Back in 2016, we examined historical international data on debt growth in 1870-2015 and concluded that significant debt accumulation typically led to slower growth, lower inflation and falling interest rates in subsequent years. In China, which experienced its own debt boom in the 2010s, growth has slowed below 5% in recent years, inflation has dropped to near zero, and the 10-year Chinese government bond yield has dropped below 1.9% this month for the first time ever. In this piece, we update our eight-year-old analysis with more recent data.
回到 2016 年,我们研究了 1870-2015 年间的历史国际债务增长数据,并得出结论,显著的债务积累通常会导致随后的增长放缓、通货膨胀降低和利率下降。在经历了 2010 年代的债务繁荣的中国,近年来增长已放缓至 5%以下,通货膨胀降至接近零,本月 10 年期中国政府债券收益率首次降至 1.9%以下。在本文中,我们用更近期的数据更新了我们八年前的分析。
China’s debt growth stands out compared to other economies. Excluding the World War I period in Europe, the only country that has had a similar speed of debt accumulation to China is Japan, although Japan’s rapid debt growth took place when its income level was three times as high. Overall, China's combination of development stage and debt growth makes it an outlier in the historical data.
中国的债务增长在与其他经济体的比较中显得尤为突出。排除第一次世界大战期间的欧洲,唯一与中国债务积累速度相似的国家是日本,尽管日本的快速债务增长发生在其收入水平是中国的三倍时。总体而言,中国的发展阶段与债务增长的结合使其在历史数据中成为一个异常值。
Using the latest IMF Global Debt Database during 1960-2023, we identify a set of large economies with debt-to-GDP ratios rising significantly over a 7-year period, including Netherlands, Canada, China, Japan and Spain. Analysis of these data confirmed our previous findings. Annual real GDP growth slowed in years following debt booms, mostly driven by weaker domestic demand. Inflation dropped by 1-2pp and policy rates declined by 2pp in the median episode.
使用最新的国际货币基金组织全球债务数据库(1960-2023 年),我们识别出一组在 7 年期间债务与 GDP 比率显著上升的大型经济体,包括荷兰、加拿大、中国、日本和西班牙。这些数据的分析证实了我们之前的发现。在债务繁荣后的几年中,实际 GDP 年增长率放缓,主要是由于国内需求疲软。通货膨胀下降了 1-2 个百分点,政策利率在中位数事件中下降了 2 个百分点。
Our results are robust to alternative debt measures and different sample selection criteria. One caveat is that China is unique in its size and its economic development path, making it difficult to find a parallel in the historical record. That said, our findings carry important lessons for China. While the central government still has room to expand the balance sheet to manage the speed of growth slowdown, the reflation process is likely to be prolonged and interest rates are likely to head lower for longer.
我们的结果对替代债务指标和不同样本选择标准具有稳健性。一个警告是,中国在其规模和经济发展路径上是独特的,这使得在历史记录中找到平行案例变得困难。尽管如此,我们的发现对中国具有重要的启示。虽然中央政府仍有空间扩大资产负债表以管理增长放缓的速度,但再通胀过程可能会延长,利率可能会在较长时间内走低。
As explained in our 2025 outlook, one of the reasons why we are cautious on China’s medium-term growth outlook is debt. From 2008Q4 to 2015Q4, the debt-to-GDP ratio shot up from 135% to 232%, a 97pp increase over 7 years. In the 2016 piece entitled “Lessons for China from 150 Years of Debt Booms”, we examined historical international debt booms and concluded that growth slowed, inflation declined, and interest rates fell in the aftermath of large debt buildups. In December 2024, yields on 10-year Chinese Government Bonds (CGB) fell to their lowest level on record, echoing the findings of our analysis more than 8 years ago (Exhibit 1).
