the article cited in the Links section at the end of this entry.
在某些方面，本詞典條目的標題具有誤導性，因為我們專注於當代法律哲學家所探討的「法律是什麼？」這一問題。還有其他重要的法律本質觀點，這些觀點更關注法律的功能，而非概念的意義或法律有效性的標準。例如，社會學傳統中，馬克斯·韋伯和尼克拉斯·盧曼對法律本質的研究都非常重要。這些問題在本條目末尾的鏈接部分引用的布賴恩·塔馬哈的文章中有討論。
This Lexicon entry maps the territory of the “What is Law?” controversy, and provides introductory sketches of the major positions. As always, the Lexicon is written for law students, especially first-year law students, with an interest in legal theory.
本詞典條目描繪了「法律是什麼？」爭議的範疇，並提供了主要立場的簡介。與往常一樣，本詞典是為法律學生撰寫的，特別是對法律理論感興趣的第一年法律學生。
Natural Law Theory 自然法理論
Natural law theory is strongly associated with classical and medieval thought, especially Aristotle, Roman jurisprudence, and St. Thomas Aquinas. There are several challenges associated with the task of explicating natural law theory, and one of the most important tasks of this introductory entry is simply to identify these challenges.
自然法理論與古典及中世紀思想密切相關，特別是亞里士多德、羅馬法學及聖托馬斯·阿奎那。闡明自然法理論的任務面臨幾個挑戰，而本介紹條目的最重要任務之一就是簡單地識別這些挑戰。
First, there are two interrelated but distinct views that are called “natural law theory.” One is a view about the nature of morality: this view asserts that there are natural moral laws, and it is not essential to this view that it take any particular stand on the “What is law?” debate. A second view that is called “natural law theory” is a theory about “law” as an institution or practice–that is the view that is implicated in the “What is law”" controversy.
首先，有兩種相互關聯但又不同的觀點被稱為「自然法理論」。一種是關於道德本質的觀點：這種觀點主張存在自然道德法則，並且這種觀點並不必須在「什麼是法律？」的辯論中採取任何特定立場。第二種被稱為「自然法理論」的觀點是關於「法律」作為一種制度或實踐的理論——即涉及「什麼是法律」爭議的觀點。
Second, contemporary understandings of “natural law theory” have been strongly influenced by the legal positivists critique. When the positivists articulated the theory they were criticizing, their articulations of natural law theory were neither charitable nor true to the natural law tradition. When Holmes referred to a “brooding omnipresence in the sky” he was not offering a sympathetic or charitable reading of the natural law tradition.
其次，當代對「自然法理論」的理解受到法律實證主義者批評的強烈影響。當實證主義者闡述他們所批評的理論時，他們對自然法理論的闡述既不仁慈也不忠於自然法傳統。當霍姆斯提到「天空中的沉思全能者」時，他並不是在對自然法傳統提供一種同情或仁慈的解讀。
For the purposes of this broad overview, we might use the latin phrase lex injusta est non lex as a starting point. Natural law theory could be understood as affirming something like the following:
為了這個廣泛概述的目的，我們可以使用拉丁語短語「lex injusta est non lex」作為起點。自然法理論可以被理解為肯定類似以下的內容：
An unjust “law” is not a true law.
不公正的「法律」並不是真正的法律。
This formulation differs from a literal translation–an unjust law is not a law. Formulated in that way, natural law theory seems to be committed to a contradiction: something which is a law (but also is unjust) is not a law. The quotation marks around “law” and the phrase true law make it clear that natural law theory is asserting something else, that something which might be called a “law” is not in fact a law if it is unjust. Usually, this notion is accompanied by some explication of the characteristics that are required for status as a “true law,” a “focal case of law,” or perhaps “valid law.”
這種表述不同於字面翻譯——不公正的法律不是法律。以這種方式表述，自然法理論似乎承諾了一個矛盾：某些被稱為法律的東西（但同時也是不公正的）實際上不是法律。圍繞“法律”的引號和“真法律”這一短語清楚地表明，自然法理論在主張其他東西，即如果某些被稱為“法律”的東西是不公正的，那麼它實際上不是法律。通常，這一概念伴隨著對被認為是“真法律”、“法律的焦點案例”或可能是“有效法律”的地位所需特徵的一些闡述。
Legal Positivism 法律實證主義
It is difficult to know where the positivist tradition begins. Hobbes’s theory of law shares some characteristics with the theories offered by Jeremy Bentham and John Austin–both of them clearly in the positivist tradition. Jeremy Bentham developed a very sophisticated version of legal positivism, but for a variety of reasons, the more influential and widely known view was that of Bentham’s student, John Austin, the author of The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1861).