正如我们在 2025 年展望中所解释的,我们对中国中期增长前景持谨慎态度的原因之一是债务。从 2008 年第四季度到 2015 年第四季度,债务与 GDP 的比率从 135%飙升至 232%,在 7 年内增加了 97 个百分点。在 2016 年的文章《从 150 年的债务繁荣中汲取的教训》中,我们研究了历史上的国际债务繁荣,并得出结论:在大规模债务积累之后,增长放缓,通货膨胀下降,利率下跌。到 2024 年 12 月,10 年期中国国债(CGB)的收益率降至历史最低水平,呼应了我们 8 年前分析的发现(附录 1)。
As highlighted by our credit strategists, although Chinese policymakers have striven to keep leverage stable since 2016, the last two years have seen leverage increase again. They estimate China's non-financial debt-to-GDP ratio will rise to 307% at the end of 2024 (Exhibit 2). In this note, we update our previous analysis using more recent data, including the latest releases of the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database[1] and the IMF Global Debt Database (GDD).[2] While incorporating new data alters a few details of our analysis, the broader set of conclusions remains unchanged: slower growth, lower inflation and falling interest rates are the key features of the aftermath of large debt booms.
正如我们的信用策略师所强调的,尽管中国政策制定者自 2016 年以来努力保持杠杆稳定,但过去两年杠杆再次上升。他们估计到 2024 年底,中国的非金融债务与 GDP 的比率将上升至 307%(展览 2)。在本报告中,我们使用更近期的数据更新了之前的分析,包括最新发布的 Jordà-Schularick-Taylor 宏观历史数据库 [1] 和国际货币基金组织全球债务数据库(GDD) [2] 。虽然纳入新数据改变了我们分析的一些细节,但更广泛的结论保持不变:增长放缓、通胀降低和利率下降是大规模债务繁荣后果的关键特征。
Source: Bloomberg 来源:彭博社
Source: PBOC, NFRA, BIS, Bloomberg, Wind, China Trustee Association, Asset Management Association of China, Chinabond, China Central Depository & Clearing, China Securities Finance Corporation, Company data, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
来源:人民银行,国家金融监管局,国际清算银行,彭博社,Wind,中国信托协会,中国资产管理协会,中国债券,中央国债登记结算公司,中国证券金融公司,公司数据,高盛全球投资研究
China’s debt growth stands out in comparison to other countries. In Exhibit 3, we outline debt growth of major economies, including both EM and DM countries, over the past 150 years. To ensure consistency throughout this long history, we use a narrower debt definition by summing bank credit to private sector and government debt. Excluding the World War I period in Europe, the only country that had a similar speed of debt accumulation to China was Japan, although Japan’s rapid debt growth took place when its income level was three times as high as China’s.
中国的债务增长在与其他国家的比较中显得尤为突出。在图表 3 中,我们概述了过去 150 年主要经济体的债务增长,包括新兴市场和发达市场国家。为了确保在这段漫长历史中的一致性,我们采用了更狭义的债务定义,即将银行对私营部门的信贷与政府债务相加。排除第一次世界大战期间的欧洲,唯一一个与中国债务积累速度相似的国家是日本,尽管日本的快速债务增长发生在其收入水平是中国的三倍时。
GIPS stand for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The light grey lines are other developed economies including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden & Switzerland. Gaps reflect lack of data particularly around the two world wars.
GIPS 代表希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙和西班牙。浅灰色线条代表其他发达经济体,包括澳大利亚、加拿大、丹麦、法国、意大利、荷兰、挪威、瑞典和瑞士。数据缺口反映了特别是在两次世界大战期间缺乏数据。
Source: Jorda-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database, BIS, World Bank, IMF, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
来源:Jorda-Schularick-Taylor 宏观历史数据库,国际清算银行,世界银行,国际货币基金组织,高盛全球投资研究
To be sure, some degree of debt growth, and even a modest rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio, is normal for rapidly developing economies. Higher-income economies typically have more developed financial markets and more debt, undergoing a process known as "financial deepening". To account for the "financial deepening" effect on debt growth, we calculate debt-to-GDP ratio changes over 7-year periods. Then, we estimate the "expected" increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio given the change in per-capita income that occurred over the same 7-year period.
可以肯定的是,某种程度的债务增长,甚至债务与 GDP 比率的适度上升,对于快速发展的经济体来说是正常的。高收入经济体通常拥有更发达的金融市场和更多的债务,经历一个被称为“金融深化”的过程。为了考虑“金融深化”对债务增长的影响,我们计算了 7 年期间债务与 GDP 比率的变化。然后,我们估算了在同一 7 年期间人均收入变化的情况下,债务与 GDP 比率的“预期”增加。
Even with an adjustment for the expected pace of financial deepening, China's debt boom was as of 2015 in the 96th percentile of all seven-year debt buildups since 1960. China's combination of size and debt growth makes it an outlier in the historical record. In fact, during the sample period of 1960-2023, the only episodes where a large country (with share of world GDP > 10%) experienced significant debt buildups (with 7-year change in debt-to-GDP ratio, after financial deepening adjustment, exceeding 25pp) were the US (2007-13), Japan (1986-2000) and China (2012-20).
即使考虑到预期的金融深化步伐,截至 2015 年,中国的债务激增在 1960 年以来的所有七年债务积累中处于第 96 百分位。中国的规模和债务增长的结合使其在历史记录中成为一个异常值。事实上,在 1960-2023 年的样本期内,唯一几个大型国家(全球 GDP 占比超过 10%)经历显著债务积累(经过金融深化调整后的债务与 GDP 比率的七年变化超过 25 个百分点)的情况是美国(2007-2013 年)、日本(1986-2000 年)和中国(2012-2020 年)。
Why be concerned about rising debt? Given the experiences of Japan in the aftermath of its 1980s debt boom, and of the United States after the surge in credit during the 2000s, the answer is probably self-evident. Higher levels of debt imply greater susceptibility of the financial system and economy to shocks, and higher growth rates of debt suggest that spending (demand) is vulnerable to a correction. Take the following thought experiment for example. An increase in debt by $100 allows an additional $100 of spending. But to maintain that level of spending in future periods, the debt stock needs to keep rising by $100 per period; otherwise, spending will go back to its original, non-debt financed level. In this example, the level of spending is related to the growth of total debt. Therefore, the growth rate of spending is related to the second derivative of credit—but credit cannot accelerate forever, and when it begins to decelerate there is very likely to be a negative impact on spending growth.
为什么要担心债务上升?考虑到日本在 1980 年代债务繁荣后的经历,以及美国在 2000 年代信贷激增后的情况,答案可能是不言而喻的。更高的债务水平意味着金融系统和经济对冲击的敏感性更大,而债务的更高增长率表明支出(需求)容易受到修正。以以下思想实验为例。债务增加 100 美元允许额外支出 100 美元。但要在未来维持这一支出水平,债务总额需要每期继续增加 100 美元;否则,支出将回到其原始的、非债务融资的水平。在这个例子中,支出水平与总债务的增长相关。因此,支出增长率与信贷的二阶导数相关——但信贷不可能永远加速,当它开始减速时,支出增长很可能会受到负面影响。
To investigate the link between debt and macroeconomic indicators, we collated IMF debt data with each country’s growth, inflation, and interest rate data. The IMF GDD data have consistent and comprehensive debt measures for 190 countries going back to 1950, including both public and private debt, and both loans and securities. Moreover, the IMF checked the data through bilateral contacts with country officials and IMF country desks for all countries in the sample, which arguably helps improve data quality. Building on our 2016 analysis, we compile a sample of 54 countries for years between 1960 and 2023.
为了研究债务与宏观经济指标之间的联系,我们将国际货币基金组织(IMF)的债务数据与各国的增长、通胀和利率数据进行了汇总。IMF 的全球债务数据库(GDD)为 190 个国家提供了一致且全面的债务衡量数据,数据追溯至 1950 年,包括公共和私人债务,以及贷款和证券。此外,IMF 通过与样本中所有国家的官员和 IMF 国家办公室的双边联系检查了数据,这无疑有助于提高数据质量。在我们 2016 年的分析基础上,我们编制了 1960 年至 2023 年间 54 个国家的样本。
We next narrow our comparison set to large economies with rapid debt buildups. China is a very large economy—it currently represents 19% of world GDP on a PPP basis and 17% on a Dollar basis. By contrast, most of the countries in our sample represent less than 1% of world GDP. Because small economies tend to have very different economic structures and may be more vulnerable to global cycles and shocks, we limit our sample to countries whose economies are at least 1.4% of world GDP (the 90th percentile of sample distribution). We also focus on large debt accumulations where the debt-to-GDP ratio increases at least 64pp over seven years (also the 90th percentile of sample distribution). Although China technically wouldn't qualify by this criteria in 2024, the 40pp increase in its debt-to-GDP ratio during 2017-24 is still significant and ranks at round the 75th percentile in our sample.