很難確定實證主義傳統的起源。霍布斯的法律理論與傑瑞米·邊沁和約翰·奧斯丁所提出的理論有一些相似之處——他們兩者顯然都屬於實證主義傳統。傑瑞米·邊沁發展了一個非常精緻的法律實證主義版本，但由於各種原因，更具影響力和廣為人知的觀點是邊沁的學生約翰·奧斯丁的觀點，他是《法理學的省分確定》（1861）的作者。
Austin’s theory was that a given rule was a law if and only if the rule was the command of the sovereign to subjects of that sovereign backed by the threat of punishment. A sovereign is some person or institution who is habitually obeyed in a well-defined territory, but who or which does not habitually obey any other person or institution.
奧斯丁的理論是，只有當一項規則是主權者對該主權者的臣民的命令，並且以懲罰的威脅作為支持時，該規則才是一項法律。主權者是指在明確界定的領土內習慣性地被服從的某個人或機構，但該人或機構並不習慣性地服從任何其他人或機構。
Austin’s positivist theory does an excellent job of explaining the rules of criminal law, which forbid certain actions and impose punishments on those who engage in the forbidden actions. But this theory has a difficult time accounting for other aspects of law, and especially for those rules that create legal powers, such as the power to create contracts, trusts, wills, and so forth. This difficulty is most acute with respect to rules that define the basic institutional arrangements that define the sovereign itself, e.g., the rules of constitutional law in the United States.
奧斯丁的實證主義理論在解釋刑法規則方面表現出色，這些規則禁止某些行為並對從事禁止行為的人施加懲罰。但這一理論在解釋法律的其他方面，特別是那些創造法律權力的規則時，面臨困難，例如創造合同、信託、遺囑等的權力。這種困難在定義主權本身的基本制度安排的規則方面尤為明顯，例如美國的憲法法律規則。
These deficiencies in Austin’s theory prompted H.L.A. Hart to develop a more sophisticated version of legal positivism. One feature of that theory is the distinction between primary rules (which would include criminal prohibitions) and secondary rules (which allow for the creation, alteration, and termination of primary rules). Hart replaced the notion of a sovereign with that of a rule of recognition–a social rule that specifies what counts as a law and what does not.
這些奧斯丁理論中的缺陷促使 H.L.A.哈特發展出一種更為精緻的法律實證主義版本。該理論的一個特徵是區分主要規則（包括刑事禁止）和次要規則（允許創建、修改和終止主要規則）。哈特用認可規則的概念取代了主權的概念——這是一種社會規則，明確規定什麼算作法律，什麼不算。
Moral Facts, Social Facts, and Legal Content
道德事實、社會事實與法律內容
The contemporary approach to these issues is the product of almost sixty years of thinking within the tradition that is sometimes called “analytic jurisprudence.” Beginning with the work of H.L.A. Hart in the 1950s, through is publication of The Concept of Law in 1961, and extending through Ronald Dworkin’s critique of Hart, and the reformulation of the positivist tradition by both Joseph Raz and Jules Coleman, the basic issues and questions have gone through several transformations.
當代對這些問題的處理方式是近六十年來在有時被稱為「分析法理學」的傳統中思考的產物。從 H.L.A. Hart 在 1950 年代的工作開始，經過他在 1961 年出版的《法律的概念》，再到羅納德·德沃金對哈特的批評，以及約瑟夫·拉茲和朱爾斯·科爾曼對實證主義傳統的重新詮釋，基本問題和疑問經歷了幾次變革。
One useful way to get get at the heart of these developments is to conceive of the debate about the nature of law as centrally concerned with the relationship between social facts, moral facts, and legal content. Our question is “What determines legal content?,” where “legal content” is simply understood as the content of the legal norms.
一個有用的方法來深入了解這些發展是將有關法律本質的辯論視為主要關注社會事實、道德事實和法律內容之間的關係。我們的問題是「什麼決定法律內容？」，其中「法律內容」簡單理解為法律規範的內容。
- One answer to this question takes the form: It is necessarily the case that only social facts determine legal content. This is exclusive legal positivism–a view that is strongly associated with Joseph Raz.