我们接下来将比较范围缩小到快速债务积累的大型经济体。中国是一个非常大的经济体——目前在购买力平价基础上占全球 GDP 的 19%,在美元基础上占 17%。相比之下,我们样本中的大多数国家占全球 GDP 的比例不到 1%。由于小型经济体往往具有非常不同的经济结构,并可能对全球周期和冲击更为脆弱,我们将样本限制在经济规模至少占全球 GDP 1.4%的国家(样本分布的第 90 百分位)。我们还关注债务积累较大的情况,其中债务与 GDP 的比率在七年内至少增加 64 个百分点(也是样本分布的第 90 百分位)。尽管中国在 2024 年技术上不符合这一标准,但在 2017-2024 年期间其债务与 GDP 比率增加了 40 个百分点,仍然是显著的,并在我们的样本中排名大约第 75 百分位。
The final list is very short—notable modern examples are Japan in the 1980s and 1990s and Spain during the few years before and after the Global Financial Crisis. Note that since each debt boom episode represents a separate data point in our sample, the analysis is effectively weighted towards those countries in Exhibit 6 that have a greater number of qualifying episodes. However, we emphasize that most of our results are quite robust to tinkering with the country size or debt expansion thresholds, as well as alternative debt measures.
最终名单非常简短——显著的现代例子包括 1980 年代和 1990 年代的日本,以及全球金融危机前后几年的西班牙。请注意,由于每个债务繁荣事件在我们的样本中代表一个单独的数据点,因此分析实际上是加权于展览 6 中具有更多合格事件的国家。然而,我们强调,我们的大多数结果对国家规模或债务扩张阈值的调整,以及替代债务指标,都是相当稳健的。
With our selection of large economy debt booms in hand, we move on to illustrating the typical macroeconomic outcomes during and after these episodes. In the charts that follow (Exhibit 5-Exhibit 8), we compare each macroeconomic variable (real GDP growth, domestic demand growth, inflation and policy rate) to its average during the 7-year debt boom period. Thus, in a chart on GDP growth, a horizontal line at zero would indicate that the pace of growth did not change during or after the debt boom, while a line sloping downwards from zero indicates growth slowing below its average during the boom. It is important to note that our analysis does not presume anything about whether the debt boom continues after year 7, slows, or stops. In each chart, the shaded region represents the interquartile range of our sample—i.e. half of the episodes fall within this range, one-quarter above, and the other quarter below. The median and range shown are for booms where we have at least five years of subsequent data before the Covid pandemic (i.e. debt booms with the seventh year occurring in 2014 or earlier).[3]
在我们手中掌握了大型经济债务繁荣的选择后,我们继续说明这些事件期间及之后的典型宏观经济结果。在接下来的图表中(展览 5-展览 8),我们将每个宏观经济变量(实际 GDP 增长、国内需求增长、通货膨胀和政策利率)与 7 年债务繁荣期的平均值进行比较。因此,在 GDP 增长的图表中,零的水平线表示增长速度在债务繁荣期间或之后没有变化,而从零向下倾斜的线则表示增长速度低于繁荣期间的平均水平。需要注意的是,我们的分析并不假设债务繁荣在第 7 年之后是否继续、减缓或停止。在每个图表中,阴影区域代表我们样本的四分位范围——即一半的事件落在这个范围内,四分之一在上方,另四分之一在下方。所示的中位数和范围是针对我们在 Covid 大流行之前至少有五年后续数据的繁荣(即第七年发生在 2014 年或更早的债务繁荣)。
We summarize three key findings. First, economic growth typically decelerates towards the end of large-country debt booms and stays muted in their aftermath (Exhibit 5). Annual real GDP growth tends to be the slowest around the third year after a 7-year debt boom, with the median 2.5pp lower than the boom year average. The source of the slowdown is weakness in domestic demand (Exhibit 6). The median domestic demand growth is almost 4pp below the boom year average around the third year after a 7-year debt boom. Second, inflation pressures typically ebb in the aftermath of a debt boom, reflecting a softer economy. Exhibit 7 illustrates that inflation rates typically fall by 1-2pp in the five years following a large debt boom. Third, the large debt overhang and the deceleration in growth put pressure on central banks to lower policy interest rates to facilitate debt repayment and support economic activity. Policy rates decline by around 2pp five years after the debt boom in most cases (Exhibit 8).