對於這個問題的一個回答是：只有社會事實必然決定法律內容。這是排他性的法律實證主義——一種與約瑟夫·拉茲密切相關的觀點。
- A second answer to this question takes the form: It possibly the case that moral facts determine legal content, but only if social facts give the moral facts this role. This is inclusive legal positivism–and this view is most strongly associated with Jules Coleman.
第二個回答這個問題的形式是：道德事實可能決定法律內容，但只有在社會事實賦予道德事實這一角色的情況下。這是包容性法律實證主義——這一觀點最強烈地與朱爾斯·科爾曼相關聯。
- A third answer to the question takes the form: It is necessarily the case that moral facts determine legal content. This view would include natural law theory and interpretivism–the view that is strongly associated with Ronald Dworkin.
第三種回答這個問題的形式是：道德事實必然決定法律內容。這種觀點包括自然法理論和詮釋主義——這種觀點與羅納德·德沃金密切相關。
By framing the “What is law?” debate in terms of the relationship between social facts, moral facts, and legal content, the conceptual space we get precise mapping of the conceptual space. In the rest of this Lexicon entry, we will take a somewhat less shallow look at the three options.
通過將「法律是什麼？」的辯論框架化為社會事實、道德事實和法律內容之間的關係，我們可以對概念空間進行精確的映射。在本詞典條目的其餘部分，我們將對這三個選項進行稍微深入的探討。
Inclusive and Exclusive Legal Positivism
包容性與排他性法律實證主義
Exclusive legal positivism is the view that only social facts can determine legal content. Joseph Raz famously argued for exclusive legal positivism based on the premise that law claims authority, that authority consists in displacing other reasons for actions, and therefore law must displace moral reasons for action. (That was a very short and inadequate summary of a long and complex argument.)
排他性法律實證主義是認為只有社會事實能夠決定法律內容的觀點。約瑟夫·拉茲以法律聲稱權威為前提，著名地為排他性法律實證主義辯護，該權威在於取代其他行動理由，因此法律必須取代道德行動理由。（這是一個非常簡短且不充分的長篇複雜論證的摘要。）
Inclusive legal positivism is the view that moral facts can play a role in determining legal content, but only if there are some social facts that give the moral facts this role. For example, a constitution might include an clause that make a moral conception of human equality a legal rule. This would give the morality of equality a role in determining legal rights, but this role would exist because a social fact (the Constitution) made it so.
包容性法律實證主義是指道德事實可以在確定法律內容中發揮作用的觀點，但前提是存在一些社會事實賦予道德事實這一角色。例如，憲法可能包含一條條款，將人類平等的道德觀念轉化為法律規則。這將使平等的道德在確定法律權利中發揮作用，但這一角色的存在是因為一個社會事實（憲法）使其成為可能。
Contemporary Natural Law Theory
當代自然法理論
The positivist critique of classical natural law theory resulted in a major restatement by John Finnis. Finnis’s theory is subtle and complex and no thumbnail sketch can do it full justice, but for the purpose of the Lexicon, one of his ideas can serve to illustrate the flavor of his theory. Finnis argues that the natural-law claim that an unjust “law” is not a true law can be explicated via the idea of the “focal meaning” of “law.” This argument that concedes that unjust enactments are “laws” in a sense, but that that the focal sense of “law” is limited to laws that are not unjust. Finnis’s position has both critics and defenders, but his magisterial book Natural Law and Natural Rights is must reading for anyone interested in contemporary natural law theory.
古典自然法理論的實證主義批評導致約翰·芬尼斯（John Finnis）對該理論進行了重大重述。芬尼斯的理論微妙而複雜，無法用簡單的概述充分表達，但為了詞典的目的，他的其中一個觀點可以用來說明他理論的特點。芬尼斯主張，自然法的主張，即不公正的“法律”並不是真正的法律，可以通過“法律”的“焦點意義”來解釋。這一論點承認不公正的法規在某種意義上是“法律”，但“法律”的焦點意義僅限於不不公正的法律。芬尼斯的立場既有批評者也有辯護者，但他的權威著作《自然法與自然權利》是任何對當代自然法理論感興趣的人必讀的書籍。
Interpretivism 詮釋主義
The final view is “interpretivism,” strongly associated with Ronald Dworkin. For Dworkin, social facts, such as constitutions, statutes, and court decisions, do not directly determine legal content. Instead, Dworkin believes that the content of the law is given by the theory that best fits and justifies the legal materials. Dworkin makes this theory vivid by imagining a judge, Hercules, who is able to construct a grand theory of political morality that provides a constructive interpretation of the entire institutional history of a given society. Because this theory is a theory of that institutional history, it is constrained. For example, the best constructive interpretation of the institutional history of the United States will have to acknowledge that our federal legislature is bicameral and that it includes a Senate with equal representation of each state. But this constraint does not require a perfect match between a literal interpretation of every legal text and the content of the law. So some precedents may be categorized as mistakes, and some statutory or constitutional provisions may be given a constructive interpretation that makes them morally more attractive but does not follow every jot and tittle of the text.