我们总结了三个关键发现。首先,经济增长通常在大国债务繁荣的末期减速,并在其后保持低迷(图表 5)。在经历 7 年债务繁荣后的第三年,年实际 GDP 增长往往是最慢的,中位数比繁荣年份的平均水平低 2.5 个百分点。减速的原因是国内需求疲软(图表 6)。在经历 7 年债务繁荣后的第三年,国内需求增长的中位数几乎比繁荣年份的平均水平低 4 个百分点。其次,通胀压力通常在债务繁荣后减弱,反映出经济放缓。图表 7 显示,在经历大规模债务繁荣后的五年中,通胀率通常下降 1-2 个百分点。第三,大规模的债务负担和增长减速给中央银行施加了压力,迫使其降低政策利率以促进债务偿还并支持经济活动。在大多数情况下,债务繁荣五年后,政策利率下降约 2 个百分点(图表 8)。
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
来源:高盛全球投资研究
Our findings of slower growth, lower inflation, and falling interest rates are fairly robust whether we stop the sample period before the onset of the Covid pandemic or not, whether we include China itself in the analysis or not, and whether we lower the threshold to include more large debt booms (e.g., the US in 2009) or not. A couple caveats are in order. First, as noted previously, China is an outlier in our dataset—a very large debt buildup in a very large economy. Second, the range of variation in growth outcomes is considerable from one debt boom episode to the next—by definition, half the episodes lie outside the shaded region in Exhibit 5-Exhibit 8.
我们的研究发现,无论我们是否在新冠疫情爆发之前停止样本期,无论我们是否将中国本身纳入分析,无论我们是否降低阈值以包括更多的大规模债务繁荣(例如,2009 年的美国),增长放缓、通胀降低和利率下降的结果都相当稳健。有几点需要注意。首先,如前所述,中国在我们的数据集中是一个异常值——在一个非常大的经济体中出现了非常大的债务积累。其次,从一个债务繁荣事件到下一个事件,增长结果的变化范围相当大——根据定义,半数事件位于图表 5-图表 8 的阴影区域之外。
Caveats aside, the experience of historical international debt booms in large economies carries important lessons for today’s China. After years of significant debt accumulation by real estate developers, local governments, and households, the Chinese economy has been reckoning with the consequences of extraordinary debt booms. To cushion the impact from property sector and local government deleveraging, the central government needs to borrow more and to increase spending significantly. This trend is likely to continue based on both other countries' historical experience (Exhibit 9) and statements by Chinese policymakers that the central government has relatively large space for debt expansion and deficit increases. While central government leverage buildup is necessary for managing the speed of growth slowdown, it probably will not be enough to completely offset the headwinds from the property sector and local government deleveraging as well as the headwinds from increased trade tensions with the US. As a result, and consistent with the lessons from 150 years of international debt booms, China's reflation process is likely to be prolonged and interest rates are likely to head lower for longer to help reduce costs of servicing the large and still growing level of debt.
抛开警告不谈,历史上大型经济体的国际债务繁荣经验对今天的中国有重要的启示。在房地产开发商、地方政府和家庭经过多年的显著债务积累后,中国经济正在面对非凡债务繁荣的后果。为了缓解房地产行业和地方政府去杠杆化带来的影响,中央政府需要增加借款并显著提高支出。根据其他国家的历史经验(见图表 9)以及中国政策制定者的声明,中央政府在债务扩张和赤字增加方面相对有较大的空间,这一趋势可能会继续。虽然中央政府的杠杆积累对于管理增长放缓的速度是必要的,但这可能不足以完全抵消来自房地产行业和地方政府去杠杆化的逆风,以及与美国贸易紧张局势加剧带来的逆风。 因此,与 150 年来国际债务繁荣的经验教训一致,中国的再通胀过程可能会延长,利率可能会在更长时间内走低,以帮助降低服务于庞大且仍在增长的债务水平的成本。
Hui Shan 汇山
Andrew Tilton 安德鲁·蒂尔顿
Jonathan Sequeira 乔纳森·塞基拉
Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC certification and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to www.gs.com/research/hedge.html.
投资者应将本报告视为做出投资决策的唯一因素之一。有关 Reg AC 认证和其他重要披露,请参见披露附录,或访问 www.gs.com/research/hedge.html。
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