最終的觀點是「詮釋主義」，與羅納德·德沃金密切相關。對德沃金而言，社會事實，如憲法、法規和法院判決，並不直接決定法律內容。相反，德沃金認為法律的內容是由最能契合並證明法律材料的理論所賦予的。德沃金通過想像一位法官赫拉克勒斯，使這一理論生動起來，他能夠構建一個關於政治道德的宏大理論，為特定社會的整個制度歷史提供建設性的詮釋。因為這一理論是該制度歷史的理論，所以它是受限的。例如，對美國制度歷史的最佳建設性詮釋必須承認我們的聯邦立法機構是兩院制，並且包括一個各州平等代表的參議院。但這一限制並不要求每一法律文本的字面詮釋與法律內容之間必須完全吻合。 因此，一些先例可能被歸類為錯誤，而某些法定或憲法條款可能會被賦予一種建設性的解釋，使其在道德上更具吸引力，但並不遵循文本的每一個細節。
Conclusion 結論
This very brief introduction to the “What is law?” debate is necessarily incomplete and shallow. But I hope that it gives you a general sense of the various positions that have been taken on the nature of law.
這個對「法律是什麼？」辯論的簡要介紹必然是不完整和淺薄的。但我希望它能讓你對法律本質上所採取的各種立場有一個大致的了解。
- Legal Theory Lexicon 032: Fit and Justification
法律理論詞彙 032：適合性與正當性
- Legal Theory Lexicon 038: The Internal Point of View
法律理論詞彙 038：內部觀點
- Legal Theory Lexicon 039: Primary and Secondary Rules
法律理論詞彙 039：主要規則與次要規則
- Legal Theory Lexicon 044: Legal Theory,_Jurisprudence, and the Philosophy of Law
法律理論詞彙 044：法律理論、法學及法律哲學
Bibliography 參考文獻
- John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1861).
約翰·奧斯丁，《法理學的範疇確定》（1861）。
- Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (2001).
朱爾斯·科爾曼，《原則的實踐：為法律理論的實用主義方法辯護》（2001 年）。
- Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986).
羅納德·德沃金，《法律的帝國》（1986 年）。
- John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980).
約翰·芬尼斯，《自然法與自然權利》（1980 年）。
- H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) (2d ed. 1984).
H.L.A. Hart，《法律的概念》（1961 年）（第二版 1984 年）。
- Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (1983).
約瑟夫·拉茲，《法律的權威：法律與道德的論文》（1983 年）。
- Scott Shapiro, Legality (Harvard University Press 2011).
斯科特·夏皮羅，《合法性》（哈佛大學出版社 2011）。
Resources on the Internet
互聯網資源
- John Finnis, Natural Law Theories, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
約翰·芬尼斯，自然法理論，斯坦福哲學百科全書。
- Leslie Green, Legal Obligation and Authority, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
萊斯利·格林，《法律義務與權威》，斯坦福哲學百科全書
- Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
萊斯利·格林，法律實證主義，斯坦福哲學百科全書。
- Andrei Marmour, The Nature of Law, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
安德烈·馬爾莫爾，《法律的本質》，斯坦福哲學百科全書。
- Nicos Stavropoulos, Interpretivist Theories of Law, Stanford Encyclopedia of Law.
尼科斯·斯塔夫羅波盧斯，法律的詮釋主義理論，史丹佛法律百科全書。
- Brian Tamanaha, Law, Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, 2008.
布賴恩·塔馬納哈，《法律》，《牛津國際法律史百科全書》，2008 年。
(This entry was last revised on February 25, 2024.)
（本條目最後修訂於 2024 年 2 月 25 日。）
May 11, 2008 in Philosophy of Law | Permalink
2008 年 5 月 11 日 法律哲學 | 永久鏈接